STAFF STUDY FOR SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3 F. EDWARD HEBERT, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 3516, FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM 88TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

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Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5_ NOT OR RELEASE NOT FOR RELEASE [UNTIL DELIVERED' $TAFF STUDY FORSUBCO TT3EN'~ F. EDWARD HEBERT, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REIPRESENTATIVES ON H. R. 3516, FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM 88th CONGRESS, 1 st SESSION --- By Philip W. Kelleher*,. Counsel Approved 'For Release 2004/01/15 QlA=RDP65BQO383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Mr. Chairman: Your Subcommittee has for consideration H. R. 3516, a bill "To further amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, to provide for shelter in Federal structures, to authorize payment toward the construction or modification of approved public shelter space, and for other purposes. " In accordance with your direction I have prepared a staff study on the general subject of fallout shelters and other matters related thereto. May I at the outset suggest that this bill, H. R. 3516, could have such far reaching effects that it would be helpful to the Subcommittee to deliberate upon not only fallout shelters themselves but a number of other matters which in one way or another relate to the subject. This study is designed to present and suggest discussion on many basic considerations relating to the shelter program -- considerations which, I feel, could broadly and deeply affect our country, perhaps our allies, and, quite certainly, every Member of the Armed Services Committee and of the Congress. To place the matter in its broadest perspective, I suggest that the question which the Congress will ultimately be called upon to answer is whether the prosecution of the currently planned fallout shelter program, or any extension or expansion of it would work a cruel and dangerous Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Rblease,2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 deception on the American people, or would it, on the other 'hand, constitute the salvation of this country both for itself and as the leader of the free world. The considerations underlying this question range from the point of mere technical feasibility of a fallout shelter program to whether, granting its technical feasibility, its collateral effects would be such as to render its prosecution unwise. The distance between thege two points is a long one. I shall try to travel that distance as quickly as possible. THE BILL The bill, H. R. 3516, is before each Member of the Committee. It can be seen that the bill is a relatively brief one and extremely broad in its language. THE LAW As we all know, the original enabling legislation for Civil Defense was the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 approved by the President :on January 12, 1951, over 13 years ago. Since then Civil Defense has not, had a happy history. Until the issuance of Executive Orde.r 10952 by the President on July 20, 1961, it had gotten nowhere. No one thing can be blamed for this picture other than perhaps the lack of interest on the part of the American people. It had lacked funds, leadership, and any true sense of direction. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 On July 20, 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10952. The White House press release accompanying the Executive Order quoted the President as follows: "More than ever, a strong Civil Defense program is vital to the nation's security. Today, Civil Defense is of direct concern to every citizen and at every level of Government. " In his letter of August 2, 1962, to the Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, concerning the need for early affirmative action on the Administration's civil defense recommendations, the President stated: "The Secretary of Defense and my other senior advisors on this subject had intensively reviewed what is known and what is not known about the possible effects of nuclear warfare. The conclu- sion was clear that, for the foreseeable future, under a wide range of attack assumptions, large numbers of lives could be saved by adequate fallout shelter space. " Secretary McNamara, in his posture briefing to the Committee, maintains that the President's civil defense program is an essential element in the total defense effort and is a complement to any future anti-ballistic missile system. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, which placed the authority of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 in the President, Executive Order 10952 transferred from. the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Secretary of Defense the civil defense functions authorized by the Act, with certain exceptions. The President from a legal standpoint retains all final authority for the civil defense program and for defense mobilization. The authority of the Secretary of Defense is therefore delegated from the President. Seven specific Civil Defense functions were transferred to the Secretary of Defense. They are as follows: (1) A fallout shelter program; (2) A chemical, biological, and radiological warfare defense program; (3) All steps necessary to warn or alert Federal military and civilian authorities, State officials, and the civilian population; (4) All functions pertaining to communications including a warning network, reporting on monitoring, instructions to shelters, and communications between authorities; (5) Emergency assistance to State.and local governments in a postattack period, including water, debris, fire, health, traffic, police, and evacuation capabilities; Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 (6) Protection and emergency operational capability of State and local government agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of government; (7) Programs for making financial contributions to the States (including personnel and administrative expenses) for civil defense purposes. The first of these, the fallout shelter program., is the subject of PROGRAM The program. contemplated by H. R. 3516 has a number of elements which I will delineate as briefly as possible. --- The cost of the shelter payments to nonprofit institutions proposed by the Bill is estimated at $175 million for the first year of ope ration. This would provide for the first year an estimated 10 million shelter spaces in public or private non-profit institutions. Over a five- year period, the estimate totals 95 million spaces. --- Eligible non-profit institutions would include both governmental (state or local) and non-profit private institutions. These include schools, hospitals, welfare institutions and State and local government owned buildings. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 The non-profit character of private institutions would be determined generally by the Internal Revenue Service criteria. The reason for selecting only non-profit institutions is because (1) They are usually large organizations, occupying substantial facilities and with available personnel readily adaptable for emergency leadership and organized efforts in shelters, but with limited access to sources of financing; (2) Are engaged in activities of a public service nature; (3) Are well located in relation to homes; (4) Are occupied in part by school children, invalids, and others for whom society must take a special responsibility; (5) The school building is often the most substantial community facility; (6) The building of schools represents the largest share of construction in the United States today, except housing; (7) Schools are organized institutions with responsible leaders and orderly procedures; (8) Hospitals provide emergency supplies and a trained cadre, organized for emergency operations. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 (9) Dual purpose space capable of daily use is encouraged rather than prohibited. In confining payments to non- profit activities, there is no danger of favoring one competitive position over another due to the accident of being located where shelter is needed. An official statement of Civil Defense says that on the basis of the foregoing, "there is a logic to discrimination in favor of these institutions. " The rate of shelter incentive payments will be set at $2. 50 per square foot, or the cost of the shelter construction or modification, which- ever is less. At 10 square feet per person, this equals $25. Typical shelter space is estimated at $40. 00 in new construction. In this case, the Federal Government would pay $25 and the institution would pay $15. If an institution wanted to spend more than $40 in order, for example, to make the shelter blast proof as well as fallout proof, it could spend as much as it wanted but it still would receive only $25 per space. In order to qualify for incentive payments, each shelter must accommodate a minimum of 50 people and must be open for public use in time of emergency. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 --- Based on available cost data and estimates of public response, the total cost of the program. for shelter development is projected at $2. 1 billion. The objective is substantially to meet the national fallout shelter requirements over a five-year period. --- Larger sum.s -- which have been referred to in the press and elsewhere -- $5 billion, and $7 billion -- refer to the total Civil Defense program rather than the shelter program itself. The very much larger sums $100 billion, $200 billion, and even more -- refer to a total blast shelter program. for the whole United States. For eligible institutions to receive payment, the shelter space (1) Meet shelter standards prescribed by the Office of Civil Defense; (2) Be located in an area where existing shelter is inadequate in the opinion of local civil defense officials; (3) Provide shelter space for fifty or more persons in one structure; (4) Be immediately available for public use as shelter in an emergency in accordance with the plan or direction of the local civil defense organization or local government; and Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 (5) Not involve peacetime use which would prohibit, restrict or interfere with the immediate use of the area in an emergency as public shelter (e. g. , use of the shelter space for heavy or extensive storage would be prohibited). There is a procedure for allocation of funds based upon population and immediate need for shelter in the localities. The foregoing is one part of the shelter program which is covered by the bill. The total shelter program has three other elements, only one of which is involved in the bill. The first of these is the shelter survey financed primarily from. Fiscal Year 1962 funds. Funds were also appropriated in 1963 for this program. This survey is taking inventory of all fallout shelter space for 50 or more people in existing structures throughout the United States. The shelter area is then licensed, marked and stocked with austere food and other necessary supplies. The Defense Department estimates that it will locate spaces for over 100 million people, of which over 70 million can be brought into use (that is, licensed, marked and provisioned). This program is going on at the present time. The department expects that there will be a continuing survey program to locate an additional 4 million spaces per year for a total of 20 million spaces by the end of Fiscal Year 1968. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 The second part (new section 206), which is relatively small insofar as spaces are concerned but which is important as far as example and leadership is concerned, relates to shelter spaces to be built into Federal -- civil and military -- structures. The estimated total number of spaces from. this source through Fiscal Year 1968 is estimated at 5 million spaces. This provision would require the incorporation of shelter in all Federal buildings, new or existing, owned or occupied by the Government unless an exemption from the requirement were granted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the President. Reasons for the exemption could include design and construction characteristics of the building, lack of need in the locality, excessive cost, etc. The third element is those shelters which would be provided by private means. Here the department estimates an average of 10 million unsubsidized shelter spaces per year for a 5-year total of 50 million shelter spaces. These rough estimates add up to 240 million shelter spaces by the end of Fiscal Year 1968. In summary, the 240 million spaces are made up of 95 million spaces from the bill's shelter development program; up to one million per year or 5 million in Federal civil and military construction; 90 million as a result of the survey, and 50 million unsubsidized privately constructed shelters. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 BROADNESS OF BILL That is the program. contemplated by H. R. 3516. The sources of information as to what the program contemplates are various statements made by the Executive Branch, including the letter which transmitted the bill to the Congress and statements before Committees by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, Mr. Pittman. The bill does not, of course, set out any of these details. It is very broad in its language and would leave a great deal of the prosecution of the program up to administrative decision. CONSIDERATIONS Lengthy as the foregoing has been, it appears necessary to possess this background information in order that the matters to be brought from. here on can be considered in the context of what is planned by the Department of Defense. Any other course would cause this matter to be discussed in a vacuum. Approval of this bill or any variation of it would, very probably, constitute the taking of an irretraceable step. This bill is, in truth, only a first step and the decision made and'the course followed at this time may well be a virtually irreversible one. For this reason, it is submitted, more care and more deliberation is necessary than would be the case with respect to legislation of the kind -11- Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 usually dealt with by this Committee. All of the matters to be mentioned are brought up as considerations which should be thought about and dis- cussed. None of the information is of a classified nature and all of it has been taken from public sources. It is my belief that all or most of what I will call "facts" are substan- tially correct, and this because only well-informed, well-intentioned, and responsible people are quoted or paraphrased. It should be stated that, at the outset for the most part, the matters raised and the arguments presented are against the fallout shelter program. The reason for this will become evident I think. This program, of course, is a fallout shelter program and not a blast shelter program. Analysis of the whole problem, however, has caused me to believe that any -attempt to concentrate on the single aspect of shelter directed only to fallout could well lead to erroneous conclusions -- for blast < and fallout in a nuclear attack are inextricably entwined. Indeed, this same entwinement extends to all of the multitudinous dangers involved in a nuclear attack. For what does one gain to survive the radiation effects of a nuclear attack only to be suffocated in a shelter by a fire storm which, has' consumed the oxygen necessary for life? The first matter to be discussed is the feasibility of constructing shelters which will provide a true measure of protection. -12- Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 There are those who say that the fallout shelter poses for the creative engineer problems which are well-nigh insuperable. Standards of engineer- ing are required for shelters as they are for autos, trains, and airplanes. But can such standards be extrapolated from virtually non-existent data and operational experience? Only two atomic bombs, and no thermonuclear bombs, have been used in war. Many people feel that at the present time shelter engineering must be based on sheer imagination and without the certainty that is the normal result of reasonably established standards. Even the strongest proponent of civil defense and of the fallout shelter program, Herman Kahn, agrees with this when he says: "In considering civil defense against nuclear weapons, we enter a field which is, in a critical sense, new: there is no adequate experience; no one has fought and survived more than a comparatively small and one-sided nuclear war. If, therefore, we wish to understand what the existence of these weapons of unprecedented destructiveness may mean for us, we have no choice but to rely on theoretical analysis and extrapolation, while trying to relate our theories as closely as possible to the known facts and lessons of the real past." Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Even a Research Chief for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense has said: "We know far less than we would like to. about fallout from a major weapon. The statement that we need shelters, and we need good shelters, is about the best information we have. " Dr. Alexander Langsdorf, Jr. , a physicist at the Argonne Laboratories, in an interview with a Chicago newspaperman said that if the Russians know that we had an adequate fallout protection, they would explode. the bomb in the air rather than on the surface. Dr. Langsdorf said: "From an airburst you get a massive firestorm which might set all Chicago on fire. Concrete fallout shelters would turn into ovens, cooking the people inside. If they don't burn, they would probably suffocate, because all the oxygen would be consumed." In this connection, we do have some non-nuclear experience on which James R. Newman, who was chief intelligence officer for the U. S. Embassy in London during World War II, has described what happened during the Hamburg firestorm. On July 24, 1943, the British dropped the equivalent of 2, 400 tons of conventional explosives on that city. There were, Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 admittedly, circumstances favoring combustion--dry weather, some wooden houses. The first bombs were especially powerful and put the water mains out of commission. In succeeding days the Allies dropped tens of thousands of small fire bombs, as well as more.. blockbusters--8, 000 tons in all. "We got a phenomenon, " Newman reported, :'that man has never seen before, except perhaps in pre-history. Fires joined together 'in a radius of three miles. Hot gasses rose, while surrounding cool air was pulled in and acted as a bellow. Seventy thousand of Hamburg's 100, 000 street trees splintered to earth. Two hundred and fifty thousand dwelling units, out of 556, 000, were completely destroyed. The fire lasted for seven days. Temperatures flared to 1, 400 and 1, 800 degrees so that the bricks themselves actually burned. Thousands and thousands of people were in shelters at the time; all but a negligible fraction died anyway. Bodies were still being dug up six months later, most of them completely unmarked by fire. They had died of suffocation and caxbon monpxade--70, 004 in l1: In Dregden, where another firestorm occurred, 300, 000 * were killed in a single night, and only 2, 000 tons of explosives were dropped." It has also been suggested that the Russians could combine nuclear attack with other forms of destruction. For instance, if they dropped chemical or biological weapons a few hours or a few days after the bombs, the pumps drawing in air for the shelters would simultaneously draw in *The writer has been unable to confirm the accuracy of this figure. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 poison. Admittedly, chemical and biological weapons are far from perfected, but they are almost certain to become manageable in the near future. So far as I have been able to determine, the current fallout, shelter program does not contemplate protection against chemical or biological agents, even though in 19.61, Major ..general Marshall Stubbs, as Chief Chemical Officer, stated: "All available information points with certainty to the fact that the Sino-Soviet bloc is ahead of the United States and our allies, an both-offensive and defensive chemical and biological research and development, and have a stronger capability to wage a chemical and biological attack. " A previous Chief Chemical Officer, Major General William M. Creasy, said seven years ago that a"s he saw it, the use of nuclear weapons didn't make sense economically for an aggressor, because such weapons "cause physical destruction not only to the human element, but also to the build- ings and machines those humans operate." He said, "Poisoning, sickness, radioactivity, starvation, and mental derangement can cause death or dehabilitation among humans, but do not destroy material things. " Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, says in an article which appeared in the March 31, 1962 issue of the Saturday Evening Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 "Shelters are a gamble and a poor one at that. If a rocket aimed at Philadelphia hits nearby Haverford, you have had it if you live in Have.rford-- shelter or not. If there's a strong westerly wind over Los Angeles on D-day, Pasadena may well be out of luck from both fire and fallout. Nobody- -but nobody--can make allowances for all of the variables and fill in all the unknowns in the equation: Size and number of weapons used; accuracy of the weapons; targets selected; height of burst; the winds and weather; sunshine or mist; the intentions of the enemy, and so -..on. In the same article, Mr. Baldwin said: "A 20, 000-ton bomb wiped out Hiroshima and killed 70, 000 people. Today, some sixteen years later, the Russians claim to have a 100, 000, 000-ton weapon. And a 100-megaton weapon is by no means the ultimate. There's an open-end progression possible and no per- ceptible limit to the power that can be produced by a thermonuclear explosion. "The 100-megaton weapon already has invalidated the' -17- Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 civil defense concepts of yesterday. Its explosion and- the resulting fire storm would probably ignite anything flammable out to thirty-five to sixty miles from the center and incinerate or asphyxiate the occupants of shelters. Thus, the concept of shelters against radio- in great cities or in their surrounding suburbs activity has little technical validity--unless you assume, as so many supporters of the shelter program do--that cities will not be targets.. "All of this means that civil defense planners are con- fronted with the nearly insoluble problem of technical obsolescence. The programs of yesterday are of limited usefulness today; today's shelters may not be worth the cost of tearing them down tomorrow. In an age when the offensive has such a great advantage over the defensive, the enemy can `easily nullify all except the most elaborate and expensive attempts to provide passive protection." Many people have pointed out that protection against fallout is one and only one of the many hazards that man must surmount if he is to survive a nuclear attack. Again quoting Mr. Baldwin: "The terrific blast of a nuclear explosion, the intense Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 heat and the burst of radioactivity released at the instant of the detonation, as well as the later fallout, make it almost impossible to provide shelters against big bombs near ground zero. The ground burst of a 100-megaton weapon would scoop out a crater 350 feet deep and a mile in diameter--in solid granite. And if