YUGOV IS NAMED BULGARIAN CHIEF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 1998
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: April 18, 1956
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
err-e"1,,
CPYRGHT
YUGO IS .NAMED
-BulAro)0.:011EF.
Continued From Page 1
? radio, Georgi Chankov and
Georgi Traikov head the new
list of Deputy Premiers as First
Deputy Premiers.
? They are followed by four
Deputy PrernierS: Raiko Damya-
nov, who wil have charge of
construction, Col. Gen. Ivan
Mi ailov, Mr. Chervenkov and
Kao. uk
Ltukaannoovv. was a Deputy
Premier in 1953, was dropped in
154 and has now been restored
as ? tigputy 'Premier and 'presi-
dent ot the State Planning Corn-
misSiort. '-
Mr. ,Yugov, the 52-year-old
Premier, ih his inaugural speech
indicated that his AGovernment
would lay stress on the develop-
ment of mining and agriculture,
particularly the production of
corn.
In contrast with Mr. Cherven-
kov, who has always been
ranked os an out-androut Stalin-
ist, Mr. Yugov was a Bulgarian
"national" Communist.
In 1948 he was relegated to
the relatively unirhportant post
of Minister4of Industry.
In January, 1950, he was ac-
cused by Mr. Chervenkov be-
fore the party's Central Conn-
mittee of a "lack of vigilance"
as Minister of the Interior. He
had to resort to humiliating
"self-criticism."
In 1952, during a Government
shuffle, Mr. Yugov was named
Deputy Premier and head of in-
dustrial planning. In 1954, on his
fiftieth birthday, he was pro-
claimed First Deputy Premier, a
post he has now given Up for
the Premiership; .
Mr. Chervenkov succeeded
GeoorgrDimitrov in 1949 at the
hel mof the Bulgarian regime.
A. faithful disciple of Stalin, Mr.
Chervenkov was one of the bit-
terest opponents of President
Tito when the Yugoslav Com-
munist party was expelled from
the Corninform in 1948. The res-
ignation 'of the Bulgarian Pre-
mier has been widely interpreted
as a gesture of conciliation to-
ward Marshal Tito,
Mr. Chervenkov is the first
head of a Soviet satellite gave-
ernment to resign on, a charge
of having encouraged the "cult
of personality," an allusion to
Stalin's one-man rule. Collective
leadership AO become Moscow's
new formula for Communist rule.
Chervenkov Statement .
BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, April
17/ (Reuters)?Mt, Chervenkov's
statement, quoted by the Bul-
garian Telegraph Agency, said:
"In view of the irregular meth-
ods allowed by me In jmy position
as Premier, which ','have caused
considerable 4aage fa- the op-
erations of ,te state, T ask the
National M ly to relieve in
of my'cluties. Premier of th
People's Repu. 4 Bulgaria."
Diti)Ate
SO
?April 17? ,
It took Only three zninutei for
the National A:Seel:04r to end
today without drarlut br-exCite-
N
merit Mr. Chervenkov's six-year
Premiership ancl to approve the
selection of Mr.' Yugov.
Mr. Chervenkov was sitting
with other Government leaders
when, without any preliminaries,
the? chairman read the Premier's
letter of resignation.
The letter, as translated, took
less than thirty words for Mr.
Chervenkov to say. that "owing
to incorrect, methods of work
that I have countenanced and
that inflicted a certain harm to
state activity" he requested the
Assembly te release him from
his post as Premier.
The Deputies heard the state-
ment in silence add immediately
gave their attention to Todor
Zhivkov, First Secretary of the
Communist party, who as brief-
ly proposed the election of r.
Yugov.
Czech Leader Criticized
By SYDNEY GRILTSON
Special to The New York Times.
PRAGUE, Czechoslovakia,
April - 17?The days of Gen.
Alexej Cepicka, Czechoslovak
Minister of Defense and a Dep-
uty Premier, are believed to be
numbered. _
He has been strongly attacked
in the magazine Literarni No-
Any for having permitted a "cult
of personality" to grow up
around him. This is an allusion
to one-man rule, as typifies1 by
Stalin. /
According to reliable sourdes,
General Cepicka was also criti-
cized at a recent meeting of the
'Czechoslovak party's Central
Associated Press
FUTURE UNCERTAIN:
Gen. Alexej Cepicka, Czech
Minister of Defense and
Deputy Premier, who has
been criticized for "cult."
Committee. It was after this
meeting that the late President
Klement Gottwald was formally
downgraded and the cult around
him condemned. General Cepicka
married the President's only
daughter, Marta, in 1948.
Prague is full of reports that
the general was already re-
signed. Nothing official has
been announced but portraits of
him in the Army museum and
Army offices have disappeared
since the Central Committee con-
demned this practice az one of
the worst forms of the "cult of
Literarni Noviny's attack took
the form of,- a letter by Pavel
Kohout: author of the current.
play "September Nights," deal-
ing, with Army resentment over
the Munich settlement that led
to Hitler's dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia. M. Kohout told
of a long discussion' held with
General Cepicka after the Min-
ister wast the play on March 13. ?
M.' Kohout said he agreed
with some of the Minister's
criticisms made -then and dis-
agreed, with others. He would
not have considered this any-
thidg but a "friendly discus-
sion,' be said, if it had not been
followed "by something that
after the Twentieth Congress
for the Soviet Communist
party] seems incredible."
March 27, M. Kohout said,
200 top political officers of the
Army met to discuss the play.
"With two or three exceptions,"
M. Kohout said, ""nobody at-
tempted to make a frahk analy-
sis of the play. For some hours
some of the faults expressed by
the Minister were repeated and
made .extrem. The. words most
frequently heard were 'Ban W."
,All work on the movie that
was to have been made from the
play had been stopped when the
scenario, already approved by
the- Film Board, and Army po-
litical headquarters, was sent to
Geheral Cepicka, M. Kohout
said.-- He described this as a
practical example of the cult of
personality.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1956:
RED PARTIES END
00MINFORM UNION
Continued From Page 1
admitted the error of Marshal
Tito's exclusion from that or-
ganization.
To what must be Marshal Tito's
great satisfaction it has been
made clear that the Cominform
action against him was a con-
sequence of the Stalin cult.
Leading Soviet-bloc victoms of
anti-Tito arrests and trials have
been rehabilitated. There seemed
little for the Cominform,to do
except to publish the weekly
journal For a Lasting Peace, For
a People's Democracy, which
these days contained lithe but
confessions of mistakes made
in Stalin's time. '
At a reception at the Syrian
Mmbassy this evening Dmitri T.
Shepilov, who is an alternate
member of the Soviet party's
Presidium, said that "Tidies
have changed, and now each of
the Communist parties has
reached its moturity.'
Yugoslav sources have been
saying With increasing certainty
recently that the Cominform
would be dissolved. Yugoslaiiia's
ultimate victory was signaled
in the summer of 1953 when the
Soviet union reauested a TA.
Text on Dissolution of the Comm
ROME, April 17 (Reuters)?
Following, in translation, is the
text of the Cominform's state-
ment of dissolution, as published
today in the Italian Communist
party newspaper L'Unita: '
The formation in 1947 of the
Information Office of Commu-
nist and Worker's parties has
had a positive part in bridging
the gap- among Communist
parties that occurred-with the
dissolution of the Comintern.
It has contributed notably by
its reinforcement of the inter-
national proletariat and by bet-
ter linking the,, working class
and all the workers in the
struggle for a stable peace, for
democracy and for socialisrp.
The Information Office and
Its newspaper, For e; Lasting
Peace, for a People's Democ-
racy, have had a positive func-
tion in developing and reinforc-
ing the bonds and the recipro-
cal exchange of experience
between the Communist parties
and the workers, and in clan-.
tying the problems of ,Marxist-
Leninist doctrine while taking
into account the actual Condi-
tions in individual countries
and the experience of the Com-
munist movement and the in-
ternational working class.
This has helped in the strength-
ening of brother parties and in
increasing the influence of
Communist parties among the
masses.
However, the modifications
that have taken place in the
International situation in the
last few years:
ThA AMPreence of socialism
Anastas Mikoyan
and for the national independ-
ence of their countries;
And, finally, the tasks of
overcoming the splits in the
working class movement and
the reinforcement of working
class unity to bring success in
the struggle for peace and so-
cailism ;
All this hasc created zew con-
stituted in 1947 has exhausted
its uses.
They have therefore all agreed
that the office should cease its
activities and' the Information
Office organ,: For a Lasting
Peace, For a People's Democ-
racy, should cease publication.
The Central Committees of
the Communist* and Workers'
parties already' participating in
the Information Office believe
that the individual parties and
groups of pirties, battling for
the interests of the working
class, pursuing their activities
according to the general objec-
tives of the .Marxist-Leninist
parties and according to the
particular national conditionb
of their own countries, will find
new useful methods of estab-
lishing links with each other.
The Communist and Workers'
parties Will without doubt con-
tinue on their own judgment,
taking, into account common
problems of the struggle for
peace, democracy and social-
ism, the defense of the inter-
ests of the working class and
of all workers, and the mobil-
ization or the popular masses
against the danger of war.
At the same time they will
exambie" the problems of col-
laboration with parties with
tendencies toward socialism,
and also with other organiza-
tions which aim to consolidate
peace and democracy.
All this will make even
stronger the spirit of reciprocal
collaboration between the Com-
munist and Workers parties,
on the basis of the principles
of the international proletariat.
All this will strengthen the
fraternal bonds between them
in the interests of the cause of
peace, of democracy and of
socialism.
The statement was signed by
the Central: Committees of the
Bulgarian-communist party, the
Hungarian Workers' party, the!
Italian Communist . party, the
Polish United Workers' party,
the Rumanian ,Workers' party,
the dmimunist party of thd So-
viet Union, the Communist party
of Czechoslovakia and tife French
Communist party;
Gas Lobby Inquiry Pushed
WASHINGTON, April 17 CB
?The Senate seleet committee
to investigate _corrupt practices
ordered its staff today to begin
work immediately on an investi-
gation of lobbying in the vetoed
natural gas pin. The committee
chairman, John L. McClellan,'
'
Democrat of Arkansas, atd the
group would move, "with all pos-
sible speed" to get hearing
under way.", But he indicated
that it -might' be' sometime be-
fore private or public bearings
were started...
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CPYRGHT
Auu roved Fur Rekdse 2002/07/22 :ElYik-g131:41bleitkbOTeatitS00615' 1936. C Is
Purported Text of Speech by Khrushchev as Released by the State Department
%wool to The Nes York Mmes,
WASHINGTON, June 4?Fol-
Towing, in translation, is the text
of a document that purports to
be a version of the speech deliv-
ered by Nikita S. Khrushchev,
First Secretary of the Soviet
Communist arty, at a secret
session of the party's Twentieth
Congress in Moscow, Feb. 24 and
25, 1956. This version, obtained
by the State Department, was
understood by the department to
have been prepared for the guid-
ance of the leadership of a Com-
munist party outside the Soviet
Union.
Comrades! In the report of the
Central Committee of the party
at the Twentieth Congress, in a
number of speeches by delegates
to the congress, as also formerly
during the plenary CC/CPSU
[Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Un-
ion] sessions, quite a lot has
been said about the cult of the
individual and about its harmful
consequences.
After Stalin's death the Cen-
tral Committee of the party be-
gan to Implement a policy of
explaining concisely and con-
sistently that it is'impermiselble
and foreign to the spirit of
maz-Asro - Leninism to elevate
one person, to transform him
into superman passesing super-
natural characteristics akin to
those of a god. Such a man sup-
posedly knows everything, sees
everything, thinks for everyone,
can do anything, is infallible in
his behavior.?
Such a belief about a man, and
specifically about Stalin, was
cultivated among us for many
years.
The objective of the present
report is not a thorough evlua-
tion of Stalin's life and activity.
Concerning Stalin's merits, an
entirely sufficient number of
books, pamphlets and studies
had already been written in his
lifetime. The role of Stalin in
the preparation and execution of
the Socialist revolution, in the
civil war, and in the fight for
the construction of socialism in
our country is universally known.
Everyone knows this well.
At the present we are con-
cerned with a question which
has immense importance for the
party now and for the -future?
?fwe are concerned) with how
the cult of the person of Stalin
has been gradually growing, the
cult which became at a certain
specific stage the .source of' a
-whole series of exceedingly seri-
ous and grave perversions of
party principles, of party democ-
racy, of revolutionary legality.
called the Central Committee of
the party a collective of leaders
and the guardian and interpreter
lof party principles. "During the
Iperiod between congresses,"
I pointed out Lenin, "the Central
I Committee guards and interprets
the principles of the party."
Committee Role Stressed
Underlining the role of the
Central Committee of the party
and its authority, Vladimir Dyich
[Lenin] pointed out: "Our Cen-
tral Committee constituted itself
as a closely centralized and
highly authoritative group' . . ."
During Lenin's life the Central
Committee of the party was a
real expression of collective
leadership of the party and of
the nation. Being a militant
Marxist revolutionist, always
unyielding in matters of princi-
ple, Lenin never imposed by
force his "views upon his co-
workers. He tried to convince;
he patiently explained his opin-
ions to others. Lenin altvays dili-
gently observed that the norms
of party life were realized, that
the party statute was enforced,
that the party congresses and
the plenary sessions of the Cen-
tral Committee took place at the
proper intervals.
In addition to the great ac-
complishments of V. I. Lenin for
the victory of the working class
and of the working peasants, for
the victory of our party and for
the application of the ideas of
scientific communism to life, his
acute mind expressed itself also
in this that he detected in Stalin
in time those negative charac-
teristics which resulted later in
grave consequences.
Fearing the future fate of the
party and of the Soviet nation,
V. 1. Lenin made a completely
correct characterization of
Stalin, pointing out that it wan
necessary, to consider the ques-
tion of transferring Stalin from
the position of the Secretary
General because of the fact that
Stalin is excessively rude, that
he does not have a proper atti-
tude toward his comrades, that
he is capricious and abuses his
power.
In December, 1922, in a letter
to the party congress Vladimir
Dyich wrote: "After taking over
the position of Secretary General
Comrade Stalin aAcumulated in
his hands immeasureable power
and I am not certain whether he
will be always able to use this
power with the 'required care."
This letter, s political docu-
ment of tremendous importance,
known in the party history as
Lenin's "testament,' was dis-
ributed among the delegates to
e twentieth party congress.
Harm of Cult Noted
Sottoto
INDICTMENT: This was the occasion?the twentieth con- Mr. Khrushchev, shown here addressing the meeting, began
\
gress of the Soviet Communist party in 3199e.ow?st which his speech on Feb. 24, finished it the next day. On the
Nikita S. Khurshchev deliveredlils denunciation of Stalin. dais at microphones is Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin.
Borisovich] Kamenev, who was
at that time head of the Po-
litical Bureau, and a personal
letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
to BOUM..
I will now read these docu-
ments:
Lev Borisovich!
Because of a short letter which
I had written in words dictated
to me b Vladimir Ilyich b er
Y P -
Because of the fact that not You have read it. and will tin-
the pr., doubtedly read it mission of the doctors, Stalin
all as yet realize fully again mere allowed himself yesterday an un-
tical consequences resulting than once. You might reflect on usually rude outburst directed at
from the- cult of the individual, Lenin's Plain words, in which ex- me. This is not my first duty
the great harm caused by the nresnion is even to Vladimir to the .party, (During all these
violation of the principle of col- IlYich's anxiety concerning the
___
lective direction of the party Party. the Pe?PIO, the Onto. thirty years I have never heard ono from any comrade one word of
and because of the accumela- Mc future direction a Part" rudeness. The business of the
tion of immense and limitless Po___ . .lioy. party and ay ityich not ent
power in the hands of one per- visunstr lIfkli ' "Iteldbi kostr IA me than
son, tbe Central Committee , oCesnesidwily ,
the party considen it at
necessary to make the material
pertaining to this matter avail-
able to the Twentieth Congress
of the Communlit party of the
el ri)* n't.14! is
aM,
tac ong us Communists, be-Dyich, I know better than any
comes a defect which cannot be doctor, because I know what
.
tolerated in one hekling the Pc:- maltase him nervous and. what
from her. I have no intention ? of Stalin, who absolutely did not
to forget so easily that whist tolerate collegiality in leadership
Is being done against me, snit
I need not stress here that I
consider as directed against
me that which is being dam
thereforest , thwale. SrIoU -'-'"a'nelyrh hdirconticcepethaaracter, contrary to
carefully whether you are
agreeable to retracting .your
words and apologizing or
whether you prefer the sever-
ance of relations between Us.
(Commotion in the hall)
Sincerely,
March 5, 1923
Comrades! I will not muusent
on these documents, They speak removal from the leading cones-
eloquently for thenweivea Since ties and to subsequent moral
Stalin cralld behave el thlit MVP and physical azilsJdon. This
""" e.440;,OrA"'f'aiitlizireacyozdede!ig'naI
?
whom
the party knowa WgU sad prominent party leaders and
values highly as a loyal friend rank-and-file party workers,
of Lenin and as an active tight- honest and dedicated to the
and in work, and who practiced
brutal violence, not only toward
everything which opposed him,
but also toward that which
seemed to his capricious and
Stalin acted not through per-
suasion, exPlanation, and patient
cooperation with people, but by
imposing his concepts and de-
manding absolute submission to
his opinion. Whoever opposed
this concept or tried to prove his
Viewpoint, and the correctness
of MS position was doomed to
?
we would not have the collective
farms, we would find ourselves
disarmed and weak in a capi-
talist encirclement.
It was for this reason that the
party led an inexorable ideologi-
cal fight and explained to all
party members and to the nen-
party masses the harm and the
danger of the anti-Leninist pro-
posals of the Trotskyite opposi-
tion and the rightist opportu-
nists. And this great work of
explaining the party line bore
fruit; both the Trotskyites and
the rightist opportunists were
politically isolated; the over-
whelming party majority sup-
ported the Leninist line and the
party -wan- table to -amlsss.an
organize the working masses to
apply the Leninist party line
and to build socialism.
Worth noting is the fact that
even during the pmevess of the
the Trotskyites and the rightists ideological struggle for that of
for the Leninist party line, administrative violence, mass re-
Stalin originated _the concept pressions, and terror. He acted
','enemy of the people." This term on an increasingly larger scale
and more stubbornly through
punitive organs, at the same
time often violating all existing
norms of morality and of Soviet
laws.
Mass Arrests Recalled
Arbitrary behavior by one
person encouraged and permit-
ted arbitrariness in-others. Mass
arrests and deportations of
many thousands of people, exe-
cution without trial and without
normal investigation created
conditions of insecurity, fear
and even desperation.
This, of course, did not con-
tribute toward unity of the
party ranks and of all strata of
working people, but, on the con-
trary, brought about annihila-
tion and the expulsion from the
party of workers who were loyal
but inconvenient to Stalin.
Our party fought for the Im-
plementation of Lenin's plans
for the construction of social-
ism. This was an ideological
fight. Had Leninist principles
been observed during the course
of this fight, had the party's de-
votion to principles been skill-
fully combined with a keen and
solicitous concern for people,
had they not been repelled and
wasted, but rather drawn to our
side, we certainly would not
have had such a brutal violation
of revolutionary legality and
many thousands of people would
not have fallen victim of the
method of trror. Extraordinary
methods would then have been
resorted to only against those
people who had in fact commit-
ted criminal acts against the
Soviet system.
Let us recall -some historical
facts.
In the days before the Octo-
ber Revolution two members of
the Central Committee of the
Bolshevik party, Kamenev and
Zinoviev, declared themselves
against Lenin's plan for an
armed uprising. In addition, on
Lenin Directive Quoted Oct. 18 they published in the
Menshevik newspaper Novaya
In this connection tchoentdreelsse-
Zhizn a statement declaring that
gates to the party
should familiarize themselves the
with an unpublished note by V.I. Preparations for an uprising and
ec
Lenin directed to the central that they considered it adven-
Committee's Political Bureau in turi stiBcele. Kheavinths erere
enevand Zimaknov:e:
ties of the Control Commission, decision of thed
Central Commit-
Lenin wrote that the commission tee to stage the uprising, slid
should
1920. Outlining the do_ dthisecloselluprisintogthhade enbeemen or-
real
y
tt
thetrol Commission there is recom- zPainrotvyievancirevacalgaadinstht ethedecisreioVnOloU
mended a deepr-
individualized re-
should be tra_nsformed into a very
letarian conscience."
"organ of party end pro- ganized to take place within the
"As a special duty of the Con-
ttln.hoeCenItnratilil Cs tioomcomnniteteeeon
Lenin f
This was treason on maegnaeinvst and
e
near future.
their
party on the armed uprising to
[M] Rodzyanko and (Alexander
F.) Kerensky. ? ? *" He put
before the Central Committer.
the question of Zinoviev's and
Kunietiev's expulsion from the
party.
However; after the Great So-
cialist October Revolution, as is
known, Zinoviev and Kamenev
were given leading positions.
Lenin put them in positions in
automatically rendered it unnec-
essary that the ideological er-
rors of a man or men engaged
in a controversy be proven; this
term made possible the usage of
the most cruel repression, vio-
lating all norms of revolutionary
legality, against anyone who in
any way disagreed with Stalin,
against those who were only sus-
pected of hostile intent, against
those who had bad reputations.
This concept "enemy of the
people" actually eliminated the
possibility of any kind of ideo-
logical fight or the making of
one's views known on this or
that issue, even those of a prac-
tical character. In the main,
and in actuality, the only proof
of guilt used, against all norms
of current legal science, was the
"confession" of the accused him-
self; and, as subsequent probing
proved, "confessions" were ac-
quired through physical pres-
sures against the accused.
This led to glaring vMlations
of revolutionary legality, and to
the fact that many entirely in-
nocent persons, who in the past
had defended the party line, be-
came victims.
We must assert that, in regard
to those persons who in their
time had opposed the party line,
there were often no sufficiently
serious reasons for their physi-
cal annihilation. The formula
"enemy of the people" was spe-
cifically introduced for the pur-
pose of physically annihilating
such individuals.
It is a fact that many Per-
sons who were later annihilated
as enemies of the party and the
people had worked with Lenin
during his life. Some of these
persons had made errors during
Lenin's life, but, despite this.
Lenin benefited by their work,
he corrected them and he did
everything possible to retain
them in the ranks of the party;
he induced them to follow him.
lationship with, and sometimes
even a type of therapy for, the
representatives of the so-called
opposition, those who have ex-
perienced a psychological crisis
because of failure in their Soviet
or party career. An effort should
be made to quiet them, to ex-
** the Platter to them in a
way mead among comrades, to
find for 'them (avoiding the
method pf issuing orders), a task
for which- they are psychologi-
cally fitted. Advice and rules
relatin, to this matter are to
-----"
pieeeeeree lie i.e.( ilia( tiei
all as yet realize fully the prac-
tical consequences resultingusually
from the cult of the individual,
the great harm caused by the
violation of the principle of col-
lective direction of the party
and because of the accumula-
tion of immense and limitless
Prwer ra the hands a one l'ee:,,..emiw4
son, the Central Committee or
the party encedders iteiebefeetely
necessary to maim the material
to this matter avail-
able to 'Twentieth Congress
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Intim.
-.Allow Me first of all to re-
mind you how severiy the alas-
sics of ,Mandimi-Leninism de-
minced every manifestation of
the eillt of the individual. In a
letter. to the. German political
worker, Wilhelm Mims, Marx
stated: .
. "Because of my antipathy to
any cult of the individual, I
never made public during the
existence of the First Interns.-
tional the numerous addresses
from various countries which
recognized my merits and which
annoyed me. I did not even reply
to them, except sometimes to
rebuke their authors.
"Engels and I first joined the
secret society of Communists on
the condition that everything
snaking for superstitious worship
of authority would be deleted
from its statute. Lassalle [Ferdi-
nand leassalle, German Socialist]
subsequently did quite the oppo-
site.'
Sometime later Epgels wrote:
"Both Marx and I have always
been against any public reenife e_
tation with regard to individuals,
with the exception of cases when
it had an important purpose; and
we most strongly opposed such
manifestations which during our,
lifetime concerned us personally,'
Lenin Termed Modest
The great modesty of the gen-
Ms of the revolution, Vladimir
Ileich Lenin, is known. Lenin had
always stressed the role of the
people as the creator of history,
the directing and organizational'
role of. the party as a living and
creative organism, and also the
:Ole of the Central Committee.
Marxism does not negate the
role of the leaders of the work-
ers' class in directing the reveille
tionary liberation movement
. While ascribing great impor.
tance to the role of the leaders
and organizers of the masses,
Lenin at the same time merci-
stigmatized every manifes-
tation of the Cult of the indivi-
dual, inexcorably combated the
foreign-to-Marxism views about
a "hero" and a "crowd" and
countered all efforts to oppose a
"hero" to the masses and to the
people.
Lenin taught that the Party's
strength depends on its indissol-
uble unity with the masses, on
the filet that behind the Party
follow the people-workers, peas-
ants and intelligentsia. "Only he
saut Win and retain the power,"
. said Leen, 'Who believes in the
eptiple, who submerges himself
kile the fountain of the living ere-
ealiVenees of the people."
- Leah Spoke with pride about
Bolshevik Communist party
se the leader and teacher of the
. he called for the presen-
ce all the most important
before the opinion of
;
workers before
? ?
opinion of their Party; he
MM.: "We believe in it, we see in
k ***slam, the honor, and the
W ,"
9961Inienee of our epoch.
