THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9
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• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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196 CONGRESSIQNAL.RECORD - S NA`I"E
cultural industry, and which will bring a treaty. I have done this in an effort
profitable return from power revenues. They to present to the Members of the Con-
plan. this development in connection with
the Montana POR'_gr Co. gress, and particularly the Members of If thg Goverent persists in its course, the Senate who are now considering this
the Indians say, they plan to s}Ie the United treaty in debate on the Senate floor, an
States for $116 million for violation of their indication of the widespread concern
tieaty rights and usurpation of their lands, over the efforts to ratify this treaty.
This will make Knowles, already assailed I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
by private power exponents as a costly, tax- dent, to have printed in the RECORD at
payer-supported project that will not pay its the conclusion of these remarks the fol-
way, an extremely expensive undertaking, lowing materials:
The public power exponents and Montana's My weekly newsletter dated Septem-
to. Democratic Senators apparently are not Y
to. be swayed, however. Nor is that great ber 16, 1963, and entitled "Superiority or
conservator, supposedly the greatest in that Surrender."
field since Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford A broadcast editorial over Radio Sta-
Pinchot, the honorable Secretary of the In- tion KGAF of Gainesville, Tex., dated
terior, Stewart L. Udall. September 10, 1963.
This matter places both Mr. Udall and the An article by Maj. Gen. Thomas A.
entire New Frontier in a curious position.
While the Kennedy administration poses as Lant, U.S. Army, retired, entitled "Ad-
the champion of civil rights in behalf of the vise and Consent-A Test of Courage."
Negro, it exhibits blatant disregard for those An editorial from the State, of Co-
of these American Indians, the Flatheads, lumbia, S.C., dated September 13, 1963,
who apparently wish only to be left alone to and entitled "A Farewell to Arms?"
devise their own industrial progress. A column by Mr. Fred McKinney from
The Indians and Mr. BATTIN probably will an Arizona newspaper.
be attacked by professional do-gooders as An editorial from the Knoxville Jour-
attacked, of the private power trust; they will be
attacked, as in the Burns Creek argument, of nal, of Knoxville, Tenn., dated Septem-
shedding "crocodile tears" for the Indians ber 10, 1963, and entitled "We Trust the
(in former Idaho Congresswoman Gracie Reds."
Pfost's Burns Creek testimony, it was the A column by Mr. Bill Henry which ap-
Wyoming coal miners). peared in the September 10, 1963, issue
But they cannot get around the fact that of the Los Angeles Times of Los An-
the Indians have a treaty with the_ United
States, it is being flagrantly violated by an geles, Calif., entitled "To Vote Without
invasion of the Flatheads' rights and inter- Full Knowledge."
ests, and over their protests. Volume 7, No. 34, September 1, 1963,
Mr. BBTTIN can and should call attention of NBC's Meet the Press.
again and again to this brazen breach of a A column by Mr. W. D. Workman
solemn agreement. which appeared in the State, of Colum-
Mr. METCALF. Finally, Mr. Pres- bia, S.C., on September 15, 1963, en-
ident, point No. 6 of the summary ques- titled "Security Endangered."
tioned the consistency of the Secretary Statement by Dr. M. H. Johnson, a
of the Interior in the case of Knowles leading physicist, on the test ban treaty,
Dam. In this regard, I cannot improve entitled, "Dr. Johnson Discusses issues."
upon the statement of the Secretary, in There `being no objection, the letters,
response to a question by Chairman editorial, and articles were ordered to
Davis, of the House Public Works Sub- be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
committee on Flood Control, during the SUPERIORITY OR SURRENDER
hearings June 5, 1963. Secretary Udall (By Hon. STROM THURMOND, U.S. Senator
said: from South Carolina, reports to the people)
Knowles Dam, as I indicated in .my pre- SEPTEMBER 16, 1963.
pared statement, is relatively speaking a high Debate in the U.S. Senate over ratification
dam; it will be primarily a producer of hy- of the Moscow test ban treaty is waxing
droelectric power where my Department has hotter and is now boiling down to a basic
marketing responsibilities for all hydroelec- question of whether political or military con-
tric power. You have in this area problems siderations are of more importance to our
of irrigation, which are the problem of my Nation. The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
Department. You have the Indian land mittee has endorsed the treaty in a report
problem, which is again my Department. which is filled with rosy observations about
You have the fish, wildlife, outdoor recrea- Soviet intentions in proposing the treaty.
tion. All these are responsibilities of my Following issuance of this report, the Sen-
Department, These were reasons why, ate Armed Services Committee's Prepared-
among others, this was felt that this was ness Investigating Subcommittee, of which
a logical project, even though both the corps I am a member, also filed a report with the
and the Bureau have studied this project Senate. The report states that based on
under assignment by Congress in the past extensive evidence presented by military and
over the years. It was felt that this was a scientific witnesses in closed door sessions,
logical decision, just as we felt for Other the subcommittee has concluded that "the
16159
(4) We will be unable to determine with
confidence the performance and reliability
of an antiballistic missile system developed
without benefit of atmospheric operational
system tests;
(5) We will be unable to verify the ability
of our hardened underground second-strike
missile systems to survive closein, high-yield
nuclear explosions;
(6) We will be unable to verify the ability
of our missile reentry bodies under defensive
nuclear attack to survive and to penetrate
to the target without the opportunity to test
nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear
environment under dynamic reentry condi-
tions;
(7) The treaty will provide the Soviet Un-
ion an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish-
ments in submegaton weapon technology;
and
(8) The treaty would diminish our ca-
pability to learn of Soviet advancements in
technology.
What the Preparedness Subcommittee is
particularly concerned with is preservation
of U.S. nuclear superiority in the cold war.
In fact, this superiority must be of an over-
whelming nature, not only to our satisfac-
tion but also in the judgment of the U.S.S.R.,
especially in view of the fact that our lead-
ers have made it known to the world that
we will accept the first blow in the nuclear
exchange. All our plans are bottomed on
the idea that we will be able to absorb the
U.S.S.R.'s first strike capability, and then
retaliate with enough power to destroy the
enemy and win the war.
Since we hava? spotted the enemy the first
strike, we must be absolutely certain that
we can indeed absorb the first blow, and have
left enough strategic nuclear weapons to
win. The Soviets, therefore, don't need to
test as much as we to ascertain weapons
effects. In addition, they may have already
learned enough to exploit our vulnerabilities
so as to neutralize our second strike capa-
bilities in underground ICBM's and in under-
water Polaris missiles, to such an extent that
they can win in a nuclear exchange or that
they can demand U.S. surrender. There is
deep concern that the Soviet superbomb
either has, or shortly will have, the capa-
bility to neutralize many or most of our
underground missiles, and that the already
deployed Soviet antiballistic missile system
may be able to stop U.S. retaliation by Po-
laris missiles.
For these reasons-and r can think of
nothing more important than national se-
curity considerations-I am opposing this
treaty, even though I realize that to refuse
to ratify the treaty, since it was signed with-
out the advice of the Senate, may cause
some international repercussions. However,
I share the view of Dr. Edward Teller when
he warned that "if you reject the treaty this
will be a small mistake. * * * If you ratify
this treaty, I think you will have committed
an enormously bigger mistake. * * * You
will have given away the future safety of this
country."
Sincerely,
reasons that it was logical that major con- proposed treaty will affect adversely the fu- RADIO STATION KGAF EDITORIAL,
struction work in the State of Alaska, wheth- ture quality of this Nation's arms, and that SEPTEMBER 10, 1983
er it is high dams or low dams, should be it will result in serious, and perhaps formid- The Senate is now debating whether to
done by the corps, which has a major con- able, military and technical disadvantages." ratify the recent Moscow treaty-or the so-
struction responsibility in the construction The preparedness report lists eight prin- called test ban treaty. The investigations
organization in Alaska. cipal disadvantages which would flow to the h ld ,ire this + at ,
e -------
-
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w
e
o
RECORD I have had printed a number Of una a acquire noes- petted to materially help the Soviets to in-
sary data on the effects of very high yield crease their military strength in relation to
news columns, editorials, and other ma- atmospheric explosions; that of the United States, while preventing
terials expressing concern or criticism (3) We will be unable to acquire data on this country from making the necessary
about the proposed Moscow test ban high altitude nuclear weapons effects; progress to simply hold our own in the cur-
- ' V bab ity of the United States if this treaty should
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (1) We probably will be unable to dupli- be ratified in its present form. Close exam-
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in cats Soviet achievements in very high-yield ination of the testimony given in the hear-weapon Previous issues of the CONGRESSIONAL
Inge has revealed that the treaty can be ex-
ill b
W
bl t
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE September 16
rent military relationship with the Russians.
In fact, the most damaging testimony of all
was that given by Secretary of Defense
McNamara himself, who was testifying for
the treaty. McNamara's testimony, however,
reveals serious contradictions and unwar-
ranted assumptions by the Defense Depart-
ment and the administration concerning our
national defenses in relation to the
Communists.
Even beyond these considerations, how-
ever, is the more obvious facts of life con-
cerning dealing with the Communists who
have continuously proclaimed that deceit is
the foundation of Communist policy. The
hypocrisy of the Soviet position and the en-
tire concept of the treaty of Moscow and the
theories of disarmament are exposed in an
amendment to the treaty offered by Senator
BARRY GOLDWATER.
The Goldwater amendment says, "the ef-
fectiveness of the treaty will be deferred until
the U.S.S.R. has removed all nuclear weap-
ons, all weapons capable of carrying nuclear
warheads, and all military, technical per-
sonnel from Cuba and until arrangements
.have been made for the international in-
spection within Cuba to determine and con-
firm such removal."
The treaty of Moscow-or test ban treaty-
has been described by President Kennedy as
the "first step toward peace."
GOLDWATER exposed the fantasy of this
statement when he said, "This proposed test
ban treaty cannot be a first step toward
peace If it must stumble over Soviet mis-
siles and troops in Cuba."
For over 17 years the Communists have
followed an unrelenting course dedicated to
the destruction of the United States. For
this country to consider disarming or letting
down our guard even slightly without some
tangible evidence of change In the Soviet
policy will be national suicide.
KGAF feels that if the treaty of Moscow
is to be considered at all, it must have the
'Goldwater amendment as a basic protection
of our survival. We urge that you wire or
write your Senators today calling upon them
to insist upon the addition of the Goldwater
amendment to the test ban treaty.
The opinion expressed In this editorial is
the view of KGAF Radio, not necessarily the
view of any advertiser. KGAF Radio will
provide equal time for opposing views upon
request by a qualified spokesman.
ADVISE AND CONSENT-A TEST OF COURAGE
(By Thomas A. Lane, major general,
U.S. Army, retired)
acceptance of the Presidential judgment.
They must weigh carefully the full impact
of the treaty military, political and spirit-
ual. If they find it to be against the inter-
est of the United States, they must have
the courage to reject it.
Free peoples are in a race with the Com-
munist powers for the dominion of the
world. Unhappily, we run not so as to win
the prize, but so as to withdraw from the
race. To foster illusion in our peoples, we
pretend that we can avoid the contest.
It began with President Eisenhower who,
to appease a popular desire, suspended our
testing program without adequate safe-
guards. We stopped running while the
Soviet Union forged ahead.
President Kennedy continued the volun-
tary ban without making preparations for
its violation by the Soviet Union. When the
Soviets were ready, they tested; and the scope
and magnitude of their tests amazed the
world. The United States was caught flat-
footed, unprepared.
The Soviet tests challenged us to a vigor-
ous program to overcome the handicap which
negligence and bad judgment had imposed
on us. What was our response? We have
striven not to overcome the handicap but to
perpetuate it. We have had no program of-
testing to bring our knowledge of nuclear
weapons abreast of Soviet knowledge. We
have been fearful that aggressive testing
would jeopardize our negotiations for a test
ban, so we have conceded the Soviet supe-
riority.
Since 1946, the United States has been
urging atomic arms control under adequate
inspection. Refusal of the Soviet Union to
accept inspection, even when it was far be-
hind in. the race, reflects the Communist
determination to prevail. Khrushchev is not
withdrawing from the race.
The United States, in contrast, has frit-
tered away its nuclear leadership in vain
peace seeking which can only spur the Com-
munist confidence in ultimate victory. If it
now abandons the standards of positive in-
spection which are the only adequate safe-
guard of treaty compliance in a matter as
vital as nuclear weapons development, it in-
vites its own destruction.
