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proved ' F& Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65BOO383R000100200001-9 196 CONGRESSIQNAL.RECORD - S NA`I"E cultural industry, and which will bring a treaty. I have done this in an effort profitable return from power revenues. They to present to the Members of the Con- plan. this development in connection with the Montana POR'_gr Co. gress, and particularly the Members of If thg Goverent persists in its course, the Senate who are now considering this the Indians say, they plan to s}Ie the United treaty in debate on the Senate floor, an States for $116 million for violation of their indication of the widespread concern tieaty rights and usurpation of their lands, over the efforts to ratify this treaty. This will make Knowles, already assailed I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi- by private power exponents as a costly, tax- dent, to have printed in the RECORD at payer-supported project that will not pay its the conclusion of these remarks the fol- way, an extremely expensive undertaking, lowing materials: The public power exponents and Montana's My weekly newsletter dated Septem- to. Democratic Senators apparently are not Y to. be swayed, however. Nor is that great ber 16, 1963, and entitled "Superiority or conservator, supposedly the greatest in that Surrender." field since Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford A broadcast editorial over Radio Sta- Pinchot, the honorable Secretary of the In- tion KGAF of Gainesville, Tex., dated terior, Stewart L. Udall. September 10, 1963. This matter places both Mr. Udall and the An article by Maj. Gen. Thomas A. entire New Frontier in a curious position. While the Kennedy administration poses as Lant, U.S. Army, retired, entitled "Ad- the champion of civil rights in behalf of the vise and Consent-A Test of Courage." Negro, it exhibits blatant disregard for those An editorial from the State, of Co- of these American Indians, the Flatheads, lumbia, S.C., dated September 13, 1963, who apparently wish only to be left alone to and entitled "A Farewell to Arms?" devise their own industrial progress. A column by Mr. Fred McKinney from The Indians and Mr. BATTIN probably will an Arizona newspaper. be attacked by professional do-gooders as An editorial from the Knoxville Jour- attacked, of the private power trust; they will be attacked, as in the Burns Creek argument, of nal, of Knoxville, Tenn., dated Septem- shedding "crocodile tears" for the Indians ber 10, 1963, and entitled "We Trust the (in former Idaho Congresswoman Gracie Reds." Pfost's Burns Creek testimony, it was the A column by Mr. Bill Henry which ap- Wyoming coal miners). peared in the September 10, 1963, issue But they cannot get around the fact that of the Los Angeles Times of Los An- the Indians have a treaty with the_ United States, it is being flagrantly violated by an geles, Calif., entitled "To Vote Without invasion of the Flatheads' rights and inter- Full Knowledge." ests, and over their protests. Volume 7, No. 34, September 1, 1963, Mr. BBTTIN can and should call attention of NBC's Meet the Press. again and again to this brazen breach of a A column by Mr. W. D. Workman solemn agreement. which appeared in the State, of Colum- Mr. METCALF. Finally, Mr. Pres- bia, S.C., on September 15, 1963, en- ident, point No. 6 of the summary ques- titled "Security Endangered." tioned the consistency of the Secretary Statement by Dr. M. H. Johnson, a of the Interior in the case of Knowles leading physicist, on the test ban treaty, Dam. In this regard, I cannot improve entitled, "Dr. Johnson Discusses issues." upon the statement of the Secretary, in There `being no objection, the letters, response to a question by Chairman editorial, and articles were ordered to Davis, of the House Public Works Sub- be printed in the RECORD, as follows: committee on Flood Control, during the SUPERIORITY OR SURRENDER hearings June 5, 1963. Secretary Udall (By Hon. STROM THURMOND, U.S. Senator said: from South Carolina, reports to the people) Knowles Dam, as I indicated in .my pre- SEPTEMBER 16, 1963. pared statement, is relatively speaking a high Debate in the U.S. Senate over ratification dam; it will be primarily a producer of hy- of the Moscow test ban treaty is waxing droelectric power where my Department has hotter and is now boiling down to a basic marketing responsibilities for all hydroelec- question of whether political or military con- tric power. You have in this area problems siderations are of more importance to our of irrigation, which are the problem of my Nation. The Senate Foreign Relations Com- Department. You have the Indian land mittee has endorsed the treaty in a report problem, which is again my Department. which is filled with rosy observations about You have the fish, wildlife, outdoor recrea- Soviet intentions in proposing the treaty. tion. All these are responsibilities of my Following issuance of this report, the Sen- Department, These were reasons why, ate Armed Services Committee's Prepared- among others, this was felt that this was ness Investigating Subcommittee, of which a logical project, even though both the corps I am a member, also filed a report with the and the Bureau have studied this project Senate. The report states that based on under assignment by Congress in the past extensive evidence presented by military and over the years. It was felt that this was a scientific witnesses in closed door sessions, logical decision, just as we felt for Other the subcommittee has concluded that "the 16159 (4) We will be unable to determine with confidence the performance and reliability of an antiballistic missile system developed without benefit of atmospheric operational system tests; (5) We will be unable to verify the ability of our hardened underground second-strike missile systems to survive closein, high-yield nuclear explosions; (6) We will be unable to verify the ability of our missile reentry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and to penetrate to the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear environment under dynamic reentry condi- tions; (7) The treaty will provide the Soviet Un- ion an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish- ments in submegaton weapon technology; and (8) The treaty would diminish our ca- pability to learn of Soviet advancements in technology. What the Preparedness Subcommittee is particularly concerned with is preservation of U.S. nuclear superiority in the cold war. In fact, this superiority must be of an over- whelming nature, not only to our satisfac- tion but also in the judgment of the U.S.S.R., especially in view of the fact that our lead- ers have made it known to the world that we will accept the first blow in the nuclear exchange. All our plans are bottomed on the idea that we will be able to absorb the U.S.S.R.'s first strike capability, and then retaliate with enough power to destroy the enemy and win the war. Since we hava? spotted the enemy the first strike, we must be absolutely certain that we can indeed absorb the first blow, and have left enough strategic nuclear weapons to win. The Soviets, therefore, don't need to test as much as we to ascertain weapons effects. In addition, they may have already learned enough to exploit our vulnerabilities so as to neutralize our second strike capa- bilities in underground ICBM's and in under- water Polaris missiles, to such an extent that they can win in a nuclear exchange or that they can demand U.S. surrender. There is deep concern that the Soviet superbomb either has, or shortly will have, the capa- bility to neutralize many or most of our underground missiles, and that the already deployed Soviet antiballistic missile system may be able to stop U.S. retaliation by Po- laris missiles. For these reasons-and r can think of nothing more important than national se- curity considerations-I am opposing this treaty, even though I realize that to refuse to ratify the treaty, since it was signed with- out the advice of the Senate, may cause some international repercussions. However, I share the view of Dr. Edward Teller when he warned that "if you reject the treaty this will be a small mistake. * * * If you ratify this treaty, I think you will have committed an enormously bigger mistake. * * * You will have given away the future safety of this country." Sincerely, reasons that it was logical that major con- proposed treaty will affect adversely the fu- RADIO STATION KGAF EDITORIAL, struction work in the State of Alaska, wheth- ture quality of this Nation's arms, and that SEPTEMBER 10, 1983 er it is high dams or low dams, should be it will result in serious, and perhaps formid- The Senate is now debating whether to done by the corps, which has a major con- able, military and technical disadvantages." ratify the recent Moscow treaty-or the so- struction responsibility in the construction The preparedness report lists eight prin- called test ban treaty. The investigations organization in Alaska. cipal disadvantages which would flow to the h ld ,ire this + at , e ------- - () w e o RECORD I have had printed a number Of una a acquire noes- petted to materially help the Soviets to in- sary data on the effects of very high yield crease their military strength in relation to news columns, editorials, and other ma- atmospheric explosions; that of the United States, while preventing terials expressing concern or criticism (3) We will be unable to acquire data on this country from making the necessary about the proposed Moscow test ban high altitude nuclear weapons effects; progress to simply hold our own in the cur- - ' V bab ity of the United States if this treaty should THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (1) We probably will be unable to dupli- be ratified in its present form. Close exam- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in cats Soviet achievements in very high-yield ination of the testimony given in the hear-weapon Previous issues of the CONGRESSIONAL Inge has revealed that the treaty can be ex- ill b W bl t Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RD P65B00383R000100200001-9 16160 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE September 16 rent military relationship with the Russians. In fact, the most damaging testimony of all was that given by Secretary of Defense McNamara himself, who was testifying for the treaty. McNamara's testimony, however, reveals serious contradictions and unwar- ranted assumptions by the Defense Depart- ment and the administration concerning our national defenses in relation to the Communists. Even beyond these considerations, how- ever, is the more obvious facts of life con- cerning dealing with the Communists who have continuously proclaimed that deceit is the foundation of Communist policy. The hypocrisy of the Soviet position and the en- tire concept of the treaty of Moscow and the theories of disarmament are exposed in an amendment to the treaty offered by Senator BARRY GOLDWATER. The Goldwater amendment says, "the ef- fectiveness of the treaty will be deferred until the U.S.S.R. has removed all nuclear weap- ons, all weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and all military, technical per- sonnel from Cuba and until arrangements .have been made for the international in- spection within Cuba to determine and con- firm such removal." The treaty of Moscow-or test ban treaty- has been described by President Kennedy as the "first step toward peace." GOLDWATER exposed the fantasy of this statement when he said, "This proposed test ban treaty cannot be a first step toward peace If it must stumble over Soviet mis- siles and troops in Cuba." For over 17 years the Communists have followed an unrelenting course dedicated to the destruction of the United States. For this country to consider disarming or letting down our guard even slightly without some tangible evidence of change In the Soviet policy will be national suicide. KGAF feels that if the treaty of Moscow is to be considered at all, it must have the 'Goldwater amendment as a basic protection of our survival. We urge that you wire or write your Senators today calling upon them to insist upon the addition of the Goldwater amendment to the test ban treaty. The opinion expressed In this editorial is the view of KGAF Radio, not necessarily the view of any advertiser. KGAF Radio will provide equal time for opposing views upon request by a qualified spokesman. ADVISE AND CONSENT-A TEST OF COURAGE (By Thomas A. Lane, major general, U.S. Army, retired) acceptance of the Presidential judgment. They must weigh carefully the full impact of the treaty military, political and spirit- ual. If they find it to be against the inter- est of the United States, they must have the courage to reject it. Free peoples are in a race with the Com- munist powers for the dominion of the world. Unhappily, we run not so as to win the prize, but so as to withdraw from the race. To foster illusion in our peoples, we pretend that we can avoid the contest. It began with President Eisenhower who, to appease a popular desire, suspended our testing program without adequate safe- guards. We stopped running while the Soviet Union forged ahead. President Kennedy continued the volun- tary ban without making preparations for its violation by the Soviet Union. When the Soviets were ready, they tested; and the scope and magnitude of their tests amazed the world. The United States was caught flat- footed, unprepared. The Soviet tests challenged us to a vigor- ous program to overcome the handicap which negligence and bad judgment had imposed on us. What was our response? We have striven not to overcome the handicap but to perpetuate it. We have had no program of- testing to bring our knowledge of nuclear weapons abreast of Soviet knowledge. We have been fearful that aggressive testing would jeopardize our negotiations for a test ban, so we have conceded the Soviet supe- riority. Since 1946, the United States has been urging atomic arms control under adequate inspection. Refusal of the Soviet Union to accept inspection, even when it was far be- hind in. the race, reflects the Communist determination to prevail. Khrushchev is not withdrawing from the race. The United States, in contrast, has frit- tered away its nuclear leadership in vain peace seeking which can only spur the Com- munist confidence in ultimate victory. If it now abandons the standards of positive in- spection which are the only adequate safe- guard of treaty compliance in a matter as vital as nuclear weapons development, it in- vites its own destruction. The Moscow test ban treaty prohibits test- ing, without Inspection, of small atmospheric blasts which we cannot detect and which are important to nuclear progress. Will the United States voluntarily impose this limita- tion on itself and trust the Soviet Union to do the same? Our Senators are called to vote. Will they give the seal of their approval to a policy of granting concessions to communism, and thereby assure its continuance? Will they reject the treaty and call upon the Soviet Union to accept full inspection of nuclear activities? Will they attach protective clauses to the treaty to limit the ban to testing which can be positively identified without inspection at the testing site? Each Senator must decide for himself and for our country. [From the Columbia (S.C.) - State, Sept. 13, 1963] A FAREWELL TO ARMS? embrace a threat to this Nation's defense which goes far beyond the particulars of the treaty itself, The American people are being spoon fed with soothing sirup which plays up the sup- posed benefits to accrue from the treaty and plays down the hazards to national security. Prominent politicians in both parties are swallowing the same sirup that they are la- dling out to the public. Only a handful of courageous spokesmen, mostly Southerners, are challenging the bland promises and unsupported assurances that the treaty is in the national interest. But, little by little, the people are beginning to develop that genuine concern which should accompany any proposal which could even possibly, jeopardize national security. With this awakening on the public's part, there is a corresponding rush in Washington to hasten the vote on the treaty. The Presi- dent himself is launching a crash program to gain early ratification by the Senate, before any groundswell of opposition from the folks back home can influence the outcome of the vote. . The Kennedy administration already has subscribed to the treaty. Now, only the U.S. Senate stands between the American Nation, along with Russia and Great Britain, party to an agreement embodying these omi- nous words: "Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agree- ment on general and complete disarmament under gtrict international control in accord- ance with the objectives of the United Na- tions which would put an end to the arma- ments race and- eliminate the testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weap.