Um* resolutely stood against
every attempt *mimed at belit-
' '"' " 'e, ie." n? eed :en' me
doubtedly read i again more
than once. You might reflect on
Lenin's Plain wo seen whi
fatpre tiro if
5 &ma anneerning the
Party, the PeoPle. the state, and
the future direetion ' at PartY
li
leadmir Web ,eaiid: "Stens%
. - ? do.
eireleifiellge4
crated in our midst and in eon
. .
tacts among us ConUnUnists, he-
',Mel a defeat. which' eaho' a be,
Mierated M one holding the Po-
talon of the Secretary Gelleral.
Meeamw ef ?thia" I Preixew that
the comrades consider the meth-
od by which Stalin would be re-
moved from this position and by
which another man would be
selected for it; a man who, above
all, would differ from Stalin in
only-
one quality. namely, greater
tolerance, greater loyalty, great-
er kindness and more consider-
ate . .
attitude toward the corn-
rades, a less capricious temper,
etc."
This document of Lenin's was
made known to the delegates atthose
the thirteenth party congress,
who discussed the question of
transferring Stalin from the po.
sition of Secretary General. The
delegates declared themselves in
favor of retaining Stalin in this
post, hoping that he would heed
the critical remarks of Vladimir
Ilyich and would be able to over-
come the defects which caused
Lenin serious anxiety.
Two New Documents Read
Comrades? The party congress
should become acquainted with
two new documents, Which con-
firm Stalin's character as al-
ready outlined by Vladimir Ilyich
,.___en in his "testament." These
'''''''-e
documents are a letter from Na-
. - . -
tieznaa nonstantinovna Krup-
seep, [Lenin's wife.
i to [Lev
. .
.11.,1011 of tile doctors, Stalin
allowed himself yesterday an un-
rude outburst directed at
toe (lure'
ftep414021107141.11F thelikrEPRA5-Gevirti4
thirty years I have never beard
any comrade one word o
rudeness. 'The business of the
pasty end of IlYieh nee net Una'
-
dear to me than te sisitin?:, .1
ire" o ' ' t" one 'can awl
-what one cannot diseeree.With
.....
I ,____i. I know better e'n.,...Y.,,
doctor, beca
-nea ' "e"., Mae"'
makes him nervous and What
__..._ ...._ ...%
not; Nu any cue, ,
better than Stalin.. I am turning
to and to Gri fZinoviev]
as to m?eb closer comrades ,f
v. /.., and I beg of you to pro.
teat me from rude interference
with my private life and from
vile invectives and threats. I
have no doubt as to what will
be the unanimous decision of the
Control Commission, with 'which
?
Stalin sees fit to threaten me;
however, I have neither the
strength nor the time to waste
on this foolish quarrel. And I
am a living Person and my
nerves are strained to the ut-
mese
N. Kenesitset.
Nadezhda Konstantinovna
wrote this letter on Dec. 23 ,
1922. After two and a half
menthe, in March, 1923, Vladi-
mir Dyich Lenin sent Stalin the
following letter:
TO Comrade Stalin:
Copies for: Kamenev and
einoviev. .
Dear Comrade Stalin!
You permitted yourself a
rude summons of my wife to
the telephone and a rude rep-
rimand of her. Despite the
fact that she told you that
she agred to forget what was
said, nevertheless Zinoviev
and Kamenev heard about it
4'.qi '?
whether you prefer the sever-
ance of relations between us.
(Commotion in the hall)mposed
Comrades! I will not coinment
on these documents. They Speak
eloquently for themeor _wt..
stew could behave in thl ''."??e
, ,.. . ,. .
reer .4a/StIgy - el
wee, tin .? .
tan oVna Krupelesya,
whom the parte knows well and
values highly as a loyal friend
of Lenin and as an active tight.
in the
er r the cause of e party
since its creation, We can easily
imagine how Stalin treated 0th-
er people .These negative char-
tertsti . of bis' developedagainst
aL.,..., ea ,_
es`'`'em d d ? the s
y acquired an g absolutely
f ears eraLleui
character. .
Stalin's Abuse of Power
As later events have proven,
Lenin's - t
aurae y was justified: in
the feet period after Lenin's
death Stalin stili paid attention
to his [Lenin's] advice but later
he be to disregard the sere
ous admonitions of Vladimirposed
, ?
yich.
When we analyze the practice
of Stalin in regard to the, diree-
um, of the ' 1
party and o the
country, when we pause to con-
sider everything' '
winch stain
perpetrated ,
ted we must be eon-
vine at s 'fears were
justified. The negative eharac-
teristies of Stalin, which, in
Lenin's time, were only incipient,
transformed themselves du
the last years into a grave abuse
of power by Stalin, which caused
untold harm to our party. .
We have to consider seriously
and analyze correctly this mat-
ter in order that we may pre-
dude any possibility of a repel-
tion in any form whatever of
what took place during the life
J111,111011 nilh ia.olde, Jail I.`,
imposing his concepts and the
mantling absolute submission to
flag:64We his
in t, and the- correctness
of his position was doomed to
removal from the leading collec-
and .penhyasicatol sliannthibseglauentiotn.mThisoral
was ?especially true clualog . the
period following the seventeenth
'
party congress, when many
prominent party leaders and
rank-and-file party 'Workers,
honest and dedicated to the
f unis fellfuriousIdeological
cause o comm m,victimfight
to Stalin's despotism.
We must affirm that the party
had fought a serious fight
the Trotskyites,right-
nationalists,
ists and bourgeois ' 'tightideological
and that it disarmed ideological-
ly all the enemies o Leninism.
' f "
This ideological fight was
.
carried on successfully as a re-
suit of which the party became
strengthened and tempered. Here
Stalinplayed a positive role
po ...
The party led a great political
ideological struggle againstgroups
in its owe ranks pro-
kwho
anti-Leninist theses, who
represented a political line hos-
tile to the party and to the cause
of socialism This was a stub-
. ? ?
born and a difficult fight but aextrememethods.
necessaryone because the poli-
? ? ' Trotskyite-It
tical line of both the
zinovievite bloc and of the Buk-
harnutes [followers of Nikolai I.
Bultharin] led actually toward
the restoration of capitalism and
capitulation to the world hour-
geois.intelligentsia
Let us consider for a moment
what would have happened if in
1928-1929 'the politica/ line of
right deviation had prevailed
among us or orientation toward
co ndress industrialization,'
'' tto ' ' ' ' " "
or toward the kulak [rich peas-
ant] etc. We would not now
have a powerful heavy industry,
111.0., of the ah 11-1,0111141 pin-
posals of the Trotskyite opposeeationship
tion and the rightist opportu-
mists. And this great work of
explaining the party line bore
fruit; both the Trotskyites and
the rightist opportunists were
politically isolated; the over-
eritaay dmitaep-
party Leninist
powhitecleimingthe line
party was able .to aszaken.And
organize. the working' masses to
apply the Leninist party line
and to build socialism,
Worth noting is the fact that
even during the pro of the
f"
against
the Trotskyites, the Zinovievites,
the Bultharinites and others?
extreme repressive measures
were not used against the 'The
them.
was on grounds,
But some years later when so-
? 1"line.At
ma ism in our country was
fundamentally constructed when
. . '
the exploiting classes were gen-
erally liquidated, when the So-
viet social structure had radical-
y changed when the social basis
.,s
for political movements and
hostile to thehad
partyThe
violently contraeted, when the
ideological opponents of the
party were long since defeated
politically, then the repression
directed against them began.
Repressive Policy ? Starts

was precisely during thisevident
Period (1935-1937-1938) that the
Practicerepressionwi
of mass
through the Government appara-
tins was born, first against the
enemies of Leninism?Trotsky-
ites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites,
long since politically defeated by
the party, and subsequently also
against Many honest COMUM-
mists, against those party cadres
who had borne the heavy load
o f the Civil War and the first
and most difficult years of in-
dustrialization and collectivize-
don, who actively fought againstthe
i vieienzei e..
j,,,,,,i,.,i a 00?.1, 111,1
with and sometimesforthe
even a type of therapy .
no-called
representatives of the so-ca
opposition, those who have ex-
Perieneed a psychological crieis
because of failure in their Soviet
mild
or party career. An effort should
riet tathetame,mto ex .
eammataclee to matterin. a
plain
sed among comrades, to
way p ...
find -for them , (avoiding the
method Pf issuing orders). a task
for which. they are psychologi-
catty fitted. Advice and rules
relating to this matter are to
be formulated by the Central
.
Committee's Organizational Bu-
reau etc." ,
,
Everyone knows how irrecon-
enable Lenin was with the ideo-
logical ' of Marxism, with
enemies
e eor-
those who deviated from the
rect party the same
time however. Lenin, as is evi-
' She 'yen document.
dent from e gi
in his Practice of directing the
Party demanded the most inti-
mate party contact with people
who had shown indecision or
temporary nonconformity with
nartv line, but whom it was
the . .
t the party
Possible to return 0
t such
oath. Lenin advised tlia .
neonle ehould be patiently edu
ated without the application of
? with
Lenin's wisdom in dealing wi
people was in his work
?i- cadres
11 ? ' ?
An entirely different relation-
hie with people Characterized
Stalin. Lenin's traits?patient
work with peonle; stubborn and
nainStaking education of them:
the ability to induce people to
follow him without using coin-
nulsion. but rather through the
1/41eological influence on them of
the whole eollective?were en-
a-
rely foreign to e a-
ti ' Stalin.H [St
en] discarded the Leninist meth-
od of convincing and educating;
he abandoned e method of
ie., et the ?,.no. e.
Lenin wrote: "leaneeee. 0,, I (
Zinoviev revealed the decision ef
the Central Committee of their
party on the armed uprising to
[ide Rodzayanko.an.d [Alexander
Fe Kere sky. ? H pm.
before the Central Committee
the question of Zinoviev's and
Kamepetes expulsion from the
Per ty.
-
However, after the Great So-
c ist as IS
MI OctoberRevolution,'
known. Zinoviev and Kamenev
re given leading positions.
we . .
Lenin put them in positions in
which they carried out most re-
sponsible party tasks and par-
ticipated actively in the work of
the leading party and Soviet qr-
gans. It is known that Zinoviev
and Kamenev committed a num-
ber of other serious errors dur-
.
ing Lenin's life. In his "testa.
nt" Lenin warned that "Zino-
tete , ,
viev's and Kamenev s October
episode was, of course, not an
accident." But Le .
Lenin did not
pose the question of their arrest
and certainly not their shooting,
Trotskyite Issue
Or let us take the example of
the Trotskyites. At present,
after a sufficiently long histor-
.
lea period, we can speak .
1k about
the fight with the Trotskyites
with complete calm and can ana-
lyze this matter with sufficient
objectivity. After all, around
Trotsky were people whose ore
n
gin canot by any means be
traced to bourgeous society.
bel to th
Part of them belonged e
Party . -
and a cer
tam
t n part were recruited from
ernme can name many?ng the workers.
v. individuals"
who in their time joined the
Trotskyites; however, these same
individuals took an active part
,
in the workers' movement before
during the Social-
the revolution, g
1st October Revolution itself, and
also in the consolidation Of the
victory of this greatest of revo-
lotions. Many of them broke
with 'Trotskyism and returned to
Leninist positions. Was it neces-
sary to annihilate such people?
We are deeply convinced that
d ' lived h
had Leninsuch an extreme
method WOUld not have been
used against many of them.
Such are only a few historical
facts. But canit be said that
Lenin did not decide to use even
the most severe means against
enemies of the revolution when
this was actually necessary? No,
no one Can say this. Vladimir n-
yich demanded uncompromising
?
dealings with the enemies of the
revolution and of the working
class and when necessary re-
sorted ruthlessly to such
methods.
You will recall only V. I. Len-
Len-
in's fight with the Socialist
Revolutionary organizers of the
anti-Soviet uprising, with the
counter-revolutionary kulaks in
1918 and with others, when
Lenin without hesitation used
the most extreme methods
against the enemies. Lenin used
-
such methods, however, only
aeainst actual class enemies and
?, ,
not against those who blunder,
who err, and whom it was pos.
sible to lead through ideological
influence, and even retain in the

Lenin used severe methods
nnIV in the most necessary caees
--- 4 e m .
when the exploiting classes were
?
still in existence and were vigor-
0usly opposing the revolution,
.
when the. struggle for .survival
was decidedly assuming th?
sharpest forms, even including
a civil war.
i ...", ? th, ,,,,, ,++,,.
lessly
.

Directory
, .
of Persons Mentioned in Khrushcheve s Moscow Speech
-
Following is list
lab. Ambassador to Moscow, who
tried to warn .Soviet leaders of
impending Nazi invasion.
DENIKIN, Lieut. Gen. Anton I.,
one of the chief leaders of the
anti-Soviet military forces
ing the Civil War that followed
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
DZERZHINSKY, Felix E. leader
of the Soviet secret police who
directed the terror campaign
against anti-Communists after
the1917 Bolshevik Revolution
EIIE, Robert I former Co . -
., rmer mmu
Mat party leader and alternate
ro
Politburo member who wa.s ar-
rested in 1938 and executed in
GOLUBIEV, victim' of a Bela
purge, otherwise unidentified.
GoRBATOV. Col, Gen. Alexander
V., World War It Soviet military
Commander. Now commander of
the Baltic Military District and
an alternate member of the Corn-
munist party Central COnSInIttne.
IGNATIEV. Semyon D., head of
the Ministry of State Security, or
lihecerezfarrliccaeier early 1051 when
"doctors'plot"
wail announced. Removed as no-
tional party secretary when the
fabrication was exposed, but now
secretaryPOZERN,
party ill the Sash-kir
glilltiir. former party head in
Sverdlovak province who was
purged in late 1930's.
KAGANOVICH. Lazar M., one of
Stalin's oldest associates and
aupporters. First Deputy Premier
and member of the Presidium ofer
the Soviet Zommunist party.
KneeereEv, Lee e?, we, of the
most prominent Soviet leaders in
the early 1920's. At one time Len-
iIeo? obe
til!
ee chug. of treason et the paa
purge trial. ?
MINSKY, former Peoples Com-
missar of Health, purged in 1037.
. 'oe-'-,- '" "rrr,
KHLOPOV deputy Soviet military
attache 1. Berlin in 1941. tarY
KIROV, In
M., top Soviet
Communist pagty leader and
Politburo member who was mur,-
dared in 1934. Ilia murder is usu-
ally regarded as haying been the
starting point of the period of the
greatest Soviet purges in the mid-
Nineteen Thirties.
KOMAROV, purge victim rehabill-
tated in 1955 but otherwise un-
identified. Believed to be old
B I h ik . . an
o s ev prominent in the
in Nineteen Twenties. party
K V
OSARYE, Alexander A., former
Secretary General of the Your?
Communist Leurav we eoaf announcedte6 Sovi
uli His
Nov. 23, 1931'8 ofi charges that he
had protected immoral and anti-
Communist elements in that or-
sanitation and had failed to
purge the league an Stalin had
ord ed i 19
KOSIOR, Stanislav V., elected to
the Soviet Communist Party
Politburo in 1930. Disappeared
In 1938, a victim of the purge.
KRUPSKAYA. Nadezhda K., Le-
sin's wife. Stalin's insulting atti?
tude toward her brought Lenin's
wrath upon him.
KUZNETSOV, A. A., former top
Communist party leader executed
after World War It after halgrg
been "framed" in the Lenin
Caan,
LASALLE, Ferdinand, important
nineteenth century Socialist lead-
and theoretician. ,
MALENICOV, Georgi M.,' one Of
Stalin's chief proteges. Succeeded
Stalin " Premier in March Mh3.
when Stalin died. Real egost
4
MERETS1COV, Marshal Kirin A.,
Soviet World War It military
commander.
MEZHLAUK. Valery I., former
.
pasty Presidium Resigned as
Forn Minister .last week.
NIKOliAYEV, investigative judge
in the Eikhe case.
NIKOLAYEV, Leonid V., the as-
sassin of Kirov.
ORDZHONIKIDZE
(se , G.s.rigorl K.
leacaTs1,foronemofhrsheelliettiloe.st govtii7et
Politburo in um to his death in
1937.
PODLAS, Soviet World War II
commander.
POPKOV, Peter S., Soviet Corn-
? munist party leader who was a
victim of the fabricated Lenin-
_grad case after World War II.
POSKREBYSHEV, A. N., Stalin's
who dhe.canrisols it,tnd pbersona; friend
n since Setealiin'ae death or
rgreh, 1953. GenerallybolieoeTi
to have been urged y Stall '
auccessors. I.' n a
POSTYSHEV Pavel P former
Communist , ., rmer
Ukraine 'wsthopadritsyappleeLdees Inn 1t9h3;
after he had protested against
the Stalinist excesses. He had
earlier purged his predecessors
in the Ttkraine for b ? t
too a-
tionalistic for Stalin'se"g '1
liking.
purge victim and mem-
her of 1937 Leningrad center not
otherwise identified.
OD ONOV,
R I muthas 7.. former
Premier of the Russian Soviet
Republic and a victim of the
Lret
vir ingrad case after World
War II.
RODOS, one of the Investigative
Judg during the purges of the
" - h
nineteen thirties w 0 was called
ore the party Presidium in
0031304:1544 the
`
Duma (Parliament) of Russia :in
the hoe years of the Czarist
regime.
ROKOSSOVSPY Marshal IC on.
? .- .0 -
party's Central Control Commis-
ion '
s . As head of the commission,
he supervised the expulsion of
17 per cent of the party's mem-
bership in 1934. He disappeared
in 1938.
a
RTJ.KHIMOIC.H.,, otherwise
- purge victim ldenti
sHAPOSHNIKOVA, purge victim
who was said to be member of
1937 Leningrad center
SIVIORODIN, purge victim who was
said to be member of 1937 Lenin-
grad center'writer.
SNEGOV, amember ' Trans_
cauca.sian C om.0. i.o f t h e
tparty Corn.
mittee in the Nineteen Thirties.
He was imprisoncr for seventeen
years before being rehabilitated.
TIMASHUIC, Dr. Lydia F. The
woman who inaugurated the fab-
nested "doctors' plot" of 1953 by
sending a letter accusing leading
Soviet physicians of having tried
toi4rtiurd:irghtiiyigh rewarded and
praised, her fate sintre the plot
was repudiated is unknown.
TITO, Marshal. Communist leader
of Yugoslavia whom Stalin ex-
pelted from the Cominforrn in
1948. From mid-1948 to Stalin's
death in 1953, the resources of
the Communist world were thrown
into the effort to overthrow and
destroy the Tito regime. Marshal
Tito's success In standing up to
Stalin, with United States, Brit-
ish, and French aid, led to the
post-Stalin Soviet apology that
nas concluded with Marshal
Tito's present triumphant visit
to mo.,0,,... 7
UGAROV. purge victim who was
said to be member of 1937 Lenin-
grad center.
USHAKOV. investigative Judge in
h Sithe caee -
EVSICY 51a
VASIL . !Thal Alexander
XL, ono of tho ,,,,,t 1,),,,, q
VOZNESENS"Nikolai A .,
chief''..r
former Soviet planner and
Politburo member who disap-
peered in 1949 and is now known
to have been executed. He was
the highest ranking victim of the
Leningra.d case.
YAGODA, Henryk G., former head
of the Soviet secret police and
one of the chief purgers aatp
his own arrest. He waa tried and
executed in 1938 on the charge
of treason and of having mar-
dered, Idaxim Gorky, Soviet
YENUKIDZE, Abel S., once
Stalin's closest friends from the
days of their youth in their na-
tinve Georgia.t l!'entud'idT't neearmos
omeat officials Inin"theovearelyg7930' -
e
In 1935, he was forced to apolo:
glee tor having exaggerated his
role in the Caucasian revolution-
at7 movement. Re weeee demotede
to,rimuman.agrGoefortljea. meal
Georgia, in December-
1937, he was executed after a
secret trial before a military
court that convicted him of es-
I naee and terroristic activities.
0-0 i, . . he
YEZHOV, Nikolai I., d f t
height ofthe
secret police at the 0
mass purges alter 1935. Near the
close of the purge period in
1938, he was himself removed and
replaced
aced by Berm Yerhov was
rt dlexecuted afterward.
repo e Y eA high t
ZAXOVSKY, 001 , a ?:sereleadership,
police official in 1937.
ZHUKOV, Marshal Georgi K., So-
viet Minister of Defense and al-
rnate member of the Corn-
te .
muttist party Presidium, first
military man ever to attain 40
high a political rank. Though the
outstanding Soviet military hero
of World-War II, he was exiled
to provincial assignments shortly
after the end of the war, not to
,e-enween on the yOwnw !scene
a of persona
mentioned in the purported test
of Nikita S.Kitrusiichetes speech,
together with, brief identified-
floes:
ABAKIJMOV, Victor S., former
heed of the Soviet secret Imiirs
exerted 11_1954 /yea Berta. ac-
eeelerafeereeeeseeee charged With
i
Leningrad Case, as a result of
which aeveral Confinaths4 party
leaders were executed.
A_N DREYEV, Andrei A., former
icAmurrirounmisetthre;tywil,egersranlid. Pon;
moved from that body in 1962.
BAGRAMYAN, Marshal Ivan K.
Soviet World War It commander
now believed to be a Deputy
Minister of Defense,
BATURINA, purge victim of Bela,
otherwise unidentified,
BERIA, Lavreriti P., former head
of the Soviet secret police and,a
SmoLt1tXykstageefulytafifi7Vedrealt7.
Arrested on charges of treason
in June, 1953, and executed after
a secret trial in December, 1953.
SLOSS, Wilhelm, German political
of the nineteenth century
workerwnoreceived a letter from Marx
that Mr. Khreshchev quotes in
speech.
BUICHAKIN. Nikolai I.. former
outstanding Soviet theoretician
a. leader of the n ht-win
g g
among
mong Soviet Communists in the
1920a. Tried on charges of tree-
son in the 1938 purge trial and
subsequently executed.
BULGANIN, Marshal Nikolai A,
Premier of the Soviet Union and
a member of the Piciluip., _of .
iksiroyolaio IlitiVeleaSID,r,a0=0,7122=
omen party. ?
CHUBAR, Vlas B.. Soviet Corn-
Politburorounstiader who Was elected
In 1935 and diem,-
neared in Mk a victim of the ,-
,-r-
?like
'
e
e,
. ,
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
CPYRGHT
Oiligeseitio Xerrewe ..)40.teet
e great modesty of the gen-
ius of the revolution, Vladimir?
IlYicil Lenin, is known. Lenin had
always stressed the role of the
people as the creator of history,
the directing and organizational
role of the party as a living and
creative organism, and also the
role of the Central Committee,
Marxism does not negate the
role of the leaders of the work-
era' class in directing the revolU-
denary liberation Movement.
While ascribing great impor-
twice to the role of the leaders
and organizers of the masses,
Lenin at the same time merci-
lessly stigmatised every manifes-
n -
tatio of the cult of the indivi
dual, inexceirably combated the
foreign-to-Marxism views about
a "hero" and a crowd and
countered all efforts to oppose a
"hero. to the inasses and to the
-11.7,?,,,?Ple' ' _
............. taught that the Party's
ittetigth &Panda on its inah?401-
ubb, =ay wiu, the ? =mews. on
he fact that behind the Party
follow the'PeoPle-workers. PeSS-
ants and intelligentsia. "Only he
will will arid retain the power,"
'said Lenin, "who be/ieves in the
pee*, who submerges himself
In the fountain of the living cre-
alivenes of the people
s ."
Irina spoke with pride about
the Bolshevik Communist party
is the leader and teacher of the
people; he called for the presen-
lation of all the most important
guestions before the opinion of
knowledgeable workers before
?
the opinion of their 'Party; he
laid: "We believe in it, we see in
t the wisdom, the honor, and the
ronscience of our epoch."
Lenin resolutely stood against
livery attempt mimed at belit-
ding or weakening the directing
role of the party in the structure
if the Soviet state. He worked
iut Bolshevik principles of party
arid norms of party life,
itressing that the guiding prin-
liple of party leadership j8 its
allegiality. Already during the
-- CRIPPS.
ire-revolutionary years Lenin
., ..".k., ,i,.. , . ,.011ill ILIALli,.Stri%fliZatiOn and colieetiviza-,0 of convincing and educating
-.. ,,,,le, L.) ii.,,. .ii,i Kanweev heard about it 1 what took 'place during the lifelhave a powerful heavy industry, i tion, who actively fought agains 'he abandoned the method o
-
1 :::ocitnotaRelvivolutIon itself, en
solklation of th
victory of this greatest of revo-
lutionS. Many of them broke
withi iitTsrOt tskiittisan. Ndvasret
iutrnnedecets?-
sary to annihilate such people?
We are deeply convinced that
had Lenin lived such an extreme
method mad t h
me w no avebeen
used against many of them.
Such are only a few historical
facts. But can it be said that
Lenin did not decide to use even
Use Moat severe means against
enemies of the revolution when
this was actually necessary? No,
no one can say this Vladimir fl-
yieh demanded uncompromising
dealings with tkie enemies of the
revolution and of the working
class and when necessary re-
sorted ruthlessly to such
methods.