The Moscow test ban treaty prohibits test-
ing, without Inspection, of small atmospheric
blasts which we cannot detect and which are
important to nuclear progress. Will the
United States voluntarily impose this limita-
tion on itself and trust the Soviet Union to
do the same?
Our Senators are called to vote. Will they
give the seal of their approval to a policy of
granting concessions to communism, and
thereby assure its continuance? Will they
reject the treaty and call upon the Soviet
Union to accept full inspection of nuclear
activities? Will they attach protective
clauses to the treaty to limit the ban to
testing which can be positively identified
without inspection at the testing site? Each
Senator must decide for himself and for our
country.
[From the Columbia (S.C.) - State, Sept. 13,
1963]
A FAREWELL TO ARMS?
embrace a threat to this Nation's defense
which goes far beyond the particulars of the
treaty itself,
The American people are being spoon fed
with soothing sirup which plays up the sup-
posed benefits to accrue from the treaty and
plays down the hazards to national security.
Prominent politicians in both parties are
swallowing the same sirup that they are la-
dling out to the public.
Only a handful of courageous spokesmen,
mostly Southerners, are challenging the
bland promises and unsupported assurances
that the treaty is in the national interest.
But, little by little, the people are beginning
to develop that genuine concern which
should accompany any proposal which
could even possibly, jeopardize national
security.
With this awakening on the public's part,
there is a corresponding rush in Washington
to hasten the vote on the treaty. The Presi-
dent himself is launching a crash program to
gain early ratification by the Senate, before
any groundswell of opposition from the folks
back home can influence the outcome of the
vote. .
The Kennedy administration already has
subscribed to the treaty. Now, only the
U.S. Senate stands between the American
Nation, along with Russia and Great Britain,
party to an agreement embodying these omi-
nous words:
"Proclaiming as their principal aim the
speediest possible achievement of an agree-
ment on general and complete disarmament
under gtrict international control in accord-
ance with the objectives of the United Na-
tions which would put an end to the arma-
ments race and- eliminate the testing of all
kinds of weapons, including nuclear weap.-
The Federal Government already has vir-
tually abolished the sovereignty of the indi-
vidual American States. Are we now to sur-
render the sovereignty of the United States
itself?
THE BREwssw GULCH PHmososusR SAYS--
(By Fred McKinney) -
The test ban treaty between Russia, Great
Britain and this country won't become ef-
fective until the United States ratifies it.
President Kennedy, urges its ratification as
the "first step toward peace," but the Sen-
ate is giving thematter considerable study
before making this important deal with our
enemy in the cold war, one who has proved
treacherous in the past. He has said that
he would bury us, and probably some Sen-
ators believe that this treaty is a step in
that direction along with other steps that
may be expected to follow. In the meantime,
many other members of the U.N., mostly the
smaller ones, have signed. -
None of them, as far as we know, have
bombs and they couldn't do any testing even
if they wanted to. This is a reminder of the
story of the hunter and the bear. As the
hunter was about to shoot, the bear said,
"What is it you want?" The hunter said, "I
want a fur coat." The bear said, "I am hun-
gry, I want a full stomach. Let's talk it over,
let's negotiate." The hunter laid down his
rifle and after a while the bear got up and
walked away. He had a full stomach and the
hunter had his wish, he had a fur coat.
Could this be a case of history repeating
itself?
WAsmNOToN.-The Senate of the United
States is not called often to exercise Its
power to approve or reject treaties. Even
more rarely is it called to pass upon an
agreement negotiated without prior consul-
tation with the Senate leadership. As the
Democrats used to say to President Eisen-
hower, "if we are going to be in on the
crash landings, we want to be in on the
takeoffs."
In the test ban treaty, the Senators face
a serious question of national security. Un-
der compulsive pressures to make some head-
way in disarmament and serve domestic po-
litical considerations in the United States
and Britain, our representatives have exe-
cuted an agreement which is plainly advan-
tageous to the Soviet Union.
The dangers of the treaty- have been clear-
ly marked. by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By
accepting the judgment of the President
that the political advantages outweigh the
risks taken, the Joint Chiefs and others who
are not responsible for political judgments
have brought themselves to accept the
treaty.
The Senators cannot so easily avoid re-
sponsibility. The Constitution requires
their solemn judgment of the issue and this
responsibility will not be served by mere
Do we want complete disarmament of
the United States--under the supervision of
some international agency?
The State finds no evidence of any such
thinking on the part of South Carolinians
or of other patriotic Americans. But com-
plete disarmament and international control
are the ultimate objectives of the nuclear
test ban treaty now being considered in the
Senate. - -
This is no speculative assertion on our
part: It is spelled out in exact language in
the preamble of the treaty itself. Somehow,
in both the political and public debate over
the treaty, little attention has been paid-to
that preamble, but those preliminary words
[From the Knoxville Journal, Sept. 10, 1963]
WE TRUST THE REDS
The conviction is almost universal. in this
country and in other free nations that for
the past 40 years Communist world domi-
-nation has been prevented by just one thing.
'That has been the military superiority of
this country and the other nations a ma-
jority of whose people are hostile to the
police state as a form of government.
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 t is
clear to
i isny of us that the nuclear [Fromthe Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 19631
test ban treaty into - which the Kennedy .To VOTE WITHOUT FULL KNOWLEDGE
adm Fiietration alas all but mar,eVvered tkle (By Bill Henry)
couriry represents a first step toward
-tie theory defined above. As we watch Members of the Senate of the
power, we are now encouraged to believe
that between M4rch and August of this year
the Communist have experienced a com-
plete change o viewpoint, that the tiger
held at bay by the sight of a gun has now
become a tame kitten anxious, only to lap
up milk from a'dish.
I.istory tells us that where Communists
are 8oneerned, ere is no such thing as
maintaining a status quo. The late F.D.R.
made concessions at Yalta that placed mil-
lions of unoffending people behind the Iron
Curtain. He did so under the impression
he could charm Joe Stalin into being good.
Out of the fateful concessions made there
many of our current cold war troubles grew.
A few years later, at the urging. of the late
George Catlett Marshall, President Truman
forced upon the Nationalist Chinese a coali-
tion with the Chinese Communists. It was
not long before the Reds owned the govern-
ment and Chiang Kai-shek's forces had to
flee to Formosa.
In the Korean' war, American forces were
under orders not to win. It was forbidden
to attack the enemy beyond the Yalu River
where were located the staging areas for
enemy forces. At the end of an inconclusive
truce, we are still, 10 years later, wrestling
with, the problem of keeping South Korea
both non-Communist and free.
An arrangement made by the British with
the Russians to safeguard the neutrality of
Laos has collapsed by reason of Communist
failure to keep commitments publicly made.
We continue to wrestle not only with the
troubles of Laos, but with increasing prob-
lems in South Vietnam.
Following what was made to appear to be
a bold confrontation of Khrushchev on the
issue of removing missiles from Cuba, we
have subsequently acquiesced to the perma-
nent occupation of that country 90 miles
from our shores, and, indeed, have consti-
tuted the Castro, regime as a protectorate.
We have listed a few outstanding examples
of attempting to maintain a status quo posi-
tion with the Communists and now it ap-
pears they are ready to try it again. We are
abandoning the axiom that the only thing
Communists recognize is force and are once
more adopting, in this proposed treaty, the
historically discredited theory that Commu-
nists are susceptible to reason and considera-
tions of honor and conscience.
Furthermore, we are about to take this
step in the face of a statement issued by the
Senate Armed Services Preparedness Sub-
committee which confirms the view that
treaty ratification will make permanent our
inferior position with respect to military
power.
After hearing the testimony of 21 military
and scientific witnesses, the majority of this
committee reported as follows:
"The Soviets have overtaken and sur-
passed us in the design of very high yield
nuclear weapons;
"That they 'may possess knowledge of
weapons effects and antiballistic missile pro-
grams superior to ours;
"That under the terms of the tr'eaty it is
entirely possible that they will draw even
with us in low yield weapons technology.
"These things are no ground for compla-
cency. We believe very strongly that Soviet
secrecy and duplicity require that this Na-
tion possess a substantial margin of superi-
ority in both the quality and the quantity of
its implements of war."
CONGRESSIONAL RE qRI , LATE
sciences this week as they prepare to vote on
the test ban treaty, trying to disagree in
some cases witho_utheing disagreeable, we're
eying a strange situation. Here's a treaty
Which nobody is sure about, one regarding
which even its most strenuous advocates can
advance only the faintest of praise, yet one
virtually pertain to be passed by a large ma-
jority. It will be approved largely because
it will certainly contribute to the peace of
mind of a lot of people. Everyone hopes it
may lead to a better world. But the exist-
ence of the free world is at stake also. Un-
fortunately, while everyone seems to have a
strong opinion on the subject, these opin-
ions are not based on sound fact or knowl-
edge. The real truth about the test ban
treaty is that everyone concerned, from Pres-
ident Kennedy down to the least informed
of us private citizens, is really taking a
chance. President Kennedy, who advocates
it and regards it as a sort of peak of accom-
plishment, doesn't really know what it por-
tends. He is neither a scientist capable of
judging the real value of testing in the at-
mosphere, nor a military expert cable of
measuring the treaty's possible consequences
on our future ability to survive. It is quite
true that the best scientific and military
advice is available to him but the fact is
that there is vital disagreement among both
the scientists and the military. The only
place where there is unanimity is in the per-
fectly human hope for peace, or at least for
a lessening of tension. That's just about
universal. Unfortunately it is a feeling based
entirely on emotion. It is not based either
on knowledge of facts or judgment of con-
sequences.
THEY ALL HAVE RESERVATIONS
The truth of the matter is that you can't
find anybody on our side whose judgment is
worthy of consideration, who wholeheartedly
regards the test ban treaty as a good thing.
The best that even the President will say
for it is that it is a "small first step in the
right direction." He, and others who advo-
cate its approval on this ground, say that
this is their judgment. Actually, it is just
their hope. The scientific side of this ques-
tion is far too intricate for any layman to
assess it sensibly. Furthermore, the scien-
tific people themselves are sharply divided.
It is all very well to say that Edward Teller's
opinion against approval is offset by the
opinions of other scientists who are for it.
This may be true, but most of us remember
that a lot of the finest of the scientists were
convinced that Teller was wrong when he
said that we could and should develop the
H-bomb. They said it couldn't be done.
Teller was right. That's grounds for believ-
ing that he might be right this time, too.
PEACE OF MIND VERSUS SURVIVAL
The most disturbing factor in the argu-
ment is the uneasiness of the people whose
lives and careers are devoted to our country's
survival. Not a single defense expert has
come out wholeheartedly in favor of the _
treaty. The best any of them has given is a
yes-but. The most enthusiastic of them
merely says that "the benefits outweigh the
drawbacks." All base what approval they
are willing to give on the fact that the treaty
has "political advantages." A good share
say they would have opposed it if it hadn't
already been signed. General Power, on
whom the actual nuclear defense of our
country largely rests, is flatly opposed to it.
The Senators already opposed to it are largely
16161,1
those closest to our national defense. So
just remember that the men who are ap-
proaching this very vital decision are inter-
ested in, and responsible for, not only our
peace of mind, but our national survival.
MEET THE PRESS-AMERICA'S PRESS CONFER-
ENCE OF THE AIR, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1,
1963
Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak.
Guest: Dr. Edward Teller.
Panel: John Finney, the New York Times;
Peter Hackes, NBC News; and R. H. Shack-
ford, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance.
Moderator: Ned Brooks.
Mr. BROOKS. This Is Ned Brooks, inviting
you to Meet the Press. Last Thursday the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee ap-
proved a test ban treaty overwhelmingly. It
now goes to the Senate floor for debate and
vote.
Our guest today on Meet the Press is the
treaty's leading opponent, Dr. Edward Teller,
one of the world's outstanding nuclear scien-
tists, who has urged the treaty's defeat in
public and secret testimony before the Senate
committees.
Dr. Teller was the key man in the fight for
and the development of the H-bomb. He is
a physicist at the University of California.
We will have the first question from Law-
rence E. Spivak, permanent member of the
Meet the Press panel.
Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, you have been quot-
ed as saying about the test ban treaty: "if
it is ratified, you will be giving away the
safety of this country, and you will have in-
creased the dangers of war."
