NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 12, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

ppraved For3 t1~0 10021'1006'15
e SEN 15 6
If this is the case in a State as pros- to provide botii 'a sound and substantial The Health Pro essions// ducational
perous as Connecticut, it is obvious that medical education, while at the same Assistance Act represents ~Cnother major
-there are many communities throughout time lessening the time and cost of edu- accomplishment in lth field which
the country where the health and well- eating its participants. has been possible the wise and
being of families, while not necessarily Should we fail to look ahead, to count skillful leadershi'/ e distinguished
.in jeopardy, "are suffering from neglect. the future needs of this country in an Senator from Alabe has the pro-
I ho't an alarmist who contends area that affects us all at one time or an- found thanks anation of this
hat Twill be too late to meet this prob- other, we shall be doing less than meet- Senator and, in f the people of
-
gem lI aU r1V4 4~riG Gbt YtV 1 uauaa u.wvwJ ? --- ---- ------ _ _
Sut I do egret that' it has taken us so failing to provide that important ounce Mr. HILL. M . President, I yield back
long to m ke provision for the Federal of prevention. If we do fail to act as the the remainder of the time under my
merican people
-
h
_
e A
- --
-
the yekLr-A' o ~. rare t
"Skill have an` a , uate number of doctors Mr. HILL. I yield 2 minutes to the The que ipn is, Shall the bill pass?
and other heap specialists. Senator from Minnesota. On thi question, the yeas and nays
f believe the s tistics I have cited Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, as have be ordered; and the clerk will
Make a compelling ., gument in support an original cosponsor of this bill in call the oll.
of l' ederal assistance. earlier Congresses, it is Indeed a pleasure The egislative clerk proceeded to call
I have had an especiall,v deep interest to witness its passage this afternoon. the r
,,.. .. _ r.,a...... i.:,.....1 n.. 1\R n_nT DWATEA l,,,hen his name
r
in this neia IOF U rtuuiucre Vr yea ---- ---- - .cause of the project that isderway in sistance Act will provide badly needed wax called). On this vote I have a pair
ut to start -a medl dental help in alleviating critical shortages of wAh the distinguished minority leader,
ti
C
c
onnec
a school as a part of . the U`nive s, ity of professional health personnel throughout t e Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRK-
Connecttciit. the Nation. 1fsEx]. If he were present and voting he
The State legislature has approgridted The Senator from Minnesota wants would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to
the sum, of $2 . million toward this goal,, the record to be clear that the existin vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore I
a site has been selected and the land has parliamentary situation necessitated s withhold my- vote.
The rollcall was concluded.
ainst several perfecting ame d-
tin
a
V
g
o
g
though good
been purchased. But even
progress' has been made to date, under nts that otherwise should have een Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that
State initiative, Federal assistance would ado ted. In particular, the otton the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. AN-
-be most helpful, so that the eventual ame ment to provide foregive - ess of DERSON], the Senator from Maryland Mr.
of this medical-dental student-loans where the gradua agrees BREWSTER], the Senator from Mississippi
acit
ing ca
i
t
y
p
n
ra
to pract a In rural areas was a con- [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Alaska
school can be expanded.
Year after year Congress appropriates structive Miggestion. But its adoption [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from North
millions of dollars for medical research would have 14aced the entire measure in Carolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from
and for the construction of hospitals, and serious jeopaf y. I could /not vote to Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Sen-
this is certainly''a-proper and worthwhile take this risk. Astor from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], the
thing for us to do. Let the Senator;, from New Hampshire Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARAI,
Let us today pass and send to the Pres- know that this Seator,'would welcome the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MON-
ident this Louse bill, so that we can take the opportunity to Qte" for this feature RONEY], the Senator from Wisconsin
an important first step toward insuring once the program is ?established and is [Mr. NELSON], the Senator from Connec-
Manyurl areas of Min-
and the Senator
RtEtcoFF]
eration
in o
ti
t CMr
.
,
p
cu
.
an adequate supply of professionally
trained persons;'to pass onto all of our nesota are faced with a -growing short- from Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] are ab-
peopie the knowledge and techniques that age of doctors and other health person- sent on official business.
have been developed by modern medi- nel and this pro osal would.,help meet I further announce that the Senator
Line. -this shortage. I hope this amendment from California [Mr. ENGLE] is neces-
Mr. HILL. I yield 1 minute to the will be adopted At a future time. `._ sarily absent.
Senator, from Rhode Island. There is no, ,'possible excuse for every I further announce that, if present and
Mr, _ FELL. Mr. President, the bill resident of ti(is Nation not to have the voting, the Senator from Maryland [Mr:
presently under consideration, 'has re- finest medical and health care available.,, B voting, the the Senator from Alaska
Ceived long and exhaustive study by both But, unforttmately, this is not the case. RE ST RUENINGI ], the the Senator f mm North
this 'body and the House. In fact as my We are all quite familiar with the grave CTMr. arolina [Mr. JORDAN], the Senator from
.senior colleague; Senator PASTORS said problem faced by many senior citizens Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], the Sen-
earlier, he helped lead this same fight a a-nd this,-Senator hopes that matter will ator from Wyoming [Mr. Y], the McGEEI, the
dozen years ago.' This bill's provisions -be resolved before the 88th Congress ad- Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARAI,
have been scrutinized and weighed with journs' next year. The legislation we the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MoN-
care and deliberation. The final result consider today represents a good begin- the Se RONEY], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr.
of these labors, is a conclusion that a ning,.' to insure that we will train an NELSON], the Senator from Connecticut
great need exists for more medicalfacili adequate supply of health personnel to [Mr. NELSON], RXBICOFF], and the Senator from
ties and more adequate loan moneys m'et the expanding population of the Tennessee [Mr. WALTERS] would each
available to the students who qualify for cdming decades. Now let us also en- vote essee
this training. Oct legislation to Insure that our ele-
'tnentary schools, secondary schools, and Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the
Only, 6 , 'r shorn w hile ago on August 2 'colleges and universities are able to train Senator from Colorado [Mr. AC LOTTI and
196$, received a letter from Barnaby the students we need to enter medical the Senator from Kanasas [Mr.-PEARSON]
C. Keeney, president of Brown Univerr school. The challenge of education is are absent on official business to' attend
hear which isincluded ithe Labor and 305 of Puthe a comprehensive challenge. We must a meeting of the Interparliamentary
hearings before ell y meet it with a comprehensive program Union.
ryi? iply i Committee. President of ed- such as President Kennedy has pre- The Senator from New Jersey [Mr.
eral le ialation In the the importance
medical antance of re- sented to us. CASE], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
latelegislation in - COOPER], the Senator from Illinois [Mr.
14ted. fields. Hddiscussed this itedical I commend the distinguished Senator
I?TRxsENI, and the Senator from New
education pro ram, the ilr"st'In modern from Alabama [Mr.-HILL], the most able Mexico [Mr. MECHEM] Se are necessarily
times in "the State of Rhode Island, that chairman of the Committee on Labor
$rpwn thniversit, is undertaking. -It -is and Public Welfare, for his masterful absent.
a d o mttl dable effort, and one for which guidance of this legislation. No pub- If present and voting, the Senator from
a, definiYt need exists. It is also some- lie servant in the history of America has Colorado [Mr. ALLOTT], the Senator from
thing y of-1 an innovation in the "field of done so much to see that this Nation New Jersey [Mr. CASE], and the Senator
'medic&i jtudy; fbr it is predicated upon has the finest health and medical facili- from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] would each
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 15968
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CONGRESSIONAL R CORD - SENATE September 12
The pair of the Senator from Illinois
[Mr. DIRKsEN] has been previously an-
nounced.
The result was announced--71 yeas,
9 nays, as follows:
[No. 160 Leg.]
YEAS-71
Aiken Hickenlooper Morton
Bartlett Hill Moss
Bayh Holland Mundt
Beau Hruska Muskie
Bennett Humphrey Neuberger
Bible Inouye Pastore
Boggs Jackson Pell
Burdick Javits Prouty
Byrd, W. Va. Johnston Proxmire
Cannon Jordan, Idaho Jt,andolph
Carlson Beating Russell
Church Kuchel Saltonstall
Clark Lausche Scott
Cotton Long, Mo. Smathers
Dodd Long, La Smith
Douglas Magnuson Sparkman
Edmondson Mansfield Symington
Ervin McCarthy Talmadge
Fong McClellan Williams, N.J.
Fulbright McGovern Williams, Del.
Gore McIntyre Yarborough
Hart Metcalf Young, N. Dak.
Hartke Miller Young, Ohio
Hayden Morse
NAYS-9
Byrd, Va. Ellender Stennis
Curtis Robertson Thurmond
Dominick Simpson Tower
NOT VOTING-20
Allott Engle Mechem
Anderson Goldwater Monroney
Brewster Gruening Nelson
Case Jordan, N.C. Pearson
Cooper Kennedy Ribicoff
Dirksen McGee Walters
Eastland McNamara
So the bill (H.R. 12) was passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the bill was passed.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion to
lay on the table the motion to reconsider.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. RUSSELL, and
Mr. KUCHEL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Montana is recognized.
EXTENSION AND BROADENING OF
AUTHORITY TO INSURE MORT-
GAGES UNDER THE NATIONAL
HOUSING ACT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
with the concurrence of the Senate, I
move at this time that the Senate pro-
ceed to consider Calendar No. 463, S.
1952, which the distinguished Senator
from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] will ex-
plain, as well as the reason for having it
considered at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title for the information
of the Senate.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S.
1952) to extend and broaden the author-
ity to insure mortgages under sections 809
and 810 of the National Housing Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc-
GOVERN in the chair). The question is
on agreeing to the motion by the Senator
from Montana.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate proceeded to consider the bill,
which had been reported from the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, with
amendments, on page- 3, line 8, after the
word "section", to insert "and"; after
line 8, to strike out:
(3) by striping out "Ave thousand" In sub-
section (I) and inserting in lieu thereof "ten
thousand"; and
And, at the beginning of line 11, to
strike out "(4) -and insert "(3) "; so as
to make the bill read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section
809 of the National Housing Act is amended-
(1) by striking out "October 1, 1963" In
subsection (f) and inserting in lieu thereof
"October 1, 1965";
(2) by striking out the first sentence of
subsection (g) (1) and inserting in lieu
thereof the following: "A mortgage secured
by property which is intended to provide
housing for a person (1) employed or as-
signed to duty at or in connection wish any
research or development installation of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion and which is located at or near such in-
stallation, or (ii) employed at any research or
development installation of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission and which Is located at or
near such installation, may (if the mortgage
otherwise meets the requirements of this
section) be insured by the Commissioner un-
der the provisions of this section.' ; and
(3) by striking out clause (B) In subsec-
tion (g) (2) (iii) and inserting in lieu thereof
the following: "(B) persons employed at or
in connection with any research or develop-
ment installation of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, as the case may be;".
SEC. 2. Section 810 of the National Housing
Act is amended-
(1) by striking out clause (1) of subsec-
tion (b) and-inserting in lieu thereof the f ol-
lowing: "(1) the housing which is covered
by the insured mortgage Is necessary in the
interest of national security in order to pro-
vide adequate housing for (A) military per-
sonnel and essential civilian personnel serv-
ing or employed in connection with any in-
stallation of one of the armed services of the
United States, or (B) essential personnel
employed or assigned to duty at or in con-
nection with any research or development in-
stallation of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration of of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission,";
(2) by striking out in' the second sentence
of subsection (d) "and employees of con-
tractors for the armed services", and insert-
ing in lieu thereof the following: "employees
of contractors for the armed services, and
persons described in clause (1) (B) of subsec-
tion (b) of this section"; and
(3) by striking out "October 1, 1963" in
subsection (k) and Inserting in lieu thereof
"October 1, 1965".
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, the
bill would extend sections 809 and 810, al-
ready existing in the Dousing Act, which
make special provision for home build-
ing in areas of research and develop-
ment of the armed services, the Atomic
Energy Commission, aid our space effort.
It represents a contiluation of existing
-programs, due to expire September 30,
and is supported unanimously by the
Committee on Banking and Currency.
Mir. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD at
this point an explanation of the bill.
There being no objection, the explana-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
EXPLANATION or S. 1952
1. Extend section 809 of the National .Hous-
ing Act (sales housing for essential civilian
employees of the armed services, NASA and
AEC) for 2 years, from October 1, 1963, to
October 1. 1965;
2. Broaden section 800 to cover housing for
essential efvilian employees of NASA and
ABC at any NASA or AEC research and devel-
opment installation;
3. Extend section 810 of the National Hous-
ing Act (primarily rental housing, single-
family and multifamily, for military person-
nel and essential civilian employees of the
armed services) for 2 years, from October 1,
1963, to October 1, 1965; and
4. Broaden section 810 to cover housing for
essential employees of NASA and AEC.
The establishment of the section 809 pro-
gram was necessary because In some in-
stances homes built for essential civilian em-
ployees of the armed services, NASA, and AEC
in communities near or adjacent to research
or development installations of these agencies
were considered to be above and beyond those
needed for the normal economic growth. of
the communities. In the opinion of the
FHA, homes built in excess cf the normal
growth of the communities do not meet the
test of economic soundness required by the
statute as a prerequisite of FHA mortgage
insurance. Section 809 permits the economic
soundness test to be waived in such cases in
order that essential civilian employees of
these agencies may obtain decent and ade-
quate sales housing.
Similarly, section 810 was established in
order to provide decent and adequate sales
and rental housing for personnel and civilian
employees of the armed services near or ad-
jacent to any military installation where
adequate housing did not exist and where
the FHA believes that the economic sound-
ness prerequisite of the regular programs
could not be met.
Section 809 insofar as NASA and. AEC
activities are concerned was limited In its
application when the law was established.
These limitations prohibit the program from
being used at newly designated or developed
NASA research and development installa-
tions or in the case of AEC outside of Los
Alamos County, N. Mex. Because of these
limitations many essential civilian employees
of these agencies are unable to obtain ade-
quate housing. For example, NASA is de-
veloping a new research and development
installation in Hancock County, Miss.
It Is anticipated that by 1967, some 2,500 per-
sons will be employed at this site. Com-
munities near or adjacent to the site do not
have a sufficient inventory of adequate hous-
Ing for this influx of population. At present
housing constructed in these communities
to meet this need would not, in the opinion
of the FHA, meet the prerequisite economic
soundness test of the regular programs.
Thus, in order to overcome this situation,
section 809 would be broadened to take care
of the housing needs in this area as well as
in other areas where similar conditions exist.
FHA section 810 would also be broadened
to cover AEC and NASA activities where
similar conditions prevail.
Letters to the Chairman of the Banking
and Currency Committee from the housing
Agency, NASA, and AEC support the ;provi-
sions of the bill.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I send
to the desk and ask to have printed and
lie on the table an amendment I in-
tend to propose to the resolution of
ratification of the test ban agreement.
The amendment is in language identical
with that which was appended to the
resolution of ratification of the Atomib
Energy Act. My amendment would
make perfectly clear that any future
amendments to this treaty must be sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and
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 consent, as in the case of the original
treaty.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I shall speak only
about 3 minutes. I thought the Senator
had yielded the floor.
11 , Mr, SPARKMAN. I am trying to
have the pending bill passed.
Mr. RUSSELL. I have a right to dis-
cuss the bill. The Senator cannot cut
me off. I have my rights.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I have no desire to
do so. I thought the Senator was under
the impression that action on the bill
had been completed.
Mr. RUSSELL. No. I am speaking
in my own right, -on my own time.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Very well. The
Senator is `entitled to do so.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the
test ban treaty is very unusual in its
scope. It is said to be the first step in a
program of disarmament. With all the
emotions which have been stirred about
the pending treaty, we have overlooked
the comprehensive nature of the pre-
amble and article II of the treaty, which
do not touch the ban on nuclear testing
as proposed in article I.
The preamble to the treaty contains
the following language, which is about
as far reaching and sweeping as the
mind of man could devise to describe the
objective of the signatory states:
Proclaiming as their principal aim the
speediest possible achievement of anagree-
ment on general and complete disarmament
under strict international control in accord-
>ance With the objectives of the United Na-
tions which would put an end to the arma-
ments race and eliminate the incentive to
the production and testing of all kinds of
Weapons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time, determined to continue negotiations to
this end, and desiring to put an end to the
contamination of man's environment by
radioactive substances-
Then follows tl}ie language of the test
ban provision found in article I, which
has thus far been the sole subject of de-
bate.
Article II is rather unique, in that it
stipulates a method of amending the
treaty, of carrying the first step on to
include the banning of nuclear weapons
and indeed of conventional weapons. It
reads: "Any party may propose amend-
ments to this treaty."
Mr. President, there are a number of
parties to the treaty already. I noticed
yesterday In the press that Gabon had
signed the pact, making a total of 91
signatories, each of whom would have
the same right to offer amendments to
the treaty as would the United States.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. What nation was
that?
Mr. RUSSELL. Gabon.
Mr: LA'USCHE. How is that spelled?
Mr. RUSSELL. G-a-b-o-n. That is
one of the newly emerging states.
I continue to read:
The text of any proposed amendment shall
be submitted to the Depositary Governments
which shall circulate it to all Parties to this
'treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by
one-third or more of the Parties, the De-
positary Governments shall convene a can-
ference, to which they shall invite all the
Parties, to consider such amendment.
I think it is perfectly clear that the
procedure for amendments of the treaty
will provide a forum which will soon cap-
ture much more attention throughout
the world than the United Nations. In
this very brief language we would be
establishing a new assembly of nations
and a new method of arriving at agree-
ments with respect to the most important
question before the human family today,
which is the limitation of or prohibition
of the explosion of nuclear weapons as
well as general disarmament.
Subsection 2 of article II reads:
Any amendment to this treaty must be
approved by a majority of the votes of all the
parties to this treaty, including the votes of
all of the original parties.
That would, of course, give the execu-
tive branch of the Government the right
to veto, since the United States was one
of the 'three original signatories and
would have a right of veto, but it would
not protect the right of the legislative
branch of the Government to pass on
suggested amendments, which could be
more far reaching than the original
treaty. The language is:
The amendment shall enter into force for all
parties upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by a majority of all the parties,
including the instruments of ratification of
all of the original parties.
Mr. President, this amendment would
not affect the terms of the treaty. it
would not require any renegotiation with
other nations. It would be an amend-
ment to the resolution of ratification,
which would make it perfectly clear that
the Senate's constitutional duty and
right to advise and consent to treaties
will not be bypassed by executive agree-
ment or in any other way by the execu-
tive branch of the Government.
I do not see how there could be any
valid objection to clearing up this mat-
ter beyond any peradventure. Many are
talking about this being a small step
down the road to disarmament. There
will be a great many steps of various
lengths proposed by 91 nations that have
already signed, and others that will sign;
and it would not be very difficult to get
one-third of the signatories to call a con-
ference and consider all the amend-
ments.
We have done very little to, enhance
the prestige and power of the Senate and
the Congress of the United States in the
past several years. Indeed, in many
instances we have done things that have
contributed to making us subservient to
the executive branch of the Government.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Earlier, prior to
the Senator's submission of this amend-
ment, which I feel has a very worthy pur-
pose, the Senator from Georgia was dis-
cussing with me the testimony of the
distinguished Secretary of State. The'
Senator was saying, and I also was say-
ing, that we thought the Secretary of
State had made comments on this point.
15969
Mr. RUSSELL. I thought he had, but
I have not been able to find them.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I asked the staff
director, Dr. Marcy, if he could be of
help to us. I am glad to say he was.
On page 13, of the hearings, at the bot-
tom of the page, relating to article II,
the Secretary of State made the follow-
ing statement:
Article II provides a procedure for amend-
ing the treaty. Amendments may be pro-
posed by any party and are approved by a
majority vote. The majority must include
the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the U.S.S.R. Amendments do not enter into
force until instruments of ratification have
been deposited by a majority of the parties,
"including the instruments of ratification
of all the original parties."
The Senator from Georgia read that
part.
Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.
Mr. HUMPHREY. This is the impor-
tant line:
Thus, no amendment to the treaty can
enter into force until it has been considered
and approved by the Senate.
That is the testimony of the Secretary
of State. I do not see that that obviates
the proposal of the Senator from Geor-
gia. I merely wanted it clear that some-
where in the testimony, as I had recol-
lected, the Secretary of State deemed
this as the process of ratification, which,
in the instance of the United States, in-
cludes advice and consent of the Senate.
Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad the Senator
located that statement. The committee,
in its report, states that the Senate will
have a right to consider and pass on
amendments that will be coming in from
time to time for the next generation or
more, if we are to achieve progress in
disarmament. But I think we should
write it into the resolution of ratifica-
tion, just as we did in the case of the
Atomic Energy Act, which provided for
amendment. It was written into the
ratification of that statute that any
amendments to the atomic energy stat-
ute should be submitted to the Senate
for ratification.
I think it should be made perfectly
clear in this instance that amendments
to this treaty would be submitted to the
Senate for ratification.
Mr. HUMPHREY. My only contribu-
tion at this point is to invite the Sen-
ator's attention to the fact that this
matter was referred to by the Secretary.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.
He had better help than I had. I have
been searching for the reference. I did
not have the very able help of the staff
director for the Committee on Foreign
Relations, who is one of the ablest staff
men on the Hill.
Mr. HUMPHREY. With which state-
ment I fully concur. I merely followed
the example of the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee.
Mr. RUSSELL. I was sure the Secre-
tary of State had made the statement,
but I could not find it.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. KUCHEL. Yesterday, or the day
before, reference was made to a memo-
randum that had been read into the
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RECORD, bearing on the constitutional
authority of the Senate to act in that
capacity. In the event any Senator has
not seen it, I think it would be a good
idea to refer to it.
Mr. RUSSELL. The reference to the
amendments to the atomic energy
statute appears in the memorandum
submitted by the distinguished chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Committee
in undertaking to explain the very com-
plex procedure which must be followed
when opposition develops to a treaty. I
had been concerned about amendments
to the treaty, but when I found that
precedent- in the memorandum sub,
mitted by the Senator from Arkansas, it
cleared the matter in my own mind as
to the approach which might properly
be followed.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield to the Senator
from Alabama.
Mr. SPARKMAN. As appears on page
63 of the hearings, Secretary Rusk also
had this to say:
Certainly any arrangement for amendment
to this treaty would be a treaty submitted to
the Senate. It is our plan In the disarma-
ment field and the general disarmament field
that to move forward on that by way of treaty
where that would be the appropriate means
of doing so.
Mr. RUSSELL. The resolution of
ratification has not yet been submitted.
