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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200021-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/11111" CIA-RAP"65$x3038 ROO'G` 0020OO21?-"7
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ~SENATE
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tee-in his reply found on pages 968-969 all our problems. rectly, Dr. Brown's attitude with respect
of the printed hearings--that the Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President, to the antiballistic missile was that the
amending procedures has no bearing on will the Senator yield? best defense was a penetration of the
the recognition question. He also replied Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. other side, rather than trying to knock
that the Past German regime is a party Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to go missiles. out of the sky after they got
to 24 international conventions, and that back into the first chapter of the Sena- over our country.
the United States and West Germany tor's discussion. Mr. LAUSCHE. I was amazed by his
are both parties to 11 of these. I would Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. idea that the development of an anti-
note that all. 11 of these treaties have Mr. LAUSCHE. Is, it the understand- ballistic missile was beyond the realm
been in effect for more than 10 years and ng of the Senator from Alabama that of achievement, but that the research
do not imply recognition by us of East we have reliable knowledge concerning and development should go on because
Germany. These agreements, together he tests made by Red Russia with re- of the particular good that comes from
with East Germany's bilateral undertak- and to the blackout impact, the weap- incidental discoveries that are made.
ings, are listed starting on page 969 of ns effects impact, and the technological I asked him, "Why do you think that
the printed hearings.' knowledge possessed by Russia in all surrounding Leningrad in Red Russia is
It should also be noted that East Ger- elds? I refer especially to the Sena- installed a system of antiballastic
many has already acceded to the treaty or's suggestion that the transcript of weapons?"
In Moscow. The process of its asses- ' be read. His answer was that he thought some-
sion did not and will not require any Mr. ARKMAN. I understand. body had sold a bill of goods to Khru-
official action by the United States even Mr. LAUSCHE. To repeat my ques- shchev.
hinting at recognition. The Soviet ? tion, is it the understanding of the Sena- I hope so, but Khrushchev is not sold
Union i set it a note advising the United tor from Alabama that we have reliable a bill of goods with that ease.
States of the accession to the treaty in knowledge concerning first, the status of Still, I do not believe that the c_laes-
Moscow of Vast Germany and a number the development of antiballistic missiles tion which I put, "Do we have reliable
of other countr`ies. The United States in Russia; second, the blackout impact knowledge on these items?" that can be
responded by notifying the Soviet Gov- by high yield bombs; third, the effects answered in the affirmative.
ernment that since it did not recognize upon weapons. of the high yield bomb Mr. SPARKMAN. I agree with the
the East German' regime as a govern- explosions; and fourth, the technical Senator.
weapons, for consider . the igh-
ment, the United States could only take knowledge acquired. yield This a
note of the fact that the authorities in Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me call the at- point everyone should keep in mind. At
that country had signed on in Moscow tention o e Senator to the quotation the time when we were testing, and the
and could not accept notice of East Ger- I gave from Dr. Harold Brown's testi- whole world was free to test, there was
many's signature. Thus, the recognition mony. We will take high altitude black- no ban of any kind whatsoever. When
question remains unaffected by the out first. He said: we were testing, the military authorities,
those on the Atomic Energy Commission,
treaty. With respect to high altitude blackout,
pox?'LOSrorr the Chiefs say the Soviets have some data and those in charge of determining what
Mr. President, I have no-t'-resolved any that we do not have. I would say yes, and course we should take, including our
of the questions raised by the senior we have some data they may not have. scientists, all deliberately reached the
Senator from Maine for I do not believe I do not think it is anywhere plain decision that we did not want to test
high-yield weapons, because we did
they can at this time be resolved by that we necessarily know everything the for not want high-yti develop ons b weapons;
facts but only by well-based opinions. Russians learned from those tests; but, that to e numerous relatively
The answers 'I have given here.were se- on the other hand, I think sometimes we small-yield weapons. I rou r
sae at call
lected from many answers "that could are prone to emphasize what they may them small-yield weapons, because they
have been chosen, but having heard most have learned from them. There was have tremendous i weapons, ause they
of the testimony and studied the record testimony on hieh altitude blac ut by have tremendous mine they, are e rhe-
as best t could, these are the answers Mr McCone. I recommended that that ons of syield. It was felt that such
testlmtoon;: relati
that are satisfactory to me and will read. I think it is quite one of small
in larger numbers were much weapons prove to be correct. reassuring. better for our purposes than were high-
r I do, not deny, there are risks in this So far as weapons effects are con- yield weapons.
treaty. As the distinguished chairman cerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated So inot a qof the Rof the Foreign Relations Committee said that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United having stepped question es on of the Russians
with
in opening this debate: - States in weapons effects knowledge their testing; the tact isad that us with we did
There are to be sure, risks in such an ap- derived from high yield nuclear explo- not want to test and did not test when
e
proach. There is"an element of trust in it, sions. But Dr. Brown said-and this no had the test and did do so. en
and we cah" be betrayed. But human life is indicates the difference of opinion which decided it was something we did We
fraught with risks and the behavior of the arises on many of these questions: want, and did not test.
sane man is not the avoidance of all possible My interpretation of all the data indicates
danger, but the weighing of greater against that although they have done more high Mr. LAUSCHE. May I put a further
lesser risks and of risks against opportunities. yield tests, they were not effects testa. question?