President Kennedy has decided that ratify-
ing the treaty will not endanger our security.
Do you think you and the President are
reaching opposite conclusions from the same
set of facts?
Dr. TELLER. I believe so. It seems obvious
than an agreement should lead toward peace.
Peace is the question of overriding impor-
tance. In that, I agree. But this treaty
will-in my opinion, weaken the United States.
Weakness will make it harder for us to pre-
serve the peace. It is our strength that is
preserving the peace in our dangerous world.
It is because of my desire for peace, for
the same reason for which the President
and so many other excellent people are urg-
ing ratification of the treaty-it is strangely
enough for this same reason, for peace, that
I argue that this treaty must not be ratified.
Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, may I come back to
my question? Do you have access to all the
scientific and intelligence information avail-
able to the President, so that you can come
to a conclusion from the same set of facts?
Dr. TELLER. No two people ever know the
same facts. In the scientific field, in the
military field, I have been worried about this
question for almost a quarter of a century
now. I have become very familiar with it,
and I have learned that gften I have to
change my mind. In that field I think
I have a little competence.
On the intelligence information, I do not
know all the facts, and the President does,
but I do know that in the intelligence field
we have made in the past many mistakes.
Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, the thing that
bothers a great many people, as I am sure
you know, the heads of the Air Force, the
Army, the Navy, the Marines, are united in
their support of the limited test ban agree-
ment, provided security safeguards are guar-
anteed, which the President says he is going
to put into effect.
Are there any safeguards which would con-
vince you that this treaty ought to be
ratified?
Dr. TELLER. I think this treaty limits
knowledge. This treaty limits our possibil-
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16162 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16
ity to find out about defense against ballistic tee, "Dr. Teller has been extraordinarily the country. But the ardent desire for
missiles. The man in charge of the ballis- single minded in his devotion to one project; peace, the imagination, the hope, in my
tic missiles and also the man in charge of namely bigger and better nuclear weapons opinion the false hope, but nevertheless the
our main Air Force, General SchreiVer, and and specifically the H-bomb, for 20 years." hope that this might bring peace closer, it
General Power, have argued vigorously Dr. Kistiakowaky went on to say that it is this that has misled in the past and is
against the treaty. I think that the treaty was inevitable that in concentrating on one misleading now many very excellent people.
as it stands does not have the proper safe- aspect of this problem you tended to ignore Mr. HACKES. There was a time, Dr. Teller,
guards. some of the other considerations. What is I believe, when you favored a test ban treaty.
Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, isn't it true that a your answer to those who say that you base you are obviously against this one.
t
great many distinguished scientists and a your views upon a narrow, technical point Is there a treaty other than this that
great many important military men all agree of view and fail to look at the entire pic- you would urge the Senate to approve?
that there are some risks but that the risks ture? so, what would it include?
are not so great that they ought not to take Dr. TELLER. I try to look the entire Dr. TELLER. There is one. In 1958, Dr.
the risk? picture, but all of us place great emphasis Libby, then Commissioner of the Atomic En-
Do you believe that the United States on the things we know. Now, I would like ergy Commission, and I made a suggestion,
should take no risk at all, no matter how to say this: I wish I could agree with my and I still maintain this suggestion. I sug-
slight? good friend George Kistiakowsky. I wish I gested-we suggested, that we limit the re-
Dr. TELLER. I believe that we can take risks, could agree with him that I am single minded lease of radioactivity to such an amount that
but I also believe that as a scientist I must and consistent. I am neither. I do not base between us and the Russians and possibly
look at arguments. I must not look at peo- this case on the development of bigger other countries, there shall be no further in-
ple. I don't care who disagrees with me, but weapons. In 1958, in. 1959, I was in favor crease of radioactivity-that we shall do no
I do care what the reasons are of the dis- of an atmospheric ban because at that time more than replace the amount of radio-
agreement. I -did not believe in missile defense. I activity that year by year is decaying in. the
Mr. SPIVAK. One more question, Dr. Teller. thought it was too difficult. atmosphere. This radioactivity is small, and
Are you more concerned that the Soviet Un- Then, in 1961 and 1962, the Russians put if we observed this limitation then we could
ion might keep this treaty not to test in up a terriffic show of atmospheric explosions, be sure about the future of the cleanness
the atmosphere-or that they might not? and during 1961 they said they have the of the atmosphere. This I have favored, and
I mean, which bothers you most? missile defense. This fact, together with this I do favor because within these limits
Dr. TELLER. I don't know. I know that this many discussions on missile defense which we can carry out everything we need for our
treaty gives a great deal of flexibility to the followed, have convinced me that I must defense.
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union may devel- change my mind-that missile defense, while Mr. Se'IvAx. Dr. Teller, you seem to place
extremely difficult, might be possible. I am a great deal of emphasis on the fact that we
ed a they defense, because the because t they ey o in this treaty, not because I am sin- will be unable, unless we test in the atmos-
may t be hey cheating. And d if and they have a de- gle minded, not minded, I want big explo- phere, to develop an antimissile missile.
s e sives, but because I have learned that we I would like to quote to you what: the
't, this tense and we tacks po is jant as though must have defense and for defense we need President said about that recently: "The
Also had an attacking be used and erect didn't. explosions in the air. problem," he said, "of developing a defense
riers er- Mr. SHACKFORD Dr. Teller, Iam sure you against a missile is beyond us and beyond
Also, bthis etween our treaty can allies es and used us. keep-
Ing the bet treaty n the treaty y at agree that there are also factors involved in a the Soviets technically, and I think many
will Soviet vor by breaking a treaty of this sort other than nuclear tech- who work in it feel that perhaps it can :never
great the dvangeUnion e can put us at a very y nology__international. affairs, diplomacy, be successfully accomplished."
Mr. disadvantage. overall military strategy. When you were Is there any reliable scientific evidence
Mr. FINNEY. y Teller, could you spell treaty asked at the Senate hearings about these fac- that it can be accomplished?
would ld precisely how this test ban treaty tors, particularly the political considerations, Dr. TELLER. I am puzzled. The Secretary
would weaken our national security? said that you thought the consequences of Defense said that even without testing in.
Dr. TELLER. This treaty permits under of this treaty may weaken the alliance, the the atmosphere we can develop it. I am
ground testing, and rightly so. By under- NATO Alliance, and in the end it might de- afraid that the truth may be In between
ground testing we can continue to develop stroy the alliance. these two statements. That it may be that
and the Russians can continue to develop What led you to this sort of a conclusion? without testing in the atmosphere we can
their attacking t power. rie uanergrvelop unp Dr. TELLER. The treaty says, Each of the develop a missile defense just as Secretary
tescing, any other signatories can dev pasties undertakes to refrain from causing, McNamara said, but without testing it we
nuclear weapons, end therefora this treaty encouraging or in any way participating in shall never be sure whether it will work,
will not stop proliferation. What and d trea eherty the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test and not being sure, we then may not spend
byes is to ban atmospheric testo, ais explosion or any other nuclear explosion." the billions of dollars needed to establish the oy it prevents observation of the meetteeds We need cooperation with our allies in our such defense.
of nuclear weappo ons. These effects we n, common nuclear defense. I understand that Mr. SPrvAK. Dr. Teller, the treaty is almost
and we need them desperately in order to even today our cooperation with Canada has
find out how to defend ourselves against --our cooperation because of which certain to be ratified, judging by what the
one government in Canada has already fallen. committee did the other day, and by the
incoming missiles. Only by a practice suffered
in the air can can w we find o out t how t to makee an n I think that the language\of this treaty will reports about it. Are there any additional
antimissile missile. This treaty will not safeguards that you think would help?
what we
stop further big explosives-and I didn't care make it even harder for us to do have to do: Make out of the Westerh World Dr. TELLER. There are important safe-
if it stopped that or not. a unit which Is truly one in which each mem- guards. This . treaty explicitly says that we
Mr. FlNmy. Doctor, let's turn to this anti- ber knows that its fate is irrevocably tied to must not perform any nuclear ex.plosio:n--
ICBM question upon which you pin so much the fate of every other participant. And we and I read-"any nuclear test explosion or
of your case. Is it not true that at the pres- must start with common defense, with com- any other nuclear explosion"
ent time we have a warhead for an anti- mon nuclear defense. The treaty makes I think it should be spelled out i:n a reser-
ballistic missile, in fact, a warhead which this vital step more difficult. vation, as President Eisenhower has sug-
has been certified as reliable by the AEC? Mr. HAcKEs. Dr. Teller, a great many peo- gested, that in case of aggression against any
Dr. TELLER. We have the warhead, and ple within the administration, Cabinet mem- free nation we should promptly and without
that is not what I am talking about. We may beers and such, along with a number of pro- doubt be able to use nuclear explosives.
need another one, and we can't develop that minent scientists, some of whom have been There are other reservations, but this is the
warhead underground. I want to explain to mentioned here, differ with you rather most important one.
you in a very few words what defense against adrarply Mr. FrxxEr. Dr. Teller, you suggested that
missiles means. We have to count on 6 What would you say are the motives of we can never be sure that an anti-ICBM
live missiles coming against us simul- these men? Are they political? Have they would work until we actually tested it. Isn't
taneously, accompanied by 25 decoys. We been browbeaten by the administration? it a fact, sir, that we have several weapons
must discriminate which are the lot war- Dr TELLER I am sure they have not been in our arsenal now, such as the Titan. and
heads, and we must shoot down every one browbeaten. I have: met.many of my gaps- the Atlas which have never really been. tested
of them. When we shoot at the first, our Lents. I have been always received with with the firing of the missile and t.he? ex-
thet w blind u The second, th, courtesy and with smiles. Maybe what we plosion of the warhead?
the thie d rd of the fi fifth may come thrnroughh. . are facing here is a steamroller. But if it is a Dr. TELLER. It Is true, and there are many
This kind of most e rel exercise must is steamroller, it is something I have never seen of my technical friends who are worried
practiced a it is n b be reliable. It is this before. It is a smiling steamroller, rolling about that fact. But the problems of :ICBM's
pr Mr. that Focanot un Teller, deller, during ens along irresistibly in the wrong direction. attacking, anti-ICBM's defending, are of a
Mr. Ssarngs y oy Mr. HACKES. Would you go so far as to ac- complexity similar to the complexity of
tilts Senate who hearings disagree many with you your were fellow asked wh schy cuse the administration of 1Yin to the Amer- fencing, Would you in all seriousness say
w i;
they thought you took such an opposite scan people in this general area. that to become a good fencer all you need is
point of view. One of those was Dr. Kis- Dr. TELLER. Certainly not. The adndnis- good eyesight, a good blade and rapid reac-
tiakowsky, who was President Eisenhower's tration and everyone in the administration tions? Do you not think that fencing should
scientific adviser, and he told the commit- is doing what in his opinion is the best for be actually practiced?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Mr. FINNEY. Does not the complexity of ate Armed Services Committee a year ago to
this problem, sir,, involve the nonnuclear launch a thorough inquiry into the military
side of the problem, the discrimination, the implications of nuclear test bans. Today, the
electron'cs, the radio blackout and so on, results of that study are at hand in the
rather than the warhead and its effects? form of a printed report by the Preparedness
Dr. TELLER. It is true. It involves the non- Investigating Subcommittee-and those re-
nuclear side. It also involves the nuclear suits give additional cause for concern over
side, and it involves the interaction between this Nation's subscribing to the pending nu-
these two, because when a nuclear blast has clear test ban,
blinded your radars, your radars won't work, In designating the Preparedness Subcom-
and you have to find out in what way your mittee, the chairman of the Armed Services
radars, your detection systems, your track- Committee (Georgia's Senator RICHARD B.
ing systems will be influenced by this nu- RUSSELL) named a group of Senators whose
clear surrounding. This is what you have to knowledge of and dedication to national se-
find out and many other similar things. curity are well established. They are Sen-
Mr. SHACKFORD. Dr. Teller, earlier you ators JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi, chair-
mentioned that General Schreiver and Gen- man; STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, HENRY
eral Power were especially opposed to this M. JACKSON, of Washington, STROM THUR-
treaty, the men in charge of our ICBM's and MOND, of South Carolina, LEVERETT SALTON-
the Strategic Air Force. But as I understand STALL, of Massachusetts, MARGARET CHASE
it, the Army is in charge and has the respon- SMITH, of Maine, and BARRY GOLDWATER, of
sibility for building the anti-ICBM. Don't Arizona.
you find it unusual that the Army and the The Senators differed to some degree in
people who testified before the Senate Com- their conclusions, and both SYMINGTON and
mittee, representing the views of the Army, SALTONSTALL indicated in the subcommittee's
said that the laboratory people working on report their intention to vote for ratification
.this did not feel that this treaty would in- of the present test ban treaty.
hibit the development of an anti-ICBM? But these two, along with the rest of the
Dr, TELLER.. I do. subcommittee, accepted the validity and ac-
Mr. SHACK-FORD. The President at his press curacy of the -factual data acquired by the
conference a few weeks ago said that he was group in its extensive hearings. And it is
afraid that nothing in the field of -testing that data which needs be brought to the
would satisfy you. He was speaking then attention not only of the Senate but of the
particularly about the numbers of tests that American public.
should be conducted. Could you tell us
what would satisfy you in the field of test-
ing?' If there were no treaty-if the treaty
were defeated, how many tests, and how long
these should go on?
