MR. FULBRIGHT . THE ON -SITE INSPECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100200025-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 15933
ments to which it has been a party. A
list of 27 of those agreements appears on
page 967 of the printed hearings of the
committee.
In that connection 1, also draw the
Senator's attention to pages 132 to 135
of the hearings. At that point he will
find a list of agreements, some of which
are treaties and some not so formal,
which the Russians have violated. That
material was inserted in the record dur-
ing the hearings.
With respect to these documents I
should like to make the following com-
menti While some of the agreements
listed on page 967 are of real substance
and importance, a number of them are
more or less minor in nature. So one
must discriminate to some extent in
judging the nature of those agreements.
Further, with regard to this list of
broken agreements, the Senator will
note the significance of the fact that
since Stalin's death in 1953 there have
been relatively few breaches of agree-
ments. The most important one, from
our point of view, relates to the Berlin
wall and,pccess to Berlin.
To illustrate how nebulous and in-
consequential some of these agreements
are, though cited as being significant
treaty violations, two of the last four are
agreements that the U.S.S.R. had with
Yugoslavia with regard to credits and
grants. It would be somewhat similar
to our agreements in connection with
foreign aid. We always consider such
agreements rather tentative in nature.
We decide that we will do so much for
a certain country, usually with recipro-
cal obligations. Two of those cases are
ones in which the U.S.S.R. withdrew or,
rather, postponed for 5 years a grant to
Yugoslavia of $285 million. That was a
bilateral agreement. I do not believe it
was in the nature of a treaty or a solemn
undertaking. It was an agreement be-
tween those two countries: I only men-
tion that point so that we do not swallow
.the declaration that 50 out of 52 agree-
ments have been broken, but we should
consider the nature of the agreement.
Insofar as concerns solemn treaty un-
dertakings of a dignity and a substan-
tive importance comparable to the one
now before the Senate, outside the Berlin
problem and since the death of Stalin,
the number of treaties violated has been
relatively few. Many more of equal dig-
nity have been adhered to without viola-
tion. For example, I cite the Antarctic
Treaty and the Austrian Treaty. So far
as I know, no violation of these treaties
has taken place.
These things are not quite as black
and white as they appear.
Further with regard to the present
treaty, the very least one can say with
regard to what distinguishes the treaties
that have been observed from those vio-
lated-which applies in all cases, I
think-in that the treaties that have
been observed are those which were in
the interest of the Soviet Union. It was
for that reason that the committee was
concerned in-its hearings, and set forth
In its report the considerations which, it
appears, have led the Soviet Union to
enter into this agreement. Insofar as
those considerations can be relied on to
be continuing factors in Soviet policy,
they provide some guarantee against fu-
ture violations of this treaty.
First, it is apparent that the 1961-62
tests have led Soviet scientists to believe
that in many critical areas of nuclear
weaponry they have achieved a rough
technical parity with the United States.
Of course, it is speculative as to how
they feel, but it is very probable that
they feel a certain assurance as to their
capacity, which from their point of view
is their deterrent.
Second, the Cuban missile crisis is
likely to remain ? in the minds of the
present Soviet leadership as a sobering
glimpse at the implications of nuclear
war.
That point was developed at consider-
able length, and I believe quite per-
suasively, by the Secretary of State in
his testimony at the hearing.
Third, is the Sino-Soviet schism. The
depth of that schism as it is progressive-
ly revealed, indicates, I believe, the ex-
tent of the commitment which the Rus-
sians have been willing to make for the
sake of agreement in this case. It seems
hardly likely that such consequences as
the Soviet Union has already incurred
from the mere signing of this document
would be incurred for the sake of a docu-
ment which they do not intend to abide
by.
An example of that break was set forth
in this morning's newspaper. The bit-
terness of the exchange between the two
countries indicates that there has been a
great change in that relationship, and it
also has had a sobering effect upon the
Russians.
Fourth, the possibility of diverting re-
sources away from nuclear weapons de-
velopment and into the consumer goods
area in which they are solely needed has
probably motivated the Soviet leaders.
Once the diversion is made it seems pos-
sible that this will have a cumulative
effect in creating a Soviet Union with
interests in other, areas than weaponry.
For several years we have heard about
the difficulties of Russia In respect to
agriculture. It is quite reasonable to
believe that these difficulties may have
contributed to the Soviets desire to de-
celerate the rate in the field of nuclear
weapons in order to enable them to de-
vote more of their resources to things
such as agriculture and the production
of other consumer goods.
Finally, there is the interest which the
Soviet Union must share with this coun-
try in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. This interest can only
increase with time.
All these things are questions which
the committee believes-and I,believe-
the treaty effects in a way which is in
the self-interest of the Soivets. We rely
upon such self-interest for the observ-
ance by the Soviets of the' treaty. It is
in their interest. It seems to me that it
is quite possible that great countries,
with the kind of power that we both
possess, could have a common interest in
certain fields. These fields may be dif-
ferent. We do not have the same in-
centives, for example, insofar as con-
sumer goods are concerned, although I
think we have a great need in the field
of education, urban renewal, and other
things to divert some of the exorbitant
cost of armaments to meeting those
needs. They are not the same interests
as those of the Russians, but they are in
that general area.