I express the hope that the Senator from
Arkansas would include this provision in
the resolution when he submits it to the
Senate. It could x}ot do any haxm.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, with regard
to the precedent in the Atomic Energy
Act, in that case, two-thirds of the mem-
ber States could ratify an amendment,
and it did not require the approval of
this country by instrument of ratifica-
tion. The only way this country could,
In effect, veto an amendment, would be
to withdraw from the treaty. There was
a valid reason for inserting that under-
standing in the Atomic Energy Act, be-
cause we did not want to be faced with
the alternative of either accepting
amendments to the statute or, if we did
not like them, withdrawing from the
agency; whereas in the instance of this
treaty, the words which have been in-
serted in article 2 are, "including the in-
struments of ratification of all the origi-
nal parties." These instruments must
be obtained in addition to a two-thirds
vote in order to amend the treaty before
the Senate.
I ask the Senator what the instrument
of ratification would be if it would not be
the instrument which had been approved
by the Senate?
W. RUSSELL. Hundreds of execu-
tive agreements with other nations have
been ratified by the Executive. I do
not think the word "ratification" appears
In the Constitution of the United States.
I have no recollection of having seen
it there, though I have not checked it
in this instance. The executive branch
might well say that the President had
signed an executive agreement. When
the Executive signs it, does he not ratify
it?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. The way this
Is written-
Mr. RUSSELL. I m talking about
the Constitution. I o not recall that
the word "ratify" appears in the Con-
stitution. The language is "advise and
consent." That is a process of ratifica-
tion, But when the 'resident signs an
executive agreement, he ratifies that
agreement. This proposal is an amend-
ment to a treaty. It does not provide
for a new treaty. Itprovides that the
treaty maybe amended. This is of much
greater importance than the atomic
energy ' statute, whi6h required two-
thirds of those voting to approve the
statute, but in this case a majority can
amend the treaty in' any area of dis-
armament so long as the majority in-
cludes the original parties.
Mr. FULBRIGHT.' Which includes
Mr. RUSSELL. That is the executive
branch. That is action by the execu-
tive branch. I am undertaking-and I
realize it is almost a' forlorn hope, be-
cause some Senators have lost interest-
to protect the rights of the Senate of the
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know why
the Senator from Georgia should say that
all Senators have 1 t interest in the
Senate. I have not 1st interest in the
Senate. If he says that, perhaps he is
speaking for himself. He has that right.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1 do not know why
he should say that all Senators have lost
interest in the Senate.
Mr. RUSSELL. I did not say that.
I did not say all Senators. I said some
Senators. I stand on that statement.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was the,Senator
referring to me?
Mr. RUSSELL. N9t specifically. If
the Senator wishes to. crawl under that
mantle, he may do so. The Senate rules
prohibit me from referring to the Sen-
ator directly by name in that regard.
However,. there is no rule of the Senate
which prohibits the Senator from as-
suming that role.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. So far as my
knowledge is concerned, an executive
agreement is not considered an amend-
ment to a treaty, but is a separate in-
strument. However, I consulted the
Secretary of State 2 days ago about this
possibility, and, with the Senator's per-
mission, I should like to read the reply
of the Secretary of State.
Mr. RUSSELL. I would be happy to
have the Senator do so.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The letter reads as
follows:
THE SECR$TARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 1963.
Ilon. MIKE MANSFIELD,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: In response to
your inquiry, I am glad to explain how the
ratifying procedure for amendments to the
test ban treaty would operate.
Paragraph 2 of article II of the treaty
provides that an amendment "shall enter
into force for all parti~s upon the deposit
of instruments of ratification by a majority
of all the parties, including the instruments
of ratification of all of the original parties."
The United States is an "original party" by
the force of the preamble and article II,
paragraph 2. Thus, no amendment to the
treaty can enter into force unless and. until
the United States has deposited an instru-
merit of ratification.
The Constitution of the United States, In
article II, section 2, requires that the Senate,
by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators pres-
ent, shall "advise and consent" to the mak-
ing of all treaties. An "instrument of
ratification" of an amendment to this treaty
could not be executed by the President un-
less the Senate had given its advice and
consent in accordance with article II, section
2, of the Constitution. Therefore, an alnend-
merit to the test ban treaty could enter into
force only if the Senate consented to the
amendment by a vote of two-thirds of the
Senators present.
As you will recall, I stated In my testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that "no amendment to the treaty
can enter into force until it has been con-
sidered and approved by the Senate."' The
message from the President transmitting the
test ban treaty also states that it cannot be
amended without the consent of the Senate.
Sincerely yours,
DEAN RUSK.
Mr. RUSSELL. That is a very able
letter. It elaborates on what the distin-
guished Senator from Minnesota [M:r.
HUMPHREY] read from the Secretary's
testimony. I do not doubt that that is
the present view of the Secretary of
State, and that he will hold to that view.
We do not usually legislate on a mat-
ter of this vital importance, a matter
that refers to a permanent treaty, in con-
nection with which the Senate will be
confronted with amendments from. year
to year, from angle to angle, in finding
new approaches to disarmament. It is
too important to entrust the interpreta-
tion to any one man. The Senate can
put its own interpretation on this sub-
ject, and it should give careful considera-
tion to the proposal.
My amendment does not interfere with
the treaty. It does not delay it. It does
not have to go back to any of the signa-
tories. This is an amendment proposed
to the resolution of ratification, a do-
mestic assertion, of the right of the Sen-
ate to advise and consent to any amend-
ment to the treaty. It cannot possibly
hurt in any way if Secretary Rusk in-
tends to pursue the course he outlines in
his letter, which the Senator from Mon-
tana has read, but it' would help if lie
should pass from the scene and another
man should become Secretary of State
and if he felt that the signature of the
President of the United States was suf-
ficient ratification of an agreement to
reduce armaments and vitally affect the
security of the country.
Mr. MORTON. Mr. President? will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. MORTON. What the Senator is
proposing does not mean that it would
have to go back to any other country,
as I understand.
Mr. RUSSELL. No; of course not.
Mr. MORTON.. It is not a reserva-
tion.
Mr. RUSSELL. No; it is not a reser-
vation.
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 Mr. MANSFIELD. Is not the word
"understanding" used there?
Mr. RUSSELL. It is in there, as well
as the other language.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor.
EXTENSION AND BROADENING OF
AUTHORITY TO INSURE MORT-
GAGES UNDER THE NATIONAL
HOUSING ACT
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 1952) to extend and broad-
en the authority to insure mortgages un-
der sections 809 and 810 of the National
Housing Act.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, may
we have action on the committee amend-
ments?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the commit-
tee amendments.
The amendments were agreed to.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Do I correctly
understand the purpose of the bill to be
that employees of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration may
be put in the same position for purposes
of insuring mortgages as is the case now
with members of the armed services?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; in the area of
research and. development. The same is
true of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The bill would
extend the act for 2 years. Is that cor-
rect?
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. It includes not
only military personnel but also space
and atomic energy personnel.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is because
the people have to live in out-of-the-way
places where they cannot ordinarily ob-
tain housing. Is that correct?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Where there are
obstacles to getting adequate housing.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is the only
purpose of the bill.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
bill is open to further amendment. If
there be no amendment to be proposed,
the question is on the engrossment and
third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading, read the third time,
and passed.
Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President, I
move that the Senate reconsider the vote
by which the bill was passed. .
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
As in executive session,
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, in view
of the discussion which has been held
on the proposed understanding or
amendment of the distinguished Senator
from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and which
`15971
he has submitted for consideration, or
"to lie on the table, I should like to refer
to page 63 of the hearings, and to read
one or two sentences, because I believe
this is important to the subject under
discussion.
In response to a question asked by the
distinguished senior Senator from South
Dakota [Mr. MUNDT), Secretary Rusk
replied ;
Senator, I would not wish to give a com-
prehensive commitment that any kind of
agreement or understanding with the Soviet
Union would necessarily take the form of a
treaty. We do expect, and we certainly fol-
low the practice of consulting with the For-
eign Relations Committee and the Foreign
Affairs Committee and other appropriate
committees on any important developments.
Certainly any arrangement for amendment
to this treaty would be a treaty submitted
to the Senate. It is our plan in the disarma-
ment field and the general disarmament field
to move forward on that by way of treaty
where that would be the appropriate means
of doing so.
But I would not think it would be wise to
say that any subject we take up with the
Soviet Union should take the form of a
treaty.
I thought that statement should be a
part of the RECORD, in view of the dis-
cussion that has just taken place.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator
from Kansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on
this subject, I wish to ask the Senator
from Georgia a question.
I have only one or two questions to
ask, and I believe the Senator from Geor-
gia desires to leave the Chamber.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
INCLUSION OF LABOR UNIONS
WITHIN PURVIEW OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS BILL
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the
members of the Committee on Commerce
today adopted, by a vote of 9 to 6, an
amendment to the public accommoda-
tions bill, bringing labor unions within
its purview.
If this decision is allowed to stand and
finally becomes law, it will be a great step
forward in utilizing the skills of minority
groups in industry and especially in the
construction field, where craftsmen are
hired.
The amendment, in effect, states that
no person shall be denied membership in
a labor organization because of his race,
color, religion, or national origin.
The bill as pending covered the whole
gamut of operation in which services,
accommodations, facilities, goods, food,
and entertainment are either sold or
served. It did not cover labor unions,
I deeply hope that the decision made
today through the adoption of this
amendment will not be changed here-
after.
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.1963
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. MORTON. All that the Senator
from Georgia is trying to do is to have
the Senate affirm what the Secretary of
State and other spokesmen of the ad-
ministration, and others who are in fa-
vor of the treaty, have said we mean.
Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.
Mr. MORTON. The Senator wants
the Senate to settle this question, so
that there cannot possibly be any doubt
about it. Is that correct?
-Mr. RUSSELL. So that there cannot
be any doubt about it, today or tomor-
row., or after all who are assembled here
have passed from the scene. This is a
permanent treaty. In my opinion, the
operations under the procedures pre-
scribed in the treaty will soon practi-
cally supplant the United Nations, be-
cause it gives the various parties so
much more power for a direct approach
to amendment by calling a meeting and
by approving it by majority vote if they
can get the three original signatories.
Mr. MORTON. How could this in
any way embarrass the 93 or so coun-
tries which have signed the treaty?
Mr. RUSSELL. It could not in any
way embarrass any other nation. It is
not a reflection on any of them. It is
not a reflection on the President or on
the Secretary of State. It is merely a
statement by the Senate: "We wish to
remind you that we have the right to
have these agreements submitted to us
,for,adviceand consent." Senators have
called this treaty the first short step.
The next step will be much farther in
the field of disarmament. The treaty
not only looks to nuclear disarmament,
but also disarmament in conventional
weapons. In my opinion, the Senate
'would be derelict if it did not make clear
Its position and assert its right in this
respect.
Mr. MORTON. Is it not also our ap-
proval of the interpretation of the ad-
ministration-our stamp of approval on
it?
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator
for the suggestion. It puts the stamp
of approval of the Senate of the United
States upon the interpretation of the
Secretary of State.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Of course none of
us could' imagine any Senator being at
variance" in his views in the interpreta-
tion of the right of the Senate to be
called on, under its constitutional respon-
sibility, to advise and consent, on a two-
thirds basis, to any amendment offered
to any treaty to which we are a party:
The question I am raising-and it may
be a technical one-is this: Would not
the Senator think that, instead of being
considered as an amendment, this pro-
posal should perhaps be considered an
understanding, as I believe it was at the
time the International Atomic Energy
Agency Act was passed?
Mr: RUSSELL. I copied the language
in the International Atomic Energy Act
verabtim. It is identically the same
language as that which appears in the
atomic energy statute. It has been ap-
proved by the Senate. I followed it to
the letter and to the last comma.
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15972
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12
THE CALUMET SKYWAY BRIDGE IN
THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYS-
TEM
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, yes-
terday I called the attention of the Sen-
ate to efforts that are being made to
induce the U.S. Government to pick up
the tab for the payment of a $63 million
indebtedness of the Calumet Skyway
and Bridge Commission, the indebted-
ness having been incurred in the build-
ing of a toll bridge in Chicago. The toll
bridge has become a failure, The inter-
est payment due has not been made.
Someone conceived the clever idea of
asking the U.S. Government to pick up
the tab- . In the House, initial action has
been taken by a committee which has
recommended that the United states de-
clare the Calumet Skyway and Bridge to
be apart of the Interstate Highway Sys-
tem, and pay off the $63 million debt.
There are many other toll roads.. West
Virginia has one that has failed. Ohio
has one that has succeeded. Kansas,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Okla-
homa, and other States have toll roads.
If the Federal Government pays off the
Calumet Skyway and Bridge indebted-
ness, why should not the U.S. Govern-
ment pay off the indebtedness of every
other similar project in the country?
In conclusion, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD an article which was pub-
lished in the Chicago Daily Calumet of
July 30, 1963, and an article which was
published in the same newspaper on Au-
gust 17, 1963.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Chicago Daily Calumet,
July 30, 1963]
S'EYWAY'S FLOP PREDICTED BY ALDERMAN
BOHLING IN 1954
Alderman Nicholas J. Bohling (seventh)
has joined the city officials supporting pur-
chase of the Chicago Skyway by the Federal
Government.
in 1954, Bohling opposed construction of
the skyway as unneeded-and doomed it to
financial failure. His original stand nowt
financial problem is sale to the Federal
ernment.
"The whole thing has been, a bi "flop,"
Bohling said. "It's just a mattr of me be
fore the Federal Government has buy it.
And it might as well be now as ter.
Bohling said the surveys pres ted in 1954
did not adequately show neec , the huge
toll bridge, but the city weuf through with
the plan anyway. /,
Skyway manager Jinn/McDonough said
there was a definite and very great need for
the skyway in 195--1rot agrees with Bohling
that the only solution to present problems
is Federal purchase.
McDonough predicted that commuter
traffic on- the road would Increase sub-
stantially if the Federal Government buys
the skyway for use as a freeway.
Referring to the Chicago area transporta-
tion study report last year, McDonough said
total usage would probably double in 10
years- if tolls were discontinued. During the
past year, skyway traffic has averaged about
20,000 vehicles per day.
McDonough said the bridge is capable of
handling 60,000 vehicles a day under the toll
setup, but would be able to handle nearly
100,000 per day If t411 gates were removed
in conversion to a freeway.
Whatever the case, the skyway will not be
used near full capacity in the foreseeable
future as are the Dan Ryan. Congress, and
Northwest Expressways.
At the time of construction, it was thought
that 40,000 vehicles would use the bridge each
day. The present financial setup was or-
ga,n:ized on this basis; and bonds were sold.
But traffic on the skyway has never ap-
proached this for the daily average at the
end of a-year.
Opened in 1958, toll collections on the sky-
way have never been sufficient to pay the
interest on the $100;700,000 in bonds sold
to ilnance its construction. The city is in
default of the bond interest due July 1 and
foreclosure is a possibility.
Nevertheless, McDonough said the skyway
is a very important traffic artery. "It was
"The city was forced to build the way
because there was no Interstate high y act
at that time and something had to done
to relieve the traffic," he said. "A 1 bridge
McDonough said construction the an
Ray Expressway and Interstate 4 underD the
Federal Highway Act slubstan ally hurt the
skyway and the Indiana toll d because It
allowed for construction o freeways gener-
ally parallel to the toll sy ms. He said 65
to '70 percent of skyway traffic comes from
If the bridge is ev tually turned into a
freeway, McDonough i d it would clear the
way for, constructlofi- Of at least two addi-
tional ramps.
He said ramp built', at 79th and Stony
Island and 87t and Anthony would allow
vehicles to'tra i north from these points to
the Dan Rya xpressway connection at 67th
Street.
These r pa were not originally included
`
in t: he s way
because the 1953 Municipal
Toil Br ge Actt enacted by the Illinois
Gene, Assembly allowed toll charges-in
cities-aaorily on bridges over water,
Tin IS, tolls paid'\,on the skyway are for
cr ing the Calume Myer. Since no water
w Ild'be crossed by vehicles going north from
Begun In 1954, the Chicago kywav toll
bridge has never produced the re enue pre-
dicted for it. Default on interest ayments
due July 1 has passed control of t struc-
ture from the city to holders of $101 illion
In revenue bonds issued to finance co truc-
er Co. It was written by Morgan L. Fitch,
prominent area realtor a4d board chairman
of the Ringer Co. -
"As the last beams swing Into place on the
125-fart-high Calumet Skyway river bridge
and workers swarm the streets building ap-
proach ramps, South Chicago citizens who
are to help pay for the $101 million-plus
bridge are speculating about the amount of
money needed to pay off the elevated high-
way. (Which will, incidentally, cost more
than the recently opened Mackinac Bridge
although the big Michigan bridge is about
3 miles longer in length.)
"Investors in skyway bonds ate also curious.
They are interested in knos'ing the answers
to three questions: ,/
"1. Will traffic on 4 elevated roadway
a to pay operation
provide sufficient r7n
costs, interest, and retirement?
"2. Are mainten and Operating - ex-
penses correctly 96mputed for the 36-yeas
period during w ch the bonds are to be paid
"3. Will th Northern Illinois Toll High-
way event ly link up with the Indiana
Toll Road d, if so, will this connection de-
orease s and traffic and revenue?
"Whe complete, the 73/4-mile elevated road
will c rp cars and trucks between the In-
dian Toll Road terminus in southeast Chi-
ca and 63d and State Streets. Eastern en-
"THIRTY CARS PER MINUTE
"On the basis of a passenger car charge of
25 cents and an average toll of 32 cents per
vehicle, this amounts to 43,723 cars per day,
SO cars per minute, or 1 every 2 seconds, day
and night, 7 days a week, providing better
than $5 million In revenue that year.
"Thus to pay its way, according to present
calculations, the skyway must generate in
1960 traffic more than two-thirds the current
volume of the Congress Street Expressway
and a little less than half of today's low on
Lake Shore Drive, one of the world's heaviest
traveled roadways. The skyway vehicular
load is dueto increase by 1987 to 27 million
cars per year, according to the traffic engi-
neers,
"During the 30 years while traffic is to nearly
double in volume, maintenance and admin-
istrative expenses, according to the planners,
are to remain absolutely static. Every item
of the $135,000 in administrative costs for
1958, including salaries, is exactly duplicated
In 1.987, a generation later.
"Every item of maintenance, amounting to
$187,000 is unchanged for 30 years. Operat-
ing costs vary only in the addition of 30 toll
collectors--but their $4,200 annual salary Is
to be the same in 1987 as in 1958.
"NEEDED SECOND BOND ISSUE
"The $10,000 annual fee for the consulting
engineers Is unchanged from 1958 to 1987 al-
though this is presumably to be the firm
which saw increases of as much as 497 per-
cent in some construction costs and an over-
all increase of 37 percent in their cost esti-
mates during 2 years of preliminary surveys,
an Increase which forced a second bond issue
to cover $13 million in added skyway charges.
"While the prospectus for the skyway bonds
and that for Northern Illinois Toll Highway
bonds avoid showing any connection with
the Indiana Toll Road, it seems unreasonable
to expect the tri-state highway to be built
without some link to toll roads running to
New York City.
"Just in case, the literature for the skyway
carries a denial from Indiana that such a
connection is planned, and the engineers
have provided a statement that such a road
will probably not be completed until the sky-
way has been open a number of years and
the advantages of the skyway route well
n rs' estimates as to traffic, revenues, and
ope tang expense are more accurate than
thei omputations of construction cost, that
there ill be a car every 2 seconds to pay off
the 7?? le bridge from revenue."
Mr. LAVSCHE. Mr. President, these
articles po]Xt out that examination of
the fiscal fear lity reports made in 1954
shows somethln was wrong with the
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 9ff
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that selecion of employees for training,
career development, or promotion, be made
in 411 agencies strictly on merit considers-
tions-a requirement we are supporting
through the Civil Service Commission's regu-
lar agency inspections, rather than waiting
for employees to come to us with complaints.
In some quarters -the charge has been
made that this emphasis on equal oppor-
"tun~y damages the merit system and gives
preference to this or that special group.
This is a serious accusation. It deserves a
serious answer.
We are in no sense violating the merit sys-
tem. No one is appointed to a civil serv-
ice position who is not qualified for that
position.
'The truth is that the actions we are tak-
ing, such as those I have enumerated, are
taken not to weaken the merit system, but
to perfect it.
The perfecting of the merit system is neces-
sary to asure that America's future draws
upon the talents of all the American people.
We must see that the moral obligation of
equality of opportunity is fully reflected in
employment in the public interest.
EXECUTIVE SESSION .
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate resume the con-
sideration of executive business.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate resumed the consideration of ex-
ecutive, business.
lI'HE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
r The Senate, as in Committee of the
Whole, resumed the consideration of Ex-
ecutive M (88th Cong., 1st secs.), the
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere, in outer space, and un-
derwater.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Article
I is open to amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of
the constitutional right of the Senate in
regard to treaties, let me say I do not be-
lieve I understood the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RussELLI to assert that in
the absence of the provision he is pro-
posing, an amendment to the treaty
would not require approval by the Sen-
ate. I thought that had always been
understood, and there was no question
about it.
. Does the Senator from Georgia believe
this right of the Senate is not of derived
from the Constitution itself?
Mr. RUSSELL. Of course I believe it
is derived from.the Constituton itself;
but I know, of no way in which we could
assert that right if the President of the
United States were to undertake to rati-
fy, as an executive agreement,,an amend-
ment to the treaty. Of course I have no
fear that President Kennedy will take
any such action as that; but this is to be
a permanent treaty, and its permanence
and its projection into the future are
stressed. I know of no way by which
the Senate could assert its constitutional
right to-ad . vise and consent if a' President
'Were to, use such an executive agreement.
Senators might go to the 'House and
lobby with the Members of the House
and try to get them to institute a reso-
lution of impeachment, but that would
be a very farfetched procedure. Such a
resolution could not be instituted. in the
Senate.
What harm could such a provision do?
Mr FULBRIGHT. But the necessity
for Senate approval of an amendment
to the treaty comes from the Constitu-
tion. However, if we accept the, pro-
posal of the Senator from Georgia-par-
ticularly when the treaty reads as it
does in section 2-I see no way to escape
the necessity of doing that in every case;
and the Senator. from Georgia would
thereby establish a precedent for main-
taining that the right of the Senate to
approve an amendment to a treaty
comes, not from the Constitution, but
from a provision which we would insert
in each subsequent treaty.
I believe the action the Senator
from Georgia proposes would not be
strengthening the Constitution, but, in-
stead, would be a derogation from the
Constitution and from the existing right
of the Senate. I believe that by the
adoption of such a precedent, we would
be saying, in effect, that the Senate does
not have any such constitutional right,
and that therefore we believe we should
include such a provision In the form of
a reservation. That is the way the sit-
uation appears to me. In my opinion,
such a provision would only state the
obvious.
So I hope that Senators will consider
carefully the precedent which would thus
be established.