Dr. TELLER. I don't want bigger explosives.
I do want knowledge, knowledge that comes
from testing, knowledge to be applied for
our defense, knowledge to be applied for the
peaceful use of nuclear exposives. In the
way of increasing this badly needed knowl-
edge, I think the more we have the better,
and we can do it cleanly and without dis-
turbing anybody in any serious sense, As
far as knowledge is concerned, more and
more will be needed.
Mr. HAOKES. You have indicated, Dr. Teller,
that you feel that the Russians are ahead of
us in an antimissile weapon. Do you believe,
as the Russians have claimed, that they have
one now, and how extensive is their anti-
missile system?
Dr.-TALLER. I _do not know. I fear that
they might have the knowledge by which to
build one now, and I am almost sure that
none of us really know whether they have
it or? not. This is what worries me.
- Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, if you were a Sena-
tor listening to the conflicting testimony
that has been advanced by distinguished
scientists and military men, what would
finally decide you to vote against or for the
treaty?
Dr. TELLER. What would decide me to vote
is my desire for peace and for the safety of
the United States. What would decide me
to vote' is the possibility of opening up a
real way to cooperate with our allies, to
make the first step toward the lawful world
government by the union of all free democ-
racies. This is what this treaty inhibits,
and that, is why I would vote against it if
I had a vote.
Mr. BROOKS. I am sorry to interrupt but I
see that our time is up.
Thank you very much, Dr. Teller, for
being with us.
[From the Columbia (S.C.) State, Sept. 15,
. 19631
SECURITY ENDANGERED
Sell- reservation is a law uI nations as
p superior to ours.
well as a law of nature, and in this world of
turmoil there can be no guarantee of self-' THE SPECIFICS
preservation without military strength. 'The 'Preparedness Subcommittee, con-
This sort of realization prompted the Sen- cerned over what seems to be a U.S. lag in
16163
the area of high yield experience, listed these
eight disadvantages which are expected to
stem from our involvement in a test ban
treaty:
1. We will probably be unable to duplicate
Soviet achievements in the technology of
high yield weapons.
2. We cannot acquire needed data on the
effects of high yield nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere.
3. We would be unable to develop high
altitude data required for the development
of an antiballistic missile system.
4. We would find it impossible to predict
the performance and reliability of our own
antiballistic missile systems unless their
guidance and control systems would be tested
in the face of nuclear explosions.
5. We cannot verify the degree to which
our second-strike missiles in their hardened
underground sites would be operable in the
face of high yield enemy strikes against our
missile sites.
8. We would be unable to confidently de-
termine proper design for our nose cones and
warheads when the enemy opposes them with
antimissile nuclear explosions.
7. The testing areas left open by the pend-
ing treaty would allow the Soviets to gain
upon the United States in low yield knowl-
edge while effectively preventing us from
gaining on them in high yield areas.
8. By driving Soviet testing below surface
(assuming Russian compliance) we would
deprive ourselves of intelligence data which
would be available to us from atmospheric
Soviet tests.
WE RISK ALL
Proponents of the test ban treaty contend
.that political considerations carry advantages
which more than offset the military disad-
vantages. But political gains cannot be
weighted or predicted with the scientific ac-
curacy which can be applied to military
weaponry.
We know that the Soviets are our political
opponents, with or without a. test ban treaty.
Our job is to maintain military superiority
over them.
Ratification of the test ban treaty may
make the task impossible.
TREATY: DR. JOHNSON DISCUSSES
ISSUES-
(EDITOR'S NoTE.-The News recently printed
short discussions by several division mem-
bers on the treaty for a limited ban on nu-
clear explosions. The subject is discussed at
greater length in the following article, writ-
ti.en by Dr. Montgomery H. Johnson, chief
scientist, Research Laboratory, and one of the
Nation's leading authorities on nuclear en-
ergy and theoretical physics.)
The treaty for a limited ban on nuclear
explosions has been widely acclaimed as a
first small step toward peace. It is really
a step toward an honorable peace? Or is it
a step toward submission to Soviet domina-
tion? The answer depends on what we gain
or lose vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.
The U.S.S.R. is a formidable antagonist.
Starting long after us, her nuclear arms now
excel ours in the 50-megaton class. She has
never yielded an advantage except to a threat
of force, most recently in Cuba. She has
broken numerous treaties. Therefore, let us
be sure we understand what the treaty
means, -
First of all, the treaty is not just a limited
ban on nuclear testing. That is a misnomer.
The treaty specifically prohibits nuclear ex-
plosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and
in space for any purpose whatever. So long
as the treaty binds us, we cannot use nuclear
weapons to prevent aggression, to aid our
allies in Europe, or to dig canals and harbors
off the territorial United States. It is essen-
tial to know exactly the conditions under
which we are bound by the treaty prohibi-
tions. The conditions have not been made
clear in public discussions.
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LOSSES WE FACE
In summary, and without embodying such
allied factors as foreign policy and interna-
tional relations, the subcommittee made
these pertinent statements:
"1. From the evidence, we are compelled
to conclude that serious-perhaps even for-
midable-military and technical disadvan-
tages to the United States will flow from the
ratification of the treaty. At the very least
it will prevent the United States from pro-
viding our military forces with the highest
quality of weapons of which our science and
technology is capable.
"2. Any military and technical advantages
which we will derive from the treaty do not,
in our judgment, counterbalance or outweigh
the military and technical disadvantages.
The Soviets will not be similarly inhibited
in those areas of nuclear weaponry where
we now deem them to be inferior."
Incidentally, the matter of arms superiority
and inferiority is subject to grave question.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which has come up with a report favoring the
test ban treaty, reports that "Soviet scien-
tists presumably are confident that in many
critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have
achieved a rough technical parity with the
United States."
Such a statement, far from being an argu-
ment in favor of the treaty, actually should
argue against ratification. Senator STROM
THURMOND, in a comprehensive September
11 speech opposing the treaty, made that
point clear in voicing this conviction:
If the Soviets think, rightly or wrongly,
they have achieved parity with us in nuclear
weapons, then they have less reason than
before to be deterred by our own strike capa-
bility.
This is especially true since President Ken-
nedy and other American spokesmen have re-
peatedly pledged that this country would
never make a, first strike. Since we have vol-
untarily yielded that terrific advatnage to our
enemies, they can concentrate on plans to
neutralize our second strike capability with
their first blow.
Here is an area in which their, knowledge,
gained through the testing of high yield,
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16164 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16
Second, the U.S.S.R. can withdraw from It has been my privilege to observe national society; the State Department to
the treaty with 90 day's notice and start at- Fred Dutton's service while we were both see that the hard complex facts and alterna-
mospheric testing. The extensive series employed In the Executive Office of the tives of policy concerning the rest of the
with which the required U.S.S.R. broke the previous
moratorium and since he has assumed his world are fully considered in the ultimate
oratorium required 2 years' secret prepare- decisions of the Government.
tion. Thereby the U.S.S.R. gained 2 years' present Important task in the State De- Increasingly, the main business of Wash-
time in the development of nuclear weapons. partment, I think he is a brilliant and ington is to reconcile this country's domesrtic
We need to know the cost and feasibility of highly able public official and a dedi- and international interests. Since the rela-
maintaining a 90-day readiness of an atmos- cated, ideally motivated citizen. tionship between Congress and the State
pheric test series in order to forestall more His article on the difficult problems of Department is intimately involved in that
such gains, foreign policy as they relate to Congress business, there is serious need to dispel the
Third, the U.S.S.R. could test clandestine- and the State Department is well worth encumbering nonsense.
ly, a possibility open to the United States reading by the Members of Congress. I The difficulties between the legislative
only under wartime conditions. Experts at branch and foreign-policy apparatus stem
Geneva agreed that a determined nation ask unanimous consent that the article primarily from the fact that they are sharply
could secretly test a half megaton in space. be printed at this point In the RECORD. different creatures. The State Department
Surveillance of atmospheric tests is not reli- There being no objection, the article is analytical, tentative and cumbersome as it
able below a certain yield and that limit may Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, digests vast detail from far sources and
be raised by "clean" explosives. Can the as follows: cautiously gropes for the real meaning of
U.S.S.R. develop a successful ballistic missile COLD WAR BETWEEN THE HILL AND what is happening in the world. A friendly
defense by clandestine testing? What po- FOGGY BOTTOM but exasperated Senator recently described
tentialities in our ability to penetrate State as "rational, maybe, iffy at best." Its
U.S.S.R. defenses and we denied by treaty pro- (By Frederick G. Dutton ecognize that only
) recommendations often recognize What potentialities for our own WASHINGTON.-Whatever the shifting out- part of a problem can be Influenced, and de-
defense and the protection of ICBM sites are look in the rest of the world, one area of visions are sometimes deliberately left im..
we denied? The nuclear shield of the free chronic tension and even occasional guer- plicit.
world hinges on the answer to these ques- rilla warfare is the 2-mile gap in Washing- Congress, regularly faced with reelection,
tions. ton between the Hill and Foggy Bottom- is assertive, often glandular, in its approach
Fourth, underground explosions are pro- between Congress and the State Department, to the world. If one views the untidy
hibited if radioactive debris falls outside na- In the gamut of American Government legislative process of interrogation and ad-
tional territory. Most ploughshare harbors probably no greater antagonism has been vocacy as an effort to reach a consensus
and canals entail minor contamination of generated over the years than that between rather than as executive decisionmaking and
international waters and will be prghibited. the legislative branch and the Nation's for- recognizes that Congress can really affect
Underground testing might be limited in a eign policy apparatus. The wrangling could the President's hold on foreign affairs only
crippling way depending on a quantitative be dismissed as just more governmental in. If wide support is enlisted, then what some-
definition of "radioactive debris" nowhere fighting if it did not involve some of the times seems erratic or even perverse behavior
stated. Of equal importance to treaty lim- most critical and complex issues facing this may actually contain a creativeness, vigor
itations is the support that will be given to country. and incisiveness often undernourished In the
the underground program. We learned in The view from Capitol Hill is reflected in foreign-policy apparatus,
the last moratorium that the pace of nuclear almost any daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL In addition to the inherent differences,
weapon development is set by the pace of the RECORD. Thus, on one typical day this year: international developments since World War
experimental test program. Our ability un- An Ohio Congressman called for "a thorough 11?-including farflung security demands
der the treaty to maintain our nuclear arms fumigation of the State Department"; a Mis- and the growing interdependence of the
relative to the U.S.S.R. depends on the vigor sissippi Senator held forth on an investiga- world-have widened and complicated con-
of the underground program. tion of present Cuban policies; a New Jersey tacts between the two, making a tolerable
These are important military and. technical Representative charged this country's role in accommodation between them vastly more
issues raised by the treaty. There are addi- the Congo was "a sorry mess"; a Wyoming difficult.
tional political issues, such as the effect of Senator claimed he saw indications of a More directly, the legislative branch has
the treaty on he NATO alliance, that need secret agreement with Khrushchev; and a been injected into broad and continuing
discussion. When sober consideration has California Representative claimed that dur- international policies through Its control of
been given to these Issues of national secu- ing 5 years of negotiation the United States the purse strings. Global efforts since World
rity, and only then, can we see if ratification "has been steadily losing its nuclear shirt." War II have relied on larger and lar
er a
r
g
p;~
o-
of the treaty is a step toward an honorable Over a dozen others spoke out with counsel priations for economic assistance, for military
--+--4 submissi
m or criticism aimed at th
?`--
__ .. __-_ - __ - _ -
n +__S S n d
or
e
D
o
many foreign affairs specialists, on- the other The principal foreign-policy legislation be-
hand, was summed u
ear
f
i
th
p y
s ago
ore
n Henry
e current session of C th
ongress,e
THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND Adams' comment: "The Secretary of State foreign-aid bill, highlights the tugging and
THE CONGRESS exists only to recognize the existence of a hauling going on between the executive and
world which Congress would rather ignore." legislative branches over their respective in-
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Or, as a Secretary of State once wrote, "We fluence-a struggle between the constitu-
Sunday New York Times magazine Of are so handicapped by the Senate and House tionai authority over foreign affairs and that
yesterday, September 15, 1963, carries an that there is nothing more to do but follow a over appropriations-where this country's
important, thoughtfully written article Policy of makeshifts and half measures." relations with the rest of the globe are
by Mr. Fred Dutton entitled "The Cold With such sharply contrasting attitudes concerned.