Insofar as these considerations lead the
Soviet Union to enter upon the treaty,
they will to a greater or lesser extent, I
believe, bind them to the treaty in the
future.
In addition to self-interest, some gen-
eral statements can be made as to the
likelihood of Soviet treaty violation on
the basis of an analysis of the treaties
adhered to and violated in that Govern-
ment in the past.
For one thing, the greater the num-
ber of parties adhering to the treaty, the
greater seems the assurance that the So-
viet Union will not blatantly abrogate
the understanding reached. To date
in excess of 80 parties have adhered to
the treaty.
While it would not be prudent to pre-
dict any change of Soviet policy in this
regard based on the personalities of the
Soviet leadership, it is noteworthy that
recent treaty violations have sought the
color of legal justification in place of the
cynical statements of Marxist dogma
which accompanied the about-faces of
the Stalin period. Perhaps the need for
legal arguments to support their position
will eventually lead the Soviets to con-
form their conduct to international law.
However, the most persuasive argu-
ment for not permitting past violations
to dictate our present relations with the
Soviet Union on this matter is that a
violation in this case will not pass un-
noticed or put the United States at a
disadvantage. The treaty is self-policing.
The United States can safely rely on its
own ability to detect Soviet violations
and to maintain a military and scien-
tific posture that will assure that no
gains will accrue to the Soviet Union
from violation of the treaty.
That latter statement is based to a
considerable degree upon testimony
taken in executive session, which is avail-
able to the Senator if he wishes to look
at it, with regard to our country's capac-
ity for detection.
Mr. HARTKE. I think I shall do that.
I should do it, in all sincerity, for the
benefit of my own constituency and for
my own satisfaction.
Secondly, many have alleged that the
treaty is advantageous only to Russia.
The Senator has indicated that there
were certain benefits from the treaty to
Russia; otherwise, the Russians would
not have signed it. It has been said that
the Russian goal is to dominate the
world, and that the Russians would not
agree to a pact which would not aid them
in obtaining this objective. I am sure
my constituents would be interested in
the chairman's view of this question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If that statement
has any validity, it could be said about
any agreement. To put it another way,
no agreement could ever be signed, be-
cause obviously the parties who signed
it each believe, at the least, that it is to
their advantage.
We think the treaty is to our advan-
tage, also. In this particular case, the
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 15934
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September
limited test ban treaty Is an American
proposal, going back to 1959, as has al-
ready been stated, and as the Senator
knows.
Its purpose is to decelerate the arms
race which, if allowed to proceed un-
checked and unlimited, would represent
a hazard for both the United States and
for the Soviet Union. So this hazard
faces both of us equally.
I have already given certain reasons
why we believe the Soviets can be relied
upon to some extent-perhaps to a great
extent-to abide by the treaty, because it
Is in their self-interest. It is also in our
self-interest. I think our interests are
mutual in many respects with regard to
this particular treaty. Many of the rea-
sons why the Soviets will abide by the
treaty, which I have mentioned, are also
applicable to and relevant to this ques-
tion. It is in their interest. It is also
in our interest.
I emphasize that this is an American
proposal by the previous administration,
supported by this administration.
It is inconceivable to me that both
administrations, together with the vast
majority of the present military leaders
of this country and a clear majority of
the scientific brains not only of the
present administration but also of the
past one, could all be mistaken in their
assessment as to where the advantage
lies.
Mr. IiARTKE. Many people also be-
lieve that the Russians will test secretly.
We have heard this in the debate 're-
peatedly on the Senate floor. Many
people believe that, because there will
be no on-site inspections, we shall be
unable to detect such tests.
Mr. FU] RIGI T. The on-site in-
--s ns, as the Senator knows, which
occupied so much of the discussions in
Geneva, related to underground testing,
which is not to be covered by this treaty.
In the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water, it is the belief of our best
experts-the ones to whom I have al-
ready referred-that our capacity for de-
tection is adequate. Not only was this
the testimony in executive session, but it
was also stated in open session, without
going into details.
The director of . the CIA; the Joint
e s or rown, the chief
scientific adviser; and the Secretary of
Defense all stated in general terms that
they believe our detection capacity is
adequate to detect any significant viola-
tions of this treaty in the environments
covered by it.
I think everyone would recognize that
there could.be tests small enough in size
that they might go undetected, but they
would be quite small- and would not be
significant with regard to the balance
of power between the countries.
Mr. HARTKE. It is also said that
even if the Russians do not test in their
own country there is nothing to prevent
them from providing a nonsignatory na-
tion, such as Red China, with nuclear
weapons which would then be tested un-
der Russian supervision.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That would be a
clear violation of the treaty. If it were
done, the treaty would be abrogated. and
would. end. The language of the treaty
prohibits such acts.
