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Rio d For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA- 6R000500080002-7 STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND IN ADJACENT AREAS DURING WW II ed For Release 1-999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R00~ 0890Q2j7 STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND IN ADJACENT AREAS DURING WW II Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 1. Germany launched its attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941, and the Security Service (SD) of the RSHA immediately went into action. 114 Poles and White Russians were arrested on 23 June, and on the following day 906 Soviet citizens were detained. 4995 Soviet citizens were reported to be under arrest as of 3 July 1941. During the first month of the German-Soviet war, the SD in Germany, Belgium, France, and other parts of Europe arrested some 12, 000 persons considered to be dangerous to the security of the Reich. As the German military forces advanced, so did teams of the SD. But, despite their speed, they captured very few NKVD documents. Reaching NKVD installations, they found that the files had been removed or destroyed. They did, however, make a large number of arrests on the basis of information they already had had in their possession. Losing intelligence assets in large numbers, the Soviets made desperate efforts to repair the damage. On 3 August 1941, 250 members of the 212th Soviet Parachute Brigade dropped behind the German lines in Byelorussia (White Russia) and West Ukraine. On 9 August, 200 more agents were parachuted behind the lines between Rowno and Luck, most of them quickly rounded up by the German SD. So great was the Soviet need for intelligence data about the rapidly advancing German armies that hundreds of agents were sent behind the lines, apparently in the hope that a few might survive and provide the sorely needed information. 2. Operational groups of the SD were soon deployed in the occupied territory between the Baltic and the Black Sea, their task being to control their respective regions by neutralizing or exterm- inating elements hostile to Nazi domination.* The groups reported to their headquarters (i. e. , the RSHA) in Berlin, which, in turn, drew up periodical studies for distribution to high SS and other Nazi officials. 3. . The jurisdiction in security and police matters was divided territorially into three segments, each under a high official representing the SS and SD. Headquarters for the Northern area was in Riga, for the Middle area in Mogilev, and for the Southern area in Kiev. Subordinated These activities included the so-called "final solution" (i. e. , liquidation of the Jews). Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 to them were the "Einsatzgruppen"* of the SD, and the still-lower echelons, the "Einsatzkommandos"*, which operated closer to the front. Einsatzgruppen A and B were located in the Northern and Middle sectors respectively. Groups C and D were located in the Southern sector. 4. As the war progressed, German civilian administration was introduced into the rear areas of the Eastern occupied terri- tories which were administered by two large departments, one called I 'Reich skommissariat-Ostland" (RKO) and the other, "Reichskommissariat-Ukraine". Each department was divided into general administrative districts (Generalbezirke). The civilian administration did not in any way relieve the SD from its responsibility in matters affecting the security of the Reich. ** 5. One of the SD?s tasks was to get rid of Communists and Soviet agents, and the Nazis tackled this job with determination. On 16 July 1941, the SD arrested and executed 117 Communists and Soviet agents in West Ukraine, and arrested another 130 on 20 July. 67 Soviet agents were executed in the Brest-Litovsk region in late July, and 41 were arrested near Leningrad in late August of that year. Many arrests in smaller numbers were reported from various other districts. Yet, despite this effort, the SD estimated on 9 January 1942 that about 500 agents remained in the Soviet espionage net behind the German lines in the Leningrad area alone. And the Germans had good reason to expect more, because at Mogilev they had captured pictures of about 1000 agents trained at an NKVD school in that area. All told, the arrest of 3742 Soviet agents was recorded between 31 July 1941 and 2 April 1943, in addition to 365 persons listed as Communists. A far larger number of Communists was liquidated in the mass executions that occurred under the auspices of the Nazi program for political and ethnic purification of the occupied territories. Special Action Groups--also known as Extermination Groups. On occasions the SD and SS units ruthlessly conducted executions despite the protests of the civilian administration. See pp. 74-77, The Case Against Adolf Eichmann, published by The New American Library. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 6. With the outbreak of war, mass executions started almost immediately on the eastern front.* A great majority of the persons thus liquidated was Jews, but occasional executions of Communists, NKVD informants and Soviet partisans were included in the mass executions. Generally'_;the operating units simply listed their victims as so many "Jews" or '-''mostly Jews", and there is no indication that the RSHA asked for more precise reporting. The SD teams led the action. They also did the reporting, although a police battalion might have done the actual killing, as was the case when one such battalion slaughtered 2000 Jews and Russians in the Czebetowska area in early August 1941. Einsatzgruppe A, situated further north, reported the execution of 29, 000 persons in the rear areas of Latvia and Lithuania at about the same time. SS Major fnu BARTH was commended for leading the action "in an outstanding manner" when he was in charge of the execution of 2300 Jews in Riga in July 1941, Day after day this program of extermination continued, in Grodno, in Slonin, in Brest, The Case Against Adolf Eichmann, published by The New American Library, contains a report by General Stahlecker, the Commanding General of Einsatzgruppe A. He wrote: "But it was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinary harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction against the terror exercised by the Communists during the preceding period." Also: "It was no less important in view of the future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measure against the Bolshevik and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction by German authorities could not be found out." While the Germans obviously did stir up the local population, and did enlist the aid of the auxiliary police, anti-communist partisan groups, and "Self-Defence" forces in carrying out mass executions, the RSHA studies do not play up this aspect of the situation, although the SD filed unit reports may possibly have done so. There is no evidence that the SD and SS units may have assumed the role of spectators at any place or at any time. They reported executions by the thousands and were credited with these executions in the RSHA studies with no dissimulation. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 in Kishinev, and in the rear areas all along the line. In the months of July and August 1941 alone, a total of some 150, 000 executions was reported.* In a September report concerning Einsatzgruppe C, the following notation was entered: 50, 000 executions "foreseen" in Kiev. 7. The statistics regarding these executions were embodied in the periodical studies issued by the RSHA and distributed in 48 copies. Although most of the copies were apparently sent to other Nazi government agencies as well. 8. The RSHA studies made but infrequent reference to the attitude of the local populace towards the anti-Jewish campaign.** Only the Latvians were reported to be "not very enthusiastic" about the campaign; nevertheless, "Self-Defence" forces of Latvia, as well as those of Lithuania and Estonia, were used for carrying out executions. Reportedly, the West Ukrainians were ardent supporters of anti-Jewish action and, as such, made contributions to it. In Dobromil they set fire to a Jewish synagogue. In Sambor they mobbed approximately fifty Jews, and in Lvov (Lemberg) they rounded up about a thousand of them and turned them over to the Germans. The Poles were reported to be anti-Semitic, and in favor of the anti-Jewish campaign by implication. 9. As the German military forces moved ahead, local political groups came out into the open in Soviet held areas which were about to be seized:by the Germans. On 25 June 1941, three days after the out- break of the German-Soviet war, a West Ukrainian uprising in Lvov was ruthlessly suppressed by the NKVD. Among the 3000 rebels shot on that day were many intellectuals wh o were supporters of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). MELNIK was the recognized head of the OUN at the time, but immediately after the uprising and the departure of the NKVD, Stefan BANDERA declared himself leader, Careless field reporting by the SD makes it impossible to arrive at precise totals; for example, in July 1941 Einsatzgruppe B reported "200 executions daily in Minsk" for an unspecified period. It is probable that the RSHA rejected field comments that were repugnant to the official point of view. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 which gave rise to an OUN (Bandera) as opposed to OUN (Melnik). Under BANDERA's leadership, a Ukrainian National Committee was formed. The Committee, in turn, formed a provisional government in Lvov, with the following line-up: STECZKO Dr. PANYSCHAN FEDUSEWICZ Iwan KLIMIW Dr. JACIW HOLOWKO Rico JARY 10. On 12 July 1941, thirty members of the OUN (Bandera) set out on a march to Kiev for the purpose of proclaiming independ- ence for the entire Ukraine, East (Soviet) as well as West. The Germans arrested BANDERA and kept him under detention-at Graeow, presumably to put a brake on his aggressive brand of nationalism. Then, on 1 August 1941, they incorporated West Ukraine into the General -Gouvernment.* OUN (Bandera) protested this action, but the intelligencia,** not at all pleased with the STECZKO type of government, seemed ready to help the Germans adopt the national life to Gene ral-Gouvernme nt standards. 11. In early October 1941, the SD arrested several members of OUN (Bandera) in Zhitomir because they were organizing a Ukrainian Militia and also for trying to gain control over local government posts. The SD learned that an order had been issued to OUN (Bandera) members to search the woods for abandoned Soviet rifles, implying that the leadership planned to form partisan groups. This discovery led to numerous arrests, because the Germans did not delude themselves with the idea that hatred of the Soviets nec- essarily made the OUN (Bandera) pro-German. OUN (Bandera) The government established by the Germans in the part of Poland occupied by Germany in 1939. Generally speaking, "the supporters of OUN (Melnik)". Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 members followed the advancing German armies, propagating the idea of a future "Sovereign Ukraine", and placing their own men in local governments which sprang up in the cities along the way. They were successful except in the important city of Kiev, where OUN (Melnik) was able to gain and hold control until the German retreat. OUN (Melnik) was able to achieve this gain, through the help of Bishop HILARION of the Autokephale (sic) Ukrainian Church, apparently more the politician than the church leader. From its agents, the SD learned that Bishop HILARION was somehow associated with the NKVD. But, as of January 1942 the SD had found no valid evidence confirming this allegation. 12. The Germans perceived a difference between the people of West Ukraine and those of East Ukraine (Soviet). Although those of the East opposed chauvinism and stood solidly against secession from Russia. The name BANDERA was unknown to them and no movement for independence seemed to exist among them. Two members of OUN (Bandera), fnu KONRAD and fnu KRIZE were appointed Militia Commandant and Mayor in Cherson, East Ukraine respectively, and they tried to use their positions to propagate BANDERA's ideas. But, because they were from East Galicia and hence aliens to the people of Cherson, they were unable to build an OUN organization or to interest anyone in the concept of a unified, independent Ukraine. 