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Approved For:5elease 2007/0i/20 : RDP658 - 196 H CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE [Prom the St. Louis Post-DisPatCh, Sept. *J.7, 1963] , - litisszsnis FROM NWT' .,The IO-State power pool project Of MidL Contirient Area toTer, FISurf,era-(MAPP) is described, in Union' Electric News, publication- of one qf its niiijOr participants, as "the" ve,Fy thing the Post-Diabatoh advocated 2 . years- ago in tirglifg investor-owned com- panies to, join Govelmnent in an overall grid 'plan." The POSt:tif.Sptitoh continues to ad- vocate all-incluslire pooling of po-Wer, em- hracing not only agencies Of- the Federal Government but:also municipal and rural electric cooperative and. privately owned pro- duction and, distribution systems, as first proposed on a nationwide bails by Secretary ?- f tha Interior DOI, - ? It is on this very account, that MAPP is ? an overall grid plan, but to the contrary highly and one-sidedly exclusive, that we ex- press serious misgivings. MAPP Could in- deed produce precisely the adverse effect, by setting up a rival pool, dominated by pri- vate companies, in advance, and preventing an oVerall grid from being accomplished, by keeping its members Separate. IT44Qh Blectriel publication offers' no facts to support its claim that MAPP is "an over- all grid plan." Yet how can a pool be fac- tually so- described when it does'not include the largest transmission system in the 10- _State area, that of the U.S. Bureau of Rec- lamationi *hen It does not include more ,than ,a smattering of the rural electric co- operatives, and none at all in four of the States; when it does not Maude a single one of the many municipal systems or the numer- ous &NM utility districts in Nebraska or elsewhere with the lone exception of the ,Onialla Public Power District; and when it does not even include Most of the private ' powSr companies, among then' several of the largest? ' 'MAPP'e public announcements Make much of its professed intentions to take in other members?but strictly on its Own terms. '7.7! -These terms express "strong opPoSitiOn to Federal domination of power supply or trans- ' _mission," and a aualifled desire to "coordi- nate. with Federal agencies," 'leaving the Uneritical reader o infer that in wArp pri- . tate companies are joining the Government ',1n an overall grid-plan. But are they? -MAPP's own statements do not say so. And Senator MSTCALF of Montana - Says the Bureau 'ofReclamation "proposed a power pool to these people" before MAPP was conceived but has never received a reply, tO its offer. . - Does this, in the opinion of the 'Union 'Electric co., substantiate the claim that it and its associates in MAPP are 'pining the Government in an overall pool? Or does it suggest that the Old technique of apite lines to forestall public power is being magnified manyfold into a 'multistate system of spite pooling to forestall a national gfid? Clarifi- cation of these' questions would be ease Itself. Xt wouldrequire 011.13i a clear and simple statement-that the members-of MAPP propose to join in pooling with all Federal, munielpal, and cooperative agencies on equal terms. Do we hear such a statement? . , TRIBUTE TO SENATOR ANDERSON Mr, METCALF. Mr. President, last May I had the privilege to be one of some three dozen Members of the Sen- ate to attend a testimonial dinner spon- , 'sorecl by a dozen national conservation - organizations Which honored our distin- guished colleague, the senior' senator fyoin New MeNleo iMr. ANDERSON], and Ow Mrs. iinelei:son. On June 13 i5f this.'" year I introduced into' the RECORD, starting on page 10161, seVeral excerpts from remarks made by speakers at this dinner, and several edi- torials and articles. which followed the event and, appeared in several na- tional magazines. I now wish to add to the testimony Of the greatness of this distinguished colleague, an editorial by Carl W. Buch- heister, president of the National Audu- bon Society which appears in the Sep- tember-October issue of the Audubon magazine. I believe this editorial comes close to expressing in words what most of us feel in our hearts for this great leader, statesman, politician, and con- servationist?this true American who is leading the fight to save our wilderness and natural resources from the en- croachment of selfish man and his de- structive machines. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that this editorial entitled "The Pleasure and Honor Were Ours" be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE PLEASURE AND HONOR WERE OURS All agreed it was one of the moat note- worthy occasions for Conservations in the history of the Nation's Capital when some Soo persons turned out for the testimonial dinner to Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON, of New Mexico last May 20 Among the -diners were about 50 Members of Congress, three members of the Cabinet, representatives of President Kennedy's White House staff, and a virtual outpouring of admiring citizens. The dinner was spon- sored by 12 national conservation organiza- tions, the National Audubon Society among them. The purpose was to pay deserved trib- ute to the great Senator who is one of the finest examples of the kind of statesmen we like to think of as making up the Congress of the United States, a man of exceptional ability and extraordinary devotion to the public welfare. Our purpose was to accord recognition to' Senator ANDERioN, particularly for his lead- ership in behalf of needed laws and sound programs for the Conservation of America's natural resources. The overwhelming Sen- ate passage of the wilderness bill, of which he is the leading sponsor, is one measure of his effectiveness. In truth, it is we?all of us who call our.: selves conservationists?Who are honored by the dedication and the career of a man like CLINTON ANDERSON. And, like Theodore Roosevelt, who first 'made conservation a national purpose and a public cause, and later great ones we could name, Senator ANDERSON illustrates the truth that for the purpose of _winning the battles we engage in, there is no substitute for having able advocates in high places, as at the head of a key committee of Congress, at the helm of an executive department, or in the White House itself. The Yankees win the most pennants because they have the best pitchers and the hardest hitters. , 0010.6 TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PASTORE Mr. wiT.T.TAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, it is my very great pleasure to bring to the -attention of the Senate an article which recently appeared in the Newark, N.J., Sunday Star-Ledger about one of our most disttimished-colleagues, , Mr. PASTORE, of Rhode Island. We here are well aware of the qualities of diligence and ability which Senator PASTORE has been 'bringing to his duties in the Senate for nearly 13 years. While he is not always in the limelight or in 16597 the headlines, he is always to be found in the thick of the fight for substantive, progressive legislation. _ This excellent article, commenting on his role as a truly effective legislator, is richly deserved, and Mr. President, I request unanimous permission that the text of the article be inserted in the REC- ORD at this point. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger, Sept. 15,1963] A LITTLE MAN MAKES GOOD IN A BIG WAY (Senator PASTORE is a living symbol of an immigrant father's dream. The son of a tailor, the Senator from Rhode Island is cutting a big path for himself on Capitol Hill these days, riding herd on President Ken- nedy's priority legislation: Ratification of the nuclear test ban bill, the private accom- modations phase of the civil rights bill, and the vital rail strike legislation. Senator PAS- TORE is a little man who is not afraid to tangle with some of the big figures in the Senate. He came out of a tangle with the late Senator Bob Kerr of Oklahoma, a big, bluff man who made an imposing, formidable opponent in a debate. Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, an astute Member of the upper House, has openly admired the little Senator from the Nation's smallest State. He once said that ?he wanted PASTORE as his lawyer if he ever got into trouble. This is not faint praise.) (By John A. Goldsmith) JOHN ORLANDO PASTORE is the Senate's smallest Senator from the Nation's smallest State. His story reads like the American dream. Modern inytholOgy alleges the Senate is run by men of towering seniority, generally from the South. Twenty-seven Senators have more seniority than the immigrant tailor's son who is the senior Senator from Rhode Island In recent weeks, however, Democrat PAS- TORE has been riding herd on three of Presi- dent Kennedy's priority bills. No one else has had quite the same role in handling rail strike legislation, the nuclear test ban treaty, and the public accommodations civil rights bill. True, it was something of an accident? illness of Commerce Committee Chairman WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Democrat, of Wash- ington?that gave PASTORE a central role in consideration of the measures: But such accidents have been the making of many a congressional leader. In PASTORE'S case, presiding at daytime civil rights hearings and night rail hearings was public notification of the fact that he had arrived as a Senate leader. Actually, as chairman of the Senate-House Atomic Energy Committee and a member of the Sen- ate Democratic policy committee, he already had moved into a leadership position in Senate councils. In a broader sense, of course, he also had attained a position of political leadership when he was elected to the Senate In 1950, having served as Lieutenant Governor and then as Governor of his State. Born in Providence in 1907, PASTORE ran errands for his Lathgrie tailor shop until the father died. Young PASTORE was then 8 years old. His mother went back to work as a seamstress to slipport the boy and his three brothers and two sisters. PASTORE worked after school at a jewelry factory and graduated in 1925 from Classical High School. College was out of the ques- tion, although Brown University was conven- iently close. Instead, PASTORE clerked for an electric power company and enrolled in night classes at the local branch of Northeastern University. He won a bachelor of laws degree -Approve e 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R60D1002 Approved For Rplease2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16598 CONGRESSIONAL REcORD ? SENATE In 1931 and was adm 1992. Starting in Provid moved into politics. to the State's genera became an assistant He became Lieutene.n was Governor from 1 During his tenure adopted a fair empl and PASTORS pushed for teachers' salaries to finance it. The sa nor's return trip tic not curb PASTORE'S in polls. It was something o one of another kind, election to the Sena bar of the corporatio University. PASTORE'S Senate v with Democratic libe social welfare and ci ever, split with the issues as the con= for vlhich, as chairm fnunicatinns Subco manager. In one of the Sena ality disputes of race the nomination of Strauss, to be Secret against his Atomic E league, Senator CLINT cat, of New Mexico, fight against Strauss. With ANDERSON, that sive and misleading in committee. PASTORE has a broad his bearing shows a b his Small frame, howe strong piercing voice frequently in Senate d PASTORE was, in fact tors to tangle period with the late Senator crat, of Oklahoma, a ments unblunted an Senator Itsciiiien B. Georgia, one of the Se legal experts, has on like to have PASTORE In trouble. In the best traditio talented tongue nor t any dampening effec disposition in which a matter of great ser Recently he was di nuclear fallout with he made it quite cle Idea that changes or fallout might prove harmful. "Mutations," he sal they'll make PASTORE d to law practice in e's seventh ward, he n 1935 he was elected assembly: In 1937 he tate attorniy general. Governor in 1944, then 5 until 1950 . Governer, the State yment practices law, ough an aid program nd a sales tax needed tax, often a Gover- t to private life, did easing margins at the a triumph, too, albeit hen shortly after his he was made a mem- -a trustee of Brown Mg record places him ale on such issues as rights. He has, how- iberal group on such 'cations satellite bill n of the Senate Com- ittee, he was floor 's most bitter Person- t years, he voted for friend, Lewis L. of Commerce and ergy Committee col- P. ANDERSON, Demo- ho was leading the Be did not believe, trauss had been eve- his dealings with the and ready smile, and of cockiness. From, or, there emanates a hich is lifted not in- bate. one of the few Sena- lly in floor debate obert S. Kerr, Demo- emerge with argu- spirit unchastened. SSELL, Democrat, of ate's top orators and casion said he would his lawyer if he were , however, neither the e cocky bearing have On PASTORE'S sunny ACTORS IS not always ousness to PASTORE. cussing the effects of ewsmen. He did not, r, go along with the mutations caused by neficial rather than explosively, "perhaps 6 feet tall." THE JEW1S Mr. KEATING. With a warm sense that I extend my h good wishes to our occasion of the Je The ancient holid and the Ten Days minating in Yom Atonement, embed which the Jewish of a new year of sound of the shof mation of the joy o time its strangely that the coming y reexamination of amine our past, Pr HOLIDAYS r. President, it is f personal pleasure rtfelt greetings and ewish citizens on the h New. Year. y of Rosh Hashanah of Repentance cul- ippur, the Day of the solemnity with ople hold the coming responsibility. The echoes as an affir- life but at the same d call reminds man requires a serious urpose. As we ex- yin.g for the under- standing that will'enahle us to profit from our errors, w open the way to a richer and fuller e tence. The message of 1 e Jewish New Year Is a universal one hich all men should heed. These are hi toric times, rife with social and political unrest both at home and abroad. In a t me of confusion, and at times seeming c aos, the melancholy Wail of the shofar oes out to provide a promise of order d heope to all citilens of the world. It is my fervent ope' that the coming year will mark the unrise of a new and even richer era of piritual vitality and growth in the age- Id and distinguished history of a great eople. America is a tapestry woven of many strands, and none is more gold n than that repre- sented by our fello Americans of Jewish descent From th earliest days Of our history this Natio ha S counted among its richest nourish i g forces the spirit- ual strength, the i tellectual dynamism, and the dedicated energy of its Jewish sons and daughter. As one who has ? een privileged to visit the fountainhead if Hebrew culture, as one who has witne sed With his own eyes the tremendous fo ard surge of history that Israel repr ents in the Middle East, I can und *stand whence came these high qualiti s of heart and mind and will that h e been translated? here in Americ to the national fiber and the material advancement of our beloved country. Israel stands a tribute to the in- domitable spirit 1' the Jewish people just as the new ear embraces an op- timistic hope for he future side by side with a strong s se of the importance of looking back to history for future guidance. Parti larly in the present moment of his y, when new nations are emerging in the light of freedom, does the exampl4 of what Israel has ac- complished stani as a living proof of the will and ability cJf a people to create its own destiny. In keeping w1t the spirit of the occa- sion, then, I am privileged to echo the ancient words uttered in a solemn yet joyful affirmatlo4 of hope on this day. "May you be ins ribed, once again, in the Book of Life fr a good New Year." The PRESID G OloriCER (Mr. HART in the ch r) . Vs there further morning business If not, morning busi- ness is concluded. r----THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY The Senate resumed the consideration of Executive M-88th Congress, 1st ses- sion?the treaty banning nuclear weap- on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The PRESIDING CuoisiCER. The Senate is now in executive session. The question is on agreeing to the resolution of ratification of the treaty. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia obtained the floor. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the majority leader. , Mr. MANSFIELD I suggest the ab- sence of a quorum. September 19 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. " The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the time is now at hand for a final decision on the treaty banning nu- clear weapons tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. On August 8,1963, President Kennedy trans- mitted this treaty to the Senate, with the recommendation that we advise and con- sent to its ratification. He gave as his principal reason that, in his opinion, the treaty would advance world peace and Inhibit the nuclear arms race. Since that time, the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy?along with other Senators?have been engaged In an intensive study of the merits of the treaty. Knowing that the final responsibility for approving or rejecting the treaty lies in our hands, I have literally searched my soul for the correct decision. When our decision has finally been reached, whatever that decision may be?and of course there is no question that it will be that of approval?no American can be sure that it is the right decision. None of us can be sure, beyond doubt, that either ratification or rejection will ulti- mately be in the best interests of our country. Some persons have stated that, while it would be a mistake to re- ject the treaty, it may prove to be an even greater mistake to ratify it. So only history will be able to record the correctness or the incorrectness, the wisdom or the lack of wisdom, the suc- cess or the failure, of the action we take. There is no question as to the objec- tive we seek. All of us share the desire to advance the cause of peace and to strengthen the progress of peace. All of us would like to reduce the threat of nu- clear war. All of us would like to see a complete termination of all nuclear tests In all environments, if both the East and West could agree upon a system of ade- quate and effective inspection, and if at the beginning of such cessation of testing the Unites States were, indeed, superior In nuclear weapons technology in all of the yield-weight ranges. All of us would like to live in a which weapons of war and destruction could be con- verted into instruments of peace and human progress. All of us would like to move away from the costly expenditures for armaments, and move in the direc- tion of applying our financial and human resources toward the building of a better world for mankind, Au of us would like to eliminate the tensions that for many years have plagued the free world. The question is, however, whether the pro- posed partial test ban moves us closer toward these goals, or leads us in the opposite direction. The proponents of the treaty admit that it carries inherent military risks; Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 ele*se-2017/01 CIAIROP65 0000020 004-6 ,E. 1963 CO;\I?GRESSIONAL 1tECOR SNATE ,but, in their view, these risks are out wlghed ,hPolitteal and other advan tages which are exTected to accrue.fro the treaty's ratification. Tho,se of us who oppose the treaty recognize tha certain bene4ts ?MAY result therefrom but feel that the risks involved are to great to assume in a situation which, a best, offers no positive guarantee tha the hoped-for benefit, will reall materialize "Rope springs e t ternal in the uma breast," and the proponents of th -treaty base their position largely upon a hope that it will jead to a lessening o tensions, to a slowing of the nuclea, weapons race, and to eventual peace. W opponents of the treaty, feeling that pas hopes having proved to be false, are un- willing, in what is our view, to risk the Security of this Nation in pursuing what may be another false and even more dangerous hope. D. 16599 - _ the security of this Nation demands that - _I say "no." In so doing, I recognize that ?those ,Senators who will vote to ratify the treaty have the same sincerity of t purpose and the same dedication to their , country as I have. o ARGTJMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE TREATY The following arguments are the prin- cipal ones, in my opinion, that have been Y advanced in favor of ratification: First. The test ban treaty is desirable because further nuclear testing in the atmosphere is not necessary, the soviet Union and the United States each having already acquired a capacity of overkill. r Second. The test ban will eliminate e the danger of further fallout. Third. The test ban will serve to deepen the rift between Russia and Red China. Fourth. The test ban will contribute to a lessening of tensions and be a step toward other agreements and eventual peace. Fifth. The test ban treaty will slow, or signal the end of, the arms race. Sixth. The test ban will make it more difficult for Russia to catch up with the United-States in the field of nuclear ex- plosives. Seventh. The test ban will slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, I should like to analyze each of these arguments in brief detail. When the treaty was first announced, was inclined to SI1PPert it. The long- ing for peace which I share with other Americans naturally led me to see, in this proposal, a faint glimmer of hope. ? I thought JA best, _however, to withhold my judgment untiLI could have the op- portunity to listen to the testimony and to weigh the evidence presented both for and against the treaty. If it were not for my membership on the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in all likelihood I would have supported the treaty, because otherwise I would not normally be exposed to the subject mat- ter of the treaty as thoroughly as I have been as a member ,of that committee. Although the treaty is within the juris- ? diction of the Foregn Relations Com- mittee, in view of the military aspects the Anna Eervices_conunittee has par- ticipated in Joint hearings with the For- eign Relations CoMmittee. Moreover, the Senate preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has held executive hearings Independent of those joint hearings in Which the parent ?committee partici- pated. Although I am not a member of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, I did attend and partici- pate, as did other members of the lull committee, in the hearings of that sub- committee at the invitation of it chair- man, the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. STENNIS. In addition to participating In the public and closed hearings, I have read and reread most of the testimony submitted in those hearings. I, there- fore, feel that I can. say, without being Immodest, that there are few Members of the Senate that have been exposed to more of the evidence presented at the hearings than have I. After weighing the arguments for and against the treaty, I have reached the conclusion that a greater risk to our country lies in accepting this treaty than In rejecting it. I have no doubt, as I have already indicated, that it will be ratified by the Senate, and I realize that the position I _am taking will not be shared by a great many of my colleagues in this body. But, while it would be easy and pleasant for me to say "yes" to this treaty, it is my conviction that No. 149 7 - 1. THE TEST BAN TREATY IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOS- PHEnE IS NOT NECESSARY, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES EACH HAVING AL- READY ACQUIRED A CAPACITY OF OVERKILL As to the argument by some that the United States has acquired an overkill capacity, Secretary of Defense McNa- mara? who supports the treaty, made the following comment, which appears be- ginning on page 146 of the hearings be- fore the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions: Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that we have execessive armaments today. I don't believe we have excessive strategic forces, which I believe were those portions of our armaments that Senator MCGOVERN was speaking about. -As I tried to outline in my statement this morning, there are a number of uncertainties which we must recognize in evaluating the relative positions of the U.S.S.R. and the United States. It is not possible for us to eliminate those uncertainties from the equation. And be- cause our knowledge is not complete and be- cause it cannot be made complete in the near future, we must seek to offset those un- certainties with additional forces. This we have done. We have made every effort to hold the defense budget, which is pres- ently being considered by Congress, at an absolute minimum. I think we have done so. I would not recommend that one dollar be taken out of it. In responding to further questions re- garding overkill, Secretary McNamara had this to say: I think it is possible to say that we have more weapons than would be utilized in a particular war situation, without concluding that our inventories are excessive. For ex- ample, were there to be a war at sea, and the war were limited to sea, presutaably the weapons that had been designed for land warfare would not be Waltzed. Conversely, if there were a general nuclaer war, it is possible that certay1 waapons conva1t12na1 or otherwise, that had been designed for less than a general nuclear war would be in ex- cess supply. But in neither instance would it mean that our inventories were necessarily excessive. I do not believe they are exces- sive today. I think it is necessary to con- tinue to increase them as we are planning to do in fiscal 1964. Secretary McNamara had this addi- tionally to say: One other major point raised was that we have more nuclear weapons than we could conceivably use in an allout war ? ? ". We must meet requirements for various kinds of limited and tactical nuclear contingencies; the great bulk of the nuclear weapons we "could not conceivably use" during an all- out war are low-yield weapons procured to meet requirements for tactical nuclear warfare. ? And, therefore, I am convinced that the kind of large cut in the strategic budget proposed by Senator McGovEnzes speech could not be adopted without substantial risk to our national security. Gen. Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, in his appearance before the Senate Prepared- ness Investigating Subcommittee was asked about overkill and he answered in is way. I do not agree with it. I think the overkill claim is often made by people who are not well informed and do not necessarily know what they are talking about. Now, there is such a thing as a pro- gramed bomb or weapon as against the delivered weapon. If you look at the pro- gramed weapons, that is, if you look at the weapons I have in the present war plan, you would say we are overkilling. But if you look at the weapons that I think will survive and arrive, then you will change your opinion. So a lot of these people look at our stock- pile and they think that every bomb is going to be delivered. Now, do they think that every bullet that is bought for a rifle is going to kill an enemy soldier? No. We buy millions upon millions of bullets. I don't know the exact statistics, but maybe one in a hundred thousand bullets actually will kill an enemy. It is the same way with a shell or a cannon. Not every bomb is going to arrive at the target. Many of them will be destroyed on the ground before they are launched. Many will be destroyed by enemy action. Some will be duds. But we have figured this all out mathematically for every sortie and every weapon, and we have arrived at a confidence factor. You can have any confidence you want, but if you want to be, say, 90 percent sure that you will destroy a very sensitive target, and if you have a 50-percent confidence factor that a particular weapon will reach its target, then you will have to program somewhere in the neighborhood of six to seven weapons to hope to get one there, but there is still a 10-percent chance that none will get there. $;) it is a question of mathematics and how sure you want to be or how much you want to gamble. We write a war plan so that, if we are told to go to war, these prime sensitive targets will be destroyed, and I have a high confi- dence factor. I have a 90-percent confidence factor because I have programed many weap- ons and I have crosstargeted them, using different types of weapons from different areas to get a reliability factor that is acceptable. Now if they all got there, yes, we would be overbombing and overkilling. But again people forget that what we are really trying ? Approved For Release 2007/01 RDP65 383 R0001002000 16600 to do is to prevent war. We are trying to parison with the 5-,000 inillirems per gen- make this thing so sure that it will deter eration proposed previously by the Federal anyone. I think this is the real challenge, Radiation Council as a level of genetic risk Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP6r00383R000100200004-6 September CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE to try to prevent it. I think we can. We - have clone it and I think we can continue to do it if we make up our minds to do it. Senator JAcicso/NT then interposed that: The critics make the fatal mistake of equating the number of weapons and their combined yield with delivery on the target. General Power's final comment on this point was as follows: know many of these people, and it is really easy to become an expert in a field that you have had no experience in and no responsibility for. You have to have over- whelming superiority, if you are really trying to deter. That is the key to it. (At this point Mr. NELSON took the chair as presiding officer.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. PreSident, it is evident from the state- Ments of Secretary McNamara, a sup- porter of the treaty, and General Power, an opponent of the treaty, that the argu- ment which is being made by well-mean- ing people throughout the country that we have two or three times as many weapons as We need, so why not put a stop to their production, is a fallacious argument. This philosophy, of course, discounts the fact that it would be fool- ish for us to attempt to disarm uni- laterally or even to halt, unilaterally, the production of weapons. It also dis- co1.Mts the possibility of progressive clefeloPment of techniques- and weap- onry. General Curtis LeMity, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, commented on this point, on page 390, by saying: True, we have got all of these weapring, and we think we can deliver them now. But the situation never stay e static. The side that has the best yield-to-weight ratio has an advantage in tlieir capability to put their weapons on targets sometime in the future. 2, THE TEST SAN WILL ELIMINATETHE SANEER OF Frump= riimotrr As to this argument by the propon- ents, the question of fallout has been or concern to Me at it has to moat Ameri- cans, I am sure. There was virtual. unanimity among the witnesses that the health risks from worldwide fallout-due to past testing are very Accord- ing to the experts, we receive far less radiation from fallout than we receive from naturally occurring source's, and some authorities maintain that a con- siderably larger amount *mild be -ac- ceptable to gain the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The report of the Federal Radiation Council of May 1963 states: The revised estimates of the short-term per capita effective dose to the reproduetive Valls Show that weapons tests conducted dur- ing 1062 will be about 47 rnillirems. All tests conducted through 'December 1962 will result in a per capita 30-year dose of about 110 millirems. This is about one-hundredth of the amount recommended by the National Academy of Sciences. These values are con- siderably less than the corresponding 30-year dose of 3,000 millirems from naturally occur- ring sources during the same period. SIM- ilerly, the variatIOns in dose-rate from world- Wide fallout in different pasts of the coun- try are less than the variations in dose-rate from naturally occurring soirrces in the in- habited parts of the world. Further, cam- that Would be acceptable to gain the benefits of nuclear energy from normal peacetime operations and the 10,000 millirems per gen- eration recommended by the NAS Subcom- mittee on Genetics as a "reasonable quota" for manmade radiation exposure of the gen- eral public indicates that present anticipated levels of fallout do not consitute an undue risk to the genetic future of the Nation. Dr. Edward Teller, the noted nuclear physicist, had this to say about fallout, and his statement appears on page 489 of the hearings: The one point which is most often em- phasized. Worry about fallout, is one-where we have clearcut evidence. We have in- creased the effects of natural radiation by 10 percent. These effects of natural radiation have nev- er been proved to be harmf ul. From the present level of worldwide fallout there is no danger. The real danger is that you will frighten mothers from -giving milk to their babies. By that probably much more dam- mage has been done than by anything else concerning this matter. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., director, Law"- rence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, Calif,, one of the most eminent and highly regarded young scientists in this country today, was asked the following questions by me during the hearings: Just how great a factor is fallout from the standpoint of its danger to the health of the human race? Dr. Foster's answer, which appears on page 622 of the hearings, was as follows: One way to look at it would be to say that the fallout from all past tests affecting man for the next 50 to 100 years would be some- thing like the same thing as deciding to live a few hundred feet higher above sea it) from fallout is only a small frac- tion of the radiation that we receive from natural background, from the radiation that Is present everywhere. The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKEN- LOOPER] asked the following question of Dr. Seaborg: Has science been able to pinpoint eve:n one case where fallout can be scientifically attributed to radiation?that is, where one case of leukemia Or bone cancer or things of that kind or mutation that can be scien- tifically attributed to fallout? Dr. Seaborg answered the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENL0OPER] like this: Excepting these one or two freak cases of local fallout * * * I know of no case where a particular case could be attributed to fall- out. On page 214 of the hearings the fol- lowing colloquy Occurred between the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Russsix] an Dr. Seaborg: Senator RUSSELL. Dr. Seaborg, I read in the paper, I believe the day before yesterday, that there is twice as much radiation in milk today as there was 3 years ago. Is that approximately right? Dr. SEABORG. That would depend on the section of, the country that was being referred to. I would like to say that there are probably sections of the country wherethere is twice as much strontium 90 in the milk now as there was 3 years ago, yes, sir, Senator. Senator Russisia. Has that yet reached a point where it is sufficient to endanger the human family? DT. SEABORG. No, sir. Senator RUSSELL. It is a long way from It? Dr. SEABORG. It is a considerable distance from it, yes, sir. On page 219 of the hearings the Sen- ator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pasrorg level. and Dr. Seaborg had the following col- asked this question of Dr. Foster: loquy: I am wondering if this is a factor which Senator PASTORE. As a matter of fact, you we, from a scientific standpoint, might be could bring about almost the same result by able to disregard in our attempt to reach testing as you could through a nuclear war a decision? :Dr. Foster -answered by saying : If you kept doing this promiscuously without any limitation, isn't that a fact? Dr. SEABORG. Well, I think the factor, the Yes, sir; from the technical point of view amount in a nuclear war, would be greater I believe it has no hearing on the major by something of the order of a hundred as issue. compared to the high rate of testing in peacetime, even the rate of testing that you I then made this inquiry of Dr. Foster: have indicated. If I may pose a hypothetical zmestion, are you saying, in essence, that if you were a Although Dr. Seaborg's statements are Senator with the knowledge that you possess not to be inferred as an endorsement of in the scientific field, you would disregard fallout, it is evident that he does not en- entirely this factor in your reaching a de- dorse the exaggerated fears that have eision? been expressed by some people through- Dr. Foster answered thusly: out the country. That is correct, sir; although it would be a On pages 222 and 223 of the hearings very difficult position for me to put myself we find this testimony by Dr. Seaborg. into. * ? ? For hundreds, millions of years, The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARK- people have lived in this environment. We MAN] asked the following question: are talking about the fallout that is a few Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to the percent of that natural background, and we fallout, you stated that you thought there know that people have lived at a few thou- had been some effect already on health and sand-foot altitude, under higher exposure genetics particularly. Are there specific ex- levels over thousands and thousands of years, ples? and we cannot decide whether this has hurt Dr. SEABORG. Oh, no. There are no---I them or helped them or how it has affected don't think that we could, I am sure that we them. . can't identify any specific examples of effect Dr. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the of fallout on health or heredity up until the Atomic Energy Corinnission, and a p- present time. We know, we have approxi- matesu information on the effects of radiation Porter of the test ban treaty, made the on health and heredity, approximate infor- following statement on the subject of mation. We can relate these effects to the fallout: amount of radiation. I should add, although I think it is prob- Senator SPARKMAN. in other words, you ably well known, that the total amount of know that the effect can be produced pro- Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : C -RDP65B00363R000100200004-6 Approved For Releas 2007/01/20 . 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,-" SENATE ?VIFIC.d IlAre isspient of ractla-, CU OJT 1%.4X4R4i71',4;74",14.,,beeal-fie of t.110-9Spproxi- / .nate relatinilit that have been estab 11s)aed,''add einp asize the word aapproxi- ' mate"-=I'' can't' eniphesize that lon?mnch- relationships between radiation and certain effects on health, leukemia, bone 'cancer, ? hareditz effects, and so forth, and because we know the. anfOunt of radiation present ? from 'fallOtit, we Can make calculations that WOulidandicate sfq?tistically how many people will In, the -course of time he affected b this small ainbunf of radiation, and statist- cally these are very small figures, very small niunber,sof people. " - . But / OR want to emphasize we should av0i4 exposure to radiation us much as pos- bible at.all tMies. 8611,0401'? SPAEXINSAN, We did have the ex- ainples of- the ctntaminatiOn of fish and' of the area 41. someparts of the Pacific where ? /apanese fishermen were affected, did we not? Dr. SEisoito, Yes. In sonic t,esta in the Pacific? Sen.ator ,SPARKIViAN, Of course, that ? was in heavily Infested- or contaminated area. Di. SEstosa? Yes; that was neer an actual large weapons telt, where the People Were doWnwtrid from the fallout, and were sub- jected to a substantial amount of actual fallout on a, swell area. This is something that I am sure' Will never, be repeated. This is what ,we call' local fallout, that is in the immediate areao the tests. The local fall- but is so well understood' today that this would never be repeated in a weapons test -situation, and that, of course, Is the only Situation in which local fallout would be a -problem in a testing; in a peacetime situa- tion. There would be some hot spots because It is carried clown by rain and various weather 00ndititths, so that there is some Spottiness in the leve/ of,fallout. Senator SY'ARKM,Arr. SC1/10- areas could be- come dangerous While others were safe? --- Dr. 55A sq. Yes although / would hesitate to 'use the word ,,,dangerous.' t don't be- lieve any area has become dangerous. , Senator SPSitipcs,N. I am n net tallting about how but if 'testing should be carried on., -Dr. StAsoito, Yes, in the future. On, pages 224 and 22-5 of the hearings, , the enar,or , froka Iowa. Eur. 17-11CICEN- ' " LOOPER1 S,Skdd is question. Teivt it a fact_ that, the_m?os,t skilled scien- tific evislence of geneticists and others were brought out in those hearings and that their best .estimate of the number of ca.ies of for instance leukemia and bone cancer caused . by natural radiation?not by the radiation of fallout pr man-,induced radiation, but by natural ,racliationis in the ease of leukemia zero to 84,000?that is between zero and 84,000 cases-Land in the case of bone cancer between 'Xero and, 14,000 cases? , .The zero means they Still can't necessarily trace even one case? Dr. SEABORG. Yes. Senator gicitnioopEtt..,For sure? Dr. Ssitsoac. They can't say with certainty. Senator RicxEN400aaa. That is right. Doctor, I ani ,quoting from- the Federal Radiation .Co,v1101-2and th,ey start with zero. Dr. ipse, Tes? Senator 1Tick,ENpoopra,. They don't start fewwith a, A 6 111111' Ybee.Z.1 E know. Senator. 1-froicp ()OPER, Thy start with _ zero to possible number. Doesn't Zero , mean tfl;Lat they don't have even One case tsbat t4,17 ca/1 confirm? Dr.54oao, ,17.3?ei don't have absolute proof. Qn page 226 of the hearings, the Sena- tor from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] asked these questions: Isn't it a fact that throughout history we have had mutations, that we have had ab- normalities in birth, even before anybody ever thought of letting off an atomic bomb. History is replete with countless instances of definite mutations. Dr. SEABORG. Of course. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Definite altera- tions. Dr. SEABORG. Oh, of course. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Definite deficien- cies and so on. Dr. SEABORG. Yes. I think that is a known thing. Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been going on as long as we have any history, hasn't it? Dr. SEABORG. Yes. But the question that is?a question that is?being vigorously in- vestigated now by the biologists and the geneticists is how much of that is due to the natural background, how much of it is due to the cosmic rays, to the radioactivity that is present in small amounts everywhere including a little bit in this table here, and other sources. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Other unknown phenomena? Dr. SEABORG. Yes and X-rays, medical X-rays, and so forth. Senator HICKENLOOPER. These things oc- curred long before they ever heard of an X-ray. Dr. SEABORG. Yes, that is true, that is more recent. But the cosmic ray background and the natural radioactivity present essentially, in small amounts, present essentially every- where, has been with us ever since there have been people on earth so this may have played a role? Senator HIcKENLOOPER. Yes, Dr. SEABORG (continDing). Yet to be deter- Inined with any exactitude. On page 230 of the nuclear test ban treaty hearings, Dr. Seaborg says: There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that air pollution is a much greater hazard to the health of the people than is fallout. Again, on page 243, Dr. Seaborg made reference to air pollution from exhaust contamination in this manner: Pollution of atmosphere in our country in terms of the number of people, where it has adv,erse effects on?their health., is clearly more dangerous than the situation from fall- out with respect to adverse effects on the health, in my mind, in m opinion. Mr. President, none of these eminent witnesses would have you believe that no risk whatsoevez , exists -froul fallout. Hewever, the smal risk which does exist must be measured against the risk of Communist aggresssion which the free world may face if and when there comes a time when it no longer has nuclear superiority. The small risk from test fallout must be measured against the fallout which would result from a-third world war launchd by the Communists in the hope that they could wipe out the United States' It MIISt -theasurqd against the millions of deaths which would certainly occur if our nuclear de- terent force were allowed to grow so weak that it failed to prevent war. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. RUSSELL. I dislike to interrupt the very excellent addil'essWitthe Sena- ?16601 , tor is making, but on the subject of fall- out I wondered if he had studied the position of the President of the United States, President Kennedy, when he an- nounced resumption of testing on March 2, 1962. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I had read it but I had not included it in my prepared statement. Mr. RUSSELL. This statement, of course, was a compendium of the opin- ion of all of the most eminent scientists In our Government. The President of the United States would not have made this statement unless it had been care- fully checked with all of our most emi- nent scientists. If the Senator does not object, I should like to read it into the RECORD at this point. It is a very brief statement. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I shall be delighted to have the distinguished Senator from Georgia read into the REC- ORD at this point the statement to which he has referred. Mr. RUSSELL. This is the President's statement by television and radio on March 2, 1962: Natural radioactivity, as everyone knows, has always been part of the air around us, with certain long-range biological effects. By conservative estimate, the total effects from this test series will be roughly equal to only 1 percent of those due to this na- tural background. It has been estimated, In fact, that the exposure due to radio- activity from these tests will be less than one-fiftieth of the difference which can be experienced, due to variations in natural radioactivity, simply by living in different locations in ths country. This will obviously be well within the guides for general population health and safety, as set by the Federal Radiation Coun- cil, and considerably less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the exposure guides set for adults who work with industrial radioac- tivity. No one recommends radioactivity or fallout. We all wish to keep it limited to the lowest possibly degree, but the danger of fallout has certainly been overstressed, as stated by the President and by the report of the Federal Radia- tion Council as of May 4, 1963. This is the official agency of the U.S. Government that surveys this matter to determine when there is a hazard to the health of our people. They conclude their report by saying: The Council concludes that the health risks from radioactivity in foods, now and over the next several years, are too small to justify countermeasures to limit intake of radionuclides by diet modifications or alter- ing the normal distribution and use of food, particularly milk and dairy products. The presently estimated radiation dose to bone from all past (weapons) tests is about 465 millirem in 70 years, which is about one- twentieth (5 percent) the exposure from nat- ural sources. -In other words, one gets more radio- activity by moving to Denver and living in that altitude than by conducting this comprehensive series of tests. I thank the Senator and commend him for the great diligence he has manifested In preparing his excellent address. Mr. BYFD of West Virginia I thank the senior Sego* ZQm. CieOrgia. I aP- Approved For Release 2007/01/20: A-RDP65600383R000100200004-6 16602 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP651300353R000100200004-6 ??? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19 preciate his having placed in the RECORD the statement of President Kennedy on natural radioactivity and test fallout. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. On the same point, I believe it is interesting to note what Mr. Teller said on this subject. I do not believe the Senator has referred to this specific statement. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I was coming to the point of quoting Dr. Teller, but I shall be glad to have the Senator- give the quotation. Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Teller made ?this statement: This argument, while it sounds simple and plausible, is wrong. Fallout has so small an effect that nobody ever has observed it. And nobody knows either from direct ob- servation, or from statistics, or from any valid theory whether the claimed damages In fact exist or do not exist. I want to talk about that a lot more, because talking about the effects of various doses of radia- tion leads us immediately into an interest- ing field of research which should be im- portant for all of us. The plain fact is that we do not know what are the effects of small doses of radiation. We have heard that fallout produces a terrific genetic burden. To begin with, radiation from fallout is only 1 percent of the radiation which we are getting anyway. Fallout is not dangerous. But the fallout scare is. Many people know that a medical X-ray gives you 100 times as great a dose as fallout will give you in your whole life- time. How many people have been scared away from X-rays? How many people have gone with their ailments unrecognized and untreated, only because there has been this needless and exaggerated fallout scare? I don't know. I don't know whether anybody has been killed by fallout, but I am sure that many have been killed by the fallout scare. Further on that subject, it may be interesting to note what the former Sec- retary of Health, Education, and Wel- fare, who is now a distinguished Mem- ber of the Senate, had to say on Sep- tember 9, 1963. The Senator from Con- necticut [Mr. RirucorF] said: We must face the fact that the land on which we live and work, the air we breathe, the water we drink and use in industry, agri- culture and recreation have been altered over the past half century by a manmade fallout far more atfandant and potentially more dangerous than the contathination of nuclear weapons testing. I could quote many other authorities on the subject, but I thought it would be well for these two quotations to be brought in at this point. I congratulate the distinguished Sena- tor on the excellent address he is mak- ing. I shall have more to say as time goes on. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Carolina. Dr. Teller had this to say, at page 428 of the test ban hearings: There is radioactivity in the air. The total amcaMt is less than 10 percent in its effects, 10 percent of the natnral radiation to which all of us have been exposed for millenia. Yet there is a point to not further increase this activity. Each year about 3 megatons worth of fission products decay. We could agree with the Russians not to release in any year more than 1 megaton fission products. Neither we release more than 1 megaton nor do they release more than 1 megaton. On page 429 of the hearings, Dr. ,Teller said this: Under a ban of the kind that I describe, we could easily observe 'Whatever the Rus- sians or anybody else are doing. Under such a ban we would have the Opportunity to ac- quire the knowledge we need about missile defense. Under that ban we would be permitted to do all the work that we need- to do in the Plowshare program, in the peaceful uses; all of this becomes the more possible because we have developed clean explosives and we can make our experimentation with the re- lease of little radioactivity. At page 455 of the hearings, Dr. Teller said: Contamination in the atmosphere produces similar biological effects as a number of nat- ural processes such as cosmic rays, radio- activity on the soil, radioactive potassium in the blood, in our blood. There are essentially no differences. The radioactivity in the at- mosphere amounts in its worst biological effects over great numbers of people to 10 percent of the natural background. We have increased an effect, of which it has not been proven that it is a dangerous effect. We have increased that effect by 10 percent. Anybody who lives in Denver is ex- posed to a greater increase due to the fact that there is more uranium in the soil there and that it is higher and the cosmic ray in- tensity is greater. People in Denver are in greater danger than the increases to which we have been exposed due to the radioac- tivity in the atmosphere. Nevertheless, I have said and want to em- phasize that it is reasonable to try to limit radioactivity in. the air. We could do that by a special agreement drawn in a way pro- posed by Dr. Libby and myself 5 years ago, and we can make such an agreement without forgoing any of the tests or the develop- ments which are needed for the military de- fense or which are needed for the peaceful applications. I claim that these two questions, the test ban and the fallout, are linked only by propaganda. Dr. Teller, at page 500, sums up this question rather aptly by saying: Therefore, while fallout is no real prob- lem from the point of view of health, it cer- tainly is a great problem in connection with psychology and politics. Dr. Austin M. Brues, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Ill., had this to say during the 1957 hearings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: It would be rash to claim that small radi- ation doses have no effect on humans in in- creasing bone cancer and leukemia. But it would seem reasonable to conclude that if there is any increase in the incidence of these diseases because Of fallout, it is so slight as to be unnoticeable when compared with other suspected caatses of bone cancer and leukemia. During the 1959 hearings by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Dr. Brues made the following statement: That we are on a reasonably secure basis can be illustrated if I rephrase the calcula- tion I made at the earlier hearing, concern- ing the apparent hazard of cigarette smok- ing. In several countries of Europe it has been noted that the number of cigarettes consumed is in direct proportion to the inci- dence of lung cancer. If the radiation hazard at low levels is proportional to that at high 1 levels, the same is possibly true Of the ciga- rette. Taking into account the present fall- out levels it would follow that they are about as likely to produce leukemia in an individ- ual as two cigarettes a year to produce a lung cancer, using the worst guesses in each case. At this point I should like to quote an Interesting passage which appears on page 124 of "Our Nuclear Future," 1958,, by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter: We may summarize in this way: The fall- out effect is below the statistically observ- able limit. It is also considerably less than the effect produced by moving from sea level to an elevated location like De:aver, where cosmic radiation has a greater intensity. It, is also less than having a chest X-ray every year. In other words, we know enough to state positively that the danger from the worldwide fallout is less than many other radiation effects which have not worried people and do not worry them now. Of course, many nuclear tests have been conducted since Drs, Braes, Teller, and ;matter made these statements in 1957, 1958, and 1959. But current statements regarding fall- out hazards reflect the same 'basic opin- ion as that which was expressed by well- informed people in earlier years. For example, Dr. Willard F. Libby, University of California, has this to say about the biological effects of radiation in "Nuclear Ambush," 1963: Whatever the extent of our ignorance of the biological effects of radiation, we do -know that these effects are not unexperi- enced by the human species, even from the genetic point of view, since it Is clear now that persons living at high altitudes on granite rocks always have received extra radiation many times greater than is con- tained in radioactive fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons, and that even those living on certain sedimentary rocks at sea level always have received ten to twenty times the present fallout dose. Earl H. Voss, author of "Nuclear Am- bush"?the test ban trap--says some very interesting things about the dangers of radiation from fallout. On page 10 of the book, this statement will be found: Fallout radioactivity would have to de- liver doses hundreds of times greater than the present dose to produce detectable et. fects. On page 21 of his book, Mr. VOSS makes this statement: Natural background gives the average individual a 7-roentgen radiation dose stretched over a period of 70 years. Fallout gives him 0.2 to 0.4 roentgen over the same 70-year period. Mr. Voss continues on pages 22, 23, and 24 with these statements: This excursion into the basic science of radiation has shown that the hazard of nu- clear test fallout is trifling-3 to 5 percent? compared to background radiation hazards the world accepts without question. How distorted the thinking has become can be made clear by comparing fallout with other hazards, using some popular statistical tech- niques. Over the past 20 years, in the United States, there have been six fatal accidents and a small number of injuries to atomic energy workers from ionizing radiation. For most of these 20 years automobile accidents have been causing more than 30,000 deaths per year. But each of the four radiation accidents that caused the six deaths among atomic energy workers has received world- Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-R DP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65800 1963 CO Wide publicity; the fact that over 100 an- . ^ik r Clear-en/1w w.., e s have been killed in -alrtOin01,119 fieCicrents alone during the same period has gone unnoticed. Smokestacks belch millions of tons of acid, silicone, beryllium, lead, and arsenic?all .widely suspected to be cancer agents?while scientists are sifting the air for faint traces - of radioaPtiVe failput. Living in a brick house gives a person 20 times the radiatiOn dose one gets from fall- out. But world attention has been concen- trated on limiting the strontium 90, not on finding a substitute for bricks. There is no known case of moving from a brick house to a frame house to avoid radioactivity. Luminous-dial wrist watches give off as Much as 10 times the radiation dose that fallout produces. Science suspects automobile exhausts, as It suspects fallout, of producing cancer. But no one has suggested declaring a moratorium on antomobile transportation, or even mak- ing a multhnillion dollar investigation of auto exhausts. Principally because of the fallout problem, science has been stimulated to learn much more about radiation as a cause Of cancer and other health problems than it knows about ainaCet any other occupational or en- Viromnental hazard.. Benzpyrene, for in- stance, was discovered in the early 1930's to be a powerful cancer-producing agent in Mice. Combustion of petroleum by autos yields more than enough benzpyrene to produce a cancer hazard. In large American cities, there is so much benzpyrene in the air that it settles on windowsills in meas- urable quantities. But there has been no Selentific investigation of the hazard of benz- pyrene at low doses. On the east Mast, the annual radiation from natural sources is about 0.1 roentgen per year, while Denver and other large Colo- radan cities get about twice that amount frOM natnral background sources. Denver is expanding despite this health hazard. And New York reports a higher rate of leukemia than Colorado, presumably from causes other than radiation. Voss thus Makes the point that it is misleading to urge that this recently discovered factor?fallout?is the sole cause, major cause, or minor cause of cancers, bone tumors, and leukemia when ranged against "a whole spectrum of causes And changes." Mr. President, the Communists have shown by their detonation of huge bombs that they are not worried about fallout. However, they have been eager to build up our fear of .fallout to establish mo- mentum for a test ban treaty which would be to their advantage. I do not advocate that additional fall- out would, be beneficial, but I regret that much of the support for this treaty has been generated by hysteria about dis- torted and exaggerated dangers of fall- out radiation. Referrinz to the explosion of nuclear bombs, Admiral _Strauss said, at page 685 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign RelatiOns: Most of those which have been exploded in the intervening years, the fusion type of weapon has been involved with relatively less radioactive debris, The decay rate is not the same for all types of debris. Some of the i fission products hate very brief half lives; SeCOnds and reintitW. Some of them have many, many years. So that it is impossible for me as a layman to give you a clear pic- ture of the totality. But of this I am as- sured, also on competent authority, that the t total amount of radioactivity in the bio- sphere, that is to say, the air and the waters NGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16603 and the lands, which has resulted from nu clear tasting since the first bomb was tested at Alamagordo, is about 5 percent of th radioactivity experienced by people in the world who live in the civilized part of the world where we have medical and dental X- rays, and about 10 percent of the radioactiv- ity experienced by the population of the world generally. At page 686 of the hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Ad- miral Strauss said: As I understand it, there is a great diver- gence of opinion not only among the physi- cists, as was pointed out this morning, but among the geneticists. There are those who regard the most infinitesimal additions to the radioactivity in the atmosphere as dele- terious. There are others who take the view that nothing, definitely nothing has been proved in either human or animal experi- mentation that would warrant such an assumption. I read testimony, I read a newspaper ac- count of testimony before this committee in which Dr. Seaborg, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated, if I recall correctly, that industrial pollution of the atmosphere was a far more serious threat than radioactive pollution. We accept that as a necessary component of modern life. I accept the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere to the extent that it exists as a necessary component of being prepared to defend ourselves. - West Virgina yield to the Senator from e South Carolina? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am glad to yield. Mr. THTJRMOND. The Senator from West Virginia is making an excellent case in refuting the statements of those who claim it is dangerous to continue to produce fallout; and I commend him. If the Senator from West Virginia will permit me to do so, I should like to place in the RECORD the testimony of Dr. Fos- ter, which appears on pages 632 and 633 of the hearings before the Senate Com- mittee on Foreign Relations. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Cer- tainly. Mr. THURMOND. It reads as fol- lows: Senator Tircramorni. Dr. Poster, on the quetsion of the fallout to which Senator BYRD referred to a few moments ago, that seems to be the question that is disturbing a great many people today who tend to favor the treaty where otherwise they might be against. On this question, if I recall correctly, last week or the week before some scientists made the statement that one would get more radiaiton from living in the mountains of Colorado than from fallout. Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir. Senator THURMOND. That is correct. I believe it is also true that one living In a brick house would get 20 times more radiation than he would get from fallout. Dr. FOSTER. Well, sir, there you are ahead of me. I do hot know that because? Senator Tr-Immo/gm. Mr. Earl Voss, I be- lieve, brought that out in his book "Nuclear Ambush." DT. FOSTER. Yes. Senator THURMOND. And one wearing a wristwatch with a luminous dial, as I have on here, would get 10 times as much radia- tion as he would get from fallout. Dr. Fosrisa. I am familiar with the argu- ments, sir. I do not know that a wrist- watch? Senator THURMOND. Does that sound rea- sonable? In other words, do those state- ments sound reasonable to you? Dr. FOSTER. It is true that natural back- ground is large compared with the addi- tional activity, radioactivity, associated' with fallout from all past tests. ? Senator THURMOND. Isn't it a matter of fact that the fallout mentioned by some of those who favor this treaty, the propaganda that is being disseminated and the bugaboo that is being raised, that the fallout is im- perceptible, and is of little consequence? Dr. FOSTER. I think, sir, that the problem or the question of fallout is of insignificance, of little significance, compared to the major issue with which the development of war- heads is attempting to deal. Senator THURMOND. Mitt people want to know Is this; We have been reading about fallout, fallout in milk, and fallout in food and resulting injury to the future genera- tion. Is it possible for this fallout to bring about sterility and various other reactions? I just want to ask you whether you feel that there is danger to people's health from the little fallout radiation resulting from the tests we have conducted? DT. FOSTER. No, SIT. Senator THURMOND. Your answer is "No"? Dr. FOSTER. My answer is no. Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I thought it might be pertinent to add that to the citations the distinguished Senator from West Virginia has pre- ented in the course of his excellent ddress. Admiral Strauss was referring to in- dustrial pollution of the atmosphere, a far more serious threat than radioactive pollution. One final interesting reference to fall- out is to be noted in a colloquy between General Power and Senator JACKSON ap- pearing on page 38 of the released de- classified testimony of General Power: General Pow= I am thoroughly familiar with on problem as someone who writes a war plan and has to take this fall- out into consideration. I believe I have available to me the opinions of all the ex- perts. There is by no means agreement among all the experts, but I do feel that, as a general statement, in some areas the danger of fallout has been greatly overex- aggerated. I think the type of testing that we have done or that we had contemplated doing is well within the acceptable risk limits. It would be negligible, in relation to the natural fallout you are subjected to at all times, and that is what they are referring to in the difference between Denver and sea level. Senator JACKSON. On this question of fall- out it is well to mention too, General, that as a result of nuclear tests the country be- came conscious of practices that had been indulged in by the medical and dental pro- fessions, shoe salesmen, and so on. The knowledge of these practices resulted in cor- rections that have helped to safeguard peo- ple which would not have been made other- wise. I think that this is a very interesting point because, to my knowledge, more harm and more damage was being done by the careless practices, X-raying everybody for everything, shoe salesmen with the X-ray business for the feet, and dentists with the harm that many received as a result of poor practices n the handling of dental X-rays. If nothing else, we have made the country alert to some of these practices that have been definitely harmful. r Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will he Senator from West Virginia yield? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAY11 s in the chair). Does the Senator from a Approved For Release 2007/01/20-: 1A-RDP65B00.383R00010,02Q00,0476 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16604 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. It is very ticated doctrine of aggression, relaxa- pertinent; and I thank the Senator from tion of tensions, retreat and advance. South Carolina. By no means does it approach the state Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the of genuine peace. Khrushchev, on Janu- Senator from West Virginia yield? ary 8, 1961, described peaceful coexist- Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am ence as follows: post. glad to yield. Peaceful coexistence is the high road of Mr. President, I wish that the present Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator international relations betWeen socialist and rift between Russia and Red China could for yielding to me. In view of the fact capitalist countries. The policy of peace- be considered deep, lasting and irrepar- that I am compelled to attend a meet- ful coexistence * ? * is a form of intense able. I doubt that the pages of history ing, I must interrupt him now. economic, political, and ideological struggle will reveal such to be the case. It may During the hearings of the Prepared- against the aggressive forces of imperialism be quite possible, however, that, as a re- ness Investigating Subcommittee, I in the international arena, suit of the treaty, Red China may feel noticed that the Senator from West Vir- Thus, peaceful coexistence is to be the need to undertake hostile acts ginia, attended most of the hearings, even construed as a continuation of the bat- against the Indian subcontinent or other at the expense of his work schedule, tie against our system of government areas as a manifestation of her Marxist which already was very heavy, indeed, and our way of life; and it does not mean orthodoxy, and such hostile acts could, I observed there his intense interest in that war has been discarded as an in- of course, involve Great Britain and the the subject* and now I marvel at the strument of achieving victory. United States in the defense of these September 19 the Soviets will launch a different type of economic warfare, undermining West- ern export trade by flooding choice mar- kets with low-priced goods, possibly even using Yugoslavia as a transshipment thoroughness and the completeness of The crux of the isslie between the the fine speech he has prepared and is Soviets and the Chineie concerns the delivering today. utility of war. Western observations I have had an opportunity to glance may have magnified this dispute out of through the printed copy of his entire proportion, and may halm reached hasty speech; and I find it both learned, in- judgments concerning the Sino-Soviet teresting and sound. I predict that it split Some commentators have gone will not be, and cannot be, effectively answered during this debate. , I believe his speech is in keeping with the very best stature and tradition of the Senate in sitting as a special consti- tutional body to consider treaties. His speech is also in keeping with the very fine stature of the Senator from West Virginia, who is not given to idle talk; instead, when he brings a matter to the attention of the Senate, his state- ment is one of substance. I wish especially to commend him, too, for the very effective way in which he has dealt with the fallout question. He has thoroughly demonstrated that even .,,,i-.,w, considered at its worst, the ques- so far as to predict that the Soviet desire for a detente with the Wset stems from the realization that the United States and the Soviet Union Will have to join forces to contain Red China. However, we should remember that a few years ago Khrushchev and Tito were at each other's throats, whereas we have just witnessed 15 days of back-patting, folk dancing, and general joviality between Tito, the man who earlier was being de- nounced, and Khrushchev, the de- nouncer. This turnabout within the Communist world may occur again in the case of Red China. We cannot be certain that the quarrels will not be patched up and that Sino-Soviet coop- eration will not begin again. As a in Admiral Strauss as shown on page 691 of the hearings, had the following to say about China and Russia: Admiral Sissuss. Well, I have the feeling that the temporary breaches between dicta- tors are like those between monarchs in the Middle Ages. They develop quickly and they heal quickly, and inexplicably. I pointed out?I don't know whether you were here, Senator?that I had seen photographs this morning in some of the daily press showing Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Tito em- bracing. Not so very long ago they were with daggers drawn. Who would know on what day Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Mao 'The- tung would compose their differences? It seems to me so flimsy a road upon which to base our foreign policy that I con- sidered dropping it from my statement this morning. Certainly, Mr. President, all that glit- ters is not gold, and the lessons of the past should long ago have taught us that the words of Lenin, the founder of the Soviet system, have never been deviated the question of the Senate's approval a ter of fact, in the absence of any in- from by the Communists in their drive tion of fallout really has no bearing on the treaty. spection right to accompany this treaty, for world conquest: We have to use any ruse, dodges, tricks, we will never be able toi ascertain wheth- -1 believe the Senator from West Vir- er a nuclear test by China?which Would cunning, unlawful method, concealment, and ginia has made that point more clearly not he a violation of the treaty, Inas- veiling of the truth. and more conolusively than anyone else much as China has not signed it--was General LeMay voiced the same with has; and I look forward pleasure to Ti. . assisted by the Soviet ynion. opinion that was voiced by Admiral hearing the remainder of his excellent The rapprochement we have just wit- Strauss. The testimony appears on speech. I thank the Senator from West nessed between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Page 362 of the hearings. General Virginia for it. Tito may, indeed, signal a new and gi- LeMay said: 1vtr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. gantic offensive to hring about more General LEMAy. I think they probably President, I am very grateful to the Sen- trade with the West. It was reported have some differences of opinion. But I be- atOr from Mississippi. that one of the major interests of Khru- lieve that they are mostly on how to advance THE TEST BAN WILL SERVE TO =mem THE iurr shch.ev in his tour of Yugoslavia WELs the world communism, and it is my opinion if . BETWEEN' RUSSIA AND RED CHINA tangible benefits of Yugoslav coopera- there was any real trouble in the world we Mr. President, most of the differences tion with Western countries. It was re- would find that very quickly Russia and China would get back together again. They ., between the Soviet Union and Red China ported that the Soviet leader toured fac- do have a mutual defense pact, and I eel- can be boiled down to one basic ques- tories operated under British and Italian tainly think it would be invoked and operat- tion: How should the further prosecu- licenses as well as a plastics and chemi- ing efficiently if it was necessary. tion of the Communist revolution pro- cal factory built with funds from the Senator AIKEN. If the 'United States had ceed? The basic threat is too often 'U.S. development loan fund where he trouble with either one of them, you think overlooked; the Soviets and the Chi- observed firsthand the fruits of coopera- they would get together again? If China nese have one sacred and irrevocable tion with the West. Perhaps we will now becomes very aggressive toward India or gal: the destruction of capitalism, the find Khrushchev seeking goods from us other countries in southeastern Asia, do you think Russia and China would get together destruction of any religion which ac- that are in short supply in the Soviet then? knowledges the existence of a Supreme Union, such as computers, data-process- General LEMAY. I think they would; yes. Being, and the destruction of all Sys- ing machines, and other complex prod- As a matter of fact, China ha.s a very vigorous tems of free government. The Chinese ucts. It would not surprise me to find program in southeast Asia now. Russia advocate brute violence as the means the Communists seeking a loan to help knows about it, and probablragrees with it. for a,dvaneing the revolution, while the the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Eco- ,THE TEST SAN WILL CONTRIBUTE l'O A LESSENING Soviets are, at the moment, advocating nomic Assistance. Perhaps we will evenOF TE"W)NS AND BE A STEP TOWARD OTHER more aubtle approaches, through "peace- find the Communists seeking to discuss a AGREEMENTS AND EVENTUAL PEACE foil coexistence," with emphasis on sub- lend-lease settlement as a starting-point version, political machinations, and for obtaining aid from us. This is not Those who advocate the treaty as a economic warfare. improbable because the Soviet Union is way of lessening tensions forget that the The policy of peaceful coexistence one of the very few countries with whom very nature of communism suggests that does not simply mean "you live there; a settlement on lend-lease accounts has an atmosphere of tension is the desired we live here." It is, in reality, a sophis- not been reached. Or we may find that political atmosphere in which to press Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approve,d For Releqse 2607/01/ CIA-RDP65B00383R000160200004:6 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 16665 Coninoinist goals. Nathan Leites, in "A Study of bolshevism," 1953, alerts us to the attit des and methods of our adver- saries asfollows: To Bolsheviks, the high tension is the normal state of Rolitics. They do not ex- perience it as something that just cannot go on, but father as something that necessarily persists. /What Westerners call a real agree- ment seems to Bolsheviks inconcelvable. It is often predicted in the West that if partic- ular issues * * * 9ould be settled with the Politburo, an easing of the overall tension might ensue. Por Bolsheviks, this does not follow, ?"There might be less noise, but the basic situation?the presence of two blocs attempting to annihilate each other?would be unchanged. If the Soviets genuinely, desired to re- lieve world tensions they could easily do so by tearing down the wall separating East Berlin from West Berlin, They could ease international tensions by per- mitting the reunification of Germany through free electriins. They could re- lieve tensions by withdrawing their armies from the captive countries of Eastern Europe. They could even go so far as to Withdr.aiy their men and arme- rnents kr= Cuba, These are hut .a few of the genuine causes of world tensions and the Soviets could easily show their good faith by promptly acting to remove these causes. And speaking of Cuba, may 1, parenthetically, recall to mind that Andrei Grpmyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister who signed the nuclear test ban treaty for the Soviet Union, falsely told President Kennedy on October 18, 1962, that the missiles which had been sent to Cuba were purely defensive. I quote from President Kennedy's broadcast of October 22: Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid Offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Poreigh Minister Grornyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote him, "train- ing by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that, "if it were other- wise," Mr. GrornykO went on, "the Soviet Government would neve become involved in Tendering such assistance." That statement was false. In other words, the President meant that Mr. drornyko was a liar. It is less than a year since attention was publicly called to this falsehood, less than a year since the Soviet Union took the world to the -Very brink of nuclear war?less than a year since Senators were notified to attend briefings in vari- ous parts of the TJnited States in connec- tion with the Cuban crisis. Yet, we are called upon to consent to a treaty with the nation, which so recently demon- strated it still harbors the aim of world conquest, signed by the very man who lied to our 'President. 'The free world has all too often been willing to accept at face value every ap- parent shifting of Soviet lines in the ide- ological arena. Yet, shifting Soviet po- sitions have just as often simply con- fused the issue, compounded the com- plexities, and created a climate of crisis rather than a lastinelessening of ten- sions. Leites refers to the alacrity and purpose with whieh the Soviets are able to change position. He says: Westerners have often commented that there is, in negotiating with the Soviet Union, no common search for a solution to common problems, no discussion in the west- ern Sense of the term; the Soviet delegates elaborate or change their position in strict isolation and then present it in dogmatic fashion. They fairly take account of the views and objections of the other side. We must ever be wary concerning what may appear to be a concession or a modification of position or retreat. In this connection, Lenin wrote: Revoluntionaxy parties must go on learn- ing. They have learned how to attack. Now it is time for them to realize that this knowl- edge must be supplemented by acquiring a knowledge of how best to retreat. We have got to understand (and a revolutionary class learns this by bitter experience) that victory can only be won by those who have learned the proper method both of advance and re- treat. (Works, Russian edition, vol. XVII, p. 121.) Stalin, in one of his lectures in 1924, explained the purpose of such retreat in this way: The object of such strategy is to gain time, to scatter the forces of the enemy while con- solidating our own for a future advance. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. Since the Soviets conducted tests in 1961 and 1962 and got ahead of the United States in high-yield weapons, I wonder whether they might not wish to gain time?to buy time?in order to develop the weapons in accord- ance with the knowledge they have gained. Therefore, they may be tender- ing the treaty for that purpose. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I have no doubt that this is one purpose, if they are indeed ahead; and I do not doubt that they are. Mr. THURMOND. From 1958 until September 1961, there was a moratorium on testing. During that time the Soviets prepared carefully and assiduously, then suddenly broke the moratorium and im- mediately went back to testing. They gained time to prepare for testing.. They now have tested. It is highly pos- sible that they wish to gain time to man- ufacture the weapons with which to try to destroy us during the pendency of the treaty. is there any doubt in the Senator's mind that as soon as the Soviets feel they are ready with their weapons they will take the next step? It is a Com- munist trick to take two steps forward and one back?two forward and one back?for so long as they are moving two forward and one back they are gain- ing. Does the Senator have spy ques- tion at all that when the Communists are ready to proceed with their next step they will not hesitate to violate the treaty, abrogate the treaty, or pursue some course which would force the United States to abrogate the treaty? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I have no doubt that the development which is predicted by the Senator from South Carolina will ensue, as I shall show later in my statement. The Soviets have frequently sought release from international tensions in order to be able to solidify and incre- ment their warmaking or defense ca- pabilities. Many people view the present treaty as the first sign of dawn on the horizon of genuine peace. Peace, to be sure, is our strongest desire, and toward that goal we must continue to strive. But it may be timely to recall the Biblical admonition: "When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace." It is equally necessary to re- member that the Communists frequently do not interpret words as we interpret them, and this may be equally true of the word peace. As to the evolvement of peace from the signing of this treaty, I call the attention of the Senate to a reference, made by Admiral Arleigh Burke during his testimony on the treaty, to the statement of a Radio Mos- cow commentator on August 1, midway between the initialling and signing of the treaty. Admiral Burke quoted the, Moscow commentator as follows: The argument that some newspapers and politicians are harping on more and more persistently is that Soviet policy is under- going some changes. And some people even go so far as to make the ridiculous asser- tion that the Soviet Union has openly re- nounced Lenin's doctrine, and has actually stated that war is impermissible as an in- strument of policy. Facts do not back up this absurd contention. The Moscow commentator went on to say: The initialing of the treaty to ban nuclear tests in the three elements is therefore a direct result of the fight waged by the Soviet Union for many years, and it is cer- tainly not a result of any change in Soviet policy, or departure from Lenin's principles. Admiral Burke continued in his own words: Hence, it would appear to even the casual Observer of Soviet reaction to the current state of affairs that the Soviets themselves view the test ban treaty as a "victory for the policy of peaceful coexistence." Admiral Burke proceeded then to indi- cate, as I have already indicated, that "the interpretation of peaceful coexist- ence is crucial." Peace, in the eyes of the Communists, is but a masquerade under which war is waged by new techniques. Infiltration and subversion, espionage, propaganda, the fear complex, group pressure, nu- clear blackmail, all these and more, sig- nify a peace that is not peace, a war that is not war. Referring to the argument being ad- vanced with reference to reduced ten- sions, Admiral Strauss, as shown on page 691 of the hearings on the test ban treaty, commented thusly: Reduction of tensions. I am not satis- fied?I am not sure that the reduction of tensions is necessarily a good thing. Our tensions were very much reduced following the moratorium and I can give you at least one result of it. We abandoned our proving ground in the Pacific, that costly installation there which had involved an outlay of many millions of dollars, and a result was that when the President decided very properly to resume testing after the Russians had re- sumed, it was a matter of months, some 7 or more months, before we were able to pick up where we had left off. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16606 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19 And so, genuine peace, that bright crown for which mankind has so nobly aspired throughout the ages, is as elu- sive today as ever. Indeed, 2,000 years ago, a humble Nazarene warned us that the prize would continue to flee from our grasp when He said, as recorded in the 24th chapter of the gospel according to St. Matthew: And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars; see that ye be not troubled; for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet. For, nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom; and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earth- quakes, in divers places. THE TEST BAN TREATY WILL SLOW, OR SIGNAL THE END OF, THE ARMS RACE Mr. President, the treaty, in the words of Secretary of Defense McNamara, "will not end the threat of nuclear war. It will not reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It will not halt the production of nuclear weapons." Addi- tionally, the treaty will not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war. It is unnecessary to state that it has equally no bearing whatsoever on the develop- ment, production, and use of conven- tional weapons. The President of the United States in his Message to the Senate said: This treaty advances, though it does not assure, world peace; and it will inhibit, though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms FRCS. While it does not prohibit the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the testing in which bath nations would other- wise engage. While it will not halt the production or re- duce the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons? stexitially weaken the danger of thermonu- clear war. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, said this, as appears on page 371 of the test ban treaty hear- ings: I would think? Referring to the treaty-- ft would have no effect on the production of weapons or the knowledge we now have. Certainly Russia is going to produce all the tactical weapons that it considers it must have, as we would, of the kind we now build. It may slow down the modernization of the stockpile, if we want to speak of it in that regard. It quite possibly would slow down the re- search and the advance in weapons of some types. General LeMay went on to say, as ap- pears on page 401: I don't think we are any farther or any closer to a nuclear war with or without the test ban treaty. Senator AIKEN. I don't think anyone can answer that, anyway. General WHEELER. I think you have to rec- ognize this. Senator, that this test ban treaty doesn't lessen the number of weapons in stockpile, it doesn't change the production of weapons, and I think we would all agree that the threat is still the same. In other words, I believe the objectives of the So- viets are still world domination. So you have about six of one and a half dozen of the other, I would say. The President said? it would be a first step toward limiting the nuclear arms race. While it will not end the threat of nu- clear war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons? He went on to say that? it can reduce world tensions, open a way to further agreements, and thereby help to ease the threat of war. Secretary Rusk, on page 13 of the hearings, stated: This treaty does not affect the use of nu- clear weapons in war. It has to do with nu- clear, weapon testing in time of peace. On page 28 Secretary Rusk said: There is nothing here that interferes with the production of nuclear weapons, for ex- ample, the deployment of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in war. Secretary Rusk said, as shown on page 29: This treaty itself does not reduce weap- ons in being or prevent their further pro- duction. Mr. Khrushchev in his speech on July 2, in Berlin, expressed a similar under- standing. After stating the willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude a limited agreement banning nuclear tests, he said this: Of course, an agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, notwithstanding all the im- portance of this major act, cannot stop the arms race, and cannot avert or even sub- Ing tests which may be conducted sur- repetitiously in violation of the treaty. I think we can be sure that the Soviets will attempt to exploit every advantage gained during the course of the post- moratorium atmospheric tests. They will exploit and press their lead in high- yield weapons. Both sides will do every- thing possible to develop and deploy an antimissile missile system. If, as it is said, we are ahead of the Soviets in tactical nuclear weapons, they will strive to overcome our lead while we strive to maintain it. As to the production of conventional weapons, this will continue unabated, and perhaps even be acceler- ated. The end of the aims race is no- where in sight and, in all probability, will be as elusive as ever when the treaty becomes a fait accompli, I read from pages 404 and 405 of the hearings: Senator Corns. Well, now, the next ques- tion has to do with money and may I pre- face it so that the record will be clear. I think we have to have the top defense regardless of what it costs and I believe that the American people are of that opinion. Never in the history of the United States have they kept up the degree of prepared- ness we have and the peOple accept it gladly, whether it is an extension of the draft or heavy appropriations and the rank and file of people that I meet on Main Street of the towns of Nebraska, they want this country defended and they are not complaining about it, But just as a matter of information, if the safeguards that you favor are adequately carried out, is this test ban, would this test ban, then be a moneysaver? General WHEELER. On the contrary, I ?would say, Senator, if I may offer my opin- ion first. As I look at it, the military threat to our security from the Soviet Union speci- cally and from the Communist bloc in gen- eral, is not lessened in one degree by this particular treaty. The safeguards also, in my opinion, are going to cost sums of money over and above the sizable military budget that the chair- man pointed out this morning. General LEMAT. I would agree that the military budget will probably go up as a re- sult of the treaty, not down. In view of what these witnesses have said, therefore, Mr. President, I cannot agree that this treaty will signal the end of the arrni race., Even if both sides were scrupulously to abide by the treaty, we are assured that the safeguards stipulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, fortunately, be implemented. Consequently, we say, we will test underground aggressively; we will maintain our laboratories in a high state of readiness for the possible resumption of atmospheric testing; and we will improve our system of monitor- THE TEST BAN vvria, MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO CATCH UP WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF NUCLE.AR EXPLOSIVES Those who advance this argument say that underground testing is considerably more expensive than atmospheric test- ing and that, in view of the fact that this will be the only environment in which tests may be conducted under the treaty, the financial burden upon the Soviets will be such that they will be inhibited from progressing as rapidly as they would otherwise progress in catch- ing up with the United States in the field of tactical nuclear weapons. It is also said that we are further along in the state of the art, Insofar as under- ground testing is concerned, and that this will make it doubly difficult for the Russians to catch up. Of course, the very nature of the Soviet society makes it difficult for us to be absolutely posi- tive that we are ahead of the Russians In the development of tactical nuclear weapons. It is possibly an assumption based on another assumption, to wit: That we have conducted more under- ground tests than have the Soviets and we have, consequently? made greater progress in this area of testing. Dr. Ed- ward Teller, in his testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- tee, said: It is by no means certain that the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union in the knowledge of producing and using nuclear weapons. In the field of big weapons, Rus- sian lead has been demonstrated before the eyes of the world. In this category Russian tests decisively outnumber United States tests. In the category of smaller weapons, from a few kilotons to a megaton, the known Russian tests are somewhat fewer in number than the American tests. It is possible, how- ever, that we may have missed quite a few Russian tests in this range. In the im- portant subkiloton range (deleted). There is no objective justification to assume, as is usually done, that in this area we are ahead. General teMay had this comment, as appears at page 391 of the hearings, with reference to the oft-repeated statement that we are ahead in the field of low- yield nuclear weapons. His statement was prefaced by this question, which was put by the Senator from. Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] : But I had asked you a question previous to that, and I asked you whether or not the balance of power, nuclear power, was in our Approved For Release 2007 01 20 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For kel .1963 CONGIttSSIONAL RECORto`-- StNATE favor overall against the Russians, and you said it Was hi our favor. - ITQW ifrat 'true, if It is in our favor: alld We" st,Pp"ded the-re:What have we got to lose'? " General I/MAY: Well, if it -would stay there, probably we Wouldn't have iiii-beh" to But I wonder whether it is going to stay there or not, and, in 'addition to that, this is Net our eitimate of -the situation. Our de- livery caPablIities, / think, at the present time are better than the Russians. That doesn't rneanthey are-g6ing to stay that way. / think We .'have Mae Weap-Ord arid a great- et variety of Weapons-now than the Riiisians have.. That doesn't Mean it is going to stay that way. The thing that Worries me is that this pre- serves the uncertainties that we have in our mind may -lot as Tong. as the treaty is going to be in effect rdelered]. We just don't all knew the things we would like to know about the vulnerabilities of [de- leted] sySteiii.s. [deleled]." ?4enator PAsroin. 