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September 12, 1963
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ppraved For3 t1~0 10021'1006'15 e SEN 15 6 If this is the case in a State as pros- to provide botii 'a sound and substantial The Health Pro essions// ducational perous as Connecticut, it is obvious that medical education, while at the same Assistance Act represents ~Cnother major -there are many communities throughout time lessening the time and cost of edu- accomplishment in lth field which the country where the health and well- eating its participants. has been possible the wise and being of families, while not necessarily Should we fail to look ahead, to count skillful leadershi'/ e distinguished .in jeopardy, "are suffering from neglect. the future needs of this country in an Senator from Alabe has the pro- I ho't an alarmist who contends area that affects us all at one time or an- found thanks anation of this hat Twill be too late to meet this prob- other, we shall be doing less than meet- Senator and, in f the people of - gem lI aU r1V4 4~riG Gbt YtV 1 uauaa u.wvwJ ? --- ---- ------ _ _ Sut I do egret that' it has taken us so failing to provide that important ounce Mr. HILL. M . President, I yield back long to m ke provision for the Federal of prevention. If we do fail to act as the the remainder of the time under my merican people - h _ e A - -- - the yekLr-A' o ~. rare t "Skill have an` a , uate number of doctors Mr. HILL. I yield 2 minutes to the The que ipn is, Shall the bill pass? and other heap specialists. Senator from Minnesota. On thi question, the yeas and nays f believe the s tistics I have cited Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, as have be ordered; and the clerk will Make a compelling ., gument in support an original cosponsor of this bill in call the oll. of l' ederal assistance. earlier Congresses, it is Indeed a pleasure The egislative clerk proceeded to call I have had an especiall,v deep interest to witness its passage this afternoon. the r ,,.. .. _ r.,a...... i.:,.....1 n.. 1\R n_nT DWATEA l,,,hen his name r in this neia IOF U rtuuiucre Vr yea ---- ---- - .cause of the project that isderway in sistance Act will provide badly needed wax called). On this vote I have a pair ut to start -a medl dental help in alleviating critical shortages of wAh the distinguished minority leader, ti C c onnec a school as a part of . the U`nive s, ity of professional health personnel throughout t e Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRK- Connecttciit. the Nation. 1fsEx]. If he were present and voting he The State legislature has approgridted The Senator from Minnesota wants would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to the sum, of $2 . million toward this goal,, the record to be clear that the existin vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore I a site has been selected and the land has parliamentary situation necessitated s withhold my- vote. The rollcall was concluded. ainst several perfecting ame d- tin a V g o g though good been purchased. But even progress' has been made to date, under nts that otherwise should have een Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that State initiative, Federal assistance would ado ted. In particular, the otton the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. AN- -be most helpful, so that the eventual ame ment to provide foregive - ess of DERSON], the Senator from Maryland Mr. of this medical-dental student-loans where the gradua agrees BREWSTER], the Senator from Mississippi acit ing ca i t y p n ra to pract a In rural areas was a con- [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Alaska school can be expanded. Year after year Congress appropriates structive Miggestion. But its adoption [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from North millions of dollars for medical research would have 14aced the entire measure in Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from and for the construction of hospitals, and serious jeopaf y. I could /not vote to Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Sen- this is certainly''a-proper and worthwhile take this risk. Astor from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the thing for us to do. Let the Senator;, from New Hampshire Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARAI, Let us today pass and send to the Pres- know that this Seator,'would welcome the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MON- ident this Louse bill, so that we can take the opportunity to Qte" for this feature RONEY], the Senator from Wisconsin an important first step toward insuring once the program is ?established and is [Mr. NELSON], the Senator from Connec- Manyurl areas of Min- and the Senator RtEtcoFF] eration in o ti t CMr . , p cu . an adequate supply of professionally trained persons;'to pass onto all of our nesota are faced with a -growing short- from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are ab- peopie the knowledge and techniques that age of doctors and other health person- sent on official business. have been developed by modern medi- nel and this pro osal would.,help meet I further announce that the Senator Line. -this shortage. I hope this amendment from California [Mr. ENGLE] is neces- Mr. HILL. I yield 1 minute to the will be adopted At a future time. `._ sarily absent. Senator, from Rhode Island. There is no, ,'possible excuse for every I further announce that, if present and Mr, _ FELL. Mr. President, the bill resident of ti(is Nation not to have the voting, the Senator from Maryland [Mr: presently under consideration, 'has re- finest medical and health care available.,, B voting, the the Senator from Alaska Ceived long and exhaustive study by both But, unforttmately, this is not the case. RE ST RUENINGI ], the the Senator f mm North this 'body and the House. In fact as my We are all quite familiar with the grave CTMr. arolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from .senior colleague; Senator PASTORS said problem faced by many senior citizens Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Sen- earlier, he helped lead this same fight a a-nd this,-Senator hopes that matter will ator from Wyoming [Mr. Y], the McGEEI, the dozen years ago.' This bill's provisions -be resolved before the 88th Congress ad- Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARAI, have been scrutinized and weighed with journs' next year. The legislation we the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MoN- care and deliberation. The final result consider today represents a good begin- the Se RONEY], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. of these labors, is a conclusion that a ning,.' to insure that we will train an NELSON], the Senator from Connecticut great need exists for more medicalfacili adequate supply of health personnel to [Mr. NELSON], RXBICOFF], and the Senator from ties and more adequate loan moneys m'et the expanding population of the Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] would each available to the students who qualify for cdming decades. Now let us also en- vote essee this training. Oct legislation to Insure that our ele- 'tnentary schools, secondary schools, and Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Only, 6 , 'r shorn w hile ago on August 2 'colleges and universities are able to train Senator from Colorado [Mr. AC LOTTI and 196$, received a letter from Barnaby the students we need to enter medical the Senator from Kanasas [Mr.-PEARSON] C. Keeney, president of Brown Univerr school. The challenge of education is are absent on official business to' attend hear which isincluded ithe Labor and 305 of Puthe a comprehensive challenge. We must a meeting of the Interparliamentary hearings before ell y meet it with a comprehensive program Union. ryi? iply i Committee. President of ed- such as President Kennedy has pre- The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. eral le ialation In the the importance medical antance of re- sented to us. CASE], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. latelegislation in - COOPER], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. 14ted. fields. Hddiscussed this itedical I commend the distinguished Senator I?TRxsENI, and the Senator from New education pro ram, the ilr"st'In modern from Alabama [Mr.-HILL], the most able Mexico [Mr. MECHEM] Se are necessarily times in "the State of Rhode Island, that chairman of the Committee on Labor $rpwn thniversit, is undertaking. -It -is and Public Welfare, for his masterful absent. a d o mttl dable effort, and one for which guidance of this legislation. No pub- If present and voting, the Senator from a, definiYt need exists. It is also some- lie servant in the history of America has Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from thing y of-1 an innovation in the "field of done so much to see that this Nation New Jersey [Mr. CASE], and the Senator 'medic&i jtudy; fbr it is predicated upon has the finest health and medical facili- from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each ,Approved; For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-'5 15968 R11 Approved for Release 2004/03/11 : IA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL R CORD - SENATE September 12 The pair of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKsEN] has been previously an- nounced. The result was announced--71 yeas, 9 nays, as follows: [No. 160 Leg.] YEAS-71 Aiken Hickenlooper Morton Bartlett Hill Moss Bayh Holland Mundt Beau Hruska Muskie Bennett Humphrey Neuberger Bible Inouye Pastore Boggs Jackson Pell Burdick Javits Prouty Byrd, W. Va. Johnston Proxmire Cannon Jordan, Idaho Jt,andolph Carlson Beating Russell Church Kuchel Saltonstall Clark Lausche Scott Cotton Long, Mo. Smathers Dodd Long, La Smith Douglas Magnuson Sparkman Edmondson Mansfield Symington Ervin McCarthy Talmadge Fong McClellan Williams, N.J. Fulbright McGovern Williams, Del. Gore McIntyre Yarborough Hart Metcalf Young, N. Dak. Hartke Miller Young, Ohio Hayden Morse NAYS-9 Byrd, Va. Ellender Stennis Curtis Robertson Thurmond Dominick Simpson Tower NOT VOTING-20 Allott Engle Mechem Anderson Goldwater Monroney Brewster Gruening Nelson Case Jordan, N.C. Pearson Cooper Kennedy Ribicoff Dirksen McGee Walters Eastland McNamara So the bill (H.R. 12) was passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the motion to reconsider. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. RUSSELL, and Mr. KUCHEL addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized. EXTENSION AND BROADENING OF AUTHORITY TO INSURE MORT- GAGES UNDER THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, with the concurrence of the Senate, I move at this time that the Senate pro- ceed to consider Calendar No. 463, S. 1952, which the distinguished Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] will ex- plain, as well as the reason for having it considered at this time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 1952) to extend and broaden the author- ity to insure mortgages under sections 809 and 810 of the National Housing Act. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc- GOVERN in the chair). The question is on agreeing to the motion by the Senator from Montana. The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Com- mittee on Banking and Currency, with amendments, on page- 3, line 8, after the word "section", to insert "and"; after line 8, to strike out: (3) by striping out "Ave thousand" In sub- section (I) and inserting in lieu thereof "ten thousand"; and And, at the beginning of line 11, to strike out "(4) -and insert "(3) "; so as to make the bill read: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 809 of the National Housing Act is amended- (1) by striking out "October 1, 1963" In subsection (f) and inserting in lieu thereof "October 1, 1965"; (2) by striking out the first sentence of subsection (g) (1) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "A mortgage secured by property which is intended to provide housing for a person (1) employed or as- signed to duty at or in connection wish any research or development installation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion and which is located at or near such in- stallation, or (ii) employed at any research or development installation of the Atomic En- ergy Commission and which Is located at or near such installation, may (if the mortgage otherwise meets the requirements of this section) be insured by the Commissioner un- der the provisions of this section.' ; and (3) by striking out clause (B) In subsec- tion (g) (2) (iii) and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(B) persons employed at or in connection with any research or develop- ment installation of the Atomic Energy Com- mission, as the case may be;". SEC. 2. Section 810 of the National Housing Act is amended- (1) by striking out clause (1) of subsec- tion (b) and-inserting in lieu thereof the f ol- lowing: "(1) the housing which is covered by the insured mortgage Is necessary in the interest of national security in order to pro- vide adequate housing for (A) military per- sonnel and essential civilian personnel serv- ing or employed in connection with any in- stallation of one of the armed services of the United States, or (B) essential personnel employed or assigned to duty at or in con- nection with any research or development in- stallation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of of the Atomic En- ergy Commission,"; (2) by striking out in' the second sentence of subsection (d) "and employees of con- tractors for the armed services", and insert- ing in lieu thereof the following: "employees of contractors for the armed services, and persons described in clause (1) (B) of subsec- tion (b) of this section"; and (3) by striking out "October 1, 1963" in subsection (k) and Inserting in lieu thereof "October 1, 1965". Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the bill would extend sections 809 and 810, al- ready existing in the Dousing Act, which make special provision for home build- ing in areas of research and develop- ment of the armed services, the Atomic Energy Commission, aid our space effort. It represents a contiluation of existing -programs, due to expire September 30, and is supported unanimously by the Committee on Banking and Currency. Mir. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an explanation of the bill. There being no objection, the explana- tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: EXPLANATION or S. 1952 1. Extend section 809 of the National .Hous- ing Act (sales housing for essential civilian employees of the armed services, NASA and AEC) for 2 years, from October 1, 1963, to October 1. 1965; 2. Broaden section 800 to cover housing for essential efvilian employees of NASA and ABC at any NASA or AEC research and devel- opment installation; 3. Extend section 810 of the National Hous- ing Act (primarily rental housing, single- family and multifamily, for military person- nel and essential civilian employees of the armed services) for 2 years, from October 1, 1963, to October 1, 1965; and 4. Broaden section 810 to cover housing for essential employees of NASA and AEC. The establishment of the section 809 pro- gram was necessary because In some in- stances homes built for essential civilian em- ployees of the armed services, NASA, and AEC in communities near or adjacent to research or development installations of these agencies were considered to be above and beyond those needed for the normal economic growth. of the communities. In the opinion of the FHA, homes built in excess cf the normal growth of the communities do not meet the test of economic soundness required by the statute as a prerequisite of FHA mortgage insurance. Section 809 permits the economic soundness test to be waived in such cases in order that essential civilian employees of these agencies may obtain decent and ade- quate sales housing. Similarly, section 810 was established in order to provide decent and adequate sales and rental housing for personnel and civilian employees of the armed services near or ad- jacent to any military installation where adequate housing did not exist and where the FHA believes that the economic sound- ness prerequisite of the regular programs could not be met. Section 809 insofar as NASA and. AEC activities are concerned was limited In its application when the law was established. These limitations prohibit the program from being used at newly designated or developed NASA research and development installa- tions or in the case of AEC outside of Los Alamos County, N. Mex. Because of these limitations many essential civilian employees of these agencies are unable to obtain ade- quate housing. For example, NASA is de- veloping a new research and development installation in Hancock County, Miss. It Is anticipated that by 1967, some 2,500 per- sons will be employed at this site. Com- munities near or adjacent to the site do not have a sufficient inventory of adequate hous- Ing for this influx of population. At present housing constructed in these communities to meet this need would not, in the opinion of the FHA, meet the prerequisite economic soundness test of the regular programs. Thus, in order to overcome this situation, section 809 would be broadened to take care of the housing needs in this area as well as in other areas where similar conditions exist. FHA section 810 would also be broadened to cover AEC and NASA activities where similar conditions prevail. Letters to the Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee from the housing Agency, NASA, and AEC support the ;provi- sions of the bill. NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I send to the desk and ask to have printed and lie on the table an amendment I in- tend to propose to the resolution of ratification of the test ban agreement. The amendment is in language identical with that which was appended to the resolution of ratification of the Atomib Energy Act. My amendment would make perfectly clear that any future amendments to this treaty must be sub- mitted to the Senate for its advice and Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 consent, as in the case of the original treaty. Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I shall speak only about 3 minutes. I thought the Senator had yielded the floor. 11 , Mr, SPARKMAN. I am trying to have the pending bill passed. Mr. RUSSELL. I have a right to dis- cuss the bill. The Senator cannot cut me off. I have my rights. Mr. SPARKMAN. I have no desire to do so. I thought the Senator was under the impression that action on the bill had been completed. Mr. RUSSELL. No. I am speaking in my own right, -on my own time. Mr. SPARKMAN. Very well. The Senator is `entitled to do so. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the test ban treaty is very unusual in its scope. It is said to be the first step in a program of disarmament. With all the emotions which have been stirred about the pending treaty, we have overlooked the comprehensive nature of the pre- amble and article II of the treaty, which do not touch the ban on nuclear testing as proposed in article I. The preamble to the treaty contains the following language, which is about as far reaching and sweeping as the mind of man could devise to describe the objective of the signatory states: Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of anagree- ment on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accord- >ance With the objectives of the United Na- tions which would put an end to the arma- ments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of Weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances- Then follows tl}ie language of the test ban provision found in article I, which has thus far been the sole subject of de- bate. Article II is rather unique, in that it stipulates a method of amending the treaty, of carrying the first step on to include the banning of nuclear weapons and indeed of conventional weapons. It reads: "Any party may propose amend- ments to this treaty." Mr. President, there are a number of parties to the treaty already. I noticed yesterday In the press that Gabon had signed the pact, making a total of 91 signatories, each of whom would have the same right to offer amendments to the treaty as would the United States. Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. LAUSCHE. What nation was that? Mr. RUSSELL. Gabon. Mr: LA'USCHE. How is that spelled? Mr. RUSSELL. G-a-b-o-n. That is one of the newly emerging states. I continue to read: The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this 'treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the De- positary Governments shall convene a can- ference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. I think it is perfectly clear that the procedure for amendments of the treaty will provide a forum which will soon cap- ture much more attention throughout the world than the United Nations. In this very brief language we would be establishing a new assembly of nations and a new method of arriving at agree- ments with respect to the most important question before the human family today, which is the limitation of or prohibition of the explosion of nuclear weapons as well as general disarmament. Subsection 2 of article II reads: Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to this treaty, including the votes of all of the original parties. That would, of course, give the execu- tive branch of the Government the right to veto, since the United States was one of the 'three original signatories and would have a right of veto, but it would not protect the right of the legislative branch of the Government to pass on suggested amendments, which could be more far reaching than the original treaty. The language is: The amendment shall enter into force for all parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the original parties. Mr. President, this amendment would not affect the terms of the treaty. it would not require any renegotiation with other nations. It would be an amend- ment to the resolution of ratification, which would make it perfectly clear that the Senate's constitutional duty and right to advise and consent to treaties will not be bypassed by executive agree- ment or in any other way by the execu- tive branch of the Government. I do not see how there could be any valid objection to clearing up this mat- ter beyond any peradventure. Many are talking about this being a small step down the road to disarmament. There will be a great many steps of various lengths proposed by 91 nations that have already signed, and others that will sign; and it would not be very difficult to get one-third of the signatories to call a con- ference and consider all the amend- ments. We have done very little to, enhance the prestige and power of the Senate and the Congress of the United States in the past several years. Indeed, in many instances we have done things that have contributed to making us subservient to the executive branch of the Government. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. HUMPHREY. Earlier, prior to the Senator's submission of this amend- ment, which I feel has a very worthy pur- pose, the Senator from Georgia was dis- cussing with me the testimony of the distinguished Secretary of State. The' Senator was saying, and I also was say- ing, that we thought the Secretary of State had made comments on this point. 15969 Mr. RUSSELL. I thought he had, but I have not been able to find them. Mr. HUMPHREY. I asked the staff director, Dr. Marcy, if he could be of help to us. I am glad to say he was. On page 13, of the hearings, at the bot- tom of the page, relating to article II, the Secretary of State made the follow- ing statement: Article II provides a procedure for amend- ing the treaty. Amendments may be pro- posed by any party and are approved by a majority vote. The majority must include the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Amendments do not enter into force until instruments of ratification have been deposited by a majority of the parties, "including the instruments of ratification of all the original parties." The Senator from Georgia read that part. Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Mr. HUMPHREY. This is the impor- tant line: Thus, no amendment to the treaty can enter into force until it has been considered and approved by the Senate. That is the testimony of the Secretary of State. I do not see that that obviates the proposal of the Senator from Geor- gia. I merely wanted it clear that some- where in the testimony, as I had recol- lected, the Secretary of State deemed this as the process of ratification, which, in the instance of the United States, in- cludes advice and consent of the Senate. Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad the Senator located that statement. The committee, in its report, states that the Senate will have a right to consider and pass on amendments that will be coming in from time to time for the next generation or more, if we are to achieve progress in disarmament. But I think we should write it into the resolution of ratifica- tion, just as we did in the case of the Atomic Energy Act, which provided for amendment. It was written into the ratification of that statute that any amendments to the atomic energy stat- ute should be submitted to the Senate for ratification. I think it should be made perfectly clear in this instance that amendments to this treaty would be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Mr. HUMPHREY. My only contribu- tion at this point is to invite the Sen- ator's attention to the fact that this matter was referred to by the Secretary. Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. He had better help than I had. I have been searching for the reference. I did not have the very able help of the staff director for the Committee on Foreign Relations, who is one of the ablest staff men on the Hill. Mr. HUMPHREY. With which state- ment I fully concur. I merely followed the example of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Mr. RUSSELL. I was sure the Secre- tary of State had made the statement, but I could not find it. Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. KUCHEL. Yesterday, or the day before, reference was made to a memo- randum that had been read into the Approved For Release 2004/03/11 :CIA-RDP65B00383R00010021.0-005-5 15970 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : _ IA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL CORD - SENATE Sep ember, 12 RECORD, bearing on the constitutional authority of the Senate to act in that capacity. In the event any Senator has not seen it, I think it would be a good idea to refer to it. Mr. RUSSELL. The reference to the amendments to the atomic energy statute appears in the memorandum submitted by the distinguished chair- man of the Foreign Relations Committee in undertaking to explain the very com- plex procedure which must be followed when opposition develops to a treaty. I had been concerned about amendments to the treaty, but when I found that precedent- in the memorandum sub, mitted by the Senator from Arkansas, it cleared the matter in my own mind as to the approach which might properly be followed. Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator from Alabama. Mr. SPARKMAN. As appears on page 63 of the hearings, Secretary Rusk also had this to say: Certainly any arrangement for amendment to this treaty would be a treaty submitted to the Senate. It is our plan In the disarma- ment field and the general disarmament field that to move forward on that by way of treaty where that would be the appropriate means of doing so. Mr. RUSSELL. The resolution of ratification has not yet been submitted. I express the hope that the Senator from Arkansas would include this provision in the resolution when he submits it to the Senate. It could x}ot do any haxm. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, with regard to the precedent in the Atomic Energy Act, in that case, two-thirds of the mem- ber States could ratify an amendment, and it did not require the approval of this country by instrument of ratifica- tion. The only way this country could, In effect, veto an amendment, would be to withdraw from the treaty. There was a valid reason for inserting that under- standing in the Atomic Energy Act, be- cause we did not want to be faced with the alternative of either accepting amendments to the statute or, if we did not like them, withdrawing from the agency; whereas in the instance of this treaty, the words which have been in- serted in article 2 are, "including the in- struments of ratification of all the origi- nal parties." These instruments must be obtained in addition to a two-thirds vote in order to amend the treaty before the Senate. I ask the Senator what the instrument of ratification would be if it would not be the instrument which had been approved by the Senate? W. RUSSELL. Hundreds of execu- tive agreements with other nations have been ratified by the Executive. I do not think the word "ratification" appears In the Constitution of the United States. I have no recollection of having seen it there, though I have not checked it in this instance. The executive branch might well say that the President had signed an executive agreement. When the Executive signs it, does he not ratify it? Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. The way this Is written- Mr. RUSSELL. I m talking about the Constitution. I o not recall that the word "ratify" appears in the Con- stitution. The language is "advise and consent." That is a process of ratifica- tion, But when the 'resident signs an executive agreement, he ratifies that agreement. This proposal is an amend- ment to a treaty. It does not provide for a new treaty. Itprovides that the treaty maybe amended. This is of much greater importance than the atomic energy ' statute, whi6h required two- thirds of those voting to approve the statute, but in this case a majority can amend the treaty in' any area of dis- armament so long as the majority in- cludes the original parties. Mr. FULBRIGHT.' Which includes Mr. RUSSELL. That is the executive branch. That is action by the execu- tive branch. I am undertaking-and I realize it is almost a' forlorn hope, be- cause some Senators have lost interest- to protect the rights of the Senate of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know why the Senator from Georgia should say that all Senators have 1 t interest in the Senate. I have not 1st interest in the Senate. If he says that, perhaps he is speaking for himself. He has that right. Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator. Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1 do not know why he should say that all Senators have lost interest in the Senate. Mr. RUSSELL. I did not say that. I did not say all Senators. I said some Senators. I stand on that statement. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was the,Senator referring to me? Mr. RUSSELL. N9t specifically. If the Senator wishes to. crawl under that mantle, he may do so. The Senate rules prohibit me from referring to the Sen- ator directly by name in that regard. However,. there is no rule of the Senate which prohibits the Senator from as- suming that role. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. So far as my knowledge is concerned, an executive agreement is not considered an amend- ment to a treaty, but is a separate in- strument. However, I consulted the Secretary of State 2 days ago about this possibility, and, with the Senator's per- mission, I should like to read the reply of the Secretary of State. Mr. RUSSELL. I would be happy to have the Senator do so. Mr. MANSFIELD. The letter reads as follows: THE SECR$TARY OF STATE, Washington, D.C., September 12, 1963. Ilon. MIKE MANSFIELD, U.S. Senate. DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: In response to your inquiry, I am glad to explain how the ratifying procedure for amendments to the test ban treaty would operate. Paragraph 2 of article II of the treaty provides that an amendment "shall enter into force for all parti~s upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the original parties." The United States is an "original party" by the force of the preamble and article II, paragraph 2. Thus, no amendment to the treaty can enter into force unless and. until the United States has deposited an instru- merit of ratification. The Constitution of the United States, In article II, section 2, requires that the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators pres- ent, shall "advise and consent" to the mak- ing of all treaties. An "instrument of ratification" of an amendment to this treaty could not be executed by the President un- less the Senate had given its advice and consent in accordance with article II, section 2, of the Constitution. Therefore, an alnend- merit to the test ban treaty could enter into force only if the Senate consented to the amendment by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. As you will recall, I stated In my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee that "no amendment to the treaty can enter into force until it has been con- sidered and approved by the Senate."' The message from the President transmitting the test ban treaty also states that it cannot be amended without the consent of the Senate. Sincerely yours, DEAN RUSK. Mr. RUSSELL. That is a very able letter. It elaborates on what the distin- guished Senator from Minnesota [M:r. HUMPHREY] read from the Secretary's testimony. I do not doubt that that is the present view of the Secretary of State, and that he will hold to that view. We do not usually legislate on a mat- ter of this vital importance, a matter that refers to a permanent treaty, in con- nection with which the Senate will be confronted with amendments from. year to year, from angle to angle, in finding new approaches to disarmament. It is too important to entrust the interpreta- tion to any one man. The Senate can put its own interpretation on this sub- ject, and it should give careful considera- tion to the proposal. My amendment does not interfere with the treaty. It does not delay it. It does not have to go back to any of the signa- tories. This is an amendment proposed to the resolution of ratification, a do- mestic assertion, of the right of the Sen- ate to advise and consent to any amend- ment to the treaty. It cannot possibly hurt in any way if Secretary Rusk in- tends to pursue the course he outlines in his letter, which the Senator from Mon- tana has read, but it' would help if lie should pass from the scene and another man should become Secretary of State and if he felt that the signature of the President of the United States was suf- ficient ratification of an agreement to reduce armaments and vitally affect the security of the country. Mr. MORTON. Mr. President? will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. MORTON. What the Senator is proposing does not mean that it would have to go back to any other country, as I understand. Mr. RUSSELL. No; of course not. Mr. MORTON.. It is not a reserva- tion. Mr. RUSSELL. No; it is not a reser- vation. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Mr. MANSFIELD. Is not the word "understanding" used there? Mr. RUSSELL. It is in there, as well as the other language. Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena- tor. EXTENSION AND BROADENING OF AUTHORITY TO INSURE MORT- GAGES UNDER THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 1952) to extend and broad- en the authority to insure mortgages un- der sections 809 and 810 of the National Housing Act. Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, may we have action on the committee amend- ments? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the commit- tee amendments. The amendments were agreed to. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Do I correctly understand the purpose of the bill to be that employees of the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration may be put in the same position for purposes of insuring mortgages as is the case now with members of the armed services? Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; in the area of research and. development. The same is true of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. SALTONSTALL. The bill would extend the act for 2 years. Is that cor- rect? Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator is cor- rect. Mr. SALTONSTALL. It includes not only military personnel but also space and atomic energy personnel. Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is because the people have to live in out-of-the-way places where they cannot ordinarily ob- tain housing. Is that correct? Mr. SPARKMAN. Where there are obstacles to getting adequate housing. Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is the only purpose of the bill. Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed. Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President, I move that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed. . Mr. FULBRIGHT. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY As in executive session, Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, in view of the discussion which has been held on the proposed understanding or amendment of the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and which `15971 he has submitted for consideration, or "to lie on the table, I should like to refer to page 63 of the hearings, and to read one or two sentences, because I believe this is important to the subject under discussion. In response to a question asked by the distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT), Secretary Rusk replied ; Senator, I would not wish to give a com- prehensive commitment that any kind of agreement or understanding with the Soviet Union would necessarily take the form of a treaty. We do expect, and we certainly fol- low the practice of consulting with the For- eign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee and other appropriate committees on any important developments. Certainly any arrangement for amendment to this treaty would be a treaty submitted to the Senate. It is our plan in the disarma- ment field and the general disarmament field to move forward on that by way of treaty where that would be the appropriate means of doing so. But I would not think it would be wise to say that any subject we take up with the Soviet Union should take the form of a treaty. I thought that statement should be a part of the RECORD, in view of the dis- cussion that has just taken place. Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator from Kansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on this subject, I wish to ask the Senator from Georgia a question. I have only one or two questions to ask, and I believe the Senator from Geor- gia desires to leave the Chamber. Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. INCLUSION OF LABOR UNIONS WITHIN PURVIEW OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS BILL Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the members of the Committee on Commerce today adopted, by a vote of 9 to 6, an amendment to the public accommoda- tions bill, bringing labor unions within its purview. If this decision is allowed to stand and finally becomes law, it will be a great step forward in utilizing the skills of minority groups in industry and especially in the construction field, where craftsmen are hired. The amendment, in effect, states that no person shall be denied membership in a labor organization because of his race, color, religion, or national origin. The bill as pending covered the whole gamut of operation in which services, accommodations, facilities, goods, food, and entertainment are either sold or served. It did not cover labor unions, I deeply hope that the decision made today through the adoption of this amendment will not be changed here- after. Approved For -Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 .1963 Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Mr. MORTON. All that the Senator from Georgia is trying to do is to have the Senate affirm what the Secretary of State and other spokesmen of the ad- ministration, and others who are in fa- vor of the treaty, have said we mean. Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Mr. MORTON. The Senator wants the Senate to settle this question, so that there cannot possibly be any doubt about it. Is that correct? -Mr. RUSSELL. So that there cannot be any doubt about it, today or tomor- row., or after all who are assembled here have passed from the scene. This is a permanent treaty. In my opinion, the operations under the procedures pre- scribed in the treaty will soon practi- cally supplant the United Nations, be- cause it gives the various parties so much more power for a direct approach to amendment by calling a meeting and by approving it by majority vote if they can get the three original signatories. Mr. MORTON. How could this in any way embarrass the 93 or so coun- tries which have signed the treaty? Mr. RUSSELL. It could not in any way embarrass any other nation. It is not a reflection on any of them. It is not a reflection on the President or on the Secretary of State. It is merely a statement by the Senate: "We wish to remind you that we have the right to have these agreements submitted to us ,for,adviceand consent." Senators have called this treaty the first short step. The next step will be much farther in the field of disarmament. The treaty not only looks to nuclear disarmament, but also disarmament in conventional weapons. In my opinion, the Senate 'would be derelict if it did not make clear Its position and assert its right in this respect. Mr. MORTON. Is it not also our ap- proval of the interpretation of the ad- ministration-our stamp of approval on it? Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator for the suggestion. It puts the stamp of approval of the Senate of the United States upon the interpretation of the Secretary of State. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Of course none of us could' imagine any Senator being at variance" in his views in the interpreta- tion of the right of the Senate to be called on, under its constitutional respon- sibility, to advise and consent, on a two- thirds basis, to any amendment offered to any treaty to which we are a party: The question I am raising-and it may be a technical one-is this: Would not the Senator think that, instead of being considered as an amendment, this pro- posal should perhaps be considered an understanding, as I believe it was at the time the International Atomic Energy Agency Act was passed? Mr: RUSSELL. I copied the language in the International Atomic Energy Act verabtim. It is identically the same language as that which appears in the atomic energy statute. It has been ap- proved by the Senate. I followed it to the letter and to the last comma. Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R0001 0021 0005-5- - 15972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12 THE CALUMET SKYWAY BRIDGE IN THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYS- TEM Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, yes- terday I called the attention of the Sen- ate to efforts that are being made to induce the U.S. Government to pick up the tab for the payment of a $63 million indebtedness of the Calumet Skyway and Bridge Commission, the indebted- ness having been incurred in the build- ing of a toll bridge in Chicago. The toll bridge has become a failure, The inter- est payment due has not been made. Someone conceived the clever idea of asking the U.S. Government to pick up the tab- . In the House, initial action has been taken by a committee which has recommended that the United states de- clare the Calumet Skyway and Bridge to be apart of the Interstate Highway Sys- tem, and pay off the $63 million debt. There are many other toll roads.. West Virginia has one that has failed. Ohio has one that has succeeded. Kansas, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Okla- homa, and other States have toll roads. If the Federal Government pays off the Calumet Skyway and Bridge indebted- ness, why should not the U.S. Govern- ment pay off the indebtedness of every other similar project in the country? In conclusion, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article which was pub- lished in the Chicago Daily Calumet of July 30, 1963, and an article which was published in the same newspaper on Au- gust 17, 1963. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Chicago Daily Calumet, July 30, 1963] S'EYWAY'S FLOP PREDICTED BY ALDERMAN BOHLING IN 1954 Alderman Nicholas J. Bohling (seventh) has joined the city officials supporting pur- chase of the Chicago Skyway by the Federal Government. in 1954, Bohling opposed construction of the skyway as unneeded-and doomed it to financial failure. His original stand nowt financial problem is sale to the Federal ernment. "The whole thing has been, a bi "flop," Bohling said. "It's just a mattr of me be fore the Federal Government has buy it. And it might as well be now as ter. Bohling said the surveys pres ted in 1954 did not adequately show neec , the huge toll bridge, but the city weuf through with the plan anyway. /, Skyway manager Jinn/McDonough said there was a definite and very great need for the skyway in 195--1rot agrees with Bohling that the only solution to present problems is Federal purchase. McDonough predicted that commuter traffic on- the road would Increase sub- stantially if the Federal Government buys the skyway for use as a freeway. Referring to the Chicago area transporta- tion study report last year, McDonough said total usage would probably double in 10 years- if tolls were discontinued. During the past year, skyway traffic has averaged about 20,000 vehicles per day. McDonough said the bridge is capable of handling 60,000 vehicles a day under the toll setup, but would be able to handle nearly 100,000 per day If t411 gates were removed in conversion to a freeway. Whatever the case, the skyway will not be used near full capacity in the foreseeable future as are the Dan Ryan. Congress, and Northwest Expressways. At the time of construction, it was thought that 40,000 vehicles would use the bridge each day. The present financial setup was or- ga,n:ized on this basis; and bonds were sold. But traffic on the skyway has never ap- proached this for the daily average at the end of a-year. Opened in 1958, toll collections on the sky- way have never been sufficient to pay the interest on the $100;700,000 in bonds sold to ilnance its construction. The city is in default of the bond interest due July 1 and foreclosure is a possibility. Nevertheless, McDonough said the skyway is a very important traffic artery. "It was "The city was forced to build the way because there was no Interstate high y act at that time and something had to done to relieve the traffic," he said. "A 1 bridge McDonough said construction the an Ray Expressway and Interstate 4 underD the Federal Highway Act slubstan ally hurt the skyway and the Indiana toll d because It allowed for construction o freeways gener- ally parallel to the toll sy ms. He said 65 to '70 percent of skyway traffic comes from If the bridge is ev tually turned into a freeway, McDonough i d it would clear the way for, constructlofi- Of at least two addi- tional ramps. He said ramp built', at 79th and Stony Island and 87t and Anthony would allow vehicles to'tra i north from these points to the Dan Rya xpressway connection at 67th Street. These r pa were not originally included ` in t: he s way because the 1953 Municipal Toil Br ge Actt enacted by the Illinois Gene, Assembly allowed toll charges-in cities-aaorily on bridges over water, Tin IS, tolls paid'\,on the skyway are for cr ing the Calume Myer. Since no water w Ild'be crossed by vehicles going north from Begun In 1954, the Chicago kywav toll bridge has never produced the re enue pre- dicted for it. Default on interest ayments due July 1 has passed control of t struc- ture from the city to holders of $101 illion In revenue bonds issued to finance co truc- er Co. It was written by Morgan L. Fitch, prominent area realtor a4d board chairman of the Ringer Co. - "As the last beams swing Into place on the 125-fart-high Calumet Skyway river bridge and workers swarm the streets building ap- proach ramps, South Chicago citizens who are to help pay for the $101 million-plus bridge are speculating about the amount of money needed to pay off the elevated high- way. (Which will, incidentally, cost more than the recently opened Mackinac Bridge although the big Michigan bridge is about 3 miles longer in length.) "Investors in skyway bonds ate also curious. They are interested in knos'ing the answers to three questions: ,/ "1. Will traffic on 4 elevated roadway a to pay operation provide sufficient r7n costs, interest, and retirement? "2. Are mainten and Operating - ex- penses correctly 96mputed for the 36-yeas period during w ch the bonds are to be paid "3. Will th Northern Illinois Toll High- way event ly link up with the Indiana Toll Road d, if so, will this connection de- orease s and traffic and revenue? "Whe complete, the 73/4-mile elevated road will c rp cars and trucks between the In- dian Toll Road terminus in southeast Chi- ca and 63d and State Streets. Eastern en- "THIRTY CARS PER MINUTE "On the basis of a passenger car charge of 25 cents and an average toll of 32 cents per vehicle, this amounts to 43,723 cars per day, SO cars per minute, or 1 every 2 seconds, day and night, 7 days a week, providing better than $5 million In revenue that year. "Thus to pay its way, according to present calculations, the skyway must generate in 1960 traffic more than two-thirds the current volume of the Congress Street Expressway and a little less than half of today's low on Lake Shore Drive, one of the world's heaviest traveled roadways. The skyway vehicular load is dueto increase by 1987 to 27 million cars per year, according to the traffic engi- neers, "During the 30 years while traffic is to nearly double in volume, maintenance and admin- istrative expenses, according to the planners, are to remain absolutely static. Every item of the $135,000 in administrative costs for 1958, including salaries, is exactly duplicated In 1.987, a generation later. "Every item of maintenance, amounting to $187,000 is unchanged for 30 years. Operat- ing costs vary only in the addition of 30 toll collectors--but their $4,200 annual salary Is to be the same in 1987 as in 1958. "NEEDED SECOND BOND ISSUE "The $10,000 annual fee for the consulting engineers Is unchanged from 1958 to 1987 al- though this is presumably to be the firm which saw increases of as much as 497 per- cent in some construction costs and an over- all increase of 37 percent in their cost esti- mates during 2 years of preliminary surveys, an Increase which forced a second bond issue to cover $13 million in added skyway charges. "While the prospectus for the skyway bonds and that for Northern Illinois Toll Highway bonds avoid showing any connection with the Indiana Toll Road, it seems unreasonable to expect the tri-state highway to be built without some link to toll roads running to New York City. "Just in case, the literature for the skyway carries a denial from Indiana that such a connection is planned, and the engineers have provided a statement that such a road will probably not be completed until the sky- way has been open a number of years and the advantages of the skyway route well n rs' estimates as to traffic, revenues, and ope tang expense are more accurate than thei omputations of construction cost, that there ill be a car every 2 seconds to pay off the 7?? le bridge from revenue." Mr. LAVSCHE. Mr. President, these articles po]Xt out that examination of the fiscal fear lity reports made in 1954 shows somethln was wrong with the Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 9ff Approved Por31R6513f100100210005-5 that selecion of employees for training, career development, or promotion, be made in 411 agencies strictly on merit considers- tions-a requirement we are supporting through the Civil Service Commission's regu- lar agency inspections, rather than waiting for employees to come to us with complaints. In some quarters -the charge has been made that this emphasis on equal oppor- "tun~y damages the merit system and gives preference to this or that special group. This is a serious accusation. It deserves a serious answer. We are in no sense violating the merit sys- tem. No one is appointed to a civil serv- ice position who is not qualified for that position. 'The truth is that the actions we are tak- ing, such as those I have enumerated, are taken not to weaken the merit system, but to perfect it. The perfecting of the merit system is neces- sary to asure that America's future draws upon the talents of all the American people. We must see that the moral obligation of equality of opportunity is fully reflected in employment in the public interest. EXECUTIVE SESSION . Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the con- sideration of executive business. The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of ex- ecutive, business. lI'HE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY r The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of Ex- ecutive M (88th Cong., 1st secs.), the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and un- derwater. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Article I is open to amendment. Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of the constitutional right of the Senate in regard to treaties, let me say I do not be- lieve I understood the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RussELLI to assert that in the absence of the provision he is pro- posing, an amendment to the treaty would not require approval by the Sen- ate. I thought that had always been understood, and there was no question about it. . Does the Senator from Georgia believe this right of the Senate is not of derived from the Constitution itself? Mr. RUSSELL. Of course I believe it is derived from.the Constituton itself; but I know, of no way in which we could assert that right if the President of the United States were to undertake to rati- fy, as an executive agreement,,an amend- ment to the treaty. Of course I have no fear that President Kennedy will take any such action as that; but this is to be a permanent treaty, and its permanence and its projection into the future are stressed. I know of no way by which the Senate could assert its constitutional right to-ad . vise and consent if a' President 'Were to, use such an executive agreement. Senators might go to the 'House and lobby with the Members of the House and try to get them to institute a reso- lution of impeachment, but that would be a very farfetched procedure. Such a resolution could not be instituted. in the Senate. What harm could such a provision do? Mr FULBRIGHT. But the necessity for Senate approval of an amendment to the treaty comes from the Constitu- tion. However, if we accept the, pro- posal of the Senator from Georgia-par- ticularly when the treaty reads as it does in section 2-I see no way to escape the necessity of doing that in every case; and the Senator. from Georgia would thereby establish a precedent for main- taining that the right of the Senate to approve an amendment to a treaty comes, not from the Constitution, but from a provision which we would insert in each subsequent treaty. I believe the action the Senator from Georgia proposes would not be strengthening the Constitution, but, in- stead, would be a derogation from the Constitution and from the existing right of the Senate. I believe that by the adoption of such a precedent, we would be saying, in effect, that the Senate does not have any such constitutional right, and that therefore we believe we should include such a provision In the form of a reservation. That is the way the sit- uation appears to me. In my opinion, such a provision would only state the obvious. So I hope that Senators will consider carefully the precedent which would thus be established. In the precedents to which reference has been made, there was no necessity for the submission of a resolution of ratification to be filed or even for assent by the Senate. But this pro- vision would require that we include in the treaty an amendment similar in ef- fect to the amendment which was adopt- ed in connection with the International 11 Atomic Energy Agency. In other words, we already have in this treaty a provi- sion similar to the amendment the Sen- ator from Georgia uses as a precedent, which was put into the other treaty. That was perfectly proper in that case, because in it there was no way for the Senate to veto or to advise and consent. But that is not the case with this treaty. 16001 and general~y'it is true that Members of the Senate strongly oppose any change- even in the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t"-in any legislation which they may propose. However, I hope that after further reflection, the Senator from Arkansas will come forward with a more substantial argument. He says because the veto power is re- tained by the treaty in the Executive, the Senate does not need to insist on its right to advise and consent. I do not say the Senate does not have a right to advise and consent. I am asserting the right of the Senate to advise and con- sent to all amendments to the treaty. I do not believe it at all relevant to assert that in this instance we have the veto power, because the Senator from Arkansas knows that power is lodged solely in the executive branch. The Sen- ate has no right to veto an amendment which might subsequently be proposed. The President or his representative at this conference-not the Senate-would have that right. So the Senate would not have a right to veto any such amend- ment, except after its representatives at the conference approved it, and when it was then submitted to the Senate, for its advice and consent. The Senate has no representative at the conference to consider an amend- ment, but the President does have a rep- resentative there to consider it. He might approve it. So we should, of course, make certain that the provision will be submitted to the Senate, and that the Senate will have a right, under its constitutional obligation and responsi- bility, to advise and consent to the amendment. I do not believe the veto power, which is vested in the executive branch of the Government, has the slightest relation- ship to the constitutional power of the Senate to advise and consent. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It requires the filing and deposit of an instrument of ratification, for Senate approval, in con- nection with a treaty. Any amendment to this treaty would All I am saying is that this right in- have to be dealt with under the consti- heres in the Senate by means of the tutional provision. The Senator from Constitution,' not because of any state- Georgia says we have no way to enforce ment a Senator might propose for it, but that is simply to say that the inclusion. So I think our reliance on President is not going to do his duty. such a provision would certainly place As a matter of fact, the President, being us in a weaker position than our position the Commander in Chief, will be obeyed when we rely on the Constitution. Such by the Armed Forces; and in that respect a statement by the Senate could not be we have to assume that every President stronger than the constitution. The will discharge his constitutional duties. Constitution already contains a provi- A President could thus stop all-tests; and sion relating _to that point. So in doing if he did,' there would be nothing the what the Senator has suggested, we Senate could do about it. A President would raise doubt as to whether the Con- could violate many provisions of law; stitution does so provide. but if he did, the Senate could not take Mr. President, for the information of forcible action about his action. How- the Senate I ask unanimous consent to ever, normally we do not have to pro- have printed in the RECORD at this point ceLd in that way. au excerpt. from the. report of the Com- I do believe, however-and I ask the mittee on Foreign Relations on Execu- Senator from Georgia to consider this tive I, 85th Congress, 1st session, on the point seriously-that a provision of this statute of the International Atomic sort, would be in derogation of a consti- Energy Agency-Executive Report No. 3, tutional right which already exists under 85th Congress, 1st session-appearing on the Constitution. pages 15 to 17, under the heading, Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I did "Committee Understanding' and the not expect the distinguished Senator Problems of U.S. Withdrawal." I do not fr,QTA Arkansas to.embrace this,augges- wish to read that section now. It is too t'oh It .isyery_difficult for parents to late. ' But I wish tohave it In the RECORD f d much wrong with their cliildren; ? for the Information of the Senate be- Approved .For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-ROP65B00383R000100210005-5 16002 Approved For uyxZD f 3J'L1 ? & 65gRRJ 000100210005-~erotember 12 what we might want see done * * * it seemed preferable to edt it up so that if a qualified majority wanted the amendment, it would be effective, but If we did not like it, we would get out, and thereby have in effect a practical veto power Qver amendments." Administration testimony further em- phasized that in the unlikely event that any amendment is adopted' which would place the national interest of;the United States in jeopardy, there is no question but that Con- gress and the President would move swiftly to withdraw from the Agency. Any conflicts In viewpoint which might develop between the two branches of opr Government over future amendments, it !was urged, are more likely to relate to points which, though re- jected by the Senate for; whatever reason, are not such as to outweigh the disadvantages of being outside the Agency. To assure the Senate what the policy and intention of the administration would be under article XVIII, Secretary Dulles, as noted earlier in this report, informed the committee that in the event of an amend- ment rejected by the Senate, the President would and should withdraw, if a majority of the Congress took the position that the amendment rendered continued American participation in the Agency contrary to the best interests of this country. The committee is not impervious to the force of these considerations. It recognizes that, as a practical realty, any prejudice to the national interest which might arise from the operation of !article XVIII would doubtless be effaced in any future contin- gency by the privilege of withdrawal from the Agency, exercised! by the executive branch with the support of the Congress. Nevertheless, the committee is not per- suaded that the withdrawal procedure is sufficient to cure what it regards as a poten- tial hazard for the constitutional division of responsibility between the Senate and the Chief Executive in the treaty process. For the statute creates a legal possibility that this Nation might find itself bound by a treaty obligation which had failed upon sub- mission to the Senate. The suggestion that executive action pursuant to a majority vote of the Congress would' afford adequate as- surance of a protectivle withdrawal is no answer to this possibility. Such an abroga- tion of its constitution duty by the Sen- ate, ti?.xough a kind of advance acquiescence in amendments to the statute unless disap- proved by congressional resolution, is not countenanced by the' fundamental safe- guards of article II, section 2, of the Con- stitution, which requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate for treaties to be approved. To the committee It appears essential that no uncertainty beermitted to subsist as to whether the United States, through continued participation In the Agency, would be obligated by some future amendment which the Senate saw fit to reject. For these reasons, in reporting th@ statute to the Sen- ate, the committee recommends that the cause it bears upon the amendment which the Senator has submitted and which he cites as a precedent., There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: 12. THE COMMITTEE UNDERSTANDING AND THE PROBLEM OF UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL By virtue of article XVIII d, as already mentioned in this report, amendments to the statute which have been accepted by two- thirds of the member states In accordance with their constitutional processes, come into force for all members, even those who fail to ratify such amendments. On the other hand, should a member be unwilling to accept a proposed amendment, it may withdraw from the Agency by appropriate notice in writing. Should such member fail to exercise this right to withdraw and re- main in the Agency,, it would 'be bound in exactly the same way as If it had approved the amendment. Inherent in the statute, ther"efore, is the possibility that the United States may be bound by a provision which the Senate re- jects unless affirmative action is taken by the executive branch, through withdrawal, to protect the national interest. A similar result conceivably could follow with respect to a--provision which the draftsmen of the statute might have intentionally omitted be- cause of the apprehension that such a pro- vision would have rendered the treaty un- acceptable to the Senate at the outset. In short, the hazard of the amendment proce- dure. in article XVIII as viewer by some of the members of the committee, lies in a po- tential difference of views concerning the acceptability of a given amendment as be- tween the Senate and the executive branch. Should the Senate reject- an amendment which the executive branch did not consider sufficiently repugnant to warrant with- drawal, the net effect would be a flouting of the constitutional requirement that the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Sen- ate be obtained before an affirmative treaty commitment might be imposed on the United States. This feature of the amendment procedure received a most penetrating examination in the committee. The dilemma presented by article XVIII, of course, arises from the rela- tiveauthority of the President and the Sen- ate in the treaty process, and the considera- tion that denunciation of a treaty is an executive act, even though termination be effected pursuant to congressional resolu- tion. (Cf. Hackworth, Digest of Interna- tional Law, pp. 330-331.) Testimony furnished by administration witnesses tended to minimize the risks which the amendatory procedure of article XVIII might create for the United States. Since, according to that testimony, the new Agency will remain dependent upon the United States for survival for a long while to come, the likelihood of any amendment being adopted against the determined op- position of the United States is extremely remote. In the words of Secretary of State Dulles: "In view of the preponderant role which the United States will play, and I have testi- fied that in my opinion It could not get started without the United States, I am equally prepared to testify that for the fore- seeable future it could not continue without the United States. We, in effect, have con- trol over the amendments in that if there was an amendment which the Senate did not approve, we would then withdraw. "Anything less than that * * * would mean that any member country would have a veto power over amendments which in the course of time might be found to be de- sirable by the United States and other im- portant countries. Rather than give any one of 80 nations a complete veto power over Senate's advice and consent to ratification be made subject to an interpretation and understanding to be ma4ie a part and condi- tion of ratification. Thq resolution of advice and consent would thus read as follows: "Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Sen- ate advise and consentto the ratification of Executive I, 85th Congress, 1st session * e * subject to the interprtatton and under- standing, which is here1y made a part and condition of the resol ion of ratification, that (:l) any amendmento the Statute shall be submitted to the Sen to for its advice and consent, as in the case 4 f the Statute itself, and (2) the United States will not remain a member of the Agency in the event of an amendment to the Statute being adopted to which the Senate by a formal vote shall refuse its advice and consent." The language of this resolution will thus insure an automatic termination of ITS. membership should two-thirds of the Agency's members approve an amendment which is rejected by the Senate in the exer- cise of Its prerogatives under article ]:I, sec- tion 2, of the Constitution. The committee desires at this time to record its concern with the practice, infre- quent as it may be, of including in treaties a provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations deemed necessary in the national interest or of preventing the Senate from exercising Its constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to all treaty commitments before they can in any way have a binding effect on the United States. Whatever justifica- tions may have existed for inclusion of such a prohibition in the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 (Ex. M, 83d Cong., 1st sets., art. XX) in view of the peculiar cir- cumstances there present, the Senate's ap- proval of that treaty should not be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future agreements with other nations requiring the Senate's advice and consent. Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad that the Senator has asked to have that section printed in the RECORD. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It will be in the RECORD for every Senator to read. Mr. FULBRIGHT subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the appropriate place in the RECORD a letter from the Secretary AL State concerning the proposal sub- mitted by the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The letter is as follows: HOn. J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You have asked for the views of the executive branch on a pro- posal to amend the Senate resolution con- senting to ratification of the test ban treaty to include an understanding that the Senate mutt consent to any amendment to the treaty. The executive branch believes that this understanding is unnecessary and that It would not be in the interests of the United States to include it in a Senate resolution consenting to ratification of the treaty. If the treaty were ambiguous as to the participation of the Senate In the amending process, and understanding could be desir- able. However, there is no ambiguity. This very matter was dealt with by the President today in his press conference. He said: "I can give a categorical assurance that the treaty cannot be amended without the agree- ment of the three basic signatories. The treaty cannot be changed in any way by the three basic signatories and the others, with- out the consent of the Senate. Any proposal to change the treaty would be submitted to the usual ratification procedure, followed by or prescribed by the Constitution. Jr. addi- tion, there would be no executive action, which would permit us to in any way limit or circumscribe the basic understandings of the treaty. This is a commitment which is made by the Executive and by the Senate, operating under one of the most important provisions of the Constitution, and no President of the United States would seek to, even if lie could-and I strongly doubt that he could, by stretching the law to the furthest-seek In any way to break the bond and the under- standing which exists between the Senate and the Executive and, In a very deep sense, the American people, In this issue." In my testimony before the Senate For- eign Relations Committee, I stated that "no amendment to the treaty can enter into force Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approv_ee,d-f of R V 8 QS ONJf lit. M G ! 00210065-5 by the Senate." The treaty requires that "instruments of ratification" of the original parties be deposited before anyeamendment can go into effect. Under the Constitution, the President cannot execute an instrument of ratification without first obtaining the ad- vice and consent of the Senate under article II, section 2, of the Constitution. In my letter of September 12 to Senator MANSFIELD, I pointed out how this language of the treaty, as well as the Constitutional provi- sion, expressly requires the consent of the Senate to any treaty amendment. As .you pointed" out, the Senate resolution consenting to ratification of the statute of International Atomic Energy Agency con- tained an understanding with respect to the consent of the Senate in the amending process. But the cases are not parallel. Unlike the test ban treaty, which expressly provides that no amendment can become effective until it has been ratified by all three original parties-the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union- the IAEA statute permitted amendment by a two-thirds vote. of all members of the Agency. Thus, amendments could have be- come effective without the concurrence of the United States. The statute also pro- vided that any member unwilling to accept an amendment could withdraw from the The` Senate was concerned that the statute might be amended without its con- sent and the Executive might not withdraw from the Agency, leaving the United States committed to a treaty which the Senate iilight not have been willing to approve. (See Senate Ex. Rept. No. 3, 85th Cong., 1st seas., pp. 15-17.) In this context, the Senate approved the statute, "subject to the. in- terpretation and understanding, which is hereby made a part and condition` of the resolution of ratification, that (1) any amendment to the statute shall be sub- mitted to the Senate for its advice and con-' sent, as in the case of the statute itself, and (2) the United States will not remain a member of the $ency in the event of an amendment to the statute being adopted to which the Senate by a formal vote shall refuse its advice and consent." The qualification in the resolution con- senting to ratification of the statute of the IAEA had a real purpose; which would not be served by' a similar understanding in the present ease. On the contrary, since an understanding implies that the provisions of the treaty were 'previously unclear, the adoption of such a proposal With respect to the test ban treaty would tend to cast doubt on the prerogatives of the Senate under the Constitution. -For these reasons, it is the position of the executive branch that the interests of the United States would best be served by ratifi- cation of the proposed test ban treaty with- out the understanding referred to in your inquiry. S(ncerely, DEAF? RUSK) Surrender; and a peace of sorts, followed almost at once. It was thus that the world and its people, armed with growing scientific knowledge by which to construct new tools of instantaneous destruction, over an ever-widening area, and with growing ranges of delivery, stumbled forward into the nuclear age. Wonderful, peaceful uses of the new energy were found. Many others were anticipated. But nu- clear power was primarily dedicated, as, indeed, it needed to be, to the defensive might of the people of the United States. Our attempts to dedicate it exclusively to peaceful purposes, on a multination basis, consistently met with failure. Scientific brainpower is not solely indigenous to the West, nor to free peo- ples alone. And so, alas, the Soviet Union, aided by Nazi rocket experts whom it had captured, and by informa- tion which its far-flung system of es- pionage had obtaified, embarked, also, on a long-range program to test and to manufacture thermonuclear warheads and Intricate systems for speeding them on their way, even across the seas. So did the United Kingdom. So, now, has France. And so, too, has the inhuman and wanton regime of the Red Chinese. Others could, and some would, unques- tionably follow. I say to my colleagues that America's nuclear arsenal has been a profound de- terrent against a potential Soviet sur- prise H-bomb aggression against our country and the West. Our Secretary of Defense, during the hearings on the treaty, has reiterated that- Our strategic retaliatory forces are fully capable of destroying the Soviet target sys- tem, even after absorbing an initial surprise attack. Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack and attrition en route to tar- get, we calculate that our forces today could still destroy the Soviet Union without any help from the deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces or Thor or Jupiter IRBM's. The Secretary of Defense has testified at that same hearing that the United States "has nuclear superiority." After listening to all the testimony, Mr. Pres- ident, I sincerely believe that statement. He testified that "we are determined to maintain superiority." And that, Mr. President, we must unfailingly accom- plish. The American people are devotedly de- dicated to the cause of a just peace. We are not a warlike nation. When we have been attacked, we have fought wars, and we have won. We are not going to aban- don our liberty, nor will we ever, ever, suffer it to be taken from us, whatever the cost. We continue to seek a con- tinuing security for our country, as we continue to seek an honorable, peace in the world, This is not a confession of weakness. It comes rather, from a strength of spirit, and from the knowl- edge that anyone who would try to hurt us would suffer, swiftly and surely, an annihilating retribution. An arms race-particularly a nuclear arms race-cannot acid would not pro- vide permanent security. Peace does not rest on military power alone. In an arms race, do we not increase the danger of war by mistake or miscalculation as well Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield? Mr. KUCHEL, I shall. But I wish to point out to the Senator that the Senate will need more study and more reflection before it resolves what to do in this instance, I have been waiting for a long time to make my speech. Of course, I yield. Mr. GORE. I wish to propound an interrogation to the junior Senator from the treaty b in fact a new treaty? e, ? upon two enemy cities, pulverizing their Mr. F'VLBRIdRT. It would. For all homes and buildings and incinerating - practical legal purposes it would. I do . their people, with a sudden and devastat not believe that a treaty could be amend- ing fury never before known to man. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 ed except by following the same proce- dures which the treaty itself must follow. Mr. GORE. The Senator has said, "For all practical and legal purposes." Without any qualification, is not an amendment to a treaty a treaty ab initio? Mr. FULBRIGHT. It Is. I apologize for that slip of the tongue. It would be a new treaty. It must follow the same procedure, in my opinion. Mr. GORE. To assert by legislative amendment or resolution the right of the Senate to ratify an amendment to the treaty, or to advise and consent- two-thirds of the Senate concurring, if we wish to be specific-is but to restate what is already in the Constitution. In no possible way could a resolution of the Senate strengthen those provisions. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator. By implication, by- agreeing to such an amendment, the Senate would raise an inference that such is,not the fact. Mr. GORE. Does not the Senator re- call that former President Eisenhower suspended nuclear weapons tests with- out the obligation of a treaty? Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. Mr. GORE, The Senator has said that any President, by his executive action, could do so. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. Mr. GORE. If a President wished to enter into an executive agreement, no provision in the Constitution would for- bid him from doing so. But an executive agreement could not be an amendment to a treaty because, as the Senator has said, an amendment to a treaty is a treaty in and of itself, and must there- fore be subjected to. the constitutional procedures. Mr. FULBRIGHT. And since the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, such an amendment would become a treaty under the Constitution. Mr. GORE. If this reservation or amendment Is to be accepted and adopted by the Senate, what argument is there against many other resolutions of the same type? Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is none. All sorts of things could be included. In my view, such a provision would be unnecessary. Mr. President, I have just been in- formed that Mr. Charles Bevans, treaty adviser of the Department of State, has informed the committee . on. Foreign Re- lations, as follows: The U.S. Government has never deposited an instrument of approval of an amend- ment to a treaty without first going back to the Senate. WE HAVE PONDERED-NOW LET US PAUSE Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, the gen- esis of this issue occurred 18 years ago when American men of science dis- covered and put to use the secrets of a 16004 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD . SENATE September 12 as by design? And, in a nuclear arms race, free of all restraints, do we not, as we undertake repeated and competitive testing in the atmosphere, finally reach the point where radioactive fallout would surely become a hideous danger to the survival of the human race? It is to the everlasting credit of the leaders of America that, from the dawn of the nuclear era, they have earnestly sought agreement to control nuclear test- ing, and to dedicate nuclear power to the betterment of man. That grand old American, Bernard Baruch, early told the nations of the world that the choice they had to make was "between the quick and the dead." In 1957, President Eisenhower offered the Soviet Union what he termed "a cessation of tests as an integral part of what we call a gen- eral first step toward disarmament." Two years later, in a letter to Chair- man Khrushchev, dated April 20, 1959, President Eisenhower said: The United States strongly seeks a last- ing agreement for the discontinuance of nu- clear weapons tests. We believe that this would be an important step toward reduc- tion of international tensions and would open the way to further agreements on sub- stantial measures of disarmament. On January 11, 1960, President Eisen- hower spoke of America's proposal for a nuclear test ban agreement in the atmos- phere and in the oceans. He said: These are initial, but far-reaching and yet readily attainable steps toward a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests. If adopted, they will prevent increases in the level of radioactivity in the atmosphere and so allay worldwide concern. The United Kingdom joined President Eisenhower in his limited proposal. It has continued to agree with our country's position under President Kennedy. Finally, last July 25, representatives of the United States, the United King- dom and the Soviet Union, initialed an agreement for a limited test ban. Since then, 91 other nations have approved it, without qualification. The issue, thus, 18 years after the first - Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I fur- ther ask unanimous Consent that the transcript of a number of questions I asked of witnesses during the hearings and the answers I received may also be printe(i at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from California. The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 3.) Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, by the terms of the treaty the parties agree to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water. Underground nuclear explosions are permitted so long as radioactive debris is not vented outside the territory of the nation conducting such explosions. Weapons testing underground or explo- sions underground for peaceful purposes are equally permissible, The nations agree not to encourage or participate in the carrying out of the prohibited testing and explosions any- where by anyone. The treaty is open to any nation to join. It may be amended but only if a majority of the members-specifically including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union-agree. That simply means that the treaty can- not be amended unless the executive branch of our Government agrees, and unless the Senate, by a two-thirds re- corded vote, also agrees'. The treaty is of unlimited duration, but it permits any signatory to withdraw on 3 months' notice if the signatory it- self, and by itself alone, determines that "extraordinary events, related to the sub- ject matter of this treaty, have jeopard- ized the supreme interests" of the signa- tory. And, obviously, under interna- tional. law, if a signatory were to abrogate the treaty, secretly or otherwise, the treaty would be at an end, and any other signatory could proceed immediately to test at will. Does the treaty, in any way, restrict the use of nuclear weapons by any signa- Con- _ tory nation in the event of war or In the Senate. It is our duty under the stitution, to determine whether or not we shall advise and consent to the treaty agreement. I ask unanimous consent that the en- tire text of the treaty and the agreed communique be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator. from California? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, also, that the De- partment of State letter of transmittal to the President, dated August 8, 1963, and the text of the President's letter of the same date to the Senate be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from California? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.) event of an aggressive act against it? The answer is in the negative. The treaty, by its own teriis, is specifically designed to prevent test explosions in the three enumerated environments. That is what it does. That is what it is intended to do., The agreed communique of the three powers, issued simultaneously with the initialing of the treaty clearly relates the treaty to the problem of "the discon- tinuance of nuclear tests." It refers to the treaty as "the test ban treaty." The Department of State, in transmitting the treaty to the President refers to the treaty, particularly the article referring to prohibiting nuclear' explosions, and says: The article does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war nor restrict the exercise of the right of self-de- fense :recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. In his message to the Senate, the Pres- ident of the United States clearly stated that the treaty "will not end the threat of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nu-, clear weapons." The clear issue before the Senate Is whether a limited nuclear test ban agree- ment Js in the interests of the American people. The treaty has nothing to do with the manufacture and stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. It has nothing to do with our country using our nuclear arsenal if the President, as Commander in Chief, determines that; American security requires its use. And, I repeat, the limitation on test explosions does not apply to testing underground. for any purpose. Will the treaty, in any way, require any signatory nation to recognize any other signatory nation if it does not de- sire to do so? It will not. International law is clear on this. The precedents, over the years, are unequivocal, The right of the United States to determine, by herself, what countries to recognize and what countries not to recognize, continues unimpaired. And I feel com- pletely assured that West Germany would never have signed the treaty if she had felt that there was the slightest implication that her signature would re- quire her to-recognize Communist East Germany. In the committee hearings, I asked each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether he, individually, approved the treaty. Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff answered in the affirma- tive. It was their unanimous, collective judgment that, under the terms of the treaty, our country should immediately proceed with an underground testing program designed to improve our weap- ons. Glenn T. -Seaborg, the distin- guished nuclear scientist, now Chairman of the Atomic Energy Copunission, in his testimony on the treaty, described the Commission's responsibility as follows: To develop atomic energy so as to make the maximum contributions to the common defense and security of the United States. We will continue to vigorously support re- search and development in our weapons laboratories; the terms of the treaty permit us to carry out an active underground testing program and we are doing so. Yesterday, the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], read to the Senate a let- ter from the President of the United States reaffirming the testimony, in- deed, the pledge, of all responsible Government officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission who testified on this treaty that the readiness of our nuclear testing facilities would be main- tained. Our military leaders vigorously ad- vocate that we be constantly able to re-, sume atmospheric testing if the Soviet Union cheats On its treaty obligations. Seaborg firmly promises that-- We will maintain a state of readiness for - conducting tests in the atmosphere and other media. This readiness posture has been stated as national policy by the Presi- dent, What are the hazards of clandestine cheating by the Soviet Union? I believe, by the testimony given. to us by scienti- Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 oved 1963 Appr fie and. military personnel during closed committee sessions, that our skills and techniques to detect cheating in.the pro- hibited environments are surprisingly efficient; and that there is a high proba- ,bility that any Soviet illegal test would be discovered, If such illegal explosions occurred, the treaty would`be breached, and, as i say, were it in our national in- terests, tinder the decision of the Presi- dent, we would have the immediate right to test at once in the environments covered by the treaty. Mr. President, I have little, if any, faith in the word of the Soviet Union. Her record of breaking her word is long and sordid. If she is in good faith in this instance, it is only and solely because the-treaty is in her interests. I do not, in the slightest, believe that the Soviet Union has abandoned its goal of world- wide Communist domination. The So- viet Union knows that if, God forbid, the United States were the victim of a surprise nuclear attack, our retaliatory nuclear blow would incinerate the land of ,the aggressor. I believe the U.S.S.R. knows that our capacity to retaliate is sufficiently large and dispersed and se- cured that no surprise attack against us could wipe out the fiery vengeance which we could and would wreak on a nuclear aggressor. Her leaders know the full fury of thermonuclear bombs. But -if such weapons were to proliferate around the world, to become the property of an increasing number of nations, large and small, irresponsible or not, would not the hazards to all mankind- including the Soviet Union-proliferate, too? Suppose, for example, the nations in the Middle East all possessed nuclear arsenals. Would we not be inching to- ward the abyss of nuclear conflict? Is it not, therefore, in the self-interest of humanity, including the U.S.S.R., to accept a multilateral policy deisgned at least to inhibit, if not prevent, the de- velopment of nuclear bombs by more and more nations? Is it not in the interest of humanity, including the Soviet Union, that the atmosphere which all people, including its own, breathe, should be freed, if only for a while, from additional radioactive poison, no matter how far away, or how near, an actual level of immediate danger might be? These are the considerations which from the very first have impelled our country to try to reach even a first-step agreement in the field of nuclear test- ing. And now, at long last, the U.S.S.R. has accepted our propdsal. It should be rejected by the Senate only if it were to find that the security of our country is endangered by what both Eisenhower and Kennedy have been contending for over the years. Where is such evidence? Eisenhower and Kennedy recommend it. The mili- tary Joint Chiefs of Staff support it. Out of nine top American military com- manders, spread all around the world, eight approve it. Of all the nuclear physicists who testified before the com- mittee, the predominant view was that this treaty represented a step away from an age of darkness and desolation, and ment and breach would be outweighed by the measure of hope given to man- kind, and by an America-ever alert and standing guard-representing in her continuing military power, and in the strength of her dedication to a just peace, once again, the last, best hope of And even the great American scien- tist, Dr. Edward teller, a brilliant patriot from my own State of Califor- nia, in answer to my questions, suggested And General Wheeler continued: The matter of proliferation has been put forward as being a military advantage. I would certainly say this: If we can restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this is a military advantage as well as a political ad- vantage. Mr. President, as one who does not customarily sit on the major commit- tees dealing with test ban affairs, I did not have the background' or the pre- science of wisdom to become immediately either an advocate or a critic of the that the fears which prompted his op- treaty when it was first announced. I position might be ameliorated, and that have seen my role as have the majority the treaty "might still be compatible with our safety"-his words-by suitable and available expansion in some of our present defense systems. Later in the hearings, I asked Dr. -Harold Brown, Director of Defense Re- search and Engineering of the Depart- ment of Defense, if the treaty restrictions would not crucially affect our capacity to develop a defensive antiballistic mis- sile system. He replied, "I would go fur- ther than that and say it would not seriously affect our capacity. I don't want to say that it is not useful infor- mation but it will not seriously hamper our development." Both the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relying on both their military judgment and the advice of the distinguished scientists who hold positions of responsibility in the Penta- gon, moreover, made it clear that, in their opinions, development of an anti- ballistic missile system does not depend on atmospheric testing. As Gen. Max- well Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, testified: As the Joint Chiefs have pointed out there are limitations in the sense that we can never have complete weapons effects tests which would involve atmospheric testing. That is a disability, but not a critical one. We can, indeed, develop, fabricate, and de- ploy an antiballistic missile system if we so choose. At another point in the hearings, I also asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their individual reasons for supporting the treaty. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, replied: Well, the political advantages that might accrue from this are a great number. Some of them are (1) the cleavage that now exists between Russia and China. Another one is that if we can satisfy Mr. Khrushchev as to our nonaggressive designs, and we can get him to pull back into the Soviet Union and concentrate a great number of his resources on consumer goods, on his agricultural pro- gram, and things of that sort, rather than going off on excursions to further commu- nism worldwide, this would be a political ad- vantage. Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, replied: I would go a step further in merely call- ing this political. It is politicomilitary. If a reduction in tensions can be achieved- although I would certainly argue whether weapons cause tensions or tensions cause weapons-perhaps we will have an oppor- tunity to deal with some of the very sticky problems such as Berlin, Cuba, and others which plague us. of my colleagues: to wait and see, to listen and to question, to advise and con- sent or to dissent, as each one of us sees the light. Let me recall the solemn pledge of the 1960 Republican national platform, which reads: We are similarly ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament, and for the suspension of nuclear tests. We advocate an early agree- ment by all nations to forgo nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and the suspension of other tests as verification techniques permit. Yesterday in debate the Republican leader in the Senate likewise quoted that platform as constituting a commitment by my party to the people of the United States. Nonetheless, I told the Senate on August 2 that I would vote in favor of the treaty only if, after all the questions were asked and all the answers were given, it then appeared to be abundantly clear that ratification of the treaty would be in the interest of the American peo- ple and, beyond that, in the interest of the cause of a just peace on this globe. Mr. President, the questions have been asked, the answers have been given, and I think the conclusion is abundantly clear. I am not a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. But I regarded- and now regard-the responsibility of the Senate, in judging this treaty as so cru- cially important that I participated in the committee hearings, both public and private, and with the approval of the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], I par- ticipated in the examination of wit- nesses. My sole concern was to cast my vote-for or against the treaty-on the single basis of what I believed would be best for my country. I listened to the evidence, pro and con.' As carefully as I could, I examined the exhibits and the charts of the Military Establishment. All of my original reservations con- cerning the treaty have been answered. I have reached my decision. As an Amer- ican, whose prime concern is for his own country, I shall support the treaty, for I believe it to be in the interest of the people of the United States as well as in the interest of world peace. The treaty may not halt the prolifera- tion of nuclear weapons entirely, but it constitutes a drive to impede it. The treaty may, but for a short time, halt the danger of fallout. Should the Soviet Union break the treaty, we will, as we must, be ready immediately to resume Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R00010021U005-5 16006 Approved ForC U ftRP A1IR P6 1 000100210005 ptember Y testing ourselves. We shall hope for the best, but we shall prepare for the worst. But most important of all, I believe, for the first time the major nations of the world have taken a small step toward reality and common sense and sanity in a world laden with thermonuclear bombs. I recall the words of the great Church- ill: _ Mankind has never been in this position before. Without having improved apprecia- bly in virtue or enjoying wiser guidance, it has got into its hands for the first time the toolsby which it can unfailingly accomplish its own extermination. That is the point in human destinies to which all the glories and toils of men have at last led them. They would do well to pause and ponder upon their new responsibilities. Mr. President, we have pondered. Now let us pause. EXHIBIT 11. TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDERWATER The Governments of the United Statesof America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit- ain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agree- ment on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accord- ance with the objectives of the United Na- tions which would put an end to the arma- ments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I 1` Each of the Parties to this Treaty un- dertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, includ- ing territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such ex- plosion causes radioactive debris to be pres- ent outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such ex- plosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the per- manent banning of all nuclear test explo- sions, including all such explosions under- ground, the conclusion of which, as the Par- ties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve. 2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty under- takes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any'nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the ef- fect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article. ARTICLE II 1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall he submitted to the Deposi- tary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if re- quested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty. including the votes of all the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force ftr all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Orig- inal Parties. ARTICLE ;III - 1. This Treaty shall bj Open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before- its entry into force in ac- cordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at anytime. 2. This Treaty shall bo~ subject to ratifica- tion by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties-tile United Sta'ies of America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit- ain, and Northern Irelandd, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic!--which are hereby designated the Depositor Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of rati- fication or accession are deposited subse- quent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall' be registered by the Depcsitory Governmentspursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE IV _ This Treaty shall be of unlimited dura- tion. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events. related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter- ests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all Other Parties to the Treaty three months in ':advance. ARTICLE V This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Deposi- tary Governments. Dully certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the De- positary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. For the Government of the United States of America: DEAN RUSH WAH For the Government Of the United King- dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: HOME H For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: A. GRoMYao A.G. I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Treaty banning Nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in otter space and under water, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963 in the English and Russian languages, a signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government_of the United States of America. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, George W. Ball, Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Authentica- tion Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Co- lumbia, this eighth day of August, 1963. [SEAL] GEORGE W. BALL Acting Secretary of State By BARBARA HARTMAN Authentication Officer, Department of State (Released on July 25, 1963) AGREED COMMUNIQUE The special representatives of the Presi- dent; of the United States of America and of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdorn, W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister of Science fo:r the United Kingdom, visited Moscow together With their advisers on July 14. Mr. Harri- man and Lord Hailsham were received by-the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist I epublics, N. S. Khrushchev, who presided on July 15 at the first of a series of meetings to discuss ques- tions relating to the discontinuance of nu- clear tests, and other questions of mutual interest. The discussions were continued from July 16 to July 25 with A. A. Gro:myko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During these discussions each principal was assisted by his advisers. The discussions took place in a business- like, cordial atmosphere. Agreement was reached on the text of a treaty banning nu.- clear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This text is being published separately and simultane- ously with this communique. It was int.- tialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko, Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham, Mr. Harri- man and Lord Hailsham together with the r advisers will leave Moscow shortly to report and bring back the initialed texts to their respective Governments. Signature of the treaty is expected to take place in the near future in Moscow. The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty constituted an im- portant first step toward the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forward to further progress in this direction. The heads of the three delegations dis- cussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discus- sions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all par- ticipants. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, directed at a relaxation of tension. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR. WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOS- PHERE, IN OUTER SPACE, AND UNDERWATER, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON AUGUST 5, 1963, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIC.9, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SO- VIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS THE: WHITE HOUSE, August 8, 1963. To the Senate of the United Slates: With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- mit herewith a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- phere, in outer space, and underwater, signed Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For ?,~![D1~~~ :6568 #00100210005-5 16007 at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the more experience in underground testing than United.States of America, the United King- any other nation; and we intend to use this dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, capacity to maintain the adequacy of our and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will main- This treaty is the first concrete result of tain an active development program, includ- 18 years of effort by the United States to ing underground testing, and we will be ready impose limits on the nuclear arms race. to resume testing in the atmosphere of neces- There is hope that it may lead to further sary. Continued research on developing the measures to arrest and control the dangerous peaceful uses of atomic energy will be pos- competition for increasingly destructive sible through underground testing. weapons. Seventh. This treaty is not a substitute for, The provisions of the treaty are explained and does not diminish the need for, con- in the report of the Acting Secretary of tinued Western and , American military State, transmitted herewith. Essentially it strength to meet all contingencies. It will prohibits only those nuclear tests that we not prevent us from building all the strength ourselves can police. It permits nuclear that we need; and it is not a justification for tests and explosions underground so long unilaterally cutting our defensive strength at as all fallout is contained within the coun- this time. Our choice is not between a try where the test or explosion is conducted. limited treaty and effective strategic In the weeks before and after the test strength-we need and can have both. The ban negotiations, the hopes of the world continuous buildup in the power and in- have been focused on this treaty. Especially vulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent in America, where nuclear energy was first years has been an important factor in per- unlocked, where the danger of nuclear war suading others th t th t a lution passed by the Senate in that same year; and it carries out the explicit pledges contained in the platforms of both parties in 1960. Nothing has happened since then to alter its importance to our security. It is also consistent with the proposals this adminis- tration put forward in 1961 and 1962-and with the resolution introduced in the Sen- ate, with wide bipartisan support, in May of 1963. This treaty is in our national intrest. While experience teaches us to be cautious in our expectations and ever vigilant in our preparations, there is no reason to oppose this hopeful step. It is rarely possible to recap- ture missed opportunities to achieve a more secure and peaceful world. To govern is to choose; and it is my judgment that the United States should move swiftly to make the most of the present opportunity and ap- prove the pending treaty. I strongly recom- mend that the Senate of the United States advise and consent to its ratification. e ime for a limitation and the meaning of radioactive fallout are has arrived. so clearly recognized, there has been under- Eighth. This treaty will assure the security OF STATE, standing and support Y Washington, August 8, 1963. g for this effort. Now of the United States better than continued The PRESIDENT, the treaty comes before the Senate, for that unlimited testing on both sides: According The White House: careful study which is the constitutional to a comprehensive report prepared by the I have the honor to submit to you, with obligation of the Members of that body. re.ponsible agencies of f overnme + f +, or --- h y ~Uullcll, Tne tests - to the Senate its t e following considerations be kept clearly ducted by both the Soviet Union and the ratification, a fcert fied co advice p of and the tre to in mind: United States since President Eisenhower banning nuclear weapon tests in the pat- First. This treaty is the whole agreement. first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 mosphere, in outer space and underwater, U,S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed have not resulted in any substantial alters- signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on be- not to make this agreement conditioned tion in the strategic balance. In 1959 our half of the United States of America, upon any other understanding; and they relative nuclear position was strong enough the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- made none. The treaty speaks for Itself. to make a limited test ban desirable, and it ern Ireland, and the econd. This treaty advances, though it remains so today. Under this treaty any cialist Republics: Union of Soviet So- 3oes not assure, world peace; and it will gains in nuclear strength and knowledge On October 31, 1958, the United States 1 Ihibit, though it does not prohibit, the ? which could be made by the tests of any other and the United Kingdom began negotiations nuclear arms race, power-including not only underground tests with the Soviet Union at Geneva for an ef- While it does not prohibit the United but even any illegal tests which might escape fectively controlled nuclear test cessation States and the Soviet Union from engaging detection-could not be sufficient to offset agreement. As you are aware, continued n all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the ability of our strategic forces to deter or studies and assessments of the technical, po- the testing in which both nations would survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and litical, military, and other aspects of this )therwise engage. destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, subject have been conducted since that time While it will not halt the production or and under this treaty we will continue to in connection with the negotiations. reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear have, the nuclear strength that we need. On The Senate has followed the test ban ne- weapons, it is a first step toward limiting the other hand, unrestricted testing-by gotiations with close attention, holding many the nuclear arms race, which other powers could develop all kinds hearings and enacting a resolution in sup- While it will not end the threat of nuclear of weapons through atmospheric tests more port of the efforts of the executive branch war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, cheaply and quickly than they could under- (S. Res. 96, 86th Cong., let sess.). Congres- lt can reduce ,world tensions, open a way to ground-might well lead to a weakening of sional advisers have attended the negotia- further agreements, and thereby help to our security. It is true that the United tions at Geneva at various times since 1958. ease the threat of war. States would be able to make further progress The first proposal for a limited test ban While it cannot wholly prevent the spread if atmospheric tests were continued-but so treaty was a dvanced by the United States of nuclear arms to nations not now posses- would the Soviet Union and indeed, so could and the United Kingdom on April 13, 1959. sing them, it prohibits assistance to testing other nations. It should be remembered On that date, supported by Prime Minister in these environments by others; it will be that only one atomic test was required to Macmillan, President Eisenhower proposed signed by many other potential testers; and complete the development of the Hiroshima in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev a ban it is thus an important opening wedge in our bomb. Clearly the security of the United on tests above ground and up to 50 kilom- effort to "get the genie back in the bottle." States-the security of all mankind-is in- eters. On September 3, 1961, you and Prime Third. The treaty will curb the pollution creased if such tests are prohibited. Minister Macmillan proposed to Chairman of our atmosphere. While it does not as- Ninth. The risks in clandestine violations Khrushchev that the three Governments sure the world that it will be forever free under this treaty are far smaller than the agree immediately not to conduct "nuclear from the fears and dangers of radioactive risks in unlimited testing. Underground tests which take place in the atmosphere fallout from atmospheric tests, it will greatly tests will still be available for weapons devel- and produce radioactive fallout." reduce the numbers and dangers of such opment; and other tests, to be significant, On August 27, 1962, the United States and tests. must run substantial risks of detection. No the United Kingdom submitted to the Con- Fourth. This treaty protects our rights in nation tempted to violate the treaty can be ference of the 18-Nation Committee on Dis- the future. It cannot be amended without certain that an attempted violation will go armament, a draft treaty banning nuclear the consent of the United States, including undetected, given the many means of detect- weapon tests in the atmosphere, Outer space, the consent of the Senate; and any party to ing nuclear explosions. The risks of detection and underwater. Both proposals have been the treaty has the right to withdraw, upon outweigh the potential gains from violation, renewed by the United States and the United 3 months' notice, if it decides that extraor- and the risk to the United States from such Kingdom at various times since then. dinary events related to the subject matter violation is outweighed by the risk of a con- On May 27, 1963, Senators Donn and Hum- of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme tinued unlimited nuclear arms race. There PIinEy introduced in the Senate a resolution Interests. - is further assurance against clandestine test- Fifth. This treaty does not alter the status ing in our ability to develop and deploy lution, c sponsoednby1325Qother Senators, of unrecognized regimes. The provisions re- additional means of detection, in our deter- urged negotiation of a treaty banning tests in lating to ratification by others, and the mination to maintain our own arsenal the atmosphere and the oceans. precedents of international law, make it clear through underground tests, and in our readi- On June 10, 1963, in a speech at American that our adhe, gnce to this treaty, and the ness to resume atmospheric testing if the ac- University, you announced further negotia- adherence of any other, party, can in no way tions of others so require. tions with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test accord or evep imply recognition by the Tenth. This treaty is the product of the ban, and a suspension of U.S. tests in the at- United States or any other nation of any steady effort of the U.S. Government in two mosphere so long as other nations did not regime which is not now accorded such recog- administrations, and its principles have had conduct them. nation, the explicit support of both great political On Sixth. This treaty does not halt American parties. It grows out of the proposal made de pressed July the 2, 1963, n ness of the Govern- nuclear, - will llingness of the Soviet progress. The United States has by President Eisenhower in 1969 and the reso- ment "to conclude an agreement banning nu- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For D-1 yg NA1L :IR 1 65 3 00100210005- ep~tember 1 z 16008 clear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space Article III provides that the treaty shall native thoroughly and found it impossible and underwater." enter into force upon the deposit of instru- of execution." Commencing July 15, 1963, negotiations merits of ratification by all three original Now that we have an agreement before us were held in Moscow between W. Averell liar- parties and specifies how other states may how would you seek to dispel any appreher._ riman, representing the United States, Lord become parties. It designates the three Sion which the Members of the Senate anc Hailsham, representing the United Kingdom, original parties as depository governments the people of our country may have-I gas and A. A. Gromyko, representing the Soviet and contains other provisions of a formal parenthetically I think you have coverec Union, looking toward the possibility of Con- na:ure relating to ratification, accession, and this in part-first, with respect to a breacl eluding a treaty banning nuclear weapons registration with the United Nations. of the agreement and, secondly, with respec tests in three environments, but not under- An increasing number of countries have to the question of technical laboratories an( -cua d. On July 25, 1963, these negotiations indicated their intention of becoming parties scientific brains being kept on the alert un Icsulted in an agreed draft initialed by the to the treaty and of thus broadening its der the agreement? rip esantatives of each of the parties. On effectiveness. The pr visions for signature Secretary Rusx. In the first instance, c f.ugust 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Mos- and accession have been designed to permit the first question, there is a difference, c'u' by Secretary Rusk on behalf of the the widest possible application of the treaty. believe, between a solemn 6rcaty soleronl U *_tcd States, by A. A, Gromyko on behalf of At the same time adherence to the treaty entered into, and in the case of this treat he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and will in no way imply recognition or change endorsed by the signatures and the aciherenc by Lord Home on behalf of the United King- in status of regimes the United States does of almost every nation of the world, on to dam. not now recognize. or will it an any way one side, and the kind of moratorium whic The treaty consists of a preamble and five result in according re c ;nition or change in we had between 1958 and 1961. articles. status to any regime hot now recognized by That moratorium was based, in effect, upo The preamble indicates the relationship of any other party. unilateral declarations. It was not a con this treaty to the much broader aim of Article IV provides th.t the treaty shall be tractual relationship between the parties,. achieving an agreement on general and con- of unlimited duration. It also creates a I have tried myself, in, fairness and in so plete disarmament under strict international sp ai right of withdrawal, upon 3 months' curacy, to refer to the fact that the Savie control, as well as to the more specific aims notic tice, if a party firida: that extraordinary Union terminated or broke the moratoriun but it did not break an agreement when of eventually preventing nuclear weapons events related to the; subject matter of the That Is, tests in all environments, meanwhile stop- treaty have jeon.,."