THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6
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• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: OPEN

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196 H CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
[Prom the St. Louis Post-DisPatCh, Sept.
*J.7, 1963]
, - litisszsnis FROM NWT'
.,The IO-State power pool project Of MidL
Contirient Area toTer, FISurf,era-(MAPP) is
described, in Union' Electric News, publication-
of one qf its niiijOr participants, as "the"
ve,Fy thing the Post-Diabatoh advocated 2
. years- ago in tirglifg investor-owned com-
panies to, join Govelmnent in an overall grid
'plan." The POSt:tif.Sptitoh continues to ad-
vocate all-incluslire pooling of po-Wer, em-
hracing not only agencies Of- the Federal
Government but:also municipal and rural
electric cooperative and. privately owned pro-
duction and, distribution systems, as first
proposed on a nationwide bails by Secretary
?-
f tha Interior DOI, -
? It is on this very account, that MAPP is
? an overall grid plan, but to the contrary
highly and one-sidedly exclusive, that we ex-
press serious misgivings. MAPP Could in-
deed produce precisely the adverse effect, by
setting up a rival pool, dominated by pri-
vate companies, in advance, and preventing
an oVerall grid from being accomplished, by
keeping its members Separate.
IT44Qh Blectriel publication offers' no facts
to support its claim that MAPP is "an over-
all grid plan." Yet how can a pool be fac-
tually so- described when it does'not include
the largest transmission system in the 10-
_State area, that of the U.S. Bureau of Rec-
lamationi *hen It does not include more
,than ,a smattering of the rural electric co-
operatives, and none at all in four of the
States; when it does not Maude a single one
of the many municipal systems or the numer-
ous &NM utility districts in Nebraska or
elsewhere with the lone exception of the
,Onialla Public Power District; and when it
does not even include Most of the private
' powSr companies, among then' several of the
largest?
' 'MAPP'e public announcements Make much
of its professed intentions to take in other
members?but strictly on its Own terms.
'7.7! -These terms express "strong opPoSitiOn to
Federal domination of power supply or trans-
' _mission," and a aualifled desire to "coordi-
nate. with Federal agencies," 'leaving the
Uneritical reader o infer that in wArp pri-
. tate companies are joining the Government
',1n an overall grid-plan.
But are they? -MAPP's own statements do
not say so. And Senator MSTCALF of Montana
- Says the Bureau 'ofReclamation "proposed
a power pool to these people" before MAPP
was conceived but has never received a reply,
tO its offer.
. -
Does this, in the opinion of the 'Union
'Electric co., substantiate the claim that it
and its associates in MAPP are 'pining the
Government in an overall pool? Or does it
suggest that the Old technique of apite lines
to forestall public power is being magnified
manyfold into a 'multistate system of spite
pooling to forestall a national gfid? Clarifi-
cation of these' questions would be ease
Itself. Xt wouldrequire 011.13i a clear and
simple statement-that the members-of MAPP
propose to join in pooling with all Federal,
munielpal, and cooperative agencies on equal
terms. Do we hear such a statement?
. ,
TRIBUTE TO SENATOR ANDERSON
Mr, METCALF. Mr. President, last
May I had the privilege to be one of
some three dozen Members of the Sen-
ate to attend a testimonial dinner spon-
,
'sorecl by a dozen national conservation
-
organizations Which honored our distin-
guished colleague, the senior' senator
fyoin New MeNleo iMr. ANDERSON], and
Ow Mrs. iinelei:son.
On June 13 i5f this.'" year I introduced
into' the RECORD, starting on page 10161,
seVeral excerpts from remarks made by
speakers at this dinner, and several edi-
torials and articles. which followed the
event and, appeared in several na-
tional magazines.
I now wish to add to the testimony
Of the greatness of this distinguished
colleague, an editorial by Carl W. Buch-
heister, president of the National Audu-
bon Society which appears in the Sep-
tember-October issue of the Audubon
magazine. I believe this editorial comes
close to expressing in words what most
of us feel in our hearts for this great
leader, statesman, politician, and con-
servationist?this true American who is
leading the fight to save our wilderness
and natural resources from the en-
croachment of selfish man and his de-
structive machines.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this editorial entitled "The
Pleasure and Honor Were Ours" be
printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE PLEASURE AND HONOR WERE OURS
All agreed it was one of the moat note-
worthy occasions for Conservations in the
history of the Nation's Capital when some
Soo persons turned out for the testimonial
dinner to Senator CLINTON P. ANDERSON, of
New Mexico last May 20
Among the -diners were about 50 Members
of Congress, three members of the Cabinet,
representatives of President Kennedy's
White House staff, and a virtual outpouring
of admiring citizens. The dinner was spon-
sored by 12 national conservation organiza-
tions, the National Audubon Society among
them. The purpose was to pay deserved trib-
ute to the great Senator who is one of the
finest examples of the kind of statesmen we
like to think of as making up the Congress
of the United States, a man of exceptional
ability and extraordinary devotion to the
public welfare.
Our purpose was to accord recognition to'
Senator ANDERioN, particularly for his lead-
ership in behalf of needed laws and sound
programs for the Conservation of America's
natural resources. The overwhelming Sen-
ate passage of the wilderness bill, of which
he is the leading sponsor, is one measure of
his effectiveness.
In truth, it is we?all of us who call our.:
selves conservationists?Who are honored by
the dedication and the career of a man like
CLINTON ANDERSON.
And, like Theodore Roosevelt, who first
'made conservation a national purpose and
a public cause, and later great ones we could
name, Senator ANDERSON illustrates the
truth that for the purpose of _winning the
battles we engage in, there is no substitute
for having able advocates in high places, as
at the head of a key committee of Congress,
at the helm of an executive department, or
in the White House itself. The Yankees win
the most pennants because they have the
best pitchers and the hardest hitters.
,
0010.6
TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PASTORE
Mr. wiT.T.TAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, it is my very great pleasure to
bring to the -attention of the Senate an
article which recently appeared in the
Newark, N.J., Sunday Star-Ledger about
one of our most disttimished-colleagues,
,
Mr. PASTORE, of Rhode Island.
We here are well aware of the qualities
of diligence and ability which Senator
PASTORE has been 'bringing to his duties
in the Senate for nearly 13 years. While
he is not always in the limelight or in
16597
the headlines, he is always to be found
in the thick of the fight for substantive,
progressive legislation.
_
This excellent article, commenting on
his role as a truly effective legislator, is
richly deserved, and Mr. President, I
request unanimous permission that the
text of the article be inserted in the REC-
ORD at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger, Sept.
15,1963]
A LITTLE MAN MAKES GOOD IN A BIG WAY
(Senator PASTORE is a living symbol of an
immigrant father's dream. The son of a
tailor, the Senator from Rhode Island is
cutting a big path for himself on Capitol Hill
these days, riding herd on President Ken-
nedy's priority legislation: Ratification of
the nuclear test ban bill, the private accom-
modations phase of the civil rights bill, and
the vital rail strike legislation. Senator PAS-
TORE is a little man who is not afraid to tangle
with some of the big figures in the Senate.
He came out of a tangle with the late Senator
Bob Kerr of Oklahoma, a big, bluff man who
made an imposing, formidable opponent in
a debate. Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, an
astute Member of the upper House, has
openly admired the little Senator from the
Nation's smallest State. He once said that
?he wanted PASTORE as his lawyer if he ever
got into trouble. This is not faint praise.)
(By John A. Goldsmith)
JOHN ORLANDO PASTORE is the Senate's
smallest Senator from the Nation's smallest
State. His story reads like the American
dream.
Modern inytholOgy alleges the Senate is run
by men of towering seniority, generally from
the South. Twenty-seven Senators have
more seniority than the immigrant tailor's
son who is the senior Senator from Rhode
Island
In recent weeks, however, Democrat PAS-
TORE has been riding herd on three of Presi-
dent Kennedy's priority bills. No one else
has had quite the same role in handling rail
strike legislation, the nuclear test ban treaty,
and the public accommodations civil rights
bill.
True, it was something of an accident?
illness of Commerce Committee Chairman
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Democrat, of Wash-
ington?that gave PASTORE a central role in
consideration of the measures: But such
accidents have been the making of many a
congressional leader.
In PASTORE'S case, presiding at daytime
civil rights hearings and night rail hearings
was public notification of the fact that he
had arrived as a Senate leader. Actually,
as chairman of the Senate-House Atomic
Energy Committee and a member of the Sen-
ate Democratic policy committee, he already
had moved into a leadership position in
Senate councils.
In a broader sense, of course, he also had
attained a position of political leadership
when he was elected to the Senate In 1950,
having served as Lieutenant Governor and
then as Governor of his State.
Born in Providence in 1907, PASTORE ran
errands for his Lathgrie tailor shop until the
father died. Young PASTORE was then 8
years old. His mother went back to work as
a seamstress to slipport the boy and his three
brothers and two sisters.
PASTORE worked after school at a jewelry
factory and graduated in 1925 from Classical
High School. College was out of the ques-
tion, although Brown University was conven-
iently close. Instead, PASTORE clerked for an
electric power company and enrolled in night
classes at the local branch of Northeastern
University. He won a bachelor of laws degree
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16598 CONGRESSIONAL REcORD ? SENATE
In 1931 and was adm
1992.
Starting in Provid
moved into politics.
to the State's genera
became an assistant
He became Lieutene.n
was Governor from 1
During his tenure
adopted a fair empl
and PASTORS pushed
for teachers' salaries
to finance it. The sa
nor's return trip tic
not curb PASTORE'S in
polls.
It was something o
one of another kind,
election to the Sena
bar of the corporatio
University.
PASTORE'S Senate v
with Democratic libe
social welfare and ci
ever, split with the
issues as the con=
for vlhich, as chairm
fnunicatinns Subco
manager.
In one of the Sena
ality disputes of race
the nomination of
Strauss, to be Secret
against his Atomic E
league, Senator CLINT
cat, of New Mexico,
fight against Strauss.
With ANDERSON, that
sive and misleading in
committee.
PASTORE has a broad
his bearing shows a b
his Small frame, howe
strong piercing voice
frequently in Senate d
PASTORE was, in fact
tors to tangle period
with the late Senator
crat, of Oklahoma, a
ments unblunted an
Senator Itsciiiien B.
Georgia, one of the Se
legal experts, has on
like to have PASTORE
In trouble.
In the best traditio
talented tongue nor t
any dampening effec
disposition in which
a matter of great ser
Recently he was di
nuclear fallout with
he made it quite cle
Idea that changes or
fallout might prove
harmful.
"Mutations," he sal
they'll make PASTORE
d to law practice in
e's seventh ward, he
n 1935 he was elected
assembly: In 1937 he
tate attorniy general.
Governor in 1944, then
5 until 1950 .
Governer, the State
yment practices law,
ough an aid program
nd a sales tax needed
tax, often a Gover-
t to private life, did
easing margins at the
a triumph, too, albeit
hen shortly after his
he was made a mem-
-a trustee of Brown
Mg record places him
ale on such issues as
rights. He has, how-
iberal group on such
'cations satellite bill
n of the Senate Com-
ittee, he was floor
's most bitter Person-
t years, he voted for
friend, Lewis L.
of Commerce and
ergy Committee col-
P. ANDERSON, Demo-
ho was leading the
Be did not believe,
trauss had been eve-
his dealings with the
and ready smile, and
of cockiness. From,
or, there emanates a
hich is lifted not in-
bate.
one of the few Sena-
lly in floor debate
obert S. Kerr, Demo-
emerge with argu-
spirit unchastened.
SSELL, Democrat, of
ate's top orators and
casion said he would
his lawyer if he were
, however, neither the
e cocky bearing have
On PASTORE'S sunny
ACTORS IS not always
ousness to PASTORE.
cussing the effects of
ewsmen. He did not,
r, go along with the
mutations caused by
neficial rather than
explosively, "perhaps
6 feet tall."
THE JEW1S
Mr. KEATING.
With a warm sense
that I extend my h
good wishes to our
occasion of the Je
The ancient holid
and the Ten Days
minating in Yom
Atonement, embed
which the Jewish
of a new year of
sound of the shof
mation of the joy o
time its strangely
that the coming y
reexamination of
amine our past, Pr
HOLIDAYS
r. President, it is
f personal pleasure
rtfelt greetings and
ewish citizens on the
h New. Year.
y of Rosh Hashanah
of Repentance cul-
ippur, the Day of
the solemnity with
ople hold the coming
responsibility. The
echoes as an affir-
life but at the same
d call reminds man
requires a serious
urpose. As we ex-
yin.g for the under-
standing that will'enahle us to profit
from our errors, w open the way to a
richer and fuller e tence.
The message of 1 e Jewish New Year
Is a universal one hich all men should
heed. These are hi toric times, rife with
social and political unrest both at home
and abroad. In a t me of confusion, and
at times seeming c aos, the melancholy
Wail of the shofar oes out to provide a
promise of order d heope to all citilens
of the world.
It is my fervent ope' that the coming
year will mark the unrise of a new and
even richer era of piritual vitality and
growth in the age- Id and distinguished
history of a great eople. America is a
tapestry woven of many strands, and
none is more gold n than that repre-
sented by our fello Americans of Jewish
descent From th earliest days Of our
history this Natio ha S counted among
its richest nourish i g forces the spirit-
ual strength, the i tellectual dynamism,
and the dedicated energy of its Jewish
sons and daughter.
As one who has ? een privileged to visit
the fountainhead if Hebrew culture, as
one who has witne sed With his own eyes
the tremendous fo ard surge of history
that Israel repr ents in the Middle
East, I can und *stand whence came
these high qualiti s of heart and mind
and will that h e been translated?
here in Americ to the national fiber
and the material advancement of our
beloved country.
Israel stands a tribute to the in-
domitable spirit 1' the Jewish people
just as the new ear embraces an op-
timistic hope for he future side by side
with a strong s se of the importance
of looking back to history for future
guidance. Parti larly in the present
moment of his y, when new nations
are emerging in the light of freedom,
does the exampl4 of what Israel has ac-
complished stani as a living proof of the
will and ability cJf a people to create its
own destiny.
In keeping w1t the spirit of the occa-
sion, then, I am privileged to echo the
ancient words uttered in a solemn yet
joyful affirmatlo4 of hope on this day.
"May you be ins ribed, once again, in
the Book of Life fr a good New Year."
The PRESID G OloriCER (Mr.
HART in the ch r) . Vs there further
morning business If not, morning busi-
ness is concluded.
r----THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The Senate resumed the consideration
of Executive M-88th Congress, 1st ses-
sion?the treaty banning nuclear weap-
on tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and underwater.
The PRESIDING CuoisiCER. The
Senate is now in executive session. The
question is on agreeing to the resolution
of ratification of the treaty.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia obtained
the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from West Virginia yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the majority leader. ,
Mr. MANSFIELD I suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
September 19
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
" The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, the time is now at hand for a
final decision on the treaty banning nu-
clear weapons tests in the atmosphere,
under water, and in outer space. On
August 8,1963, President Kennedy trans-
mitted this treaty to the Senate, with the
recommendation that we advise and con-
sent to its ratification. He gave as his
principal reason that, in his opinion, the
treaty would advance world peace and
Inhibit the nuclear arms race. Since
that time, the Senate Armed Services
Committee, of which I am a member, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
and the Senate members of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy?along
with other Senators?have been engaged
In an intensive study of the merits of the
treaty.
Knowing that the final responsibility
for approving or rejecting the treaty lies
in our hands, I have literally searched
my soul for the correct decision. When
our decision has finally been reached,
whatever that decision may be?and of
course there is no question that it will be
that of approval?no American can be
sure that it is the right decision. None
of us can be sure, beyond doubt, that
either ratification or rejection will ulti-
mately be in the best interests of our
country. Some persons have stated
that, while it would be a mistake to re-
ject the treaty, it may prove to be an
even greater mistake to ratify it. So
only history will be able to record the
correctness or the incorrectness, the
wisdom or the lack of wisdom, the suc-
cess or the failure, of the action we take.
There is no question as to the objec-
tive we seek. All of us share the desire
to advance the cause of peace and to
strengthen the progress of peace. All of
us would like to reduce the threat of nu-
clear war. All of us would like to see a
complete termination of all nuclear tests
In all environments, if both the East and
West could agree upon a system of ade-
quate and effective inspection, and if at
the beginning of such cessation of testing
the Unites States were, indeed, superior
In nuclear weapons technology in all of
the yield-weight ranges. All of us would
like to live in a world.in which weapons
of war and destruction could be con-
verted into instruments of peace and
human progress. All of us would like to
move away from the costly expenditures
for armaments, and move in the direc-
tion of applying our financial and human
resources toward the building of a better
world for mankind, Au of us would like
to eliminate the tensions that for many
years have plagued the free world. The
question is, however, whether the pro-
posed partial test ban moves us closer
toward these goals, or leads us in the
opposite direction.
The proponents of the treaty admit
that it carries inherent military risks;
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,E.
1963 CO;\I?GRESSIONAL 1tECOR SNATE
,but, in their view, these risks are out
wlghed ,hPolitteal and other advan
tages which are exTected to accrue.fro
the treaty's ratification. Tho,se of us
who oppose the treaty recognize tha
certain bene4ts ?MAY result therefrom
but feel that the risks involved are to
great to assume in a situation which, a
best, offers no positive guarantee tha
the hoped-for benefit, will reall
materialize
"Rope springs e t
ternal in the uma
breast," and the proponents of th
-treaty base their position largely upon
a hope that it will jead to a lessening o
tensions, to a slowing of the nuclea,
weapons race, and to eventual peace. W
opponents of the treaty, feeling that pas
hopes having proved to be false, are un-
willing, in what is our view, to risk the
Security of this Nation in pursuing what
may be another false and even more
dangerous hope.
D. 16599
- _ the security of this Nation demands that
- _I say "no." In so doing, I recognize that
?those ,Senators who will vote to ratify
the treaty have the same sincerity of
t purpose and the same dedication to their
, country as I have.
o ARGTJMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE TREATY
The following arguments are the prin-
cipal ones, in my opinion, that have been
Y advanced in favor of ratification:
First. The test ban treaty is desirable
because further nuclear testing in the
atmosphere is not necessary, the soviet
Union and the United States each having
already acquired a capacity of overkill.
r Second. The test ban will eliminate
e the danger of further fallout.
Third. The test ban will serve to
deepen the rift between Russia and Red
China.
Fourth. The test ban will contribute to
a lessening of tensions and be a step
toward other agreements and eventual
peace.
Fifth. The test ban treaty will slow,
or signal the end of, the arms race.
Sixth. The test ban will make it more
difficult for Russia to catch up with the
United-States in the field of nuclear ex-
plosives.
Seventh. The test ban will slow down
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Mr. President, I should like to analyze
each of these arguments in brief detail.
When the treaty was first announced,
was inclined to SI1PPert it. The long-
ing for peace which I share with other
Americans naturally led me to see, in
this proposal, a faint glimmer of hope.
? I thought JA best, _however, to withhold
my judgment untiLI could have the op-
portunity to listen to the testimony and
to weigh the evidence presented both
for and against the treaty. If it were
not for my membership on the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, in all
likelihood I would have supported the
treaty, because otherwise I would not
normally be exposed to the subject mat-
ter of the treaty as thoroughly as I have
been as a member ,of that committee.
Although the treaty is within the juris-
? diction of the Foregn Relations Com-
mittee, in view of the military aspects
the Anna Eervices_conunittee has par-
ticipated in Joint hearings with the For-
eign Relations CoMmittee. Moreover,
the Senate preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee has held executive hearings
Independent of those joint hearings in
Which the parent ?committee partici-
pated. Although I am not a member of
the Senate Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, I did attend and partici-
pate, as did other members of the lull
committee, in the hearings of that sub-
committee at the invitation of it chair-
man, the Senator from Mississippi, Mr.
STENNIS. In addition to participating
In the public and closed hearings, I have
read and reread most of the testimony
submitted in those hearings. I, there-
fore, feel that I can. say, without being
Immodest, that there are few Members
of the Senate that have been exposed to
more of the evidence presented at the
hearings than have I.
After weighing the arguments for and
against the treaty, I have reached the
conclusion that a greater risk to our
country lies in accepting this treaty than
In rejecting it. I have no doubt, as I
have already indicated, that it will be
ratified by the Senate, and I realize that
the position I _am taking will not be
shared by a great many of my colleagues
in this body. But, while it would be
easy and pleasant for me to say "yes"
to this treaty, it is my conviction that
No. 149 7 -
1. THE TEST BAN TREATY IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE
FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE ATMOS-
PHEnE IS NOT NECESSARY, THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE UNITED STATES EACH HAVING AL-
READY ACQUIRED A CAPACITY OF OVERKILL
As to the argument by some that the
United States has acquired an overkill
capacity, Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara? who supports the treaty, made the
following comment, which appears be-
ginning on page 146 of the hearings be-
fore the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions:
Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that
we have execessive armaments today. I don't
believe we have excessive strategic forces,
which I believe were those portions of our
armaments that Senator MCGOVERN was
speaking about. -As I tried to outline in my
statement this morning, there are a number
of uncertainties which we must recognize in
evaluating the relative positions of the
U.S.S.R. and the United States.
It is not possible for us to eliminate those
uncertainties from the equation. And be-
cause our knowledge is not complete and be-
cause it cannot be made complete in the
near future, we must seek to offset those un-
certainties with additional forces. This we
have done. We have made every effort to
hold the defense budget, which is pres-
ently being considered by Congress, at an
absolute minimum. I think we have done
so. I would not recommend that one dollar
be taken out of it.
In responding to further questions re-
garding overkill, Secretary McNamara
had this to say:
I think it is possible to say that we have
more weapons than would be utilized in a
particular war situation, without concluding
that our inventories are excessive. For ex-
ample, were there to be a war at sea, and the
war were limited to sea, presutaably the
weapons that had been designed for land
warfare would not be Waltzed. Conversely,
if there were a general nuclaer war, it is
possible that certay1 waapons conva1t12na1
or otherwise, that had been designed for less
than a general nuclear war would be in ex-
cess supply. But in neither instance would
it mean that our inventories were necessarily
excessive. I do not believe they are exces-
sive today. I think it is necessary to con-
tinue to increase them as we are planning to
do in fiscal 1964.
Secretary McNamara had this addi-
tionally to say:
One other major point raised was that we
have more nuclear weapons than we could
conceivably use in an allout war ? ? ". We
must meet requirements for various kinds
of limited and tactical nuclear contingencies;
the great bulk of the nuclear weapons we
"could not conceivably use" during an all-
out war are low-yield weapons procured to
meet requirements for tactical nuclear
warfare.
?
And, therefore, I am convinced that the
kind of large cut in the strategic budget
proposed by Senator McGovEnzes speech
could not be adopted without substantial
risk to our national security.
Gen. Thomas S. Power, Commander
in Chief, Strategic Air Command, in his
appearance before the Senate Prepared-
ness Investigating Subcommittee was
asked about overkill and he answered in
is way.
I do not agree with it. I think the overkill
claim is often made by people who are not
well informed and do not necessarily know
what they are talking about.
Now, there is such a thing as a pro-
gramed bomb or weapon as against the
delivered weapon. If you look at the pro-
gramed weapons, that is, if you look at the
weapons I have in the present war plan,
you would say we are overkilling. But if
you look at the weapons that I think will
survive and arrive, then you will change
your opinion.
So a lot of these people look at our stock-
pile and they think that every bomb is going
to be delivered. Now, do they think that
every bullet that is bought for a rifle is
going to kill an enemy soldier? No. We
buy millions upon millions of bullets. I
don't know the exact statistics, but maybe
one in a hundred thousand bullets actually
will kill an enemy. It is the same way with
a shell or a cannon.
Not every bomb is going to arrive at the
target. Many of them will be destroyed
on the ground before they are launched.
Many will be destroyed by enemy action.
Some will be duds. But we have figured
this all out mathematically for every sortie
and every weapon, and we have arrived at
a confidence factor.
You can have any confidence you want, but
if you want to be, say, 90 percent sure that
you will destroy a very sensitive target, and
if you have a 50-percent confidence factor
that a particular weapon will reach its target,
then you will have to program somewhere
in the neighborhood of six to seven weapons
to hope to get one there, but there is still a
10-percent chance that none will get there.
$;) it is a question of mathematics and how
sure you want to be or how much you want
to gamble.
We write a war plan so that, if we are told
to go to war, these prime sensitive targets
will be destroyed, and I have a high confi-
dence factor. I have a 90-percent confidence
factor because I have programed many weap-
ons and I have crosstargeted them, using
different types of weapons from different
areas to get a reliability factor that is
acceptable.
Now if they all got there, yes, we would be
overbombing and overkilling. But again
people forget that what we are really trying
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to do is to prevent war. We are trying to parison with the 5-,000 inillirems per gen-
make this thing so sure that it will deter eration proposed previously by the Federal
anyone. I think this is the real challenge, Radiation Council as a level of genetic risk
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
to try to prevent it. I think we can. We
- have clone it and I think we can continue
to do it if we make up our minds to do it.
Senator JAcicso/NT then interposed that:
The critics make the fatal mistake of
equating the number of weapons and their
combined yield with delivery on the target.
General Power's final comment on this
point was as follows:
know many of these people, and it is
really easy to become an expert in a field
that you have had no experience in and no
responsibility for. You have to have over-
whelming superiority, if you are really trying
to deter. That is the key to it.
(At this point Mr. NELSON took the
chair as presiding officer.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
PreSident, it is evident from the state-
Ments of Secretary McNamara, a sup-
porter of the treaty, and General Power,
an opponent of the treaty, that the argu-
ment which is being made by well-mean-
ing people throughout the country that
we have two or three times as many
weapons as We need, so why not put a
stop to their production, is a fallacious
argument. This philosophy, of course,
discounts the fact that it would be fool-
ish for us to attempt to disarm uni-
laterally or even to halt, unilaterally,
the production of weapons. It also dis-
co1.Mts the possibility of progressive
clefeloPment of techniques- and weap-
onry. General Curtis LeMity, Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force, commented on this
point, on page 390, by saying:
True, we have got all of these weapring,
and we think we can deliver them now.
But the situation never stay e static.
The side that has the best yield-to-weight
ratio has an advantage in tlieir capability
to put their weapons on targets sometime
in the future.
2, THE TEST SAN WILL ELIMINATETHE SANEER
OF Frump= riimotrr
As to this argument by the propon-
ents, the question of fallout has been or
concern to Me at it has to moat Ameri-
cans, I am sure. There was virtual.
unanimity among the witnesses that the
health risks from worldwide fallout-due
to past testing are very Accord-
ing to the experts, we receive far less
radiation from fallout than we receive
from naturally occurring source's, and
some authorities maintain that a con-
siderably larger amount *mild be -ac-
ceptable to gain the benefits of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. The report of the
Federal Radiation Council of May 1963
states:
The revised estimates of the short-term
per capita effective dose to the reproduetive
Valls Show that weapons tests conducted dur-
ing 1062 will be about 47 rnillirems. All tests
conducted through 'December 1962 will result
in a per capita 30-year dose of about 110
millirems. This is about one-hundredth of
the amount recommended by the National
Academy of Sciences. These values are con-
siderably less than the corresponding 30-year
dose of 3,000 millirems from naturally occur-
ring sources during the same period. SIM-
ilerly, the variatIOns in dose-rate from world-
Wide fallout in different pasts of the coun-
try are less than the variations in dose-rate
from naturally occurring soirrces in the in-
habited parts of the world. Further, cam-
that Would be acceptable to gain the benefits
of nuclear energy from normal peacetime
operations and the 10,000 millirems per gen-
eration recommended by the NAS Subcom-
mittee on Genetics as a "reasonable quota"
for manmade radiation exposure of the gen-
eral public indicates that present anticipated
levels of fallout do not consitute an undue
risk to the genetic future of the Nation.
Dr. Edward Teller, the noted nuclear
physicist, had this to say about fallout,
and his statement appears on page 489
of the hearings:
The one point which is most often em-
phasized. Worry about fallout, is one-where
we have clearcut evidence. We have in-
creased the effects of natural radiation by
10 percent.
These effects of natural radiation have nev-
er been proved to be harmf ul. From the
present level of worldwide fallout there is
no danger. The real danger is that you will
frighten mothers from -giving milk to their
babies. By that probably much more dam-
mage has been done than by anything else
concerning this matter.
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., director, Law"-
rence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore,
Calif,, one of the most eminent and
highly regarded young scientists in this
country today, was asked the following
questions by me during the hearings:
Just how great a factor is fallout from the
standpoint of its danger to the health of the
human race?
Dr. Foster's answer, which appears on
page 622 of the hearings, was as follows:
One way to look at it would be to say that
the fallout from all past tests affecting man
for the next 50 to 100 years would be some-
thing like the same thing as deciding to
live a few hundred feet higher above sea
it)
from fallout is only a small frac-
tion of the radiation that we receive from
natural background, from the radiation that
Is present everywhere.
The Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKEN-
LOOPER] asked the following question of
Dr. Seaborg:
Has science been able to pinpoint eve:n
one case where fallout can be scientifically
attributed to radiation?that is, where one
case of leukemia Or bone cancer or things of
that kind or mutation that can be scien-
tifically attributed to fallout?
Dr. Seaborg answered the Senator
from Iowa [Mr. HICKENL0OPER] like this:
Excepting these one or two freak cases of
local fallout * * * I know of no case where
a particular case could be attributed to fall-
out.
On page 214 of the hearings the fol-
lowing colloquy Occurred between the
Senator from Georgia [Mr. Russsix] an
Dr. Seaborg:
Senator RUSSELL. Dr. Seaborg, I read in the
paper, I believe the day before yesterday,
that there is twice as much radiation in milk
today as there was 3 years ago.
Is that approximately right?
Dr. SEABORG. That would depend on the
section of, the country that was being
referred to. I would like to say that there are
probably sections of the country wherethere
is twice as much strontium 90 in the milk
now as there was 3 years ago, yes, sir,
Senator.
Senator Russisia. Has that yet reached a
point where it is sufficient to endanger the
human family?
DT. SEABORG. No, sir.
Senator RUSSELL. It is a long way from
It?
Dr. SEABORG. It is a considerable distance
from it, yes, sir.
On page 219 of the hearings the Sen-
ator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pasrorg
level. and Dr. Seaborg had the following col-
asked this question of Dr. Foster: loquy:
I am wondering if this is a factor which Senator PASTORE. As a matter of fact, you
we, from a scientific standpoint, might be could bring about almost the same result by
able to disregard in our attempt to reach testing as you could through a nuclear war
a decision?
:Dr. Foster -answered by saying :
If you kept doing this promiscuously without
any limitation, isn't that a fact?
Dr. SEABORG. Well, I think the factor, the
Yes, sir; from the technical point of view amount in a nuclear war, would be greater
I believe it has no hearing on the major by something of the order of a hundred as
issue. compared to the high rate of testing in
peacetime, even the rate of testing that you
I then made this inquiry of Dr. Foster: have indicated.
If I may pose a hypothetical zmestion, are
you saying, in essence, that if you were a Although Dr. Seaborg's statements are
Senator with the knowledge that you possess not to be inferred as an endorsement of
in the scientific field, you would disregard fallout, it is evident that he does not en-
entirely this factor in your reaching a de- dorse the exaggerated fears that have
eision? been expressed by some people through-
Dr. Foster answered thusly: out the country.
That is correct, sir; although it would be a On pages 222 and 223 of the hearings
very difficult position for me to put myself we find this testimony by Dr. Seaborg.
into. * ? ? For hundreds, millions of years, The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARK-
people have lived in this environment. We MAN] asked the following question:
are talking about the fallout that is a few Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to the
percent of that natural background, and we fallout, you stated that you thought there
know that people have lived at a few thou- had been some effect already on health and
sand-foot altitude, under higher exposure genetics particularly. Are there specific ex-
levels over thousands and thousands of years, ples?
and we cannot decide whether this has hurt Dr. SEABORG. Oh, no. There are no---I
them or helped them or how it has affected don't think that we could, I am sure that we
them. . can't identify any specific examples of effect
Dr. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the of fallout on health or heredity up until the
Atomic Energy Corinnission, and a p-
present time. We know, we have approxi-
matesu information on the effects of radiation
Porter of the test ban treaty, made the on health and heredity, approximate infor-
following statement on the subject of mation. We can relate these effects to the
fallout: amount of radiation.
I should add, although I think it is prob- Senator SPARKMAN. in other words, you
ably well known, that the total amount of know that the effect can be produced pro-
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,-" SENATE
?VIFIC.d IlAre isspient of ractla-,
CU OJT
1%.4X4R4i71',4;74",14.,,beeal-fie of t.110-9Spproxi-
/ .nate relatinilit that have been estab
11s)aed,''add einp asize the word aapproxi-
' mate"-=I'' can't' eniphesize that lon?mnch-
relationships between radiation and certain
effects on health, leukemia, bone 'cancer,
? hareditz effects, and so forth, and because
we know the. anfOunt of radiation present
? from 'fallOtit, we Can make calculations that
WOulidandicate sfq?tistically how many people
will In, the -course of time he affected b
this small ainbunf of radiation, and statist-
cally these are very small figures, very small
niunber,sof people. "
- .
But / OR want to emphasize we should
av0i4 exposure to radiation us much as pos-
bible at.all tMies.
8611,0401'? SPAEXINSAN, We did have the ex-
ainples of- the ctntaminatiOn of fish and' of
the area 41. someparts of the Pacific where
? /apanese fishermen were affected, did we not?
Dr. SEisoito, Yes. In sonic t,esta in the
Pacific?
Sen.ator ,SPARKIViAN, Of course, that ? was in
heavily Infested- or contaminated area.
Di. SEstosa? Yes; that was neer an actual
large weapons telt, where the People Were
doWnwtrid from the fallout, and were sub-
jected to a substantial amount of actual
fallout on a, swell area. This is something
that I am sure' Will never, be repeated. This
is what ,we call' local fallout, that is in the
immediate areao the tests. The local fall-
but is so well understood' today that this
would never be repeated in a weapons test
-situation, and that, of course, Is the only
Situation in which local fallout would be a
-problem in a testing; in a peacetime situa-
tion.
There would be some hot spots because
It is carried clown by rain and various weather
00ndititths, so that there is some Spottiness
in the leve/ of,fallout.
Senator SY'ARKM,Arr. SC1/10- areas could be-
come dangerous While others were safe?
--- Dr. 55A sq. Yes although / would hesitate
to 'use the word ,,,dangerous.' t don't be-
lieve any area has become dangerous.
, Senator SPSitipcs,N. I am n net tallting about
how but if 'testing should be carried on.,
-Dr. StAsoito, Yes, in the future.
On, pages 224 and 22-5 of the hearings,
,
the enar,or , froka Iowa. Eur. 17-11CICEN-
' "
LOOPER1 S,Skdd is question.
Teivt it a fact_ that, the_m?os,t skilled scien-
tific evislence of geneticists and others were
brought out in those hearings and that their
best .estimate of the number of ca.ies of for
instance leukemia and bone cancer caused
. by natural radiation?not by the radiation
of fallout pr man-,induced radiation, but by
natural ,racliationis in the ease of leukemia
zero to 84,000?that is between zero and
84,000 cases-Land in the case of bone cancer
between 'Xero and, 14,000 cases? , .The zero
means they Still can't necessarily trace even
one case?
Dr. SEABORG. Yes.
Senator gicitnioopEtt..,For sure?
Dr. Ssitsoac. They can't say with certainty.
Senator RicxEN400aaa. That is right.
Doctor, I ani ,quoting from- the Federal
Radiation .Co,v1101-2and th,ey start with zero.
Dr. ipse, Tes?
Senator 1Tick,ENpoopra,. They don't start
fewwith a, A 6 111111' Ybee.Z.1
E know.
Senator. 1-froicp ()OPER, Thy start with _
zero to possible number. Doesn't Zero
, mean tfl;Lat they don't have even One case
tsbat t4,17 ca/1 confirm?
Dr.54oao, ,17.3?ei don't have absolute
proof.
Qn page 226 of the hearings, the Sena-
tor from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] asked
these questions:
Isn't it a fact that throughout history we
have had mutations, that we have had ab-
normalities in birth, even before anybody
ever thought of letting off an atomic bomb.
History is replete with countless instances
of definite mutations.
Dr. SEABORG. Of course.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Definite altera-
tions.
Dr. SEABORG. Oh, of course.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Definite deficien-
cies and so on.
Dr. SEABORG. Yes. I think that is a known
thing.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been
going on as long as we have any history,
hasn't it?
Dr. SEABORG. Yes. But the question that
is?a question that is?being vigorously in-
vestigated now by the biologists and the
geneticists is how much of that is due to
the natural background, how much of it is
due to the cosmic rays, to the radioactivity
that is present in small amounts everywhere
including a little bit in this table here, and
other sources.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Other unknown
phenomena?
Dr. SEABORG. Yes and X-rays, medical
X-rays, and so forth.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. These things oc-
curred long before they ever heard of an
X-ray.
Dr. SEABORG. Yes, that is true, that is more
recent. But the cosmic ray background and
the natural radioactivity present essentially,
in small amounts, present essentially every-
where, has been with us ever since there have
been people on earth so this may have played
a role?
Senator HIcKENLOOPER. Yes,
Dr. SEABORG (continDing). Yet to be deter-
Inined with any exactitude.
On page 230 of the nuclear test ban
treaty hearings, Dr. Seaborg says:
There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever
that air pollution is a much greater hazard
to the health of the people than is fallout.
Again, on page 243, Dr. Seaborg made
reference to air pollution from exhaust
contamination in this manner:
Pollution of atmosphere in our country in
terms of the number of people, where it has
adv,erse effects on?their health., is clearly
more dangerous than the situation from fall-
out with respect to adverse effects on the
health, in my mind, in m opinion.
Mr. President, none of these eminent
witnesses would have you believe that no
risk whatsoevez , exists -froul fallout.
Hewever, the smal risk which does exist
must be measured against the risk of
Communist aggresssion which the free
world may face if and when there comes
a time when it no longer has nuclear
superiority. The small risk from test
fallout must be measured against the
fallout which would result from a-third
world war launchd by the Communists
in the hope that they could wipe out the
United States' It MIISt -theasurqd
against the millions of deaths which
would certainly occur if our nuclear de-
terent force were allowed to grow so
weak that it failed to prevent war.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. RUSSELL. I dislike to interrupt
the very excellent addil'essWitthe Sena-
?16601
,
tor is making, but on the subject of fall-
out I wondered if he had studied the
position of the President of the United
States, President Kennedy, when he an-
nounced resumption of testing on March
2, 1962.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I had
read it but I had not included it in my
prepared statement.
Mr. RUSSELL. This statement, of
course, was a compendium of the opin-
ion of all of the most eminent scientists
In our Government. The President of
the United States would not have made
this statement unless it had been care-
fully checked with all of our most emi-
nent scientists. If the Senator does not
object, I should like to read it into the
RECORD at this point. It is a very brief
statement.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I shall
be delighted to have the distinguished
Senator from Georgia read into the REC-
ORD at this point the statement to which
he has referred.
Mr. RUSSELL. This is the President's
statement by television and radio on
March 2, 1962:
Natural radioactivity, as everyone knows,
has always been part of the air around us,
with certain long-range biological effects.
By conservative estimate, the total effects
from this test series will be roughly equal to
only 1 percent of those due to this na-
tural background. It has been estimated,
In fact, that the exposure due to radio-
activity from these tests will be less than
one-fiftieth of the difference which can be
experienced, due to variations in natural
radioactivity, simply by living in different
locations in ths country.
This will obviously be well within the
guides for general population health and
safety, as set by the Federal Radiation Coun-
cil, and considerably less than one-tenth of
1 percent of the exposure guides set for
adults who work with industrial radioac-
tivity.