13. Despite the fact that the OUN (Bandera) was more aggressively chauvinistic and (in this sense) less pro-German than the OUN (Melnik), the SD concluded that the Bandera faction rep- resented less potential danger to German objectives than did the Melnik faction.' 14. As they played with Arab nationalists, so the Germans toyed with the nationalists of the Eastern territories. By maintaining a discreet silence about what the future held in store, they permitted the leaders to believe that independence was just around the corner. At the time of the report, the SD had been told that OUN (Melnik) was British oriented and anything but sympathetic to the anti-Jewish campaign. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 While this policy of devious procrastination did not make for solid friendships, it did avoid stirring up dangerous enmities.* In 1942 the SD reported that the OUN (Bandera) and OUN (Melnik) were rivals which contributed greatly to the German cause.** 15. Upon entering Latvia, which had been under Soviet occupation for only a year, the Germans did not quite know what political developments to expect. They merely seemed to be certain that numerous groups were prepared to cooperate with the German authorities, When the German troops arrived, the officers of the former Latvian Army immediately tried to form a government, and a "committee" came into being under the leadership of KREISCHMANIS and SKAISTLAUKS, two Colonels of the regular pre-war Latvian Army. The Committee, given recognition by the German authorities, set about organizing a "Self-Defence" force as the first step towards bringing the country to normalcy. Two Latvian officers, Colonel PLENZNERS and Lt. Colonel DEGLAVS, were brought from Berlin*** to help build up the "Self-Defence" force (Selbstachutz); but, with the arrival of the German General ROQUES, the SS took command. At this point, Colonel PLENZNER became ill, and Colonel DEGLAVS committed suicide. 16. In August 1941, the assignment of a German High Commissioner to Latvia, as well as district commissars, was accepted without question in the rural areas, but it had an unfavorable impact in the urban centers. The Germans pointed Editorial comment. The reasoning behind this observation is obscure. If OUN (Bandera) contributed to the German cause, it is difficult to understand why the members of that organization were arrested in such large numbers. (See Addendum F. ) ***PLENZNERS had been the Latvian Military Attache in Berlin until the Soviets occupied Latvia in June 1940. (Correct spelling PLENSNERS). Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 out that this arrangement would bring about improvements in the Latvian economy, but the Latvians could see that it ran counter to their plans for a sovereign state. Most surprised by the German maneuver was the Latvian pre-war fascist group "Perkonkrusts"* which had expected the Nazis to be as generous to Latvia as they had been to Slovakia. Although the use of German commissars continued to evoke criticism, in January 1942 the SD was able to report that the Latvians were still friendly toward Germany, still thrilled at being free of the Communist yoke. The "Perkonkrusts" was about to organize a Latvian volunteer division, and young Latvian officers (but not those of the older generation) were thought to be pre-German. 17. When the Germans entered Estonia they found the economy in a chaotic state. During their one-year occupation, the Soviets had taken railway rolling stock and had destroyed what they could not haul away. They had also taken away two-thirds of the horses. Some factories had only two weeks' supply of raw material while others had none. The Estonians welcomed the Germans, thinking that they would restore the country to the status it had enjoyed in 1940, before the Soviet occupation. But this hope could not have been very strong, because the Germans noted no opposition to the German commissars whom they brought into the area. The people manifested interest in everything German: German classes, movies and literature. How- ever, this aimiable disposition did not place the Estonians in a favored category, because the German occupying authorities were under orders not to treat them any better, or worse, than the Latvians and Lithuanians. 18. In Lithuania the story was much the same as in Latvia. In Vilnyus, a National Committee was formed under the leadership of Stasys ZAKEVIZCIUS, and it received German recognition. Colonel SKIRPA, former Lithuanian Ambassador to Germany, tried to form a government, but the Germans found it unacceptable and put SKIRPA under house-arrest. Other political groups, such as the Christian-Democrats, Socialists, and the Waldemaras group, tried to gain status, believing that they were on the verge of independence. * Swastika (League) Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07: CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 But this hope faded in August 1941 when the Germans appointed a High Commissioner and assigned a quota of district commi- ssars. This set the Lithuanian nationalists upon a propaganda campaign for an independent state. They warned the people against siding with the Germans, on the grounds that inde- pendence would come only with the defeat of Germany, which would certainly result when the United States entered the war. Despite such propaganda, the Germans, generally, were able to get cooperation from the Lithuanians by stirring up Lithu- anian hatred of Jews and Communists. Two companies of Lithuanian (anti-Communist) partisans were incorporated into the "Einsatzkommandos" and were assigned to guard bridges, ammunition dumps and Jewish concentration camps, and to help liquidate the Jews in various cities of the country. 19. The Germans found the people of Byelorussia to be strongly anti-Communist. Although neither for nor against the Germans, they did entertain the hope that the Germans would improve the standards of living.* They compared the equipment and personnel of the German Army with that of the Red Army and found the Nazis superior. 