- The Federal Government already has vir- tually abolished the sovereignty of the indi- vidual American States. Are we now to sur- render the sovereignty of the United States itself? THE BREwssw GULCH PHmososusR SAYS-- (By Fred McKinney) - The test ban treaty between Russia, Great Britain and this country won't become ef- fective until the United States ratifies it. President Kennedy, urges its ratification as the "first step toward peace," but the Sen- ate is giving thematter considerable study before making this important deal with our enemy in the cold war, one who has proved treacherous in the past. He has said that he would bury us, and probably some Sen- ators believe that this treaty is a step in that direction along with other steps that may be expected to follow. In the meantime, many other members of the U.N., mostly the smaller ones, have signed. - None of them, as far as we know, have bombs and they couldn't do any testing even if they wanted to. This is a reminder of the story of the hunter and the bear. As the hunter was about to shoot, the bear said, "What is it you want?" The hunter said, "I want a fur coat." The bear said, "I am hun- gry, I want a full stomach. Let's talk it over, let's negotiate." The hunter laid down his rifle and after a while the bear got up and walked away. He had a full stomach and the hunter had his wish, he had a fur coat. Could this be a case of history repeating itself? WAsmNOToN.-The Senate of the United States is not called often to exercise Its power to approve or reject treaties. Even more rarely is it called to pass upon an agreement negotiated without prior consul- tation with the Senate leadership. As the Democrats used to say to President Eisen- hower, "if we are going to be in on the crash landings, we want to be in on the takeoffs." In the test ban treaty, the Senators face a serious question of national security. Un- der compulsive pressures to make some head- way in disarmament and serve domestic po- litical considerations in the United States and Britain, our representatives have exe- cuted an agreement which is plainly advan- tageous to the Soviet Union. The dangers of the treaty- have been clear- ly marked. by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By accepting the judgment of the President that the political advantages outweigh the risks taken, the Joint Chiefs and others who are not responsible for political judgments have brought themselves to accept the treaty. The Senators cannot so easily avoid re- sponsibility. The Constitution requires their solemn judgment of the issue and this responsibility will not be served by mere Do we want complete disarmament of the United States--under the supervision of some international agency? The State finds no evidence of any such thinking on the part of South Carolinians or of other patriotic Americans. But com- plete disarmament and international control are the ultimate objectives of the nuclear test ban treaty now being considered in the Senate. - - This is no speculative assertion on our part: It is spelled out in exact language in the preamble of the treaty itself. Somehow, in both the political and public debate over the treaty, little attention has been paid-to that preamble, but those preliminary words [From the Knoxville Journal, Sept. 10, 1963] WE TRUST THE REDS The conviction is almost universal. in this country and in other free nations that for the past 40 years Communist world domi- -nation has been prevented by just one thing. 'That has been the military superiority of this country and the other nations a ma- jority of whose people are hostile to the police state as a form of government. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 t is clear to i isny of us that the nuclear [Fromthe Los Angeles Times, Sept. 10, 19631 test ban treaty into - which the Kennedy .To VOTE WITHOUT FULL KNOWLEDGE adm Fiietration alas all but mar,eVvered tkle (By Bill Henry) couriry represents a first step toward -tie theory defined above. As we watch Members of the Senate of the power, we are now encouraged to believe that between M4rch and August of this year the Communist have experienced a com- plete change o viewpoint, that the tiger held at bay by the sight of a gun has now become a tame kitten anxious, only to lap up milk from a'dish. I.istory tells us that where Communists are 8oneerned, ere is no such thing as maintaining a status quo. The late F.D.R. made concessions at Yalta that placed mil- lions of unoffending people behind the Iron Curtain. He did so under the impression he could charm Joe Stalin into being good. Out of the fateful concessions made there many of our current cold war troubles grew. A few years later, at the urging. of the late George Catlett Marshall, President Truman forced upon the Nationalist Chinese a coali- tion with the Chinese Communists. It was not long before the Reds owned the govern- ment and Chiang Kai-shek's forces had to flee to Formosa. In the Korean' war, American forces were under orders not to win. It was forbidden to attack the enemy beyond the Yalu River where were located the staging areas for enemy forces. At the end of an inconclusive truce, we are still, 10 years later, wrestling with, the problem of keeping South Korea both non-Communist and free. An arrangement made by the British with the Russians to safeguard the neutrality of Laos has collapsed by reason of Communist failure to keep commitments publicly made. We continue to wrestle not only with the troubles of Laos, but with increasing prob- lems in South Vietnam. Following what was made to appear to be a bold confrontation of Khrushchev on the issue of removing missiles from Cuba, we have subsequently acquiesced to the perma- nent occupation of that country 90 miles from our shores, and, indeed, have consti- tuted the Castro, regime as a protectorate. We have listed a few outstanding examples of attempting to maintain a status quo posi- tion with the Communists and now it ap- pears they are ready to try it again. We are abandoning the axiom that the only thing Communists recognize is force and are once more adopting, in this proposed treaty, the historically discredited theory that Commu- nists are susceptible to reason and considera- tions of honor and conscience. Furthermore, we are about to take this step in the face of a statement issued by the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Sub- committee which confirms the view that treaty ratification will make permanent our inferior position with respect to military power. After hearing the testimony of 21 military and scientific witnesses, the majority of this committee reported as follows: "The Soviets have overtaken and sur- passed us in the design of very high yield nuclear weapons; "That they 'may possess knowledge of weapons effects and antiballistic missile pro- grams superior to ours; "That under the terms of the tr'eaty it is entirely possible that they will draw even with us in low yield weapons technology. "These things are no ground for compla- cency. We believe very strongly that Soviet secrecy and duplicity require that this Na- tion possess a substantial margin of superi- ority in both the quality and the quantity of its implements of war." CONGRESSIONAL RE qRI , LATE sciences this week as they prepare to vote on the test ban treaty, trying to disagree in some cases witho_utheing disagreeable, we're eying a strange situation. Here's a treaty Which nobody is sure about, one regarding which even its most strenuous advocates can advance only the faintest of praise, yet one virtually pertain to be passed by a large ma- jority. It will be approved largely because it will certainly contribute to the peace of mind of a lot of people. Everyone hopes it may lead to a better world. But the exist- ence of the free world is at stake also. Un- fortunately, while everyone seems to have a strong opinion on the subject, these opin- ions are not based on sound fact or knowl- edge. The real truth about the test ban treaty is that everyone concerned, from Pres- ident Kennedy down to the least informed of us private citizens, is really taking a chance. President Kennedy, who advocates it and regards it as a sort of peak of accom- plishment, doesn't really know what it por- tends. He is neither a scientist capable of judging the real value of testing in the at- mosphere, nor a military expert cable of measuring the treaty's possible consequences on our future ability to survive. It is quite true that the best scientific and military advice is available to him but the fact is that there is vital disagreement among both the scientists and the military. The only place where there is unanimity is in the per- fectly human hope for peace, or at least for a lessening of tension. That's just about universal. Unfortunately it is a feeling based entirely on emotion. It is not based either on knowledge of facts or judgment of con- sequences. THEY ALL HAVE RESERVATIONS The truth of the matter is that you can't find anybody on our side whose judgment is worthy of consideration, who wholeheartedly regards the test ban treaty as a good thing. The best that even the President will say for it is that it is a "small first step in the right direction." He, and others who advo- cate its approval on this ground, say that this is their judgment. Actually, it is just their hope. The scientific side of this ques- tion is far too intricate for any layman to assess it sensibly. Furthermore, the scien- tific people themselves are sharply divided. It is all very well to say that Edward Teller's opinion against approval is offset by the opinions of other scientists who are for it. This may be true, but most of us remember that a lot of the finest of the scientists were convinced that Teller was wrong when he said that we could and should develop the H-bomb. They said it couldn't be done. Teller was right. That's grounds for believ- ing that he might be right this time, too. PEACE OF MIND VERSUS SURVIVAL The most disturbing factor in the argu- ment is the uneasiness of the people whose lives and careers are devoted to our country's survival. Not a single defense expert has come out wholeheartedly in favor of the _ treaty. The best any of them has given is a yes-but. The most enthusiastic of them merely says that "the benefits outweigh the drawbacks." All base what approval they are willing to give on the fact that the treaty has "political advantages." A good share say they would have opposed it if it hadn't already been signed. General Power, on whom the actual nuclear defense of our country largely rests, is flatly opposed to it. The Senators already opposed to it are largely 16161,1 those closest to our national defense. So just remember that the men who are ap- proaching this very vital decision are inter- ested in, and responsible for, not only our peace of mind, but our national survival. MEET THE PRESS-AMERICA'S PRESS CONFER- ENCE OF THE AIR, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1963 Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak. Guest: Dr. Edward Teller. Panel: John Finney, the New York Times; Peter Hackes, NBC News; and R. H. Shack- ford, Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance. Moderator: Ned Brooks. Mr. BROOKS. This Is Ned Brooks, inviting you to Meet the Press. Last Thursday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ap- proved a test ban treaty overwhelmingly. It now goes to the Senate floor for debate and vote. Our guest today on Meet the Press is the treaty's leading opponent, Dr. Edward Teller, one of the world's outstanding nuclear scien- tists, who has urged the treaty's defeat in public and secret testimony before the Senate committees. Dr. Teller was the key man in the fight for and the development of the H-bomb. He is a physicist at the University of California. We will have the first question from Law- rence E. Spivak, permanent member of the Meet the Press panel. Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, you have been quot- ed as saying about the test ban treaty: "if it is ratified, you will be giving away the safety of this country, and you will have in- creased the dangers of war." President Kennedy has decided that ratify- ing the treaty will not endanger our security. Do you think you and the President are reaching opposite conclusions from the same set of facts? Dr. TELLER. I believe so. It seems obvious than an agreement should lead toward peace. Peace is the question of overriding impor- tance. In that, I agree. But this treaty will-in my opinion, weaken the United States. Weakness will make it harder for us to pre- serve the peace. It is our strength that is preserving the peace in our dangerous world. It is because of my desire for peace, for the same reason for which the President and so many other excellent people are urg- ing ratification of the treaty-it is strangely enough for this same reason, for peace, that I argue that this treaty must not be ratified. Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, may I come back to my question? Do you have access to all the scientific and intelligence information avail- able to the President, so that you can come to a conclusion from the same set of facts? Dr. TELLER. No two people ever know the same facts. In the scientific field, in the military field, I have been worried about this question for almost a quarter of a century now. I have become very familiar with it, and I have learned that gften I have to change my mind. In that field I think I have a little competence. On the intelligence information, I do not know all the facts, and the President does, but I do know that in the intelligence field we have made in the past many mistakes. Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, the thing that bothers a great many people, as I am sure you know, the heads of the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marines, are united in their support of the limited test ban agree- ment, provided security safeguards are guar- anteed, which the President says he is going to put into effect. Are there any safeguards which would con- vince you that this treaty ought to be ratified? Dr. TELLER. I think this treaty limits knowledge. This treaty limits our possibil- Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-R?P65B00383R000100200001.-9_ Approved-For ReIease 106{1C I1 +A Rf . Y@10I}2f #?f701-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 16162 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16 ity to find out about defense against ballistic tee, "Dr. Teller has been extraordinarily the country. But the ardent desire for missiles. The man in charge of the ballis- single minded in his devotion to one project; peace, the imagination, the hope, in my tic missiles and also the man in charge of namely bigger and better nuclear weapons opinion the false hope, but nevertheless the our main Air Force, General SchreiVer, and and specifically the H-bomb, for 20 years." hope that this might bring peace closer, it General Power, have argued vigorously Dr. Kistiakowaky went on to say that it is this that has misled in the past and is against the treaty. I think that the treaty was inevitable that in concentrating on one misleading now many very excellent people. as it stands does not have the proper safe- aspect of this problem you tended to ignore Mr. HACKES. There was a time, Dr. Teller, guards. some of the other considerations. What is I believe, when you favored a test ban treaty. Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, isn't it true that a your answer to those who say that you base you are obviously against this one. t great many distinguished scientists and a your views upon a narrow, technical point Is there a treaty other than this that great many important military men all agree of view and fail to look at the entire pic- you would urge the Senate to approve? that there are some risks but that the risks ture? so, what would it include? are not so great that they ought not to take Dr. TELLER. I try to look the entire Dr. TELLER. There is one. In 1958, Dr. the risk? picture, but all of us place great emphasis Libby, then Commissioner of the Atomic En- Do you believe that the United States on the things we know. Now, I would like ergy Commission, and I made a suggestion, should take no risk at all, no matter how to say this: I wish I could agree with my and I still maintain this suggestion. I sug- slight? good friend George Kistiakowsky. I wish I gested-we suggested, that we limit the re- Dr. TELLER. I believe that we can take risks, could agree with him that I am single minded lease of radioactivity to such an amount that but I also believe that as a scientist I must and consistent. I am neither. I do not base between us and the Russians and possibly look at arguments. I must not look at peo- this case on the development of bigger other countries, there shall be no further in- ple. I don't care who disagrees with me, but weapons. In 1958, in. 1959, I was in favor crease of radioactivity-that we shall do no I do care what the reasons are of the dis- of an atmospheric ban because at that time more than replace the amount of radio- agreement. I -did not believe in missile defense. I activity that year by year is decaying in. the Mr. SPIVAK. One more question, Dr. Teller. thought it was too difficult. atmosphere. This radioactivity is small, and Are you more concerned that the Soviet Un- Then, in 1961 and 1962, the Russians put if we observed this limitation then we could ion might keep this treaty not to test in up a terriffic show of atmospheric explosions, be sure about the future of the cleanness the atmosphere-or that they might not? and during 1961 they said they have the of the atmosphere. This I have favored, and I mean, which bothers you most? missile defense. This fact, together with this I do favor because within these limits Dr. TELLER. I don't know. I know that this many discussions on missile defense which we can carry out everything we need for our treaty gives a great deal of flexibility to the followed, have convinced me that I must defense. Soviet Union. The Soviet Union may devel- change my mind-that missile defense, while Mr. Se'IvAx. Dr. Teller, you seem to place extremely difficult, might be possible. I am a great deal of emphasis on the fact that we ed a they defense, because the because t they ey o in this treaty, not because I am sin- will be unable, unless we test in the atmos- may t be hey cheating. And d if and they have a de- gle minded, not minded, I want big explo- phere, to develop an antimissile missile. s e sives, but because I have learned that we I would like to quote to you what: the 't, this tense and we tacks po is jant as though must have defense and for defense we need President said about that recently: "The Also had an attacking be used and erect didn't. explosions in the air. problem," he said, "of developing a defense riers er- Mr. SHACKFORD Dr. Teller, Iam sure you against a missile is beyond us and beyond Also, bthis etween our treaty can allies es and used us. keep- Ing the bet treaty n the treaty y at agree that there are also factors involved in a the Soviets technically, and I think many will Soviet vor by breaking a treaty of this sort other than nuclear tech- who work in it feel that perhaps it can :never great the dvangeUnion e can put us at a very y nology__international. affairs, diplomacy, be successfully accomplished." Mr. disadvantage. overall military strategy. When you were Is there any reliable scientific evidence Mr. FINNEY. y Teller, could you spell treaty asked at the Senate hearings about these fac- that it can be accomplished? would ld precisely how this test ban treaty tors, particularly the political considerations, Dr. TELLER. I am puzzled. The Secretary would weaken our national security? said that you thought the consequences of Defense said that even without testing in. Dr. TELLER. This treaty permits under of this treaty may weaken the alliance, the the atmosphere we can develop it. I am ground testing, and rightly so. By under- NATO Alliance, and in the end it might de- afraid that the truth may be In between ground testing we can continue to develop stroy the alliance. these two statements. That it may be that and the Russians can continue to develop What led you to this sort of a conclusion? without testing in the atmosphere we can their attacking t power. rie uanergrvelop unp Dr. TELLER. The treaty says, Each of the develop a missile defense just as Secretary tescing, any other signatories can dev pasties undertakes to refrain from causing, McNamara said, but without testing it we nuclear weapons, end therefora this treaty encouraging or in any way participating in shall never be sure whether it will work, will not stop proliferation. What and d trea eherty the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test and not being sure, we then may not spend byes is to ban atmospheric testo, ais explosion or any other nuclear explosion." the billions of dollars needed to establish the oy it prevents observation of the meetteeds We need cooperation with our allies in our such defense. of nuclear weappo ons. These effects we n, common nuclear defense. I understand that Mr. SPrvAK. Dr. Teller, the treaty is almost and we need them desperately in order to even today our cooperation with Canada has find out how to defend ourselves against --our cooperation because of which certain to be ratified, judging by what the one government in Canada has already fallen. committee did the other day, and by the incoming missiles. Only by a practice suffered in the air can can w we find o out t how t to makee an n I think that the language\of this treaty will reports about it. Are there any additional antimissile missile. This treaty will not safeguards that you think would help? what we stop further big explosives-and I didn't care make it even harder for us to do have to do: Make out of the Westerh World Dr. TELLER. There are important safe- if it stopped that or not. a unit which Is truly one in which each mem- guards. This . treaty explicitly says that we Mr. FlNmy. Doctor, let's turn to this anti- ber knows that its fate is irrevocably tied to must not perform any nuclear ex.plosio:n-- ICBM question upon which you pin so much the fate of every other participant. And we and I read-"any nuclear test explosion or of your case. Is it not true that at the pres- must start with common defense, with com- any other nuclear explosion" ent time we have a warhead for an anti- mon nuclear defense. The treaty makes I think it should be spelled out i:n a reser- ballistic missile, in fact, a warhead which this vital step more difficult. vation, as President Eisenhower has sug- has been certified as reliable by the AEC? Mr. HAcKEs. Dr. Teller, a great many peo- gested, that in case of aggression against any Dr. TELLER. We have the warhead, and ple within the administration, Cabinet mem- free nation we should promptly and without that is not what I am talking about. We may beers and such, along with a number of pro- doubt be able to use nuclear explosives. need another one, and we can't develop that minent scientists, some of whom have been There are other reservations, but this is the warhead underground. I want to explain to mentioned here, differ with you rather most important one. you in a very few words what defense against adrarply Mr. FrxxEr. Dr. Teller, you suggested that missiles means. We have to count on 6 What would you say are the motives of we can never be sure that an anti-ICBM live missiles coming against us simul- these men? Are they political? Have they would work until we actually tested it. Isn't taneously, accompanied by 25 decoys. We been browbeaten by the administration? it a fact, sir, that we have several weapons must discriminate which are the lot war- Dr TELLER I am sure they have not been in our arsenal now, such as the Titan. and heads, and we must shoot down every one browbeaten. I have: met.many of my gaps- the Atlas which have never really been. tested of them. When we shoot at the first, our Lents. I have been always received with with the firing of the missile and t.he? ex- thet w blind u The second, th, courtesy and with smiles. Maybe what we plosion of the warhead? the thie d rd of the fi fifth may come thrnroughh. . are facing here is a steamroller. But if it is a Dr. TELLER. It Is true, and there are many This kind of most e rel exercise must is steamroller, it is something I have never seen of my technical friends who are worried practiced a it is n b be reliable. It is this before. It is a smiling steamroller, rolling about that fact. But the problems of :ICBM's pr Mr. that Focanot un Teller, deller, during ens along irresistibly in the wrong direction. attacking, anti-ICBM's defending, are of a Mr. Ssarngs y oy Mr. HACKES. Would you go so far as to ac- complexity similar to the complexity of tilts Senate who hearings disagree many with you your were fellow asked wh schy cuse the administration of 1Yin to the Amer- fencing, Would you in all seriousness say w i; they thought you took such an opposite scan people in this general area. that to become a good fencer all you need is point of view. One of those was Dr. Kis- Dr. TELLER. Certainly not. The adndnis- good eyesight, a good blade and rapid reac- tiakowsky, who was President Eisenhower's tration and everyone in the administration tions? Do you not think that fencing should scientific adviser, and he told the commit- is doing what in his opinion is the best for be actually practiced? Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B)00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE Mr. FINNEY. Does not the complexity of ate Armed Services Committee a year ago to this problem, sir,, involve the nonnuclear launch a thorough inquiry into the military side of the problem, the discrimination, the implications of nuclear test bans. Today, the electron'cs, the radio blackout and so on, results of that study are at hand in the rather than the warhead and its effects? form of a printed report by the Preparedness Dr. TELLER. It is true. It involves the non- Investigating Subcommittee-and those re- nuclear side. It also involves the nuclear suits give additional cause for concern over side, and it involves the interaction between this Nation's subscribing to the pending nu- these two, because when a nuclear blast has clear test ban, blinded your radars, your radars won't work, In designating the Preparedness Subcom- and you have to find out in what way your mittee, the chairman of the Armed Services radars, your detection systems, your track- Committee (Georgia's Senator RICHARD B. ing systems will be influenced by this nu- RUSSELL) named a group of Senators whose clear surrounding. This is what you have to knowledge of and dedication to national se- find out and many other similar things. curity are well established. They are Sen- Mr. SHACKFORD. Dr. Teller, earlier you ators JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi, chair- mentioned that General Schreiver and Gen- man; STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, HENRY eral Power were especially opposed to this M. JACKSON, of Washington, STROM THUR- treaty, the men in charge of our ICBM's and MOND, of South Carolina, LEVERETT SALTON- the Strategic Air Force. But as I understand STALL, of Massachusetts, MARGARET CHASE it, the Army is in charge and has the respon- SMITH, of Maine, and BARRY GOLDWATER, of sibility for building the anti-ICBM. Don't Arizona. you find it unusual that the Army and the The Senators differed to some degree in people who testified before the Senate Com- their conclusions, and both SYMINGTON and mittee, representing the views of the Army, SALTONSTALL indicated in the subcommittee's said that the laboratory people working on report their intention to vote for ratification .this did not feel that this treaty would in- of the present test ban treaty. hibit the development of an anti-ICBM? But these two, along with the rest of the Dr, TELLER.. I do. subcommittee, accepted the validity and ac- Mr. SHACK-FORD. The President at his press curacy of the -factual data acquired by the conference a few weeks ago said that he was group in its extensive hearings. And it is afraid that nothing in the field of -testing that data which needs be brought to the would satisfy you. He was speaking then attention not only of the Senate but of the particularly about the numbers of tests that American public. should be conducted. Could you tell us what would satisfy you in the field of test- ing?' If there were no treaty-if the treaty were defeated, how many tests, and how long these should go on? Dr. TELLER. I don't want bigger explosives. I do want knowledge, knowledge that comes from testing, knowledge to be applied for our defense, knowledge to be applied for the peaceful use of nuclear exposives. In the way of increasing this badly needed knowl- edge, I think the more we have the better, and we can do it cleanly and without dis- turbing anybody in any serious sense, As far as knowledge is concerned, more and more will be needed. Mr. HAOKES. You have indicated, Dr. Teller, that you feel that the Russians are ahead of us in an antimissile weapon. Do you believe, as the Russians have claimed, that they have one now, and how extensive is their anti- missile system? Dr.