MOSCOW EMBTEL 1040 - SOVIET INTENTIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130041-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 15, 1953
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Control: 5627
Recd: January 15, 1953
7.21 p.m.
SS TO: Secretary of State
G NO: 1040, January 15, 9 p.m.
GER
NEA
FE'
UN DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, PARIS BONN. SENT DEPARTMENT 1010,
IINA REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 118, PARIS 339, BONN 197-
CIA--
.ARMY Have completed formal calls on Foreign Office and seen most
_OSD chiefs diplomatic missions. While I indicated readiness call
AIR on whomever he desired, Protocol chief suggested only Malik
NM and USA affairs officer Bazykin, not (repeat not) mentioning
SAM Vishinsky, whom I have not (repeat not) asked to see. Except
p for three long interviews convoked by Malik, who alleged USA
PSB delay in providing plumbing for new building, Foreign Office
conversations were confined to polite exchanges with no (repeat
no) reference political problems.
Speculation, which is chief activity diplomatic corps, centers
at present on possible new USA moves Far East and on Soviet,
reaction in coming TJSA administration. Anti-Anlerican campaign.
has shown no (repeat no) relaxation except to continue to exempt
General Eisenhower and his associates from advice and attacks.
Hard, skeptical line is taken by British and Commonwealth repre-
sentatives who, although acknowled ing Soviet political activity
in waiting posture, see as yet no.(repeat no) concrete evidence
change Soviet policy of intransigence and enmity to West. New
Turkish Ambassador believes Soviets will make no (repeat no)
basic concession unless forced by danger of war, which they
desire avoid at all costs. He considers Soviets satisfied with
USA commitment in Far Eastern war without similar involvement
themselves and feels they will be encouraged in divide and con-
quer' tactics by what he regards as Western retreat last NATO
meeting. Following Soviet rejection UN prisoner of war resolu-
tion, Indian Ambassador, who is man independent thinking. also'
forsees small hope immediate change. He claims certain.`ow'ledge
Chinese were ready accept face-saving solution whereby they would
disinterest themselves in numerical proportion prisoners of war
in Korea, but he admits he made no (repeat no) headway in1 -ap rO ch
to Chinese colleague here, who consistently maintained USA blocked
settlement. Indian Ambassador of opinion Kremlin persuaded
Chinese prisoner of war agreement would not (repeat not)''. produce
settlement Far Eastern problems at this time.
Indian more balanced than some neutralist colleagues like$urpese
and Iranian, who regard world conflict as chief responsibility
of US and
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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
-2- 1.040, January 15, 9 P.M., from Moscow
of US and USSR, within power of each to stop. Portrayal by
Soviet press of USA as chief antagonist has obviously produced
some effect local diplomatic circles, as it may have elsewhere.
British Ambassador concerned about impression Soviets have
succeeded in creating of isolated US position., and he feels
other countries freely subscribing to Western system and accept-
ing USA aid should voluntarily or through suggestion defend USA
motives as common to all.
Middle ground of pure theory and speculation is adopted by the
French and Italian colleagues who, while acknowledging Russian
strategy of subversion and. confusion will continue, nevertheless
feel coming year may produce some flexibility in Soviet tactics.
Stalin. replies to Reston interview are cited as possible first
maneuver aimed yield results any one of which would be advantage-
ous to Kremlin. (1) Stalin has made peaceful gesture, rejection
of which would be USA responsibility; (2) USA leading role in'
any future discussions with Soviets would be admission of res can
sibility provoking doubt and discord. amore; Allies; (3) should"
great power discussions eventuate after successful preparation,
Soviets might propose over-all modus vivendi which would doom
development Western defense and permit them consolidate their
bloc and relieve their economy. As to pivotal question of '
Germany, one theory is advanced that Soviets might be prepared to
concede that total of German forces in both Eastern and Western
zones be kept militarily inferior to those of France.
French Ambassador, who is entirely skeptical Soviet intentions,
feels, however, Russians may produce new maneuver capitalize on
recent evidences Western division. While not (repeat not) in-
alined to believe Stalin is sentimentalist he thinks Stalin'
nevertheless retains great respect for Allied wartime associates
and might wish to renew contacts with Churchill and General"
Eisenhower in attempt to produce a relaxation of tension aril
vigilance useful for Soviet ends.
Above presented as summary various local opinions rather than
Embassy view, which remains one of reserved skepticism pen.,ng
Soviet reaction to events of next few weeks, which in turn" ay
yield clearer indication Soviet tactics.
Re domestic affairs observers report noticeable physical improve-
ment, particularly last two months, due availability conse
goods from satellites which has helped city population clothe
themselves not (repeat not) stylishly, but warmly and fairly`
.adequately. Foreigners making recent trips state individual'
Russians seem to accept propaganda re USA aggression in Far'East
but apparently without much bitterness as yet since they do riot
(repeat not) regard themselves as directly involved. No (repeat
no) signs hostility to Western representatives in Moscow a-ad
feeling only occasionally evident at anti-US plays attended"'
by model Soviet workers. Compared to the sullen individualistic
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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
 Approved For Releis ? p( 25 1~- TC5-0070RMAT5 130041-8
-3- 1040, January 15, 9 p..m., from Moscow
opposition of Yugoslavs, Moscow city population seems accustomed
accept moral debasement and demands communism in more business-
like manner with principal aim of staying out of trouble. In
Moscow at least, national pride and dread of another war seem
diluted by atmosphere of artificial calm prevailing in storm
center of world conflict. Corruption and inefficiency almost
daily criticized in press and administration is held to have
sufficient experience and momentum to produce at least most
planned results. Deficiencies attacked in current propaganda
drive are those inherent in system itself where state is only and
harshest employer.
Anti-Semitic action at first regarded by some observers as
primarily aimed, with subsidiary purpose of appealing to Germans
and Arabs, at type of Jewish intellectual whose mime., manner of
discussion and international interest do not (repeat not) submit
readily to regidity Communist doctrine. Many now (repeat now)
fearful however that unless checked, anti-Semitism will extend to
mistreatment Jewish population in cities and Ukraine. Troubles
underlying Slansky and Moscow doctor's trials apparently suffi-
ciently serious to warrant Communists taking measures forfeiting
leftwing liberal support to which peace congresses intended to
appeal. Although extent to which Moscow doctor's may have
ramifications among top hierarchy is uncertain, effects of
suggested disciplinary and vigilance measures, which. in themselves
may reflect expectation of intensified enmity with West, may be
far-reaching among certain classes, and a few observers report
some general uneasiness. These stresses which are possibly fur-
ther evidenced in running press dispute over economic theory
cannot (repeat not) but help diminish show of strength and sta-
bility staged at party congress. As yet they do not (repeat not)
seem to have tarnished the facade of Stalin's recent public
appearances where his commanding stature contrasts strongly
with the relative lack of appeal other leaders.
BA:SJM-10
NOTE: Passed to London, Paris, Bonn 1/15/53, 8:15 p.m., GC.
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