BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 1957 THE KHRUSHCHEV PURGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 1998
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: July 23, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

4pprgved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
1957
V
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 Approved, For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
THE KHRUSHCHEV PURGE
(23 July 1957)
1. In retrospect Khrushchev's action pattern since the death
of Stalin is consistent in at least one respect, 1. e. , his movement
toward power, His consistency in terms of policy is less clear,
perhaps because, in his movement toward power, he has used
differences and conflicts over policy matters in such a way as
to strengthen his own position, Nevertheless, his basic approach
seems to stem from a desire to break with the obsolete methods
of the Stalinist past and to strengthen the appeal of Communism
both internally (as a ruling system.) and externally (as a means
of weakening, if not destroying, the enemy). His break with
the past and his approach to the future are consistent with his
movement toward power, The man who is to succeed a giant
like Stalin could not aspire to this role if he were merely to copy
Stalin, Such a, man must emerge with a stature and ideas of his
own, Khrushchev has shown that he is willing to take great risks
in order to obtain such stature, The 20th CPSU Congress, his
secret speech, his virgin lands program, his concept of de-
centralization--these are all steps involving considerable risks,
Obviously, too, a man on his march to power would. feel
compelled to rationalize his gambling as being good for the USSR
and World Communism. It may be assumed that Khrushchev
similarly justified the June purge and probably received backing
from the Central Committee on the same grounds. Thus.,
Khrushchev has propelled himself into a position where he has
to show that he is good for the USSR and World Communism, and
in so doing incurred the greatest risk in his career.
2. Khrushchev's struggle with his competitors in the Presidium
appears to have gone rather well from the start. The Malenkov-
Beria combine was broken in 1953. In 1954 Abakumov was
executed for his role as purger in the "Leningrad affair, " Early
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 in 1955 Malenkov stepped down as Premier, and later in that
year Molotov relinquished his post as Foreign Minister after
having been castigated by a Plenum of the Central Committee in
July. The 20th CPSU Congress (February 1956) castigated
Molotov's and Malenkov's policies. In the second half of 1956
Kaganovich suffered demotion from his job as Chairman of the
important Committee of Labor and Wages. However, the
explosions in Poland and Hungary enabled Khrushchev's
competitors to rally and to stage a comeback. Between November
1956 and early January 1957 Molotov and Malenkov re-emerged as
influential. The December Plenum of the CC /CPSU which discussed
highly controversial economic issues (downward revisions of
the Sixth Five-Year Plan, managerial impediments and
inefficiency) probably found Khrushchev at the lowest point of
his recent career. However, from the February 1957 Plenum
on, following a session of the Supreme Soviet which had accepted
Khrushchev's industrial decentralization plan, Khrushchev rose
to considerable strength backed by tremendous publicity and
probably also by the majority of the regional Party apparatus
which was loyal to him and found his decentralization plan
profitable .
3. It has been pointed out that Khrushchev's competitors in the
Presidium who were felled in June by the Khrushchev-packed
Central Committee were not a homogeneous group. This is
certainly true. The popular Malenkov was his chief competitor.
Molotov and Kaganovich were "conservative" Stalinists and
probably more inconvenient than threatening. Shepilov, a
wartime associate of Khrushchev, probably was an opportunistic
turncoat. Probably they all joined in opposition to Khrushchev on
the question of industrial decentralization which they may have
considered too dangerous a gamble. In turn they probably were
joined or supported to various degrees by other Presidium
members equally critical of Khrushchev's modus operandi.
Bulganin at one time appears to have been associated with the
"anti-Party group" but disassociated himself (possibly by
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65- 07 6R0 0500130072-4
 "squealing") in time to win a temporary reprieve. Pervukhin
and Saburov's actual connection with the group may have been
based on a concurrence in views rather than factional activity.
The exact line-up against Khrushchev in the Presidium sessions
of 17, 18 and 19 June* may have been based on a loose alliance 1)1;ylyF
a temporary majority, Although it will probably
never be known exactly how the alliance coagulated, apparently
the strategy of the opposition was to defeat Khrushchev on
political grounds before he would eliminate the leaders of the
opposition (Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich) because of their
complicity in Stalin's crimes, particularly the "Leningrad affair".