You will recall only V. L Len-
with the Socialist'
het olfuittntarywiorganizers o the
anti-SoViet uprising, with the
counter-revialutionary kulaks in
1918 and with others when
Lenin Without hesitation used
the most extreme methods
against the enemies. Lenin used
such methods, however, only
against actual class enemies and
not against those who blunder.
who err, and whom it was pos-
.
sible to lead through ideological
influence, and even retain in the
leadership,
Lenin Used severe methods
.
only in the most necessary cases,
when the exploiting classes were
still in existence and were vigor-
ously opposing the revolution
. '
when the struggle for survival
Was decidedly assuming the
sharpest forms, even including
?jell w ar.
Stalin, on the o ,
other hand used
extreme methods and mass re-
preSeiOns at a time when the
revolution was already victori-
ous, when the Soviet state was
strengthened, when the exploitlirection
ing classes were already hqui-
dated and Socialist relations
e, e r e roted solidly in .all phases
?
Directory
?
) . ?
of Persons Mentioned in Khrti,?1cliev s Moscow Speech
?
.
?
Following is a list of persons
Mentioned in the purported tart
Of Nikita S. lihruehChetee speech,
together with brief identifiea-
tions:
ABAKUMOV, Victor S., former
head of the Soviet secret l'ohce
executed in 5954 as a Berle ac-
f=lgicei blieenVisi astrtedc,...L1
Leningrad' Caae, . a result a
which aeveral Communist Patty
leitclers were executed.
ANDREYEV Andrei A., former
)
gibmummunmitztywLe:red %taxi P::
moved from that body in 195;
BAGRAMYAN, Marshal Ivan K.,
sada World War II command.
limy believed to be a Deputy
Minister of Defenae.
BATURINA, purge victim of Bede,
othervrise unidentified.
BERIA. Lavrenti P., former head
of the Soviet seeret police and ,a
Soviet First Deputy rnmier Im-
mediately after Stalin's death.
Arrested on charge. of treason
in June, 1953, and executed after
a secret trial in December, 1953.
BLOT) WphillmiiOerma , ,
milt Politic.
,1role'eueirtedeenInetlee; frointf.Y.
that Mr. Klitrushchey quote. in
peech.
se
BUKHARIN, Nikolai L, former
outstanding Soviet theoretician
i
rd a leader of the right-ss ng
mong Soviet Communists in the
1920's. Tried on charges of tree-
son in the 1938 purge trial and
subsequently executed.
EU LGANIN, Marshal Nikolai A.
Premier of the Soviet Union and
a member of the Presidium of
the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist party,
CHUBAR, Vlas B. Soviet Corn-
munist leader who was elected
to Politburo in 1935 and &sap-
peered in 1938, a victim of the
Durres.
CHUDOV. member of the 1937
Leningrad anti-Soviet center
nthers-ise unidentified.
CFIURCHILL. sir Winston. former
British Prime Minister who tried
fruitlessly to warn Stalin of the
11:17ending Nazi invasion of June,
Sir Stafford, former Brit-
ish Labor party leader ard Brit-
?
.
fah Ambassador to Mos.*, who
tried to warn Soviet leaders of
impending Nazi invasion.
DENIX1N, Lieut. Gen, Anton I.,
one of the chief leadera of the
anti-Soviet military forces fur-
ing the Civil War that followed
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
DZERZIIINSKY, Felix R, leader
of the Soviet secret pollee who
directed the terror campaign
ittalrity atifeojrkmunividolutiafontcr
EIKHE, Robert /., former Commu-
Mat party leader and alternate
Politburo member who was ar-
ireard in 1938 and executed in
GOLUBIEV, victim' of a Berta
purge, otherwise unidentified.
GORBATOV, Col. Gen. Alexander
V., World War /I Soviet military
commander. Now commander of
the Baltic Military District and
an alternate member of the Com-
munist party Central Committee,
IGNATIEV, Seroyon D., head of
the Ministry of Stat Security, or
tegeeefatieseeier early 1913. l ee
? was announced. Remenveed al) naet -
bona! party secretary when the
fabrication was exposed, but now
rttY tY bisectet. in the Bashkir'
e e IrPfp former party head in
Kjargx 4i.
Sverdlovak provinc who was
purged m late mu,.
KAGANOVICH, Lazar M., one of
Stalin'e oldest aseociates and
supporters. First Deputy Premier
and member of the Presidium of
the Soviet Communist party.
KAMENEV, Lev B., one of the
most prominent Soviet leaders in
the early 1920's. At one time Len-
in 's deputy and head of the Mos-
cow Soviet. Tried and executed
on eliaies of treason at the 1936
purge trial. ?
KAMINSKY, former Peoples Com.
miss. of Health, purged ia me.
KARTVELISHVILI - LAVREN-
TIEV, former Communist party
secretary in the Transcaucasue
who was purged in 1931 allegedly
a result of plotting by Bede.
KtiROV, Berle purge victim oth-
erwise unidentified.
KERF_NSKY.. Alexander F., head
of the Provisional Government of lifaL,X0V,oldryatcheidav
by the Bolshevikswhv'in overthrownTo re er,
1917. ',
?
KHLOPOV, deputy Soviet military
attache in Berlin in 194.1.
KIROV, Sergei IL, top soviet
Communist peaty leader and
Polltbiiro member who was imp-
tiered in 1934. His murder is eau-
ally regarded az having been the
t rting point of the period of the
;realest SOViet. purges in the Mid-
Nineteen Thirties.
KOMAROV,_purge victim rehabili-
ttlet:dtt.4,LlaSB52uvterilerzlse liorild-
Bolshevik prominent 1,1 the party
in Nineteen Twentlee.
KOSARYEV . Alexander A., farmer
Secretary General of the Young
Communist League unist ague of the Soviet
purge was esu Ce
Nov! 23, 193ronecharges that he
had protected Immoral and anti-
Communlat elements In that or
ganization and had failed to
purge the league arf Stalin had
ordered in 1937. '
KOS/OR, Stanislav V., elected to
the Soviet Communist party
Politburo in 1930. Disappeared

in 1938, a victim of the purge. ,
KRUPSKAYA, Nadezhda If., Le-
ma's wife. Stalin's inmdting attii?
tude toward her brought in's
wrath upon hint.
KUZNETSOformer, A. A., former top
Communist party leader executed
after World War /I after having
n famed
ee "" rad
in the Lening
ease. .
LAgialz gordinand I. rt....t.
uineteendi century ? lisiTlead-
er and theoretician. ?
StA.LENKOV, Georg! 14.,? one of
Stalin's chief proteges Succeeded
St lin as Premier in illarch 1963
- i?- i, "
nib n Sta m died. Resigned post
in February, 1955. Member of the
Communist party Presidium.
MERETSKOV, Marshal Kirill A.,
Soviet World War It military
commander.
MEZHLAUK, Valery I., former
head of the Soviet State Planning
Commission, who disappearedarmed
after March, 1937.
MIKOYAN; . Anestaa I., one of
Stalin's oideat collea es and
supportere. Now a First D ery
Premier and member of the om-
munist party Presidium.
M., one of
supporLra. ;Iowcog'iersatu colleagues
and member of the Communist
? e,
.
party Presidium,Resigned as
Foreign lanisterlast week.
Yin investigative judge
In the Eikhe case.
IfixoLs..yEtr, Leonid -v., the as-
remain of Kirov.
ORDZHONIKIDZE, Grigort K.
Sem 1 ?
of the highest Soviet
leaderes?Preoni his election to the
Politburo in 1930 to his death in
1937,
PODLAS, Soviet World War II
commander.
POPKOV, Peter S., Soviet Com-
? munist party leader who was a
e
vi Um of the fabricated Leale-
_ gra d case after World War I/.
pOSKREBYSIIEV, A. N. Stalin's
aide de camp and personal friend
varr.b,: haLpot been hard fromonr
st lin s d ER 1
March 1g3 G' &Ill believed
t ? ? ener . ,
0 have been purged y Stalin s
successors. _
coSTYSHEV, Pavel P., former
ukmrnnuniu: party leadeder in the
ho in 1M7
after he had protested against
the. Stalinist excesses, He had
earlier purged his predecessors
In the Ukraine for being too na-
tionalistic for Stalin'a liking.
POZERN, icem-
be of 19purge v 37 Leningradtim and m center not
otherwise identified.
RODIONOV, Mikhail L, former
Premier of the Russian Soviet
Republic and a victim of the
Leningrad case after World
War II.
RODOS, one a the Investigative
judges during the purges a the
nineteen thirties who wai called
before the party Presidium in
.,nee .
a''"'"- '
RODZYAITKO, M., s. leader in the
u I nt) of Russia in
thee't Tee 'erne f Ur 0 ? ,,
e as Years 0 o sorls,
regime,
ROKOSSOVSEY, Marshal Ron-
staatin, now head of the Polish
force,. During World War
II he was a leading Soviet mill-
tory commander thong _
h earlier
he had been unpustly arrested
and Jelled by Stall..
EOEENE.11,Elif, a purge victim an-
rested in Leningrad in 1937.
RUDe ZUTA ber F. . Jant9F.i..tnPiottlobuHro.
win:
formere;ye2People's Commissar
of Railroads and head of the
) . .
party 'a Central Control Commis-
sion. As head of the commission,
he supervised the expuLsion of
17 per per cent of the party's mem-
bership in 1934. He disappeared
in 1938.
RUXHIMOVICH, presumably a
? purge victim not otherwise oienti-
fied.
SHAPOS12NIKOVA, purge victim
who was said to be member of
1937 Leningrad center_
SMORODIN, purge victim who was
said to be member of 1937 Lenin-
grad center. member of th Trans
SNEGOV. a e' _
caticasian Communist party com.
mittee in the Nineteen Thirties.
He was imprison, for seventeen
years before being rehabilitated.
TIMASHUK, Dr. Lydia F. The
-woman who inaugurated the fah-
ricated "doctors' plot" of 1933 by
sending a letter acensing leading
Soviet physicians of having tried
to murder high Soviet leaders.
First highly rewarded and
praised, her fate since the plot
was repudiated is unknown,
TITO, Marshal. Communist leader
of Yugoslavia vvhom Stalin ex-
pelled from the Corninform in
1948. From mid-1918 to Stalin'.
death in 1953, the resources of
the Communist world were thrown
into the effort to overthrow and
destroy the Tito regime: Marshal
Tito's suzcess in standing up tiro
iSntenn.nc7.1.hrentinntitteVtates, t
?
lefts th-
-
post-Stalin Soviet apology that
he concluded with Marshal
Tito 's present triumphant visit
-
UGAROV, purge victim ' who was
said to be member of 1937 Lenin-
grad center.
u SHAKOV, investigative judge In
the Eikhe case.
VASILEVSKY, Marshal Alexander
M., ? one of the Soviet Union's
highest military leaders. Noy(
First Deputy Minister of Defense,
VINOGRADOV, Prot V. N., one
f the Soviet Union's most
o . , . .
eminent physicians. He waa one
of the doctors accused in the
1953 fabricated "doctors plot"
case of having tried to murder
high Soviet leaders. He has been
V):MNTSOV, Capt. Soviet mill-
.
tory attache In Berlin in 1941.
VOZNESENSEY, Nikolai A..
former chief Soviet planner and
Politburo member who
peered in 1949 and in now known
to have been executed. He was
the highest ranking victim of the
Leningrad case,
YAGODA. limaryk G., former head
of the Soviet secret police and
one of the chief purgers until
his own arrest, He was tried and
executed in 1938 on the eliarge
axen and of having mt.er:
aered? M"im Gc'rkY' Se'''
writer.
YENUEIDZE. Abel S on
., ce
Stalin's closest friends from the
days of their youth in their na-
tive Georgia. Yenuicidze became
one..torogrciabelinestuiSeoLiertl golver;
me ?,. .
gt..In Mil. hneayiai?ne: reed Li;
ted&Pehirs
role in the Caucasian revolution-
say movement, tHe was demoted
to manager of he medicals aril-
tariums in Georgia. in December
2937, he was executed after a
secret trial before a military
court that convicted him of es-
Menage and terroristic activities.
YEZHOV, Nikolai I., head of the
secret police at the height of the
mass purges after 1931 Near the
close of the purge period in
193S he was himself remved and
o
re Placed by B erle. Yezhov waa
reportedly executed afterward.
ZAKOVSEY, Leonid. a ,high secret
police official in 1937.
ZHUKOV, 5farehal Georgi X. So-
viet Minister of Defense and al-
ternate member of the Corn-
muoist party Presidium, first
ilitary man ever to attain so
high a political rank. Though the
out-standing Soviet military hero
of World ? War IL he was exiled
to provincial assignments shortly
after the end of the war not to
?_eruerge en the moseow scene
tin th? day after Stalin's death.
ZINOVIEV, Grigory E., one of
the outstanding Soyfet leaders in
the early 1920's. President of the
Communist International and a
member of the Politburo of the
enr,mmist ns^ty until 1926, by
which time Stalin had &inclusive-
ly defeated his hopes of becoming
Lenin'sec on"cea.4er. Torfieeretseodne T .-
the great public purge trial of
1938.
Continued on Following rage
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
CPYRGHT
? of national economy, when our
party was politically
consoli-
dated and had strengthened itself
? ..both numerically and ideological.
ly. It Is dear that here Stalin
? showed ma whole series of cases
his intolerance, his brutality and
? his abuse of power. Instead of
? proving his political correctness
and mobilizing the masses, he
often chose the path of reprea-
non and physical annihilation,
not only against actual enema;
Lot also against individuals who
not committed any crimes
?the party and the
Government. Here we see no wig-
446= but only a demonstration
the brutal force which had
'enoso alarmed V.1. Lenin.
Lately, especially after the un-
471:masking of the [lavrentl P.]
Baia gang, the Central Com-
mittee looked into a series of
. matters fabricated by this gang.
This revealed a very ugly pic-
ture of brutal willfulness con-
. meted with the incorrect be-
havior of Stalin. As facts prove,
Stalin, using his unlimited power,
allowed himself many abuses,
acting in the name of the Cen-
tral Committee, not asking for
the opinion of the Committee
members nor even of the mem-
bers of the Central Committee's
Political Bureau; often he did
not inform them about his per-
sonal decisions concerning very
important Party and government
matters.
14
Cult of the Individual
Considering the quart/on of the
cult of an individual we must
, first of all show everyone what
harm this caused to the interests
of our party.
Vladimir Ilyieh Lenin had al-
ways stressed, the party's role
' rand significance in the direc-
tion ,of the Socialist govern-
ment of workers and peasants;
the saw in this the chid precon-
;,1",dttion for a successful bighting'
k444 socialism In oar country. Point.
Aar to the great responsibility
the Bolshevik party, as a
''"tilnig Parte' In the Soviet date,
called for the most made-
observance, of all norms
party life; he called for the
realtation of the principles of
aillegallly in the direction of the
perty and the state.
anlettiality of leadership flows
nom the very nature of our
''''''7/40stri puty bent rucznee=
destresauc
mid Lenin. 'that
Seretters as. mom.
-nitt Pair
ar tiereagli
flue, vibe without offs
',Atone. ars subject to the
.4aletee le addition, all
lliefthell. all directing
all holders of party po-
em. deceive, they muit
thee aothritlee and
Lea* kir*
of
s.zoto
BEAT, BEAT AND ONCE AGAIN, BEAT' was the ad-
vice given by Stalin to force confessions from the old Bol-
sheviks In the purge trials of the 1930's, according to
Nikita S. Rhreshcher. Trials were held throughout nation.
congress was not convened for
more than seven years.
Central Committee plenums
were hardly ever called. It should
be Nutticient to mention that
during all the years of the Pa-
triotic War not a single Central
Committee plenitin took place.
It is true that there was an at-
tempt to call a Central OccomIt-
toe pietism in October, ail,
and revolutionary legality was
gravely undermined.
The same fate met not only
the Central Committee members
but also the majority of the
delegates to the seventeenth
party congress. Of 1966 dele-
gates with either voting or ad-
visory rights, 1.108 persons were
arrested on charges of anti-
revolutionary crimes. Le, de.
cldedly more than a majority.
fact ate
ihnseurre the
orrolutlonary crimes
made. as we now see, against a
majority of participants at the
seventeenth party congress. (In-
dignation 41 the hall.)
We should recall that the sev-
enteenth party congressis his-
y known as the Congress ea
Victors, Delegates to the o
esiSof
wafted two days for the opening
of the plenum, but in vale. Stalin
did not enn want to meet and
to talk to the Central Committee
This fact shows how
Stalin was in the
first mouths of Me war and how
bseghtily and disdainfully be
nor, they disproved the acei
Bons against theta. :
It must be asserted fa*
this day the circumstance.rounding Kfrov's murdermany things which are ina
plicable and mysteriousdemand a most careful .eanan
d-
nation. There are reasoinfor
the suspicion that the killer af
Kirov, [Leonid V.] Nikdayre
was assisted by someone free
among the people whose duty it
was to protect the person of
Kirov. A. month and a half be.
fore the Stilling, Nikolayev was
arrested on the ground of sus-
picious behavior, but he was
released and not even searched.
It is an visually. suspicious
circumstance that when the
Chekist [secret police member]
assigned to protect Kirov was
being brought for an interroga-
tion, on Dec. 2; 1934, he was
killed in a car "accident" in
which no other occupants of the
car were harmed. After the
murder of Kirov, top function-
aries of the Leningrad N. K. V.1).
were given very light sentences,
but in 1937 they were shot. We
can assume that they were shot
In- order to cover the traces of
the organizers of Kirov's
Growing Repression Noted
Mass repressions grew tre-
mendously from the end of 1936
after a telegram from Stalin and
(Andrei A.] Zhdanov, dated from
Sochi Sept. 25, 1936, was ad-
dressed to [Lazar M.] Kagan-
ovich, (Vyacheslav M.] Molotov
and other members of the Politi-
cal Bureau. The content of the
telegram was as follows:
We deem it absolutely neces-
sary and urgent that Comrade
[Nikolai I.]Yezhov? be nom-
inated to the, post of People's
Commissar for Internal Af-
fairs, [Flenryk G.] Yagoda ha
definitely proved himself to
be incapable of unmasking the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc.
The 0. G. P. U. is four years
behind in this matter. This is
noted by all party workers and
by the majority of the rem*.
sentatives of the N. IL V. 19.
Strictly speaking we should
stress that Stalin did not meet
with and therefore could not
know the opinion of party work-
ers.
This Stalinist formulation that
the "N. K. V. D. [term used in-
terchangeably with 0. (3. P. U.]
is four years behind" In apply-
ing mass repression and that
there is a necessity for "catch-
ing up" with the neglected work
directly pushed e K. V. D.
workers on the path of mass
U.
Have Cost Thousands of Lives in War
wt gave up the use of all ex-
traordinary methods. We have
proved this in practice.
, Stalin deviated from these
elear and plain precepta of Lenin.
Saila put the party and th
N. IC, V. D. up to the use
mass terror when the exploitin
classes had been liquidated
oar country and when the
were no serious reasons for th
me of extraordinary rni.iss te
? roe.
This terror was actually d
rected not at the remnants
the defeated exploiting class
but against the honest worke
of the party aria. of the Soulstate; against them were mad
lying, slanderous and absurd a
emotions concerning "two-faced
nese." "espionage,' -"sabotage
preparation of fictitious "plots
etc.
Stalin's Coarse Questioned
At the February-March Cen-
tral CommitteePlenum in 1937
niany members actually ques-
toned the rightness of the estab-
lished course regarding mass re-
'ons under the pretext of
combating "two-facedness." ?
Comrade [Pavel P.] Postyshev
most ably expressed these
doubts. He said:
I have philosophized that the
severe years of fighting have
passed, party members who
have lost their backbones have
broken down or have joined
the camp of the enemy;
healthy elements have fought
for the party. These were the
years of industrialization and
collectivization I never thought
it possible that after this
severe, era had passed Karpov
and people like him would find
themselves in the camp of the
enemy. (Karpov was a worker
in the Ukrainian Central Cern-
mittee whom Postyshev knew
well.] And now, according to
the testimony, it appears that
Karpov was recruited in 1934
by the Trotzkyites. I personal-
ly do not believe that in 1934
an honest party member who
had trod the long road of un-
relenting fight against enemies
for the party and for social-
ism, would now be in the camp
of the enemies. I do not be-
lieve it.. . . I cannot imagine
how it would be possible to
travel with the party during
the difficult years and then, in
1934, join the Trotzkyites. It
is an odd thing. (Movement in
the ball).
Using Stalin's formulation,
namely that the closer we are to
....taloa the more enemies we
.,and Using the resolu-
,
rebruary-Iderch Cen-
ral" Ceennaittee Plenum passed
on the basis of Yezhov's report?
the provooateurs who had infil-
trated the state security organs
together with conscienceless ca-
reerists began to protect with
the party name the mass terror
against party cadres, cadres of
tba Soviet state and the
e
sf
in
re
of
es
rs
et
the Pelonarjabfareh
Man of the Central Committee
the All-Union Communist party
(Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary
nsolution approved it on the
basis of Terhov's report, "Les-
sons flowing from the baneful
deity, diversion and espionage
f the Japaness-Cerme.n
Cseauseniist party (Bolsheviks/
ce
rt:tvoluttonary crimes* thell'had,
t
British 01151,1 Photo
ADVICE IGNORED: Stalin with Prime Muster Churchill
at a meeting in Moscow in 1942. The year before, 'Stalin
had disregarded British warnings--and even Soviet intel-
ligence reports?that Germany would invade Soviet Union.
were accused of anti-Soviet aer
On Oct. 1, 1939, Eikhe sent
his declaration to Stalin in which
he categorically denied his guilt
and asked for an examination
of his case. In the declaration
he Wrote:
There is no more bitter mis-
ery than to sit in the jail of a
government for which I have
always fought.
Second Declaration Cited
A second declaration of Eikhe
has been preserved which he
sent to Stalin Oct 27, 1939. In it
he cited facts very convincingly
and countered the slanderous
accusation was on the one hand
the work of real Trotskyites
whose arrests he had sanctioned
as First Secretary of the West
Siberian Kral. Party Committee
and who conspired to take re-
venge on him, and, on the other
hand, the result of the base fal-
sification of materials by the in-
vestigative judges. Eilthe wrote
in his declaration:
On Oct. 25 of this year I
was informed that the investi-
gation in my case has been
concluded and I was given az-
Oils to_ the Materiels of this
iniesetbadoe. Va.*
Public
With unbelievable crafty crea-
tion
(Movement in the hall.)
tion of fabricated "anti-Soviett
in a terroristic center in Lenin-
grad,"
Trial Planned
"In order to illustrate it to
me," stated Rosenblum, "Za-
kovsky gave me several possible
variants of the organization of
this center and of its branches.
After he detailed the organiza-
tion, Zakovsky told me that the
NICVD would prepare the case
of this center, remarking thac
the trial would be public.
"Before the court were. to be
brought four or five members
of this center: Chudov, Ugarov,
Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhniko-
va [Chudov's wife] and others
together with two or three
members from the branches of
this center,
'
"The case of the Leningrad
center has to be built solidly
and for this reason witnesses
are needed. Social origin (of
course, in the past) and the
party standing of the witness
will play more than a small role.
"You, yourself," said Zakov-
sky, "will not need to invent
anything. The N. K. V. D. will
prepare for you a ready outline
for every branch of the center;
you will have to study it care-
fully and to remember well all
questions and answers which
the Court might ask. This case
will be ready in four-five
months, or perhaps a half year.
During all this time you will be
preparing yourself so that you
will not compromise the inves-
tigation and yourself. Your
trial goes and on its results. It
future will depend on how the
you begin to lie and to testify
falsely, blame yourself. If you
manage to endure it, you will
save your head and we will feed
an examination by the Central and clothe you at the govern-
nCootinnlidonteteeandTtlikise This is the kind of vile thing.
This, however, was
, was rehienth's cost until your death?.
n prac
transmitted to Boris while the ?(fltdoctementr % till; hall.) flee&
terrible maltreatment of the Even more widely was the
Political Bureau candidate, Cora- falsification of cases practiced
rade Eikhe, continued. in the provinces. The N. K. V. D.
On Feb. 2, 1940, Mare was headquarters of the Sverdlovsk
or-
said
as
brought bellofwores, the court Here Oblast "discovered" the so-called
he did not confess any guilt and
g"Ilan of th
ura
l uprisinge bloc of
' rightists,o r -
letter written by, me with the
In all the so-called confes. Trotskyite.s, Socialist Revolu-
exception of my signatures
sions of mine there is not one tionaries, church leaders?whose
chief supposedly was the Sao-
forced from ore. I have made retary of the Sverdlovsk Ob-
my confession under pressure last Party Committee and mem-
under the protocols which were
wfrhoomfmthme the
eestimtigae tiovfemjyudagre. her of the Central Committee,
terials of
osere eu: tormented n h.r hee ne t pe da:myste an After'adpsr tanw thatnt- time show
I began to write all this non- be(Beonlshaepartviksly,.Kabemakberov,,nweehoishad14.