20. The Germans used two approaches to the problems of Byelorussia, one for the portion that was Polish before 1939 and another for the portion that was originally Soviet. Con- cerning the Polish portion, the Germans went straight ahead with the decentralization of the economic system. Collective farms were dissolved and the properties returned to the origi- nal owners. Provisional local governments were set up, comprised of Byelorussians. In the territory that was origi- nally Soviet, the Germans indefinitely postponed decentralization of the former Soviet state system. German farmers were made supervisors of collective farms and German officials were placed in key positions.** When the Germans arrived, the attitude of the people was fav- orable toward the victors, but the reports do not record the changes which may have occurred with the passage of time. The intelligencia asked why they were treated differently than the people in the adjoining region, but the documents examined do not provide the answer given by the Germans, if in fact they did answer the question. Approved For Release 1999 -00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/ - D ,65-00756R000500080002-7 0 _u' 21. As the German military forces advanced farther into Soviet territory, problems of a civilian nature mounted. The retreating Soviets had demolished power-stations, govern- ment buildings and warehouses. Food was scarce, particularly in the urban areas. People who had fled from their homes were not returning. A dependable system of personal documentation and controls had to be devised in order to combat Soviet intel- ligence activity. Therefore, German military commandants were assigned to the cities and towns and travel without an identity document, signed and sealed by the German commandant, was not permitted. 22. The people on Soviet territory seemed genuinely friendly toward the German conquerors. In Kiev they were reported to be cordial and anti-Communist, In the Crimea, the tartars wanted to organize a volunteer unit to fight alongside the Germans, and much the same proposal was made in the Leningrad area. Only in Smolensk the people were found to be neither for nor against the Germans. Everywhere the intelligensia plagued the invaders with questions about German-Russian relations. They wanted it understood that there was a difference between Russians and Soviets. The citizens of Klinsy proposed activation of an association to promote Russo-German friendship. Although the feeling against Communism was widespread, the intelligensia expressed concern about the possibility of the USSR becoming a second-rate state (or a conglomeration of protectorates and colonies) under the control of Germany*. 23. There was a difference in the behavior of the people near the front lines and that of the people further to the rear. Near the front, people were restless and nervous, under pressure of Soviet propaganda and agents. They were afraid the Soviets might return; they lived in terror of the partisans. Food was scarce, jobs hard to find. Under these circumstances, the German bonus of 100 rubles for each Red Army soldier turned in, and 1000 rubles for each partisan, could not have offered much of a future. *>, But in that area as elsewhere in occupied territory, the Germans seemed unable or unwilling to tell the people what the future held in store. The effectiveness of this German bonus is not revealed in the documents examined. Approved For Release 1 NCMNM-00756ROO0500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 24. In July 1941, Red Army Captain M. PUGATSLOW, then a German prisoner of war, said that at the outbreak of war the Soviet High Command had given no thought to partisan warfare, believing it impossible that a large number of Red Army troops could be encircled by the enemy. Further, the High Command believed that partisans could only exist with the support of the civilian population, and they knew that the population was not sympathetic to the Soviet regime. 25. Before his capture, Captain PUGATSLOW, had served in the Red Army's XI Mechanized Army Corps. As the Corps retreated from Grodno, it encountered a demolished bridge at the Neman River and was forced to abandoned its heavy weapons and trucks. Realizing that the corps was now encircled by the Germans, the corps commander, MOSTAVENKO, summoned his staff and other selected personnel into a nearby woods. After .distributing hand weapons among them, he said that they must try to break through the German lines near Borisow; if that failed they were to return to the woods and wage partisan warfare, requisitioning their food from local farmers. Captured soon thereafter, Captain PUGATSLOW could not contribute much information about the nature of partisan, activity; but local farmers testified that the partisans brought terror to the villages. Hiding in the woods by day, they came out at night to kill cattle, raid villages, and rob farmers of their meager supply of food and clothes. 26. The Germans soon concluded that most of the Red Army officers and soldiers who had managed to escape capture after encirclement had also contrived to regroup into partisan groups. Other groups were comprised of Communists. In Latvia one unit consisted of old-believers (Starovers) evicted from Russia by the Czar decades before. But that was only a beginning. 27. If members of the Soviet High Command had given no thought to partisan warfare before the outbreak of war, they must have given thorough attention to it soon thereafter, because in mid-July 1941, near Witebsk, the Germans captured a Soviet liaison plane carrying secret instructions for partisan warfare, issued by fnu MECHLIS, the chief of the Red Army?s Political Approved For Release 1999/09/07: CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Management. And it soon became evident that groups were being dropped behind the lines by the Soviet Air Force, groups consisting principally of refugees who had fled before the German Army and desired to return to their homes. The Soviets helped them get back--at a price. Other groups, trained in the use of explosives, were taken to the Latvian shores from'.the Soviet island, Oesel. Wherever they were, the partisan groups generally employed the same tactics. They hid in woods and swamps and came out for surprise attacks, demolishing bridges, telephone lines and German installations. The Soviet Air Force supplied them with food and explosives, and with leadership in the form of Red Army officers and commissars. What they could not get from the Soviets, they procured from the civilian population, usually by force. 