'tan I interrupt you there, General? Do you think that the This- ' Glans know? General LigAT. They may-know-- a' great deal more about it than we do, as a result of the, last 'big? series Of tests that they have run. [Deleted.] This bothers me, and one of the things that I don't like IS that if -this is tine and- they do know more than we do, they Ma* "know" soniething that is Vital. They may have been able to pick up a weakness in our de- fense system that they can exploit. There, is &bine reslon for them wanting this treaty when they didn't want it on two ciecasioris before. What is it? General. teivro *ent or.1 to say: These arS.the ,41S0vanthos hat vis see. They are possibilities and we ceitainif have" tried, to pay'that even with the safeguards that viehave suggested that we have, that Certainly 'ratifying the treaty is not without its risks. NOw,1 pointed out these Other uneeitain- ties, that we don't know. - Pbr instance, [deleted] that the Russians are ahead of us pn the high-yield- Spectrum, we are about equal in the[deleted] megaton- range-, and ' we are ahead in the lower [deleted] range. -41wow, I can't prove Otherwise, but I aria very suspicious. . . -. ? . Genkral IeMay tete was expressing his suspicions as to the assumption .United $tates is clearly in the lead in the field of low-yield nuclear weapons. He said; Now, I can't prove otherwise, but I am very suspistoxis, because we know [deleted] that theRussians were planning a teat pro- gram [deleted] before they broke the mora- torium and started testing. [Deleted.l. Senator -Bssrosir. I agree. General.I.41Vlsx. They may have been pre- paring for it 4onger. - I,Tow, when they did hreak'the-rnoratoriuni and starttheir testing program, ideleted], the size a the-162.64Am and the compirehen- eivenese of 11;thii is an area where we could detect the explosions and learn sthiething "about it, I can't'qUite sWatiow [deleted] that they didn't do, equally well in the lower 'ranges where [deleted] what they were doing. 'I 'am ineffned to agree? referrfrig to the statement that are al In the field of lOW--YieId nu- , - - clear weapons? ' am inclined to -agree with it beCause I can't prove it otlietwlee. -But I kin- sus- picious, and ffiero May be a pOssiblIity hers ? they are ahead throUghout the spectrum. N'oVA will admit tdeletedl teChnichins say that the odds are against [deleted] but they also say there is a possibility. Therefore, one of our key military men, Mr. President, as I have just read, questioned the statement, and indicated a strong suspicion that perhaps we are not really ahead in the low-yield nuclear weapons field. At page 407 the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] said: The area within which tests will continue under the treaty, as I understand your testi- mony, is in that field where we feel we have the greatest experience and have made the most advances; is that carrect? Of course, that is the low-yield nuclear weapons field. General LeMay answered: We think; am not sure of it. I am probably less sure than the other two Chiefs. But this is the general consensus of opinion, but one that I worry about particularly. I, too, worry about it, Mr. President. A point that should be emphasized is that the test ban will render it impossible for the United States to catch up with the Russians in -the -area of high-yield weapons because of the ban on atmos- pheric tests, while the Russians will be permitted, by the treaty's terms, to con- duct underground tests and, thus, catch up with us in the tactical nuclear weap- ons field where we think we are ahead. In summation, we may be kidding our- selves when we depend upon our being ahead of the Russians in the field of small weapons, and I have no doubt that ? we are kidding ourselves when we argue that this treaty will make it difficult for the Russians to catch up in this field. History will show that the Soviets have? not been 'disconcerted when con- _fronted with difficult problems. They produced the atomic bomb long before we thought they could produce it; they produced the hydrogen bomb long before we predicted; and they launched Sput- nik I, to our consternation and amaze- ment. Moreover, While our feats in put- ting astronauts' in 'orbit have been re- markable the Soviets have excelled us. Who will say that these, achievements have not been difficult' or expensive? It Is obvious that they have required the marshalling of tremendous energy, brains, and money. The Soviets have shown that they can make rapid advances in research and de- velopment when they contribute maxi- mum effort and emphasis to the task. Additionally, there is always the pos- sibility that the Soviets will make a major breakthrough in nuclear tech- nology which will permit them to achieve -substantial reductions in cost. Soviet national resouree.s may be under heavy strain, but this does not "Mean that even greater stress cannot be put upon them. The Soviets repeatedly have put their national resources under great' strain, but this has never inter- erecl with their deterthl?ation to secure supremacy, for example, in space re- search and exploration. Yet, the Soviet leadership evinced little apparent con- cern that the Soviet population was made to suffer through strictures on con- sumer goods. As a matter of fact, the 'people of the Soviet Union apparently have always been willing to make what- ever sacrifices appeared to be necessary, and I am sure that they stand ready to- day to make whatever further sacrifices are required of them by their leaders. There are those who said that Cuba would prove to be too expensive for the Soviet Union, but that theory has thus far proved to be false. As Adm. Arleigh Burke stated in his appearance before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee: Oast alone should not be the standard measurement for our attempting to explain what is and what is not in the best interest of any enemy nation. The use of criteria which normally we would apply in attempt- ing to clarify a given course of action for the United States will be of little value when applied to the motives or desires of a totali- tarian adversary. Far to often the Com- munists have defied reason and logic to pur- sue seemingly impossible objectives; and far too often we have made false assessments of their ability or willingness to pursue those impossible objectives. Mr. President, I do not think that any of us can be absolutely sure that we are actually ahead of the Russians in over- all nuclear technology. Yet, with few exceptions, one after another of the wit- nesses who appeared to support the treaty stated it as his opinion that the United States now enjoys technological superiority over the Soviet Union and will, through its participation in the pro- posed test ban treaty, maintain that superiority. According to this argument, parity between the Soviet Union and the United States does not now exist nor will it ensue in the foreseeable future. Sec- retary McNamara pointed out in his statement that: This prolongation of our technological superiority will be a principal direct military effeot of the treaty on the future military balance. He referred to our technological su- periority and said it would be prolonged under the treaty. Yet at page 113 of the hearing Secretary McNamara had something interesting to note. The Sen- ator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] had made this statement: I would like to pursue that just a little bit. You do concede in your statement that Insofar as the extremely large yield weapons are concerned the Soviets do have superior- ity over us. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; I do. Senator PASTORE. In the smaller tactical weapons, which can be tested underground, we have superiOrity over them? Secretary Mc/sTsmsas. I believe so, al- though I can't state that with absolute certainty. . Therefore, Secretary McNamara could not say with absolute certainty?nobody can say with absolute certainty?that even in the smaller tactical weapons field we have superiority over the Soviet Union. We are to believe, nonetheless, that the treaty will insure our continued superi- ority and the Soviets' inferiority for the foreseeable future. The Soviets appear, by this argument, to be willing to freeze themselves in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis the United States. If, in fact, they have resigned themselves to such a 7/0112 -ROP658603$3R0041,0o20drib4-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16608 CONGRESSIONAL RECpRD -- SENATE position of strategic inferiority, it would follow that they must have renounced their goal of world conquest and the de- struction of our way of life. But, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed out in his statement during the hearings: We have no basis yet for assuming a fun- damental change in Soviet objectives. Moreover, the statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphatically points out that, "We must not for a moment forget that militant communism remains com- mitted to the destruction of our society." It is hard to believe that the Soviet Union would agree to a treaty, which, if faithfully adhered to by all parties, would guarantee the long-range inferiority of . Soviet strength and the concomitant failure to achieve Communist goals. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that on August 5, the day on which the 'treaty was signed in Moscow, the official Tess statement included this passage: Does conclusion of a treaty banning the tests alter the present balance of power? No; it does not. The Soviet Government would never have agreed to the conclusion of such a treaty if it placed us in an unequal position, if it gave unilateral advantage to the other side. All this does not require Special proof. As one can see, while we have been assured that we possess technological superiority, the Soviet Union claims it- self to be superior in nuclear technology. This creates doubt ineiny mind that we possess facts which really assure us as to who is ahead of whom at this stage of the game. As Adm. ArIeigh 13urke, U.S. Navy, retired, stated, in referring to our vaunted technological superiority over the Soviet Union: This superiority has been claimed so often that I fear it has become automatically ac- cepted as being fact. What is not generally realized is that this statement is not founded on hard evidence, but rather is the result of speculation. It is of interest to note that the Soviets claim to be ahead of us in nu- clear weapons technology. Whereas this claim need not be accepted necessarily, neither is it possible to reject ft unequivo- cally. Our own military leaders and scien- tists state that the Soviet Union is, without doubt, ahead of the United States in the high yield range, and that the treaty will permit the Russians to retain the advantage in this- field. At the same time it will permit the Soviet Union to make gains, through under- ground tests, in the development of tac- tical nuclear weapons, a field in which we are supposedly ahead. In other words, we will be prevented from catch- ing up with the Russians where they are admittedly ahead, and they will be per- mitted to catch up with us where we are presumably ahead. THE TEST BAN WILL SLOW DOWN THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Most persons will probably agree that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may be slowed as a consequence of the ban, particularly among lamf-abiding democ- racies which are friends and from which we have nothing to fear. Moreover, scores of the nations which have signed the treaty would probably never develop nuclear weapons or become nuclear powers in any event. The same cannot ? be said, however, for Communist coun- tries and dictatorships which may have the potential and the motive and which can develop nuclear explosives secretly. As Dr. Edward Teller stated before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- tee: The only technical comment which is relevant is the observation that the develop- ment of nuclear weapons is easy once nu- clear materials are readily available. Start- ing with the 1955 Atoms for Peace confer- ence we have made it Very sure that in the course of time nuclear materials will become available oh every continent. Once a coun- try is in the possession of a few kilograms of plutonium simple experiments that can be earned out in secrecy an produce a small nuclear explosion in lesig than 1 year. Such small nuclear explosions are sufficient to give the needed assurance and experience to a country which intends to use these explosives on a relatively small scale. The treaty will indubitably not prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in- sofar as Red China and France are con- cerned. In fact, France is already a nu- clear power. Red China is evincing the determination to become one. Neither of these nations has indicated a willing- ness to become a signatory. What Russia will do when France progresses in the state of the art remains to be seen. One might venture to guess that this could furnish the pretext for Russia's abrogation of the treaty. Furthermore, the treaty will not pre- vent nuclear weapons passing into the hands of additional nations by purchase, by loan, or by transfer. It will not pre- vent or prohibit one nation giving to an? other design or production knowledge. It will not prevent any nation from ac- quiring the means to produce pluto- nium?and possession of plutonium is the key to the atomic bomb. In the final analysis, it will not pre- vent testing. In fact, the treaty tends to remove whatever moral restraints pre- viously attached to weapons tests by es- sentially legalizing the testing of weap- ons underground. Let no one imagine that the treaty will frustrate the testing of weapons by any nation which has made a decision to become a nuclear power, and which has allocated the re- sources and expended them on the re- search, development, and production programs which must necessarily pre- cede a weapon test. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY Mr. President, I now proceed to the main arguments against the treaty, as I see them. I am oppased to the treaty mainly for the following reasons: First. The treaty is difficult of exact interpretation. Second. There is danger of clandestine testing by the Soviets. Third. There is danger of surprise ab- rogation by the Soviets. Fourth. The treaty will result in eu- phoria in the West. Fifth. Military superiority will shift to the Soviets. Now I shall attempt to elaborate upon each of these. THE TREATY IS DIFFICULT OF EXACT INTERPRETATION On July 26, 1963, a New York Times corres_pondent quoted a State Depart- September 19 ment source as having stated that the wording of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was "disturbingly imprecise." It is diffi- cult to disagree. For example, under the terms of the treaty, what constitutes an "underground" test? Much depends on the interpretation of "underground." Must an "underground'" test be one that is totally confined? Shallow tests con- ducted just beneath the surface may produce much more valuable informa- tion than tests at greater depths. Such shallow tests are also more economical. Yet, what is mean by "underground" tests may be open to question. In the report of the Senate Committee on For- eign Relations, September 3, 1963, page 22, Secretary of State Rusk is quoted as saying: Obviously this treaty permits a clear un- derground test where the explosion is under- ground, where the testing apparatus is based on that phenomenon, and I would think we would not think that it applied to a surface explosion which was christened by a few shovelfuls of dirt. But even though venting accompanies a low-yield undergrou:nd explosion it cannot necessarily be detected, identi- fied, or verified. What then will be the Soviet definition of "underground" arid will it be broader than the U.S. defini- tion? The question of what constitutes an "underground" test may, however, be purely academic. The pressure of world Public opinion may be brought to bear as a reason for the cessation of under- ground testing even though permitted by the treaty. Already the Soviet Union has laid the groundwork for a psycho- logical warfare campaign to keep the United States from carrying out what is provided for by the treaty. The of- ficial Soviet news agency Tass on August 30, 1963, stated that the recent under- ground test in Nevada violated the "spirit of the treaty." The Communists are quite aware of the esteem in which any treaty is held by the people of the United States. They understand that our respect for the law is such that we will live up not only to the words of a binding treaty, but will lean over back- ward in order to avoid violating even the spirit of a binding treaty. They understand the American penchant for thinking along legalistic lines and re- member how much faith we placed in the Kellogg-Briand treaty for the re- nunciation of war. To the Soviets a disarmament treaty is a paper bullet, a technique of psychopolitical struggle. As President Kennedy has aptly said, the Soviet idea of diplomacy is: What's mine is mine, and what's yours is negotiable. Several other ambiguities are sprin- kled throughout passages of the treaty. Admiral Arleigh Burke, in his testi- mony, indicated that he is concerned lest the words "underwater, including territorial waters or high seas" might not be interpreted by the Soviets to in- clude "internal waters." My own in- terpretation would be that "underwater'' includes internal waters. But there is room for debate, argument, question, and misunderstanding. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Accorcliqg to Admiral Burke: Tests iiiitterrlal,,waters, under the present wording of lie treaty and under at least one interpretation of international law, would be regarded as Underground tests and, therefore, permissible if radioactive debris is not deposited outside national boundaries. s Otherwise, the treaty would need provisions for inspection to detect against inland un- derwater testing. And if testing underwater in an inland lake is permissible, in what other waters might it also be permissible2 Admiral 13urke; On page 13 of his pre- pared statement, also raised a question concerning the interpretation of "terri- , tonal waters" as alluded to in the treaty: ' We have a meaning for "territorial waters," but it is doubtful that the soviets Would entertain, the, same meaning. In fact, a representative sampling- of the writ- ings of international lawyers would give evidence to the ft that they either re- frain from using the, term or disagree to Its meaa_ing When they do use it. We would probably agree with' the definition that ter- ritorial waters are those included within a definite maritime zone or belt adjacent to a State's /erritory. The Soviets would also tuie this definition if It Were clearly suitable to their ?purpose's, regardless of their pres- ent intentions. But since he term is ambiguous, any party is free to adopt his own 'definition. There obviously cannot be, in the present case, a' mutually agreed definition of the term "territorial waters," since we have been assured that this treaty constituteelhe en- tire agreement. Other important areas of misinterpre- tation are clearly in evidence as? was Manifested, during the entire course of the hearings. Careful reading of the hearings will reveal that many Senators Were not satisfied that the United States may be permitted to use nuclear Weap- ons in war. ' Even former President Eisenhower was , not satisfied with the terminology of the treaty on this point. Mr. President, my concern ?is that the United States will be overly cautious in its interpretation of the treaty. In Eta- tual practice, therefore, our progress ? under the treaty will be inhibited by the fear that we will be charged with a vio- lation thereof, whereas the Soviets, on ? the otheifiand, will not suffer from such inhibitions. As a matter of fact, the very nature of a closed society, such as theirs, will encourage them to undertake Viola- tions of the treaty in the expectation that those violations cannot be detected, identified, and verified. Our past be- havior reveals precedents of the exercise pf excessive caution in interpreting agreements. As a matter of fact, we Itted excessive caution in observing the ? Voluntary moratorium during the years 1958-61., That agreement was not even a treaty, In order to avoid alarming the nussians; however, we refrained from Making ,adequate preparations for the of nuclear testing. As a re- t,-the-itisSsian'atmospheric explosions In the rairof 196i:caught us only weakly prepared. 2. 'THERE IS'DANona CLANnfisrfin rieriNn BY ? Tat SOVIET'S _ "Many vvho speak for the treaty do not ?dpny that there are real risks of clan- '4estine ,t6Sting, but they find reasons to , discount every nsk, or to resolve every doubt in favor of the treaty. Secretary McNamara, for example, stated: While tests at extreme ranges are a tech- nological possibility, thqy would involve years of preparation plus several months to a year of actual execution, and they could cost hun- dreds of millions of dollars per successful experiment. Are we not forgetting the patience of the Communists, their skill in space, and their willingness to put as much of their resources as necessary into their efforts to achieve military supremacy over the United States? . Secretary McNamara then pointed out two more possible loopholes for cheat- ing. He said: Over the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, only very low-yield tests, with quite limited objectives, could have a good chance of es- caping discovery. These tests could not pro- duce significant advantage@. In certain remote parts of the world such as the South Pacific the threshold of evasion of geophysical detectors in the upper atmos- phere will be somewhat higher and the chance of recovering a debris sample might be rather small. However, it is most un- likely that the Soviets will try to take ad- vantage of this situation. An upper atmos- phere test would be difficult to perform from shipboard and might require several vessels properly deployed around the test point. Preparations for such a test would be rela- tively easy to discover. In other words, this treaty has known loopholes; but explanations, some of which are admittedly plausible, as to why the Soviets will not employ them, InaY be advanced. I think we are un- derrating Soviet cunning and the Soviet determination to outwit us. On the other hand, I think we are overrating the Soviet fear of being caught in a vio- lation and the 'Soviet respect for world opinion. The fact that the Soviets have no concern about the wrath of public opin- ion is amply demonstrated by the way they ended the moratorium on tests in the fall of 1961. The Soviets knew in advance that there would be loud pro- tests throughout tile world when they resumed testing after the moratorium which had lasted 34 months. Neverthe- less, they did not hesitate to resume tests, because they knew it would catapult them ahead in their nuclear knowledge. Even though the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly passed, on October 27, 1961, by a vote of 87 to 11, with 1 ab- stention, a resolution appealing to the .Soviet Union not to carry out its stated intention of exploding a 50-megaton bomb, 3 days later the Soviet Union detonated a bomb of 57 megatons, which the United States has not yet matched. World opinion, ergo, means nothing to the Soviet Union, except insofar as it may constitute a very useful tool against the United States. As to our detection ,system, there_ is ample evidence that it leaves much to ,be desired. Even if a very expensive detection system is employed, we can tion is reversed, as well it may be? have no assurance that theRnssians will For instance, it has been said that the So- not devise a way to successfully shield vista might elect cheating with a single test tests from currently known detection which might even escape detection; that we methods. The entire question of outer could surely detect a series of tests but that space testing and detection is in the one test by itself alone would be of little stage of infancy, and it is impossible to predict how it will develop. As shown on page 106 of the test ban treaty hearings, Secretary McNamara said: Over the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, only very low-yield tests with quite limited objectives could have a good chance of escaping discovery. These tests, we believe, could not produce significant advantages. And on page 109, we find that Secre- tary McNamara said: I do not pretend that this or any other agreement between great, contending pow- ers can be risk free. Surely this one is not. I cannot guarantee that we will detect any single clandestine test the Soviets might at- tempt; but Soviet technical and military advisers cannot guarantee that we will not. I am convinced that even undetected clan- destine tests will not alter the basic mili- tary balance. Supporting witnesses have indicated, therefore, that there is not 100 percent assurance that we will detect violations; but, they added, neither is there 100 per- cent assurance for the Russians that we will not detect violations. In other words, we are to accept the minimum standards of adequacy. In effect, we are told that, so long as there is not 100 percent assurance that an attempted test In space will go undetected, we are ade- quately safeguarded. I contend that when dealing with the Communists, we must apply the maximum standards, and must allow no loophole for evasion, for so long as there is a single loophole, the Communists will find it and will use it. Secretary McNamara said?as shown on pages 140 and 141: Secretary McNailAaa. I would be quite happy to go into it in length, but perhaps I can simply say now we have a very substan- tial capability through geophysical and oth- er means of detecting nuclear explosions in the forbidden environments. I don't believe that we can say that the present capability will give assurance of de- tecting all such explosions or of identifying all such explosions. We, therefore, are considering augmenting the present capability. Even after that aug- mentation is made, if it is made. I don't be- lieve that we can guarantee that we will be able to identify all possible violations of the treaty, but I do strongly believe that the vio- lations that may not be identified by the present or augmented system will not shift the military balance of power. So, in essence, we are told not to worry about violations which may go undetect- ed, because they will not significantly alter the balance of military power. As shown on page 673 of the test ban treaty hearings, Admiral Strauss made this statement with reference to the sig- nificance of even one test: A radical new weapon discovery or a break- through in countermeasure systems, sudden- ly tested and found workable, could put the possessor nation in command of world events. We ourselves were twice in that position, first with our invention of the fission bomb and later of the fusion bomb. Of course, we never considered making such use of our ad- vantage, but what if in the future the situa- Approted Foi-Rele 2 07/017 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP6130038R000100200004-6 16610 CONGRESSIONAL 11.CORD ? SENATE significance. This unfortunately will not stand up in the light of history. We cannot forget, we should not forget, that only one single test proved the atomic bomb, and one test proved the principle of the 11-bomb. If such ,radical Invention is made on our side of the Iron Curtain, one that Is provable only by testing it above ground, the treaty will firmly bind our hands. Thus paralyzed, we can only file the idea away in a safe and pray fervently that the same invention will not occur to scientists on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Unfortu- nately, there is a well-recognized and fre- quently experienced phenomenon known as simultaneous invention. It may operate against us. If the discovery?the breakthrough?Ls made on the other side of the Iron Curtain, is there anything upon which to base an esti- mate of the situation? Would the Soviets, in that circumstance, or other circumstances favorable to them, clandestinely breach the treaty? On page 186 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] made the following statement: DETECTING TESTS AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES Senator RussELL. Mr. Chairman, / only have one or two questions that I did not get to this morning. I hope they were not covered in my absence. If they were, Mr. Secretary, I hope you will tell me if the answers are in the record. On page 19 of your statement, in dealing with the subject of atmospheric tests, you said: "In the upper atmosphere?say above 6 miles [to 20 miles] high?the principal purpose of clandestine tests would be for determining weapons effects." Is there any difference in the ability to test in that area, from 6 to 20 miles, than on the surface of the earth, and still higher in the atmosphere Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; there is a difference?not in the ability to test?be- cause none of the parties are allowed to test there, but there is a difference in the ability to detect and identify clandestine tests. It is more difficult to detect and identify tests in certain bands of the atmosphere, particular- ly in this band I am discussing?say rough- ly from 6 to 20 miles, than it is to detect tests in the low atmosphere. Senator RUSSELL. Of course, tests below the 6 miles X suppose you can detect through debris rather easily. That is our principal method of detecting them. Secretary IVIcNAmARA. There are a series of methods used for that purpose. Perhaps Dr. Brown could speak to them very briefly. Senator RUSSELL. Very well. Dr. BROWN. The techniques that / think are of most interest in this regard are the acoustical signal, the electromagnetic signal, which is like a lightning flash essentially, and the debris. All of them are applicable below 6 miles. In the band from 6 to about 20 miles, the electromagnetic signal is suppressed somewhat, and therefore you do not have as many techniques, and therefore it is somewhat more difficult. Debris sampling is also harder to do, but it is not impossible. So that even for tests at, say, 10 or 15 miles, there is some chance of being able to detect debris. But it is a smaller chance. And that is why this region is of particular concern. On page 274 of the hearings General Taylor referred to the risks and disad- vantages in the treaty, and the fact that the disadvantages will be aggravated by illicit testing. He said: Such disadvantage as might accrue to the United States under conditions of honest fulfillment of treaty conditions would be further aggravated if the Soviets success- fully tested by illicit explosions in the atmos- phere, underwater, or in outer space. On page 282 of the hearings,bef ore the Committee on Foreign [Mr. RUSSELL] Relations, the Senator from Gapr asked the following question of General Taylor: PRBSENT DETECTION SYSTEM NOT ADEQUATE Senator RI:13mm. General, one of the very important elements involved in the art of detection by various methods of explosions. Are you satisfied with the devices that we have at the present time? General TAYLOR. No, sir. As Indicated among the four safeguards, one of the areas where the Joint Chiefs feel additional effort should be expended is in improving our de- tection devices, and a review of our program is being conducted at the present time. On page 324 of the bearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCEE] and General Taylor engaged in this colloquy: RISK OF CLANDESTINE TESTING Senator LAUSCHE. You are also of the- opin- ion that by clandestine tests, Russia could technologically aggravate these disadvan- tages under which we will be laboring in the event the treaty is adopted. General TAYLOR. That is correct. We would say they can do I, certain amount of clandestine testing if they want to and if they are prudent enough to hold down the level, thereby they can Make some gain- On page 330 of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- lations Senator Youria asked a question of General Taylor regarding detection devices: - Senator YOUNG. And do you feel, General, that 2 years from now or a year from now, our detection devices probably will be more accurate? General TAYLOR. I am not an expert in the field. I doubt that we could do it quite that fast. But certainly in a few years we can do distinctly better. On page 331 the following appears: General TAYLOR. Well, I don't dispute the logic of what you say, Senator. I don't think we military individuals can afford to assume anything other than the worst in this par- ticular field, and we did take our position on the treaty with the assumption that the So- viets would attempt clandestine testing of some sort. The CHAntsmsr. Do you mean very minor, small tests which would be difficult to detect? General TAztort. Yes, sir. I would think the temptations would be in the atmospheric tests of small weapons, small tactical weap- ons, for example, or small tests which could be extrapolated to apply to the antimissile missiLes. That would be the tempting area. The CHAIRMAN. So small it would be very difficult to detect. Is that what you mean? General TAYLOR. That Is right. The CHAIRMAN. But it Is in this field that you feel we are very well prepared ourselves, Is it not? General TAYLOR. Well,- it is in this field where I don't think the gains that might come from this kind of testing would have any great bearing upon our relative posi- tion. On page 395 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from California [Mr. KucaraL] asked the following question of General LeMay : EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION METHODS Senator KUCHEL. General, just In lay terms, is our detection system with respect September 19 to atmospheric nuclear explosions sufficient- ly efficient so that we would know if there were an attempted clandestine breach by the Soviet Union? General LEMAY. The answer to that has to be "No,". because I don't think we can de- tect every explosion that they may attempt in the atmosphere any place in the world. Now, we have some figures; I am sure you are familiar with them as well as I am, but we cannot guarantee to detect every explo- sion; no, sir. On pages 418 and 419, Dr. Teller said the following: Most of us believed and the U.S. intelli- gence firmly and unequivocally predicted, that the Russians will not have a nuclear ex- plosion for many years. The first Russian test in 1992 was a com- plete surprise. Some of us got worried. I got very worried about the next surprise that might be in store for us, and we started out on the next step which the majority of the scientists said could. noi; be done, the thermonuclear explosion. You know that within a short time that succeeded, with an effect almost a thousand times as great as the first explosion, and that, in turn, was followed within a few months with the Russians producing some- thing that looked very much like a ther- monuclear explosion. Again, in contradiction to all expectations, to all predictions, to the explicit statements of the intelligence community. On page 448 Dr. Teller, with reference to illegal and clandestine testing in space as not being a reasonable proposition for the Soviet Union, and as being something that we can protect ourselves against, said as follows: Dr. TELLER. I believe that this reflects the Secretary's great reliance on intelligence. I hope he is right. I fear he may not be. Senator MUNDT, on page 241 of the hearings, asked questions of Dr. Seahorg concerning the detectability of an under- water test: DETECTABILITY OF AN UNDERWATER TEST Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you a specific question in. this field of detection. Several people who have made a lifetime study of gopolitics are concerned about the fact that while underwater testing in the interior waters of Russia in a lake as vast as Lake Baikal?which is so deep that you could use it for submarines and so vast that it is vir- tually an interior ocean?is barred by the treaty. Do we presently have the means of detection so that we could find out if they violate the treaty in this area by Underwater tests, 3,000 or 4,000 feet unde:r the surface of the Water, in Lake Baikal in the interior of Russia? Dr. SEABORG. No. We don't have the means of detecting such a test by instrumentation, by the methods of detecting nuclear tests through physical means., Senator MUNDT. Does this mean that we simply have to rely on the unsupported veracity and word of the Russians that they are fulfilling their treaty in this area. We are told by Secretary Rusk that it is intended that the treaty prohibit underwater tests of that nature in Lake Baikal, Dr. SEABORG. Well, I think that more im- portant than that is that we don't see any great gain that they could make by making such a test or tests and that the hazards to the Soviets themselves are considerable In contaminating the inland waters, and so forth. I think that I would he motivated more by that consideration, that it would be the sort of test that wouldn't bother me very much, that there isn't a great deal that they could Approved Fpr Release 2007/01/20: CIA-R DP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For F3elease 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 ? 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE learn there that would be of concern to us so fares Our national security is concerned. Senates' Mtafrir.4The fact that underwater tests are prohibited by the treaty would im- ply to me that they must have some value to somebody or they wouldn't be prohibited. Dr. 8mi:ions. Yes, they do, but the value is an order of magnitude less than the value, much, much less than the value of atmo- spheric tests. Senator 1Vluisior. They do have some value. Dr, SEADORG. They have some value, yes, very specific value, though, namely, the ef- fect of the nuclear explosion on a ship or a submarine. I think it is apparent, Mr. President, that, although we hope for compliance, we cannot discount the probability that the Soviet Union will violate the treaty. The frustrating problem which will con- front us, in this regard, will be that of detecting and verifying the Violation. 3. THERE IS DANGER OF SURPRISE ABROGATION BY THE SOVIETS The fact that the Soviets brazenly broke the moratorium in 1961 demon- strates more than the fact that ;they have no regard for public opinion. It also warns us of another method in ad- dition to clandestine testing by which the Soviets can use this treaty to get ahead of us. I refer, as I have already indicated, to surprise abrogation. On August 30, 1961, while the United States was offering various concessions at the Geneva Conference to get the Soviet Union to agree to a ban on all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government simply is- sued a statement announcing that it was going to resume tests, and 2 days later, It conducted the first of a long, extremely well-planned, highly advantageous test series. This ended a 3-year uninspected moratorium which the United States had unwisely observed in the futile hope that it would encourage the Soviet Union to accept an adequate inspection system. Almost 8 months passed, fol- lowing the Soviet abrogation, before the? United States was able to resume atmos- pheric testing. Just before the announcement that the United States would resume atmos- pheric tests, William C. Foster, Director Of the 'U.S. Arms Control and,Disarma- - Merit Agency, pointed out the tremen- dous advantages which were reaped by the Soviet Union in its surprise resump- tion of tests in 061. He wrote in a let- ter to the editor of the Washington Post on February 9, 1962: While the details ,would not be appropriate in this letter, it has become clear only in the last month that the Soviets achieved some substantial gains in their test series of last summer and fall. One more such advan- tage?that is, another long and intensive se- ries, after a period of no testing on either side during which they extrapolated the re- sults of these tests and, o,n that ba,sis, secretly prepared for new tests?might actually give them a superiority in the anti-missile or Other Strategic areas which their military in- tereSte wOlild find hard not to exploit. This treaty lays the groundwork for the exact same thing to happen again. After the Soviet Union has analyzed all Its data from past tests and laid careful plans for a new series, after our guard has been let down and our efforts have relaxed, after the American scientists have performed ail the work they can in the laboratories and through under- ground tests and have been stymied by the inability to conduct further tests, the Soviets will simply 1 day resume testing, leaving the United States far behind. It would not be out of character for them to ignore the 3-month withdrawal clause, because observance of the clause would give us an opportunity to prepare for a test resumption too. The administration has contended that it will protect the Nation against the danger of surprise abrogation by keeping Its scientists active in the laboratories and active in an underground testing program, and by maintaining a high state of readiness to conduct tests in the atmosphere at any time. I question whether we will be able to maintain such preparations indefinitely, no matter how good our intentions, especially after the treaty has gone on a few months or years And the Communists have succeeded in getting us to lower our guard. Only a year and a half ago, on March 2, 1962, when President Kennedy an- nounced that the United States also would resume atmospheric testing, he pointed out the difficulties of keeping scientists in a free society working on a test series which might never be con- ducted. He toll a radio and television audience: We know enough now about broken nego- tiations, secret preparations, and the advan- tage,s gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particu- larly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future. Nor can large technical lab- oratories be kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient?we have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it impos- sible of execution. Although the President was speaking of an uninspected moratorium on all tests, the same argument applies today to the uninspected treaty which awaits our decision, unless the American people are determined, and remain determined, not to relax in the effort to be prepared for any eventuality. We should also know by this time that an intelligence community which was unable to detect in time the conduct of preparations, by the Russians, during the moratorium, for a resumption of atmospheric testing, and which was un- able to detect the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba until virtually the last minute, cannot be depended upon to de- tect Soviet activities in anticipation of a planned abrogation of this treaty. With reference to the possibility of planned abrogation, I refer to Dr. Sea- borg's statement, as shown on page 208 of the test ban treaty hearings: We must always remain alert to the fact that one side may try to acquire a superior advantage through violation or abrogation of the treaty. The effect of such an action on the other parties is decidedly less where underground testing is permitted and where an active program of worldwide nuclear test detection is continued. 16611 It does not seem possible to be forewarned against a surprise abrogation. Even if the 3 months' notice period for any country planning to withdraw is given, it would pos- sibly have been accompanied by an earlier period of preparation. General Taylor, as shown on page 274 of the hearings, referred to the possibil- ity of an abrupt abrogation: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the withdrawal provision requiring 90 days' no- tice following a unilateral U.S. decision pro- vides a satisfactory means of escape in case we believe our national interest is being threatened. They are impressed, however, by the possiiblity of an abrupt abrogation by the Soviets, followed by a comprehensive series of atmospheric tests. As appears on page 319, General Tay- lor further commented on the possibility of an abrupt abrogation by the Soviets: I doubt we will ever be sure that we can detect the preparations and not be surprised. We can hedge our stake, so to speak, by im- proving our own reaction time. But beyond that I would say it is impossible in my judg- ment to upset the relative balance of power quickly, as a result of something of this sort. General LeMay, on page 375, said this: (The Russians) have already said they would abrogate the treaty if?at any time they thought it was necessary. And I firmly believe that they were conducting tests dur- ing the moratorium that we had. And?I certainly have no faith that they will keep their word in this one if they feel it is to their advantage to do otherwise. Secretary McNamara, on page 130, said this: It has led to the conclusion I just gave that they will not adhere to any treaty when they think it is contrary to their interest to continue to adhere to it. It is for that rea- son, among others, that I believe we must be prepared for surprise abrogation of the treaty by the Soviets. At page 140, Secretary McNamara re- ferred again the likelihood of a Soviet abrogation: First, I think we must be prepared for surprise abrogation by the Soviets. As I testified, I don't believe they will adhere to this treaty one moment longer than they think it is in their interest to adhere to it, and I can't predict how long that will be. So, we must be prepared for surprise abro- gation. Admiral Strauss, as appears on page 674 of the hearings, had this to say about the planned abrogation of the voluntary moratorium: A distinguished scientist, who was a prin- cipal adviser to our negotiating team in Ge- neva, published an essay in August 1960. This is a quotation from it: "I had the doubtful honor of presenting the theory of the big hole to the Russians in Geneva in November 1959." May I interrupt there to say that the ref- erence to the big hole is a method for reduc- ing the seismic signal of an underground explosion by decoupling. I continue with the balance of the quotation: "I felt deeply embarrassed in so doing, because it implied that we considered the Russians capable of cheating on a massive scale. I think that they would have been quite justified if they had considered this an insult and had walked out of the negotia- tions in disgust." The Russian scientists for whose sensitiv- ity our scientist had so admirable a regard were not so thin-skinned, At that very time Approved For Release 2007/01/2 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16612 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE they must have been engaged in the massive preparations for cheating on a massive scale. In barely 12 months atter the article ap- peared, they staged a series of tests which, for length, and number, and size of weapons, astonish the neutral and free world, and I might interpolate here parenthetically that we might not forget that the Soviets got not so much as a slap on the wrist from the congress of neutral nations in whose very faces, as it were, this series had been ex- ploded. This "contemptuous breach of faith," to use the President's appropriate adjective, seems already forgotten by many Americans. It took place 2 years ago, but we can shorten the focus in point of time. On page 420 of the hearings, Dr. Ed- ward Teller alluded to the surprise abro- gation of the moratorium and to the test results which followed: AIISSIAN TESTS RESUMED-1961 In the summer of 1961 the Russians re- sumed testing, in the late summer. We know now that this test series was by far the most powerful, we have reason to be- lieve that it was the most powerful in the whole history of Russian preparations, and it was the most plentiful, the most repeti- tious, the most solid ever carried out by any nation. I don't think that any expert will disagree with me when I say that this test series had to be prepared for many months in advance, and that the preparations had to be ex- nsive, widespread, and should have been open to intelligence information. It is pos- sible, I would even say that it is probable that the planning of this abrogation took a time longer than a year. Yet on the day before Khrushchev made his announcement our Government still did not know that a test series was impending. Here is another surprise, another failure of us to predict what the future will bring and what the Russians intend to do. RUSSIAN ADVANCES?RESULT OE TESTING As a result of this test series the Russians made a big explosion. For one I can tell you this was no surprise. I wish / could talk about it more. It is interesting, it is slightly relevant, it is classified, but the Russians did have a surprise in store for us, and that sur- prise was their announcement and evidence stmporting that announcement that they did make great strides toward missile defense. In 1961, and in the dimilarly impressive test series in 1962, the Russians had every chance in the world to make the observa- tions in the atmosphere which are the firm basis of any plan for an effective or halfway effective missile defense, and I am saying halfway effective in the most serious way. As to the amount of time that would be lost, in the event of a surprise abroga- tion by the Soviets, before we could pro- ceed with atmospheric testing, Secretary McNamara elucidates, on page 157 of the test ban treaty hearings, as follows: Secretary MCNAMARA. I will give you some rough approximations. I think they are suf- ficiently accurate to answer your questions. I think we could test within approxi- mately, or could carry out within approxi- mately 2 months, proof tests. By proof tests, I mean tests of previously developed weap- ons. I think we could test within approxi- mately 1 month thereafter?that is, a total of 30 days?technical developments. I think we could carry out within approximately 3 months thereafter?that is, a total of 6 months, could carry out within that, ex- tensive effects tests. Now, this latter answer applies from a period 12 months from now and thereafter? this because whether we have a test ban treaty or don't have a test ban treaty, an extensive period Of time is required to pre- pare for complex effects tests. Mr. President, if past actions of the Russians have any meaning whatsoever, this treaty is made to be breached, and I believe that it will be breached. There should be no doubt that its abrogation, which even the propon nts generally an- ticipate, will be to our 4isadvantage mili- tarily and possibly, politically. 