nice, solidly built shelters hundreds of feet deep saved one from. blast, the searing heat and exhaustion of oxygen caused by the fire storm. would trap most of the survivors within a radius of twenty to sixty miles." Assuming that one has not been killed or incapacitated by reason of blast, radiation, or suffocation, one still must face the question of survival afterwards. Dr. John N. Wolfe, Chief, Environmental Sciences Branch of the Biology and Medicine Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, epit- omizes the whole question in a speech. Dr. Wolfe said: "Fallout shelters in many areas seem only a means of delaying death and represent only a part of a survival plan. With an environment so completely modified, the question is, where does man go after his sojourn in shelters? What does he do upon emergence?" What Dr. Wolfe means is that the survivor emerges from his shelter only to find that communications and distribution systems are damaged or -19- Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 destroyed.. If there is food still undestroyed it may well be contaminated as will be 'the water supply. It is at least possible that the land which he must stand on is dangerously radioactive. Under these circumstances, he may survive but if so it will be through pure luck. This picture is presented, again by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who says= "The survivor may emerge, into an area uninhabitable for days, weeks, months, years, or a lifetime. His immediate need is to know where to go to reach an area relatively uncontaminated by radioactivity. His ancillary need is transportation to get there. If he has to walk, he may receive a lethal dose of radioactivity before he reaches safety. To surmount all these hazards pre- supposes. nation-wide reporting, communications, transportation and control systems relatively intact-- and people to operate them. "And it presupposes, if the survivor reaches a safe area, the existence of prestocked foods, pure water, uncontaminated farmlands, and a muscle instead of a gasoline economy. 11 In a recent statement, Dr. James Van Allen and his associates at the University of Iowa stated that: Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 "It is extremely dangerous to give the impression to the public that the building of fallout shelters will enable the average citizen to survive a nuclear war. " The New York Herald Tribune for May 31, 1962, contained a summary of four articles by, a group of Boston physicians that appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine, The articles deal with the probable effects' of a twenty-eight-megaton attack on the Boston area. The.doctors estimate that there. would be 2, 250, 000 deaths from heat and blast alone. In the metropolitan Boston area there are 6, 560 physicians of which perhaps 900 would survive. This would leave a ratio of one physician to every 2, 300 injured. Probably only 10, 000 hospital beds of the 65, 000 in Massachusetts would survive. This would present the impossible task of putting over 2, 000, 000 sick and wounded human beings in 10, 000 already occupied beds in hospitals without water, electricity, sewage disposal, refrigeration, transportation or communication. The'foregoing presents a dismal and even horrifying picture of what nuclear war can mean. And does not this disturbing question present itself- In whose hands might rest the success or failure of a.fallout shelter program? Is it not possible that this might rest entirely in the hands of the enemy, the Soviet Union? Could not the Soviet Union wait until we have completed the currently proposed fallout shelter program. and then so conduct an attack as to render it useless?. Those who. claim-to know say that this could be Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 done in a fashion which I have already -referred to - - by exploding their nuclear weapons at high altitudes so as to cause widespre'a'd fires and no fallout whatsoever. In other words, we would commit ourselves to a par- ticular position only to find that that position is overcome by events in the form of a simple tactical manuever, NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS As I have indicated, the current program contemplates that incentive payments would be made only to non-profit institutions. Let us look at this matter for a moment. There are those who feel that our schools, colleges, hospitals, and welfare institutions are going to be unwilling or unable to make the contributions contemplated by the fallout shelter program. As I understand it, the Civil Defense organization believes that many institutions will not require ,more than the $25 per space that the Federal Government would pay. On th'e?other hand, if, as they say, the average cost of shelter space is $40, then for every space costing below $25, there must be another space costing as much as $55.- . And for those higher cost spaces, a $30 payment per space would be required. For the current fiscal year the Federal Government appropriate $49. 5 million for grants and loans to schools to aid the teaaching of science, mathematics, and foreign languages; $72.,9 million for grants for vocational rehabilitation programs; $220 million for grants and loans-'for hospital Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 construction; and $75 million for the Housing for the Elderly Fund. This totals over $417 million. The fallout 'shelter program would in Fiscal ' Year .J. 1964, in effect, ask that a substantial portion of this amount be returned in the form of contributions toward the fallout shelter program. If these institutions can't afford Cheese services without Federal help, is it reasonable to suppose that they can or would want to find the money for fallout shelters ? Incidentally, schools would play a prominent part in the -shelter pro- gram, but children are in schools only one-eighth of the hours of.ttbe year. Allied to this question. of contributions from sources