28. The Germans learned from captured partisans and documents that the Soviets had organized partisan training sbhools in most large cities. Preference was given to athletes, not necessarily members Communist Party. As a rule, 200 Soviet agents at a time were trained in each school in radio communications, and in the use of weapons, explosives, etc. A headquarters in Leningrad, comprised of eight sections, was active in recruiting and training agents for espionage and partisan activity. The curriculum of a center near Orel provided an example of the training: espionage at the front lines and behind them; utilization of terrain in approaching the target; transmitting intelligence; destroying bridges, buildings and military objects; techniques of arson; mining of streets, fields and railroads; destruction of vehicles; use of hand-grenades. In order to improve their effectiveness in destroying trains, trucks and heavy equipment, partisans were given "new" weapons. Some agents, usually high CP officials, were given false identification cards and infiltrated into Germany territory as workers. 29. The fight against the Soviet partisans;vwas entrusted to the SD units, whose stated objective was to apprehend the Soviet officers and commissars providing the leadership. The SD hued agents as informants and guides, low-flying aircraft for spotting of partisan hideouts, and bloodhounds in an unspecified manner. The thought that bitter winter weather would force the partisans to give~tltemselves up, seems to have to have been a wrong guess, because according to subsequent reports, some partisans sought refuge in their villages, Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/;Q7 .Cj f -BDPA5-00756R000500080002-7 refuge in their villages, while the remainder erected headquarters in the woods. Winter merely slowed up partisan action and the Germans expected to have them come out with increased strength in the spring. 30. During the year that followed, partisan activity more than met SD expectations. At times the SD had to call on military units for help. By the end of 1942, partisan groups of army size were being encountered, as was the case in operation "Franz", when Einsatzgruppe B encircled a "brigade" of 2000 partisans in Byelorussia and succeeded in killing 1400 along with 900 of their supporters (Bandenhelfer). At about the same time, Einsatzgruppe B reported the existence of another group north of Loknja, under the leadership of Soviet Colonel fnu WASSILJEW; the estimated strength of that group was 1500. Although the SD killed partisans by the score, there always seemed to be more of them ready to take the place of their fallen comrades. 31. As noted in paragraph 1 above, the SD was able to capture relatively few NKVD documents** as the Germans moved deeper and deeper into Soviet domain; from captured agents, however, they were able to get a good idea of the methods used by the Soviets in dispatching people behind the lines. A few cases are cited below. 32. Marija PLATONOWA, twenty years of age, was working at the Kolpino radio broadcasting center at the outbreak of war . In December 1941, she was trained at the radio school located at Krestowski-Ostrow and became a w/t instructor. At the school she also received instruction in map-reading and was told by her instructor that she was to be dropped behind the German lines although she never had received parachute training. He then introduced her to twenty- year old Marija SCHTATNOWA, who was to be her companion on the mission. Although it is not stated in the RSHA reports, the captured doc- uments provide ample reason for believing that more and more people joined the partisans as it gradually dawned on them that the Germans were not "liberators" but tyrants of a new order. Among the Soviet records seized were those of the All-Union Communist Party, Smolensk District, 1917-1941. But these were not records of the NKVD, Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 33. On 16 April 1942, Marija PLATONOWA and Marija SCHTATNOWA were taken by auto to the Liwaschowo airfield in the Leningrad suburbs. After two hours in the air, they para- chuted into a swamp behind the German lines. Hiding her parachute, Marija PLATONOWA shouldered her ration bag and her w/t set and walked to Witchera III (sic) (S.eredka district) where she presented herself as a refugee. On 27 April she went to Maslogostizy; there she registered at the local German military headquarters and was issued a regular personal identity document. Although she was to transmit messages to the espionage center in Leningrad every noon on the 53 meter band, and every midnight on 80 meters, she was unable to send any messages because of antenna trouble. 34. After leaving the swamp, Marija SCHTATNOWA lived in the woods for four days before going to her -native village, Witchera III. There she divulged her mission to Anastasia FEODOROWA, an old friend who happened to be in contact with Soviet partisans. It was not long before the partisans asked her to transmit their messages to the partisan center in Leningrad. She was, however, unable to comply, because of a malfunctioning antenna and battery. Anastasia FEODOROWA then urged. her to turn her w/t set over to the partisans, on the basis that its presence in the village could have serious consequences for the villagers. Seeing the logic of the argument, SCHTATNOWA went to Aksentchewo village on 4 May 1942 and delivered the set to the partisans. Both SCHTATNOWA and PLATONOWA were arrested soon thereafter. 35. Alexej DSEMESCHTSCHIK, a thirty-year old engineer, was working in a tobacco factory at Wassiliewski -Ostrow in August 1942, when he was approached by an unknown civilian and asked to fill out a questionnaire. Soon he received orders to report to an NKVD school located in the area. There he met Wladimir, his brother, and Simon RUBAKIN, his brother-in-law. His supervisor at the school was "SINOWEI LWOWITSCH', the civilian who had handed him the questionnaire. He received instructions in the use of explosives and weapons, and theoretical lessons in the art of hiding in German occupied territory. He was also taught how to reconnoiter German military establishments. He was then made the leader of a four-men group which included the above-mentioned relatives. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 36. On 8 October 1942 the group was told to proceed to the Pleskau (PSKOV) area (behind the German lines) and to blow up the flax machine factory, the fur factory, the electrical power works, and a railway bridge. The group was given the names of eight people in Pleskau, whom they could approach for help, but was cautioned that these people should be addressed only by their aliases. Provided with rations, pistols, rifles, explosives, grenades, axes, a first-aid kit, and a "Sever" type w/t set, the group was dropped (in pairs) behind the lines on the night of 5 November 1942. Alexej DSEMESCHTSCHIK recovered the equipment, but could not find the other members of the group and started out for Pleskau, hoping to find them there. He was apprehended by the Germans on the way. His companions, also separated from one another, started out in various directions, hoping to make contact. All were arrested in short order. 37. Radio-trained Victor FEODOROW had barely reached the age of twenty when he received orders to go on a mission behind the German lines. In Leningrad he was provided with a false passport and a false certificate citing him as unfit for military service. Supplied with pistols, grenades, compasses, a "Sever" type w/t set, and 200 German marks, FEODOROW and a companion, Iwan MICHAILOW, were taken to a Leningrad airfield at midnight of 3 August 1942. An hour later the pair landed near Radilowskoje Lake. FEODOROW stayed in the woods while MICHAILOW--according to plan--went to Schabinez village to see an uncle. MICHAILOW returned to report that his uncle was dead. The pair moved on toward Pererosten, and again FEODOROW stayed in the woods while MICHAILOW went to the village of Podmoschje. While waiting in the woods, FEODOROW established radio contact with Leningrad and the following messages were exchanged: FEODOROW: Landed O. K. Found parachute, but not big bag of rations. FEODOROW: No German troops around Pererosten, Alexejewka, Pawlowo and Schabinez villages. No troop movements on Porchow-Nowoselle highway or 5.8.1942. FEODOROW: German passes are used in this area. Land is divided between the farmers. Soviet war prisoners work on the highways. Approved For Release 19 65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/~AIfl~ _IA-1a00756R000500080002-7 Leningrad: Leningrad: FEODOROW: Leningrad: Leningrad: MICHAILOW uncle dead. MICHAILOW went to his native village Podmoschje. Promised to return within 24 hours. Report immediately why MICHAILOW went to Podrnoschje village MICHAILOW went to Podmoschje to visit his uncle. I waited for him for five days and am running out of food. Ration your food. Help is coming. Food is gone. Food will be dropped I September 1942. Send coordinates and direction. Coordinates plate 31, 35. North-South Radilowskoje Lake. No airplanes. Waiting for an answer. When one is asleep one cannot.)hear flying aircraft. Bag with food was dropped at the agreed place. On the verge of starvation, FEODOROW reported to the mayor of Pererosten on 9 September 1942, and soon found himself at the German police station in Karamyschewo. 3.? When MICHAILOW left FEODOROW in the woods for the second time, he apparently had no intention of returning. He went to Podmoschje, where an uncle of his was the town mayor; he told his uncle that he was a Soviet spy and that he had just walked all the way from Leningrad. He hid his pistol, map, and compass under the roof of his uncle's house, and burned the false passport given to him by the Soviets. He then, went to Dubowo and officially registered himself in his true name. During August 1942 the partisans attached Dubowo and made off with all the documents in the mayor's office, therefore, MICHAILOW had to get a new passport, this time from the local govern- ment in Porchow. He then obtained employment in a sawmill in Podmoschje, but was soon arrested by the German SD, presumably as a result of FEODOROW's confession. Approved For Release 19ZIUMMIFUl 5-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 39. If NKVD agents were a hazard to the Germans in general and the SD in particular, the local communists were a positive menace, because they were already living behind the lines under natural cover and in sufficient strength to create organized havoc. Within days after the outbreak of German- Russian hostilities they had disseminated subversive leaflets in Greece, Vienna, Duesseldorf, Berlin and Zagreb. The SD confiscated mimeographs and stencils in Prague; and 2000 Communist functionaries were arrested on 3 July 1941, presum- ably in Bulgaria. 40. The Communist activity, varying as it did with each area according to the political and military situation, included. the formation of partisan units; the formation of cells for passive resistance; the assassination of German officers; the sabotage of radio stations, communications cables, telephone lines, railway equipment and bridges; raids on radio stations, armament plants, towns and villages; the dissemination of leaflets and posters, as well as the dissemination of news heard on foreign broadcasts. What bothered the SD was the organized character of this activity. The CP organization in the city of Kiev may be used as an illustration. 41. Established shortly after the outbreak of the Russo- German war, the "Secret City Committee of the Communist Party in Kiev" took on a structural composition analogous to the old Party organization. The secretary of the "Secret City Committee' had at his disposal nine secretaries of district committees in Kiev and kept in touch with them by means of five or six liaison men. Reliable Party members were assigned to the district committees to carry out Party objectives, and these individuals, in turn, were instructed to recruit other "resolute" members for the same purpose. Financial aid in support of this work was promised by the parent committee. 