No one recommends radioactivity or
fallout. We all wish to keep it limited
to the lowest possibly degree, but the
danger of fallout has certainly been
overstressed, as stated by the President
and by the report of the Federal Radia-
tion Council as of May 4, 1963.
This is the official agency of the U.S.
Government that surveys this matter to
determine when there is a hazard to
the health of our people. They conclude
their report by saying:
The Council concludes that the health
risks from radioactivity in foods, now and
over the next several years, are too small to
justify countermeasures to limit intake of
radionuclides by diet modifications or alter-
ing the normal distribution and use of food,
particularly milk and dairy products.
The presently estimated radiation dose to
bone from all past (weapons) tests is about
465 millirem in 70 years, which is about one-
twentieth (5 percent) the exposure from nat-
ural sources.
-In other words, one gets more radio-
activity by moving to Denver and living
in that altitude than by conducting this
comprehensive series of tests.
I thank the Senator and commend him
for the great diligence he has manifested
In preparing his excellent address.
Mr. BYFD of West Virginia I thank
the senior Sego* ZQm. CieOrgia. I aP-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19
preciate his having placed in the RECORD
the statement of President Kennedy on
natural radioactivity and test fallout.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. On the same point,
I believe it is interesting to note what
Mr. Teller said on this subject. I do not
believe the Senator has referred to this
specific statement.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I was
coming to the point of quoting Dr. Teller,
but I shall be glad to have the Senator-
give the quotation.
Mr. THURMOND. Dr. Teller made
?this statement:
This argument, while it sounds simple and
plausible, is wrong. Fallout has so small
an effect that nobody ever has observed it.
And nobody knows either from direct ob-
servation, or from statistics, or from any
valid theory whether the claimed damages
In fact exist or do not exist. I want to
talk about that a lot more, because talking
about the effects of various doses of radia-
tion leads us immediately into an interest-
ing field of research which should be im-
portant for all of us. The plain fact is that
we do not know what are the effects of small
doses of radiation.
We have heard that fallout produces a
terrific genetic burden. To begin with,
radiation from fallout is only 1 percent of
the radiation which we are getting anyway.
Fallout is not dangerous. But the fallout
scare is. Many people know that a medical
X-ray gives you 100 times as great a dose
as fallout will give you in your whole life-
time. How many people have been scared
away from X-rays? How many people have
gone with their ailments unrecognized and
untreated, only because there has been this
needless and exaggerated fallout scare? I
don't know. I don't know whether anybody
has been killed by fallout, but I am sure
that many have been killed by the fallout
scare.
Further on that subject, it may be
interesting to note what the former Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, who is now a distinguished Mem-
ber of the Senate, had to say on Sep-
tember 9, 1963. The Senator from Con-
necticut [Mr. RirucorF] said:
We must face the fact that the land on
which we live and work, the air we breathe,
the water we drink and use in industry, agri-
culture and recreation have been altered
over the past half century by a manmade
fallout far more atfandant and potentially
more dangerous than the contathination of
nuclear weapons testing.
I could quote many other authorities
on the subject, but I thought it would
be well for these two quotations to be
brought in at this point.
I congratulate the distinguished Sena-
tor on the excellent address he is mak-
ing. I shall have more to say as time
goes on.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the distinguished Senator from South
Carolina.
Dr. Teller had this to say, at page 428
of the test ban hearings:
There is radioactivity in the air. The total
amcaMt is less than 10 percent in its effects,
10 percent of the natnral radiation to which
all of us have been exposed for millenia.
Yet there is a point to not further increase
this activity. Each year about 3 megatons
worth of fission products decay. We could
agree with the Russians not to release in any
year more than 1 megaton fission products.
Neither we release more than 1 megaton nor
do they release more than 1 megaton.
On page 429 of the hearings, Dr. ,Teller
said this:
Under a ban of the kind that I describe,
we could easily observe 'Whatever the Rus-
sians or anybody else are doing. Under such
a ban we would have the Opportunity to ac-
quire the knowledge we need about missile
defense.
Under that ban we would be permitted to
do all the work that we need- to do in the
Plowshare program, in the peaceful uses; all
of this becomes the more possible because
we have developed clean explosives and we
can make our experimentation with the re-
lease of little radioactivity.
At page 455 of the hearings, Dr. Teller
said:
Contamination in the atmosphere produces
similar biological effects as a number of nat-
ural processes such as cosmic rays, radio-
activity on the soil, radioactive potassium in
the blood, in our blood. There are essentially
no differences. The radioactivity in the at-
mosphere amounts in its worst biological
effects over great numbers of people to 10
percent of the natural background.
We have increased an effect, of which it
has not been proven that it is a dangerous
effect. We have increased that effect by 10
percent. Anybody who lives in Denver is ex-
posed to a greater increase due to the fact
that there is more uranium in the soil there
and that it is higher and the cosmic ray in-
tensity is greater. People in Denver are in
greater danger than the increases to which
we have been exposed due to the radioac-
tivity in the atmosphere.
Nevertheless, I have said and want to em-
phasize that it is reasonable to try to limit
radioactivity in. the air. We could do that
by a special agreement drawn in a way pro-
posed by Dr. Libby and myself 5 years ago,
and we can make such an agreement without
forgoing any of the tests or the develop-
ments which are needed for the military de-
fense or which are needed for the peaceful
applications.
I claim that these two questions, the test
ban and the fallout, are linked only by
propaganda.
Dr. Teller, at page 500, sums up this
question rather aptly by saying:
Therefore, while fallout is no real prob-
lem from the point of view of health, it cer-
tainly is a great problem in connection with
psychology and politics.
Dr. Austin M. Brues, Argonne National
Laboratory, Lemont, Ill., had this to
say during the 1957 hearings by the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy:
It would be rash to claim that small radi-
ation doses have no effect on humans in in-
creasing bone cancer and leukemia. But it
would seem reasonable to conclude that if
there is any increase in the incidence of
these diseases because Of fallout, it is so
slight as to be unnoticeable when compared
with other suspected caatses of bone cancer
and leukemia.
During the 1959 hearings by the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Dr. Brues
made the following statement:
That we are on a reasonably secure basis
can be illustrated if I rephrase the calcula-
tion I made at the earlier hearing, concern-
ing the apparent hazard of cigarette smok-
ing. In several countries of Europe it has
been noted that the number of cigarettes
consumed is in direct proportion to the inci-
dence of lung cancer. If the radiation hazard
at low levels is proportional to that at high
1
levels, the same is possibly true Of the ciga-
rette. Taking into account the present fall-
out levels it would follow that they are about
as likely to produce leukemia in an individ-
ual as two cigarettes a year to produce a lung
cancer, using the worst guesses in each case.
At this point I should like to quote an
Interesting passage which appears on
page 124 of "Our Nuclear Future," 1958,,
by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter:
We may summarize in this way: The fall-
out effect is below the statistically observ-
able limit. It is also considerably less than
the effect produced by moving from sea level
to an elevated location like De:aver, where
cosmic radiation has a greater intensity. It,
is also less than having a chest X-ray every
year. In other words, we know enough to
state positively that the danger from the
worldwide fallout is less than many other
radiation effects which have not worried
people and do not worry them now.
Of course, many nuclear tests have
been conducted since Drs, Braes, Teller,
and ;matter made these statements in
1957, 1958, and 1959.
But current statements regarding fall-
out hazards reflect the same 'basic opin-
ion as that which was expressed by well-
informed people in earlier years.
For example, Dr. Willard F. Libby,
University of California, has this to say
about the biological effects of radiation
in "Nuclear Ambush," 1963:
Whatever the extent of our ignorance of
the biological effects of radiation, we do
-know that these effects are not unexperi-
enced by the human species, even from the
genetic point of view, since it Is clear now
that persons living at high altitudes on
granite rocks always have received extra
radiation many times greater than is con-
tained in radioactive fallout from the testing
of nuclear weapons, and that even those
living on certain sedimentary rocks at sea
level always have received ten to twenty
times the present fallout dose.
Earl H. Voss, author of "Nuclear Am-
bush"?the test ban trap--says some very
interesting things about the dangers of
radiation from fallout. On page 10 of
the book, this statement will be found:
Fallout radioactivity would have to de-
liver doses hundreds of times greater than
the present dose to produce detectable et.
fects.
On page 21 of his book, Mr. VOSS
makes this statement:
Natural background gives the average
individual a 7-roentgen radiation dose
stretched over a period of 70 years. Fallout
gives him 0.2 to 0.4 roentgen over the same
70-year period.
Mr. Voss continues on pages 22, 23,
and 24 with these statements:
This excursion into the basic science of
radiation has shown that the hazard of nu-
clear test fallout is trifling-3 to 5 percent?
compared to background radiation hazards
the world accepts without question. How
distorted the thinking has become can be
made clear by comparing fallout with other
hazards, using some popular statistical tech-
niques.
Over the past 20 years, in the United
States, there have been six fatal accidents
and a small number of injuries to atomic
energy workers from ionizing radiation. For
most of these 20 years automobile accidents
have been causing more than 30,000 deaths
per year. But each of the four radiation
accidents that caused the six deaths among
atomic energy workers has received world-
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1963 CO
Wide publicity; the fact that over 100 an-
. ^ik r
Clear-en/1w w.., e s have been killed in
-alrtOin01,119 fieCicrents alone during the same
period has gone unnoticed.
Smokestacks belch millions of tons of acid,
silicone, beryllium, lead, and arsenic?all
.widely suspected to be cancer agents?while
scientists are sifting the air for faint traces
- of radioaPtiVe failput.
Living in a brick house gives a person 20
times the radiatiOn dose one gets from fall-
out. But world attention has been concen-
trated on limiting the strontium 90, not on
finding a substitute for bricks. There is no
known case of moving from a brick house
to a frame house to avoid radioactivity.
Luminous-dial wrist watches give off as
Much as 10 times the radiation dose that
fallout produces.
Science suspects automobile exhausts, as
It suspects fallout, of producing cancer. But
no one has suggested declaring a moratorium
on antomobile transportation, or even mak-
ing a multhnillion dollar investigation of
auto exhausts.
Principally because of the fallout problem,
science has been stimulated to learn much
more about radiation as a cause Of cancer
and other health problems than it knows
about ainaCet any other occupational or en-
Viromnental hazard.. Benzpyrene, for in-
stance, was discovered in the early 1930's to
be a powerful cancer-producing agent in
Mice. Combustion of petroleum by autos
yields more than enough benzpyrene to
produce a cancer hazard. In large American
cities, there is so much benzpyrene in the
air that it settles on windowsills in meas-
urable quantities. But there has been no
Selentific investigation of the hazard of benz-
pyrene at low doses.
On the east Mast, the annual radiation
from natural sources is about 0.1 roentgen
per year, while Denver and other large Colo-
radan cities get about twice that amount
frOM natnral background sources. Denver
is expanding despite this health hazard. And
New York reports a higher rate of leukemia
than Colorado, presumably from causes other
than radiation.
Voss thus Makes the point that it
is misleading to urge that this recently
discovered factor?fallout?is the sole
cause, major cause, or minor cause of
cancers, bone tumors, and leukemia
when ranged against "a whole spectrum
of causes And changes."
Mr. President, the Communists have
shown by their detonation of huge bombs
that they are not worried about fallout.
However, they have been eager to build
up our fear of .fallout to establish mo-
mentum for a test ban treaty which
would be to their advantage.
I do not advocate that additional fall-
out would, be beneficial, but I regret that
much of the support for this treaty has
been generated by hysteria about dis-
torted and exaggerated dangers of fall-
out radiation.
Referrinz to the explosion of nuclear
bombs, Admiral _Strauss said, at page
685 of the hearings before the Committee
on Foreign RelatiOns:
Most of those which have been exploded in
the intervening years, the fusion type of
weapon has been involved with relatively less
radioactive debris, The decay rate is not the
same for all types of debris. Some of the i
fission products hate very brief half lives;
SeCOnds and reintitW. Some of them have
many, many years. So that it is impossible
for me as a layman to give you a clear pic-
ture of the totality. But of this I am as-
sured, also on competent authority, that the t
total amount of radioactivity in the bio-
sphere, that is to say, the air and the waters
NGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16603
and the lands, which has resulted from nu
clear tasting since the first bomb was tested
at Alamagordo, is about 5 percent of th
radioactivity experienced by people in the
world who live in the civilized part of the
world where we have medical and dental X-
rays, and about 10 percent of the radioactiv-
ity experienced by the population of the
world generally.
At page 686 of the hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Ad-
miral Strauss said:
As I understand it, there is a great diver-
gence of opinion not only among the physi-
cists, as was pointed out this morning, but
among the geneticists. There are those who
regard the most infinitesimal additions to
the radioactivity in the atmosphere as dele-
terious. There are others who take the view
that nothing, definitely nothing has been
proved in either human or animal experi-
mentation that would warrant such an
assumption.
I read testimony, I read a newspaper ac-
count of testimony before this committee in
which Dr. Seaborg, the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, stated, if I recall
correctly, that industrial pollution of the
atmosphere was a far more serious threat
than radioactive pollution. We accept that
as a necessary component of modern life. I
accept the radioactive contamination of the
atmosphere to the extent that it exists as a
necessary component of being prepared to
defend ourselves.
- West Virgina yield to the Senator from
e South Carolina?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am
glad to yield.
Mr. THTJRMOND. The Senator from
West Virginia is making an excellent
case in refuting the statements of those
who claim it is dangerous to continue to
produce fallout; and I commend him.
If the Senator from West Virginia will
permit me to do so, I should like to place
in the RECORD the testimony of Dr. Fos-
ter, which appears on pages 632 and 633
of the hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Cer-
tainly.
Mr. THURMOND. It reads as fol-
lows:
Senator Tircramorni. Dr. Poster, on the
quetsion of the fallout to which Senator
BYRD referred to a few moments ago, that
seems to be the question that is disturbing
a great many people today who tend to favor
the treaty where otherwise they might be
against.
On this question, if I recall correctly, last
week or the week before some scientists
made the statement that one would get
more radiaiton from living in the mountains
of Colorado than from fallout.
Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, sir.
Senator THURMOND. That is correct.
I believe it is also true that one living
In a brick house would get 20 times more
radiation than he would get from fallout.
Dr. FOSTER. Well, sir, there you are ahead
of me. I do hot know that because?
Senator Tr-Immo/gm. Mr. Earl Voss, I be-
lieve, brought that out in his book "Nuclear
Ambush."
DT. FOSTER. Yes.
Senator THURMOND. And one wearing a
wristwatch with a luminous dial, as I have
on here, would get 10 times as much radia-
tion as he would get from fallout.
Dr. Fosrisa. I am familiar with the argu-
ments, sir. I do not know that a wrist-
watch?
Senator THURMOND. Does that sound rea-
sonable? In other words, do those state-
ments sound reasonable to you?
Dr. FOSTER. It is true that natural back-
ground is large compared with the addi-
tional activity, radioactivity, associated' with
fallout from all past tests. ?
Senator THURMOND. Isn't it a matter of
fact that the fallout mentioned by some of
those who favor this treaty, the propaganda
that is being disseminated and the bugaboo
that is being raised, that the fallout is im-
perceptible, and is of little consequence?
Dr. FOSTER. I think, sir, that the problem
or the question of fallout is of insignificance,
of little significance, compared to the major
issue with which the development of war-
heads is attempting to deal.
Senator THURMOND. Mitt people want to
know Is this; We have been reading about
fallout, fallout in milk, and fallout in food
and resulting injury to the future genera-
tion. Is it possible for this fallout to bring
about sterility and various other reactions?
I just want to ask you whether you feel
that there is danger to people's health from
the little fallout radiation resulting from
the tests we have conducted?
DT. FOSTER. No, SIT.
Senator THURMOND. Your answer is "No"?
Dr. FOSTER. My answer is no.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you.
I thought it might be pertinent to add
that to the citations the distinguished
Senator from West Virginia has pre-
ented in the course of his excellent
ddress.
Admiral Strauss was referring to in-
dustrial pollution of the atmosphere, a
far more serious threat than radioactive
pollution.
One final interesting reference to fall-
out is to be noted in a colloquy between
General Power and Senator JACKSON ap-
pearing on page 38 of the released de-
classified testimony of General Power:
General Pow= I am thoroughly familiar
with on problem as someone who
writes a war plan and has to take this fall-
out into consideration. I believe I have
available to me the opinions of all the ex-
perts. There is by no means agreement
among all the experts, but I do feel that,
as a general statement, in some areas the
danger of fallout has been greatly overex-
aggerated. I think the type of testing that
we have done or that we had contemplated
doing is well within the acceptable risk
limits.
It would be negligible, in relation to the
natural fallout you are subjected to at all
times, and that is what they are referring
to in the difference between Denver and sea
level.
Senator JACKSON. On this question of fall-
out it is well to mention too, General, that
as a result of nuclear tests the country be-
came conscious of practices that had been
indulged in by the medical and dental pro-
fessions, shoe salesmen, and so on. The
knowledge of these practices resulted in cor-
rections that have helped to safeguard peo-
ple which would not have been made other-
wise.
I think that this is a very interesting point
because, to my knowledge, more harm and
more damage was being done by the careless
practices, X-raying everybody for everything,
shoe salesmen with the X-ray business for
the feet, and dentists with the harm that
many received as a result of poor practices
n the handling of dental X-rays.
If nothing else, we have made the country
alert to some of these practices that have
been definitely harmful. r
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
he Senator from West Virginia yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAY11 s
in the chair). Does the Senator from a
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16604 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. It is very ticated doctrine of aggression, relaxa-
pertinent; and I thank the Senator from tion of tensions, retreat and advance.
South Carolina. By no means does it approach the state
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the of genuine peace. Khrushchev, on Janu-
Senator from West Virginia yield? ary 8, 1961, described peaceful coexist-
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am ence as follows: post.
glad to yield. Peaceful coexistence is the high road of Mr. President, I wish that the present
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator international relations betWeen socialist and rift between Russia and Red China could
for yielding to me. In view of the fact capitalist countries. The policy of peace- be considered deep, lasting and irrepar-
that I am compelled to attend a meet- ful coexistence * ? * is a form of intense able. I doubt that the pages of history
ing, I must interrupt him now. economic, political, and ideological struggle will reveal such to be the case. It may
During the hearings of the Prepared- against the aggressive forces of imperialism be quite possible, however, that, as a re-
ness Investigating Subcommittee, I in the international arena, suit of the treaty, Red China may feel
noticed that the Senator from West Vir- Thus, peaceful coexistence is to be the need to undertake hostile acts
ginia, attended most of the hearings, even construed as a continuation of the bat- against the Indian subcontinent or other
at the expense of his work schedule, tie against our system of government areas as a manifestation of her Marxist
which already was very heavy, indeed, and our way of life; and it does not mean orthodoxy, and such hostile acts could,
I observed there his intense interest in that war has been discarded as an in- of course, involve Great Britain and the
the subject* and now I marvel at the strument of achieving victory. United States in the defense of these
September 19
the Soviets will launch a different type
of economic warfare, undermining West-
ern export trade by flooding choice mar-
kets with low-priced goods, possibly even
using Yugoslavia as a transshipment
thoroughness and the completeness of The crux of the isslie between the
the fine speech he has prepared and is Soviets and the Chineie concerns the
delivering today. utility of war. Western observations
I have had an opportunity to glance may have magnified this dispute out of
through the printed copy of his entire proportion, and may halm reached hasty
speech; and I find it both learned, in- judgments concerning the Sino-Soviet
teresting and sound. I predict that it split Some commentators have gone
will not be, and cannot be, effectively
answered during this debate. ,
I believe his speech is in keeping with
the very best stature and tradition of
the Senate in sitting as a special consti-
tutional body to consider treaties.
His speech is also in keeping with the
very fine stature of the Senator from
West Virginia, who is not given to idle
talk; instead, when he brings a matter
to the attention of the Senate, his state-
ment is one of substance.
I wish especially to commend him, too,
for the very effective way in which he
has dealt with the fallout question. He
has thoroughly demonstrated that even
.,,,i-.,w, considered at its worst, the ques-
so far as to predict that the Soviet desire
for a detente with the Wset stems from
the realization that the United States
and the Soviet Union Will have to join
forces to contain Red China. However,
we should remember that a few years
ago Khrushchev and Tito were at each
other's throats, whereas we have just
witnessed 15 days of back-patting, folk
dancing, and general joviality between
Tito, the man who earlier was being de-
nounced, and Khrushchev, the de-
nouncer. This turnabout within the
Communist world may occur again in
the case of Red China. We cannot be
certain that the quarrels will not be
patched up and that Sino-Soviet coop-
eration will not begin again. As a in
Admiral Strauss as shown on page 691
of the hearings, had the following to say
about China and Russia:
Admiral Sissuss. Well, I have the feeling
that the temporary breaches between dicta-
tors are like those between monarchs in the
Middle Ages. They develop quickly and
they heal quickly, and inexplicably. I
pointed out?I don't know whether you were
here, Senator?that I had seen photographs
this morning in some of the daily press
showing Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Tito em-
bracing. Not so very long ago they were
with daggers drawn. Who would know on
what day Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Mao 'The-
tung would compose their differences?
It seems to me so flimsy a road upon
which to base our foreign policy that I con-
sidered dropping it from my statement this
morning.
Certainly, Mr. President, all that glit-
ters is not gold, and the lessons of the
past should long ago have taught us that
the words of Lenin, the founder of the
Soviet system, have never been deviated
the question of the Senate's approval a ter of fact, in the absence of any in- from by the Communists in their drive
tion of fallout really has no bearing on
the treaty. spection right to accompany this treaty, for world conquest:
We have to use any ruse, dodges, tricks,
we will never be able toi ascertain wheth-
-1 believe the Senator from West Vir- er a nuclear test by China?which Would cunning, unlawful method, concealment, and
ginia has made that point more clearly not he a violation of the treaty, Inas- veiling of the truth.
and more conolusively than anyone else much as China has not signed it--was General LeMay voiced the same
with has; and I look forward pleasure to Ti. .
assisted by the Soviet ynion. opinion that was voiced by Admiral
hearing the remainder of his excellent The rapprochement we have just wit- Strauss. The testimony appears on
speech. I thank the Senator from West
nessed between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Page 362 of the hearings. General
Virginia for it. Tito may, indeed, signal a new and gi- LeMay said:
1vtr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. gantic offensive to hring about more General LEMAy. I think they probably
President, I am very grateful to the Sen- trade with the West. It was reported have some differences of opinion. But I be-
atOr from Mississippi. that one of the major interests of Khru- lieve that they are mostly on how to advance
THE TEST BAN WILL SERVE TO =mem THE iurr shch.ev in his tour of Yugoslavia WELs the world communism, and it is my opinion if
. BETWEEN' RUSSIA AND RED CHINA tangible benefits of Yugoslav coopera- there was any real trouble in the world we
Mr. President, most of the differences tion with Western countries. It was re- would find that very quickly Russia and
China would get back together again. They
.,
between the Soviet Union and Red China ported that the Soviet leader toured fac- do have a mutual defense pact, and I eel-
can be boiled down to one basic ques- tories operated under British and Italian tainly think it would be invoked and operat-
tion: How should the further prosecu- licenses as well as a plastics and chemi- ing efficiently if it was necessary.
tion of the Communist revolution pro- cal factory built with funds from the Senator AIKEN. If the 'United States had
ceed? The basic threat is too often 'U.S. development loan fund where he trouble with either one of them, you think
overlooked; the Soviets and the Chi- observed firsthand the fruits of coopera- they would get together again? If China
nese have one sacred and irrevocable tion with the West. Perhaps we will now becomes very aggressive toward India or
gal: the destruction of capitalism, the find Khrushchev seeking goods from us other countries in southeastern Asia, do you
think Russia and China would get together
destruction of any religion which ac- that are in short supply in the Soviet
then?
knowledges the existence of a Supreme Union, such as computers, data-process-
General LEMAY. I think they would; yes.
Being, and the destruction of all Sys- ing machines, and other complex prod- As a matter of fact, China ha.s a very vigorous
tems of free government. The Chinese ucts. It would not surprise me to find program in southeast Asia now. Russia
advocate brute violence as the means the Communists seeking a loan to help knows about it, and probablragrees with it.
for a,dvaneing the revolution, while the the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Eco-
,THE TEST SAN WILL CONTRIBUTE l'O A LESSENING
Soviets are, at the moment, advocating nomic Assistance. Perhaps we will evenOF TE"W)NS AND BE A STEP TOWARD OTHER
more aubtle approaches, through "peace- find the Communists seeking to discuss a
AGREEMENTS AND EVENTUAL PEACE
foil coexistence," with emphasis on sub- lend-lease settlement as a starting-point
version, political machinations, and for obtaining aid from us. This is not Those who advocate the treaty as a
economic warfare. improbable because the Soviet Union is way of lessening tensions forget that the
The policy of peaceful coexistence one of the very few countries with whom very nature of communism suggests that
does not simply mean "you live there; a settlement on lend-lease accounts has an atmosphere of tension is the desired
we live here." It is, in reality, a sophis- not been reached. Or we may find that political atmosphere in which to press
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 16665
Coninoinist goals. Nathan Leites, in "A
Study of bolshevism," 1953, alerts us to
the attit des and methods of our adver-
saries asfollows:
To Bolsheviks, the high tension is the
normal state of Rolitics. They do not ex-
perience it as something that just cannot go
on, but father as something that necessarily
persists. /What Westerners call a real agree-
ment seems to Bolsheviks inconcelvable. It
is often predicted in the West that if partic-
ular issues * * * 9ould be settled with the
Politburo, an easing of the overall tension
might ensue. Por Bolsheviks, this does not
follow, ?"There might be less noise, but the
basic situation?the presence of two blocs
attempting to annihilate each other?would
be unchanged.
If the Soviets genuinely, desired to re-
lieve world tensions they could easily do
so by tearing down the wall separating
East Berlin from West Berlin, They
could ease international tensions by per-
mitting the reunification of Germany
through free electriins. They could re-
lieve tensions by withdrawing their
armies from the captive countries of
Eastern Europe. They could even go so
far as to Withdr.aiy their men and arme-
rnents kr= Cuba, These are hut .a few
of the genuine causes of world tensions
and the Soviets could easily show their
good faith by promptly acting to remove
these causes. And speaking of Cuba,
may 1, parenthetically, recall to mind
that Andrei Grpmyko, the Soviet Foreign
Minister who signed the nuclear test ban
treaty for the Soviet Union, falsely told
President Kennedy on October 18, 1962,
that the missiles which had been sent to
Cuba were purely defensive. I quote
from President Kennedy's broadcast of
October 22:
Only last Thursday, as evidence of this
rapid Offensive buildup was already in my
hand, Soviet Poreigh Minister Grornyko told
me in my office that he was instructed to
make it clear once again, as he said his
Government had already done, that Soviet
assistance to Cuba, and I quote him, "train-
ing by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals
in handling defensive armaments was by no
means offensive," and that, "if it were other-
wise," Mr. GrornykO went on, "the Soviet
Government would neve become involved in
Tendering such assistance."
That statement was false. In other
words, the President meant that Mr.
drornyko was a liar.
It is less than a year since attention
was publicly called to this falsehood, less
than a year since the Soviet Union took
the world to the -Very brink of nuclear
war?less than a year since Senators
were notified to attend briefings in vari-
ous parts of the TJnited States in connec-
tion with the Cuban crisis. Yet, we are
called upon to consent to a treaty with
the nation, which so recently demon-
strated it still harbors the aim of world
conquest, signed by the very man who
lied to our 'President.
'The free world has all too often been
willing to accept at face value every ap-
parent shifting of Soviet lines in the ide-
ological arena. Yet, shifting Soviet po-
sitions have just as often simply con-
fused the issue, compounded the com-
plexities, and created a climate of crisis
rather than a lastinelessening of ten-
sions. Leites refers to the alacrity and
purpose with whieh the Soviets are able
to change position. He says:
Westerners have often commented that
there is, in negotiating with the Soviet
Union, no common search for a solution to
common problems, no discussion in the west-
ern Sense of the term; the Soviet delegates
elaborate or change their position in strict
isolation and then present it in dogmatic
fashion. They fairly take account of the
views and objections of the other side.
We must ever be wary concerning
what may appear to be a concession or
a modification of position or retreat. In
this connection, Lenin wrote:
Revoluntionaxy parties must go on learn-
ing. They have learned how to attack. Now
it is time for them to realize that this knowl-
edge must be supplemented by acquiring a
knowledge of how best to retreat. We have
got to understand (and a revolutionary class
learns this by bitter experience) that victory
can only be won by those who have learned
the proper method both of advance and re-
treat. (Works, Russian edition, vol. XVII,
p. 121.)
Stalin, in one of his lectures in 1924,
explained the purpose of such retreat in
this way:
The object of such strategy is to gain time,
to scatter the forces of the enemy while con-
solidating our own for a future advance.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Since the Soviets
conducted tests in 1961 and 1962 and got
ahead of the United States in high-yield
weapons, I wonder whether they might
not wish to gain time?to buy time?in
order to develop the weapons in accord-
ance with the knowledge they have
gained. Therefore, they may be tender-
ing the treaty for that purpose.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I have
no doubt that this is one purpose, if
they are indeed ahead; and I do not
doubt that they are.
Mr. THURMOND. From 1958 until
September 1961, there was a moratorium
on testing. During that time the Soviets
prepared carefully and assiduously, then
suddenly broke the moratorium and im-
mediately went back to testing. They
gained time to prepare for testing..
They now have tested. It is highly pos-
sible that they wish to gain time to man-
ufacture the weapons with which to try
to destroy us during the pendency of the
treaty.
is there any doubt in the Senator's
mind that as soon as the Soviets feel
they are ready with their weapons they
will take the next step? It is a Com-
munist trick to take two steps forward
and one back?two forward and one
back?for so long as they are moving
two forward and one back they are gain-
ing. Does the Senator have spy ques-
tion at all that when the Communists
are ready to proceed with their next step
they will not hesitate to violate the
treaty, abrogate the treaty, or pursue
some course which would force the
United States to abrogate the treaty?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I have
no doubt that the development which is
predicted by the Senator from South
Carolina will ensue, as I shall show later
in my statement.
The Soviets have frequently sought
release from international tensions in
order to be able to solidify and incre-
ment their warmaking or defense ca-
pabilities. Many people view the present
treaty as the first sign of dawn on the
horizon of genuine peace. Peace, to be
sure, is our strongest desire, and toward
that goal we must continue to strive.
But it may be timely to recall the Biblical
admonition: "When a strong man,
armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are
in peace." It is equally necessary to re-
member that the Communists frequently
do not interpret words as we interpret
them, and this may be equally true of
the word peace. As to the evolvement of
peace from the signing of this treaty, I
call the attention of the Senate to a
reference, made by Admiral Arleigh
Burke during his testimony on the
treaty, to the statement of a Radio Mos-
cow commentator on August 1, midway
between the initialling and signing of
the treaty. Admiral Burke quoted the,
Moscow commentator as follows:
The argument that some newspapers and
politicians are harping on more and more
persistently is that Soviet policy is under-
going some changes. And some people even
go so far as to make the ridiculous asser-
tion that the Soviet Union has openly re-
nounced Lenin's doctrine, and has actually
stated that war is impermissible as an in-
strument of policy. Facts do not back up
this absurd contention.
The Moscow commentator went on to
say:
The initialing of the treaty to ban nuclear
tests in the three elements is therefore a
direct result of the fight waged by the
Soviet Union for many years, and it is cer-
tainly not a result of any change in Soviet
policy, or departure from Lenin's principles.
Admiral Burke continued in his own
words:
Hence, it would appear to even the casual
Observer of Soviet reaction to the current
state of affairs that the Soviets themselves
view the test ban treaty as a "victory for
the policy of peaceful coexistence."
Admiral Burke proceeded then to indi-
cate, as I have already indicated, that
"the interpretation of peaceful coexist-
ence is crucial."
Peace, in the eyes of the Communists,
is but a masquerade under which war is
waged by new techniques. Infiltration
and subversion, espionage, propaganda,
the fear complex, group pressure, nu-
clear blackmail, all these and more, sig-
nify a peace that is not peace, a war
that is not war.
Referring to the argument being ad-
vanced with reference to reduced ten-
sions, Admiral Strauss, as shown on page
691 of the hearings on the test ban
treaty, commented thusly:
Reduction of tensions. I am not satis-
fied?I am not sure that the reduction of
tensions is necessarily a good thing. Our
tensions were very much reduced following
the moratorium and I can give you at least
one result of it. We abandoned our proving
ground in the Pacific, that costly installation
there which had involved an outlay of many
millions of dollars, and a result was that
when the President decided very properly to
resume testing after the Russians had re-
sumed, it was a matter of months, some 7 or
more months, before we were able to pick
up where we had left off.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19
And so, genuine peace, that bright
crown for which mankind has so nobly
aspired throughout the ages, is as elu-
sive today as ever. Indeed, 2,000 years
ago, a humble Nazarene warned us that
the prize would continue to flee from our
grasp when He said, as recorded in the
24th chapter of the gospel according to
St. Matthew:
And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of
wars; see that ye be not troubled; for all
these things must come to pass, but the end
is not yet.
For, nation shall rise against nation, and
kingdom against kingdom; and there shall
be famines, and pestilences, and earth-
quakes, in divers places.
THE TEST BAN TREATY WILL SLOW, OR SIGNAL
THE END OF, THE ARMS RACE
Mr. President, the treaty, in the words
of Secretary of Defense McNamara, "will
not end the threat of nuclear war. It
will not reduce the existing stockpiles
of nuclear weapons. It will not halt the
production of nuclear weapons." Addi-
tionally, the treaty will not prohibit the
use of nuclear weapons in war. It is
unnecessary to state that it has equally
no bearing whatsoever on the develop-
ment, production, and use of conven-
tional weapons.
The President of the United States in
his Message to the Senate said:
This treaty advances, though it does not
assure, world peace; and it will inhibit,
though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms
FRCS.
While it does not prohibit the United
States and the Soviet Union from engaging
in all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the
testing in which bath nations would other-
wise engage.
While it will not halt the production or re-
duce the existing stockpiles of nuclear
weapons?
stexitially weaken the danger of thermonu-
clear war.
Gen. Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, said this, as appears
on page 371 of the test ban treaty hear-
ings:
I would think?
Referring to the treaty--
ft would have no effect on the production
of weapons or the knowledge we now have.
Certainly Russia is going to produce all
the tactical weapons that it considers it
must have, as we would, of the kind we now
build. It may slow down the modernization
of the stockpile, if we want to speak of it in
that regard.
It quite possibly would slow down the re-
search and the advance in weapons of some
types.
General LeMay went on to say, as ap-
pears on page 401:
I don't think we are any farther or any
closer to a nuclear war with or without the
test ban treaty.
Senator AIKEN. I don't think anyone can
answer that, anyway.
General WHEELER. I think you have to rec-
ognize this. Senator, that this test ban treaty
doesn't lessen the number of weapons in
stockpile, it doesn't change the production
of weapons, and I think we would all agree
that the threat is still the same. In other
words, I believe the objectives of the So-
viets are still world domination. So you
have about six of one and a half dozen of
the other, I would say.
The President said?
it would be a first step toward limiting the
nuclear arms race.
While it will not end the threat of nu-
clear war or outlaw the use of nuclear
weapons?
He went on to say that?
it can reduce world tensions, open a way to
further agreements, and thereby help to ease
the threat of war.
Secretary Rusk, on page 13 of the
hearings, stated:
This treaty does not affect the use of nu-
clear weapons in war. It has to do with nu-
clear, weapon testing in time of peace.
On page 28 Secretary Rusk said:
There is nothing here that interferes with
the production of nuclear weapons, for ex-
ample, the deployment of nuclear weapons,
the use of nuclear weapons in war.
Secretary Rusk said, as shown on page
29:
This treaty itself does not reduce weap-
ons in being or prevent their further pro-
duction.
Mr. Khrushchev in his speech on July
2, in Berlin, expressed a similar under-
standing. After stating the willingness
of the Soviet Government to conclude a
limited agreement banning nuclear tests,
he said this:
Of course, an agreement on the ending of
nuclear tests, notwithstanding all the im-
portance of this major act, cannot stop the
arms race, and cannot avert or even sub-
Ing tests which may be conducted sur-
repetitiously in violation of the treaty.
I think we can be sure that the Soviets
will attempt to exploit every advantage
gained during the course of the post-
moratorium atmospheric tests. They
will exploit and press their lead in high-
yield weapons. Both sides will do every-
thing possible to develop and deploy an
antimissile missile system. If, as it is
said, we are ahead of the Soviets in
tactical nuclear weapons, they will strive
to overcome our lead while we strive to
maintain it. As to the production of
conventional weapons, this will continue
unabated, and perhaps even be acceler-
ated. The end of the aims race is no-
where in sight and, in all probability,
will be as elusive as ever when the treaty
becomes a fait accompli,
I read from pages 404 and 405 of the
hearings:
Senator Corns. Well, now, the next ques-
tion has to do with money and may I pre-
face it so that the record will be clear.
I think we have to have the top defense
regardless of what it costs and I believe that
the American people are of that opinion.
Never in the history of the United States
have they kept up the degree of prepared-
ness we have and the peOple accept it gladly,
whether it is an extension of the draft or
heavy appropriations and the rank and file
of people that I meet on Main Street of the
towns of Nebraska, they want this country
defended and they are not complaining about
it,
But just as a matter of information, if the
safeguards that you favor are adequately
carried out, is this test ban, would this test
ban, then be a moneysaver?
General WHEELER. On the contrary, I
?would say, Senator, if I may offer my opin-
ion first. As I look at it, the military threat
to our security from the Soviet Union speci-
cally and from the Communist bloc in gen-
eral, is not lessened in one degree by this
particular treaty.
The safeguards also, in my opinion, are
going to cost sums of money over and above
the sizable military budget that the chair-
man pointed out this morning.
General LEMAT. I would agree that the
military budget will probably go up as a re-
sult of the treaty, not down.
In view of what these witnesses have
said, therefore, Mr. President, I cannot
agree that this treaty will signal the
end of the arrni race.,
Even if both sides were scrupulously
to abide by the treaty, we are assured
that the safeguards stipulated by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff will, fortunately,
be implemented. Consequently, we say,
we will test underground aggressively;
we will maintain our laboratories in a
high state of readiness for the possible
resumption of atmospheric testing; and
we will improve our system of monitor-
THE TEST BAN vvria, MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT
FOR RUSSIA TO CATCH UP WITH THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD OF NUCLE.AR EXPLOSIVES
Those who advance this argument say
that underground testing is considerably
more expensive than atmospheric test-
ing and that, in view of the fact that
this will be the only environment in
which tests may be conducted under the
treaty, the financial burden upon the
Soviets will be such that they will be
inhibited from progressing as rapidly as
they would otherwise progress in catch-
ing up with the United States in the
field of tactical nuclear weapons. It is
also said that we are further along in
the state of the art, Insofar as under-
ground testing is concerned, and that
this will make it doubly difficult for the
Russians to catch up. Of course, the
very nature of the Soviet society makes
it difficult for us to be absolutely posi-
tive that we are ahead of the Russians
In the development of tactical nuclear
weapons. It is possibly an assumption
based on another assumption, to wit:
That we have conducted more under-
ground tests than have the Soviets and
we have, consequently? made greater
progress in this area of testing. Dr. Ed-
ward Teller, in his testimony before the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee, said:
It is by no means certain that the United
States is ahead of the Soviet Union in the
knowledge of producing and using nuclear
weapons. In the field of big weapons, Rus-
sian lead has been demonstrated before the
eyes of the world. In this category Russian
tests decisively outnumber United States
tests.
In the category of smaller weapons, from
a few kilotons to a megaton, the known
Russian tests are somewhat fewer in number
than the American tests. It is possible, how-
ever, that we may have missed quite a few
Russian tests in this range. In the im-
portant subkiloton range (deleted). There
is no objective justification to assume, as is
usually done, that in this area we are ahead.