?dizeld its supreme interests. resumed not its atmospheric tests, is a at Is, tth, oo nsa ping the contamination of the atmosphere by Article V provides that the English and had ad among the governments. I as thitra nk that radioactive fallout. Russian texts of the treaty are equally an- the more significant. Article I contains the principal substan- tb.oritative and makes provision for the de- formal treaty is question, sir,. I thin tive obligations of the parties. Under its posit of the original treaty instruments and that Now, this would be it much more rI thin first paragraph the parties undertake to pro- the transmittal of certified copies to signa- that difficulty for us, quite f otam were difficulty about r a c quite f rarnkl hibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, at tor' and acceding states. if problem and any place under their jurisdiction or con- There is transmitted for your informa- treaty which eliminated tests m all sort trol, nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear tiorc, and for that of the Senate, the agreed and which could b ated tests speedy viols explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, communique issued by the representatives tion which or the other p ctito. or underwater. In the context of provisions of the original parties on July 25, 1963, at We do believe that with underground Les devoted to obtaining a complete, verifiable the conclusion of they Conference in Moscow iris proceeding that some of the most as ban on tests in these three environments, the at which the treaty Was formulated. ing pr work will that done here; that it vanced be treaty language relates "any 7iuclear weapon I believe that thel signing of this treaty laboratories will be fully engaged in tha test explosion" to "any other nuclear ex- is it significant achievement. Its ratifica- the preparations for the- resumption of a posion," thus preventing evasion based on tion by the three oiriginal parties and by inospheric testing and the keeping up to da the contention that a particular detonation such other states as *nry sign or accede to it of plans for such tests in the event of viol; was not a weapon test but the explosion of will. be an important and hopeful step to- tion, would go a long way toward p:reveritir an already tested device. The phrase "any ward the reduction of international tensions, the degration of our laboratory capabilitio. other nuclear explosion" includes explosions allcvi:aeon of the fears and dangers caused- We would also expect to keep in operatic for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are by radioactive fallout, and the prevention of condition the actual test sites anc[ not d prohibited by the treaty because of the dif- the spread of nuclear weapons capability. mobilize those to the extent that they we: ficulty of differentiating between weapon test I believe it will pror4iote the security of the before or turn them over to other use. explosions and peaceful explosions without United States and of the entire free world. So that we believe it would be pos: ;ibl additional controls. The. article does not pro- In view of these advantages, and of the and Dr. Seaborg will be able to address hin weapons in the hopes and expectations of virtually every self to that question specifically, that it wi hibit the use of nuclear, event of war nor, restrict the exercise of the nation in the worlds it is my sincere hope be possible for us to go ahead with our pre right of self-defense recognized in article 51 that the United States will promptly ratify gram, with our laboratories functioning, an of the Charter of the United Nations. this treaty. be in a good position to take care of or Underground nuclear explosions are not R ;p ctfully submitted. interests if this treaty is violated. prohibited so long as they do not cause radio- GEORGE W. BALL. TREATY'S EFFECT ON DEVELOFMF,]VT OF active debris to be present outside the ter- - ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ritorial limits of the state under whose Ex nsrr 3 s ad ad Referring once again t jurisdiction or control such explosions are NLCLEAR Senator TEST BAN TREAT Sr the e President's to the people a yea conducted. Thus, so long as adequate pre- ago he said, in cautions are taken to prevent such spread Senator KUCIIEL. yr. Secretary, first your part or radioactive debris, the treaty will not pro- statement earlier this morning was excellent; "While apparently seeking information o! hibit the United States from conducting un- Sour answers have peen likewise. They are the effects of nuclear blast on radar an derground nuclear weapons tests or under- "lost useful to those of us, like myself, who communication, which is important in de ground nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- have not been in a Position to draw on any velopi:ng an antimissile defense system? then poses, background and experience in this field. tests--" referring to the Soviet tests- The on paragraph of article I contains ITICULTIES IN MESC T A STATE CON- "did not, in our judgment, reflect- a Bevel on undertaking b the parties to refrain rain STANT REA ADINESS TO RESUME TESTING by sped system." from causing, encouraging, or in any Way "In March of 1962 ]President Kennedy, after Perhaps this question should be directec participating in, the carrying out of the pro- the Soviet Union lad abruptly announced more properly to either Glenn Seaborg of hibited tests and explosions anywhere by the termination of f s unilateral moratorium, Robert McNamara. But would it be you; anyone. This provision prevents a party had this to say, in rt: testimony that the development of defensive from doing indirectly what it has agreed to 'We know enough'now about broken nego- systems, including an anti-missile-missile refrain from doing directly. ,ia.tions, secret preparations, and the advan- system by the United States would not be Article II contains a procedure for 1-,ages gained from along test series never to inhibited by our agreement not to explode amending the treaty. Any party may pro- offer again - an ulrinspected moratorium. in the atmosphere? pose an amendment, and -a conference to Some may urge us to try it again, keeping Secretary Rusx. Secretary McNamara wii consider such an amendment must be called our preparations to { test in a constant state address himself to that point in eensiderabb if requested by one-third or more of the of readiness. But in actual practice, partic- detail, Senator KUCHEL. But lei me jus parties although a conference would not be ularly in a society df free choice, v5e cannot comment very briefly. That the contra necessary for the adoption of an amendment. :seep topflight scietists concentrating on problems of an anti-missile-missile defense To be effective, an amendment must be ap- the preparation of an experiment which may system lie generally outside of the werheac proved and ratified by a majority of all the or may not take place on an uncertain date problem itself. parties which must, include the United in the future nor c large technical labora- This has to do with radar capabilities States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. tories be kept fully alert on a standby basis with missile capabilities, with guidance sys Thus, no amendment can become effective waiting for some oer nation to break an terns, with things that can proceed in ex without the advice and consent of the agreement. This I not merely difficult or perimentation and development withou Senate. inconvenient. We save explored this alter- inhibition by this treaty. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 1963 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 16009 There are one or two aspects of that which appreciate being here and listening to you. I bothered people with whom I have spoken. are related to the possibilities of atmos- think your statement was most helpful to When the words are used "or any other nu- pheric testing which my colleagues may Senators like myself. clear explosions," would it be the statement wish to take up In executive session, because GENERAL SUMMARY OF TREATY TERMS of the General Counsel that that should be it does involve some fairly delicate matters. fair to say interpreted as any other "nuclear test" ex-Is it WHO IS RENEFITED MORE BY TEST BAN? urging g the e Senate e to that, advisse you and consent t to here plosion? Senator KUCHEL. I paraphrase comments this treaty, that in your opinion the intent CLARIFICATION OF OR ANY OTHER NUCLEAR made by some Californians in the press when of the treaty is to prohibit nuclear test ex- EXPLOSION" I say "Russia can continue testing in her plosions in the three enumerated environ- Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No-a peaceful use ex- area of weakness while we will be denied the ments by the original signatories and by plosion might not be a test explosion. For chance to catch up In her area of strength." those other nations or states which hereafter example, a peaceful use explosion, digging a Sir, speaking for the Government, you may approve `it? new canal, would scarcely be a test explosion. would deny that. Would you elaborate on Secretary -MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; it is. So the word "test" is not in there for that such a denial? Senator KucHEL. And is it your statement reason. As you may recall, the approved U.S. Secretary Rusx. Again, sir, this is a matter to this committee that the intention of the draft had an article II permitting peaceful which ought to be taken up in connection parties in drafting it is not to prohibit the uses under certain circumstances. with weaponry and with highly technical use of nuclear weapons on the part of any Senator KUCHEL. I remember. as well as some classified material. But it is nation which finds its security involved to Mr. MCNAUGHTON. When that article was quite true that the Soviet Union has ex- the point that it would determine it neces- deleted, this language, as the Secretary ploded, for example, a larger weapon from sary to use them? pointed out, was inserted to prevent peaceful the megaton point of view than have we, and Secretary MCNAMARA. That is the clear in- use explosions, whether tests or otherwise, they, therefore, perhaps, have both some tent of the parties. in the peaceful three environments; and the knowledge and capability in that field that DISCUSSION OF DEFINITION OF "OR ANY OTHER reliance was placed on the commonly ac- we have not yet demonstrated or proof- NUCLEAR EXPLOSION" cepted legal rule of interpretation that such tested, although we do have a capacity for a limitation does not apply in time of war very substantial weapons. Senator KucHEL. I turn to the language of here, I think that it will beV shown wef feel "Each of the parties to this treaty under- that statement again. It does not apply in that we are ahead, and to that extent the takes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to time of war? cessation of testing will impose some limi- carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, TREATY NOT APPLY IN TIME OF WAR tations on the Soviet side. or any other nuclear explosion, at any place Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It is a commonly ac- On the underground side, I think that under its jurisdiction or control-" cepted rule of interpretation in international our experience has been much more fertile, Then it describes the areas to be covered in law that provisions of a treaty do not apply It is much larger in number. I think we feel (a) and (b). I refer particularly to the in time of war, or hostilities unless the treaty we have a significant advantage in the un- phrase, "or any other nuclear explosion." clearly indicates to that effect. Now I am derground field, and we can continue to What is your opinion of the intention of not an international lawyer. But this is develop the state of the art through the the parties in utilizing that series of words? my understanding of this subject from the underground testing with full protection of Secretary MCNAMARA. Again I speak as international lawyers. This is clearly the American Interests. Secretary of Defense and not as an ex- case. So it is not quite as simple a problem as perienced international lawyer. But it is saying they are ahead at this point, we are certainly my understanding of the intent of NEED FOR FULL UNDERSTANDING OF TREATY ahead at the other. They can test where the parties that the term "any other nuclear LANGUAGE they need to catch up, we cannot test where explosion" was inserted in order to prohibit Senator KUCHEL. In the interest of time we need to catch up. But this is a great so-called peaceful use explosions which met then might this hearing have for the purpose oversimplification, and I think as a con- the conditions outlined in the following two of establishing intent on this point not sim- clusion would not be correct, subparagraphs, A and B. ply that that is the understanding of our Senator KucHEL. That phrase also appears participants in the discussion but also an CONSULTATIONS WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF in section 2 of article I: explanation of your statement that in time Senator KUCHEL. Just one more question. "Each of the parties to this treaty under- of war treaties do not apply specifically re- You stated this morning In answer to a ques- takes furthermore to refrain from causing, ferring to who is at war. tion by Senator STENNIS, that only the Gen- encouraging, or in any other way partici- (The explanation referred to is as follows:) eral Counsel of the Defense Department ac- pating in, the carrying out of any nuclear _ "GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE companied our delegation to Moscow. Did weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, the State Department and the White House explosion, anywhere which would take place Washington, D.C. consult with the members of the Joint Chiefs in any of the environments described, or "Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, of Staff prior to our participating in the ne- have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of "Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, gotiations in Moscow? this article." "U.S. Senate. Secretary RUSK. Senator, the procedure by Would your statement be to the commit- "DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearings which we developed positions in disarmament tee that that phrase again, "or any other nu- before the Committee on Foreign Relations culminates In what is called the Committee clear explosion," is restricted to peaceful on the proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of Principals, which is a Cabinet-level com- nuclear test explosions? on August 13, 1963, Senator KUCHEL raised mittee which was organized soon after the Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe that was the the question whether the treaty prohibits present administration came into office. purpose and intent-to apply only to peace- the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. That is made up of the Secretary of State, ful explosions. "It is my opinion, shared by the Legal the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the , Senator KUCHEL. Would you feel it rea- Adviser of the Department of State, that Atomic Energy Commission. sonable for anyone to try to contend that the treaty cannot properly be so construed. The Secretary of Defense, from the be- this phrase would apply across the board and "As is the case with contracts between pri- ginning, was normally accompanied by the prohibit any other nuclear explosion of any vate parties, it is a familiar principle of inter- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I my- kind or character? national law that in ascertaining the mean- self was accompanied by the Director of the Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I do not be- ing of a treaty we may look beyond its writ- Disarmament Agency. have so. As I say, I based my conclusion ten words to the negotiations and diplomatic Back, I think, in April both of those were on two points: (a) I am quite familiar with correspondence of the contracting parties made full members of the Committee of the background that led to the introduction and to the interpretation made of the treaty Principals, although they had been at all of the language and it is clearly the intent by the parties. Compare, Factor v, Lauben- meetings previously in the last 2 or 3 years. of the parties that the phrase would not heimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-295; Cook v. United All of these disarmament questions are dis- apply to a prohibition of the use of nuclear States, 288 U.S. 102, 112; Nielsen v. Johnson, cussed there, debated there, reviewed there. weapons in the event of war. And, second, 279 U.S. 47, 52; Lauterpacht, Some Observa- The Committee of Principals then meets I am told by my legal counsel that it is quite tions on Preparatory Work in the Interpre- periodically with the President for full dis- customary so to interpret international tation of Treaties, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 549. It cussion there with all those who participated treaties unless they quite specifically state is equally fundamental that a treaty is to be at the Committee level sitting in on those the contrary. interpreted in the light of the general pur- discussions with the President. So that there Senator KucHEL. Your General Counsel pose which it is intended to serve. Com- has been the fullest opportunity for an ex- was present in Moscow at the time of the pare, advisory opinion of July 20, 1962, of change of views among any of the agencies negotiations? the International Court of Justice on cer- there or any of the individuals there, as we Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; he was. 'tain expenses of the United Nations, page 20. have idscussed these various issues. Perhaps you would like to hear him speak "The preamble of the treaty states that the * * * * ? on this point. parties seek to achieve the discontinuance Senator KUCHEL. Mr. Secretary, first let Senator KUCHEL. I would like to ask him of test explosions of nuclear weapons. The me permit the record to show that I greatly, this question for the record, because it has title of the treaty proclaims that the agree- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 16010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12 ment is a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon jor act, cannot stop the arms race, and can- weapon in our arsenal when the Commander Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, not avert or even substantially weaken the in Chief deems that to be necessary. and Under Water. Similarly, the cornmu- danger of thermonuclear war.' In a press Mr. MCNAUCIITON. That is correct. nique accompanying the treaty announces conference of July 27, 1963, Ault)assador Har- Senator KUCHEL. And I must say I think that agreement was reached on the text of riman, the U.S. delegate at the Moscow talks, the agreed communique of the three parties a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in revealed that the possible interpretation of bears on the intention. But when the See- the atmosphere, in outer space, and under article I as interfering with; use o1 juclear retary mentions the phrase "intention of the water. Surely, if it had been intended to weapons Sad been discussed ly the three par- parties" all I know is what we develop in prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war- ties during the negotiations and that it was these hearings by questions and answers. time, some mention of that important pur- 'perfectly plain that this anguage in no This is the only thing that not only the pose would be found in the communique, the way inhibits any country, tile United States Senate, but the American people, will have title, and the preamble. Not only is no or any country, from using nuclear weapons, to determine the intention of the specific such purpose stated, but the communique should the need require i9 war.' See the language used. This is extremely important, and the preamble make it clear that the Washingl:on Post, July 28, 1 1963, page A8, because very dedicated Americans do raise treaty is only an important first step in the column 2. these questions and have raised them to me achievement of an agreement on general "Finally, it should be noted] that it is stand- orally and in writing. and complete disarmament and, specifically, and practice in treaties outlawing the use of MAINTENANCE AND CONTINUATION OF ABM on the cessation of the production of nuclear specified weapons or actions in time of war RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT weapons. for the treaties to state expiressly that they Mr. Secretary, are we taking steps in re- "Further, if it had been intended to pro- apply in t1--ale of war, in ordef to prevent pos- search and development of an antiballistic hibit the use of nuclear weapons in war, one sible application of the rube that war may missile system? would expect to find some provisions in the suspend or annul the operation of treaties Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; we are. We text calling for the cessation of production between the warring partied (Cf. Karmuth have spent something on the order of $800 of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons v. United States, 279 U.S, 201,236-239; Op- million, if I recall, to date, and we are re- for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear penheim's `International 14w,' vol. II, 7th questing funds be appropriated in fiscal 19,34 weapons, and for the progressive destruction ed., pp. 30:2-306.) See, e.g.:; of $450 million. for that purpose. of existing nuclear weapons and their means "'International Declaration Renouncing Senator KUCHEL. When President Eise:a- of delivery. No such provisions appear. the Use in Time of War of xplosive Projec- hewer announced his unilateral moratorium, They do not appear because the treaty was tiles Under 400 Grammes Wight (St. Peters- it was an across-the-board moratorium; was not intended to deal with the use of nuclear burg, Ncvcmber 29, Decemb4r 11, 1868).' it not? weapons in war. "'International Declaration Respecting As- Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. "This conclusion is further substantiated phyxiating Gases, Hague, J1ily 29, 1899; In- Senator KucHeL.:I asked this question yes- by the historical background of the treaty. ternatio:nal Declaration Respecting Expand- terday. President Kennedy, in his speech The language of article I of the treaty has Ing Bullets, Hague, July 29,1899.' to the Nation of over a year ago, indicated its origin in article I of the draft treaty International Convention Concerning that we would never be caught short agaiin, banning nuclear weapon tests tabled in the Laws and Customs o> War on Land, as you and I hope and pray, and we are as- Geneva by the United States and the United Hague, October 18, 1907.' suming that we are taking arrangements we will not be caught short again. Secondly, Kingdom on August 27, 1962. The major "'Protocol for the Prohil}ition of the Use point of difference between article I of this he indicated that there would not be a stable treaty and article I of the 1962 draft treaty in War of Asphyxiating, Pc4sonous, or other of American scientific brainpower available is that the present article I also prohibits Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of if tests could not be seen down toward the 'any other nuclear explosion' in the spec- Warfare. Geneva, June 17,;1925.' end of the road. ified environments. The quoted words stem "'Geneva Conventions oka Wounded and Would it be your statement that since an- from the existence of article II of the 1962 Sick, 19,19 (art. 2); POW's Dart. 2); Civilians derground testing is not prohibited in this United States-United Kingdom draft, which (art. 2) ' treaty that the statement of the President authorized the explosion of nuclear devices "In the present case, language specifically ought not to apply here? for peaceful purposes in the specified envi- prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Senator KUCHEL. ronments if unanimously agreed to by the wartime: cloesnot appear; it must, therefore, I think it is quite a different situation where 'original parties.' This limited exception was be presumed that no such prohibition would we will be able to carry on a large number unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The words apply. of development projects through under- 'or any other nuclear explosion' were accord- "Senator KUCHEL also asked whether the ground tests on the one hand, versus com- ingly inserted in article I of the present draft entire treaty would be ab;ogated if one of plete prohibition of tests In all environments treaty for the purpose of banning peaceful the parties thereto was at War either with a on the other hand. In the latter case, it use explosions as well as test explosions in second party or a state not a party. The would be far more difficult to maintain the the three environments, answer is that the operation of the treaty vitality of the laboratories than it would be "Except for this change with respect to would be annulled only wgth- respect to the in the former case. explosions for peaceful purposes, the present specific parties at war. For example, If the CALL FOR PRESENTATION OF ALL POSSIBLE draft and the earlier draft are substantially hypothetical war did not i*volve the United INFORMATION identical. The preamble of the earlier draft, States and the Soviet Union, and their re- Senator KUCHEL. Just this statement and its title, and the accompanying statement of spectivo allies, the war wogtld have no effect then I am through, Mr. Chairman. the U.S. delegate, Ambassador Dean, make it on the application of the treeaty to the Un;.ted I am most grateful, sit, that you share the plain that the draft did not have as an ob- States and the Soviet Union. It should be views of some of us that to as great an jective the prohibition of the use of nuclear noted, however, that depglding on the cir- extent as possible this record may disclose weapons in war. See Department of State cumstances, the United States or the Soviet all the pros and all the cons involved in Bulletin, volume XLVII, No. 1212, September Union might unilaterally decide to invoke the this treaty-not, of course, violating a sensi- 17, 1962, pages 404-410; 415-416. Indeed, withdrawal clause of article IV. tive security question. This is going to be it is apparent from the `Outline of Basic "Sincerely, important, not simply for the Senate, but Provisions of a Treaty on General and Com- "JOHN T1 MCNAUGHTON." for the people we represent in endeavoring, piste Disarmament in a Peaceful World,' Senator KUCHEL. Let us suppose that 1 of (a) to find the proper answer, and (b) to which was presented by the United States the signatories of 50 would be engaged in have the people approve what is done here. in Geneva on April 18, 1962, that the pro- conflict. Would this abibgate the entire Secretary MCNAMARA. I strongly support pose - test ban treaty was only one element treaty? I do think that it is most imp -or- that position. Even though, as I say, Dr. of the overall problem of disarmament. See tart-particularly since, ! Senator MORSE Teller's statement recommends against sup- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, earlier referred to the word "encourage." It port of the treaty, I will make every effort publication 4, general series 3 (May 1962). raises a dreadful problem ?with respect to at to declassify every possible element, includ- "In addition to this historical background, least one of our allies. $enator CASE also ing all his arguments against the treaty, so there is the contemporaneous interpretation brought up the question; of what "under- that the committee and the public may be openly given to the current- draft by the par- ground" means. I would xl~ot want to restrict informed of the opposite point of view. ties. In his speech of July 26, 196:3, Presi- my Government by having this record indi- Senator KucHEL. And the question of in- dent Kennedy stated that the treaty `will Cate that "underground" lust mean some- tent, as I have enumerated it here, I think not restrict their (nuclear weapons) use in thing more than an inch or; 2 inches or a foot. is most important. And I understand, then, time of war.' See New York Times, July 27, I think it terribly imperint if this is the sir, that the administration will supply for 1963, page 2, column 1. Significantly, this only hearing which is available to legal this record-- construction was not unilateral. Earlier, on minds--maybe after the fact has occurred- Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; we will be happy July 2, Mr. Khrushchev in his speech in Ber- as to what is intended. Then you must to do so. - - lin expressed a similar understanding. After scrupulously indicate whjat "underground" * * * ' t mean. ment to conclude a limited agreement ban- courage" means and what it doesn ning nuclear tests, he said: `Of course, an And in this case, what the words "or any STATEMENT agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, not other nuclear explosion" means: That it does Senator KUCHEL. General LeMay, In the withstanding all the importance of this ma- not mean a nuclear detonation of a defensive statement which General Taylor read to this Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R0001.00210005-5 .1963. Approved For R0?I&S& Yd1A ,Q b1rBOQ$~D 01100210005-5 16011 c al `days ago, he said in part, pendently, and at the same time arrived at That is all I have now, Mr. Chairman. committe sever' and I quote: the same point as did my colleagues. "The broader advantages of the test ban All of us have reservations in this area. treaty have led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to I think the reservations are well spelled out conclude that it is compatible with the in the paper which we presented to the Con- security interests of the United States and to gress. In the purest sense of the term any support its ratification." agreement or treaty which limits the man- Is that a correct statement of the position ner in which'we develop our weapons sys- of the Joint Chiefs? tems represents a military disadvantage. General LEMAY, I believe so; yes, sir. On the other hand, there can also be mili- Senator Kuc5IEL, It is fair to say that every tary advantages, and certainly there can be member of the Joint Chiefs does support the political advantages, to the overall good of ratification of the treaty? the country. I think General LeMay is cor- General LEMAY. That is correct. rect in saying that each of us probably Senator KucHEL. Every day letters have assessed the various risks and the various ad- Come into my office from people who have vantages with a slightly different weight. on a number of occasions (as have all of u$) However, the net result you can read. We read statements in the public press to the all agreed that in toto the treaty is accept- effeet that in reality the Joint Chiefs of able. Staff opposed the treaty; that, and I apologize Senator KUCHEL. Even more than that, for repeating this statement into the record, however, sir, is it fair to say that each mem- that they have been "brainwished," and that ber of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the lan- this proposal does not have their approval guage of the Chairman, "Supports its ratifi- but rather their opposition.. cation." I think the American people, and the m n General WHEELER. That is correct, sir. and women in the Senate, share a very great Senator KUCHEL. Any further comment, respect for you and for your colleagues in Admiral? the Joint Chiefs, and, therefore, while it is Admiral McDONALD. I have nothing to add repetition, I think it completely necessa y to what General LeMay and General VIeeler for all of us to understand that there are have stated other than to say for myself that risks involved which will, I take it, be ex- no pressure whatsoever was put upon me. plored in greater detail in an executive ses- Senator KUCHEL. Thank you, sir. sion because of the security factors involved. General Shoup? But for the record, for the benefit of the NO PRESSURE FELT people of the country, it is then true with- General SHOUP. I agree with that state- out any qualification that in acting simply and solely to determine the best interests of ment. I would like to-I suppose this is the the people of the United States, it is true time, if I came back here to say something that every member of the Joint Chiefs of this is the time to say it. Staff supports the ratification of the treaty. I hold a very unique position amongst the General LEMAY. I would like to amplify a other service chiefs inasmuch as the likely little bit on your question, Senator. value of my views and counsel has been ?POAZNwA~H21~G` - limited by. legislation to the matters in which I declare the interests of the Marine First of all, as t o the Vramwashing, _ ,I Corps are directly involved. would resent very much any attempt to put In this particular item I did not take the pressure on Me t0 come up with an answer position of direct concern. However, I did either way on this treaty. r recognize. that avail myself of the opportunity and privilege I have not only a responsibility to the Presi- of being present during all the discussions. dent and the administration but that I have In addition I was called for by the Com- one to the Congress and to the people of the madder in Chief and the Secretary of De- United States also. - fense in person and in private and I presume So, I say again that there has been no that if pressure was being used I would have pressure applied to me in this matter, and found it out. - I have come up with the best possible answer There was no such indication whatsoever. that I could give based on all of the knowl- I would like to make one other statement. edge that' l have in the military profession That I believe that there is a possibility of in nuclear science, and with all of the input getting our orientation too closely frozen to that I could get from everyone who could talk this business of a nuclear exchange. intelligently on this subject. Obviously, we want to avoid nuclear As to the decision itself, we all feel that blackmail, and. it is by these safeguards that there are possibly some political gains that are stated here that is intended to be pro- might accrue to the country that would be vided for, very important if this test ban treaty were FIFTH SAFEGUARD TO FIGHT COMMUNISM ratified. I think each of us in the Joint Nevertheless, I would like to point out Chiefs attaches importance to these political that I believe one of the main purposes of gains. A& to how great they cromightm them, or our Government is to prevent the spread of I am s. much benefit might ght communism and the Communist system. ewhat more pessimistic than the other Chiefs are in this regard. Then I would like to call your attention But if we provide the safeguards we men- to the fact that communism has not yet tioned in our paper, I believe that the mill- been spread by the use of nuclear weapons, tary and technical disadvantages that the and I think a fifth safeguard is an essential treaty would bring about could be offset to one at this time and that is our efforts should a point where they would be acceptable and be tripled against the spread of communism .the country'should have a chance to make by methods, other than the use or the threat these political gains if, in fact, they could of nuclear eapons. materialize. Senator KucHEL. Thank you, sir. Both Perhaps the. other Chiefs would want to- you and Admiral McDonald do then support the ratification of the treaty? amplify my remarks a, little on'that , Admiral McDONs.LD. I do. General WHEELER. Senator, my position as Senator Kucnsz? I thank you very much, regards pressure is exactly that of General because, and I repeat this, you gentlemen LeMay. I, too, would resent any pressure and the chairman are held in the greatest of being put upon me. respect by the American, people. I think it Of course, every official I. subject to Ares- is a very wicl ed insult to a man in uniform sure. Ile has the pressure of his conscience, operating' in the seat of responsibility as the pressure of his professional integrity, and each of you do, to say publicly that you are the pressures of his duty to the President, not reflecting what your own views are. I the Congress and to the people of the United very much appreciate your assurances for States. I arrived at this conclusion inde- the record. * * * * Senator KUCHEL. We have got some Sena- tors who said they were for this treaty al- most immediately. We have got some others who said. they were against it almost im- mediately. I think the, rest of us are the great majority. I think we would like to approve the treaty but we don't want to make a mistalze, I don't think there is a scientist in the crowd., ,od klaows there is not a military expert in the crowd. Now, I think most of us would feel far more comfortable if, as has now been the case, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated they favor the treaty, subject, however, to certain things which to my lay mind simply must be done. GENERAL LE MAY'S POSITION ON TREATY HAD HE BEEN ASKED DURING NEGOTIATING STAGE As I left the Senate a few minutes ago to come down here, on the ticker, General Le- May, there was a paragraph, which said that had this treaty been in the negotiation stage and you were asked your own opinion, you would have objected to it. You would have felt that it should not be entered into. Was that a correct quotation? General LEMAY. I think I said that. May- be I didn't qualify my statement now. I said I thought I would probably be against it. But I have spent a lot of midnight oil on this particular question, on the treaty, we had in our hands that we could look at, looking at the disadvantages, looking at the advantages, and trying to come up in my own mind with a recommendation that I would give to you people, I have spent a lot of time. I haven't spent as much time on any other subject that has ever come before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it has worried me a great deal as to whether I came up with the right answer or not. Now, with all of that .time that I have spent trying to come up with a specific recommendation on a specific treaty, then to be asked some hypothetical question of what I would do, I don't know exactly. I just say I think I would, but I am not sure. Senator KucHEL. I wish maybe on the open record that type of answer might be put in because that is the sort of thing many peo- ple- General LEMAY. I have no objection to that answer going in the open record. We all like to have a second time, Senator. I wish I had said it then. Senator MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield? I think General LeMay has a very valid point. No one would have known what they would have done 2 or 3 weeks ago. At the time no one could have known. How could you give a. definite answer? Senator KUCHEL. All I say is I noticed the ticker upstairs says that. It is the sort of thing that will make people in the country wonder. The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the general thinks this answer is appropriate for giving it to the public. Is that correct? General LEMAY. I have no objection to it. The CHAIRMAN. Elaborate on it so we can have it clarified. Without objection, available. EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION METHODS Senator KUCHEL. General, just in lay terms, is our detection system with respect to atmospheric nuclear explosions sufficiently efficient so that we would know if there were an attempted clandestine breach by the So- viet Union? General LEMAY. The answer to that has to "No," because I don't think we can detect every explosion that they may attempt in the atmosphere any place in the world. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B0038.3R000100210005-5 16012 Approved Fa ps2 p ,1 E9.000 10021000 ppte-mber 12 Now, we have some figures; I am sure you are familiar with them. as well as I am, but we cannot guarantee to detect every explo- sion; no, sir. [Deleted.] EFFECT OF LARGE MEGATON WEAPON ON A SUBMARINE Senator KuciEL. I wanted to clear up, Ad- miral, your answer to Senator PASTORE this morning, and I am not a member of the Atomic Energy Committee. I think he raised a question with respect to the impact of an extremely large nuclear warhead upon the capability of a Polaris missile [deleted]. Admiral McDONALD. I believe the question was what impact would it have; would it have an adverse impact upon the communica- tions of the Polaris submarine? My answer was- Senator PASTORE. With the permission of Mr. KucHEL, I think we ought to read Gen- eral Taylor's answer to that question. That is the reason I asked it so that you would have the full context of it. "General TAYLOR. Admiral McDonald really should answer the question. I would say from what I know we have so many duplicat- ing pairs for communications that we would have no problem communicating with any one of our weapons systems or the essential elements of those systems, although, ob- viously, some fraction might be lost." Admiral MCDONALD. May I go ahead, Sir? Senator PASTORE. Yes. Admiral McDONALD. When the question was asked this morning my immediate thought was the effect that a megaton bomb would have upon the communications sys- tem of the submarine were the bomb applied to the submarine, in other words, a megaton underwater burst near the submarine, and that is the reason I said "Quite likely." I had studied earlier this morning something that Admiral Anderson had worked up because of a question that was asked him in the spring [deleted]. Now, if we are speaking, as I understand now, of the communications, not of the sub- marine but to the submarine from the shore, I doubt very much if it would adversely affect them, because we do have duplicating sys- tems [deleted] I realize that there are some who ask, What will happen If these megaton bombs create a communications blackout? Well, I don't know, and I am not certain that our scientists know positively that such a thing will happen. But if it does, I think It would have less effect upon the Polaris system than any other because the Polaris system does not have to be as immediately responsive. Senator KucHEL. So when you answered across the street this morning "quite likely," you now qualify that? Admiral McDONALD. Very definitely, and the "quite likely" would apply to the com- munications of the submarine if a megaton bomb was exploded in the water close to the sub. Senator KUCHEL. To the extent that that answer could be stated in a nonclassified fashion, I think that, too, ought to go in the record that Is going to be printed and distributed. The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to do this, although the admiral clarified his statement at the end of the meeting. Were you there? Senator KUCHEL. No; I was not. The CHAIRMAN. At the end of the meeting, he clarified his statement quite clearly. Admiral MCDONALD. I don't believe we would like to have unclassified the distance at which we calculate- The CHAIRMAN. NO. Admiral McDONALD (continuing), We cal- culate this will destroy the submarine. The CHAIRMAN. I believe when you see what he said at the end it is pretty well taken care of. Senator KUCHEL. Yes, Sir. Just one more question. REASONS FOR FAVORING RATIFICATION On the plus side, Gerjeral LeMay, could you outline what, in the opinion of the ,Joint Chiefs, are the reasons Which impel you to favor the treaty, reasons particularly that affect the potential security of our people, if there are any? General LEMAY. Well, the political advan- tages that might accrue from this are a great number. We have talked at great length with Ambassador Harriman and Secretary Rusk on the advantages. Some of them are, one, the cleavage that now exists between Russia and China- Senator KucHEL. Yes, sir. General LEMAY. [Deleted.] Another one Is that if we can satisfy Mr. Khrushchev as to our noitaggressive designs, and we can get him to Pull back into the Soviet Union and concentrate a greater num- ber of his resources on Consumer goods, on his agricultural program, and things of that sort, rather than going off on excursions to further communism worldwide, this would be a political advantage. Th se are the two main things, that I would attach the most i#nportance to. Perhaps the others would recall others. General WHEELER. I certainly agree with General LeMay so far as he has gone [deleted.]. I would go a step further in merely calling this political. It is politico I think this matter of, tensions is impor- tant. If a reduction in tensions can be achieved-although I would certainly argue whether weapons cause tensions or tensions cause weapons-perhaps We will have an op- portunity to deal with some of the very sticky problems such as, Berlin, Cuba, and Others which plague US. The matter of proliferation has been put forward as being a military advantage. I would certainly say this;; If we can restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this is a miltary advantage as well as a political` advantage. Now, I certainly do riot have any idea, gentlemen, that the Chinese Communists or the French are going tote deterred in, any degree In moving forward'; to become nuclear powers. However, I think Mr. Khrushchev is right when he points o}.It that their capa- bility is negligible, will be negligible, for any foreseeable future that many affect us. Certainly the smaller toe nuclear club the better, particularly if you can keep these weapons out of the hands of more irrespon- sible and perhaps more adventurous nations. I would characterize those items as being military advantages as well as political ad- vantages if they can be achieved, Senator. Admiral McDONALD. I believe it has been pointed out that we all place different em- phasis on various things oven though we all came to the same final conclusion. While I agree with General Wheeler that some of these things are normally considered political by some people, they really have great military advantages, I think perhaps we might have some other military advan- tages, too, purely technical military advan- tages. It is generally accepted, I think, that we are ahead in our underground testing tech- niques. In that connection, General Le- May says that we aren't sure the Soviets didn't conduct a rather!., thorough under- ground program: The fact remains, how- ever, that Some of our scientists have said the knowledge which we do have of the sta- tus of Soviet [deleted] 'weapons leads us to believe that [deleted] would have been much more el9cient. That is one reason we think we are ahead in underground testing. We are both permitted to conduct rather unlimited, really unlimited underground tests under the treaty. I pelieve we can use this additional knowledge that we already have to great advantage provided we don't agree that there is an end of progress in sight. Once again, I agree with General LeM'ay, I am not sure there is an end, and if we are way ahead of them in underground testing 3 am not sure they will ever catch up, at least we will have a few years to watch them. Senator KUCHEL. Is it not reasonable to assume, however, that scientific brains on both sides of the Iron Curtain and with. two conflicting forces using those scientific brains, that the one that is behind is going to have a tendency to catch up and the one that is behind in one particular field where atmospheric testing is important is going to be restricted in going ahead with that? Admiral McDONALD. I think the tendency is for the gap to be closed],; yes, sir. Senator KUCHE;L. It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, and then I am through, that Gen eral LeMay's point of view reflecting those: of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending this treaty, is on the basis of hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. With. then specifications they suggest which unques- tionably, I feel, will be carried on, the risks that you outline In your judgment would be. held at what you would call an acceptable mini mum. Thank you, sir. DOES TREATY LIMIT V.S. RIGHT OF ' SELF-DEFENSE? Senator KUCHEL. First, sir, I was very deeply moved by a remarkable presentation. of your viewpoint, because you have enriched this country by your citizenship, and you have added to the sinews of strength of this Nation to maintain its freedom. All I can say is that I was quite honored to listen to you this morning. The points you raised which are complex, difficult for a layman to understand, simply add to the burden that a hundred Senators aregoing to have. First, I want to point out, however, that in one comment you made: in your judgment this treaty is something more than a test; ban; in your judgment, sir, this treaty would, restrict or tend to interdict the use of Amer- ica's nuclear arsenal in time of war. On that point I begin to feel somewhat qualified to disagree for until this morning, and I observe parenthetically I have had an. opportunity to speak with you and to enjoy and try to listen and to absorb your thinking on that point, none who has come here thus far has hesitated for a moment in stating that this is a test ban in three environments, period. And I sincerely believe if the Senate were to approve the treaty it would be on a full and complete understanding that the Amer- ican Government would take the position that this proposal now before us is a proposal to prohibit the testing of nuclear explosions in three environments. It would not prevent the man in the White House, whoever he would be, to act as Commander in Chief in the defense of our country or in the fulfill- ment of our collective security commitments in determining what part of our defensive arsenal should be used for that purpose. But since you have raised it, I think. the question should be made -abundantly clear and it should be answered unequivocally. DIFFERENT OPINIONS AMONG SCIENTISTS Dr. Teller, in the group of uniquely skilled and qualified nuclear physicists in our coun- try, it is true, is it not, that there are gi.ver- gencies of view from those you have ex?? pressed this morning? Dr. TELLER. There certainly are. Senator KucHEL. So that for a common layman the difficulties which face: them when they become Senators, in this Instance, are dreadful. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 EFFECTIVENESS OF POLARIS SYSTEM `1 try to find some things that I can tie to in making up my" own mind, which I have not done so far. At any rate in the techni- cal arguments you raised this morning which are powerful and pointed, would those argu- ments apply to such defensive systems as the Polaris defensive systems? In other words, you have suggested that the treaty would restrict our creation of an ABM system, and that it might damage, if not destroy, our capacity to retaliate. Is it your statement that it might damage and destroy the capacity to retaliate now pos- sessed by the Polaris system or simply to the hardened missile sites which you described and to those other segments of our defense? Dr. TELLER. I could answer this question very much better in executive session. Senator KUCHEL. Then I would like to have you do that this afternoon. Dr, TELLER. I would like to say that I be- lieve-this much I can say in open session- that by expanding and perfecting our Polaris system, we could ameliorate the situation. This is one phase of the general situation where-to which I have referred when I said it, that this treaty might still be compatible with our safety, if we make up in money what we haven't acquired in knowledge, and ,hat in this sense it is a step toward the s.rms race rather than away from it. SCQPE OF TREATY QUESTIONED, I would also like to say with respect to rour remarks something that is an appeal 'ather than a statement, and I would like to )reface it by telling you of an occurrence vhich deeply disturbed me, which occurred octually the day after I saw you. f met with Mr. Poster from the Dis- smament Agency, and I mentioned to him ay worries about our using these instru- ments in case of real need, invasion of India t somethings of that kind. He assured me hat it Is clearly understood between the 'soviet Union and ourselves that in case of var these things do not apply. Then privately, as we were walking out to he elevator I asked him, well, if this is so, vould it not be good for the sake of clarity, o spell this out in the treaty as a reserva ion or something? He said, "The Soviet would never agree to hat: (The following supplemental information was subsequently furnished:) U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Washington, August 22, 1963. Hon, J. W. FULBRIGHT,. Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. DEAR MR, CHAIRMAN: In the course of his testimony before the p'oreign Relations Com- mittee on August 20, 1963, Dr. Teller, in sug- gesting that the test ban treaty should have contained language clarifying the fact that it does not restrict the use of our nuclear arsenal in time of war, alluded as follows to a recent conversation he had with me: "I met with Mr. Foster from the Disarma- ment,Agency, and I mentioned to him my worries about our using these instruments in case of real need, invasion of India or some- thing of that kind. Ile assured me that it is clearly understood between the Soviet Union and ourselves that in case of war these things do not apply; "Then, privately, as we were walking out to the elevator I asked, him, `Well, if this is so 4 world it not be good for the sake of. clarity, `to.::_spell this out in the treaty as a reservation or something?' "Fte said, 'The Soviets would never agree to that' " (transcript, p. 766). I would like to make the record clear as to First, since it was clear to me that the Soviets understood the treaty in the same way that we did (as I had just told Dr. Teller), I was convinced that they would not agree that any clarification was needed. Much of the evidence on which I based this conclusion is set forth in the opinion of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, dated August 14, 1963, entitled "Meaning of the Words 'Or Any Other Nuclear Explosion' appearing in article I, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under- water." Second, since the treaty had already been initialed and signed by the three original parties, and, at the urgent invitation of the Soviets as well as ourselves, by a large num- ber of other nations, it seems clear to me that the Soviets would not agree to reopen the negotiations, require resignature or re- consideration by all of such parties, and defer the date on which the treaty can be- come effective, merely for the purpose of adding more words to clarify an intention which they did not consider required any clarification. Third, my experience in negotiating with the Soviets over the years had convinced me that they would oppose legalistic qualifica- tions in the treaty language which were not absolutely necessary, because of their belief that such qualifications would tend to re- duce the directness of the appeal of the treaty to the mass audiences on which they would like it to have an impact. Sincerely yours, WILLIAM C. FOSTER. Dr. TELLER. I should say that those of us who are trying to testify from different points of view about technical subjects should try to make things on the technical side as clear to you as possible, so that you should not make your decision usiSer the authority of so and so, but on the basis of the objective evi- dence that you culled from our partly con- tradictory testimony. I would be much happier if a similar attempt would be made in the legal field be- cause in this legal question I am utterly con- fused. We don't mean it but we must say it. I don't see why. Senator KUCHEL. The only document or writing which bears on the intent of the parties, If we try to analyze the legal aspects of this compact, was the agreed-upon com- munique which was issued at the time the treaty was initialed. It appears to me that the whole essence of that agreed-upon com- munique was to restrict the area of the agree- ment to nuclear testing in the environments mentioned. But I must say, as I have listened here these last 7, 8 days, there are questions of the intent of the parties in other fields that re- quire additional testimony. However, I say with profound respect, that I would disagree with you on that point in your statement. VIOLATION OF TELLER PROPOSAL POSSIBLE Dr. Teller, in the Teller-Libby proposal for a test ban of several years ago, would there have been any possibility for a clandestine breach by the Soviet Union of your proposal without the United States discovering the breach? Dr. TELLER. I think the answer is "Yes." But I do not think that this probability would be at all great. Let me tell you what kind of a breach could occur, and this example in itself might tell you the quality of my confidence In this treaty. This treaty might-should`-prohibit a test in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and the Russians could send a ship to-the South At- fantic, launch a big explosion from -there, which makes a sizable contribution to this megaton fission product, and then say it was the United States. We would know about it. In this sense they may cheat. Or they might say it was the French. Wherever there is a treaty there is at least some chance of a breach, but I don't think that this breach would be so much a clandestine breach. It would be sort of a brazen breach. Senator KUCHEL. Insidious. PROBLEMS OF ABM DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT TESTING President Kennedy, in his news conference several days ago, indicated that those upon whom he was relying rather felt that the problems of developing a missile defense were almost insurmountable. This Congress, if I recall, has appropriated about half a million dollars to commence the studies. I asked the Secretary, Secretary McNamara, and Chairman Seaborg if we were proceeding under that appropriation and they both said, "Of course, yes"; which I assume would be completely correct. Your statement is that we can proceed toward the development of a missile defense system but that, in your opinion, in the absence of testing in the atmosphere you would be unable to guarantee the efficiency of such a system. Dr. TELLER. That is right, and furthermore, in the absence of such experimentation statements like that of the President could be more easily made and could have more easily an effect. EISENHOWER MORATORIUM Senator KUCHEL. We are all Americans. I thrilled to General Eisenhower's statements as I did to President Kennedy's address at his inauguration. All of us in this country seek peace with justice. All of us, I think, have hoped over these last many years that we might be able to inch ahead in prohibit- Ing or in restricting and confining the devel- opment of these horrible weapons of destruc- tion. We prayed that time would be on our side. President Eisenhower's unilateral decision for a moratorium across the board, I think most of us in this room, as laymen and as people seeking peace, felt was right. I know you, sir, felt that from the stand- point of the security of our country, that decision was wrong. Nevertheless, we were astounded when the Soviet Union first ac- cepted it on its own and then broke it. TELLER RECOMMENDATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL One question: Ifow would you as-an Amer ican citizen suggest to your Government that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, be controlled and be made to subside and how would you' recommend `that pro- liferation be prohibited? Dr. TELLER. I would recommend three measures. One I have already mentioned to you-the proposal of Libby and myself. The second goes more closely to the heart of the matter. Arms limitations are not possible unless there is openness. What is the real preventive of any arms limitation is secrecy. Senator KUCHEL. Is what? Dr. TELLER. Secrecy, the enormous weight of Soviet secrecy. This is what we have to fight. Now, we can do something to fight it. We have secrets, too. The Russians know all our secrets, I believe, all our important secrets. Sometimes I fear that the Russians know all the secrets we are going to discover in the next 2 years. But we don't tell it to our people. We don't tell it to our allies, and by having some secrecy we have a harder time to convince the Russians, individual Russian scientists and Russian people, some of whom don't like secrecy either. We should try to convince them that this is the Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP6SB003$3R000100210005-5 16014 Approved For ~~~ ~65BWP00100210005-5Septe-mbar .1;v heart of the matter. Here is another thing where unilateral action could do a lot of good. Abandon as much of- secrecy, particularly technological secrecy as possible. Nobody needs to know where our Polaris submarines are going, that Is proper, that is operations. But technological secrecy only leads to con- fusion, and Is not in agreement with the basic institutions of the United States. The third thing that I recommend is that we strengthen the ties within the Atlantic Community, strengthen them to the point where we can feel that we can act as a unit, as a strong unit within which there are no secrets, and which can act in concert. The best deterrent to De Gaulle is if he does not need a nuclear explosive. Senator KucHEL. Thank you, sir. Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Brown, your state- ment was very excellent. I find it very use- ful. As a scientist, you have, a facility to express yourself in relatively understandable English although I must say that when you speak of the "fourth power," you lose me. Dr. BROWN. That was an interpolation, sir, CAN ABM SYSTEM BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT TESTS? Senator KUCHEL. Yes, sir; Dr. Teller, in op- posing ratification of the treaty, described it in his opinion as a step toward war. Generally speaking, in his opinion, the treaty would restrict or prevent the develop- ment of an operational ABM system, and it would undermine the credibility of our re- taliatory capability. Do you agree with that or disagree? Dr. BROWN. I disagree, Senator KUCHEL, I have known Edward Teller for a dozen years. I have been not only a close profes- sional associate but he has been a dear per- sonal friend of mine. I have had, and do have, the greatest respect for him, and I have had, and do have, a deep personal affec- tion for him. On this matter we disagree. He thinks I am wrong. I obviously think he is wrong. Senator KUCHEL. Would it be your testi- mony that It is not necessary in the con- struction or the fabrication or the manufac- ture of an antimissile defense system for at- mospheric testing in order to provide a creditable defense system. Dr. BROWN. I am not sure that an effec- tive system can be provided at all, but if it can, the degradation by not being able to do atmospheric tests will be a small part of the problem-will be a small degradation. In all of these meetings that I have men- tioned in connection with Senator MANS- FIELD'S question, when the people who are working_on ballistic missile defense talk about the main problems, or the main new and exciting ideas, almost everything that they say has nothing to do with nuclear testing. Senator LAUSCHE. Nothing to do with what? Dr. BROWN. Nuclear testing at all, and of what does have to do with nuclear testing, testing In the atmosphere. Russians~didvthem. , \,Ve :tavo not and we Senator KUCHEL. So that in your judg- know that the Soviets not, done much ment the restriction of the treaty would high-yield tests near t#Ie ground. not crucially affect our capacity, whatever Senator KUCHEL. Is tt important whether it may be, to develop an antimissile system? it is near the ground or not near the ground? Dr. BROWN. I would go further than that Dr. BROWN. Oh, yes, i~ you are going to find and say it would not seriously - affect our the effect on a hardened missile site on the capacity. I don't want to say that it is not earth shock you have tQ do the test near the useful Information but it will not seriously hamper our development. UNCERTAINTIES REDUCED AS RESULT OF HARD SITE TESTS Senator KUCHEL. In your statement on page 3 you say, in part: "The effects of surface bursts on hard- Later on: "Some uncertainty remains in our minds about the effects on hard sites.. The Soviet Union appears to be In the same situation regarding the effects of surface bursts." And then later on: The separation and numbers of our pro- jected Minuteman forge in addition to their hardening certainly prvide adequate margin against these uncert nties as well as the uncertainty in the precise distance at which a given yield can destroy a site." Again referring to the testimony of Dr. Teller yesterday he seriously questions the treaty specifically b3c4use in his judgment nuclear testing in th$ atmosphere is vital to the security interests withrespect to this problem about which; I have just quoted you. When you describe Ithe several low-yield explosions which we have undertaken to determine an effect on the hardened missile sites now in an oPeratdo:nal status, are your conclusions that they are in a satisfactory security status-again' in derogation or in opposition of what Dr.Teller's position is? Dr. BROWN. I thing that here we may not be in opposition o much on the facts but perhaps on the conclusions. I believe that our past tests have reduced uncertain- ties in how close an Incoming missile has to land in order to knock out our base by a substantial amount. Some uncertainty re- mains. On the other hand we know if they hit close enough they are; going to destroy our hardened bases that is why we have sepa- rated them and that Is why we have hard- ened them and that is Why we have so many of them. - The uncertainties in~ the accuracy and the uncertainties in the yield of the Soviet attack that might be launched in 1970 have had to be compensated by these various measures. These same measures automatically com- pensate for the remaining uncertainty, in the vulnerability of o air sites. -F'or example, supposing that our sites aren't as hard as we say, as, we think-al- though the Soviets, if they have any sense, will asume them to be even harder than that in their targeting-it might be that if they could only withstand one-fifth or one-sixth or one-tenth the shock, a missile could land twice as far away and still knock out the mis- sile system. But we have separated them encugh and can separate them still farther so that they can't knock out many at once. Senator KUCHEL. Tote use the words "low yield" in describing the explosions that were made. HD1H-YIELD TESTS WOULD HAVE REDUCED UNCERTAINTIES Would it have been letter to have any ad- ditional tests of high yield? Dr. BROWN. Yes; I believe that the uncer- tainties could have been reduced still further by high-yield tests, and some of the projected tests that we could- dq would be high-yield tests; these would be so high-in order to do any good beyond what we now know, that Senator KucHEL. ThEn your statement on the Soviet history in this field is based upon your intelligence reports? HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIONS-DIFFICULT TO PREPARE ened structures such as missile sites have Senator KUCHEL. I wonder why we didn't been studied in the United States by means have any high-yield explosions close to the of several low-yield explosions." ground In our last testing? Dr. BnowN. Well, in the first place, we had some before, but as has been pointed out, that was a time when we didn't have hard sites to test them'on. It turns out that in order to do a decent hard-site vulnerability test you need to do it in the', same kind of ground as your mis- sile sites, and the area in the Pacific that was available to us isn't that kind,. In the second place, carrying them out close to the ground produces large amounts of local fallout, and can, therefore, be fairly dangerous to the inhabitants in the vicinity. In order to get ready for Something like that would take quite a long time. Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Brown, I don't think we are going to have any disagreement on this statement by anyone here at the table or by you or anyone seated here. WEAPONS-FOR DEFENSE ONLY The goal, the basic goal, of the United States is the security of the people of the United States in a world at peace with jus- tice. That is what our leaders have said, that is what I am, sure we believe. We are a peaceful people. We maintain a defense, we maintain a nuclear arsenal, not for purposes of aggres- sion but for purposes of potential defense. We oppose proliferation of nuclear nations even by statute in one instance. You say at the conclusion of your paper: "The limited effect of the treaty on out strategic superiority means that the benefit: to our security in the broader sense will not be outweighed by military technological fac. tors. Having satisfied myself as completel3 as humanly possible that the proposed treaty cannot substantially impair our strategic superiority if we take the steps outlined, find the arguments for it on broader ground; persuasive, and I fully support its ratifica tion." Now forgetting all the technical aspects c your paper and the disagreements which ex ist between scientists who appear here anc testify for it and against it, will you tell thi; committee as an American citizen, why yor believe this treaty ought to be approved bs the U.S. Senate on broad grounds? Dr. BROWN. I should point out that in do- ing so, I speak-- -Senator KucHEL. For yourself. Dr. BROWN. Not as a broad expert, not as an. expert on the broad picture, although I have been involved in this now for ii years, very deeply. I come to it with whatever biases a technical person automatically has, and I have that view of things. ARMS LIMITATION TREATY--ONE STEP TO SECURITY The arms race has not provided anyone with permanent security. Arms limitation will not automatically provide anyone with permanent security. But I believe that we must pursue both our own military strength and whatever we can achieve in the way of enforceable arms limitation agreements. Otherwise the hopes, I am quite sure the hopes of many people that somehow we will be able technologically to invent ourselves out of the arms race are not going to succeed. Senator KucHEL. Do you regard this as an arms limitation treaty in any respect? Dr. BROWN. It does limit arms develop- ment. It does not reduce armaments but it does reduce arms development. I believe that unless we get some kind of arms limi- tation as well as maintaining our own mili- tary capability the next 10 years are going to see further degradation in everyone's secur- ity as other nations obtain nuclear weapons, less responsible ones than have them now, :i think that will make everyone less secure. I don't say this treaty is going to solve that or produce the millenium but I think in the absence of this treaty, which has rep- resented the first step, no one can go on to anything else. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B0g,38RR0 0100210005-5 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - E A 16015 I think that we, having taken this first step, have to consider other arms limitation possibilities, reject them if they are not in our security interests. I believe in only that way can we do something to keep our secur- ity from getting worse. I don't think this is a panacea, but having satisfied myself that it is not going substan- tially to reduce our strategic superiority, if we do everything that also we can and should do, I believe that the treaty should be ap- proved for these broader reasons. RISKS-BUT NOT SUBSTANTIAL Senator KucHEL. You do not believe that it constitutes a risk to American security? Dr. BROWN. I believe that there are risks in the treaty. I think if the Soviets cheat as much as they can, and then make a sur- prise test, even if we are as ready as we can be, that they will make certain gains. I don't consider them to be substantial. Senator SPARKMAN. Senator, your time 1s up. Senator KUCHEL: Thank you, Mr. Chair- man. DR. LIBBY's POSITION ON MORATORIUM DURING AEC CHAIRMANSHIP Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Libby, first the com- mittee is honored to listen to you, and I certainly have enjoyed listening to your answers. Did-you participate, Dr. Libby, in the discussions that I assume took place before General Eisenhower announced his unilat- eral moratorium? Dr. LIBBY. Yes, I was on the Commission, Senator. Senator KUCHEL. Did you recommend such a moratorium by General Eisenhower? Dr. LIBBY. Well, we had many, many dis- cussions and I think it is fair to say that the Commission was worried about this but went along with it. I should remind you that the Commissioners are not individually in the Presidential confidence. It is usually managed through the chairman. Senator KUCHEL. Did you make' your own views known, Doctor? Dr. LIBBY. My own views were not in any essential disagreement with the action which the President took. _SUPPORT IN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DECISION FOR MORATORIUM Senator KUCHEL. Would it be fair then to say that you suported the President, Presi- dent Eisenhower's decision? Dr. LIBBY. I was worried but went along, shall we say. This is a feeling that, well, we can detect and we can be prepared. This latter point was a source of some disappointment to me. It does prove rather difficult to keep the lab- oratories right on instant notice or coming tinction between the situation under the moratorium and this proposed treaty, to wit: That under the moratorium there was no testing as you have just suggested, but un- der this treaty there is underground testing so that the stable of scientific brains can remain active under this treaty whereas it could not under the moratorium, is that a fair statement? Dr. LIBBY. I certainly' agree with that. It seems to me there are enough opportunities for testing out things in principle, and I would point out, Senator Kuchel, that by and large Los Alamos and Livermore are not what you would call effects laboratories. They do effects, but by and large they are after the principle of the explosion and how the thing works, and so except for this all- important area of the-this very Important area in my mind-of the very large weapon they can carry this forward. Now, they can be in good scientific fettle and have good ideas and plans on the basis of this, I believe. DETONATION OF 65 MEGATON ENABLES DEVELOP- MENT OF 100 MEGATON Senator KucHEL. Now, Doctor, do we know whether the Soviet Union detonated a hun- dred-megaton device? Dr. LIBBY. Well, I think we are sure they did not, and that the one they shot was somewhere around 65, I forget the exact announced number. Senator KUCHEL. Is it feasible for a nation in testing a 65-megaton bomb automatically to construct a 100-megaton bomb? Dr. LIBBY. Yes, sir. Senator KUCHEL. Is it feasible for this country to construct a 100-megaton bomb on the basis of the tests that we have had? Dr. LIBBY. I do not believe so. The extrap- olation is too great. DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS PRESENTED Senator KucHEL. Now, you suggest, Dr. Libby, in your statement, "to your fullest satisfaction the facts as presently known on the point of whether the possession of this weapon"-referring to the 100-megaton bomb-"is a commanding advantage to the Soviet." I read into the problem for these Senators two basic issues, among others: One is the security of the American people, and two, it Is the prayer of the American people, and the people of the world, for world peace. There isn't a nuclear physicist in the bunch here, and in spite of some of the com- ments occasionally, I doubt that there are any military experts in the U.S. Senate. There. are some political experts, my friend from Nebraska suggests; I think that is prob- ably true. So in order to make our decision we call Dr. LIBBY. Well, Senator, it seems to me you have no choice but to make up your own mind by careful investigation. [Laughter.] Senator KucHEL. You give me my toga back. [Laughter.] This committee, I am going to say, is go- ing to make up its own mind. Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield to me. Senator KUCHEL. I yield to my senior col- league. Senator HICKENLOOPEE. May I call his at- tention to the philosophy stated by one Sen- ator a few years ago? He said, "Some of my friends are for it, some of my friends are against it, and I always stay with my friends." QUESTION OF ADVISABILITY OF ATTACHING A RESERVATION Senator KUCHEL. Doctor, what the Senate can do with this treaty, I take it, is approve it, ratify it, advise, and consent. It can dis- approve it or, I suppose, some Members of the Senate may offer, what I think may be the correct legal term, reservations by way of amendment which, of course, would de- stroy the meeting of the minds which did take place in Moscow. TACIT UNDERSTANDING REGARDING PEACFUL USES You suggest in your second paragraph of observation that some tacit understanding ought to exist with respect to the possible peaceful uses of nuclear energy. You do not suggest that the Senate write in any kind of an amendment, do you, Doctor, in consid- ering this treaty? Dr. LIBBY. Well, I am a little bit-I am poorly informed as to what kind of conversa- tion went on in this treaty. I know, because I was on the AEC when negotiations first started in 1958, that the original delegations were instructed to make clear to the Soviets that Plowshare was a very important thing, and it was our concern to be sure that we could go forward with this kind of activity. So it is more or less in that context that I suggest that insofar as you can, and agree that you should, or conclude that you should, you should make it very clear that if, for example, a Panama canal should be-we should dig one with atomic explosives, that some clear answer or some precedent for the conversation will be on record. Senator KucHEL. By that, I take it you mean that, in the discussion in the Senate? Dr. LIBBY. That is right, sir. Senator KucHEL. Some time ought to be given to the hopes or the aspirations that if the treaty were approved peaceful uses requiring detonation in space might subse- quently be negotiated into an agreement? Dr. LIBBY. For example, I am not a lawyer, but I can well see the difficulty of carrying out the treaty literally where you say the, let's see, an atmospheric test is one that gives radioactivity beyond the boundaries. Well, this takes some defining technically. You know we can detect very minute amounts if we want to be fussy about it. So I think this Is going to be a technical ques- tion, a practical question of your judgment in any case and it might be that in the administrative handling of the practical problem there would be an opportunity to come up with a workable Plowshare defini- tion, you see. This is the kind of thing which might save Plowshare. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. Senator KucHEL. Does that include the time I yielded to Senator HICKENLOOPER? The CHAIRMAN. I will give the Senator a half minute. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I yield it back to you. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator can have a half minute. Senator KUCHEL. I think, Doctor, your third point is very well taken. I can under- stand it. I think it, however, is answered, things to do, you know, without the scien- tists knowing that they could carry them forward, and the things they had on tap were Useful, but I think there is no doubt that the significance of the Soviet series, as they undertook it in 1961 far out- shadowed the significance of our testing in 1961. We were caught off base, to put it bluntly. Senator KucHEL. It is fair to say you did approve President Eisenhower's decision on the moratorium, but- Dr. LIBBY. Went along with it. Senator KucI-IEL. But you were worried about it. Is that about your position on this treaty that you approve it, but you are worried about it? Dr. LIBBY. That is it more or less. You see when you consider everything, not just the technical aspects, it is more or less a worried reluctant acquiescence, I would say would be the best way to describe it. DISTINCTION IN CONDITIONS UNDER MORATO- RIUM AND TREATY Senator KUCHEL. Is it fair for this com- mittee and for the Senate to make this dis- members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Every one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that this treaty be adopted providing we do certain things on our part. In the scientific community, with very great regret I observe that there is a cleav- age. Later on today we are going to have a very able American, one of your friends, and coworkers, Admiral Strauss, who will oppose the treaty; a very great scientist, Dr. Teller, at great length and with great eloquence, op- posed it. We have others yesterday who approved it. Now, let me put my tattered senatorial toga over your shoulders for a moment. [Laughter.] Senator GORE. That is dangerous. Senator KUCHEL. Well, just on a tempo- rary basis. [Laughter.] How would you make a decision when some scientists urge that we approve this, that others with equal and no greater pa- triotism urge we disapprove it, when the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ap- prove it, and when other renowned military leaders now on active duty disapprove it? Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12 that is to say from the President down the caveats of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which you reflect are going to be met, at least that is what they tell us, and we must rely on that, and to that extent do you not agree that your point 3 is made and satisfactorily an- swered? Dr. Lissy. I would think so, yes. Senator KUCHEL. Thank you. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. KUCHEL. I yield. Mr. FULERIGHT. I compliment the Senator on his very thoughtful speech. I need not tell him that I approve of his analysis of the present situation. I should like to ask him one or two ques- tions. He recounted the history of the test ban treaty, going back to Mr. Baruch's proposal, which was in a sense an effort to control the development of nuclear weapons, on down through the Eisenhower proposal. This is essentially an American proposal, is it not; it orig- inated with the American Government, not with the Soviet Government? Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is cor- rect. From the very first, when Amer- ican scientists first made the discovery, our Government has been intensely in- terested in having it devoted to peaceful purposes. Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were also in- tensely interested in trying to control the proliferation,-the danger of fallout, and the actual use in warfare. That was the original Baruch proposal, as I believe it was called. It had various forms; but it was an effort to restrain the develop- ment. We are not in the position of ac- ceding to a request of the-Russians. We have put forth a proposal. If there is anything to that argument, after many rejections and after the modifications with regard to underground testing, the Russians are acceding to our proposal. Is that not true? Mr. KUCHEL. Again the Senator is correct. As an American, I would be embittered if, at any point in the past many years since nuclear power came upon the earth, our Government had failed in trying to find the point at which an agreement could be reached in this field. Therefore, both under Eisenhower and under Kennedy I have approved the posi- tion of my Government, as the Senator has, in painstaking negotiation and in trying to formulate such an agreement. Mr. FULBRIGHT. If it is our pro- posal, are we in a position to demand a price for the other parties to join the proposal? Mr. KUCHEL. Not at all. In my judgment any attempt to exact such a price would be exceedingly regrettable. Mr. FULBRIGHT. In any business transaction, if a person makes an offer, and is the moving party, that person is in no position to demand any addi- tional favors, is he? Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct. Equally important, however, is this point: I listened to the testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, including that of the men who wear our American military uniforms, the top military per- sonnel, whose responsibility it is to de- fend this country. All of them approved the treaty, as did the great majority of the other witnesses who appeared before the committee-witnesses representing both the Government and private in- dividuals, and scientists. On that basis I say to the Senator that !to demand any additional price in ordor to have the treaty approved would result in weaken- ing the votes that I trus it will receive when the roll is called oti it. To do so would be a disservice, i my judgment. Mr. FTLBRIGHT. II appreciate the Senator's comment. From a historical .point of view, President Eisenhower of- fered a proposal solely With regard to atmospheric testing, I believe. Later we got into the other elements, and I be- lieve at one point there was a proposal, which the Russians rejeeted, merely to stop testing in the atmosphere. We also engaged in long-drawn- ut discussions on underground testing However, we could never agree on inspections for un- derground testing. Is that correct? Mr. KUCHEL. Yes; that is my under- standing of the situation.' I quoted from President Eisenhower's statement, in which, early in his tenure, he specifically asked the Soviet Union do agree to pro- hibit tests not only in 01e atmosphere, but also under oceans. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator men- tioned the fact that Nest Germany would never have accedejd to the treaty if there had been any quos';ion of recog- nition of East Germany. VVe have made it clear that we do not: recognize East Germany. Does not the precise question confront the Soviet Unibn with regard to Taiwan? 1 Mr. KUCHEL. Of course it does. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Taiwan accedes to the treaty. The Russians have clearly stated that that does nbt mean recog- nition of Taiwan. Therefore we have a case involving similar conditions. It ought to be reassuring to! those who have any doubts about whether the treaty is a recognition of East Germany. I have no doubt, and I do not Ibelieve anyone should have. The Secretary of State dealt at great length with the point that recognition is primarily ja matter of in- tent. There are already in existence multilateral agreements to which -both West Germany and East' Germany have acceded, and none of then has ever been conisdered as recognition. I compliment the Senator on his dili- gent attendance at the; hearings. Al- though he is not a memlper of the com- mittee, in view of his important position as assistant minority lea er, I thought it incumbent upon me to invite him, and he responded and attended much more as- siduously than some n}einbers of the committee. He followed the proceedings of the hearings very diligently. Mr. KUCHEL. I thalk the Senator. Mr. GORE. Mr. Pre ident, will the Senator yield? Mr. KUCHEL. I yield Mr. GORE. The Pend g treaty is fre- quently referred to as a irnited test ban treaty. Were not the proposals advanced by Messrs. Barauch and Stassen as repre- sentatives of the U.S. Government con- siderably more comprehensive than those contained in the Pending treaty? Mr. KUCHEL. The Snator is correct. I recall reading some of, the text of the deliberations when Governor Stassen, representing President Eisenhower, was in London, with members of the Atlantic Alliance, trying to arrive at a, nuclear agreement. The Senator is correct. It was far less limited than the proposal before us. Mr. GORE. Were not the proposals made in Geneva by Ambassador Wads- worth, representing former President Eisenhower, and by Ambassador Dean, representing President Kennedy, con- siderably more far reaching than what is contained in the pending treaty, the .pending treaty being all that it appeared possible to accomplish at this time? Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct. Mr. GORE. The Senator, in colloquy with the distinguished junior Senator from Arkansas, referred to the U.S. initiative in this field of understanding. Is it not a fact that the existence of atomic weapons is a feat of accomplish- ment for which the United States can take pride, but for the creation of which she has some responsibility, too? Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct. Mr. GORE. The fact that our coun- try took the lead in the creation of nu- clear weapons, and later development of nuclear weapons, seems to me to place upon our country some burden of re- sponsibility, if not for initiation, in reaching agreements to bring this awful might of destruction under control. Mr. KUCHEL. In answer to that most intriguing statement, the Senator from Tennessee and I, and all other Ameri- cans, are grateful that these discoveries were first made by our fellow P mericans in the free world; but intellectual power in this or any other field, as :[ tried to say in my speech, is not indigenous to one side of the Iron Curtain or the other. Those responsible for the government of the United States were appalled at the unbelievable might of the power which had been discovered, and to their ever- lasting credit have consistently taken the lead in trying to arrive at agreements by which the cloud which hangs over mankind by reason of those discoveries might be dissipated. Mr. GORE. So this undertaking, as the junior Senator from Arkansas de- scribed it, is an American proposal; but it is, in addition, as purely nonpartisan in its historic development as it is pos- sible to achieve. Mr. KUCHEL. That is correct. Mr. GORE. President Eisenhower sent distinguished representatives to Geneva. It was my privilege to be a delegate representing the U.S. Senate the day the conference convened on Oc- tober 30, 19158. I served again during the Kennedy ad- ministration in such a capacity. Presi- dent Kennedy sent to Geneva not one of his own partisan political faith, but a distinguished lawyer having affiliation with the Republican Party, a former law partner of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Mr. Arthur Dean. I served with Mr. Dean. He served well. So in consonance with this responsibility devolving upon our country, because it brought into being fissionable weapons, three successive administrations and eminent members of both political Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE parties have striven to bring into being an international agreement to bring this awful destructive power under interna- tional control. Now that this objective has been finally achieved, although in a very limited sense, the question is finally before the Senate. I know that many persons raise ques- tions about military risks. There are military risks in many of the decisions the Senate makes, such as when it votes upon an amendment to build an aircraft carrier. We take a military risk when the Government, and the Congress, by appropriation, decide whether to build 12 or 20 additional atomic submarines. There is a military risk involved in the decision as to whether we will have en- ough or not quite enough. There is an economic risk involved in whether we overspend ourselves or live within our means. So every day in this Chamber we live with risks of many sorts. I believe there would be a greater risk in the rejection of the treaty than in the approval of the treaty. I doubt whether the treaty can be viewed solely from the narrow standpoint of military aspects or of scientific aspects. More than 90 na- tions have subscribed to the treaty. They are rapidly acceding to the treaty. It has become an. international concert of great portent. So there is at test the capacity and the will of the United States to initiate and sustain international leadership in a deli- cate field, but a very important field, in which it has been the leader both in the creation of the problem and in the search for a solution of the problem. 'The last act now is for the U.S. Senate, and the test is before this body. I shall join the senior Senator from California. Mr. KUCHEL. I thank the able Sen- tor from Tennessee. Every Member of this body, no matter how he casts his vote,-is thinking about his country and will cast his vote as he sees the light. I hope and pray that when the roll is called the U.S. 'Senate, by an overwhelming vote, will approve the treaty. Mr. KEATING, Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield? Mr. KUCHEL. I yield to the Senator from New York.. Mr. KEATING. I commend the dis- tinguished Senator from California for the thoughtful, concise analysis he has made of this problem. Speaking Sen- atewise, he has succinctly stated the essential arguments in favor of the ratification of the treaty. He has done so carefully and eloquently, and has again performed a notable service. I was impressed with the statement of the distinguished chairman of the com- mittee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] that the senior Senator from California, with his mani- fold other duties, had attended most of the hearings, although he is not a mem- ber of the committee. That is most com- mendable and helpful to us who did not have the benefit of hearing the testi- mony as members of the committee. I believe there has been no statement in support of the treaty which has been more compelling or persuasive than that so ably presented today by the Senator from California. Mr. KUCHEL. I am most grateful to my able friend from New York for his kindness. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, be- fore I begin my remarks, I apologize to the Senate for delaying until, now to make them. I, too, commend the able Senator from California for his eloquent presentation of his views. While I find myself in dis- agreement with him, I have respect for the processes through which he reached his conclusion. Mr. President, on Monday of this week the Senate began the debate on the pro- posed partial nuclear test ban treaty. The idea, I had assumed, would be to lay before this body and before the American people all of the facts, to weigh them, deliberate them, debate them, and pre- pare for one of the most fateful decisions the Senate ever has been called upon to make. On the same day, the Preparedness Subcommittee presented an interim re- port based upon many months of hear- ings. On the same day it became appar- ent in the press of the Nation that the months of hearings would not be permit- ted to weigh heavily in this debate. In fact, it has become clear to anyone view- ing this situation that the proponents feel that no argument against the treaty should be forwarded. It has become obvious that debate is not the objective of the exercise in which we are engaged. For every point of de- bate, for every argument, for every doubt, the answer is that we must look but not touch; we must consent, but not advise; we must approve, but not revise. Those who would exercise their responsibility as Members of the Senate and who seek debate on, and possible adoption of, res- ervations or amendments to the treaty are called irresponsible. Is that an in- vitation to debate? The same ones who speak of irrespon- sibility admit the risks of the treaty, but deny the right of the Senate to guard against those risks in its own way and through its own powers. How respon- sible is that position? How responsible is it to question the devotion to duty, to country, and to the families of America of any Senator who seeks in the Senate to question, to ad- vise, or to suggest changes in the treaty? If there can be no changes, if there is no possibility of a vote other than one of ap- proval, what would be the meaning of debate? Would debate even be needed? Any appeal to emotion, rather than to fact; any recourse to name-calling, rath- er than to truth seeking, does this body and its Members a disservice. Far worse, it does the cause of peace and freedom a disservice. It stifles freedom; and it makes discussion of peace an exclusive preserve, rather than an open forum. If the Senate has no choice in this mat- ter, if it has no chance to responsibly ad- vise that changes be made, then it should have no role at all in foreign policy. To follow the dictates of those who want no advice, we might consider amending the Constitution so as to do away with the Senate's right and responsibility to ad- vise and consent on treaties. That would merely formalize what we have heard ev- ery time we hear that we have no choice and that there can be no change. Choice and change are the essence of freedom. If the exercise of either is irresponsible, so is freedom. What sort of atmosphere for debate in this body has been created? When we raise doubts as to the long- range effects of the treaty, we are told that only its immediate impact must be considered. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield? Mr. GOLDWATFR. I prefer to finish my remarks; but I yield. Mr. GORE. If the Senator from Ari- zona will permit me to say so, I respect- fully state that he has made a serious indictment upon the Senate and upon the conduct of the debate. I have lis- tened to a great deal of it, and have con- tributed in a small way to it. He has just said: When we raise doubts as to the long-range effects of the treaty, we are told that only its immediate impact must be considered. I should like to ask who said that. Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator from Tennessee will allow me to conclude my remarks, I believe he will be able to figure that out. Mr. GORE. I have read a copy of the Senator's statement, and the answer to that question is not in it. Mr. GOLDWATER. During the course of the debate I held with the Sen- ator from Minnesota [Mr. HumPHREY]- it was 2 weeks ago, I believe-we dis- cussed the problem of the immediate im- pact and the long-range impact. In this speech, r do not confine my remarks to statements by Members of the Senate. I refer, for example, to Mr. Harriman's statement that by means of the reserva- tion I proposed, I was trying to make a political issue of the pact. The state- ments to which I refer have been ac- cumulated from many sources; not all of them necessarily come from Senators. I am merely trying to set the stage for debate that will not be acrimonious. I know the Senator from Tennessee differs with me; and I differ with him; but I sug- gest that the Senator from California made an excellent statement when he said that we should arrive at our deci- sions honestly and on the basis of the exercise of our conscience; that we pro- pose our reservations and make our sug- gestions honestly; that we do not wish to be called irresponsible, or to have our suggestions referred to as mischievous toyings with the hopes and aspirations of the people of the United States. I do not believe the Senator from Tennessee would seek to accuse me of improper pro- cedure. Mr. GORE. I certainly do not. I rec- ognize the right of every Senator to reach his own conclusions by whatever process he chooses. But I respectfully suggest to the Senator from Arizona that if he will carefully reconsider the state- ments he has made in the last few min- utes, he will find in them a serious re- flection, in my humble opinion, on the quality, the purpose, and the sincerity of the debate in the Senate. I think the debate has been good and constructive. Yesterday, my 15-year-old Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 16018 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 1"? son was present, to hear the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illi- nois [Mr. DIRKSEN], who spoke so elo- quently and so thoughtfully. Forty or fifty Senators listened carefully to his speech; and I was proud to have my son see the Senate in action. I thought it was a fine hour for the Senate. I regret that now after 6 p.m., when the distinguished junior Senator from Arizona is speaking, most of the other Members of the Senate have gone to din- ner-as I am sure both he and I would also like to do. Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not by my choice, I may say, that I speak at this hour. I have been waiting a long time to speak. Mr. GORE. I realize that. The debate has been diligent, and has been reasonably well attended. Yet the Senator from Arizona has said: If the Senate has no choice In this mat- ter. Why should the Senator from Arizona raise that question? The Senate does have a choice. That is the issue before the Senate; it is the subject on which the Senator is speaking. Mr. GOLDWATER. I feel very deeply about this matter. The other day I dis- cussed it with the Senator from Min- nesota. I said that if, in effect, we are to be knocked down because we do not agree, if we are to be referred to as ir- responsible, as toying mischievously with the lives of the American people, such statements would indicate that any change would be resisted. So I merely wish to discuss this point. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield? Mr. GOLDWATER. I am glad to yield. Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Arizona may recall that both of us fully agreed that this matter requires debate, and that there should be debate on it. In my presentation on Tuesday, I made quite clear-under questioning by the distinguished Senator from Iowan-that, first of all, this is not partisan matter. I referred particularly to the then an- nounced position of the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN]; and piror to the delivery of his magnificent address, I commended him for his forth- rightness, his courage, and his states- manship, because I had heard and had read that after he and the majority leader had visited with the President, at the White House, the distinguished Senator from Illinois had announced his support of the treaty. I also pointed out-under questioning by the Senator from Iowa, who had some d bt nd expressed concern that Sen- ou s a ho awls w tempting to stifle debate, or at least to ence to the 91 nations t1h.Lt have signed make it appear that when questions were the treaty. Frankly, while we all have asked, a disservice was being per- concern :for all nations of the world, I do formed-that the Constitution requires not think that, when the chips are the advice and consent of the Senate; really down, what we do or do not do that the Senate is composed of 100 Sen- with the treaty should be affected by ators; that under the constitutional pro- what any of those nations might think cess, each Senator has a political and a about us moral responsibility to make his or her Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly not from decision according to his or her own con- the point of view of offending them. I science; and that that is the primary think it is proper to observe that, since duty and the highest duty of a Senator. we, the most powerful Nation in the great Uetall talc 111111 t.aly le1celav aaavat,S_., and then we are told that the Secretary of Defense will turn the disadvantages to advantages. We hear witnesses who warn of future diplomatic difficulties because of the treaty and then we are told that the Secretary of State and the President will turn those difficulties to assets. We hear witnesses who warn of future steps along this path and we are told that we must think only of this first step. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Regardless of how a Senator may vote, world, and the second most powerful, certainly that duty is the highest duty a which, I suppose, would be Russia, are Senator can perform-namely, to make the principal parties, if we reject this his own decision, effort it would be a disappointment. I So I wish to make it Crystal clear- do not think it would offend anyone in and I know the Senator from Arizona that sense. I am not afraid of giving [Mr. GOLDWATER] feels this way, too-- offense. That would not disturb me at that debate on the treaty is not only all in voting for the ratification of the desirable, it is also required under the treaty or not voting for it. constitutional requirement for Senate Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the advice and consent. Senator for clearing up that point. Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator We suggest changes in the treaty and from Minnesota and I agree completely. we are told that they are unnecessary I am trying to lead is away from because of agreements and assurances charges of irresponsibility and of mak- beyond the treaty. ing a political issue out of the treaty. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the I could not agree more than politics Senator yield? should not enter into this treaty. i do Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator not know how it could be interjected if would allow me to finish, I would appre- someone tried to figure out how to do ciate it. I have been waiting all day. so. I merely plead that, during the short I yield once more to the Senator. presentation of my reservation, we con- Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. I tinue in this way. shall desist. The Senator has said, if I We raise doubts about the immediate understood him correctly, "We suggest military impact of the treaty, and we are changes in the treaty and we are told told that only its long-range hope must that they are unnecessary because of be considered. agreements and assurances beyond the We are told to debate, aind then we are treaty." In fact, during the hearings, told that the rest of the world already time after time, Senators were told that has decided for us and that we cannot there were no side agreements or addi- risk offending them. tional agreements, and that the total of Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr.: President, will the agreement between the United the Senator yield so that I may ask a States, Russia, and Great Britain on this question? subject was contained in the treaty. Mr. GOLDWATER. I. yield. Who made the statement to which the Mr. FULBRIGHT. i cannot recall Senator has referred? that any Senator has made a statement Mr. GOLDWATER. That was brought about offending them. I; believe that I out in the early part of the testimony. and others have stated that it would be It was stated not once, but several a very great disappointrment, which I times. We asked the witnesses what believe is quite different from offense. the next step would be, and that is the It would be a great disappointment to area in which the statements were made. the other members of the society of na- Yesterday, I admit, the President re- tions, not only the original parties but affirmed what the Senator has said. the others, if we rejected the treaty. But Once before he did so. The Senator that is quite different from offense. I from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], asked am not a bit concerned ebout offending to see the letters and correspondence those people. The word has a connota- pursuant to the treaty. I do not know tion of our being servile and afraid of whether they were ever made available to the Committee on Foreign Relations them. That is not the point at all. If or to the Senator the Senator has reference to anything from Iowa [Mr, that I have said or heard, will not the HICKENLOOPER]. Senator agree that Senators who are for Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. I the treaty are not for it because they do apologize to him for intruding on his I do speech at this late hour. But :feeling so not wish to offend another nation? strongly believe that statement to be accurate. in disagreement with some of the statements that the able Senator has Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator has made; a great service. I have un- I did ask him to yield. I thank him for the courtesy of his doing so. derstood it in that way. If I have under- Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the next stood it in the way I have said it, I have sentence would have solidified the point. understood it wrong. We were con- We raise questions about implications cerned about an offense that the treaty beyond the wording of the treaty and we might bring to the e othe other $0 nations that are told- that everything is contained in have signed the treaty. In the course the wording of the treaty, that no impli- of the complimentary remarks made by cations beyond it should be drawn. the distinguished Senator from Arkan- 7,7 96 Approved For Releas ~ g R 83 1,210005-5 16019 The chairman pf tle e9rijmittee will That shouldnot. be taken in such a large one. I have not followed the mat- the hearings literal sense. I do not believe it is in- ter too closely, but I have read the news- rather assiduously. The next step is tended that way. Papers. What they are doing is phasing the point about which I Kaye most, doubt Mr. FULBRIGHT subsequently said: out the B-47's and putting in the B-58's, in my mind. I know it could be any one Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent which I believe are called the Hustlers. Qf a :number of things. I would think to have printed in the RECORD imme- That to me does not mean disarming. By that during the course of?the debate that diately following the exchange I had taking out the B-47's they are merely im- would be a point which, the Senatgr. about the preamble of the treaty a short proving the striking capacity and quality would wish to spell out very carefully, quotation from Isaiah, as follows: of the weapons. I thought that was the Indiscussing the treaty with Senators And He shall judge among the nations, reason why they might be destroying the who agree with me on, my stand on the, and shall rebuke many people: and they B-47's:- It is the same reason why they treaty, I find that they agree that such shall beat,their swords,into plowshares, and are getting rid of some of the old missiles points as principal political advantages their spears into pruninghooks: nation which are now obsolete. I was told that have?riot been spelled out, at least to our shall not lift up sword against nation, net- the missiles'were obsolete in Turkey and satisfaction ther shall they learn war any more. in Italy because the Polaris is the much Mr. FULBRIGHT, If. I may respond I think that is rather appropriate. as better missile. to that statement, in all good faith I do to the preamble to the treaty, which was I never consider things like that dis- not believe. anyone has affirmed that discussed earlier this afternoon. armament. I say quite frankly to the there will be a next step. It is hoped that Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will Senator that I am not pleading for dis- there will lZe a next step. Our Govern- the Senator from Arkansas yield? armament in this country, and certainly ment quite positively stated that we Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. not for unilateral disarmament. would not consider a nonaggression pact Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it might I would question, in the present state as a part of the treaty. Our representa- be well to place in the RECORD the pre- of the world, even whether multilateral tives said, "That is out. If you insist amble of the Constitution of the United disarmament is very wise. on such a pact, we might as well stop, States, which reads: The treaty is not a disarmament now, 11 We the people of the United States, in treaty. This will be merely a slowing On the other hand, we do not take order to form a more perfect union, estab- down of the acceleration of the prolifera- a position which would foreclose any lish justice, insure domestic tranquility, tion of weapons. It seems to me that is further movement We hope that as a provide for the common defence, promote quite different from disarmament. result of a favorable experience under the general welfare, and secure the blessings Mr. GOLDWATER. The B-47's will the treaty, and after some tangible evi- of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do naturally be out of the inventory by ordain dente of performance by the parties to th e U and establish this constitution for 1968 or 1969. If we enter into an the treaty, then further steps would be the United States of America. Y - - - agreement such as that which has been possible, reasonable, and, would be sub- That is a great statement of purpose, proposed, the B-47's will be out of in- mitted to this body. The Senator surely to which every article of the Constitu- ventory by 1965 or 1966. would not want to take a position which tion is dedicated, and to which yet un- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is that not amat- would exclude any further steps. born, generations will have to dedicate ter of judgment to be made by the mili- Mr. GOLDWATER. No; the Senator their efforts for its ultimate fulfillment. tary people themselves, as to whether does not. I believe preambles have a particular those are efficient instruments? Mr. FULI~RIGHT. I am sure he does place in all great documents, primarily Mr. GOLDWATER. They are quite not. the place of challenging the future. efficient, but they are old. Mr. GOLDWATER, But tonight the Mr. GOLDWATER. One of the rea- Mr. FULBRIGHT. And slower. Senator from Georgia voiced the feelings sons why I have an apprehension on this Mr. GOLDWATER. Like many of us, of those of us who find ourselves in op- subject relates to the work of the Dis- they are wearing out. position to the treaty. He spoke not armament and Arms Control Agency. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree. I thought about the fear or the concern about dis- The Senator will recall my interrogation the reason they were taking the planes armament. I think all of us want dip- of Mr. Foster, which occurred probably in out was that better ones were available. armament, but we wish to make sure that January or February of this year, in re- Mr. GOLDWATER. We do have bet- we are not the only ones disarming. Bard to the reported proposal that, we ter ones, but we do not have enough of I think the Senator right now has said should destroy 30 B-47's a year and that them. what the Sepator from Georgia was try- Russia would destroy 30 Badgers. Since, Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will Ing to elicit, namely, that any changes in I have learned, the figure was to be 30 a the Senator yield? the treaty would have to be approved by month. Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield. two-thirds gf this body. I wrote to .Mr.Foster some time ago, Mr. HUMPHREY. It is well known Mr. FULBRIGHT. Absolutely. I. am probably in July. While he made no as- that the military has made some plans convinced of that. I am very dubious sertive statement, he said that was still for phasing out th,; B-47's. The ques- about those. who speak of disarmament. under consideration, ' tion is, do we wish to phase them out all That word-is used much too loosely, The This is the type of thing about which alone, or would we like to get the Rus- preamble of, the treaty, as with many we have concern. So long as these things sians to phase out some comparable air- preambles, is a statement in. rather fine are being considered by the Disarmament craft? language of aspirations. Such aspiras and Arms Control Agency, it causes con- These are similar to the oversea bases. 'tions occur in many documents. corn. We are all vitally interested in the Everybody knows that we shall have to Mr. HUMPHREY. Such as the Con- military strength of our country. We are give up our bases in North Africa one stitution. concerned because we realize that one of day, or else it will be necessary to pay for st1Mr. FULBRIGHT. As my friend the the ambitions expressed by the statement them about 10 times. Do we wish to give Senator from Minnesota has said, it is of September 26, 1961-I believe it was up the bases all by ourselves, or would not a little unlike some of the expressions .1961-was the reduction of the number we like to negotiate with the Russians' in our Constitution and Declaration of of vehicles capable of carrying nuclear and have them give up some bases? Independence. We are far from achiev- weapons. I am sure the Senator, who is a dis- ing some of those aspirations. We are I explain this to the Senator so that he tinguished military officer in his own struggling toward them. I do not think may understand our apprehension about right, knows full well that since we are that ;that, statement about disarmament this general field of disarmament. I to phase out the B-47's it might not be is one whigh,fnust be taken seriously and must follow that immediately by saying a bad idea to try to get the Russians to for, tbe,,foresVeable future., It is Merely that every American is interested in dis- phase out something, also. That seems a ,tatW. brad statement of .a vague armament, so long as we are not the only to be sensible to me. aspiration that we hope we could at least nation engaging in it. The point is that we are not phasing limit armaments, Personally I cannot Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the out our military strength. Our airpower imagine a world without any armaments Senator. There happens to be a B-47 today is more than it was a year ago. at all. base at Little Rock, which ris rather Our Polaris strength today is more than Approved For Release 2004103/11:; c -RDP65B00383 Z06,"- 1 0 5 a 16020 Approve&R&W egWR~4/J 1~bR ,=- P?R 0383R00010021 Wbe7. 