War Between the Hill and Foggy Bot- between the Hill and Foggy Bottom, it is On immediate life-and-death decisions, the
tom >, little wonder that misunderstandings and Chief Executive unquestionably holds the
The article centers on the prOblein s even occasional conflicts break out. "The initiative. In circumstances such as the
miracle of the day," Secretary Rusk has ob- Cuban crisis last October and the Korean
and tensions which inevitably arise in served, "is that we have moved in concert as action in 1950, the President can and did
the relations between the Congress and well as we have." determine the Nation's course without bav-
the State Department in the field of As with nations, much Of the real cause ing to consult with Congress in advance of
foreign policy. of the trouSle has long since been obscured his decision.
Mr. Dutton is admirably qualified to by semantics and stereotypes injected into But in the longer-range programs through
discuss this vital sector of American problems in which they are irrelevant and which the United States can most constst-
invoked mostly to vent frustrations. Thus ently influence rather than just react to
public life. He is currently Assistant congressional complaints about world affairs world developments, the two branches of
Secretary Of State-a responsibility are often dismissed by foreign-policy ex- Government still seem too often to be wres-
which he discharges with rare skill and perts-in the press as well as in Govern- tling for control. Recent comments by Mal-
intelligence. Mr. Dutton was previously ment-as "uninformed," "opportunist," and colm Moos, Richard Neustadt, and others
a Special Assistant to President Ken- "special interest motivated." The State De- about "the shift of great decisions to the
nedy-a position which gave him a keen partment is recurrently assailed as "Weak executive offices and out of the parliamentary
understanding of the overall problems kneed," "the victim of a plot," "the dupe of chamber", really apply more to pushbutton
and standing fies of the problems foreigners," and with other more lurid than long-haul problems.
charges as old as politics. The extent to which legislators court post-
branch of our Government. Prior to his So far neither side has given much recog- tive influence is reflected not only In their
service in Washington, Fred Dutton es- nition to the possibility that the other may recurring forays Into the Cuban problem, but
tablished an enviable record as an ad- be only trying to meet Its functional re- also in the influential role Congress has
viser and assistant to Governor Brown sponsibility--Congress to represent the played In this country's China policy for the
of California. diverse views and interests that make-up our last decade and a half.
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 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ent. Two examples demonstrate the ineffec-
tiveness of the rule. In United States v. Van
Allen, 1961, dismissal was denied under the
rule although the indictment was not filed
until the very end of the period of limitations
and then 6 years elapsed without the case
being brought to trial.
In Harlow v. United States, 1962, the in-
dictment was not filed until 4 years after
the alleged criminal act occurred and 2 years
later the case still had not been brought to
trial. A Federal 'court dismissed the case
where there was a delay of 8 years after the
indictment was returned. But where the
delay was only 7 years, all that the court was
prepared to do was to set the case for imme-
diate trial. Certainly the Federal courts
have thus given a strange meaning to the
constitutional requirement of a speedy trial.
Two other measures I have introduced in
.the 88th Congress will also be of interest to
your membership, and to all labor organiza-
tions. They seek to revise the bonding pro-
vision of the infamous Landrum-Griffin Act
of 1959. It will be remembered that the
1959 act requires an individual bond "for the
faithful discharge of duties." In my speech
against that bill in the fall of 1959, I said of
the founding provision: "Individual bonding
would not provide any greater protection to
union funds. The same losses would be
covered, if there were any losses. But we
have an implication here of suspicion-that
we must have some special safeguard with
regard to a union officer, which is not re-
quired in the case of a bank president or a
member of the board of directors of some
corporation. They are privileged to use
position schedule bonding. I do not know
why we single out labor unions and say, 'You
must have individual bonding.'"
Of course, the bonding required of union
officers was also far more expensive. The
bond previously used had been honesty
bonds, providing protection against loss by
reason of acts of fraud or dishonesty. Surety
companies were required to develop a rate
structure for the new bond without having
experience to guide them. The rates were
extremely high for the first year and have
been reduced periodically since.
Just 14 months ago the Congress enacted
the 1962 amendments to the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act which provided
for the bonding of the administrators, of-
Accra, and employees of employee welfare
benefit plans and of employee pension plans.
The two laws overlap. A sizable number of
the plans subject to bonding under Lan-
drum-Griffin were covered by the newly en-
acted bonding provisions of the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act. However, by
this time we had,learned our lesson. The
new bonding provisions in the 1962 bill re-
quired an honesty bond, providing protec-
tion protection against loss by reason of acts
of fraud or dishonesty.
The 1962 law also provided that its provi-
sions would supersede the' Landrum-Griffin
provisions to the extent that the two over-
lapped.
I think it is long past time to strike the
remaining application of the 1959 bonding
provision, and that is what one of my bills
would do. It would make the Landrum-
Griffin law conform to the 1962 Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act, insofar as
bonding requirements are concerned.
The second of my bonding amendments
would remove the rigid and inflexible pro-
vision which enables the bonding companies
to decide whether an officer or employee of
a union may function. The language of the
Landrum-Griffin Act means that arbitrary
refusal of any bonding company to issue
bonds would result in an absolute disquali-
fication of all union officers or employees and
would have the effect of paralyzing- the
union.
Again, the 1962 law was flexible in this re-
spect. The Secretary of Labor was given au-
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thority to exempt any plan from the bond-
ing requirement if he found that other bond-
ing arrangements would provide adequate
protection. of the beneficiaries and partici-
pants. So I have proposed to amend Lan-
drum-Griffin by adding this same language
from the 1962 law.
Now all these measures are pending in
Senate committees. The first two are in the
Judiciary Committee, the second two in the
Labor Committee. I do not expect that any
action can be taken on them this year, be-
cause Congress has done so little that its
whole normal yearly workload is still piled
up ahead of it. In 19 years in the Senate, I
have never known a session that has done so
little as this one. And the big roadblock-
civil rights-is still' ahead of us. The Ju-
diciary Committee in particular does little
but drag out hearings on civil rights meas-
ures when enactment of a civil rights bill
seems imminent.
But my bills will also be pending next
year. If any action is to be taken on them,
there will have to be a good deal of interest
expressed among all of American labor. The
legislation is there. Now it needs support
and backing from all the unions it affects.
Finally, I want to comment on the most
recent labor legislation on which Congress
has acted, the railway arbitration law. As
many of you know, I believe that the first
plan proposed by President Kennedy to sub-
mit the work rules issue to the Interstate
Commerce Committee was a sound one. It
followed a procedure already in effect and
long supported by the railroad brotherhoods,
which is that where railroad mergers occur
that affect jobs, the ICC shall determine the
rearrangement of jobs. It does so subject to
all the rules of procedure that govern all
proceedings of the regulatory agencies.
Instead, and mistakenly, I think, the rail-
road brotherhoods flatly rejected the appli-
cation of this established means of handling
job security in the railroad industry. It re-
jected this means of settlement, just as it
rejected voluntary arbitration as a means of
settlement.
To me it is a shocking fact that what the
railroad brotherhoods did give their stamp
of approval to was pure and unadulterated
compulsory arbitration. Their formal ob-
jections to the bill reported by the Senate
Commerce Committee were mere window
dressing. Before the bill was ever reported,
the word was out that this was the solution
that was acceptable to the unions. It was
also understood that the brotherhoods were
behind the McGee amendment to restrict the
arbitration to the two major work rule
issues. -
Many of the same Members of Congress
who opposed the ICC solution because the
brotherhoods did not want to go before the
ICC promptly accepted the compulsory arbi-
tration approach, and they did so because
the brotherhoods accepted it.
It is no exaggaration to say that not only
was compulsory arbitration forced on rail-
way employees by a union refusal to use
voluntary arbitration, but it was accepted
by the chiefs of the unions as preferable
either to the proceedings of a regulatory
agency or to voluntary arbitration by Justice
Goldberg. So the crocodile tears shed by the
chiefs of the brotherhoods over the fact that
out-and-out compulsory arbitration was ap-
plied to-their unions for the first time in
the history of Congress should not mislead
anyone. This result was their own doing.
It was concurred in, too, by much of orga-
nized labor. In my opinion, labor did a great
disservice to itself, to its members, and to
the future of collective bargaining by reject-
ing all alternative means of handling this
'articular dispute which would have in-
volved voluntary action on their part. They
invited Congress to impose compulsory arbi-
tration upon labor. Let no one doubt that
Congress will not need that kind of invita-
16167
tion next time. The press and the Nation
knew a precedent when they saw it, and this
settlement has already been entered on many
books as the way to handle any future dis-
pute that may so much as threaten any
substantial portion of the economy.
I am as proud of my vote against this bill
as I am of my votes against Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin. This arbitration is un-
necessary and unwise. Since it was preferred
by labor to any other proposal, however, the
country and the Congress know that labor's
opposition to compulsory arbitration is not
even skin deep and it will be even easier to
use next time than it was this time.
NOTICE OF SHOWING OF FILM
ENTITLED "TROUBLED WATERS"
Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, re-
ports and studies issued by our Senate
committees usually are replete with facts
and figures, but they seldom get high
marks for engrossing reading.
In an effort to present a major na-
tional problem, water pollution, to
achieve maximum public attention, the
Senate Public Works Committee has de-
parted from the usual written report.
Instead, it has produced in coopera-
tion with several interested Federal
agencies a documentary motion picture.
The film is entitled "Troubled Waters"
and is narrated by Mr. Henry Fonda.
On behalf of the Public Works Com-
mittee, I would like to extend an invita-
tion to all Senators and their staffs to
attend the first public showing of this
film.
It will be presented Friday, Septem-
ber 20, at 9:30 a.m. and 11 a.m., in the
Senate auditorium, room G-308, in the
New Senate Office Building.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will state it.
Mr. KUCHEL. Is there further morn-
ing business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If - not,
morning business is closed.
AUTHORIZATION FOR MEMBERS OF
THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY TO
THE PRIVILEGES OF THE FLOOR
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that during the de-
bate on the test ban treaty, Mr. James
B. Graham and Mr. Jack Rosen, of the
staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, be permitted the privileges of
the floor, in addition to the regular staff
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The Senate, as in Committee of the
Whole, resumed the consideration of
Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the
treaty banning nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space, and
underwater.
Mr. McGOVERN obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me so that I may
suggest the absence of a quorum?
Mr. McGOVERN. I am glad to yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 16
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that further pro-
ceedings under the quorum call may be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
there appears in this morning's Wash-
ington Post a very fine article by Mr.
Louis Harris, a noted public opinion poll-
ster. Mr. Harris reports that a recent
survey of national sentiment toward the
test ban,teaty reveals that the treaty now
receives the unqualified approval of ap-
proximately four out of five Americans.
To say the least, these figures are en-
couraging to those of us who favor rati-
fication of the treaty and I, of course,
commend the Harris survey to my col-
leagues. More startling than the vast
support given to the treaty is the fact
that the Harris survey reveals a marked
shift of opinion during the past 2 months.
During the period in which the Foreign
Relations Committee held hearings on
the treaty and issued its report and the
treaty has been debated on the floor, the
percentage of those polled favoring the
treaty rose from a bare majority-52 per-
cent-to the overwhelming 81 percent
recorded in September.
I believe this shift in opinion is fair
evidence of the independence of the
American people and a tribute to the
open and free society in which we live.