which concededly have limited access to funds is the question of public acceptance of such a program -- and those who would make the decisions as to whether any - amount would be contributed are part of'the public. The apathy toward fallout protection which settled over the country since the relaxation of the Berlin crisis is well known. At the peak of the crisis there was a great surge toward building home shelters. This quickly died down and, as we have seen in the'press, those who were engaged in the manufacture of shelters have been left with unsaleable stocks. The Cuban crisis and its aftermath reflects very much the same picture. . When a newspaper columnist encouraged one of her inquiring readers to build a fallout shelter, she received thousands of letters. in response to -23- Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 her suggestion. The letters were 9. to 1 in opposition to her advice. This was, of course, not a public opinion poll taken under controlled conditions but it might be revealing as to how the public, appears to feel. If the pre- ponderance of feeling is as great as it would appear to be against fallout shelters, can it reasonably be expected that the local officials responsible for health, education, and welfare institutions will be willing to raise and expend the funds necessary to make the program an effective one? With respect to discrimination, many situations can be imagined which would envisage shelter for one group and no shelter for another group in exactly similar circumstances, one having funds available and the other not. This same kind of discrimination could be one of mere geography. An area with a high water table would not have basements, and the provision of fallout shelters would impose a great financial burden. On the other hand, in another area the situation would be ideal for fallout shelters and the cost would be minimal. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Is it reasonable to assume that this will not cause disquiet and result in the greatest possible pressure to expand the program so as to have Federal funds available for fallout shelters for all the people regardless of their situation? Perhaps' the answer is not obvious but I will say that it presents an interesting area for conjecture. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 "I U BUSINESS AXWMUNICLPAL INTEREST Not wholly unrelated to'ti e:,t}taestigns jiis? brought up is the question of pressures from the buai e.ss. 4rsltf ulana;y ,td^'engatge in an ever expanding c-irogram of shelters. ame s Reston of the Neer York, dime a, pointed o'i t on Ncyve mbe r 12,' 1961: "`No group. oaf citizens is show og-ore solicitude for the future well-being of the, ria, iq 1Ftliati the builders off lout aliel!ter's)-. '1'We Iron and Steel Institute, the cement ma-nu a: tuarev's,. avid" the makers oil brick and Grier c'2*y.!products are 41. vying,.,: th. one another to matte abetter shelter, and' the National I;,umber Manu- f* ctur a ra A'ssociation', has piS duc ed a dandy little number t (*rlade)~out of wood, which{ a_e" everybody knows, doesn't Lijurm, oh.B.a1dwiu:.has:.touched gonerall on this'' subject. He sa L 'There remain, moreover. the ecq+Aotnic and social ('r' costs of a shelter'-prp ram. T1ie'costs staxt modestly by,; today! s standards abbut $170, 000, 0Y0--(for, All Federal civo1 + e{pse} ;for: the next (1; 6) fiscal~tyear, - according f ,1 M1.' tafpree t plans ,But they a nd with the years, A etmously anyl unendingly. jgviernm.ent fallout'sheiters, Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5. Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 if built for every,.person, will yult mately , price out at a roughly calculated $40 per capita to at least j,2 40, 000, 0000--probably twice that.. , Food, water, accessgriesm??all perishable and requiring periodic replac entm?will add more billions. The possibilities ,of political chicanery and graft are legion. Even at best such a program could be a gigantic boondoggle;. To be completely realistic about the pressures which might be exerted so .e*paD4,t ri4 program far beyond its present confines, one merely needs to.ask bi 06if. What- city, town, or village doesn?t have a requirement, argil or im3gipary, for a municipal structure for which a large injection of j'ederal funds would be most desirable. How many cities but would like to build a downtown garage under the Common which could serve the double function Of' g ,rage and fallout shelter. Even the mention of this consideration presents each meriaer of Congress with his own Pandora?s box. FLDERAL RESPONSIBILITY T1here are, of course, responsible people who feel that. the totality of 1 is program is a Federal responsibi?ity, and that it should not: be dependent upon cbntributious from any segment of the public, On November 9, 1961, the Columbia B roi.dca sti*g System presented as hour tong` show on Civil Defense Appearing on thi*,.sshow were Mr. Holifield, _x6_ Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100180009-5 then / Chairman of the Joint Committee:. on tic Stre igy and Chairman of a Subcommittee of the -Iouse ' Committee' on, Governihent O erations which has- for years been holding hea.rtng' s an Civil Defense, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, In response to a question raised by. CBS reporter Howard K. Smith as to who was to do what about what', Secretary McNamara said: "Certainly. the federal government, the, state, and local governments all' have partb to pls.y, Wt most importantly; it' a the ree sonsibility of each individ*Vjo `prepare him- self'and its family for that (thefrnondclear) strike .... ~' Mr. Holifield said: "The American people are net, individually, going to be able to tackle this any more than they can tackle- modern war as an indiviii"I 'o 46'a `fanilly or as 'a city, or as a state... This is a challenge for 'survival ' to the nation. The response has to be a national responses and the only way we''can do tkat'is