All-Union Communist party
The
ve
timpin all kr-ala, oblasta imeintiat republics
In almost
th,ei'e supposedly
thathintgI for
me
et iSguilt4ty.teIllhathvee 7m??thrsed?'""lighni,d?t-
r.
never been guilty of any con- s's""'"--
and spiracy. I will die believing in that the heads at Such ergaalta's
Lavelife.betrutillevldp'fil rea"? policy as tkas "wer.a rui"eflirstr "me"riegialominu-113wni
of Wiest or republIc
On Fels 4 Eikhe was shot. It Aid Party onaugluse or Central
has been definitely established Osinmittem. Ilravesaedt hi the
powankhae.' age ne?"."-*
116441. - 1.1117 U14 mule! tu.'d. . g
rin all the years of the Pa- delegates to 'the. seventeenththe "N. K. V. D. [term use.d in-
. . ........
how it be to
er
travel with the party during angea ly with O. G. P. U.]
triotic War not a single Central party congress. Of 1966 dele-. an apply- the difficult years and then, in
Committee plenum took place. gates with either voting or ad- ittis four years
1934, join the Trotallites. It
Collegiality of readership flows
from tbe very nature of our
? elides of democratic cen ?
party, a party built on the p ' -
''This means," said Lenin, "that
all Party matters are accom-
nc." pllshed by all Party members,
directly or through representa-
pt6Streartaftt ?ZY4211142=CIA?
the neglec wor
revolutionary crimes, i.e., de' directly pushed the N. K. V. D. Using Stalin's formulation"
tee plenum in October, 1941, cidediy more than a majority, workers on the
when Central Committee mem- This very fact shows how ab- path of mass namely that the closer we are to
0,5=30,054a. ment m
eerie:nem the more enemies we
an execu ons.
hers from the whole country surd, veld and contrary to cone- We should state that this will have, and us -
ing the res?
lu
- w
ere lled 'to Moscow. They mon sense were the c ;Urges of eormuestion was also famed on tics of the February
tions, are subject to the same -March Cen-
fives, who without any excep-
ca counter - revolutionary crimes mazy- plenary tral Committee Plenum Passed
rules; in addition, all adminis- waited two days for the oPening made, as we now see, against a eon of the Central committee Of
nee_
' trative members, all directing of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin majority of participants at the the All-Union Communist Party
' collegia, all holders of party po- did not even want to meet and seventeenth party congress. (In- (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary
" ?? seems are elective, they must to talk ia the Central Committee dignation in the hall.) = resolution approved it on the
account for their activities and members. This fact Shows how , We should recall that the v
.i. are recallable." o s report, 'Les-
demoralized Stalin was-- in the enteenth party congress is his- sons flowing from the hartneei
ee It is known that Lenin him- first months of the war and how torically known as the Congress activity, diversion sad espionage
'1, self offered an example of the haughtily and disdainfully be of Victors. Delegates to the of the Japaness-Gennamegrot-
O. most careful observance of these treated the Central Committee congress were active partici- skyite agents," stating:
?st, principles. There was no matter members. _ pants in the buedlug of our So- e The Ilenum of th
es e Central
se important that Lenin himself en practece Stalin ignored the cleave state: many of them sof- . committee 0 fthe Ap.thnon
fie- decided it without asking for norms of party life and trampled fered. and fought for Party in" Communist Party (BOIsheviks)
..eadvice and approval of the ma- on the Leninist principle ee col- tweeds during We pre-revole- considers., that all facts re'.
Jere), of the Central Cortunittee jectiw party leadership:. binary years in the conspiracy waled durin gthe investiga-
ne'anembers or of the members of eteue.s willfulness vis-a-vis and at the Civil War fronts: tion into the matter of an
, ;he central
B Committee's pad- the and its central Com- they fought their enemies val. anti-Soviet TrotskYite center
eei cal ureau. '
4.; . In the most difficult period
for our party and our country,
ee Lenin considered it necessary
eeeregularly to convoke congresses,
ec! party conferences, and plenary
,et, sessions of the Central Commit-
eil-tee at which all the most um-
,sie tent questions were diseussel
uuttee became fully evident after iantly and often nervelessly and
it
the seventeenth party congress, looked into the face of death, provinces show that the ,Peo-
which took place in 1934. How then can we believe that pie's Commissariat of Internal
such people could prove to be Affairs has fallen behind at
Injustices Investigated "two-faced" and had joined the least four years M the attempt
Having at its disposal numer- camps of the enemies of Social- to unmask these most inexora-
ous data showing brutal willful- ism during the era after the his enemies of the people,
nes, toward party cadres, the political liquidation of Zinoviev- The mass repressions at this
Central Cemmtttee had created ites, Trotskyites and rightists time were made under the sio-
eiecand where resolutions, eareesBY a party coremiedon under the and after the great accomplish- gs,n of-a fight against the Trot-
,,eileadersworked, sweat by thecollectiveod. a control of the Central Ceruett- meats of Socialist construction? skyites. Did the Trotskyites at
C ees presidhuni it was cheesed This was the result of the this time acttmllyur constitute
.e. Year of Intervention with ineestigat went made abuse of power by Stalin, who such a danger to o party and
We can recall, for an example, possible the r ug
nees repressions
began to use mass terror against to the Soviet State? We should
the year 1918 when the country against the majority of the Con- the Party cadres-
recall that in 1927 on the . eve
?' was threatened by the attack of tral Committee members and What is the reason that mass of the Fifteenth Party Congress
. repressions against activists in- only about 4,000 votes were cast
for the Trotskyite-Zinovievite op-
candidates elected at the seven
of the All-Union creased more and more after the
teenth con
seventeenth party congress? It Position, while there were 724,-
Communist party (Bolsheviks).
The commission has become was because at that time Stalin ti00 for the party line. During
had so elevated himself above the ten years that rued be-
e Imperialistic Interventionists.
? 'In this situation the seventh
'party congress was convened in
order to discuss a vitally Import-
ant matter which could not be
' postponed, the matter of peace.
In 1919, while the Civil War was
raging, the eighth party con-
, gress convened adopted a new
acquainted with a large quantity
of materials in the N. IC. V. D
[secret police] archives and with
other documents and has estab- party-. While he still reckoned TrotsliYism was completely dis-
_. Party program and decided such the fabrication of cases against had changed their former views The majority of the Central
before the seventeenth
Con-
that he ceased to consider eith- gives the party and above the nation tween the Fifteenth arty Con-
and the February-March
es the central committee or the Central Committee, Plenum,
lished many facts Pertaining to with the opinion of the collective armed; many former Trotskyites
irePertant /mitten' as the relit" Communists, to false aeons.- after the complete
-,, UonshiP with the Peemut masses._ . tions, to glaring abuses of So- liquidation of the Trotskylixatites,cai toanrsd wburortirsed gin the various sec, Committee members and candi-
socialism, It is dates elected at the seventeenth
,,,,, organize ' of the rim ciailst legality which resulted in ednoeteettes and Beehttrinites clear that in the situation of congress and arrested in 1937-
c Army. the leading role of the the death of innocent people, It when as n win= of that fight Socialist victory there was no 1938 were expelled from
esel",_,VertY in the wecr.fIrt=vietst became apparent that raany per- and Socialist victories the party halls f.er mam terror in ine =tir illegaSY thmugn 11113:
elle potation'''. et the Party, and ether acne*, siesie
eves? ty, Gammas* and: mononge unity. Stalls ceased to Ile= oftbstbecossuomparty staott.
Weer Sonilisetien *sr
Ili 11730 no Meth peke' mew
gress was rammed, which laid ,???, eta, bet wee shrew boot ottbe Pontine Healtarte 1437
.....eednewntogniclintho 1211n, CI_ eeeePkie Pertain._ ee_ c ammuldsts?--' . Stalin thought that how he party leo& so4i methods tor
sphere or .s.-,..7,,:zi: c-zitizaz _They were only ao Stigmatised could decide ail things alone and *wail= se the Tro
and often, no longer able to bear all he needed were atatisliciane: amt other two-facers," contained
barbaric tortures, they charged
themselves (at the order of the
Investigative judges?realness)
During Lenin's life party, ton_ with all =ids of grave and un-
on the basis of Yezhov's report?
the provooateurs who had infil-
trated the state security organs
together with conscienceless Ca-
reerists began to protect with
the party name the mass terror
against party cadres, cadres of
the Soviet state and the ordinary
Sgriet eineees. It should Suffice
to say that the number of ar-
rens based oil charges of mud"
ter-revolutioeary crimes had
grown ten times between 1936
and 1937.
It is know that brutual
will-
fulness was practiced against
leading party workers. The par-
ty statute, approved at the sev-
enteenth . party congress, was
based on Leninist principles ex-
pressed at the tenth party con-
gress. It stated that to apply
an, extreme method such as ex-
clusion from the party against
a Central Committee member,
against a Central Committee
candidate, and against a mem-
ber of the Party Control Com-
mission, "it is necessary to call
a Central Committee Plenum and
to invite to the Plenum all Cen-
tral Committee candidate mem-
bers and all members of the
Party Control Commissoin"; only
If two-thirds of the members of
such a general assembly of re-
sponsible party leaders find it
necessary, only then can a Cen-
tral Committee member or can-
didate be expelled,
Illegal Ousters Charged
In 1921, the tenth party congress
e accepted Lenin's New Economic
'Policy and the historical resolu-
tion called, "About Party Unity."
N who the ages of borne
et these. se-called *spier and
'saboteurs' thrt:esuesamined it
an: attempt at theoretical jus- Were fabricated. Confessions of
ewer that thee could only listen tification of the mass terror PM" guilt of many anested and
to end praise him. icy under the . pretext that as chaiged with enemy activity
.. greases Were convened regularlY? likelY crimes' The ecemnisehul After the minim! murder of gatiffinweiTeurtrettseTyhoehusartiet
The Faroe purges mamh forward toward socialism were gained with the help of
alwaYa when a radical turn 1155 PresentL?dr,d,dh??to the 1?,?,,,eireCentral Serget Kimv, mass 'vim's" to and Lenin ht him this.
,- the development of the party Committee ? Mons and brutal acts of viola- rictually, Lenin taught that
i.'Landenintheecasicodimeredtry
It absolutely taming to mass repressions On the evening of Dec. 1. 1934, violence is necessitated by the
took place, and documented materials Per- tion of Socialist legality began, - the application of revotionary
on Stalin's initiative (without resistance of the exploitating
Btheuresaup,prowhivalch of thethe1:ed twolitical classes,
o
era
days later, casually) the secre- existed and were powerful: As
sven and th this
exploiting referred
classest?t
, necessary that the Party discuss
?'1', at length all the basic matters
pertaining to internal and for-
eign policy and to question's
? bearing on the development, of
, party and government.
'? It is very characteristic that Central Committee.
Lenin addressed to the party
congress as the highest party
organ his last articles, letters
and remarks. During the period
, between congresses the Central
? Corrunittee of the party, acting
?' as the most authoritative leading
collective, meticulously observed
ths principles of the Party and
carried out its policy.
So it was during Lenin's life.
Were our party's holy Leninist
principles observed after the
death of Vladimir Ilyich?
Whereas during the first few
? years ,after Lenin's death party
congresses anel Central Commit- revo ution and during the Civil
" tee plenums took place more or War; this means before 1921. By
" lese ,ater. .
against the delegates to the sev-
enteenth party congress and
against members of the Central
Committee elected at that Con-
gress. These materials have been
studied by the Presidium of the
It was determined that of the
139 members and candidates of
the party's Central Committee
who were elected at the seven-
teenth congress, ninety- eight
persons, I e., 70 per cent, were
arrested and shot (mostly in
1937-38), (Indignation in the
hall.)
What was the composition of
the delegates to the seventeenth
congress? it is known that
80 per cent of the voting partici-
pants of the seventeenth con-
tioledittiP4051efaX
cruel and inhuman tortures,
At the same time Stalin, as
we have been informed by mem-
bers of the Politica/ Bureau of
that time, did not show them
the statements of many accused
political activists when they re-
tracted their confessions before
the military tribaoal and asked
soon as the nations PoUUoaI alt-
for an objective examination of
Central Executive Committee, nation had improved,
when in their cases. There were many
Abel S. Yenukidze, signed the January, 1920, the Red Amiy such declarations, and Stalin
following directive: took Rostov and thus won a doubtlessly knew of them.
1. Investigative agencies are most imnortant victory .over The Central Committee con-
directed to speed up the cases [Anton 1-.) Denikin Lenin in- siders it absolutely necessary to
of those accused of the preps- structed [Felix E.] Dzherzhin- inform the congress of many such
ration or execution of acts of sky to stop mass terror and fabricated "cases" against the
terror. . abolish the death penalty. Lenin members of the party's Central
2. Judicial organs are di- Justified this important report Committee elected at the seven-
meted not to hold up the at the session of the Ail-Union
execution of death Sentences Central. Executive Committee
pertaining to crimes of this Feb. 2, 1920.
category in order to consider We were forced to use ter-
the Possibility of Pardon, be- ror because of the terror
cause the Presidium of the Practiced by the Entente.. when
Central Executive Committee strong world powers threw Committee Political Bureau, one
teenth party congress.
An example of vile provoca-
tion, of odious falsification and
of criminal violation of revolu-
Unary legality is the case of the
former candidate for the Central
e:tiiitittigrantatilltWAMigatuoov!
ceiving of petitions of this We would not have lasted two eminent, Comrade Robert L
sort. days had we not answered Blithe, who was a party member
Second Declaration Cited
A second declaration of Eikhe
has been preserved which he
sent to Stalin Oct. 27, 1939. In it
he cited facts very convincingly
and countered the slanderous
accusation was on the one hand
the work of real Trotskyites
whose arrests he had sanctioned
as First Secretary of the West
Siberian Krai Party Committee
and who conspired to take re-
venge on him, and, on the other
hand, the result of the base fal-
sification of materials by the in-
vestigative judges, Eikhe wrote
in his declaration:
On Oct. 25 of this year I
was informed that the investi-
gation in my, case has been
concluded and I was given ace
cess to. the nieterialh.e1 this
investigation. Had. LI' been
guilty of only one-hundredtli
of the crimes with which /
charged, I would not. have
dared to send you this pre-
execution declaration; how-
-ever, I have not been guilty of
even one of the things with
which I am charged and, my
heart is clean of even the
shadow of baseness. I have
never in my life told you a
word of falsehood and now,
finding my two feet -in the
grave, / am also not lying. My
whole case is a typical exam-
ple of provacation, slander and
violation of the elementary
basis of revolutionary legal-
ity.
The confessions which were
made part of my file are not
only absurd but contain some
slander toward the Central
Committee of the All-Union
Communist party (Bolshe-
viks) and toward the Council
of People's Commissars be-
cause correct resolutions of
the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist party
(Bolsheviks) and of the Council
of People's Cormnissars which
were not made on my initia-
tive and without my participa-
tion are presented as hostile
acts Of counter-revolutionary
arganhations made at my
alb610 tri;
life and to my really grave
gulit against the party and
against you, This is my oon..
fesslon" of counter-revolution-
ary activity . . . The case is
as follows: not being able to
suffer the tortures to which I
was submitted by Ushakov
and Nikolayev?and especially
by the first one?who utilized
the knowledge that my broken
ribs have not properly mend-
ed and have caused me great
pain?I have been forced to
accuse myself and others.
The majority of my confes-
sion has been suggested or
dictated by Usha.kov, and the
remainder is my reconstruc-
tion of NICVD materials from
Western Siberia for which I
assumed all responsibility. If
some part of the story which
Ushalcov fabricated and which
I signed did not properly hang
together, I was forced to sign
another variation. The same
thing was done to Rulthimo-
vich, who was at first desig-
nated as a member of the
reserve net and whose name
later was removed without
telling me anything about it;
the same was also done with
the leader of the reserve net,
supposedly created by Burk-
harin in 1935. At first I wrote
my name in, and then I was
instructed to insert Mezhlauk.
III Aliii..,t).1,11i. 1.1114
sions of mine there is not one
letter written by me with the
exception of my signatures
under the protocols which were
-forced from me. I have made
my confession under pressure
from the investlgative judge
who from the time of my ar-
rest tormented me, After that
I began to write all this non-
sense. The most important
thing for me is to tell the
court, the party and Stalin
that / am not guilty. I have
never been guilty of any con-
spiracy. I will die believing in
the truth of party policy as
have believed in it during my
hasw.0huobleeenPelilf:definitely established
"4 Eikhe was shot. It
paw that Bilche's ease was fab-
ricated; he has been postine
mously rehabilitated, -
Comrade Tan E. Rudzutak
candidate member of the Politi-
cal Bureau, member of the party
since 1905, who spent ten years
in a Czarist hard-labor camp,
completely retracted in court the
confession which was forced
from him. The protocol of the
session of the Collegium of the
Supreme Military Court contains
the following statement by Rud-
zutak:
The only. , plea which he
places before the court is that
the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist party
Bolsheviks) be informed that
there is in the N. IC. V. D. an
yet not liquidated center
which is craftily manufactur-
ing cases, which forces inno-
cent persons to confess; there
is netopportunity to prove
one's donparticipation in crimes
to which the confessions of
various persons testify. The in-
vestigative methods are such
that they force people to lie
and to slander entirely inno-
cent persons in addition to
thoise who already stand ac-
cused.
He asks the court that he be
Showed to inform the Central
Committee of the All-Unica
Ossiseenis party iillobits-
Waal abort
all ttilte in wrens&
He moans the at tbst he
personally had never any end/
designs in regard to the policy
of our party because he had
always agreed with the party
policy pertaining to all spheres
of economic and cultural ac-
tivity.
This declaration of- Rudzutak
was ignored, despite the fact
that Rudzutak was in his time
the chief of the Central Control
Commission, which was called
into being in accordance with
Lenin's concept for the purpose
of fighting for party unity. In
this manner fell the chief of this
highly authoritative party organ,
a victim of brqtal willfulness: he
was not even' called before the
Central Committee's Political
Bureau because Stalin did not
want to talk to him. Sentence
was pronounced on him in twen-
ty minutes and he was shot (In-
dignation in the hall).
After careful examination of
the case in 1955 it was estab-
lis,hed that the accusation against
Rudzutak was false and that it
was based on slanderous ma-
terials. Rudzutak has been reha-
bilitated posthumously.
The way in which the former
NRVD ? workers manufactured
various fictitious "anti-Soviet
centers" and "blocs" with the
help of provocatory methods is r
seen from the confession a
tionaries, chile, 11
chief supposedly was the .`s, ?
retary of the Sverdlovsk 0-
last Party Committee and /IV,
her of the Central Committo
All-Union Communist part y
(Bolsheviks). Kabakov, who ha
been a Party member since 191 I
The investigative materials 6,
that time show that in almo t
all krais, oblasts and republi
there supposedly existed "right-
ist Trotskyite, espionage-terror
and diversionary-sabotage or-
ganizations and centers" aid
that the heads of such organize-
Dons as a rule?far no knoe.e
reason?were first secretari.,
of oblast or republic Commie
Mat party committee or Centre!
Committees. (Movement in Its
.. Other Cases Are Noted
? Many thousands of honest and
innocent Communists have died
as a result of this monstrous
falsification of such "cases," a,
a result of the fact that all
kinds of slanderous "confes-
sions" were accepted, and as a
result of the practice of fort-
ing accusations against onselt
and others. In the sante man-
ner were fabricated the "cases"
against ezeinent party and stet
workers?Kosior, Chuber, Posty-
shev, Kosaryev, and others.
In those yeare repressions on
a mass scale were applied which
were based on nothing tangible
and which resulted in heavy
cadre losses to the party.
The vicious practice was con-
doned of having the N. IC. V. D
prepare lists of persons who;.i
cases were under the jurisdic-
tion of the Military Collegium
and whose sentences were pre-
pared in advance. Yezhov woull
send these lists :to Stalin per-
sonally for his approval of the
proposed punishment In 1937-3S.
383 such lists containing the
names of many thousands et'
party, Soviet, Komsomal, Army
and economic workers were sent
to Stalin. He approved these
Usti.
A huge part of these rases
Si'. Wog awriented now and a
greet ,part sg them Sr. being
'mind .they were base-
less and blithe& Wham n in
say that from Mt to the reesseet
time the Military Colleen= et
the Supreme Court has rehabilt
Rated 7,679 persona, many of
whom were rehabilitated post-
humously.
Mass arrests of party, Soviet,
economic and military workers
caused tremendous harm to our
country and to the cause of So-
cialist advancement.
Mass repressins had a nega-
tive influence on the moral-pee
litical condition of the party,
created a situation of uncer-
tainty, contributed to the
spreading of unhealthy suspic-
ion, and sowed distruct among
Communists. All sorts of slan-
derers and careerists were ac-
tive.
Resolutions of the January
Plenum of the Central Commit-
tee, All-Union Corninunist Party
(Bolsheviks), in 1938 ha.i
brought some measure of im-
provement to the party organi-
zations. However, widespread
repression also existed in 1938.
Only because our party has at
Its disposal such great moral-
political strength was it possible
for it to survive the difficult
clients in 1937-1938 and to edu-
cate new cadres. There is, how-
ever, no doubt that our march
orward toward socialism ani
the et
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
CPYRGHT
In 1919, while the Civil War was
Ming. the eighth party con-
, ..gress convened, adopted a new
'Tarty program and decided such
Important matters as the
,tionship with Umpeasant masses,
;!:the organization of the Red
-,rnay, the leading role of the
Party in the work of the Soviets,
the correction of the social com-
;,7iaosition of the Party, and other
? matters, ,
? In 1920 the ninth party con-
gress was convened, which laid
. down guiding principles pertain-
ing to the Party's work in the
sphere of scenomic construction.
In 1921, the tenth party congress
accepted Lenin's New Economic
Policy and the historical resolu-
tion called, "About Party Unity."
During 1.,..ain's life party con-
gresses were convened regularly;
always, when a radical turn in
the development of the party
and the country took place,
Lenin considered it absolutely
, necessary that the Party discuss
at length all the basic matters
Pertaining to internal and for-
eign policy and to questions
. bearing on the development, of
party and government
It is very characteristic that
Lenin addressed to the party
' congress as the highest party
organ his last articles, letters
'and remarks. During the
, between congresses the
'I` ? Committee of the party, acting
as the most authoritative leading
Collective, meticulously observed
tha principles of the Party and
'""carried out its policy. '
So it was during Lenin's life.
Were our party's holy Leninist
4 priaciples observed after the
death of Vladimir Ilyich?
4l Whereas during the first few
'years ,after Lenin's death party
- congresses and Central Commit-
tee plenums took place more or
less regularly, later, when Stalin
..vg.10~00100.00411110001110w4, ?
c
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000
00130054.'4 ?
THE NEW YORK TIMES.
Self-Praise as Military 'Genius' Denounced as Shameful Distortion of Facts
"Pram Preceding Page
such t matters ea the
fate suelS eminent Party fig-
ures 7
/lama Placed on Stalin
ye, it would be a display of
navete to consider this the work
Yezhov alone. It is clear that
these matters were decided by
'Stalin, and that without his or-
ders and his sanction Yezhov
could not have done this.
We have examined the cases
and have rehabilitated Kosior,
Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosaryev
and others. For what causes
were they arrested and sen-
tenced? The review of evidence
Shows that there was no reason
for this. They, like many others,
were arrested without the prose-
cutor's knowledge.
. In such a situation there is no
need for any sanction, for what
port of a sanction could there be
when Stalin decided everything.
WaS the chief prosecutor in
t.hese cases. 'Strain not only
? agreed to, but on his own initia-
tive. issued arrest orderer We
Must say this so that the dele-
gates to the congress can clearly
undertake and themselves ,assess
this and draw the proper eonclu
aionS.
, Facts prove that many abuses
were made on Stalin's orders
without reckoning with any
norms of party and Soviet legal-
ity. Stalin was a very distrustful
man, sickly suspicious; we knew
this from our work with him.
He could look at a man and
say: "Why are your eyes so
shifty today," or "Why are you
turning so much today and
avoiding to look me directly in
the eyes?" The sickly suspicion
created in him a general dis-
erust even toward eminent party
workers whom he had known
for years. Everywhere and in
everything he saw "enemies,'
"two-facers" and "spies."
Possessing unlimited power,
he indulged in great willfulness
and choked a person morally
and physically. A situation was
created where one could not
;express one's own will.
When Stalin said that one or
another should be arrested, it
,'was ne.....ny to accept on
faith that be was an "enemy of
people." Meanwhile, Beria's
tang, which ran the organs of
seem*" outdid itself in
?
laredr "/ thought that I was
executing the. ?orders' of the
party." In this Manner Stalin's
orders concerning the use of
methods . cif physical pressure
against the arrested-Were in
practice executed.
These and many other, facts
show that all norms of correct
party solution of problems were
Invalidated and, everything was
dependent upon the willfulness
of one man.
Stalin's Role in War
'The , power accumulated in
the hands of one person, Stalin,
led to serious consequences dur-
ing the Great Patriotic War.
When we look at manr of our
novels, films and historical
"scientific studies," the role of
Stalin in the Patriotic War ap-
pears to be entirely improbable.
Stalin had foreseen everything.
The Soviet Army, on the basis
of a strategic plan prepared by
Stalin long before, used the tac-
tics of so-called "active defense,
"i. e., tactics 'which, as we know,
allowed the Germans 'to come
up to Moscow. sod Stalingrad..
Using such tactics the Soviet
Army, supposedly, thanks only
to Stalin's , genius, turned to the
offensive Sad subdued the en-
emy. The epic victory gained
through Abe armed might of the
Land of the Soviets, through our^
heroic people, is ascribed in thii
type of novel, film and "scien-
tific study" as being completely
due to the strategic genius of
Stalin. ?