General teMay had this comment, as
appears at page 391 of the hearings, with
reference to the oft-repeated statement
that we are ahead in the field of low-
yield nuclear weapons. His statement
was prefaced by this question, which was
put by the Senator from. Rhode Island
[Mr. PASTORE] :
But I had asked you a question previous
to that, and I asked you whether or not the
balance of power, nuclear power, was in our
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.1963 CONGIttSSIONAL RECORto`-- StNATE
favor overall against the Russians, and you
said it Was hi our favor. -
ITQW ifrat 'true, if It is in our favor:
alld We" st,Pp"ded the-re:What have we got to
lose'? "
General I/MAY: Well, if it -would stay
there, probably we Wouldn't have iiii-beh" to
But I wonder whether it is going to stay
there or not, and, in 'addition to that, this is
Net our eitimate of -the situation. Our de-
livery caPablIities, / think, at the present
time are better than the Russians. That
doesn't rneanthey are-g6ing to stay that way.
/ think We .'have Mae Weap-Ord arid a great-
et variety of Weapons-now than the Riiisians
have.. That doesn't Mean it is going to stay
that way.
The thing that Worries me is that this pre-
serves the uncertainties that we have in our
mind may -lot as Tong. as the treaty is going
to be in effect rdelered].
We just don't all knew the things we would
like to know about the vulnerabilities of [de-
leted] sySteiii.s. [deleled]."
?4enator PAsroin. 'tan I interrupt you
there, General? Do you think that the This-
' Glans know?
General LigAT. They may-know-- a' great
deal more about it than we do, as a result of
the, last 'big? series Of tests that they have
run. [Deleted.]
This bothers me, and one of the things that
I don't like IS that if -this is tine and- they do
know more than we do, they Ma* "know"
soniething that is Vital. They may have
been able to pick up a weakness in our de-
fense system that they can exploit.
There, is &bine reslon for them wanting
this treaty when they didn't want it on two
ciecasioris before. What is it?
General. teivro *ent or.1 to say:
These arS.the ,41S0vanthos hat vis see.
They are possibilities and we ceitainif have"
tried, to pay'that even with the safeguards
that viehave suggested that we have, that
Certainly 'ratifying the treaty is not without
its risks.
NOw,1 pointed out these Other uneeitain-
ties, that we don't know. - Pbr instance,
[deleted] that the Russians are ahead of us
pn the high-yield- Spectrum, we are about
equal in the[deleted] megaton- range-, and
' we are ahead in the lower [deleted] range.
-41wow, I can't prove Otherwise, but I aria very
suspicious.
. . -. ? .
Genkral IeMay tete was expressing his
suspicions as to the assumption
.United $tates is clearly in the lead in
the field of low-yield nuclear weapons.
He said;
Now, I can't prove otherwise, but I am
very suspistoxis, because we know [deleted]
that theRussians were planning a teat pro-
gram [deleted] before they broke the mora-
torium and started testing. [Deleted.l.
Senator -Bssrosir. I agree.
General.I.41Vlsx. They may have been pre-
paring for it 4onger.
-
I,Tow, when they did hreak'the-rnoratoriuni
and starttheir testing program, ideleted],
the size a the-162.64Am and the compirehen-
eivenese of 11;thii is an area where we could
detect the explosions and learn sthiething
"about it,
I can't'qUite sWatiow [deleted] that they
didn't do, equally well in the lower 'ranges
where [deleted] what they were doing.
'I 'am ineffned to agree?
referrfrig to the statement that
are al In the field of lOW--YieId nu-
, - -
clear weapons? '
am inclined to -agree with it beCause I
can't prove it otlietwlee. -But I kin- sus-
picious, and ffiero May be a pOssiblIity hers
? they are ahead throUghout the spectrum.
N'oVA will admit tdeletedl teChnichins say
that the odds are against [deleted] but they
also say there is a possibility.
Therefore, one of our key military
men, Mr. President, as I have just read,
questioned the statement, and indicated
a strong suspicion that perhaps we are
not really ahead in the low-yield nuclear
weapons field.
At page 407 the Senator from Idaho
[Mr. CHURCH] said:
The area within which tests will continue
under the treaty, as I understand your testi-
mony, is in that field where we feel we have
the greatest experience and have made the
most advances; is that carrect?
Of course, that is the low-yield nuclear
weapons field.
General LeMay answered:
We think; am not sure of it. I am
probably less sure than the other two Chiefs.
But this is the general consensus of opinion,
but one that I worry about particularly.
I, too, worry about it, Mr. President.
A point that should be emphasized is
that the test ban will render it impossible
for the United States to catch up with
the Russians in -the -area of high-yield
weapons because of the ban on atmos-
pheric tests, while the Russians will be
permitted, by the treaty's terms, to con-
duct underground tests and, thus, catch
up with us in the tactical nuclear weap-
ons field where we think we are ahead.
In summation, we may be kidding our-
selves when we depend upon our being
ahead of the Russians in the field of
small weapons, and I have no doubt that
? we are kidding ourselves when we argue
that this treaty will make it difficult for
the Russians to catch up in this field.
History will show that the Soviets
have? not been 'disconcerted when con-
_fronted with difficult problems. They
produced the atomic bomb long before
we thought they could produce it; they
produced the hydrogen bomb long before
we predicted; and they launched Sput-
nik I, to our consternation and amaze-
ment. Moreover, While our feats in put-
ting astronauts' in 'orbit have been re-
markable the Soviets have excelled us.
Who will say that these, achievements
have not been difficult' or expensive? It
Is obvious that they have required the
marshalling of tremendous energy,
brains, and money.
The Soviets have shown that they can
make rapid advances in research and de-
velopment when they contribute maxi-
mum effort and emphasis to the task.
Additionally, there is always the pos-
sibility that the Soviets will make a
major breakthrough in nuclear tech-
nology which will permit them to achieve
-substantial reductions in cost.
Soviet national resouree.s may be
under heavy strain, but this does not
"Mean that even greater stress cannot be
put upon them. The Soviets repeatedly
have put their national resources under
great' strain, but this has never inter-
erecl with their deterthl?ation to secure
supremacy, for example, in space re-
search and exploration. Yet, the Soviet
leadership evinced little apparent con-
cern that the Soviet population was
made to suffer through strictures on con-
sumer goods. As a matter of fact, the
'people of the Soviet Union apparently
have always been willing to make what-
ever sacrifices appeared to be necessary,
and I am sure that they stand ready to-
day to make whatever further sacrifices
are required of them by their leaders.
There are those who said that Cuba
would prove to be too expensive for the
Soviet Union, but that theory has thus
far proved to be false. As Adm.
Arleigh Burke stated in his appearance
before the Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee:
Oast alone should not be the standard
measurement for our attempting to explain
what is and what is not in the best interest
of any enemy nation. The use of criteria
which normally we would apply in attempt-
ing to clarify a given course of action for
the United States will be of little value when
applied to the motives or desires of a totali-
tarian adversary. Far to often the Com-
munists have defied reason and logic to pur-
sue seemingly impossible objectives; and far
too often we have made false assessments of
their ability or willingness to pursue those
impossible objectives.
Mr. President, I do not think that any
of us can be absolutely sure that we are
actually ahead of the Russians in over-
all nuclear technology. Yet, with few
exceptions, one after another of the wit-
nesses who appeared to support the
treaty stated it as his opinion that the
United States now enjoys technological
superiority over the Soviet Union and
will, through its participation in the pro-
posed test ban treaty, maintain that
superiority. According to this argument,
parity between the Soviet Union and the
United States does not now exist nor will
it ensue in the foreseeable future. Sec-
retary McNamara pointed out in his
statement that:
This prolongation of our technological
superiority will be a principal direct military
effeot of the treaty on the future military
balance.
He referred to our technological su-
periority and said it would be prolonged
under the treaty. Yet at page 113 of
the hearing Secretary McNamara had
something interesting to note. The Sen-
ator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE]
had made this statement:
I would like to pursue that just a little
bit. You do concede in your statement that
Insofar as the extremely large yield weapons
are concerned the Soviets do have superior-
ity over us.
Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; I do.
Senator PASTORE. In the smaller tactical
weapons, which can be tested underground,
we have superiOrity over them?
Secretary Mc/sTsmsas. I believe so, al-
though I can't state that with absolute
certainty. .
Therefore, Secretary McNamara could
not say with absolute certainty?nobody
can say with absolute certainty?that
even in the smaller tactical weapons field
we have superiority over the Soviet
Union.
We are to believe, nonetheless, that the
treaty will insure our continued superi-
ority and the Soviets' inferiority for the
foreseeable future. The Soviets appear,
by this argument, to be willing to freeze
themselves in a position of inferiority
vis-a-vis the United States. If, in fact,
they have resigned themselves to such a
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position of strategic inferiority, it would
follow that they must have renounced
their goal of world conquest and the de-
struction of our way of life. But, as
Secretary of State Dean Rusk pointed
out in his statement during the hearings:
We have no basis yet for assuming a fun-
damental change in Soviet objectives.
Moreover, the statement of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff emphatically points out
that, "We must not for a moment forget
that militant communism remains com-
mitted to the destruction of our society."
It is hard to believe that the Soviet
Union would agree to a treaty, which, if
faithfully adhered to by all parties, would
guarantee the long-range inferiority of
. Soviet strength and the concomitant
failure to achieve Communist goals. It
is interesting to note, in this connection,
that on August 5, the day on which the
'treaty was signed in Moscow, the official
Tess statement included this passage:
Does conclusion of a treaty banning the
tests alter the present balance of power?
No; it does not. The Soviet Government
would never have agreed to the conclusion
of such a treaty if it placed us in an unequal
position, if it gave unilateral advantage to
the other side. All this does not require
Special proof.
As one can see, while we have been
assured that we possess technological
superiority, the Soviet Union claims it-
self to be superior in nuclear technology.
This creates doubt ineiny mind that we
possess facts which really assure us as
to who is ahead of whom at this stage of
the game. As Adm. ArIeigh 13urke, U.S.
Navy, retired, stated, in referring to our
vaunted technological superiority over
the Soviet Union:
This superiority has been claimed so often
that I fear it has become automatically ac-
cepted as being fact. What is not generally
realized is that this statement is not founded
on hard evidence, but rather is the result
of speculation. It is of interest to note that
the Soviets claim to be ahead of us in nu-
clear weapons technology. Whereas this
claim need not be accepted necessarily,
neither is it possible to reject ft unequivo-
cally.
Our own military leaders and scien-
tists state that the Soviet Union is,
without doubt, ahead of the United
States in the high yield range, and that
the treaty will permit the Russians to
retain the advantage in this- field. At
the same time it will permit the Soviet
Union to make gains, through under-
ground tests, in the development of tac-
tical nuclear weapons, a field in which
we are supposedly ahead. In other
words, we will be prevented from catch-
ing up with the Russians where they are
admittedly ahead, and they will be per-
mitted to catch up with us where we
are presumably ahead.
THE TEST BAN WILL SLOW DOWN THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Most persons will probably agree that
the proliferation of nuclear weapons may
be slowed as a consequence of the ban,
particularly among lamf-abiding democ-
racies which are friends and from which
we have nothing to fear. Moreover,
scores of the nations which have signed
the treaty would probably never develop
nuclear weapons or become nuclear
powers in any event. The same cannot
?
be said, however, for Communist coun-
tries and dictatorships which may have
the potential and the motive and which
can develop nuclear explosives secretly.
As Dr. Edward Teller stated before the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee:
The only technical comment which is
relevant is the observation that the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons is easy once nu-
clear materials are readily available. Start-
ing with the 1955 Atoms for Peace confer-
ence we have made it Very sure that in the
course of time nuclear materials will become
available oh every continent. Once a coun-
try is in the possession of a few kilograms
of plutonium simple experiments that can be
earned out in secrecy an produce a small
nuclear explosion in lesig than 1 year. Such
small nuclear explosions are sufficient to give
the needed assurance and experience to a
country which intends to use these explosives
on a relatively small scale.
The treaty will indubitably not prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons in-
sofar as Red China and France are con-
cerned. In fact, France is already a nu-
clear power. Red China is evincing the
determination to become one. Neither
of these nations has indicated a willing-
ness to become a signatory.
What Russia will do when France
progresses in the state of the art remains
to be seen. One might venture to guess
that this could furnish the pretext for
Russia's abrogation of the treaty.
Furthermore, the treaty will not pre-
vent nuclear weapons passing into the
hands of additional nations by purchase,
by loan, or by transfer. It will not pre-
vent or prohibit one nation giving to an?
other design or production knowledge.
It will not prevent any nation from ac-
quiring the means to produce pluto-
nium?and possession of plutonium is
the key to the atomic bomb.
In the final analysis, it will not pre-
vent testing. In fact, the treaty tends to
remove whatever moral restraints pre-
viously attached to weapons tests by es-
sentially legalizing the testing of weap-
ons underground. Let no one imagine
that the treaty will frustrate the testing
of weapons by any nation which has
made a decision to become a nuclear
power, and which has allocated the re-
sources and expended them on the re-
search, development, and production
programs which must necessarily pre-
cede a weapon test.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY
Mr. President, I now proceed to the
main arguments against the treaty, as I
see them. I am oppased to the treaty
mainly for the following reasons:
First. The treaty is difficult of exact
interpretation.
Second. There is danger of clandestine
testing by the Soviets.
Third. There is danger of surprise ab-
rogation by the Soviets.
Fourth. The treaty will result in eu-
phoria in the West.
Fifth. Military superiority will shift to
the Soviets.
Now I shall attempt to elaborate upon
each of these.
THE TREATY IS DIFFICULT OF EXACT
INTERPRETATION
On July 26, 1963, a New York Times
corres_pondent quoted a State Depart-
September 19
ment source as having stated that the
wording of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
was "disturbingly imprecise." It is diffi-
cult to disagree. For example, under the
terms of the treaty, what constitutes an
"underground" test? Much depends on
the interpretation of "underground."
Must an "underground'" test be one that
is totally confined? Shallow tests con-
ducted just beneath the surface may
produce much more valuable informa-
tion than tests at greater depths. Such
shallow tests are also more economical.
Yet, what is mean by "underground"
tests may be open to question. In the
report of the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, September 3, 1963, page
22, Secretary of State Rusk is quoted as
saying:
Obviously this treaty permits a clear un-
derground test where the explosion is under-
ground, where the testing apparatus is based
on that phenomenon, and I would think we
would not think that it applied to a surface
explosion which was christened by a few
shovelfuls of dirt.
But even though venting accompanies
a low-yield undergrou:nd explosion it
cannot necessarily be detected, identi-
fied, or verified. What then will be the
Soviet definition of "underground" arid
will it be broader than the U.S. defini-
tion?
The question of what constitutes an
"underground" test may, however, be
purely academic. The pressure of world
Public opinion may be brought to bear
as a reason for the cessation of under-
ground testing even though permitted
by the treaty. Already the Soviet Union
has laid the groundwork for a psycho-
logical warfare campaign to keep the
United States from carrying out what
is provided for by the treaty. The of-
ficial Soviet news agency Tass on August
30, 1963, stated that the recent under-
ground test in Nevada violated the
"spirit of the treaty." The Communists
are quite aware of the esteem in which
any treaty is held by the people of the
United States. They understand that
our respect for the law is such that we
will live up not only to the words of a
binding treaty, but will lean over back-
ward in order to avoid violating even
the spirit of a binding treaty. They
understand the American penchant for
thinking along legalistic lines and re-
member how much faith we placed in
the Kellogg-Briand treaty for the re-
nunciation of war. To the Soviets a
disarmament treaty is a paper bullet,
a technique of psychopolitical struggle.
As President Kennedy has aptly said, the
Soviet idea of diplomacy is:
What's mine is mine, and what's yours is
negotiable.
Several other ambiguities are sprin-
kled throughout passages of the treaty.
Admiral Arleigh Burke, in his testi-
mony, indicated that he is concerned
lest the words "underwater, including
territorial waters or high seas" might
not be interpreted by the Soviets to in-
clude "internal waters." My own in-
terpretation would be that "underwater''
includes internal waters. But there is
room for debate, argument, question,
and misunderstanding.
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Accorcliqg to Admiral Burke:
Tests iiiitterrlal,,waters, under the present
wording of lie treaty and under at least one
interpretation of international law, would
be regarded as Underground tests and,
therefore, permissible if radioactive debris
is not deposited outside national boundaries.
s Otherwise, the treaty would need provisions
for inspection to detect against inland un-
derwater testing. And if testing underwater
in an inland lake is permissible, in what
other waters might it also be permissible2
Admiral 13urke; On page 13 of his pre-
pared statement, also raised a question
concerning the interpretation of "terri-
,
tonal waters" as alluded to in the
treaty: '
We have a meaning for "territorial
waters," but it is doubtful that the soviets
Would entertain, the, same meaning. In
fact, a representative sampling- of the writ-
ings of international lawyers would give
evidence to the ft that they either re-
frain from using the, term or disagree to
Its meaa_ing When they do use it. We would
probably agree with' the definition that ter-
ritorial waters are those included within a
definite maritime zone or belt adjacent to a
State's /erritory. The Soviets would also
tuie this definition if It Were clearly suitable
to their ?purpose's, regardless of their pres-
ent intentions.
But since he term is ambiguous, any
party is free to adopt his own 'definition.
There obviously cannot be, in the present
case, a' mutually agreed definition of the
term "territorial waters," since we have been
assured that this treaty constituteelhe en-
tire agreement.
Other important areas of misinterpre-
tation are clearly in evidence as? was
Manifested, during the entire course of
the hearings. Careful reading of the
hearings will reveal that many Senators
Were not satisfied that the United States
may be permitted to use nuclear Weap-
ons in war. '
Even former President Eisenhower was
,
not satisfied with the terminology of the
treaty on this point.
Mr. President, my concern ?is that the
United States will be overly cautious in
its interpretation of the treaty. In Eta-
tual practice, therefore, our progress
? under the treaty will be inhibited by the
fear that we will be charged with a vio-
lation thereof, whereas the Soviets, on
? the otheifiand, will not suffer from such
inhibitions. As a matter of fact, the very
nature of a closed society, such as theirs,
will encourage them to undertake Viola-
tions of the treaty in the expectation
that those violations cannot be detected,
identified, and verified. Our past be-
havior reveals precedents of the exercise
pf excessive caution in interpreting
agreements. As a matter of fact, we
Itted excessive caution in observing the
? Voluntary moratorium during the years
1958-61., That agreement was not even
a treaty, In order to avoid alarming the
nussians; however, we refrained from
Making ,adequate preparations for the
of nuclear testing. As a re-
t,-the-itisSsian'atmospheric explosions
In the rairof 196i:caught us only weakly
prepared.
2. 'THERE IS'DANona CLANnfisrfin rieriNn BY
? Tat SOVIET'S _
"Many vvho speak for the treaty do not
?dpny that there are real risks of clan-
'4estine ,t6Sting, but they find reasons to
,
discount every nsk, or to resolve every
doubt in favor of the treaty. Secretary
McNamara, for example, stated:
While tests at extreme ranges are a tech-
nological possibility, thqy would involve years
of preparation plus several months to a year
of actual execution, and they could cost hun-
dreds of millions of dollars per successful
experiment.
Are we not forgetting the patience of
the Communists, their skill in space, and
their willingness to put as much of their
resources as necessary into their efforts
to achieve military supremacy over the
United States?
. Secretary McNamara then pointed out
two more possible loopholes for cheat-
ing. He said:
Over the U.S.S.R. or Communist China,
only very low-yield tests, with quite limited
objectives, could have a good chance of es-
caping discovery. These tests could not pro-
duce significant advantage@.
In certain remote parts of the world such
as the South Pacific the threshold of evasion
of geophysical detectors in the upper atmos-
phere will be somewhat higher and the
chance of recovering a debris sample might
be rather small. However, it is most un-
likely that the Soviets will try to take ad-
vantage of this situation. An upper atmos-
phere test would be difficult to perform from
shipboard and might require several vessels
properly deployed around the test point.
Preparations for such a test would be rela-
tively easy to discover.
In other words, this treaty has known
loopholes; but explanations, some of
which are admittedly plausible, as to
why the Soviets will not employ them,
InaY be advanced. I think we are un-
derrating Soviet cunning and the Soviet
determination to outwit us. On the
other hand, I think we are overrating
the Soviet fear of being caught in a vio-
lation and the 'Soviet respect for world
opinion.
The fact that the Soviets have no
concern about the wrath of public opin-
ion is amply demonstrated by the way
they ended the moratorium on tests in
the fall of 1961. The Soviets knew in
advance that there would be loud pro-
tests throughout tile world when they
resumed testing after the moratorium
which had lasted 34 months. Neverthe-
less, they did not hesitate to resume tests,
because they knew it would catapult
them ahead in their nuclear knowledge.
Even though the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly passed, on October 27,
1961, by a vote of 87 to 11, with 1 ab-
stention, a resolution appealing to the
.Soviet Union not to carry out its stated
intention of exploding a 50-megaton
bomb, 3 days later the Soviet Union
detonated a bomb of 57 megatons, which
the United States has not yet matched.
World opinion, ergo, means nothing to
the Soviet Union, except insofar as it
may constitute a very useful tool against
the United States.
As to our detection ,system, there_ is
ample evidence that it leaves much to
,be desired. Even if a very expensive
detection system is employed, we can tion is reversed, as well it may be?
have no assurance that theRnssians will For instance, it has been said that the So-
not devise a way to successfully shield vista might elect cheating with a single test
tests from currently known detection which might even escape detection; that we
methods. The entire question of outer could surely detect a series of tests but that
space testing and detection is in the one test by itself alone would be of little
stage of infancy, and it is impossible to
predict how it will develop.
As shown on page 106 of the test ban
treaty hearings, Secretary McNamara
said:
Over the U.S.S.R. or Communist China,
only very low-yield tests with quite limited
objectives could have a good chance of
escaping discovery. These tests, we believe,
could not produce significant advantages.
And on page 109, we find that Secre-
tary McNamara said:
I do not pretend that this or any other
agreement between great, contending pow-
ers can be risk free. Surely this one is not.
I cannot guarantee that we will detect any
single clandestine test the Soviets might at-
tempt; but Soviet technical and military
advisers cannot guarantee that we will not.
I am convinced that even undetected clan-
destine tests will not alter the basic mili-
tary balance.
Supporting witnesses have indicated,
therefore, that there is not 100 percent
assurance that we will detect violations;
but, they added, neither is there 100 per-
cent assurance for the Russians that we
will not detect violations. In other
words, we are to accept the minimum
standards of adequacy. In effect, we
are told that, so long as there is not 100
percent assurance that an attempted test
In space will go undetected, we are ade-
quately safeguarded. I contend that
when dealing with the Communists, we
must apply the maximum standards, and
must allow no loophole for evasion, for
so long as there is a single loophole, the
Communists will find it and will use it.
Secretary McNamara said?as shown
on pages 140 and 141:
Secretary McNailAaa. I would be quite
happy to go into it in length, but perhaps I
can simply say now we have a very substan-
tial capability through geophysical and oth-
er means of detecting nuclear explosions in
the forbidden environments.
I don't believe that we can say that the
present capability will give assurance of de-
tecting all such explosions or of identifying
all such explosions.
We, therefore, are considering augmenting
the present capability. Even after that aug-
mentation is made, if it is made. I don't be-
lieve that we can guarantee that we will be
able to identify all possible violations of the
treaty, but I do strongly believe that the vio-
lations that may not be identified by the
present or augmented system will not shift
the military balance of power.
So, in essence, we are told not to worry
about violations which may go undetect-
ed, because they will not significantly
alter the balance of military power.
As shown on page 673 of the test ban
treaty hearings, Admiral Strauss made
this statement with reference to the sig-
nificance of even one test:
A radical new weapon discovery or a break-
through in countermeasure systems, sudden-
ly tested and found workable, could put the
possessor nation in command of world events.
We ourselves were twice in that position,
first with our invention of the fission bomb
and later of the fusion bomb. Of course, we
never considered making such use of our ad-
vantage, but what if in the future the situa-
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16610 CONGRESSIONAL 11.CORD ? SENATE
significance. This unfortunately will not
stand up in the light of history.
We cannot forget, we should not forget,
that only one single test proved the atomic
bomb, and one test proved the principle of
the 11-bomb. If such ,radical Invention is
made on our side of the Iron Curtain, one
that Is provable only by testing it above
ground, the treaty will firmly bind our hands.
Thus paralyzed, we can only file the idea
away in a safe and pray fervently that the
same invention will not occur to scientists on
the other side of the Iron Curtain. Unfortu-
nately, there is a well-recognized and fre-
quently experienced phenomenon known as
simultaneous invention. It may operate
against us.
If the discovery?the breakthrough?Ls
made on the other side of the Iron Curtain,
is there anything upon which to base an esti-
mate of the situation? Would the Soviets,
in that circumstance, or other circumstances
favorable to them, clandestinely breach the
treaty?
On page 186 of the hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]
made the following statement:
DETECTING TESTS AT DIFFERENT ALTITUDES
Senator RussELL. Mr. Chairman, / only
have one or two questions that I did not
get to this morning. I hope they were not
covered in my absence. If they were, Mr.
Secretary, I hope you will tell me if the
answers are in the record.
On page 19 of your statement, in dealing
with the subject of atmospheric tests, you
said: "In the upper atmosphere?say above
6 miles [to 20 miles] high?the principal
purpose of clandestine tests would be for
determining weapons effects."
Is there any difference in the ability to
test in that area, from 6 to 20 miles, than
on the surface of the earth, and still higher
in the atmosphere
Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; there is a
difference?not in the ability to test?be-
cause none of the parties are allowed to test
there, but there is a difference in the ability
to detect and identify clandestine tests. It is
more difficult to detect and identify tests in
certain bands of the atmosphere, particular-
ly in this band I am discussing?say rough-
ly from 6 to 20 miles, than it is to detect
tests in the low atmosphere.
Senator RUSSELL. Of course, tests below
the 6 miles X suppose you can detect through
debris rather easily. That is our principal
method of detecting them.
Secretary IVIcNAmARA. There are a series
of methods used for that purpose. Perhaps
Dr. Brown could speak to them very briefly.
Senator RUSSELL. Very well.
Dr. BROWN. The techniques that / think
are of most interest in this regard are the
acoustical signal, the electromagnetic signal,
which is like a lightning flash essentially,
and the debris. All of them are applicable
below 6 miles.
In the band from 6 to about 20 miles,
the electromagnetic signal is suppressed
somewhat, and therefore you do not have
as many techniques, and therefore it is
somewhat more difficult. Debris sampling is
also harder to do, but it is not impossible.
So that even for tests at, say, 10 or 15 miles,
there is some chance of being able to detect
debris. But it is a smaller chance. And that
is why this region is of particular concern.
On page 274 of the hearings General
Taylor referred to the risks and disad-
vantages in the treaty, and the fact that
the disadvantages will be aggravated by
illicit testing. He said:
Such disadvantage as might accrue to the
United States under conditions of honest
fulfillment of treaty conditions would be
further aggravated if the Soviets success-
fully tested by illicit explosions in the atmos-
phere, underwater, or in outer space.
On page 282 of the hearings,bef ore the
Committee on Foreign [Mr. RUSSELL] Relations, the
Senator from Gapr
asked the following question of General
Taylor:
PRBSENT DETECTION SYSTEM NOT ADEQUATE
Senator RI:13mm. General, one of the very
important elements involved in the art of
detection by various methods of explosions.
Are you satisfied with the devices that we
have at the present time?
General TAYLOR. No, sir. As Indicated
among the four safeguards, one of the areas
where the Joint Chiefs feel additional effort
should be expended is in improving our de-
tection devices, and a review of our program
is being conducted at the present time.
On page 324 of the bearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCEE] and
General Taylor engaged in this colloquy:
RISK OF CLANDESTINE TESTING
Senator LAUSCHE. You are also of the- opin-
ion that by clandestine tests, Russia could
technologically aggravate these disadvan-
tages under which we will be laboring in the
event the treaty is adopted.
General TAYLOR. That is correct. We
would say they can do I, certain amount of
clandestine testing if they want to and if
they are prudent enough to hold down the
level, thereby they can Make some gain-
On page 330 of the hearings conducted
by the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations Senator Youria asked a question
of General Taylor regarding detection
devices: -
Senator YOUNG. And do you feel, General,
that 2 years from now or a year from now,
our detection devices probably will be more
accurate?
General TAYLOR. I am not an expert in the
field. I doubt that we could do it quite that
fast. But certainly in a few years we can do
distinctly better.
On page 331 the following appears:
General TAYLOR. Well, I don't dispute the
logic of what you say, Senator. I don't think
we military individuals can afford to assume
anything other than the worst in this par-
ticular field, and we did take our position on
the treaty with the assumption that the So-
viets would attempt clandestine testing of
some sort.
The CHAntsmsr. Do you mean very minor,
small tests which would be difficult to detect?
General TAztort. Yes, sir. I would think
the temptations would be in the atmospheric
tests of small weapons, small tactical weap-
ons, for example, or small tests which could
be extrapolated to apply to the antimissile
missiLes. That would be the tempting area.
The CHAIRMAN. So small it would be very
difficult to detect. Is that what you mean?
General TAYLOR. That Is right.
The CHAIRMAN. But it Is in this field that
you feel we are very well prepared ourselves,
Is it not?
General TAYLOR. Well,- it is in this field
where I don't think the gains that might
come from this kind of testing would have
any great bearing upon our relative posi-
tion.
On page 395 of the hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Senator from California [Mr. KucaraL]
asked the following question of General
LeMay :
EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION METHODS
Senator KUCHEL. General, just In lay
terms, is our detection system with respect
September 19
to atmospheric nuclear explosions sufficient-
ly efficient so that we would know if there
were an attempted clandestine breach by
the Soviet Union?
General LEMAY. The answer to that has to
be "No,". because I don't think we can de-
tect every explosion that they may attempt
in the atmosphere any place in the world.
Now, we have some figures; I am sure you
are familiar with them as well as I am, but
we cannot guarantee to detect every explo-
sion; no, sir.
On pages 418 and 419, Dr. Teller said
the following:
Most of us believed and the U.S. intelli-
gence firmly and unequivocally predicted,
that the Russians will not have a nuclear ex-
plosion for many years.
The first Russian test in 1992 was a com-
plete surprise. Some of us got worried. I
got very worried about the next surprise
that might be in store for us, and we started
out on the next step which the majority
of the scientists said could. noi; be done, the
thermonuclear explosion.
You know that within a short time that
succeeded, with an effect almost a thousand
times as great as the first explosion, and
that, in turn, was followed within a few
months with the Russians producing some-
thing that looked very much like a ther-
monuclear explosion.
Again, in contradiction to all expectations,
to all predictions, to the explicit statements
of the intelligence community.
On page 448 Dr. Teller, with reference
to illegal and clandestine testing in space
as not being a reasonable proposition for
the Soviet Union, and as being something
that we can protect ourselves against,
said as follows:
Dr. TELLER. I believe that this reflects the
Secretary's great reliance on intelligence. I
hope he is right. I fear he may not be.
Senator MUNDT, on page 241 of the
hearings, asked questions of Dr. Seahorg
concerning the detectability of an under-
water test:
DETECTABILITY OF AN UNDERWATER TEST
Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you a specific
question in. this field of detection. Several
people who have made a lifetime study of
gopolitics are concerned about the fact that
while underwater testing in the interior
waters of Russia in a lake as vast as Lake
Baikal?which is so deep that you could use
it for submarines and so vast that it is vir-
tually an interior ocean?is barred by the
treaty. Do we presently have the means of
detection so that we could find out if they
violate the treaty in this area by Underwater
tests, 3,000 or 4,000 feet unde:r the surface
of the Water, in Lake Baikal in the interior
of Russia?
Dr. SEABORG. No. We don't have the means
of detecting such a test by instrumentation,
by the methods of detecting nuclear tests
through physical means.,
Senator MUNDT. Does this mean that we
simply have to rely on the unsupported
veracity and word of the Russians that they
are fulfilling their treaty in this area. We
are told by Secretary Rusk that it is intended
that the treaty prohibit underwater tests of
that nature in Lake Baikal,
Dr. SEABORG. Well, I think that more im-
portant than that is that we don't see any
great gain that they could make by making
such a test or tests and that the hazards
to the Soviets themselves are considerable In
contaminating the inland waters, and so
forth.
I think that I would he motivated more by
that consideration, that it would be the sort
of test that wouldn't bother me very much,
that there isn't a great deal that they could
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?
1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
learn there that would be of concern to us
so fares Our national security is concerned.
Senates' Mtafrir.4The fact that underwater
tests are prohibited by the treaty would im-
ply to me that they must have some value
to somebody or they wouldn't be prohibited.
Dr. 8mi:ions. Yes, they do, but the value is
an order of magnitude less than the value,
much, much less than the value of atmo-
spheric tests.
Senator 1Vluisior. They do have some value.
Dr, SEADORG. They have some value, yes,
very specific value, though, namely, the ef-
fect of the nuclear explosion on a ship or a
submarine.
I think it is apparent, Mr. President,
that, although we hope for compliance,
we cannot discount the probability that
the Soviet Union will violate the treaty.
The frustrating problem which will con-
front us, in this regard, will be that of
detecting and verifying the Violation.
3. THERE IS DANGER OF SURPRISE ABROGATION
BY THE SOVIETS
The fact that the Soviets brazenly
broke the moratorium in 1961 demon-
strates more than the fact that ;they
have no regard for public opinion. It
also warns us of another method in ad-
dition to clandestine testing by which
the Soviets can use this treaty to get
ahead of us. I refer, as I have already
indicated, to surprise abrogation. On
August 30, 1961, while the United States
was offering various concessions at the
Geneva Conference to get the Soviet
Union to agree to a ban on all nuclear
tests, the Soviet Government simply is-
sued a statement announcing that it was
going to resume tests, and 2 days later,
It conducted the first of a long, extremely
well-planned, highly advantageous test
series. This ended a 3-year uninspected
moratorium which the United States
had unwisely observed in the futile hope
that it would encourage the Soviet
Union to accept an adequate inspection
system. Almost 8 months passed, fol-
lowing the Soviet abrogation, before the?
United States was able to resume atmos-
pheric testing.
Just before the announcement that
the United States would resume atmos-
pheric tests, William C. Foster, Director
Of the 'U.S. Arms Control and,Disarma-
- Merit Agency, pointed out the tremen-
dous advantages which were reaped by
the Soviet Union in its surprise resump-
tion of tests in 061. He wrote in a let-
ter to the editor of the Washington Post
on February 9, 1962:
While the details ,would not be appropriate
in this letter, it has become clear only in the
last month that the Soviets achieved some
substantial gains in their test series of last
summer and fall. One more such advan-
tage?that is, another long and intensive se-
ries, after a period of no testing on either
side during which they extrapolated the re-
sults of these tests and, o,n that ba,sis, secretly
prepared for new tests?might actually give
them a superiority in the anti-missile or
Other Strategic areas which their military in-
tereSte wOlild find hard not to exploit.
This treaty lays the groundwork for
the exact same thing to happen again.
After the Soviet Union has analyzed all
Its data from past tests and laid careful
plans for a new series, after our guard
has been let down and our efforts have
relaxed, after the American scientists
have performed ail the work they can in
the laboratories and through under-
ground tests and have been stymied by
the inability to conduct further tests, the
Soviets will simply 1 day resume testing,
leaving the United States far behind. It
would not be out of character for them
to ignore the 3-month withdrawal clause,
because observance of the clause would
give us an opportunity to prepare for a
test resumption too.
The administration has contended that
it will protect the Nation against the
danger of surprise abrogation by keeping
Its scientists active in the laboratories
and active in an underground testing
program, and by maintaining a high
state of readiness to conduct tests in the
atmosphere at any time. I question
whether we will be able to maintain such
preparations indefinitely, no matter how
good our intentions, especially after the
treaty has gone on a few months or years
And the Communists have succeeded in
getting us to lower our guard.
Only a year and a half ago, on March
2, 1962, when President Kennedy an-
nounced that the United States also
would resume atmospheric testing, he
pointed out the difficulties of keeping
scientists in a free society working on a
test series which might never be con-
ducted. He toll a radio and television
audience:
We know enough now about broken nego-
tiations, secret preparations, and the advan-
tage,s gained from a long test series never to
offer again an uninspected moratorium.
Some may urge us to try it again, keeping our
preparations to test in a constant state of
readiness. But in actual practice, particu-
larly in a society of free choice, we cannot
keep topflight scientists concentrating on the
preparation of an experiment which may or
may not take place on an uncertain date in
the future. Nor can large technical lab-
oratories be kept fully alert on a standby
basis waiting for some other nation to break
an agreement. This is not merely difficult
or inconvenient?we have explored this
alternative thoroughly and found it impos-
sible of execution.
Although the President was speaking
of an uninspected moratorium on all
tests, the same argument applies today
to the uninspected treaty which awaits
our decision, unless the American people
are determined, and remain determined,
not to relax in the effort to be prepared
for any eventuality.
We should also know by this time that
an intelligence community which was
unable to detect in time the conduct of
preparations, by the Russians, during
the moratorium, for a resumption of
atmospheric testing, and which was un-
able to detect the shipment of offensive
weapons to Cuba until virtually the last
minute, cannot be depended upon to de-
tect Soviet activities in anticipation of a
planned abrogation of this treaty.
With reference to the possibility of
planned abrogation, I refer to Dr. Sea-
borg's statement, as shown on page 208
of the test ban treaty hearings:
We must always remain alert to the fact
that one side may try to acquire a superior
advantage through violation or abrogation
of the treaty. The effect of such an action
on the other parties is decidedly less where
underground testing is permitted and where
an active program of worldwide nuclear test
detection is continued.
16611
It does not seem possible to be forewarned
against a surprise abrogation. Even if the
3 months' notice period for any country
planning to withdraw is given, it would pos-
sibly have been accompanied by an earlier
period of preparation.
General Taylor, as shown on page 274
of the hearings, referred to the possibil-
ity of an abrupt abrogation:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the
withdrawal provision requiring 90 days' no-
tice following a unilateral U.S. decision pro-
vides a satisfactory means of escape in case
we believe our national interest is being
threatened. They are impressed, however,
by the possiiblity of an abrupt abrogation
by the Soviets, followed by a comprehensive
series of atmospheric tests.
As appears on page 319, General Tay-
lor further commented on the possibility
of an abrupt abrogation by the Soviets:
I doubt we will ever be sure that we can
detect the preparations and not be surprised.
We can hedge our stake, so to speak, by im-
proving our own reaction time. But beyond
that I would say it is impossible in my judg-
ment to upset the relative balance of power
quickly, as a result of something of this
sort.
General LeMay, on page 375, said this:
(The Russians) have already said they
would abrogate the treaty if?at any time
they thought it was necessary. And I firmly
believe that they were conducting tests dur-
ing the moratorium that we had. And?I
certainly have no faith that they will keep
their word in this one if they feel it is to
their advantage to do otherwise.
Secretary McNamara, on page 130,
said this:
It has led to the conclusion I just gave
that they will not adhere to any treaty when
they think it is contrary to their interest to
continue to adhere to it. It is for that rea-
son, among others, that I believe we must
be prepared for surprise abrogation of the
treaty by the Soviets.
At page 140, Secretary McNamara re-
ferred again the likelihood of a Soviet
abrogation:
First, I think we must be prepared for
surprise abrogation by the Soviets. As I
testified, I don't believe they will adhere to
this treaty one moment longer than they
think it is in their interest to adhere to it,
and I can't predict how long that will be.
So, we must be prepared for surprise abro-
gation.
Admiral Strauss, as appears on page
674 of the hearings, had this to say about
the planned abrogation of the voluntary
moratorium:
A distinguished scientist, who was a prin-
cipal adviser to our negotiating team in Ge-
neva, published an essay in August 1960.