It is also gratifying to those of us in the
Senate who sometimes feel that the de-
bate on the floor a'nd the information
produced by committee hearings go
unnoticed by the public. I believe this
poll indicates a deep public concern with
the issues which it involves and I hope
my colleagues will take time to examine
its results.
I ask unanimous consent that the Har-
ris survey be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE HARRIS SURVEY: PUBLIC MORE THAN 4 TO 1
FOR TREATY, MANY SWITCHING TO IT SINCE
JULY
(By Louis Harris)
If the American people had to vote in the
Senate this wee% on ratification of the nu-
clear test ban agreement, they would vote
better than 4 to 1 in approval, according to
a special nationwide survey completed this
past week. Public fears of the effect of fall-
out and radiation from continued testing and
the cautious hope that the agreement marks
a first step toward peace contribute heavily
to people's views.
Actually, there have been some interesting
shifts In public opinion on the test ban ques-
tion since the negotiations were begun early
in July. As the Senate has moved closer
to a decision on the treaty, there has been
a sharp increase in the number of people
who now give unqualified support to the ban
and a comparable fall off in the number
who are outrightly opposed or still have
reservations.
Here are the current feelings toward the
treaty among Americans who expressed their
opinion in a poll taken last week-compared
with the outcome before negotiations began
in July:
Attitudes toward test ban agreement
Percent
Unqualified approval ---..__-_-
Qualified approval _____
Opposed ----------------
September
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff---all
of these have only served to fortify my
own longtime convictions as to the logic
of the treaty.
The Senate and the Nation were fur-
ther strengthened in their support for
the test ban by the unusually eloquent
statements of Senator MANSFIELD, our be-
loved majority leader, and Senator: DISK-
SEN, the respected minority leader, whose
plea to the Senate was one of the most
moving experiences I have ever wit-
nessed. Senator FULBRIGHT, the wise and
able chairman of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, has likewise set forth
what seems to me to be an irrefutable
argument for approval of the treaty.
In his news conference of last Thurs-
day, President Kennedy summarized the
case for ratification in two or three sen-
tences, as follows:
This treaty will enable all of us who in-
habit the earth, our children, and children's
children, to breathe easier, free from the fear
of nuclear test fallout. It will curb the
spread of nuclear weapons to other countries,
thereby holding out hope for a more peaceful
Even if people giving only qualified ap-
proval are combined with those opposed,
there are only 19 percent who could not go
along with ratification at the agreement
now before the U.S. Senate.
If the overall shift has been decidedly to-
ward unqualified approval of the test ban
agreement, then there are just as dramatic
changes in the reasons that lie back of
people's opinions. When asked why they
feel the way they do, here is the lineup of
the reasons given:
Reasons for favoring or opposing test ban
Unqualified approval ----------
Cut fallout________________
Must end tests- -----------
End risk of atom war -----
Stop world suicide.-..-----
Step to world peace -.---_-
Halt cost of testing--------
Qualified approval-----_------
If Russia keeps word. -----
Only with inspection.-----
If on our terms ------. -----
Opposed- ---------------------
Russia will break it-.-----
Hurts U.S. defense...-.---
52 . and stable world.
12 It Will-
19, Said the President-
0 slow down the nuclear arms race without
4 impairing- the adequacy of this Nation's ar-
In the 2 months of public discussion of
the test ban, public awareness on the fallout
issue has risen. In Lowell, Mass., for example,
a 42-year-old machine tool operator put it
this way: "Everyone should agree to this on
account of the fallout. This is bad for your
system. It can hurt your health." In Gary,
Ind., a 27-year=old steel worker had this to
say: "It should cut down on the danger to
people's health."
A sizable segment of the public also sees
the test ban as a first step on the road to
peace. However, most agree with this elderly
widow in Alhambra, Calif., in her caution,
when she said: "I grant it doesn't really do
much, but it's at least a step, a possible move
for something better." Or as a 28-year-old
St. Louis accountant put it: "It's a first step
in the relaxation of the cold war, but I'm
still terribly leery of the Communists."
Much of the opposition was summed up
by a business executive in Rochester, N.Y.,
who said: "It puts us at a military disadvan-
tage. We've been hoodwinked by the Rus-
slans before. It cuts down our experimenta-
tion for an antimissile missile weapon." Or,
in the words of a motel owner in Inverness,
Fla.: "It hurts national defense. We'll keep
our word. Russia will break Its word."
In short, in the view of a large majority
of the American people, the test-ban treaty
is considered a first, cautious step worth tak-
ing, but few are ready to believe the millen-
nium of peace is anywhere in sight.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
support the nuclear test ban treaty with-
out reservation of any kind. The weeks
of committee hearings-the supporting
statements of our top Government, scien-
tific, military, and religious leaders-the
specific endorsements by the President,
senal or security, and it will offer a small but
important foundation on which a world of
law can be built.
RADIATION HAZARD OF NUCLEAR TesnNG
I am for this ban on atmospheric test-
ing first of all because I am worried by
the danger to our children, and to gen-
erations yet unborn, of death-dealing ra-
dioactive fallout.
I referred a moment ago, in my intro-
duction of a bill, to the birth of the
quintuplets born to Mr. and Mrs. Fisch-
er, in my home State. I think one of the
greatest gifts I can offer as one of the
elected representatives of this family is
to work in every possible way for a world
where these children, all the children of
South Dakota, indeed, all the children of
the earth, can breathe clean air and live
free from the blight of hatred and, war.
It is true that the experts are not in
agreement as to the number of leukemia
or cancer victims there may be if we do
not cease polluting the air with test ex-
plosions. We do not yet know for cer-
tain how much genetic damage may be
done to the brains, the bones, and the
tissue of the children of the future if the
nuclear test explosions continue. But
we do know that uncontrolled testing
with more and more nations joining in
the nuclear race will doom thousands of
innocent human beings to suffering and
premature death.
Harvard's distinguished professor of bi-
ology, Matthew Meselson, told the Sell-
ate Foreign Relations Committee that
"a reasonable estimate for the number
of children with gross mental or physical
defects who will be born in the world be-
cause of the genetic effects of fallout
from tests conducted to date is about
50,000."
Recent Government surveys have re-
ported radioactive concentrations in
some localities two or three times great-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
er than we had previously believed to
exist.
The tragic fact is that we may not
know fo>~ another generation or more the
full effect of radiation damage already
caused by nuclear explosions.
The Friday an of the Washington
Star carried an urgent half-page paid
advertisement, sponsored by the noted
physician, Dr. F3enjamin Speck, and 66
other medical doctors. Said Dr. Spock
and his associates;
We believe that as a result of the fallout
.from past tests, at best a small percentage
of our children will develop cancer or leu-
kemia in the future, and that some of our
children's children'will be born with physical
deformities or mental deficiencies. If test-
ing in the atmosphere continues, the risks
will increase.
Some persons have contended that the
radiation danger is a minor factor since
it may affect only a small percentage of
the world's children. But if one of those
children, Mr. President, happened to be
yours or mine, we would not think that
was a minor matter. No one of us
relishes the thought of living perma-
nently with the fear that our families
might be drinking contaminated milk or
eating polluted food or breathing poison-
But, Mr. President, you and I would
have less cause to complain about radia-
tion damage to one of our children as a
result of nuclear testing than would a
'arent in Norway or Tunisia or the Phil-
ippines. For we have a voice and a vote
in the determination of the nuclear
policy of the world's mightest nuclear
power-the first nation to develop and
explode ' a nuclear device. Those mil-
lions of human beings around the world
who are nervously watching the nuclear
race must rest their chances of survival
on what the giant powers decide to do.
Like the rain, radioactive dust falls alike
on the just and the unjust, the inno-
cent and the guilty, the weak and the
strong. Little wonder, then, that some
91 nations have quickly offered their
signatures to the treaty now pending
before the Senate.
In this morning's Washington Post,
the distinguished columnist Mr. Roscoe
Drummond reports the overwhelming
support for the nuclear test ban treaty
among the 59 national parliamentary
groups attending the conference in Bel-
grade, our .country being one of the coun-
tries represented at the conference. I
should like to read one brief passage from
this column:
If there are any U.S. Senators wavering in
their opposition to the nuclear test ban on
the ground that it Is a meaningless gesture,
it is too bad that they are not in Belgrade
sitting with the American congressional
delegation at the 52d conference of the Inter-
parliamentary Union * * *. To a man they
are deeply convinced that the test ban treaty
is welcome and worth while, a beginning
toward a more peaceful world. They do not
look upon the test ban as meaningless. They
look upon it as a blessing.
One final phrase :
It is evident to every Senator and Con-
gressman attending this global gathering of
parliamentarians that if the U.S. Senate
turns its back on the test ban, world opinion
will turn its back on the United States in
agony and disappointment.
I ask unanimous consent that the full
text of the article by Mr. Drummond be
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, this
one single factor-the radiation haz-
ard-places a sobering responsibility on
those who say that we will all be safer
if the nations of the world continue to
explode their nuclear warheads in the
air.
Of course, those who oppose the treaty
contend that we must risk radioactive
fallout to avoid the military risk involved
in the limited test ban.
I think this argument has been de-
molished by our best military and scien-
tific authorities-to say nothing of the
moral, political, and diplomatic issues in-
volved.
We now have a clear-cut nuclear su-
periority over any other nation. We
have enough warheads and delivery sys-
tems right now to obliterate civilization
even if we never test another bomb or
missile In the atmosphere. Far from
adding to our nuclear superiority, con-
tinued testing by ourselves and other
countries could clear the way for our
rivals to narrow our present nuclear lead.
This has been the past experience of nu-
clear testing over the years.
There are those who argue that we
need to test in the atmosphere to develop
a defensive antimissile missile. This
argument falters at two points: First, it
it highly unlikely that either we or the
Russians can develop any really depend-
able defense against offensive missiles;
second, the unsolved problems of the
antimissile missile do not call for atmos-
pheric testing but relate instead to tech-
nical problems such as guidance systems
and the identification of incoming
missiles, which have nothing to do with
the testing of warheads.
The only dependable protection
against enemy missiles is the enemy's
knowledge that if he destroys our coun-
try, we can destroy his simultaneously.
We are in a balance of terror today, and
neither side has the slightest need to ex-
plode another test bomb to demonstrate
its enormous killing power. The leaders
of both the United States and Russia al-
ready know that a nuclear exchange of
a few minutes' duration would incin-
erate most of the people in both nations.
If that is not enough to deter a nuclear
strike, then mankind is doomed no mat
ter how many test bombs we explode or'
fail to explode.
But for those in doubt, we have the re-
peated assurance of our President and
our military leaders that underground
testing will be energetically pushed and
that we will be prepared to resume
atmospheric tests if that becomes
necessary.
Indeed, Mr. President, the administra-
tion has been called upon to give so
many assurances of our continued nu-
clear, efforts after treaty ratification
Approved For Release 2006110
16169
that a casual observer might assume
that we are approving this treaty so that
we can accelerate the arms race and
beef up the warmaking facilities of our
country.
There seems to be a side of our nature
which leads us to require repeated assur-
ances that we will continue to add to our
capacity to annihilate the enemy more
thoroughly than he annihilates us.
Some spokesmen have warned about
the great danger of euphoria setting in
if we cease exploding test bombs over
the heads of the earth's inhabitants.
Webster defines "euphoria" as "bodily
comfort; a feeling of well-being."
Frankly, Mr. President, I think there
is less danger to the world from this
dread disease, "euphoria," with its symp-
toms of "bodily comfort" and "a feeling
of well-being" than from polluting the
air with radiation and accelerating the
nuclear race.
As a former combat soldier I know
the necessity of a strong and alert na-
tional defense.
But I also know that there is more to
the defense of a nation than the size of
its nuclear stockpile.
We need to balance off the alleged dan-
ger of becoming afflicted by "a feeling of
well-being" against the dangers to our
way of life from another 10, 20, or 50
years of mounting tension, anxiety, and
fear. What does it do to a free society
to live decade after decade under the
shadow of a nuclear Armageddon. What
does it do to our Nation to invest annu-
ally more than half of our entire na-
tional budget in building the weapons
of death while neglecting the quality
of our schools, our cities, and our lives?