. We have to analyze this mat-
ter carefully because it has a
aster and defeats at the front
tremendous significance not
only from the historical, but enemy's invasion of the Soviet Stalin thought that this was the
end. In one of his speeches in
especially from the political, ed- land, we did not have sufficient
ucationaleKid practical point of quantities either of old machinery these days he said: "All that
which was no longer used for Lenin, created we have lost for-
Capabilities' for ouch prePara:Tressions against the 'military
twitsl yes, we had the tinie cadres led also to undermined
and capabilities. Our industry
was already so developed that
it was capable of supplying fully
the Soviet Army with every-
thing that it needed. This is
proven by the fact that although
during the war' we lost almost
half of our industry and impor-
tant industrial and food produc-
tion, areas as the result of en-
military discipline, because for
several years officers of all
ranks and even soldiers in the
party and Komsomol cells were
taught to "unmask" their su-
periors as hidden enemies.
(Movement in the hall.) It is
natimal that this caused a nega-
tive influence on the state of
military discipline in the first
War period.
emy occupation of the Ukraine, And, as you know, we had be-
Nprtherne Caucasus and other fore the war excellent military
western parts. of the country, cadres which were unquestion-
the Soviet nation was still able ably loyal to the party and to
to organize the production of the fatherland. Suffice it to say
military .equipment in the east- that those of them who managed
ern parts of the country, install to' survive despite severe tor-
there equipment taken from the tures to which they were sub-
Western industrial areas, and to jected in the prisons, have from
supply our armed forces with the first war days shown' them-
everything which was necessary selves real patriots and heroical-
to destroy the enemy, ly fought for the glory of the
Had our industry been mobil- fatherland. '
ized properly and in time to sup- I have here in mind such com-
ply the army with the necessary rades as Ftekossovsky (who, as
materiel, our wartime losses you know, had been jailed), Car-
would have been decidedly batov, Meretskov (who is a dee-
smaller, such mobilization had gate at the present congress),
not been, however, started in Podlas (he was an excellent corn-
time. And already in the first mender who perished at the
days of the war. it became evi_ front), and many, many others.
planese iugh t
mined, that we did not have em perished in camps and jails
dent that our army was badly However, many such command-
and the army saw them no more,
athrrtiolwlerthy,e
enemytank s back. All All this brought about the
Soviet science and technology situation that existed at the be-
produced excellent models of ginning of the war and which
tanks and artillery pieces ,before was the great threat to our
the war. But mass production of
all this was not organized and as
a matter of fact we started to
modernize our military equip-
ment only on the eve of the war.
As a result, at the time of the
Stalin's Despair Recounted
It would be incorrect to forget
that after the first severe dis-
Wbat are the facts of this armament production or of new ever
matter? machinery which we had planned
Before the war our press and to introduce into armament pro-
all our political - educational duction.
work was characterized by its The situation with anti-air-
bragging tone' when an enemy craft artillery was especially
violates the holy Soviet soil bad; we did not organize the pro- rflien some members of the Poli-
After this Stalin for a long
time actually did not direct the
military operations and ceased
to do anything whatever. He re-
turned to active leadership only
then for every blow of the en- duction of anti-tank ammuni-
cal Bureaui visited him and told
emy we will answer with three on. Many fortified regions had ? was neeesarY to take
blows and we will battle the proven to be indefensible as soon
enemy on his soil and we will as they were attacked, because
win without much harm to our- the old arms had been with- ger which hung over our father'.
land
But thee.. positive state- drawn and new ones were not
'1
were not based in all
areas on concrete facts, which
would actually guarantee the
Immunity of our borders,
certain steps immediately to im-
prove the situation at the front.
Therefore the threatening dari-
land in the first period of the
war was largely due to the faulty
methods of directing the nation
and the party by Stalin himself.
However, we speak not only
BMWs Excuse Disputed
yet available there.
Rifles for Army Lacking
This pertained, alas, not only
to tanks, artillery and planes
At the outbreak of the war we about the moment when the war
the t began, which led to serious dis-
eleaNtkle ea- gielit of the arrested During the war and atter the did not even have sufficient
and the truth or materials which war swan pet forward the thesis numbers of rifles to arm the organization of our army and
Wafted. that the tragedy which our na- mobilized manpower. I recall brought us severe losses Even
16,44 pivots um. ot- don experiTted in the Ana part that in those days I telephoned after the war began the nerv-
ed the at the war hakthe result Of the to Comrade Malenkov from kiev ousness and hysteria which
the_attereltSetthat_ _ 'Initarpaatair attack of the and told him: "People have vol-
Stalin demonstrated, interfering
ume "pagrois. &fang the soviet unteered for the new army and With actual military operations,
4.ea ?km, fi, a limibiertieso, not. commit, this is demand arms. you must send caused our army serious damage.
' *la 'let CONSINitiell t As. MairlIkOir answered me: "We understanding of ibe real aitua-
us arms." Stalin was very far from an
Maar ewe te
01 Oan IMaaa Maid yau arm, W are tion that was developing at the
imam all our does to Lenin- front That was natural because
otot haaa un, yen, during the whole patriotic war
h)te isheer totawlymirisited an
itasdaea
imos. givrta,
--
Pole-forget, ta
port-N"v- le
Der to our plea Stalin said, "Let
everything remain as it is!"
And what was the result of
this? The worst that we had ex-
pected. The German surrounded
our army concentrations and
consequently we lost hundreds of
thousands of our soldiers. This
is ' Stalin's military "genius;"
this is what it cost us. (Move-
ment in the hall.)
On-one occasion after the war,
during a meeting of Stalin with
members of the Political Bureau,
Anastas Ivanovich Miltoyan men-
tioned that Khrushehev must
have been right when he tele-
phoned concerning the Kharkov
operation and that it was un-
fortunate' that his suggestion
bad not been accepted.
Fury of Stalin Is Cited
You should have seen Stalin's
fury! How could it be admitted
that he, Stalin, had not been
right! Heis after all a "genius!'
and allgenius cannot help but be
right! Everyone can err, but
Stalin considered that he never
erred, that he was always right.
He never acknowledged to
anyone that he made any mis-
take, large or small, despite the
fact that he made not a few mis-
takes in the matter of theory
and in his practical activity.
After the Party Congress we
shall probably have to re-evaluate
many wartime military opera-
tions and to present them in
their true light.
The tactics on which Stalin in-
sisted without knowing the es-
sence of the conduct of battle
operations cost us mach blood
until we succeeded in stopping
the opponent and going over to
the offensive.
The military know that al-
ready by the end of 1911 instead
of great operational maneuvers
flanking the opponent and pene-
trating behind his back, Stalin
demanded incessant frontal at-
tacks and the capture of one vil-
lage after another. Because of
this we paid with great losses
until our generals, on whose
shoulders rested the whole weight
of conducting the war, succeed-
ed in changing the situation and
shifting to flexible maneuver
operations, which immediately
brought serious changes at the
front favorable to us.
All the more shameful was the
fact that after our great victory
over the enemy which cost us so
much, Stalin began to down-
grade many of the commanders
who contributed so much to the
victory over the enemy, because
Stalin excluded every possibility
that services rendered at the
front should be credited to any-
one but himself.
Stalin was very much inter-
ested in the assessment of Com-
rade Zhuki as a military leader.
He asked e often for myin
Opin-
ion of Zh ov. I told him then,
"I have known Zhukov for along
dcrOtrr
ea
mime Missimak Highway Miring a
mew. stabilised sittlation at the front.
war Stalin began to
tell all kinds of nonsense about
ZiZikov, among others the fol-
.4111WW11----
strength to the cause of the de-
feese of ,the fatherland.
Great and. brave deeds during
the war Were 'accomplished by
our 'Soviet women who bore on
their backs the heavy load of
production work in the factories,
on the collective farms, and in
various economic and cultural
sectors;' many women partici-
pated directly in the great pa-
triotic war at the fronts; our
brave yonth contributed im-
measurably at the front and at
home to the defense of the So-
viet fatherland and to the an-
nihilation of the enemy.
Immortal are the servicea of
the Soviet withers, of our com-
manders and political workers
of all ranks; after the loss of a
considerable part of the army
in the first war months they did
not lose their heads and were
able to reorganize auring the
progress of combat; they cre-
ated and toughened during the
progress of the war a strong
and heroic army and not only
stood off pressure of the strung
and cunning enemy but also
smashed him.
The magnificent and heroic
deeds of hundreds of millions of
of the people and liquidated?
Facts prove that the "Lenin-
grad Affair" also is the result of
willfulness ' Stalin exercised
against party cadres. -
Had a normal situation existed
in the -party's Central Commit-
tee and in the Central Commit-
tee Political Bureau, affairs of
this nature would have been ex-
amined there in accordance with
party practice, and all pertinent
facts assessed; as a result such
an affair as well as others would
not have happened. ? .
We must state that after the
war the situation became even
more complicated. Stalin became
even more capricious irritable
and brutal; in particular his sus-
picion grew. His persecution ma-
nia reached unbelievable dimen-
eions.? Many workers were be-
coming enemies before his very
eyes. After the war Stalin sepa-
rated himself from the collective
even more. Everything was de-
cided by him alone without any
consideration for anyone 'or any-
thing.
This- unbelievable suspicion
was cleverly taken advantage of
by the abject provocateur and
people of the East and of the vile enemy, Rena, who had mur-
West during the ? fight against dered thousands of Communists
the threat of Fascist subjuga- and loyal Soviet people. The dic-
tion which loomed before us will vation of Voznesensky and Run.
live centuries and millenia in the haveve no
netso vMw proven, it had been
(Thunderons applause) ' ermed Berm. As we
'
memory of thankful humanity,
precisely Beria who had "sug-
The main role and the main gested" to Stalin the fabrication
credit for the victorious ending by him and by his confidants of
of the war belongs to our Corn-
materials in the form of declara-
.
munist party, to the armed tions and anonymous letters, and
forces of the Soviet Union, and
to the tens.of millions of Soviet
people raised by the party.
(Thunderous and prolonged ap-
plause.)
in the form of various rumors
Minorities Were Exiled
Comrades, let us reach for
some other facts. The Soviet
Union is justly considered as a
model of a multi-national state
because we have in practice as-
sured the equality and friend-
ship of all nations which live
in our great fatherland.
All the more monstrous are
the acts whose initiator was
Stalin and which are rude vioM-
tions of the basic Leninist
principles 'of the nationality
policy of the Soviet' State. We because Stalin personally super-
the international relations of the
Soviet Union.
The July Plenum of the Cen-
tral Committee studied in detail
the reasons for the development
of conflict with Yugoslavia. It
was a shameful role which Sta-
lin played here. The "Yugoslav
Affair" contained no probleme
that could not have been solved
through Party discussions among
comrades.
There was no signifcant basis
for the development of this "af-
fair," it was completely possible
to have prevented the rupture
of relations with that country.
This does not mean, however,
that the Yugoslav leaders did
not make mistakes or did not
have shortcomings. But these
mistakes and shortcomings were
magnified in a monstrous man-
ner by Stalin, which resulted in
a break of relations with a
friendly country.
I recall the first days when
the conflict between the &Air
Union and Yugoslavia began art-
ificially to be blown up. Once.
when I came from Kiev to Mos-
ow, I was ivited to visit Stalin
who, pointing to the copy of a
letter lately sent to Tito, asked
me, "Have you read this?"
'Fall' of Tito Pledged by Stalin
Not waiting, for my reply he
answered: "I will shake my lit-
tle finger?and there will be no
more Tito. He will fall."
We have dearly paid for this
"shaking of the little .finger."
This statement reflected Stalin's
mania for greatness, but he act-
ed just that way: I will shake
and talks,
my little finger?and there will
The Party's Central Commit-
tee has examined this so-called be no Kosice': "I will shake my
"Leningrad Affair"epersons who little finger once more and POP -
innocently suffered are now re- mare_ .
tyshev and Chubar will be no
restored to the glorious Lenin- finger again?and Voznesensky.
; 'I wil shake my little
habilitated and 'honor has been
Kuznetsov and many other will
grad party organization. Abaku- disappear."
mov and others who had fabri-
cated this affair were brought But this did not happen to
Tito, No matter how much or
before a court; their trial took
place in Leningrad and they how little Stalin shook, not only
his little finger but everything
received what they deserved,
else that he could shake, Tit
The question arises: Why o
it that we see the truth of this
Is did not fall. Why? The reason
affair only now, and why did we was that, in this case of dis-
-eement with the Yugoslav
not do something earlier, during
comrades, Tito had behind him
Stalin's life, in order to prevent a state and a
the loss of innocent lives? It was people who had
gene through a severe school of
flatting for liberty and inde-
pendence. a people which gave
support to its leaders.
You see to what Stalin's ma -
refer to the mass deportations vised the "Leningrad Affair,"
from their native places of and the majority of the Political
whole nations together with all
Bureau members did not, at that
Communists and Komsomols
stances in
nia for greatness led. Ile had
these
matters,th circuamnd-
without any exception; this de-completely lost consciousness of
portation action was not dic- could not therefore intervene, reality; he demonstrated his sus-
tated by any military consider-a-31ingrelian 'Plot' Cited picion and haughtiness not only
tions.
This, already at 'the end of When Stalin received certain in relation to individuals in the
1943, when there occurred a materials from Berle and Abalcu- U. S. S. R., but in relation to
permanent break-through at the muv' without examining these whole parties and nations.
fronts of the great patriotic war slanderous materials, he ordered We have carefully examined
benefiting the Soviet Union, a an investigation of the "affair" the case of Yugoslavia and have
of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. found a proper solution which is
With this their fate was sewed. approved by the peoples of the
Instructive in the same way m Soviet Union and or Yugoslavia
the ease of the etingrehan nee as well as by the working
period, at the end of December, tionalist organization, which masses of all the people's de.
1943, the same lot befell the supposedly existed in Georgia. mocracies and by all progressive
whole population of the gabnee As is known, resolutions by the humanity. The liquidation of
Au m s Republie ' Central Committee, Communist the abnormal relationship with
1444,;...406.3.1.......411...,...
decision was taken and executed
concerning the deportation of
all the Kamchai from the lands
on which they lived. In the same
on' mol
tileiclotO LIle Illit.,..i.eiling Sal-
express one's own will.
g in without much harm to our- the old arms had been with- ' er which hung over our father- operations, which immediately
When Stalin said that one or
another should be arrested, it selves' But these positive state- drawn and new ones were not
, land in the first period of ,the brought serious changes at the
was necessa,ry to accept on ments were not based in all yet available there.
faith that he was an "enemy of ri
prverlfftv r lease 2002/07$02 : war was far el due to the faul front favorable to us.
wouldactuoally
guarantee This pertain a
esi, alas, not only .1' :" 411. 1 Mft5iftl'otiles
n e p14Z
gang, which ran the organs of to tanks, artillery and planes. However,a We11 speak not only over the enemy which cost us so
the people." Meanwhile, Bena's immunity of our borders.
state security, outdid itself in Stalin's Excuse Disputed At the outbreak of the war we about the moment when thewar much, Stalin began to down-
proving the guilt of the arrested During the war and after the did not even have sufficient began, which led to serious dis- grade many of the commanders
and the truth of materials which war Stalin put forward the thesis numbers of rifles to arm the -Organization of, our army ' and who contributed so much to the
,
it falsified.that the tragedy which our na - mobilized manpower. I recall brought us severe losses. Even victory over the enemy, because And what proofs were of- non experienced in the first part that in those days I telephoned after the war began the nerv- Stalin excluded every possibility
ousness and hysteria which that services rendered at the bons.
fered? The confessions of the of the war wasthe result of the to Comrade Malenkov from 'Kiev
Stalin demonstrated, interfering front should be credited to any- This, already at the end of
arrested, and the investigative -unexpected" attack of the and told him: "People have vol-
with actual military operations, one but himself,
us arrnS. 1943, when there occurred a
judges accepted these "confes- Germans against the Soviet unteered for the new army and
caused our army serious darnage., Stalin was very much inter- permanent break-through at the
sions." And how is it possible Union, But, Comrades, this is demand arms. You must send
that a person coafesses to crimes completely untrue. Stalin was very far from an ested in the assessment of Coin- fronts of the great patriotic war
.we understanding of the real situa- rade Zhukov as a military leader, benefiting the SovietUnion,
which - he has not committed? As soon as Hitler came to Malenkov answered me:
tion that was developing at the He asked jie often for mys apio- decision was taken and executed
Only in one way--because of ap- power in Germany he assigned cannot send you arms. We are
front. That was natural because ion of Zhilkov. I told him then, concerning the deportation of
plication of physical methods of to himself the task of liquidat- sending all our riles to Lenin-
during the whole patriotic war "I have known Zhukov for a long all the Karachai from the lands
pressuring him, tortures, bring- ing communism. The Fascists grad and you have to arm your-
he never visited any section of time; he is a good general and on Which they lived. In the same
judgment, taking away of his tam this aggressive end all sorts ation. , except for one Mott ride on the After the war Stalin began to 1943, the same lot befell the
Mozhaisk . Highway during a tell all kinds of nonsense about whole population of the Kalmyk
period, at the end of December,
lag him to a state of uncoils, Were saying this' openly; they selves." (Movement in the hall.)
the front or any liberated city a good military leader."
ciciusitess, - deprivation of his did not bide their plans. To at- Such was the armament situ-
human dignity. In this manner of pacts and blocs were created, In this connection we eanaot
wffe ?confekidouss ,eoirs.,ss, . ss?,,, as the famous Berlin-Rome- forget, for resume,. the ,or,. stabilized situation at the front Naukov, among others the fol- Autonomous Republic.
'-'-''''"'" s'"'""' ? s'"'"" -s To thiSslackierze Weeirs dedi-
s Torture wended t,?? sup, Tokyo Axis_ ?Many. facts - fuer-Shortly before the -ht.. , . lowing, "You praised Zhukov, In March, 1944, all the Che-
. . -''' the pre-war period clearly vision of the Soviet Union by ea
ted Maar literary Werke full but he does not deserve it. It is chen and Ingush peoples were
When the wave of mass ar- showed that Hitler wila going the i_palarate army, Kirponos, of fantasies at all sorts and se said that before each operation deported and the Chechen-
and the leaders of territorial
rests began to recede in 1939, all out to begin a war against who was Chief of the Kiev spe- man, Y Paintings. Simultaneous- at the front zhukov used to be Ing-ush Autonomous Republic
the Soviet state and that he had cial Military District (he was it's Stalin was interfering With have as follows: he used to take was liquidated. In April, 1914,
operations arid issuing orders a handful of earth,
of using methods of physical near the Soviet borders. Armies were at the Bug River, t the real situation at a given or the opposite, .the planned oi, tory of the Kabardino-Balkar
ion say, 'We can begin the attack,'
smell It and all Balkans were deported to
faraway places from the tern-
accuse the N. K. V. D. workers together with armored . units, to Stalin that the German
e that did not take Into considera-
Tan. 20, 1939, to the committee April 3, 1941 [Sir Winston] would probably start their of- I will allow myself in this eon- I stated at that time "
Stalin, I do not know who in-
' republic itself was renamed the
Republic and the
pressure on the arrested, Stalin Documents which have now were prepanng for an attack section of the front and which e
could not help but result in huge ration cannot be carried out
, Comrade
ponos proposed that a strong de- n . .
tenstic fact that lllustrates how Vented this, but it is not true.'
It is 'Me that Stalin him-
, public.
Kabardinian Autonomous Re-
dispatched a coded telegram been published show that by and in tit very near future personnel losses. - - -
fense be organized, that 300,000 Stalin directed operations at the self invented these thin The Ukrainians avoided meet--
secretaries of ?blasts and krais, Churchill, through his Arabes- fensive. In this connection Kir- ection to bring out one charec-
persons be evacuated from the ing this fate only because there
b,'tlliltl to,
Stalin and which are rude viola- nu do Tito hali
Stalin's life in order to prevent a state and a people v.. o had
tions of the basic Leninist
principles of the nationality the loss of innocent lives? It was gam through a severe school of
policy of the Soviet State. We because Stalin personally super- figailing for liberty and inde-
refer to the mass deportations rised the "Leningrad Affair,' pendence, a people which gave
from their native places of and the majority of the Political support to its leaders.
whole nations, together with all Bureau members did not, at that you see to what Stalin's ma-
Communists and Komsomols time, know all of the circum- nia for greatness led. He had
completely lost consciousness of
without any exception; this de_ stances in these matters, and
portation action was not sic- could not therefore intervene, reality; he demonstrated his sus-
toted by any military considera- Mingrelian 'Plot' Cited picion and haughtiness not only
in relation to individuals in the
U. S. S. R., but in relation to
whole parties and nations.
We have carefully examined
the case of Yugoslavia and have
found a proper solution which is
approved by the peoples of the
Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia
as well as by the working
masses of all the people's de-
mocracies and by all progressive
humanity. The liquidation of
the abnormal relationship with
Yugoslavia was done in the in-
terest of the whole camp of so-
cialism, in the interest of
strengthening peace in the whole
world,
Let
us also recall the "Affair
of the Doctor Plotters." (Anima-
tion in the hall.) Actually there
was no "affair" outside of the
declaration of the woman doctor
Timashuk, who was probably
influenced or ordered by some-
one (after all, she was an un-
official collaborator of the or-
gans of state security) to write
Stalin a letter in which she de-
clared that doctors were apply-
ing supposedly improper meth-
ods of medical treatment.
Such a letter was sufficient
for Stalin to reach an immedi-
ate conclusion that there are
doctor-plotters in the Soviet Un-
ion. He issued orders to arrest
a group of eminent Soviet medi-
cal specialists. He personally
issued advice on the conduct of
the investigation and the meth-
od of interrogation of the ar-
rested persons.
When Stalin received certain
materials from Beria and Abaku-
mov, without examining these
slanderous materials, he ordered
an investigation of the "affair"
of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov.
With this their fate was sealed.
Instructive in the same way is
the case of the Mingrelian na-
tionalist organization, which
supposedly existed in Georgia.
As is known, resolutions by the
Central Committee, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, were
made concerning this case in No-
vember 1951 and in March 1952.
These resolutions were made
Without prior discussion with the
Polictical Bureau.
Stalin had personally dictated
them. They made serious accu-
sations against many loyal Com-
Munists. On the basis of falsi-
fied documents it was proven
that there existed in Georgia a
supposedly nationalistic ofgani-
zation whose objective was the
liquidation of the Soviet power
n that republic with the help of
Imperialist powers,
In this connection, a number
of responsible party and Soviet
workers were arrested in Geor-
gia. As was later proven, this
was a slander directed against
the Georgian party organization.
We know that there have been
at times manifestations of local
bourgeois nationalism in Georgia
as in several other republics.
The question arises:'Could it be
possible that in the period dur-
ing which the resolutions re-
ferred to above were made, na-
tionalist tendencies grew so
much that there was a danger of
Georgia's leaving the Soviet
Union and joining Turkey?
(Animation in the hall, laugh-
ter.)
This is, of course, nonsense. It
is impossible to imagine how
such assumptions could enter
anyone's mind. Everyone knows
how Georgia has developed eco-
nomically and culturally under
Soviet rule,
sailor to the ILS. SR. [Sir
republic Communist parties, to Stafford] Cripps, personally
the Peoples Commissars of In- warned Stalin that the Germans
ternal Affairs and to the heads had begun regrouping their
of N. K. V. D. organizations. areled units with the intent of
This telegram stated:
The Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist
party (Bolsheviks) explains
that the application of meth-
ods of physical pressure in
N. K. V. D. practice is per-
missible from 1937 on in ac-
cordance with permission of
the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist party
(Bolsheviks). It is known that
all bourgeois intelligence serv-
ices use methods of physical
influence against the represen-
tatives of the Socialist prole-
tariat and that they use them
in their most scandalous forms.
The question arises as to
why the Socialist intelligence
service should be more
humanitarian against the mad
agents of the bourgeoisie,
against the deadly enemies of
the working class and of the
collective workers. The Cen-
tral Committee of the All'
Union Communist party (Bol-
sheviks) considers that physi-
cal pressure should still be
used obligatorily, as an ex-
ception applicable to known
and obstinate enemies of the
people, as a method both justi-
fiable and appropriate.
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in
the name of the Central- Corn-
gs for the were too many
border areas and that several fronts. There is present at this P:r)seo, minim
military talents" of the r...,...ole there was as place to which. to
of them and
strong points be organized there: eengrese Marshal SagramYan, ? f Marshal deport them. Otherwise, he
In this connection Stalin very would have deported them also.
. 0 Zhukov.
energetically popularized him- halls)
(Laughter and animation in the
way he tried to inculcate in the Not only a Marxist-Leninist
self as a great leader. In various
tories gained by the Soviet na- but also no man of common
sense can grasp how it is pos-
people the version that all vie-
tion during the great patriotic sponsible for inimical activity,
sible to make whole nations se-
wer were due to the courage, including women, children, old
daring and genius of Stalin and people, Communists and Komso-
of no one else. Exactly like mols, to use mass repression
Kuzma Kryuchkov [a famous against them, and to expose
Cossack who performed heroic them to misery and suffering for
feats against the Germans], he the hostile acts of individual
put one dress on seven persons persons or groups of persons.
at the same time. (Animation After the conclusion of the
in the hall.) Partiotic War the Soviet Nation
stressed with pride the magni-
Histerkal Fame Paeredited ficent victories gained through
Stalin, stating that the atm- In 'the same vein, let us take, great sacrifices and tremendous
don demanded changes in opera- for instance, our historical arid efforts. The country experienced
Hone' plans so that the enemy military films and some literary a period of political enthusiasm.
would be prevented from liqui- creations; they make us feel The party came out of the war
dating a sizable concentration sick. Their true objective is the exen more united; in the fire of
of our army, propagation of the theme of the war party cadres were tern-
Contrary to common mama praising Stalin as a military pored and hardened. Under such
Stalin rejected our suggestion genius. Let us recall the film, conditions nobody could have
and issued the order to continue "The Fall of Berlin." Here only even thought of the possibility of
The following sis, the operation aimed at the en- Stalin acts; he issues orders in some plot in the party.