-TALLER. I _do not know. I fear that they might have the knowledge by which to build one now, and I am almost sure that none of us really know whether they have it or? not. This is what worries me. - Mr. SPIVAK. Dr. Teller, if you were a Sena- tor listening to the conflicting testimony that has been advanced by distinguished scientists and military men, what would finally decide you to vote against or for the treaty? Dr. TELLER. What would decide me to vote is my desire for peace and for the safety of the United States. What would decide me to vote' is the possibility of opening up a real way to cooperate with our allies, to make the first step toward the lawful world government by the union of all free democ- racies. This is what this treaty inhibits, and that, is why I would vote against it if I had a vote. Mr. BROOKS. I am sorry to interrupt but I see that our time is up. Thank you very much, Dr. Teller, for being with us. [From the Columbia (S.C.) State, Sept. 15, . 19631 SECURITY ENDANGERED Sell- reservation is a law uI nations as p superior to ours. well as a law of nature, and in this world of turmoil there can be no guarantee of self-' THE SPECIFICS preservation without military strength. 'The 'Preparedness Subcommittee, con- This sort of realization prompted the Sen- cerned over what seems to be a U.S. lag in 16163 the area of high yield experience, listed these eight disadvantages which are expected to stem from our involvement in a test ban treaty: 1. We will probably be unable to duplicate Soviet achievements in the technology of high yield weapons. 2. We cannot acquire needed data on the effects of high yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. 3. We would be unable to develop high altitude data required for the development of an antiballistic missile system. 4. We would find it impossible to predict the performance and reliability of our own antiballistic missile systems unless their guidance and control systems would be tested in the face of nuclear explosions. 5. We cannot verify the degree to which our second-strike missiles in their hardened underground sites would be operable in the face of high yield enemy strikes against our missile sites. 8. We would be unable to confidently de- termine proper design for our nose cones and warheads when the enemy opposes them with antimissile nuclear explosions. 7. The testing areas left open by the pend- ing treaty would allow the Soviets to gain upon the United States in low yield knowl- edge while effectively preventing us from gaining on them in high yield areas. 8. By driving Soviet testing below surface (assuming Russian compliance) we would deprive ourselves of intelligence data which would be available to us from atmospheric Soviet tests. WE RISK ALL Proponents of the test ban treaty contend .that political considerations carry advantages which more than offset the military disad- vantages. But political gains cannot be weighted or predicted with the scientific ac- curacy which can be applied to military weaponry. We know that the Soviets are our political opponents, with or without a. test ban treaty. Our job is to maintain military superiority over them. Ratification of the test ban treaty may make the task impossible. TREATY: DR. JOHNSON DISCUSSES ISSUES- (EDITOR'S NoTE.-The News recently printed short discussions by several division mem- bers on the treaty for a limited ban on nu- clear explosions. The subject is discussed at greater length in the following article, writ- ti.en by Dr. Montgomery H. Johnson, chief scientist, Research Laboratory, and one of the Nation's leading authorities on nuclear en- ergy and theoretical physics.) The treaty for a limited ban on nuclear explosions has been widely acclaimed as a first small step toward peace. It is really a step toward an honorable peace? Or is it a step toward submission to Soviet domina- tion? The answer depends on what we gain or lose vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. is a formidable antagonist. Starting long after us, her nuclear arms now excel ours in the 50-megaton class. She has never yielded an advantage except to a threat of force, most recently in Cuba. She has broken numerous treaties. Therefore, let us be sure we understand what the treaty means, - First of all, the treaty is not just a limited ban on nuclear testing. That is a misnomer. The treaty specifically prohibits nuclear ex- plosions in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space for any purpose whatever. So long as the treaty binds us, we cannot use nuclear weapons to prevent aggression, to aid our allies in Europe, or to dig canals and harbors off the territorial United States. It is essen- tial to know exactly the conditions under which we are bound by the treaty prohibi- tions. The conditions have not been made clear in public discussions. Approved For Release 2006/10/17 ?CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 LOSSES WE FACE In summary, and without embodying such allied factors as foreign policy and interna- tional relations, the subcommittee made these pertinent statements: "1. From the evidence, we are compelled to conclude that serious-perhaps even for- midable-military and technical disadvan- tages to the United States will flow from the ratification of the treaty. At the very least it will prevent the United States from pro- viding our military forces with the highest quality of weapons of which our science and technology is capable. "2. Any military and technical advantages which we will derive from the treaty do not, in our judgment, counterbalance or outweigh the military and technical disadvantages. The Soviets will not be similarly inhibited in those areas of nuclear weaponry where we now deem them to be inferior." Incidentally, the matter of arms superiority and inferiority is subject to grave question. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has come up with a report favoring the test ban treaty, reports that "Soviet scien- tists presumably are confident that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States." Such a statement, far from being an argu- ment in favor of the treaty, actually should argue against ratification. Senator STROM THURMOND, in a comprehensive September 11 speech opposing the treaty, made that point clear in voicing this conviction: If the Soviets think, rightly or wrongly, they have achieved parity with us in nuclear weapons, then they have less reason than before to be deterred by our own strike capa- bility. This is especially true since President Ken- nedy and other American spokesmen have re- peatedly pledged that this country would never make a, first strike. Since we have vol- untarily yielded that terrific advatnage to our enemies, they can concentrate on plans to neutralize our second strike capability with their first blow. Here is an area in which their, knowledge, gained through the testing of high yield, Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 16164 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 16 Second, the U.S.S.R. can withdraw from It has been my privilege to observe national society; the State Department to the treaty with 90 day's notice and start at- Fred Dutton's service while we were both see that the hard complex facts and alterna- mospheric testing. The extensive series employed In the Executive Office of the tives of policy concerning the rest of the with which the required U.S.S.R. broke the previous moratorium and since he has assumed his world are fully considered in the ultimate oratorium required 2 years' secret prepare- decisions of the Government. tion. Thereby the U.S.S.R. gained 2 years' present Important task in the State De- Increasingly, the main business of Wash- time in the development of nuclear weapons. partment, I think he is a brilliant and ington is to reconcile this country's domesrtic We need to know the cost and feasibility of highly able public official and a dedi- and international interests. Since the rela- maintaining a 90-day readiness of an atmos- cated, ideally motivated citizen. tionship between Congress and the State pheric test series in order to forestall more His article on the difficult problems of Department is intimately involved in that such gains, foreign policy as they relate to Congress business, there is serious need to dispel the Third, the U.S.S.R. could test clandestine- and the State Department is well worth encumbering nonsense. ly, a possibility open to the United States reading by the Members of Congress. I The difficulties between the legislative only under wartime conditions. Experts at branch and foreign-policy apparatus stem Geneva agreed that a determined nation ask unanimous consent that the article primarily from the fact that they are sharply could secretly test a half megaton in space. be printed at this point In the RECORD. different creatures. The State Department Surveillance of atmospheric tests is not reli- There being no objection, the article is analytical, tentative and cumbersome as it able below a certain yield and that limit may Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, digests vast detail from far sources and be raised by "clean" explosives. Can the as follows: cautiously gropes for the real meaning of U.S.S.R. develop a successful ballistic missile COLD WAR BETWEEN THE HILL AND what is happening in the world. A friendly defense by clandestine testing? What po- FOGGY BOTTOM but exasperated Senator recently described tentialities in our ability to penetrate State as "rational, maybe, iffy at best." Its U.S.S.R. defenses and we denied by treaty pro- (By Frederick G. Dutton ecognize that only ) recommendations often recognize What potentialities for our own WASHINGTON.-Whatever the shifting out- part of a problem can be Influenced, and de- defense and the protection of ICBM sites are look in the rest of the world, one area of visions are sometimes deliberately left im.. we denied? The nuclear shield of the free chronic tension and even occasional guer- plicit. world hinges on the answer to these ques- rilla warfare is the 2-mile gap in Washing- Congress, regularly faced with reelection, tions. ton between the Hill and Foggy Bottom- is assertive, often glandular, in its approach Fourth, underground explosions are pro- between Congress and the State Department, to the world. If one views the untidy hibited if radioactive debris falls outside na- In the gamut of American Government legislative process of interrogation and ad- tional territory. Most ploughshare harbors probably no greater antagonism has been vocacy as an effort to reach a consensus and canals entail minor contamination of generated over the years than that between rather than as executive decisionmaking and international waters and will be prghibited. the legislative branch and the Nation's for- recognizes that Congress can really affect Underground testing might be limited in a eign policy apparatus. The wrangling could the President's hold on foreign affairs only crippling way depending on a quantitative be dismissed as just more governmental in. If wide support is enlisted, then what some- definition of "radioactive debris" nowhere fighting if it did not involve some of the times seems erratic or even perverse behavior stated. Of equal importance to treaty lim- most critical and complex issues facing this may actually contain a creativeness, vigor itations is the support that will be given to country. and incisiveness often undernourished In the the underground program. We learned in The view from Capitol Hill is reflected in foreign-policy apparatus, the last moratorium that the pace of nuclear almost any daily issue of the CONGRESSIONAL In addition to the inherent differences, weapon development is set by the pace of the RECORD. Thus, on one typical day this year: international developments since World War experimental test program. Our ability un- An Ohio Congressman called for "a thorough 11?-including farflung security demands der the treaty to maintain our nuclear arms fumigation of the State Department"; a Mis- and the growing interdependence of the relative to the U.S.S.R. depends on the vigor sissippi Senator held forth on an investiga- world-have widened and complicated con- of the underground program. tion of present Cuban policies; a New Jersey tacts between the two, making a tolerable These are important military and. technical Representative charged this country's role in accommodation between them vastly more issues raised by the treaty. There are addi- the Congo was "a sorry mess"; a Wyoming difficult. tional political issues, such as the effect of Senator claimed he saw indications of a More directly, the legislative branch has the treaty on he NATO alliance, that need secret agreement with Khrushchev; and a been injected into broad and continuing discussion. When sober consideration has California Representative claimed that dur- international policies through Its control of been given to these Issues of national secu- ing 5 years of negotiation the United States the purse strings. Global efforts since World rity, and only then, can we see if ratification "has been steadily losing its nuclear shirt." War II have relied on larger and lar er a r g p;~ o- of the treaty is a step toward an honorable Over a dozen others spoke out with counsel priations for economic assistance, for military --+--4 submissi m or criticism aimed at th ?