I fully agree with the distinguished
Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDERI,
who said on Friday:
If the Senate should fail to ratify the test
ban treaty, it appears to me we face two al-
ternatives, and either will be destructive
of our way of life. We may eventually drift
or be forced into a nuclear war with Russia
or we will go broke attempting to maintain
the status quo indefinitely. Does any in-
telligent person believe we can continue to
pour out between $50 and $60 billion for
any length of time without doing violence
and much harm to our economy and our
way of life? I for one do not.
I agree with the Senator whole-
heartedly.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I have only a brief
statement. I wonder whether the Sen-
ator will withhold his questions until I
have completed my statement; then I
will be glad to yield to him.
Senator ELLENDER expressed the hope
of a world that longs for peace when
he said that the treaty could be a first
step to thaw the cold war and help dispel
the fear existing between Russia and the
United States.
This brings me to one aspect of the
treaty ratification which I t4ink has not
had sufficient consideration. I refer to
the impact of this first step upon the
Communist world.
THE TREATY AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT
All of us would readily agree that the
hopes for world peace depend not only
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on the policy of the United States, but
even more significantly on the, course
which the Communist world follows.
All our hopes for peace-and I believe
the American people are united in that
hope, for peace-can be dashed into a
nuclear holocaust no matter what we do
if the Soviets and their allies should de-
cide that they prefer that alternative to
peaceful coexistence.
So we need to consider whether rati-
fication of the test ban encourages the
forces of peace or war in the Com-
munist sectors of the globe.
During most of the 18 years since
World War IT, we have thought of the
Communist nations as a monolithic
structure solidly united under the lead-
ership of Moscow. With the emergence
of a Communist regime in Peking, we
developed the phrase "Sino-Soviet bloc"
to describe what we believed to be the
common front of Russian and Chinese
Communist power. We noted and par-
tially exploited the divergence of Tito's
Yugoslavia from Moscow leadership, but
we saw this as a unique and uncertain
exception to the monolithic nature of
international communism.
In recent years, however, we have wit-
nessed a fast-growing split in the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Indeed, there is now clear
evidence of a bitter power struggle be-
tween Moscow and Peiping for leader-
ship of international communism.
"The New Cold War: Moscow Versus
Peking" is the title of a newly published
book by Edward Crankshaw, the London
Observer's respected authority on Soviet
affairs. Crankshaw and others see the
first signs of the Russo-Chinese rift in
the notable 20th Soviet Party Congress
of February 1956 when Ihrushchev
launched the movement to downgrade
Stalin. At the same Congress, Khru-
shchev announced that war with the
capitalist societies is no longer consid-
ered inevitable in Communist dogma.
The Chinese took issue with both of these
developments.
For several years the Soviets and the
Chinese tried to soften the public dem-
onstration of their differences by indirect
verbal attacks. When the Chinese
wanted to attack the views of Moscow
they did so by sharp criticism of Yugo-
slavia. The Russians would reply by a
verbal blast at Albania.
There are numerous factors involved in
the widening Sino-Soviet rift. Basical-
ly, however, the dispute centers around
Khrushchev's policy of coexistence and
some accommodation with the West.
While Mr. Khrushchev has given growing
evidence of his desire to avoid a military
showdown, the Chinese have denounced
this policy as a cowardly betrayal of
Communist principle.
During 1959 Khrushchev seemed to be
cultivating President Eisenhower and
laying the groundwork through the
spirit of Camp David for a high-level
understanding. The subsequent sum-
mit conference in Paris in the spring of
1960 was, however, torpedoed by the ill-
fated U-2 incident and Khrushchev's
violent reaction to that event. it seems
probable that the hard-liners in the
Kremlin and the more militaristic advo-
cates In Peiping made it politically nec-
essary for Khrushchev to back off from
the Paris conference when the U--2 in-
cident erupted on the very eve of the
conference.
Since that time, the Soviet leader has
seemed to act alternatively belligerent
and peaceful, but always he has backed
away from the much more aggressive
course demanded by Peiping.
The Moscow-Peiping battle broke into
full public view following the Cuban mis-
sile crisis of last October. After gam-
bling on the missile Installations in Cuba
which he thought would strengthen his
hand for a showdown on Berlin, Khru-
shchev withdrew his missiles in the face
of President Kennedy's stern ultimatum.
This withdrawal infuriated the
Chinese who saw it as a surrender to
the hated imperialists-the United
States-which had previously been de-
scribed by Peiping as a "paper tiger."
Khrushchev replied: "The paper tiger
has nuclear teeth".
He warned the Chinese that to follow
the unyielding militaristic course advo-
cated by them would lead to a nuclear
devastation that would cause survivors
to envy the dead.
The Moscow-Peiping differences were
further inflamed by the Chinese attack
on the Indian border which coincided
with the Cuban missile crisis. Moscow
made no effort to hide its displeasure
and in fact assisted the Indians rather
than its Communist ally.
This summer the world has witnessed
the public exchange of lengthy letters
between the Communist parties of China
and Russia which erase any doubt as to
the fundamental ideological conflict be-
tween the two power blocs.
No one can read the article on the
origins of the Sino-Soviet rift published
by Peiping on September 6 without
sensing the intensity of the struggle.
The article traces the dispute to the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1956 and the Soviet
peaceful coexistence policy which ac-
companied the downgrading of Stalin.
The Peiping government takes strong
exception to the Soviet warning about
the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war.
In its letter to the Chinese on July 14
of this year-remember, this was on the
eve of the nuclear test ban discussion-
the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party wrote:
The CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet
Union) Central Committee believes it a
necessary duty to tell the party and the
people with all frankness that in questions
of war and peace the CCP (Chinese Com-
munist Party) leadership is based on prin-
ciple differences with us, with the world
Communist movement. The essence of these
differences lies in the diametrically opposite
approach to such vital problems as the pos-
sibility of averting a world thermonuclear
war, peaceful coexistence of states with dif-
ferent social systems, and interconnection
between the struggle for peace and the de-
velopment of the world revolutionary move-
ment.
Two recent actions-to say nothing of
the battle of words-of the Soviet Union
point up their acute 'differences with
Peiping. Under Secretary of State
Averell Harriman has noted that it was
the U.S.S.R. which proposed that the
successful test ban treaty negotiations
should begin in Moscow on July 15.
Previously, July 5 had been fixed for the
Moscow talks with the Chinese. The
Soviet letter-in effect, an attack on the
Chinese position, which I have just
quoted-was sent on July 14 while talks
with the Chinese Communists were in
progress. Both the timing of these
events and the substance of that letter
are less than conciliatory toward the
Chinese.
The Chinese Communists have de-
nounced the proposed test ban as a. "nu-
clear fraud," a "fake peace," an instru-
ment of nuclear "monopoly," and a
"capitulation to U.S. imperialism" which
allows it to "gain military superiority."
In the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute
published by Peiping on September 6, the
Chinese openly berated Moscow for
scrapping its agreement to help Red
China develop nuclear weapons. Peiping
said that the agreement was broken "ap-
parently as a gift" to be made to Presi-
dent Eisenhower "to curry favor with the
U.S. imperialists" during the Khrush-
chev visit to the United States in Sep-
tember of 1959.
One could quote at length from the
growing literature of dispute, down to
the recent bitter exchange about inci-
dents along the frontier between the
U.S.S.R. and Communist China and the
charge of Peiping that Mr. Khrushchev
has joined President Kennedy, President
Tito, and Prime Minister Nehru as a
"vaudeville star" in a new holy alliance..
What I have said, however, is quite
enough to remind the Senate that this
dispute over the leadership of interna-
tional communism between these two
major Communist powers is a major
reason for Soviet agreement to the treaty,
a proposal which they had rejected in
1959 and, again, in 1961.
Some of our most able Soviet authori-
ties, including Mr. Harriman, believe that
Mr. Khrushchev urgently needs some
tangible evidence that his doctrine of
peaceful coexistence is a more practical
policy than the militant Chinese line.
The treaty is popular in Eastern. Eu-
rope, as indicated by remarks of Mr.
Roscoe Drummond, which I just read,
where there is pressure for more inde-
pendence of Soviet control. It has been
widely acclaimed by the developing coun-
tries of the globe. It is plausible that
Moscow desires the treaty to win greater
voluntary approval among people both
at home and abroad. Khrushchev
doubtless feels that he can command
greater influence by supporting the test
ban as a symbol of peace than Mao Tse-
tung can in the role of an unyielding
warmonger.
Beyond this, it is quite probable that
the Soviet leadership should mean in. a
literal sense what they say about avoid-
ing nuclear war even as they say it for
propaganda effect. Why should they not
wish to avoid a nuclear war which could
destroy most of their country? Why
should it not be reasonable to suppose
that in the avoidance of nuclear war, at
least, we have some common ground
with them; that they conceive of this
treaty, as we do, as a step-admittedly
a limited step-admittedly-a step involv-
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12B3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 1617]
Ing some risk-toward that end. Why powers, we have never been.at.war with each I am familiar with the warning that
should we in this country want to give other. And no nation in the history of bat- those who place faith in such doctrines
Peiping ammunition to suport its loud tee ever suffered more than the Soviet Union should take care to keep their o
contention that "peaceful coexistence" in the Second World War. At least 20 million p wder
lost their lives, dry. I agree in general with that Are-
as Moscow conceives it, is impossible in caution.
relationship to the West? Ever since The Soviet Union and -the United During World War II, we used to sing
1959 we have told the world that we were States would be the centers of unspeak- a song, "Praise the Lord, and pass the
prepared to stop test explosions in the able horror in the event of another war. ammunition." I appreciate the need for
atmosphere if the Soviets and other Likewise, these two great powers are ammunition. It has at various times in
countries would agree. carrying the chief burdens of the arms history overcome tyranny and brought
Mr. President, can you not hear the race, and have the most to gain from a down bullies. But let us not forget the
ridicule and scorn that Mao Tse-tung relaxation of tensions. other side of the equation-that our Na-
tion heap on the head of Khrushchev Said the President: tion has also come to greatness under a
if we now reject our own proposal? We are both caught up in a vicious and tradition of praising the Lord.
I believe that the rejection of the test dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side I see the banning of nuclear test ex-
ban treaty would play squarely into the breeding suspicion on the other, and new plosions in God's heavens as an exercise
hands of the Chinese militarists and weapons begetting counterweapons. In i
short, n realism by earthbound men, and also
might leither to trepudiation of both the United States and its allies
m
peaceful ight lead coexistence the Mr. repudiation of and the Soviet Union and its allies have a as a hymn of praise to the Father of all
mutually deep interest in a just and genuine mankind.
or his replacement by a more militaristic. peace and in halting the arms race. Agree- ExHIBrr 1
Soviet leader. On the other hand, our ments to this end are in the interests of the TEST BAN HOPES-LEGISLATORS AT BELGRADE
acceptance of the treaty could very well Soviet Union as well as. ours-and even the FAVOR TREATY
,have the effect of widening the split in most hostile nations can be relied upon to (By Roscoe Drummond)
the Communist world. accept and keep those treaty obligations and
We know that the dispute between only those treaty obligations, which are in BELGRADE.-If there are any U.S. Senators
their own interest. wavering in their opposition to the nuclear
Russia and China does not mean that test ban on the ground that it is a meaning
our troubles with Moscow are over. The Mr. President, the treaty before us. is less gesture, it is too bad they are not in
tensions between our two competing in our interest and is also in the interest Belgrade sitting with the American congres-
social systems will remain. We know of the Soviet Union- and in the interest of sional delegation at the 52d conference of
that the Soviet Union seeks to outdo us the 91 nations that have signed it. The the Inter-Parliamentary union.
s
in at least the economic and ideological Chinese Communists and Fidel Castro do ers Here are more representing 59 n than natti aonal electeaarli laea men e
sense of the term, and we know there not think the treaty is in their interest; from every continent. To a man they are
will be military pressure. But I do not but, fortunately, neither of them is pres- deeply convinced that the test ban treaty is
fear peaceful competition with the Sov- ently in a position to jeopardize its suc- welcome and worthwhile, a beginning to-
iets. I have the faith to believe that our cess. ward a more peaceful world. They do not
economy and our society and our demo- I know that some Senators have hon- look upon the test ban as meaningless. They
cratic government are more than equal est doubts about the wisdom of this look upon it as a blessing.
to that long-term struggle. I believe, treaty. But I hope and pray that their n r
It is evident tog this every global Senatogathering on-
too, that if we can avoid war, we shall doubts will not prevent an overwhelming parliamentarians U.S. Senate
rld S on
continue to see modifications in Soviet vote of approval. Noone can deny that turns its back back on the that test if ban, the world opinion
society and foreign policy that will im- if we were to reject this proposal, for will turn its back on the United states in
prove the chances for a world of law, whatever reason-a proposal which our agony and disappointment.
rather than ruin. leaders have been urging on the world The one overriding sentiment which unites
As the late John Foster Dulles said 5 for 5 years-that rejection would bring these diverse delegates from Senegal and
years ago: from Peiping and from Havana the loud- Sierre Leone, from Israel and Iceland, from
There is nothing inevitable about Com- est shouts of glee. sionaata
, is desire Ceylon, for Egypt, and Chile, a pas-
There, except that it, too, is bound to sionate peaceful world.