4. In a CPSU document given to a Western CP leader or briefing
purposes on 12 July reference is made to attempts made as early as
January 1955 to oust Malenkov, These attempts are probably
bound up with the de-Stalinization process and may have actually
started when former Soviet Minister of State Security Abakumov
was executed in December 1954 because of his role in the
"Leningrad affair", i. e. , the liquidation of high-ranking Soviet
leaders** and associates of Zhdanov, Malenkov's chief competitor
prior to his (possibly natural) death in 1948. Khrushchev cited
the "Leningrad affair" in his "secret" speech of February 1956
as an illustration of Stalin's terror regime against the CPSU in
the postwar period; he exculpated the majority of the Political
It is likely that
the crucial session took place on 19 June. On 11 and. IS
June the majority of the Presidium appeared jointly in public
at various social and ceremonial occasions,
** E. g. , Politburo member and State planner Voznesensky,
Secretary of the CC/CPSU Kuznetsov, et al,
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 Bureau which did not know what Stalin was doing, and, conversely,
he pointed his finger at those who did.. Malenkov, Molotov and
Kaganovich were members of the Politbureau at the time the
"Leningrad affair" occurred. The implications could not have
been lost on them in February 1956. Khrushchev used the method
of indirect threat again in the 30 June 1956 Resolution of the CPSU
which defined the limits of the de-Stalinization campaign, when
he referred to a(presumably anti-Stalinist) "Leninist nucleus"
which operated already during Stalin's lifetime. Implicitly,
again, he pointed his finger at those leaders who had not been
part of the "Leninist nucleus."
At that time, an evaluation of the secret Khrushchev speech
noted:
"There is another theory which has been advanced.
It is the theory that the secret speech by Khrushchev
could be well interpreted as a blackmail instrument to
be used against actual or potential opponents. This theory
has acquired some weight in the light of the 30 June CPSU
Resolution, which came out with the rather surprising
statement that already during Stalin's lifetime a Leninist
nucleus existed among the CC members and ranking
Army officers--a nucleus which at various periods, for
instance during the war years, curtailed the power of
Stalin. From the reference to the existence of such a
Leninist nucleus, it is possible to argue that the people
outside of this Leninist nucleus are intended to be
identified more distinctly with the Stalin era and, further,
are singled out to be attacked or destroyed as traitors
when the need arises. The theory, then, is that
by having his speech accepted by the Central Committee,
Khrushchev obtained a 'legal' basis for moving in on
his actual or potential opposition and that, in having
obtained this 'legal' basis, he has strengthened his power
position. By the same token he has also alerted the
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 'non-Leninists' to his intentions. Thus, the question
arises of the relative strength of Khrushchev and of
the opposition, as well as the question of the possibility
that a power struggle in the CPSU leadership may break
out. "
To this evaluation may be added good evidence of a later date
which indicated that Khrushchev had not actually planned to make
the speech but gave it because the delegates to the 20th CPSU
Congress pressured for the details which had not been brought
out in the open attacks on Stalin at the Congress. This evidence
may be an indication that Khrushchev used his men in the Central
Committee at the Congress in such a way that he would be "pressured"
into forging his blackmail weapon, i, e. , he let himself be induced
into making the speech. Given the evidence of increasing and
spreading opposition to Khrushchev's policies at the end of 1956 and
beginning of 1957, it would be fair to assume that Khrushchev felt
compelled to settle the score once and for all and to move from the
employment of blackmail towards an actual showdown. The following
statement in Victor Zorza's article of 11 July in the Manchester
Guardian Weekly is extremely plausible.
"The opposition, and Malenkov in particular, had
got wind of Khrushchev's intention to blame Malenkov,
either implicitly or explicitly, for arranging the
demotion and even the execution of Leningrad party
leaders in 1948-9 and wanted the matter thrashed out
in the Presidium. It
This item is plausible not only on general grounds but also by
reason of other indications.
a. The announcement of the 250th Anniversary of the
Founding of Leningrad was made on 24 April by Leningrad
Pravda, So far as can be determined the 250th Anniversary
5-
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 actually took place in 1953. In view of Khrushchev's subsequent
and emphatic allegations that the opposition were afraid to face
the Leningraders, the timing of the Leningrad Celebration in
April (when Khrushchev had already recouped his strength)
appears ominous,
b. The official CPSU version of the June events emphasizes
that the opposition used the pretext of discussing the speeches
to be made at the Leningrad Anniversary in order to obtain an
extraordinary Presidium session at which they then attacked
the allegedly unsuspecting Khrushchev. In view of the fact
that all. parties concerned must have been fully cognizant of
the implications of the Leningrad issue, it is highly improbable
that the opposition used this pretext or that they should have made
the matter of ceremonial speeches an urgent business. If the
opposition had used this flimsy pretext, they certainly would
have tipped their hand.
It is therefore submitted that Khrushchev maneuvered his
opposition into a corner where they had only two alternatives,
i.e. , to cease their opposition or to force a showdown. Khrushchev's
position was strong. He had the Central Committee on his side.