This is a quotation from it: "I had the
doubtful honor of presenting the theory of
the big hole to the Russians in Geneva in
November 1959."
May I interrupt there to say that the ref-
erence to the big hole is a method for reduc-
ing the seismic signal of an underground
explosion by decoupling. I continue with
the balance of the quotation:
"I felt deeply embarrassed in so doing,
because it implied that we considered the
Russians capable of cheating on a massive
scale. I think that they would have been
quite justified if they had considered this an
insult and had walked out of the negotia-
tions in disgust."
The Russian scientists for whose sensitiv-
ity our scientist had so admirable a regard
were not so thin-skinned, At that very time
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they must have been engaged in the massive
preparations for cheating on a massive scale.
In barely 12 months atter the article ap-
peared, they staged a series of tests which,
for length, and number, and size of weapons,
astonish the neutral and free world, and I
might interpolate here parenthetically that
we might not forget that the Soviets got not
so much as a slap on the wrist from the
congress of neutral nations in whose very
faces, as it were, this series had been ex-
ploded.
This "contemptuous breach of faith," to
use the President's appropriate adjective,
seems already forgotten by many Americans.
It took place 2 years ago, but we can shorten
the focus in point of time.
On page 420 of the hearings, Dr. Ed-
ward Teller alluded to the surprise abro-
gation of the moratorium and to the test
results which followed:
AIISSIAN TESTS RESUMED-1961
In the summer of 1961 the Russians re-
sumed testing, in the late summer.
We know now that this test series was by
far the most powerful, we have reason to be-
lieve that it was the most powerful in the
whole history of Russian preparations, and
it was the most plentiful, the most repeti-
tious, the most solid ever carried out by any
nation.
I don't think that any expert will disagree
with me when I say that this test series had
to be prepared for many months in advance,
and that the preparations had to be ex-
nsive, widespread, and should have been
open to intelligence information. It is pos-
sible, I would even say that it is probable
that the planning of this abrogation took a
time longer than a year.
Yet on the day before Khrushchev made
his announcement our Government still did
not know that a test series was impending.
Here is another surprise, another failure
of us to predict what the future will bring
and what the Russians intend to do.
RUSSIAN ADVANCES?RESULT OE TESTING
As a result of this test series the Russians
made a big explosion. For one I can tell you
this was no surprise. I wish / could talk
about it more. It is interesting, it is slightly
relevant, it is classified, but the Russians did
have a surprise in store for us, and that sur-
prise was their announcement and evidence
stmporting that announcement that they did
make great strides toward missile defense.
In 1961, and in the dimilarly impressive
test series in 1962, the Russians had every
chance in the world to make the observa-
tions in the atmosphere which are the firm
basis of any plan for an effective or halfway
effective missile defense, and I am saying
halfway effective in the most serious way.
As to the amount of time that would
be lost, in the event of a surprise abroga-
tion by the Soviets, before we could pro-
ceed with atmospheric testing, Secretary
McNamara elucidates, on page 157 of the
test ban treaty hearings, as follows:
Secretary MCNAMARA. I will give you some
rough approximations. I think they are suf-
ficiently accurate to answer your questions.
I think we could test within approxi-
mately, or could carry out within approxi-
mately 2 months, proof tests. By proof tests,
I mean tests of previously developed weap-
ons.
I think we could test within approxi-
mately 1 month thereafter?that is, a total
of 30 days?technical developments. I think
we could carry out within approximately 3
months thereafter?that is, a total of 6
months, could carry out within that, ex-
tensive effects tests.
Now, this latter answer applies from a
period 12 months from now and thereafter?
this because whether we have a test ban
treaty or don't have a test ban treaty, an
extensive period Of time is required to pre-
pare for complex effects tests.
Mr. President, if past actions of the
Russians have any meaning whatsoever,
this treaty is made to be breached, and
I believe that it will be breached. There
should be no doubt that its abrogation,
which even the propon nts generally an-
ticipate, will be to our 4isadvantage mili-
tarily and possibly, politically.
4. TH E TREATY WILL RESULT IN rep HORIA
IN THE WEST _
Mr. President, with reference to my
fourth point, that the treaty will result
in euphoria in the West, may I MY that
the danger of euphoria has been alluded
to by both friend and foe of the treaty.
Secretary of Defense McNamara stated
this fear as follows:
Perhaps the most serious risk of this
treaty is the risk of euphoria. We must
guard against a condition of mind which
allows us to become lax in our defenses.
The Joint Chiefs of staff, in their po-
sition paper, presented during the hear-
ings, echoed this fear:
The most serious reservations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are
more directly linked with the fear of a
euphoria in the West which will eventually
reduce our vigilance and the willingness of
our country and of our allies to expand con-
tinued effort on our collettive security. If we
ratify this treaty, we Must conduct a vig-
orous underground testing program and be
ready on short notice to resume atmospheric
testing. We should strengthen our detection
capabilities and maintain modern nuclear
laboratory facilities and programs. Finally,
we must not for a moment forget that mili-
tant communism remains committed to the
destruction of our society.
Adm. George W. Anderson, U.S. Navy,
retired, referred to aa public opinion
which must not for any reason be lulled
into an attitude of false security or com-
placency."
All scientific and military personnel,
whether proponents or opponents of the
treaty, urged that every precaution be
taken to carry out underground testing
aggressively, maintain the necessary
capability of our laboratories, and sus-
tain a high state of readiness to resume
atmospheric testing in the event of ab-
rogation, all of which precautions may
be victimized if our people become com-
placent and let down their guard.
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., said:
People and skills cannot be stored for
future use. In science just as in other spe-
cialtes one must practice -continually to be
effective. Ultimately tlae present genera-
tion of weapons technologists must be re-
placed, by younger scientists who, through
experiments and theoretical studies, will also
cleveiop the required skills * * *. Without
atmospheric tests, however, I doubt that we
can develop and maintain the requisite skill
in the important area of the effects of nu-
clear weapons. Even our theoretical effort
In this area is likely to deterioriate without
the incentive of meaningful experiments.
Secretary Rusk, as shown on page 30
of the test ban treaty hearings, referred
to his fear of euphoria in this manner:
Quite frankly we here are concerned, we
and the free world are Concerned, that this
treaty not itself lead to the kind of euphoria
we cannot afford in the' present situation.
September 19
Secretary McNamara, on page 109 of
the hearings, displayed a similar concern
regarding euphoria:
Perhaps the most serious risk of this,
treaty is the risk of euphoria. We must.
guard against a condition of mind which.
allows us to become lax in our defenses,
This agreement is a product of Western.
strength?of the military buildup which.
I described to you earlier. Further progress
in arms control arrangements with the So-
viet Union?progress which we all want to
make?depends critically on the mainte-
nance of that strength.
Then, as appears on page 124, Secre-
tary McNamara reiterated his concern:
I want to mention again, however., the
point I raised in the latter part of my state-
ment when I emphasized the clanger of re-
laxation of our security measures, the danger
of euphoria, the danger that could easily
lead to a reduction in military budget, and
a reduction in our military strength actions
which I think at this time are quite unde-
sirable.
Dr. Seaborg added his comment, as ap-
pears on page 208 of the hearings:
Public recognition of the need for strong
laboratories and of the contributions made
by the scientists is necessary.
At page 273, General Taylor's warn-
ing regarding euphoria was voiced by him
as follows:
Finally, they believed that account must
be taken of the dangers of any relaxed mili-
tary effort by the United States and our al-
lies; hence, that ratification of the treaty
should be accompanied by evidence of a clear
Intent to maintain and improve the military
posture of the West.
At page 275, General Taylor elaborated
further regarding euphoria:
The most serious reservations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with regard to the treaty are
more directly linked with the fear of a-eu-
phoria in the West which will eventually
reduce our vigilance and the willingness of
our country and of our allies to expand con-
tinued effort on our collective security.
General Taylor, at page 276 of the
hearings, continued, with reference to
euphoria:
I think it may ,be a serious problem, Mr.
Chairman. Certainly I am encouraged by
the statement of the leaders of our Govern-
ment at this time as to their determination
to effect the safeguards that have been me:n.-
tioned in my statement. As the years go by,
however, I think we may lose sight of the
fact that the Communist bloc has not
changed its overall objective.
General LeMay, at page 3'79, ref ering
to euphoria said:
Well, we feel if we follow these courses
that we recommend that we can reduce the
risk to an acceptable proportion.
But I am frank to admit that I do worry,
considering my experience in this field, that
we may get -complacent and drop our safe-
guards programs down to a level that I would
consider insufficient.
At page 403, General LeMay said:
Well, certainly this isn't beyond the real n
of possibility.
He was refering to euphoria.
I think It is probably well known by Khru-
shchev as well as all the rest of us that we
have a tendency to become complacent from
time to time. And let down our guard. We
have done that many times in the past.
Whereas they?
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The Russians?
Whereas they can control things like that
[deleted].
This could be a deliberately planned pro-
gram in that regard, to get us to drop our
guard down and this 10 one of the things
that the Chief have worried about, that we
will get such a treaty and then become com-
placent about it and not maintain the neces-
sary safeguards.
Mr. President, the candidly expressed
fears of the witnesses whose statements
I have just quoted may inaterialize, to
our country's disadvantage, in the course
of future events.
? Eternal vigilance on the part of the
Congress, the executive branch, and the
people will indeed, be the price if we are
to retain our cherished liberty. The
same vigilance will be required by the
other Western Powers, because, if we
ratify this treaty, there is cause to fear
that the underlying sense of urgency
which led to the creation of NATO and
which sustains NATO today may suffer
a gradual erosion which will lead to the
final collapse of Western unity and the
Western will to resist.
Of course, the Soviets may, for reasons
unknown to us at the moment, live UP
to the provisions of this treaty, at least
for awhile, just as they faithfully ob-
served their nonaggression pacts with
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for awhile
before committing acts of aggression
against those countries, But we shall
have to be all the more on our guard,
lest we be enticed, by virtue of their
doing so, to begin the descent Into the
maelstrom of, in effect, unilateral dis-
armament. ?
5. MILITARY SUPERIORITY WILL SHIFT TO THE
.00V1ETS
It is not a groundless fear that the
treaty constitutes a risk to the continued
Military superiority of the United States.
The following reasons are stated to sub-
stantiate this apprehension:
First. The United States will be unable
to overcome Russia's lead in high-yield
weapons.
Second. The door would be closed to
a further identification of problems of
which we may be entirely unaware at
this time.
Third. we would be unable to proof
test our weapons systems.
Fourth. We would be prohibited from
acquiring information concerning weap-
ons effects upon weapons systems.
A. THE UNITED STATES. WILL BE UNABLE TO
OVERCOME RUSSIA'S LEAD IN ,HIGH-YIELD
WEAPONS
We have been told by expert witnesses
during the hearings that the U.S. weap-
ons laboratories are capable of develop-
ing and stockpiling weapons with yields
greater than 50 megatons without fur-
ther atmospheric experimentation. It
goes without saying, however, that we
would not be able to test such weapons,
and "their weight and size would be
incompatible with any existing or pro-
gramed missile delivery vehicle." I think
that military ?Pinion, generally, in this
country has heretofore ruled out the ne-
. cessity of a. yeapon_ of this size. It is
worth noting, however, that unanimity
does not exist on this matter, and that
It is undergoing a reevaluation.
Gen, Curtis LeMay, on page 350 of the
hearings, answered the question as to
whether he sees any military need for a
50- or 75-megaton bomb:
Yes, sir; I do. The Joint Chiefs have
already recommended we go ahead with the
development work on a large-yield bomb.
General LeMay was then asked the
question: Is this a new policy?
He answered by saying:
It is not new as far as I am concerned.
I asked for, the Air Force asked for, a high-
yield bomb as early as 1954.
General LeMay then went on to in-
dicate that his reference to "a high-yield
bomb" meant "over 50 megatons."
General Power, commander of the
Strategic Air Command, expressed a
similar need for a big bomb:
In the field of high yield weaponry, I feel
that the Soviet Union now has a technical
lead as a result of their tests in 1961 and
1962. They have a lead in their weight-to-
yield ratio in the big bomb categories, and I
feel that we should overcome that lead. You
can only do this through testing in the at-
mosphere in my opinion.
? ? ?
However, again as we discussed earlier, if
we are going to build such a weapon and put
it in our arsenal, I would like to test it. I
would like to know that I can depend on it
from an actual test rather than on the basis
of a theory or an extrapolation. I think the
stakes are much too serious to deal with
theoretical information. I think what we
need are cold hard facts.
In answer to a question as to whether
or not, as time goes on, the requirement
for high-yield weapons goes up, General
Power replied thusly:
It could. One of the things about strate-
gic war planning is that you have to have
flexibility. You cannot predict what some-
thing is going to be 4 or 5 years from now.
You must be able to react to any situation.
you must have the full spectrum of tactics
covered and the full spectrum of weapons
because ours is the role of retaliation, the
most difficult role.
General Power, therefore, indicated
the necessity of our having a flexibility
of choice so that we might be prepared
to deal with all foreseeable moves that
an enemy nation might make.
B. THE DOOR WOULD BE CLOSED TO A FURTHER
IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS OF WHICH WE
MAY BE ENTIRELY UNAWARE AT THIS TIME
Aside from the problems which we see
inherent in this test ban, there are un-
doubtedly problems which will not come
to our attention except through atmos-
pheric testing. The Russians, in their
very comprehensive atmospheric tests
following the moratorium, may have
identified such problems and may have
acquired information, which we do not
possess, leading to the solution of those
problems, all of which could enable them
to make a vital breakthrough in nuclear
technology that would wrest superiority
from us. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.,
touched upon this during his testimony:
In being specific we can deal only with
those problems which have already been
identified. Of equal concern to me in the
long run are those problems which have not
yet been identified and that will surely arise
In the future. The way in which the test
ban would affect our relative ability to solve
these future problems is impossible to an-
ticipate. The best we can do is to extrapo-
?
16613
late on the basis of our experience, to
examine what we have felt was essential in
the past. * ? * Moreover, we have to reckon
with the fact that in an expanding tech-
nology, vigorously pursued, there frequently
result abrupt increases in scientific knowl-
edge?rapidly reflected, in military capa-
bility?which could upset the balance of
power. * ? * The proposed treaty would
limit not only our knowledge of the actual
state of Soviet military development, but
would also restrict our knowledge of what
may even be technically possible. Specifi-
cally, this requires that the United States
explore vigorously all areas of technology
critical to our security. Failure to do this
would add to the uncertainties concerning
our relative strength, and force us to choose
between either an increase in risk to our
security or a further increase in our level of
armament.
General Power, in referring to Russia's
comprehensive test program following
the moratorium, had this to say:
And it was a very comprehensive test pro-
gram. The magnitude of it showed their
interest in these weapons.
To me that was very significant, not the
fact they had tests but the magnitude of
these tests. It didn't indicate that this was
information in which they were only slightly
interested.
They must have attached vital importance
to it in order to have a test program of this
magnitude.
In answer to a question as to whether
the United States accomplished as much
"in proportion" during our atmospheric
tests as did the Russians in the course of
their tests following the moratorium,
General Power answered in this man-
ner:
No, I don't agreed with that statement.
We discovered things, but one of the most
Important things I think we discovered is
the great void in our knowledge.
Admiral Anderson expressed the same
fear in this way:
I think that it is also prudent to caution
that we do not know the precise extent to
which the U.S.S.R. can advance in nuclear
technology and in augmentg its overall
nuclear capability as a result of the most
recent series of tests conducted by
them. ? * " Further, with respect to the
military aspects, I would caution against
any suggestion that nuclear technology will
remain static; that prevailing offensive or
defensive balance of forces cannot change;
or that nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R. could
be acceptable in the security interests of the
United States.
C. WE WOULD BE 'UNABLE TO PROOF-TEST OUR
WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Grave fears were expressed during the
hearings with reference to our inability,
under the treaty, to proof-test our nu-
clear weapons. Dr. Foster's statement
is an illustration:
Perhaps the starkest of these other wor-
ries is that we will not be able to proof-test
our weapons systems. Missile systems for
offense or defense are extremely complex,
yet must function not only under the ideal
laboratory conditions in which they are usu-
ally tested, but also under the most adverse
conditions?those of nuclear war. I know
of simpler systems which have not per-
formed as expected?or which have actually
failed?when proof-tested in environments
Which are far better understood than that
of a hostile nuclear situation. Technical
people have had this experience not once but
many times. That the exact nuclear en-
vironment for missiles, missile sites, and re-
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16614
' entry vehicles probably cannot be completely
duplicated even without treaty restrictions
is not an argument for no atmospheric tests
whatever. We can obtain a much better
understanding of the situation with nuclear
experiments in the atmosphere than without
them.
Admiral Strauss, at page 672 of the
test ban treaty hearings, expressed the
need for testing in this way:
TESTING TOR COMPATIBILITY OP WARHEADS TO
SYSTEMS
There are, as you know, other purposes
in testing besides the specialization and the
improvement of weapons. We test to be sure
that the weapon and its carrier--originally
only the manned bomber and now also the
missile?will function toegther as a depend-
able system. Even if weapon development
should be frozen in its present state, there
is no warranty for assuming that the car-
rier of the weapon may not be, and most
probably will be, as revolutionary in the fu-
ture as the guided missile and the Polaris
submarine are today by comparison with the
state of military art crnly 10 short years ago
when neither of these existed.
When these new devices are invented, they
-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19
can see the danger when you are specu- The caliber of tests conducted by the:
lating on a quality. You might think Russians following the moratorium was
you have it. He might think you don't such as to necessitate elaborate prepare-
have it." tions extending over a long period of time
Now we are talking about deterrence, and prior to the resumption of the tests.
in deterrence it is not ,so much what we Well-informed witnesses have testified
think Of our capability. The important that at least 11/2 years were required to
thing is what does the Soviet Union think of propare for the high-altitude tests alone;
our capability, and that, is an -Unknown. and there are highly informed persons
D. WE WOVED BE PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING who estimate that the Soviets carried on
INFORMATION CONCERNING WEAPONS EFFECTS their preparations, for the entire series
UPON WEAPONS SYSTEMS of tests, from the very beginning of the
Mr. President, the fact that this Nation 34-month moratorium. We, therefore,
has had military superiority has pre- were not only unable to detect the acts-
vented the Soviet Union from overrun- ity, on the part of the Russians, in pre-
ning the countries of Eastern Europe, paring for a resumption of the tests; but
the Middle East, and Africa, and has re- by our having observed the moratorium
suited in a world free from nuclear war- and, thereby, having failed to make
fare. Our military superiority has un- preparations to resume nuclear tests, we
derwritten and assured our own national were unable to conduct an atmospheric
security. I think the reason we have not explosion of a nuclear device before April
had war with the Soviet Union is re- 25, 1962?almost 8 months after the RUB-
markably simple: we have had over- sians had resumed atmospheric testing.
whelming superiority.. And if any idea Our preparation for a resumption of a t-
of attacking this Nation has been con- mospheric tests was therefore a hasty
sidered by anyone, the idea had to be one; and our subsequent tests were not
OI it ulousness ------------ ensive or successful as were
can only be dependably mated to the weapon rejected
by testing. Their theoretical compatibility I believe that this 4 a sound position those of the Russians. In other words,
with the weapon will be too uncertain to rely which we should continue to maintain, the Soviet Union, by deliberately plan-
upon. because I believe that our- way of life is ning to resume tests. and by conducting
General Power alluded again and again worth it and that our economy will sus- preparations throughout the period of
to the necessity of proof testing our taut it. moratorium, as some think, was able not
weapons: ? Recently, we have been switching the only to get the jump on us, by a period
I have some * *. ? different types of nuclear emphasis, as far as our striking power of 8 months, in the resumption of at-
weapons in the Strategic Air Command is concerned, from the manned bomber mospheric tests, but also was able to con-
arsenal'. None of them have been tested OP- to the ballistic missile. This means that duct a much more elaborate, compre-
' ti nail front stockpile to detonation. I our deterrent posture is going to rely hensive, and productive series.
General LeMay, in referring to our
possible loss of ground within the last 2
years, more specifically because of the
preparations conducted by the Soviets
during the voluntary moratorium and
their planned and surprise abrogation of
that moratorium, said?as shown on
pages 363 and 364 of the hearings:
General LEMKE. We have already lost, I
think, in some aspects, the lead that we had
at the end of the war. We certainly had a
tremendous lead then. We have lost that
to some extent, because particularly in the
last couple of years the Russians have con-
ducted a very vigorous nuclear program.
Ours has not been of that magnitude. So
we, in effect, have allowed the Russians to
catch up in some fields and perhaps even
surpass us in some.
What we want to do is reverse this trend,
at least to hold our own, and forge ahead if
at all possible.
Senator JacxsoN. Is it not true that they
and with it would ge the deterrent which made this big gain because they were able
has heretofore guaranteed the security to use the element of surprise in abrogating
of America and the free world against without 'warning the moratorium?
? more and more upon our missile system.
tlaink this is a mistake I think they should
The only way you can prove a weapon sys- As stated by General Power, "In 1959
be tested.
tem is to take it out of the Stockpile in a we had better than 3,000 bombers.. in the
random pattern and let the tactical unit Strategic Air Command, and 10 years
take it out and detonate it. If you haven't later, in 1968, we will have some 700,"
done this, there is always a chance that according to present programs. In the
something has happened that we won't dis- meantime, we will have added greatly
Cover until too late. ? * The point I am to our ballistic raissile complex. In
making is that, unless you test the very thing
that is in your arsenal, you are never cer- other words, we are phasing out our
tam, and the stakes are so high I feel we manned bomber program and are re-
Must be certain, placing it with missile delivery systems.
* ? * ? This means, then, that our missile sys-
We have not tested any of the operational tem will become, More and more, the
warheads in our inventory. That includes security lifeline of this Nation and the
the missiles and the bombs. free world. It follews, therefore, that
? ? ? * ? nothing must be allowed to eventuate
A certain amount of information can be which would neutralize the effective-
arrived at in underground testing. * ? ? But ness of our missile delivery systems or
you never know until you atually test in permit the enemy to better penetrate our
the environment full scale *hether or not own defenses. Such an event would shift
you have solved the problem. Maybe you military superiority to the Soviet Union,
have oversolved it and pay -too heavy a
penalty. The sensible way to do it is to test
it in the nuclear environment.
*
But with the RV coming hack into the
atmosphere, it depends whellier you attack
it outside of the atmosphere, you have a
different heating problem. As soon as the
RV enters the atmosphere, it is being sub-
jected to additional terrific heat. Now if you
happens? And the ?nig way you can many At the advent of, the voluntai-y mora- On October 30, 1961., exactly 2 months
add pressure under those conditions, what
test it is in the real environment. torium in 1958, this country had un- after the Soviets had announced plans
General Power further referred to to resume nuclear testing, they deto-
' questioned superiority in nuclelir weep-
testing as necessary' "in Order to get a ...,tzttes faithfully observed the morator- nated a 50-megaton to 60-Megaton de-
ocns technology. 118ecause the United
higher confidence Viktor that you have inm, we conducted, no atmospheric tests vice. As late as August 5, 1962, the
a valid war plan for one thing, and that between October 3b, 1958, and April 25, Soviet Union detonated in the atrnos-
you have a credible military capability, 1962?a Period of 31/2 years. The Soviet magnitude of 30 megaton's. This was the
phere a nuclear device in the order of
and that you can react under all of the
Union broke the moratorium by re- first of some 40 tests continuing to De-
with in retaliation, and not only that, E..uming nuclear tests in the atmosphere celnber 25, 1962. The last atmospheric
various conditions that Ion are faced
but also that you can corivince any pe_ on September 1, 1961, having announced detonation by the United States was on
tential aggressors that-yoll have all this. its intention to resume such tests only November 4, 1962. Subsequent under-
So it must be a proven capability. You 2 days before, on August 30. ground tests were, however, conducted
attack.
, General LaMar. I think this is a fair state-
Itr is my fear that the proposed treaty, mweentw,eryees,nsoitr; that a rdiunring theenermmoroantes testrium
if ratified?as I On sure it will be? Program. The pErtupssiansg, I think, were. And
Will be the instruraent through which when they suddenly abrogated the mora-
and by virtue of which such an event will toriurn and launched the test program they
materialize Why ido I say this? made very rapid progress.
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL .REdORD ? SENA
'by the 'United -States: As recently as
June 30 of"thisieltr, the Atomic t nergy
Commislqn -repoited evidence of events
-In the Soviet Union in recent weeks
which may be nuclear tests of -very low
yields. Incidentally, our inability to
.know with certainty whether these de-
tected events arose from nuclear explo-
?sions is an example of the kind of un-
certainties which may well face the de-
cisionmaking elements of our Govern-
ment under the proposed treaty.
On July 2, Mr: ghrushchei, in a speech
in East merlin, agreed to negotiate on a
*nuclear test ban treaty limited to the
atmosphere, Outer space, and under-
'Water, The commencement of negotia-
tions on such a treaty began on July 15,
?1963.
It is niy; fear, Mr. President, that the
Soviet Union, during its elaborately
'planned, comprehensive postmoratorium
-tests, was able to acquire information
concerning? weapons effects whioh we
have not been able to acquire because
of our failure to explode a nuclear de-
vice in the order of magnitude of the
-Soviet nuclear explosions.
Mr. RUSSELL. lVIr. President, will the
Senator from West Virginia yield?
The? PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SinirsoN in the chair). Does the Sena-
Apr from West Virginia yield to the Sen-
ator from Georgia?
Mr. BYRD of West Virglnia. I am
glad to yield.
Mr. Re$SELL. I do not like to in-
terrupt the very., able and well-docu-
'mented discourse of the Senator from
West Virginia. I regret that I have not
been able to be in the Chamber during
"all the time he has been speaking; but
I have heard as much of ins speech as I
possibly could.
Does not the Senator believe that our
Obsession with opr world image has
Something to do with the fact that we
have fallen 'behind in some kinds of
tests? As soon asnther nations protest,
'we cut back the size of our tests, or aban-
don them altogetrier. We Seeni' fo be--
'neve that we cannot exist unless wp
strive ceaselessly, day and night, to
create the proper kind of world image.
' Of course we want people to like us. I
.wish all would admire, us; I should like
-to see all the nations of the 'world
emulate us; but t believe there is danger
in carrying this policy too far.
Their world image has never disturbed
the rt,us$ians, They were preparing to
test for the high-yield warhead: As it
,turnecl out, I believe our scientists esti-
Mated that it was one of 60 megatons;
but after im was actually tested, it was
found that if it had had a different kind
of jacket it would have been a 100-mega-
ton bomb.
gven the United Nations-overwhelm-
ingly passed, as I-recall, a resolution--
although I do not recall the exact vote.
, BYRD of I,/est Virginia. It was
passed by a vote o 87 to 11.
mr. ntsstst. Yes, 87 to 11?or 8
to 1. The United Nations passed that
resolution; but it had no more effect on
`Rnssifee conduct* of thatlest than if
some peisgn confined to a Menfar instf-
tutlon, hacl_wr4en a letter to- Mr: ghru-,
Isto.149?p
shchev. He did 'not pay the slightest
particle of attention to the resolution;
Instead, he proceeded With the tests.
How hits that hurt the Russians? In-
stead, 'when' they do such things, they
seem only to increase our desire to ap-
pease them, to accord them every con-
sideration in connection with treaties,
and to abandon' elementary safeguards
for our Nation's security.
I have been disturbed about the over-
weening and compelling desire to yield
almost everything to the world image.
-We hear about it here- on the Senate
floor. In the course of the speeches dur-
ing this debate, very few Senators Who
have spoken in favor of approval of the
treaty, have failed to state -that a very
poor impression of the United States
would be created if we did not imme-
diately advise and consent to ratifica-
tion of the treaty. However, I believe
that sometimes our willingness to lean
over backward in our attempts tb please
everyone is mistaken for weakness.
If we would pursue a firmer policy, not
only with respect to the Soviet Union
and the Communist world in-general, but
also in protecting our interests through-
out the entire world, I believe we would
fare better ttan we do by sitting down,
and holding our hands, or holding our
heads, and being distressed almost to
death about the kind of world image we
are creating. It is a form of narcissism;
we are so worried about looking "pretty"
to the world that we abandon almost ev-
erything else, and give ourselves up to
Idolatry of the world image and to at-
tempts to create the right kind of world
Image.
Of course, the world image has its
blaze, and we must respect world opin-
ion. So we try to make friends. Heav-
en knows that we have been generous
enough in our efforts to make friends
throughout the world. We have spent
more than $100,000 million; we have
? given it away here, there, and every-
where. On the other hand, the Rus-
sians, who have made a few loans and
-some minor grants, apparently have
-fared about as well as we have. Cer-
tainly they have fared as well by looking
after their own self-interest, when they
thought it was involved, as we have
-by abandoning our own self-interest, at
-times, when we thought we would thus
create the proper world image.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I thank the senior Senator
from Georgia for his very pertinent
statement concerning the anticipated ef-
fects which our rejection of the treaty
--would have upon world opinion, and also
concerning the fact that this is a factor
Which evidently has carried great weight
? with many Senators in reaching their de-
?Olsten to support the treaty.
The same factor Of world Opinion was
reflected, I am sure, in the course of
reaching decisions upon the treaty by
menibers of the military.
Mr. TIMSELL. fear of World
opinion has become almost a national
disease.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Yes.- I
-shall refer to viorId opinion 'a little later
in my statement. But r think it would
' -
16615
be -arirOpos' of What the senior Senator
from Georgia has said to refer, at this
time, to a statement by General LeMay
which appears on page 371 of the hear-
ings of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions on the test ban treaty. General
LeMay said:
General LEMAY. I think the fact that it
had been signed had an effect on me, yes.
In other words, both administrations in the
years since the war have been trying to make
some gains in the general disarmament field.
This may be a gairi.
Consideration of world opinion must
have had an effect upon General LeMay,
or at least the fear of an adverse effect
which rejection of the treaty would have
upon other nations of our world and our
relationship with those nations must
have been a -factor. It could not help
but be a factor in General LeMay's
thinking, in the thinking of others or,
for that matter, in my own thinking.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I should
like to continue briefly, and then I shall
be happy to yield to the Senator from
Louisiana.
On page 372 of the hearings, the Sen-
? ator ?from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER]
asked the following question:
Senator GOLDWATER. My question was at
this point that if it had not been signed,
if it had not been initialed, if we were merely
sitting here discussing the desirability or
lack of desirability of a limited treaty like
this, would you oppose it or support it?
General LEMAY. I had not given any
thought to that patricular one. This is an
important question. I would think that I
would have been against it.
On page 373, the Senator from South
Carolina and General LeMay engaged
in the following colloquy:
POSITION IF TREATY WERE NOT YET SIGNED
Senator THURMOND. Senator GOLDWATER
asked a question similar to one I propounded
in the Preparedness Subcommittee. That is
this: If the proposed treaty had not already
been signed, but was being considered in a
proposal stage, would you recommend that
the United States sign the treaty?
General LEMAY. I haven't given any
thought to the subject, Senator. I said I
would?I thought I would not be in favor of
it. But I wouldn't even want to give an
unqualified "No" until I spent some time on
it. Certainly this was a factor that influ-
enced me in recommending that we ratify it.
How much weight I would give to it?I would
want to spend a considerable amount of time
on this, and I have not done so.
Senator THURMOND. I believe your answer
in the subcommittee, and I quote, was this:
"I think that if we were in a proposal stage
that I would not recommend?that I would
recommend against it."
That is correct, is it not?
General LEMAY. I think I would. That is
correct.
On page 399, General LeMay said:
Well, I gave some weight to this psycho-
logical atmosphere that you were talking
about, Senator, myself, in arriving at my
conclusions. At this morning's session the
other Chiefs said no, they didn't think it was
very important. I do attach some impor-
tance to it because for a number of years we
u_lote,s trying to reduce tensions, reduce
armaments in thls country both administra-
tions
have been trying to do that.
_
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16616 CONGRESSIONAL ,RECORD -- SENATE
This is a step in that direction, I believe,
and if we did not ratify it I don't know what
our political loss would be, but I think there
would be political loss.
So I gave it some weight in arriving at my
answer.
On page 399 General Wheeler said:
I would agree that world opinion has built
up to the point where there would be very
sizable political implications if the United
States were to dash these hopes. I am not
prepared to say exactly what the effect of
those political implications or the political
effect would be, but I do not think it would
be good.
Secretary of State Rusk, who sup-
ported the treaty, made a statement re-
garding world opinion which should
guide us in our deliberations upon this
treaty. I quote from page 55 of the
hearings, where the following question
by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARL-
sox], will be found:
There could be, I am sure, no question as
to the legal right to withdraw from a treaty,
but I wonder if there is not another side to
this. Once our signature is on this treaty,
would it not be most difficult to withdraw
from the treaty from the point of view of
world opinion, even though there is positive
evidence that the Soviet Union had violated
it?
What will our position be with other na-
tions in that event?
Secretary Rusx. So I think there would be
very great regret if this treaty were to
collapse.
But, on the other hand, where we are
dealing with a security matter that goes
to the life of our own country I do not be-
lieve that world opinion can play a decisive
role. We must do what has to be done, and
I believe that the rest of the world will
understand.
I think that there Would be general under-
standing, even if with great regret, there
would be general understanding if we came
to the conclusion that this treaty was not
working and that our security required us
to resume testing.
of course, Secretary Rusk was talk-
ing about the possibility of our having
to withdraw at some future time. It is
easy to say now that in such a situation
we could disregard world opinion. But
we have not reached that bridge yet.
mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. RUSSELL. The Senator has cer-
tainly shown that he has done his home-
work. He has available a quotation of
evidence for any question which might
arise.
At that period, when we first started
the hearings, nearly all of our attention
was centered on the effects the treaty
would have on the United States of
America and Soviet Russia. We did not
go very far beyond that point. Some
questions were asked as to Chinese test-
ing and French testing. But we did not
realize that we would wind up with more
than 100 countries signatory to the
treaty. That was one of the things that
finally persuaded me that the treaty was
not in the best interests of our Nation,
Amendments will be proposed to the
treaty by countries which have nothing
to lose. If they receive one-third of the
vote& a conference will be called, and if
there were a large majority of votes in
favor of an amendment, it would be dif-
_
flcult for us to say that we would not
SUP port the particular amendment.
That is as grave a danger to me as the
implications of the treaty itself. Men of
great ability, courage and intelligence
have risen on the floor of the Senate and
said?
We would shock the world if we did not
sign the treaty. I myself have grave doubts
and besetting fears about it. I fear it will
endanger our country. But I shall support
it because I do not wish to offend world
opinion.
I must say that that argument almost
persuaded me at the Outset. I finally de-
cided that nothing in human history
would lead me to believe that any other
country would sacrifice any of its vital
interests on our behalf. So while I crave
the good opinion of every people on
earth, when it comes to a question of
gaining world opinion at the expense of
the vital interests of the United States,
I must be counted out. I cannot go that
far.
Much as I wish to be liked, and much
as I wish to have my Nation ad:mired,
when it comes to a clash between world
opinion and our vital interests, the world
opinion will have to "go hang." I shall
have to be counted out, fot that will not
enter into my calculations.
I. do not believe any other country on
earth has ever made the sacrifices which
the United States has made since the
end of World War II to build up a favor-
able world image. We have built up an
image of people who will continue to tax
themselves to take care of projects all
over the earth. If the American people
ever reach the point where they cannot
maintain the tremendous foreign assist-
ance program the tillage will be de-
stroyed, and we shall have a bad world
image, because next to a woman scorned
"hell bath no fury" like that which re-
sults from taking away from a country
some benefit which has been extended
to it for a long period of years.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I agree with the Senator from
Georgia. It seems to Me the sound po-
sition which has been expressed by the
proponents of the treaty; namely, that
if that moment ever comes when we must
withdraw we should disregard world
opinion in the interests of our own na-
tional security?should be applied here
and now. I should like to apply that
argument at this point.
The Senator from Georgia referred to
world opinion. The Senator referred to
the number of nations that have signed
the nuclear test ban treaty. As of today,
97 nations have signed the nuclear test
ban treaty. Since we are talking about
world opinion, I should like to closely
and meticultrusly scrutinize exactly what
nations will constitute that world opin-
ion insofar as signatures are concerned.
I shall read the list of the nations:
The United States, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, :Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burma, Cameroon, Canada,
Ceylon, Chad.
There are countriea on this list I have
never before heard of. There are coun-
tries listed which, I daresay, few Sena-
September 19
tors ever realized were in existence. Yet
they are countries which are supposed to
alter the course of world history.
Colombia, Chile, China?Taiwan?
Congo, Leopoldville, Costa :Rica, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethio-
pia, Finland, Gabon.
I have no doubt that I shall mispro-
nounce some of these names, because
this is my first occasion ever to read
them.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, if the
Senator will permit me so to state, when
I announced on the Senate floor my
views with respect to this question, and
incidentally stated that Gabon was the
91st state to sign the treaty, an eminent,
able, well-educated and intelligent Sen-
ator asked me how to spell ."Gabon."
Of course, Gabon will have the same
right to propose an amendment to this
treaty that the representative of the
U.S. Government will have.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Cer-
tainly.
German Democratic Republic--East
Germany?Federal Republic of Ger-
many?West Germany--Ghana, Greece,
Honduras.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield at that
point?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We are told
in the committee report that the treaty
will not forbid us from using atomic
weapons to fulfill our treaty commit-
ments in the event we must defend some
nation.
Is it not true that any one of these
little countries, some of which have
hardly been heard of, would have the
right to haul the United States before
the World Court and have the World
Court tell the United States that it is
forbidden by the very clear language of
the treaty to use its missiles or atomic
weapons in the fulfillment of treaty com-
mitments to defend some other country?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I so in-
terpret the treaty.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The treaty
reads that among its purposes is a pur-
pose to prohibit pollution in the atmos-
phere. That would give every country
an interest. No matter where an atomic
explosion occurred, whether over our
Nation's own territory, over the high
seas, or in space, every country would
have an interest and could haul the
United States before the World Court.
We are a member of the Court. We do
have the Connally reservation.
A majority of Senators who expect to
vote for the treaty have been trying to
get kid of the Connally reservation.
In such an event we would have to
stultify ourselves and say that the treaty
was not an international question, which
would provide for jurisdiction of the
World Court.
It is clear to me that any one of the
countries which accept the jurisdiction
of the World Court would have the right
to haul the United States before the
World Court, which could tell the United
States that the treaty means exactly
what it says.
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SE
As the Senator well knows, General
Visenhower, a former President of the
United States, said we would not wish to
be held to a commitment that we could
not use these weapons for our own de-
fense purposes or to fulfill treaty com-
mitments. The administration tells us
the treaty does not mean that at all, and
that they have no such thing in mind.
? There has been a legal opinion written by
?soem legal officer who was willing to put
his name on it, which says the treaty does
not mean that. But the Senator knows
that the rule of statutory interpretation
Is that when the language is clear one
does not look to legislative intent. Many
people, who did not realize that if the
language is clear the legislative intent is
Meaningleas, have been put in jail.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator. /Agree with him.
I continue to call the roll of the sig-
natories: Hungary, -Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Korea, Kuwait.
Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxem-
bourg, Malaya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Norway.
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philip-
pines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, San
Marino, Sierra Leone, Somali, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian
Arab Republic.
Tanganyika, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad,
and Tobago?there are two names, but
only one country?Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, United Arab Republic?Egypt--
Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, 'Nest-
ern Samoa, Yemen Arab Republic?
Yemen?and Yugoslavia.
Mr. President, as has been stated one
Of the arguments persistently suggested
In favor of the Senate's consenting to the
ratification of this treaty revolves around
the consequences to U.S. prestige and its
Image as the leader of the free world,
and the adverse reaction which could be
eXpected from world opinion if our con-
sent should be withheld.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true
that a great many of those nations?par-
ticularly the smaller and less well-known
nations?signed the treaty because the
United States sent its Ambassador to the
country and asked- that it be signed?