In the precedents to which reference
has been made, there was no necessity
for the submission of a resolution of
ratification to be filed or even for
assent by the Senate. But this pro-
vision would require that we include in
the treaty an amendment similar in ef-
fect to the amendment which was adopt-
ed in connection with the International 11 Atomic Energy Agency. In other words,
we already have in this treaty a provi-
sion similar to the amendment the Sen-
ator from Georgia uses as a precedent,
which was put into the other treaty.
That was perfectly proper in that case,
because in it there was no way for the
Senate to veto or to advise and consent.
But that is not the case with this treaty.
16001
and general~y'it is true that Members of
the Senate strongly oppose any change-
even in the dotting of an "i" or the
crossing of a "t"-in any legislation
which they may propose. However, I
hope that after further reflection, the
Senator from Arkansas will come forward
with a more substantial argument.
He says because the veto power is re-
tained by the treaty in the Executive,
the Senate does not need to insist on its
right to advise and consent. I do not
say the Senate does not have a right to
advise and consent. I am asserting the
right of the Senate to advise and con-
sent to all amendments to the treaty. I
do not believe it at all relevant to assert
that in this instance we have the veto
power, because the Senator from
Arkansas knows that power is lodged
solely in the executive branch. The Sen-
ate has no right to veto an amendment
which might subsequently be proposed.
The President or his representative at
this conference-not the Senate-would
have that right. So the Senate would
not have a right to veto any such amend-
ment, except after its representatives at
the conference approved it, and when it
was then submitted to the Senate, for
its advice and consent.
The Senate has no representative at
the conference to consider an amend-
ment, but the President does have a rep-
resentative there to consider it. He
might approve it. So we should, of
course, make certain that the provision
will be submitted to the Senate, and that
the Senate will have a right, under its
constitutional obligation and responsi-
bility, to advise and consent to the
amendment.
I do not believe the veto power, which
is vested in the executive branch of the
Government, has the slightest relation-
ship to the constitutional power of the
Senate to advise and consent.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It requires the
filing and deposit of an instrument of
ratification, for Senate approval, in con-
nection with a treaty.
Any amendment to this treaty would All I am saying is that this right in-
have to be dealt with under the consti- heres in the Senate by means of the
tutional provision. The Senator from Constitution,' not because of any state-
Georgia says we have no way to enforce ment a Senator might propose for
it, but that is simply to say that the inclusion. So I think our reliance on
President is not going to do his duty. such a provision would certainly place
As a matter of fact, the President, being us in a weaker position than our position
the Commander in Chief, will be obeyed when we rely on the Constitution. Such
by the Armed Forces; and in that respect a statement by the Senate could not be
we have to assume that every President stronger than the constitution. The
will discharge his constitutional duties. Constitution already contains a provi-
A President could thus stop all-tests; and sion relating _to that point. So in doing
if he did,' there would be nothing the what the Senator has suggested, we
Senate could do about it. A President would raise doubt as to whether the Con-
could violate many provisions of law; stitution does so provide.
but if he did, the Senate could not take Mr. President, for the information of
forcible action about his action. How- the Senate I ask unanimous consent to
ever, normally we do not have to pro- have printed in the RECORD at this point
ceLd in that way. au excerpt. from the. report of the Com-
I do believe, however-and I ask the mittee on Foreign Relations on Execu-
Senator from Georgia to consider this tive I, 85th Congress, 1st session, on the
point seriously-that a provision of this statute of the International Atomic
sort, would be in derogation of a consti-
Energy Agency-Executive Report No. 3,
tutional right which already exists under 85th Congress, 1st session-appearing on
the Constitution. pages 15 to 17, under the heading,
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I did "Committee Understanding' and the
not expect the distinguished Senator Problems of U.S. Withdrawal." I do not
fr,QTA Arkansas to.embrace this,augges- wish to read that section now. It is too
t'oh It .isyery_difficult for parents to late. ' But I wish tohave it In the RECORD
f d much wrong with their cliildren; ? for the Information of the Senate be-
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 16002
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what we might want see done * * * it
seemed preferable to edt it up so that if a
qualified majority wanted the amendment, it
would be effective, but If we did not like it,
we would get out, and thereby have in effect
a practical veto power Qver amendments."
Administration testimony further em-
phasized that in the unlikely event that any
amendment is adopted' which would place
the national interest of;the United States in
jeopardy, there is no question but that Con-
gress and the President would move swiftly
to withdraw from the Agency. Any conflicts
In viewpoint which might develop between
the two branches of opr Government over
future amendments, it !was urged, are more
likely to relate to points which, though re-
jected by the Senate for; whatever reason, are
not such as to outweigh the disadvantages
of being outside the Agency.
To assure the Senate what the policy and
intention of the administration would be
under article XVIII, Secretary Dulles, as
noted earlier in this report, informed the
committee that in the event of an amend-
ment rejected by the Senate, the President
would and should withdraw, if a majority of
the Congress took the position that the
amendment rendered continued American
participation in the Agency contrary to the
best interests of this country.
The committee is not impervious to the
force of these considerations. It recognizes
that, as a practical realty, any prejudice to
the national interest which might arise
from the operation of !article XVIII would
doubtless be effaced in any future contin-
gency by the privilege of withdrawal from
the Agency, exercised! by the executive
branch with the support of the Congress.
Nevertheless, the committee is not per-
suaded that the withdrawal procedure is
sufficient to cure what it regards as a poten-
tial hazard for the constitutional division of
responsibility between the Senate and the
Chief Executive in the treaty process. For
the statute creates a legal possibility that
this Nation might find itself bound by a
treaty obligation which had failed upon sub-
mission to the Senate. The suggestion that
executive action pursuant to a majority vote
of the Congress would' afford adequate as-
surance of a protectivle withdrawal is no
answer to this possibility. Such an abroga-
tion of its constitution duty by the Sen-
ate, ti?.xough a kind of advance acquiescence
in amendments to the statute unless disap-
proved by congressional resolution, is not
countenanced by the' fundamental safe-
guards of article II, section 2, of the Con-
stitution, which requires a two-thirds vote
of the Senate for treaties to be approved.
To the committee It appears essential
that no uncertainty beermitted to subsist
as to whether the United States, through
continued participation In the Agency, would
be obligated by some future amendment
which the Senate saw fit to reject. For these
reasons, in reporting th@ statute to the Sen-
ate, the committee recommends that the
cause it bears upon the amendment
which the Senator has submitted and
which he cites as a precedent.,
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
12. THE COMMITTEE UNDERSTANDING AND THE
PROBLEM OF UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL
By virtue of article XVIII d, as already
mentioned in this report, amendments to the
statute which have been accepted by two-
thirds of the member states In accordance
with their constitutional processes, come
into force for all members, even those who
fail to ratify such amendments. On the
other hand, should a member be unwilling
to accept a proposed amendment, it may
withdraw from the Agency by appropriate
notice in writing. Should such member fail
to exercise this right to withdraw and re-
main in the Agency,, it would 'be bound in
exactly the same way as If it had approved
the amendment.
Inherent in the statute, ther"efore, is the
possibility that the United States may be
bound by a provision which the Senate re-
jects unless affirmative action is taken by
the executive branch, through withdrawal,
to protect the national interest. A similar
result conceivably could follow with respect
to a--provision which the draftsmen of the
statute might have intentionally omitted be-
cause of the apprehension that such a pro-
vision would have rendered the treaty un-
acceptable to the Senate at the outset. In
short, the hazard of the amendment proce-
dure. in article XVIII as viewer by some of
the members of the committee, lies in a po-
tential difference of views concerning the
acceptability of a given amendment as be-
tween the Senate and the executive branch.
Should the Senate reject- an amendment
which the executive branch did not consider
sufficiently repugnant to warrant with-
drawal, the net effect would be a flouting of
the constitutional requirement that the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Sen-
ate be obtained before an affirmative treaty
commitment might be imposed on the
United States.
This feature of the amendment procedure
received a most penetrating examination in
the committee. The dilemma presented by
article XVIII, of course, arises from the rela-
tiveauthority of the President and the Sen-
ate in the treaty process, and the considera-
tion that denunciation of a treaty is an
executive act, even though termination be
effected pursuant to congressional resolu-
tion. (Cf. Hackworth, Digest of Interna-
tional Law, pp. 330-331.)
Testimony furnished by administration
witnesses tended to minimize the risks
which the amendatory procedure of article
XVIII might create for the United States.
Since, according to that testimony, the new
Agency will remain dependent upon the
United States for survival for a long while
to come, the likelihood of any amendment
being adopted against the determined op-
position of the United States is extremely
remote. In the words of Secretary of State
Dulles:
"In view of the preponderant role which
the United States will play, and I have testi-
fied that in my opinion It could not get
started without the United States, I am
equally prepared to testify that for the fore-
seeable future it could not continue without
the United States. We, in effect, have con-
trol over the amendments in that if there
was an amendment which the Senate did
not approve, we would then withdraw.
"Anything less than that * * * would
mean that any member country would have
a veto power over amendments which in
the course of time might be found to be de-
sirable by the United States and other im-
portant countries. Rather than give any
one of 80 nations a complete veto power over
Senate's advice and consent to ratification
be made subject to an interpretation and
understanding to be ma4ie a part and condi-
tion of ratification. Thq resolution of advice
and consent would thus read as follows:
"Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein), That the Sen-
ate advise and consentto the ratification of
Executive I, 85th Congress, 1st session * e *
subject to the interprtatton and under-
standing, which is here1y made a part and
condition of the resol ion of ratification,
that (:l) any amendmento the Statute shall
be submitted to the Sen to for its advice and
consent, as in the case 4 f the Statute itself,
and (2) the United States will not remain a
member of the Agency in the event of an
amendment to the Statute being adopted
to which the Senate by a formal vote shall
refuse its advice and consent."
The language of this resolution will thus
insure an automatic termination of ITS.
membership should two-thirds of the
Agency's members approve an amendment
which is rejected by the Senate in the exer-
cise of Its prerogatives under article ]:I, sec-
tion 2, of the Constitution.
The committee desires at this time to
record its concern with the practice, infre-
quent as it may be, of including in treaties
a provision which has the effect of inhibiting
the Senate from attaching reservations
deemed necessary in the national interest or
of preventing the Senate from exercising Its
constitutional duty to give its advice and
consent to all treaty commitments before
they can in any way have a binding effect
on the United States. Whatever justifica-
tions may have existed for inclusion of such
a prohibition in the Universal Copyright
Convention of 1952 (Ex. M, 83d Cong., 1st
sets., art. XX) in view of the peculiar cir-
cumstances there present, the Senate's ap-
proval of that treaty should not be construed
as a precedent for such clauses in future
agreements with other nations requiring the
Senate's advice and consent.
Mr. RUSSELL. I am glad that the
Senator has asked to have that section
printed in the RECORD.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It will be in the
RECORD for every Senator to read.
Mr. FULBRIGHT subsequently said:
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
to have printed at the appropriate place
in the RECORD a letter from the Secretary
AL State concerning the proposal sub-
mitted by the senior Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The letter is as follows:
HOn. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: You have asked for
the views of the executive branch on a pro-
posal to amend the Senate resolution con-
senting to ratification of the test ban treaty
to include an understanding that the Senate
mutt consent to any amendment to the
treaty.
The executive branch believes that this
understanding is unnecessary and that It
would not be in the interests of the United
States to include it in a Senate resolution
consenting to ratification of the treaty.
If the treaty were ambiguous as to the
participation of the Senate In the amending
process, and understanding could be desir-
able. However, there is no ambiguity. This
very matter was dealt with by the President
today in his press conference. He said: "I
can give a categorical assurance that the
treaty cannot be amended without the agree-
ment of the three basic signatories. The
treaty cannot be changed in any way by the
three basic signatories and the others, with-
out the consent of the Senate. Any proposal
to change the treaty would be submitted to
the usual ratification procedure, followed by
or prescribed by the Constitution. Jr. addi-
tion, there would be no executive action,
which would permit us to in any way limit or
circumscribe the basic understandings of the
treaty. This is a commitment which is made
by the Executive and by the Senate, operating
under one of the most important provisions
of the Constitution, and no President of the
United States would seek to, even if lie
could-and I strongly doubt that he could,
by stretching the law to the furthest-seek
In any way to break the bond and the under-
standing which exists between the Senate
and the Executive and, In a very deep sense,
the American people, In this issue."
In my testimony before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, I stated that "no
amendment to the treaty can enter into force
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 Approv_ee,d-f of R V 8 QS ONJf lit. M G ! 00210065-5
by the Senate." The treaty requires that
"instruments of ratification" of the original
parties be deposited before anyeamendment
can go into effect. Under the Constitution,
the President cannot execute an instrument
of ratification without first obtaining the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate under article
II, section 2, of the Constitution. In my
letter of September 12 to Senator MANSFIELD,
I pointed out how this language of the
treaty, as well as the Constitutional provi-
sion, expressly requires the consent of the
Senate to any treaty amendment.
As .you pointed" out, the Senate resolution
consenting to ratification of the statute of
International Atomic Energy Agency con-
tained an understanding with respect to the
consent of the Senate in the amending
process. But the cases are not parallel.
Unlike the test ban treaty, which expressly
provides that no amendment can become
effective until it has been ratified by all
three original parties-the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union-
the IAEA statute permitted amendment by
a two-thirds vote. of all members of the
Agency. Thus, amendments could have be-
come effective without the concurrence of
the United States. The statute also pro-
vided that any member unwilling to accept
an amendment could withdraw from the
The` Senate was concerned that the
statute might be amended without its con-
sent and the Executive might not withdraw
from the Agency, leaving the United States
committed to a treaty which the Senate
iilight not have been willing to approve.
(See Senate Ex. Rept. No. 3, 85th Cong., 1st
seas., pp. 15-17.) In this context, the Senate
approved the statute, "subject to the. in-
terpretation and understanding, which is
hereby made a part and condition` of the
resolution of ratification, that (1) any
amendment to the statute shall be sub-
mitted to the Senate for its advice and con-'
sent, as in the case of the statute itself, and
(2) the United States will not remain a
member of the $ency in the event of an
amendment to the statute being adopted to
which the Senate by a formal vote shall
refuse its advice and consent."
The qualification in the resolution con-
senting to ratification of the statute of the
IAEA had a real purpose; which would not be
served by' a similar understanding in the
present ease. On the contrary, since an
understanding implies that the provisions
of the treaty were 'previously unclear, the
adoption of such a proposal With respect to
the test ban treaty would tend to cast doubt
on the prerogatives of the Senate under the
Constitution.
-For these reasons, it is the position of the
executive branch that the interests of the
United States would best be served by ratifi-
cation of the proposed test ban treaty with-
out the understanding referred to in your
inquiry.
S(ncerely,
DEAF? RUSK)
Surrender; and a peace of sorts, followed
almost at once.
It was thus that the world and its
people, armed with growing scientific
knowledge by which to construct new
tools of instantaneous destruction, over
an ever-widening area, and with growing
ranges of delivery, stumbled forward into
the nuclear age. Wonderful, peaceful
uses of the new energy were found.
Many others were anticipated. But nu-
clear power was primarily dedicated, as,
indeed, it needed to be, to the defensive
might of the people of the United States.
Our attempts to dedicate it exclusively to
peaceful purposes, on a multination
basis, consistently met with failure.
Scientific brainpower is not solely
indigenous to the West, nor to free peo-
ples alone. And so, alas, the Soviet
Union, aided by Nazi rocket experts
whom it had captured, and by informa-
tion which its far-flung system of es-
pionage had obtaified, embarked, also,
on a long-range program to test and to
manufacture thermonuclear warheads
and Intricate systems for speeding them
on their way, even across the seas. So
did the United Kingdom. So, now, has
France. And so, too, has the inhuman
and wanton regime of the Red Chinese.
Others could, and some would, unques-
tionably follow.
I say to my colleagues that America's
nuclear arsenal has been a profound de-
terrent against a potential Soviet sur-
prise H-bomb aggression against our
country and the West. Our Secretary of
Defense, during the hearings on the
treaty, has reiterated that-
Our strategic retaliatory forces are fully
capable of destroying the Soviet target sys-
tem, even after absorbing an initial surprise
attack. Allowing for losses from an initial
enemy attack and attrition en route to tar-
get, we calculate that our forces today could
still destroy the Soviet Union without any
help from the deployed tactical air units or
carrier task forces or Thor or Jupiter
IRBM's.
The Secretary of Defense has testified
at that same hearing that the United
States "has nuclear superiority." After
listening to all the testimony, Mr. Pres-
ident, I sincerely believe that statement.
He testified that "we are determined to
maintain superiority." And that, Mr.
President, we must unfailingly accom-
plish.
The American people are devotedly de-
dicated to the cause of a just peace. We
are not a warlike nation. When we have
been attacked, we have fought wars, and
we have won. We are not going to aban-
don our liberty, nor will we ever, ever,
suffer it to be taken from us, whatever
the cost. We continue to seek a con-
tinuing security for our country, as we
continue to seek an honorable, peace in
the world, This is not a confession of
weakness. It comes rather, from a
strength of spirit, and from the knowl-
edge that anyone who would try to hurt
us would suffer, swiftly and surely, an
annihilating retribution.
An arms race-particularly a nuclear
arms race-cannot acid would not pro-
vide permanent security. Peace does not
rest on military power alone. In an arms
race, do we not increase the danger of
war by mistake or miscalculation as well
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from California yield?
Mr. KUCHEL, I shall. But I wish to
point out to the Senator that the Senate
will need more study and more reflection
before it resolves what to do in this
instance, I have been waiting for a long
time to make my speech. Of course, I
yield.
Mr. GORE. I wish to propound an
interrogation to the junior Senator from
the treaty b in fact a new treaty?
e,
? upon two enemy cities, pulverizing their
Mr. F'VLBRIdRT. It would. For all homes and buildings and incinerating
-
practical legal purposes it would. I do . their people, with a sudden and devastat
not believe that a treaty could be amend- ing fury never before known to man.
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ed except by following the same proce-
dures which the treaty itself must follow.
Mr. GORE. The Senator has said,
"For all practical and legal purposes."
Without any qualification, is not an
amendment to a treaty a treaty ab
initio?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It Is. I apologize
for that slip of the tongue. It would
be a new treaty. It must follow the
same procedure, in my opinion.
Mr. GORE. To assert by legislative
amendment or resolution the right of
the Senate to ratify an amendment to
the treaty, or to advise and consent-
two-thirds of the Senate concurring, if
we wish to be specific-is but to restate
what is already in the Constitution. In
no possible way could a resolution of the
Senate strengthen those provisions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the
Senator. By implication, by- agreeing
to such an amendment, the Senate would
raise an inference that such is,not the
fact.
Mr. GORE. Does not the Senator re-
call that former President Eisenhower
suspended nuclear weapons tests with-
out the obligation of a treaty?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. GORE, The Senator has said that
any President, by his executive action,
could do so.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. GORE. If a President wished to
enter into an executive agreement, no
provision in the Constitution would for-
bid him from doing so. But an executive
agreement could not be an amendment
to a treaty because, as the Senator has
said, an amendment to a treaty is a
treaty in and of itself, and must there-
fore be subjected to. the constitutional
procedures.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. And since the
Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, such an amendment would become
a treaty under the Constitution.
Mr. GORE. If this reservation or
amendment Is to be accepted and
adopted by the Senate, what argument
is there against many other resolutions
of the same type?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is none.
All sorts of things could be included.
In my view, such a provision would be
unnecessary.
Mr. President, I have just been in-
formed that Mr. Charles Bevans, treaty
adviser of the Department of State, has
informed the committee . on. Foreign Re-
lations, as follows:
The U.S. Government has never deposited
an instrument of approval of an amend-
ment to a treaty without first going back to
the Senate.
WE HAVE PONDERED-NOW LET US PAUSE
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, the gen-
esis of this issue occurred 18 years ago
when American men of science dis-
covered and put to use the secrets of a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD . SENATE September 12
as by design? And, in a nuclear arms
race, free of all restraints, do we not, as
we undertake repeated and competitive
testing in the atmosphere, finally reach
the point where radioactive fallout would
surely become a hideous danger to the
survival of the human race?
It is to the everlasting credit of the
leaders of America that, from the dawn
of the nuclear era, they have earnestly
sought agreement to control nuclear test-
ing, and to dedicate nuclear power to
the betterment of man. That grand old
American, Bernard Baruch, early told
the nations of the world that the choice
they had to make was "between the
quick and the dead." In 1957, President
Eisenhower offered the Soviet Union
what he termed "a cessation of tests as
an integral part of what we call a gen-
eral first step toward disarmament."
Two years later, in a letter to Chair-
man Khrushchev, dated April 20, 1959,
President Eisenhower said:
The United States strongly seeks a last-
ing agreement for the discontinuance of nu-
clear weapons tests. We believe that this
would be an important step toward reduc-
tion of international tensions and would
open the way to further agreements on sub-
stantial measures of disarmament.
On January 11, 1960, President Eisen-
hower spoke of America's proposal for a
nuclear test ban agreement in the atmos-
phere and in the oceans. He said:
These are initial, but far-reaching and yet
readily attainable steps toward a complete
ban on nuclear weapons tests. If adopted,
they will prevent increases in the level of
radioactivity in the atmosphere and so allay
worldwide concern.
The United Kingdom joined President
Eisenhower in his limited proposal. It
has continued to agree with our country's
position under President Kennedy.
Finally, last July 25, representatives
of the United States, the United King-
dom and the Soviet Union, initialed an
agreement for a limited test ban. Since
then, 91 other nations have approved it,
without qualification.
The issue, thus, 18 years after the first
-
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I fur-
ther ask unanimous Consent that the
transcript of a number of questions I
asked of witnesses during the hearings
and the answers I received may also be
printe(i at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from California. The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, by the
terms of the treaty the parties agree to
prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out,
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, or under water.
Underground nuclear explosions are
permitted so long as radioactive debris
is not vented outside the territory of the
nation conducting such explosions.
Weapons testing underground or explo-
sions underground for peaceful purposes
are equally permissible,
The nations agree not to encourage or
participate in the carrying out of the
prohibited testing and explosions any-
where by anyone.
The treaty is open to any nation to
join. It may be amended but only if
a majority of the members-specifically
including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union-agree.
That simply means that the treaty can-
not be amended unless the executive
branch of our Government agrees, and
unless the Senate, by a two-thirds re-
corded vote, also agrees'.
The treaty is of unlimited duration,
but it permits any signatory to withdraw
on 3 months' notice if the signatory it-
self, and by itself alone, determines that
"extraordinary events, related to the sub-
ject matter of this treaty, have jeopard-
ized the supreme interests" of the signa-
tory. And, obviously, under interna-
tional. law, if a signatory were to abrogate
the treaty, secretly or otherwise, the
treaty would be at an end, and any other
signatory could proceed immediately to
test at will.