- fact is ? circlement of Nharkov, despite the hall in which there are man
known. On the eve of the lava- Y The Leningrad Affair
the fact that at Ms time many empty chairs and only one man . .
sion of the territory of the
army concentrations were them- approached him and. reports . And 1-4 was precisely at this
Soviet Union by the Hitler-Re a thaa the called "Lenin
ii,???? selves actually threatened with something to him?that is Pas- -
army a certain German et-- encirclement and liquidation_ krebyshev, his lo al shield- grad Affair"
y was born. As we
I telephone to Vasilevsky and have now roven this case was
begged him:
"Alexander Mikhailovich, take
a map (Vasilevsky is present
here) and show Comrade Stalin
the situation which has devel-
oped "
attacking the Soviet Union. It anti-tank ditches, trenches for
ations in the Headquarters of
is self-evident that Churchill did the Southwestern front and who
can corroborate what I will tell
you.
Kharkov Used as Illustration
When there developed an ex-
ceptionally serious situation for
our army in 1942 in the Kharkov
region, we had correctly decided
to drop an operation, whose ob-
jective was to encircle Kharkov,
because the real situation at
When the Fascist armies had
the danger which threatened actually invaded Soviet territory that time would have threatened
our army with fatal conse-
him." and military operations began. quences if this operation were
Churchill streamed this re-Moscow issued the order that continued
peatedly in his dispatches of Stalin, despite evident facts. We cimmunicated this to
April 18 and in the following
days. However, stoio_ took n.0 ytheotughstartectt that thteuuswarwasha,r.lulnyout
heed of these warnings. What is provocative action on the part
more, Stalin ordered that ne of seem' undisciplined motion,
credence be given to information
of this sort, in order not to of the German army, and that
yoke the initiation of null= our reaction might serve as a
operations, reason for the Germans to begin
the war.
We must assert that informa-
tion of this sort concerning the German's Information Ignored
threat of German armed invasion
of Soviet territory was coming
In also from our own military
and diplomatic sources' however,
because the leadership was con-
ditioned against such informa- bearer. (Laughter in the hall.)
tion. such data were dispatched crossed our border and stated
ervation. fabricated. Those who innocent-
that the German armies had And where is the military com-
mittee of the All-Union Com- Thus, for instance, information fensive against the Soviet Union Bureau? Where is the Govern. ly lost their lives included Com-
with fear and assessed with res- received orders to start the of- mand? Where is the Political
niunist party (Bolsheviks) the sent from Berlin May 6, 1941 b on the night of June 22 at 3 raent? What are they doing and Com-
rades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov,
most brutal violation of Socialist the Soviet military -i-to.-- h-ey o'clock. Stalin was informed with what are they engaged? Rodionov, Popkov, and others.
legality, torture and oppression, Capt. Vorontsov, stated: --c---, about this immediately, but even There is nothing about them in As is known, Voznesensky and
which led as we have seen to Soviet citizen Bozer . . . this warning was ignored.
We should note that Stalin the film. Stalin acts for every- Kuznetsov were talented and
the slandering and self-accusa- communicated to the deputy As you see, everything was eminent leaders. Once they
stood very close to Stalin. It
tion of innocent people. naval attache that according ignored; warnings of certain Planned operations on a globe. body; he does not reckon with
Not long ago, only several to a statement of ' a certain army commanders, declarations (Animation in the hall.) Yes, anyone; he asks no one for ad- is sufficient to mention that
days before the present congress, German officer from Hitler's of deserters from the enemy comrades, he used to take the vice. Everything is shown to
the nation in this false light. Stalin made Voznesensky first
deputy to the Chairman of the
rnittee Presidium session and paring to invade the U. S. S. R. ity of the enemy. Is this an on it.
Stalin with glory, contrary to Council of Ministers and Hornet-
we called to the Central Corn- Headquarters, Germany is pre- army; and even the open hostil- globe and ? trace the frontline
Why? In order to surround
interrogated the investigative may 14 through Finland, the example of the alertness of the I said to Comrade Vasilevsky:
the facts and contrary to his- Central Committee. The very
investigated and interrogated At the same time Moscow and state at this particularly si - map; in the present situation we toncal truth.
The question arises: And fact that Stalin entrusted Kuz-
netsov with the supervision of
judge Bodes, who in his time Baltic countries and Latvia. chief of the party and of th "Show him the situation on a
Nosior, Chubar and Kosaryev. Leningrad will be heavily flcant historical moment?
And what were the results of which was planned. The old de-
cannot continue the operation
where are the military on whose the state security organs shows
He is a vile person, with the raided and the trust he enjoyed.
brain of a bird, and morally corn- landed in border cities, trc*Perm this carefree attitude, this dis- cision must be changed for the
the war? They are not in the How did it happen that these
shoulders rested the burden of
regard of clear facts? The result good of the cause."
film' with Stalin in no room was persons were branded as enemies
pletely degenerate. And it was In his relaortfic_May 22, ..1941-. was th t Si/ in the first Vasilevsky i sa in that
3: el AaIRDP ,
he was making judgments also that " ... the attack of the Ger- a large part of our air force, would not see Stalin further con-
? 821/3911141161131M54431 as a Albanian Reds Rename
' whole, the Soviet Government,
this man who was deciding thaSt mactveatimapattarsteM se
fate of prominent party workers; firs- Nhlepov. commurnea en destroy in our en regions problem and t e,
man army is re
viiiittore h000nco haiiin, ti,"t3h-,O=5 Ito. Juni. 15 hut it is DOS- 5,, .inniiiilatod loroo numbers of lotto,' diri riot want to hear any ledfrs....an!".bralre soilless, ill
. ha as Party Leader
concerning the politics in these reportedly sehed- artillery and other equipment; cerning this matter because the
our heroic army, its talented, Hox
not do this at all because of his
friendly feeling toward the So-
viet nation.
He' had in this his own im- no preparatory defensive work
perialistic goals?to bring Ger- should be undertaken at the
many and the U. S. S. R. into a
bloody war and thereby to
strengthen the position of the
British Empire- Just the same.
Churchill affirmed in his writ-
ings that he sought to "warn
Stalin and call his attention to
the soldiers, etc.
Moscow answered this propo-
sition with the assertion that
this would be a provocation, that
borders, that the Germans were
not to be given any pretext for
the initiation of military action
against us. Thus, our borders
were insufficiently prepared to
repel the enemy.
Progress in Georgia Noted
Industrial production of the
Georgian Republic is twenty-
seven times greater than it was
before the revolution. Many new
industries have arisen in Georgia
that did not exist there before
the revolution: iron smelting, an
oil industry, a machine construc-
tion industry, etc. Illiteracy has
long since been liquidated, which,
in pre-revolutionary Georgia, in-
cluded 78 per cent of the popula-
tion.
Could the Georgians, compar-
ing the situation in their repub-
lic with the hard situation of
the working masses in Turkey,
be aspiring to join Turkey? In
1955 Georgia producer eighteen
times as much steel a person as
Turkey. Georgia produces nine
times as much electrical energy
a person as Turkey.
According to the available
1950 census, 65 per cent of
Turkey's total population are
illiterate, and of the women, 80
per cent are illiterate. Georgia
has nineteen institutions of
higher learning, which have
about 39.000 students, this is
eight times more than in Tur-
--- s.,ss arm inbalittanivi
Stalin Threat Recalled
He said the academician.
Vinogradov, should be put in
chains, another one should be
beaten. Present at this congress
as a delegate is the Former
Minister of State Security, Corn'
rade Ignatiev. Stalin told him
curtly, "If you do not obtain
confessions from the doctors va
will shorten you by a head.'
(Tumult in the hall.)
Stalin personally called tin
investigative judge, gave bin
instructions, advised him or
which investigative method:
should be used; these method:-
were sinuile--beat, beat and
once again, beat.
Shortly after the doctors were
arrested we members of the
Political Bureau received proto
cols from the doctors; confes
sions of guilt. After distributing
these protocols Stalin told us.
"You are blind like young kit-
tens; what will happen withou
me? The country will cerisk
because you do not know how he
recognize enemies."
The case was so presented
that no one could verify th
facts on which the investigation
was based. There was no possis
bility of trying to verify fame
by contacting those who had
made the confessions of guilt.
We felt, however, that ih
case of the arrested doctors was
questionable. We knew some of
these people personally because
they had once treated us. Vihe
we examined this "case" after
Stalin's death, we found it ti
be fabricated from beginning U
end,
This ignominous "case" was
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
CPYRGHT
influence against the represen-
tatives of the Socialist prole-
tariat and that they use them
in their most scandalous forms.
The question arises as to
Why the Socialist intelligence
service should be more
humanitarian against the mad
agents of the bourgeoisie,
against the deadly enemies of
the working class and of the
collective workers. The Cen-
tral Committee of the All-
Union Communist party (Bol-
sheviks) considers that physi-
cal pressure should still be
used obligatorily, as an ex-
ception applicable to known
and obstinate enemies of the
People, as a method both justi-
fiable and appropriate.
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in
the name of the Central Com-
mittee of the All-Union Com-
munist party (Bolsheviks) the
most brutal violation of Socialist
legality, torture and oppression,
which led as we have seen to
the slandering and self-accusa-
tMn of innocent people.
Not long ago, only several
days before the present congress,
we called to the Central Com-
mittee Presidium session and
interrogated the investigative
judge Bodes, who in his time
investigated and interrogated
Kosior, Chubar and Kosaryev.
He is a vile person, with the
brain of a bird, and morally com-
pletely degenerate. And it was
this man who was deciding the
fate of prominent party workers;
he was making judgments also
concerning the politacs in these
matters, because having estab-
lished their "crime," he provided
therewith materials from which
important political implications
could be drawn.
The question arises whether a
man with such an intellect could
alone make the investigation in
a manner to prove the guilt of
people such as Kosior and others.
No, he could not have done it
without proper directives. At
the Central Committee Presi-
clium session he told us: "I was
told that Kosior and Chubar
were people's enemies and for
this reason, I, as an investiga-
tive judge, had to make them
confess that they are enemies.'
(Indignation in the hall.)
He could do this only through
long tortures, which he did, re-
ceiving detailed instructions
from Boris. We must say that
at the central Committee Pre-
sidium session he cynically de-
.
..111 Call his all ell( on In
the danger which threatened
him."
Churchill stressed this re-
peatedly in his dispatches of
April 18 and in the following
days. However, Stalin took no
heed of these warnings. What is
more, Stalin ordered that no
credence be given to information
of this sort, in order not to pro-
voke the initiation of military
operations.
We must assert that informa-
tion of this sort concerning the
threat of German armed invasion
of Soviet territory was coming
in also from our own military
and diplomatic sources; however,
because the leadership Was con-
ditioned against such informa-
tion, such data were dispatched
with fear and assessed with res-
ervation.
Thus, for instance, information
sent from Berlin May 6, 1941 by
the Soviet military attache,
Capt. Vorontsov, stated:
Soviet citizen Boyer . . .
communicated to the deputy
naval attach?hat according
to a statement of ' a certain
German officer from Hitler's
Headquarters, Germany is pre-
paring to invade the U. S. S. R.
May 14 through Finland, the
Baltic countries and Latvia.
At the same time Moscow and
Leningrad will be heavily
raided and paratroopers
landed in border cities.
In his report of May 22, 1941,
the deputy military attache in
Berlin, Khlopov, communicated
that" the attack of the Ger-
man army is reportedly sched-
uled for June 15, but it is pos-
sible that it may begin in the
first days of June."
Waining From London Recalled
A cable from our London Em-
bassy dated June 18, 1941,
stated:
As of now Cripps is deeply
convinced of the inevitability
of armed conflict between
Germany and the U. S. S. R.
which will begin not later than
the middle of June. Accord-
ing to Cripps. the Germans
have presently concentrated
147 divisions (including air
force and service units) along
the Soviet borders.
Despite these particularly
grave warnings, the necessary
steps were not taken to prepare
the country properly for defense
and to prevent it from being
caught unawares
Did we have time and the
When the Fascist armies had t'''au'e the leak situation at
actually invaded Soviet territory
and military operations began,
Moscow issued the order that
Stalin, despite evident facts,
thought that the war had not
yet started, that this was only a
provocative action on the part
of several undisciplined sections
of the German army, and that wmgd be Prevented from liqu
our reaction might serve as a dating a sizable concentration
reason for the Germans to begin of our army
the war.
German's Information Ignored
that time would have threatened
our army with fatal conse-
quences if this operation were
continued.
We communicated this to
Stalin, stating that the situa-
tion demanded changes in opera-
tional plans so that the en
The following fact is also
known. On the eve of the inva-
sion of the territory of the
Soviet Union by the Hitlerite
army a certain German citizen
crossed our border and stated
that the German armies had
received orders to start the of-
fensive against the Soviet Union
Contrary to common sense,
Stalin rejected our suggestion
and issued the order to continue
the operation aimed at the en-
circlement of Kharkov, despite
the fact that at this time many
army concentrations were them-
selves actually threatened with
encirclement and liquidation.
I telephone to Vasilevaky and
begged him:
Alexander Mikhailovich, take
on the o'clock.nigstahtlinof was informed
in22formated.3 a map
here) andshow Comrade Stalin
(Vasilevsky is present
about this immediately, but even the situation which has devel-
this warning was isalored. oped "
We should note that Stalin
planned operations on a globe.
(Animation in the hall.) Yes,
comrades, he used to take the
globe and trace the frontline
on it.
I said to Comrade Vasilevsky:
"Show him the situation on a
man; In the present situation we
cannot continue the operation
And what were the results of which was planned. The old de-
this carefree attitude, this dis- cision must be changed for the
regard of clear facts? The result good of the cause."
was that already in the first Va.salevsky replied saying that
Stalin had already studied this
problem and that he, Vasilevsky,
would not see Stalin further con-
cerning this matter because the
latter did not want to hear any
arguments on the subject of
this operation
After my talk with Vasilevskv
prevent e enemy from rnereh- I telephoned to Stalin at his-
esrtecially in reference to the p one and Malenkov was
t the ereceiver. I told Comrade
beginning of the war, followed
Stalin's annihilation of many
at
that I was calling
from the front and that I wanted
military commanders and polit-
ical workers during 1937-41 be- to speak personally to Stalin.
cause of his suspiciousness and Stalin inferme0 me through
through slanderous accusations. Malenkov that I should speak
During these years repressions With Maleakev?
were instituted against certain I stated for the second time
Win literally at the company
Parts of military cadres begin- that
personally llwyishaebOutot thinefgraormveSstalituin-
P
and battalion commander level ation which had arisen for us at
and extending to the higher milt- the front. But Stalin did not
tary centers. During this time consider it convenient to raise
the cadre of leaders who had the phone and again stated that
gained military experience in I should speak to him through
Malenkov, although he was
As you see, everything was
ignored; warnings of certain
army commanders, declarations
of deserters from the enemy
army; and even the open hostil-
ity of the enemy. Is this an
example of the alertness of the
chief of the party and of th
state at this particularly 9'
ficant historical moment?
hours and days the enemy had
destroyed in our border regions
a large part of our air force,
artillery and other equipment;
e annihilated large numbers of
our military cadres and dis-
organized our military leader-
ship; consequently we could not
Ing deep into the country. villa. But Stalin did not answer
Very grievous consequences, the tel eh
only
pain and in the Far East was
gantafions overcame untold
most completely liquidated, a few steps from the telephone. hardatips and, bearin th
The pOlicy of
? ill,t1.,1111,1
feats against the Germans) he
roil. them to misery and suffering for
the hostile acts of individual
persons or groups of persons.
After the conclusion of the
Partiotic War the Soviet Nation
stressed with pride the magni-
ficent victories gained through
great sacrifices and tremendous
efforts. The country experienced
a period of political enthusiasm.
The party came out of the war
exen more united; in the fire of
the war party cadres were tem-
pered and hardened. Under such
conditions nobody could have
even thought of the possibility of
some plot in the party.
The Leningrad Affair
put one dress on seven persons
at the same time. (Animation
in the hall.)
Historical Films Discredited
In-the same vein, let us in
for instance, our historical a
military films and some litera
creations; they make us f
sick. Their true objective is t
Propagation of the theme
praising Stalin as a milit
genius. Let us recall the fil
"The Fall of Berlin." Here on
Stalin acts; he issues orders
the hall in which t/fere are ma
empty chairs and only one man
approached him and, repor
something to him?that Is Po
krebyshey, his loyal shiel
bearer. (Laughter in the hall.)
And where is the military co
mand? Where is the Politic
Bureau? Where is the Govern
merit ? What are they doing an
with what are they engaged
There is nothing about them
the film. Stalin acts for every
body; he does not reckon wi
anyone; he asks no one .for a
vice. Everything is shown t
the nation in this false ligh
Why? In order to surroun
Stalin With glory, contrary t
the facts and contrary to his
torical truth.
The question arises: An
where are the military on whos
boulders rested the burden o
the War? They are not in th
film; with Stalin in, no room wa
left for them.
Not Stalin, but the party as a
Whole, the Soviet Government
our heroic army, its talented
leaders and brave soldiers, the
whole Soviet nation?these are
the ones who assured the victory
in the great patriotic war.
(Tempestuous and prolonged ap-
plause.)
The Central Committee mem-
bers, ministers, our economic
leaders, leaders of Soviet cul-
ture, directors of territorial
party and Soviet organizations,
engineers, and technicians?
everyone of them in his own
place of work generously gave
of his strength and knowledge
toward ensuring victory over the
enemy.
Exceptional heroism was shown
by our hard core?surrounded by
glory is our whole working class,
our collective farm peasantry,
the Soviet intelligentsia, who un-
der the leadership of party
he,
nil nd
ry
eel
he
of
ary
m,
ly
in
fly
is
s-
d-
in-
al
in
th
d-
t?.
ef
al
g e large-scalehard-
re- After "listening" in this man- ship, ,of war, devoted all their
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
And it' was precisely at this
time than the so-called "Lenin-
grad Affair" was born. As we
have now proven, this case Was
fabricated. Those who innocent-
ly lost their lives included Com-
rades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov,
Ftodionov, Popkov, and others.
As is known, Voznesensky and
Kuznetsov were talented and
eminent leaders. Once they
stood very close to Stalin. It
is sufficient to mention that
Stalin made Voznesenalry first
deputy to the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and Kuznet-
sov was elected Secretary of the
Central Committee. The very
fact that Stalin entrusted Kuz-
netsov with the supervision of
the state security organs shows
the trust he enjoyed.
How did it happen that these
persons were branded as enemies
Albanian Reds Rename
Hoxha as Party Leader
LONDON, June 4 (Reuters)
?Gen. Enver Hoxha has been
re-elected First Secretary of
the Albanian Communist party
at the first plenary session of
the new Central Committee.
the Albanian news agency said
today.
The former Premier, in a
report to the party congress
May 25, said the party recog-
nized that it had erred, "like
all other Communist parties,"
in breaking relations with
Yugoslavia in 1948.
Last week the official Yugo-
slav newspaper Borba criti-
cized his report saying, "from
the way Hoxha spoke about
Yugoslavia's break with the
Cominform in 1948, it looked
as if he was trying to pin
responsibility for it on Yugo-
slavia "
Of which the resolutions re-
ferred to above were made, na-
tionalist tendencies grew so
much that there was a danger of
Georgia's leaving the Soviet
Union and joining Turkey?
(Animation in the hall, laugh-
ter.)
This is, of course, nonsense It
is impossible to imagine how
such assumptions could enter
anyone's mind. Everyone knows
how Georgia has developed eco-
nomically and culturally under
Soviet rule.
Progress in Georgia Noted
ilitiqrnr/Mirltellpry?
rested persons.
Stalin Threat Recalled
He said the academicism
Vinogradov, should be put
chains, another one should b.
beaten. Present at this congress
as a delegate is the Forimw
Minister of State Security, Corr
rade Ignatiev. Stalin told him
curtly, "If you do not obtai
confessions from the doctors
will shorten you by a head
(Tumult in the hall.)
Stalin personally called th
investigative judge, gave hits
Instructions, advised him ON
Industrial production of the which investigative methods
Georgian Republic is twenty- should be used; these method ;
seven times greater than it was were simple?beat, beat ant
before the revolution. Many new once again, beat.
industries have arisen in Georgia Shortly after the doctors were
that did not exist there before arrested we members of the
the revolution: iron smelting, an Political Bureau received proto
oil industry, a machine construe- cola from the doctors; conies
don industry, etc. Illiteracy has sions of guilt, After distributinr
long since been liquidated, which, these protocols Stalin told us
in pre-revolutionary Georgia, in- "You are blind like young kit
tion.
luded 78 per cent of the popula- tens; what will happen withow
Could the Georgians, compar- bmeceLsTehyeoucdoounntroty knwoiwn hpeowristhc
ng the situation in their repub- recognize enemies."
lir with the hard situation of
he
the working masses in Turkey, that
nocasoene wcaosulds? y eprriefsye n the
be aspiring to join Turkey? In
1955 Georgia producer eighteen facts on which the investigation
was based. There was no possi-
times as much steel a person as bility of trying to verify facts
Turkey. Georgia produces nine by contacting those who had
times as much electrical energy
a person as Turkey. made the confessions of guilt.
We felt, however, that the
According to the available
1950 census, 65 per cent of case of the arrested doctors was
Turkey's total population are questionable. We knew some of
these people personally because
!literate, and of the women, 80 they had once treated us. When
per cent are illiterate. Georgia we examined this "case" after
as nineteen institutions of Stalin's death, we found it to
igher learning, which have
fab
bout 39,000 students, this is be fabricated from beginning to
end.
ight times more than in Tur- This ignoininous "case" was
ey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). set up by Stalin; he did not, how-
he prosperity of the working ever, have the time in which to
Pt
has grown tremendously bring it to an end (as he con-
n Georgia under Soviet rule. ceived that end), and for this
It is clear that as the economy reason the doctors are still alive,
d culture develop, and as the Now all have been rehabilitated.
ocialist consciousness of They are working in the same
the
orking masses in Georgia places they were working before;
own, the source from which they treat top individuals, not
hcsurgeois nationalism draws its
rength evaporates, excluding members of the Gov-
ernment; they have our full con-
As it developed, there was 110
orgia. Thousands of innocent fore.
duties honestly, as they did be-
fidence; and they execute their
rsons fell victim of willfulness In organizing the various dirty
d lawlessness. All of this hap- and shameful cases, a very has.
tied tinder the "genial" leader- role was played by the rabid
ip of Stalin, "the great son of enemy of our party, an agent of
e Georgian nation," as Geor- a foreign intelligence service--
an,, liked to refer to Stalin.
nimation in the hal].) Beria, who had stolen into Sta-
lin's confidence In what way
The willfulness of Stalin this provocateur gain such
owed itself not only in d a positionin the party and 5.
ns concerning ,the internal
a
could ?
C
an
Sr
St
Ge
pe
an
Pe
sh
th
gi
(A
sh
910
CPYRGHT
?-??,? ?
? el twelenelleasi
Approved For Release 2002/07/22: CIA-RDP65-00751000500130054-4?
16 THE NEW YORK TDIES, TUESDAYS NNE 5, 1956.
Mass Terror by the N. K. V. D. in 1936737 Is Declared to Have Been Unjustied
Q5,
Continued From Preceding Page
the state, so as to become the
First Deputy ,Ohairman of the
Council of ministers of the So-
viet Union and a member of the
Central Committee Political
Bureau? It has now been estab-
lished that this villain had
climbed up the Government lad-
der over an untold number of
corpses.
Were there any signs that
Beria was an enemy of the party?
Yes, there were.
Kaminsky Slaying Is Noted
Already in 1937, at a Central
Committee Plenum, former Peo-
ple's Commissar of Health, Ka-
minsky, said that Beds worked
for the Mussavat intelligence
service. But the Central Com-
mittee Plenum had barely con-
cluded when Kaminsky was an-
- rested and then shot.
Had Stalin examined Kamin-
, sky's statement? No, because
Stalin believed in Berta, and
that wag enough for him. And
when Stalin believed in anyone
or anything, then no one could
say anyeeleg that was contrary
to his opinion; anyone who would
dare to Empress opposition would
have met the same fats as Ha-
There were other signs also.
The declaration which Comrade
Snegov made at the party's em-
end Committee is interesting
(parenthetically speaking, be
was also rehabilitated not long
nothing which cm turn a
loyal son of the party into an
enemy, even right up to his
last dying breath.
But I have no way out. I
cannot divert from myself the
hastily approaching new and
powerful blows.
Everything, however, has its
limits. My torture has reached
the extreme. My health is
broken, my strength and my
energy are waning, the end is
drawing near. Ta die in a
Soviet prison, branded as a
vile traitor to the fatherland
-what can be more monstrous
for an honest man. And how
monstrous all this is! Unsur-
passed bitterness and pain
grips my heart.
No! No! This will not hap-
pen; this cannot be-I cry.
Neither the party, nor the
Soviet Government, nor the
People's Commissar, L. P.