12 it was a year ago today. Our missile the plan still is under consideration. I of the Senate Preparedness Subcommit- strength today is more than it was a year for one do not agree with it. I do not tee and God knows we have heard that ago. think it would work to our advantage. advice accorded all the respect of a Sun- So all of the strawmen that are This is extraneous to the particular day supplement mystery story. - raised-as to the fact that we are en-, debate before the Senate, but it might It is obvious from the thousands of gaging in some kind of a "sellout" on a be informational. If we depended upon words of testimony and questioning that unilateral basis of disarming-are plain the bomb bays in SAC for 75 percent of there are all of the doubts and reserva- strawmen, and are easily knocked over. our nuclear striking force and we di- tions that I and others have mentioned Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator minished that capability before we on this floor, and it is obvious that these wants to call them strawmen, I suggest planned to under a natural phaseout of are sincere and reasoned. 'that we get a denial from Mr. Foster the weapon, I do not see that reducing -And yet are we sincerely preparing to that this is being contemplated. It does our nuclear strategic striking capability debate changes in the treaty that would not involve the obsolete aircraft that are would be of any great advantage to us. help resolve the doubts? Instead, again, taken to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base This is, as I say, beside the treaty en- and again, and again we have only verbal in Arizona and destroyed. This involves tirely. assurances. And again, and again, and the removal of the B-47's which are Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeedit is beside again even the idea of changes in the operable. I should like to have some as- the treaty. treaty have been derided as mischief or surance in that regard. Mr. GOLDWATER. The ;Senator in- precluded as unnecessary, because of I am not saying that the proponents of terjected it, and I merely wanted to get more and ever more verbal assurances. this*plan are engaged in unilateral disar- these remarks in so that we might re- It Is because I have seen this body mament. I merely mention what bothers fer to them some time. swamped by those assurances and in- home of us who have studied this prob- Mr. IHUMPHREY. If the Senator will creasingly committed to them-no mat- lem more from the military side than permit, I did not interject the B-47 is- ter the doubts, no matter the dangers, from the political side. We are con- sue; the Senator from Arizona inter- no matter the real will of the people- cerned. I think the day is ahead when jetted the E-47 issue. All I say is that that I have suggested one reservation we shall not have enough bases overseas the proposal was merely a proposal for which would, at least, exact a price for to put in our hat. That is entirely beside discussion. It makes more sense than ttreaty that we are told we must rat- the point. That will be a natural phase- casting aside B-47's while letting the this hi We know of the price in must red- out. I do not wish to see a speedup of Russians keep theirs. If we are to cast ify. that we are paying. price have asked the phaseout, with no followon. aside the B-47's we should try to get the ness tha tha of we the are paying. Mr. HUMPHREY. If we can get that Russians to take similar action. no The of e S y I discussed a reserva- sians along with getting the Rus- Mr. GOLDWATER. If they had a tion e to the other treatyy. That is what eserva- sians to phaseout under some agree- fleet comparable to ours in ,size, I think treaty. That is w I have ught ment, we would not alter the balance of I might be in agreement. up thin this. power. If we can get 25 planes compara- Mr.HUMPHREY. If they do not have accused this his whole of various approaches a ble to the B-47's phased out by the Soviet a fleet whiich is so. big, what are we wor- The reservation that I have suggested, Union at the same time 25 B-47's are ried about? which would make the effectiveness of phased out in the United States-which Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not worry the treaty contingent upon the removal were going to be phased out anyway, about them so much. I am worried of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, Russia or no Russia-it seems to me that about us. would set a price. It would at least sal- would be sensible. We suggest caution about this first vage something from the Senate's deci- Interestingly enough, we are not doing step and we are warned that we must sion to accept this treaty regardless of that now. There was merely some think- think only of the next steps. doubt and danger. ing out loud. Apparently there is an un- We hear witnesses who speak of prat- I want to make this perfectly clear: written law in this country that one tical dangers and we are told of theoreti- It would not make the treaty one ounce should not think out loud. If the Pen- cal hopes. We question theoretical more acceptable to me for I cannot accept tagon or the Disarmament and Arms hopes and we are told that the treaty is it because of the peril in which it places Control Agency expresses such a propo- all practicality, not based on trust. our security over all the world. But sal publicly, it is suddenly attacked. If We hear that the sheer numbers of such a reservation would return to the it is negotiated secretly, it is called a our nuclear weapons outweigh any quali- American people at least one portion "secret deal." tative gains that the Soviets may make of purpose and meaning. It would, at Whenever we negotiate for any type under the treaty and then we read that least, force this treaty to be weighed on of arms control, we negotiate only in an the Department of Defense is studying a realistic balance, against a realistic effort to improve our own position or to a cutback in our weapons procurement. testing of Soviet intentions. keep on an equal plane the balance-of- We hear that the dangers of radioac- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will power structure as it now exists. For ex- tive fallout are the main thing guarded the Senator yield on that point? ample, if we can get the Soviet Union against by the treaty and then we read Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield. to give up 5 intercontinental ballistic that smog is a far more serious peril, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I had understood missiles-and if we could be sure that that testing could be quadrupled with- his statement about the same matter, they gave them up, and we could inspect out danger, the nuclear test ban treaty, which the to find out that they gave them up-then We heard last year that maintenance 'Senator made, as appears at page 15546 we could give up 5 intercontinental bal- of our readiness to test on an indefinite of the RECORD for September 5, to be as listic missiles and possibly we would not standby basis would be impossible. Now follows: alter the balance of power at all, yet it we hear that such readiness is guaran- A reservation embodying this needed dem- might help the world a bit. At least it teed. What has changed? onstration of Soviet intent could make the would save a little money, and that ought I have listened to colleague after dis-? treaty proposal perfectly acceptable even to to please some Members of this body. tinguished colleague warn of the treaty, its harshest critics. Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator is question the treaty, worry over the treaty Mr. GOLDWATER. I may not be its getting into the realm of the impossible and then say "but we must vote for it." it it per- clear critio. that, I even want if to this make condition now, because we have tried to do that. I have heard colleague after distin- harshest. The basis of most of our concern is guished colleague say that the people fectly to be accedve not naive am would not not military. I hope that during the de- demand this treaty and then report a, were enough to acceppte it will be--it -a d I this bate-I intend to be present as often as flood of mail running heavily against make the treaty amore acceptable. I can-it will be possible to have de- the treaty. y any n I was reading the veloped the political advantages which 1 have read the constitutional require Mr. the treaty Se was real speech seemingly overweigh the military advan- ment that the Senate advise and consent speech today, and it anticipating struck me as r'ss quite tages. I mention this field. I have been on treaties but what I have heard so far inconsistent with the Senator's position. interested in it for nearly a year. I have assures one that all that is wanted is I wondered what had caused the Senator not kept in constant touch, but in touch consent. God knows we have been ad- once in a while with the agency; and, vising in such honorable hearings as that to change his mind. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 1963. Approved For ReWONE MEEM&AM!"09 Mr. GOLDWATER. I have not. I within reason? Or does he 'think the mex I said"harshest critic." I am not Russians are so bad that we should not the harshest critic. attempt to do any business with them? Mr. 'FITLBR,IGHT. If the Senator is not a harsh critic, perhaps it will take something less to change his mind. Mr. GOLDWATER. I wanted to make it clear that if this were the point, mak- ing acceptance of the Senator's idea a part ' of the bargain, I think then the Senator could inject the charge of pol- itics, and I do not care to do that. Mr. _ FULBRIGHT. What really in- terests me about the point the Senator is making on his proposed amendment is that it seems to me to be based on the astumption that if the Russians have come to us with a proposal and are beg- ging us to take it, we can demand any kind of terms we like, or terms the Sen- ator suggests, whereas it occurs to me, in accordance with the suggestion of the Senator from California, that this is an American proposal; we urged it in past administrations. How, are we in a position to ask for extraneous and additional concessions when it is our own proposal? Are we interested in it or not? It seems to me .it is an irrelevant consideration. The only relevant consideration is, Is this particular treaty in our interest, as writ- ten? If it is not, we ought to reject it, even if Russia should get out of Cuba. If it is in our interest, we ought to ac- cept it regardless of what is done in Cuba or anywhere else. I do not sec how the Senator thinks this is an appropriate reservation. When ,I say-"appropriate," I mean wise. Of course, he is within his rights to offer it; but is it a wise reservation? Mr. GOLDWATER. I think it is wise, for this reason; We have tried,foar a long time to get this kind of limited test ban treaty with the Russians, and suddenly there is evidence that she is desirous of having it. If this is so, and if the major purpose of the treaty is to ease world tensions, what"would be better than eras- ing one of the greatest tensions in the world and forcing the world to recog- nize that the creator of the tensions is not the United States, but the Soviet Union? This Is why I feel this reserva- tion, and frankly, other reservations to this treaty are not unwise. Mr. FULBRIGHT. In all honesty, I cannot follow that line of reasoning. If we.refuse to ratify the treaty if they aid not do something, we would be the ones accused of. creating, least prolong- ing, tensions by refusing to go forward with our own proposal. I cannot help thinking that if we made such a condi- and T do not think anybody ought to commit acts of aggression. If the Amer- icans have been able to impress anything treaty we worked at for so many years that we do hot believe in aggression any- at Geneva-a complete test ban treaty where. So it was rather difficult to say, with on-site inspections-was the an- "We will not discuss a nonaggression swer to our problem. pact, except that nonaggression related Mr. FULBRIGHT. Would the Sena- to the recognition of : certain satellite tor approve that? countries and the power of the Commu- Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator nist Party in those countries." But that from Arizona has said many times that does not mean we are for aggression. It he would. However, that discussion gets means we are against aggression. far afield from this evening's discussion. Having once taken the Russians into Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the woodshed, so to speak, we have said, the Senator yield? "If you want to discuss a nuclear test Mr. GOLDWATER. In just a moment. ban treaty, here it is. We will negotiate We find ourselves in a position of mak- it with you. But do not go into anything ing a treaty that says, in effect, to our else and start a long talk about some side potential enemies that "We feel we are deals. Do not bring in a nonaggression well ahead of anybody in nuclear tac- pact that we would have to sign as a tical weapons, but we are going to let you part of the test ban agreement." continue to develop them underground, We took that position. Now the Sena- and we can develop them, too." tor from Arizona says, "Maybe we were So, frankly, I do not see a promise of wrong. I think we were wrong in prin- peace in this treaty. I see a prolifera- ciple, because we really ought to have a tion of weapons. I am concerned about tie-in. Let us tie in Cuba." that particular point. Again, it is .a mil- Khrushchev says, "Let us tie in a non- itary concern, and has nothing particu- aggression pact." larly to do with what I am saying to- The Senator from Arizona says, "Let night. I shall address myself, in a formal us tie in Cuba." speech, more to these points. We ought to try to tie the treaty down. The whole purpose of introducing this We can tie the treaty down, and if there matter is to give the Russians an op- is a sense of honest performance of the portunity to do what they promised to treaty, then perhaps there will be some do and to do what the President of the chance to negotiate the Cuba matter United States has demanded that they and to get these troops out. do on two occasions. We are merely test- Mr. GOLDWATER. I get back to my ing them. This does not become an first contention. I_ am not accusing the amendment to the treaty. It merely Senator. However, there are certain dif- says, "We will withhold the date of de- ficulties in our situation which are not positing the resolution and do it later." uncommon to legislative bodies of the We say, further, "You do this, and we world, because I believe most of them will have proof by third party inspec- must ratify treaties. We are given the tion."' charge of advising and consenting. If It does not change the wording of the the treaty, which was not negotiated by treaty; it merely puts in the resolution the Senate or by the Senate Committee that it is the sense of the Senate, and on Foreign Relations, comes to us and the American people, that this treaty we feel that it is not in our best interest, will not be put into effect until we have we have the right to reject it. assurances that the Russians will comply Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeed. with what she has already said she would Mr. GOLDWATER. If any one of us, do and what the President has asked. as the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will RUSSELL], the Senator from Connecticut the Senator yield? [Mr. DODD]-and other Senators have in- Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield. dicated, feels that there could be some Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has improvement in it, I believe the Senator acknowledged that the proposal now be- would admit that it would be our duty to fore the Anate in the nature of a test ourselves and to the constitutional charge ban treaty was, in its original draft, a to try to bring about the improvement U.S. initiative and a U.S. proposal. that we felt was needed. Mr. GOLDWATER. I would suppose I have read many of the debates on so. treaties. There has been prolonged and Mr. HUMPHREY. We initiated the intelligent debate on some of them. The proposal. We discussed this proposal Treaty of Versailles got into trouble. tion, or any such unacceptable condition, - with the Russians. Mr. Khrushchev, a part,of the treaty, it would provide the Russians with the greatest kind of prop- aganda against us. They would say, "The Americans made a proposal to us. We accepted it. Now they will not con- sider it." I do not wish to prolong this debate; but would any kind of agreement with the Russians be,acceptable to the Sen- ator from Arizona-that is, a proposal in this field-other than one which would ask hem to flay down and play dead and say,. "I am sorry"? Would it _be t No. 144-11 AG 00210005-5 16021 said, "Yes; this is pretty good, but we want to be sure that it is tied in with a nonaggression pact." We said, "No deals. ' No tie-in, Mr. Khrushchev. We will discuss this pro- posal. We will not discuss the rest of the world. We are discussing this proposal. No deals. No tie-ins." Now we say, "We have discussed this proposal. We want to tie in. We want you to get out of Cuba." I thinkthey'_ought to get out of Cuba, Perhaps that was well. Who can tell? The League of Nations got into trouble because of reservations that Senators proposed. The Connally reservation on the World Court has been debated at length as to whether it was wise or unwise. Mr. HUMPHREY. That was not a treaty. Mr. GOLDWATER. I merely suggest that this is a negotiating point. I am going to offer the reservation. As I said earlier, I do not believe it has any more chance of succeeding than an ice cream Approved for Release 2004/03111 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 Approved kF61~ft"SIZMJ3/AtC&]JbRaFWRW3ROO0100210099pemb'er cone has on the corner of Washington and Central in Phoenix, Ariz., on the 4th of July. At least I can say that I hare done what in my conscience needed to be done to the resolution, not to the treaty. Mr. HUMPHREY. I hope the Senator does not misunderstand me. He has every right to offer any understanding and any amendment and any reservation that his conscience and his experience and his political judgment compel him to do. That is his duty, as well as his right. All I am saying is that possibly the So- viets felt the same way. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev-I will not say it was in his conscience, because some people would doubt it-felt that politically he had to insist on a nonaggression pact and tie it into the treaty on the limitation of nu- clear weapons. Our Government repre- sentatives said, "If you do that, there will be no treaty; the game is over; we are going home." That was our right. If the Senator's reservation is adop- ted-and he has given us some assur- ance that it will not be, for which I am grateful to him- Mr. GOLDWATER. I could not imagine that it would be adopted. Mr. HUMPHREY. Incidentally, I hope that it is not cold on the 4th of July in Phoenix, Ariz., because the analogy the Senator has used makes me hope that the temperature will remain at the cus- tomary 4th of July temperature not only in Phoenix but also in Minneapolis. Mr. GOLDWATER. We are con- sistent out there. Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. I hope the Senator's prediction is consistent, with respect to the fate of his reservation. What the adoption of the Senator's res- ervation would do to the treaty is what would have been done *to the treaty by the nonaggression reservation of the Russians during the negotiations. That would be the end of it. Mr. GOLDWATER. Is the Senator absolutely sure about that? Mr. HUMPHREY. One is never abso- lutely certain of anything. I suppose the word "never" should never be used. However the Senator is a man of sound judgment, and he knows that the odds are that if we should adopt his reserva- tion, it would not accelerate the accept- ance of the treaty. I have a feeling that it might very well impede it for several generations. Mr. GOLDWATER. Let us suppose it will put it off for several months fur- ther, and the Russians keep their promise and the President achieves what he so courageously set out to achieve a year ago? Other reservations are to be proposed, in other areas. However, the one I am proposing, inasmuch as the treaty is said to be directed toward easing world tensions, is an easer of tensions, a diplomatic "Miltown"; and it might possibly work. But what have we heard of this at- tempt to give Americans some measure of profit in this excursion into the never- never land of communism's grand design? We have heard that if we demand that the Soviets get out of Cuba they will demand that we get out of Germany, that Egypt will demand Israel get out of the Middle East, and so forth. By what poor and tortured stretch of what fever- ish imagination is our presence in Ger- many or Israel's in the Middle East simi- lar to the Soviet presence in. Cuba? Our demand is made with justice and in keep- ing with, not in violation of, international law and order. If the Soviet should, in fact, make such demands'; because of our stand on Cuba then we would see com- munism as it is and not as we may come to regard it through a laze of treaty- bred optimism. Cuba can be a test of all the hopes and fears of this treaty. Why should we fail to make such a test? We hear, however, that such a reser- vation would require renegotiation with all the nations that have signed it. That simply is not true. It is a reservation hot to the treaty but to our instrument 4+f ratification. It does not permit our ratification to be deposited until the Soviets have cleared out of Cuba. It does not involve other nations--just the Soviet, It does not involve the treaty-just the time of its ratification. There would be no world- wide renegotiation-just a pause while the peaceful intent of the Soviet is put to the test. But, of course, it is the; recognition in the State Department and on the floor of this Chamber that the Soviet purpose cannot be trusted-it is that very recog- nition, that very truth that causes such anguished. cries when someone asks only to claim our share of justice, our price of justice in. giving to the' Kremlin this paper pie-in-the-sky, this abandonment of half-a-decade's work to achieve a sys- tem of arms control under unshakeable terms of international inspection. But we are told also that the Cuban price is not appropriate to place upon this treaty, it is not pertinent, it is an extraneous matter, it opens up other areas of the cold war. What other areas? Since when has the cold war been a series of compart- ments? Since when has worldwide Com- munist aggression and treachery been divisible into little bureaucratic pigeon- holes? The suggested reservation goes to the very heart of the treaty and is in no way extraneous because it goes to the very heart of the causes of tension. And what is this treaty proposal if 'riot related to world tensions? Of course, Cuba is per- tinent. Nothing is more !pertinent. State Department haitsplitters may want to bend this treaty away from real- ity and from all connection with the real war in which we stand challenged by a real enemy. But ask the American peo- ple if Cuba is pertinent. .. Ask them if Cuba is too high a price to set on this treaty. A$k them if we should only give, and get nothing. I am confident that their reply would be firm where some replies I have heard recently are frightened and fearful. We hear that the proposal to remove Soviet .troops. and weapons from Cuba merely is partisan. Has t been merely partisan every time the administration itself has said that the matter of Soviet troops in Cuba is not negotiable? Is it partisan to say that this treaty should not be negotiated while nonnegotiable Soviet aggression haunts our southern shoreline? Is everyone who speaks for his beliefs in this treaty consideration to be called partisan? Is conscience par- tisan? Are the voices we hear in opposi- tion to the treaty or in support of safe- guards and changes, voices on both sides of the aisle, merely partisan? No. There is in this consideration only the partisan- ship of each Member's own sou].-search- ing decision, the partisanship of prin- ciple, the partisanship of duty and re- sponsibility. Mr. President, as I have said before, I intend to offer a reservation regarding Cuba. I will ask that it be considered and debated at the appropriate :moment. I will ask that the Senate, which has placed so small a price upon its delibera- tion of this treaty so far, will at the mo- ment of final decision at least place upon the treaty itself a price which the Soviet can and must pay. I should like to make a parliamentary inquiry of the Chair. I should like to inquire whether under rule XXXVII a reservation to the resolution of ratifica- tion may at any time be sent to the desk to be printed and to lie on the table until called tip by the mover of the reservation. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Seri- ator is correct. A reservation may be printed and lie on the table. Mr. GOLDWATER. I send it to the desk and ask to have it printed. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The res- ervation will be received and printed, and will lie on the table. Mr. GOLDWATER. I will call it up in due time. BOMB TESTING REAPS WHIRLWIND OF POISON Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, there are risks for our Nation with or with- out the treaty, which has been the sub- ject of lively debate. Absolute security cannot be achieved. No nation in the history of this world, at least for long, has been able to reach and maintain a position of absolute supremacy. A few days ago I received from Mr. Alexander P. de Seversky a statement sent to each Member of the U.S. Senate in which opposition to the treaty was forcibly expressed by this eminent Amer- ican. Mr. de Seversky states bluntly that the Soviet Government has "nuclear superiority." He believes Russia is a-head of us in many areas in the field of nuclear weaponry and defense. My reaction to this is, I suppose, that of the average American. If scientists devoting their lifework to this cannot agree, how can I know? If military men cannot agree, how can I decide? However, I am convinced absolutely that there is a basic fault in the argu- ment made that we must have more testing-without treaty-in order to catch up. If we are behind-and the burden of testimony and the accumulative evidence suggests we are not-then what makes anyone think. we are going to catch up if there is unrestricted testing in the at- mosphere, in the water, underground, everywhere, by everyone? We had the A-bomb first. We had the H-bomb first. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE We have been spending fantastic sums on our defenst structure. In this effort we are spending about $50 billion each year, 50 times more than our entire Fed- eral Government cost a half century ago. We have sought to create a massive deterrent. In my opinion, we have achieved this. There has been no restriction, of con- sequence, of expenditure of funds in the field of nuclear weapons and deterrents so far as the United States is concerned. Yet it is suggested that in spite of our great expenditure and effort we not only have failed to retain our lead, but have positively lost it. These arguments would have us be- lieve, first, that although we have been running as fast as we can run, the Rus- sians have outstripped us; second, that if the treaty is 'rejected and the arms race continues unabated, the American people can be confident that we shall recapture the lead and surpass the Rus- sians. I fail to be convinced by the va- lidity of any such argument. Would it not be just as easy to argue that, if the treaty were not ratified, that if both nations continued to have free- dom to spread fallout all over the world in search for perfect weapons and for perfect deterrents, then we might find ourselves even farther behind than some of the opponents of the treaty claim we now are? As every other Senator has, I have received many, many letters from treaty opponents asking me if we can trust Khrushchev. I do not see what that has to do with the situation. If I as one Senator believed the Com- munist side of the world did not present a clear danger to our life here and the life of those elsewhere joined with us, I would never vote year after year as I do vote for these tremendous defense ap- propriations. I would be infinitely hap- pier to be voting instead for appropria- tions to improve the well-being of our own people, to provide a better life for our own citizens and, to the extent of our abilities and our desires, for people elsewhere. It is precisely because I be- lieve the peril which confronts us and haunts us is not a fantasy of the imag- ination that I vote for those appropria- tions and shall continue to do so for so long as they are needed and so long as I am here. The proposition of trusting Khrushchev does not enter into this at all, so far as my own.analysis and my own conclusions are concerned. I trust the President of the United States. I trust the Secretary of State. I trust the leaders of our Armed Forces who have testified for the treaty. Much has been said, much has been made, of warning signals which have been raised by some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Too little empha- sis has been placed on the fact that each of them did endorse the treaty. I take comfort in this. I would expect any military leader of this Nation to resign from his service rather than to endorse a proposition which on balance he thought absolutely detrimental to the security of the United States. Does any one of us for one minute believe that the honesty and integrity and patriotism of these men would not have brought about their resignations almost automatically if they had thought the arguments against the treaty were prevailing in a military sense? I trust the predominant testimony given in favor of the treaty. I am a layman. I must take the judgments )f others, analyze them, bal- ance them, and then make up my own mind as every other Senator must make up his or her mind, and then vote ac- cordingly. In considering the many aspects of this treaty Senators should give atten- tion to the importance which ratifica- tion would have on the dangers caused by radioactive contamination. A cessation of atomic testing in the atmosphere would mean, in time, an The hazards of fallout, the radioactive residue from atomic blasts which poi- sons the air we breathe, the ground we walk, the food we eat, are still largely unknown to science and to civilization. They are not understood, they are un- derestimated, and largely ignored. Federal officials charged with the pro- tection of American citizens from radio- active hazards have consistently, from Hiroshima to the present day, placed the most optimistic interpretation upon these hazards. The Russian officials, with similar responsibilities to the Rus- sian people, have always denied, reso- lutely, that such hazards even exist in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt, however, that they do exist. There can be no doubt they are more dangerous than past American interpre- tations would make them seem. That fallout does exist, that it does now con- stitute a peril to children and to children yet unborn is undeniable. Equally un- deniable is that should testing continue unbridled, it will constitute a truly sub- stantial risk. This will be a risk to American children, to Russian children, to European and, yes, to Chinese chil- dren. This is a fact which the world must recognize; this is a fact which is, I believe, recognized in the test ban treaty. I have repeatedly called the attention of the Senate to the inadequacy of our Nation's research efforts in the field of radiological health, to the confusion which now exists in the determination of acceptable levels of contamination for large population groups, and to the sparse, hit-or-miss nature of our radia- tion monitoring and surveillance activi- ties. We are capable, apparently, of deter- mining the size of a Russian atmospheric test the day it is shot; we are unable, however, to determine the amount of iodine 131 in a child's glass of milk in St. George, Utah, 3 days after a .shot of our own in Las Vegas. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Division of Radiological Health of the Public Health Service have seldom, to my knowledge, acted upon their own initiative to step up their research and surveillance activities. Consistently they have but reacted to public or scien- tific outcry. This is truer today than it has ever been for there has been much recently to react to. Slowly and painstakingly our knowl- edge of the effects of radioactive con- tamination is increased. Step by step our too-optimistic esti- mate of acceptable levels must be scaled downward. There have been several important scientific studies published recently. I shall attempt to summarize them. In so doing, I cannot avoid simplifying; I can- not include all the many qualifications, the ifs, the perhaps, the assumptions which must be added if these compara- tively small-scale studies are to be mean- ingfully applied for large population groups. In the August 1963 issue of the Canad- ian Medical Association Journal, Dr. L. J. le Vann, of Alberta, publishes a statisti- cal analysis of birth deformities in that Province. In 1959 there was no atomic testing. In 1961 there was. In 1959 there was a ratio of 7.76 physical abnor- malities per 1,000 children born. In 1961 there was a ratio of 13.8 physical abnormalities per 1,000 children born. Dr. le Vann breaks down these figures into area groups and finds that the great- est increase in the abnormality ratio is in the areas which experienced the greatest precipitation. As Senators know, It is the rain which brings radiation contam- inants. Dr. le Vann attributes the in- crease in birth deformities to the increase in fallout between the two time periods. In Edmonton, with an average precipi- tation of 20.9 inches, there were 16.76 ab- normal births per thousand. In Left- bridge, with a precipitation level of 12.9 inches, the abnormal birth rate was 13.07 per thousand. Dr. le Vann's thesis has a post hoc propter hoc aura to it; he may not be right. The size of his sample was but slightly more than 30,000 infants. His data were but for 2 years. It will be necessary to have additional data for additional years before his work can be verified. It is, however, undeniable that indications of such importance to us all should be followed up with, more exten- sive studies. Dr. E. J. Sternglass, in an article pub- lished in Science June 7, 1963, comments upon Dr. Bryan MacMahon's report in the Journal of the National Cancer In- stitute, 28: 1173-91, 1962. Hitherto our knowledge of cancer and leukemia resulting from radiation ex- posure has been limited to cases in which individuals received massive doses, doses as high as a thousand roentgens. Esti- mates of cancer and leukemia incidence among large population groups from the relative small amounts of radioactivity carried by fallout have been based until now upon interpretation of these cases. Dr. MacMahon ran a statistical check on 734,243 children born in 37 maternity hospitals in New England during the years 1937-54. He found 10.6 percent of the mothers had received X-ray exposures which would have had the effect of subjecting the unborn infant to some radiation. Dr. MacMahon com- pared the exposed group of infants with Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5" Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005=5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September if 2 a control group made up of children whose mothers had not been X-rayed. Present X-ray exposures now averages between 75 and 100 milliroentgens. In early years of the test periods, exposure levels of X-ray were higher-4 to 8 times higher. Dr. MacMahon's results were startling: The death rate from leukemia and can- cer was 40-percent higher for the chil- dren whose mothers had been X-rayed than for those who had not. This ap- pears to be direct, hard, evidence that small levels of radiation can cause serious harm. It also offers evidence that the human foetus is between 20 to 60 times more sensitive to radiation than an adult. Dr. Sternglass in his Science article, suggests that MacMahon's data also in- dicate a direct, linear relationship be- tween cancer deaths and radiation dose increases. Utilizing these new statistics, Dr. Sternglass estimates that the effect of the 1962 test series will be-as a result of the short-lived contamination alone- materials such as I181-a 2.5- to 10-per- cent increase in childhood cancer for children born in this year. Put a dif- ferent way, 4,000 out of the 4 million children born in the United States in the last year may die of cancer and leukemia. In evaluating this staggering interpretation, we must remember that it is based on fairly complicated) assump- tions and interpolations. As such, it may be very wrong. However, Consumer Reports, a journal with a good deal of knowledge in this field, has said with respect to the Sternglass article that its results are "apparently generally although not unanimously accepted." And lead "one to conclude that present radiation tolerance may have to be revised downward.". The conclusions of Drs. le Vann, Mac- Mahon, and Sternglass become of greater concern when we turn to recent reports of detailed monitoring in Utah and Nevada. During the month of July 1962, five test shots were set-off at Yucca Flats in Nevada. All five carried substantial amounts of I11 into Utah. Shortly after one of these tests, Dr. Robert C. Pendle- ton, radiation safety officer at the Uni- versity of Utah, while demonstrating monitoring procedures to a class of stu- dents, discovered, purely by accident, extraordinary background radiation levels. Because of this discovery, the Utah State Department of Health de- cided to collect milk samples on a regular basis from 39 stations located across the State. The levels of Il" in the milk dis- covered were extraordinary. The Radiation Protection Guide sets 100 micromicrocuries of I" as an accept- able level of exposure for large popula- tion groups. Anything higher than this, if caused by "peacetime uses of atomic energy," would call for the possible ap- plication of countermeasures and in- creased surveillance. Utah officials determined that if it is assumed the average Utah citizen con- sumes 1 litre of milk a day (1.06 quarts), he would, in 1962, have received 58 thousand micromicrocuries of I11. This is almost one and a half times the acceptable RPG limit. It was found that contamination levels varied widely from dairy to dairy, from cold spot to hot spot. Some sample areas had undetect- able levels of radionuclide contamina- tion. Other areas had 'average intake levels ranging as high a$ 800 thousand micromicrocuries. This evel is almost 10 times higher than the highest levels ever before reported in thy; United States. The above figures are based upon a daily consumption of one litre of milk. Studies undertaken by the Public Health Service indicate that 10 percent of all male infants under 1 year of age drink 1.3 litres of milk a day or more. Such children receive, of course 1.3 times more radiation than the av- erage citizen referred to above. A recent study by R. T.; Morrison indi- cates that a young child has a r~ thyroid uptake of 50 percent, 20 percent more than that previously assumed. This means that 20 percent more radioactive material is absorbed by the thyroid than scientists have calculated in the past. Usually I'll milk samples have been taken on a pooled daily basis. Figures released weekly by the Division bf Radiological Health report contamination levels of a composite quart made tip of carefully derived contributions from the major dairies in the area of testing. The Utah report makes clear what I have long suspected: Milk pool values can be misleading indexes of group exposure. Our measurements of milk from one major Salt Lake dairy indi- cated total intake of 117,000 micromicro- curies of I311 for individuals consuming 1 liter of :milk per day. Whereas at a second major Salt Lake dairy, the total intake was only 3,400 micromicrocuries pf I' For com- parison, the current yearly radiation protec- tion guide of 0.5 rad to the thyroid gland of members of the general population is con- sidered to correspond to the intake of about 29,000 micromicrocuries of r111 by the young child. Mr. President, if wd assume the average infant thyroid of 12-gram weight absorbs a conservative 30' percent of the h 81 intake, the average child in Utah re- ceived a dose of 1 rad n 1962 during the month of July, and the range of ex- posure stretches from 0 tq 14 rads. The seriousness of this contamination is seen when it is noted that the radiation protection guide sets 0.5 rad as the max- mum acceptable amount of contamina- tion permissible on an average basis to large population groups. This, in turn, is based upon an acceptable 30-year ex- posure of 0.5 rad. These Utah figures presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in- dicate that some children in the month of July of last year received almost three times as much radiation exposure from I131 as is considered acceptable over a 30-year period from all radiation sources. In his testimony befor the Subcom- mittee on Research Development and Radiation, Dr. Charles M.ys made some rough estimates of the total thyroid dose received by Utah children prom tests pre- vious to the 1962 series. ! These figures are general. Information on the 80 or more aboveground nuclear test shots at Yucca Flats between 1951 and 1958 is still difficult to obtain. The AEC has been slow to release data for the earliest tests in Nevada. According to Dr. Pendleton, at least one of these tests-May 7, 1952- released more I13' in Utah than the tests in 1962. It is only recently that the irn- portance of I"' has become generally rec- ognized. The Government did not begin monitoring the I"' levels surrounding the Nevada test site until 1962. Dr. Charles Dunham, Director of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, has explained this lapse with "we were too busy chasing strontium 90." Dr. Mays summarizes his estimate of infant radiation dosages as follows: Recognizing that some children were ex- posed at age 0-1 and again at age 1-2, ap- proximately. 