In nearly all those countries?all ex-
cept the ones behind the Iron Curtain,
With possitly one or two exceptions?
there are U.S. aid programs in operation.
My guess would- be that the Ambassador
merely walked In and asked them to sign.
The people of those nations have no
Weapons nevertheless, they would not be
barred frOin testing atmoic explosions
erg.K9u,nd-,,
suppose the American Ambassador
, merely walked in and asked them to sign
the treaty. They would sign, of course.
I have been informed that perhaps not
more than seven countries have an
atomic capacity, the ability to build an
atomic wpapom _
The American Ambassador would walk
In. - The nation would not have an
ability to build a weapon anyway
There would be a U.S..aid program in
that nation. The Ambassador would
say, "I would like to have you join in this
treaty." And they would say, "We think
that would be fine."
While I respect our president and feel
very kindly toward him, and propose to
help him in some of his legislative pro-
posals, certainly with regard to this type
of thing if the administration or the
Government is worried about the em-
barrassment that may be caused, before
we go that far out on a limb, it should
withhold action until it ascertains
whether the Senate is going to ratify the
treaty.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr, President, if the
Senator will yield, the treaty is also im-
portant to certain ambassadors of most
of those countries. It is a stimulation
their ego to sign the treaty. It puts
them on a level with the "big boys."
They can say, "Here we are all together.
We are just as big as the U.S.S.R. and
the United States and Great Britain or
any other great nation, and we have the
same right to offer amendments as any-
one else; and while we have no nuclear
weapons, if we can do anything to ham-
string those who do have them and limit
their use, it is in our interest, because
100 years from now we hope to be a
mighty country. We may be able to
dominate the earth, if we can stop those
who have such weapons."
I think we can states pretty well
by reactions within the human family.
Anyone who remembers when he was a
little boy knows how little boys like to
play with big boys. What a hard time
the big boys have keeping the little
boys from playing with them. This
treaty gives the emerging nations great
prestige. A foreign minister can say,
"I was in the United Statesand sat down
by the Secretary of the United States
and, in behalf of our country"?perhaps
with a few hundred thousand popula-
tion?"I took the same position on the
ban on nuclear weapons as did the United
States and Soviet Russia, We are all
equals in the community of nations spon-
soring the treaty."
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Does not the Sen-
ator from West Virginia think this was
a move on the part of the administration,
from the psychological standpoint, so it
could be placed in the position of saying,
"Look at all the nations which signed
the treaty. If this country fails to ratify
the treaty, that will give us a bad image
around the world'?" Does not the Sen-
ator think a psychological play was made
on that point'?
Mr. BYRD a West Virginia. I do not
presume to read the minds otother peo-
? ple or to look into their hearts or to
know whether or riot this may have been
the purpose and plan of the administra-
tion. I merely say that we are con-
fronted with the situation, and I do not
believe that we should be overly per-
aded by it. _
,?I. join with the Senator from Georgia
In saying it is important that we enjoy
ATE, 16617
favorable world opinion, and it is im-
portant that we project a favorable image
before the world for ourselves; but I feel
in asituation such as confronts Senators,
they are voting on a question that is
vital to the security of the United States
of America, and Senators should sub-
ordinate the factor of world opinion, or
our _world image, to a secondary role in
reaching a decision as to how to vote.
Mr. THURMOND, Does not the Sen-
ator feel that we would enhance our
image if some of the very nations that
seem offended by our action would not
ask for foreign aid? I believe the rec-
ord shows that we have provided foreign
aid, to 10_4 nations of the world, and this
year there is a request to provide foreign
aid to 100 foreign nations. The record
shows that since World War II this coun-
try has provided $121 billion, including
interest, in foreign aid. Would it not
seem more in order if there were not re-
quests from these countries for large
amounts of aid? Would it not be more
In keepingy they would first provide for
their own means, and not call upon this
country for aid and then turn around
and criticize this country for anything
that happens here?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I thank the Senator for his
comments. I appreciate them. To
some extent, I share those sentiments,
but I do net believe that they are perti-
nent at this time, so I do not wish to
proceed to discuss the matter of foreign
aid. I do not mean to say that the sub-
ject of foreign aid is entirely dissociated
from the subject which is now under dis-
cussion. I cannot see the close rele-
vancy of it however.
Mr. THURMOND. Except in re-
spect: Nations over the world want for-
eigri: aid. The same nations have been
asked to sign the treaty; and many of
those nations are the very ones which
have criticized the policy of this country.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not
think there is any question about it; and
1 deplore the situation.
Mr. President if we accept the argu-
ment concerning world opinion and if
we agree that world reaction Would be
Intolerable, the implications for future
U.S. implementation of the withdrawal
provisions of the treaty are ominous, as
/ have indicated.
But if we cannot refuse our consent
now, before we are committed, how much
more difficult Will if, be for us to with-
draw, even with cause, after a few
months or years have passed?
I am convinced that we cannot have
the best of both worlds. We cannot
bow to world opinion now, and empha-
size its significance, and still argue that
our withdrawal -from the treaty would
be precise and simple and dictated solely
by this Government's own judgment of
its security requirements.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to
the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is it not true
that if this Nation is compelled to fight a
...3Yar. Alie_BOVIet. Unioa Jam* the
Cuban question, for example, it is en-
tirely possible that we shall not have a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE September 19
single ally that will make a major con-
tribution, one way or the other, to the
outcome of the conflict? The Senator
well realizes, I am sure, that if there is
to be a nuclear war, most countries that
do not have nuclear weapons will count
themselves out in the beginning.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I think
they would like to count themselves out
if they could by so doing extricate them-
selves from the situation.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Can the
Senator suggest what possible difference
it would make in a struggle of this nature
whether the smaller nations joined or
stayed out? Would not the outcome be
determined one way or the other by the
devastating power of the two great
nuclear powers?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not
think there is any question about it.
The United States possesses 90 percent
of the striking power of the free world.
That 90 percent of the striking power of
the free world is built around the Po-
laris submarine and the Strategic Air
Command. I think this fact supports
what the Senator from Louisiana has
just said.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point
that strikes the Senator from Louisiana
is that if we should let the strength and
defenses of this country decline, as com-
pared with the Soviet Union's, to the
point where we would not be able to save
ourselves, we would be so foolish that we
should not expect anybody to save us,
because we have that power today, and
we ought to see to it that it is main-
tained.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I agree.
Mr. President, we cannot argue that
this Government will be the unchal-
lenged master of its fate in connection
with the withdrawal provisions of this
treaty, and the servant of world opinion
in connection with the treaty's ratifi-
cation.
Our national security policies either
are dictated by world opinion or they
are not. If they are not, we can dismiss
world opinion as a factor which looms
large in our consideration of the treaty
and confine ourselves to its security im-
plications. If they are, we should rec-
ognize, then, that withdrawal will be
complicated and difficult, and not the
simple, straightforward announcement
of decision and intent that the treaty
and its advocates suggest.
I now return to my fifth point, the
argument that we would be prohibited
from acquiring information of weapons
effects of tests.
General Power articulately voiced my
fears before the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee, when he said:
Now there are great voids in our knowledge
on such things as (deleted) shock wave prop-
agation, blackout, communications, and
command and control that, in my opinion,
can be obtained only through atmospheric
testing.
If this information which we don't have
should turn out to be valid information
(deleted) I would say it is vital.
So, Mr. President, is there a possibility
of unknown vulnerabilities in our inter-
continental ballistic missile launch sites?
Are our missiles truly survivable in a nu-
clear environment? Are our missile sites
vulnerable to overpre,,ssure, shock, and
thermal effects which flow from the ex-
Plosions of high-yield weapons?
I ask these further questions, Mr.
President: Is it possible that the Soviets,
in exploding multimeg-'aton weapons, may
be able to render our missiles useless
through weapons effects upon the
highly sophisticated electronic systems?
Will our nuclear warheads and reentry
vehicles have the ability to penetrate and
survive in a nuclear environment created
by Soviet defenses? Will our radars be
ineffective in the presence of "blackout"
from multimegaton latusts, thus making
it impossible to locate the incoming war-
heads and perhaps more importantly to
discern between .the incoming warhead
and the decoys?
While I do not doubt that our deter-
rent missile systems Will be able to per-
form their mission tcklay and tomorrow,
because of their complexity there are un-
resolved uncertainties that we need to
determine and to rectify so as to assure
ourselves that our deterrent capability
will be maintained' in future years.
These uncertainties can be more fully re-
solved only through a series of atmos-
pheric nuclear tests. Could it be possible
that the Russians, through their post-
moratorium atmospheric tests, have ac-
quired valid information which will guide
them in determining' and resolving such
uncertainties as far as their own systems
are concerned?
This is the question the answer to
which we may learn, when it is too late
General Power referred to some voids
in our knowledge:
This missile has never been operationally
tested all the way through from stockpile to
detonation, and we have never tested such
things as the vulnerability [deleted] due to
shock wave propagation, due to blackout,
there are many voids in our knowledge as
to the operational capabilities and vulner-
abilities of this weapon system.
In particular the RV, !deleted] thermal ef-
fects, blast effects?cahnot really be tested
from my point of view as an operator until
you test it in the nuclear environment, and
as I am responsible for writing the war plans
of the free world, I have to deal with facts.
I have to deal with proven data, and if
too much of the data is extrapolated or
theoretical, I do not have a high confidence
factor that I have a sound plan. We are
dealing with the security of the United
States, and if facts can be obtained, I want
to haye them.
Now, in writing a war plan, I have to as-
sign a survivability factor to every one of
these silos. I have to assume that the Soviet
Union has missiles with a certain accuracy
and a certain yield arid that they land in a
certain place. Then I have to extrapolate
whether that particular silo is going to sur-
vive and give it a value. I have to do that
for each weapon system.
Dr. Edward Teller referred to the pos-
sible vulnerability of our weapons sites:
It is a fact fraught with danger that the
ability of these sites to withstand the over-
pressures for which they have been designed
has never been tested. * * * It is prob-
able that under the 4test ban as proposed
and interpreted at the present time these
badly needed tests will not be carried out.
Dr. Foster spoke of the problem in this
way:
:Regarding defense, one of the critical
questions concerns the effect of blackout
from defending missile's on the defense sys-
tem itself.
Dr. Foster then went on to explore
the problems which might confront our
effort to penetrate Soviet defenses:
On the opposite side of the coin, suppose
that the U.S.S.R. were to develop a defense
such that our ability to penetrate might
depend on a saturation attack. For this
application, specially designed hardened war-
heads might be required. Considerable
progress on such warheads can be made with
underground tests, but under the treaty
again the crucial atmospheric experiments
to determine if the warhead actually has
the necessary hardness against combined
radiation and shock effects would be pro-
hibited. We might thereby 'be denied as-
surance of such a penetration capability.
The disadvantages resulting from the
treaty in restricting our knowledge of site
vulnerability, :penetration and defense, I
believe, are very serious. Our current judg-
ments are based on relatively few atmospher-
ic tests. Wide margins of error are possible
in weapon effects which we do not fully un-
derstand. Other effects, heretofore ne-
glected as unimportant, could become dam-
Ment, Ignorance, ineradicable under the
treaty, can thereby increase the uncertainty
in technical-military judgments.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield to
the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am sure the
Senator is familiar with the fact that
not only do we not know the information
we should have if we are to be secure
in our defense, and whether the hard-
ened sites will withstand the shock and
radiation of an enemy attack with
atomic weapons; but, as the chairman of
the Armed Services Committee pointed
out in his speech, we do not know
whether the overwhelming; majority of
the missiles we have in our inventory
will actually work, because they have
never been tested under the conditions
under which they would be fixed at a
target.
I can illustrate that by the fact that
in World War II the Japanese sank al-
most our entire Pacific Fleet, at least
everything they could catch at Pearl
Harbor, with torpedoes that we did not
even know existed. They had tested
their torpedoes against old ships, to
make sure they would work.
On the other hand, during the first 18
months of World War II, time after time
our submarine commanders would fire
torpedoes at a Japanese ship, only to
have the torpedoes bounce off the ship,
or go under the ship in the case of mag-
netic torpedoes. The torpedoes would
not explode, because we had never tested
them under the actual circumstances in
which they would be used. We had never
determined whether they would work
when they were fired. 'We had con-
tented ourselves with putting them
through a test course. We thought that
if all the components checked out, they
would work. That is what we assumed.
Of course it was a false assumption, and
it almost lost us the war.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the able Senator for his observation con-
cerning the failure to test torpedoes dur-
ing the early part of World War II. The
Senator's comment is interesting and ap-
propriate.
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1963
At page 182 of the hearings the Sen-
ator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] asked a
question with reference to weapons
effects:
Senator CANNON. Now, do you feel that we
have sufficient evidence and information
available to us in the areas of guidance, from
the standpoint of weapons effects?
Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe we have
sufficient information available to us in rela-
tion to the effect on guidance of nuclear
explosions properly to protect our force and
insure that will be effective against the
enemy. I want to emphasize that we don't
know all there is to know about the effects of
nuclear detonations on guidance. Much of
what we don't know can be learned from
underground tests.
There is considerable difference of
opinion, of course, as to how much can
be learned from underground tests, but
there is unanimity of opinion that every-
-thing we need to know Concerning weap-
OM effects cannot belearned from un-
derground tests.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Secre-
tary's statement relies heavily upon the
Idea that we could test a warhead under-
ground and find that it would explode;
then test some other component and find
that it would 'operate satisfactorily;
which would lead to the conclusion that
if the components were satisfactory
when tested separately, and then were
all assembled, desired results could be
obtained.
What is wrong with that theory is
that so often in actual operation the
WeapOn will fail. That was what we, Because tins is the total effect in the at-
learned about our torpedos in World mosphere I am referring to here on the inte-
grated system, the whole system. We can
War 11. Theoretically they worked; in carry out component studies, that is, the
practice, they were not worth the effect of the radiation from an ABM on a
powder it took to blow them up. warhead, and things of that sort, under-
'When a, weapon is as complicated as ground. We can do that underground. But
a missile, which is'infinitebr more diffi- in order to study the effect of an ABM and
cult to explode than it is to fire a tor- its kill radiation on an incoming warhead,
pedo, the only way to learn whether it under the conditions that you would en-
willwork is actually to try it under the counter in actual use, you have to do it in
kind of conditions in which it is designed the atmosphere where the use would--in the
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CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD ? SENATE 16619
war conditions. But at least it would ons effects tests which would involve at-
be a test to determine whether a weapon mospheric testing. That is a disability, but
not a critical one. We can indeed develop,
would actually work. fabricate, and deploy an antiballistic missile
The Senator from West Virginia knows system if we so choose.
that many missiles in inventory have Senator HUMPHREY. In other words, the
never been tried under similar condi- scientific work relating to the vehicle that
tions. As to those, the hope is that they would be needed to mount a nuclear war-
would work, although we do not know head or to send it into outer space or into
the high altitude or into any kind of defense
whether they would or not. position is not impaired by this treaty, is it?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Exactly. General TAYLOR. No, sir. That can be
General Power said there were x num- done and tested. It is primarily the absence
bers of weapons in his arsenal, not one of a complete weapons lest, including the
of which had been tested through the nuclear warhead, which is being made impos-
point of detonation. sible.
?Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Since our The point made by the Senator from
lives depend on the functioning of mis- Louisiana has been well substantiated by
siles, would not the Senator say it is statements of our military experts. The
rather dangerous to say that weapons fear that I have, and that certain other
which we rely on will work, not knowing Senators have, is that while we do not
whether they will work or not?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I cer-
possess more information?and it may be
vital information?with respect to weap-
tainly would say so. ons effects on our weapons sites and
At page 214 of the hearings before the systems, the Russians may already have
Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. acquired such information as a result of
Seaborg said, with respect to weapons their extensive, elaborate, comprehen-
effects : sive, effective, and successful atmospheric
This is a weapons effect question for which tests that were conducted subsequent to
the Department of Defense has primary re- their abrogation of the moratorium.
sponsibility. I can say that we have ob-
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sen-
tained a good deal of information on black-
out phenomena in connection with our al-
ator familiar with the statement of Dr.
ready performed high-altitude tests. Brown to the effect that We could design
However, it would not be possible to ob- around the areas of American ignor-
tain any substantial further information on ance? Can the Senator say what Dr.
blackout phenomena under the terms of Brown meant by "designing around" our
this test ban treaty. ignorance of the answers to these prob-
At page 245 of the hearings, Dr. Sea-
lems? How do we "design around"?
borg said, again with respect to the sub-
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I as-
ject of weapon effects on our weapons
sume, with reference to a blackout of our
radars, that he meant that we would
system sites: provide more radars, and that they
would be spaced in such away that even
though there might be a blackout here
or a blackout there, the radars in some
other area would function. That would
be one way of "designing around." ?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If there were
a large explosion in the vicinity of a city
which was the target of one missile, I
would then assume that "designing
around" probably would mean that we
would try to have a radar several hun-
environment where it would take place, and
to function. that is what t mean by that statement. dred miles away, or might have some re-
Another example is the orbiting ofmote control procedure, in the hope of
men in space. Every time a man was At page 274 of the hearings, General
put in space?it has been done about 10 Taylor said: guiding a missile against a succeeding
weapon aimed at the same city.
times--sornething has gone wrong. The There are other disadvantages which apply
Not having had explained in detail
first time the shield was not ejected as in varying degrees to both sides. For ex-
ample, knowledge of weapons effects is in what the problems are?and I am sure
it was supposed to eject. There was fear complete at best and although knowledge some of them are classified?it seems
that the man would burn up as he came kconuelwdlebdegegawinheidehfreonml underground testing to me that the idea of "designing
out of space. I believe it was John Glenn around" areas of American ignorance
whose shield burned. When another hibited media could provide in
pro
rather than finding answers to the prob-
man was orbited, something else hap- denied. Also, there would be no opportunitye
pened. " Improvisations were made to to conduct environmental tests of current lem would be in the same general
weapons or of those which might be ac- category as trying to kill elephants with
Intereontinental ballistic missiles? quired in order to verify their performance. broomsticks, because one would be pro-
hibited by a treaty from developing a
overcome mechanical failures.
the ones we are 'building at this mo- General Taylor, referring to the sub-
_ good elephant gun.
Ment?can ge thiough to an enemy. ject of weapons effects, said, at page 286:
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. It would
But only one has been tested success- I am not a technical expert, Senator certainly be costly, time consuming, and
fully, so far as I know, under combat spAparmAN, on this subject. Obviously, I uncertain. I assume that another way
fire, a test in which a missile was ac- have raised qeur tess t itohnast of e ah asvi me i 1 awr en aktnuerwe
qf "designing around" the weapons effects
Wally fired to see if it would get near With tbit abPout the general phenomenology problem would be in connection with
the tauet and explode. quite a enomenology
of blackout effects from our own testing. I control systems related to missiles. In-
' 4-be4Yle :th'ere- was a successful test think that all'orour experts would say, how- stead of ground control systems being
of a PiiramriS giaile. That would give ever, we certainly do not know everything, used for our missiles, we could develop
us rea'soti to-believe that that type of and we would like to know more, airborne control stations.
missile will work because it was fired General Taylor said further, at page Another way of "designing around"
. , .
under aceila test -conditions.
,
299: some of the defects would be to attempt
that would be an instance General TAYLOR. As the Joint chiefs have to harden missile sites to a greater de-
in which' everything was checked out pointed out there are limitations in the gree than they have been hardened in
under conditions more favorable than sense that we can never have complete weap- the past.
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'16620 CONGRESSIQNAL RECORD --- SENATE September 19
-
There is some reason for them wanting
this treaty when they didn't want it on two
occasions before. What is it?
s ?
General LsMsv. These are the disadvan-
tages that we see. They are possibilities and
we certainly have tried to say that even with
the safeguards that we have suggested that
we have, that certainly ratifying the treaty
is not without its risks
NOW, I pointed out these other uncertain-
ties, that we don't knew. For instance, [de-
leted] that the Russians are ahead of us in
the high yield spectrUni, we are about equal
in the [deleted] megaton range, and we are
ahead in the lower [deleted] range.
Now, I can't prove Otherwise, but I am
very suspicious, because we know ] deleted]
that the Russians were planning a test pro-
gram [deleted] before they broke the mora-
torium and started testing. [Deleted.]
agree with the Sanator from Louisi-
ana that while we might be able to over-
design or overcompensate for some of
the defects, we are not certain, in the
first place, of precisely what the un-
certainties are, and we Will not be able
to fully identify the uncertainties until
we can test in the atmosphere.
Secondly, we cannot be sure that we
have adequately compensated for the
defects.
Finally, it is important to remember
that we are dealing with the security of
the United States. When we deal with
the,. security of the United States, we
would like to deal with as few uncer-
tainties as possible.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. To say the
least, if we should try to "design around"
areas of ignorance, the weapons system
act-opted might be far less efficient than
the one we would have if we actually had
the answer.
Mr, BYRD of West Virginia. Yes. I
thank the Senator from Louisiana.
Continuing on the point of weapons
effects tests, I should like to quote Gen-
eral LeMay, as his testimony appears on
page 365 of?the hearings:
General Ladsy. Well, from my personal
standpoint, I haven't been toa happy with
our testing program in the past. I think we
Should have done more testing than we did,
not only underground but in the atmosphere,
toe. I certainly haven't been happy with the
sitUatiOn which exists that we haven't been
able to carry out full-scale teets on any of
our missile systems.
Again I quote General LeMay, as his
testimony appears on page 391 of the
hearings:
deneral LEMAy. Well, if it would stay
there, probably we wouldn't have much to
lose.
He was referring to the nuclear supe-
riority we are supposed to possess.
Then he said:
But I wonsler whether it is going to stay
there or not, and, in addition to that, this
is rust our estimate of the situation. Our
delivery capabilities,,I think at the present
time are better than the Russians. That
doesn't mean they are going to stay that
way.
I think we have more weapons and a great-
er variety of weapons now than the Rus-
sians have. That doesn't mean it is going
to stay that way.
The thing that worries me is that this
preserves the uncertainties that we have in
our mind now for as long as the treaty is
going to be in effect [deleted].
We just don't all know the things we
would like to know about the vulnerabilities
of [deleted] systems [deleted].
Senator PASTORE, Can I interrupt you
there, General? Do you think that the Rus-
sians know?
General LEMsy. They may know a great
deal more about it than we do, as a result of
the last two series of tests that they have
run. [Deleted.]
General LeMay and the Senator from
Rhode Island were referring to the pos-
sible vulnerabilities of missile systems.
General LeMay, continuing, said:
This bothers me, and one of the things
that I don't like that if this is true and they
do know more than we do, they may know
something that is vital. They may have been
able to pick up a weakness in our defense
system that they can exploit,
In addition to the Uncertainties affect-
ing our strategic Missile system, expert
testimony has indicated that atmos-
pheric testing is mandatory for the de-
velopment of an optimum anti-ballistic
missile and for establishing with cer-
tainty its ability to, perform its mission
under the extreme conditions to which it
will be exposed if the occasion to em-
ploy it should ever arise. There has
been much confusion about the relation-
ship between atmospheric testing and
the perfection of ABM systems. This is
not a matter involving the development
and testing of the warhead. It does in-
volve the question of whether we have
adequate information on what we require
in the way of a warhead and what we
require in the way of radar performance
to give this Nation an ABM system with
sufficient reliability to make its produc-
tion and development and deployment
worth the billions of dollars involved.
The technical testimony leaves no doubt
that we can design arid produce an ABM
system of unknown performance and re-
liability under the conditions in which it
must perform its mission. However, the
degree of confidence we can place in
such a system and the extent to which
we can provide a system which will give
this Nation the greatest protection at the
lowest cost are directly dependent upon
our ability to conduct the necessary tests
in the atmosphere.
Mr. President, regarding the need for
atmospheric tests in the development
and deployment of an antiballistic mis-
sile system, I read a statement by Ad-
miral Strauss, which appears on page
692 of the test ban treaty hearings:
With this reservation, I would like to com-
ment, in order to proteet myself from attack.
I am no technician but I have been present
at the birth of many new weapons systems
over a long period of years. No matter how
well in theory the components of a weapon
will behave on paper, there is no assurance
that they will work dependably together un-
til they are put together and tried, and an
antiballistic missile system cannot be tested
underground and, therefore, no nation, our
Nation could not put one safely into produc-
tion and stockpile it which had never been
tested. This is a layman's opinion based on
experience.
On page 103 of the hearings, the fol-
lowing statement by Secretary McNa-
mara appears:
In. designing an antiballistic missile sys-
tem? the major factors are reaction speed,
missile performance, traffic handling capae-
ity, capacity for decoy discrimination, re-
sistance to blackout effects, and warhead
teehnology.
The last two of these items, resistance to
blackout effect and warhead technology de-
pends on nuclear testing.
At page 438 of the hearings, Dr. Ed-
ward Teller is recorded as saying:
I am in agreement with Secretary Mc-
Namara that under the present ban we can
proceed with our antiballistic-missile de-
fense. I do not agree that we can complete
this development. Actually, Secretary Mc-
Namara did not say anywhere that he in-
tends to deploy a system. Perhaps his lack
of determination to deploy is due to some
lack of knowledge. These are not black-
and-white questions. I feel we need obser-
vation, traffic handling, the perfection of
warheads, radar, all the points that the Sec-
retary has made very effectively; I agree
with all of them.
At page 452, Dr. Teller said, with refer-
ence to the necessity for atmospheric
tests in connection with the development
of an antiballistic missile:
On that point I will say that indeed we
can do a lot in this development without
atmospheric tests, we cannot bring the de-
velopment to a reliable conclusion without
atmospheric tests.
More than that, as we proceed in develop-
ing our defenses, we have to make choices.
We have to decide at what attitude we want
to shoot down the aggressor.
- Senator LAUSCHE. I think ysu have covered
that.
Dr. TELLER. What kind of rocket we need.
A number of choices of that kind. This
must be done often rather early in the game
and to make choices without the knowledge
' that atmospheric testing could give us is a
very distinct handicap.
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-SEPTEMBER 1961 TESTS
Senator LAUSCHE. When you state that in
your opinion Russia occupies a superior posi-
tion to ours in connection with the anti-
ballistic missile, what significance do you at-
tach to the extensive and large tests which
were made after September of 1961?
Dr. TELLER. I would guess that the Rus-
sians may have acquired the bulk of their
knowledge in this field in 1961 and 1962, al-
though it is quite possible that they may
have acquired quite a bit of their knowledge
even earlier. They have been pushing mis-
siles, rockets, much- earlier than we have, and
every indication shows that their interest
and confidence in ballistic missile defense is
older and stronger than ours.
ATMOSPHERIC TESTING AND SOUND MISSILE
DEFENSE
Senator LAUSCHE. The statement is made
by the Joint Chiefs further. I quote:
Both sides could achieve an antiballistic
missile, but one with less desirable charac-
teristics than would.be the case if additional
atmospheric tests were conducted.
May I have your comment on that state-
ment, first as to its soundness and second
as to whether Russia is ahead of us, because
It has conducted these large-scale tests.
Dr. TELLER. In general I agree with the
statement. I consider it something of an
understatement.
Senator LAITSCHE. Will you give it in your
light? s
Dr. TELLER. I would say that with atmos-
pheric testing, there is a real chance to de-
velop a sound antiballistic missile, a sound
missile defense. Without such testing, it is
my opinion that whatever we develop will be
uncertain, imperfect, and that may not even
be developed, because our doubts, together
with the expenses, may persuade us from
such a development
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,
?
1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENAIT
The Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
LONG l Oen asked questions?which ap-
pear' On page _467 of the hearings?as
follows;
Senator LONG. Doctor, you suspect, as I
understand your earlier testimony, you sus-
pect that in the last series of tests the Rus-
sians probably "obtained the information
that they would need to develop an anti-
Missile missile, or to develop a ballistic mis-
Bile defense, to put it another way.
Dr. TELLER. I do not know how perfect
their information is, but / feel the prob-
ability is very coffirnon that they have de-.
Veloped -Very relevant knowledge which will
be useful for them in installing their anti-
ballistic missile systems.
Senator LoNg. In the event they were
able to develop a missile defense against our
ballistic missiles, and then proceed to breach
the treaty just long enough to prove it out.
Would there be time for us to do the same
thing after we found out that they had
violated the treaty?
Dr. Tur-LEa. I am virtually certain there
Would not be time enough. We would be
lucky to get off to meaningful testing in 3
niOnths, whereas they, if they Eave indeed
perfected, instated, but not completely
proven Out their antiballistic missile equip-
ment, they could abrogate tilt treaty in a
day, use the next week for 100 or 500 detona-
tions, and if they then find the results un-
satisfactory, they will have lost a treaty.
If they find it satisfactory, they will have
won the world.
In addition to the need for weapons ef-
fects tests in our quest for an effective
ABM -system, I think it signifiCant that
We have conflicting testimony regarding
our Ilation's requirements for very high
yield weapons on the order of 50 to 100
Megatons. The problem has been under
Etucly,for years, and clear and unequivo-
cal decisions relating to our needs for
Butch weapons and the techniques we
would use in employing them still are not
forthcoming, I ,can only conclude that
our inability to make a firm military de-
cision on this matter, perhaps, is the re-
sult of our lack of knowledge concerning
the military effects of these weapons. It
is unlikely that clear decisions will ever
be forthcoming unless we are able to pro-
duce the device, to test it, and to meas-
ure and analyze its effects, as the Rus-
sians did nearly 2 years ago.
Mi. President, it seems to me that the
crucial ,problem of weapons effects was
epitomized by Dr. Foster in the course of
a Colloquy which is to be found beginning
'on page 628 of the hearings. I Shall pro-
Ode following excerpts:
Benjtor ISYRD of West Virginia. Dr. Paster,
I have beard that we have as large a weapon
RS we could conceivably need. We can pro-
duce a 50-megaton weapon', and this would
be as large as any country would ever have
to have. It seems to me that this is really
beside the point,
Ada , correct,' Dr. Poster, in saying that
what Should really concern us are the effects
of the explosion of such (i weapon upon our
inissile,sites and upon our missile systems?
? Prt, 9,$-TER. That is correct, Senator BYRD.
... Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Dr. Fos-
ter, if we confirm the treaty we will have
to confine our tests to underground tests.
namf, with the information vre already
Lave s a, result of previous testing in the
attnospaere, and through the medium of un-
derground testing, can we acquire satis-
factory and dependable and conclusive in-
formation with respect to Weapons effects
Upon sites and systems?
Dr. FOSTER. No.
Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Dr-. Pos-
ter, this is the dilemma in which I find my-
self. I, too, would like to hope that con-
firmation of, the treaty would be a step
toward peace and a step toward eventual
disarmament. 13,U,t I ,recall that the Rus-
sians were able to prepare for tests without
our detecting such preparation, when they
abrogated the moratorium.
I recall that they assured the President,
to our great satisfaction and happiness, that
weapons which were being moved into Cuba
were defensive weapons and not offensive
weapons, at the very time when he had in
his own hands evidence to the contrary.
Now, it seems to me, in the light of the
atmospheric tests which have been con-
ducted and for which elaborate preparations
were made, the equal of which we have not
been able to conduct, that the Russians
suddenly have come to a conclusion which
they opposed heretofore; to wit, that they
should enter Into this kind of a test ban
treaty.
Now, with the history of deceit that we
have before us, I am afraid that they already
have information which is vital to our se-
curity, and they may know what our own
weapons systems and sites can stand by
virtue of the tests which they have carried
out, and if they presently intend or at some
later date should decide to abrogate the
treaty, then the additional disadvantage to
which we would be put, I fear, might be very
dangerous to our security.
So with theSe fears in mind, unless some
scientist din tell' me that we can indeed ex-
trapolate information through underground
testing which will satisfy our fears with re-
gard to weapons effects upon sites and sys-
tems, I am not satisfied with the argument
that we should take into consideration the
political judgments, because I do not believe
that the military leaders are prepared to
weigh those political judgments, and I do
not believe that the scientists are. But I do
believe that the scientists can tell us whether
or not we can extrapolate information from
underground tests that will satisfy our fears
in the other regard.
Dr. FosTEii. Sir, there is no existing experi-
mental data or theory, or to our knowledge,
future underground tests that can provide
you, with the complete assurance you want.
Senator BYRD of West Virginia. I would
just like to carry Senator JACKSON'S ques-
tions one step further, if I might, and tie
them in with such a question I asked earlier.
Dr. Foster, I asked you earlier, if by using
the information that we already have, and by
conducting aggressively underground tests
under the conditions of the treaty, we could
acquire information which would satisfy our
fears with regard to weapons effects upon
sites and systems, and you indicated, I be-
lieve, that we could not.
Would your answer still be the same if
I had framed my question differently to the
extent that I had included the safeguards
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended?
Dr. FOSTER. Yes, it would have been the
same. It is simply that the question of how
hard anything is to electromagnetic phe-
nomena, be it antiballistic missile defense or
hardness of silos, has to do with matters that,
in my opinion, are not sufficiently well under-
stood to be able to say with full confidence
that they will function as designed in a nu-
clear environment and this nuelear_environ-
ment cannot be created by underground ex-
periments.
Senator Thrill) of West Virginia. We are
taking a great chance with the security of
this country if we approve a treaty which
prohibits our further testing in the atmos-
phere, and, consequently, learning by such
testing important facts dealing With effects
upon sites and systems?
Dr. Fosain. You are taking a risk, and you
cannot calaula-,te it.
16621
?Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Regardless
of these safeguards?
Dr. FOSTER. Regardless of these safeguards.
Senator BYRD of West Virginia. Even
though they are implemented to the fullest?
Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.
(At this point Mr. METCALF took the
chair as Presiding Officer.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, with further reference to the vital
issue of weapons effects on our sites, and
systems, and to the fact that we can ac-
quire full information only through the
medium of atmospheric tests, I should
like to quote General LeMay, reading
from page 370 of the test ban treaty hear-
ing. General LeMay was asked the fol-
lowing question:
SURVIVABILITY OF MISSILE SITES
General LeMay, without tests on the hard-
ness of our missile sites, can you be assured
of the survivability of our second strike
force?
General LEMAY. Well, we have overde-
signed to a great extent on our missile sites,
so that we are reasonably sure that they will
stand an attack all right. .
But you never can be positively sure until'
we test them under actual conditions, and
this has not been done, of course.
On page 390 General LeMay said:
General LEMAy. Let us put it another way:
There are things you can find out about at-
mospheric effects in underground tests, but
I would say these are in the minority about
what we would like to know about weapons
effects.
Pursuing that same issue of weapons
effect, I read from page 443, in the testi-
mony of Dr. Teller:
But this test ban has nothing at all to do
with how many missiles either side builds.
This test ban has something to do with
knowledge, and it does not have to do so
much with knowledge concerning aggressive
potentials. It has something vitally impor-
tant to do with knowledge concerning mis-
sile defense, concerning the vulnerability of
our retaliatory forces. I believe that the
Russians have acquired this knowledge. I
believe that, because they have acquired
this knowledge, they don't need any more
atmospheric tests, and I believe that is why
Khrushchev is willing to sign the treaty at
present.
In 1960, he wasn't willing to sign, but
now he had these magnificent test series of
1961 and 1962. He now knows how to de-
fend himself. He now knows, probably,
where the weaknesses lie in our defense.
Be has the knowledge, and he is now willing
to stop and prevent us from obtaining similar
knowledge.
If the Russians want to build a big missile
force with which to attack us, they can do
so legally under the present testing. What
they need is knowledge, and that is what
they have. What we need is knowledge and
that is what we don't have.
As shown on page 464 of the hearings,
I asked Dr. Teller the following:
Is there information regarding overpres-
sure effects upon our weapons systems re-
sulting from the explosion of high-yield
nuclear devices in the multimegaton range
that can only be acquired through atmos-
pheric testing?
Dr. TELLER. If you tried to make a nuclear
explosion underground, then everything con-
nected with overpressure is very strongly in-
fluenced by the surroundings and the effects
of such testing_ cannot by any trick that I
have seen so far constitute a sufficient sub-
stitute for simple and straightforward test-
ing in the atmosphere.
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16622. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?
Senator BYRD. Then is the absence of ade-
quate arid complete information regarding
weapons effects upon our weapons sites and
systems vital to the security of this Nation?
Dr. TELLER. I believe that it is vital.
Senator BYRD. If the safeguards recom-
mended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?and I
am confident that you are familiar with the
safeguards that were suggested in their posi-
tion paper?are observed and carried out,
will we be able to acquire the information we
need to satisfactorily overcome What has
been termed by you to be a weakness vital
to our security?
Dr. TELLER. I believe that if these safe-
guards are observed, then the dangers which
I have mentioned will disappear in part only.
A lot of these dangers, a lot of these difficul-
ties will remain.
Senator BYRD. Then your answer would be
that we would not be able to acquire to our
complete satisfaction the information that
we need to overcome these vital weaknesses
in our system?
Dr. TELLER. This would be my conclusion,
uncertain as all such conclusions, but this
would be it.
As shown on page 466, Dr. Te:ler had
this to say with regard to weapons
effects:
The main difficulty is just what you men-
tion. We are probably, or quite possibly,
at least, going to be faced with several mis-
siles, and we should be able to shoot at all of
them, and we should not be blinded by our
first shot.
This means we must not make our first
shot unnecessarily big. This means that we
should know what is the probable right kill
radius. This means that we should so de-
sign our missiles as to give it a maximum
destructive effect at a minimum binding
effect.
All these questions need testing and more
testing, and after you have done it, you still
need to test to see whether the whole thing
works, whether there is no flaw in the actual
operation.
On page 424 of the hearings it is shown
that Dr. Teller said:
Secretary McNamara has told you, and he
is right, that we can do a lot about missile
defense. We can study the incoming mis-
siles, we can study the decoys, and we can
try to see the difference between them. We
can perfect our radars, make them harder,
more versatile, faster.
By underground testing we can develop
the best kind of nuclear explosives by which
to kill an incoming missile, because when
you are shooting at such a fast and uncer-
tain target as an incoming missile, you can-
not hit it with a bull's-eye. You need a pow-
erful counterforce, a small nuclear explo-
sion.
Secretary McNamara has said rightly that
we can do all that.
But there is one thing, one circumstance
he did not explain. He did not explain to
you that we must expect not 1 missile to
come against us, but 5, and not to come
alone but to come accompanied by 25 de-
coys. We have to discriminate between
these, find out which are the dangerous ob-
jects and shoot them down, not some of
them, but all of them. The first shot that
we fire will blind us, and will make us less
prepared to shoot against the second missile
I that comes hard on the heels of the first.
I quote Secretary McNamara on weap-
ons effects tests, reading from page 104:
The problems of nuclear technology here
relate to the vulnerability of the balistic
missile warheard to kill by blast or by radia-
tion. The latter vulnerability, as to radia-
tion, can be tested underground, but the for-
mer cannot be fully tested underground.
We have not, and we beheve that the So-
viet Union has not, explored by full-scale
high altitude tests the vulnerability Of re-
entry vehicles to blast.
Atmospheric testing woUld enable us to
conflon the enhanced resistance of new,
hard-warhead designs to blast. Without the
confirmation which dynamic tests of reentry
vehicles would provide, we will have to rely
on extensive extrapolations, and, therefore,
there will be greater uncertainties than
would otherwise exist.
I have attempted to indicate, by quot-
ing from distinguished and eminent
scientists and military experts who gave
testimony during the course of the hear-
ings conducted by the Committee on
Foreign Relations and by the Prepared-
ness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, that the
matter of weapons effects can be vital
to the security of our Nation.
Some of the witnesses expressed the
fear that the Soviet Union may have ac-
quired such vital information concern-
ing weapons effects upon sites and sys-
tems during the comprehensive and
effective postmoratoriurn atmospheric
tests. If the Soviets have not so devel-
oped such information, the danger in
our ratifying the treaty, And by so doing
precluding ourselves from engaging in
atmospheric testing, would not be so
great. We cannot be sure, however, that
the Soviet Union has not developed such
information.