Serie, will permit this cruel
Irreparable injustice. I am
firmly certain that given a
quiet, objective examination,
without any foul rantings,
without any anger and with-
out the fearful tortures, it
would be easy to prove the
baselessness of the charges.
I believe deeply that truth and
justice will triumph. I believe.
I believe.
The old Bolshevik, Comrade
Keirov, was found innocent by
the Military Collegfum. But de-
spite this, he was shot at Beria's
ago, after seventeen years in order. (Indignation in the hall.)
? prison camps). In this declare- Suicide of Ordzhonikidze
time Snegov writes:
? In connection with the pro-
posed rehabilitation of the for-
mer Central Committee mem-
ber, Kartvelishvill-Lavrentiev.
I have entrusted to the hands
- of the representative of the
Committee of State Security a
detailed deposition concerning
Berials role in the disposition
of the Kartatelisleedi case and
., concerning the criminal me-
Ates by Winch Berle was
guided.
le nor Gelation it b indecision-
te OMB an impedes*
to this ease end
le WA WC.
' bectesees-' ?
it as proper to Mehl&
Berta also handled cruelly the
family of Comrade Ordzhoni
iddze. Why? Because Ordzho-
nilddze had tried to prevent
Sects from realizing his shame-
ful please. Berrie had cleared
from his way all persons who
could possibly tInterfere with
daily generously does he endow
himself with praises pertaining
to his military genius, to his
talent for strategy.
I will cite one more insertion
made by Stalin concerning the
theme of the Stalinist military
genius. He writes:
-The advanced Soviet science
of war received further de-
velopraent at Comrade Stalin's
hands. Comrade Stalin elebo-
rated the theory of the per-
manently operating factors
that decide the issue of wars,
of active defense and the laws
of counter-offensive and offen-
sive, of the co-operation of all
services and arms in modern
warfare, of the role of big
tank masses and air forces in
modem war, and of the artil-
lery as the most formidable
of the armed services. At the
various stages of ? the war
Stalin's genius found the cor-
rect solutions that took ac-
count of all the circumstance
of te ituatio." (Idovemet i
is an.)
And further, writes Stalin:
"Stalin's military master-
ship was displayed both in de-
fense and offense. Comrade
Stalin's genius misled him to
divine the enemy's plans and
defeat them. The battles in
which Comrade Stalin directed
the Soviet armies are brilliant
examples of operational mili-
tary skill."
In this manner was Stalin
praised as a strategist. Who
did this? Stalin himself, not in
his role as a strategist but in
the role of an author-editor, one
of the main creators of his self-
adulatory biography.
Such, comrades, are the facts.
We should rather say shameful
facts.
And one additional fact from
the tame "Short Biography" of
Stalin. As is known, "'The Short
Course of the History of the All-
Union Communist party (Bol-
Ordzhanikidze. wsa alwlkYs eheviker was written by a
opponent of Bernie wniell be tokilCommession of the Party Cen-
Stalin. Instead or examining tral Committee.
this affair and taking approve-
Me stem Stalin allowed the
Cele ef latiletbial Used
o
Seescoe
rezelie
SOVIET UNION
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'The Nee York Thar June 5. 1556
STALIN' MASS DEPORTATIONS: Nikita S. Khrushehev
told of the banishment of native populations from four of
the Soviet republics and regions shown by diagonal shading.
He did not mention similar steps against the German Volga
and Crimean Tartar republics.
quent. Huge sums were spent to situation in agriculture, but
build it at a time when people stalla never even noted it. Did
of this area had lived since the we tell Stalin about this? Yes,
war in huts. Consider yourself, we told him, but he did not sup-
was Stalin right when he wrote port nn Why? Because Stalin
In his biography that " ? ? he never traveled anywhere, did not
were gained during his lifetime.
Can we deny this? In my opin-
ion, the question can be asked
In this manner only by those
who are blinded and hopelessly
hypnotized by the cult of the
Individual, only by those whe
do not understand the essence
of the revolution and of the So-
viet state, only by those who
do not understand, in a Leninist
manner, the role of the party
and of the nation in the develop-
inent of the Soviet society.
Party of the People Stressed
The Socialist revolution was
attained by the working class
and by the por peasantry with
the partial support of middle-
class peasants. It was attained
by the people under the leader-
ship of the Bolshevik Party.
Lenin's great service consisted
of the tact that he created a
militant party of the working
class, but he was armed with
Marxist understanding of the
laws of social development and
with the science of proletarian
victory In the fight with capi-
talism, and he steeled this party
in the crucible of revolutionary
struggle of the masses of the
people. During this fight the
party consistently defended the
Interests of the People. became
its experienced leader, and led
the working,masses to power, to
the creation of the first Socialist
state.
You remember well the wise
words of Lenin that the Soviet
state is strong because of the
awareness of the masses that
history is created by the millions
and tens of millions of people.
Our historical victories were
attained thanks to the organiza-
tional work Of the party, to the
many provincial organizations,
and to the self-sacrificing work
of our great nation. These vic-
tories are the result of the great
drive and activity of the nation
and of the party as a whole;
they are not at all the fruit of
the leadership of Stalin, as the
situation was pictured during
_
les seth *8t* Onalvidual and was written moots of Ms lack of for muse only from films. And then we have to state unequiv-
and ocably that the leadership prac-
- was -forced &shoot idniself? flee be a designated greelleof authors. f???alres reeniorY? It is not a co- these films had dressed up
the Investigation documems dIgnanon In the hall.) Buck was mete feet was reflected In the incidence that, despite the clod- beautified me existing situation tice which came into being dur?
On Oet. 30. 1931, at the session Herta. "" ing the last years of Stalin's life
following formulation on ' the don taken, over thirty years ago in agriculture.
became a oriole' obstacle in the
proof copy of the "Short Blogra- to mbeuinledmaenPt Palace
path of Soviet social develop-
-
of Stalin": adefie18?Tiir fletgYicr? tivMene'layrmilimelifeeethpaiettuthmde calblecles-
' A commission of the Central this Palace was not built, its were bending from the weight ment
Committee, all-Union Comm- Ys Poe of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin often failed for months
nist party (Bolsheviks), under poned, and the Project allowed Stalin thought that it was actu- to take up some unusually im-
the direction of Comrade Stalin to lapse. portant problems concerning the
? all so.
and with his most active per- We cannot forget to recall the Vladimir Ilyicit Lenin looked ?
life of the party and of the state
sonal participation, has pre- Soviet Government resolution of at life differently. lie was ai._ whom solution could not be post-
poned. During Stalin's leadership
pared a "Short Course of the Aug. 14, 1925 concerning "the ways close to the people; he
History of the All-Union Corn- founding of Lenin prizes for used to receive
educational work." This resole-gates, peasant dele-
nations were often threatened.
our peaceful relations with other
munist party (Bolsheviks)." gates, and often spoke at factory
ers, was not unmasked during But even this phrase did not tion was published in the press, gatherings; he used to visit vil- because one-man decisions could
tion of the Secretariat of the, Stalin's life?, He V.M.5 not un- satisfy Stalin: the following sen- but until this day there are no lages and talk with the peasants, cause, and often did cause, great
Tran.s-Caucesian Kral Commit-;masked earlier because he had tence replaced it in the final Lenin prizes. This, too, should be Stalin separated himself from imf?Phvati?11?'
tee composed of the following: , utilized very skillfully Stalin's version of the "Short Biogra. corrected. (Tumultuous, pro-
longed applause). ?
the people and never went any- In the last years, when we
- First Secretary Kartvelishvili; iweaknesses; feeding him with phy": . where. This lasted tens of managed to free ourselves of the
Stela (it vrattl,???Pieions. he Waisted Stalin in In ISM appeared the book, During eramea me, thanes to eette. Th last time hevisited harmful practice of the cult of
and acted With hisl "Histo of the All-Union }mown methods Which I have - e the individual and took several
1928,
in the sphere of in-
did not allow In himself meet city and collective work- e_ethe of the cult of the
bwere:sits-stiorstioashadow arrace,1.44ePrij'il skaatkinen4 31? know
rtinceetthe actual
17 If'
If w e to consider this mat-
At the gum titactetsZorive phe hhete the-Mint*, and a grl. ter of Marxists and as Leninists,
of the Organizational Bureau of
the central Committee, Ail-
' Union Communist party (Boishe-
Berke was unmasked by the
serty's Central Committee short-
y after Stalin's death. As a re-
viks), Kartvelishvill, Secretary suit of the particularly detailed
of the Trans-Caucasian Kral egal proceedings it was estab-
9"Committee, made a report. All ished that Berta had commit-
members of the Executive of the ted monstrous crimes and Eerie
Kral Committee were present,
of them I alone am alive.
During this session .1. V. Stalin
made a motion at the end of his
speech concerning the organize-
was shot.
The question arises why Serie,
who had liquidated tens of thou-
sands of party and Soviet work-
member of tbe Political Bureauldastrial enterprises, to
-
to take a stand against one or and Sovkbease,
another Iniust or improper pro- 'lions and cultural insettcwa
madam, against serious errors have been referred to by I with!
and shortcomings in the pram ota tiptIde-vateit pIroratipeyrtyexpotresetheiw_41/2.es
tidAs es of
we have already shown, of these or those governme or
many decisions were taken party leaders who were Will ee
either by one person or in a tive and in good health. Manye
roundabout way, without collec- us participated in the action ?
tire discussions. The sad fate of assigning our names to mem.
Political Bureau member, Coni- towns, districts, factories and
rade Vaunt-we/sky, who fell vie- kolltbeses. We must correct this,
tine to Stalin's repressions, is (Applause.)
known to all. It is a charactere- But this should be done calm
tb thing movehimthatfremthtehedecisiprdiotrealto3372. Cele magandlowly
tte:wm. . The Centraleuesthi
reau was never discussed but Matter and consider it carefully
was reached in a devious fash? to Prevent errors and excesses%
came
eothvale Ileareannedrem=r Kosiohew theenCritrainarrest4
deeliounw.tele:Inpothest,.eenreeteriMntgwathey
of Stixnetsov and Redionov from
programs thus: "Thiel is Radbe
The Kiev radio used to start itil
CeTnimheieritteepo,srtanreluofralthe Central u Line thdeeynanitbee ofplir.
icoxg;EirevbeWherren
was reduced and its work was without naming
disorganizedthliit PohllyticaltheBucrreaeautieo! i.lrfittegwd.halleeellputrolleahahl3Pencertiy aeltttatlfgo*eiraer:
various commissions-the so- that been
called "quintets" "sextets
"septets" and "novenaries." Here Thus, if today we begin to aridintore
is, for instance, a resolution of move the shfhe everywhere people
the Political Bureau of Oct. 3, t? change hamesi .
?
Stalin's Proposal:
"1. 'The Political Bureau
Commission for Foreign At-
fairs ("Sextet") is to concern
Itself in the future, in addition
to foreign affairs, also with
matters of internal construe-
player! ( clear tighter in the hall.) eehat is tight...) This will hens-
It
ill ie PolitiLltheBur
Central Committee, J. Stalin." holithwea and the Wei-chore.?
tion andi do.mestic policy.
State Commission of Economic
Comrade Voznesensky, and is
its roster the Chairman of the
Planning of the U. S. S. R.,
to be known as a Septet.
What a terminology of a card
"2. The Sextet is to add to
s gned Secretary the the industrial ente"'w.ni:esui
eatujollawItit. fit
l'hure cause.
isr ell the cult (Laughter, applause, voices!
the
type of commissions-"quintets," also in this Wee.
"sextets,". "septets." and "nevem We should in all seriousness
,e-.was against e prin-
ciple of collective leadership.
The result of this was that eome
members of the Political Bureau
were In this way kept away from
participation In reaching -the
most important state matters.
One of the oldest members of
our party, Kliment Yefremovich give ammunition to the enemy:
Voroshilov, found himself in an
almost impossible situation. Por hi ;e:f ledr e not wash a se yh
several years he was actually think
several of the right of putic- that the delegates te:outhrIe
lyneene
gress will understand and as-
ipation in Political Bureau ass- seas properly sii these proposals.
sions. Stalin forbade him to at-
tend the Political Bureau ass- Party Policy Set
dons and to receive documents.
in session and Comrade VOro- iliv:yin,radOnCeesa: tidWteormauall;tiva4:?mluleht
When the Political Bureau was the cult of the individual deci -
Miley heard about it, he tele- draw the proper conclusions con-
phoned each time and asked cernins.
both ideological-theore-
whether he would be allowed to tical and practical work.
attend. Sometimes Stalin pee- It ill necessary for this pur-
mitted it, but always showed his pose,
dissatisfaction. First, in a Bolsbevec manner
vereabuev under suspicion to condemn and to eradicate the
as alien to
not con-
whose honor the given enter
prises, kolkhoses or tales are
named, also met some bad fate
and that they have also been
arrested, (Animation in the
hall.)
How Is the authority and the
importance of this or that lead
en judged? On the basis of how
many towns, industrial enter
prises and factories, khollthozee
and sovIthozes carry his name
Is it not about time that we
eliminate dole "private property'
and "nationalize" the factories,
considers the questionof the cult
of the individual. We cannot let
this matter get out of the party.
especially not to the press. It
I s for this reason that we are
considering it here at a closed
Congress session. We should
know the limits- we should not
cult of the individual
Because of his extreme sus- efaraiscn,,f,,,eresta and
pidoteletelan toyed also with
of
I 1 I I
ey of' ?_ t
concerning the 100- Ordzhonikidze was always a ,n
n shessr. a , war in huts. Consider yourself,( we told him, but he did not slip- th are not at all the fruit
p- aries -was again
s the prin-
tires by which Ber w
ia' as was written by
opponent of Beria, which he told, Commission of the Party Cen- was Stalin right when he wrote !port us. Why? Because Stalin
guided. Stalin Instead of+ examining tral Committee, in his biography that '" ? ? ? he never traveled anywhere, did not
In my opinion it is indispens- '
able to recall an important fact ri SM AUb4ikd
pertaining to this case and to
quidation. of Ordzhonikictze's or self-adoration?" situation in the provinces.
communicate it to the Central.
At the same time Stalin gave He knew the country and agri-
Committee kidze himself to such a state he
because I did not brother and brought Onizhoni-
proofs of his lack of respect for culture only from films. And
Lenin's memory. It is not a co- these films had dressed up and
incidence that, despite the deci- beautified the existing situation
sion taken, over thirty years ago in agriculture.
to build a Palace of Soviets as Many films so pictured collec-
a monument td Vladimir Ilyich,
tiVe farm life that the tables
this Palace was not built, its were bending from the weight
coponnstdtru and
construction
the proasarect allowedayst Stalin thought that it was actu-
.
of turkeys and geese. Evidently
tolae pae. ' ally so.
We
,
cannot forget to recall the Vladimir Ilyick 1 Lenin looked
Soviet Government resolution of
Aug. 14, 1925 concerning the at life differently. He was al-
"? ways close to the people; he
founding of Lenin prizes for used to receive peasant dele-
gates, and often spoke at factory
gatherings; he used to visit vil-
lages and talk with the peasants.
Stalin separated himself from
the people and never went any-
where. This lasted tens of
years. The last time hevisited
a village was in January, 1928,
when he visited Siberia In con-
nection with grain deliveries.
How then mould he have known
the-situation in. the provinces?
And when he was once told
during a discussion that our
situation on the land was a dif-
ficult one and that the situation
of battle breeding and meat
production was especially bad,
a commission was formed which
Stalin loved to see the film, was charged with the prepara-
tion of a resolution called,
"Means
tmened furthereedin develop-
"The
ielopzi.
"The Unforgettable Year of menet of animal breeding
1919," in which he was shown Kollchozes and SovIchozes.' We
anond the where
h
s of e wag
anrm
armored redtrain worked out this project.
Of course, our proposals of
sabre. hilLeotvKit
n n ouren t dYeeaf re e mf ren di e nedn possibilities,
, that time did not contain all
but we did charter
ways in which animal breeding
vanquishing the foe with Ws own
Did this book properly reflect find the necessary courage and on the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes
the efforts of the party in the write the truth about Stalin; would be raised. We had pro-
Socialist transformation of the after all, he knows how Stalin posed then to raise the prices
country, in the construction of had fought. It will be difficult of such products to create mate-
Socialist society, in the Indus- for Comrade Voroshilov to un-
rial incentives for the Kolkhoz,
.
trialization and collectivization dertake this, but it would. be M T .S. and SovIchoz workers
of the country, and also other good if he did it. Everyone will in the development of cattle
' lLartvelishviii was the elosestladd is that they all were ap- steps taken by the party which approve of it, both the people breeding. But our project was
assistant of Sergi:o. The unfriend Proved and edited by Stalin per- undeviatingly traveled the path and the party. Even his grand- not accepted and in February,
relatlenshiP impelled Beria,soaally and some of them were autlined by Lenin? This book eons win thee, wee Fragrant 1931 was laid aside entirely.
'to *thrice., a "ease. against added in Ws own issatheri=g to spmki WiMipany about stalk, aoga,...) -What is more, while reviewing
the draft text of the book. .
Kartrelishvilt
ii is a characteristic thing What did StalW consider es- ports. Everythingwith the
about hfe speeches, about hie re- ''fn ignitible about tha events this project Stalin proposed that
that in this "case" Kartvelishvili sential to write into this book? men. -
Did he want to coo/ the ardor po out of the October Revolution and the taxes paid by the Kolkhozes
est exception is tied to his about the Civil War the and by the Kolkhoz workers
, impres-
was charged with a terroristicshould be raised by 40,000,000,-
name. sion was created that' Stalin
act against Beria. And when Stalin himself as- always played the main role, as 000 rubles. According to him the
The indictment in the Berlell-off and the
serts that he himself wrote the if everywhere and always Stalin peasants are we
case contains a discussion ofKolkhoz worker would need to
"Short Course of the History of had suggested to Lenin what to
his crimes. Some things should,sell only one more chicken to
the All-Union Communist Party do and how to do it. However,
however, be recalled, especially pay his tax in full,
since it is possible that not all Imagine what this meant.
delegates to the Congress have Certainly 40,000,000,000 rubles
read this document. I wish to is a sum which the Kolkhoz
recall Beria's bestial disposition workers did not realize for all
of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev, the products which they sold to
and Golubiev's adopted mother, the Government. In 1952, for in-
Baturina, persons who wished to stance, the Kolkhozes and the
Inform the Central Committee
concerning Beria's treacherous
activity. They were shot with-
out any trial and the sentence
wa$ paeaad ex-post facto, after
the execution.
Here is what the old Com-
raireiet, Comrade Kedrov, wrote
to the Central Committee
through Comrade Andreyev
(Comrade A_ndreyev was then
a Central Committee secretary),
I am calling ti you for help
from a gloomy cell of the Le-
fortovsky prison. Let my cry
of horror reach your ears; do
not remain deaf; take me Un-
der your protescion; please
help remove the nightmare of
interrogations and show that
this is all a mistake.
I suffer innocently. Please
believe me. Time will tea'
to the truth. I am not an
agent -proveicatuer of the
Tsarist nkhrana; I ,,,I not a
se-2002/01M2ed. C
This book, parenthetically,
was also permeated with the cult
of the individual and was written
by a designated group of authors.
This fact was reflected in the
following formulation on the
proof copy of the "Short Biogra-
hy of Stalin":
? A commission of the Central
Committee, all-Union Commu-
nist party (Bolsheviks), under
the direction of Comrade Stalin
and with his most active per-
sonal participation, has pre-
pared a "Short Course of the
24Rtgattaret.?k
consider it as proper to include
in the investigation documents.
On Oct. 30, 1931, at the session
of the Organizational Bureau of
the Central Committee, All-
Union Communist party (Bolshe-
viks), Kartvelishvili Secretary
of the Trans-Caucasian Krai
was forced to shoot himself. (In-
dignation in the hall.) Such was
Bede.
Beria was unmasked by the
party's Central Committee short-
ly after Stalin's death. As a re-
sult of the particularly detailed
legal proceedings it was estab-
C-emmittee, made a report- All lished that Beria had commit-
members of the Executive of the ted monstrous crimes and Beria
Kral Committee were present,
of them I alone am alive.
During this session J. V. Stalin
made a motion at the end of his
speech concerning the organiza-
tion of the Secretariat of the
Trans-Caucesian Kral Commit-
tee composed of the following:
First Secretary Kartvelishvili;
was shot.
The question arises why Berta,
who had liquidated tens of thou- History of the All-Union Com-
sands of party and Soviet work- munist party (Bolsheviks)." educational work." This resolu-
tion was published in the press,
era, was not unmasked during But even this phrase did not
satisfy @win, the following nen. but until this day there are no
Stalin's life?, lie was not un-
masked earlier because he had tence replaced it in the final Lenin prizes. This, too, should be
?Boort Biogriv corrected. (Tumultuous, pro-
utilized very skillfully Stalin's version of the
weaknesses; feeding him with phy": longed applause).
Second Secretary Beria (it was suspicions, he assisted Stalin in In 1938 appeared the book, During !Rahn's life, thanks to
everything and acted with his "History of there tkods which , L have
then for the first time in the 111-UniCM known
mentioned, and quoting facts,
Communist Party (Bolshe-
viks), Short Course," written for instance, from the "Short
by Comrade Stalin and ap- Biography" of Stalin-all events
proved by a commission of the were explained as SI lessasePlaral
Central Committee, All-Union only a secondary role, siren Our-
self, using all conceivable meth- Communist party (Bolatievis). ing the October Socialist Hero-
reason refused categorically to lution. In. many films and in
ods, supported the glorification Add anyting more? (Anima-
nis own person. This is sup- tion in the hall.) many literary works, the figure
work together with him. Stalin of .. .
proposed then that this matter, of Lenin was incorrectly pre-
ported by numerous facts. One As you see, a surprising meta-
be left open and that it be solved of the most characteristic ex- morphosis changed t he work "Med and - Inadmissably de-
in the process of the work itself. =pies of Stalin's self-glorifica- created by a group into a book preciated.
Two days later a decision was tion and of his lack of even written by Stalin. It is not nec- lihrushchev Cali for Truth
arrived at that Berle would re- elementary modesty is the edi- essary to state how and why this
tion of his "Short Biography," metamorphosis took place.
which was published in 1948. A pertinent question comes to
This book is an expression of our mind: If Stalin is the author
the most dissolute flattery, an of this book, why did he need
example of making a man into a to praise the person of hietorical
godhead, of transforming him period of our glorious Commu-
nto an infallible safe, "the great- nist party solely into an action
est leader," "sublime strategist of "the Stalin genius?"
of all times and nations." Finally
no other words could be found
with which to lift Stalin up to
the heavens.
We need not give here exam-
ples of the loathsome adulation
filling this book. All we need to
party's history that Beria 's
name was mentioned as a can-
didate for a party position).
Kartvelishvili answered that
he knew Beria well and for that
support.
His Self-Glorification Assailed
Comrades: The cult of the in-
dividual acquired such monstrous
size chiefly because Stalin him-
ceive the party post and that
Kartvelishvili would be deported
from the Trans-Caucasus.
This fact can be confirmed by
Comrades Islikoyan and Kagan-
ovich, who were present at that
_session. -
BR-teener* Long-Stending
The long unfriendly relations
between T.Worelishvili and Berta
were widely known. They date
back to the time When Comrade
Serge (Ordzhonikidze) was ac-
tive in the Trans-Caucasus;
of his flatterers who were com-
posing his "Short Biography,"
No! He marked the very places
where he thought that the praise
of his services was insufficient
the leadership of Stalin, as the
situation was pictured during
the period of the cult of the
individual..
If we are to consider this mat-
ter of Marxists and as Leninists,
then we have to state unequiv-
ocably that the leadership prac-
tice.which came into being dur-
ing the last years of Stalin's life
became a serious obstacle in the
path of Soviet social develop-
ment.
Stalin often failed for months
to take up some unusually im-
portant problems concerning the
life pf the party and of the state
whale solution could not be post-
poned. During Stalin's leadership
our peaceful relations with other
nations were often threatened,
because one-man decisions could
cause, and often did cause, great
complications!.
In the last years, when we
managed to free ourselves of the
harmful practice of the cult of
the individual and took several
proper steps in the sphere of in-
ternal and external policies,
everyone saw how activity grew
before their very eyes, how the
creative activity of the broad
working masses developed, how
favorably all this acted upon the
development of economy and of
culture. (Applause.)
Some comrades may ask us:
Where were the members of the
Political Bureau of the Central
Committee? Why did they not
assert themselves against the
cult of the individual in time?
And why is this being done only
now?
First of all we have to con'
aider the fact that the members
of the Political Bureau viewed
these matters in a different way
at different times. Initially,
many of them backed Stalin
was one of the strongest Marx-
ists and his logic, his strength
and his will greatly influenced
the cadres and party work.
It is known that Stalin. after
Lenin's death, especially during
the first years, actively fought
for Leninism against the ene-
mies of Leninist theory and
against those who deviated.
Beginning with Leninist theory,
the party, with its Central Com-
mittee at the head, started on
a great scale the work of Social-
ist industrialization of the coun-
try, agricultural collectivization
and the cultural revolution.
At that time Stalin gained
great popularity, sympathy and
support. The party had to fight
those who attempted to lead the
country away from the correct
Leninist path; it had to fight
Trotskyites, Zinovietites and
rightists, and the bourgeois
nationalists. This fight was in-
dispensable,
Later, however, Stalin, abus-
ing his power more and more,
began to fight eminent party
and Government leaders and to
use terroristic methods against
honest Soviet people. As we
have laready shown, Stalin thus
handled such eminent party and
government leaders as Kosior,
Rudzutak, Eike, Postyshev and
many others.