Does the treaty, in any way, restrict
the use of nuclear weapons by any signa-
Con- _ tory nation in the event of war or In the
Senate. It is our duty under the
stitution, to determine whether or not
we shall advise and consent to the treaty
agreement.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire text of the treaty and the agreed
communique be printed in the RECORD
at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator.
from California? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent, also, that the De-
partment of State letter of transmittal
to the President, dated August 8, 1963,
and the text of the President's letter of
the same date to the Senate be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request by the Senator
from California? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
event of an aggressive act against it?
The answer is in the negative. The
treaty, by its own teriis, is specifically
designed to prevent test explosions in the
three enumerated environments. That is
what it does. That is what it is intended
to do., The agreed communique of the
three powers, issued simultaneously with
the initialing of the treaty clearly relates
the treaty to the problem of "the discon-
tinuance of nuclear tests." It refers to
the treaty as "the test ban treaty." The
Department of State, in transmitting the
treaty to the President refers to the
treaty, particularly the article referring
to prohibiting nuclear' explosions, and
says:
The article does not prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons in the event of war nor
restrict the exercise of the right of self-de-
fense :recognized in article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations.
In his message to the Senate, the Pres-
ident of the United States clearly stated
that the treaty "will not end the threat
of nuclear war or outlaw the use of nu-,
clear weapons."
The clear issue before the Senate Is
whether a limited nuclear test ban agree-
ment Js in the interests of the American
people. The treaty has nothing to do
with the manufacture and stockpiling
and deployment of nuclear weapons. It
has nothing to do with our country using
our nuclear arsenal if the President, as
Commander in Chief, determines that;
American security requires its use. And,
I repeat, the limitation on test explosions
does not apply to testing underground.
for any purpose.
Will the treaty, in any way, require
any signatory nation to recognize any
other signatory nation if it does not de-
sire to do so? It will not. International
law is clear on this. The precedents,
over the years, are unequivocal, The
right of the United States to determine,
by herself, what countries to recognize
and what countries not to recognize,
continues unimpaired. And I feel com-
pletely assured that West Germany
would never have signed the treaty if
she had felt that there was the slightest
implication that her signature would re-
quire her to-recognize Communist East
Germany.
In the committee hearings, I asked
each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
whether he, individually, approved the
treaty. Each member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff answered in the affirma-
tive. It was their unanimous, collective
judgment that, under the terms of the
treaty, our country should immediately
proceed with an underground testing
program designed to improve our weap-
ons. Glenn T. -Seaborg, the distin-
guished nuclear scientist, now Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Copunission, in his
testimony on the treaty, described the
Commission's responsibility as follows:
To develop atomic energy so as to make
the maximum contributions to the common
defense and security of the United States.
We will continue to vigorously support re-
search and development in our weapons
laboratories; the terms of the treaty permit
us to carry out an active underground testing
program and we are doing so.
Yesterday, the distinguished minority
leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr.
DIRKSEN], read to the Senate a let-
ter from the President of the United
States reaffirming the testimony, in-
deed, the pledge, of all responsible
Government officials, including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission who testified
on this treaty that the readiness of our
nuclear testing facilities would be main-
tained.
Our military leaders vigorously ad-
vocate that we be constantly able to re-,
sume atmospheric testing if the Soviet
Union cheats On its treaty obligations.
Seaborg firmly promises that--
We will maintain a state of readiness for -
conducting tests in the atmosphere and
other media. This readiness posture has
been stated as national policy by the Presi-
dent,
What are the hazards of clandestine
cheating by the Soviet Union? I believe,
by the testimony given. to us by scienti-
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1963 Appr
fie and. military personnel during closed
committee sessions, that our skills and
techniques to detect cheating in.the pro-
hibited environments are surprisingly
efficient; and that there is a high proba-
,bility that any Soviet illegal test would
be discovered, If such illegal explosions
occurred, the treaty would`be breached,
and, as i say, were it in our national in-
terests, tinder the decision of the Presi-
dent, we would have the immediate
right to test at once in the environments
covered by the treaty.
Mr. President, I have little, if any, faith
in the word of the Soviet Union. Her
record of breaking her word is long and
sordid. If she is in good faith in this
instance, it is only and solely because
the-treaty is in her interests. I do not,
in the slightest, believe that the Soviet
Union has abandoned its goal of world-
wide Communist domination. The So-
viet Union knows that if, God forbid,
the United States were the victim of a
surprise nuclear attack, our retaliatory
nuclear blow would incinerate the land
of ,the aggressor. I believe the U.S.S.R.
knows that our capacity to retaliate is
sufficiently large and dispersed and se-
cured that no surprise attack against us
could wipe out the fiery vengeance
which we could and would wreak on a
nuclear aggressor. Her leaders know the
full fury of thermonuclear bombs. But
-if such weapons were to proliferate
around the world, to become the property
of an increasing number of nations,
large and small, irresponsible or not,
would not the hazards to all mankind-
including the Soviet Union-proliferate,
too?
Suppose, for example, the nations in
the Middle East all possessed nuclear
arsenals. Would we not be inching to-
ward the abyss of nuclear conflict?
Is it not, therefore, in the self-interest
of humanity, including the U.S.S.R., to
accept a multilateral policy deisgned at
least to inhibit, if not prevent, the de-
velopment of nuclear bombs by more and
more nations? Is it not in the interest
of humanity, including the Soviet Union,
that the atmosphere which all people,
including its own, breathe, should be
freed, if only for a while, from additional
radioactive poison, no matter how far
away, or how near, an actual level of
immediate danger might be?
These are the considerations which
from the very first have impelled our
country to try to reach even a first-step
agreement in the field of nuclear test-
ing. And now, at long last, the U.S.S.R.
has accepted our propdsal. It should be
rejected by the Senate only if it were to
find that the security of our country is
endangered by what both Eisenhower
and Kennedy have been contending for
over the years.
Where is such evidence? Eisenhower
and Kennedy recommend it. The mili-
tary Joint Chiefs of Staff support it.
Out of nine top American military com-
manders, spread all around the world,
eight approve it. Of all the nuclear
physicists who testified before the com-
mittee, the predominant view was that
this treaty represented a step away from
an age of darkness and desolation, and
ment and breach would be outweighed
by the measure of hope given to man-
kind, and by an America-ever alert and
standing guard-representing in her
continuing military power, and in the
strength of her dedication to a just
peace, once again, the last, best hope of
And even the great American scien-
tist, Dr. Edward teller, a brilliant
patriot from my own State of Califor-
nia, in answer to my questions, suggested
And General Wheeler continued:
The matter of proliferation has been put
forward as being a military advantage. I
would certainly say this: If we can restrict
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this is
a military advantage as well as a political ad-
vantage.
Mr. President, as one who does not
customarily sit on the major commit-
tees dealing with test ban affairs, I did
not have the background' or the pre-
science of wisdom to become immediately
either an advocate or a critic of the
that the fears which prompted his op- treaty when it was first announced. I
position might be ameliorated, and that have seen my role as have the majority
the treaty "might still be compatible
with our safety"-his words-by suitable
and available expansion in some of our
present defense systems.
Later in the hearings, I asked Dr.
-Harold Brown, Director of Defense Re-
search and Engineering of the Depart-
ment of Defense, if the treaty restrictions
would not crucially affect our capacity
to develop a defensive antiballistic mis-
sile system. He replied, "I would go fur-
ther than that and say it would not
seriously affect our capacity. I don't
want to say that it is not useful infor-
mation but it will not seriously hamper
our development."
Both the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, relying on both
their military judgment and the advice
of the distinguished scientists who hold
positions of responsibility in the Penta-
gon, moreover, made it clear that, in
their opinions, development of an anti-
ballistic missile system does not depend
on atmospheric testing. As Gen. Max-
well Taylor, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, testified:
As the Joint Chiefs have pointed out there
are limitations in the sense that we can
never have complete weapons effects tests
which would involve atmospheric testing.
That is a disability, but not a critical one.
We can, indeed, develop, fabricate, and de-
ploy an antiballistic missile system if we
so choose.
At another point in the hearings, I
also asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
their individual reasons for supporting
the treaty.
Gen. Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, replied:
Well, the political advantages that might
accrue from this are a great number. Some
of them are (1) the cleavage that now exists
between Russia and China. Another one is
that if we can satisfy Mr. Khrushchev as to
our nonaggressive designs, and we can get
him to pull back into the Soviet Union and
concentrate a great number of his resources
on consumer goods, on his agricultural pro-
gram, and things of that sort, rather than
going off on excursions to further commu-
nism worldwide, this would be a political ad-
vantage.
Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army, replied:
I would go a step further in merely call-
ing this political. It is politicomilitary. If
a reduction in tensions can be achieved-
although I would certainly argue whether
weapons cause tensions or tensions cause
weapons-perhaps we will have an oppor-
tunity to deal with some of the very sticky
problems such as Berlin, Cuba, and others
which plague us.
of my colleagues: to wait and see, to
listen and to question, to advise and con-
sent or to dissent, as each one of us sees
the light.
Let me recall the solemn pledge of the
1960 Republican national platform,
which reads:
We are similarly ready to negotiate and
to institute realistic methods and safeguards
for disarmament, and for the suspension of
nuclear tests. We advocate an early agree-
ment by all nations to forgo nuclear tests
in the atmosphere, and the suspension of
other tests as verification techniques permit.
Yesterday in debate the Republican
leader in the Senate likewise quoted that
platform as constituting a commitment
by my party to the people of the United
States.
Nonetheless, I told the Senate on
August 2 that I would vote in favor of
the treaty only if, after all the questions
were asked and all the answers were
given, it then appeared to be abundantly
clear that ratification of the treaty would
be in the interest of the American peo-
ple and, beyond that, in the interest of
the cause of a just peace on this globe.
Mr. President, the questions have been
asked, the answers have been given, and
I think the conclusion is abundantly
clear.
I am not a member of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. But I regarded-
and now regard-the responsibility of the
Senate, in judging this treaty as so cru-
cially important that I participated in
the committee hearings, both public and
private, and with the approval of the
chairman of the committee, the Senator
from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], I par-
ticipated in the examination of wit-
nesses. My sole concern was to cast my
vote-for or against the treaty-on the
single basis of what I believed would be
best for my country. I listened to the
evidence, pro and con.' As carefully as
I could, I examined the exhibits and the
charts of the Military Establishment.
All of my original reservations con-
cerning the treaty have been answered.
I have reached my decision. As an Amer-
ican, whose prime concern is for his own
country, I shall support the treaty, for
I believe it to be in the interest of the
people of the United States as well as in
the interest of world peace.
The treaty may not halt the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons entirely, but it
constitutes a drive to impede it. The
treaty may, but for a short time, halt
the danger of fallout. Should the Soviet
Union break the treaty, we will, as we
must, be ready immediately to resume
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testing ourselves. We shall hope for the
best, but we shall prepare for the worst.
But most important of all, I believe, for
the first time the major nations of the
world have taken a small step toward
reality and common sense and sanity in
a world laden with thermonuclear bombs.
I recall the words of the great Church-
ill: _
Mankind has never been in this position
before. Without having improved apprecia-
bly in virtue or enjoying wiser guidance, it
has got into its hands for the first time the
toolsby which it can unfailingly accomplish
its own extermination. That is the point
in human destinies to which all the glories
and toils of men have at last led them. They
would do well to pause and ponder upon their
new responsibilities.
Mr. President, we have pondered. Now
let us pause.
EXHIBIT 11.
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN
THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND
UNDERWATER
The Governments of the United Statesof
America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter
referred to as the "Original Parties",
Proclaiming as their principal aim the
speediest possible achievement of an agree-
ment on general and complete disarmament
under strict international control in accord-
ance with the objectives of the United Na-
tions which would put an end to the arma-
ments race and eliminate the incentive to
the production and testing of all kinds of
weapons, including nuclear weapons,
Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of
all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all
time, determined to continue negotiations
to this end, and desiring to put an end to
the contamination of man's environment by
radioactive substances,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1` Each of the Parties to this Treaty un-
dertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to
carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion,
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place
under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits,
including outer space; or underwater, includ-
ing territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such ex-
plosion causes radioactive debris to be pres-
ent outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such ex-
plosion is conducted. It is understood in
this connection that the provisions of this
subparagraph are without prejudice to the
conclusion of a treaty resulting in the per-
manent banning of all nuclear test explo-
sions, including all such explosions under-
ground, the conclusion of which, as the Par-
ties have stated in the Preamble to this
Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty under-
takes furthermore to refrain from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in,
the carrying out of any'nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,
anywhere which would take place in any of
the environments described, or have the ef-
fect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
ARTICLE II
1. Any Party may propose amendments to
this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall he submitted to the Deposi-
tary Governments which shall circulate it to
all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if re-
quested to do so by one-third or more of the
Parties, the Depositary Governments shall
convene a conference, to which they shall
invite all the Parties, to consider such
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be
approved by a majority of the votes of all
the Parties to this Treaty. including the votes
of all the Original Parties. The amendment
shall enter into force ftr all Parties upon
the deposit of instruments of ratification by
a majority of all the Parties, including the
instruments of ratification of all of the Orig-
inal Parties.
ARTICLE ;III -
1. This Treaty shall bj Open to all States
for signature. Any State which does not sign
this Treaty before- its entry into force in ac-
cordance with paragraph 3 of this Article
may accede to it at anytime.
2. This Treaty shall bo~ subject to ratifica-
tion by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Governments of
the Original Parties-tile United Sta'ies of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain, and Northern Irelandd, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republic!--which are hereby
designated the Depositor Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after
its ratification by all the Original Parties
and the deposit of their instruments of
ratification.
4. For States whose instruments of rati-
fication or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of this Treaty,
it shall enter into force on the date of the
deposit of their instruments of ratification
or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall
promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date
of deposit of each instrument of ratification
of and accession to this Treaty, the date of
its entry into force, and the date of receipt
of any requests for conferences or other
notices.
6. This Treaty shall' be registered by the
Depcsitory Governmentspursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE IV _
This Treaty shall be of unlimited dura-
tion.
Each Party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events. related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter-
ests of its country. It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to all Other Parties to the
Treaty three months in ':advance.
ARTICLE V
This Treaty, of which the English and
Russian texts are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the Deposi-
tary Governments. Dully certified copies of
this Treaty shall be transmitted by the De-
positary Governments to the Governments
of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned,
duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow
the fifth day of August, one thousand nine
hundred and sixty-three.
For the Government of the United States
of America:
DEAN RUSH
WAH
For the Government Of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
HOME
H
For the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. GRoMYao
A.G.
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy
of the Treaty banning Nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere in otter space and under
water, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963
in the English and Russian languages, a
signed original of which is deposited in the
archives of the Government_of the United
States of America.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, George W. Ball,
Acting Secretary of State of the United
States of America, have hereunto caused the
seal of the Department of State to be affixed
and my name subscribed by the Authentica-
tion Officer of the said Department, at the
city of Washington, in the District of Co-
lumbia, this eighth day of August, 1963.
[SEAL] GEORGE W. BALL
Acting Secretary of State
By BARBARA HARTMAN
Authentication Officer,
Department of State
(Released on July 25, 1963)
AGREED COMMUNIQUE
The special representatives of the Presi-
dent; of the United States of America and of
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdorn,
W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs of the United States,
and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the
Council and Minister of Science fo:r the
United Kingdom, visited Moscow together
With their advisers on July 14. Mr. Harri-
man and Lord Hailsham were received by-the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist I epublics, N. S.
Khrushchev, who presided on July 15 at the
first of a series of meetings to discuss ques-
tions relating to the discontinuance of nu-
clear tests, and other questions of mutual
interest. The discussions were continued
from July 16 to July 25 with A. A. Gro:myko,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. During these
discussions each principal was assisted by
his advisers.
The discussions took place in a business-
like, cordial atmosphere. Agreement was
reached on the text of a treaty banning nu.-
clear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in
outer space and under water. This text is
being published separately and simultane-
ously with this communique. It was int.-
tialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko, Mr.
Harriman and Lord Hailsham, Mr. Harri-
man and Lord Hailsham together with the r
advisers will leave Moscow shortly to report
and bring back the initialed texts to their
respective Governments. Signature of the
treaty is expected to take place in the near
future in Moscow.
The heads of the three delegations agreed
that the test ban treaty constituted an im-
portant first step toward the reduction of
international tension and the strengthening
of peace, and they look forward to further
progress in this direction.
The heads of the three delegations dis-
cussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact
of non-aggression between the participants
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty.
The three Governments have agreed fully to
inform their respective allies in the two
organizations concerning these talks and to
consult with them about continuing discus-
sions on this question with the purpose of
achieving agreement satisfactory to all par-
ticipants. A brief exchange of views also
took place with regard to other measures,
directed at a relaxation of tension.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMITTING THE TREATY BANNING
NUCLEAR. WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOS-
PHERE, IN OUTER SPACE, AND UNDERWATER,
SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON AUGUST 5, 1963, ON
BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIC.9,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SO-
VIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
THE: WHITE HOUSE,
August 8, 1963.
To the Senate of the United Slates:
With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith a certified copy of the treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space, and underwater, signed
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16007
at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the more experience in underground testing than
United.States of America, the United King- any other nation; and we intend to use this
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, capacity to maintain the adequacy of our
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. arsenal. Our atomic laboratories will main-
This treaty is the first concrete result of tain an active development program, includ-
18 years of effort by the United States to ing underground testing, and we will be ready
impose limits on the nuclear arms race. to resume testing in the atmosphere of neces-
There is hope that it may lead to further sary. Continued research on developing the
measures to arrest and control the dangerous peaceful uses of atomic energy will be pos-
competition for increasingly destructive sible through underground testing.
weapons. Seventh. This treaty is not a substitute for,
The provisions of the treaty are explained and does not diminish the need for, con-
in the report of the Acting Secretary of tinued Western and , American military
State, transmitted herewith. Essentially it strength to meet all contingencies. It will
prohibits only those nuclear tests that we not prevent us from building all the strength
ourselves can police. It permits nuclear that we need; and it is not a justification for
tests and explosions underground so long unilaterally cutting our defensive strength at
as all fallout is contained within the coun- this time. Our choice is not between a
try where the test or explosion is conducted. limited treaty and effective strategic
In the weeks before and after the test strength-we need and can have both. The
ban negotiations, the hopes of the world continuous buildup in the power and in-
have been focused on this treaty. Especially vulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent
in America, where nuclear energy was first years has been an important factor in per-
unlocked, where the danger of nuclear war suading others th t th
t
a
lution passed by the Senate in that same
year; and it carries out the explicit pledges
contained in the platforms of both parties in
1960. Nothing has happened since then to
alter its importance to our security. It is also
consistent with the proposals this adminis-
tration put forward in 1961 and 1962-and
with the resolution introduced in the Sen-
ate, with wide bipartisan support, in May of
1963.
This treaty is in our national intrest.
While experience teaches us to be cautious in
our expectations and ever vigilant in our
preparations, there is no reason to oppose this
hopeful step. It is rarely possible to recap-
ture missed opportunities to achieve a more
secure and peaceful world. To govern is to
choose; and it is my judgment that the
United States should move swiftly to make
the most of the present opportunity and ap-
prove the pending treaty. I strongly recom-
mend that the Senate of the United States
advise and consent to its ratification.
e
ime for a limitation
and the meaning of radioactive fallout are has arrived.
so clearly recognized, there has been under- Eighth. This treaty will assure the security OF STATE,
standing and support Y Washington, August 8, 1963.
g for this effort. Now of the United States better than continued The PRESIDENT,
the treaty comes before the Senate, for that unlimited testing on both sides: According The White House:
careful study which is the constitutional to a comprehensive report prepared by the I have the honor to submit to you, with
obligation of the Members of that body. re.ponsible agencies of f overnme + f
+,
or
---
h
y ~Uullcll, Tne tests - to the Senate its
t
e following considerations be kept clearly ducted by both the Soviet Union and the ratification, a fcert fied co advice p of and the tre to
in mind: United States since President Eisenhower banning nuclear weapon tests in the pat-
First. This treaty is the whole agreement. first proposed this kind of treaty in 1959 mosphere, in outer space and underwater,
U,S. negotiators in Moscow were instructed have not resulted in any substantial alters- signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on be-
not to make this agreement conditioned tion in the strategic balance. In 1959 our half of the United States of America,
upon any other understanding; and they relative nuclear position was strong enough the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
made none. The treaty speaks for Itself. to make a limited test ban desirable, and it ern Ireland, and the
econd. This treaty advances, though it remains so today. Under this treaty any cialist Republics: Union of Soviet So-
3oes not assure, world peace; and it will gains in nuclear strength and knowledge On October 31, 1958, the United States
1 Ihibit, though it does not prohibit, the ? which could be made by the tests of any other and the United Kingdom began negotiations
nuclear arms race, power-including not only underground tests with the Soviet Union at Geneva for an ef-
While it does not prohibit the United but even any illegal tests which might escape fectively controlled nuclear test cessation
States and the Soviet Union from engaging detection-could not be sufficient to offset agreement. As you are aware, continued
n all nuclear tests, it will radically limit the ability of our strategic forces to deter or studies and assessments of the technical, po-
the testing in which both nations would survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and litical, military, and other aspects of this
)therwise engage. destroy an aggressor's homeland. We have, subject have been conducted since that time
While it will not halt the production or and under this treaty we will continue to in connection with the negotiations.
reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear have, the nuclear strength that we need. On The Senate has followed the test ban ne-
weapons, it is a first step toward limiting the other hand, unrestricted testing-by gotiations with close attention, holding many
the nuclear arms race, which other powers could develop all kinds hearings and enacting a resolution in sup-
While it will not end the threat of nuclear of weapons through atmospheric tests more port of the efforts of the executive branch
war or outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, cheaply and quickly than they could under- (S. Res. 96, 86th Cong., let sess.). Congres-
lt can reduce ,world tensions, open a way to ground-might well lead to a weakening of sional advisers have attended the negotia-
further agreements, and thereby help to our security. It is true that the United tions at Geneva at various times since 1958.
ease the threat of war. States would be able to make further progress The first proposal for a limited test ban
While it cannot wholly prevent the spread if atmospheric tests were continued-but so treaty was a dvanced by the United States
of nuclear arms to nations not now posses- would the Soviet Union and indeed, so could and the United Kingdom on April 13, 1959.
sing them, it prohibits assistance to testing other nations. It should be remembered On that date, supported by Prime Minister
in these environments by others; it will be that only one atomic test was required to Macmillan, President Eisenhower proposed
signed by many other potential testers; and complete the development of the Hiroshima in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev a ban
it is thus an important opening wedge in our bomb. Clearly the security of the United on tests above ground and up to 50 kilom-
effort to "get the genie back in the bottle." States-the security of all mankind-is in- eters. On September 3, 1961, you and Prime
Third. The treaty will curb the pollution creased if such tests are prohibited. Minister Macmillan proposed to Chairman
of our atmosphere. While it does not as- Ninth. The risks in clandestine violations Khrushchev that the three Governments
sure the world that it will be forever free under this treaty are far smaller than the agree immediately not to conduct "nuclear
from the fears and dangers of radioactive risks in unlimited testing. Underground tests which take place in the atmosphere
fallout from atmospheric tests, it will greatly tests will still be available for weapons devel- and produce radioactive fallout."
reduce the numbers and dangers of such opment; and other tests, to be significant, On August 27, 1962, the United States and
tests. must run substantial risks of detection. No the United Kingdom submitted to the Con-
Fourth. This treaty protects our rights in nation tempted to violate the treaty can be ference of the 18-Nation Committee on Dis-
the future. It cannot be amended without certain that an attempted violation will go armament, a draft treaty banning nuclear
the consent of the United States, including undetected, given the many means of detect- weapon tests in the atmosphere, Outer space,
the consent of the Senate; and any party to ing nuclear explosions. The risks of detection and underwater. Both proposals have been
the treaty has the right to withdraw, upon outweigh the potential gains from violation, renewed by the United States and the United
3 months' notice, if it decides that extraor- and the risk to the United States from such Kingdom at various times since then.
dinary events related to the subject matter violation is outweighed by the risk of a con- On May 27, 1963, Senators Donn and Hum-
of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme tinued unlimited nuclear arms race. There PIinEy introduced in the Senate a resolution
Interests. - is further assurance against clandestine test-
Fifth. This treaty does not alter the status ing in our ability to develop and deploy lution, c sponsoednby1325Qother Senators, of unrecognized regimes. The provisions re- additional means of detection, in our deter- urged negotiation of a treaty banning tests in
lating to ratification by others, and the mination to maintain our own arsenal the atmosphere and the oceans.
precedents of international law, make it clear through underground tests, and in our readi- On June 10, 1963, in a speech at American
that our adhe, gnce to this treaty, and the ness to resume atmospheric testing if the ac- University, you announced further negotia-
adherence of any other, party, can in no way tions of others so require. tions with the Soviet Union for a nuclear test
accord or evep imply recognition by the Tenth. This treaty is the product of the ban, and a suspension of U.S. tests in the at-
United States or any other nation of any steady effort of the U.S. Government in two mosphere so long as other nations did not
regime which is not now accorded such recog- administrations, and its principles have had conduct them.
nation, the explicit support of both great political On
Sixth. This treaty does not halt American parties. It grows out of the proposal made de pressed July the 2, 1963, n ness of the Govern-
nuclear, -
will llingness of the Soviet progress. The United States has by President Eisenhower in 1969 and the reso- ment "to conclude an agreement banning nu-
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16008
clear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space Article III provides that the treaty shall native thoroughly and found it impossible
and underwater." enter into force upon the deposit of instru- of execution."