He also had the "Leningrad affair" and, presumably, other affairs
from the Stalin era which he could pin on the opposition. The
opposition held the weaker position from the start. They were
apparently in no position to use Khrushchev's complicity in Stalin's
crimes. (It is presumed that Khrushchev controls the materials
pertaining to this issue, to the exclusion of the opposition, ) The
opposition's choice to fight the battle on grounds of policy also is
an indication of weakness. They could not have realistically
expected to hold their ground against a Khrushchev-dominated
Central Committee,
5. It is a matter of speculation why the opposition chose to fight for
a lost cause. It is believed that there was a certain type of Communist
psychology operating which has been directly or indirectly observed
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
in lesser though somewhat parallel cases, It has often been asked
why Communist leaders who had seen the handwriting on the wall did
not take action in time to save themselves or to stave off approaching
doom, Communist leaders often refuse to face such a situation and
rationalize their attitude by saying, "They will not dare --it will not
happen to me, 11 It may be that Malenkov and company, in the final
analysis, similarly closed their eyes to the realities of a system
which they had helped to perfect and in which a Khrushchev can ride
to power by having his men shout down any opposition. to his policies,
by declaring his opponents criminals when it is politically opportune.
or by a combination of these tactics,
6. It should be clear from the foregoing that the June events are
the climax of an intramural struggle among the Soviet leadership in
the course of which policy issues became tactical weapons but were
not in themselves the roots of the struggle. It would appear, for
example, that Malenkov was more concerned with the loss of his
influence among the bureaucrats than with the principle of industrial
decentralization.
This belief is confirmed by the initial and admittedly limited
impressions gained of public reactions in the Soviet Union. Apathy,
resignation, and cynicism were coupled with disapproval, shock, and
sympathy for Molotov and particularly for Malenkov, who is still
remembered for his consumer goods program, It is probable that
the regime has suffered a further loss of prestige as a result of the
spect4cle of open warfare among the top chiefs, This may be
precisely the reason why no retreat is possible for the Khrushchevr
regime, which must continue to justify the purge as being in the best
interests of the people. On 21 July Pravda criticized a number of
regional Soviet journals for not publicizing sufficiently the ouster of
the Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov group.
"The meetings devoted to the plenum are over,"
Pravda said, "but that does not mean that our press
should limit itself only to reports of those meetings.
dOMMONSPIMP
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 The militant task of our papers is to continue day in
and day out to clarify the decisions of the June plenum,
clearly and in popular form to tell of the immense
victories of the Communist party and the Soviet people
during the great forty years / since the Bolshevik
Revolution /,'' (New York Tine s, 22 July 1957).
7, In the, absence of a detailed study of the exact following that
Khrushchev commands in the CPSU apparatus and, conversely, of
those elements in the bureaucracy or the Party who may still
sympathize with the ousted opposition, it is of course impossible
to state whether Khrushchev's position is actually as strong as his
victory in the June Plenum would indicate. Among the papers
attacked by Pravda on 21 July (see above) were Party organs in
the Ukraine and Bielorussia. This, may indicate opposition in areas
which should normally be safe for Khrushchev. The best available
estimates on Khrushchev's strength within the CPSU apparatus
indicate a loyal following of roughly 60% of the total. If this estimate
is correct, Khrushchev must reckon with some continued opposition
within the Party and further purges on lower echelons will probably
take place.
8. Much, speculation has been aired concerning the role of Zhukov
and the Soviet Army. One school of thought holds that Khrushchev
rules with the help of, and possibly under pressure from,the Army,
which now holds a position similar to that of the Reichswehr in pre-
World War II Germany, Another school maintains that Zhukov has
no political aspirations and that the Soviet Army will be satisfied
with the recognition of its requirements concerning the security of
the USSR. Still another school holds that it would be an over-
simplification to consider the Soviet Army a monolithic unit since
it contains both elements with political aspirationsas well as
non-political elements. This latter view probably comes closer to
the truth. There is no doubt that Zhukov is backing Khrushchev to
a point of glorification. Nevertheless the 30 June 1956 CPSU
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
Resolution (see above) stressed the fact that the so-called Leninist
nucleus was composed of Party as well as military leaders, and it
would be reasonable to assume that Khrushchev in June 1956 had
already threatened by implication certain opposition elements in the
Soviet Army. With Bulganin's downfall reportedly imminent, it
should be interesting to watch for shifts in the Army command.
Although one should think that Khrushchev would not risk endangering
Army efficiency through excessive purges, his view of the Soviet
Army--as implied in certain remarks of his during his London visit--
is a traditional Bolshevik one, i,e, , that the Army is an instrument
of the Party. Given his precariously balanced position between the
needs of the consumers (which he promises to satisfy) and Army
requirements on heavy industry, Khrushchev may yet be forced by
circumstance into an Army purge, if and when the Soviet military
press too hard for their objectives.
It should be remembered that Khrushchev until now has used the
de-Stalinization issue largely as it pertained to crimes committed
by Stalin against the Party. (Thus he brought the Malenkov
group to its knees.) He has not used as yet the issue of the crimes
committed by Stalin against the Army, i, e, , the pre-World War II
executions of Soviet military leaders such as Marshal Tukhachevsky,
et al. It may be speculated that he holds the issue in reserve in
order to turn it against opposition or recalcitrant Army elements.