42. According to Committee documents captured by the SD, the Party objectives were: distribution of leaflets, dissemination or rumors, distribution of Communist literature, and the collection of Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 T information on measures taken by the occupying authorities and on the public mood. Activity along these lines was not to be started until special orders had been issued by higher Party echelons; these orders were expected within four to six weeks after the Germans had occupied Kiev. 43. The regular Kiev CP functionaries had left the city for Borispol on or before 19 September 1941, in accordance with Stalin's orders. The secret organization was formed on the principle of strict secrecy on the part of the functionaries among themselves and toward outsiders; the functionaries were to know only their immediate superiors and subordinates. Functionaries selected for secret Party work were provided with aliases, false passports, and were relocated in various zones of the city. They were given two to three thousand rubles in cash; and almost without exception they had been given pistols before the actual seizure of Kiev. 44. A Party membership book of the secretuCP, captured by the Germans in March 1943, contained the following: "The illegal Communist Party (Bolsheviki), NKP (b)*, is a section of the Bolshevik Party, hence it is based on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. The objectives of the NKP (b) are the liberation of our socialist homeland from German-Rumanian national fascism and the reestablishment of a socialist regime in our homeland. Another task is to inform (by agitation and propaganda) the western nations about the aims of the murderous Hitler and his hordes, which have come to our country; and to inform them about the aims of the Bolshevist Party, with Stalin, the bright genius, at its head. "NKP (b) must prepare the population of occupied areas for rebellion against the invaders. For that purpose the NKP (b) forms a vast political-propaganda organization, and forms fighting forces which will help disarm the occupational forces. It will mobilize citizens to help their brothers who are at the front fighting the enemies of mankind. "Nelegalnaja KP" i. e. , "Illegal CP". Approved For Release 199 -00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 "Statutes of the NKP (b) Only he can become a member of the NKP (b) who vows to devote the whole of his life to his socialist homeland, who vows to bear his honor membership in the Party organi- zation, and who vows to fulfill without reservation all orders of the Central Committee. 1'The Central Committee, which is at the top of the NKP (b), is responsible to the Central Committee of the WKP (b)--the central committee of the All-Russian Communist Party.* The district groups answer to the Central Committee of the NKP (b); the sub-groups account to the district groups; individual members are responsible to the units to which they belong. Disobedience is considered treason. it 45. Alongside the illegal Communist Party in Kiev, there existed an illegal youth organization (Komsomol), using the same methods and pursuing the same objectives. This illegal Komsomol group, organized along the same lines as the NKP (b); its members were generally between 17 and 25 years of age. Although a parallel activity, it was subordinate to the CP in Kiev. 46. While the documents under review throw light on the organizational structure of the secret CP in Kiev, they do not indicate what success the organization may have had in the pursuit of its objectives; but from the details to be found in Addendum F.. it may be inferred that the SD was the source of many difficulties for the Communists, no matter where they operated. 47. In the initial stages of the German-Soviet war the Germans directed their propaganda effort toward Red Army troops, dropping leaflets. that encouraged them to desert. Using the same frequency band as the Moscow Comintern Radio Station, and aping the voice of that station's announcer, the German, radio station beamed false news to the east, hoping to disconcert the Red Army 6 Now Communist Party of the Soviet Union. C7.1 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 troops and the Soviet people as a whole. For example, the capture of Kiev and Leningrad was announced when these cities were held by Soviet troops. As the Soviet military forces retreated they abandoned Soviet radio stations, newspapers and other media, creating propaganda opportunity which the Germans were not slow to seize and exploit. 48. At first, leaflets in the German language were dropped over occupied Soviet territory, but it soon became apparent to the Germans that they would have to use a language the common people could read. Berlin suggested to the German military authorities that a more intense propaganda campaign be started through the use of newspapers, magazines, posters, motion pictures and radio." Accordingly, a propaganda team was formed, consisting of the following: Captain fnu STOFFROGEN, Sonderfuehrer fnu NAGS, Sonderfuehrer Dr. fnu SCHULE, and Sonderfuehrer fnu KAISER. 49. The first newspaper to appear was the bi-weekly Smolensker Nachrichten (Smolensk News), printed in Russian. A similar paper, Glocke (Bell), was published in Witebsk shortly thereafter. Both papers were read eagerly by the news-hungry Soviet people, especially because they got more truth from these publications than they had received from the press under the Communist regime. In February 1942, Retsch (Speech) came out in Orel. Initially, the propaganda program called for a fight against Soviet saboteurs and partisans, but increasingly the attack turned against the kolkhoz system, with stress laid on impending land reforms. Another favorite topic concerned the working conditions in Germany, depicted in terms calculated to promote the recruitment of Soviet people for labor in Germany. 50. In May 1942 the demand for reading matter was so great that the Germans resorted to putting newspapers and posters in public places in order to reach a wider audience. Otherwise the demand could not have been met, owing to a shortage of paper, and a lack of qualified interpreters and trained propagandists. Two propaganda organizations, "The Committee for Peace and Tranquility" and "Drushina", were The propaganda campaign was not under the jurisdiction of the SD, but the SD did report on it,, presumably because of its interest in the "public mood". Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 formed in Gomel. Movie theatres in Orel, Roslawl and Mogilew were reopened. The use of loud-speakers in these cities was considered. All in all, the Germans considered their propaganda to be vigorous and effective, especially in the urban areas. 51. People were eager for information about Germany, about the Nazi Party, and about Adolf Hitler himself. They wanted to know all about the NKVD, because this subject had been taboo under Communist rule. Fnu ALBRECHT's book about the NKVD was very popular, as were his pamphlets Is This a Building-up of Socialism, In the Cellar of the GPU, and Stalin's Rule. The mayor of Sytschewka was sent to Germany and--upon his return--he became an effective propagandist. Russians who had been German prisoners of war during World War I also contributed to the German propaganda campaign. 52. In addition to Glocke, two other publications appeared in Witebsk: Das Neue Leben (New Life), an illustrated newspaper, as well as Die Geisel (The Hostages), a comic paper. Monatschrift fue Politik'.und Kultur (Monthly Review of Politics and Culture) was also published there. A special newspaper for the Tartars was printed in the Crimea. In Dnepropetrowsk, press propaganda was limited to one newspaper, Dnepropetrowsk Zeitung (Dnepropetrowsk News), published in Ukrainian. In Kiev, both newspapers, Novo Ukrainske Slowo (New Ukrainian Word) and Poslednie Nowosti (The Latest News) reportedly had shrunk in size by October 1942, probably owing to the paper shortage. 53. Motion pictures were considered to be especially effective propaganda instruments. In Sytschewka, the German motion picture Wiener Blut (Vienese Blood) was shown, and the theatre was packed long before the show started. Besides this feature picture, the Russian audience was shown the assault upon Sevastopol. In Bryansk the German picture Sieben Jahre Pech (Seven Years of Bad Luck) was used as a feature film. Especially impressive were German news reels. The result: the movie theatres were always filled to capacity and the people asked for more pictures depicting life in Germany, but liked any picture as long as it had quality. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 54. In Zhitomir, loud speakers were used on market days to bring news to the Russian people in their own language. In Charkow, the Germans organized an anti-Communist exhibition entitled Nieder mit dem Bolschewismus (Down with Bolshevism). Exhibited were materials dealing with problems of youth, health, and the economy. Posters showing two radiant Ukrainian boys who had just volunteered for the labor force in Germany were to be seen elsewhere while other posters depicted life under Communist rule- -starvation, purges. 55. Yet, by the end of 1942, German propaganda was running into heavy criticism. The Russian intelligencia kept asking the Germans to clarify their political plans.* Others protested against false statements made about Communist leaders. Also, the program for the recruitment of labor began to falter badly. Letters from Russian workers who had gone to Germany described conditions very different than the Sauerbraten and Bier idyl spewed up by the mechanisms designed to glorify Germany.** In the Ukraine, where the Germans were trying to combat the influence of Soviet propaganda, they were asked why they did not expose Soviet lies about the "new spirit" of the Soviet army, religious freedom, and agrarian reform. (German authorities in the Ukraine sent a letter to the OMI (Ostministerium) in Berlin about this matter.) The Soviet victory in Stalingrad in January 1943 gave German propaganda one of its most damaging blows. Sensing the change, Berlin instructed German authorities in Byelorussia to pay more attention to the psychology of the people. *** See also paragraph 22 above. ~e For a realistic picture see William Shirer?s "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", pp 949-951. The Byelorussians were still protesting against being treated differently than the people in the area once held by Poland. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 56. German propaganda in the Baltic States failed to achieve any marked results, although German controlled news- papers (some printed in German) were widely read. Motion pictures were popular and widely used. Cars equipped with loud-speakers were employed to keep pedestrians abreast: of the times. But somehow the Baltic people, particularly the intelligensia, remained singularly unaffected by German blandishments. The Germans were well aware that the Baltic countries had enjoyed cordial relations with Great Britain and other Western countries in the past, but apparently decided this was a question best left alone. Although the Germans were also not happy about the Finnish broadcast beamed at Estonia, which touched on controversial questions such as Estonian independence, liberal socialism, etc., there is nothing in the available captured documents to suggest that they were prepared to make an issue of that irritation. * The Germans apparently directed their propaganda effort primarily at occupied Soviet territory rather than at the Western Ukraine or the Baltics. Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 1j ILI NKVD OPERATIVES AND PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THEM IT, Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RD 5-00756R000500080002-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7 NKVD Operatives and Persons Connected with Them fnu ABRIKOSOW Serial 735 Frame 266682 A member of a Crimean auxiliary police force; also a member of a terrorist and sabotage group* in Simferopol in 1942. "AGEJEW" 735. * ........... 266782 A Soviet lieutenant who was chief of a sabotage group known as "Young Comrades", in Priluky, Ukraine, before his arrest by the Germans on 26 March 1943. Tolja AHONIN 3647 ............. 2885 A Jewish NKVD agent, arrested and executed by the Germans on 16 October 1941. Simon ALEXANDROWISCH 3647 ............. 2885 A Jew, executed by the Germans in Byelorussia in 1941 for having explosives in his possession. fnu AWDEJEW 3647 ............. 3069 An NKVD captain in the special unit of the 42nd Army in Leningrad in 1941. He expressed the opinion that Leningrad would surrender to the Germans. e