Certainly we must be suspicious of Mr.
Khruslichev in regard to all things, and
particularly in this situation, since he
has upon at least two occasions rejected
a somewhat similar treaty and then sud-
denly, in this year of 1963, has reversed
his position and indicated a willingness
to enter into this treaty.
I am no expert, but I have listened to
the experts, as have other Senators. The
Soviet Union carefully planned elaborate
tests?such plans perhaps extended
through the entire 34 months of the
voluntary moratorium?and surprised
us with their statement that they were
going to abrogate the moratorium. Then,
subsequent to the abrogation of the
moratorium, they carried out a success-
ful series of tests. Furthermore, they
have had the opportunity and time, at
least, to evaluate the information which
could be extrapolated from such tests,
and may have found that important dis-
coveries are in their possession with ref-
erence to weapons effects upon sites and
systems.
The possibility is very alarming to me,
as it has been to Dr. Foster, Dr. Teller,
General Power, Admiral .Burke, General
LeMay and others. Since we cannot be
sure, I fear the results of ratification
of the pending treaty, because under the
treaty we can never fully develop such
information through underground tests
alone. The case, therefore, in respect of
weapons effects is simply, this. The So-
viets effected a planned abrogation of
the voluntary moratorium. Through
subsequent atmospheric tests, they may
have acquired vital information which
can only be developed by testing in the
atmosphere. Having such information
in their possession, and realizing that
our failure to conduct atmospheric tests
to the same degree following the mora-
ATE
September 19
torium leaves us in an inferior position,
the Soviets may have every reason to be
willing to sign a treaty which will freeze
us in that inferior position.
THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST THREAT
Support of the test ban springs largely,
I believe, from an intense wish that the
world were different than it actually is.
It springs from viewing the world as we
would like it to be, rather than as it is.
It springs from a genuine desire for peace
and is so sincere and so overwhelming
that the nature of communism is for-
gotten. Let us remember that the Com-
munists have only one purpose to which
all their actions are geared. This pur-
pose is world conquest.
The aims which the Communists seek
and the methods they are willing to use
have been vividly spelled out many
times by the Communists themselves.
On December 26, 1922, in his report to
the 10th All-Russian Congress of So-
viets, Stalin declared that the decision to
form a union of Soviet republics was
"another decisive step toward the amal-
gamation of the toilers of the whole
world into a single world Socialist Re-
public." The handbook of Marxism
states further the Communist objective
in the section on the program of the
Communist International. It says:
Thus, the dictatorship of the world pro-
letariat is an essential and vital condition
precedent to the transformation of the world
capitalist economy into Socialist economy.
This world dictatorship can be established
only when the victory of socialism has been
achieved.
And Stalin supported this objection,
for he said this:
For the victory of the revolutLon in one
country, in the present case Russia * *
is the beginning of and the groundwork
for the social revolution.
And with the death of Stalin, Malen-
kov?notwithstanding his professions for
a new order of coexistence--revealed his
faith in Soviet destiny when he said:
We khow firmly that the victory of de-
mocracy and socialism throughout the world
is inevitable.
Dimitri Manuilsky, active in the revo-
lution, one-time chairman of the Coun-
cil of People's Commissars of the Ukraine
S.S.R., and a Communist representative
at the United Nations, described, in a
lecture at the Lenin School of Political
Warfare, the tactics that the Commu-
nists would some day employ. He said:
War to the hilt between communism and
capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course,
we are not strong enough to attack. Our
time will come in 20 or 30 years. To win we
shall need the element of surprise. The
bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. So
we shall begin by launching the most spectac-
uar peace Movement on record. There will
be electrifying overtures and unheard of con-
cessions. The capitalist countries stupid
and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate in
their own destruction. They will Jeep at an-
other chance to be friends. As soon as their
guard is down, we shall smash them with our
clenched fist.
Lenin outlined the modus operandi for
Communist domination of the world.
Ho said:
First we will take Eastern Europe, then
the masses of Asia. Then we will surround
America, the last citadel of capitalism. We
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 16623
shall not have' to attack. She will fall into
our lap 11,17 an overripe fruit.
IChrLISAiCheV, 61.1-0 to form, told West-
ern diplomats at a reception in Moscow
on November 18, 1956;
Whether you like It or nOt, history is on
out side. We will latiry you yet.
- Lest any person feel that Khru-
shchev's words were spoken in a moment
of jocundity, they 'would do well to re-
flect upon what he said when, on June 2,
1957, he appeared before an American
television audience:
I can prophesy that your grandchildren
in. America will live under socialism.
Communist policies are Mined to un-'
renlitting war on non-Communist na-
tions?war in the military sense at
times; at other times, a war of doctrinal
tactics, of infiltration and subversion, of
economic piracy and the stimulation of
moral chaos.
,
I do not wish to labor the point, but
it is Clear; and, irrespective of changes in
leadership, the 'key objective of world
domination has remained constant.
xlis SOOT& RECORD ON TREATIES
_
We learned long ago that the Soviet
leaders cannot be trusted and that their
agreements are usually worthless. As a
matter, of tact, we have no less author-
ity for our, guidance than Stalin, Lenin's
successor. V Stalin was frank to say:
Words must have no relation to action?
? othervrise at kind of diplomacy is it?
Words are one thing: actions another. Good
words are a mask for concealment of bad
deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more pos-
sible than dry water or iron wood.
The unfolding tragic history of the
times in Which we men have lived pro-
vides the stark and irrefutable evidence
that the eomniunists keep -only those
agreernents which are in their interests
to keep, and that they will break those
agreements which no longer serve their
Interests, And the fact should not es-
cape us that "their interests," as used
here, are not the interests of a free peo-
ple whose rulers govern by the consent,
freely expressed, of the governed; but,
rather, they are the "interests" of the
International conspiracy which has its
roots in the Kremlin and which seeks
to impose its ideological will upon other
governments throughout the world so as
to assure the final outcome about which
Lenin, the high priest of Communist
strategy, spoke in 1923, "the final victory
of socialism -(cornmunism)."
'the' ong list of 'pledges broken by the
,
Soviet 'Union leads almost inevitably to
the conclusion that many of the agree-
ments were entered into without good
faith and in accordance with the familiar
Communist dictum: '
Prprnises are like pie ciiistsL- made to be
broken.
AS long, as we have an agreement
which does not provide for inspection of
Soviet territory, SO that we can See for
ourselves What the Soviet 'Union is do-
ing, we are in effect relying upon trust
that gip Aovietaiill abide. by the treaty.
Yet, Many are the instances in the past
when the Soviet Union has demonstrated
Its disrespect for agreements solemnly
.No.149 10
entered into. At least a few of these are
worth remembering at this time.
On September 28, 026, Lithuania and
the Soviet Union concluded a non-
aggression pact. On June 15, 1940,
Lithuania was invaded by Soviet forces.
On May 4, 1932, Estonia and the
U.S.S.R. signed a nonaggression pact.
Eight years later, on June 16, 1940,
Soviet military forces invaded Estonia.
On February 5, 1932, Latvia and the
Soviet Union signed a nonaggression
pact. Eight years later, on June 16,
1940, Soviet military forces invaded
Latvia.
At the Yalta Conference in February
1945, the United States, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union agreed to help the
peoples liberated from Nazi control to
solve their political and economic prob-
lems by democratic means. The
U.S.S.R. flagrantly violated the letter and
spirit of this pledge by installing Com-
munist regimes in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
Also at Yalta, the Soviet Union agreed
that the Republic of China should retain
full sovereignty in Manchuria. The
Russians flouted this agreement by
tactics of obstruction designed to deliver
Manchuria to the Chinese Reds.
At Potsdam in July 1945, the United
States, the U.S.S.R., and the United
Kingdom agreed that, subject to the re-
quirements of military security, freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, and free-
dom of religion would be respected in the
occupation of Germany. As everyone
knows, Soviet authorities in East Ger-
many have curtailed genuine freedom of
speech and press by imposing the totali-
tarian instruments of suppression, cen-
sorship, and secret police. Basic legal
and political rights have been the victim
of authoritarian edict and one-party
control, with the inevitable result that a
puppet regime has been installed.
Most fresh in our minds, of course, is
the summit conference of the Big Four
In Geneva in July 1955. This high-level
parley in the diplomatic Alps engendered
great expectations among the peoples of
the free world.
The single most specific agreement
made at Geneva was on the German
question. The four powers declared it
was their purpose to settle the German
question and the reunification of Ger-
many by means of free elections which
shall be carried out in conformity with
the national interests of the German
people and the interests of European
security,
As Mr. John Foster Dulles later said,
the Soviet Union failed to keep this sol-
emn pledge, and on November 16, 1955,
the Foreign Ministers of France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States
stated that negotiations on the German
question had reached a deadlock, because
the Soviet Foreign 'Minister insisted on a
German policy which would have in-
volved the continued division of Ger-
many as well as the eventual dissolution
of the Western security system. In a
letter dated February 28, 1958, Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko tore up the
final scrap of the Geneva agreement
when he said the German question is a
question of relations between the two
existing German states.
To those who may suffer the illusion
that the real nature of international
communism can be changed by any new
show of amiability and affability put on
by the Russians in connection with the
signing of this treaty, one might only
point to the announcement, which came
on the heels of the 1955 Geneva adjourn-
ment, that the Soviets were increasing
their military forces in East Germany.
Then, too, the Israeli plane disaster, in
which more than 50 persons were shot
down by the Bulgarian Communists, only
conformed to the Russian pattern of
committing Overt, violent acts in order
to demean the United States before the
eyes of the world. "So sorry," said the
Bulgarian Communists, and they felt
that they had atoned for their trigger-
happy brutality. One must not forget,
too, that it was virtually on the eve of
the Geneva Conference that the Rus-
sians shot down one of our American
planes over international waters, inflict-
ing severe burns upon American boys,
scars which some of the victims will carry
to their graves. In that instance, the
Soviets quickly assumed the partial re-
sponsibility, a development, based upon
past experience, that warranted the
sound conclusion that they knew it was
their full responsibility. Our State De-
partment made a hasty agreement, ac-
cepting the Soviet offer to pay for the
damages.
I mention these incidents at this junc-
ture merely to point up the sorry stand-
ards of measurements we have too often
used in our official dealings with the Rus-
sians and to stress the fact that our
sincere desire for peaceful relations with
the Communists will carry us into serious
danger unless we base our reckonings and
policies on realism.
SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON QUES-
TIONS RAISED BY THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
TREATY
First. A detente.
Second. The leopard's spots.
Third. Time and circumstance.
Fourth. Peace with justice.
Fifth. World opinion.
Sixth. The basic issue.
1. A DETENTE
Mr. President, as one explanation for
Mr. Khrushchev's willingness to be a
party to this treaty, the thought is ad-
vanced that he wishes to attain a de-
tente with the West. I consider it to be
merely another one of those cycles in
which the Communists follow periods of
tension with periods of seeming relaxa-
tions. The Soviets may desire, at this
point, a period in which to consolidate
gains and repair weaknesses.
It is impossible, of course, for us to
know with certainty what the reasons are
for the sudden change of Soviet position
and the turn of events. But there is
no evidence that Khrushchev has finally
decided to work for a stable and lasting
peace.
Many of us have asked, "Why did
Khrushchev agree at this time to an
agreement he had refused even to dis-
cuss in September 1961 and August
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16624 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
1962?" In answer, we have been told
that in October 1962, during the Cuban
crisis, the Russian leader "peered into the
pit of the inferno," realized for the first
time the horrors that a nuclear exchange
could unleash upon the world, and be-
came convinced that the real interest of
the Soviet Union would best be served
by a relaxation of world tensions as a
prelude to control over world armaments.
Those who hold this view seem to for-
get that the immediate result of the
Cuban crisis was a "hardening" of the
Soviet position on on-site inspection at
the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference
in Geneva, that the Soviet decision to
participate in the pact did not come until
the Soviet Union had completed its at-
mospheric test series, and that all the
comments relating to the inferno into
which world leaders peered during the
Cuban crisis have come from officials of
the free world. One is almost tempted
to ask, "Who frightened whom?"
There is little evidence of any sincere
effort on the part of the Soviet Union to
correct or modify the real causes of world
tensions. Soviet forces still (YOCUM'
Cuban soil. The Berlin wall still stands.
East Germany still cannot participate in
free elections or in a referendum on re-
unification. The Soviet leadership con-
tinues to threaten the free world with
bombs in orbit and 100-megaton nuclear
weapons. Subversion and warfare con-
tinue under Soviet sponsorship around
the periphery of the free world while
the Soviet and Chinese heartlands re-
main relatively immune.
The Soviet leadership may have peered
Into the inferno last October, but I am
not convinced that they were reformed
by what they saw.
I feel that, as has been the case be-
fore, the Soviets desire a breathing spell
for the purpose of regrouping forces and
for reexamining strategy and tactics. As
AdM.. Arleigh Burke testified during the
hearings:
Based on the past actions of the Com-
munists when they make a sudden about-
face, as they have clone in the case of this
treaty the provisions of which they have
rejected on several previous occasions, it
would seem that they wish to seek some
advantage over the United States.
They never have been generous. They al-
ways have acted solely in their own in-
terests to reach their own goal of domi-
nation.
James David Atkinson, Ph. D., Asso-
ciate Professor of Government at
Georgetown University, in his book "The
Edge of War," 1960, includes an. inter-
esting chapter entitled "The Fusion of
War and Peace." Dr. Atkinson, a West
Virginian, discusses the Soviet purpose
of seeking a "breathing space," from
time to time, in the course of the Corn-
mtinist offensive:
Furthermore, any disarmament conces-
sions will be, on the part of the Soviet bloc,
in the nature of a detente. But the democ-
racies, by contrast, have in the past tended
to consider such arrangements on a perma-
nent or semipermanent basis.
The new phase of Soviet strategy does not
imply an abandonment of the ultimate goal
of a? Communist world. This is clearly
spelled out by Khrushchev's statement im-
mediately preceding his American visit:
"We Communists believe that the idea of
communism will ultirnately be Victorious
throughout the world, just as it has been
victorious in our country, in China, and
many other states."
The idea of a breathing space during
which Soviet strategy will call for
the struggle against the non-Communist
countries to be conducted in a more sophis-
ticated form was also pointed out in a Pravda
editorial that laid down the line in these
words: "Today we are living at a time when
the historic transition from socialism to
communism is taking place. * * At the
United Nations, Comrade Khrushchev put
forward the principles of U.S.S.R. foreign
policy and on behalf of the Soviet Govern-
ment submitted proposals for universal and
complete disarmament of all states, which
opens up a new era in the struggle for world
peace."
A breathing space in the cold war between
the Soviet Union and the NATO allies will
also permit the Chinese Communist junior
partner to stepup cold war activity in the
Far East while the 'U.S.S.R. regroups its
forces in the other half of the globe.
The apparent new phase in Soviet policy
can be expected to last only as long as it
offers advantages to the Kremlin leadership.
Undoubtedly there will be those in the Soviet
high command who will urge a harder policy
against the West, for they will see signs that
will confirm their belief that the capitalists
are sufficiently decadent and weakened to be
eliminated sooner rather than later. From
time to time the non-Communist world will
be threatened, and incidents will be manu-
factured to test its strength. The United
States will remain the principal barrier to
Soviet bloc aspirations. Nineteen hundred
and fifty-eight saw the beginnings of a sub-
tler policy by the Soviet Union to dissipate
American determination to maintain this
barrier. The decade to 1968, and especially
the years from 1961, will be the crucial period
in the development of 'Soviet strength and
the at tempted softening of the American will
to resist and of the ingredient that chiefly
supports that will, our military strength.
Signs of weakness on the part of the United
States will no doubt increase the momentum
of the Soviet advance and lead the Kremlin
to believe that it need not delay the last
stage of the Communist offensive.
I believe Dr. Atkinson's words are
prophetic.
2. THE LEOPARD'S SPOTS
Many of the attitudes and stratagems
which mark the Communists' approach
to negotiations are baffling in the ex-
treme so long as we believe that they are
seeking peace, or even a significant low-
ering of tensions. But they become un-
derstandable as soon as we realize that
they are seeking only in Lenin's phrase,
"an agreement concerning war." Marxist-Lenin thinking in this regard has not
changed from the idea of one-time Polit-
buro member Grigori E. Zinoviev, who
said on February 2, 1019:
We are willing to sign an unfavorable
peace with the Allies. * * * It would only
mean that we should put no trust whatever
In the bit of paper we should sign. We
should use the breathing space so obtained
to gather our strength.
Stated another way if the other party
to such a treaty belieyes that it is being
signed in good faith, he is to be rated as
a victim of his own naivete: what Lenin
called petty bourgeois trustfulness.
History repeats itself. This is a com-
mon saying which we have all heard from
our youth up. If, then, we refuse to
understand the lesson of history, we are
condemned to repeat the errors a the
September 19
past. We shall suffer all the more if we
insist upon closing our eyes to that in-
evitable history which Communist lead-
ers, as did Hitler in Mein Kampf, write
in advance.
If, indeed "coming events cast their
shadows before," we should long ago
have taken warning from, a commit-
ment, grievously broken, of 30 years ago.
Litvinoff's pledge to President Roosevelt
is referred to on page 287 of "What We
Must Know About Communism," by
Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, 1958:
Even the ideological outposts of empire
rest on broken promises. Thus, on Novem-
ber 12, 1933, Litvinoff gave a four-point
pledge to President Roosevelt?as a condi-
tion of the U.S.S.R.'s being officially rec-
ognized--guaranteeing that the Soviet
Union would refrain from all propaganda
and organized activity that had as its aim
the overthrow of the U.S. Government or
the undermining of our institutions. Five
days later, however?with recognition ac-
complished?he released a statement which
said, "The Third International is, not men-
tioned in this document. You must not
read into it more than was intendedt A
month later, the Comintern met in Moscow
and adopted resolutions which instructed
all parties?including the CPUSA?that
there was no way out of the general crisis
of capitalism other than the one demon-
strated by the Bolshevik revolution.
In His Sermon on the Mount, Jesus
uttered an oft-quoted truism: "Where-
fore by their fruits ye shall know them."
The Soviet record of deceit and duplic-
ity, treachery and perfidy is clearly
written. But that record is not com-
plete, nor, in my judgment will it be
complete as long as leaders in the So-
viet Union subscribe to Communist
ideology.
The words of the Prophet Jeremiah,
heard above the din of the centuries, are
as meaningful in our age as they were
in his tempestuous day:
Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the
leopard his spots? Then may ye also do
good, that are accustomed to do evil.
That the leopard has not changed his
spots should be evident from the follow-
ing statement by Mr. K.hrushchey--a
statement arrestingly free from dissimu-
lation. Khrushchey, who some appear
to believe is somewhat less dangerous
than was Josef Stalin for the United
States, said on September 17, 1955:
If anyone thinks that our smiles mean
the abandonment of the teachings of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, he is deceiving himself
cruelly. Those who expect this to happen
might just as well wait for a shrimp to learn
how to whistle.
3. TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE
It has been suggested that we cannot
now reject a nuclear test ban treaty
since we advanced the same offer in
1959 and again in 1962.
The situation which now confronts the
United States is quite different from the
situation at the time of the previous of-
fers. In 1961 and 1962, the Soviet Union
carried out an extensive series of nuclear
tests in violation of previous promises to
refrain from testing. As is well known,
much time is required in order to eval-
uate such a series of tests. The Soviet
evaluation of the 1961-62 series was
completed during 1963. The Soviets
now have the opportunity to freeze us
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Into an inferior technological position. o
Consequently, the situation as of today and the Soviets are able to victimize us
has clearly changed and, in prudence, we in one way or another, as by testing on
cannot be bound by offers made when Chinese soil and pushing ahead to the
quite different circumstances obtained, development of new plans based upon
Proponents of the nuclear test ban treaty knowledge already obtained, would it not
would l quite clearly have a much stronger be likely that the Communists would
case had the Soviet Union refrained have even stronger reason to believe that
from conducting such an extensive series they might eventually be able to lure us
of nuclear tests in 1961-62. into a disarmament treaty, under which
4. PrAcc WITH JITSTICE
the present 'treaty We will never be able viets might offer?
to get the Soviet Union to sign another For example, they are proposing to
test ban treaty. have inspections at certain places which
This argument ignores 46 years of they would designate?a particular
Soviet diplomacy. From the Bolshevik crossroads or railroad crossing that they
seizure of power in Russia down to the would agree to. But if we agreed to such
present day, if there has been one con- a plan, they would "route the train" the
stant in Soviet diplomacy it has been, other way, so that it not pass the loca-
above all, the constant of flexibility. As tions of the sites to be inspected, in an
shown over the course of thousands of attempt to mislead or deceive us. Thus
negotiations, the Soviets are quite willing the seeds of our own undoing would be
to bargain endlessly at the diplomatic contained in such an agreement.
table. It is not they, but we who become On the other hand, if we insisted that
restless and believe that some action we would make no agreement until we
Mgdt be taken now, some diplomatic were satisfied that such a treaty served
agree/rib/it reached at once. And this our purpose equally with theirs, we would
flexibility on the part of the Soviets has have executed an agreement under which
consistently been tied to a keen appre- we could automatically detect a viola-
elation of the balance of military power tion.
in the world. When the military power If we obtained that kind of agree-
Of the United States has been in the ment, would it not be the basis for mak-
aseendanoY the Soviets?being always Ing the Soviets realize that eventually,
inclined at such thine as disarmament came, it
100200004-6
16625
th test b treatyminus inspection, a the treaty by the Senate would have
we would forgo essential inspection or
It has been argued that if we reject " agree to the kind of inspection the So-
an adverse psychological effect upon the
countries that have signed the treaty.
But is this to deter us from acting, even
at this late hour, in our own best inter-
ests and in the best interests of those
who might momentarily condemn us?
It should give us pause to remember that
the overwhelming majority of the sig-
natories will never become nuclear pow-
ers. Many of these signatories could ill
afford a modern battleship.
To allow world opinion to dissuade us
from taking a course away from danger
is to allow "the tail to wag the dog," if
I may refer to a common expression.
Let us not forget that when we talk about
the striking power that is built around
the Strategic Air Command and the
Polaris submarine, we are talking, in
General Power's words, "about better
than 90 percent of the striking power
of the free world." This being the case,
why should the United States?a country
which, in the event of all-out war, would
be expected to deliver 90 percent of the
striking power for the protection of the
free world?hesitate to act in accordance
with its own safety, and that of its allies,
even if it means that we temporarily dis-
appoint the portion of the free world
complex which can supply only 10 per-
cent of the striking power?
A large percentage of those who would
condemn us for rejection of the treaty
been to be more reasoable. When the mill- would have to be on a foolproof inspec- would be neutral states. Some of these
flexible, as they are?have
, have been more or less chronic critics,
try power of the United States has be- tion basis?
gun even a slightly apparent decline, the Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The sug- not only of our foreign policy, but-of our
. Soviets have tended to become bellig- gestion is an interesting one. domestic policies, as well.
erent,, bellicose, and intransigent. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. If we en- In this trying hour we should heed
Paradoxically, rejection of the treaty tered into this treaty minus inspection, the words of the Psalmist: "Be still, and
May eventually bring about a treaty em- the Communists would be given every know that I am God." Perhaps if we
bracing solid Inspection safeguards?and incentive to feel that if they held out would but take a moment in this mad
which the Soviet Union would accept. long enough, they could get a disarma- rush of life and "be still" to ponder and
How, one may Well ask, could such a ment agreement minus inspection, meditate upon the troublesome aspect of
desirable end be achieved? If the Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Earlier world opinion as it is involved in the
United States tests?as we have not this week the distinguished chairman of momentous question before us, we would
done---a,nd realizes the full potential of the Committee on Armed Services [Mr. find an inner counsel and an inner
a which we are?Capable, we can prove , RUSSELL] lucidly and cogently presented strength that would enable us, not "to
Onclusively to the Soviet 'Union that a logical step-by-step hypothetical case see through a glass darkly," but to come ,
? they cannbt compete with us in nuclear
weaponS. The Soviet record is clear.
They are the hardest of hard negotiators.
put they do respect power. Here again
the record is clear. If faced with a con-
-timing position ot inferiority in nuclear
technology, they would have every reason
to accept a valid treaty providing sound
rules of inspection. Unfortunately, it
WoUld appear that they accept our pres-
ent desire for a treaty as a sign of weak-
ness. By rejecting the treaty we can
disabuse them of this notion. Then, pa-
tiently but purposefully, we can go for-
ward to build an enduring peace. Not a
?tenuous peace Which may expire as
-qUiekly as did Neville Chamberlain's
"peace in our time." But an enduring
? peace based on power with purpose. Let
Us not timidly shrink from the atom, but,
knoivTng that God is good, have faith that
is 'N'ation under God" was given great
Over-Itroin the-atom?to be used in the
pursuit riot of peace alone, but of peace
With justice.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. 13VRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. LONG Of touisiana. In line with
What the Senator is saying, if we agree fore us. I, too, will agree that rejection torY.
precisely in point with what the Sena- face to face with our destiny.
tor from Louisiana has just said. I thank American is a great nation. It has
the Senator. long been a good neighbor to the coun-
5. WORLD OPINION tries that join its unwalled and un-
It is urged that so many nations of the guarded borders. Its sons and daugh-
world have already signed the nuclear ters have shed their blood more than
test ban treaty that the United States once in the cause of liberty. It has free-
risks the censure of world opinion if we ly poured out its largess to other nations,
refuse to approve the treaty. This is small and large, throughout the earth.
really one of the strongest arguments Many of the signatories of the treaty?
sustaining the decision, right or wrong? in fact, virtually all of them?have, at
and only the future will reveal this?of one time or another, been the recipients,
those who will support the treaty. At in one way or another, of our benef-
least, it appears to be one of the major icence. America's good will again and
factors in their decision, again has been liberally demonstrated
There seems to be a great fear of fly- by the outpouring of her billions and by
ing in the face of world opinion if we re- her other deeds of kindness. What more
ject the treaty. Voss, in Nuclear Am- is needed to convince the world of the
bush, aptly puts this question into peaceful motives of the greatest nation
focus: in all the ages?
Before the world is overcome with guilt There are but few nations that have
for having produced the atomic age's bril- power to alter the course of world his-
liant mushroom cloud, it would do well to .
reflect how much more of this globe would be tory. America is one of the few. The
under the communistic cloud today were it overwhelming majority of nations will
not for the U.S. nuclear capacity, be able in the future, as they have been
I think we should pause and reflect able in the past, to contribute but little
about the matter of world opinion, as to the determination of human events
it has been injected into the issue be- and to the course of the stream of his-
pprovedi
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16626 CQ
Those who would c Dude:rip us lack the
power to take "at the flood" that "tide
in the affairs of men which leads on to
fortune." But not so with America. She
has the power and the resources to direct
the path of events.
Along with this power, America has a
duty, in this situation, to act so as to
insure that communism will, not be "the
wave of the future."
But we cannot temporize, and we must
not shrink from our oft-unpleasant re-
sponsibility. What really counts so
much is, not world opinion in this era
of confusion but, rather, what will pre-
serve this Republic in all the years to
come.
I refer again to "An Appraisal," a
chapter in Nuclear Ambush
For the United States, it matters only to
a minor degree?it is not even morally de-
fensible?if neutrals complain about our
sprinkling them with radioactive fallout that
may possibly harm a very few of their people.
Dysentery and influenza, which the com-
plainers export to us, more than balance the
grievance lists. If the safety of all America
is at stake, however, one takes the risk of
harming a few people, foreigners or fellow
citizens. We can regret the injury?perhaps
try to compensate in some way for it. But
We cannot sacrifice our whole Nation's safety
or our own very lives, of,it of deference to a
vague fear that is more mystic than
scientific--
Or real.
Voss clearly reflects the Soviet Union's
disregard for world opinion on page 532
of his book:
Test ban advocates said Russia could not
afford to cheat, because she would be griev-
ously embarrassed if she were caught. But
the Communists dared to cheat on the
Korean and Indochinese armistice agree-
ments and seemed to bear up extremely well,
if they suffered any embarrassment at all.
The Russians later forced abandonment of
the whole premise when they resumed test-
ing in September 1961, boasted of it, and
tried to intimidate the world.
The fact that "world opinion" has its
curse as well as it blessing is articulately
portrayed in this final excerpt from Voss'
work:
There are some lessons to be drawn from
the history if the nuclear test ban issue.
One of the first is that it is extremely dan-
gerous to put off a showdown with "world
opinion" over issues vital to the national
security. The United States got involved
in a nuclear test ban negotiation more be-
cause it "wanted to be nice" to the rest of
the world than because It believed its own
security interests would be served. It may
or may not have been true that wiping out
the danger of nuclear war would have been
in the national interest, if it were even pos-
sible. But it was clearly perceived in the
days before 1958 that a nuclear test ban
alone could not possibly accomplish this.
Later, the United States stumbled rather
than walked into the test ban ambush,
humoring the worriers of the world, who de-
pended on the United States for protection,
rather than leading them. Humoring the
fainthearted, when confronted with a ruth-
less adversary like Soviet communism, has
proved tO be a dangerous game.
Indeed, if the question before us were
not so sobering, one might, in being con-
fronted with the argument that we
should not fly in the face of world opin-
ion?that of 97 nations?brush aside the
thought, by simply referring to Thomas
Carlyle, On Boswell's Life of Johnson.
NGRESSIONAL .ECORD -- SENATE September 19
Aesop's Fly, sitting ' on the axle of the
Will the effects of the nuclear test ban
chariot, has been much laughed at for ex- treaty increase the risk cif war by en
claiming: "What a duft I do raise.'" couraging Khrushchev?or his succes-
In answer to those who urge that re- sor?to take risks against the "enemy'
jection of the treaty risks the censure which would otherwise not be taken? To
- of world opinion, it is a temptation to answer this hard question easily in the
point out that the general peace?the name of the relaxation of tensions is
. freedom from a total war?enjoyed by tempting. It may even be momentarily
the world since the end of World War II Popular. But a harder course of action is
.r has not been brought about by world that enjoined by the admonition of the
opinion. It results, as Sir Winston Bible to act with prudence. Using words
Churchill has reminded us, from the so applicable to the question of trust to-
blunt fact that the 'United States has day, to the spirit of the nuclear test ban
possessed such overwhelming power in treaty, the psalmist said:
nuclear weapons and their delivery ca-
pability as to insure a general peace.
Such an answer, I say, is indeed tempt-
ing, for it is true. But there is an even
more compelling answer. The nuclear
test ban treaty is before the Senate of
the United States for serious and prayer-
ful deliberation. It is to be hoped that
the United States is not engaged in an
international popularity contest. The
compelling answer is, not how many Na-
tions have ratified this treaty, but that
the United States adopt the course of
action that is right. British Prime Min-
ister Neville Chamberlain returned from
Munich with the plaudits of most of the
nations of the world that he had
brought peace in our time. The Brit-
ish press recorded that massive crowds
hailed him in London on the night of
his return from Munich, and that the
cheering masses joined in singing "For
He's a Jolly Good Fellow." But did he
. do what was right? ?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, we come to a discussion of the
basic issue of the nuclear test ban treaty.
THE BASIC ISSITE
The basic, the overriding, issue is
whether the treaty constitutes a risk to
the continued military superiority of the
United States and, a so, whether the
risk to that superiority is a risk to peace.
That the treaty constitutes a serious
risk to the continued Military superiority
The words in his mouth were as smooth as
butter, but war was in his heart.
CONCLUSI ON"
Mr. President, I have reached my con-
clusion to vote against this treaty. I
shall do this sorrowfully. Sorrowfully
because it places me in opposition to the
position of our President, a leader who
has earnestly sought to find a path of
hope in his pursuit of peace. I respect
and honor our Commander in Chief.
Yet, all men are fallible, and all may,
therefore, err. As a Member of the
Senate, upon whose shoulders rests an
equal portion of the awesome responsibil-
ity of choosing the right course as we
stand at what may be the last great
crossroads, I feel it imperative that duty
should rise above all things and that in
the course of fulfilling my. duty, I am
bound to be true to my convictions. My
convictions have led me to speak the
words I have spoken today and they will
lead' me, if I live, to carry out my an-
nounced intention to cast my vote
against confirmation of the treaty. For,
as Robert E. Lee said:
If we, only to please the people, stand for
that which we disapprove, how, then, can we
later defend our actions?
I hope that I am wrong in my ap-
prehensions, because as the distinguished
chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee said earlier this week if
those of us who are agrtins,; this treaty
of this Nation is clear, as I think I have are wrong in our decision, then, we will
already shown. This is my judgment all be the happier for it.
of the matter, but it is based upon a care- Paul the Apostle said: "Where the
ful weighing of the evidence. And spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."
while I do not stand with the majority America's greatness has been, from the
in this judgment, I do not stand alone, beginning, of the spirit. There have been
The ultimate question, therefore, is times recently when I have thought that
this: Is the treaty a risk to peace? America's greatness had slipped from
Since the end of the Second World War her grasp, but this cannot be right.
the world-has witnessed an uneasy peace Human destiny will still be influenced
which some have called the cold war, by an America that calls back again her
But there has been a general peace, an greatness, because there is yet an Amer -
absence of general war. What has main- ica that, in this conflict of wills and
tamed this general peace? Not an Amer- ideologies and ways of life, can draw once
loan, as I have already indicated, but an more on her spiritual heritage with the
Englishman has given the most cogent call to action of the Prophet Isaiah:
answer. Sir Winston Churchill has said
Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and con-
that the overwhelming ,nuclear superior- firm the weak knees. Say to the faint-
ity possessed by the United States has hearted: Take courage, and fear not.
kept the peace. Clearly, anything which
diminishes this nuclear superiority is a A people that thus recalls its heritage
step which diminishes the power to of courage may yet ensure that "the edge
maintain this general peace. It is a step of war, like an ill-sheathed knife, no more
Which may encourage any aggressor- shall cut its master."
Minded nation to take a risk which it Mr. President, I apologize to the other
would otherwise be inhibited from taking, Members of the Senate who have been.
the risk of war, discommoded by my long and tedious
Speaking in Yugoslavia on August 21, statement. I recognize that those of us
1963, Soviet Premier Khrushchev said: who take the position I have taken are
You and we have mutual aims, the struggle assuming an unpopular position in this
to construct socialism and communism. You matter. I accord to those who support
and we have a mutual enemy: imperialism, the treaty, however, as I stated in the
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1963
beginning, the same sincerity of purpose
and the same dedication to the security
of our country as I claim to possess.
We have all examined the same testi-
mony, the same evidence, on the question
which we soon must decide. We have
listened to the same witnesses. But,
having weighed this evidence, having
evaluated it, each of us has attempted
to judge, in his own mind and in his own
conscience, what his decision should be.
And we shall not an agree.
Regardless of the decision of each of
us, every Senator has conscientiously
strived to wrest from this agonizing
question the answer that will serve his
country best. For, differ though we will,
the consolation may be ours that we have
labored in the spirit of the words en-
graved on a statue which stands in the
State capitol at Atlanta, Ga.:
He who saves his country saves all things,
And all things saved will bless him.
He who lets his country die lets all things
die,
And all things dying curse him.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRr) of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. VirtatmOND. I congratulate the
able Senator from West Virginia for the
magnificent address he has made today
against the ratification of the nuclear
test ban treaty. It is one of the most
scholarly addresses I have heard during
my Service in the Senate. It has been
clear, forceful, arid logical.
In his address he has raised the differ-
ent arguments seriatim in favor of the
treaty, discussed them, and successfully
refuted them.
In his address he has discussed argu-
ments against the treaty that should ap-
peal to Members of the Senate, and I
believe will appeal to the American peo-
ple. These arguments are sound and
they are logical.
In his address he has discussed the na-
ture of the Soviet Communist threat,
Which we know is a Most dangerous and
vicious threat. Lenin said, when he took
over Russia in 1917, that the aim of the
Soviets was to be the gravediggers, the
heirs, and successors to the governments
Of the world. 'The "Communists have
never departed from -their goal. Their
goal today is world domination.
The able Senator from West Virginia
has discussed this topic with ability, the
same AS he has discussed the Soviet rec-
ord on treaties. It is clear that the So-
viets will not keep a treaty except when
It is in their favor. 'The American Bar
Association had a study made, and it
found that the Soviets had broken 50 out
fat 52 major agreeMents. They had
broken hundreds of other agreements.
The Senator from West Virginia has
shown clearly their perfidy, treachery,
atid lack of good faith in keeping agree-
Merits.
In addition, the Senator from West
Virginia has discussed other questions
Jhave beeh raised by the nuclear test
ban freatir.
-
All in all, lie has delivered a very com-
prehensive address. The address should
be read by every Meinber of this body.
I do not see how any opernninded, fair,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16627 -
objective person could read the address
and reach any conclusion other than that
reathed by the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia?namely, that the
treaty is unwise and that the Senate
would walk the path of wisdom if it
failed to ratify it.
Again I congratulate the able Senator
for his fine address.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator from South Carolina for his
generous and kind remarks.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield
to the Senator from Georgia.
Mr. RUSSELL. I extend my hearty
congratulations and strongest commen-
dations to the Senator from West Vir-
ginia for this very remarkable presenta-
tion.
The Senator is a careful man. I have
worked with him on committees. I know
the care he exercises even in minor mat-
ters before reaching a conclusion. In
this case, the reenarkable statement he
has made indicates a most thorough and
exhaustive study of all the evidence that
was available on the subject of the pro-
posed treaty.
All of us have a pretty clear idea about
the outcome of the voting on the proposal
when the Senate takes it up next Tues-
day morning under the unanimous-con-
sent agreement.
However, I am willing to risk a proph-
ecy?and that is always a dangerous
thing to do?that the events of the next
12 months will completely justify the
unstinted effort and the devoted patri-
otism which the Senator has put into
his analysis of the treaty. He has docu-
mented it so thoroughly that if this coun-
try endures and some historians of the
future decide to make a study of the
subject, they will find most of the ma-
terial they will need in the address of
the Senator from West Virginia.
Let me say to the Senator that even if
our numbers are small on Tuesday, his
efforts have not been wasted. They will
serve a very useful purpose in the days
to come.
I am proud to be able toslaim him as
a friend, one who has shown such high
motivation and such a distinguished ef-
fort in the preparation of the analysis.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I shall
always treasure the compliments of the
distinguished senior Senator from Geor-
gia. I consider him to be a great U.S.
Senator, a great southerner, and a great
American.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr.. President, I
West Virginia for what I believe to be
one of the most forceful arguments
against approval of the treaty that it has
been my pleasure to hear on the floor of
the Senate.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
to have printed :n the RECORD the first
14 pages of the interim report of the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from West Virginia? The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD a memorandum on
significant dates in atomic weapons de-
velopment and subsequent negotiations.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from West Virginia? The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent to 'have
printed in the RECORD "Alert No. 5, So-
viet Treaty Violations," published by the
Armed Forces Information and Educa-
tion Institute, Department of Defense,
November 5, 1962.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from West Virginia? The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an article from the
Sunday Star of September 15, 1963, en-
titled "How the Soviets Are Observing
Their Treaties."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from West Virginia? The Chair hears
none, and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
EXHIBIT 1
INTERIM REPORT ON THE MILITARY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE PROPOSED LIMITED NUCLEAR
TEST BAN TREATY
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Since September 1962, the Preparedness In-
vestigating Subcommittee has engaged in a
comprehensive and extensive inquiry into the
military and technical implications and as-
pects of the various nuclear test ban pro-
posals.