Attempts to oppose ground-
less suspicions and charges re-
sulted in the opponent falling
victim of the repression. This
characterized the fall of Com-
rade Postyshev;
In one of his speeches tSalin
expressed his dissatisfaction with
Postyshev and asked him, "What
are you actually?"
Postyshev answered clearly,
"I am a Bolshevik, Comrade
Stalin, a Bolshevik."
This assertion was at first con-
(Bolsheviks)," this calls at least this is slander of Lenin- Pro-
Here are some examples char- for amazement. Can a Marxist- longed applause.)
acterizing Stalin's activity, add-
Leninist thus write 'about him- I will probably not sin against
etl in Stalin's own hand:
self, praising his own person to the truth when I say that 99 per
"In this fight against the
skeptics and capitulators; the the heavens? cent of the persons present here
Or let us take the matter of heard and knew very little about
'rrotskyites, Zinovievites, Bu- the Stalin prizes. (Movement in Stalin before the year 1924,
kharinites and Kamenevites, the hem) Not even the Czars while Lenin was known- to all;
gtheethreerw,"afdetefinir, Lenin's death, deddeath-th, created prizes which they named he was known to the whole Kolkhoz workers received 26,-
after themselves. party, to whole nation, from the 280,000,000 rubles for all their
that leading core of the party _ children up to the graybeards, products delivered and sold to
. . .. that upheld the great Stalin Praised In Anthem .,,,,,,.. r (Tumultuous; - prolonged an- the Government
party behind Lenin's behests,
banner of Lenin, rallied the 0 - as the hest plause.) Did Stalin's position then rest
and brought the Soviet people a _ '''"'""
text of tehce national an of All this has to be thoroughly on data of any wart whatever?
into the broad road of indus- the Soviet Union which contains revised, so that history, litera- Of course not.
trializing the country and col- nota word about the Communist Wm, and the fine arts Properly In such cases facts and
_.
The leader of this core and following uspreeeden ed p !,, the great deeds of our Commit- Stalin said anything, it mean it
it con ' however, the reflect V. I. Lenin's role and figures; did not interest him. If
. t int
lectivising the rural economy. Pa` -
of Stalin.
Stalin brought us up in loy-
alty to the people, He inspired
us to great toil and acts.
In these lines of the anthem is
the whole educational direction-
al and inspirational activity of
the great Leninist party seedbed
to Stalin. This is, of course, a
clear deviation from
Marxism- Soviet
party and of the Soviet
people-the creative people. (Ap-
plause.)
Comrades! The cult of the in-
dividual has caused the em-
ployment of faculty principles
In party work and in economic
activity. It brought about rule
violation of internal party and
Soviet democracy, sterile ad-
ministration, deviations of all
was so-after all, he was a
the guiding force of the party "genius" and a genius does not
and the state was Comrade
Stalin." need to count, he only needs to
look and can immediately tell
Thus writes Stalin himself! how it should be. When he ex-
Then he adds: presses his opinion, everyone
"Although he performed llia hes to repeat it and to admire
task of leader of the party and his wisdom.
the people with consummate But how much wisdom was
skill and enjoyed the tmre- contained in. the proposal to
served support of the entire raise the agricultural tax by 40,-
Soiligargoigiiinettes.
Lenin
NM=
, abso-
tly the slightest hint of vanit, Y. e pro-
e ou Or your
conceit or self-adulation.". y
Or nation gave birth to many
flatterers and specialists in
false ontimiem and deceit.
information that the Presidium posal was not based on an ac-
Where and when could a leader of the Central Committee has al- tual assessment of the situation butt on th.
eiple of collective leadership.
The result of this was that Some
members of the Political Bureau
were in this way kept away from
participation in reaching -the
most important state matters.
One of the oldest members of
our party, Kliment Yefremovich
Voroshilov, found himself in an
almost impossible situation. For
several years he was actually
deprived of the right of partic-
ipation in Political Bureau ses-
sions. Stalin forbade him to at-
tend the Political Bureau ses-
sions and to receive documents.
When the Political Bureau was
In session and Comrade Voro-
shilov heard about it, he tele-
phoned each time and asked
whether he would be allowed to
atteild. Sometimes Stalin per-
mitted it, but always showed his
dissatisfaction.
Voroshilov Under Suspicion
Because of his extreme sus-
picion, Stalin toyed also with the
absurd and ridiculous suspicion
that Voroshilov was an' English
agent (Laughter in the hall.)
It's tra, art English agent. A
Special tapping device was in-
stalled in his home to listen to
what was said there. (Indigna-
tion in the hall.)
By unilaterial decision Stalin
had also separated one other
man from the work of the Poli-
tical Bureau - Andre Andreye-
vich Andreyev. This was one of
the most unbridled acts of will-
fulness.
Let us consider the first Cen-
tral Committee Plenum aftethe
Nineteenth Party Congress when
Stalin, in his talk at the plenum,
characterized Vyacheslay Mik-
hailovkh Molotov and Anastas
Ivanovich Mikoyan and sug-
gested that these old workers of
our party were guilty of some
baseless charges. It is not ex-
cluded that had Stalin remained
at the helm for another several
months, Comrades Molotov and
Mikoyan would probably have
not delivered any speeches at
this congress.
Stalin evidently had plans to
finish off the old members of
the Political Bureau. He often
stated that Political Bureau
members should be replaced by
new ones.
His proposal, after the Nine-
teenth Congress concerning the
selection of twenty-five ' persons
to the Central Committee Pre-
sidium, was aimed at the re-
moval of the old Political Bu-
reau members and the bringing
In of less experienced persons so
that these would extol him in all
sorts of ways.
We can assume that this was
also a design for the future an-
nihilation of the old Political
Bureau nunebe,rs and in this way
a cover for all shameful acts of
Stalin, acts which we are now
considering.
Comrades! In order not to re-
peat errors of the past, the Cen-
tral Committee has declared
itself resolutely against the cult
of the individual, We consider
that Stalin was 'excessively ex-
tolled. However, in the past
Stalin doubtlessly performed
great services to the party, to
the working class and to the in-
tethational workers' movement.
This question is complicated
by the fact that all this that we
have just discussed was done
during Stalin's life under his
leadership and with his concur-
rence; here Stalin was convinced
Wil SIIUtila Ali ei?
considers the question of the rill!. CI
of the individual. We cannot let
this matter get out of the party.
especially not to the press. It
Is for this reason that we are
considering it here at a closed
Congress session. We should
know the limits; we should not
give ammunition to the enemy;
we should not wash our dirty
linen before their eyes. I think
that the delegates to the Con-
gress will understand and as-
sess properly all these proposals.
Party Policy Set
Comrade.: We must abolish
the cult of the individual deci-
sively, once and for all; we must
draw the proper conclusions con-
cerning both ideological-theore-
tical and practical work.
It is necessary for this pur-
pose:
First, in a Bolshevik manner
to condemn and to eradicate the
cult of the individual as alien to
Mancism-Leilnism and not con-
sonant with the principles nf
party leadership and the norms
of party life, and to fight in-
exorably all attempts at bring-
ing back this practice in one
form or another.
To return to and actually prae-
tite in ilk our ideological work
the most important theses of
Marxist - Leninist science &bout
the people as the creator of his-
tory and as the creator of all
material and spiritual good of
humanity, about the decisive
role of the Marxist party in the
revolutionary fight for the tram-
formation of society, about the
victory of communism.
In this connection we will be
forced to do much work to ex-
amine Critically from the Marx-
ist-Leninist viewpoint and to
correct the widely spread er-
roneous views connected with the
cult of the individual in the
sphere of history, philosophy.
economy and of other sciences.,
as well as in the literature and
the fine arts. It is especially
necessary that in the immediate
uture we compile a serious text-
book of the history of our pert y
which will be edited in accord-
ance with scientific Marxist ob-
jectivism, a textbook of the his-
tory of Soviet society, a book
pertaining to the events of the
civil war and the great patriotic
war.
Leninist Principles Railed
Secondly, to continue syste-
matically and consistently the
work done by the party's Central
Committee during the last years,
a work characterized by minute
observation in all party organi-
zations, from the bottom to the
top, of the Leninitt principles of
party leadership, characterized,
above all, by the main principle
of collective leadership, charac-
terized by the observation of the
norms of party life described in
the statutes of our party, and
finally, characterized by the
Wide practice of criticism and
self-criticism.
Thirdly, to restore completely
the Leninist principles of Soviet
Socialist democracy, expressed
in the Constitution of the Soviot
Union, to fight willfulness of in-
dividuals abusing their power.
The ern caused by acts violating
revolutionary Socialist legality
which have accumulated during
a long time as a result of the
negative influence of the cult of
the individual to be com-
pletely corrected.
Comrades! The twentieth con -
grass of the Communist Party of
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130054-4
CPYRGHT
Serge lOrdthen11.17.C..1 AC.
tive in the Trans-Caucasus:
liartvelishvili was the closest
assistant of Serge. The unfriend-
ly relationship impelled Berle
to fabricate a "case" against,
Kartvelishvili.
It is a characteristic thing:
that in this "ea,e" Kartvelishvill'
was charged with a terroristic
act against Eerie.
The indictment in the Berth
case contains a discussion of
his crimes. Some things' should,
however, be recalled, especially
since it is possible that not all
delegates to the Congress have
read this document_ I wish to
?recall Eeriest bestial disposition
of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev,
and GoIubiev's adopted mother,
Baturina, persons who wished to
inform the Central Committee
concerning Beria's treacherous
actiVity. They were shot with-
out any trial and the sentence
was passed ex-post facto, after
the execution.
Here is what the old Com-
munist, Comrade Kedrov, wrote
to the Central Committee
through Comrade Andreyev
(Comrade Andreyev was then
a Central Committee secretary)
I sin calling ti you for help
from a gloomy cell of the Le-
fortovsky prison. Let my cry
of horror reach your ears; do
not remain deaf; take me un-
der your protescion; please
help remove the nightmare of
interrogations and show that
this Is all a mistake.
I suffer Innocently. Please
believe me. Time will testify
to the truth. I am not an
agent -provoeatuer of the
Tsarist Okhrana; I am not a
sPY: I am not a member of an
anti-Soviet organization of
Which I am being accused on
the basis of denunciations. I
am also not guilty of any
other crimes against the party
and the Government I are an
old Bolshevik, free of any
stain; I have honestly fought
for almost forty years in the
ranks of the party for the
good and the prosperity of
the nation.
Today I, a 62-year-old man,
ara being threatened by the
Investigative judges with more
severe, cruel and degrading
methods of physical pressure.
They (the judges] are no
longer capable of becoming
aware of their error and of
recognizing that their han-
dling of my case is illegal and
impermissible. They try to
justify their, actions by pic-
turing me as a hardened and
raring enemy and are demand-
isiesessied repressions. But
know that I am.
there .is
plc,: of the loathsome adulatiom
n' g"'e here ""1-1Socialist society, in the indus-
, ,, .,. Is
I , , 0,1.411,1101; ol
filling this book. All e ...I t trialization and collectivization
add is that they aliww- -e-r?e - sp -o. Of the country, and also other
steps taken by the party which
,sonally and some of them were
undeviatingly traveled the path
proved and edited by Stalin per-
added in his own handwriting to outlined by Lenin? This book
the draft text of the book. '
What did Stalin consider es-
sential to write into this book?
Did
cool the ardor
of his flatterers who were com-
posing his "Short Biography,"
No! He marked the very places
where he thought that the praise
of his services was insufficient.
Here are some examples char-
acterizing Stalin's activity, add-
ed in Stalin's awn hand:
"In this fight against the
skeptics and capitreators; the
Trotskyites, Zinovievites, 13u-
kharinites and KamenevItes,
there was definitely welded to-
gether, after Lenin's death,
that leading core of the party
. that upheld the great
banner of Lenin, rallied the
party behind Lenin's behests,
and brought the Soviet people
into the broad road of indus-
trializing the country and col-
lectivising the rural economy.
The leader of this core and
the guiding force of the party
and the state was Comrade
Stalin,"
Thus writes Stalin himself!
Then he adds:
"Although he performed his
task of leader of the party and
the people with consummate
skill and enjoyed the Imre-.
seSorvvieedt pseoupppole,rtStaeflinthenevenertireal-
lowed his work to be marred
by the slightest hint of vanity,
conceit or self-adulation." -?
Where and when could a leader
so praise himself? Is this worthy
of a leader of the Marxist-Len-
inist type? No. Precisely against
this did Marx. and Engels take
such a strong position. This also
was always sharply condemned
by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin,
orlinitalted patina of Hat as found In "A
Short Slolnater." by_ &or* Stalin. blooeoloi
pregeouLarriunoBwns Mane. 1440,
=a, Yoko.. To'orni c4
in,tieffitheorialavvholeto
cth,77.7ing?i.th"e often WithoutWitholnuta CrOungtatineeringmaunerthe
In the draft text of his book ft is a fact that Stalin himself concrete situation. This went so
appeared the following sectence: had signed on July 2, 1951 a fal" that party workers
"Stalin is the Lenin of today:. resolution of the U. g. 5, during the smallest sessions,
This sentence appeared to Stalin Council of Ministers concerning read their speeches. All this pro-
to be
bdewritgweakhe,
read: es:aningedhisitownte the erection on the Volga-Don duced the danger of formalising
Canal of an impressive menu- the party and Soviet work and
ment to Stalin. On Sept. 4 of of bureaucratizing the whole ap-
"Stalin is the worthy continuer the same year he issued an order Paratus.
of Lenin's work, or, as it is said making thirty-three tons of Stalin's reluctance to con-
of today." You see how well it struction of this impressive
in our party, Stalin is the Lenin copper available for
the cm-
that he was aarealinetitesawaeeand the fact
Is said, not by the nation but monument -
by Stalin himself. real airs in the
Anyone who has visited the Provinces can be illustrated by
It is possible to give many Stalingrad area must have his direction of agricultere,
such seif-pntising' appraisala the huge statue which is being All thbse who intents them-
mitten into the draft teat of bulk there, and that csi a site selves even a little In
that book in sterna' hand. ?gape- which hard/y any people file- Hanel situation saw the
uI fought. IL trill be difficult
for Comrade Voroshilov to un-
dertake this, but it would be
good if he did it. Everyone will
approve of it, both the people
an he party. Even his grand-
Sens will think him. Prolonged
speaks principally about Stalin, applause.)
about his speeches, about his re- In speaking about the eV
porta. Everything without the of the October Revolution
name.
smallest exception Is tied to his about the Civil War, the imp
ri was created that' S
And when Stalin himself as. always played the main role,
serts that he himself wrote the if everywhere and always El
"Short Course of the History of had suggested to Lenin what
the All-Union Communist Party do and how to do it. Ilowev
(Bolaheviks);" this calls at least this is slander of Lenin,
for amazement. Can, a Marxist- longed applause.)
Leninist thus write 'about him- I will probably not Bin ag
self, praising his own person to the truth when I say that 99
the heavens? cent of the pertains present her
Or let us take the matter of heard and knew very little abo
the Stalin prizes. (Movement in Stalin before the year 19
the halt) Not even the Czars
created prizes which they named
at_ ter themselves.
Stalin Praised in Anthem
enta
and
res.
talin
as 000 rubles, According to him the
men peasants are well-off and the
to Kolichoz worker would need to
er, eel only one more chicken to
Pro- pay his tax in full.
Imagine what this meant.
sinsi Certainly 40,000,000,000 rubles
per la a sum which the Kolkhoz
e workers did not realize for all
ut
24
UI !I Pi 1.0 ciente mate-
rial incentives for the Kolkhoz,
T .S. and Sovkhoz workers
in the development oL. cattle
breeding. But our prct was
not accepted and in February,
1953 was laid aside entirely.
What is more, while reviewing
this project Stalin proposed that
the taxes paid by the Kolkhozes
and by the Kolichoz workers
should be raised by 40.000,000
while Lenin was }mown- to
he was known to the Who
party, to whole nation, from
children up to the graybeanis.
(Tumultuous - ' prolonged a
Stalin recognized as the best Plauae.)
a text of the national anthem of All this has to be thoroughly
the Soviet Union which contains revised, so that history, litera
ot a word about the Communist tore, and the fine arts properly
party; it contains, however, the reflect V. L Lenin's role and
following' unprecedented praise 01st
grpeaarttydeat of fourtheConimseeiu-
of SStaltelinin:brought us up in loy-
alty to the people, He inspired
us to great toil and acts
In these lines of the anthem is
Leninism, a clear debasing and
clear deviation from Mandl=
al and inspirational activity of in party work and in economi
the great Leninist party asclibe: yiaeatilaVititeny. It r brought aboutApr:Alit rulan
to Stalin.. This Is, of course,
the whole educational direction- P oyment of faculty principl
_ soviet demozrad,rirpiotifonstssdlshortearaoer ad
an
belittling of the role of the Par- somirtsnis,tricotiveoringn'
flatterers information , that the Presidium
y. We should add for your logs and varnishing of reality
f the Centre/ Committee has al- narerstion and
dve liaii)teethialintotamani
ready passed a resolution con- false optimism and deceit
We should also not forge
that due to the numerous at,
rests of party, Soviet and eco-
nomic leaders, many workers be-
gan o work uncertainly. slufwed
And was it without Stalin's over-cautiousness, feared all
knowledge that many of the Which was new, feared their Own
largest enterprises and towns shadows and began to show less
were named after him?' Was it initiative in their work.
Take, for instance, party and
Stalin monument, were erected Soviet resolutions, They were
without his knowledge that
the products which they sold to
the Government. In 1952, for M-
au; stance, the Kolkhozes and the
Kolkhoz workers received 26,-
the 280,000,000 rubles for all their
products delivered and sold to
the Government.
Did Stalin's position then rest
on data of any sort whatever?
Of course not.
In such cases facts and
figures did not interest him. If
Stalin said anything, it mean it
so?afterwas all, he was a
P- "genius" and a genius does not
need to count, he only needs to
- look and can immediately tell
- how it should be. When he ex-
people?the creative people. (A
plauae.)
Comrades! The cult of the in
dividual has caused the em
es opinion, everyone
c has to repeat it and to admire
ii
cerning the composition of a
new text of the anthem, which
will reflect the role of the
people, and the role of the party.
(Loud. prolonged applause,)
055 om.
But how much wisdom was
contained in the proposal to
raise the agricultural tax by 40,-
000,000,000 rubles? None, abso-
lutely none, because the pro-
Y sal was not based on an ac-
-ual assessment of the situation
but on the fantastic ideas of a
t person divorced from reality.
We are currently beginning
slowly to work our way out of
a difficult agricultural situa-
tion. The speeches of the dele-
gates to the Twentieth Congress
please us all. We are glad that
many delegates deliver speeches
that there are conditions for the
fulfillment of the Sixth rive-
Year Plan for animal hus-
bandry, not during the period
of flys years, but within two to
three years. We are certain that
commitments of the new
It-Year Plan will be accom-
plished successfully. (Prolonged
applause.)
Comrades! If we sharply
criticize today the cult of the
individual which was so wide-
spread during Stalin's life and
if we speak about the many
negative phenomena generated
by this cult which is so alien to
the spirit of Mandam-Leninism,
various persons may ask: How e Political Bureau occurred Long live the victorious ban.
could it be? Stalin headed the only occasionally, from time to Leninist example in all respects, (Tumultuous, prolonged sp.
nes' of our party--Lentnismil
party' and the country for time, then we will understand It is enough to point out that plans' endlug in ovation. Al
thirty years and many' victories how difficult It was for any many town& factories and in- rise)
"eelluees
ea^
io,n and his logic, his stiengili Milmyan and :mg- uf the individual in II
and his will greatly influenced gested that these old workers of sphere of history hilo
the cadres and party work. our party were guilty of some
It is known that Stalin, after
Lenin's death, especially during
the first years, actively fought
for Leninism against the ene-
mies of Leninist theory and
against those who deviated.
Beginning with Leninist theory,
the party, with its Central Com-
mittee at the head, started on
a great scale the work of Social-
ist industrialization of the coun-
try, agricultural collectivization
and the cultural revolution.
At that time Stalin gained
great popularity, sympathy and
support. The party had to fight
those who attempted to lead the
country away from the correct
Leninist path; it had, to fight
Trotskyites, Zinovietites and
rightists, and the bourgeois
nationalists, This fight was in-
dispensable,
Later, however, Stalin, abus-
ing his power more and more,
began to fight eminent party
and Government leaders and to
use terroristic methods against
honest Soviet People. As we
have laready shown, Stalin thus
handled such eminent party and
government leaders as Hosier,
Rudzutak, Eike, Postyshev and
many others.
Attempts to oppose ground-
less suspicions and charges re-
sulted in the opponent falling
victim of the repression. This
characterized the fall of Com-
rade Postyshev;
In one of his speeches tSalin
expressed his dissatisfaction with
Postyshev and asked him, "What
are you actually?"
Postyshev answered clearly,
"I am a Bolshevik, Comrade
Stalin, a Bolshevik."
This assertion was at first con-
sidered to show a lack of respect
for Stalin; later it was consid-
ered a harmful act and conse-
quently resulted in Postyshev's
annihilation and branding with-
out any reason as a "people's
enemy."
In the situation which then
prevailed / have talked often
with Nikolai Aleksandrovich
Bulganin, Once when we two
were traveling in a car, he said;
"It has happened sometimes that
a man goes to Stalin on his invi-
tation as a friend. And when he
site with Stalin, he does not
know where he will be sent next,
borne or to jail."
It is clear that such conditions
put every member of the Politi-
al Burea in a very difficult
situation. And when we also con-
sider the fact that in the last
years of the Central Committee
plenary sessions were not con-
vened and that the sessions of
baseless charges. It is not ex-
cluded that had Stalin remained
at the helm for another several
months, Comrades Molotov and
Mikoyan would probably have
not delivered any speeches at
this congress.
Stalin evidently had plans to
finish off the old members of
the Political Bureau. He often
stated that Political Bureau
members should be replaced by
new ones.
His proposal, after the Nine-
teenth Congress concerning the
selection of twenty-five' persons
to the Central Committee Pre-
sidium, was aimed at the re-
moval of the old Political Bu-
reau members and the bringing
in of less experienced persons so
that these would extol him in all
sorts of ways.
We can assume that this was
also a design for the future an-
nihilation of the old Political
Bureau mmebers and in this way
a cover for all shameful acts of
Stalin, acts which we are now
considering.
Comrades! In order not to re-
peat errors of the past, the Cen-
tral Committee has declared
itself resolutely against the cult
of the individual, We consider
that Stalin was excessively ex-
tolled. However, In the past
Stalin doubtlessly performed
great services to the party, to
the working class and to the in-
ternational workers' movement.
This question is complicated
by the fact that all this that we
have Just discussed was done
during Stalin's life under his
leadership and with his concur-
rence; here Stalin was convinced
that this was necessary for the
defense of the interests of the
working classes against the plot,
ting of the enemies and against
the attack of the imperialist
camp.
Re saw this from the position
of the interest of the working
class, of the interest of the la-
boring people, of the interest of
the victory of socialism and
communism. We cannot say that
these were the deeds of a giddy
despot He considered that this
shuold be done in the interest of
the party; of the working mass-
es, in the name of the defense of
the revolution's gains. In this
lies the whole tragedy!
The Naming of Towns
Comrades! Lenin had often
tressed that modesty is an ab-
solutely integral part of a real
Bolshevik. Lenin himself was the
living personification of the
greatest modesty. We cannot say
that we have been following this
economy and of other sciences,
as well as in the literature aro
the fine arts. It is especially
necessary that in the immediate
future We compile a serious text-
book of the history of our party
which will be edited in accord-
ance with scientific Marxist ob-
jectivism, a textbook of the hie-
tory of Soviet society, a book
pertaining to the events of the
civil war and the great patrioter
Wan
Leninist Principles Hailed
Secondly, to continue syste-
matically and consistently the
Pre-
sidium, done by the party's Central
Committee during the last years,
a work characterized by minute
observation in all party organi-
zations, from the bottom to the
top, of the Leninist principles of
party leadership, characterized.
above all, by the main principle
of collective leadership, charac-
terized by the observation of the
norms of party life described in
the statutes of our party, and
finally, characterized by the
'wide practice of criticism and
self-criticism.
Thirdly, to restore completely
the Leninist' principles of Soviet
Secialist democracy, expressed
in the Constitution of the Soviet
Union, to fight willfulness Of in-
dividuals abusing their power.
The evil caused by acts violating
revolutionary Socialist legality
which have accumulated during
a long time as a result of the
negative influence of the cult of
the individual has to be com-
pletely corrected_
Comrades! The twentieth con-
gress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union has manifested
with a new strength the unsItak-
able unity of our party, its co-
hesiveness around the Central
Committee, its resolute will to
accomplish the great task of
building commimism. (Tumultu-
ous applause.) And the fact that
we present in al/ their ramifica-
tions the basic problems of over-
corning the cult of the individual
Which is alien to Marxism-Len-
inism, as well as the problem of
liquidating its burdensome con-
sequences, is an evidence of
the great moral and political
strength of our Party. (Pro.
longed applause,)
We are absolutely certain that
our party, armed with the his-
torical resolutions of the twenti.
eth congress, will lead the Soviet
people along the Leninist path to
new successes, to new victories.
Tumultuous, prolonged ap-
plause,)
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