4. TH E TREATY WILL RESULT IN rep HORIA IN THE WEST _ Mr. President, with reference to my fourth point, that the treaty will result in euphoria in the West, may I MY that the danger of euphoria has been alluded to by both friend and foe of the treaty. Secretary of Defense McNamara stated this fear as follows: Perhaps the most serious risk of this treaty is the risk of euphoria. We must guard against a condition of mind which allows us to become lax in our defenses. The Joint Chiefs of staff, in their po- sition paper, presented during the hear- ings, echoed this fear: The most serious reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are more directly linked with the fear of a euphoria in the West which will eventually reduce our vigilance and the willingness of our country and of our allies to expand con- tinued effort on our collettive security. If we ratify this treaty, we Must conduct a vig- orous underground testing program and be ready on short notice to resume atmospheric testing. We should strengthen our detection capabilities and maintain modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs. Finally, we must not for a moment forget that mili- tant communism remains committed to the destruction of our society. Adm. George W. Anderson, U.S. Navy, retired, referred to aa public opinion which must not for any reason be lulled into an attitude of false security or com- placency." All scientific and military personnel, whether proponents or opponents of the treaty, urged that every precaution be taken to carry out underground testing aggressively, maintain the necessary capability of our laboratories, and sus- tain a high state of readiness to resume atmospheric testing in the event of ab- rogation, all of which precautions may be victimized if our people become com- placent and let down their guard. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., said: People and skills cannot be stored for future use. In science just as in other spe- cialtes one must practice -continually to be effective. Ultimately tlae present genera- tion of weapons technologists must be re- placed, by younger scientists who, through experiments and theoretical studies, will also cleveiop the required skills * * *. Without atmospheric tests, however, I doubt that we can develop and maintain the requisite skill in the important area of the effects of nu- clear weapons. Even our theoretical effort In this area is likely to deterioriate without the incentive of meaningful experiments. Secretary Rusk, as shown on page 30 of the test ban treaty hearings, referred to his fear of euphoria in this manner: Quite frankly we here are concerned, we and the free world are Concerned, that this treaty not itself lead to the kind of euphoria we cannot afford in the' present situation. September 19 Secretary McNamara, on page 109 of the hearings, displayed a similar concern regarding euphoria: Perhaps the most serious risk of this, treaty is the risk of euphoria. We must. guard against a condition of mind which. allows us to become lax in our defenses, This agreement is a product of Western. strength?of the military buildup which. I described to you earlier. Further progress in arms control arrangements with the So- viet Union?progress which we all want to make?depends critically on the mainte- nance of that strength. Then, as appears on page 124, Secre- tary McNamara reiterated his concern: I want to mention again, however., the point I raised in the latter part of my state- ment when I emphasized the clanger of re- laxation of our security measures, the danger of euphoria, the danger that could easily lead to a reduction in military budget, and a reduction in our military strength actions which I think at this time are quite unde- sirable. Dr. Seaborg added his comment, as ap- pears on page 208 of the hearings: Public recognition of the need for strong laboratories and of the contributions made by the scientists is necessary. At page 273, General Taylor's warn- ing regarding euphoria was voiced by him as follows: Finally, they believed that account must be taken of the dangers of any relaxed mili- tary effort by the United States and our al- lies; hence, that ratification of the treaty should be accompanied by evidence of a clear Intent to maintain and improve the military posture of the West. At page 275, General Taylor elaborated further regarding euphoria: The most serious reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are more directly linked with the fear of a-eu- phoria in the West which will eventually reduce our vigilance and the willingness of our country and of our allies to expand con- tinued effort on our collective security. General Taylor, at page 276 of the hearings, continued, with reference to euphoria: I think it may ,be a serious problem, Mr. Chairman. Certainly I am encouraged by the statement of the leaders of our Govern- ment at this time as to their determination to effect the safeguards that have been me:n.- tioned in my statement. As the years go by, however, I think we may lose sight of the fact that the Communist bloc has not changed its overall objective. General LeMay, at page 3'79, ref ering to euphoria said: Well, we feel if we follow these courses that we recommend that we can reduce the risk to an acceptable proportion. But I am frank to admit that I do worry, considering my experience in this field, that we may get -complacent and drop our safe- guards programs down to a level that I would consider insufficient. At page 403, General LeMay said: Well, certainly this isn't beyond the real n of possibility. He was refering to euphoria. I think It is probably well known by Khru- shchev as well as all the rest of us that we have a tendency to become complacent from time to time. And let down our guard. We have done that many times in the past. Whereas they? Approved For Release 2007/01/20: dA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For ReleasPe 2007/(01/2 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE : CIA-RDP651300383R000100200004-6 The Russians? Whereas they can control things like that [deleted]. This could be a deliberately planned pro- gram in that regard, to get us to drop our guard down and this 10 one of the things that the Chief have worried about, that we will get such a treaty and then become com- placent about it and not maintain the neces- sary safeguards. Mr. President, the candidly expressed fears of the witnesses whose statements I have just quoted may inaterialize, to our country's disadvantage, in the course of future events. ? Eternal vigilance on the part of the Congress, the executive branch, and the people will indeed, be the price if we are to retain our cherished liberty. The same vigilance will be required by the other Western Powers, because, if we ratify this treaty, there is cause to fear that the underlying sense of urgency which led to the creation of NATO and which sustains NATO today may suffer a gradual erosion which will lead to the final collapse of Western unity and the Western will to resist. Of course, the Soviets may, for reasons unknown to us at the moment, live UP to the provisions of this treaty, at least for awhile, just as they faithfully ob- served their nonaggression pacts with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for awhile before committing acts of aggression against those countries, But we shall have to be all the more on our guard, lest we be enticed, by virtue of their doing so, to begin the descent Into the maelstrom of, in effect, unilateral dis- armament. ? 5. MILITARY SUPERIORITY WILL SHIFT TO THE .00V1ETS It is not a groundless fear that the treaty constitutes a risk to the continued Military superiority of the United States. The following reasons are stated to sub- stantiate this apprehension: First. The United States will be unable to overcome Russia's lead in high-yield weapons. Second. The door would be closed to a further identification of problems of which we may be entirely unaware at this time. Third. we would be unable to proof test our weapons systems. Fourth. We would be prohibited from acquiring information concerning weap- ons effects upon weapons systems. A. THE UNITED STATES. WILL BE UNABLE TO OVERCOME RUSSIA'S LEAD IN ,HIGH-YIELD WEAPONS We have been told by expert witnesses during the hearings that the U.S. weap- ons laboratories are capable of develop- ing and stockpiling weapons with yields greater than 50 megatons without fur- ther atmospheric experimentation. It goes without saying, however, that we would not be able to test such weapons, and "their weight and size would be incompatible with any existing or pro- gramed missile delivery vehicle." I think that military ?Pinion, generally, in this country has heretofore ruled out the ne- . cessity of a. yeapon_ of this size. It is worth noting, however, that unanimity does not exist on this matter, and that It is undergoing a reevaluation. Gen, Curtis LeMay, on page 350 of the hearings, answered the question as to whether he sees any military need for a 50- or 75-megaton bomb: Yes, sir; I do. The Joint Chiefs have already recommended we go ahead with the development work on a large-yield bomb. General LeMay was then asked the question: Is this a new policy? He answered by saying: It is not new as far as I am concerned. I asked for, the Air Force asked for, a high- yield bomb as early as 1954. General LeMay then went on to in- dicate that his reference to "a high-yield bomb" meant "over 50 megatons." General Power, commander of the Strategic Air Command, expressed a similar need for a big bomb: In the field of high yield weaponry, I feel that the Soviet Union now has a technical lead as a result of their tests in 1961 and 1962. They have a lead in their weight-to- yield ratio in the big bomb categories, and I feel that we should overcome that lead. You can only do this through testing in the at- mosphere in my opinion. ? ? ? However, again as we discussed earlier, if we are going to build such a weapon and put it in our arsenal, I would like to test it. I would like to know that I can depend on it from an actual test rather than on the basis of a theory or an extrapolation. I think the stakes are much too serious to deal with theoretical information. I think what we need are cold hard facts. In answer to a question as to whether or not, as time goes on, the requirement for high-yield weapons goes up, General Power replied thusly: It could. One of the things about strate- gic war planning is that you have to have flexibility. You cannot predict what some- thing is going to be 4 or 5 years from now. You must be able to react to any situation. you must have the full spectrum of tactics covered and the full spectrum of weapons because ours is the role of retaliation, the most difficult role. General Power, therefore, indicated the necessity of our having a flexibility of choice so that we might be prepared to deal with all foreseeable moves that an enemy nation might make. B. THE DOOR WOULD BE CLOSED TO A FURTHER IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS OF WHICH WE MAY BE ENTIRELY UNAWARE AT THIS TIME Aside from the problems which we see inherent in this test ban, there are un- doubtedly problems which will not come to our attention except through atmos- pheric testing. The Russians, in their very comprehensive atmospheric tests following the moratorium, may have identified such problems and may have acquired information, which we do not possess, leading to the solution of those problems, all of which could enable them to make a vital breakthrough in nuclear technology that would wrest superiority from us. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., touched upon this during his testimony: In being specific we can deal only with those problems which have already been identified. Of equal concern to me in the long run are those problems which have not yet been identified and that will surely arise In the future. The way in which the test ban would affect our relative ability to solve these future problems is impossible to an- ticipate. The best we can do is to extrapo- ? 16613 late on the basis of our experience, to examine what we have felt was essential in the past. * ? * Moreover, we have to reckon with the fact that in an expanding tech- nology, vigorously pursued, there frequently result abrupt increases in scientific knowl- edge?rapidly reflected, in military capa- bility?which could upset the balance of power. * ? * The proposed treaty would limit not only our knowledge of the actual state of Soviet military development, but would also restrict our knowledge of what may even be technically possible. Specifi- cally, this requires that the United States explore vigorously all areas of technology critical to our security. Failure to do this would add to the uncertainties concerning our relative strength, and force us to choose between either an increase in risk to our security or a further increase in our level of armament. General Power, in referring to Russia's comprehensive test program following the moratorium, had this to say: And it was a very comprehensive test pro- gram. The magnitude of it showed their interest in these weapons. To me that was very significant, not the fact they had tests but the magnitude of these tests. It didn't indicate that this was information in which they were only slightly interested. They must have attached vital importance to it in order to have a test program of this magnitude. In answer to a question as to whether the United States accomplished as much "in proportion" during our atmospheric tests as did the Russians in the course of their tests following the moratorium, General Power answered in this man- ner: No, I don't agreed with that statement. We discovered things, but one of the most Important things I think we discovered is the great void in our knowledge. Admiral Anderson expressed the same fear in this way: I think that it is also prudent to caution that we do not know the precise extent to which the U.S.S.R. can advance in nuclear technology and in augmentg its overall nuclear capability as a result of the most recent series of tests conducted by them. ? * " Further, with respect to the military aspects, I would caution against any suggestion that nuclear technology will remain static; that prevailing offensive or defensive balance of forces cannot change; or that nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R. could be acceptable in the security interests of the United States. C. WE WOULD BE 'UNABLE TO PROOF-TEST OUR WEAPONS SYSTEMS Grave fears were expressed during the hearings with reference to our inability, under the treaty, to proof-test our nu- clear weapons. Dr. Foster's statement is an illustration: Perhaps the starkest of these other wor- ries is that we will not be able to proof-test our weapons systems. Missile systems for offense or defense are extremely complex, yet must function not only under the ideal laboratory conditions in which they are usu- ally tested, but also under the most adverse conditions?those of nuclear war. I know of simpler systems which have not per- formed as expected?or which have actually failed?when proof-tested in environments Which are far better understood than that of a hostile nuclear situation. Technical people have had this experience not once but many times. That the exact nuclear en- vironment for missiles, missile sites, and re- Approved For Release 2007/01/20,: CIA-RDP651300383R000100200004-6 16614 ' entry vehicles probably cannot be completely duplicated even without treaty restrictions is not an argument for no atmospheric tests whatever. We can obtain a much better understanding of the situation with nuclear experiments in the atmosphere than without them. Admiral Strauss, at page 672 of the test ban treaty hearings, expressed the need for testing in this way: TESTING TOR COMPATIBILITY OP WARHEADS TO SYSTEMS There are, as you know, other purposes in testing besides the specialization and the improvement of weapons. We test to be sure that the weapon and its carrier--originally only the manned bomber and now also the missile?will function toegther as a depend- able system. Even if weapon development should be frozen in its present state, there is no warranty for assuming that the car- rier of the weapon may not be, and most probably will be, as revolutionary in the fu- ture as the guided missile and the Polaris submarine are today by comparison with the state of military art crnly 10 short years ago when neither of these existed. When these new devices are invented, they - Approved For Release 2007/01/20: 0A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19 can see the danger when you are specu- The caliber of tests conducted by the: lating on a quality. You might think Russians following the moratorium was you have it. He might think you don't such as to necessitate elaborate prepare- have it." tions extending over a long period of time Now we are talking about deterrence, and prior to the resumption of the tests. in deterrence it is not ,so much what we Well-informed witnesses have testified think Of our capability. The important that at least 11/2 years were required to thing is what does the Soviet Union think of propare for the high-altitude tests alone; our capability, and that, is an -Unknown. and there are highly informed persons D. WE WOVED BE PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING who estimate that the Soviets carried on INFORMATION CONCERNING WEAPONS EFFECTS their preparations, for the entire series UPON WEAPONS SYSTEMS of tests, from the very beginning of the Mr. President, the fact that this Nation 34-month moratorium. We, therefore, has had military superiority has pre- were not only unable to detect the acts- vented the Soviet Union from overrun- ity, on the part of the Russians, in pre- ning the countries of Eastern Europe, paring for a resumption of the tests; but the Middle East, and Africa, and has re- by our having observed the moratorium suited in a world free from nuclear war- and, thereby, having failed to make fare. Our military superiority has un- preparations to resume nuclear tests, we derwritten and assured our own national were unable to conduct an atmospheric security. I think the reason we have not explosion of a nuclear device before April had war with the Soviet Union is re- 25, 1962?almost 8 months after the RUB- markably simple: we have had over- sians had resumed atmospheric testing. whelming superiority.. And if any idea Our preparation for a resumption of a t- of attacking this Nation has been con- mospheric tests was therefore a hasty sidered by anyone, the idea had to be one; and our subsequent tests were not OI it ulousness ------------ ensive or successful as were can only be dependably mated to the weapon rejected by testing. Their theoretical compatibility I believe that this 4 a sound position those of the Russians. In other words, with the weapon will be too uncertain to rely which we should continue to maintain, the Soviet Union, by deliberately plan- upon. because I believe that our- way of life is ning to resume tests. and by conducting General Power alluded again and again worth it and that our economy will sus- preparations throughout the period of to the necessity of proof testing our taut it. moratorium, as some think, was able not weapons: ? Recently, we have been switching the only to get the jump on us, by a period I have some * *. ? different types of nuclear emphasis, as far as our striking power of 8 months, in the resumption of at- weapons in the Strategic Air Command is concerned, from the manned bomber mospheric tests, but also was able to con- arsenal'. None of them have been tested OP- to the ballistic missile. This means that duct a much more elaborate, compre- ' ti nail front stockpile to detonation. I our deterrent posture is going to rely hensive, and productive series. General LeMay, in referring to our possible loss of ground within the last 2 years, more specifically because of the preparations conducted by the Soviets during the voluntary moratorium and their planned and surprise abrogation of that moratorium, said?as shown on pages 363 and 364 of the hearings: General LEMKE. We have already lost, I think, in some aspects, the lead that we had at the end of the war. We certainly had a tremendous lead then. We have lost that to some extent, because particularly in the last couple of years the Russians have con- ducted a very vigorous nuclear program. Ours has not been of that magnitude. So we, in effect, have allowed the Russians to catch up in some fields and perhaps even surpass us in some. What we want to do is reverse this trend, at least to hold our own, and forge ahead if at all possible. Senator JacxsoN. Is it not true that they and with it would ge the deterrent which made this big gain because they were able has heretofore guaranteed the security to use the element of surprise in abrogating of America and the free world against without 'warning the moratorium? ? more and more upon our missile system. tlaink this is a mistake I think they should The only way you can prove a weapon sys- As stated by General Power, "In 1959 be tested. tem is to take it out of the Stockpile in a we had better than 3,000 bombers.. in the random pattern and let the tactical unit Strategic Air Command, and 10 years take it out and detonate it. If you haven't later, in 1968, we will have some 700," done this, there is always a chance that according to present programs. In the something has happened that we won't dis- meantime, we will have added greatly Cover until too late. ? * The point I am to our ballistic raissile complex. In making is that, unless you test the very thing that is in your arsenal, you are never cer- other words, we are phasing out our tam, and the stakes are so high I feel we manned bomber program and are re- Must be certain, placing it with missile delivery systems. * ? * ? This means, then, that our missile sys- We have not tested any of the operational tem will become, More and more, the warheads in our inventory. That includes security lifeline of this Nation and the the missiles and the bombs. free world. It follews, therefore, that ? ? ? * ? nothing must be allowed to eventuate A certain amount of information can be which would neutralize the effective- arrived at in underground testing. * ? ? But ness of our missile delivery systems or you never know until you atually test in permit the enemy to better penetrate our the environment full scale *hether or not own defenses. Such an event would shift you have solved the problem. Maybe you military superiority to the Soviet Union, have oversolved it and pay -too heavy a penalty. The sensible way to do it is to test it in the nuclear environment. * But with the RV coming hack into the atmosphere, it depends whellier you attack it outside of the atmosphere, you have a different heating problem. As soon as the RV enters the atmosphere, it is being sub- jected to additional terrific heat. Now if you happens? And the ?nig way you can many At the advent of, the voluntai-y mora- On October 30, 1961., exactly 2 months add pressure under those conditions, what test it is in the real environment. torium in 1958, this country had un- after the Soviets had announced plans General Power further referred to to resume nuclear testing, they deto- ' questioned superiority in nuclelir weep- testing as necessary' "in Order to get a ...,tzttes faithfully observed the morator- nated a 50-megaton to 60-Megaton de- ocns technology. 118ecause the United higher confidence Viktor that you have inm, we conducted, no atmospheric tests vice. As late as August 5, 1962, the a valid war plan for one thing, and that between October 3b, 1958, and April 25, Soviet Union detonated in the atrnos- you have a credible military capability, 1962?a Period of 31/2 years. The Soviet magnitude of 30 megaton's. This was the phere a nuclear device in the order of and that you can react under all of the Union broke the moratorium by re- first of some 40 tests continuing to De- with in retaliation, and not only that, E..uming nuclear tests in the atmosphere celnber 25, 1962. The last atmospheric various conditions that Ion are faced but also that you can corivince any pe_ on September 1, 1961, having announced detonation by the United States was on tential aggressors that-yoll have all this. its intention to resume such tests only November 4, 1962. Subsequent under- So it must be a proven capability. You 2 days before, on August 30. ground tests were, however, conducted attack. , General LaMar. I think this is a fair state- Itr is my fear that the proposed treaty, mweentw,eryees,nsoitr; that a rdiunring theenermmoroantes testrium if ratified?as I On sure it will be? Program. The pErtupssiansg, I think, were. And Will be the instruraent through which when they suddenly abrogated the mora- and by virtue of which such an event will toriurn and launched the test program they materialize Why ido I say this? made very rapid progress. Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : CL-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 200r-7/011 1963 CONGRESSIONAL .REdORD ? SENA 'by the 'United -States: As recently as June 30 of"thisieltr, the Atomic t nergy Commislqn -repoited evidence of events -In the Soviet Union in recent weeks which may be nuclear tests of -very low yields. Incidentally, our inability to .know with certainty whether these de- tected events arose from nuclear explo- ?sions is an example of the kind of un- certainties which may well face the de- cisionmaking elements of our Govern- ment under the proposed treaty. On July 2, Mr: ghrushchei, in a speech in East merlin, agreed to negotiate on a *nuclear test ban treaty limited to the atmosphere, Outer space, and under- 'Water, The commencement of negotia- tions on such a treaty began on July 15, ?1963. It is niy; fear, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union, during its elaborately 'planned, comprehensive postmoratorium -tests, was able to acquire information concerning? weapons effects whioh we have not been able to acquire because of our failure to explode a nuclear de- vice in the order of magnitude of the -Soviet nuclear explosions. Mr. RUSSELL. lVIr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield? The? PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SinirsoN in the chair). Does the Sena- Apr from West Virginia yield to the Sen- ator from Georgia? Mr. BYRD of West Virglnia. I am glad to yield. Mr. Re$SELL. I do not like to in- terrupt the very., able and well-docu- 'mented discourse of the Senator from West Virginia. I regret that I have not been able to be in the Chamber during "all the time he has been speaking; but I have heard as much of ins speech as I possibly could. Does not the Senator believe that our Obsession with opr world image has Something to do with the fact that we have fallen 'behind in some kinds of tests? As soon asnther nations protest, 'we cut back the size of our tests, or aban- don them altogetrier. We Seeni' fo be-- 'neve that we cannot exist unless wp strive ceaselessly, day and night, to create the proper kind of world image. ' Of course we want people to like us. I .wish all would admire, us; I should like -to see all the nations of the 'world emulate us; but t believe there is danger in carrying this policy too far. Their world image has never disturbed the rt,us$ians, They were preparing to test for the high-yield warhead: As it ,turnecl out, I believe our scientists esti- Mated that it was one of 60 megatons; but after im was actually tested, it was found that if it had had a different kind of jacket it would have been a 100-mega- ton bomb. gven the United Nations-overwhelm- ingly passed, as I-recall, a resolution-- although I do not recall the exact vote. , BYRD of I,/est Virginia. It was passed by a vote o 87 to 11. mr. ntsstst. Yes, 87 to 11?or 8 to 1. The United Nations passed that resolution; but it had no more effect on `Rnssifee conduct* of thatlest than if some peisgn confined to a Menfar instf- tutlon, hacl_wr4en a letter to- Mr: ghru-, Isto.149?p shchev. He did 'not pay the slightest particle of attention to the resolution; Instead, he proceeded With the tests. How hits that hurt the Russians? In- stead, 'when' they do such things, they seem only to increase our desire to ap- pease them, to accord them every con- sideration in connection with treaties, and to abandon' elementary safeguards for our Nation's security. I have been disturbed about the over- weening and compelling desire to yield almost everything to the world image. -We hear about it here- on the Senate floor. In the course of the speeches dur- ing this debate, very few Senators Who have spoken in favor of approval of the treaty, have failed to state -that a very poor impression of the United States would be created if we did not imme- diately advise and consent to ratifica- tion of the treaty. However, I believe that sometimes our willingness to lean over backward in our attempts tb please everyone is mistaken for weakness. If we would pursue a firmer policy, not only with respect to the Soviet Union and the Communist world in-general, but also in protecting our interests through- out the entire world, I believe we would fare better ttan we do by sitting down, and holding our hands, or holding our heads, and being distressed almost to death about the kind of world image we are creating. It is a form of narcissism; we are so worried about looking "pretty" to the world that we abandon almost ev- erything else, and give ourselves up to Idolatry of the world image and to at- tempts to create the right kind of world Image. Of course, the world image has its blaze, and we must respect world opin- ion. So we try to make friends. Heav- en knows that we have been generous enough in our efforts to make friends throughout the world. We have spent more than $100,000 million; we have ? given it away here, there, and every- where. On the other hand, the Rus- sians, who have made a few loans and -some minor grants, apparently have -fared about as well as we have. Cer- tainly they have fared as well by looking after their own self-interest, when they thought it was involved, as we have -by abandoning our own self-interest, at -times, when we thought we would thus create the proper world image. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I thank the senior Senator from Georgia for his very pertinent statement concerning the anticipated ef- fects which our rejection of the treaty --would have upon world opinion, and also concerning the fact that this is a factor Which evidently has carried great weight ? with many Senators in reaching their de- ?Olsten to support the treaty. The same factor Of world Opinion was reflected, I am sure, in the course of reaching decisions upon the treaty by menibers of the military. Mr. TIMSELL. fear of World opinion has become almost a national disease. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Yes.- I -shall refer to viorId opinion 'a little later in my statement. But r think it would ' - 16615 be -arirOpos' of What the senior Senator from Georgia has said to refer, at this time, to a statement by General LeMay which appears on page 371 of the hear- ings of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions on the test ban treaty. General LeMay said: General LEMAY. I think the fact that it had been signed had an effect on me, yes. In other words, both administrations in the years since the war have been trying to make some gains in the general disarmament field. This may be a gairi. Consideration of world opinion must have had an effect upon General LeMay, or at least the fear of an adverse effect which rejection of the treaty would have upon other nations of our world and our relationship with those nations must have been a -factor. It could not help but be a factor in General LeMay's thinking, in the thinking of others or, for that matter, in my own thinking. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I should like to continue briefly, and then I shall be happy to yield to the Senator from Louisiana. On page 372 of the hearings, the Sen- ? ator ?from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER] asked the following question: Senator GOLDWATER. My question was at this point that if it had not been signed, if it had not been initialed, if we were merely sitting here discussing the desirability or lack of desirability of a limited treaty like this, would you oppose it or support it? General LEMAY. I had not given any thought to that patricular one. This is an important question. I would think that I would have been against it. On page 373, the Senator from South Carolina and General LeMay engaged in the following colloquy: POSITION IF TREATY WERE NOT YET SIGNED Senator THURMOND. Senator GOLDWATER asked a question similar to one I propounded in the Preparedness Subcommittee. That is this: If the proposed treaty had not already been signed, but was being considered in a proposal stage, would you recommend that the United States sign the treaty? General LEMAY. I haven't given any thought to the subject, Senator. I said I would?I thought I would not be in favor of it. But I wouldn't even want to give an unqualified "No" until I spent some time on it. Certainly this was a factor that influ- enced me in recommending that we ratify it. How much weight I would give to it?I would want to spend a considerable amount of time on this, and I have not done so. Senator THURMOND. I believe your answer in the subcommittee, and I quote, was this: "I think that if we were in a proposal stage that I would not recommend?that I would recommend against it." That is correct, is it not? General LEMAY. I think I would. That is correct. On page 399, General LeMay said: Well, I gave some weight to this psycho- logical atmosphere that you were talking about, Senator, myself, in arriving at my conclusions. At this morning's session the other Chiefs said no, they didn't think it was very important. I do attach some impor- tance to it because for a number of years we u_lote,s trying to reduce tensions, reduce armaments in thls country both administra- tions have been trying to do that. _ Approved For Release B00383 R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16616 CONGRESSIONAL ,RECORD -- SENATE This is a step in that direction, I believe, and if we did not ratify it I don't know what our political loss would be, but I think there would be political loss. So I gave it some weight in arriving at my answer. On page 399 General Wheeler said: I would agree that world opinion has built up to the point where there would be very sizable political implications if the United States were to dash these hopes. I am not prepared to say exactly what the effect of those political implications or the political effect would be, but I do not think it would be good. Secretary of State Rusk, who sup- ported the treaty, made a statement re- garding world opinion which should guide us in our deliberations upon this treaty. I quote from page 55 of the hearings, where the following question by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARL- sox], will be found: There could be, I am sure, no question as to the legal right to withdraw from a treaty, but I wonder if there is not another side to this. Once our signature is on this treaty, would it not be most difficult to withdraw from the treaty from the point of view of world opinion, even though there is positive evidence that the Soviet Union had violated it? What will our position be with other na- tions in that event? Secretary Rusx. So I think there would be very great regret if this treaty were to collapse. But, on the other hand, where we are dealing with a security matter that goes to the life of our own country I do not be- lieve that world opinion can play a decisive role. We must do what has to be done, and I believe that the rest of the world will understand. I think that there Would be general under- standing, even if with great regret, there would be general understanding if we came to the conclusion that this treaty was not working and that our security required us to resume testing. of course, Secretary Rusk was talk- ing about the possibility of our having to withdraw at some future time. It is easy to say now that in such a situation we could disregard world opinion. But we have not reached that bridge yet. mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator has cer- tainly shown that he has done his home- work. He has available a quotation of evidence for any question which might arise. At that period, when we first started the hearings, nearly all of our attention was centered on the effects the treaty would have on the United States of America and Soviet Russia. We did not go very far beyond that point. Some questions were asked as to Chinese test- ing and French testing. But we did not realize that we would wind up with more than 100 countries signatory to the treaty. That was one of the things that finally persuaded me that the treaty was not in the best interests of our Nation, Amendments will be proposed to the treaty by countries which have nothing to lose. If they receive one-third of the vote& a conference will be called, and if there were a large majority of votes in favor of an amendment, it would be dif- _ flcult for us to say that we would not SUP port the particular amendment. That is as grave a danger to me as the implications of the treaty itself. Men of great ability, courage and intelligence have risen on the floor of the Senate and said? We would shock the world if we did not sign the treaty. I myself have grave doubts and besetting fears about it. I fear it will endanger our country. But I shall support it because I do not wish to offend world opinion. I must say that that argument almost persuaded me at the Outset. I finally de- cided that nothing in human history would lead me to believe that any other country would sacrifice any of its vital interests on our behalf. So while I crave the good opinion of every people on earth, when it comes to a question of gaining world opinion at the expense of the vital interests of the United States, I must be counted out. I cannot go that far. Much as I wish to be liked, and much as I wish to have my Nation ad:mired, when it comes to a clash between world opinion and our vital interests, the world opinion will have to "go hang." I shall have to be counted out, fot that will not enter into my calculations. I. do not believe any other country on earth has ever made the sacrifices which the United States has made since the end of World War II to build up a favor- able world image. We have built up an image of people who will continue to tax themselves to take care of projects all over the earth. If the American people ever reach the point where they cannot maintain the tremendous foreign assist- ance program the tillage will be de- stroyed, and we shall have a bad world image, because next to a woman scorned "hell bath no fury" like that which re- sults from taking away from a country some benefit which has been extended to it for a long period of years. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Georgia. It seems to Me the sound po- sition which has been expressed by the proponents of the treaty; namely, that if that moment ever comes when we must withdraw we should disregard world opinion in the interests of our own na- tional security?should be applied here and now. I should like to apply that argument at this point. The Senator from Georgia referred to world opinion. The Senator referred to the number of nations that have signed the nuclear test ban treaty. As of today, 97 nations have signed the nuclear test ban treaty. Since we are talking about world opinion, I should like to closely and meticultrusly scrutinize exactly what nations will constitute that world opin- ion insofar as signatures are concerned. I shall read the list of the nations: The United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Aus- tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, :Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad. There are countriea on this list I have never before heard of. There are coun- tries listed which, I daresay, few Sena- September 19 tors ever realized were in existence. Yet they are countries which are supposed to alter the course of world history. Colombia, Chile, China?Taiwan? Congo, Leopoldville, Costa :Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethio- pia, Finland, Gabon. I have no doubt that I shall mispro- nounce some of these names, because this is my first occasion ever to read them. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me so to state, when I announced on the Senate floor my views with respect to this question, and incidentally stated that Gabon was the 91st state to sign the treaty, an eminent, able, well-educated and intelligent Sen- ator asked me how to spell ."Gabon." Of course, Gabon will have the same right to propose an amendment to this treaty that the representative of the U.S. Government will have. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Cer- tainly. German Democratic Republic--East Germany?Federal Republic of Ger- many?West Germany--Ghana, Greece, Honduras. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We are told in the committee report that the treaty will not forbid us from using atomic weapons to fulfill our treaty commit- ments in the event we must defend some nation. Is it not true that any one of these little countries, some of which have hardly been heard of, would have the right to haul the United States before the World Court and have the World Court tell the United States that it is forbidden by the very clear language of the treaty to use its missiles or atomic weapons in the fulfillment of treaty com- mitments to defend some other country? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I so in- terpret the treaty. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The treaty reads that among its purposes is a pur- pose to prohibit pollution in the atmos- phere. That would give every country an interest. No matter where an atomic explosion occurred, whether over our Nation's own territory, over the high seas, or in space, every country would have an interest and could haul the United States before the World Court. We are a member of the Court. We do have the Connally reservation. A majority of Senators who expect to vote for the treaty have been trying to get kid of the Connally reservation. In such an event we would have to stultify ourselves and say that the treaty was not an international question, which would provide for jurisdiction of the World Court. It is clear to me that any one of the countries which accept the jurisdiction of the World Court would have the right to haul the United States before the World Court, which could tell the United States that the treaty means exactly what it says. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007101/20 : CIA-FDP65B003 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SE As the Senator well knows, General Visenhower, a former President of the United States, said we would not wish to be held to a commitment that we could not use these weapons for our own de- fense purposes or to fulfill treaty com- mitments. The administration tells us the treaty does not mean that at all, and that they have no such thing in mind. ? There has been a legal opinion written by ?soem legal officer who was willing to put his name on it, which says the treaty does not mean that. But the Senator knows that the rule of statutory interpretation Is that when the language is clear one does not look to legislative intent. Many people, who did not realize that if the language is clear the legislative intent is Meaningleas, have been put in jail. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator. /Agree with him. I continue to call the roll of the sig- natories: Hungary, -Iceland, India, In- donesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait. Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxem- bourg, Malaya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway. Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philip- pines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Somali, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic. Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, and Tobago?there are two names, but only one country?Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic?Egypt-- Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, 'Nest- ern Samoa, Yemen Arab Republic? Yemen?and Yugoslavia. Mr. President, as has been stated one Of the arguments persistently suggested In favor of the Senate's consenting to the ratification of this treaty revolves around the consequences to U.S. prestige and its Image as the leader of the free world, and the adverse reaction which could be eXpected from world opinion if our con- sent should be withheld. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that a great many of those nations?par- ticularly the smaller and less well-known nations?signed the treaty because the United States sent its Ambassador to the country and asked- that it be signed? In nearly all those countries?all ex- cept the ones behind the Iron Curtain, With possitly one or two exceptions? there are U.S. aid programs in operation. My guess would- be that the Ambassador merely walked In and asked them to sign. The people of those nations have no Weapons nevertheless, they would not be barred frOin testing atmoic explosions erg.K9u,nd-,, suppose the American Ambassador , merely walked in and asked them to sign the treaty. They would sign, of course. I have been informed that perhaps not more than seven countries have an atomic capacity, the ability to build an atomic wpapom _ The American Ambassador would walk In. - The nation would not have an ability to build a weapon anyway There would be a U.S..aid program in that nation. The Ambassador would say, "I would like to have you join in this treaty." And they would say, "We think that would be fine." While I respect our president and feel very kindly toward him, and propose to help him in some of his legislative pro- posals, certainly with regard to this type of thing if the administration or the Government is worried about the em- barrassment that may be caused, before we go that far out on a limb, it should withhold action until it ascertains whether the Senate is going to ratify the treaty. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr, President, if the Senator will yield, the treaty is also im- portant to certain ambassadors of most of those countries. It is a stimulation their ego to sign the treaty. It puts them on a level with the "big boys." They can say, "Here we are all together. We are just as big as the U.S.S.R. and the United States and Great Britain or any other great nation, and we have the same right to offer amendments as any- one else; and while we have no nuclear weapons, if we can do anything to ham- string those who do have them and limit their use, it is in our interest, because 100 years from now we hope to be a mighty country. We may be able to dominate the earth, if we can stop those who have such weapons." I think we can states pretty well by reactions within the human family. Anyone who remembers when he was a little boy knows how little boys like to play with big boys. What a hard time the big boys have keeping the little boys from playing with them. This treaty gives the emerging nations great prestige. A foreign minister can say, "I was in the United Statesand sat down by the Secretary of the United States and, in behalf of our country"?perhaps with a few hundred thousand popula- tion?"I took the same position on the ban on nuclear weapons as did the United States and Soviet Russia, We are all equals in the community of nations spon- soring the treaty." Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Sen- ator from West Virginia think this was a move on the part of the administration, from the psychological standpoint, so it could be placed in the position of saying, "Look at all the nations which signed the treaty. If this country fails to ratify the treaty, that will give us a bad image around the world'?" Does not the Sen- ator think a psychological play was made on that point'? Mr. BYRD a West Virginia. I do not presume to read the minds otother peo- ? ple or to look into their hearts or to know whether or riot this may have been the purpose and plan of the administra- tion. I merely say that we are con- fronted with the situation, and I do not believe that we should be overly per- aded by it. _ ,?I. join with the Senator from Georgia In saying it is important that we enjoy ATE, 16617 favorable world opinion, and it is im- portant that we project a favorable image before the world for ourselves; but I feel in asituation such as confronts Senators, they are voting on a question that is vital to the security of the United States of America, and Senators should sub- ordinate the factor of world opinion, or our _world image, to a secondary role in reaching a decision as to how to vote. Mr. THURMOND, Does not the Sen- ator feel that we would enhance our image if some of the very nations that seem offended by our action would not ask for foreign aid? I believe the rec- ord shows that we have provided foreign aid, to 10_4 nations of the world, and this year there is a request to provide foreign aid to 100 foreign nations. The record shows that since World War II this coun- try has provided $121 billion, including interest, in foreign aid. Would it not seem more in order if there were not re- quests from these countries for large amounts of aid? Would it not be more In keepingy they would first provide for their own means, and not call upon this country for aid and then turn around and criticize this country for anything that happens here? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments. I appreciate them. To some extent, I share those sentiments, but I do net believe that they are perti- nent at this time, so I do not wish to proceed to discuss the matter of foreign aid. I do not mean to say that the sub- ject of foreign aid is entirely dissociated from the subject which is now under dis- cussion. I cannot see the close rele- vancy of it however. Mr. THURMOND. Except in re- spect: Nations over the world want for- eigri: aid. The same nations have been asked to sign the treaty; and many of those nations are the very ones which have criticized the policy of this country. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not think there is any question about it; and 1 deplore the situation. Mr. President if we accept the argu- ment concerning world opinion and if we agree that world reaction Would be Intolerable, the implications for future U.S. implementation of the withdrawal provisions of the treaty are ominous, as / have indicated. But if we cannot refuse our consent now, before we are committed, how much more difficult Will if, be for us to with- draw, even with cause, after a few months or years have passed? I am convinced that we cannot have the best of both worlds. We cannot bow to world opinion now, and empha- size its significance, and still argue that our withdrawal -from the treaty would be precise and simple and dictated solely by this Government's own judgment of its security requirements. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true that if this Nation is compelled to fight a ...3Yar. Alie_BOVIet. Unioa Jam* the Cuban question, for example, it is en- tirely possible that we shall not have a ^ PProve ForReIeas.2D07/01/2: _ CIA-R DP65B00383R000100-200-604-6 16618 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19 single ally that will make a major con- tribution, one way or the other, to the outcome of the conflict? The Senator well realizes, I am sure, that if there is to be a nuclear war, most countries that do not have nuclear weapons will count themselves out in the beginning. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I think they would like to count themselves out if they could by so doing extricate them- selves from the situation. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Can the Senator suggest what possible difference it would make in a struggle of this nature whether the smaller nations joined or stayed out? Would not the outcome be determined one way or the other by the devastating power of the two great nuclear powers? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not think there is any question about it. The United States possesses 90 percent of the striking power of the free world. That 90 percent of the striking power of the free world is built around the Po- laris submarine and the Strategic Air Command. I think this fact supports what the Senator from Louisiana has just said. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point that strikes the Senator from Louisiana is that if we should let the strength and defenses of this country decline, as com- pared with the Soviet Union's, to the point where we would not be able to save ourselves, we would be so foolish that we should not expect anybody to save us, because we have that power today, and we ought to see to it that it is main- tained. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I agree. Mr. President, we cannot argue that this Government will be the unchal- lenged master of its fate in connection with the withdrawal provisions of this treaty, and the servant of world opinion in connection with the treaty's ratifi- cation. Our national security policies either are dictated by world opinion or they are not. If they are not, we can dismiss world opinion as a factor which looms large in our consideration of the treaty and confine ourselves to its security im- plications. If they are, we should rec- ognize, then, that withdrawal will be complicated and difficult, and not the simple, straightforward announcement of decision and intent that the treaty and its advocates suggest. I now return to my fifth point, the argument that we would be prohibited from acquiring information of weapons effects of tests. General Power articulately voiced my fears before the Preparedness Subcom- mittee, when he said: Now there are great voids in our knowledge on such things as (deleted) shock wave prop- agation, blackout, communications, and command and control that, in my opinion, can be obtained only through atmospheric testing. If this information which we don't have should turn out to be valid information (deleted) I would say it is vital. So, Mr. President, is there a possibility of unknown vulnerabilities in our inter- continental ballistic missile launch sites? Are our missiles truly survivable in a nu- clear environment? Are our missile sites vulnerable to overpre,,ssure, shock, and thermal effects which flow from the ex- Plosions of high-yield weapons? I ask these further questions, Mr. President: Is it possible that the Soviets, in exploding multimeg-'aton weapons, may be able to render our missiles useless through weapons effects upon the highly sophisticated electronic systems? Will our nuclear warheads and reentry vehicles have the ability to penetrate and survive in a nuclear environment created by Soviet defenses? Will our radars be ineffective in the presence of "blackout" from multimegaton latusts, thus making it impossible to locate the incoming war- heads and perhaps more importantly to discern between .the incoming warhead and the decoys? While I do not doubt that our deter- rent missile systems Will be able to per- form their mission tcklay and tomorrow, because of their complexity there are un- resolved uncertainties that we need to determine and to rectify so as to assure ourselves that our deterrent capability will be maintained' in future years. These uncertainties can be more fully re- solved only through a series of atmos- pheric nuclear tests. Could it be possible that the Russians, through their post- moratorium atmospheric tests, have ac- quired valid information which will guide them in determining' and resolving such uncertainties as far as their own systems are concerned? This is the question the answer to which we may learn, when it is too late General Power referred to some voids in our knowledge: This missile has never been operationally tested all the way through from stockpile to detonation, and we have never tested such things as the vulnerability [deleted] due to shock wave propagation, due to blackout, there are many voids in our knowledge as to the operational capabilities and vulner- abilities of this weapon system. In particular the RV, !deleted] thermal ef- fects, blast effects?cahnot really be tested from my point of view as an operator until you test it in the nuclear environment, and as I am responsible for writing the war plans of the free world, I have to deal with facts. I have to deal with proven data, and if too much of the data is extrapolated or theoretical, I do not have a high confidence factor that I have a sound plan. We are dealing with the security of the United States, and if facts can be obtained, I want to haye them. Now, in writing a war plan, I have to as- sign a survivability factor to every one of these silos. I have to assume that the Soviet Union has missiles with a certain accuracy and a certain yield arid that they land in a certain place. Then I have to extrapolate whether that particular silo is going to sur- vive and give it a value. I have to do that for each weapon system. Dr. Edward Teller referred to the pos- sible vulnerability of our weapons sites: It is a fact fraught with danger that the ability of these sites to withstand the over- pressures for which they have been designed has never been tested. * * * It is prob- able that under the 4test ban as proposed and interpreted at the present time these badly needed tests will not be carried out. Dr. Foster spoke of the problem in this way: :Regarding defense, one of the critical questions concerns the effect of blackout from defending missile's on the defense sys- tem itself. Dr. Foster then went on to explore the problems which might confront our effort to penetrate Soviet defenses: On the opposite side of the coin, suppose that the U.S.S.R. were to develop a defense such that our ability to penetrate might depend on a saturation attack. For this application, specially designed hardened war- heads might be required. Considerable progress on such warheads can be made with underground tests, but under the treaty again the crucial atmospheric experiments to determine if the warhead actually has the necessary hardness against combined radiation and shock effects would be pro- hibited. We might thereby 'be denied as- surance of such a penetration capability. The disadvantages resulting from the treaty in restricting our knowledge of site vulnerability, :penetration and defense, I believe, are very serious. Our current judg- ments are based on relatively few atmospher- ic tests. Wide margins of error are possible in weapon effects which we do not fully un- derstand. Other effects, heretofore ne- glected as unimportant, could become dam- Ment, Ignorance, ineradicable under the treaty, can thereby increase the uncertainty in technical-military judgments. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am sure the Senator is familiar with the fact that not only do we not know the information we should have if we are to be secure in our defense, and whether the hard- ened sites will withstand the shock and radiation of an enemy attack with atomic weapons; but, as the chairman of the Armed Services Committee pointed out in his speech, we do not know whether the overwhelming; majority of the missiles we have in our inventory will actually work, because they have never been tested under the conditions under which they would be fixed at a target. I can illustrate that by the fact that in World War II the Japanese sank al- most our entire Pacific Fleet, at least everything they could catch at Pearl Harbor, with torpedoes that we did not even know existed. They had tested their torpedoes against old ships, to make sure they would work. On the other hand, during the first 18 months of World War II, time after time our submarine commanders would fire torpedoes at a Japanese ship, only to have the torpedoes bounce off the ship, or go under the ship in the case of mag- netic torpedoes. The torpedoes would not explode, because we had never tested them under the actual circumstances in which they would be used. We had never determined whether they would work when they were fired. 'We had con- tented ourselves with putting them through a test course. We thought that if all the components checked out, they would work. That is what we assumed. Of course it was a false assumption, and it almost lost us the war. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the able Senator for his observation con- cerning the failure to test torpedoes dur- ing the early part of World War II. The Senator's comment is interesting and ap- propriate. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 1963 At page 182 of the hearings the Sen- ator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] asked a question with reference to weapons effects: Senator CANNON. Now, do you feel that we have sufficient evidence and information available to us in the areas of guidance, from the standpoint of weapons effects? Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe we have sufficient information available to us in rela- tion to the effect on guidance of nuclear explosions properly to protect our force and insure that will be effective against the enemy. I want to emphasize that we don't know all there is to know about the effects of nuclear detonations on guidance. Much of what we don't know can be learned from underground tests. There is considerable difference of opinion, of course, as to how much can be learned from underground tests, but there is unanimity of opinion that every- -thing we need to know Concerning weap- OM effects cannot belearned from un- derground tests. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Secre- tary's statement relies heavily upon the Idea that we could test a warhead under- ground and find that it would explode; then test some other component and find that it would 'operate satisfactorily; which would lead to the conclusion that if the components were satisfactory when tested separately, and then were all assembled, desired results could be obtained. What is wrong with that theory is that so often in actual operation the WeapOn will fail. That was what we, Because tins is the total effect in the at- learned about our torpedos in World mosphere I am referring to here on the inte- grated system, the whole system. We can War 11. Theoretically they worked; in carry out component studies, that is, the practice, they were not worth the effect of the radiation from an ABM on a powder it took to blow them up. warhead, and things of that sort, under- 'When a, weapon is as complicated as ground. We can do that underground. But a missile, which is'infinitebr more diffi- in order to study the effect of an ABM and cult to explode than it is to fire a tor- its kill radiation on an incoming warhead, pedo, the only way to learn whether it under the conditions that you would en- willwork is actually to try it under the counter in actual use, you have to do it in kind of conditions in which it is designed the atmosphere where the use would--in the Approved For Release 2007/01120: CIA-RDP65E300383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD ? SENATE 16619 war conditions. But at least it would ons effects tests which would involve at- be a test to determine whether a weapon mospheric testing. That is a disability, but not a critical one. We can indeed develop, would actually work. fabricate, and deploy an antiballistic missile The Senator from West Virginia knows system if we so choose. that many missiles in inventory have Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, the never been tried under similar condi- scientific work relating to the vehicle that tions. As to those, the hope is that they would be needed to mount a nuclear war- would work, although we do not know head or to send it into outer space or into the high altitude or into any kind of defense whether they would or not. position is not impaired by this treaty, is it? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Exactly. General TAYLOR. No, sir. That can be General Power said there were x num- done and tested. It is primarily the absence bers of weapons in his arsenal, not one of a complete weapons lest, including the of which had been tested through the nuclear warhead, which is being made impos- point of detonation. sible. ?Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Since our The point made by the Senator from lives depend on the functioning of mis- Louisiana has been well substantiated by siles, would not the Senator say it is statements of our military experts. The rather dangerous to say that weapons fear that I have, and that certain other which we rely on will work, not knowing Senators have, is that while we do not whether they will work or not? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I cer- possess more information?and it may be vital information?with respect to weap- tainly would say so. ons effects on our weapons sites and At page 214 of the hearings before the systems, the Russians may already have Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. acquired such information as a result of Seaborg said, with respect to weapons their extensive, elaborate, comprehen- effects : sive, effective, and successful atmospheric This is a weapons effect question for which tests that were conducted subsequent to the Department of Defense has primary re- their abrogation of the moratorium. sponsibility. I can say that we have ob- Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sen- tained a good deal of information on black- out phenomena in connection with our al- ator familiar with the statement of Dr. ready performed high-altitude tests. Brown to the effect that We could design However, it would not be possible to ob- around the areas of American ignor- tain any substantial further information on ance? Can the Senator say what Dr. blackout phenomena under the terms of Brown meant by "designing around" our this test ban treaty. ignorance of the answers to these prob- At page 245 of the hearings, Dr. Sea- lems? How do we "design around"? borg said, again with respect to the sub- Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I as- ject of weapon effects on our weapons sume, with reference to a blackout of our radars, that he meant that we would system sites: provide more radars, and that they would be spaced in such away that even though there might be a blackout here or a blackout there, the radars in some other area would function. That would be one way of "designing around." ? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If there were a large explosion in the vicinity of a city which was the target of one missile, I would then assume that "designing around" probably would mean that we would try to have a radar several hun- environment where it would take place, and to function. that is what t mean by that statement. dred miles away, or might have some re- Another example is the orbiting ofmote control procedure, in the hope of men in space. Every time a man was At page 274 of the hearings, General put in space?it has been done about 10 Taylor said: guiding a missile against a succeeding weapon aimed at the same city. times--sornething has gone wrong. The There are other disadvantages which apply Not having had explained in detail first time the shield was not ejected as in varying degrees to both sides. For ex- ample, knowledge of weapons effects is in what the problems are?and I am sure it was supposed to eject. There was fear complete at best and although knowledge some of them are classified?it seems that the man would burn up as he came kconuelwdlebdegegawinheidehfreonml underground testing to me that the idea of "designing out of space. I believe it was John Glenn around" areas of American ignorance whose shield burned. When another hibited media could provide in pro rather than finding answers to the prob- man was orbited, something else hap- denied. Also, there would be no opportunitye pened. " Improvisations were made to to conduct environmental tests of current lem would be in the same general weapons or of those which might be ac- category as trying to kill elephants with Intereontinental ballistic missiles? quired in order to verify their performance. broomsticks, because one would be pro- hibited by a treaty from developing a overcome mechanical failures. the ones we are 'building at this mo- General Taylor, referring to the sub- _ good elephant gun. Ment?can ge thiough to an enemy. ject of weapons effects, said, at page 286: Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. It would But only one has been tested success- I am not a technical expert, Senator certainly be costly, time consuming, and fully, so far as I know, under combat spAparmAN, on this subject. Obviously, I uncertain. I assume that another way fire, a test in which a missile was ac- have raised qeur tess t itohnast of e ah asvi me i 1 awr en aktnuerwe qf "designing around" the weapons effects Wally fired to see if it would get near With tbit abPout the general phenomenology problem would be in connection with the tauet and explode. quite a enomenology of blackout effects from our own testing. I control systems related to missiles. In- ' 4-be4Yle :th'ere- was a successful test think that all'orour experts would say, how- stead of ground control systems being of a PiiramriS giaile. That would give ever, we certainly do not know everything, used for our missiles, we could develop us rea'soti to-believe that that type of and we would like to know more, airborne control stations. missile will work because it was fired General Taylor said further, at page Another way of "designing around" . , . under aceila test -conditions. , 299: some of the defects would be to attempt that would be an instance General TAYLOR. As the Joint chiefs have to harden missile sites to a greater de- in which' everything was checked out pointed out there are limitations in the gree than they have been hardened in under conditions more favorable than sense that we can never have complete weap- the past. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B4O038313000100200004-6 '16620 CONGRESSIQNAL RECORD --- SENATE September 19 - There is some reason for them wanting this treaty when they didn't want it on two occasions before. What is it? s ? General LsMsv. These are the disadvan- tages that we see. They are possibilities and we certainly have tried to say that even with the safeguards that we have suggested that we have, that certainly ratifying the treaty is not without its risks NOW, I pointed out these other uncertain- ties, that we don't knew. For instance, [de- leted] that the Russians are ahead of us in the high yield spectrUni, we are about equal in the [deleted] megaton range, and we are ahead in the lower [deleted] range. Now, I can't prove Otherwise, but I am very suspicious, because we know ] deleted] that the Russians were planning a test pro- gram [deleted] before they broke the mora- torium and started testing. [Deleted.] agree with the Sanator from Louisi- ana that while we might be able to over- design or overcompensate for some of the defects, we are not certain, in the first place, of precisely what the un- certainties are, and we Will not be able to fully identify the uncertainties until we can test in the atmosphere. Secondly, we cannot be sure that we have adequately compensated for the defects. Finally, it is important to remember that we are dealing with the security of the United States. When we deal with the,. security of the United States, we would like to deal with as few uncer- tainties as possible. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. To say the least, if we should try to "design around" areas of ignorance, the weapons system act-opted might be far less efficient than the one we would have if we actually had the answer. Mr, BYRD of West Virginia. Yes. I thank the Senator from Louisiana. Continuing on the point of weapons effects tests, I should like to quote Gen- eral LeMay, as his testimony appears on page 365 of?the hearings: General Ladsy. Well, from my personal standpoint, I haven't been toa happy with our testing program in the past. I think we Should have done more testing than we did, not only underground but in the atmosphere, toe. I certainly haven't been happy with the sitUatiOn which exists that we haven't been able to carry out full-scale teets on any of our missile systems. Again I quote General LeMay, as his testimony appears on page 391 of the hearings: deneral LEMAy. Well, if it would stay there, probably we wouldn't have much to lose. He was referring to the nuclear supe- riority we are supposed to possess. Then he said: But I wonsler whether it is going to stay there or not, and, in addition to that, this is rust our estimate of the situation. Our delivery capabilities,,I think at the present time are better than the Russians. That doesn't mean they are going to stay that way. I think we have more weapons and a great- er variety of weapons now than the Rus- sians have. That doesn't mean it is going to stay that way. The thing that worries me is that this preserves the uncertainties that we have in our mind now for as long as the treaty is going to be in effect [deleted]. We just don't all know the things we would like to know about the vulnerabilities of [deleted] systems [deleted]. Senator PASTORE, Can I interrupt you there, General? Do you think that the Rus- sians know? General LEMsy. They may know a great deal more about it than we do, as a result of the last two series of tests that they have run. [Deleted.] General LeMay and the Senator from Rhode Island were referring to the pos- sible vulnerabilities of missile systems. General LeMay, continuing, said: This bothers me, and one of the things that I don't like that if this is true and they do know more than we do, they may know something that is vital. They may have been able to pick up a weakness in our defense system that they can exploit, In addition to the Uncertainties affect- ing our strategic Missile system, expert testimony has indicated that atmos- pheric testing is mandatory for the de- velopment of an optimum anti-ballistic missile and for establishing with cer- tainty its ability to, perform its mission under the extreme conditions to which it will be exposed if the occasion to em- ploy it should ever arise. There has been much confusion about the relation- ship between atmospheric testing and the perfection of ABM systems. This is not a matter involving the development and testing of the warhead. It does in- volve the question of whether we have adequate information on what we require in the way of a warhead and what we require in the way of radar performance to give this Nation an ABM system with sufficient reliability to make its produc- tion and development and deployment worth the billions of dollars involved. The technical testimony leaves no doubt that we can design arid produce an ABM system of unknown performance and re- liability under the conditions in which it must perform its mission. However, the degree of confidence we can place in such a system and the extent to which we can provide a system which will give this Nation the greatest protection at the lowest cost are directly dependent upon our ability to conduct the necessary tests in the atmosphere. Mr. President, regarding the need for atmospheric tests in the development and deployment of an antiballistic mis- sile system, I read a statement by Ad- miral Strauss, which appears on page 692 of the test ban treaty hearings: With this reservation, I would like to com- ment, in order to proteet myself from attack. I am no technician but I have been present at the birth of many new weapons systems over a long period of years. No matter how well in theory the components of a weapon will behave on paper, there is no assurance that they will work dependably together un- til they are put together and tried, and an antiballistic missile system cannot be tested underground and, therefore, no nation, our Nation could not put one safely into produc- tion and stockpile it which had never been tested. This is a layman's opinion based on experience. On page 103 of the hearings, the fol- lowing statement by Secretary McNa- mara appears: In. designing an antiballistic missile sys- tem? the major factors are reaction speed, missile performance, traffic handling capae- ity, capacity for decoy discrimination, re- sistance to blackout effects, and warhead teehnology. The last two of these items, resistance to blackout effect and warhead technology de- pends on nuclear testing. At page 438 of the hearings, Dr. Ed- ward Teller is recorded as saying: I am in agreement with Secretary Mc- Namara that under the present ban we can proceed with our antiballistic-missile de- fense. I do not agree that we can complete this development. Actually, Secretary Mc- Namara did not say anywhere that he in- tends to deploy a system. Perhaps his lack of determination to deploy is due to some lack of knowledge. These are not black- and-white questions. I feel we need obser- vation, traffic handling, the perfection of warheads, radar, all the points that the Sec- retary has made very effectively; I agree with all of them. At page 452, Dr. Teller said, with refer- ence to the necessity for atmospheric tests in connection with the development of an antiballistic missile: On that point I will say that indeed we can do a lot in this development without atmospheric tests, we cannot bring the de- velopment to a reliable conclusion without atmospheric tests. More than that, as we proceed in develop- ing our defenses, we have to make choices. We have to decide at what attitude we want to shoot down the aggressor. - Senator LAUSCHE. I think ysu have covered that. Dr. TELLER. What kind of rocket we need. A number of choices of that kind. This must be done often rather early in the game and to make choices without the knowledge ' that atmospheric testing could give us is a very distinct handicap. SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-SEPTEMBER 1961 TESTS Senator LAUSCHE. When you state that in your opinion Russia occupies a superior posi- tion to ours in connection with the anti- ballistic missile, what significance do you at- tach to the extensive and large tests which were made after September of 1961? Dr. TELLER. I would guess that the Rus- sians may have acquired the bulk of their knowledge in this field in 1961 and 1962, al- though it is quite possible that they may have acquired quite a bit of their knowledge even earlier. They have been pushing mis- siles, rockets, much- earlier than we have, and every indication shows that their interest and confidence in ballistic missile defense is older and stronger than ours. ATMOSPHERIC TESTING AND SOUND MISSILE DEFENSE Senator LAUSCHE. The statement is made by the Joint Chiefs further. I quote: Both sides could achieve an antiballistic missile, but one with less desirable charac- teristics than the case if additional atmospheric tests were conducted. May I have your comment on that state- ment, first as to its soundness and second as to whether Russia is ahead of us, because It has conducted these large-scale tests. Dr. TELLER. In general I agree with the statement. I consider it something of an understatement. Senator LAITSCHE. Will you give it in your light? s Dr. TELLER. I would say that with atmos- pheric testing, there is a real chance to de- velop a sound antiballistic missile, a sound missile defense. Without such testing, it is my opinion that whatever we develop will be uncertain, imperfect, and that may not even be developed, because our doubts, together with the expenses, may persuade us from such a development Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Rleasre 2007101 i2OC IA-RDP65B0038ak0 , ? 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENAIT The Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG l Oen asked questions?which ap- pear' On page _467 of the hearings?as follows; Senator LONG. Doctor, you suspect, as I understand your earlier testimony, you sus- pect that in the last series of tests the Rus- sians probably "obtained the information that they would need to develop an anti- Missile missile, or to develop a ballistic mis- Bile defense, to put it another way. Dr. TELLER. I do not know how perfect their information is, but / feel the prob- ability is very coffirnon that they have de-. Veloped -Very relevant knowledge which will be useful for them in installing their anti- ballistic missile systems. Senator LoNg. In the event they were able to develop a missile defense against our ballistic missiles, and then proceed to breach the treaty just long enough to prove it out. Would there be time for us to do the same thing after we found out that they had violated the treaty? Dr. Tur-LEa. I am virtually certain there Would not be time enough. We would be lucky to get off to meaningful testing in 3 niOnths, whereas they, if they Eave indeed perfected, instated, but not completely proven Out their antiballistic missile equip- ment, they could abrogate tilt treaty in a day, use the next week for 100 or 500 detona- tions, and if they then find the results un- satisfactory, they will have lost a treaty. If they find it satisfactory, they will have won the world. In addition to the need for weapons ef- fects tests in our quest for an effective ABM -system, I think it signifiCant that We have conflicting testimony regarding our Ilation's requirements for very high yield weapons on the order of 50 to 100 Megatons. The problem has been under Etucly,for years, and clear and unequivo- cal decisions relating to our needs for Butch weapons and the techniques we would use in employing them still are not forthcoming, I ,can only conclude that our inability to make a firm military de- cision on this matter, perhaps, is the re- sult of our lack of knowledge concerning the military effects of these weapons. It is unlikely that clear decisions will ever be forthcoming unless we are able to pro- duce the device, to test it, and to meas- ure and analyze its effects, as the Rus- sians did nearly 2 years ago. Mi. President, it seems to me that the crucial ,problem of weapons effects was epitomized by Dr. Foster in the course of a Colloquy which is to be found beginning 'on page 628 of the hearings. I Shall pro- Ode following excerpts: Benjtor ISYRD of West Virginia. Dr. Paster, I have beard that we have as large a weapon RS we could conceivably need. We can pro- duce a 50-megaton weapon', and this would be as large as any country would ever have to have. It seems to me that this is really beside the point, Ada , correct,' Dr. Poster, in saying that what Should really concern us are the effects of the explosion of such (i weapon upon our inissile,sites and upon our missile systems? ? Prt, 9,$-TER. That is correct, Senator BYRD. ... Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Dr. Fos- ter, if we confirm the treaty we will have to confine our tests to underground tests. namf, with the information vre already Lave s a, result of previous testing in the attnospaere, and through the medium of un- derground testing, can we acquire satis- factory and dependable and conclusive in- formation with respect to Weapons effects Upon sites and systems? Dr. FOSTER. No. Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Dr-. Pos- ter, this is the dilemma in which I find my- self. I, too, would like to hope that con- firmation of, the treaty would be a step toward peace and a step toward eventual disarmament. 13,U,t I ,recall that the Rus- sians were able to prepare for tests without our detecting such preparation, when they abrogated the moratorium. I recall that they assured the President, to our great satisfaction and happiness, that weapons which were being moved into Cuba were defensive weapons and not offensive weapons, at the very time when he had in his own hands evidence to the contrary. Now, it seems to me, in the light of the atmospheric tests which have been con- ducted and for which elaborate preparations were made, the equal of which we have not been able to conduct, that the Russians suddenly have come to a conclusion which they opposed heretofore; to wit, that they should enter Into this kind of a test ban treaty. Now, with the history of deceit that we have before us, I am afraid that they already have information which is vital to our se- curity, and they may know what our own weapons systems and sites can stand by virtue of the tests which they have carried out, and if they presently intend or at some later date should decide to abrogate the treaty, then the additional disadvantage to which we would be put, I fear, might be very dangerous to our security. So with theSe fears in mind, unless some scientist din tell' me that we can indeed ex- trapolate information through underground testing which will satisfy our fears with re- gard to weapons effects upon sites and sys- tems, I am not satisfied with the argument that we should take into consideration the political judgments, because I do not believe that the military leaders are prepared to weigh those political judgments, and I do not believe that the scientists are. But I do believe that the scientists can tell us whether or not we can extrapolate information from underground tests that will satisfy our fears in the other regard. Dr. FosTEii. Sir, there is no existing experi- mental data or theory, or to our knowledge, future underground tests that can provide you, with the complete assurance you want. Senator BYRD of West Virginia. I would just like to carry Senator JACKSON'S ques- tions one step further, if I might, and tie them in with such a question I asked earlier. Dr. Foster, I asked you earlier, if by using the information that we already have, and by conducting aggressively underground tests under the conditions of the treaty, we could acquire information which would satisfy our fears with regard to weapons effects upon sites and systems, and you indicated, I be- lieve, that we could not. Would your answer still be the same if I had framed my question differently to the extent that I had included the safeguards the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended? Dr. FOSTER. Yes, it would have been the same. It is simply that the question of how hard anything is to electromagnetic phe- nomena, be it antiballistic missile defense or hardness of silos, has to do with matters that, in my opinion, are not sufficiently well under- stood to be able to say with full confidence that they will function as designed in a nu- clear environment and this nuelear_environ- ment cannot be created by underground ex- periments. Senator Thrill) of West Virginia. We are taking a great chance with the security of this country if we approve a treaty which prohibits our further testing in the atmos- phere, and, consequently, learning by such testing important facts dealing With effects upon sites and systems? Dr. Fosain. You are taking a risk, and you cannot calaula-,te it. 16621 ?Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Regardless of these safeguards? Dr. FOSTER. Regardless of these safeguards. Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Even though they are implemented to the fullest? Dr. FOSTER. That is correct. (At this point Mr. METCALF took the chair as Presiding Officer.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, with further reference to the vital issue of weapons effects on our sites, and systems, and to the fact that we can ac- quire full information only through the medium of atmospheric tests, I should like to quote General LeMay, reading from page 370 of the test ban treaty hear- ing. General LeMay was asked the fol- lowing question: SURVIVABILITY OF MISSILE SITES General LeMay, without tests on the hard- ness of our missile sites, can you be assured of the survivability of our second strike force? General LEMAY. Well, we have overde- signed to a great extent on our missile sites, so that we are reasonably sure that they will stand an attack all right. . But you never can be positively sure until' we test them under actual conditions, and this has not been done, of course. On page 390 General LeMay said: General LEMAy. Let us put it another way: There are things you can find out about at- mospheric effects in underground tests, but I would say these are in the minority about what we would like to know about weapons effects. Pursuing that same issue of weapons effect, I read from page 443, in the testi- mony of Dr. Teller: But this test ban has nothing at all to do with how many missiles either side builds. This test ban has something to do with knowledge, and it does not have to do so much with knowledge concerning aggressive potentials. It has something vitally impor- tant to do with knowledge concerning mis- sile defense, concerning the vulnerability of our retaliatory forces. I believe that the Russians have acquired this knowledge. I believe that, because they have acquired this knowledge, they don't need any more atmospheric tests, and I believe that is why Khrushchev is willing to sign the treaty at present. In 1960, he wasn't willing to sign, but now he had these magnificent test series of 1961 and 1962. He now knows how to de- fend himself. He now knows, probably, where the weaknesses lie in our defense. Be has the knowledge, and he is now willing to stop and prevent us from obtaining similar knowledge. If the Russians want to build a big missile force with which to attack us, they can do so legally under the present testing. What they need is knowledge, and that is what they have. What we need is knowledge and that is what we don't have. As shown on page 464 of the hearings, I asked Dr. Teller the following: Is there information regarding overpres- sure effects upon our weapons systems re- sulting from the explosion of high-yield nuclear devices in the multimegaton range that can only be acquired through atmos- pheric testing? Dr. TELLER. If you tried to make a nuclear explosion underground, then everything con- nected with overpressure is very strongly in- fluenced by the surroundings and the effects of such testing_ cannot by any trick that I have seen so far constitute a sufficient sub- stitute for simple and straightforward test- ing in the atmosphere. Approve ele e 2007/01/20,: IA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP-65B00383R000100200004-6 16622. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Senator BYRD. Then is the absence of ade- quate arid complete information regarding weapons effects upon our weapons sites and systems vital to the security of this Nation? Dr. TELLER. I believe that it is vital. Senator BYRD. If the safeguards recom- mended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?and I am confident that you are familiar with the safeguards that were suggested in their posi- tion paper?are observed and carried out, will we be able to acquire the information we need to satisfactorily overcome What has been termed by you to be a weakness vital to our security? Dr. TELLER. I believe that if these safe- guards are observed, then the dangers which I have mentioned will disappear in part only. A lot of these dangers, a lot of these difficul- ties will remain. Senator BYRD. Then your answer would be that we would not be able to acquire to our complete satisfaction the information that we need to overcome these vital weaknesses in our system? Dr. TELLER. This would be my conclusion, uncertain as all such conclusions, but this would be it. As shown on page 466, Dr. Te:ler had this to say with regard to weapons effects: The main difficulty is just what you men- tion. We are probably, or quite possibly, at least, going to be faced with several mis- siles, and we should be able to shoot at all of them, and we should not be blinded by our first shot. This means we must not make our first shot unnecessarily big. This means that we should know what is the probable right kill radius. This means that we should so de- sign our missiles as to give it a maximum destructive effect at a minimum binding effect. All these questions need testing and more testing, and after you have done it, you still need to test to see whether the whole thing works, whether there is no flaw in the actual operation. On page 424 of the hearings it is shown that Dr. Teller said: Secretary McNamara has told you, and he is right, that we can do a lot about missile defense. We can study the incoming mis- siles, we can study the decoys, and we can try to see the difference between them. We can perfect our radars, make them harder, more versatile, faster. By underground testing we can develop the best kind of nuclear explosives by which to kill an incoming missile, because when you are shooting at such a fast and uncer- tain target as an incoming missile, you can- not hit it with a bull's-eye. You need a pow- erful counterforce, a small nuclear explo- sion. Secretary McNamara has said rightly that we can do all that. But there is one thing, one circumstance he did not explain. He did not explain to you that we must expect not 1 missile to come against us, but 5, and not to come alone but to come accompanied by 25 de- coys. We have to discriminate between these, find out which are the dangerous ob- jects and shoot them down, not some of them, but all of them. The first shot that we fire will blind us, and will make us less prepared to shoot against the second missile I that comes hard on the heels of the first. I quote Secretary McNamara on weap- ons effects tests, reading from page 104: The problems of nuclear technology here relate to the vulnerability of the balistic missile warheard to kill by blast or by radia- tion. The latter vulnerability, as to radia- tion, can be tested underground, but the for- mer cannot be fully tested underground. We have not, and we beheve that the So- viet Union has not, explored by full-scale high altitude tests the vulnerability Of re- entry vehicles to blast. Atmospheric testing woUld enable us to conflon the enhanced resistance of new, hard-warhead designs to blast. Without the confirmation which dynamic tests of reentry vehicles would provide, we will have to rely on extensive extrapolations, and, therefore, there will be greater uncertainties than would otherwise exist. I have attempted to indicate, by quot- ing from distinguished and eminent scientists and military experts who gave testimony during the course of the hear- ings conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations and by the Prepared- ness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, that the matter of weapons effects can be vital to the security of our Nation. Some of the witnesses expressed the fear that the Soviet Union may have ac- quired such vital information concern- ing weapons effects upon sites and sys- tems during the comprehensive and effective postmoratoriurn atmospheric tests. If the Soviets have not so devel- oped such information, the danger in our ratifying the treaty, And by so doing precluding ourselves from engaging in atmospheric testing, would not be so great. We cannot be sure, however, that the Soviet Union has not developed such information. Certainly we must be suspicious of Mr. Khruslichev in regard to all things, and particularly in this situation, since he has upon at least two occasions rejected a somewhat similar treaty and then sud- denly, in this year of 1963, has reversed his position and indicated a willingness to enter into this treaty. I am no expert, but I have listened to the experts, as have other Senators. The Soviet Union carefully planned elaborate tests?such plans perhaps extended through the entire 34 months of the voluntary moratorium?and surprised us with their statement that they were going to abrogate the moratorium. Then, subsequent to the abrogation of the moratorium, they carried out a success- ful series of tests. Furthermore, they have had the opportunity and time, at least, to evaluate the information which could be extrapolated from such tests, and may have found that important dis- coveries are in their possession with ref- erence to weapons effects upon sites and systems. The possibility is very alarming to me, as it has been to Dr. Foster, Dr. Teller, General Power, Admiral .Burke, General LeMay and others. Since we cannot be sure, I fear the results of ratification of the pending treaty, because under the treaty we can never fully develop such information through underground tests alone. The case, therefore, in respect of weapons effects is simply, this. The So- viets effected a planned abrogation of the voluntary moratorium. Through subsequent atmospheric tests, they may have acquired vital information which can only be developed by testing in the atmosphere. Having such information in their possession, and realizing that our failure to conduct atmospheric tests to the same degree following the mora- ATE September 19 torium leaves us in an inferior position, the Soviets may have every reason to be willing to sign a treaty which will freeze us in that inferior position. THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THREAT Support of the test ban springs largely, I believe, from an intense wish that the world were different than it actually is. It springs from viewing the world as we would like it to be, rather than as it is. It springs from a genuine desire for peace and is so sincere and so overwhelming that the nature of communism is for- gotten. Let us remember that the Com- munists have only one purpose to which all their actions are geared. This pur- pose is world conquest. The aims which the Communists seek and the methods they are willing to use have been vividly spelled out many times by the Communists themselves. On December 26, 1922, in his report to the 10th All-Russian Congress of So- viets, Stalin declared that the decision to form a union of Soviet republics was "another decisive step toward the amal- gamation of the toilers of the whole world into a single world Socialist Re- public." The handbook of Marxism states further the Communist objective in the section on the program of the Communist International. It says: Thus, the dictatorship of the world pro- letariat is an essential and vital condition precedent to the transformation of the world capitalist economy into Socialist economy. This world dictatorship can be established only when the victory of socialism has been achieved. And Stalin supported this objection, for he said this: For the victory of the revolutLon in one country, in the present case Russia * * is the beginning of and the groundwork for the social revolution. And with the death of Stalin, Malen- kov?notwithstanding his professions for a new order of coexistence--revealed his faith in Soviet destiny when he said: We khow firmly that the victory of de- mocracy and socialism throughout the world is inevitable. Dimitri Manuilsky, active in the revo- lution, one-time chairman of the Coun- cil of People's Commissars of the Ukraine S.S.R., and a Communist representative at the United Nations, described, in a lecture at the Lenin School of Political Warfare, the tactics that the Commu- nists would some day employ. He said: War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. To win we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most spectac- uar peace Movement on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard of con- cessions. The capitalist countries stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in their own destruction. They will Jeep at an- other chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fist. Lenin outlined the modus operandi for Communist domination of the world. Ho said: First we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. Then we will surround America, the last citadel of capitalism. We Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approvd Fo -17.elease 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 16623 shall not have' to attack. She will fall into our lap 11,17 an overripe fruit. IChrLISAiCheV, 61.1-0 to form, told West- ern diplomats at a reception in Moscow on November 18, 1956; Whether you like It or nOt, history is on out side. We will latiry you yet. - Lest any person feel that Khru- shchev's words were spoken in a moment of jocundity, they 'would do well to re- flect upon what he said when, on June 2, 1957, he appeared before an American television audience: I can prophesy that your grandchildren in. America will live under socialism. Communist policies are Mined to un-' renlitting war on non-Communist na- tions?war in the military sense at times; at other times, a war of doctrinal tactics, of infiltration and subversion, of economic piracy and the stimulation of moral chaos. , I do not wish to labor the point, but it is Clear; and, irrespective of changes in leadership, the 'key objective of world domination has remained constant. xlis SOOT& RECORD ON TREATIES _ We learned long ago that the Soviet leaders cannot be trusted and that their agreements are usually worthless. As a matter, of tact, we have no less author- ity for our, guidance than Stalin, Lenin's successor. V Stalin was frank to say: Words must have no relation to action? ? othervrise at kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing: actions another. Good words are a mask for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more pos- sible than dry water or iron wood. The unfolding tragic history of the times in Which we men have lived pro- vides the stark and irrefutable evidence that the eomniunists keep -only those agreernents which are in their interests to keep, and that they will break those agreements which no longer serve their Interests, And the fact should not es- cape us that "their interests," as used here, are not the interests of a free peo- ple whose rulers govern by the consent, freely expressed, of the governed; but, rather, they are the "interests" of the International conspiracy which has its roots in the Kremlin and which seeks to impose its ideological will upon other governments throughout the world so as to assure the final outcome about which Lenin, the high priest of Communist strategy, spoke in 1923, "the final victory of socialism -(cornmunism)." 'the' ong list of 'pledges broken by the , Soviet 'Union leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that many of the agree- ments were entered into without good faith and in accordance with the familiar Communist dictum: ' Prprnises are like pie ciiistsL- made to be broken. AS long, as we have an agreement which does not provide for inspection of Soviet territory, SO that we can See for ourselves What the Soviet 'Union is do- ing, we are in effect relying upon trust that gip Aovietaiill abide. by the treaty. Yet, Many are the instances in the past when the Soviet Union has demonstrated Its disrespect for agreements solemnly .No.149 10 entered into. At least a few of these are worth remembering at this time. On September 28, 026, Lithuania and the Soviet Union concluded a non- aggression pact. On June 15, 1940, Lithuania was invaded by Soviet forces. On May 4, 1932, Estonia and the U.S.S.R. signed a nonaggression pact. Eight years later, on June 16, 1940, Soviet military forces invaded Estonia. On February 5, 1932, Latvia and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact. Eight years later, on June 16, 1940, Soviet military forces invaded Latvia. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to help the peoples liberated from Nazi control to solve their political and economic prob- lems by democratic means. The U.S.S.R. flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of this pledge by installing Com- munist regimes in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Also at Yalta, the Soviet Union agreed that the Republic of China should retain full sovereignty in Manchuria. The Russians flouted this agreement by tactics of obstruction designed to deliver Manchuria to the Chinese Reds. At Potsdam in July 1945, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom agreed that, subject to the re- quirements of military security, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free- dom of religion would be respected in the occupation of Germany. As everyone knows, Soviet authorities in East Ger- many have curtailed genuine freedom of speech and press by imposing the totali- tarian instruments of suppression, cen- sorship, and secret police. Basic legal and political rights have been the victim of authoritarian edict and one-party control, with the inevitable result that a puppet regime has been installed. Most fresh in our minds, of course, is the summit conference of the Big Four In Geneva in July 1955. This high-level parley in the diplomatic Alps engendered great expectations among the peoples of the free world. The single most specific agreement made at Geneva was on the German question. The four powers declared it was their purpose to settle the German question and the reunification of Ger- many by means of free elections which shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security, As Mr. John Foster Dulles later said, the Soviet Union failed to keep this sol- emn pledge, and on November 16, 1955, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States stated that negotiations on the German question had reached a deadlock, because the Soviet Foreign 'Minister insisted on a German policy which would have in- volved the continued division of Ger- many as well as the eventual dissolution of the Western security system. In a letter dated February 28, 1958, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko tore up the final scrap of the Geneva agreement when he said the German question is a question of relations between the two existing German states. To those who may suffer the illusion that the real nature of international communism can be changed by any new show of amiability and affability put on by the Russians in connection with the signing of this treaty, one might only point to the announcement, which came on the heels of the 1955 Geneva adjourn- ment, that the Soviets were increasing their military forces in East Germany. Then, too, the Israeli plane disaster, in which more than 50 persons were shot down by the Bulgarian Communists, only conformed to the Russian pattern of committing Overt, violent acts in order to demean the United States before the eyes of the world. "So sorry," said the Bulgarian Communists, and they felt that they had atoned for their trigger- happy brutality. One must not forget, too, that it was virtually on the eve of the Geneva Conference that the Rus- sians shot down one of our American planes over international waters, inflict- ing severe burns upon American boys, scars which some of the victims will carry to their graves. In that instance, the Soviets quickly assumed the partial re- sponsibility, a development, based upon past experience, that warranted the sound conclusion that they knew it was their full responsibility. Our State De- partment made a hasty agreement, ac- cepting the Soviet offer to pay for the damages. I mention these incidents at this junc- ture merely to point up the sorry stand- ards of measurements we have too often used in our official dealings with the Rus- sians and to stress the fact that our sincere desire for peaceful relations with the Communists will carry us into serious danger unless we base our reckonings and policies on realism. SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON QUES- TIONS RAISED BY THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY First. A detente. Second. The leopard's spots. Third. Time and circumstance. Fourth. Peace with justice. Fifth. World opinion. Sixth. The basic issue. 1. A DETENTE Mr. President, as one explanation for Mr. Khrushchev's willingness to be a party to this treaty, the thought is ad- vanced that he wishes to attain a de- tente with the West. I consider it to be merely another one of those cycles in which the Communists follow periods of tension with periods of seeming relaxa- tions. The Soviets may desire, at this point, a period in which to consolidate gains and repair weaknesses. It is impossible, of course, for us to know with certainty what the reasons are for the sudden change of Soviet position and the turn of events. But there is no evidence that Khrushchev has finally decided to work for a stable and lasting peace. Many of us have asked, "Why did Khrushchev agree at this time to an agreement he had refused even to dis- cuss in September 1961 and August AppraVed For Release 2007/01/2 :'CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16624 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 1962?" In answer, we have been told that in October 1962, during the Cuban crisis, the Russian leader "peered into the pit of the inferno," realized for the first time the horrors that a nuclear exchange could unleash upon the world, and be- came convinced that the real interest of the Soviet Union would best be served by a relaxation of world tensions as a prelude to control over world armaments. Those who hold this view seem to for- get that the immediate result of the Cuban crisis was a "hardening" of the Soviet position on on-site inspection at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, that the Soviet decision to participate in the pact did not come until the Soviet Union had completed its at- mospheric test series, and that all the comments relating to the inferno into which world leaders peered during the Cuban crisis have come from officials of the free world. One is almost tempted to ask, "Who frightened whom?" There is little evidence of any sincere effort on the part of the Soviet Union to correct or modify the real causes of world tensions. Soviet forces still (YOCUM' Cuban soil. The Berlin wall still stands. East Germany still cannot participate in free elections or in a referendum on re- unification. The Soviet leadership con- tinues to threaten the free world with bombs in orbit and 100-megaton nuclear weapons. Subversion and warfare con- tinue under Soviet sponsorship around the periphery of the free world while the Soviet and Chinese heartlands re- main relatively immune. The Soviet leadership may have peered Into the inferno last October, but I am not convinced that they were reformed by what they saw. I feel that, as has been the case be- fore, the Soviets desire a breathing spell for the purpose of regrouping forces and for reexamining strategy and tactics. As AdM.. Arleigh Burke testified during the hearings: Based on the past actions of the Com- munists when they make a sudden about- face, as they have clone in the case of this treaty the provisions of which they have rejected on several previous occasions, it would seem that they wish to seek some advantage over the United States. They never have been generous. They al- ways have acted solely in their own in- terests to reach their own goal of domi- nation. James David Atkinson, Ph. D., Asso- ciate Professor of Government at Georgetown University, in his book "The Edge of War," 1960, includes an. inter- esting chapter entitled "The Fusion of War and Peace." Dr. Atkinson, a West Virginian, discusses the Soviet purpose of seeking a "breathing space," from time to time, in the course of the Corn- mtinist offensive: Furthermore, any disarmament conces- sions will be, on the part of the Soviet bloc, in the nature of a detente. But the democ- racies, by contrast, have in the past tended to consider such arrangements on a perma- nent or semipermanent basis. The new phase of Soviet strategy does not imply an abandonment of the ultimate goal of a? Communist world. This is clearly spelled out by Khrushchev's statement im- mediately preceding his American visit: "We Communists believe that the idea of communism will ultirnately be Victorious throughout the world, just as it has been victorious in our country, in China, and many other states." The idea of a breathing space during which Soviet strategy will call for the struggle against the non-Communist countries to be conducted in a more sophis- ticated form was also pointed out in a Pravda editorial that laid down the line in these words: "Today we are living at a time when the historic transition from socialism to communism is taking place. * * At the United Nations, Comrade Khrushchev put forward the principles of U.S.S.R. foreign policy and on behalf of the Soviet Govern- ment submitted proposals for universal and complete disarmament of all states, which opens up a new era in the struggle for world peace." A breathing space in the cold war between the Soviet Union and the NATO allies will also permit the Chinese Communist junior partner to stepup cold war activity in the Far East while the 'U.S.S.R. regroups its forces in the other half of the globe. The apparent new phase in Soviet policy can be expected to last only as long as it offers advantages to the Kremlin leadership. Undoubtedly there will be those in the Soviet high command who will urge a harder policy against the West, for they will see signs that will confirm their belief that the capitalists are sufficiently decadent and weakened to be eliminated sooner rather than later. From time to time the non-Communist world will be threatened, and incidents will be manu- factured to test its strength. The United States will remain the principal barrier to Soviet bloc aspirations. Nineteen hundred and fifty-eight saw the beginnings of a sub- tler policy by the Soviet Union to dissipate American determination to maintain this barrier. The decade to 1968, and especially the years from 1961, will be the crucial period in the development of 'Soviet strength and the at tempted softening of the American will to resist and of the ingredient that chiefly supports that will, our military strength. Signs of weakness on the part of the United States will no doubt increase the momentum of the Soviet advance and lead the Kremlin to believe that it need not delay the last stage of the Communist offensive. I believe Dr. Atkinson's words are prophetic. 2. THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS Many of the attitudes and stratagems which mark the Communists' approach to negotiations are baffling in the ex- treme so long as we believe that they are seeking peace, or even a significant low- ering of tensions. But they become un- derstandable as soon as we realize that they are seeking only in Lenin's phrase, "an agreement concerning war." Marxist-Lenin thinking in this regard has not changed from the idea of one-time Polit- buro member Grigori E. Zinoviev, who said on February 2, 1019: We are willing to sign an unfavorable peace with the Allies. * * * It would only mean that we should put no trust whatever In the bit of paper we should sign. We should use the breathing space so obtained to gather our strength. Stated another way if the other party to such a treaty belieyes that it is being signed in good faith, he is to be rated as a victim of his own naivete: what Lenin called petty bourgeois trustfulness. History repeats itself. This is a com- mon saying which we have all heard from our youth up. If, then, we refuse to understand the lesson of history, we are condemned to repeat the errors a the September 19 past. We shall suffer all the more if we insist upon closing our eyes to that in- evitable history which Communist lead- ers, as did Hitler in Mein Kampf, write in advance. If, indeed "coming events cast their shadows before," we should long ago have taken warning from, a commit- ment, grievously broken, of 30 years ago. Litvinoff's pledge to President Roosevelt is referred to on page 287 of "What We Must Know About Communism," by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, 1958: Even the ideological outposts of empire rest on broken promises. Thus, on Novem- ber 12, 1933, Litvinoff gave a four-point pledge to President Roosevelt?as a condi- tion of the U.S.S.R.'s being officially rec- ognized--guaranteeing that the Soviet Union would refrain from all propaganda and organized activity that had as its aim the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the undermining of our institutions. Five days later, however?with recognition ac- complished?he released a statement which said, "The Third International is, not men- tioned in this document. You must not read into it more than was intendedt A month later, the Comintern met in Moscow and adopted resolutions which instructed all parties?including the CPUSA?that there was no way out of the general crisis of capitalism other than the one demon- strated by the Bolshevik revolution. In His Sermon on the Mount, Jesus uttered an oft-quoted truism: "Where- fore by their fruits ye shall know them." The Soviet record of deceit and duplic- ity, treachery and perfidy is clearly written. But that record is not com- plete, nor, in my judgment will it be complete as long as leaders in the So- viet Union subscribe to Communist ideology. The words of the Prophet Jeremiah, heard above the din of the centuries, are as meaningful in our age as they were in his tempestuous day: Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil. That the leopard has not changed his spots should be evident from the follow- ing statement by Mr. K.hrushchey--a statement arrestingly free from dissimu- lation. Khrushchey, who some appear to believe is somewhat less dangerous than was Josef Stalin for the United States, said on September 17, 1955: If anyone thinks that our smiles mean the abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, he is deceiving himself cruelly. Those who expect this to happen might just as well wait for a shrimp to learn how to whistle. 3. TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE It has been suggested that we cannot now reject a nuclear test ban treaty since we advanced the same offer in 1959 and again in 1962. The situation which now confronts the United States is quite different from the situation at the time of the previous of- fers. In 1961 and 1962, the Soviet Union carried out an extensive series of nuclear tests in violation of previous promises to refrain from testing. As is well known, much time is required in order to eval- uate such a series of tests. The Soviet evaluation of the 1961-62 series was completed during 1963. The Soviets now have the opportunity to freeze us Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 1963 Approved For., Release 2007/01120 : CIA-RDP651300383R00 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Into an inferior technological position. o Consequently, the situation as of today and the Soviets are able to victimize us has clearly changed and, in prudence, we in one way or another, as by testing on cannot be bound by offers made when Chinese soil and pushing ahead to the quite different circumstances obtained, development of new plans based upon Proponents of the nuclear test ban treaty knowledge already obtained, would it not would l quite clearly have a much stronger be likely that the Communists would case had the Soviet Union refrained have even stronger reason to believe that from conducting such an extensive series they might eventually be able to lure us of nuclear tests in 1961-62. into a disarmament treaty, under which 4. PrAcc WITH JITSTICE the present 'treaty We will never be able viets might offer? to get the Soviet Union to sign another For example, they are proposing to test ban treaty. have inspections at certain places which This argument ignores 46 years of they would designate?a particular Soviet diplomacy. From the Bolshevik crossroads or railroad crossing that they seizure of power in Russia down to the would agree to. But if we agreed to such present day, if there has been one con- a plan, they would "route the train" the stant in Soviet diplomacy it has been, other way, so that it not pass the loca- above all, the constant of flexibility. As tions of the sites to be inspected, in an shown over the course of thousands of attempt to mislead or deceive us. Thus negotiations, the Soviets are quite willing the seeds of our own undoing would be to bargain endlessly at the diplomatic contained in such an agreement. table. It is not they, but we who become On the other hand, if we insisted that restless and believe that some action we would make no agreement until we Mgdt be taken now, some diplomatic were satisfied that such a treaty served agree/rib/it reached at once. And this our purpose equally with theirs, we would flexibility on the part of the Soviets has have executed an agreement under which consistently been tied to a keen appre- we could automatically detect a viola- elation of the balance of military power tion. in the world. When the military power If we obtained that kind of agree- Of the United States has been in the ment, would it not be the basis for mak- aseendanoY the Soviets?being always Ing the Soviets realize that eventually, inclined at such thine as disarmament came, it 100200004-6 16625 th test b treatyminus inspection, a the treaty by the Senate would have we would forgo essential inspection or It has been argued that if we reject " agree to the kind of inspection the So- an adverse psychological effect upon the countries that have signed the treaty. But is this to deter us from acting, even at this late hour, in our own best inter- ests and in the best interests of those who might momentarily condemn us? It should give us pause to remember that the overwhelming majority of the sig- natories will never become nuclear pow- ers. Many of these signatories could ill afford a modern battleship. To allow world opinion to dissuade us from taking a course away from danger is to allow "the tail to wag the dog," if I may refer to a common expression. Let us not forget that when we talk about the striking power that is built around the Strategic Air Command and the Polaris submarine, we are talking, in General Power's words, "about better than 90 percent of the striking power of the free world." This being the case, why should the United States?a country which, in the event of all-out war, would be expected to deliver 90 percent of the striking power for the protection of the free world?hesitate to act in accordance with its own safety, and that of its allies, even if it means that we temporarily dis- appoint the portion of the free world complex which can supply only 10 per- cent of the striking power? A large percentage of those who would condemn us for rejection of the treaty been to be more reasoable. When the mill- would have to be on a foolproof inspec- would be neutral states. Some of these flexible, as they are?have , have been more or less chronic critics, try power of the United States has be- tion basis? gun even a slightly apparent decline, the Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The sug- not only of our foreign policy, but-of our . Soviets have tended to become bellig- gestion is an interesting one. domestic policies, as well. erent,, bellicose, and intransigent. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we en- In this trying hour we should heed Paradoxically, rejection of the treaty tered into this treaty minus inspection, the words of the Psalmist: "Be still, and May eventually bring about a treaty em- the Communists would be given every know that I am God." Perhaps if we bracing solid Inspection safeguards?and incentive to feel that if they held out would but take a moment in this mad which the Soviet Union would accept. long enough, they could get a disarma- rush of life and "be still" to ponder and How, one may Well ask, could such a ment agreement minus inspection, meditate upon the troublesome aspect of desirable end be achieved? If the Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Earlier world opinion as it is involved in the United States tests?as we have not this week the distinguished chairman of momentous question before us, we would done---a,nd realizes the full potential of the Committee on Armed Services [Mr. find an inner counsel and an inner a which we are?Capable, we can prove , RUSSELL] lucidly and cogently presented strength that would enable us, not "to Onclusively to the Soviet 'Union that a logical step-by-step hypothetical case see through a glass darkly," but to come , ? they cannbt compete with us in nuclear weaponS. The Soviet record is clear. They are the hardest of hard negotiators. put they do respect power. Here again the record is clear. If faced with a con- -timing position ot inferiority in nuclear technology, they would have every reason to accept a valid treaty providing sound rules of inspection. Unfortunately, it WoUld appear that they accept our pres- ent desire for a treaty as a sign of weak- ness. By rejecting the treaty we can disabuse them of this notion. Then, pa- tiently but purposefully, we can go for- ward to build an enduring peace. Not a ?tenuous peace Which may expire as -qUiekly as did Neville Chamberlain's "peace in our time." But an enduring ? peace based on power with purpose. Let Us not timidly shrink from the atom, but, knoivTng that God is good, have faith that is 'N'ation under God" was given great Over-Itroin the-atom?to be used in the pursuit riot of peace alone, but of peace With justice. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. 13VRD of West Virginia. I yield. Mr. LONG Of touisiana. In line with What the Senator is saying, if we agree fore us. I, too, will agree that rejection torY. precisely in point with what the Sena- face to face with our destiny. tor from Louisiana has just said. I thank American is a great nation. It has the Senator. long been a good neighbor to the coun- 5. WORLD OPINION tries that join its unwalled and un- It is urged that so many nations of the guarded borders. Its sons and daugh- world have already signed the nuclear ters have shed their blood more than test ban treaty that the United States once in the cause of liberty. It has free- risks the censure of world opinion if we ly poured out its largess to other nations, refuse to approve the treaty. This is small and large, throughout the earth. really one of the strongest arguments Many of the signatories of the treaty? sustaining the decision, right or wrong? in fact, virtually all of them?have, at and only the future will reveal this?of one time or another, been the recipients, those who will support the treaty. At in one way or another, of our benef- least, it appears to be one of the major icence. America's good will again and factors in their decision, again has been liberally demonstrated There seems to be a great fear of fly- by the outpouring of her billions and by ing in the face of world opinion if we re- her other deeds of kindness. What more ject the treaty. Voss, in Nuclear Am- is needed to convince the world of the bush, aptly puts this question into peaceful motives of the greatest nation focus: in all the ages? Before the world is overcome with guilt There are but few nations that have for having produced the atomic age's bril- power to alter the course of world his- liant mushroom cloud, it would do well to . reflect how much more of this globe would be tory. America is one of the few. The under the communistic cloud today were it overwhelming majority of nations will not for the U.S. nuclear capacity, be able in the future, as they have been I think we should pause and reflect able in the past, to contribute but little about the matter of world opinion, as to the determination of human events it has been injected into the issue be- and to the course of the stream of his- pprovedi 01/2 =RD1565B-003 R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: dA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16626 CQ Those who would c Dude:rip us lack the power to take "at the flood" that "tide in the affairs of men which leads on to fortune." But not so with America. She has the power and the resources to direct the path of events. Along with this power, America has a duty, in this situation, to act so as to insure that communism will, not be "the wave of the future." But we cannot temporize, and we must not shrink from our oft-unpleasant re- sponsibility. What really counts so much is, not world opinion in this era of confusion but, rather, what will pre- serve this Republic in all the years to come. I refer again to "An Appraisal," a chapter in Nuclear Ambush For the United States, it matters only to a minor degree?it is not even morally de- fensible?if neutrals complain about our sprinkling them with radioactive fallout that may possibly harm a very few of their people. Dysentery and influenza, which the com- plainers export to us, more than balance the grievance lists. If the safety of all America is at stake, however, one takes the risk of harming a few people, foreigners or fellow citizens. We can regret the injury?perhaps try to compensate in some way for it. But We cannot sacrifice our whole Nation's safety or our own very lives, of,it of deference to a vague fear that is more mystic than scientific-- Or real. Voss clearly reflects the Soviet Union's disregard for world opinion on page 532 of his book: Test ban advocates said Russia could not afford to cheat, because she would be griev- ously embarrassed if she were caught. But the Communists dared to cheat on the Korean and Indochinese armistice agree- ments and seemed to bear up extremely well, if they suffered any embarrassment at all. The Russians later forced abandonment of the whole premise when they resumed test- ing in September 1961, boasted of it, and tried to intimidate the world. The fact that "world opinion" has its curse as well as it blessing is articulately portrayed in this final excerpt from Voss' work: There are some lessons to be drawn from the history if the nuclear test ban issue. One of the first is that it is extremely dan- gerous to put off a showdown with "world opinion" over issues vital to the national security. The United States got involved in a nuclear test ban negotiation more be- cause it "wanted to be nice" to the rest of the world than because It believed its own security interests would be served. It may or may not have been true that wiping out the danger of nuclear war would have been in the national interest, if it were even pos- sible. But it was clearly perceived in the days before 1958 that a nuclear test ban alone could not possibly accomplish this. Later, the United States stumbled rather than walked into the test ban ambush, humoring the worriers of the world, who de- pended on the United States for protection, rather than leading them. Humoring the fainthearted, when confronted with a ruth- less adversary like Soviet communism, has proved tO be a dangerous game. Indeed, if the question before us were not so sobering, one might, in being con- fronted with the argument that we should not fly in the face of world opin- ion?that of 97 nations?brush aside the thought, by simply referring to Thomas Carlyle, On Boswell's Life of Johnson. NGRESSIONAL .ECORD -- SENATE September 19 Aesop's Fly, sitting ' on the axle of the Will the effects of the nuclear test ban chariot, has been much laughed at for ex- treaty increase the risk cif war by en claiming: "What a duft I do raise.'" couraging Khrushchev?or his succes- In answer to those who urge that re- sor?to take risks against the "enemy' jection of the treaty risks the censure which would otherwise not be taken? To - of world opinion, it is a temptation to answer this hard question easily in the point out that the general peace?the name of the relaxation of tensions is . freedom from a total war?enjoyed by tempting. It may even be momentarily the world since the end of World War II Popular. But a harder course of action is .r has not been brought about by world that enjoined by the admonition of the opinion. It results, as Sir Winston Bible to act with prudence. Using words Churchill has reminded us, from the so applicable to the question of trust to- blunt fact that the 'United States has day, to the spirit of the nuclear test ban possessed such overwhelming power in treaty, the psalmist said: nuclear weapons and their delivery ca- pability as to insure a general peace. Such an answer, I say, is indeed tempt- ing, for it is true. But there is an even more compelling answer. The nuclear test ban treaty is before the Senate of the United States for serious and prayer- ful deliberation. It is to be hoped that the United States is not engaged in an international popularity contest. The compelling answer is, not how many Na- tions have ratified this treaty, but that the United States adopt the course of action that is right. British Prime Min- ister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich with the plaudits of most of the nations of the world that he had brought peace in our time. The Brit- ish press recorded that massive crowds hailed him in London on the night of his return from Munich, and that the cheering masses joined in singing "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow." But did he . do what was right? ? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, we come to a discussion of the basic issue of the nuclear test ban treaty. THE BASIC ISSITE The basic, the overriding, issue is whether the treaty constitutes a risk to the continued military superiority of the United States and, a so, whether the risk to that superiority is a risk to peace. That the treaty constitutes a serious risk to the continued Military superiority The words in his mouth were as smooth as butter, but war was in his heart. CONCLUSI ON" Mr. President, I have reached my con- clusion to vote against this treaty. I shall do this sorrowfully. Sorrowfully because it places me in opposition to the position of our President, a leader who has earnestly sought to find a path of hope in his pursuit of peace. I respect and honor our Commander in Chief. Yet, all men are fallible, and all may, therefore, err. As a Member of the Senate, upon whose shoulders rests an equal portion of the awesome responsibil- ity of choosing the right course as we stand at what may be the last great crossroads, I feel it imperative that duty should rise above all things and that in the course of fulfilling my. duty, I am bound to be true to my convictions. My convictions have led me to speak the words I have spoken today and they will lead' me, if I live, to carry out my an- nounced intention to cast my vote against confirmation of the treaty. For, as Robert E. Lee said: If we, only to please the people, stand for that which we disapprove, how, then, can we later defend our actions? I hope that I am wrong in my ap- prehensions, because as the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said earlier this week if those of us who are agrtins,; this treaty of this Nation is clear, as I think I have are wrong in our decision, then, we will already shown. This is my judgment all be the happier for it. of the matter, but it is based upon a care- Paul the Apostle said: "Where the ful weighing of the evidence. And spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." while I do not stand with the majority America's greatness has been, from the in this judgment, I do not stand alone, beginning, of the spirit. There have been The ultimate question, therefore, is times recently when I have thought that this: Is the treaty a risk to peace? America's greatness had slipped from Since the end of the Second World War her grasp, but this cannot be right. the world-has witnessed an uneasy peace Human destiny will still be influenced which some have called the cold war, by an America that calls back again her But there has been a general peace, an greatness, because there is yet an Amer - absence of general war. What has main- ica that, in this conflict of wills and tamed this general peace? Not an Amer- ideologies and ways of life, can draw once loan, as I have already indicated, but an more on her spiritual heritage with the Englishman has given the most cogent call to action of the Prophet Isaiah: answer. Sir Winston Churchill has said Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and con- that the overwhelming ,nuclear superior- firm the weak knees. Say to the faint- ity possessed by the United States has hearted: Take courage, and fear not. kept the peace. Clearly, anything which diminishes this nuclear superiority is a A people that thus recalls its heritage step which diminishes the power to of courage may yet ensure that "the edge maintain this general peace. It is a step of war, like an ill-sheathed knife, no more Which may encourage any aggressor- shall cut its master." Minded nation to take a risk which it Mr. President, I apologize to the other would otherwise be inhibited from taking, Members of the Senate who have been. the risk of war, discommoded by my long and tedious Speaking in Yugoslavia on August 21, statement. I recognize that those of us 1963, Soviet Premier Khrushchev said: who take the position I have taken are You and we have mutual aims, the struggle assuming an unpopular position in this to construct socialism and communism. You matter. I accord to those who support and we have a mutual enemy: imperialism, the treaty, however, as I stated in the Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 1963 beginning, the same sincerity of purpose and the same dedication to the security of our country as I claim to possess. We have all examined the same testi- mony, the same evidence, on the question which we soon must decide. We have listened to the same witnesses. But, having weighed this evidence, having evaluated it, each of us has attempted to judge, in his own mind and in his own conscience, what his decision should be. And we shall not an agree. Regardless of the decision of each of us, every Senator has conscientiously strived to wrest from this agonizing question the answer that will serve his country best. For, differ though we will, the consolation may be ours that we have labored in the spirit of the words en- graved on a statue which stands in the State capitol at Atlanta, Ga.: He who saves his country saves all things, And all things saved will bless him. He who lets his country die lets all things die, And all things dying curse him. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRr) of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. VirtatmOND. I congratulate the able Senator from West Virginia for the magnificent address he has made today against the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty. It is one of the most scholarly addresses I have heard during my Service in the Senate. It has been clear, forceful, arid logical. In his address he has raised the differ- ent arguments seriatim in favor of the treaty, discussed them, and successfully refuted them. In his address he has discussed argu- ments against the treaty that should ap- peal to Members of the Senate, and I believe will appeal to the American peo- ple. These arguments are sound and they are logical. In his address he has discussed the na- ture of the Soviet Communist threat, Which we know is a Most dangerous and vicious threat. Lenin said, when he took over Russia in 1917, that the aim of the Soviets was to be the gravediggers, the heirs, and successors to the governments Of the world. 'The "Communists have never departed from -their goal. Their goal today is world domination. The able Senator from West Virginia has discussed this topic with ability, the same AS he has discussed the Soviet rec- ord on treaties. It is clear that the So- viets will not keep a treaty except when It is in their favor. 'The American Bar Association had a study made, and it found that the Soviets had broken 50 out fat 52 major agreeMents. They had broken hundreds of other agreements. The Senator from West Virginia has shown clearly their perfidy, treachery, atid lack of good faith in keeping agree- Merits. In addition, the Senator from West Virginia has discussed other questions Jhave beeh raised by the nuclear test ban freatir. - All in all, lie has delivered a very com- prehensive address. The address should be read by every Meinber of this body. I do not see how any opernninded, fair, Approved For Release 2007/01/20 fCIA-RDP65E300383R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16627 - objective person could read the address and reach any conclusion other than that reathed by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia?namely, that the treaty is unwise and that the Senate would walk the path of wisdom if it failed to ratify it. Again I congratulate the able Senator for his fine address. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator from South Carolina for his generous and kind remarks. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to the Senator from Georgia. Mr. RUSSELL. I extend my hearty congratulations and strongest commen- dations to the Senator from West Vir- ginia for this very remarkable presenta- tion. The Senator is a careful man. I have worked with him on committees. I know the care he exercises even in minor mat- ters before reaching a conclusion. In this case, the reenarkable statement he has made indicates a most thorough and exhaustive study of all the evidence that was available on the subject of the pro- posed treaty. All of us have a pretty clear idea about the outcome of the voting on the proposal when the Senate takes it up next Tues- day morning under the unanimous-con- sent agreement. However, I am willing to risk a proph- ecy?and that is always a dangerous thing to do?that the events of the next 12 months will completely justify the unstinted effort and the devoted patri- otism which the Senator has put into his analysis of the treaty. He has docu- mented it so thoroughly that if this coun- try endures and some historians of the future decide to make a study of the subject, they will find most of the ma- terial they will need in the address of the Senator from West Virginia. Let me say to the Senator that even if our numbers are small on Tuesday, his efforts have not been wasted. They will serve a very useful purpose in the days to come. I am proud to be able toslaim him as a friend, one who has shown such high motivation and such a distinguished ef- fort in the preparation of the analysis. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I shall always treasure the compliments of the distinguished senior Senator from Geor- gia. I consider him to be a great U.S. Senator, a great southerner, and a great American. Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. Mr. MONRONEY. Mr.. President, I West Virginia for what I believe to be one of the most forceful arguments against approval of the treaty that it has been my pleasure to hear on the floor of the Senate. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator from Arizona. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed :n the RECORD the first 14 pages of the interim report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- tee of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a memorandum on significant dates in atomic weapons de- velopment and subsequent negotiations. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask unanimous consent to 'have printed in the RECORD "Alert No. 5, So- viet Treaty Violations," published by the Armed Forces Information and Educa- tion Institute, Department of Defense, November 5, 1962. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 3.) Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres- ident, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article from the Sunday Star of September 15, 1963, en- titled "How the Soviets Are Observing Their Treaties." The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from West Virginia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 4.) EXHIBIT 1 INTERIM REPORT ON THE MILITARY IMPLICA- TIONS OF THE PROPOSED LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT Since September 1962, the Preparedness In- vestigating Subcommittee has engaged in a comprehensive and extensive inquiry into the military and technical implications and as- pects of the various nuclear test ban pro- posals. Although the inquiry was originally di- join my colleagues in the Senate, al- rected to the entire field of nuclear test ban though I shall vote on the other side of ProPosals from the standpoint of their po- the issue, in complimenting the distin- tential impact upon our military posture and guished Senator from West Virginia on preparedness, the nezotiation and signing of the three-environmental nuclear test ban his thorough and well documented and agreement in Moscow caused the subcommit- enlightened discussion of this very seri- tee to focus attention on the potential im- ous problem which all Members of the pact of that treaty upon the future of our Senate face on next Tuesday in making Military Establishment and strategic forces. their decision on how to vote on the test This interim report is directed specifically ban treaty. to the partial test ban agreement. It deals Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank with the military advantages and disadvan- tages to the United States which flow or the able senior Senator from Oklahoma. might flow from the agreement. Political Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I considerations, and matters involving foreign take this opportunity to thank and con- and international affairs, as such are not gratulate the distinguished Senator from within the scope of this report. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 'Approved For Release 2007/01/20: 6A-RDP65B0.0383R900100200004-6 16628 ,cONGRESSIONAf RECORD ? SENATE In considering the impact and effect of the proposed test ban it le impprtant to remem- ter that for nearly two decades this Nation has been confronted by an adversary who has openly and repeatedly proclaimed that this dominant goal is to destrOy the nations of the non-Communist world. Only because we have maintained clear military superiority and the ability to inflict -unacceptable dam- age upon him has the wculd-be aggressor been deterred. The basis pf our deterrence Is military superiority which, in turn, is based on our nuclear weapens programs and nuclear retaliatory forces. It is vital to our survival that no step be taken which in any manner would impair the Integrity and credibility of our deterrence or degrade the ability of our military forces to protect our security if we should be chal- lenged militarily by a hostile nuclear power. BACKGROOND AND SCO'rE OF REPORT The chairman of the subcommittee in opening the hearings on September 17, 1962, Stated: "The Senate Committee on Armed Services has legislative responsibility for the common defense generally and for matters affecting the size, composition, and equipage of the Armed Forces, It has a dire-pt and legitimate Interest ha any and all activities which affect Or may affect the development and procure- ment of weapons and the se and quality of Our fighting forces." He also said: "Since weapons development and testiirig go hand in hand, we will inquire into the Status of our nuclear test activities with re- ipect both to weapons developments and Weapons effects. Technical data now avail- able on this question will :be considered as Well as information relating to our position na this field as compared with the progress of the Soviets." In the mpnths that have tollov,teel, the sub- Committee has Made an eithaustive ,effort, On a scope and scale whichmis believed to be Unprecedented as far as theSongress is con- cerned, to obtain complete and full informa- tion about the relationship, of nuclear test- ing?in all environments?ti the integrity of Our deterrent forces and the ability of our retaliatory or second-strike /orces to survive and respond to a nuclear attack. During the hearings thus far 2,800 pages of testimony were received from the 24 witnesses who are listed in eAphabetical order in appendix A. Most of this testimony involved highly tech- nical cliscuSsions relating to the needs and Capabilities of our present and future nuclear Weapon systems. The overall objective of the subcommittee In this inquiry has been to, develop as im- partially, as objectively, and as fully as pos- sible all available military and technical in- formation bearing upon the subject matter so as to insure that the Senate would have available to it easentially the same body of military and technical evidence as is avail- able to the executive braneh of the GOV- iturnent in its formulation_ of nuclear test ban policies and in its weighing of their security implications. This objective has, we believe, been attained. The military, technical, and security problems associated With suspensions of , nuclear testing have been identified, explored, and assessed. These problems will be discussed in this report with particular emphasis upon their relation to the treaty banning nuclear tests I n the atmosphere, outer space, and under- water. n.x. at:MP/LARY OF MAJOR vielpirtes 1. From the evidence we are compelled to conclude that serious?perhaps even formid- able?military and technical disadyaratages to the United States will flow from the rati- fication of the treaty. At the very least it will prevent the United Statee from providing ?Ur military forces with the highest qual- , ity of weapons of which our science and tech- nology is capable. 2. Any military And technical advantages which we will deriate from the treaty do not, in our judgment, counterbalance or out- weigh the military and technical disadvan- tages. The Soviets will not be similarly in- hibited in those areas of nuclear weaponry where we now deena them to be inferior. 3. Admittedly, however, other important factors?such as foreign policy, international affairs, and relations with other countries? are relevant in an overall assessment of the treaty. These are ,not within the scope of this report. When they are considered, as they must be, each individual must reach his own judgment about the wisdom and desirability of the treaty on the basis of per- sonal philosophy, past experience, current knowledge, and relative weight which he as- signs to the various factors in.yolved. IV. COMPARISON OF tr.s.-9.5.s.R. NUCLEAR WEAP- ONS PROGRAMS In this section we will endeavor from the testimony we have received to compare the nuclear warhead knowledge and state of the art of the United States with that of the Soviet Union. This includes, of course, the important field of nuclear weapons effects. The criteria we will use are the number of tests conducted within important yield ranges and the yield-to-weight ratio (the explosive energy released per pound of bomb) achieved in, the test programs. We will compare the situation prevailing in 1958 prior to the moratorium and that prevailing today. A. Multimegaton weapons capabilities In 1958, at the onset of the 34-month nu- clear test moratorium. the United States had conducted slightly More tests above 1 mega- ton in yield than had the Soviet Union. Of these U.S. tests, One-fifth were in yield ranges above 10 megatons. No tests had been conducted by the Soviet Union in this high-yield category. As a result of this ex- perimental program, the United States held a clear superiority Over the Soviet Union in the yield it could achieve in a given ther- monuclear weapon throughout the range of deliverable weights. Following the abrogation of the mora- torium by the Soviet Union, the test and performance records altered drastically. In 1961 and 1962 the Soviet Union conducted in yields above 10 megatons twice the number of tests which had been conducted by the United States in that yield range throughout the history of its nuclear test program. The total number of Soviet tests above 1 mega- ton was approximately four times that con- ducted by the United States in the same period (1961-62). In terms of yield-to- weight ratios, the Soviet Union, as a result of its aggressive test program and its con- centration on very large yield weapons, has demonstrated clearly superior performance in all yield classes above approximately 15 megatons where the United States has had no testing experience since 1954. It is also worth noting that the scientific witnesses were unanimous in expressing uncertainty about the particular designs employed by the Soviets, to achieve the results observed in their very high yield experiments. B. Low-megaton and submegaton weapon capabilities Below a few thoUsand pounds in weight and a few megatons in yield the evidence available to us indicates that ..the United States continues to hold a lead in weapon design and performance. For a variety of reasons the United States has chosen to concentrate its development efforts on weapons yielding from a few mega- tons d otons. Conse- quently, it probably continues to hold some advantage in design techniques over the So- viet Union in these lareas and in the ability September 19 to maximize the yield which can be achieved at a given weight and size or, alternatively, to package a given yield in a device of mini- mum weight and size. However, the rate of testing below 1 mega- ton indicates that the Soviet Union is at- tempting to challenge seriously the U.S. lead in the lower yield weapon categories. Prior to the 1958-61 moratorium the United States had conducted somewhat more than twice . as many tests at yields below 1 megaton as had been detected in the Soviet Union. By the end of 1962 this ratio had dropped sig- nificantly. More important, the 1961-62 So- viet test series included more tests in this yield range than had been conducted in its entire program from 1949 through 1958. Even accounting for tests to assess the ef- fects of explosions and tests to confirm the yield of stockpiled weapons, this constitutes Impressive evidence that the Soviet Union has no intention of permitting U.S. supe- riority in weapon design and performance at yields below 1 megaton to go unchal- lenged. It is in this range of yields that the testing underground permitted by the treaty can be accomplished readily. Furthermore, there is a serious question about the adequacy of our knowledge of the nuclear devices employed in the Soviet ex- periments in the lower yield range. Detec- tion, indentification, and analytical capabil- ities are degraded at the lower end of this yield spectrum, particularly in the low and subkiloton area. Consequently, OUT con- fidence in any conclusions concerning the Soviet state of the art in weapons yielding up to a few kilotons is correspondingly low. While we believe that U.S. superiority ex- tends to these very low-yield ranges, hard evidence on this point does not exist and, accordingly, we accept the judgment Of our Atomic Energy Commission witnesses that "while some intelligence exists on which to base an estimate of U.S.S.R. tactical :nuclear capability, the dearth of information [does] not permit a comprehensive United States- U.S.S.R. comparison. [Fort future develop- ments a credible U.S.S.R, development ca- pability can be made by assuming a capability similar to ours." C. Weapons effects programs Important as are programs associated with the acquisition of new or improved types of weapons, the advent of the missile age and the adoption of a second-strike or retalia- tory strategic policy by the United States has elevated to a first priority tests to deter- mine the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened missile sites and control centers, on reentry bodies in flight, and on radar, electronic, and communications systems. Of equal importance have become tests to de- termine what unique effects are produced by nuclear explosions in space, the atmos- phere, and underwater so that the knowl- edge gained might be exploited for defensive purposes or our own weapon systems de- signed to resist them. From the testimony before the subcom- mittee, it is clear that neither nation has conducted a weapons effects test program of sufficient size and complexity to resolve whatever doubts may exist about the ade- quacy of the design and the survivability of their nuclear weapon systems; nor has either tested sufficiently to fulfill the needs of their system designers and military planners. However, the necessity and the motivation to conduct such experiments is clearly great- er for the United States than for the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960's, the deter- rent strategy of the United States has been based substantially on second-strike missile systems, that is, missile systems which can survive a massive first strike by a nuclear- armed enemy and still retain the ability to retaliate in such force as to destroy the at- tacker. By the mid-1970's this Nation's nu- Approved For Release 2007/01 20 : C A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/ CI -RDP651300383R0001`00200004-6 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16629 clear deterrent will probably reside primarily in lama- Ind sea-based missile systems de- signet to achieve that degree of survivabil- ity. To date, only Polaris has been sub- jected to a full-scale system test, including the explosion of the nuclear 'warhead. Min- t have never been Utema ,and so tested, nor hage models-of the base com- plexes Of the harcrened underground Minute- men and Titan Systems been subjected to close-in 'high yield nuclear explosions to 4, prove the adequacy of their design. While all Of the Military witnesses expressed rea- sonable confidence in the ability of these systerna to fulfill- their missions, it is clear that some unresolved questions exist and that the absence Of adequate design and vul- -nerability data has necessitated radical overdesign, redundancy, and excesSiYe de- velopment and construction costs. Only by atmospheric testing, can needed answers be Obtained to the important unresolved ques- tions. ilowever, there is one area of weapons ef- fects knowledge in which the Soviet Union probably holds ti4 distinct lead. By virtue of its large, multimegaton weapon tests, it ? is prudent to assimie that the Soviet Union has acquired a unique and potentially val- ? uable body of data on high-yield blast, shock, *communications blackout, and radiation and electromagnetic phenomena which is not available to the United States. Further- more, due to themebsence of comparable ex- periments, the United States is not now in a position to evaluate realistically the military effectiveness of the Soviet 50-to-100-megaton ? terror weapons. In the field of weapons effects experiments related to the design and development of an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) sys- tem the evidence, although less conclusive, indleates that the Soviet Union in 1961 and 1962 conducted a; series of complex high alti- ' tude operations which, if properly instru- mented, could have provided substantial and Important data on various types of radar blackout and miclear effects. These Soviet ? experiments were clearly dictated by an ABM ? development program. ? The United States has conducted no ex- periments comparable in complexity to those ? Soviet operations and a disturbing number of the United States high-altitude-effects ex- periments 'which *ere cimducted were com- promised, either by considerations unrelated - to the technical objectives of the test pro- gram, bi inadequate or faulty instrumenta- tion, Or by operational inadequacies. Based On the testithon3r we have received, there can be little' doubt but that the quantity and quality of information available to the United States on high altitude nuclear effects is in- adequate for the Nation's military needs. V. mart, STATES NEEDS FOR NIIaLEAD. TESTS In assessing the merits of the treaty which fs now before the Senate for ratification, it is iMportant to Understand the kinds and ob- jectives of certain nuclear test programs Which, in the opinion of the subcommittee and based on testimony received by it, would be desirable 'or necessary in any future U.S. nuclear test programs. The following chart summarizes the sub- committee's conclusions and distinguishes between selected' test objectives which can be realized through underground test programs end those which could only be achieved through atrnosfiheric testing. - ?Tett Objectives?Can or cannot be done W ider 'treaty: , Survivability and responsiveness of hard- . ened site missile launch complexes to high 'yield nkiclear eiloiosions. No. Response of hardened underground struc- tur,e,s. to blast and cratering from high yield surface , burst nuclear weapons. No, lteSponse of hardened underground struc- tures to ground motion. Yes. Determination or Missile warhead and heads and radars. Again, this is an area in nosecone vulnerability to nuclear explosions which Soviet experiments may have provided during atmospheric reentry. No. them with greater knowledge than that now Reduction of missile warhead and nose- available to the United States. Throughout cone vulnerabilities to nuclear explosions. our hearings there was considerable dispute Yes. on this point. The treaty proponents ac- Study of atmospheric and high altitude curately observed that the ABM warheads radar blackout phenomena. No. could be developed through underground Study of communications blackout phe- testing and that development of acquisition nomena from high yield nuclear explosions, and tracking radars was an electronics prob- No. lem not directly dependent upon nuclear Full-scale operational tests of ABM sys- tests. It is clear, however, that the charac- tems. No. teristics or specifications upon which such Development of ABM warhead with max- warhead design and development should be imum lethality and minimum blackout based are not sufficiently known and cannot properties. Partially. be determined with confidence without addi- Development of very high yield warheads, tional high altitude effects tests. As the equal to or surpassing Soviet achievements. Atomic Energy Commission observed: No. "While our knowledge of * * * blackout Determination of very high yield nuclear phenomena provides some limited guidance weapons effects. No, in the determination of [ABM] warhead Determination of underwater nuclear criteria * * ? an optimized design could weapon effects for improved antisubmarine only be chosen after continued atmospheric warfare (ASW) systems. ? No. testing. Whether or not significant gains will Development of weapons requiring less result, can be argued." fissionable material than present designs. And again: Yes. "The minimal [warhead] specifica- Development of pure fusion warheads. tions * * can be met within the frame- Yes, work of existing technology. rBut, assuming Development of reduced fallout weapons. that a minimal warhead will not be ac- Yes. ceptable] testing both underground and in Full-scale performance and reliability tests the atmosphere would be required to corn- of Minuteman and Titan missile systems. plete the development." No. 4. The United States will be unable to de- Yield verification tests of stockpiled weep- termine with confidence the performance ons up to approximately 1 megaton. Yes, and reliability of any ABM system developed Yield verification tests of stockpiled weep- without benefit of atmospheric operational one above approximately 1 megaton. No. system tests: An ABM system will be re- Troop and crew training tactical exercises 'quired to function in the nuclear environ- using nuclear weapons. No. ment created both by its own defensive war- VI. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TREATY head explosions and those of the attacking enemy. Under such circumstances it is im- portant to be as certain as possible that no element of the system possesses unknown vulnerabilities to nuclear effects. All elec- tronics components of the ground arrays and missiles must function; the missiles must be capable of operating in the presence of nuclear, thermal, and blast effects; the war- heads must be resistant to nuclear radia- tions. It is apparent that unless a system of such complexity is tested in its opera- tional environment, there will be a low level of confidence in its ability to perform the ? mission for which it was designed and pro- duced. Many unknowns will arise in the course of the ABM development program which can only be explored and satisfied through the medium of atmospheric and high-altitude nuclear testing. 5. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its hardened under- ground second-strike missile systems to sur- ? vive close-in, high-yield nuclear explosions: (See the discussion under the heading of "Weapons Effects Program" on pp. 4 to 5 of this report.) 6. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies under defensive nuclear attack to survive and to penetrate to the target without the opportunity to test nose cone and warhead designs in a nuclear environment under dynamic reentry conditions. 7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union quire necessary data on the effects of very an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish- high yield atmospheric explosions: Without ments in submegaton weapon technology: such knowledge it is unlikely that a real- There can be no doubt that a treaty limiting istic assessment can be made of the military testing to an underground environment will value of such wea-pons, or that plans can be tend to favor experimentation at the lower formulated to protect military weapons sys- end of the yield spectrum. Economic fac- terns against' their use. The data possessed tors will play a part since costs rise signifi- by the United States on high yield weapons cantly with relatively modest increases in effects are inadequate to permit confident yield for underground tests. There are also extrapolations -to the higher yield cate- testing limitations arising from the type of genies, strata, geological uncertainties, and engi- 3. The United States will be unable to nearing factors. Whether or not either the acquire data on high altitude nuclear weap- United States or the Soviet Union will choose one effects: Such data are important to the to test underground at yields much greater design of antiballistic-missile-system war- ? than approximately 1 megaton is not known, The primary objective of the hearings held by the subcommittee was to determine whether or not a suspension of, or limitation upon, nuclear testing would or could result ,in overall military and technical disadvan- tage for the United States. While the evi- dence leads us to the conclusion that the net result of the proposed treaty would be a military disadvantage, there was consider- able divergence of opinion among the wit- nesses on the question of whether the disad- vantage was acceptable from the standpoint of the Nation's security and whether the risks involved were acceptable on balance. A. MILITARY DISADVANTAGES The military disadvantages associated with the treaty which were discussed in testimony before the subcommittee were as follows: 1. The United States probably will be un- able to duplicate Soviet achievements in very high yield weapon technology: Though U.S. weapons laboratories are capable of de- veloping and stockpiling designs yielding greater than 50 megatons without further ? experimentation, their weight and size would be incompatible with any existing or pro- gramed missile delivery vehicle. It is well within the capabilities of U.S. weapons lab- oratories to equal and to surpass the Soviet achievements, but to do so would require a number orafnioSpheria nublear tests. 2. The United States will be unable to ac- App-roved'R)r Release 2007/01/2E1: CIA-RDP65B00383R0001002000 4-6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16630 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE In any case, it appears that the race for nuclear technological superiority will be con- fined to that area where the United States is believed to now hold a margin of superiority. The result, with time, will probably be the achievement of parity by the Soviet Union in this area without any equivalent opportunity for the United States to attain equality in very high yield weapon technology. 8. The treaty will deny to the United States a valuable source of information. on Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities: The results ac- quired from the analysis of radioactive debris generated by nuclear explosions has long been a basic source of intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapons programs. By driving So- Viet testing underground, this intelligence will be denied the United States with the result that with the passage of time knowl- edge of the Soviet state of the art in wea- pons undergoing tests will be seriously de- graded. The effect of the treaty will be to reinforce the difficulties already imposed on the United States by Soviet secrecy. B. Counterarguments ? A clear majority of the witnesses agreed ?that the treaty would result in military and technical disadvantages when compared with the increases in performance confidence and in the quality of weapon systems which would be derived from unlimited atmospheric testing. It was stated, however, that it is charac- teristic of the experimental sciences that enough data is never available to satisfy the scientific search for knowledge. The testi- mony was unanimous that, except in the field of very high yield weapons, the United ? States today holds a clear and commanding lead in nuclear weapon systems over any one or any combination of potential enemies. This superiority was said to result from a larger and more diversified stockpile of ? nuclear weapons, by more numerous, varied, and sophisticated delivery systems, and by a greater capacity to produce nuclear mate- rials, Weapons, and delivery systems. It was also asserted that a cessation of atmospheric nuclear testing would in no case prevent qualitative improvements being . made in our weapons systems which would flow from a vigorous nonnuclear technology. Some Witnesses noted that potential im- provements in missile accuracy and reliabil- ity .would continue to be exploited. Some noted that uncertainties in ABM radar per- formanee When confrpnted with the various forms Of blackout induced by nuclear ex- plosions could be compensated by the de- ployment of greater numbers and wider dis- persal of the radars. Uncertainties concerning reentry vehicle warhead vulnerabilities could be reduced by a factor of 2 or 3, based on present knowl- edge and without further testing, by straight- forward engineering improvements, it was said. Some witnesses noted that so far as any uncertainties which might arise about the survivability of second-strike missile forces were concerned, these could be compensated by additional redundancy in missile systems, by greater numbers of missiles, and by greater dispersal. It was also noted that U.S. war plans tend to be conservative con- cerning the percentage of the second-strike force surviving a nuclear attack and in estimating the number of warheads capable of reaching enemy targets and so provide adequate margin for error. In summary, it was the contention of wit- nesses who supported the treaty that it will tend to stabilize the advantages which the United States now maintains in military nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. While recognizing that doubts concerning the quality of some of our weapons systems do exist, they maintained that these doubts can be compensated by "brute force" tech- niques by which quantity is substituted for September 10 quality at considerably greater cost to it is the intention of the Preparedness Inves- achieve approximately the same results in ?tigating Subcommittee to monitor the im- military system effectiveness. plementation of the safeguards and it would It is interesting and sobering to note that, also be our hope that other committees of as we proclaim our nuclear superiority and the Congress having jurisdiction in these our determination to maintain it, the Soviets areas Would cooperate in this important pro.. do likewise. A dispatch from Moscow, dated gram. August 30, 1963, quotes Red Star, the Soviet However, we wish to emphasize that even armed forces newspaper, as saying that Rus- the most rigorous and conscientious imple?- sla today possesses superiority in nuclear mentation of the JCS safeguards will not power "and has no intentipn of relinquishing alter, modify, or reduce the military and it." Red Star also said that, while the technical disadvantages listed herein which United States intends tq continue under- will result from this treaty. No safeguards ground testing, the hopes of the Pentagon can provide the benefits of testing where test of attaining any "advantage in nuclear power ing is not permitted, nor can they assure by means of these exploalons are illusory." that this Nation will acquire the highest And on September 3, 1968, Marshal Rodion quality weapon systems of which it is ca- Malinovsky, the Soviet ,Defense Minister, pable when the means for achieving that ob.- wrote in Komsomoiskaya Pravda that the jective are denied. Soviet Union can "prove its complete mili- vim DArACTION AND IDENTIFICATION tary superiority over the United States." vn. PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS The Joint Chiefs of Staff in testimony be- fore the subcommittee identified a number of military disadvantages which, in their collective judgment, would flow from the treaty. However, their assessment of the desirability of the treaty was not based on military considerations alone. Their con- clusions on the matter also reflected their judgment of the political and foreign policy advantages and disadvantages which would result from it. Their joint conclusion was that, on balance, the political and foreign policy advantages to be derived from the treaty outweighed the limitations which the treaty would impose on the Nation's weapon systems programs. However, the Joint Chiefs qualified their support of the treaty by making their ap- proval conditional on the effective Imple- mentation of four "safeguards" designed to reduce to a minimum the adverse effect the treaty would have on our weapon programs. On the basis of these safeguards Senator JACKSON on August 14, 1263, offered a mo- tion which was unanimously adopted by the subcommittee, and was subsequently ap- proved by all members of the Senate Com- mittee on Armed Services, requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit as soon as possible, and in any event prior to commit- tee action on the treaty, a statement of the specific requirements to implement the safeguards proposed by the Joint Chiefs. Senator JACKSON'S motion, which sets forth the proposed safeguards in full, is attached as appendix B. By a letter dated August 15, 1963, Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, chairman of the Commit- tee on Armed Services, transmitted the Jack- son motion to the Secretary of Defense, and requested a statement in response to the motion. Responses to the motion were received from the Joint Chiefs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on August 24, 1963. These responses are attached as appendix C. The subcommittee considers it to be vital that, if the treaty is ratified, the recommend- ed "safeguards" be implemented fully and that detailed and specific programs to so im- plement them be presented by the executive branch. The administration has expressed publicly its intent regarding the safeguards both in the responses to the motion by Senator JACK- SON and in other statements by the Presi- dent, the Secretary of State, and the Secre- tary of Defense. Such statements are set forth in appendix D. To permit the U.S. Senate to monitor the treaty safeguards it is necessary that the expressed good intentions be supplemented by definitive programs against which prog- ress can be compared. At this time, we have not received details of testing, preparedness, and detection improvement programs which ? will permit the safeguards to be monitored in an effective manner. If the treaty is ratified A brief word should be said about the problem of detection and identification .in connection with the proposed treaty. "De- tection" means a determination that an event . has occurred without implying that it has been identified as a nuclear explosion. "Identification" means that an event is not only detected but that it is identified as a 'nuclear detonation. During the previous negotiations on test ban treaties, the major controversy in this field has centered around the ability to de- tect, identify, and fix the location of under- ground explosions. The proposed three-en- vironment treaty, by permitting under- ground' testing, considerably reduces the problems involved in detection and identi- fication but does not eliminate them entirely. The capabilities of our verification system cannot be discussed in detail in an unclassi- fied document. However, notwithstanding anticipated and programed improvements in the system, it will still possess both detection and identification "thresholds" below which clandestine testing is possible with a low probability of detection. - The yields at which clandestine tests may be conducted and probably escape detection will vary with altitude and geographical lo- cation, and some uncertainty exists in this. field. There is also some controversy as to whether significant military advantages can be obtained by clandestine testing in the prohibited environments. It is not the purpose of this section, to ex- plore these problems in detail. It is our purpose here to point out that, under the limited treaty, problems of detection, identi- fication, and verification still remain al- though they are of a lesser order of magni- tude than would be true of a treaty banning underground testi:ng. Ix. CONCLUDING STATEMENT From the extensive evidence presented to us, we have come to the conclusion that the proposed treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, a:ad in space will affect adversely the future quality of this Nation's arms, and that it will result in serious, and perhaps formidable, military and technical disadvantages. These dis- advantages, in our judgment, are not out- weighted or counterbalanced by the claimed military advantages. At the same time, we are not convinced that comparable military disadvantages will accrue to the nuclear weapon programs of the 'U.S.S.R., Looking at the matter from the military aspect and from the effect of the treaty upon our military preparedness and posture, we cannot escape being impressed with the testimony of Gen. Thomas S. Power, com- mander in chief of the Strategic Air Com- mand, and Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, com- mander of the Air Force Systems Command, Who addressed themselves to the problem exclusively from the military poi:at of view. General Power, after stating that he did not think the treaty "is in the best interests of the United States," said: Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 IN=RIDP65B06383k000_ 10020 1003 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE ?I feel that we have, military superiority now', and I eet very strongly that this has - resulted,' In a W, grid that has been free from miCiear warfare,. I have a WNW Confidence factor that we can and will maintain that -military superiority under the test ban treaty." . _ ? General , Schriever told the subcommittee , that tliere",gre definite ,military disadvan- ? stageS"' to the -treaty and that, as a military le felthe, could protect the country 'better NOthotit the treaty than with it. ,-course, the endorsement of the treaty _ by den., Curtis E. eMay, Chief of Staff of the' Air f Force, was considerably less than ? -enthusiastic, and he testified that he prob- ably Would have recommended against the . treaty had it still been in the proposal stage. From the evidence we have learned that the Soviets have overtaken and SUrpassed us in the design of Very high yield nuclear weapons; that they may possess knowledge of -weapons effects and antiballistic missile programs simeridr to ours; and that under the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible ? that they will achieve parity with us in low, ? .. yield weapon technology. These things are not grounds for complacency. We believe very strongly that Soviet secrecy and duplic- ity requires that this Nation possess a sub- stantial margin ,of superiority in both the ?. -quality and the quantity of its implements Of defense. 'Although we have concluded that there ? Will be a net military disadvantage to us if the treaty is ratified, we recognize the exist- ence of Other factors which, while not within . the scope of this report, are pertinent to a , final judgment on the treaty. Among these art Matters related to international affairs, , ? foreign policy, and relations with other coun- tries. When these are taken into considers- 'tion 'die question becomes one of weighing relative risks, and our hearings provide ample ,,TfOvidence,,,that the overall assessment of the .relative merits, and demerits Of the treaty is COMPlex and difficult matter Ma which _equally ,mEatriotic, informed, and dedicated p?ersons liy 'and do disagree. In the final ,analysis, then, each individual .must reach his .own_judgment on the basis of personal .philosophy, past experience, current knowl- edge, and the relative weight which he as- signs to the various factors involved. ? 'ADMVIONAL VIEWS OF SgnaTon Saveurr SYMINGTON . , . sihee 1955, when I was appointed a member of the 4oirit Subcommittee on Disarmament, I h.avo followed closely the activity of our Governinent IN ,arms, control,? disarmament, and nuclear test ban proposals; and specifi- cally, have studied carefully the three-envi- rOnmen,tal teat ban treaty signed by our Gov- ernmefit in Moscow on August 5, 1963. ? ,TO, the heat of my knowledge, the factual data contained in the report of the Prepared- ness ruvestigating, Subcommittee Is correct. .1$ _ _ 1.1?t klieve the findings and conclusions are Overly pessimistic as to the effect of the treaty ouritigiena1,segvrity. ? AS '4 ipeinber Of both the,Foreign Relations Corrunittee and, the Preparedness Investigat- ing-Subcommittee, I listened to and ques- tioned Many responsible witnesses?both in 'afid out o Cloven/merit. Most of these ex- perts testified , that our. national security wo?.04 be adequately Protected under the terms Of the treaty. ' 1?41.101,91,this testimony was before the For- eign ItelatiO,ns committee and, therefore, is nOt-ernf,l'ilsized in this report. ?? BaSed q tliklekird, I am worried about the treaq.? but more worried about the possi- bility of an allrout nuclear exchange some day in the, futu, particularly if there is a proliferation of miglear weapons among more Thig4,PrtY, a very small step, neyerthei,ess .eo.1.114?,.he the first step toward _ NO.149 11 ? bringing nudlear weapons under some form of satisfactory control, which action should promote the possibilities of a just peace under law. Therefore, I plan to vote for the treaty. This does not deter me from signing the _Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee re- port. The record made by the subcommittee is, to the best of my knowledge, the most complete record ever made qn this vital sub- ject by anybody on the military and tech- nological implications of nuclear test ban treaties as they relate to our national secu- rity. It is a record which should be of Inestimable fut'ure value to the Congress and the country. DISSENTING VIEW OF SENATOR LEVERETT ? SALTONSTALL As one Senator who attended the hearings conducted by both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Investigat- ing Subcommittee on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty, I find that I cannot, as a member of the Preparedness Subcommittee, concur with its report because I feel that its general tenor and its specific findings and conclusions are unduly pessimistic as to the effect of this treaty, if ratified, upon our national security. As a U.S. Senator, I intend to consent to the ratification of this nuclear test ban treaty. I believe that the factual data contained in the report of the Preparedness Subcom- mittee is accurately stated. However, the nature of the conclusions drawn from this factual data are, in my opinion, overly ad- verse. It must be remembered that re- sponsible Government officials such as the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leading scientists, and many others, some of whom appeared only before the For- eign Relations Committee, testified that our national security would be protected under the terms of the treaty even though some important atmospheric nuclear tests could no longer be conducted. This testimony is not sufficiently emphasized in the report, al- though I realize that some of it was not necessarily given in the hearings conducted by the Preparedness Subcommittee. The Congress must insist upon an active, constructive, and energetic implementation of the four safeguards suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that our security will be maintained while the cause of peace and the lessening of tensions in the world are advanced. EXHIBIT 2 'SIGNIFICANT DATES IN ATOMIC WEAPONS DE- VELOPMENT AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS DATES OF CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS July 16, 1945: First U.S. nuclear device test, Alamogordo, N, Mex. August 6, 1945: First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. August 9, 1945: Second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. September 23, 1949: President Truman an- nounced the first atomic explosion in the U.S.S.R. October, 1952: First nuclear bomb test by the United Kingdom in Australia. November 1, 1952: Exploded hydrogen de- vice fired at Bikini by United States. ? August 21, 1953: First hydrogen device tested by 'U.S.S.R. detected by United States (Not included.) October 30, 1958: Last U.S. test before moratorium. (Not included hereafter.) November 3, 1958: Last Soviet test before moratorium. (Not included hereafter.) February 13, 1960: First French atomic test. (Not included hereafter.) September 1, 1961: Soviets resume atmos- pheric inuclear weapons tests, ?46631 September 15, 1961: United States resumes underground nuclear weapons tests. April 25, 1962: United States resumes atmospheric tests. DATES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS June 14, 1946: U.S. proposal for interna- tional control of atomic energy (Baruch ?plan). June 19, 1946: U.S.S.R. proposed alternate plan including insistence on retention of se- curity council veto power over any control System. March 24, 1957: Bermuda Declaration-- Joint declaration by United States and United Kingdom to conduct nuclear tests in such manner as to keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the level that might be hazardous, to 'continue to announce test series, also expressed will- ingness to announce tests to the U.N. and permit international observation if the U.S.S.R. would do the same. November 14, 1957: General Assembly Res- olution 1148 (XII) : Regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an inter- national convention (treaty) on the reduc- tion of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction. Among its provisions, this res- olution urged the immediate susp-ension of testing of nuclear weapons with prompt in- stallation of effective international control, including inspection posts equipped with appropriate scientific instruments located in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom and at other points as re- quired. December 10, 1957: Soviet proposal that U.S.S.R., United States, and United Kingdosn discontinue all tests as of January 1, 1958. March 31, 1958: Decree of the Supreme So- viet concerning the discontinuance of Soviet atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. April 28, 1958: President Eisenhower bY letter to Khrushchev proposed that both na- tions have the technical experts start to work on the practical problems involved in disarmament, particularly working toward the suspension of nuclear testing. President Eisenhower stated "I reemphasize that these studies are without prejudice to our respec- tive positions on the timing and inter- dependence of various aspects of disarma- ment." May 9, 1958: Letter from Khrushchev ac- cepting Eisenhower's proposal of April 28, 1958, to have experts study the problems in- volved in an agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests as far as Inspection and control are concerned. July 1, 1958: Conference of experts from the West (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France) and East (U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania) met in Geneva. August 21, 1958: Conference of experts adopted a final report for consideration by governments. Conference of experts recom- mended the so-called "Geneva system" of detecting nuclear explosions. This system recommended a network of 180 control points. It should be noted that the Ameri- can representatives, during this conference, had taken the position that 650 control points would be necessary to have adequate protection down to 1 kiloton. Through compromise with the Soviets, they settled on the 180 stations, but then had to point out the weakness between the area of 1 kiloton and 5 kilotons. August 22, 1958: President Eisenhower an- nounced that based on the conference of ex- perts' report, the United States was prepared to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for sus- pension of nuclear weapons teats and the establishment of an international control Approved For Release 2007/01/20:.CIA-RDP65E300383R000100200004-6 16632 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDF,65B0083R000100200004-6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 19 system. The President also indicated that the United States would withhold further tasting on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of 1 year from the be- ginning of the negotiations unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union. October 31, 1958: First meeting in Geneva of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Illaclear Weapon Tests. November 4, 1958: General Assembly Reso- lution 1252 (XIII) : The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Among its provisions, this resolution urged the par- ties involved in the test-ban negotiations not to undertake further testing of nuclear weapons while these negotiations are in progress. It expressed the hope that the Geneva Test Ban Conference would be suc- cessful and lead to an agreement acceptable to all. It also requested the parties con- cerned to report to the General Assembly the agreement that might be the result of their negotiations; and requested the Secretary- General to render such assistance and pro- vide such services as might be asked for by 'the Conference commencing at Geneva on October 31, 1958. November 7, 1958: President Eisenhower - announced that the United States had de- tected additional tests by the Soviets subse- quent to October 31, 1958. December 28, 1958: The President ap- pointed a panel on seismic improvement to review technical problems and to recommend methods of improving seismic detection. January 5, 1959: United States released data showing many underground tests could not be detected by Geneva experts system recommended in 1958. Indicated Geneva system applicable at 20 kiloton rather than kiloton threshold. February 22, 1959: Macmillan meeting with Khrushchev. March 2, 1959: During this meeting Mac- millan and Khrushchev discussed the estab- lishment of quotas for number of on-site in- spections in countries 'Where suspicious events have taken place. April 13, 1959: United States proposed phased testing ban limited in first phase to atmospheric tests below 50 kilometers, with simplified control system, if Soidet Union continued to insist on veto for on-site In- lipections. April 23, 1959: Soviets reject U.S. proposal 'to stop only atmospheric tests and said numerous on-site inspections would not be neceSsary for complete ban. June 22, 1959: Technical Working Group l'co. I met in Geneva to study high altitude detection problems. July 10, 1959: On July 10 Geneva Tech- nical Working Group I proposed estab- lishment of system of earth satellites and Installation of additional equipment at con- trol posts to detect high-altitude explosions. ' August 26, 1959: United States extended unilateral suspension to end of 1959. August 27, 1959: United Kingdom said it would not resume tests as long as Geneva negotiations showed, prospect of success. August 28, 1959: U.S.S.R. pledged not to resume testing unless Western powers did so. November 21, 1959: General Assembly Resolution 1402 (XIV): Suspension of nu- clear and thermonuclear tests: Among its provisions this resolution ex- pressed the hope that the Countries involved in the test ban negotiations at Geneva would Intensify their efforts to reach an agreement at an early date; it further utged the coun- tries concerned in these negotiations to con- tinue their voluntary ban on testing nuclear 'weapons; it also requested the countries con- cerned to report to the General Assembly the results of their negotiations. November 25, 1959: Technical Working Group II met in Geneva with the Soviets and the British. This group met to conside data from the Hardtack series of nuclear explosions and the findingei of the Berkner Panel. On December 18, 1959, at the con- clusion of the meetings held by Technical Working Group II, U.S. members of Geneva Technical Working Group II reported That a large number of seismic events could not be identified without onsite ' Inspection, even with improved techniques. The Soviet mem- bers of Geneva Technical Working Group II disagreed with V.S. findings. December 29, 1959: United States said it was free to resume testing after end of 1959 but would not do so withont giving advance notice. February 11, 1960: United States proposed phased agreement, first phase to provide for cessation of tests in atmosphere, oceans, and outer space, to greatest height that could be effectively controlled; underground tests above 4.75 seismic magnitude (estimated by United States to equal explosion of about 20 kilotons) would also be Covered; the 4.75 thresho'id would be lowered as capabilities of detection system were improved, 20 or 30 per- cent of unidentified seisznic events above threshold should be inspected; U.S. experts estimated that this would mean about 20 inspections per year in U.S.S.R. March 19, 1960: Soviets offered to conclude treaty on cessation of tests, together with moratorium on undergrotind tests below magnitude 4.75, and to agree to joint research program on understanding that weapons tests would be halted during program. March 29, 1960: United States and United Kingdom said they would agree to voluntary moratadum on underground weapons tests below magnitude 4.75 after treaty was signed and arrangements were made for coordinated research program. December 20, 1960: General Assembly Res- olution 157'7 (XV) : Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. This resolution urges the countries in- volved in the Geneva test ban negotiations to seek a solution for the few remaining questions so that a test ban agreement can be achieved at an early date it further urges the countries concerned in these negotiations to continue their present Voluntary suspen- sion of the testing of nuclear weapons; it also requests the countriet concerned to re- port the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly. March 21, 1961: First meeting under the new administration of the Geneva Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. U.S. proposal presented by Ambassador Ar- thur H. Dean. Soviet Union introduced its Troika proposal on this date. April 18 1961: United States and United Kingdom introduced draft treaty to the Geneva Conference. May 5, 1961: Statement by President Ken- nedy on the Geneva test ban negotiations made at his news conference. Mention is made of the new United States and United Kingdom proposals and the introduction of the Troika proposal by Russia. June 4, 1961: Khrushchev delivers Soviet aide-memoire concerning disarmament and nuclear weapons tests to President Kennedy at Vienna. Insists that the question of con- trol hinges on Western Powers (Incepting proposals on general and complete disarma- ment. June 6, 1961: Kennedy Seports to American people on his Vienna talkti with Khrushchev. June 16, 1961: Khrushchev reports to Rus- Sian people on his talks With President Ken- nedy. (Toss report) Topics covered: Gen- eral and complete disarmament, banning of nuclear weapons, cessation of tests, question of control, Hammarskjold? the German ques- tion (peace treaty). June 17, 1961: U.S. aide memoire to Soviet Russia concerning Geneva test ban nego- tiations. Repeated new proposals offered r by the United States and the United King- dom on March 21, 1961. June 28, 1961: President Kennedy an- nounces appointment of Committee of Sci- entific Experts to advise him on test ban problem. _ July 15, 1961: Soviet note replying to U.S. note of June 17, 1961, concerning suspen- sion of nuclear weapons tests.. Says Soviet proposals have been distorted. Brings up again supervision_ of inspection and control by equal representatives of three basic groups: Socialist states, capitalist states in Wester:n military bloc, and neutral states (troika) . July 15, 1961: U.S. note to Soviet Union referring to the Soviet note of July 5, 1961, on the Geneva test ban negotiations. Says Soviet note contains a multitude of irrele- vant and unwarranted comments. Confines its reply to the central issue:: Is the Soviet Union prepared to reach an accord which would halt nuclear tests under effective in- ternational control. July 15, 1961: United States and United Kingdom request to U.N. to place on the agenda of the 16th General Assembly an item .entitled: "The Urgent Need for e. Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests Under Effective International Control." July 20, 1961: President Kennedy an- nounces membership of nuclear test study group. August 10, 1961: President announces he has reviewed report of Scientific Committee and is sending Ambassador Dean back to Geneva. August 30, 1961: Soviets announce plans to resume nuclear testing. Among the reasons cited by the Soviets for taking this step were the turndown of the "Troika" proposal, the nuclear tests carried out by the French beginning February 13, 1960, and the Berlin situation? August 30, 1961: White House statement on the Soviet's announcement that they planned to resume nuclear testing. This statement expressed concern and re- sentment in regard to the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. It added that the Soviet decision presented a threat to the entire world. It denounced the Soviet pretext for resumption of weapons testing by mentioning that the Berlin crisis was created by the Soviets themselves. It also mentioned that the Soviet Union bears heavy' responsibility before all humanity for this decision which was made in complete dis- regard of the United Nations. It concluded by announcing that Ambassador Arthur Dean was being recalled immediately from his post as chief negotiator at the nuclear test ban meetings. September 1, 1961: Th.e White House re- ported that the Soviet Union had conducted a nuclear test in the atmosphere above central Asia. Authorities estimated that the device had a yield of 100-500 kilotons. . September 3, 1961: President Kennedy, in a joint statement with British Prime MM- ister Macmillan, proposed that the Soviet Union agree immediately to discontinuing testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The note suggested that th e 'United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. representa- tives meet in Geneva not later than Septem- ber 9 to record the agreement to cease nu- clear testing in the atmosphere and report it to the United Nations. September 4, 1961: Soviet Union conducted its second nuclear test in the atmosphere, over central Asia. This explosion was re- ported to be in the "low kiloton range." September 5, 1961: Soviet Union deto- nated a third nuclear device. The yield of this detonation was in the low to inter- mediate range. September 5, 1961: President Kennedy an- flounced that the United States would re- sume nuclear testing. He ordered the tests carried out in the laboratory and under- ground "with no fallout." This decision WM made after the Soviets set off their third Approved For Release 2007/01/20 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 Approved For Relege. 2007/p1/20 : C1A-RET65B, 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECOItto StNkrt nuclear test in the atmosphere in 5 days. Fresident Aennedy, in referring to the Ken- nedy-Macmillan -statement of SePtember -3 ,,binning 'nu:Clear testing in the atrn6s- phere; said the Offer remains open until Seip-' tember 9, 1961. September 15, 1961: The United States det- OnateS its firit Underground nuclear device at thellevarda -tea site. - October 27 101: The United Nations Gen- eral' AsSembly 'adopted a resolution which "SoIelnnly 'appeals to the Government of the Soviet Union' tb, refrain from testing a 50- Megaton bomb.' Premier Khrushchev has said Such a hOrnb will be 'exploded before the end of this Month. The vote WAS 87 to , . 11, with 1 abstention. ? October 30, 1061: The Soviet Union deto- nated a 55-60 Megaton device' (per AEC re- lease dated. Dec. 9, 1961). Noxernber 2, 1961: The President an7 toUnqes, that the policy of the United States will 'be to' proteed in developing nuclear Weapons to maintain a supelior capability for the defenSeOf the free orld 'against any aggreisbt.' This 'S W statement indicated that the ? 'United States *Old make necessary prepara= tions for testing in case it becomes neces- sary td test in the atmosphere. , , _ December 22, 1061: A joint, Communique ? Was issnecl by President Kermedi and Prime Minister' Macmillan following a 2-day meet- lug in Beimnda. They agreed that it was neceigary "as a fnatter of prudent planning - for, the future,, that pending the final deci- Sion [to resurne atmospheric testing]." Preparations should be made for -atmospheric testing to maintain the effectiveness of the tietei'rent; January 29, 1962: Geneva Conference On the Diecontinuarice of Nualeir Weapons Tests breaks, up at 353d meeting. The United tato Proposed -an adjournment, and Soviet negotiator lisarAbkin 'said, "This IS the end." , Peiguary 7, 1962: President Kennedy and BritiS4,rrinie glnister Macmjlian said they tia7/0 proposed to Sf9viet PresEnier Khrushchev that Another ."Supreme effort" to halt the nuelVX aims rap be made by 'raising next rriOnth's 1-nation general diSartha,thent con- ference to the, toreign-Minrster's -level. , ? kielirtiaky 14, 'Kennedy urged President Kennedy urged Premier Khrushchev not to press his proposal for an" 18-nationsummit meeting on disarmament. However, he assured the 'Soviet leader that he was ready to participate "at any stage of the conference when it ? appears-that suCh participation could posi- tively affect the chances of success." Febrnary 21, 1962: Premier Khrushchev replied to President Kennedy's letter of Feb- ruary' 14 still inSisting on a summit confer- ence,o n disarmament. Febniary 24", 1062: Letter from President Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev. Pr?dent KennedY replied' to Premier Khrushchev's letter Of ,Febrnary 21, 1962, stressing that head 2:t, state participation at the Geneva Conference should be reserved until a later Stage In the 'negotiations After' preliminary agieCinitnti have been reached at the Foreign Minister's level. 1982: President Kennedy an- nolino'd ,:hat he had ordered a resurription of nUclear tepti- in the atmosphere in late April unless the Soviet Union- agrees before 'then `to:art ironclad treat5i panning all testa-. The Tresident field out to Khrushchev the pronalse of a Arun-mit 'conference at which #3?10117,4";treatY'FOuld be 'signed, and also said that a?satisfactOry treaty-Would-be offered by the' WAst at the disarmament -conference 'opening in Geneva on March 14, -1962. March' 4, 19 : The Soviet Government sent '14e thite4 States a Message delivered to the,State Department advising that-For- ?tilifinfifer 'gibrilyko would go-to Geneva. 0-..X0itiliii-4ssage was reported to have .ealettiAt,I,thrti-dhchev had "reluctantly" ac- cepted the forergn minister proposal. March 14, 1962: Seventeen-nation armament conference opened in Geneva. '(Originally 18-nation conference, but France did not attend.) March 16, 1962: Premier Khrushchev an- nounced that Soviet scientists had de- veloped a "global rocket," invulnerable to antimissile weapons and that it rendered obsalete the early warning system of the United States. April 10, 1962: The White House released a joint United States-United Kingdom statement on nuclear testing appealing to the' Soviet Union to agree to a nuclear test ban with adequate safeguards including the principle of international verification. This statement indicated that if such an agree- ment was not successful then the test series scheduled by the United States for the latter part of April would go forward. 'April 10, 1962: Prime Minister Macmillan added a persOnal message to the joint Anglo- American note to Premier Khrushchev on a nuclear test ban asking him to accept an inspection procedure and "fill all the peoples of the world with a new sense of hope." April 12, 1962: Premier Khrushchev rejects the Kennedy-Macmillan joint statement on nuclear testing. April 16, 1962: Eight neutral nations ap- pealed to the nuclear powers to persist in their efforts to reach agreement on pro- hibiting nuclear weapons testing for all time. They suggested establishing a system for continuous observation and control on a scientific and nonpolitical basis, built on existing national network of observation posts. April 18, 1962: United States offered a three-stage plan for disarmament, having as its goals general and complete disarmament and gradual replacement of the armed power of single nations by a strengthened United Nations. The disarming process would be balanced to prevent any state from gaining a military advantage, and compli- ance with all obligations would be effectively verified. April 22, 1962: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in summary analysis of 1961 Vela hearing, reports that nearly 3 years of re- search had, brought no material progress to- ward an effective Method of detecting clan- destine underground tests. April 25, 1962: First 1962 U.S. nuclear test in the atmosphere. This test was of an in- termediate yield from a plane near Christ- mas Island. The President approved the resumption of nuclear testing after repeated unsuccessful attempts by the United States to get the U.S.S.R. to agree to a nuclear test ban treaty with adequate safeguards. April 26, 1962: Secretary of State Rusk jus- tified the new series of tests on the basis of refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the kind of international verification necessary for a test ban agreement. The Secretary of State referred to President Kennedy's ad- dress of March 2 in which he set forth the reasons why a certain number of tests would be necessary in the absence of an interna- tional agreement banning nuclear tests with adequate assurances; and, secondly, that it is a major objective of American policy to bring an end to testing immediately and per- manently when we were assured that testing had been abolished. May 1, 1962: France conducts underground explosion of nuclear device in Algerian Sa- hara. May 2, 1962: Disarmament talks were re- sumed at Geneva. British Minister of State Joseph Godber said U.S.S.R. must change its attitude toward verification measures if the wbrld is to have general and complete dis- armament. May 16, 1962: Premier Khrushchev con- firmed U.S.S.R. determination to test. He based his decision on the fact that the United"' Stateshad resumed testing in the Pacific. 16633 June 14, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, recesses. July 12, 1962: Secretary of State Dean Rusk reports that the preliminary Vela results, re- leased by the Defense Department on July 7, offer some promising signs for detecting and identifying nuclear tests but emphasized the new findings cannot be considered a substitute for control posts or onsite inspec- tions. July 13, 1962: Soviet Union served official notice that it claims the right to be the last nation to carry out nuclear weapon tests. July 16, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarmament Conference reconvenes in Geneva. The United States proposes discussion of scienti- fic findings, Particularly from Project Vela. July 21, 1962: The Soviet Government an- nounces its decision to resume nuclear tests. August 1, 1962: President Kennedy stated at his news conference that on the basis of recent technical assessments, the United States can work toward an internationally supervised system of detection and verifica- tion for underground testing which will be simpler and more economical than the sys- tem which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April 1961. He em- phasized that these new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system must include provision for onsite inspection of unidentified underground events. August 5, 1962: The Soviet Union detonates a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere in the order of magnitude of 30 megatons. This is the first of some 40 tests, continuing until December 25. August 8, 1962: U.S. Delegate Dean pro- posed reducing the number of control posts to something like 80-a reduction of more than half. He offered this concession in view of his contention that detecting devices have gone ahead rapidly. Thus, our techniques for detecting sneak tests are much better. August 9, 1962: Ambassador Dean formally introduces a new proposal for a comprehen- sive test ban treaty based on a worldwide net- work of internationally supervised, nation- ally manned control posts. Provided the So- viets agree to the principle of obligatory onsite inspection, the numbers of control posts and onsite inspections would be sub- stantially reduced from previous U.S. propos- als. Ambassador Zarin immediately rejects the new proposal. August 20, 1962: The U.S.S.R. rejected proposals for a partial nuclear test ban treaty. The idea of a half-way treaty was advanced by Brazil, Sweden, and Italy. The proposed treaty would stop atmospheric tests immedi- ately to ease fallout dangers. August 27, 1962: The United States and Great Britain offered the Soviet Union the choice of an internationally inspected total ban on nuclear weapons tests or an unin- spected limited ban. The limited ban would cover tests in the atmosphere, in space and underwater pending further negotiations for a treaty to include underground tests, the most difficult to identify. August 29, 1962: The U.S.S.R. submitted to the disarmament conference a formula for halting nuclear weapons tests that the United States and Britain have repeatedy termed unacceptable because of inadequtae guarantees and safeguards for inspection of suspicious events. August 29, 1962: President Kennedy wel- comed a Soviet proposal that all nuclear test- ing cease by January 1. But he reiterated the Western position that an enforcible treaty, complete with inspection provisions, be signed first. September 7, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarma- ment Conference recesses, but the test ban subcommittee remains in session. 1 18-Nation Disarmament Conference now composed of 17 nations. Prance, an original member, withdrew at the beginning of the -Conference. Approved ForReles?e 2007/01 -RDP6g 00383R000100200004:6 Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16634 CONGRESSIONAL REdORD - SENATE 1 negotiator at the DisarmaMent Conference at Geneva. January 7, 1963: In a letter to President Kennedy, in further exchange on the sub- ject of onsite inspection, Premier Khru- shchev holds to his contention that an an- nual quota of two or three inspections is sufficient. He emphasizes that he considers agreement in principle a great unilateral concession, and he agrees to further d1$- elusion on the questions between United States and U.S.S.R. representatives. January 14, 1963: United States and Soviet representatives meet in New York. The United States is represented by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the U.S.S.R. is represented by N. T. Fedorenko, Soviet Am- bassadcr to the U.N., and S. K. Tiarapkin, chairman of the Soviet delegation to the 18- Nation Disarmament Conference. Discus- sions centinue in New York until January 22 when they are moved to Washington. January 26, 1963: President Kennedy orders that preparations for underground :testing in Nevada be suspended in the hope that the Western-Soviet discussions pres- ently taking place in New York and Wash- ington would materially enhance the pros- pects for an effective agreement on a test ban. , February 1, 1963: The New York and Wash- ington, D.C., discussions on a test ban are slated to be taken up at the 18-Nation Dis- armament Conference scheduled to be re- surned on February 12. In a press confer- ence, Secretary of State Rusk expressed the disappointment of the United States that the position of the Soviet Union appeared to have hardened into a take-it-or-leave-it attitude on their offer for two or three on- site inspections per year. The Secretary states, '' * ? " the idea of 'onsite inspection is not simply a political qUestion involving the acceptance of onsite inspection in prin- ciple, but is the practical problem of estab- lishing arrangements which in fact do pro- vide assurance that agreements are being complied with." February 1, 1963: President Kennedy or- ders resumption of the preparations for underground testing in Neeada. February 8, 1963: The s heduled series of underground tests is begu in Nevada. February 12, 1963: The 1 -Nation Disarm- ament Conference reconvenes at Geneva. February 22, 1963: The ACDA announces in Washington that the United States is willing to consider possib1e acceptance of seven on-site inspections, providing the modalities of inspection can be agreed upon. February 28, 1963: In a Moscow election meeting speech, Premier Khrushchey re- affirms his refusal to ceinsider anything but three on-site inspections per year. April 1, 1963: The United States and United Kingdom delegations table a memo- randum of position concerning the cessa- tion of nuclear weapons tests. This memo- randum sums up the Western position on general principles of agreement, on-site inspection and automatic seismic station ar- rangements, and includes specific proposals submitted to date. , May 13, 1963: AEC and DOD announce can- cellation of the three small subkiloton de- tonations which had been announced on May 8 would be conducted at the Nevada Test Site on the surface and one just below the surface. , May 27, 1963: Senator Dedd joined by 33 other Senators introduced a resolution that U.S. offer to the Soviet Union to agree to a ban on all tests that contaminate the atmo- sphere or the oceans. . June 10, 1963: President Kennedy, in his speech at American University, announced that; (1) he, Prime Minister Macmillan and Chairman Khrushchev had agreed that high level discussions will shortly begin in Mos- cow on a comprehensive test ban treaty; October 24, 1962: At the United Nations, Brazil proposes denuclearization of Latin America and Africa which would include a ban on nuclear weapon tests in these con- tinents. November 4, 1962: President Kennedy an- nounces the end of the current series of at- mospheric nuclear tests, but states that underground tests will be continued in Ne- vada. The last atmospheric detonation was November 4, 1962. November 6, 1962: The General Assembly adopts a two-part resolution on nuclear tests. Part (A), sponsored by 37 powers and ap- proved by a vote of 75 to 0 with 21 absten- tions, calls for the cessation of testing by January 1, 1963, and an interim arrangement with certain assurances if no final agreement Is achieved by that date. Part (B), spon- sored by the United States and the United Kingdom and approved by a vote of 51 to 10 with 49 abstentions urges the early conclu- sion of a comprehensive test ban treaty with effective international verification. The United States and the U.S.S.R. abstain on part (A), and the U.S.S.R. opposes part (B). November 13, 1962: At Geneva, Ambassa- dor Tsarapkin suggests that unmanned seis- mic stations be employed as an addition to existing national detecting stations to moni- tor a test ban. November 26, 1962: The 18-Nation Disar- mament Conference reconvenes for the third session. November 28, 1962: In an attempt to end the deadlock at Geneva, Swedish Delegate Rolf Edberg proposed a moratorium on all nuclear tests while an international group of scientists works out underground control methods satisfactory to both the West and the Soviet Union. December 3, 1962: The U.S.S.R. rejected the proposal for setting up a nuclear test ban put forth by the Indian-Swedish delegations. December 4, 1962: The Soviet Union told the United States and Great Britain that as long as they insisted on on-site inspection there would "never be any agreement" to end nuclear testing. Joseph B. Godber, of Britain, declared the dismissal of the neu- tralist efforts to break the test ban stalemate was "not the action of a responsible govern- ment." December 4, 1962: Arthur H. Dean told the Soviet Union that unmanned seismic sta- tions-the so-called "black boxes"-cannot serve as sole guardian of a nuclear test ban. December 10, 1962: In the 18-Nation Dis- armament Conference, Ambassador Tsa- rapkin formally proposes the establishment of two or three unmanned seismic stations on the territories of states possessing nuclear weapons. Locations by zones for those to be placed in the Soviet Union are named. This proposal is conditioned on the abandonment by the West of its insistence on international control and obligatory on-site inspection. December 19, 1962: Premier Khrushchev, in a letter to President Kennedy, states that the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept two or three onsite inspections per year on Soviet territory. In addition, he says there could be three unmanned seismic stations on Soviet territory. The final location of the stations is left open. December 20, 1962: The 18-Nation Dis- armament Conference recesses. December 28, 1962: President Kennedy, in reply to Premier Khruslichey, indicates en- couragement that the Soviets have now ac- cepted the principle of onsite inspection, but states that the figure of "two or three" on- site inspections is not sufficient, nor are three unmanned seismic stations. He denies that the United States offered to agree on three inspections. The United States has reduced number of onsite inspections to 8 to 10. January 4, 1963: Arthur H. Dean an- nounced that he had submitted his resigna- tion on December 27, 1962, as Chief U.S. September 19 (2) the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do eo. June 20, 1963: Memorandum of Under- standing (between U.S. and U.S.S.R.) signed at Geneva to establish a direct communica- tions link between the 'United States and the Soviet Union. (This was negotiated in arms control forum). June 30, 1963: The Atomic Energy Com- mission reported that in recent weeks there has been evidence of events in the Soviet Union which may be nuclear tests of very low yields. (Newspaper articles referred to an event occurring in the Soviet Union on June 12.) e July 2, 1963: Chairman Kbruslichey, in a speech in East Berlin, agrees eo negotiate on a nuclear test ban treaty limited to atmos- phere, outer space, and underwater. He also requested negotiations on a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warshaw Treaty nations. July 15, 1963: Commencement: of three power (United States, United Kin gdom, and U.S.S.R.) talks in Moscow to negotiate a limited test ban. July 25, 1963: Negotiators for the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.-Am- bassador Harriman, Lord Hailsham, and For- eign Minister Gromyko--initial a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests in other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. EXHIBIT 3 [Alert No. 5-Soviet Treaty Violations, pub- lished by Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense, Nov. 5, 1962] SOVRET TREATY VIOLATIONS Officials of the Soviet Union, from the 1917 Bolshevik revolution onward through 15 years of Communist rule, have established an un- disputed reputation for breaking their most solemn pledges. The Soviet regime's consistent viewpoint on the relative unimportance of promises is not restricted to its dealings with other countries, but extends with equal force to its relationships with the Russian people and the various minority groups which comprise the U.S.S.R. Only 3 days after the November 7, 1917, revolution placed it in rower, the Communist regime abolished freedom of the press as a privilege too dangerous to be entrusted to the people. The people were promised, how- ever, that the decree would be rescinded just "as soon as the-new regime took root." This 45-year-old promise notwithstanding, the order still applies today. Other instances in which the Soviet Re- public has broken faith with its own people are legion. The revolution of 1917 was car- ried out in the name of democracy, and ever since "democracy" has been one of the most frequently used words in the Commu- nist lexicon. But while the Communists have capitalized on the word, they have radi- cally altered its definition-from "govern- ment by the people" to "government for the good of the workers." Since the Commu- nists keep for themselves the right to deter- mine what is "good" for the workers, the So- viet definition of democracy in fact has become "government by Communists." After 1917, the Russian people wanted not only democracy but its specifi c institutions: a constitution, a parliament, elections, a se- cret ballot, trade unions, etc. They were given all these things, but in name only. The Soviet Constitution is an interesting document to read. However, it is violated or ignored by the regime as a matter of course. The Soviet parliament meets regularly, but it possesses neither power nor function. Elections are held every 4 years, but the single-slate ballot gives the voters no choice. A "secret ballot" is provided, hut its purpose is to identify dissenters rather than protect Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 1?" N? ) A I a ,;44 ? ai be 'ofo a ? ? 5. ? "' Q co s, 15..-nA02 pa 6D gijo.N0 g ? 0 t 8 tc=5,0 go. 2'6 4 I '4:1 6 2 ?7rZ d o. g90.6' too d V?278 .0,A ? ot4 . 0, o.F.,1 8 e?-? '0 4.,? 0 Aopa, og ?t t SVD A gg-,W5 1.3 ? t fzil g'd +0182 0 g? M,S m tr, 1,1`?lEi ? gii*,g ,;.4?. ? 28 ?3 A W.:4 01 g. Q. rg 12.1) 7:1 0 tf2 `2) podg tg 4 a?H"; .po.2 ceac, gri) OA 4.0? 10 0020,1 ti-0,1 -51Arg cd.' v.F1,42 totgpni EgcOuP:.-94H ?4,000- 4. .0 Hug40..51-4 .,0 gb CO 0.k amgWt0.9., 0E- .4.,00 V814 ou.pP1 'CONGRESSIONAL RECoRb ? S ? ra0 00 ?VD C306 cur" ?ari- E4?V,`"). oopi 0 ultr8 H 00 g .d.t1"8 0.0-P P5 .. - . o Atil. ?V. 71. li ' ? g - 7,;. g dgobqi2 2 42 Igt sl 11-01,g73 Wi,k kv..8,1, ga 0 to 0Ag- ,T, 0 cd..t' *2 4:2 2 g E100,i0?.2.41 .11. 4:40 vo 2.4,2 :::%:Lgg; '!3" ab 2,?? .2 0)8.0) _051?1 ' Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6 16636 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE THE AGREEMENT tracting party ? ? *. The treaty comes into force immediately * " and shall remain in force for a term of 30 years." March 10, 1947: Council of Foreign Min- isters, meeting In Moscow, agrees that all German prisoners of war should be repatri- ated by December 31, 1948. May 4 and June 20, 1949: Four-power agreements of New York and Paris guar- antee United States, British, French, and Soviet joint control of Berlin, all access routes to and from the city, and freedom of movement within the city. July 27, 1953: Military armistice estab- lished between United Nations command and opposing Communist forces, assisted by U.S.S.R., of China and North Korea. Armi- stice agreement pledges signers to "cease Introduction into Korea of reinforcing mili- tary personnel." January 11, 1956: U.S.S.R. signs agreement with Yugoslavia, pledging $110 million in credits for industrial construction. August 4, 1956: U.S.S.R. pledges an addi- tional grant of $175 million, bringing total to $285 million. October 19, 1956: U.S.S.R.-Japanese joint declaration pledges the Soviet Union to re- frain from interference in Japan's internal affairs. THE RESULT tracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance against the other high contract- ing party and not to take part in any coali- tion or actions or measures directed against the other high contracting party * ". The present treaty will be valid for 30 years. August 3, 1955: Soviet regime furnishes West German Red Cross with data on the health and whereabouts of only 20 of the approximately 14,000 Germans known to be still held in the U.S.S.R. September 20, 1955: U.S.S.R. unilaterally transfers Soviet control over all access routes to and from Berlin to East German regime. August 13, 1961: Construction of Berlin wall completely prohibits free passage from the Soviet sector to the Western sectors. July 11, 1955: U.N. command details long list of armistice agreement violations by Communist parties. May 6, 1957: U.N. command, in another of series of official complaints, charges that Communists have sent troops in Korea's de- militarized zone six times in period of less than 4 months. May 28, 1958: Yugoslav sources disclose that the Soviet Union has postponed for 5 years the grant to Yugoslavia amounting to $285 million. This represented an attempt to retaliate against Yugoslavia for its refusal to accept the Soviet Communist Party's ideological leadership. 1958: During the weeks preceding Jap- anese elections of May 22, Soviet radio beams propaganda at Japan violently opposing the reelect:on of Premier Kishus government. 1959-60: U.S.S.R. threatens Japan with the possibility of nuclear war if Japan rati- fies United States-Japan security treaty, signed January 19, 1960. Emus's: 4 [From the Washington (D.C.) Star, Sept. 15, 19631 How THE SOVIETS ARE OBSERVING THEIR TREATIES NOW (By Dr. F. G. La.suner) The following is a short study of selected Soviet treaty practices. It is not based on a comprehensive listing of all treaties; nor does this study contribute a complete analysis of how treaties fared at the hands of the Krem- lin. However, a large enough sample of treaties was examined to permit a number of broad conclusions. a Economic treaties, in general, are being ob- served by the 'U.S.S.R. This is so because treaties of this sort operate to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. and because many of them are drawn with Communist bloc states; i.e., they are treaties within the same political entity. But where trade agreements conflict with the immediate political interests of the U.S.S.R., they are wholly or partially voided (viz, treaties with such dissident satellites as Albania, China, Yugoslavia, etc.). Many treaties signed by the U.S.S.R., espe- cially at the end of World War II, called for free elections or plebiscites. The 'U.S.S.R. presumably expected Communist and affili- ated parties to win elections in Eastern Eu- rope. When this hope was disappointed, de- spite systematic attempts to bring about electoral victories by skulduggery (e.g., out- lawing of certain parties), political warfare and insurrectional methods were used to seize political power. Treaties of strategic significance habitu- ally have been violated by the U.S.S.R. when- ever violation was in accord with the require- ments of Soviet strategic operations. This will become apparent by reading, for example, the attached list of violated and observed nonaggression and friendship treaties. A TREATY TECHNIQUE The 'U.S.S.R., on occasion, attempts to play off one country against another through the negotiation or drawing of treaties, of which one set tends to be deceptive. In 1922, the U.S.S.R. negotiated with the Western Powers, only to sten the Treaty of Rapallo with Ger- many. In 1939, extensive discussions with France and England on mutual security were terminated through the signing of the Nazi- Soviet Pact. Agreements made in 1939 with Nazi Germany on the division of Poland were annulled 2 years later by treaty with the Polish Government-in-exile; in addition, the U.S.S.R. shortly thereafter drew agreements, which were not mutually compatible with two different Polish exile governments. The U.S.S.R. has signed agreements which have a purpose that differs from the objects stated :n the treaty. The U.S.S.R., for ex- ample, joined the United Nations for many reasons connected with their strategy of revolution, but not for the humanitarian rea- sons stated in the U.N. Charter. In summary, it may be concluded that in the Soviet scheme, treaties are a tool either to solve some practical problem (Danube River navigation or International Postal Un- ion Treaties) or, more importantly, to Lu- ther the offensive-defensive strategy of the U.S.S.R. More often than not, treaties are concluded with a particular country whose assent cr benevolent neutrality is needed to carry out a particular strategic operation, or else the treaty partner is itself the intended victim, or target, of Soviet direct or indirect attack. TREATIES VIOLATED 1. Treaties pertaining to repatriation and treatment of civilians and war prisoners. A whole series of such treaties was made after World War II. Examples are: Joint declaration by the 'U.S.S.R. and Japan concerning political relations, Octo- September 19 her 19, 1956 (provisions on repatriation of Japanese nationals) . Agreement concerning repatriation of Jap- anese prisoners of war and civilians from the U.S.S.R. and from territories under Soviet control, as well as Korean nationals from Japan to Soviet-occupied North Korea, with two annexes. December 19, 1946. 2. Treaties between the RSFSR and cer- tain bodies concerning establishment of autonomous republics within the RSFSR. Such autonomy on several. occasions was unilaterally abrogated at a later date by the RSFSR. 3. Treaties of nonintervention: The U.S.S.R. frequently has violated such treaties outright, or has denied that activities in which it was engaged constituted an inter- vention within the meaning of the treaty. Intervention by the U.S.S.R. has constituted both of propaganda and political warfare, and of outright political or military activi- ties. Examples are: Exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania constituting an agreement concerning noninterference in each other's internal affairs, June 9, 1934. Exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R. and France concerning Soviet adherence to the principle of nonintervention in the Span- ish civil war. Joint declaration by the U.S.S.R. and Japan concerning political relations October 19, 1956 (provisions on noninterference in inter- nal affairs). 4. Treaties related to the International Labor Organization. U.S.S.R. has adhered to conventions on a variety of subjects: Child labor, right to unionize, annual holidays with pay, freedom of association, etc. Some of these agreements were first drawn in the early 1920's. Examples are: CONVENTION ON saevEnT Convention concerning slavery of 1926- 53, 'U.S.S.R. ratified August 1956. Several supplementary conventions of 1956 on aboli- tion of slavery and slave trade "and institu- tions and practices similar to slavery" rati- fied by the U.S.S.R. Convention concerning equal renulnera- tion for men and women workers for work of equal value (ILO convention No. 100), rat- ified by the U.S.S.R. on April 4, 1956. Convention concerning forced or compul- sory labor (ILO convention No. 29) of 1930- 46. U.S.S.R. ratified June 4, 1956. 5. Treaties pertaining to the control of narcotics. These are violated by the U.S.S.R. through proxies (China, Cuba). Examples are: International Opium Convention, with an- nex and protocol, February 19, 1925. So- viet adherence, October 31, 1935. Convention for limiting the manufactur- ing and regulating the distribution of nar- cotic drugs, with p otocol of signature, July 31, 1931. Soviet adherence, October 31, 1935. 6. Treaties establishing certain rules or regulations, or prohibiting certain practices. These either have been or are being violated by the U.S.S.R.; they aee antithetical to Soviet custom and observation of such agreements canont be expected. The U.S.S.R. was not a signatory to some of these treaties before World War H, and went out of its way to act contrary to the spirit Cf many of the provisions. Examples are: Geneva convention concerning the treat- ment of prisoners of war, with five annexes, 1949. Supersedes agreements of 1929. Geneva convention concerning the pro- tection of civilian persons in time of war, with three annexes, 1949. Convention on the prevention and punish- ment of the crime of genocide, December 9, 1948. Convention on the political rights of wo- men, December 20, 1952, and March 31, 1953. Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RbP65B00383R000100200004-6 16638 03831:V3001002o coNGnEssioNAt nteont.= AN-Aft September 19 ? At that:WIWI b_elieve I had fay cov- ered this point. However, I see that my distinguished colleague from West Vir- ginia [Mr. BYRD1 in his discussion today again has referred to General Powers' concern and cites General Powers' state- ments az -One a the bases for 'his con- cern over the treaty. - For many years now the Joint Com- Mittee on Atomic Energy : has had de- tailed_ inforniation concerning the, test- ing program by the AEC and the high degree of reliability that the AEC and the weapons laboratories attribute to their nuclear weapons. The details of this on file with the JoincOommittee are classified. In order, however, to bring this Matter to the attention of the pub- lic in a true light, the Joint Committee staff on September 17 requested Gen. A. W. Betts, Director of the Division of 'Military Application; to make available ? In an unclassified manner the details of the testing programs and the assurances aS to thc reliability of the nuclear weap- ons. .This afternoon a response from General *Betts was received at the office of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I ask unanimous consent that the let- ter a September 17 from the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic t nergy to General Betts and the reply from General Betts Of September 10 be inserted in the REc- - x believe the Commissioner's letter signed by General Betts will once and for all put to rest any doubts that exist. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ? - ,SEPTEMBER 17, 1963. Maj. Gen. A. W. BETTS, Director, DiViS1071 of Military Application, knergy Commission,, Wash- ington, D.C. Dziku c.xnNERat, 3,3ETTs: On August 19, 1963, General power, in testimony before the Pre- paredness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, testi- "The only way you can prove a weapon system is to take it out of the stockpile in a random pattern and let the tactical unit take it out and detonate It. If you haven't done this, there is always a chance that sornethio has happened that we won't cover4 1? 00 14e. * * * ?'4 VS POt tested any of the operational ln our inventory. That includes the rn s es and the bombs." The iMplications left by General Power's testimony is that the weapons systems and Warheads developed are not assured of func- tioning properly when called upon to do so in an operational manner. From the knowl- edge available to the Joint Committee in following the weapons programs over the years, this appears to be contrary to the actual situation. Most of the information on, tlje with the Joint Committee, on At9mic Energy regard- ing this matter is in classified form. It is very desirable, therefore, that an unclassi- tted letter be 'furnished recounting the long history Of looking at the need for opera- tional systems tests, and the study efforts made , on tniq problem together with the prOcedures now, in practice which provide to seientlefi, engineers and to the militaryad- 1u the ,riepartment of 'Defense the high degree of confidence tRei have in the f?SSUratiO that goniplete" Weapons systema, when fired operationally, will result in nu- clear warhead detonations as designed. To the greatest extent possible in an un- classified communication, this letter should include infbrmation on tests of weapons systems that included warheads where the entire sequence of firing was actually tested except for the final nuclear detonation. .Statistical tests apd certification procedures involving more than just the original war- head designers should also be deseribed. Thisr cooperation in providing us this in- formation is greatly appreciated. Sincerely yours, JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director. US. ATRZAIG ENERGY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., September 19,1963. Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States - DEAR me. CONWAY: I refer to your letter of September 17, 1963, regarding statements made by Gen. Thomas S. Power, commander in chief, Strategic Air Command, before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. The matter of reliability of nuclear weap- ons has always been considered a matter of great importance by the Atomic Energy Com- mission and consequently a substantial tech- nical effort has been devoted to insure that the nuclear weapons provided to the Depart- ment of Defense will flinction properly if used operationally. The required reliability for any particular nuclear weapon is estab- lished initially by the DOD in the nuclear weapon military characteristics. This re- quired reliability is quite high and is verified by the extensive testing program discussed in the following paragraphs. The accumulation of the necessary data upon which the reliability is based begins early in the development program of a weapon. Initially the nonnuclear compo- nents are siibject?.d to many rigorous tests, under various environmental conditions which, include acceleration, vibration, high and-low temperature cycling, etc. Next, the complete nonnuclear weapon (either bomb or warhead) with depleted uranium or other material substituted for the fissionable ma- terial is tested under a variety of circum- stances that include functional tests under simulated operational conditions. In these ' tests, the weapon is highly instrumented in order to olitain information that is of pri- mary interest to the weapon designer; e.g., arming, fusing, and firing circuit operation. If the weapon is a bomb, it is carried by the same type aircraft that will employ it oper- ationally and it is released on an AEC test range at Tonopah, Nev., where extensive ground instrumentation records all the vari- ous bomb functions. In the case of aclallistic missile, the same type of tests are run in conjunction with the DOD on test firings from the Atlantic or Pa- cific missile ranges. These tests confirm the compatibility between the DOD and AEC portions of the weapon system and establish that the nonnnclear, portion of the weapon will perform according to specifications. A sufficient number of these tests is performed so that a statistically signifificant amount of da