Commencing July 15, 1963, negotiations merits of ratification by all three original Now that we have an agreement before us
were held in Moscow between W. Averell liar- parties and specifies how other states may how would you seek to dispel any appreher._
riman, representing the United States, Lord become parties. It designates the three Sion which the Members of the Senate anc
Hailsham, representing the United Kingdom, original parties as depository governments the people of our country may have-I gas
and A. A. Gromyko, representing the Soviet and contains other provisions of a formal parenthetically I think you have coverec
Union, looking toward the possibility of Con- na:ure relating to ratification, accession, and this in part-first, with respect to a breacl
eluding a treaty banning nuclear weapons registration with the United Nations. of the agreement and, secondly, with respec
tests in three environments, but not under- An increasing number of countries have to the question of technical laboratories an(
-cua d. On July 25, 1963, these negotiations indicated their intention of becoming parties scientific brains being kept on the alert un
Icsulted in an agreed draft initialed by the to the treaty and of thus broadening its der the agreement?
rip esantatives of each of the parties. On effectiveness. The pr visions for signature Secretary Rusx. In the first instance, c
f.ugust 5, 1963, the treaty was signed in Mos- and accession have been designed to permit the first question, there is a difference,
c'u' by Secretary Rusk on behalf of the the widest possible application of the treaty. believe, between a solemn 6rcaty soleronl
U *_tcd States, by A. A, Gromyko on behalf of At the same time adherence to the treaty entered into, and in the case of this treat
he Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and will in no way imply recognition or change endorsed by the signatures and the aciherenc
by Lord Home on behalf of the United King- in status of regimes the United States does of almost every nation of the world, on to
dam. not now recognize. or will it an any way one side, and the kind of moratorium whic
The treaty consists of a preamble and five result in according re c ;nition or change in we had between 1958 and 1961.
articles. status to any regime hot now recognized by That moratorium was based, in effect, upo
The preamble indicates the relationship of any other party. unilateral declarations. It was not a con
this treaty to the much broader aim of Article IV provides th.t the treaty shall be tractual relationship between the parties,.
achieving an agreement on general and con- of unlimited duration. It also creates a I have tried myself, in, fairness and in so
plete disarmament under strict international sp ai right of withdrawal, upon 3 months' curacy, to refer to the fact that the Savie
control, as well as to the more specific aims notic tice, if a party firida: that extraordinary Union terminated or broke the moratoriun
but it did not break an agreement when
of eventually preventing nuclear weapons events related to the; subject matter of the That Is,
tests in all environments, meanwhile stop- treaty have jeon.,."?dizeld its supreme interests. resumed not its atmospheric tests, is a at Is, tth,
oo nsa ping the contamination of the atmosphere by Article V provides that the English and had ad among the governments. I as thitra nk that
radioactive fallout. Russian texts of the treaty are equally an-
the more significant.
Article I contains the principal substan- tb.oritative and makes provision for the de- formal treaty is
question, sir,. I thin
tive obligations of the parties. Under its posit of the original treaty instruments and that Now, this would be it much more rI thin
first paragraph the parties undertake to pro- the transmittal of certified copies to signa- that difficulty for us, quite f otam
were difficulty about r a c quite f rarnkl
hibit, to prevent, and not to carry out, at tor' and acceding states. if problem and
any place under their jurisdiction or con- There is transmitted for your informa- treaty which eliminated tests m all sort
trol, nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear tiorc, and for that of the Senate, the agreed and which could b ated tests
speedy viols
explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, communique issued by the representatives tion which
or the other p ctito.
or underwater. In the context of provisions of the original parties on July 25, 1963, at We do believe that with underground Les
devoted to obtaining a complete, verifiable the conclusion of they Conference in Moscow iris proceeding that some of the most as
ban on tests in these three environments, the at which the treaty Was formulated. ing pr work will that done here; that it vanced be
treaty language relates "any 7iuclear weapon I believe that thel signing of this treaty laboratories will be fully engaged in tha
test explosion" to "any other nuclear ex- is it significant achievement. Its ratifica- the preparations for the- resumption of a
posion," thus preventing evasion based on tion by the three oiriginal parties and by inospheric testing and the keeping up to da
the contention that a particular detonation such other states as *nry sign or accede to it of plans for such tests in the event of viol;
was not a weapon test but the explosion of will. be an important and hopeful step to- tion, would go a long way toward p:reveritir
an already tested device. The phrase "any ward the reduction of international tensions, the degration of our laboratory capabilitio.
other nuclear explosion" includes explosions allcvi:aeon of the fears and dangers caused- We would also expect to keep in operatic
for peaceful purposes. Such explosions are by radioactive fallout, and the prevention of condition the actual test sites anc[ not d
prohibited by the treaty because of the dif- the spread of nuclear weapons capability. mobilize those to the extent that they we:
ficulty of differentiating between weapon test I believe it will pror4iote the security of the before or turn them over to other use.
explosions and peaceful explosions without United States and of the entire free world. So that we believe it would be pos: ;ibl
additional controls. The. article does not pro- In view of these advantages, and of the and Dr. Seaborg will be able to address hin
weapons in the hopes and expectations of virtually every self to that question specifically, that it wi
hibit the use of nuclear,
event of war nor, restrict the exercise of the nation in the worlds it is my sincere hope be possible for us to go ahead with our pre
right of self-defense recognized in article 51 that the United States will promptly ratify gram, with our laboratories functioning, an
of the Charter of the United Nations. this treaty. be in a good position to take care of or
Underground nuclear explosions are not R ;p ctfully submitted. interests if this treaty is violated.
prohibited so long as they do not cause radio- GEORGE W. BALL. TREATY'S EFFECT ON DEVELOFMF,]VT OF
active debris to be present outside the ter- - ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
ritorial limits of the state under whose Ex nsrr 3
s ad ad Referring once again t
jurisdiction or control such explosions are NLCLEAR Senator
TEST BAN TREAT Sr the e President's to the people a yea
conducted. Thus, so long as adequate pre- ago he said, in
cautions are taken to prevent such spread Senator KUCIIEL. yr. Secretary, first your part
or radioactive debris, the treaty will not pro- statement earlier this morning was excellent; "While apparently seeking information o!
hibit the United States from conducting un- Sour answers have peen likewise. They are the effects of nuclear blast on radar an
derground nuclear weapons tests or under- "lost useful to those of us, like myself, who communication, which is important in de
ground nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- have not been in a Position to draw on any velopi:ng an antimissile defense system? then
poses, background and experience in this field. tests--"
referring to the Soviet tests-
The on paragraph of article I contains ITICULTIES IN MESC T A STATE CON- "did not, in our judgment, reflect- a Bevel
on undertaking b the parties to refrain rain STANT REA ADINESS TO RESUME TESTING by sped system."
from causing, encouraging, or in any Way "In March of 1962 ]President Kennedy, after Perhaps this question should be directec
participating in, the carrying out of the pro- the Soviet Union lad abruptly announced more properly to either Glenn Seaborg of
hibited tests and explosions anywhere by the termination of f s unilateral moratorium, Robert McNamara. But would it be you;
anyone. This provision prevents a party had this to say, in rt: testimony that the development of defensive
from doing indirectly what it has agreed to 'We know enough'now about broken nego- systems, including an anti-missile-missile
refrain from doing directly. ,ia.tions, secret preparations, and the advan- system by the United States would not be
Article II contains a procedure for 1-,ages gained from along test series never to inhibited by our agreement not to explode
amending the treaty. Any party may pro- offer again - an ulrinspected moratorium. in the atmosphere?
pose an amendment, and -a conference to Some may urge us to try it again, keeping Secretary Rusx. Secretary McNamara wii
consider such an amendment must be called our preparations to { test in a constant state address himself to that point in eensiderabb
if requested by one-third or more of the of readiness. But in actual practice, partic- detail, Senator KUCHEL. But lei me jus
parties although a conference would not be ularly in a society df free choice, v5e cannot comment very briefly. That the contra
necessary for the adoption of an amendment. :seep topflight scietists concentrating on problems of an anti-missile-missile defense
To be effective, an amendment must be ap- the preparation of an experiment which may system lie generally outside of the werheac
proved and ratified by a majority of all the or may not take place on an uncertain date problem itself.
parties which must, include the United in the future nor c large technical labora- This has to do with radar capabilities
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. tories be kept fully alert on a standby basis with missile capabilities, with guidance sys
Thus, no amendment can become effective waiting for some oer nation to break an terns, with things that can proceed in ex
without the advice and consent of the agreement. This I not merely difficult or perimentation and development withou
Senate. inconvenient. We save explored this alter- inhibition by this treaty.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 16009
There are one or two aspects of that which appreciate being here and listening to you. I bothered people with whom I have spoken.
are related to the possibilities of atmos- think your statement was most helpful to When the words are used "or any other nu-
pheric testing which my colleagues may Senators like myself. clear explosions," would it be the statement
wish to take up In executive session, because GENERAL SUMMARY OF TREATY TERMS of the General Counsel that that should be
it does involve some fairly delicate matters. fair to say interpreted as any other "nuclear test" ex-Is it WHO IS RENEFITED MORE BY TEST BAN? urging g the e Senate e to that, advisse you
and consent t to here plosion?
Senator KUCHEL. I paraphrase comments this treaty, that in your opinion the intent CLARIFICATION OF OR ANY OTHER NUCLEAR
made by some Californians in the press when of the treaty is to prohibit nuclear test ex- EXPLOSION"
I say "Russia can continue testing in her plosions in the three enumerated environ- Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No-a peaceful use ex-
area of weakness while we will be denied the ments by the original signatories and by plosion might not be a test explosion. For
chance to catch up In her area of strength." those other nations or states which hereafter example, a peaceful use explosion, digging a
Sir, speaking for the Government, you may approve `it? new canal, would scarcely be a test explosion.
would deny that. Would you elaborate on Secretary -MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; it is. So the word "test" is not in there for that
such a denial? Senator KucHEL. And is it your statement reason. As you may recall, the approved U.S.
Secretary Rusx. Again, sir, this is a matter to this committee that the intention of the draft had an article II permitting peaceful
which ought to be taken up in connection parties in drafting it is not to prohibit the uses under certain circumstances.
with weaponry and with highly technical use of nuclear weapons on the part of any Senator KUCHEL. I remember.
as well as some classified material. But it is nation which finds its security involved to Mr. MCNAUGHTON. When that article was
quite true that the Soviet Union has ex- the point that it would determine it neces- deleted, this language, as the Secretary
ploded, for example, a larger weapon from sary to use them? pointed out, was inserted to prevent peaceful
the megaton point of view than have we, and Secretary MCNAMARA. That is the clear in- use explosions, whether tests or otherwise,
they, therefore, perhaps, have both some tent of the parties. in the peaceful three environments; and the
knowledge and capability in that field that DISCUSSION OF DEFINITION OF "OR ANY OTHER reliance was placed on the commonly ac-
we have not yet demonstrated or proof- NUCLEAR EXPLOSION" cepted legal rule of interpretation that such
tested, although we do have a capacity for a limitation does not apply in time of war
very substantial weapons. Senator KucHEL. I turn to the language of
here, I think that it will beV shown wef feel "Each of the parties to this treaty under- that statement again. It does not apply in
that we are ahead, and to that extent the takes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to time of war?
cessation of testing will impose some limi- carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, TREATY NOT APPLY IN TIME OF WAR
tations on the Soviet side. or any other nuclear explosion, at any place Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It is a commonly ac-
On the underground side, I think that under its jurisdiction or control-" cepted rule of interpretation in international
our experience has been much more fertile, Then it describes the areas to be covered in law that provisions of a treaty do not apply
It is much larger in number. I think we feel (a) and (b). I refer particularly to the in time of war, or hostilities unless the treaty
we have a significant advantage in the un- phrase, "or any other nuclear explosion." clearly indicates to that effect. Now I am
derground field, and we can continue to What is your opinion of the intention of not an international lawyer. But this is
develop the state of the art through the the parties in utilizing that series of words? my understanding of this subject from the
underground testing with full protection of Secretary MCNAMARA. Again I speak as international lawyers. This is clearly the
American Interests. Secretary of Defense and not as an ex- case.
So it is not quite as simple a problem as perienced international lawyer. But it is
saying they are ahead at this point, we are certainly my understanding of the intent of NEED FOR FULL UNDERSTANDING OF TREATY
ahead at the other. They can test where the parties that the term "any other nuclear LANGUAGE
they need to catch up, we cannot test where explosion" was inserted in order to prohibit Senator KUCHEL. In the interest of time
we need to catch up. But this is a great so-called peaceful use explosions which met then might this hearing have for the purpose
oversimplification, and I think as a con- the conditions outlined in the following two of establishing intent on this point not sim-
clusion would not be correct, subparagraphs, A and B. ply that that is the understanding of our
Senator KucHEL. That phrase also appears participants in the discussion but also an
CONSULTATIONS WITH JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF in section 2 of article I: explanation of your statement that in time
Senator KUCHEL. Just one more question. "Each of the parties to this treaty under- of war treaties do not apply specifically re-
You stated this morning In answer to a ques- takes furthermore to refrain from causing, ferring to who is at war.
tion by Senator STENNIS, that only the Gen- encouraging, or in any other way partici- (The explanation referred to is as follows:)
eral Counsel of the Defense Department ac- pating in, the carrying out of any nuclear _ "GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
companied our delegation to Moscow. Did weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
the State Department and the White House explosion, anywhere which would take place Washington, D.C.
consult with the members of the Joint Chiefs in any of the environments described, or "Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
of Staff prior to our participating in the ne- have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of "Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
gotiations in Moscow? this article." "U.S. Senate.
Secretary RUSK. Senator, the procedure by Would your statement be to the commit- "DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the hearings
which we developed positions in disarmament tee that that phrase again, "or any other nu- before the Committee on Foreign Relations
culminates In what is called the Committee clear explosion," is restricted to peaceful on the proposed Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
of Principals, which is a Cabinet-level com- nuclear test explosions? on August 13, 1963, Senator KUCHEL raised
mittee which was organized soon after the Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe that was the the question whether the treaty prohibits
present administration came into office. purpose and intent-to apply only to peace- the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.
That is made up of the Secretary of State, ful explosions. "It is my opinion, shared by the Legal
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the , Senator KUCHEL. Would you feel it rea- Adviser of the Department of State, that
Atomic Energy Commission. sonable for anyone to try to contend that the treaty cannot properly be so construed.
The Secretary of Defense, from the be- this phrase would apply across the board and "As is the case with contracts between pri-
ginning, was normally accompanied by the prohibit any other nuclear explosion of any vate parties, it is a familiar principle of inter-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I my- kind or character? national law that in ascertaining the mean-
self was accompanied by the Director of the Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I do not be- ing of a treaty we may look beyond its writ-
Disarmament Agency. have so. As I say, I based my conclusion ten words to the negotiations and diplomatic
Back, I think, in April both of those were on two points: (a) I am quite familiar with correspondence of the contracting parties
made full members of the Committee of the background that led to the introduction and to the interpretation made of the treaty
Principals, although they had been at all of the language and it is clearly the intent by the parties. Compare, Factor v, Lauben-
meetings previously in the last 2 or 3 years. of the parties that the phrase would not heimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-295; Cook v. United
All of these disarmament questions are dis- apply to a prohibition of the use of nuclear States, 288 U.S. 102, 112; Nielsen v. Johnson,
cussed there, debated there, reviewed there. weapons in the event of war. And, second, 279 U.S. 47, 52; Lauterpacht, Some Observa-
The Committee of Principals then meets I am told by my legal counsel that it is quite tions on Preparatory Work in the Interpre-
periodically with the President for full dis- customary so to interpret international tation of Treaties, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 549. It
cussion there with all those who participated treaties unless they quite specifically state is equally fundamental that a treaty is to be
at the Committee level sitting in on those the contrary. interpreted in the light of the general pur-
discussions with the President. So that there Senator KucHEL. Your General Counsel pose which it is intended to serve. Com-
has been the fullest opportunity for an ex- was present in Moscow at the time of the pare, advisory opinion of July 20, 1962, of
change of views among any of the agencies negotiations? the International Court of Justice on cer-
there or any of the individuals there, as we Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; he was. 'tain expenses of the United Nations, page 20.
have idscussed these various issues. Perhaps you would like to hear him speak "The preamble of the treaty states that the
* * * * ? on this point. parties seek to achieve the discontinuance
Senator KUCHEL. Mr. Secretary, first let Senator KUCHEL. I would like to ask him of test explosions of nuclear weapons. The
me permit the record to show that I greatly, this question for the record, because it has title of the treaty proclaims that the agree-
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16010 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12
ment is a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon jor act, cannot stop the arms race, and can- weapon in our arsenal when the Commander
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, not avert or even substantially weaken the in Chief deems that to be necessary.
and Under Water. Similarly, the cornmu- danger of thermonuclear war.' In a press Mr. MCNAUCIITON. That is correct.
nique accompanying the treaty announces conference of July 27, 1963, Ault)assador Har- Senator KUCHEL. And I must say I think
that agreement was reached on the text of riman, the U.S. delegate at the Moscow talks, the agreed communique of the three parties
a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in revealed that the possible interpretation of bears on the intention. But when the See-
the atmosphere, in outer space, and under article I as interfering with; use o1 juclear retary mentions the phrase "intention of the
water. Surely, if it had been intended to weapons Sad been discussed ly the three par- parties" all I know is what we develop in
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in war- ties during the negotiations and that it was these hearings by questions and answers.
time, some mention of that important pur- 'perfectly plain that this anguage in no This is the only thing that not only the
pose would be found in the communique, the way inhibits any country, tile United States Senate, but the American people, will have
title, and the preamble. Not only is no or any country, from using nuclear weapons, to determine the intention of the specific
such purpose stated, but the communique should the need require i9 war.' See the language used. This is extremely important,
and the preamble make it clear that the Washingl:on Post, July 28, 1 1963, page A8, because very dedicated Americans do raise
treaty is only an important first step in the column 2. these questions and have raised them to me
achievement of an agreement on general "Finally, it should be noted] that it is stand- orally and in writing.
and complete disarmament and, specifically, and practice in treaties outlawing the use of MAINTENANCE AND CONTINUATION OF ABM
on the cessation of the production of nuclear specified weapons or actions in time of war RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
weapons. for the treaties to state expiressly that they Mr. Secretary, are we taking steps in re-
"Further, if it had been intended to pro- apply in t1--ale of war, in ordef to prevent pos- search and development of an antiballistic
hibit the use of nuclear weapons in war, one sible application of the rube that war may missile system?
would expect to find some provisions in the suspend or annul the operation of treaties Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; we are. We
text calling for the cessation of production between the warring partied (Cf. Karmuth have spent something on the order of $800
of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons v. United States, 279 U.S, 201,236-239; Op- million, if I recall, to date, and we are re-
for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear penheim's `International 14w,' vol. II, 7th questing funds be appropriated in fiscal 19,34
weapons, and for the progressive destruction ed., pp. 30:2-306.) See, e.g.:; of $450 million. for that purpose.
of existing nuclear weapons and their means "'International Declaration Renouncing Senator KUCHEL. When President Eise:a-
of delivery. No such provisions appear. the Use in Time of War of xplosive Projec- hewer announced his unilateral moratorium,
They do not appear because the treaty was tiles Under 400 Grammes Wight (St. Peters- it was an across-the-board moratorium; was
not intended to deal with the use of nuclear burg, Ncvcmber 29, Decemb4r 11, 1868).' it not?
weapons in war. "'International Declaration Respecting As- Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir.