There are risks in this nuclear test ban st
treaty, but they are'lesser rather than greater So I think we must admit that it Is SPARKMAN. Yes. . Mr. Mr. LWith respect to the
risks and the political opportunities outweigh not known to an absolute certainty. 100-megaton bomb, with the added
the military risks. As George Kennan has Mr. LAUSCHE. To me it seems that 10Mr. LAUSCHE. AU weight ghat must be thrown into the added
written: "Whoever is not prepared to make we do not have the knowledge, and be-air,
sacrifices and to accept risks in the military cause we do not have the knowledge we would the Senator from Alabama say
field should not lay claim to any serious de- draw the inference that they have not that, because of the propulsion devices
sire to see world problems settled by any made achievements in these fields. The developed by Red Russia, they are in a
means short of war." -impression of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, better position to throw a heavier bomb
Mr. President; T must say to the Sen-
ator from Maine that our `national
safety and security are already in jeop-
ardy in a world that permits unlimited
testing. ratification of this limited test
ban treaty in itself will not make that
h
e
situation more or Less hazardous. If t
treaty , works, however, it may over a
period of time form the basis for further
agreements that inay bring us peacefully
away from this' point of jeopardy. If
the treaty does not work, then a future
is that they have excelled us in certain Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe it is gen-
fields. I know Dr. Brown has taken a erally admitted that Red Russia is ahead
different position. of us at the moment in that respect, but
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. that situation is only temporary. I had
Mr. LAUSCHE. I put the question to the pleasure of Seeing something being
him: "You do not believe that they de- developed for us recently, in my own
veloped an -antiballistic missile?" and he home town, that I was told would tran-
said, "Yes, that is my belief." I asked scend anything that the Russians have
him, "Why do you believe that?" His yet developed. I think it is well-known
answer was, "Because I do not think it that the propulsion we are getting ready
can be done." to utilize will go far beyond anything
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16192
CONGRESSIONAL I{ FCORD -- SENATE
that Russia has available or that she
is likely to develop any time soon.
Mr. LAUSCHE. If and when that de-
velops, will it not follow that we may
change our attitude and may want to
throw bombs of higher yield into the air
than we have done heretofore?
Mr. SPARKMAN.. The Senator will
recall that there was a mass of testi-
mony on that very score, and we were
told that such tests could be carried on
to a degree-perhaps not as high as 100
megatons. If I remember correctly, it
was testified that we cquld develop
bombs as high as 60? megations.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Fifty or sixty.
Mr. SPARKMAN. It is my recollec-
tion that we could develop bombs as high
as 60 megatons with the knowledge we
have, and by making certain tests
underground.
In that connection, let me quote some-
thing from General LeMay that was
rather significant. This had
to do with
the antiballistic missile. General LeMay
said:
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems.
This testimony was taken in executive
session, and that part can be published,
but there is a deletion.
This was not before our committee;
it was before the Armed Services Com-
mittee. This testimony was given before
the treaty was signed. This was testi-
mony on military procurement authori-
zations, in February. I quote from it,
leaving out the deletions, where confi-
dential information was given:
I think both of us are going to develop
antimissile systems and the first systems
that will evolve are going to be very ex-
pensive and only defend a small segment of
Russia, and the same thing applies to our
antimissiles.
I firmly believe that we can keep. ahead of
them In our offensive systems so we can
penetrate anything that they can come up
with in an antiballistic missile system.
Let me put it this way, Senator. I think
we are relatively in the same ball park as
far as ability in antiballistic missile systems
Mr. LAUSCHE. Madam President,
there is still great difficulty for me in
trying to reconcile what General LeMay
said about developing an antiballistic
missile system with what Dr, Brown said
in stating that he did not believe it could
be developed.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Dr. Brown takes
the attitude that penetration capability
is overriding. By the way, General Le-
May indicates that, too, if the Senator
will notice it.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes; I noticed that.
Mr. SPARKMAN. We could build
anything to penetrate, that they might
develop.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. THURMOND. 'There is no ques-
tion that the Russians have developed
and have tested, in 1961 and 1962, and
have learned information from those
test, is there?
Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct.