250,000 Utah children have been exposed to crudely estimated average thyroid doses of 4.4 rad prior to age 2. Individual doses, of course, range from much higher to much lower. A study, similar to that of Dr. Mays and the Utah State Department of Health, but completely independent of it, was conducted by the Technical Divi- sion of the Greater St. Louis Citizens Committee for Nuclear Information. I cannot here do more than summarize the contents of this scholarly 50-page study presented to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Perhaps the most important point made by the St. Louis study is that cur- rent AEC measurements of fallout levels after Nevada test shots are measure- ments of external radioactivity--that is, the total beta-radioactivity deposited on a gummed film placed on the ground or of beta activity in the air. This does not take into accord the effect of radia- tion in the ecological food chain. Let me explain this: Iodine 131 is a radio contaminant with a very short half life-no more than 8 days. This means that within the first 8 days of its existence, it loses over one- half of its potency. It is really danger- ous to man for only these 8 days. After a test shot, it falls to earth fairly quickly, where it falls determined by wind and weather. If it falls on wheat or grains or pasturage which is cut and stored for longer than 8 days, it is harmless. If, however, it falls on grass which is eaten by milk cows, it is far from harmless. It reappears, and very quickly, in the milk produced by these cows. This milk in turn, if it is pasteurized and kept for a week or two, is harmless. If, however, the milk is pasteurized and immediately sold, it is far from harmless. It can be, and from time to time is, heavily con- taminated with I"'. Young children drinking this milk are particularly sus- ceptible to dosages for three reasons: First, the small size of the child's thyroid; second, its greater sensitivity to radiation; third, the long, post irradia- tion lifespan during which effects may appear. These effects may take as long as 10 to 20 years to appear. We will not know for many.years to come what the full effect of atomic testing has been upon us and our progeny. The St. Louis study, like the Utah study, is per force but a reputable esti- mate. According to the St. Louis report: Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 1963 Approved For Relea")*Rgg1b-M038~1YAp210005-5 16025 fir.. At ie Leven times since X952, Washington part of the State. During the winter prevent the proliferation of atomic weap- Utah, children received thyroid they exist largely on lichens, mosses, and ors-this surely is the path of mad d in the ,6 to lap rad range or higher ii5ni Gamma radigtion taken May 19, 1953 . sedges. These plants, unlike most plants, and despair. ness from Shot henry" indicate that_a draw their nutrients directly from the Already this -child at that year fallout levels are time would have received 50 rags, air. They sift the air a,4d in this process, twice what they were last year. And absorb large quantities of radioactive still but one-third of the contamination It is the belief of the St. Louis scientists materials. These in turn are taken up in the atmosphere has fallen to earth. that contamination levels far, far exceed- by the caribou when they eat the lichens. Even without the resumption of tests, ing radiation guides, have been experi- enced repeatedly across he The Arctic caribou are heavily radioac- fallout will be a public health hazard for country in tive. The Eskimos, who live north of places as far afield as Troy, N.Y.; Ros- the Arctic Circle, to come. well, N. 1VIex,; and Rock Springs, Wyo. , in turn depend during The resumption of tests would bring well N. Beach and Dolphin of Springs, W yo. the winter months on caribou meat as for us all, free and Communist alike, a Kingdom ach tomic Energy Authority, their principal food. As a result, there whirlwind of poison. y, on is the very real and present danger that When we, as U.S. Senators, vote on the the average 35 cases of thyroid cancer the Eskimos themselves may obtain high may be experienced per million persons ratification of the treaty, we must con- exposed to and unacceptable levels of radioactive Sider many things. We must consider 1. rad of thyroid radiation: contamination from their food supply. the strength and continued strength of 14 terms relevant to the present testimony, That this is a real problem has only our Nation and of the free world; the one in 286 children exposed to 100 rad thy- recently been recognized. Figures are effect a cessation of testing would have roid radiation. may develop thyroid cancer. sketchy and inadequate. The only reall By any standard, this is an unacceptable y this 'strength; the guarantees eie risk. useful figures we have were taken last that the terms ms o of the treaty will be en- n- year when whole body counts of Alaska forced; the assurances that we shall have Concurrently with the release of the natives were taken at several points in adequate protection should the treaty be Utah report, the Atomic Energy Com- Alaska by a team of scientists from the violated. mission made public a study which it Hanford Laboratories. The levels of These we must consider; let us also had, commissioned by Dr. H. A. Knapp, strontium 90 and cesium 137 contami- consider what continued testing, con- Fallout Studies Branch, Division of nation found were fairly high. Higher tinued fallout, would mean, now and in Biology and Medicine, AEC. This report than any found anywhere else in the future years. attempts to formulate an acceptable United States. They were, however, still In this atomic age there are great procedure for the calculation of I"' largely within range 2-or acceptable- risks-risks with and without treaties. I milk,on,the basis.o .o.ther meas- levels as determined under the RPG. believe this treaty is an acceptable risk. urements of fallout contamination on Earlier this year I insisted that more I believe it can be an important step Lo- the ground. 3 In his report Dr, Knapp extensive and comprehensive monitor- ward the goal which all men everywhere speaks of I _ levels as high as 78,000 ing be done in the Arctic. I am pleased must desire and long for and should work to 06,000 micromicrocuries per liter of that this summer the Hanford team was for. I intend to vote for its ratification. milk, This is, as we have seen, over able to take whole body counts all the I urge its ratification. twice the yearly, and I emphasize yearly, way across Alaska. It was expected that Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, acceptable amount of I'"' for a child to contamination levels would rise, and earlier today, the distinguished senior consume under the terms of the radia- they have, substantially. Senator from California [Mr. KuCHEL], tion protection guide. In testimony before the Joint Com- the minority whip, delivered a remark- The Knapp report has stirred up a mittee on Atomic Energy last month, able address in the Senate. I was not good, deal of controversy both within the manager Of the Hanford Laborator- privileged to be present during his pres- and without, the AEC. Again, his ies, Dr. H. M. Parker, verified that cesium entation, but he was thoughtful enough methods and his assumptions are 137 body burdens have increased over to supply me with a copy of his prepared debatable. They are debatable but they 1962 burdens by as much as 50 percent. remarks. I join other Senators in their are .hqt absurd. Their implications are In 1962 cesium 137 levels in several cases commendation of his address. very grave and they must be seriously bordered on the so-called maximum ac- The senior Senator from California, considered, ceptable limit of the radiation protection like his own leader, the distinguished Each of thesix papers to which I have guide. It is fair to assume that this junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DiRx- referred, utilize methods and procedures year they will have exceeded this level. sEN], demonstrated the finest open to question, This qualities T grant. There is no field more spongy The problems of radioactive contami- of bipartisan statesmanship in this re- than that pf radiological health. No two nation of the Arctic are different in kind markable address. He has analyzed the scientists agree on any detail. Increas- and degree from those of more temperate treaty item by item and article by article, soily, however, almost all detail. zones. We know very little about them. and has brought to our attention once agree that the field is an extremely important logical Health Division, the Atomic En- but the President's message to the Senate one. The problem is a national one. The ergy Commission, and the Arctic Health in submitting the treaty. He has re- responsibility is a Federal one. I xegret Research Center joined in proposing a minded us of our duties and obligations that I must say, as I have said before, study of the contamination of the Arctic under the treaty. He has again called that the.,Federal Government is duck- flora and fauna. This proposal is of to our attention the assurances that have ing its responsibility. Last year we spent very substantial importance. It has not been given to the Senate by the President but a, total of $18 million in the field of as yet received final approval from the of the United States. radiological health research monitoring Atomic Energy Commission. I am de- The Senator from California emuha- and, surveillance. This is not enough to termined that it will soon receive such sized in his address what the senior Sen- altive, the to lives say of 180 nothing of million our children's Americans now approval. Arctic Alaska is America. ator from Minnesota sought to empha- children now al and their children. Alaskan natives are American citizens. size; that is, that the overwhelming body As Senators will recall, the hazards They are being exposed to hazards about of evidence presented to the three com- of which we know little. It is our responsi- mittees that listened to the witnesses radioactive contamination are of partic- bility to insure their protection. supports the ratification of the treaty ular import to my own State of Alaska. Time and time again I have pointed out My speech today makes grim listen- and underscores the fact that the treaty the dangers which continued, and in- ing. The recital of these new findings is in our interest and the interest of the creased contal,lination of the Arctic food and studies in Canada, in Utah, in St. world. chain could mean to Alaska native citi- Louis, and in Alaska is not pleasant work. The Senator from California has also It is, however, I believe, important that reminded us of the limitations of the e ,Arctic food chain is,not unlike the Senate should have this in. xxnation treaty, which I believe are important to the grass, cows milk chain which I have and that it should have it now as_ we bear in mind. just the described,, On the Arctic slopes of debate the test ban treaty. But once having noted the limitations, Alaska_ there are great herds of caribou To continue atomic testing, to con- the initial step, as it has been called, is numbering 'into the thousands. These tinue to step up the frequency and inten- of the utmost importance to the relation- roam back anc forth across the northern sity of these tests, to make no effort to ship among nations as they struggle to 11 Approved " For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 10- n 6M ApprovedCf~ g?c 0WJ~b 1b-RQ R 383R0001002109 t5rnber 12 relieve the tension on the international testing has increased fractionally radiation to develop a defense system capable of pre.. scene and to find ways and means of risks due to natural sources. It put the in- venting destruction of a major part of its crease in hereditary effects die to testing up population and industrial establishment. establishing a peaceful world. to 1961 at 11 percent and the increase in Let me review some of the technical prob - Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- somatic effects from 15 to 23 percent. The lems which make a real defense impractical. sent to have printed at this point in the U.N. group found that the concentration of Imagine a heavy attack launched by each RECORD an editorial, published today in carbon 14, with its afterlife of thousands of side against the other. (Let us not be un- the Washington Post, entitled "The years, is now 25 percent above the concentra- necessarily paranoid-we may suppose a mu- Treaty's Great Boon"; a letter, written tions resulting from natural processes. This tual large-scale attack, triggered against the by Prof. Walter Selove, on the subject: of nuclide wall continue to irradiate future gen- real desire of both sides.) Consider first the an adequate missile defense; and the re- erations for thousands of ,years. Only after problem of a defense for the United State::. 20,000 years will 90 percent og the total dote We may reasonably imagine that the attack, marks, by Dr. Frank Graham, On the due to carbon 14 be delivered. if it occurred say 2 or 3 years from now, test ban treaty, as published in the Dr. Herman J. Muller, o4 Indiana, who would include: Chapel Hill Weekly of August 28, 1963. won the Nobel Prize in 1946; for discovering 1. Several hundred submarine ;.aunch, a Dr. Graham's remarks were made on that X-rays cause changes iii our genes, has missiles (time, launch-to-delivery, about b August 26, at the Southern Baptist As- calculated that the fallout radiation re- minutes or less for most targets). 2. Several hundred large ICBM's, of 50 sembly Grounds, at Ridgecrest, N.C. Dr. suiting from the above-group .testing of a megatons each, with a number of decoys. Graham, formerly president of the Uni- single 100-megaton bomb Would be like'.y e Several hundred large ICBkI's, each one versity of North Carolina, was, as we to induce more than 10p,000 cases of leukemia bone cancer, and other fatal ills to fragmenting (at various distances from'tar- know, a few years ago one of the most the present population of the world and a get) to several live 5 megaton bombs. distinguished and dedicated Members of million harmful mutations in the next gen- What are some of the defense problems the Senate. We are privileged to have eration. Against the total population of the against such an attack? First, lack of time the benefit of his remarks. I know of world, in terms of percentag@s, these casual- to identify and intercept the attacking mis- no one more dedicated to a just and en- ties are not great. They are staggering in siles. For the heavily settled east coast re- during ng peace than this great citizen of terms of the total human suffering conjured gion, for example, many sub marine-launched bombs could arrive within 3 minutes from the United States, who is so much loved There up in the has mind been n a any great deal sensitive of man. political launch time, and within seconds, or minutes, by peace-loving peoples throughout the conjecture about why the Soviet Union or (after initial destruction of defense in- world. wished to sign the test bsn treaty. The stallations) tens of minutes from each other. There being no objection, the editorial, reason may be much more Simple than our If 10 to 20 such bombs, out of perhaps hun- the letter, and the remarks were ordered conjecture:;. As early as December 1961, N. dreds launched, reached their targets, the reach 10 to 20 million to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: P. Dubinen of the Institute of Cytology and toll the probably coarobably st realone, ac0n there wouln [From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1963] Genetics wrote in a Soviet scientific journal dead would be vast the ea tict including i uld an article on the Analysis;of the Effect of THE TREATY'S GREAT BOON Radiation on Cellular Nuclei of the Culture try and transport facilities---the ports of Debate over the test ban treaty has been of Embryonal Human Tissues." He con- New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore would so crowded with examination of its purely eluded: "The effect of ioniajing radiation in probably be destroyed, for example. military consequences that the virtue of the range of small doses, starting with frac- So far I have spoken only of the east eliminating radioactive fallout sometimes tions of roentgens and higher, acting on coast, only of submarine-launched missiles, seems almost to be lost sight of in the overall humanity as a whole, represents a real dan- and only of 10 percent penetration of a de- discussion. ger to future generations of el threatens the fense system. Let us next consider the see- . Senator HOLLAND and Senator PASTORE, irradiated individuals themselves as possible and item of the attack volley listed above. among some others, have brought this forc- causes of malignant tumors." If one 50-megaton bomb penetrated the de- ibly to the attention of the Senate. The The weight of the world's Scientific opinion fenses of New York (remember that perhaps Senate and the country must not be allowed is that radioactive fallout from testing has 10 such bombs might be aimed there, and to minimize this very tangible boon. In the increased (and future testing would further that they could come in a saturating volley, hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations increase) the hazards due to natural radla- together with hundreds of simultaneous cte- Committee, and in the debate, there have tion; that any increase isj likely to cause toys or with scores of the fragmentation- been frequent allusions to the relatively some additional somatic and genetic damage. type, live bombs of item 3)-if one such minor risks to health Involved in testing. When this country had to weigh unilat- bomb-reached New York, New York would be It has been stated frequently that the added eral suspension of testing ij was required to obliterated, with everything destroyed by hazards involved in testing can be tolerated, place this hazard in the scales against the blast and fire out to tens of miles distance. that the risks are not considerable, that risk that a failure to test (while others were and with shelters within that area being cone- they are in fact less menacing than many testing) might handicap this country to the pletely useless unless equipped with inde other sorts of environmental pollution. point that it would increase the likelihood pendent air supply. The somatic and emetic damage that will of thermonuclear war with its calamitous It is not necessary to go into many further g radioactive fallout, that one can think of (except flow from the tests already conducted, by radioactive fallout, to say nothing of its di- for one that is probably worth mentioning, any standard of measurement, are terrible sect effects on human lif$. The test ban and that is to have a 100-megaton bomb set and horrifying. This damage might be mul= treaty committing others'; to refrain from a off New York bomb set tiplied were indiscriminate tests by many testing, greatly diminishes this hazard. The a n or fired in red a ship 5 hamiles ve a toward the city from such a ship) nations to take place in the future. The suspension of atmospheric' testing, in these to begin to realize the basic point. A defense consequences of testing alone, to say nothing altered circumstances, becomes an affirrna- of the risk of war itself, might well work tine gain of the most enortrious consequences which would be even 90 percent effective (the an altgration upon the environment of this to the human race. very first time It had to be used) and which planet that would work dreadful Injury to would be that effective even though called the health of all mankind. Events may disappoint the hopes and ex- upon to deal with decoy and other deceptive - Scientists have had to proceed with cau- pectations of those who hive proposed this techniques of a type probably not anticipat- treaty. It does not, by itself, and for all ed-even such a "defense!" could not hope Lion into this unknown area and they have time, automatically preclude the resumption to prevent the killing of many tens of niil- stated their anxieties conservatively but of atmospheric testing, but it may well re- lions of people, and the destruction of a vast there is no mistaking their apprehensions. sult in that most desirable end. And if it part of the industry and the entire civiliza- The report of the United Nations Scientific does, its adoption may spare unnumbered tied of the country. Committee on the effects of atomic radia- thousands of our own countrymen, and per- tion, last September, ought to be consulted paps millions, around the world, the pain And what about the Soviet Union? The anew. These scientists asked that great at- and sorrow of terrible, wasting, lifelong in- attack on them would involve several times tention be given this risk because, they said: And it may lift from mankind the as many missiles. Could the U.S.S.R. pro- menace and dire threat of damage to tect its people? Even Dr. Teller, the fore- "The effects of any increase in radiation ex- jury. posure may not be fully manifested for sev- the genetic integrity of the human family most arguer for a continued bomb contest, eral decades in the case of somatic disease, that would cast its dark shadow forward has said not only that the United States and for many generations in the case of ge- through the generations down to children would probably not be able to save its cities, netic damage." This report, like the reports born 20,000 years from now, but also that "it is not likely that the Rus- of many other groups, emphasized that there scans will develop a foolproof missile de- Is no threshold of added exposure up to fence." What then does Dr. Teller mean which the tests are harmless. It stated: L:STTER BY PROF. WAt,T:ER SELOVE, when he states his guess that the Russians "Geneticists have consistently found both in ASPEN, Coto. "know how to defend against oncoming rais- mammals and other animals that the fre- The opponents of the test ban have made siles"? Does be mean that he believes they quency of mutations is affected by radiation very misleading statement's about the possi- have, or can build, a 90-percent effective de- throughout the range of doses and dose rates bility of creating an effective defense against fense? Does he mean that" he believes the Investigated." massive nuclear attack. 8y any technique Soviets might be willing to accept 10 per- This committee pointed out, as has been that One can now imagine' pursuing, neither cent penetration, . and to correspondingly so frequently observed in the debate, that the United States nor the I.S.S.R. can expect suffer destruction of a major part of their Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 civilization? Does he meal that he thinks as an open forum of the world and as a safety still singing in the minds and hearts of the that no ,,matter how much the_lJnited States valve for grievances and the release of ten- people of two hemispheres. develops the penetration ability of its own sions, the United Nations has so far pre- They have come home again and must not Missiles (by decoy techniques, for example) vented the beginning of the third world war. be rejected in the house of the Founding the U.S.S.R. can still realistically expect to ac- THE TEST BAN TREATY Fathers, tually achieve an interception rate as high Which America, the haven of the disinherited of as 90 percent? Does he mean that he be- way America and which way the the earth and the home of a great revolu- lieves the percent? pannot keep ahead of the world in this fatefully interdependent world? tionary faith in the days of her infant weak- defense? Is it not clear that if either side For the first time in human history, through the scientific and ness should not, in the times of her great were to engage in the installation. of a mas- technological revolutions, man and his accumulated civilization can be power, become the home of a paralyzing fear slue antimissile System, the other side could destroyed overnight. Also for the first time and a destructive intolerance. nullify that system by merely sealing up its man has the capacity sons and daughters of the American attacking force? pacity and opportunity in this Revolution must not become the fathers and Arguments that the Soviet Union probably creative age to provide progressively for all moth people on the earth their needs for food, the very r the Amfrthe reckon evolu-s knows' how to build an effective defense,. clothing, shelter, education, health, well- the very prim iples of the American Revolu- arguments tiiat the United States must pour tion. enormous energies into the pursuit of a being and the opportunities for more beauti- ful creations of the humans irit and nobler This reaction would abdic ate the leader- d good defense system that can protect the mansions of the human . ship of equal freedom in best opeful world a country-such arguments are completely soul. desperately in need of the bewhich Amer- meaningless, and dangerously misleading, here may earth h where the essential atmos- ices has to give in this time of hazard and unless one sout the quantitative per- p ere poisoned for generations and unles o one spells talu t e qut. the panicked press of a button may end the hope for all people. formance Is human race, there is, in the midst of its fast Rather we must make clear to ourselves I am not speaking for a policy of discour- accelerating and Inevitably fateful arms race, and the world that the great declarations of agerneht. I am not speaking for a policy of the moral imperative for a be innin ste faith and freedom for progressive fulfillment futility. I am not speaking for a policy of toward ending the race whoseg oalne p are not merely the historic and professed laying down our arms. I am speaking for a human suicide. g sources, but are the present and living policy of clear, balanced examination of the The ratification of the test ban treaty of America's faith in herself, the technical facts. I am speaking fora clear would be y world's faith in America and America's moral understanding that our only real security developing beginning progressive a faith toward ea psreciprocally and and The influence and power ied the but world. deeends on the ultimately rational behavior long unfuifill yet enrolling of the Soviets (and theirs on ours). I am effective universal disarmament. This be- speaking for the understanding that the ginning step would be without any appease- ideals elthe American Revolution have pro- ment of totalitarian tyranny or any sur- gressivy opened doors of political equality pursuit of a defense against massive nuclear render wClics, hich and long eopl clcolo to Jews, Ca and ndless attack is, on the basis of the technical facts, of the great democratic goals and hopes of the equal freedom, justice, and women. The post disinherited colored people and most likely, the pursuit of a mirage. The The most d, dangers from a continued bomb contest are peace for all the people on the earth. We people in not a mirage-they are very real and urgent, have faith and hope in the physical descent erica are the migrant workers, mostly and spiritual ascent of man toward the fam- colored, who wander in search of work, root- and have been spelled out well enough not ily of man and the Kingdom of God, less, homeless, sometimes defenseless and to require repeating here. often hopeless pilgrims in the land of the To say that there is extremely little hope Yet we must also realize that, with man's Pilgrims' pride. They are on the unfinished that an effective defense can be developed is moral freedom of choice of good and evil, American agenda today. not to say that work on an ABM Iantiballis- the present potential juncture of the explo- At the end of the 18th century Thomas tic missile) should be abandoned. In the sive power deep in primitive inheritance and Jefferson victoriously led the people in mak- -present uneasy state of the world no one subco scions natures man and the explo- ing States rights-a theory nobly conceived could realistically recommend that work on power deep in the nature of and sometimes ignobly used-the sword of an ABM should be dropped. thermonuclear force, may break through the liberty against the national hysteria and The Senate lass the great and proper re- thin crust of civilization and quickly end the Federal tyranny of the alien and sedition sponsibility to examine minutely the reasons human species long slowly evolved on this laws. These laws out of fear of the French for or against the test ban treaty. I hope Planet. Revolution and the lack of faith in robust- there will remain no question, when the Great decisions in historic times are often ness of our own American freedom, sought to Senate finally votes, that the idea of a de- made in the smaller decisions of the days subvert the American Bill of Rights. Later fense is illusory, and that it is the true and the years of accumulative time. The States rights became for a time, the shield interest of both the United States and the present accumulative decisions carry in of slavery in the South; and later, the weap- U.S.S.R. that has brought this treaty to be themselves the fateful alternative between a on of exploitation of women and children in signed. beginning step in the test ban treaty toward the sweatshops of great cities in the North; slowing down the arms race and the accumu- and today the armament of massive resist- [From the Chapel Hill Weekly, Aug. 28, 1963] lative steps toward totally ending the human antes to the law of the land for the equal WHICH WAY AMERICA AND THE WORLD rye freedom of all Americans. (Remarks by Dr. Frank P. Graham on Au- THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARCH gust 26 at the Southern Baptist Assembly In this interdependent world with its ON WASHINGTON Grounds at Ridgecrest. Dr. Graham, for= accumulating decisions, the crucial alterna- The present American revolution of the mer president of the university here and tive is between this accumulating downward Negro people did not get its impulse or its U.S. Senator from North Carolina, is now drift toward universal annihilation and the impetus from Moscow but in such centers a United Nations mediator) patient upward struggle toward more effec- of the ex-Confederate South as Montgomery In this kind of a world, a war or a depres- tive international cooperation through the and Greensboro. Its older sources are in "Alen this kind involves all people everywhere. United Nations. Hundreds of millions of Carpenters' Hall and Independence Hall, There can never again be any isolation from people looking east and west for signs of Philadelphia, in the revolutionary rendez- the skies above, the seas around or the coati- humane hopes must not in this hour find a vous of the American people for equal free- nents beyond. The splendid American isola- negative approach toward a beginning step dom and human dignity. Their farther tion behind the two great ocean moats did in the test ban treaty or a prolonged fili- headwaters rnsurgently arise in the Judean not keep America out of the First World War. buster against the program for the equalizes- Hills and resurgently flow from the Sea of Staying out erica the League of Ndid not tion of the basic freedoms and rights for all Galilee where the Carpenter's Son lived, Stap nee United States out, Nations the Second Americans in the progressive fulfillment of taught, suffered, died and triumphed over Worl War. ke pd the U Tde American People Second our Hebraic-Christian heritage and our the death for the sacredness of all persons as the hard way and then decided that, instead American revolutionary hopes. children of one God and brothers of all of staying on the outside and being drawn In the midst of the American Revolution, people. into the World Wars after they start, they because of their own values and out of a The youth, in their movement for the would join the United Nations and seek more decent respect for the opinion of mankind same service for the same price, in sitting effectively on the inside to prevent the third the great Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, de- down, are standing up for the American world war which would cost millions of clared for all the American principle of equal dream. They are not trying to overthrow/ American lives, hundreds of billions of Amer- freedom, opportunity and self-determination the Republic but fulfill the promise of the scan dollars and mayhap all people on the of all people. Republic. With the Bible and Constitution earth. v This was the first universal declaration of in their hands, hymns and prayers on their The very year,1945, in which atomic power human rights ever adopted by the chosen lips and nonviolence and brotherhood in made its entrance into history the United delegates of any people. their hearts, they are in many ways the most Nations made its entrance on the stage of the Immortally declared by Jefferson, heroical- religious in their faith and the most Ameri- world. With all Its weakness and frustra. ly embodied by Lincoln, and universally can in their hopes. tions, the United Nations has cooled. off seven proclaimed by Wilson and Roosevelt, these Martin Luther King is not consciously or hotspots where a local fire might have become revolutionary principles went winging around unconsciously an agent or ally of fascism or a global conflagration. By its very existence the th _ i ng ng Approved For Release 2004/03/11 i CIA'-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5 16028 Approved W Q,3/jktCC?WOZDF%RM03R00010B2POODd r 1 ?, 1963 exist-in the continuation, growth, and the acceleration of radioactive fallout. Today, many people in this country are deeply concerned about this develop- ment-particularly people in the Mid- west and Far West, who today, as we know, are witnessing a doiubling of stron- can bulwarks for freedom against totali- tarianism, racism and colonialism in the world today. The question these August days is not whether there will be the people's pilgrim- age to Washington with their petition under the Bill of Rights for the redress of griev- ances, but whether it will be unruly, violent and self-defeating or nonviolent and im- pressive in personal dignity, human decency and public influence. The spiritual quality of the leadership and the patriotic spirit of the volunteer pilgrims reinforce our faith that this pilgrimage and petition of the peo- ple will be influential in the meaning of America at home and in the image of Amer- ica in the world in her leadership in the partnership of nations for equal freedom, justice and peace under law and human brotherhood under God in this time of mortal peril and immortal hope for all man- kind. Mr. HUMPHREY. Furthermore, Mr. President, this morning's Washington Post editorial, entitled, "The Treaty's Great Boon," is more than an editorial; it is a dissertation upon the benefits of the treaty. It relates in large measure, of course, to the fact that the treaty will make a great contribution in one area, in particular: the reduction of nuclear radioactive fallout. This itself would be enough to benefit mankind; and the fact that in this de- bate, we have not stressed this benefit, ticism of nuclear weaponry and strategy the potential danger that does exist- and is shown by scientific evidence to tiunl 90 in their milk supply, and are finding a. dangerous quantity of iodine in food particles, with a consequent in- creased possibility of leukemia and other forms of malignancy or cancer. These facts cannot be denied; and the fact that the treaty is directed toward reducing the danger of radioactive fall- out should not be minimized. I have been asked repeatedly to state the bene- fits of the treaty. One of the benefits is that it may save lives. ', I believe that question is as importantas the question of whether the treaty will limit scientific exploration in regard to, how to destroy lives. The Senate shotild try to find ways and means to make the lot of man- kind happier and the continuity of life surer, rather than simply to dedicate its efforts to the ascertainment of how to overkill or how to destroy larger numbers of people or greater amounts of property. This is our opportunity to fulfill one of the real purposes of democratic citi- zenship: to secure the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY-- AMENDMENT Mr. RUSSELL submitted an amend- ment, intended to be proposed by him, to the resolution of ratification of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed. NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY-- RESERVATION Mr. GOLDWATER submitted a reser- vation, intended to be proposed by him, to the resolution of ratification of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW AT 11 A.M. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come be- fore the Senate, I move, pursuant to the order previously entered., that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock to- morrow morning. The. motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 4 minutes p.m.) the Senate, in executive session, adjourned, under the order previosuly entered, until to- morrow, Friday, September 13, 1963, at 11 o'clock a.m. NOMINATION Executive nomination received by the Senate September 12, 1963: DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE W. True Davis, Jr., of Missouri, to be Am- bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Switzer- land. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5