"This conclusion is further substantiated phyxiating Gases, Hague, J1ily 29, 1899; In- Senator KucHeL.:I asked this question yes-
by the historical background of the treaty. ternatio:nal Declaration Respecting Expand- terday. President Kennedy, in his speech
The language of article I of the treaty has Ing Bullets, Hague, July 29,1899.' to the Nation of over a year ago, indicated
its origin in article I of the draft treaty International Convention Concerning that we would never be caught short agaiin,
banning nuclear weapon tests tabled in the Laws and Customs o> War on Land, as you and I hope and pray, and we are as-
Geneva by the United States and the United Hague, October 18, 1907.' suming that we are taking arrangements
we will not be caught short again. Secondly,
Kingdom on August 27, 1962. The major "'Protocol for the Prohil}ition of the Use
point of difference between article I of this he indicated that there would not be a stable
treaty and article I of the 1962 draft treaty in War of Asphyxiating, Pc4sonous, or other of American scientific brainpower available
is that the present article I also prohibits Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of if tests could not be seen down toward the
'any other nuclear explosion' in the spec- Warfare. Geneva, June 17,;1925.' end of the road.
ified environments. The quoted words stem "'Geneva Conventions oka Wounded and Would it be your statement that since an-
from the existence of article II of the 1962 Sick, 19,19 (art. 2); POW's Dart. 2); Civilians derground testing is not prohibited in this
United States-United Kingdom draft, which (art. 2) ' treaty that the statement of the President
authorized the explosion of nuclear devices "In the present case, language specifically ought not to apply here?
for peaceful purposes in the specified envi- prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, Senator KUCHEL.
ronments if unanimously agreed to by the wartime: cloesnot appear; it must, therefore, I think it is quite a different situation where
'original parties.' This limited exception was be presumed that no such prohibition would we will be able to carry on a large number
unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The words apply. of development projects through under-
'or any other nuclear explosion' were accord- "Senator KUCHEL also asked whether the ground tests on the one hand, versus com-
ingly inserted in article I of the present draft entire treaty would be ab;ogated if one of plete prohibition of tests In all environments
treaty for the purpose of banning peaceful the parties thereto was at War either with a on the other hand. In the latter case, it
use explosions as well as test explosions in second party or a state not a party. The would be far more difficult to maintain the
the three environments, answer is that the operation of the treaty vitality of the laboratories than it would be
"Except for this change with respect to would be annulled only wgth- respect to the in the former case.
explosions for peaceful purposes, the present specific parties at war. For example, If the CALL FOR PRESENTATION OF ALL POSSIBLE
draft and the earlier draft are substantially hypothetical war did not i*volve the United INFORMATION
identical. The preamble of the earlier draft, States and the Soviet Union, and their re- Senator KUCHEL. Just this statement and
its title, and the accompanying statement of spectivo allies, the war wogtld have no effect then I am through, Mr. Chairman.
the U.S. delegate, Ambassador Dean, make it on the application of the treeaty to the Un;.ted I am most grateful, sit, that you share the
plain that the draft did not have as an ob- States and the Soviet Union. It should be views of some of us that to as great an
jective the prohibition of the use of nuclear noted, however, that depglding on the cir- extent as possible this record may disclose
weapons in war. See Department of State cumstances, the United States or the Soviet all the pros and all the cons involved in
Bulletin, volume XLVII, No. 1212, September Union might unilaterally decide to invoke the this treaty-not, of course, violating a sensi-
17, 1962, pages 404-410; 415-416. Indeed, withdrawal clause of article IV. tive security question. This is going to be
it is apparent from the `Outline of Basic "Sincerely, important, not simply for the Senate, but
Provisions of a Treaty on General and Com- "JOHN T1 MCNAUGHTON." for the people we represent in endeavoring,
piste Disarmament in a Peaceful World,' Senator KUCHEL. Let us suppose that 1 of (a) to find the proper answer, and (b) to
which was presented by the United States the signatories of 50 would be engaged in have the people approve what is done here.
in Geneva on April 18, 1962, that the pro- conflict. Would this abibgate the entire Secretary MCNAMARA. I strongly support
pose - test ban treaty was only one element treaty? I do think that it is most imp -or- that position. Even though, as I say, Dr.
of the overall problem of disarmament. See tart-particularly since, ! Senator MORSE Teller's statement recommends against sup-
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, earlier referred to the word "encourage." It port of the treaty, I will make every effort
publication 4, general series 3 (May 1962). raises a dreadful problem ?with respect to at to declassify every possible element, includ-
"In addition to this historical background, least one of our allies. $enator CASE also ing all his arguments against the treaty, so
there is the contemporaneous interpretation brought up the question; of what "under- that the committee and the public may be
openly given to the current- draft by the par- ground" means. I would xl~ot want to restrict informed of the opposite point of view.
ties. In his speech of July 26, 196:3, Presi- my Government by having this record indi- Senator KucHEL. And the question of in-
dent Kennedy stated that the treaty `will Cate that "underground" lust mean some- tent, as I have enumerated it here, I think
not restrict their (nuclear weapons) use in thing more than an inch or; 2 inches or a foot. is most important. And I understand, then,
time of war.' See New York Times, July 27, I think it terribly imperint if this is the sir, that the administration will supply for
1963, page 2, column 1. Significantly, this only hearing which is available to legal this record--
construction was not unilateral. Earlier, on minds--maybe after the fact has occurred- Secretary McNAMARA. Yes; we will be happy
July 2, Mr. Khrushchev in his speech in Ber- as to what is intended. Then you must to do so. - -
lin expressed a similar understanding. After scrupulously indicate whjat "underground" * * *
'
t mean.
ment to conclude a limited agreement ban- courage" means and what it doesn
ning nuclear tests, he said: `Of course, an And in this case, what the words "or any STATEMENT
agreement on the ending of nuclear tests, not other nuclear explosion" means: That it does Senator KUCHEL. General LeMay, In the
withstanding all the importance of this ma- not mean a nuclear detonation of a defensive statement which General Taylor read to this
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 .1963. Approved For R0?I&S& Yd1A ,Q b1rBOQ$~D 01100210005-5 16011
c al `days ago, he said in part, pendently, and at the same time arrived at That is all I have now, Mr. Chairman.
committe sever'
and I quote: the same point as did my colleagues.
"The broader advantages of the test ban All of us have reservations in this area.
treaty have led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to I think the reservations are well spelled out
conclude that it is compatible with the in the paper which we presented to the Con-
security interests of the United States and to gress. In the purest sense of the term any
support its ratification." agreement or treaty which limits the man-
Is that a correct statement of the position ner in which'we develop our weapons sys-
of the Joint Chiefs? tems represents a military disadvantage.
General LEMAY, I believe so; yes, sir. On the other hand, there can also be mili-
Senator Kuc5IEL, It is fair to say that every tary advantages, and certainly there can be
member of the Joint Chiefs does support the political advantages, to the overall good of
ratification of the treaty? the country. I think General LeMay is cor-
General LEMAY. That is correct. rect in saying that each of us probably
Senator KucHEL. Every day letters have assessed the various risks and the various ad-
Come into my office from people who have vantages with a slightly different weight.
on a number of occasions (as have all of u$) However, the net result you can read. We
read statements in the public press to the all agreed that in toto the treaty is accept-
effeet that in reality the Joint Chiefs of able.
Staff opposed the treaty; that, and I apologize Senator KUCHEL. Even more than that,
for repeating this statement into the record, however, sir, is it fair to say that each mem-
that they have been "brainwished," and that ber of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the lan-
this proposal does not have their approval guage of the Chairman, "Supports its ratifi-
but rather their opposition.. cation."
I think the American people, and the m n General WHEELER. That is correct, sir.
and women in the Senate, share a very great Senator KUCHEL. Any further comment,
respect for you and for your colleagues in Admiral?
the Joint Chiefs, and, therefore, while it is Admiral McDONALD. I have nothing to add
repetition, I think it completely necessa y to what General LeMay and General VIeeler
for all of us to understand that there are have stated other than to say for myself that
risks involved which will, I take it, be ex- no pressure whatsoever was put upon me.
plored in greater detail in an executive ses- Senator KUCHEL. Thank you, sir.
sion because of the security factors involved. General Shoup?
But for the record, for the benefit of the NO PRESSURE FELT
people of the country, it is then true with- General SHOUP. I agree with that state-
out any qualification that in acting simply and solely to determine the best interests of ment. I would like to-I suppose this is the
the people of the United States, it is true time, if I came back here to say something
that every member of the Joint Chiefs of this is the time to say it.
Staff supports the ratification of the treaty. I hold a very unique position amongst the
General LEMAY. I would like to amplify a other service chiefs inasmuch as the likely
little bit on your question, Senator. value of my views and counsel has been
?POAZNwA~H21~G` - limited by. legislation to the matters in
which I declare the interests of the Marine
First of all, as t o the Vramwashing, _ ,I Corps are directly involved.
would resent very much any attempt to put In this particular item I did not take the
pressure on Me t0 come up with an answer position of direct concern. However, I did
either way on this treaty. r recognize. that avail myself of the opportunity and privilege
I have not only a responsibility to the Presi- of being present during all the discussions.
dent and the administration but that I have In addition I was called for by the Com-
one to the Congress and to the people of the madder in Chief and the Secretary of De-
United States also. - fense in person and in private and I presume
So, I say again that there has been no that if pressure was being used I would have
pressure applied to me in this matter, and found it out. -
I have come up with the best possible answer There was no such indication whatsoever.
that I could give based on all of the knowl- I would like to make one other statement.
edge that' l have in the military profession That I believe that there is a possibility of
in nuclear science, and with all of the input getting our orientation too closely frozen to
that I could get from everyone who could talk this business of a nuclear exchange.
intelligently on this subject. Obviously, we want to avoid nuclear
As to the decision itself, we all feel that blackmail, and. it is by these safeguards that
there are possibly some political gains that are stated here that is intended to be pro-
might accrue to the country that would be vided for,
very important if this test ban treaty were FIFTH SAFEGUARD TO FIGHT COMMUNISM
ratified. I think each of us in the Joint Nevertheless, I would like to point out
Chiefs attaches importance to these political that I believe one of the main purposes of
gains. A& to how great they cromightm them, or our Government is to prevent the spread of
I am s. much benefit might ght communism and the Communist system.
ewhat more pessimistic than the other Chiefs are in this regard. Then I would like to call your attention
But if we provide the safeguards we men- to the fact that communism has not yet
tioned in our paper, I believe that the mill- been spread by the use of nuclear weapons,
tary and technical disadvantages that the and I think a fifth safeguard is an essential
treaty would bring about could be offset to one at this time and that is our efforts should
a point where they would be acceptable and be tripled against the spread of communism
.the country'should have a chance to make by methods, other than the use or the threat
these political gains if, in fact, they could of nuclear eapons.
materialize. Senator KucHEL. Thank you, sir. Both
Perhaps the. other Chiefs would want to- you and Admiral McDonald do then support
the ratification of the treaty?
amplify my remarks a, little on'that
,
Admiral McDONs.LD. I do.
General WHEELER. Senator, my position as Senator Kucnsz? I thank you very much,
regards pressure is exactly that of General because, and I repeat this, you gentlemen
LeMay. I, too, would resent any pressure and the chairman are held in the greatest of
being put upon me. respect by the American, people. I think it
Of course, every official I. subject to Ares- is a very wicl ed insult to a man in uniform
sure. Ile has the pressure of his conscience, operating' in the seat of responsibility as
the pressure of his professional integrity, and each of you do, to say publicly that you are
the pressures of his duty to the President, not reflecting what your own views are. I
the Congress and to the people of the United very much appreciate your assurances for
States. I arrived at this conclusion inde- the record.
* * * *
Senator KUCHEL. We have got some Sena-
tors who said they were for this treaty al-
most immediately. We have got some others
who said. they were against it almost im-
mediately. I think the, rest of us are the
great majority. I think we would like to
approve the treaty but we don't want to make
a mistalze,
I don't think there is a scientist in the
crowd., ,od klaows there is not a military
expert in the crowd.
Now, I think most of us would feel far
more comfortable if, as has now been the
case, the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have indicated they favor the treaty,
subject, however, to certain things which to
my lay mind simply must be done.
GENERAL LE MAY'S POSITION ON TREATY HAD
HE BEEN ASKED DURING NEGOTIATING STAGE
As I left the Senate a few minutes ago to
come down here, on the ticker, General Le-
May, there was a paragraph, which said that
had this treaty been in the negotiation stage
and you were asked your own opinion, you
would have objected to it. You would have
felt that it should not be entered into.
Was that a correct quotation?
General LEMAY. I think I said that. May-
be I didn't qualify my statement now. I
said I thought I would probably be against
it. But I have spent a lot of midnight oil
on this particular question, on the treaty,
we had in our hands that we could look at,
looking at the disadvantages, looking at the
advantages, and trying to come up in my
own mind with a recommendation that I
would give to you people, I have spent a lot
of time.
I haven't spent as much time on any other
subject that has ever come before the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and it has worried me a great
deal as to whether I came up with the right
answer or not.
Now, with all of that .time that I have
spent trying to come up with a specific
recommendation on a specific treaty, then to
be asked some hypothetical question of what
I would do, I don't know exactly. I just say
I think I would, but I am not sure.
Senator KucHEL. I wish maybe on the open
record that type of answer might be put in
because that is the sort of thing many peo-
ple-
General LEMAY. I have no objection to
that answer going in the open record. We
all like to have a second time, Senator. I
wish I had said it then.
Senator MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield?
I think General LeMay has a very valid
point. No one would have known what they
would have done 2 or 3 weeks ago. At the
time no one could have known. How could
you give a. definite answer?
Senator KUCHEL. All I say is I noticed the
ticker upstairs says that. It is the sort of
thing that will make people in the country
wonder.
The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that
the general thinks this answer is appropriate
for giving it to the public.
Is that correct?
General LEMAY. I have no objection to it.
The CHAIRMAN. Elaborate on it so we can
have it clarified.
Without objection,
available.
EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTION METHODS
Senator KUCHEL. General, just in lay
terms, is our detection system with respect
to atmospheric nuclear explosions sufficiently
efficient so that we would know if there were
an attempted clandestine breach by the So-
viet Union?
General LEMAY. The answer to that has to
"No," because I don't think we can detect
every explosion that they may attempt in the
atmosphere any place in the world.
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Approved Fa ps2 p ,1 E9.000 10021000 ppte-mber 12
Now, we have some figures; I am sure you
are familiar with them. as well as I am, but
we cannot guarantee to detect every explo-
sion; no, sir.
[Deleted.]
EFFECT OF LARGE MEGATON WEAPON ON A
SUBMARINE
Senator KuciEL. I wanted to clear up, Ad-
miral, your answer to Senator PASTORE this
morning, and I am not a member of the
Atomic Energy Committee. I think he raised
a question with respect to the impact of an
extremely large nuclear warhead upon the
capability of a Polaris missile [deleted].
Admiral McDONALD. I believe the question
was what impact would it have; would it have
an adverse impact upon the communica-
tions of the Polaris submarine?
My answer was-
Senator PASTORE. With the permission of
Mr. KucHEL, I think we ought to read Gen-
eral Taylor's answer to that question. That
is the reason I asked it so that you would
have the full context of it.
"General TAYLOR. Admiral McDonald really
should answer the question. I would say
from what I know we have so many duplicat-
ing pairs for communications that we would
have no problem communicating with any
one of our weapons systems or the essential
elements of those systems, although, ob-
viously, some fraction might be lost."
Admiral MCDONALD. May I go ahead, Sir?
Senator PASTORE. Yes.
Admiral McDONALD. When the question
was asked this morning my immediate
thought was the effect that a megaton bomb
would have upon the communications sys-
tem of the submarine were the bomb applied
to the submarine, in other words, a megaton
underwater burst near the submarine, and
that is the reason I said "Quite likely." I had
studied earlier this morning something that
Admiral Anderson had worked up because of
a question that was asked him in the spring
[deleted].
Now, if we are speaking, as I understand
now, of the communications, not of the sub-
marine but to the submarine from the shore,
I doubt very much if it would adversely affect
them, because we do have duplicating sys-
tems [deleted] I realize that there are some
who ask, What will happen If these megaton
bombs create a communications blackout?
Well, I don't know, and I am not certain
that our scientists know positively that such
a thing will happen.
But if it does, I think It would have less
effect upon the Polaris system than any
other because the Polaris system does not
have to be as immediately responsive.
Senator KucHEL. So when you answered
across the street this morning "quite likely,"
you now qualify that?
Admiral McDONALD. Very definitely, and
the "quite likely" would apply to the com-
munications of the submarine if a megaton
bomb was exploded in the water close to
the sub.
Senator KUCHEL. To the extent that that
answer could be stated in a nonclassified
fashion, I think that, too, ought to go in
the record that Is going to be printed and
distributed.
The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well
to do this, although the admiral clarified
his statement at the end of the meeting.
Were you there?
Senator KUCHEL. No; I was not.
The CHAIRMAN. At the end of the meeting,
he clarified his statement quite clearly.
Admiral MCDONALD. I don't believe we
would like to have unclassified the distance
at which we calculate-
The CHAIRMAN. NO.
Admiral McDONALD (continuing), We cal-
culate this will destroy the submarine.
The CHAIRMAN. I believe when you see
what he said at the end it is pretty well taken
care of.
Senator KUCHEL. Yes, Sir.
Just one more question.
REASONS FOR FAVORING RATIFICATION
On the plus side, Gerjeral LeMay, could
you outline what, in the opinion of the ,Joint
Chiefs, are the reasons Which impel you to
favor the treaty, reasons particularly that
affect the potential security of our people, if
there are any?
General LEMAY. Well, the political advan-
tages that might accrue from this are a great
number. We have talked at great length
with Ambassador Harriman and Secretary
Rusk on the advantages. Some of them are,
one, the cleavage that now exists between
Russia and China-
Senator KucHEL. Yes, sir.
General LEMAY. [Deleted.]
Another one Is that if we can satisfy Mr.
Khrushchev as to our noitaggressive designs,
and we can get him to Pull back into the
Soviet Union and concentrate a greater num-
ber of his resources on Consumer goods, on
his agricultural program, and things of that
sort, rather than going off on excursions to
further communism worldwide, this would
be a political advantage.
Th se are the two main things, that I
would attach the most i#nportance to.
Perhaps the others would recall others.
General WHEELER. I certainly agree with
General LeMay so far as he has gone
[deleted.]. I would go a step further in
merely calling this political. It is politico
I think this matter of, tensions is impor-
tant. If a reduction in tensions can be
achieved-although I would certainly argue
whether weapons cause tensions or tensions
cause weapons-perhaps We will have an op-
portunity to deal with some of the very
sticky problems such as, Berlin, Cuba, and
Others which plague US.
The matter of proliferation has been put
forward as being a military advantage. I
would certainly say this;; If we can restrict
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this is
a miltary advantage as well as a political`
advantage.
Now, I certainly do riot have any idea,
gentlemen, that the Chinese Communists or
the French are going tote deterred in, any
degree In moving forward'; to become nuclear
powers. However, I think Mr. Khrushchev
is right when he points o}.It that their capa-
bility is negligible, will be negligible, for any
foreseeable future that many affect us.
Certainly the smaller toe nuclear club the
better, particularly if you can keep these
weapons out of the hands of more irrespon-
sible and perhaps more adventurous nations.
I would characterize those items as being
military advantages as well as political ad-
vantages if they can be achieved, Senator.
Admiral McDONALD. I believe it has been
pointed out that we all place different em-
phasis on various things oven though we all
came to the same final conclusion.
While I agree with General Wheeler that
some of these things are normally considered
political by some people, they really have
great military advantages, I think perhaps
we might have some other military advan-
tages, too, purely technical military advan-
tages.
It is generally accepted, I think, that we
are ahead in our underground testing tech-
niques. In that connection, General Le-
May says that we aren't sure the Soviets
didn't conduct a rather!., thorough under-
ground program: The fact remains, how-
ever, that Some of our scientists have said
the knowledge which we do have of the sta-
tus of Soviet [deleted] 'weapons leads us
to believe that [deleted] would have been
much more el9cient. That is one reason we
think we are ahead in underground testing.
We are both permitted to conduct rather
unlimited, really unlimited underground
tests under the treaty. I pelieve we can use
this additional knowledge that we already
have to great advantage provided we don't
agree that there is an end of progress in
sight.
Once again, I agree with General LeM'ay, I
am not sure there is an end, and if we are
way ahead of them in underground testing
3 am not sure they will ever catch up, at least
we will have a few years to watch them.
Senator KUCHEL. Is it not reasonable to
assume, however, that scientific brains on
both sides of the Iron Curtain and with. two
conflicting forces using those scientific
brains, that the one that is behind is going
to have a tendency to catch up and the one
that is behind in one particular field where
atmospheric testing is important is going
to be restricted in going ahead with that?
Admiral McDONALD. I think the tendency
is for the gap to be closed],; yes, sir.
Senator KUCHE;L. It occurs to me, Mr.
Chairman, and then I am through, that Gen
eral LeMay's point of view reflecting those:
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending
this treaty, is on the basis of hope for the
best, but prepare for the worst. With. then
specifications they suggest which unques-
tionably, I feel, will be carried on, the risks
that you outline In your judgment would be.
held at what you would call an acceptable
mini mum.
Thank you, sir.
DOES TREATY LIMIT V.S. RIGHT OF
' SELF-DEFENSE?
Senator KUCHEL. First, sir, I was very
deeply moved by a remarkable presentation.
of your viewpoint, because you have enriched
this country by your citizenship, and you
have added to the sinews of strength of this
Nation to maintain its freedom. All I can
say is that I was quite honored to listen to
you this morning. The points you raised
which are complex, difficult for a layman to
understand, simply add to the burden that
a hundred Senators aregoing to have.
First, I want to point out, however, that
in one comment you made: in your judgment
this treaty is something more than a test;
ban; in your judgment, sir, this treaty would,
restrict or tend to interdict the use of Amer-
ica's nuclear arsenal in time of war.
On that point I begin to feel somewhat
qualified to disagree for until this morning,
and I observe parenthetically I have had an.
opportunity to speak with you and to enjoy
and try to listen and to absorb your thinking
on that point, none who has come here thus
far has hesitated for a moment in stating
that this is a test ban in three environments,
period.
And I sincerely believe if the Senate were
to approve the treaty it would be on a full
and complete understanding that the Amer-
ican Government would take the position
that this proposal now before us is a proposal
to prohibit the testing of nuclear explosions
in three environments. It would not prevent
the man in the White House, whoever he
would be, to act as Commander in Chief in
the defense of our country or in the fulfill-
ment of our collective security commitments
in determining what part of our defensive
arsenal should be used for that purpose.
But since you have raised it, I think. the
question should be made -abundantly clear
and it should be answered unequivocally.
DIFFERENT OPINIONS AMONG SCIENTISTS
Dr. Teller, in the group of uniquely skilled
and qualified nuclear physicists in our coun-
try, it is true, is it not, that there are gi.ver-
gencies of view from those you have ex??
pressed this morning?
Dr. TELLER. There certainly are.
Senator KucHEL. So that for a common
layman the difficulties which face: them when
they become Senators, in this Instance, are
dreadful.
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 EFFECTIVENESS OF POLARIS SYSTEM
`1 try to find some things that I can tie to
in making up my" own mind, which I have
not done so far. At any rate in the techni-
cal arguments you raised this morning which
are powerful and pointed, would those argu-
ments apply to such defensive systems as the
Polaris defensive systems?