Although the inquiry was originally di-
join my colleagues in the Senate, al- rected to the entire field of nuclear test ban
though I shall vote on the other side of ProPosals from the standpoint of their po-
the issue, in complimenting the distin-
tential impact upon our military posture and
guished Senator from West Virginia on preparedness, the nezotiation and signing
of the three-environmental nuclear test ban
his thorough and well documented and agreement in Moscow caused the subcommit-
enlightened discussion of this very seri- tee to focus attention on the potential im-
ous problem which all Members of the pact of that treaty upon the future of our
Senate face on next Tuesday in making Military Establishment and strategic forces.
their decision on how to vote on the test This interim report is directed specifically
ban treaty. to the partial test ban agreement. It deals
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank with the military advantages and disadvan-
tages to the United States which flow or
the able senior Senator from Oklahoma. might flow from the agreement. Political
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I considerations, and matters involving foreign
take this opportunity to thank and con- and international affairs, as such are not
gratulate the distinguished Senator from within the scope of this report.
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16628 ,cONGRESSIONAf RECORD ? SENATE
In considering the impact and effect of the
proposed test ban it le impprtant to remem-
ter that for nearly two decades this Nation
has been confronted by an adversary who has
openly and repeatedly proclaimed that this
dominant goal is to destrOy the nations of
the non-Communist world. Only because we
have maintained clear military superiority
and the ability to inflict -unacceptable dam-
age upon him has the wculd-be aggressor
been deterred. The basis pf our deterrence
Is military superiority which, in turn, is
based on our nuclear weapens programs and
nuclear retaliatory forces.
It is vital to our survival that no step be
taken which in any manner would impair the
Integrity and credibility of our deterrence or
degrade the ability of our military forces to
protect our security if we should be chal-
lenged militarily by a hostile nuclear power.
BACKGROOND AND SCO'rE OF REPORT
The chairman of the subcommittee in
opening the hearings on September 17, 1962,
Stated:
"The Senate Committee on Armed Services
has legislative responsibility for the common
defense generally and for matters affecting
the size, composition, and equipage of the
Armed Forces, It has a dire-pt and legitimate
Interest ha any and all activities which affect
Or may affect the development and procure-
ment of weapons and the se and quality of
Our fighting forces."
He also said:
"Since weapons development and testiirig
go hand in hand, we will inquire into the
Status of our nuclear test activities with re-
ipect both to weapons developments and
Weapons effects. Technical data now avail-
able on this question will :be considered as
Well as information relating to our position
na this field as compared with the progress
of the Soviets."
In the mpnths that have tollov,teel, the sub-
Committee has Made an eithaustive ,effort,
On a scope and scale whichmis believed to be
Unprecedented as far as theSongress is con-
cerned, to obtain complete and full informa-
tion about the relationship, of nuclear test-
ing?in all environments?ti the integrity of
Our deterrent forces and the ability of our
retaliatory or second-strike /orces to survive
and respond to a nuclear attack. During the
hearings thus far 2,800 pages of testimony
were received from the 24 witnesses who are
listed in eAphabetical order in appendix A.
Most of this testimony involved highly tech-
nical cliscuSsions relating to the needs and
Capabilities of our present and future nuclear
Weapon systems.
The overall objective of the subcommittee
In this inquiry has been to, develop as im-
partially, as objectively, and as fully as pos-
sible all available military and technical in-
formation bearing upon the subject matter
so as to insure that the Senate would have
available to it easentially the same body of
military and technical evidence as is avail-
able to the executive braneh of the GOV-
iturnent in its formulation_ of nuclear test
ban policies and in its weighing of their
security implications. This objective has,
we believe, been attained. The military,
technical, and security problems associated
With suspensions of , nuclear testing have
been identified, explored, and assessed.
These problems will be discussed in this
report with particular emphasis upon their
relation to the treaty banning nuclear tests
I n the atmosphere, outer space, and under-
water.
n.x. at:MP/LARY OF MAJOR vielpirtes
1. From the evidence we are compelled to
conclude that serious?perhaps even formid-
able?military and technical disadyaratages
to the United States will flow from the rati-
fication of the treaty. At the very least it
will prevent the United Statee from providing
?Ur military forces with the highest qual-
,
ity of weapons of which our science and tech-
nology is capable.
2. Any military And technical advantages
which we will deriate from the treaty do not,
in our judgment, counterbalance or out-
weigh the military and technical disadvan-
tages. The Soviets will not be similarly in-
hibited in those areas of nuclear weaponry
where we now deena them to be inferior.
3. Admittedly, however, other important
factors?such as foreign policy, international
affairs, and relations with other countries?
are relevant in an overall assessment of the
treaty. These are ,not within the scope of
this report. When they are considered, as
they must be, each individual must reach
his own judgment about the wisdom and
desirability of the treaty on the basis of per-
sonal philosophy, past experience, current
knowledge, and relative weight which he as-
signs to the various factors in.yolved.
IV. COMPARISON OF tr.s.-9.5.s.R. NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS PROGRAMS
In this section we will endeavor from the
testimony we have received to compare the
nuclear warhead knowledge and state of the
art of the United States with that of the
Soviet Union. This includes, of course, the
important field of nuclear weapons effects.
The criteria we will use are the number
of tests conducted within important yield
ranges and the yield-to-weight ratio (the
explosive energy released per pound of
bomb) achieved in, the test programs. We
will compare the situation prevailing in 1958
prior to the moratorium and that prevailing
today.
A. Multimegaton weapons capabilities
In 1958, at the onset of the 34-month nu-
clear test moratorium. the United States had
conducted slightly More tests above 1 mega-
ton in yield than had the Soviet Union. Of
these U.S. tests, One-fifth were in yield
ranges above 10 megatons. No tests had
been conducted by the Soviet Union in this
high-yield category. As a result of this ex-
perimental program, the United States held
a clear superiority Over the Soviet Union in
the yield it could achieve in a given ther-
monuclear weapon throughout the range of
deliverable weights.
Following the abrogation of the mora-
torium by the Soviet Union, the test and
performance records altered drastically. In
1961 and 1962 the Soviet Union conducted in
yields above 10 megatons twice the number
of tests which had been conducted by the
United States in that yield range throughout
the history of its nuclear test program. The
total number of Soviet tests above 1 mega-
ton was approximately four times that con-
ducted by the United States in the same
period (1961-62). In terms of yield-to-
weight ratios, the Soviet Union, as a result
of its aggressive test program and its con-
centration on very large yield weapons, has
demonstrated clearly superior performance
in all yield classes above approximately 15
megatons where the United States has had no
testing experience since 1954. It is also
worth noting that the scientific witnesses
were unanimous in expressing uncertainty
about the particular designs employed by
the Soviets, to achieve the results observed
in their very high yield experiments.
B. Low-megaton and submegaton weapon
capabilities
Below a few thoUsand pounds in weight
and a few megatons in yield the evidence
available to us indicates that ..the United
States continues to hold a lead in weapon
design and performance.
For a variety of reasons the United States
has chosen to concentrate its development
efforts on weapons yielding from a few mega-
tons d
otons. Conse-
quently, it probably continues to hold some
advantage in design techniques over the So-
viet Union in these lareas and in the ability
September 19
to maximize the yield which can be achieved
at a given weight and size or, alternatively,
to package a given yield in a device of mini-
mum weight and size.
However, the rate of testing below 1 mega-
ton indicates that the Soviet Union is at-
tempting to challenge seriously the U.S. lead
in the lower yield weapon categories. Prior
to the 1958-61 moratorium the United States
had conducted somewhat more than twice
. as many tests at yields below 1 megaton as
had been detected in the Soviet Union. By
the end of 1962 this ratio had dropped sig-
nificantly. More important, the 1961-62 So-
viet test series included more tests in this
yield range than had been conducted in its
entire program from 1949 through 1958.
Even accounting for tests to assess the ef-
fects of explosions and tests to confirm the
yield of stockpiled weapons, this constitutes
Impressive evidence that the Soviet Union
has no intention of permitting U.S. supe-
riority in weapon design and performance
at yields below 1 megaton to go unchal-
lenged. It is in this range of yields that the
testing underground permitted by the treaty
can be accomplished readily.
Furthermore, there is a serious question
about the adequacy of our knowledge of the
nuclear devices employed in the Soviet ex-
periments in the lower yield range. Detec-
tion, indentification, and analytical capabil-
ities are degraded at the lower end of this
yield spectrum, particularly in the low and
subkiloton area. Consequently, OUT con-
fidence in any conclusions concerning the
Soviet state of the art in weapons yielding
up to a few kilotons is correspondingly low.
While we believe that U.S. superiority ex-
tends to these very low-yield ranges, hard
evidence on this point does not exist and,
accordingly, we accept the judgment Of our
Atomic Energy Commission witnesses that
"while some intelligence exists on which to
base an estimate of U.S.S.R. tactical :nuclear
capability, the dearth of information [does]
not permit a comprehensive United States-
U.S.S.R. comparison. [Fort future develop-
ments a credible U.S.S.R, development ca-
pability can be made by assuming a capability
similar to ours."
C. Weapons effects programs
Important as are programs associated with
the acquisition of new or improved types of
weapons, the advent of the missile age and
the adoption of a second-strike or retalia-
tory strategic policy by the United States has
elevated to a first priority tests to deter-
mine the effects of nuclear explosions on
hardened missile sites and control centers,
on reentry bodies in flight, and on radar,
electronic, and communications systems. Of
equal importance have become tests to de-
termine what unique effects are produced
by nuclear explosions in space, the atmos-
phere, and underwater so that the knowl-
edge gained might be exploited for defensive
purposes or our own weapon systems de-
signed to resist them.
From the testimony before the subcom-
mittee, it is clear that neither nation has
conducted a weapons effects test program of
sufficient size and complexity to resolve
whatever doubts may exist about the ade-
quacy of the design and the survivability of
their nuclear weapon systems; nor has either
tested sufficiently to fulfill the needs of their
system designers and military planners.
However, the necessity and the motivation
to conduct such experiments is clearly great-
er for the United States than for the Soviet
Union. Since the early 1960's, the deter-
rent strategy of the United States has been
based substantially on second-strike missile
systems, that is, missile systems which can
survive a massive first strike by a nuclear-
armed enemy and still retain the ability to
retaliate in such force as to destroy the at-
tacker. By the mid-1970's this Nation's nu-
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 16629
clear deterrent will probably reside primarily
in lama- Ind sea-based missile systems de-
signet to achieve that degree of survivabil-
ity. To date, only Polaris has been sub-
jected to a full-scale system test, including
the explosion of the nuclear 'warhead. Min-
t have never been
Utema ,and
so tested, nor hage models-of the base com-
plexes Of the harcrened underground Minute-
men and Titan Systems been subjected to
close-in 'high yield nuclear explosions to
4, prove the adequacy of their design. While
all Of the Military witnesses expressed rea-
sonable confidence in the ability of these
systerna to fulfill- their missions, it is clear
that some unresolved questions exist and
that the absence Of adequate design and vul-
-nerability data has necessitated radical
overdesign, redundancy, and excesSiYe de-
velopment and construction costs. Only by
atmospheric testing, can needed answers be
Obtained to the important unresolved ques-
tions.
ilowever, there is one area of weapons ef-
fects knowledge in which the Soviet Union
probably holds ti4 distinct lead. By virtue
of its large, multimegaton weapon tests, it
? is prudent to assimie that the Soviet Union
has acquired a unique and potentially val-
? uable body of data on high-yield blast, shock,
*communications blackout, and radiation and
electromagnetic phenomena which is not
available to the United States. Further-
more, due to themebsence of comparable ex-
periments, the United States is not now in a
position to evaluate realistically the military
effectiveness of the Soviet 50-to-100-megaton
? terror weapons.
In the field of weapons effects experiments
related to the design and development of
an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) sys-
tem the evidence, although less conclusive,
indleates that the Soviet Union in 1961 and
1962 conducted a; series of complex high alti-
' tude operations which, if properly instru-
mented, could have provided substantial and
Important data on various types of radar
blackout and miclear effects. These Soviet
? experiments were clearly dictated by an ABM
? development program.
? The United States has conducted no ex-
periments comparable in complexity to those
? Soviet operations and a disturbing number
of the United States high-altitude-effects ex-
periments 'which *ere cimducted were com-
promised, either by considerations unrelated
- to the technical objectives of the test pro-
gram, bi inadequate or faulty instrumenta-
tion, Or by operational inadequacies. Based
On the testithon3r we have received, there can
be little' doubt but that the quantity and
quality of information available to the United
States on high altitude nuclear effects is in-
adequate for the Nation's military needs.
V. mart, STATES NEEDS FOR NIIaLEAD. TESTS
In assessing the merits of the treaty which
fs now before the Senate for ratification, it is
iMportant to Understand the kinds and ob-
jectives of certain nuclear test programs
Which, in the opinion of the subcommittee
and based on testimony received by it, would
be desirable 'or necessary in any future U.S.
nuclear test programs.
The following chart summarizes the sub-
committee's conclusions and distinguishes
between selected' test objectives which can be
realized through underground test programs
end those which could only be achieved
through atrnosfiheric testing.
- ?Tett Objectives?Can or cannot be done
W
ider 'treaty:
, Survivability and responsiveness of hard-
. ened site missile launch complexes to high
'yield nkiclear eiloiosions. No.
Response of hardened underground struc-
tur,e,s. to blast and cratering from high yield
surface , burst nuclear weapons. No,
lteSponse of hardened underground struc-
tures to ground motion. Yes.
Determination or Missile warhead and heads and radars. Again, this is an area in
nosecone vulnerability to nuclear explosions which Soviet experiments may have provided
during atmospheric reentry. No. them with greater knowledge than that now
Reduction of missile warhead and nose- available to the United States. Throughout
cone vulnerabilities to nuclear explosions. our hearings there was considerable dispute
Yes. on this point. The treaty proponents ac-
Study of atmospheric and high altitude curately observed that the ABM warheads
radar blackout phenomena. No. could be developed through underground
Study of communications blackout phe- testing and that development of acquisition
nomena from high yield nuclear explosions, and tracking radars was an electronics prob-
No. lem not directly dependent upon nuclear
Full-scale operational tests of ABM sys- tests. It is clear, however, that the charac-
tems. No. teristics or specifications upon which such
Development of ABM warhead with max- warhead design and development should be
imum lethality and minimum blackout based are not sufficiently known and cannot
properties. Partially. be determined with confidence without addi-
Development of very high yield warheads, tional high altitude effects tests. As the
equal to or surpassing Soviet achievements. Atomic Energy Commission observed:
No. "While our knowledge of * * * blackout
Determination of very high yield nuclear phenomena provides some limited guidance
weapons effects. No, in the determination of [ABM] warhead
Determination of underwater nuclear criteria * * ? an optimized design could
weapon effects for improved antisubmarine only be chosen after continued atmospheric
warfare (ASW) systems. ? No. testing. Whether or not significant gains will
Development of weapons requiring less result, can be argued."
fissionable material than present designs. And again:
Yes. "The minimal [warhead] specifica-
Development of pure fusion warheads. tions * * can be met within the frame-
Yes, work of existing technology. rBut, assuming
Development of reduced fallout weapons. that a minimal warhead will not be ac-
Yes. ceptable] testing both underground and in
Full-scale performance and reliability tests the atmosphere would be required to corn-
of Minuteman and Titan missile systems. plete the development."
No.
4. The United States will be unable to de-
Yield verification tests of stockpiled weep- termine with confidence the performance
ons up to approximately 1 megaton. Yes, and reliability of any ABM system developed
Yield verification tests of stockpiled weep- without benefit of atmospheric operational
one above approximately 1 megaton. No. system tests: An ABM system will be re-
Troop and crew training tactical exercises 'quired to function in the nuclear environ-
using nuclear weapons. No.
ment created both by its own defensive war-
VI. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF TREATY
head explosions and those of the attacking
enemy. Under such circumstances it is im-
portant to be as certain as possible that no
element of the system possesses unknown
vulnerabilities to nuclear effects. All elec-
tronics components of the ground arrays and
missiles must function; the missiles must
be capable of operating in the presence of
nuclear, thermal, and blast effects; the war-
heads must be resistant to nuclear radia-
tions. It is apparent that unless a system
of such complexity is tested in its opera-
tional environment, there will be a low level
of confidence in its ability to perform the
? mission for which it was designed and pro-
duced. Many unknowns will arise in the
course of the ABM development program
which can only be explored and satisfied
through the medium of atmospheric and
high-altitude nuclear testing.
5. The United States will be unable to
verify the ability of its hardened under-
ground second-strike missile systems to sur-
? vive close-in, high-yield nuclear explosions:
(See the discussion under the heading of
"Weapons Effects Program" on pp. 4 to 5 of
this report.)
6. The United States will be unable to
verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies
under defensive nuclear attack to survive
and to penetrate to the target without the
opportunity to test nose cone and warhead
designs in a nuclear environment under
dynamic reentry conditions.
7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union
quire necessary data on the effects of very an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish-
high yield atmospheric explosions: Without ments in submegaton weapon technology:
such knowledge it is unlikely that a real- There can be no doubt that a treaty limiting
istic assessment can be made of the military testing to an underground environment will
value of such wea-pons, or that plans can be tend to favor experimentation at the lower
formulated to protect military weapons sys- end of the yield spectrum. Economic fac-
terns against' their use. The data possessed tors will play a part since costs rise signifi-
by the United States on high yield weapons cantly with relatively modest increases in
effects are inadequate to permit confident yield for underground tests. There are also
extrapolations -to the higher yield cate- testing limitations arising from the type of
genies, strata, geological uncertainties, and engi-
3. The United States will be unable to nearing factors. Whether or not either the
acquire data on high altitude nuclear weap- United States or the Soviet Union will choose
one effects: Such data are important to the to test underground at yields much greater
design of antiballistic-missile-system war- ? than approximately 1 megaton is not known,
The primary objective of the hearings held
by the subcommittee was to determine
whether or not a suspension of, or limitation
upon, nuclear testing would or could result
,in overall military and technical disadvan-
tage for the United States. While the evi-
dence leads us to the conclusion that the
net result of the proposed treaty would be a
military disadvantage, there was consider-
able divergence of opinion among the wit-
nesses on the question of whether the disad-
vantage was acceptable from the standpoint
of the Nation's security and whether the risks
involved were acceptable on balance.
A. MILITARY DISADVANTAGES
The military disadvantages associated
with the treaty which were discussed in
testimony before the subcommittee were as
follows:
1. The United States probably will be un-
able to duplicate Soviet achievements in
very high yield weapon technology: Though
U.S. weapons laboratories are capable of de-
veloping and stockpiling designs yielding
greater than 50 megatons without further
? experimentation, their weight and size would
be incompatible with any existing or pro-
gramed missile delivery vehicle. It is well
within the capabilities of U.S. weapons lab-
oratories to equal and to surpass the Soviet
achievements, but to do so would require a
number orafnioSpheria nublear tests.
2. The United States will be unable to ac-
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16630 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
In any case, it appears that the race for
nuclear technological superiority will be con-
fined to that area where the United States is
believed to now hold a margin of superiority.
The result, with time, will probably be the
achievement of parity by the Soviet Union in
this area without any equivalent opportunity
for the United States to attain equality in
very high yield weapon technology.
8. The treaty will deny to the United States
a valuable source of information. on Soviet
nuclear weapons capabilities: The results ac-
quired from the analysis of radioactive debris
generated by nuclear explosions has long
been a basic source of intelligence on Soviet
nuclear weapons programs. By driving So-
Viet testing underground, this intelligence
will be denied the United States with the
result that with the passage of time knowl-
edge of the Soviet state of the art in wea-
pons undergoing tests will be seriously de-
graded. The effect of the treaty will be to
reinforce the difficulties already imposed on
the United States by Soviet secrecy.
B. Counterarguments
? A clear majority of the witnesses agreed
?that the treaty would result in military and
technical disadvantages when compared with
the increases in performance confidence and
in the quality of weapon systems which
would be derived from unlimited atmospheric
testing.
It was stated, however, that it is charac-
teristic of the experimental sciences that
enough data is never available to satisfy the
scientific search for knowledge. The testi-
mony was unanimous that, except in the
field of very high yield weapons, the United
? States today holds a clear and commanding
lead in nuclear weapon systems over any one
or any combination of potential enemies.
This superiority was said to result from
a larger and more diversified stockpile of
? nuclear weapons, by more numerous, varied,
and sophisticated delivery systems, and by
a greater capacity to produce nuclear mate-
rials, Weapons, and delivery systems.
It was also asserted that a cessation of
atmospheric nuclear testing would in no case
prevent qualitative improvements being
. made in our weapons systems which would
flow from a vigorous nonnuclear technology.
Some Witnesses noted that potential im-
provements in missile accuracy and reliabil-
ity .would continue to be exploited. Some
noted that uncertainties in ABM radar per-
formanee When confrpnted with the various
forms Of blackout induced by nuclear ex-
plosions could be compensated by the de-
ployment of greater numbers and wider dis-
persal of the radars.
Uncertainties concerning reentry vehicle
warhead vulnerabilities could be reduced by
a factor of 2 or 3, based on present knowl-
edge and without further testing, by straight-
forward engineering improvements, it was
said.
Some witnesses noted that so far as any
uncertainties which might arise about the
survivability of second-strike missile forces
were concerned, these could be compensated
by additional redundancy in missile systems,
by greater numbers of missiles, and by
greater dispersal. It was also noted that
U.S. war plans tend to be conservative con-
cerning the percentage of the second-strike
force surviving a nuclear attack and in
estimating the number of warheads capable
of reaching enemy targets and so provide
adequate margin for error.
In summary, it was the contention of wit-
nesses who supported the treaty that it will
tend to stabilize the advantages which the
United States now maintains in military
nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.
While recognizing that doubts concerning
the quality of some of our weapons systems
do exist, they maintained that these doubts
can be compensated by "brute force" tech-
niques by which quantity is substituted for
September 10
quality at considerably greater cost to it is the intention of the Preparedness Inves-
achieve approximately the same results in ?tigating Subcommittee to monitor the im-
military system effectiveness. plementation of the safeguards and it would
It is interesting and sobering to note that, also be our hope that other committees of
as we proclaim our nuclear superiority and the Congress having jurisdiction in these
our determination to maintain it, the Soviets areas Would cooperate in this important pro..
do likewise. A dispatch from Moscow, dated gram.
August 30, 1963, quotes Red Star, the Soviet However, we wish to emphasize that even
armed forces newspaper, as saying that Rus- the most rigorous and conscientious imple?-
sla today possesses superiority in nuclear mentation of the JCS safeguards will not
power "and has no intentipn of relinquishing alter, modify, or reduce the military and
it." Red Star also said that, while the technical disadvantages listed herein which
United States intends tq continue under- will result from this treaty. No safeguards
ground testing, the hopes of the Pentagon can provide the benefits of testing where test
of attaining any "advantage in nuclear power ing is not permitted, nor can they assure
by means of these exploalons are illusory." that this Nation will acquire the highest
And on September 3, 1968, Marshal Rodion quality weapon systems of which it is ca-
Malinovsky, the Soviet ,Defense Minister, pable when the means for achieving that ob.-
wrote in Komsomoiskaya Pravda that the jective are denied.
Soviet Union can "prove its complete mili- vim DArACTION AND IDENTIFICATION
tary superiority over the United States."
vn. PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in testimony be-
fore the subcommittee identified a number
of military disadvantages which, in their
collective judgment, would flow from the
treaty. However, their assessment of the
desirability of the treaty was not based on
military considerations alone. Their con-
clusions on the matter also reflected their
judgment of the political and foreign policy
advantages and disadvantages which would
result from it. Their joint conclusion was
that, on balance, the political and foreign
policy advantages to be derived from the
treaty outweighed the limitations which the
treaty would impose on the Nation's weapon
systems programs.
However, the Joint Chiefs qualified their
support of the treaty by making their ap-
proval conditional on the effective Imple-
mentation of four "safeguards" designed to
reduce to a minimum the adverse effect the
treaty would have on our weapon programs.
On the basis of these safeguards Senator
JACKSON on August 14, 1263, offered a mo-
tion which was unanimously adopted by the
subcommittee, and was subsequently ap-
proved by all members of the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services, requesting that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit as soon as
possible, and in any event prior to commit-
tee action on the treaty, a statement of the
specific requirements to implement the
safeguards proposed by the Joint Chiefs.
Senator JACKSON'S motion, which sets forth
the proposed safeguards in full, is attached
as appendix B.
By a letter dated August 15, 1963, Senator
RICHARD RUSSELL, chairman of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, transmitted the Jack-
son motion to the Secretary of Defense, and
requested a statement in response to the
motion.
Responses to the motion were received
from the Joint Chiefs and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense on August 24, 1963.
These responses are attached as appendix C.
The subcommittee considers it to be vital
that, if the treaty is ratified, the recommend-
ed "safeguards" be implemented fully and
that detailed and specific programs to so im-
plement them be presented by the executive
branch.
The administration has expressed publicly
its intent regarding the safeguards both in
the responses to the motion by Senator JACK-
SON and in other statements by the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, and the Secre-
tary of Defense. Such statements are set
forth in appendix D.
To permit the U.S. Senate to monitor the
treaty safeguards it is necessary that the
expressed good intentions be supplemented
by definitive programs against which prog-
ress can be compared. At this time, we have
not received details of testing, preparedness,
and detection improvement programs which ?
will permit the safeguards to be monitored in
an effective manner. If the treaty is ratified
A brief word should be said about the
problem of detection and identification .in
connection with the proposed treaty. "De-
tection" means a determination that an event .
has occurred without implying that it has
been identified as a nuclear explosion.
"Identification" means that an event is not
only detected but that it is identified as a
'nuclear detonation.
During the previous negotiations on test
ban treaties, the major controversy in this
field has centered around the ability to de-
tect, identify, and fix the location of under-
ground explosions. The proposed three-en-
vironment treaty, by permitting under-
ground' testing, considerably reduces the
problems involved in detection and identi-
fication but does not eliminate them entirely.
The capabilities of our verification system
cannot be discussed in detail in an unclassi-
fied document. However, notwithstanding
anticipated and programed improvements in
the system, it will still possess both detection
and identification "thresholds" below which
clandestine testing is possible with a low
probability of detection. -
The yields at which clandestine tests may
be conducted and probably escape detection
will vary with altitude and geographical lo-
cation, and some uncertainty exists in this.
field. There is also some controversy as to
whether significant military advantages can
be obtained by clandestine testing in the
prohibited environments.
It is not the purpose of this section, to ex-
plore these problems in detail. It is our
purpose here to point out that, under the
limited treaty, problems of detection, identi-
fication, and verification still remain al-
though they are of a lesser order of magni-
tude than would be true of a treaty banning
underground testi:ng.
Ix. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
From the extensive evidence presented to
us, we have come to the conclusion that
the proposed treaty banning nuclear testing
in the atmosphere, underwater, a:ad in space
will affect adversely the future quality of
this Nation's arms, and that it will result
in serious, and perhaps formidable, military
and technical disadvantages. These dis-
advantages, in our judgment, are not out-
weighted or counterbalanced by the claimed
military advantages. At the same time, we
are not convinced that comparable military
disadvantages will accrue to the nuclear
weapon programs of the 'U.S.S.R.,
Looking at the matter from the military
aspect and from the effect of the treaty upon
our military preparedness and posture, we
cannot escape being impressed with the
testimony of Gen. Thomas S. Power, com-
mander in chief of the Strategic Air Com-
mand, and Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, com-
mander of the Air Force Systems Command,
Who addressed themselves to the problem
exclusively from the military poi:at of view.
General Power, after stating that he did not
think the treaty "is in the best interests of
the United States," said:
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1003 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
?I feel that we have, military superiority
now', and I eet very strongly that this has
-
resulted,' In
a W, grid that has been free from
miCiear warfare,. I have a WNW Confidence
factor that we can and will maintain that
-military superiority under the test ban
treaty." .
_
?
General , Schriever told the subcommittee
,
that tliere",gre definite ,military disadvan-
? stageS"' to the -treaty and that, as a military
le felthe, could protect the country
'better NOthotit the treaty than with it.
,-course, the endorsement of the treaty
_ by den., Curtis E. eMay, Chief of Staff of
the' Air f Force, was considerably less than
? -enthusiastic, and he testified that he prob-
ably Would have recommended against the
. treaty had it still been in the proposal stage.
From the evidence we have learned that
the Soviets have overtaken and SUrpassed us
in the design of Very high yield nuclear
weapons; that they may possess knowledge
of -weapons effects and antiballistic missile
programs simeridr to ours; and that under
the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible
? that they will achieve parity with us in low,
? .. yield weapon technology. These things are
not grounds for complacency. We believe
very strongly that Soviet secrecy and duplic-
ity requires that this Nation possess a sub-
stantial margin ,of superiority in both the
?. -quality and the quantity of its implements
Of defense.
'Although we have concluded that there
? Will be a net military disadvantage to us if
the treaty is ratified, we recognize the exist-
ence of Other factors which, while not within
. the scope of this report, are pertinent to a
, final judgment on the treaty. Among these
art Matters related to international affairs, ,
? foreign policy, and relations with other coun-
tries. When these are taken into considers-
'tion 'die question becomes one of weighing
relative risks, and our hearings provide ample
,,TfOvidence,,,that the overall assessment of the
.relative merits, and demerits Of the treaty is
COMPlex and difficult matter Ma which
_equally ,mEatriotic, informed, and dedicated
p?ersons liy 'and do disagree. In the final
,analysis, then, each individual .must reach
his .own_judgment on the basis of personal
.philosophy, past experience, current knowl-
edge, and the relative weight which he as-
signs to the various factors involved.
? 'ADMVIONAL VIEWS OF SgnaTon Saveurr
SYMINGTON
. , .
sihee 1955, when I was appointed a member
of the 4oirit Subcommittee on Disarmament,
I h.avo followed closely the activity of our
Governinent IN ,arms, control,? disarmament,
and nuclear test ban proposals; and specifi-
cally, have studied carefully the three-envi-
rOnmen,tal teat ban treaty signed by our Gov-
ernmefit in Moscow on August 5, 1963.
? ,TO, the heat of my knowledge, the factual
data contained in the report of the Prepared-
ness ruvestigating, Subcommittee Is correct.
.1$ _ _ 1.1?t klieve the findings and conclusions are
Overly pessimistic as to the effect of the treaty
ouritigiena1,segvrity.
? AS '4 ipeinber Of both the,Foreign Relations
Corrunittee and, the Preparedness Investigat-
ing-Subcommittee, I listened to and ques-
tioned Many responsible witnesses?both in
'afid out o Cloven/merit. Most of these ex-
perts testified , that our. national security
wo?.04 be adequately Protected under the
terms Of the treaty.
' 1?41.101,91,this testimony was before the For-
eign ItelatiO,ns committee and, therefore, is
nOt-ernf,l'ilsized in this report.
?? BaSed q tliklekird, I am worried about
the treaq.? but more worried about the possi-
bility of an allrout nuclear exchange some
day in the, futu, particularly if there is a
proliferation of miglear weapons among more
Thig4,PrtY, a very small step,
neyerthei,ess .eo.1.114?,.he the first step toward
_
NO.149 11
?
bringing nudlear weapons under some form
of satisfactory control, which action should
promote the possibilities of a just peace
under law.
Therefore, I plan to vote for the treaty.
This does not deter me from signing the
_Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee re-
port. The record made by the subcommittee
is, to the best of my knowledge, the most
complete record ever made qn this vital sub-
ject by anybody on the military and tech-
nological implications of nuclear test ban
treaties as they relate to our national secu-
rity. It is a record which should be of
Inestimable fut'ure value to the Congress
and the country.
DISSENTING VIEW OF SENATOR LEVERETT
? SALTONSTALL
As one Senator who attended the hearings
conducted by both the Foreign Relations
Committee and the Preparedness Investigat-
ing Subcommittee on the proposed nuclear
test ban treaty, I find that I cannot, as a
member of the Preparedness Subcommittee,
concur with its report because I feel that
its general tenor and its specific findings
and conclusions are unduly pessimistic as
to the effect of this treaty, if ratified, upon
our national security. As a U.S. Senator,
I intend to consent to the ratification of
this nuclear test ban treaty.
I believe that the factual data contained
in the report of the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee is accurately stated. However, the
nature of the conclusions drawn from this
factual data are, in my opinion, overly ad-
verse. It must be remembered that re-
sponsible Government officials such as the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, leading scientists, and many others,
some of whom appeared only before the For-
eign Relations Committee, testified that our
national security would be protected under
the terms of the treaty even though some
important atmospheric nuclear tests could
no longer be conducted. This testimony is
not sufficiently emphasized in the report, al-
though I realize that some of it was not
necessarily given in the hearings conducted
by the Preparedness Subcommittee.
The Congress must insist upon an active,
constructive, and energetic implementation
of the four safeguards suggested by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff so that our security will be
maintained while the cause of peace and the
lessening of tensions in the world are
advanced.
EXHIBIT 2
'SIGNIFICANT DATES IN ATOMIC WEAPONS DE-
VELOPMENT AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS
DATES OF CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
EXPLOSIONS
July 16, 1945: First U.S. nuclear device
test, Alamogordo, N, Mex.
August 6, 1945: First atomic bomb dropped
on Hiroshima.
August 9, 1945: Second atomic bomb
dropped on Nagasaki.
September 23, 1949: President Truman an-
nounced the first atomic explosion in the
U.S.S.R.
October, 1952: First nuclear bomb test by
the United Kingdom in Australia.
November 1, 1952: Exploded hydrogen de-
vice fired at Bikini by United States.
? August 21, 1953: First hydrogen device
tested by 'U.S.S.R. detected by United States
(Not included.)
October 30, 1958: Last U.S. test before
moratorium. (Not included hereafter.)
November 3, 1958: Last Soviet test before
moratorium. (Not included hereafter.)
February 13, 1960: First French atomic
test. (Not included hereafter.)
September 1, 1961: Soviets resume atmos-
pheric inuclear weapons tests,
?46631
September 15, 1961: United States resumes
underground nuclear weapons tests.
April 25, 1962: United States resumes
atmospheric tests.
DATES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON DISCONTINUANCE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
June 14, 1946: U.S. proposal for interna-
tional control of atomic energy (Baruch
?plan).
June 19, 1946: U.S.S.R. proposed alternate
plan including insistence on retention of se-
curity council veto power over any control
System.
March 24, 1957: Bermuda Declaration--
Joint declaration by United States and
United Kingdom to conduct nuclear tests in
such manner as to keep world radiation from
rising to more than a small fraction of the
level that might be hazardous, to 'continue
to announce test series, also expressed will-
ingness to announce tests to the U.N. and
permit international observation if the
U.S.S.R. would do the same.
November 14, 1957: General Assembly Res-
olution 1148 (XII) : Regulation, limitation,
and balanced reduction of all armed forces
and all armaments; conclusion of an inter-
national convention (treaty) on the reduc-
tion of armaments and the prohibition of
atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass
destruction. Among its provisions, this res-
olution urged the immediate susp-ension of
testing of nuclear weapons with prompt in-
stallation of effective international control,
including inspection posts equipped with
appropriate scientific instruments located in
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom and at other points as re-
quired.
December 10, 1957: Soviet proposal that
U.S.S.R., United States, and United Kingdosn
discontinue all tests as of January 1, 1958.
March 31, 1958: Decree of the Supreme So-
viet concerning the discontinuance of Soviet
atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.
April 28, 1958: President Eisenhower bY
letter to Khrushchev proposed that both na-
tions have the technical experts start to
work on the practical problems involved in
disarmament, particularly working toward
the suspension of nuclear testing. President
Eisenhower stated "I reemphasize that these
studies are without prejudice to our respec-
tive positions on the timing and inter-
dependence of various aspects of disarma-
ment."
May 9, 1958: Letter from Khrushchev ac-
cepting Eisenhower's proposal of April 28,
1958, to have experts study the problems in-
volved in an agreement on the cessation of
atomic and hydrogen weapons tests as far
as Inspection and control are concerned.
July 1, 1958: Conference of experts from
the West (United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and France) and East (U.S.S.R.,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania) met
in Geneva.
August 21, 1958: Conference of experts
adopted a final report for consideration by
governments. Conference of experts recom-
mended the so-called "Geneva system" of
detecting nuclear explosions. This system
recommended a network of 180 control
points. It should be noted that the Ameri-
can representatives, during this conference,
had taken the position that 650 control
points would be necessary to have adequate
protection down to 1 kiloton. Through
compromise with the Soviets, they settled
on the 180 stations, but then had to point
out the weakness between the area of 1
kiloton and 5 kilotons.
August 22, 1958: President Eisenhower an-
nounced that based on the conference of ex-
perts' report, the United States was prepared
to negotiate an agreement with other nations
which have tested nuclear weapons for sus-
pension of nuclear weapons teats and the
establishment of an international control
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 19
system. The President also indicated that
the United States would withhold further
tasting on its part of atomic and hydrogen
weapons for a period of 1 year from the be-
ginning of the negotiations unless testing is
resumed by the Soviet Union.
October 31, 1958: First meeting in Geneva
of the Conference on the Discontinuance of
Illaclear Weapon Tests.
November 4, 1958: General Assembly Reso-
lution 1252 (XIII) : The discontinuance of
atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Among
its provisions, this resolution urged the par-
ties involved in the test-ban negotiations
not to undertake further testing of nuclear
weapons while these negotiations are in
progress. It expressed the hope that the
Geneva Test Ban Conference would be suc-
cessful and lead to an agreement acceptable
to all. It also requested the parties con-
cerned to report to the General Assembly the
agreement that might be the result of their
negotiations; and requested the Secretary-
General to render such assistance and pro-
vide such services as might be asked for by
'the Conference commencing at Geneva on
October 31, 1958.
November 7, 1958: President Eisenhower
- announced that the United States had de-
tected additional tests by the Soviets subse-
quent to October 31, 1958.
December 28, 1958: The President ap-
pointed a panel on seismic improvement to
review technical problems and to recommend
methods of improving seismic detection.
January 5, 1959: United States released
data showing many underground tests could
not be detected by Geneva experts system
recommended in 1958. Indicated Geneva
system applicable at 20 kiloton rather than
kiloton threshold.
February 22, 1959: Macmillan meeting
with Khrushchev.
March 2, 1959: During this meeting Mac-
millan and Khrushchev discussed the estab-
lishment of quotas for number of on-site in-
spections in countries 'Where suspicious
events have taken place.
April 13, 1959: United States proposed
phased testing ban limited in first phase to
atmospheric tests below 50 kilometers, with
simplified control system, if Soidet Union
continued to insist on veto for on-site In-
lipections.
April 23, 1959: Soviets reject U.S. proposal
'to stop only atmospheric tests and said
numerous on-site inspections would not be
neceSsary for complete ban.
June 22, 1959: Technical Working Group
l'co. I met in Geneva to study high altitude
detection problems.
July 10, 1959: On July 10 Geneva Tech-
nical Working Group I proposed estab-
lishment of system of earth satellites and
Installation of additional equipment at con-
trol posts to detect high-altitude explosions.
' August 26, 1959: United States extended
unilateral suspension to end of 1959.
August 27, 1959: United Kingdom said it
would not resume tests as long as Geneva
negotiations showed, prospect of success.
August 28, 1959: U.S.S.R. pledged not to
resume testing unless Western powers did
so.
November 21, 1959: General Assembly
Resolution 1402 (XIV): Suspension of nu-
clear and thermonuclear tests:
Among its provisions this resolution ex-
pressed the hope that the Countries involved
in the test ban negotiations at Geneva would
Intensify their efforts to reach an agreement
at an early date; it further utged the coun-
tries concerned in these negotiations to con-
tinue their voluntary ban on testing nuclear
'weapons; it also requested the countries con-
cerned to report to the General Assembly the
results of their negotiations.