`-- __ .. __-_ - __ - _ - n +__S S n d or e D o many foreign affairs specialists, on- the other The principal foreign-policy legislation be- hand, was summed u ear f i th p y s ago ore n Henry e current session of C th ongress,e THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND Adams' comment: "The Secretary of State foreign-aid bill, highlights the tugging and THE CONGRESS exists only to recognize the existence of a hauling going on between the executive and world which Congress would rather ignore." legislative branches over their respective in- Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Or, as a Secretary of State once wrote, "We fluence-a struggle between the constitu- Sunday New York Times magazine Of are so handicapped by the Senate and House tionai authority over foreign affairs and that yesterday, September 15, 1963, carries an that there is nothing more to do but follow a over appropriations-where this country's important, thoughtfully written article Policy of makeshifts and half measures." relations with the rest of the globe are by Mr. Fred Dutton entitled "The Cold With such sharply contrasting attitudes concerned. War Between the Hill and Foggy Bot- between the Hill and Foggy Bottom, it is On immediate life-and-death decisions, the tom >, little wonder that misunderstandings and Chief Executive unquestionably holds the The article centers on the prOblein s even occasional conflicts break out. "The initiative. In circumstances such as the miracle of the day," Secretary Rusk has ob- Cuban crisis last October and the Korean and tensions which inevitably arise in served, "is that we have moved in concert as action in 1950, the President can and did the relations between the Congress and well as we have." determine the Nation's course without bav- the State Department in the field of As with nations, much Of the real cause ing to consult with Congress in advance of foreign policy. of the trouSle has long since been obscured his decision. Mr. Dutton is admirably qualified to by semantics and stereotypes injected into But in the longer-range programs through discuss this vital sector of American problems in which they are irrelevant and which the United States can most constst- invoked mostly to vent frustrations. Thus ently influence rather than just react to public life. He is currently Assistant congressional complaints about world affairs world developments, the two branches of Secretary Of State-a responsibility are often dismissed by foreign-policy ex- Government still seem too often to be wres- which he discharges with rare skill and perts-in the press as well as in Govern- tling for control. Recent comments by Mal- intelligence. Mr. Dutton was previously ment-as "uninformed," "opportunist," and colm Moos, Richard Neustadt, and others a Special Assistant to President Ken- "special interest motivated." The State De- about "the shift of great decisions to the nedy-a position which gave him a keen partment is recurrently assailed as "Weak executive offices and out of the parliamentary understanding of the overall problems kneed," "the victim of a plot," "the dupe of chamber", really apply more to pushbutton and standing fies of the problems foreigners," and with other more lurid than long-haul problems. charges as old as politics. The extent to which legislators court post- branch of our Government. Prior to his So far neither side has given much recog- tive influence is reflected not only In their service in Washington, Fred Dutton es- nition to the possibility that the other may recurring forays Into the Cuban problem, but tablished an enviable record as an ad- be only trying to meet Its functional re- also in the influential role Congress has viser and assistant to Governor Brown sponsibility--Congress to represent the played In this country's China policy for the of California. diverse views and interests that make-up our last decade and a half. Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ent. Two examples demonstrate the ineffec- tiveness of the rule. In United States v. Van Allen, 1961, dismissal was denied under the rule although the indictment was not filed until the very end of the period of limitations and then 6 years elapsed without the case being brought to trial. In Harlow v. United States, 1962, the in- dictment was not filed until 4 years after the alleged criminal act occurred and 2 years later the case still had not been brought to trial. A Federal 'court dismissed the case where there was a delay of 8 years after the indictment was returned. But where the delay was only 7 years, all that the court was prepared to do was to set the case for imme- diate trial. Certainly the Federal courts have thus given a strange meaning to the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial. Two other measures I have introduced in .the 88th Congress will also be of interest to your membership, and to all labor organiza- tions. They seek to revise the bonding pro- vision of the infamous Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. It will be remembered that the 1959 act requires an individual bond "for the faithful discharge of duties." In my speech against that bill in the fall of 1959, I said of the founding provision: "Individual bonding would not provide any greater protection to union funds. The same losses would be covered, if there were any losses. But we have an implication here of suspicion-that we must have some special safeguard with regard to a union officer, which is not re- quired in the case of a bank president or a member of the board of directors of some corporation. They are privileged to use position schedule bonding. I do not know why we single out labor unions and say, 'You must have individual bonding.'" Of course, the bonding required of union officers was also far more expensive. The bond previously used had been honesty bonds, providing protection against loss by reason of acts of fraud or dishonesty. Surety companies were required to develop a rate structure for the new bond without having experience to guide them. The rates were extremely high for the first year and have been reduced periodically since. Just 14 months ago the Congress enacted the 1962 amendments to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act which provided for the bonding of the administrators, of- Accra, and employees of employee welfare benefit plans and of employee pension plans. The two laws overlap. A sizable number of the plans subject to bonding under Lan- drum-Griffin were covered by the newly en- acted bonding provisions of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. However, by this time we had,learned our lesson. The new bonding provisions in the 1962 bill re- quired an honesty bond, providing protec- tion protection against loss by reason of acts of fraud or dishonesty. The 1962 law also provided that its provi- sions would supersede the' Landrum-Griffin provisions to the extent that the two over- lapped. I think it is long past time to strike the remaining application of the 1959 bonding provision, and that is what one of my bills would do. It would make the Landrum- Griffin law conform to the 1962 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, insofar as bonding requirements are concerned. The second of my bonding amendments would remove the rigid and inflexible pro- vision which enables the bonding companies to decide whether an officer or employee of a union may function. The language of the Landrum-Griffin Act means that arbitrary refusal of any bonding company to issue bonds would result in an absolute disquali- fication of all union officers or employees and would have the effect of paralyzing- the union. Again, the 1962 law was flexible in this re- spect. The Secretary of Labor was given au- Approved. For Release 2006/10117: CIA-R DP65B00383R000100200001-9 thority to exempt any plan from the bond- ing requirement if he found that other bond- ing arrangements would provide adequate protection. of the beneficiaries and partici- pants. So I have proposed to amend Lan- drum-Griffin by adding this same language from the 1962 law. Now all these measures are pending in Senate committees. The first two are in the Judiciary Committee, the second two in the Labor Committee. I do not expect that any action can be taken on them this year, be- cause Congress has done so little that its whole normal yearly workload is still piled up ahead of it. In 19 years in the Senate, I have never known a session that has done so little as this one. And the big roadblock- civil rights-is still' ahead of us. The Ju- diciary Committee in particular does little but drag out hearings on civil rights meas- ures when enactment of a civil rights bill seems imminent. But my bills will also be pending next year. If any action is to be taken on them, there will have to be a good deal of interest expressed among all of American labor. The legislation is there. Now it needs support and backing from all the unions it affects. Finally, I want to comment on the most recent labor legislation on which Congress has acted, the railway arbitration law. As many of you know, I believe that the first plan proposed by President Kennedy to sub- mit the work rules issue to the Interstate Commerce Committee was a sound one. It followed a procedure already in effect and long supported by the railroad brotherhoods, which is that where railroad mergers occur that affect jobs, the ICC shall determine the rearrangement of jobs. It does so subject to all the rules of procedure that govern all proceedings of the regulatory agencies. Instead, and mistakenly, I think, the rail- road brotherhoods flatly rejected the appli- cation of this established means of handling job security in the railroad industry. It re- jected this means of settlement, just as it rejected voluntary arbitration as a means of settlement. To me it is a shocking fact that what the railroad brotherhoods did give their stamp of approval to was pure and unadulterated compulsory arbitration. Their formal ob- jections to the bill reported by the Senate Commerce Committee were mere window dressing. Before the bill was ever reported, the word was out that this was the solution that was acceptable to the unions. It was also understood that the brotherhoods were behind the McGee amendment to restrict the arbitration to the two major work rule issues. - Many of the same Members of Congress who opposed the ICC solution because the brotherhoods did not want to go before the ICC promptly accepted the compulsory arbi- tration approach, and they did so because the brotherhoods accepted it. It is no exaggaration to say that not only was compulsory arbitration forced on rail- way employees by a union refusal to use voluntary arbitration, but it was accepted by the chiefs of the unions as preferable either to the proceedings of a regulatory agency or to voluntary arbitration by Justice Goldberg. So the crocodile tears shed by the chiefs of the brotherhoods over the fact that out-and-out compulsory arbitration was ap- plied to-their unions for the first time in the history of Congress should not mislead anyone. This result was their own doing. It was concurred in, too, by much of orga- nized labor. In my opinion, labor did a great disservice to itself, to its members, and to the future of collective bargaining by reject- ing all alternative means of handling this 'articular dispute which would have in- volved voluntary action on their part. They invited Congress to impose compulsory arbi- tration upon labor. Let no one doubt that Congress will not need that kind of invita- 16167 tion next time. The press and the Nation knew a precedent when they saw it, and this settlement has already been entered on many books as the way to handle any future dis- pute that may so much as threaten any substantial portion of the economy. I am as proud of my vote against this bill as I am of my votes against Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin. This arbitration is un- necessary and unwise. Since it was preferred by labor to any other proposal, however, the country and the Congress know that labor's opposition to compulsory arbitration is not even skin deep and it will be even easier to use next time than it was this time. NOTICE OF SHOWING OF FILM ENTITLED "TROUBLED WATERS" Mr. McNAMARA. Mr. President, re- ports and studies issued by our Senate committees usually are replete with facts and figures, but they seldom get high marks for engrossing reading. In an effort to present a major na- tional problem, water pollution, to achieve maximum public attention, the Senate Public Works Committee has de- parted from the usual written report. Instead, it has produced in coopera- tion with several interested Federal agencies a documentary motion picture. The film is entitled "Troubled Waters" and is narrated by Mr. Henry Fonda. On behalf of the Public Works Com- mittee, I would like to extend an invita- tion to all Senators and their staffs to attend the first public showing of this film. It will be presented Friday, Septem- ber 20, at 9:30 a.m. and 11 a.m., in the Senate auditorium, room G-308, in the New Senate Office Building. Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, a par- liamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it. Mr. KUCHEL. Is there further morn- ing business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If - not, morning business is closed. AUTHORIZATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COM- MITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY TO THE PRIVILEGES OF THE FLOOR Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the de- bate on the test ban treaty, Mr. James B. Graham and Mr. Jack Rosen, of the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, be permitted the privileges of the floor, in addition to the regular staff THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Executive M (88th Cong., 1st sess.), the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. Mr. McGOVERN obtained the floor. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum? Mr. McGOVERN. I am glad to yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. .Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 16168 Approved For Release 2006/10117: CI"A-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 16 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further pro- ceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there appears in this morning's Wash- ington Post a very fine article by Mr. Louis Harris, a noted public opinion poll- ster. Mr. Harris reports that a recent survey of national sentiment toward the test ban,teaty reveals that the treaty now receives the unqualified approval of ap- proximately four out of five Americans. To say the least, these figures are en- couraging to those of us who favor rati- fication of the treaty and I, of course, commend the Harris survey to my col- leagues. More startling than the vast support given to the treaty is the fact that the Harris survey reveals a marked shift of opinion during the past 2 months. During the period in which the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty and issued its report and the treaty has been debated on the floor, the percentage of those polled favoring the treaty rose from a bare majority-52 per- cent-to the overwhelming 81 percent recorded in September. I believe this shift in opinion is fair evidence of the independence of the American people and a tribute to the open and free society in which we live. It is also gratifying to those of us in the Senate who sometimes feel that the de- bate on the floor a'nd the information produced by committee hearings go unnoticed by the public. I believe this poll indicates a deep public concern with the issues which it involves and I hope my colleagues will take time to examine its results. I ask unanimous consent that the Har- ris survey be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE HARRIS SURVEY: PUBLIC MORE THAN 4 TO 1 FOR TREATY, MANY SWITCHING TO IT SINCE JULY (By Louis Harris) If the American people had to vote in the Senate this wee% on ratification of the nu- clear test ban agreement, they would vote better than 4 to 1 in approval, according to a special nationwide survey completed this past week. Public fears of the effect of fall- out and radiation from continued testing and the cautious hope that the agreement marks a first step toward peace contribute heavily to people's views. Actually, there have been some interesting shifts In public opinion on the test ban ques- tion since the negotiations were begun early in July. As the Senate has moved closer to a decision on the treaty, there has been a sharp increase in the number of people who now give unqualified support to the ban and a comparable fall off in the number who are outrightly opposed or still have reservations. Here are the current feelings toward the treaty among Americans who expressed their opinion in a poll taken last week-compared with the outcome before negotiations began in July: Attitudes toward test ban agreement Percent Unqualified approval ---..__-_- Qualified approval _____ Opposed ---------------- September the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff---all of these have only served to fortify my own longtime convictions as to the logic of the treaty. The Senate and the Nation were fur- ther strengthened in their support for the test ban by the unusually eloquent statements of Senator MANSFIELD, our be- loved majority leader, and Senator: DISK- SEN, the respected minority leader, whose plea to the Senate was one of the most moving experiences I have ever wit- nessed. Senator FULBRIGHT, the wise and able chairman of the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee, has likewise set forth what seems to me to be an irrefutable argument for approval of the treaty. In his news conference of last Thurs- day, President Kennedy summarized the case for ratification in two or three sen- tences, as follows: This treaty will enable all of us who in- habit the earth, our children, and children's children, to breathe easier, free from the fear of nuclear test fallout. It will curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, thereby holding out hope for a more peaceful Even if people giving only qualified ap- proval are combined with those opposed, there are only 19 percent who could not go along with ratification at the agreement now before the U.S. Senate. If the overall shift has been decidedly to- ward unqualified approval of the test ban agreement, then there are just as dramatic changes in the reasons that lie back of people's opinions. When asked why they feel the way they do, here is the lineup of the reasons given: Reasons for favoring or opposing test ban Unqualified approval ---------- Cut fallout________________ Must end tests- ----------- End risk of atom war ----- Stop world suicide.-..----- Step to world peace -.---_- Halt cost of testing-------- Qualified approval-----_------ If Russia keeps word. ----- Only with inspection.----- If on our terms ------. ----- Opposed- --------------------- Russia will break it-.----- Hurts U.S. defense...-.--- 52 . and stable world. 12 It Will- 19, Said the President- 0 slow down the nuclear arms race without 4 impairing- the adequacy of this Nation's ar- In the 2 months of public discussion of the test ban, public awareness on the fallout issue has risen. In Lowell, Mass., for example, a 42-year-old machine tool operator put it this way: "Everyone should agree to this on account of the fallout. This is bad for your system. It can hurt your health." In Gary, Ind., a 27-year=old steel worker had this to say: "It should cut down on the danger to people's health." A sizable segment of the public also sees the test ban as a first step on the road to peace. However, most agree with this elderly widow in Alhambra, Calif., in her caution, when she said: "I grant it doesn't really do much, but it's at least a step, a possible move for something better." Or as a 28-year-old St. Louis accountant put it: "It's a first step in the relaxation of the cold war, but I'm still terribly leery of the Communists." Much of the opposition was summed up by a business executive in Rochester, N.Y., who said: "It puts us at a military disadvan- tage. We've been hoodwinked by the Rus- slans before. It cuts down our experimenta- tion for an antimissile missile weapon." Or, in the words of a motel owner in Inverness, Fla.: "It hurts national defense. We'll keep our word. Russia will break Its word." In short, in the view of a large majority of the American people, the test-ban treaty is considered a first, cautious step worth tak- ing, but few are ready to believe the millen- nium of peace is anywhere in sight. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I support the nuclear test ban treaty with- out reservation of any kind. The weeks of committee hearings-the supporting statements of our top Government, scien- tific, military, and religious leaders-the specific endorsements by the President, senal or security, and it will offer a small but important foundation on which a world of law can be built. RADIATION HAZARD OF NUCLEAR TesnNG I am for this ban on atmospheric test- ing first of all because I am worried by the danger to our children, and to gen- erations yet unborn, of death-dealing ra- dioactive fallout. I referred a moment ago, in my intro- duction of a bill, to the birth of the quintuplets born to Mr. and Mrs. Fisch- er, in my home State. I think one of the greatest gifts I can offer as one of the elected representatives of this family is to work in every possible way for a world where these children, all the children of South Dakota, indeed, all the children of the earth, can breathe clean air and live free from the blight of hatred and, war. It is true that the experts are not in agreement as to the number of leukemia or cancer victims there may be if we do not cease polluting the air with test ex- plosions. We do not yet know for cer- tain how much genetic damage may be done to the brains, the bones, and the tissue of the children of the future if the nuclear test explosions continue. But we do know that uncontrolled testing with more and more nations joining in the nuclear race will doom thousands of innocent human beings to suffering and premature death. Harvard's distinguished professor of bi- ology, Matthew Meselson, told the Sell- ate Foreign Relations Committee that "a reasonable estimate for the number of children with gross mental or physical defects who will be born in the world be- cause of the genetic effects of fallout from tests conducted to date is about 50,000." Recent Government surveys have re- ported radioactive concentrations in some localities two or three times great- Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 19Q3 Approved For Release 2006/10/17 :, CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE er than we had previously believed to exist. The tragic fact is that we may not know fo>~ another generation or more the full effect of radiation damage already caused by nuclear explosions. The Friday an of the Washington Star carried an urgent half-page paid advertisement, sponsored by the noted physician, Dr. F3enjamin Speck, and 66 other medical doctors. Said Dr. Spock and his associates; We believe that as a result of the fallout .from past tests, at best a small percentage of our children will develop cancer or leu- kemia in the future, and that some of our children's children'will be born with physical deformities or mental deficiencies. If test- ing in the atmosphere continues, the risks will increase. Some persons have contended that the radiation danger is a minor factor since it may affect only a small percentage of the world's children. But if one of those children, Mr. President, happened to be yours or mine, we would not think that was a minor matter. No one of us relishes the thought of living perma- nently with the fear that our families might be drinking contaminated milk or eating polluted food or breathing poison- But, Mr. President, you and I would have less cause to complain about radia- tion damage to one of our children as a result of nuclear testing than would a 'arent in Norway or Tunisia or the Phil- ippines. For we have a voice and a vote in the determination of the nuclear policy of the world's mightest nuclear power-the first nation to develop and explode ' a nuclear device. Those mil- lions of human beings around the world who are nervously watching the nuclear race must rest their chances of survival on what the giant powers decide to do. Like the rain, radioactive dust falls alike on the just and the unjust, the inno- cent and the guilty, the weak and the strong. Little wonder, then, that some 91 nations have quickly offered their signatures to the treaty now pending before the Senate. In this morning's Washington Post, the distinguished columnist Mr. Roscoe Drummond reports the overwhelming support for the nuclear test ban treaty among the 59 national parliamentary groups attending the conference in Bel- grade, our .country being one of the coun- tries represented at the conference. I should like to read one brief passage from this column: If there are any U.S. Senators wavering in their opposition to the nuclear test ban on the ground that it Is a meaningless gesture, it is too bad that they are not in Belgrade sitting with the American congressional delegation at the 52d conference of the Inter- parliamentary Union * * *. To a man they are deeply convinced that the test ban treaty is welcome and worth while, a beginning toward a more peaceful world. They do not look upon the test ban as meaningless. They look upon it as a blessing. One final phrase : It is evident to every Senator and Con- gressman attending this global gathering of parliamentarians that if the U.S. Senate turns its back on the test ban, world opinion will turn its back on the United States in agony and disappointment. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the article by Mr. Drummond be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, this one single factor-the radiation haz- ard-places a sobering responsibility on those who say that we will all be safer if the nations of the world continue to explode their nuclear warheads in the air. Of course, those who oppose the treaty contend that we must risk radioactive fallout to avoid the military risk involved in the limited test ban. I think this argument has been de- molished by our best military and scien- tific authorities-to say nothing of the moral, political, and diplomatic issues in- volved. We now have a clear-cut nuclear su- periority over any other nation. We have enough warheads and delivery sys- tems right now to obliterate civilization even if we never test another bomb or missile In the atmosphere. Far from adding to our nuclear superiority, con- tinued testing by ourselves and other countries could clear the way for our rivals to narrow our present nuclear lead. This has been the past experience of nu- clear testing over the years. There are those who argue that we need to test in the atmosphere to develop a defensive antimissile missile. This argument falters at two points: First, it it highly unlikely that either we or the Russians can develop any really depend- able defense against offensive missiles; second, the unsolved problems of the antimissile missile do not call for atmos- pheric testing but relate instead to tech- nical problems such as guidance systems and the identification of incoming missiles, which have nothing to do with the testing of warheads. The only dependable protection against enemy missiles is the enemy's knowledge that if he destroys our coun- try, we can destroy his simultaneously. We are in a balance of terror today, and neither side has the slightest need to ex- plode another test bomb to demonstrate its enormous killing power. The leaders of both the United States and Russia al- ready know that a nuclear exchange of a few minutes' duration would incin- erate most of the people in both nations. If that is not enough to deter a nuclear strike, then mankind is doomed no mat ter how many test bombs we explode or' fail to explode. But for those in doubt, we have the re- peated assurance of our President and our military leaders that underground testing will be energetically pushed and that we will be prepared to resume atmospheric tests if that becomes necessary. Indeed, Mr. President, the administra- tion has been called upon to give so many assurances of our continued nu- clear, efforts after treaty ratification Approved For Release 2006110 16169 that a casual observer might assume that we are approving this treaty so that we can accelerate the arms race and beef up the warmaking facilities of our country. There seems to be a side of our nature which leads us to require repeated assur- ances that we will continue to add to our capacity to annihilate the enemy more thoroughly than he annihilates us. Some spokesmen have warned about the great danger of euphoria setting in if we cease exploding test bombs over the heads of the earth's inhabitants. Webster defines "euphoria" as "bodily comfort; a feeling of well-being." Frankly, Mr. President, I think there is less danger to the world from this dread disease, "euphoria," with its symp- toms of "bodily comfort" and "a feeling of well-being" than from polluting the air with radiation and accelerating the nuclear race. As a former combat soldier I know the necessity of a strong and alert na- tional defense. But I also know that there is more to the defense of a nation than the size of its nuclear stockpile. We need to balance off the alleged dan- ger of becoming afflicted by "a feeling of well-being" against the dangers to our way of life from another 10, 20, or 50 years of mounting tension, anxiety, and fear. What does it do to a free society to live decade after decade under the shadow of a nuclear Armageddon. What does it do to our Nation to invest annu- ally more than half of our entire na- tional budget in building the weapons of death while neglecting the quality of our schools, our cities, and our lives? I fully agree with the distinguished Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDERI, who said on Friday: If the Senate should fail to ratify the test ban treaty, it appears to me we face two al- ternatives, and either will be destructive of our way of life. We may eventually drift or be forced into a nuclear war with Russia or we will go broke attempting to maintain the status quo indefinitely. Does any in- telligent person believe we can continue to pour out between $50 and $60 billion for any length of time without doing violence and much harm to our economy and our way of life? I for one do not. I agree with the Senator whole- heartedly. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. McGOVERN. I have only a brief statement. I wonder whether the Sen- ator will withhold his questions until I have completed my statement; then I will be glad to yield to him. Senator ELLENDER expressed the hope of a world that longs for peace when he said that the treaty could be a first step to thaw the cold war and help dispel the fear existing between Russia and the United States. This brings me to one aspect of the treaty ratification which I t4ink has not had sufficient consideration. I refer to the impact of this first step upon the Communist world. THE TREATY AND THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT All of us would readily agree that the hopes for world peace depend not only t A---W P65BOO383ROOO100200001-9 161'70 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Septembe?- 16 on the policy of the United States, but even more significantly on the, course which the Communist world follows. All our hopes for peace-and I believe the American people are united in that hope, for peace-can be dashed into a nuclear holocaust no matter what we do if the Soviets and their allies should de- cide that they prefer that alternative to peaceful coexistence. So we need to consider whether rati- fication of the test ban encourages the forces of peace or war in the Com- munist sectors of the globe. During most of the 18 years since World War IT, we have thought of the Communist nations as a monolithic structure solidly united under the lead- ership of Moscow. With the emergence of a Communist regime in Peking, we developed the phrase "Sino-Soviet bloc" to describe what we believed to be the common front of Russian and Chinese Communist power. We noted and par- tially exploited the divergence of Tito's Yugoslavia from Moscow leadership, but we saw this as a unique and uncertain exception to the monolithic nature of international communism. In recent years, however, we have wit- nessed a fast-growing split in the Sino- Soviet bloc. Indeed, there is now clear evidence of a bitter power struggle be- tween Moscow and Peiping for leader- ship of international communism. "The New Cold War: Moscow Versus Peking" is the title of a newly published book by Edward Crankshaw, the London Observer's respected authority on Soviet affairs. Crankshaw and others see the first signs of the Russo-Chinese rift in the notable 20th Soviet Party Congress of February 1956 when Ihrushchev launched the movement to downgrade Stalin. At the same Congress, Khru- shchev announced that war with the capitalist societies is no longer consid- ered inevitable in Communist dogma. The Chinese took issue with both of these developments. For several years the Soviets and the Chinese tried to soften the public dem- onstration of their differences by indirect verbal attacks. When the Chinese wanted to attack the views of Moscow they did so by sharp criticism of Yugo- slavia. The Russians would reply by a verbal blast at Albania. There are numerous factors involved in the widening Sino-Soviet rift. Basical- ly, however, the dispute centers around Khrushchev's policy of coexistence and some accommodation with the West. While Mr. Khrushchev has given growing evidence of his desire to avoid a military showdown, the Chinese have denounced this policy as a cowardly betrayal of Communist principle. During 1959 Khrushchev seemed to be cultivating President Eisenhower and laying the groundwork through the spirit of Camp David for a high-level understanding. The subsequent sum- mit conference in Paris in the spring of 1960 was, however, torpedoed by the ill- fated U-2 incident and Khrushchev's violent reaction to that event. it seems probable that the hard-liners in the Kremlin and the more militaristic advo- cates In Peiping made it politically nec- essary for Khrushchev to back off from the Paris conference when the U--2 in- cident erupted on the very eve of the conference. Since that time, the Soviet leader has seemed to act alternatively belligerent and peaceful, but always he has backed away from the much more aggressive course demanded by Peiping. The Moscow-Peiping battle broke into full public view following the Cuban mis- sile crisis of last October. After gam- bling on the missile Installations in Cuba which he thought would strengthen his hand for a showdown on Berlin, Khru- shchev withdrew his missiles in the face of President Kennedy's stern ultimatum. This withdrawal infuriated the Chinese who saw it as a surrender to the hated imperialists-the United States-which had previously been de- scribed by Peiping as a "paper tiger." Khrushchev replied: "The paper tiger has nuclear teeth". He warned the Chinese that to follow the unyielding militaristic course advo- cated by them would lead to a nuclear devastation that would cause survivors to envy the dead. The Moscow-Peiping differences were further inflamed by the Chinese attack on the Indian border which coincided with the Cuban missile crisis. Moscow made no effort to hide its displeasure and in fact assisted the Indians rather than its Communist ally. This summer the world has witnessed the public exchange of lengthy letters between the Communist parties of China and Russia which erase any doubt as to the fundamental ideological conflict be- tween the two power blocs. No one can read the article on the origins of the Sino-Soviet rift published by Peiping on September 6 without sensing the intensity of the struggle. The article traces the dispute to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 and the Soviet peaceful coexistence policy which ac- companied the downgrading of Stalin. The Peiping government takes strong exception to the Soviet warning about the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war. In its letter to the Chinese on July 14 of this year-remember, this was on the eve of the nuclear test ban discussion- the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party wrote: The CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee believes it a necessary duty to tell the party and the people with all frankness that in questions of war and peace the CCP (Chinese Com- munist Party) leadership is based on prin- ciple differences with us, with the world Communist movement. The essence of these differences lies in the diametrically opposite approach to such vital problems as the pos- sibility of averting a world thermonuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with dif- ferent social systems, and interconnection between the struggle for peace and the de- velopment of the world revolutionary move- ment. Two recent actions-to say nothing of the battle of words-of the Soviet Union point up their acute 'differences with Peiping. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman has noted that it was the U.S.S.R. which proposed that the successful test ban treaty negotiations should begin in Moscow on July 15. Previously, July 5 had been fixed for the Moscow talks with the Chinese. The Soviet letter-in effect, an attack on the Chinese position, which I have just quoted-was sent on July 14 while talks with the Chinese Communists were in progress. Both the timing of these events and the substance of that letter are less than conciliatory toward the Chinese. The Chinese Communists have de- nounced the proposed test ban as a. "nu- clear fraud," a "fake peace," an instru- ment of nuclear "monopoly," and a "capitulation to U.S. imperialism" which allows it to "gain military superiority." In the history of the Sino-Soviet dispute published by Peiping on September 6, the Chinese openly berated Moscow for scrapping its agreement to help Red China develop nuclear weapons. Peiping said that the agreement was broken "ap- parently as a gift" to be made to Presi- dent Eisenhower "to curry favor with the U.S. imperialists" during the Khrush- chev visit to the United States in Sep- tember of 1959. One could quote at length from the growing literature of dispute, down to the recent bitter exchange about inci- dents along the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China and the charge of Peiping that Mr. Khrushchev has joined President Kennedy, President Tito, and Prime Minister Nehru as a "vaudeville star" in a new holy alliance.. What I have said, however, is quite enough to remind the Senate that this dispute over the leadership of interna- tional communism between these two major Communist powers is a major reason for Soviet agreement to the treaty, a proposal which they had rejected in 1959 and, again, in 1961. Some of our most able Soviet authori- ties, including Mr. Harriman, believe that Mr. Khrushchev urgently needs some tangible evidence that his doctrine of peaceful coexistence is a more practical policy than the militant Chinese line. The treaty is popular in Eastern. Eu- rope, as indicated by remarks of Mr. Roscoe Drummond, which I just read, where there is pressure for more inde- pendence of Soviet control. It has been widely acclaimed by the developing coun- tries of the globe. It is plausible that Moscow desires the treaty to win greater voluntary approval among people both at home and abroad. Khrushchev doubtless feels that he can command greater influence by supporting the test ban as a symbol of peace than Mao Tse- tung can in the role of an unyielding warmonger. Beyond this, it is quite probable that the Soviet leadership should mean in. a literal sense what they say about avoid- ing nuclear war even as they say it for propaganda effect. Why should they not wish to avoid a nuclear war which could destroy most of their country? Why should it not be reasonable to suppose that in the avoidance of nuclear war, at least, we have some common ground with them; that they conceive of this treaty, as we do, as a step-admittedly a limited step-admittedly-a step involv- Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 Approved For Release 2006/11-0./1-7': CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200'001-9 12B3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 1617] Ing some risk-toward that end. Why powers, we have never with each I am familiar with the warning that should we in this country want to give other. And no nation in the history of bat- those who place faith in such doctrines Peiping ammunition to suport its loud tee ever suffered more than the Soviet Union should take care to keep their o contention that "peaceful coexistence" in the Second World War. At least 20 million p wder lost their lives, dry. I agree in general with that Are- as Moscow conceives it, is impossible in caution. relationship to the West? Ever since The Soviet Union and -the United During World War II, we used to sing 1959 we have told the world that we were States would be the centers of unspeak- a song, "Praise the Lord, and pass the prepared to stop test explosions in the able horror in the event of another war. ammunition." I appreciate the need for atmosphere if the Soviets and other Likewise, these two great powers are ammunition. It has at various times in countries would agree. carrying the chief burdens of the arms history overcome tyranny and brought Mr. President, can you not hear the race, and have the most to gain from a down bullies. But let us not forget the ridicule and scorn that Mao Tse-tung relaxation of tensions. other side of the equation-that our Na- tion heap on the head of Khrushchev Said the President: tion has also come to greatness under a if we now reject our own proposal? We are both caught up in a vicious and tradition of praising the Lord. I believe that the rejection of the test dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side I see the banning of nuclear test ex- ban treaty would play squarely into the breeding suspicion on the other, and new plosions in God's heavens as an exercise hands of the Chinese militarists and weapons begetting counterweapons. In i short, n realism by earthbound men, and also might leither to trepudiation of both the United States and its allies m peaceful ight lead coexistence the Mr. repudiation of and the Soviet Union and its allies have a as a hymn of praise to the Father of all mutually deep interest in a just and genuine mankind. or his replacement by a more militaristic. peace and in halting the arms race. Agree- ExHIBrr 1 Soviet leader. On the other hand, our ments to this end are in the interests of the TEST BAN HOPES-LEGISLATORS AT BELGRADE acceptance of the treaty could very well Soviet Union as well as. ours-and even the FAVOR TREATY ,have the effect of widening the split in most hostile nations can be relied upon to (By Roscoe Drummond) the Communist world. accept and keep those treaty obligations and We know that the dispute between only those treaty obligations, which are in BELGRADE.