In other words, you have suggested that
the treaty would restrict our creation of an
ABM system, and that it might damage, if
not destroy, our capacity to retaliate. Is it
your statement that it might damage and
destroy the capacity to retaliate now pos-
sessed by the Polaris system or simply to the
hardened missile sites which you described
and to those other segments of our defense?
Dr. TELLER. I could answer this question
very much better in executive session.
Senator KUCHEL. Then I would like to
have you do that this afternoon.
Dr, TELLER. I would like to say that I be-
lieve-this much I can say in open session-
that by expanding and perfecting our Polaris
system, we could ameliorate the situation.
This is one phase of the general situation
where-to which I have referred when I said
it, that this treaty might still be compatible
with our safety, if we make up in money
what we haven't acquired in knowledge, and
,hat in this sense it is a step toward the
s.rms race rather than away from it.
SCQPE OF TREATY QUESTIONED,
I would also like to say with respect to
rour remarks something that is an appeal
'ather than a statement, and I would like to
)reface it by telling you of an occurrence
vhich deeply disturbed me, which occurred
octually the day after I saw you.
f met with Mr. Poster from the Dis-
smament Agency, and I mentioned to him
ay worries about our using these instru-
ments in case of real need, invasion of India
t somethings of that kind. He assured me
hat it Is clearly understood between the
'soviet Union and ourselves that in case of
var these things do not apply.
Then privately, as we were walking out to
he elevator I asked him, well, if this is so,
vould it not be good for the sake of clarity,
o spell this out in the treaty as a reserva
ion or something?
He said, "The Soviet would never agree to
hat:
(The following supplemental information
was subsequently furnished:)
U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, August 22, 1963.
Hon, J. W. FULBRIGHT,.
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR MR, CHAIRMAN: In the course of his
testimony before the p'oreign Relations Com-
mittee on August 20, 1963, Dr. Teller, in sug-
gesting that the test ban treaty should have
contained language clarifying the fact that
it does not restrict the use of our nuclear
arsenal in time of war, alluded as follows to
a recent conversation he had with me:
"I met with Mr. Foster from the Disarma-
ment,Agency, and I mentioned to him my
worries about our using these instruments in
case of real need, invasion of India or some-
thing of that kind. Ile assured me that it is
clearly understood between the Soviet Union
and ourselves that in case of war these things
do not apply;
"Then, privately, as we were walking out to
the elevator I asked, him, `Well, if this is so
4 world it not be good for the sake of.
clarity, `to.::_spell this out in the treaty as a
reservation or something?'
"Fte said, 'The Soviets would never agree
to that' " (transcript, p. 766).
I would like to make the record clear as to
First, since it was clear to me that the
Soviets understood the treaty in the same
way that we did (as I had just told Dr.
Teller), I was convinced that they would not
agree that any clarification was needed.
Much of the evidence on which I based this
conclusion is set forth in the opinion of the
Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
dated August 14, 1963, entitled "Meaning of
the Words 'Or Any Other Nuclear Explosion'
appearing in article I, paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under-
water."
Second, since the treaty had already been
initialed and signed by the three original
parties, and, at the urgent invitation of the
Soviets as well as ourselves, by a large num-
ber of other nations, it seems clear to me
that the Soviets would not agree to reopen
the negotiations, require resignature or re-
consideration by all of such parties, and
defer the date on which the treaty can be-
come effective, merely for the purpose of
adding more words to clarify an intention
which they did not consider required any
clarification.
Third, my experience in negotiating with
the Soviets over the years had convinced me
that they would oppose legalistic qualifica-
tions in the treaty language which were not
absolutely necessary, because of their belief
that such qualifications would tend to re-
duce the directness of the appeal of the
treaty to the mass audiences on which they
would like it to have an impact.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM C. FOSTER.
Dr. TELLER. I should say that those of us
who are trying to testify from different points
of view about technical subjects should try
to make things on the technical side as clear
to you as possible, so that you should not
make your decision usiSer the authority of so
and so, but on the basis of the objective evi-
dence that you culled from our partly con-
tradictory testimony.
I would be much happier if a similar
attempt would be made in the legal field be-
cause in this legal question I am utterly con-
fused. We don't mean it but we must say it.
I don't see why.
Senator KUCHEL. The only document or
writing which bears on the intent of the
parties, If we try to analyze the legal aspects
of this compact, was the agreed-upon com-
munique which was issued at the time the
treaty was initialed. It appears to me that
the whole essence of that agreed-upon com-
munique was to restrict the area of the agree-
ment to nuclear testing in the environments
mentioned.
But I must say, as I have listened here
these last 7, 8 days, there are questions of the
intent of the parties in other fields that re-
quire additional testimony. However, I say
with profound respect, that I would disagree
with you on that point in your statement.
VIOLATION OF TELLER PROPOSAL POSSIBLE
Dr. Teller, in the Teller-Libby proposal for
a test ban of several years ago, would there
have been any possibility for a clandestine
breach by the Soviet Union of your proposal
without the United States discovering the
breach?
Dr. TELLER. I think the answer is "Yes."
But I do not think that this probability
would be at all great.
Let me tell you what kind of a breach
could occur, and this example in itself
might tell you the quality of my confidence
In this treaty.
This treaty might-should`-prohibit a test
in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and the
Russians could send a ship to-the South At-
fantic, launch a big explosion from -there,
which makes a sizable contribution to this
megaton fission product, and then say it was
the United States.
We would know about it. In this sense
they may cheat. Or they might say it was
the French. Wherever there is a treaty there
is at least some chance of a breach, but I
don't think that this breach would be so
much a clandestine breach. It would be sort
of a brazen breach.
Senator KUCHEL. Insidious.
PROBLEMS OF ABM DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT
TESTING
President Kennedy, in his news conference
several days ago, indicated that those upon
whom he was relying rather felt that the
problems of developing a missile defense
were almost insurmountable.
This Congress, if I recall, has appropriated
about half a million dollars to commence the
studies. I asked the Secretary, Secretary
McNamara, and Chairman Seaborg if we
were proceeding under that appropriation
and they both said, "Of course, yes"; which
I assume would be completely correct.
Your statement is that we can proceed
toward the development of a missile defense
system but that, in your opinion, in the
absence of testing in the atmosphere you
would be unable to guarantee the efficiency
of such a system.
Dr. TELLER. That is right, and furthermore,
in the absence of such experimentation
statements like that of the President could
be more easily made and could have more
easily an effect.
EISENHOWER MORATORIUM
Senator KUCHEL. We are all Americans. I
thrilled to General Eisenhower's statements
as I did to President Kennedy's address at
his inauguration. All of us in this country
seek peace with justice. All of us, I think,
have hoped over these last many years that
we might be able to inch ahead in prohibit-
Ing or in restricting and confining the devel-
opment of these horrible weapons of destruc-
tion.
We prayed that time would be on our side.
President Eisenhower's unilateral decision for
a moratorium across the board, I think most
of us in this room, as laymen and as people
seeking peace, felt was right.
I know you, sir, felt that from the stand-
point of the security of our country, that
decision was wrong. Nevertheless, we were
astounded when the Soviet Union first ac-
cepted it on its own and then broke it.
TELLER RECOMMENDATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL
One question: Ifow would you as-an Amer
ican citizen suggest to your Government that
the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms
race, be controlled and be made to subside
and how would you' recommend `that pro-
liferation be prohibited?
Dr. TELLER. I would recommend three
measures. One I have already mentioned to
you-the proposal of Libby and myself.
The second goes more closely to the heart
of the matter. Arms limitations are not
possible unless there is openness. What is
the real preventive of any arms limitation
is secrecy.
Senator KUCHEL. Is what?
Dr. TELLER. Secrecy, the enormous weight
of Soviet secrecy. This is what we have to
fight.
Now, we can do something to fight it. We
have secrets, too. The Russians know all
our secrets, I believe, all our important
secrets. Sometimes I fear that the Russians
know all the secrets we are going to discover
in the next 2 years. But we don't tell it
to our people. We don't tell it to our allies,
and by having some secrecy we have a harder
time to convince the Russians, individual
Russian scientists and Russian people, some
of whom don't like secrecy either. We
should try to convince them that this is the
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heart of the matter. Here is another thing
where unilateral action could do a lot of
good.
Abandon as much of- secrecy, particularly
technological secrecy as possible. Nobody
needs to know where our Polaris submarines
are going, that Is proper, that is operations.
But technological secrecy only leads to con-
fusion, and Is not in agreement with the
basic institutions of the United States.
The third thing that I recommend is that
we strengthen the ties within the Atlantic
Community, strengthen them to the point
where we can feel that we can act as a
unit, as a strong unit within which there
are no secrets, and which can act in concert.
The best deterrent to De Gaulle is if he
does not need a nuclear explosive.
Senator KucHEL. Thank you, sir.
Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Brown, your state-
ment was very excellent. I find it very use-
ful. As a scientist, you have, a facility to
express yourself in relatively understandable
English although I must say that when you
speak of the "fourth power," you lose me.
Dr. BROWN. That was an interpolation, sir,
CAN ABM SYSTEM BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT
TESTS?
Senator KUCHEL. Yes, sir; Dr. Teller, in op-
posing ratification of the treaty, described
it in his opinion as a step toward war.
Generally speaking, in his opinion, the
treaty would restrict or prevent the develop-
ment of an operational ABM system, and it
would undermine the credibility of our re-
taliatory capability.
Do you agree with that or disagree?
Dr. BROWN. I disagree, Senator KUCHEL,
I have known Edward Teller for a dozen
years. I have been not only a close profes-
sional associate but he has been a dear per-
sonal friend of mine. I have had, and do
have, the greatest respect for him, and I
have had, and do have, a deep personal affec-
tion for him.
On this matter we disagree. He thinks I
am wrong. I obviously think he is wrong.
Senator KUCHEL. Would it be your testi-
mony that It is not necessary in the con-
struction or the fabrication or the manufac-
ture of an antimissile defense system for at-
mospheric testing in order to provide a
creditable defense system.
Dr. BROWN. I am not sure that an effec-
tive system can be provided at all, but if it
can, the degradation by not being able to
do atmospheric tests will be a small part of
the problem-will be a small degradation.
In all of these meetings that I have men-
tioned in connection with Senator MANS-
FIELD'S question, when the people who are
working_on ballistic missile defense talk
about the main problems, or the main new
and exciting ideas, almost everything that
they say has nothing to do with nuclear
testing.
Senator LAUSCHE. Nothing to do with
what?
Dr. BROWN. Nuclear testing at all, and of
what does have to do with nuclear testing,
testing In the atmosphere. Russians~didvthem. , \,Ve :tavo not and we
Senator KUCHEL. So that in your judg- know that the Soviets tsa.ve not, done much
ment the restriction of the treaty would high-yield tests near t#Ie ground.
not crucially affect our capacity, whatever Senator KUCHEL. Is tt important whether
it may be, to develop an antimissile system? it is near the ground or not near the ground?
Dr. BROWN. I would go further than that Dr. BROWN. Oh, yes, i~ you are going to find
and say it would not seriously - affect our the effect on a hardened missile site on the
capacity. I don't want to say that it is not earth shock you have tQ do the test near the
useful Information but it will not seriously
hamper our development.
UNCERTAINTIES REDUCED AS RESULT OF HARD
SITE TESTS
Senator KUCHEL. In your statement on
page 3 you say, in part:
"The effects of surface bursts on hard-
Later on:
"Some uncertainty remains in our minds
about the effects on hard sites.. The Soviet
Union appears to be In the same situation
regarding the effects of surface bursts."
And then later on:
The separation and numbers of our pro-
jected Minuteman forge in addition to their
hardening certainly prvide adequate margin
against these uncert nties as well as the
uncertainty in the precise distance at which
a given yield can destroy a site."
Again referring to the testimony of Dr.
Teller yesterday he seriously questions the
treaty specifically b3c4use in his judgment
nuclear testing in th$ atmosphere is vital
to the security interests withrespect to this
problem about which; I have just quoted
you.
When you describe Ithe several low-yield
explosions which we have undertaken to
determine an effect on the hardened missile
sites now in an oPeratdo:nal status, are your
conclusions that they are in a satisfactory
security status-again' in derogation or in
opposition of what Dr.Teller's position is?
Dr. BROWN. I thing that here we may
not be in opposition o much on the facts
but perhaps on the conclusions. I believe
that our past tests have reduced uncertain-
ties in how close an Incoming missile has
to land in order to knock out our base by a
substantial amount. Some uncertainty re-
mains.
On the other hand we know if they hit
close enough they are; going to destroy our
hardened bases that is why we have sepa-
rated them and that Is why we have hard-
ened them and that is Why we have so many
of them. -
The uncertainties in~ the accuracy and the
uncertainties in the yield of the Soviet attack
that might be launched in 1970 have had to
be compensated by these various measures.
These same measures automatically com-
pensate for the remaining uncertainty, in
the vulnerability of o air sites.
-F'or example, supposing that our sites
aren't as hard as we say, as, we think-al-
though the Soviets, if they have any sense,
will asume them to be even harder than that
in their targeting-it might be that if they
could only withstand one-fifth or one-sixth
or one-tenth the shock, a missile could land
twice as far away and still knock out the mis-
sile system. But we have separated them
encugh and can separate them still farther
so that they can't knock out many at once.
Senator KUCHEL. Tote use the words "low
yield" in describing the explosions that were
made.
HD1H-YIELD TESTS WOULD HAVE REDUCED
UNCERTAINTIES
Would it have been letter to have any ad-
ditional tests of high yield?
Dr. BROWN. Yes; I believe that the uncer-
tainties could have been reduced still further
by high-yield tests, and some of the projected
tests that we could- dq would be high-yield
tests; these would be so high-in order to do
any good beyond what we now know, that
Senator KucHEL. ThEn your statement on
the Soviet history in this field is based upon
your intelligence reports?
HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIONS-DIFFICULT TO PREPARE
ened structures such as missile sites have Senator KUCHEL. I wonder why we didn't
been studied in the United States by means have any high-yield explosions close to the
of several low-yield explosions." ground In our last testing?
Dr. BnowN. Well, in the first place, we had
some before, but as has been pointed out,
that was a time when we didn't have hard
sites to test them'on.
It turns out that in order to do a decent
hard-site vulnerability test you need to do
it in the', same kind of ground as your mis-
sile sites, and the area in the Pacific that
was available to us isn't that kind,.
In the second place, carrying them out
close to the ground produces large amounts
of local fallout, and can, therefore, be fairly
dangerous to the inhabitants in the vicinity.
In order to get ready for Something like that
would take quite a long time.
Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Brown, I don't think
we are going to have any disagreement on
this statement by anyone here at the table
or by you or anyone seated here.
WEAPONS-FOR DEFENSE ONLY
The goal, the basic goal, of the United
States is the security of the people of the
United States in a world at peace with jus-
tice. That is what our leaders have said,
that is what I am, sure we believe. We are a
peaceful people.
We maintain a defense, we maintain a
nuclear arsenal, not for purposes of aggres-
sion but for purposes of potential defense.
We oppose proliferation of nuclear nations
even by statute in one instance.
You say at the conclusion of your paper:
"The limited effect of the treaty on out
strategic superiority means that the benefit:
to our security in the broader sense will not
be outweighed by military technological fac.
tors. Having satisfied myself as completel3
as humanly possible that the proposed treaty
cannot substantially impair our strategic
superiority if we take the steps outlined,
find the arguments for it on broader ground;
persuasive, and I fully support its ratifica
tion."
Now forgetting all the technical aspects c
your paper and the disagreements which ex
ist between scientists who appear here anc
testify for it and against it, will you tell thi;
committee as an American citizen, why yor
believe this treaty ought to be approved bs
the U.S. Senate on broad grounds?
Dr. BROWN. I should point out that in do-
ing so, I speak--
-Senator KucHEL. For yourself.
Dr. BROWN. Not as a broad expert, not as
an. expert on the broad picture, although I
have been involved in this now for ii years,
very deeply. I come to it with whatever
biases a technical person automatically has,
and I have that view of things.
ARMS LIMITATION TREATY--ONE STEP TO
SECURITY
The arms race has not provided anyone
with permanent security. Arms limitation
will not automatically provide anyone with
permanent security. But I believe that we
must pursue both our own military strength
and whatever we can achieve in the way of
enforceable arms limitation agreements.
Otherwise the hopes, I am quite sure the
hopes of many people that somehow we will
be able technologically to invent ourselves
out of the arms race are not going to succeed.
Senator KucHEL. Do you regard this as
an arms limitation treaty in any respect?
Dr. BROWN. It does limit arms develop-
ment. It does not reduce armaments but it
does reduce arms development. I believe
that unless we get some kind of arms limi-
tation as well as maintaining our own mili-
tary capability the next 10 years are going to
see further degradation in everyone's secur-
ity as other nations obtain nuclear weapons,
less responsible ones than have them now, :i
think that will make everyone less secure.
I don't say this treaty is going to solve
that or produce the millenium but I think
in the absence of this treaty, which has rep-
resented the first step, no one can go on to
anything else.
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - E A 16015
I think that we, having taken this first
step, have to consider other arms limitation
possibilities, reject them if they are not in
our security interests. I believe in only that
way can we do something to keep our secur-
ity from getting worse.
I don't think this is a panacea, but having
satisfied myself that it is not going substan-
tially to reduce our strategic superiority, if
we do everything that also we can and should
do, I believe that the treaty should be ap-
proved for these broader reasons.
RISKS-BUT NOT SUBSTANTIAL
Senator KucHEL. You do not believe that
it constitutes a risk to American security?
Dr. BROWN. I believe that there are risks
in the treaty. I think if the Soviets cheat
as much as they can, and then make a sur-
prise test, even if we are as ready as we can
be, that they will make certain gains.
I don't consider them to be substantial.
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator, your time 1s
up.
Senator KUCHEL: Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
DR. LIBBY's POSITION ON MORATORIUM DURING
AEC CHAIRMANSHIP
Senator KUCHEL. Dr. Libby, first the com-
mittee is honored to listen to you, and I
certainly have enjoyed listening to your
answers.
Did-you participate, Dr. Libby, in the
discussions that I assume took place before
General Eisenhower announced his unilat-
eral moratorium?
Dr. LIBBY. Yes, I was on the Commission,
Senator.
Senator KUCHEL. Did you recommend such
a moratorium by General Eisenhower?
Dr. LIBBY. Well, we had many, many dis-
cussions and I think it is fair to say that
the Commission was worried about this but
went along with it. I should remind you
that the Commissioners are not individually
in the Presidential confidence. It is usually
managed through the chairman.
Senator KUCHEL. Did you make' your own
views known, Doctor?
Dr. LIBBY. My own views were not in any
essential disagreement with the action which
the President took.
_SUPPORT IN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DECISION
FOR MORATORIUM
Senator KUCHEL. Would it be fair then to
say that you suported the President, Presi-
dent Eisenhower's decision?
Dr. LIBBY. I was worried but went along,
shall we say.
This is a feeling that, well, we can detect
and we can be prepared. This latter point
was a source of some disappointment to me.
It does prove rather difficult to keep the lab-
oratories right on instant notice or coming
tinction between the situation under the
moratorium and this proposed treaty, to wit:
That under the moratorium there was no
testing as you have just suggested, but un-
der this treaty there is underground testing
so that the stable of scientific brains can
remain active under this treaty whereas it
could not under the moratorium, is that a
fair statement?
Dr. LIBBY. I certainly' agree with that. It
seems to me there are enough opportunities
for testing out things in principle, and I
would point out, Senator Kuchel, that by
and large Los Alamos and Livermore are not
what you would call effects laboratories.
They do effects, but by and large they are
after the principle of the explosion and how
the thing works, and so except for this all-
important area of the-this very Important
area in my mind-of the very large weapon
they can carry this forward.
Now, they can be in good scientific fettle
and have good ideas and plans on the basis
of this, I believe.
DETONATION OF 65 MEGATON ENABLES DEVELOP-
MENT OF 100 MEGATON
Senator KucHEL. Now, Doctor, do we know
whether the Soviet Union detonated a hun-
dred-megaton device?
Dr. LIBBY. Well, I think we are sure they
did not, and that the one they shot was
somewhere around 65, I forget the exact
announced number.
Senator KUCHEL. Is it feasible for a nation
in testing a 65-megaton bomb automatically
to construct a 100-megaton bomb?
Dr. LIBBY. Yes, sir.
Senator KUCHEL. Is it feasible for this
country to construct a 100-megaton bomb on
the basis of the tests that we have had?
Dr. LIBBY. I do not believe so. The extrap-
olation is too great.
DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS PRESENTED
Senator KucHEL. Now, you suggest, Dr.
Libby, in your statement, "to your fullest
satisfaction the facts as presently known
on the point of whether the possession of
this weapon"-referring to the 100-megaton
bomb-"is a commanding advantage to the
Soviet."
I read into the problem for these Senators
two basic issues, among others: One is the
security of the American people, and two, it
Is the prayer of the American people, and
the people of the world, for world peace.
There isn't a nuclear physicist in the
bunch here, and in spite of some of the com-
ments occasionally, I doubt that there are
any military experts in the U.S. Senate.
There. are some political experts, my friend
from Nebraska suggests; I think that is prob-
ably true.
So in order to make our decision we call
Dr. LIBBY. Well, Senator, it seems to me
you have no choice but to make up your
own mind by careful investigation.
[Laughter.]
Senator KucHEL. You give me my toga
back. [Laughter.]
This committee, I am going to say, is go-
ing to make up its own mind.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will
yield to me.
Senator KUCHEL. I yield to my senior col-
league.
Senator HICKENLOOPEE. May I call his at-
tention to the philosophy stated by one Sen-
ator a few years ago? He said, "Some of my
friends are for it, some of my friends are
against it, and I always stay with my friends."
QUESTION OF ADVISABILITY OF ATTACHING A
RESERVATION
Senator KUCHEL. Doctor, what the Senate
can do with this treaty, I take it, is approve
it, ratify it, advise, and consent. It can dis-
approve it or, I suppose, some Members of
the Senate may offer, what I think may be
the correct legal term, reservations by way
of amendment which, of course, would de-
stroy the meeting of the minds which did
take place in Moscow.
TACIT UNDERSTANDING REGARDING PEACFUL
USES
You suggest in your second paragraph of
observation that some tacit understanding
ought to exist with respect to the possible
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. You do not
suggest that the Senate write in any kind
of an amendment, do you, Doctor, in consid-
ering this treaty?
Dr. LIBBY. Well, I am a little bit-I am
poorly informed as to what kind of conversa-
tion went on in this treaty. I know, because
I was on the AEC when negotiations first
started in 1958, that the original delegations
were instructed to make clear to the Soviets
that Plowshare was a very important thing,
and it was our concern to be sure that we
could go forward with this kind of activity.