I know, too, that some Senators who Representative KATHARINE ST. GEORGE, of
change. The forces that change it are al- have no specific objection to the treaty New York, chairman of the American con-
ready at work and discernible. Education
that equips minds to find the ways to itself fear that it is dangerous and will gressional delegation which includes leading
pene-
trate outer space also equips them to pene- lead to additional steps to disarmament Democrats and Republicans from both
trate the fallacies of Marxism and its glitter- that might threaten our Nation's Se- Houses, instantly caught the temper of the
ing slogans. curity. conference and became its spokesman in the
first address of the general debate.
Merely in order to survive, the Russian But, Mr. President, so long as we re- "As representatives of the peoples of the
leaders are constrained to recognize that main reasonably alert to danger, and world," she said, "we know that the desire
they cannot force a Communist mold on maintain a reasonable level of defense, for peace is the longing and burning ambi-
the world. They do not agree with our why is it not in our interest to take as tion of all and that we who are parliamen-
ideology, and we do not agree with many steps as we can to put the arms tarians must do everything possible to ex-
race into reverse? Just as each new press, proclaim, and fulfill this desire."
theirs; but they share our urgent desire I am not suggesting that any senator
for survival, Of that, we can be sure. , round of weapons produces a counter should vote for a treaty to please world
Mr..Khrushchev and his colleagues round by our rivals, so we may find it opinion. I am reporting that the elected
are realists who must reckon, not only possible to take certain cautious steps in political leaders of 59 nations view the test
with the nuclear power of the United arms reduction that will prompt reduc- ban as an instrument of hope and unani-
States, but also with the concern of the tions by the other side. Just as fear and mousey want to see it tried in good faith.
Russian people in their legitimate inter- hate beget fear and hate, so may hope The nation which refused to try it in good
ests; and one of those interests is sur- and love, however cautious, beget hope faith--or it-would plunge its pres-
tigeh es to o the depths.
vival. The ultimate hope of more and love. Naturally the Soviet-bloc delegates are
peaceful relationships with Moscow and, Philip Wylie in his little book, "The busily trying to use this conference for polit-
indeed, the hope for a more. humane re- Answer," tells of simultaneous nuclear ical purposes which go beyond its jurisdic-
gime in the Kremlin depend in large test explosions by Russia and the United tion. Their speeches have been bland but
part on our ability to discern and to act States which broke through the canopy their tactic has come into the open.
upon the conditions on which the in- of heaven and brought two angels flut- The Soviet tactic bis to
an t get use the the p tpemenden-
terin appeal the test ban a f
terests of America and Russia coincide. g down to earth. When the angels tarians to endorse e back-handedly a series series of
As President Kennedy said in what I were examined by astonished men in political and military agreements right out
regard as his greatest speech-his both the Soviet Union and the United Of the Moscow kit. The device is a super-
speech of June 11, at American Uni- States, it was learned that they were ficially innocent resolution expressing satis-
versity: carrying to earth a message which rep- faction with the test ban.
Among the many traits the peoples of our resented the distilled wisdom of all the In a plenary vote you couldn't beat back
two countries have in common, none is universe. That message, written in ever such a resolution if you tied Satan's tail to it.
stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. language That is just about e the Soviets have
age of mankind, read simply: "Love done. They have imbedded in it a paragraph
Almost unique among the major world one another." which has the conference endorsing a non-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September-16
aggression pact between NATO and the War-
saw countries and to create denuclearized
zones in unspecified parts of the world, in-
cluding central Europe.
These are the kind of deals which Mr.
I hrusl chew wanted to tie to the test ban
itself. We refused. Unless the resolution
can be amended in committee the U.S. con-
gressional delegation (including such Sen-
ators as ABRAHAM RIBICOFF of Connecticut,
EDWARD KENNEDY of Massachusetts, JAMES
PEARSON of Kansas and such Representatives
as GERALD F'oRD of Michigan, ROSS ADArR Of
Indiana, will either have to give qualifying
speeches and vote for it or find itself in
minority of two in voting against it along
with the West Germans.
In this first international conference since
the signing of the test ban, the mood of the
bloc delegates, as evidenced by their speeches,
is amiable. There are no denunciations and
few criticisms. They are courting a detente,
a relaxation, and all they want are a few
agreements which will help Soviet purposes
and not do the free world any good.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President will the
Senator from South Dakota yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I should
like to ask the distinguished Senator
from South Dakota a question. Earlier
in his speech, he referred to a statement
by the Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
ELLENDERI that if the Senate were to
fail to approve the test ban treaty, It
would appear that either of two things
would happen: Either the United States
might drift into a nuclear war with the
Soviet Union, or increased national de-
fense expenditures would bankrupt our
country. I believe the Senator from
South Dakota has adopted that view-
point as his own.
Mr. McGOVERN. That is correct.
Mr. MILLER. I should like to ask
him whether he believes that the in-
creased cost of national defense and Its
impact on the economy is a greater
prospect for the United States than it is
for the Soviet Union.
Mr. McGOVERN. I believe not. I
believe, as a matter of fact, that the cost
of the arms burden for the people of the
Soviet Union is as great a burden on
them, if not a greater one, than it is
on us. But the point I have been. stress-
ing today is that we have a mutual in-
terest in trying to get the world on a should continue to press for a compre-
course which will relieve both our coun- hensive test ban treaty in Geneva.
tries from this very oppressive and enor- Mr. McGOVERN. We have an an-
mous burden, a burden that is making it nounced policy at present of refrain-
exceedingly difficult to do some of the ing from testing in the atmosphere so
other things in our societies that would long as the Soviets and other countries
make for a better and a happier world. refrain from such testing. _ But the
I. agree that the arms race is as detri- treaty gives us an added bonus, in that
mental to the Soviet Union as it is to us. we are seeking the signatures of coun-
Mr. MILLER. I understand and ap- tries all over the world. Already some
preciate that the point I wish to make _ 91 countries have added their signatures
is that this alternative need be no more to the treaty. So we can avoid the pro-
of a problem for the United States than liferation of tests by powers not now
for the Soviet Union. In fact, I would be members of the nuclear club. As the
inclined to agree with the Senator from Senator points out, if the announced
South Dakota that, if anything, it would policy of banning- a nuclear test is good
be a greater problem for the Soviet Union judgment, why would it not be in our
than it would be for the United States. interest to formalize that policy in a
other nuclear powers sib UO)NIL a.rutuiu
the table and agree on a limited test ban
on the testing of nuclear weapons, may
open the way-and probably will open
the way-for more favorable relations
between our competing societies.
Mr. MILLER. I suggest that it would
be more of a presumption that if we
walk out of the Chamber- that we will
not be struck by lightning than it would
be that if we enter into the treaty we
would have better relations with the
Soviet Union. I share the hope and
prayer of the Senator from South Da-
kota that such would happen? But I am
not persuaded in respect to the strong
probability that he suggests. There is,
indeed, a possibility. But I am unim-
for from Iowa is correct. world could be brought under that agree- the first step. It may be; it could be a
Mr. MILLER. With respect to the ment? step the other way, too. In. that con-
statement about drifting into a nuclear Mr. MILLER. The only reason would nection I hope the Senator from South
war, I hope the Senator from South Da- be, as set forth by some of the opponents Dakota will recall that several of the
kota will agree that certainly in the pres- to the ratification of the treaty, that proponents of the treaty who are
ent state of affairs, and insofar as the this particular treaty would not be in knowledgeable on this subject, not the
foreseeable future is concerned, in view of the best interest of the United States. least of whom is the Senator from
the assurances given by the President of
the United States, this need be no more
of a problem for us-land probably it
would be less of a problem for us-than
for the Soviet Union because-if I cor-
rectly understand the President's as-
surances-we intend to maintain our de-
terrent capability to such an extent that
if the Soviet Union sees fit to drift into
a nuclear war, it will be destroyed.
Mr. McGOVERN. I could not agree
with the Senator more enthusiastically.
Again he makes a point that I have been
trying to stress today. In the event of
a nuclear war, not only would most of
our country be destroyed, but in the
process the Soviet Union would be de-
stroyed Secretary McNamara has esti-
I am sure the Senator from South Da-
kota and I could sit down and draft a
better treaty than the one before the
Senate. It would be aimed at stopping
nuclear testing in the atmosphere, but
it would be a better treaty, and it would
remove some of the objections of some
of the opponents. The point I wish to
make is that we should not drive our-
selves into the position of pointing the
finger at anyone who opposes the treaty
and saying, "Because you oppose this
treaty, you therefore will have this coun-
try follow either of these two roads-
-drifting into nuclear war or bankrupt-
ing the United States."
I cannot imagine anything more un-
fair than to do that. I suggest that
mated that a nuclear exchange of some- most of those who oppose the treaty
thing less than 60 minutes would leave would be the first to reject those alterna-
300 million people dead in Russia, the tives and would say, "No; my alterna-
United States, and western Europe. It tive is a comprehensive test ban treaty,
seems to me that point only reinforces rather than the single approach of tak-
the point that the Soviets have an in- ing those two avenues into destruction,"
terest in taking whatever steps they can Mr. McGOVERN. If we could obtain
to move the world away from that kind a comprehensive test ban agreement at
of catastrophe Just as we have an in- this time, I would support that. But
terest. the Senator knows that we have not
Mr. MILLER. Precisely; I could not been able to negotiate that kind of
more thoroughly agree with what the agreement with the Soviet Union; nego-
Senator from South Dakota concludes, tiations since the end of World War II
because I have come to the same con- have faltered and failed. This repre-
clusion. sents a first and limited step in that
But why would we be inevitably led to direction. I hold to the doctrine that
either of these two alternatives, which it half a loaf is better than nothing at all,
appears the Soviet Union should shrink Mr. MILLER. The Senator from
from even more than the United States, Iowa does not know that to be the case.
merely because this particular treaty Neither the Senator from South Dakota
might not be ratified? We are not bound nor the most wild proponent of the
to go along either of those two roads. It treaty knows that the treaty is a "half
is my understanding that the President's a loaf," that it is a "bird in the hand,"
commitment made in his American Uni- or that it is indeed a first step. We hope
versity commencement speech in June and pray that it may be, but we do not
would still stand even if the treaty were know. I do not believe we ought to lead
not ratified. If I recall correctly, the anyone to_ think that anyone knows-
President of the United States said, "We aside from the leaders in the Krerrilin-
will not be the first to resume testing in whether indeed this is a first step'
the atmosphere." Mr. McGOVERN. There is an area
Mr. McGOVERN. Correct. of uncertainty in all our knowledge. We
Mr. MILLER. I assume that would do not know that we will survive walk-
continue to be our policy. I assume ing out of the Senate Chamber today.
that it is a long standing policy of this A bolt of lightning may strike: us all
administration, prior administrations, dead. But the presumption is that a
and other Congresses that if this par- step of the kind proposed, in which the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -.SENATE 16173
Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], Chairman
of the Joint Atomic Energy Co.nmittee
of the Congress, indicated th?,t under
the treaty we can expect our national
defense cost `to increase rathefr than to
decrease. If that is so, I am of saying
that the fact that it might be-p+ a mutual
disadvantage it is necessarily 14 reason to
reject the treaty. if it will ir.lcrease our
cost, I can see where it wojrld increase
the costs of the Soviet Unioin. I do not
believe that the proposal ?s one sided.
I do not believe we ought to be led into
voting for ratification of )the treaty on
the assumption that to dc, so would re-
duce our national defensexcosts. If any-
thing, such action would..' increase them.
The mere-fact that w?