Mr. THURMOND. The question has
been raised as to whether we had learned
as much In testing as had the Soviets,
because we tested ; more atciiospheric
shots. The United States has conducted
no experiments comparable In com-
plexity with those of the Soviet opera-
tions. A disturbing number of 11.S. high-
altitude effects experiments which were
conducted were con}promised either by
considerations of unrelated, technical ob-
jectives of the test program, or by inade-
quate or faulty experiments, or opera-
tional inadequacies.;
That is true, is it not?
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Russians car-
ried on a great many more tests during
that series than we, did. We did not
carry on an equal number of tests.. They
carried on high-altitude tests, and they
carried on high-yield tests that we did
not duplicate when, we got around to
testing. I admit that.
Mr. THURMOND., The United States
would be unable to acquire data on high-
altitude nuclear weapons effects unless
it tests in the atmosphere, will it?
Mr. SPARKMAN.: I believe It is only
fair to say that the pieponderance of evi-
dence-practically ail of it-before the
committee was to the effect that for the
purpose of developing an anti-ballistic-
missile missile-and' I presume that is
what; the Senator is'aiming at, and also
the high-yield weapon---so far as devel-
oping an anti-ballistic-missile system
was concerned, we bad all the infor-
mation that we needed so far as ef-
fects were concerned, and that what
we needed was the work that could be
carried on in laboratories relating to
guidance, selectivity;-if I may use that
term, although I do not think that that
team was used-for trying to ferret out
real missiles instead of the decoys that
might be sent out, but that we did not
need to do any atir>ospheric testing in
order to study the problems concerned
with further development.
Mr. THURMOND! The Prepared-
ness Subcommittee in one of its findings,
No. 3, made this statement:
The United States *111 be unable to ac-
quire data on high altitude nuclear weapons
effects.
That means without atmospheric test-
ing.
All seven members of the Preparedness
Subcommittee agreed to the factual ac-
curacy of the report, even the two mem-
bers who will vote for ratification, the
distinguished Senator from Massachu-
setts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri [Mn
SYMINGTON]. There is no question. about
that, is there?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I was not a member
of the subcommittee. I would rather not
be called upon to interpret what the
subcommittee said.
Mr. THURMOND. This is on page 7
of the subcommittee's report.
Mr. SPARKMAN. In the testimony
before our committee, certain limits were
recognized; but, in spite of that fact we
were told that research and development
coulld be carried on, and that we did not
need to do atmospheric testing in order
to carry on effectively. I would like to
recall this again.
Mr. Me n who beads the Central
In 111gence gency, Secretary of Defense
September .16
McNamara, every member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Brown-who, I
think, will be admitted to be a man, of
unusual competence in this field-are
aware of the same problems; yet they
support the treaty and say we ought to
ratify it.
Mr. THURMOND. But the fact :re-?
mains that without testing in the atmos-
phere, the United States will be unable
to acquire data on high altitude nuclear
weapons effects. Is this not important
because such data are necessary to the
design. of antiballistic missile systems,
warheads, and radars?
Mr. SPARKMAN. We were told time
and time again in the Foreign Relations
Committee-and I believe we were told
this many times when the Senator from
South Carolina was present-that the
design, development, arid manufacture of
warheads did not present a problem. to
us, because we already had them; that
we had all the information we needed on
them, not only with reference to design,
but that we actually had them on, hand.
Such further study of the problems con-
nected with that activity could be carried
on in laboratories and with a Limited
amount of underground testing.
Mr. THURMOND. Does the Senator
mean that we now have the type of de-
sign of warhead that we need to perte-
trate the defenses of the enemy?
Mr. SPARKMAN. In the committee
report, at the bottom of page 14, and
continuing on to page 15, we have this
brief statement:
,But in. any case, after corasidering all of
the testimony on this subject, the committee
agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
"in the antiballistic missile field, develop-
ment of the U.S. system does notdepend on
atmospheric testing."
That categorical statement was made
time after time before our committee. I
think we have a right to rely upon it. I
do not believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would join in such a statement as that
if they did not believe it to be true.
Mr. THURMOND. My question was
not about the use of the ballistic missile.
I was asking about the design of the
warhead that is necessary to penetrate
the Soviet missile defense. How do we
know we have that design? How will
we ever know we have it until such a
warhead has been designed and has been
tested in the atmosphere in which it will
have to function when the time comes?
Mr. SPARKMAN. If I interpret the
Senator's question correctly, it is the
substance of the second question pro-
pounded by the Senator from Maine,
which was the one I had started to take
up when the Senator from South Caro-
lina asked me to yield to him. So if he
will permit me to discuss it, we can have
a discussion about it later.
Mr. THURMOND. On the sane
point, about testing, someone has said
that we have learned as much about
testing as the Soviets, because we have
tested more shots than have the Soviets.
Is it not true that above values of :10
megatons-, the Soviets conducted, in 19111
and 1962, more than twice the number of
tests the United States ever conducted in
its entire history of testing?
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