After all, Stalin in the postwar period, as a qualified observer noted,
surrounded himself with his Marshals as "symbols of authoritarian
power, a and guilt by such association could be established.
Conversely, opposition elements in the Army, should they desire to
move in on the CPSU, could well turn the issue against Khrushchev,
Mikoyan, and Shvernik who, reportedly, supported Stalin and his
purger, Yezhov, in 1937-38 when thousands of Red Army officers
were liquidated.
The crux of the matter lies in Khrushchev's ability to balance
out requirements of the domestic economy and Soviet Army
requirements. This is not an easy balancing act,
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
9. On the' whole, Khrushchev's position is not as firm as it may
appear. His acts following the June Plenum indicate that his main
concern now is with the consolidation of his position and the
build-up of personal support in order to strengthen his position.
a. The trip to Czechoslovakia seems to have had no other
purpose than to impress his home audience with the support
he received personally,
b. The unprecedented advance briefings of Free World CP
leaders prior to the July 3 CPSU communique were apparently
made' in order to ensure rapid CP expressions of support
for the purge.
c. The pattern of the purges of "liberals" and pro-Titoists in
Rumania and Bulgaria has been--rather shrewdly- -analyzed
as "more a matter of personnel than of policy" and it has
been pointed out that "the leaders /in the Satellites/ on whom
Khrushchev believes he can count may be shielded regardless
of their affinity for Stalinist ideas and their tough unyielding
attitudes toward domestic problems." (See Flora Lewis'
excellent piece "Khrushchev Reshapes Policy on Satellites",
New York Times, Section 4, page 4, 21 July 1956.
d. There are also indications that the Khrushchev regime
desires some gesture of support from the West. It would be
fair to conclude that the regime could turn such gestures into
propagandistic -political capital.
It should also be considered that in the fluid post-Stalin
atmosphere in the USSR a "purge" may not take its course as
envisaged. A strong indicator in this respect will be the fate
of Bulganin who has been reliably reported on his way out. If he
should prove to be stable, a strengthening of Khrushchev's
opposition could be assumed.
Approved For Release 2002/07/22 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000500130072-4
 10, Khrushchev has not yet acquired sufficient strength to launch new
experiments with his "peaceful coexistence" tactic. Although he has
portrayed his "victory" as the triumph of the policy enunciated at
the 20th CPSU Congress, he is making clear that he is against
excessive liberalization ("revisionism") as well as obsolete Stalinist
methods ("dogmatism"). He still draws a firm ideological demarcation
line against Titoism, and has stated that Soviet foreign policy cannot be
expected,io change. Internally he is re-emphasizing the priority of
heavy indus`ry. Externally he is again advocating the united front with
"progressive" parties. In brief, his positions, for the moment, are
reaffirmations of the Khrushchev line which has been observable since
1955,
11, During Khrushchev's consolidation period the Soviets will
continue to react sensitively to Free World comments on the purge.
In the period from 5-17 July the Soviet press and radio reacted angrily
to the following themes which appeared in the West,
b, June Plenum decisions indicate weakness of the regime;
are manifestation of crisis in leadership and must lead to
the weakening of the unity of the Socialist camp.
c. Soviet system is undergoing stresses and strains;
weakness and crisis of the Soviet system.
d. Purge was characteristic of Soviet system; the CC/CPSU
is an arena for a struggle for power.
f. Exposure and removal of the anti-Party group was the
work of one man.
g. Doubt that democratic procedures were employed in the
treatment of the anti-Party group.
 h. Malenkov challenged Khrushchev?s dictatorship.
i. The average Soviet citizen had no intimation of develop-
ments, was not told the truth,
j. Suggestions that a change in Soviet foreign policy can be
expected; conclusions that the Soviet Union will make
concessions to the West; suggestions that the USSR is seeking
to increase its influence in Asia by sensational measures and
that USSR is trying to alienate Japan from the West; suggestions
that the Arabs are concerned about Shepilov's removal; Soviet
policy is not connected with Shepilov personally,
k. Czechoslovakia Party leaders are bitter enemies of
Khrushchev; suggestions that the trip to Czechoslovakia would
result in a purge there.
1. The Soviets were particularly enraged about the treatment
given the purge in the Danish press, Some of the Danish press
reactions were:
(2). The present regime will continue to pursue the
objectives it had in common with Molotov and company,
and with Stalin.
(3). Skepticism on how Khrushchev would be able to
reconcile the policy of "torpedoing capitalism" with
"peaceful coexistence",
(4). Possibility of new explosions in the Kremlin.
(5). Sympathy for the once free Czech people but not for
Czech leaders who may be on their way out,
(6). Grateful appreciation of NATO which protects free
people from developments such as occur in the East.