The signatories un{iertake to dis-
courage or to prevent; testing by other
nations, by allies or by any other nations.
That would be a clear violation of the
treaty. Our experts have no doubt that
we would know that they were doing it,
and therefore It woulI amount to an
abrogation of the treaty. We could of
course withdraw from he treaty. Sec-
tion 4 has a very lerient withdrawal
clause.
(At this point Mr. CLARK took the
chair as Presiding Mr. HARTKE. nother often-
repeated objection is that -entering into
a test ban agreement n w would prevent
the United States fron conducting the
atmospheric tests necessary to develop
very large yield weapoi>rs as a counter to
the Soviet superweapons, which are now
supposedly 100 times in re powerful than
the U.S. Polaris and Miluteman missiles,
on which our future defense depends.
It has also been contended that it would
freeze our developmen of an antimis-
sile defense system; anii that, therefore,
we must continue testliig to maintain
and to increase our uclear deterrent
power, for if we do not test we shall lose.
This is also apparent the view which
has been expressed on' the floor of the
Senate by the Preparedness Subcom-
mittee.
I wonder if the chairman of the com-
mittee would care to comment upon this
point.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. t'here was testi-
mony to that effect, but; the great weight
of the testimony was contrary to that
view. I should say that the testimony
indicated the premises'of the question
are false.
The committee was Informed by ex-
pert witnesses that the United States,
without further testing could develop a
50- to 60-megaton weapon for 13-52
delivery. But these sane witnesses as-
signed very little importance to such a
weapon. For example, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staffs General Taylor,
replying to a question on this point,
said:
I attach very little importance to this,
frankly, Senator. The whole very high yield
weapons field is one which has very little,
if any, military significance.
I interpolate that as long ago as 1954
this question was discussed by the lead-
ing military and civilian experts, and
they decided against th development of
high-yield weapons. The concept of a
50- or 60-megaton weapon, as opposed
to a 5- or 10-megaton!, weapon, rather
loses its meaning, because the 5- or 10-
megaton weapon suitably deployed is so
powerful as to be capable of destroying
any city in the world. That is why the
experts did not feel the#e was any point
in going into the extremely high-yield
weapons.
General Taylor's comment was sup-
ported( by the combined statement of
the Joint Chiefs. As the Secretary of
Defense and these other!witnesses point-
ed out, the United States could have
developed such weapons but has concen-
trated instead on the mere useful, flexi-
ble, and deliverable low and intermedi-
ate-yield weapons.
With regard to ABM development,
the committee took exhaustive testi-
mony, some of which is quoted on pages
12-15 of the report, on this question.
The burden of expert opinion Is that
development of an ABM system suffi-
ciently effective to justify deployment
would be exceedingly difficult, if only
because offensive capability in the nu-
clear field is likely to remain far ahead
of defensive capability.
Dr. York, one of the leading scientists
in the past administration, who headed
the :Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at
Livermore, Calif., said:
The race between offense and defense is
a race between a tortoise and a hare and if
only the hare does not go to sleep, the tor-
toise has no chance.
To interpret that, he was saying that
the offense can always be kept ahead of
the antiballistic missile, or defense, if we
are at all alert. Of course we must be
alert, whether there is a treaty or not.
But whether development of an eifec?-
tive ABM system is a feasible prospect
or not will not depend on testing its
warhead, according to Secretary Mc-
Namara, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Dr.
Brown, and most of the other expert
witnesses.
As the Committee report observed:
The United States has it number of nuclear
warheads of suitable design and performance
for antiballistic missile systems under de-
velopment. Still others of larger yield can
be developed underground. .however, the
-development of a high performance ABM Bye..
tem is a composite of staggering technical
problems, largely unrelated to the warhead,
a relatively simple and manageable part of
the whole system.
Secretary McNamara said,
An ABM system consists of several types
of radars, the interceptor missile and the
very complex computing equipment at a
ground station to control the radars and to
direct the interceptor missile. The various
radars serve to detect Incoming objects in
nearby space, to track the incoming war-
head, and to track and control. the Inter-
ceptor missile, which is targeted on the
incoming warhead by the computing equip.,
went.
That testimony demonstrates that the
real problem, the difficult problem, in the
ABM system is. not the warheads--wee
have many-but the system that directs
and computes, which the treaty does not;
affect. We can pursue the experimental
projects in this field and in experiment-
ing and developing computers and all
that goes with them, without the Inhi-,
bitions of the treaty.
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, we all.
know that the Soviets broke the 1.959
moratorium and in so doing gained su-
periority over us in nuclear weaponry.
If they should break this treaty, it would
take us several months to resume bast-
ing, and therefore they would gain an
additional advantage.
What has the chairman of the com-
mittee to say in reply to that question?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It Is true that the
Russians obviously learned a great deal
from those tests. I have already said
that this is one of the considerations we
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