-If there are any U.S. Senators their own interest. wavering in their opposition to the nuclear Russia and China does not mean that test ban on the ground that it is a meaning our troubles with Moscow are over. The Mr. President, the treaty before us. is less gesture, it is too bad they are not in tensions between our two competing in our interest and is also in the interest Belgrade sitting with the American congres- social systems will remain. We know of the Soviet Union- and in the interest of sional delegation at the 52d conference of that the Soviet Union seeks to outdo us the 91 nations that have signed it. The the Inter-Parliamentary union. s in at least the economic and ideological Chinese Communists and Fidel Castro do ers Here are more representing 59 n than natti aonal electeaarli laea men e sense of the term, and we know there not think the treaty is in their interest; from every continent. To a man they are will be military pressure. But I do not but, fortunately, neither of them is pres- deeply convinced that the test ban treaty is fear peaceful competition with the Sov- ently in a position to jeopardize its suc- welcome and worthwhile, a beginning to- iets. I have the faith to believe that our cess. ward a more peaceful world. They do not economy and our society and our demo- I know that some Senators have hon- look upon the test ban as meaningless. They cratic government are more than equal est doubts about the wisdom of this look upon it as a blessing. to that long-term struggle. I believe, treaty. But I hope and pray that their n r It is evident tog this every global Senatogathering on- too, that if we can avoid war, we shall doubts will not prevent an overwhelming parliamentarians U.S. Senate rld S on continue to see modifications in Soviet vote of approval. Noone can deny that turns its back back on the that test if ban, the world opinion society and foreign policy that will im- if we were to reject this proposal, for will turn its back on the United states in prove the chances for a world of law, whatever reason-a proposal which our agony and disappointment. rather than ruin. leaders have been urging on the world The one overriding sentiment which unites As the late John Foster Dulles said 5 for 5 years-that rejection would bring these diverse delegates from Senegal and years ago: from Peiping and from Havana the loud- Sierre Leone, from Israel and Iceland, from There is nothing inevitable about Com- est shouts of glee. sionaata , is desire Ceylon, for Egypt, and Chile, a pas- There, except that it, too, is bound to sionate peaceful world. I know, too, that some Senators who Representative KATHARINE ST. GEORGE, of change. The forces that change it are al- have no specific objection to the treaty New York, chairman of the American con- ready at work and discernible. Education that equips minds to find the ways to itself fear that it is dangerous and will gressional delegation which includes leading pene- trate outer space also equips them to pene- lead to additional steps to disarmament Democrats and Republicans from both trate the fallacies of Marxism and its glitter- that might threaten our Nation's Se- Houses, instantly caught the temper of the ing slogans. curity. conference and became its spokesman in the first address of the general debate. Merely in order to survive, the Russian But, Mr. President, so long as we re- "As representatives of the peoples of the leaders are constrained to recognize that main reasonably alert to danger, and world," she said, "we know that the desire they cannot force a Communist mold on maintain a reasonable level of defense, for peace is the longing and burning ambi- the world. They do not agree with our why is it not in our interest to take as tion of all and that we who are parliamen- ideology, and we do not agree with many steps as we can to put the arms tarians must do everything possible to ex- race into reverse? Just as each new press, proclaim, and fulfill this desire." theirs; but they share our urgent desire I am not suggesting that any senator for survival, Of that, we can be sure. , round of weapons produces a counter should vote for a treaty to please world Mr..Khrushchev and his colleagues round by our rivals, so we may find it opinion. I am reporting that the elected are realists who must reckon, not only possible to take certain cautious steps in political leaders of 59 nations view the test with the nuclear power of the United arms reduction that will prompt reduc- ban as an instrument of hope and unani- States, but also with the concern of the tions by the other side. Just as fear and mousey want to see it tried in good faith. Russian people in their legitimate inter- hate beget fear and hate, so may hope The nation which refused to try it in good ests; and one of those interests is sur- and love, however cautious, beget hope faith--or it-would plunge its pres- tigeh es to o the depths. vival. The ultimate hope of more and love. Naturally the Soviet-bloc delegates are peaceful relationships with Moscow and, Philip Wylie in his little book, "The busily trying to use this conference for polit- indeed, the hope for a more. humane re- Answer," tells of simultaneous nuclear ical purposes which go beyond its jurisdic- gime in the Kremlin depend in large test explosions by Russia and the United tion. Their speeches have been bland but part on our ability to discern and to act States which broke through the canopy their tactic has come into the open. upon the conditions on which the in- of heaven and brought two angels flut- The Soviet tactic bis to an t get use the the p tpemenden- terin appeal the test ban a f terests of America and Russia coincide. g down to earth. When the angels tarians to endorse e back-handedly a series series of As President Kennedy said in what I were examined by astonished men in political and military agreements right out regard as his greatest speech-his both the Soviet Union and the United Of the Moscow kit. The device is a super- speech of June 11, at American Uni- States, it was learned that they were ficially innocent resolution expressing satis- versity: carrying to earth a message which rep- faction with the test ban. Among the many traits the peoples of our resented the distilled wisdom of all the In a plenary vote you couldn't beat back two countries have in common, none is universe. That message, written in ever such a resolution if you tied Satan's tail to it. stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. language That is just about e the Soviets have age of mankind, read simply: "Love done. They have imbedded in it a paragraph Almost unique among the major world one another." which has the conference endorsing a non- roved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 16172 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September-16 aggression pact between NATO and the War- saw countries and to create denuclearized zones in unspecified parts of the world, in- cluding central Europe. These are the kind of deals which Mr. I hrusl chew wanted to tie to the test ban itself. We refused. Unless the resolution can be amended in committee the U.S. con- gressional delegation (including such Sen- ators as ABRAHAM RIBICOFF of Connecticut, EDWARD KENNEDY of Massachusetts, JAMES PEARSON of Kansas and such Representatives as GERALD F'oRD of Michigan, ROSS ADArR Of Indiana, will either have to give qualifying speeches and vote for it or find itself in minority of two in voting against it along with the West Germans. In this first international conference since the signing of the test ban, the mood of the bloc delegates, as evidenced by their speeches, is amiable. There are no denunciations and few criticisms. They are courting a detente, a relaxation, and all they want are a few agreements which will help Soviet purposes and not do the free world any good. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President will the Senator from South Dakota yield? Mr. McGOVERN. I yield. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from South Dakota a question. Earlier in his speech, he referred to a statement by the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDERI that if the Senate were to fail to approve the test ban treaty, It would appear that either of two things would happen: Either the United States might drift into a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, or increased national de- fense expenditures would bankrupt our country. I believe the Senator from South Dakota has adopted that view- point as his own. Mr. McGOVERN. That is correct. Mr. MILLER. I should like to ask him whether he believes that the in- creased cost of national defense and Its impact on the economy is a greater prospect for the United States than it is for the Soviet Union. Mr. McGOVERN. I believe not. I believe, as a matter of fact, that the cost of the arms burden for the people of the Soviet Union is as great a burden on them, if not a greater one, than it is on us. But the point I have been. stress- ing today is that we have a mutual in- terest in trying to get the world on a should continue to press for a compre- course which will relieve both our coun- hensive test ban treaty in Geneva. tries from this very oppressive and enor- Mr. McGOVERN. We have an an- mous burden, a burden that is making it nounced policy at present of refrain- exceedingly difficult to do some of the ing from testing in the atmosphere so other things in our societies that would long as the Soviets and other countries make for a better and a happier world. refrain from such testing. _ But the I. agree that the arms race is as detri- treaty gives us an added bonus, in that mental to the Soviet Union as it is to us. we are seeking the signatures of coun- Mr. MILLER. I understand and ap- tries all over the world. Already some preciate that the point I wish to make _ 91 countries have added their signatures is that this alternative need be no more to the treaty. So we can avoid the pro- of a problem for the United States than liferation of tests by powers not now for the Soviet Union. In fact, I would be members of the nuclear club. As the inclined to agree with the Senator from Senator points out, if the announced South Dakota that, if anything, it would policy of banning- a nuclear test is good be a greater problem for the Soviet Union judgment, why would it not be in our than it would be for the United States. interest to formalize that policy in a other nuclear powers sib UO)NIL a.rutuiu the table and agree on a limited test ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, may open the way-and probably will open the way-for more favorable relations between our competing societies. Mr. MILLER. I suggest that it would be more of a presumption that if we walk out of the Chamber- that we will not be struck by lightning than it would be that if we enter into the treaty we would have better relations with the Soviet Union. I share the hope and prayer of the Senator from South Da- kota that such would happen? But I am not persuaded in respect to the strong probability that he suggests. There is, indeed, a possibility. But I am unim- for from Iowa is correct. world could be brought under that agree- the first step. It may be; it could be a Mr. MILLER. With respect to the ment? step the other way, too. In. that con- statement about drifting into a nuclear Mr. MILLER. The only reason would nection I hope the Senator from South war, I hope the Senator from South Da- be, as set forth by some of the opponents Dakota will recall that several of the kota will agree that certainly in the pres- to the ratification of the treaty, that proponents of the treaty who are ent state of affairs, and insofar as the this particular treaty would not be in knowledgeable on this subject, not the foreseeable future is concerned, in view of the best interest of the United States. least of whom is the Senator from the assurances given by the President of the United States, this need be no more of a problem for us-land probably it would be less of a problem for us-than for the Soviet Union because-if I cor- rectly understand the President's as- surances-we intend to maintain our de- terrent capability to such an extent that if the Soviet Union sees fit to drift into a nuclear war, it will be destroyed. Mr. McGOVERN. I could not agree with the Senator more enthusiastically. Again he makes a point that I have been trying to stress today. In the event of a nuclear war, not only would most of our country be destroyed, but in the process the Soviet Union would be de- stroyed Secretary McNamara has esti- I am sure the Senator from South Da- kota and I could sit down and draft a better treaty than the one before the Senate. It would be aimed at stopping nuclear testing in the atmosphere, but it would be a better treaty, and it would remove some of the objections of some of the opponents. The point I wish to make is that we should not drive our- selves into the position of pointing the finger at anyone who opposes the treaty and saying, "Because you oppose this treaty, you therefore will have this coun- try follow either of these two roads- -drifting into nuclear war or bankrupt- ing the United States." I cannot imagine anything more un- fair than to do that. I suggest that mated that a nuclear exchange of some- most of those who oppose the treaty thing less than 60 minutes would leave would be the first to reject those alterna- 300 million people dead in Russia, the tives and would say, "No; my alterna- United States, and western Europe. It tive is a comprehensive test ban treaty, seems to me that point only reinforces rather than the single approach of tak- the point that the Soviets have an in- ing those two avenues into destruction," terest in taking whatever steps they can Mr. McGOVERN. If we could obtain to move the world away from that kind a comprehensive test ban agreement at of catastrophe Just as we have an in- this time, I would support that. But terest. the Senator knows that we have not Mr. MILLER. Precisely; I could not been able to negotiate that kind of more thoroughly agree with what the agreement with the Soviet Union; nego- Senator from South Dakota concludes, tiations since the end of World War II because I have come to the same con- have faltered and failed. This repre- clusion. sents a first and limited step in that But why would we be inevitably led to direction. I hold to the doctrine that either of these two alternatives, which it half a loaf is better than nothing at all, appears the Soviet Union should shrink Mr. MILLER. The Senator from from even more than the United States, Iowa does not know that to be the case. merely because this particular treaty Neither the Senator from South Dakota might not be ratified? We are not bound nor the most wild proponent of the to go along either of those two roads. It treaty knows that the treaty is a "half is my understanding that the President's a loaf," that it is a "bird in the hand," commitment made in his American Uni- or that it is indeed a first step. We hope versity commencement speech in June and pray that it may be, but we do not would still stand even if the treaty were know. I do not believe we ought to lead not ratified. If I recall correctly, the anyone to_ think that anyone knows- President of the United States said, "We aside from the leaders in the Krerrilin- will not be the first to resume testing in whether indeed this is a first step' the atmosphere." Mr. McGOVERN. There is an area Mr. McGOVERN. Correct. of uncertainty in all our knowledge. We Mr. MILLER. I assume that would do not know that we will survive walk- continue to be our policy. I assume ing out of the Senate Chamber today. that it is a long standing policy of this A bolt of lightning may strike: us all administration, prior administrations, dead. But the presumption is that a and other Congresses that if this par- step of the kind proposed, in which the Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200001-9 Approved For Re0ase 2006/10/17: CIA-RDP65BOO383ROO01 00200001 -9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -.SENATE 16173 Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Co.nmittee of the Congress, indicated th?,t under the treaty we can expect our national defense cost `to increase rathefr than to decrease. If that is so, I am of saying that the fact that it might be-p+ a mutual disadvantage it is necessarily 14 reason to reject the treaty. if it will ir.lcrease our cost, I can see where it wojrld increase the costs of the Soviet Unioin. I do not believe that the proposal ?s one sided. I do not believe we ought to be led into voting for ratification of )the treaty on the assumption that to dc, so would re- duce our national defensexcosts. If any- thing, such action would..' increase them. The mere-fact that w?