November 25, 1959: Technical Working
Group II met in Geneva with the Soviets and
the British. This group met to conside
data from the Hardtack series of nuclear
explosions and the findingei of the Berkner
Panel. On December 18, 1959, at the con-
clusion of the meetings held by Technical
Working Group II, U.S. members of Geneva
Technical Working Group II reported That a
large number of seismic events could not be
identified without onsite ' Inspection, even
with improved techniques. The Soviet mem-
bers of Geneva Technical Working Group II
disagreed with V.S. findings.
December 29, 1959: United States said it
was free to resume testing after end of 1959
but would not do so withont giving advance
notice.
February 11, 1960: United States proposed
phased agreement, first phase to provide for
cessation of tests in atmosphere, oceans, and
outer space, to greatest height that could be
effectively controlled; underground tests
above 4.75 seismic magnitude (estimated by
United States to equal explosion of about 20
kilotons) would also be Covered; the 4.75
thresho'id would be lowered as capabilities of
detection system were improved, 20 or 30 per-
cent of unidentified seisznic events above
threshold should be inspected; U.S. experts
estimated that this would mean about 20
inspections per year in U.S.S.R.
March 19, 1960: Soviets offered to conclude
treaty on cessation of tests, together with
moratorium on undergrotind tests below
magnitude 4.75, and to agree to joint research
program on understanding that weapons
tests would be halted during program.
March 29, 1960: United States and United
Kingdom said they would agree to voluntary
moratadum on underground weapons tests
below magnitude 4.75 after treaty was signed
and arrangements were made for coordinated
research program.
December 20, 1960: General Assembly Res-
olution 157'7 (XV) : Suspension of nuclear
and thermonuclear tests.
This resolution urges the countries in-
volved in the Geneva test ban negotiations
to seek a solution for the few remaining
questions so that a test ban agreement can be
achieved at an early date it further urges
the countries concerned in these negotiations
to continue their present Voluntary suspen-
sion of the testing of nuclear weapons; it
also requests the countriet concerned to re-
port the results of their negotiations to the
Disarmament Commission and the General
Assembly.
March 21, 1961: First meeting under the
new administration of the Geneva Conference
on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.
U.S. proposal presented by Ambassador Ar-
thur H. Dean. Soviet Union introduced its
Troika proposal on this date.
April 18 1961: United States and United
Kingdom introduced draft treaty to the
Geneva Conference.
May 5, 1961: Statement by President Ken-
nedy on the Geneva test ban negotiations
made at his news conference. Mention is
made of the new United States and United
Kingdom proposals and the introduction of
the Troika proposal by Russia.
June 4, 1961: Khrushchev delivers Soviet
aide-memoire concerning disarmament and
nuclear weapons tests to President Kennedy
at Vienna. Insists that the question of con-
trol hinges on Western Powers (Incepting
proposals on general and complete disarma-
ment.
June 6, 1961: Kennedy Seports to American
people on his Vienna talkti with Khrushchev.
June 16, 1961: Khrushchev reports to Rus-
Sian people on his talks With President Ken-
nedy. (Toss report) Topics covered: Gen-
eral and complete disarmament, banning of
nuclear weapons, cessation of tests, question
of control, Hammarskjold? the German ques-
tion (peace treaty).
June 17, 1961: U.S. aide memoire to Soviet
Russia concerning Geneva test ban nego-
tiations. Repeated new proposals offered
r by the United States and the United King-
dom on March 21, 1961.
June 28, 1961: President Kennedy an-
nounces appointment of Committee of Sci-
entific Experts to advise him on test ban
problem.
_ July 15, 1961: Soviet note replying to U.S.
note of June 17, 1961, concerning suspen-
sion of nuclear weapons tests.. Says Soviet
proposals have been distorted. Brings up
again supervision_ of inspection and control
by equal representatives of three basic
groups: Socialist states, capitalist states in
Wester:n military bloc, and neutral states
(troika) .
July 15, 1961: U.S. note to Soviet Union
referring to the Soviet note of July 5, 1961,
on the Geneva test ban negotiations. Says
Soviet note contains a multitude of irrele-
vant and unwarranted comments. Confines
its reply to the central issue:: Is the Soviet
Union prepared to reach an accord which
would halt nuclear tests under effective in-
ternational control.
July 15, 1961: United States and United
Kingdom request to U.N. to place on the
agenda of the 16th General Assembly an item
.entitled: "The Urgent Need for e. Treaty to
Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests Under Effective
International Control."
July 20, 1961: President Kennedy an-
nounces membership of nuclear test study
group.
August 10, 1961: President announces he
has reviewed report of Scientific Committee
and is sending Ambassador Dean back to
Geneva.
August 30, 1961: Soviets announce plans
to resume nuclear testing.
Among the reasons cited by the Soviets for
taking this step were the turndown of the
"Troika" proposal, the nuclear tests carried
out by the French beginning February 13,
1960, and the Berlin situation?
August 30, 1961: White House statement
on the Soviet's announcement that they
planned to resume nuclear testing.
This statement expressed concern and re-
sentment in regard to the Soviet decision
to resume nuclear testing. It added that
the Soviet decision presented a threat to
the entire world. It denounced the Soviet
pretext for resumption of weapons testing
by mentioning that the Berlin crisis was
created by the Soviets themselves. It also
mentioned that the Soviet Union bears heavy'
responsibility before all humanity for this
decision which was made in complete dis-
regard of the United Nations. It concluded
by announcing that Ambassador Arthur Dean
was being recalled immediately from his post
as chief negotiator at the nuclear test ban
meetings.
September 1, 1961: Th.e White House re-
ported that the Soviet Union had conducted
a nuclear test in the atmosphere above
central Asia. Authorities estimated that the
device had a yield of 100-500 kilotons.
. September 3, 1961: President Kennedy, in
a joint statement with British Prime MM-
ister Macmillan, proposed that the Soviet
Union agree immediately to discontinuing
testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.
The note suggested that th e 'United States,
United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. representa-
tives meet in Geneva not later than Septem-
ber 9 to record the agreement to cease nu-
clear testing in the atmosphere and report
it to the United Nations.
September 4, 1961: Soviet Union conducted
its second nuclear test in the atmosphere,
over central Asia. This explosion was re-
ported to be in the "low kiloton range."
September 5, 1961: Soviet Union deto-
nated a third nuclear device. The yield of
this detonation was in the low to inter-
mediate range.
September 5, 1961: President Kennedy an-
flounced that the United States would re-
sume nuclear testing. He ordered the tests
carried out in the laboratory and under-
ground "with no fallout." This decision WM
made after the Soviets set off their third
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1963
CONGRESSIONAL RECOItto StNkrt
nuclear test in the atmosphere in 5 days.
Fresident Aennedy, in referring to the Ken-
nedy-Macmillan -statement of SePtember -3
,,binning 'nu:Clear testing in the atrn6s-
phere; said the Offer remains open until Seip-'
tember 9, 1961.
September 15, 1961: The United States det-
OnateS its firit Underground nuclear device
at thellevarda -tea site.
- October 27 101: The United Nations Gen-
eral' AsSembly 'adopted a resolution which
"SoIelnnly 'appeals to the Government of the
Soviet Union' tb, refrain from testing a 50-
Megaton bomb.' Premier Khrushchev has
said Such a hOrnb will be 'exploded before
the end of this Month. The vote WAS 87 to
, .
11, with 1 abstention.
?
October 30, 1061: The Soviet Union deto-
nated a 55-60 Megaton device' (per AEC re-
lease dated. Dec. 9, 1961).
Noxernber 2, 1961: The President an7
toUnqes, that the policy of the United States
will 'be to' proteed in developing nuclear
Weapons to maintain a supelior capability
for the defenSeOf the free orld 'against any
aggreisbt.' This 'S W
statement indicated that the
? 'United States *Old make necessary prepara=
tions for testing in case it becomes neces-
sary td test in the atmosphere.
, , _
December 22, 1061: A joint, Communique
? Was issnecl by President Kermedi and Prime
Minister' Macmillan following a 2-day meet-
lug in Beimnda. They agreed that it was
neceigary "as a fnatter of prudent planning
- for, the future,, that pending the final deci-
Sion [to resurne atmospheric testing]."
Preparations should be made for -atmospheric
testing to maintain the effectiveness of the
tietei'rent;
January 29, 1962: Geneva Conference On
the Diecontinuarice of Nualeir Weapons Tests
breaks, up at 353d meeting. The United
tato Proposed -an adjournment, and Soviet
negotiator lisarAbkin 'said, "This IS the end."
,
Peiguary 7, 1962: President Kennedy and
BritiS4,rrinie glnister Macmjlian said they
tia7/0 proposed to Sf9viet PresEnier Khrushchev
that Another ."Supreme effort" to halt the
nuelVX aims rap be made by 'raising next
rriOnth's
1-nation general diSartha,thent con-
ference to the, toreign-Minrster's -level.
,
?
kielirtiaky 14, 'Kennedy
urged
President Kennedy
urged Premier Khrushchev not to press his
proposal for an" 18-nationsummit meeting
on disarmament. However, he assured the
'Soviet leader that he was ready to participate
"at any stage of the conference when it
? appears-that suCh participation could posi-
tively affect the chances of success."
Febrnary 21, 1962: Premier Khrushchev
replied to President Kennedy's letter of Feb-
ruary' 14 still inSisting on a summit confer-
ence,o
n disarmament.
Febniary 24", 1062: Letter from President
Kennedy to Premier Khrushchev. Pr?dent
KennedY replied' to Premier Khrushchev's
letter Of ,Febrnary 21, 1962, stressing that
head
2:t, state participation at the Geneva
Conference should be reserved until a later
Stage In the 'negotiations After' preliminary
agieCinitnti have been reached at the Foreign
Minister's level.
1982: President Kennedy an-
nolino'd ,:hat he had ordered a resurription
of nUclear tepti- in the atmosphere in late
April unless the Soviet Union- agrees before
'then `to:art ironclad treat5i panning all testa-.
The Tresident field out to Khrushchev the
pronalse of a Arun-mit 'conference at which
#3?10117,4";treatY'FOuld be 'signed, and also said
that a?satisfactOry treaty-Would-be offered
by the' WAst at the disarmament -conference
'opening in Geneva on March 14, -1962.
March' 4, 19 : The Soviet Government
sent '14e thite4 States a Message delivered
to the,State Department advising that-For-
?tilifinfifer 'gibrilyko would go-to Geneva.
0-..X0itiliii-4ssage was reported to have
.ealettiAt,I,thrti-dhchev had "reluctantly" ac-
cepted the forergn minister proposal.
March 14, 1962: Seventeen-nation
armament conference opened in Geneva.
'(Originally 18-nation conference, but France
did not attend.)
March 16, 1962: Premier Khrushchev an-
nounced that Soviet scientists had de-
veloped a "global rocket," invulnerable to
antimissile weapons and that it rendered
obsalete the early warning system of the
United States.
April 10, 1962: The White House released
a joint United States-United Kingdom
statement on nuclear testing appealing to
the' Soviet Union to agree to a nuclear test
ban with adequate safeguards including the
principle of international verification. This
statement indicated that if such an agree-
ment was not successful then the test series
scheduled by the United States for the latter
part of April would go forward.
'April 10, 1962: Prime Minister Macmillan
added a persOnal message to the joint Anglo-
American note to Premier Khrushchev on a
nuclear test ban asking him to accept an
inspection procedure and "fill all the peoples
of the world with a new sense of hope."
April 12, 1962: Premier Khrushchev rejects
the Kennedy-Macmillan joint statement on
nuclear testing.
April 16, 1962: Eight neutral nations ap-
pealed to the nuclear powers to persist in
their efforts to reach agreement on pro-
hibiting nuclear weapons testing for all time.
They suggested establishing a system for
continuous observation and control on a
scientific and nonpolitical basis, built on
existing national network of observation
posts.
April 18, 1962: United States offered a
three-stage plan for disarmament, having as
its goals general and complete disarmament
and gradual replacement of the armed
power of single nations by a strengthened
United Nations. The disarming process
would be balanced to prevent any state from
gaining a military advantage, and compli-
ance with all obligations would be effectively
verified.
April 22, 1962: Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy in summary analysis of 1961 Vela
hearing, reports that nearly 3 years of re-
search had, brought no material progress to-
ward an effective Method of detecting clan-
destine underground tests.
April 25, 1962: First 1962 U.S. nuclear test
in the atmosphere. This test was of an in-
termediate yield from a plane near Christ-
mas Island. The President approved the
resumption of nuclear testing after repeated
unsuccessful attempts by the United States
to get the U.S.S.R. to agree to a nuclear test
ban treaty with adequate safeguards.
April 26, 1962: Secretary of State Rusk jus-
tified the new series of tests on the basis of
refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the
kind of international verification necessary
for a test ban agreement. The Secretary of
State referred to President Kennedy's ad-
dress of March 2 in which he set forth the
reasons why a certain number of tests would
be necessary in the absence of an interna-
tional agreement banning nuclear tests with
adequate assurances; and, secondly, that it
is a major objective of American policy to
bring an end to testing immediately and per-
manently when we were assured that testing
had been abolished.
May 1, 1962: France conducts underground
explosion of nuclear device in Algerian Sa-
hara.
May 2, 1962: Disarmament talks were re-
sumed at Geneva. British Minister of State
Joseph Godber said U.S.S.R. must change its
attitude toward verification measures if the
wbrld is to have general and complete dis-
armament.
May 16, 1962: Premier Khrushchev con-
firmed U.S.S.R. determination to test. He
based his decision on the fact that the
United"' Stateshad resumed testing in the
Pacific.
16633
June 14, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarmament
Conference, recesses.
July 12, 1962: Secretary of State Dean Rusk
reports that the preliminary Vela results, re-
leased by the Defense Department on July
7, offer some promising signs for detecting
and identifying nuclear tests but emphasized
the new findings cannot be considered a
substitute for control posts or onsite inspec-
tions.
July 13, 1962: Soviet Union served official
notice that it claims the right to be the last
nation to carry out nuclear weapon tests.
July 16, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarmament
Conference reconvenes in Geneva. The
United States proposes discussion of scienti-
fic findings, Particularly from Project Vela.
July 21, 1962: The Soviet Government an-
nounces its decision to resume nuclear tests.
August 1, 1962: President Kennedy stated
at his news conference that on the basis of
recent technical assessments, the United
States can work toward an internationally
supervised system of detection and verifica-
tion for underground testing which will be
simpler and more economical than the sys-
tem which was contained in the treaty which
we tabled in Geneva in April 1961. He em-
phasized that these new assessments do not
affect the requirement that any system must
include provision for onsite inspection of
unidentified underground events.
August 5, 1962: The Soviet Union detonates
a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere in the
order of magnitude of 30 megatons. This is
the first of some 40 tests, continuing until
December 25.
August 8, 1962: U.S. Delegate Dean pro-
posed reducing the number of control posts
to something like 80-a reduction of more
than half. He offered this concession in view
of his contention that detecting devices have
gone ahead rapidly. Thus, our techniques
for detecting sneak tests are much better.
August 9, 1962: Ambassador Dean formally
introduces a new proposal for a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty based on a worldwide net-
work of internationally supervised, nation-
ally manned control posts. Provided the So-
viets agree to the principle of obligatory
onsite inspection, the numbers of control
posts and onsite inspections would be sub-
stantially reduced from previous U.S. propos-
als. Ambassador Zarin immediately rejects
the new proposal.
August 20, 1962: The U.S.S.R. rejected
proposals for a partial nuclear test ban treaty.
The idea of a half-way treaty was advanced
by Brazil, Sweden, and Italy. The proposed
treaty would stop atmospheric tests immedi-
ately to ease fallout dangers.
August 27, 1962: The United States and
Great Britain offered the Soviet Union the
choice of an internationally inspected total
ban on nuclear weapons tests or an unin-
spected limited ban. The limited ban would
cover tests in the atmosphere, in space and
underwater pending further negotiations for
a treaty to include underground tests, the
most difficult to identify.
August 29, 1962: The U.S.S.R. submitted
to the disarmament conference a formula for
halting nuclear weapons tests that the
United States and Britain have repeatedy
termed unacceptable because of inadequtae
guarantees and safeguards for inspection of
suspicious events.
August 29, 1962: President Kennedy wel-
comed a Soviet proposal that all nuclear test-
ing cease by January 1. But he reiterated
the Western position that an enforcible
treaty, complete with inspection provisions,
be signed first.
September 7, 1962: The 18-Nation Disarma-
ment Conference recesses, but the test ban
subcommittee remains in session.
1 18-Nation Disarmament Conference now
composed of 17 nations. Prance, an original
member, withdrew at the beginning of the
-Conference.
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16634 CONGRESSIONAL REdORD - SENATE
1
negotiator at the DisarmaMent Conference
at Geneva.
January 7, 1963: In a letter to President
Kennedy, in further exchange on the sub-
ject of onsite inspection, Premier Khru-
shchev holds to his contention that an an-
nual quota of two or three inspections is
sufficient. He emphasizes that he considers
agreement in principle a great unilateral
concession, and he agrees to further d1$-
elusion on the questions between United
States and U.S.S.R. representatives.
January 14, 1963: United States and Soviet
representatives meet in New York. The
United States is represented by William C.
Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; and the U.S.S.R. is
represented by N. T. Fedorenko, Soviet Am-
bassadcr to the U.N., and S. K. Tiarapkin,
chairman of the Soviet delegation to the 18-
Nation Disarmament Conference. Discus-
sions centinue in New York until January
22 when they are moved to Washington.
January 26, 1963: President Kennedy
orders that preparations for underground
:testing in Nevada be suspended in the hope
that the Western-Soviet discussions pres-
ently taking place in New York and Wash-
ington would materially enhance the pros-
pects for an effective agreement on a test
ban. ,
February 1, 1963: The New York and Wash-
ington, D.C., discussions on a test ban are
slated to be taken up at the 18-Nation Dis-
armament Conference scheduled to be re-
surned on February 12. In a press confer-
ence, Secretary of State Rusk expressed the
disappointment of the United States that
the position of the Soviet Union appeared
to have hardened into a take-it-or-leave-it
attitude on their offer for two or three on-
site inspections per year. The Secretary
states, '' * ? " the idea of 'onsite inspection
is not simply a political qUestion involving
the acceptance of onsite inspection in prin-
ciple, but is the practical problem of estab-
lishing arrangements which in fact do pro-
vide assurance that agreements are being
complied with."
February 1, 1963: President Kennedy or-
ders resumption of the preparations for
underground testing in Neeada.
February 8, 1963: The s heduled series of
underground tests is begu in Nevada.
February 12, 1963: The 1 -Nation Disarm-
ament Conference reconvenes at Geneva.
February 22, 1963: The ACDA announces
in Washington that the United States is
willing to consider possib1e acceptance of
seven on-site inspections, providing the
modalities of inspection can be agreed upon.
February 28, 1963: In a Moscow election
meeting speech, Premier Khrushchey re-
affirms his refusal to ceinsider anything
but three on-site inspections per year.
April 1, 1963: The United States and
United Kingdom delegations table a memo-
randum of position concerning the cessa-
tion of nuclear weapons tests. This memo-
randum sums up the Western position on
general principles of agreement, on-site
inspection and automatic seismic station ar-
rangements, and includes specific proposals
submitted to date. ,
May 13, 1963: AEC and DOD announce can-
cellation of the three small subkiloton de-
tonations which had been announced on
May 8 would be conducted at the Nevada
Test Site on the surface and one just below
the surface. ,
May 27, 1963: Senator Dedd joined by 33
other Senators introduced a resolution that
U.S. offer to the Soviet Union to agree to a
ban on all tests that contaminate the atmo-
sphere or the oceans. .
June 10, 1963: President Kennedy, in his
speech at American University, announced
that; (1) he, Prime Minister Macmillan and
Chairman Khrushchev had agreed that high
level discussions will shortly begin in Mos-
cow on a comprehensive test ban treaty;
October 24, 1962: At the United Nations,
Brazil proposes denuclearization of Latin
America and Africa which would include a
ban on nuclear weapon tests in these con-
tinents.
November 4, 1962: President Kennedy an-
nounces the end of the current series of at-
mospheric nuclear tests, but states that
underground tests will be continued in Ne-
vada. The last atmospheric detonation was
November 4, 1962.
November 6, 1962: The General Assembly
adopts a two-part resolution on nuclear tests.
Part (A), sponsored by 37 powers and ap-
proved by a vote of 75 to 0 with 21 absten-
tions, calls for the cessation of testing by
January 1, 1963, and an interim arrangement
with certain assurances if no final agreement
Is achieved by that date. Part (B), spon-
sored by the United States and the United
Kingdom and approved by a vote of 51 to 10
with 49 abstentions urges the early conclu-
sion of a comprehensive test ban treaty with
effective international verification. The
United States and the U.S.S.R. abstain on
part (A), and the U.S.S.R. opposes part (B).
November 13, 1962: At Geneva, Ambassa-
dor Tsarapkin suggests that unmanned seis-
mic stations be employed as an addition to
existing national detecting stations to moni-
tor a test ban.
November 26, 1962: The 18-Nation Disar-
mament Conference reconvenes for the third
session.
November 28, 1962: In an attempt to end
the deadlock at Geneva, Swedish Delegate
Rolf Edberg proposed a moratorium on all
nuclear tests while an international group of
scientists works out underground control
methods satisfactory to both the West and
the Soviet Union.
December 3, 1962: The U.S.S.R. rejected the
proposal for setting up a nuclear test ban
put forth by the Indian-Swedish delegations.
December 4, 1962: The Soviet Union told
the United States and Great Britain that as
long as they insisted on on-site inspection
there would "never be any agreement" to end
nuclear testing. Joseph B. Godber, of
Britain, declared the dismissal of the neu-
tralist efforts to break the test ban stalemate
was "not the action of a responsible govern-
ment."
December 4, 1962: Arthur H. Dean told the
Soviet Union that unmanned seismic sta-
tions-the so-called "black boxes"-cannot
serve as sole guardian of a nuclear test ban.
December 10, 1962: In the 18-Nation Dis-
armament Conference, Ambassador Tsa-
rapkin formally proposes the establishment of
two or three unmanned seismic stations on
the territories of states possessing nuclear
weapons. Locations by zones for those to be
placed in the Soviet Union are named. This
proposal is conditioned on the abandonment
by the West of its insistence on international
control and obligatory on-site inspection.
December 19, 1962: Premier Khrushchev,
in a letter to President Kennedy, states that
the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept
two or three onsite inspections per year on
Soviet territory. In addition, he says there
could be three unmanned seismic stations
on Soviet territory. The final location of the
stations is left open.
December 20, 1962: The 18-Nation Dis-
armament Conference recesses.
December 28, 1962: President Kennedy, in
reply to Premier Khruslichey, indicates en-
couragement that the Soviets have now ac-
cepted the principle of onsite inspection, but
states that the figure of "two or three" on-
site inspections is not sufficient, nor are
three unmanned seismic stations. He denies
that the United States offered to agree on
three inspections. The United States has
reduced number of onsite inspections to 8
to 10.
January 4, 1963: Arthur H. Dean an-
nounced that he had submitted his resigna-
tion on December 27, 1962, as Chief U.S.
September 19
(2) the United States does not propose to
conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so
long as other states do not do eo.
June 20, 1963: Memorandum of Under-
standing (between U.S. and U.S.S.R.) signed
at Geneva to establish a direct communica-
tions link between the 'United States and
the Soviet Union. (This was negotiated in
arms control forum).
June 30, 1963: The Atomic Energy Com-
mission reported that in recent weeks there
has been evidence of events in the Soviet
Union which may be nuclear tests of very low
yields. (Newspaper articles referred to an
event occurring in the Soviet Union on June
12.) e
July 2, 1963: Chairman Kbruslichey, in a
speech in East Berlin, agrees eo negotiate on
a nuclear test ban treaty limited to atmos-
phere, outer space, and underwater. He also
requested negotiations on a nonaggression
pact between NATO and the Warshaw Treaty
nations.
July 15, 1963: Commencement: of three
power (United States, United Kin gdom, and
U.S.S.R.) talks in Moscow to negotiate a
limited test ban.
July 25, 1963: Negotiators for the United
States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.-Am-
bassador Harriman, Lord Hailsham, and For-
eign Minister Gromyko--initial a treaty to
ban nuclear weapons tests in other nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and underwater.
EXHIBIT 3
[Alert No. 5-Soviet Treaty Violations, pub-
lished by Armed Forces Information and
Education, Department of Defense, Nov. 5,
1962]
SOVRET TREATY VIOLATIONS
Officials of the Soviet Union, from the 1917
Bolshevik revolution onward through 15 years
of Communist rule, have established an un-
disputed reputation for breaking their most
solemn pledges.
The Soviet regime's consistent viewpoint
on the relative unimportance of promises is
not restricted to its dealings with other
countries, but extends with equal force to
its relationships with the Russian people and
the various minority groups which comprise
the U.S.S.R.
Only 3 days after the November 7, 1917,
revolution placed it in rower, the Communist
regime abolished freedom of the press as a
privilege too dangerous to be entrusted to
the people. The people were promised, how-
ever, that the decree would be rescinded just
"as soon as the-new regime took root." This
45-year-old promise notwithstanding, the
order still applies today.
Other instances in which the Soviet Re-
public has broken faith with its own people
are legion. The revolution of 1917 was car-
ried out in the name of democracy, and
ever since "democracy" has been one of the
most frequently used words in the Commu-
nist lexicon. But while the Communists
have capitalized on the word, they have radi-
cally altered its definition-from "govern-
ment by the people" to "government for the
good of the workers." Since the Commu-
nists keep for themselves the right to deter-
mine what is "good" for the workers, the So-
viet definition of democracy in fact has
become "government by Communists."
After 1917, the Russian people wanted not
only democracy but its specifi c institutions:
a constitution, a parliament, elections, a se-
cret ballot, trade unions, etc. They were
given all these things, but in name only.
The Soviet Constitution is an interesting
document to read. However, it is violated or
ignored by the regime as a matter of course.
The Soviet parliament meets regularly, but
it possesses neither power nor function.
Elections are held every 4 years, but the
single-slate ballot gives the voters no choice.
A "secret ballot" is provided, hut its purpose
is to identify dissenters rather than protect
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: C1A-RDP65B00383R000100200004-6
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16636 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
THE AGREEMENT
tracting party ? ? *. The treaty comes into
force immediately * " and shall remain
in force for a term of 30 years."
March 10, 1947: Council of Foreign Min-
isters, meeting In Moscow, agrees that all
German prisoners of war should be repatri-
ated by December 31, 1948.
May 4 and June 20, 1949: Four-power
agreements of New York and Paris guar-
antee United States, British, French, and
Soviet joint control of Berlin, all access
routes to and from the city, and freedom
of movement within the city.
July 27, 1953: Military armistice estab-
lished between United Nations command
and opposing Communist forces, assisted by
U.S.S.R., of China and North Korea. Armi-
stice agreement pledges signers to "cease
Introduction into Korea of reinforcing mili-
tary personnel."
January 11, 1956: U.S.S.R. signs agreement
with Yugoslavia, pledging $110 million in
credits for industrial construction.
August 4, 1956: U.S.S.R. pledges an addi-
tional grant of $175 million, bringing total
to $285 million.
October 19, 1956: U.S.S.R.-Japanese joint
declaration pledges the Soviet Union to re-
frain from interference in Japan's internal
affairs.
THE RESULT
tracting parties undertake not to conclude
any alliance against the other high contract-
ing party and not to take part in any coali-
tion or actions or measures directed against
the other high contracting party * ". The
present treaty will be valid for 30 years.
August 3, 1955: Soviet regime furnishes
West German Red Cross with data on the
health and whereabouts of only 20 of the
approximately 14,000 Germans known to be
still held in the U.S.S.R.
September 20, 1955: U.S.S.R. unilaterally
transfers Soviet control over all access routes
to and from Berlin to East German regime.
August 13, 1961: Construction of Berlin
wall completely prohibits free passage from
the Soviet sector to the Western sectors.
July 11, 1955: U.N. command details long
list of armistice agreement violations by
Communist parties.
May 6, 1957: U.N. command, in another
of series of official complaints, charges that
Communists have sent troops in Korea's de-
militarized zone six times in period of less
than 4 months.
May 28, 1958: Yugoslav sources disclose
that the Soviet Union has postponed for 5
years the grant to Yugoslavia amounting to
$285 million. This represented an attempt
to retaliate against Yugoslavia for its refusal
to accept the Soviet Communist Party's
ideological leadership.
1958: During the weeks preceding Jap-
anese elections of May 22, Soviet radio beams
propaganda at Japan violently opposing the
reelect:on of Premier Kishus government.
1959-60: U.S.S.R. threatens Japan with
the possibility of nuclear war if Japan rati-
fies United States-Japan security treaty,
signed January 19, 1960.
Emus's: 4
[From the Washington (D.C.) Star, Sept.
15, 19631
How THE SOVIETS ARE OBSERVING THEIR
TREATIES NOW
(By Dr. F. G. La.suner)
The following is a short study of selected
Soviet treaty practices. It is not based on a
comprehensive listing of all treaties; nor does
this study contribute a complete analysis of
how treaties fared at the hands of the Krem-
lin. However, a large enough sample of
treaties was examined to permit a number of
broad conclusions. a
Economic treaties, in general, are being ob-
served by the 'U.S.S.R. This is so because
treaties of this sort operate to the advantage
of the U.S.S.R. and because many of them
are drawn with Communist bloc states; i.e.,
they are treaties within the same political
entity. But where trade agreements conflict
with the immediate political interests of the
U.S.S.R., they are wholly or partially voided
(viz, treaties with such dissident satellites
as Albania, China, Yugoslavia, etc.).
Many treaties signed by the U.S.S.R., espe-
cially at the end of World War II, called for
free elections or plebiscites. The 'U.S.S.R.
presumably expected Communist and affili-
ated parties to win elections in Eastern Eu-
rope. When this hope was disappointed, de-
spite systematic attempts to bring about
electoral victories by skulduggery (e.g., out-
lawing of certain parties), political warfare
and insurrectional methods were used to
seize political power.
Treaties of strategic significance habitu-
ally have been violated by the U.S.S.R. when-
ever violation was in accord with the require-
ments of Soviet strategic operations. This
will become apparent by reading, for example,
the attached list of violated and observed
nonaggression and friendship treaties.
A TREATY TECHNIQUE
The 'U.S.S.R., on occasion, attempts to play
off one country against another through the
negotiation or drawing of treaties, of which
one set tends to be deceptive. In 1922, the
U.S.S.R. negotiated with the Western Powers,
only to sten the Treaty of Rapallo with Ger-
many. In 1939, extensive discussions with
France and England on mutual security were
terminated through the signing of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact. Agreements made in 1939 with
Nazi Germany on the division of Poland were
annulled 2 years later by treaty with the
Polish Government-in-exile; in addition, the
U.S.S.R. shortly thereafter drew agreements,
which were not mutually compatible with
two different Polish exile governments.
The U.S.S.R. has signed agreements which
have a purpose that differs from the objects
stated :n the treaty. The U.S.S.R., for ex-
ample, joined the United Nations for many
reasons connected with their strategy of
revolution, but not for the humanitarian rea-
sons stated in the U.N. Charter.
In summary, it may be concluded that in
the Soviet scheme, treaties are a tool either
to solve some practical problem (Danube
River navigation or International Postal Un-
ion Treaties) or, more importantly, to Lu-
ther the offensive-defensive strategy of the
U.S.S.R. More often than not, treaties are
concluded with a particular country whose
assent cr benevolent neutrality is needed to
carry out a particular strategic operation, or
else the treaty partner is itself the intended
victim, or target, of Soviet direct or indirect
attack.
TREATIES VIOLATED
1. Treaties pertaining to repatriation and
treatment of civilians and war prisoners. A
whole series of such treaties was made after
World War II. Examples are:
Joint declaration by the 'U.S.S.R. and
Japan concerning political relations, Octo-
September 19
her 19, 1956 (provisions on repatriation of
Japanese nationals) .
Agreement concerning repatriation of Jap-
anese prisoners of war and civilians from the
U.S.S.R. and from territories under Soviet
control, as well as Korean nationals from
Japan to Soviet-occupied North Korea, with
two annexes. December 19, 1946.
2. Treaties between the RSFSR and cer-
tain bodies concerning establishment of
autonomous republics within the RSFSR.
Such autonomy on several. occasions was
unilaterally abrogated at a later date by the
RSFSR.
3. Treaties of nonintervention: The
U.S.S.R. frequently has violated such treaties
outright, or has denied that activities in
which it was engaged constituted an inter-
vention within the meaning of the treaty.
Intervention by the U.S.S.R. has constituted
both of propaganda and political warfare,
and of outright political or military activi-
ties. Examples are:
Exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R.
and Rumania constituting an agreement
concerning noninterference in each other's
internal affairs, June 9, 1934.
Exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R.
and France concerning Soviet adherence to
the principle of nonintervention in the Span-
ish civil war.
Joint declaration by the U.S.S.R. and Japan
concerning political relations October 19,
1956 (provisions on noninterference in inter-
nal affairs).
4. Treaties related to the International
Labor Organization. U.S.S.R. has adhered
to conventions on a variety of subjects: Child
labor, right to unionize, annual holidays
with pay, freedom of association, etc. Some
of these agreements were first drawn in the
early 1920's. Examples are:
CONVENTION ON saevEnT
Convention concerning slavery of 1926-
53, 'U.S.S.R. ratified August 1956. Several
supplementary conventions of 1956 on aboli-
tion of slavery and slave trade "and institu-
tions and practices similar to slavery" rati-
fied by the U.S.S.R.
Convention concerning equal renulnera-
tion for men and women workers for work
of equal value (ILO convention No. 100), rat-
ified by the U.S.S.R. on April 4, 1956.
Convention concerning forced or compul-
sory labor (ILO convention No. 29) of 1930-
46. U.S.S.R. ratified June 4, 1956.
5. Treaties pertaining to the control of
narcotics. These are violated by the U.S.S.R.
through proxies (China, Cuba). Examples
are:
International Opium Convention, with an-
nex and protocol, February 19, 1925. So-
viet adherence, October 31, 1935.
Convention for limiting the manufactur-
ing and regulating the distribution of nar-
cotic drugs, with p otocol of signature, July
31, 1931. Soviet adherence, October 31, 1935.
6. Treaties establishing certain rules or
regulations, or prohibiting certain practices.
These either have been or are being violated
by the U.S.S.R.; they aee antithetical to
Soviet custom and observation of such
agreements canont be expected. The U.S.S.R.
was not a signatory to some of these treaties
before World War H, and went out of its
way to act contrary to the spirit Cf many of
the provisions. Examples are:
Geneva convention concerning the treat-
ment of prisoners of war, with five annexes,
1949. Supersedes agreements of 1929.
Geneva convention concerning the pro-
tection of civilian persons in time of war,
with three annexes, 1949.
Convention on the prevention and punish-
ment of the crime of genocide, December 9,
1948.
Convention on the political rights of wo-
men, December 20, 1952, and March 31, 1953.
Approved For Release 2007/01/20: CIA-RbP65B00383R000100200004-6
16638
03831:V3001002o
coNGnEssioNAt nteont.= AN-Aft September 19
? At that:WIWI b_elieve I had fay cov-
ered this point. However, I see that my
distinguished colleague from West Vir-
ginia [Mr. BYRD1 in his discussion today
again has referred to General Powers'
concern and cites General Powers' state-
ments az -One a the bases for 'his con-
cern over the treaty. -
For many years now the Joint Com-
Mittee on Atomic Energy : has had de-
tailed_ inforniation concerning the, test-
ing program by the AEC and the high
degree of reliability that the AEC and
the weapons laboratories attribute to
their nuclear weapons. The details of
this on file with the JoincOommittee are
classified. In order, however, to bring
this Matter to the attention of the pub-
lic in a true light, the Joint Committee
staff on September 17 requested Gen.
A. W. Betts, Director of the Division of
'Military Application; to make available
? In an unclassified manner the details of
the testing programs and the assurances
aS to thc reliability of the nuclear weap-
ons. .This afternoon a response from
General *Betts was received at the office
of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy.
I ask unanimous consent that the let-
ter a September 17 from the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic t nergy to General
Betts and the reply from General Betts
Of September 10 be inserted in the REc-
-
x believe the Commissioner's letter
signed by General Betts will once and
for all put to rest any doubts that exist.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows: ?
- ,SEPTEMBER 17, 1963.
Maj. Gen. A. W. BETTS,
Director, DiViS1071 of Military Application,
knergy Commission,, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Dziku c.xnNERat, 3,3ETTs: On August 19, 1963,
General power, in testimony before the Pre-
paredness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, testi-
"The only way you can prove a weapon
system is to take it out of the stockpile in
a random pattern and let the tactical unit
take it out and detonate It. If you haven't
done this, there is always a chance that
sornethio has happened that we won't
cover4 1? 00 14e. * * *
?'4 VS POt tested any of the operational
ln our inventory. That includes
the rn s es and the bombs."
The iMplications left by General Power's
testimony is that the weapons systems and
Warheads developed are not assured of func-
tioning properly when called upon to do so
in an operational manner. From the knowl-
edge available to the Joint Committee in
following the weapons programs over the
years, this appears to be contrary to the
actual situation.
Most of the information on, tlje with the
Joint Committee, on At9mic Energy regard-
ing this matter is in classified form. It is
very desirable, therefore, that an unclassi-
tted letter be 'furnished recounting the long
history Of looking at the need for opera-
tional systems tests, and the study efforts
made , on tniq problem together with the
prOcedures now, in practice which provide to
seientlefi, engineers and to the militaryad-
1u the ,riepartment of 'Defense the
high degree of confidence tRei have in the
f?SSUratiO that goniplete" Weapons systema,
when fired operationally, will result in nu-
clear warhead detonations as designed.
To the greatest extent possible in an un-
classified communication, this letter should
include infbrmation on tests of weapons
systems that included warheads where the
entire sequence of firing was actually tested
except for the final nuclear detonation.
.Statistical tests apd certification procedures
involving more than just the original war-
head designers should also be deseribed.
Thisr cooperation in providing us this in-
formation is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN T. CONWAY,
Executive Director.
US. ATRZAIG ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., September 19,1963.
Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY,
Executive Director,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States
- DEAR me. CONWAY: I refer to your letter
of September 17, 1963, regarding statements
made by Gen. Thomas S. Power, commander
in chief, Strategic Air Command, before the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate.
The matter of reliability of nuclear weap-
ons has always been considered a matter of
great importance by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and consequently a substantial tech-
nical effort has been devoted to insure that
the nuclear weapons provided to the Depart-
ment of Defense will flinction properly if
used operationally. The required reliability
for any particular nuclear weapon is estab-
lished initially by the DOD in the nuclear
weapon military characteristics. This re-
quired reliability is quite high and is verified
by the extensive testing program discussed
in the following paragraphs.
The accumulation of the necessary data
upon which the reliability is based begins
early in the development program of a
weapon. Initially the nonnuclear compo-
nents are siibject?.d to many rigorous tests,
under various environmental conditions
which, include acceleration, vibration, high
and-low temperature cycling, etc. Next, the
complete nonnuclear weapon (either bomb
or warhead) with depleted uranium or other
material substituted for the fissionable ma-
terial is tested under a variety of circum-
stances that include functional tests under
simulated operational conditions. In these
' tests, the weapon is highly instrumented in
order to olitain information that is of pri-
mary interest to the weapon designer; e.g.,
arming, fusing, and firing circuit operation.
If the weapon is a bomb, it is carried by the
same type aircraft that will employ it oper-
ationally and it is released on an AEC test
range at Tonopah, Nev., where extensive
ground instrumentation records all the vari-
ous bomb functions.
In the case of aclallistic missile, the same
type of tests are run in conjunction with the
DOD on test firings from the Atlantic or Pa-
cific missile ranges. These tests confirm the
compatibility between the DOD and AEC
portions of the weapon system and establish
that the nonnnclear, portion of the weapon
will perform according to specifications. A
sufficient number of these tests is performed
so that a statistically signifificant amount of
da