So it is more or less in that context that
I suggest that insofar as you can, and agree
that you should, or conclude that you should,
you should make it very clear that if, for
example, a Panama canal should be-we
should dig one with atomic explosives, that
some clear answer or some precedent for
the conversation will be on record.
Senator KucHEL. By that, I take it you
mean that, in the discussion in the Senate?
Dr. LIBBY. That is right, sir.
Senator KucHEL. Some time ought to be
given to the hopes or the aspirations that
if the treaty were approved peaceful uses
requiring detonation in space might subse-
quently be negotiated into an agreement?
Dr. LIBBY. For example, I am not a lawyer,
but I can well see the difficulty of carrying
out the treaty literally where you say the,
let's see, an atmospheric test is one that
gives radioactivity beyond the boundaries.
Well, this takes some defining technically.
You know we can detect very minute
amounts if we want to be fussy about it. So
I think this Is going to be a technical ques-
tion, a practical question of your judgment
in any case and it might be that in the
administrative handling of the practical
problem there would be an opportunity to
come up with a workable Plowshare defini-
tion, you see.
This is the kind of thing which might save
Plowshare.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator KucHEL. Does that include the
time I yielded to Senator HICKENLOOPER?
The CHAIRMAN. I will give the Senator a
half minute.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I yield it back to
you.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator can have a
half minute.
Senator KUCHEL. I think, Doctor, your
third point is very well taken. I can under-
stand it. I think it, however, is answered,
things to do, you know, without the scien-
tists knowing that they could carry them
forward, and the things they had on tap
were Useful, but I think there is no doubt
that the significance of the Soviet series,
as they undertook it in 1961 far out-
shadowed the significance of our testing in
1961. We were caught off base, to put it
bluntly.
Senator KucHEL. It is fair to say you did
approve President Eisenhower's decision on
the moratorium, but-
Dr. LIBBY. Went along with it.
Senator KucI-IEL. But you were worried
about it. Is that about your position on
this treaty that you approve it, but you
are worried about it?
Dr. LIBBY. That is it more or less. You
see when you consider everything, not just
the technical aspects, it is more or less a
worried reluctant acquiescence, I would say
would be the best way to describe it.
DISTINCTION IN CONDITIONS UNDER MORATO-
RIUM AND TREATY
Senator KUCHEL. Is it fair for this com-
mittee and for the Senate to make this dis-
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Every
one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends
that this treaty be adopted providing we do
certain things on our part.
In the scientific community, with very
great regret I observe that there is a cleav-
age. Later on today we are going to have a
very able American, one of your friends, and
coworkers, Admiral Strauss, who will oppose
the treaty; a very great scientist, Dr. Teller,
at great length and with great eloquence, op-
posed it.
We have others yesterday who approved it.
Now, let me put my tattered senatorial
toga over your shoulders for a moment.
[Laughter.]
Senator GORE. That is dangerous.
Senator KUCHEL. Well, just on a tempo-
rary basis. [Laughter.]
How would you make a decision when
some scientists urge that we approve this,
that others with equal and no greater pa-
triotism urge we disapprove it, when the
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ap-
prove it, and when other renowned military
leaders now on active duty disapprove it?
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 12
that is to say from the President down the
caveats of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which you
reflect are going to be met, at least that is
what they tell us, and we must rely on that,
and to that extent do you not agree that
your point 3 is made and satisfactorily an-
swered?
Dr. Lissy. I would think so, yes.
Senator KUCHEL. Thank you.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.
Mr. FULERIGHT. I compliment the
Senator on his very thoughtful speech.
I need not tell him that I approve of
his analysis of the present situation. I
should like to ask him one or two ques-
tions. He recounted the history of the
test ban treaty, going back to Mr.
Baruch's proposal, which was in a sense
an effort to control the development of
nuclear weapons, on down through the
Eisenhower proposal. This is essentially
an American proposal, is it not; it orig-
inated with the American Government,
not with the Soviet Government?
Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is cor-
rect. From the very first, when Amer-
ican scientists first made the discovery,
our Government has been intensely in-
terested in having it devoted to peaceful
purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were also in-
tensely interested in trying to control the
proliferation,-the danger of fallout, and
the actual use in warfare. That was the
original Baruch proposal, as I believe it
was called. It had various forms; but it
was an effort to restrain the develop-
ment. We are not in the position of ac-
ceding to a request of the-Russians. We
have put forth a proposal. If there is
anything to that argument, after many
rejections and after the modifications
with regard to underground testing, the
Russians are acceding to our proposal.
Is that not true?
Mr. KUCHEL. Again the Senator is
correct. As an American, I would be
embittered if, at any point in the past
many years since nuclear power came
upon the earth, our Government had
failed in trying to find the point at which
an agreement could be reached in this
field.
Therefore, both under Eisenhower and
under Kennedy I have approved the posi-
tion of my Government, as the Senator
has, in painstaking negotiation and in
trying to formulate such an agreement.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If it is our pro-
posal, are we in a position to demand a
price for the other parties to join the
proposal?
Mr. KUCHEL. Not at all. In my
judgment any attempt to exact such a
price would be exceedingly regrettable.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In any business
transaction, if a person makes an offer,
and is the moving party, that person
is in no position to demand any addi-
tional favors, is he?
Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct.
Equally important, however, is this point:
I listened to the testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, including
that of the men who wear our American
military uniforms, the top military per-
sonnel, whose responsibility it is to de-
fend this country. All of them approved
the treaty, as did the great majority of
the other witnesses who appeared before
the committee-witnesses representing
both the Government and private in-
dividuals, and scientists. On that basis
I say to the Senator that !to demand any
additional price in ordor to have the
treaty approved would result in weaken-
ing the votes that I trus it will receive
when the roll is called oti it. To do so
would be a disservice, i my judgment.
Mr. FTLBRIGHT. II appreciate the
Senator's comment. From a historical
.point of view, President Eisenhower of-
fered a proposal solely With regard to
atmospheric testing, I believe. Later we
got into the other elements, and I be-
lieve at one point there was a proposal,
which the Russians rejeeted, merely to
stop testing in the atmosphere. We also
engaged in long-drawn- ut discussions
on underground testing However, we
could never agree on inspections for un-
derground testing. Is that correct?
Mr. KUCHEL. Yes; that is my under-
standing of the situation.' I quoted from
President Eisenhower's statement, in
which, early in his tenure, he specifically
asked the Soviet Union do agree to pro-
hibit tests not only in 01e atmosphere,
but also under oceans.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator men-
tioned the fact that Nest Germany
would never have accedejd to the treaty
if there had been any quos';ion of recog-
nition of East Germany. VVe have made
it clear that we do not: recognize East
Germany. Does not the precise question
confront the Soviet Unibn with regard
to Taiwan? 1
Mr. KUCHEL. Of course it does.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Taiwan accedes to
the treaty. The Russians have clearly
stated that that does nbt mean recog-
nition of Taiwan. Therefore we have a
case involving similar conditions. It
ought to be reassuring to! those who have
any doubts about whether the treaty is
a recognition of East Germany. I have
no doubt, and I do not Ibelieve anyone
should have. The Secretary of State
dealt at great length with the point that
recognition is primarily ja matter of in-
tent. There are already in existence
multilateral agreements to which -both
West Germany and East' Germany have
acceded, and none of then has ever been
conisdered as recognition.
I compliment the Senator on his dili-
gent attendance at the; hearings. Al-
though he is not a memlper of the com-
mittee, in view of his important position
as assistant minority lea er, I thought it
incumbent upon me to invite him, and he
responded and attended much more as-
siduously than some n}einbers of the
committee. He followed the proceedings
of the hearings very diligently.
Mr. KUCHEL. I thalk the Senator.
Mr. GORE. Mr. Pre ident, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. KUCHEL. I yield
Mr. GORE. The Pend g treaty is fre-
quently referred to as a irnited test ban
treaty. Were not the proposals advanced
by Messrs. Barauch and Stassen as repre-
sentatives of the U.S. Government con-
siderably more comprehensive than
those contained in the Pending treaty?
Mr. KUCHEL. The Snator is correct.
I recall reading some of, the text of the
deliberations when Governor Stassen,
representing President Eisenhower, was
in London, with members of the Atlantic
Alliance, trying to arrive at a, nuclear
agreement. The Senator is correct. It
was far less limited than the proposal
before us.
Mr. GORE. Were not the proposals
made in Geneva by Ambassador Wads-
worth, representing former President
Eisenhower, and by Ambassador Dean,
representing President Kennedy, con-
siderably more far reaching than what
is contained in the pending treaty, the
.pending treaty being all that it appeared
possible to accomplish at this time?
Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct.
Mr. GORE. The Senator, in colloquy
with the distinguished junior Senator
from Arkansas, referred to the U.S.
initiative in this field of understanding.
Is it not a fact that the existence of
atomic weapons is a feat of accomplish-
ment for which the United States can
take pride, but for the creation of which
she has some responsibility, too?
Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator is correct.
Mr. GORE. The fact that our coun-
try took the lead in the creation of nu-
clear weapons, and later development
of nuclear weapons, seems to me to place
upon our country some burden of re-
sponsibility, if not for initiation, in
reaching agreements to bring this awful
might of destruction under control.
Mr. KUCHEL. In answer to that most
intriguing statement, the Senator from
Tennessee and I, and all other Ameri-
cans, are grateful that these discoveries
were first made by our fellow P mericans
in the free world; but intellectual power
in this or any other field, as :[ tried to
say in my speech, is not indigenous to
one side of the Iron Curtain or the other.
Those responsible for the government of
the United States were appalled at the
unbelievable might of the power which
had been discovered, and to their ever-
lasting credit have consistently taken
the lead in trying to arrive at agreements
by which the cloud which hangs over
mankind by reason of those discoveries
might be dissipated.
Mr. GORE. So this undertaking, as
the junior Senator from Arkansas de-
scribed it, is an American proposal; but
it is, in addition, as purely nonpartisan
in its historic development as it is pos-
sible to achieve.
Mr. KUCHEL. That is correct.
Mr. GORE. President Eisenhower
sent distinguished representatives to
Geneva. It was my privilege to be a
delegate representing the U.S. Senate
the day the conference convened on Oc-
tober 30, 19158.
I served again during the Kennedy ad-
ministration in such a capacity. Presi-
dent Kennedy sent to Geneva not one
of his own partisan political faith, but a
distinguished lawyer having affiliation
with the Republican Party, a former law
partner of former Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, Mr. Arthur Dean. I
served with Mr. Dean. He served well.
So in consonance with this responsibility
devolving upon our country, because it
brought into being fissionable weapons,
three successive administrations and
eminent members of both political
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
parties have striven to bring into being
an international agreement to bring this
awful destructive power under interna-
tional control. Now that this objective
has been finally achieved, although in a
very limited sense, the question is finally
before the Senate.
I know that many persons raise ques-
tions about military risks. There are
military risks in many of the decisions
the Senate makes, such as when it votes
upon an amendment to build an aircraft
carrier. We take a military risk when
the Government, and the Congress, by
appropriation, decide whether to build 12
or 20 additional atomic submarines.
There is a military risk involved in the
decision as to whether we will have en-
ough or not quite enough. There is an
economic risk involved in whether we
overspend ourselves or live within our
means. So every day in this Chamber
we live with risks of many sorts.
I believe there would be a greater risk
in the rejection of the treaty than in the
approval of the treaty. I doubt whether
the treaty can be viewed solely from the
narrow standpoint of military aspects or
of scientific aspects. More than 90 na-
tions have subscribed to the treaty.
They are rapidly acceding to the treaty.
It has become an. international concert
of great portent.
So there is at test the capacity and the
will of the United States to initiate and
sustain international leadership in a deli-
cate field, but a very important field,
in which it has been the leader both in
the creation of the problem and in the
search for a solution of the problem.
'The last act now is for the U.S. Senate,
and the test is before this body.
I shall join the senior Senator from
California.
Mr. KUCHEL. I thank the able Sen-
tor from Tennessee. Every Member of
this body, no matter how he casts his
vote,-is thinking about his country and
will cast his vote as he sees the light. I
hope and pray that when the roll is called
the U.S. 'Senate, by an overwhelming
vote, will approve the treaty.
Mr. KEATING, Mr. President, will
the Senator from California yield?
Mr. KUCHEL. I yield to the Senator
from New York..
Mr. KEATING. I commend the dis-
tinguished Senator from California for
the thoughtful, concise analysis he has
made of this problem. Speaking Sen-
atewise, he has succinctly stated the
essential arguments in favor of the
ratification of the treaty. He has done
so carefully and eloquently, and has
again performed a notable service.
I was impressed with the statement of
the distinguished chairman of the com-
mittee [Mr. FULBRIGHT] that the senior
Senator from California, with his mani-
fold other duties, had attended most of
the hearings, although he is not a mem-
ber of the committee. That is most com-
mendable and helpful to us who did not
have the benefit of hearing the testi-
mony as members of the committee. I
believe there has been no statement in
support of the treaty which has been
more compelling or persuasive than that
so ably presented today by the Senator
from California.
Mr. KUCHEL. I am most grateful to
my able friend from New York for his
kindness.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, be-
fore I begin my remarks, I apologize to
the Senate for delaying until, now to
make them.
I, too, commend the able Senator from
California for his eloquent presentation
of his views. While I find myself in dis-
agreement with him, I have respect for
the processes through which he reached
his conclusion.
Mr. President, on Monday of this week
the Senate began the debate on the pro-
posed partial nuclear test ban treaty.
The idea, I had assumed, would be to lay
before this body and before the American
people all of the facts, to weigh them,
deliberate them, debate them, and pre-
pare for one of the most fateful decisions
the Senate ever has been called upon to
make.
On the same day, the Preparedness
Subcommittee presented an interim re-
port based upon many months of hear-
ings. On the same day it became appar-
ent in the press of the Nation that the
months of hearings would not be permit-
ted to weigh heavily in this debate. In
fact, it has become clear to anyone view-
ing this situation that the proponents
feel that no argument against the treaty
should be forwarded.
It has become obvious that debate is
not the objective of the exercise in which
we are engaged. For every point of de-
bate, for every argument, for every doubt,
the answer is that we must look but not
touch; we must consent, but not advise;
we must approve, but not revise. Those
who would exercise their responsibility
as Members of the Senate and who seek
debate on, and possible adoption of, res-
ervations or amendments to the treaty
are called irresponsible. Is that an in-
vitation to debate?
The same ones who speak of irrespon-
sibility admit the risks of the treaty, but
deny the right of the Senate to guard
against those risks in its own way and
through its own powers. How respon-
sible is that position?
How responsible is it to question the
devotion to duty, to country, and to the
families of America of any Senator who
seeks in the Senate to question, to ad-
vise, or to suggest changes in the treaty?
If there can be no changes, if there is no
possibility of a vote other than one of ap-
proval, what would be the meaning of
debate? Would debate even be needed?
Any appeal to emotion, rather than to
fact; any recourse to name-calling, rath-
er than to truth seeking, does this body
and its Members a disservice. Far worse,
it does the cause of peace and freedom a
disservice. It stifles freedom; and it
makes discussion of peace an exclusive
preserve, rather than an open forum.
If the Senate has no choice in this mat-
ter, if it has no chance to responsibly ad-
vise that changes be made, then it should
have no role at all in foreign policy. To
follow the dictates of those who want no
advice, we might consider amending the
Constitution so as to do away with the
Senate's right and responsibility to ad-
vise and consent on treaties. That would
merely formalize what we have heard ev-
ery time we hear that we have no choice
and that there can be no change. Choice
and change are the essence of freedom.
If the exercise of either is irresponsible,
so is freedom.
What sort of atmosphere for debate in
this body has been created?
When we raise doubts as to the long-
range effects of the treaty, we are told
that only its immediate impact must be
considered.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Arizona yield?
Mr. GOLDWATFR. I prefer to finish
my remarks; but I yield.
Mr. GORE. If the Senator from Ari-
zona will permit me to say so, I respect-
fully state that he has made a serious
indictment upon the Senate and upon
the conduct of the debate. I have lis-
tened to a great deal of it, and have con-
tributed in a small way to it. He has
just said:
When we raise doubts as to the long-range
effects of the treaty, we are told that only its
immediate impact must be considered.
I should like to ask who said that.
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator
from Tennessee will allow me to conclude
my remarks, I believe he will be able to
figure that out.
Mr. GORE. I have read a copy of the
Senator's statement, and the answer to
that question is not in it.
Mr. GOLDWATER. During the
course of the debate I held with the Sen-
ator from Minnesota [Mr. HumPHREY]-
it was 2 weeks ago, I believe-we dis-
cussed the problem of the immediate im-
pact and the long-range impact. In this
speech, r do not confine my remarks to
statements by Members of the Senate.
I refer, for example, to Mr. Harriman's
statement that by means of the reserva-
tion I proposed, I was trying to make a
political issue of the pact. The state-
ments to which I refer have been ac-
cumulated from many sources; not all of
them necessarily come from Senators.
I am merely trying to set the stage for
debate that will not be acrimonious. I
know the Senator from Tennessee differs
with me; and I differ with him; but I sug-
gest that the Senator from California
made an excellent statement when he
said that we should arrive at our deci-
sions honestly and on the basis of the
exercise of our conscience; that we pro-
pose our reservations and make our sug-
gestions honestly; that we do not wish to
be called irresponsible, or to have our
suggestions referred to as mischievous
toyings with the hopes and aspirations
of the people of the United States. I do
not believe the Senator from Tennessee
would seek to accuse me of improper pro-
cedure.
Mr. GORE. I certainly do not. I rec-
ognize the right of every Senator to
reach his own conclusions by whatever
process he chooses. But I respectfully
suggest to the Senator from Arizona that
if he will carefully reconsider the state-
ments he has made in the last few min-
utes, he will find in them a serious re-
flection, in my humble opinion, on the
quality, the purpose, and the sincerity
of the debate in the Senate.
I think the debate has been good and
constructive. Yesterday, my 15-year-old
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 1"?
son was present, to hear the distinguished
minority leader, the Senator from Illi-
nois [Mr. DIRKSEN], who spoke so elo-
quently and so thoughtfully. Forty or
fifty Senators listened carefully to his
speech; and I was proud to have my son
see the Senate in action. I thought it was
a fine hour for the Senate.
I regret that now after 6 p.m., when
the distinguished junior Senator from
Arizona is speaking, most of the other
Members of the Senate have gone to din-
ner-as I am sure both he and I would
also like to do.
Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not by my
choice, I may say, that I speak at this
hour. I have been waiting a long time
to speak.
Mr. GORE. I realize that.
The debate has been diligent, and has
been reasonably well attended. Yet the
Senator from Arizona has said:
If the Senate has no choice In this mat-
ter.
Why should the Senator from Arizona
raise that question? The Senate does
have a choice. That is the issue before
the Senate; it is the subject on which
the Senator is speaking.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I feel very deeply
about this matter. The other day I dis-
cussed it with the Senator from Min-
nesota. I said that if, in effect, we are to
be knocked down because we do not
agree, if we are to be referred to as ir-
responsible, as toying mischievously with
the lives of the American people, such
statements would indicate that any
change would be resisted. So I merely
wish to discuss this point.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Arizona yield?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am glad to
yield.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from
Arizona may recall that both of us fully
agreed that this matter requires debate,
and that there should be debate on it.
In my presentation on Tuesday, I made
quite clear-under questioning by the
distinguished Senator from Iowan-that,
first of all, this is not partisan matter.
I referred particularly to the then an-
nounced position of the distinguished
minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN]; and
piror to the delivery of his magnificent
address, I commended him for his forth-
rightness, his courage, and his states-
manship, because I had heard and had
read that after he and the majority
leader had visited with the President,
at the White House, the distinguished
Senator from Illinois had announced his
support of the treaty.
I also pointed out-under questioning
by the Senator from Iowa, who had some
d
bt
nd expressed concern that Sen-
ou
s a
ho
awls w
tempting to stifle debate, or at least to ence to the 91 nations t1h.Lt have signed
make it appear that when questions were the treaty. Frankly, while we all have
asked, a disservice was being per- concern :for all nations of the world, I do
formed-that the Constitution requires not think that, when the chips are
the advice and consent of the Senate; really down, what we do or do not do
that the Senate is composed of 100 Sen- with the treaty should be affected by
ators; that under the constitutional pro- what any of those nations might think
cess, each Senator has a political and a about us
moral responsibility to make his or her Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly not from
decision according to his or her own con- the point of view of offending them. I
science; and that that is the primary think it is proper to observe that, since
duty and the highest duty of a Senator. we, the most powerful Nation in the
great Uetall talc 111111 t.aly le1celav aaavat,S_.,
and then we are told that the Secretary
of Defense will turn the disadvantages
to advantages.
We hear witnesses who warn of future
diplomatic difficulties because of the
treaty and then we are told that the
Secretary of State and the President will
turn those difficulties to assets.
We hear witnesses who warn of future
steps along this path and we are told
that we must think only of this first
step.
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Regardless of how a Senator may vote, world, and the second most powerful,
certainly that duty is the highest duty a which, I suppose, would be Russia, are
Senator can perform-namely, to make the principal parties, if we reject this
his own decision, effort it would be a disappointment. I
So I wish to make it Crystal clear- do not think it would offend anyone in
and I know the Senator from Arizona that sense. I am not afraid of giving
[Mr. GOLDWATER] feels this way, too-- offense. That would not disturb me at
that debate on the treaty is not only all in voting for the ratification of the
desirable, it is also required under the treaty or not voting for it.
constitutional requirement for Senate Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the
advice and consent. Senator for clearing up that point.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator We suggest changes in the treaty and
from Minnesota and I agree completely. we are told that they are unnecessary
I am trying to lead is away from because of agreements and assurances
charges of irresponsibility and of mak- beyond the treaty.
ing a political issue out of the treaty. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
I could not agree more than politics Senator yield?
should not enter into this treaty. i do Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator
not know how it could be interjected if would allow me to finish, I would appre-
someone tried to figure out how to do ciate it. I have been waiting all day.
so. I merely plead that, during the short I yield once more to the Senator.
presentation of my reservation, we con- Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. I
tinue in this way. shall desist. The Senator has said, if I
We raise doubts about the immediate understood him correctly, "We suggest
military impact of the treaty, and we are changes in the treaty and we are told
told that only its long-range hope must that they are unnecessary because of
be considered. agreements and assurances beyond the
We are told to debate, aind then we are treaty." In fact, during the hearings,
told that the rest of the world already time after time, Senators were told that
has decided for us and that we cannot there were no side agreements or addi-
risk offending them. tional agreements, and that the total of
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr.: President, will the agreement between the United
the Senator yield so that I may ask a States, Russia, and Great Britain on this
question? subject was contained in the treaty.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I. yield. Who made the statement to which the
Mr. FULBRIGHT. i cannot recall Senator has referred?
that any Senator has made a statement Mr. GOLDWATER. That was brought
about offending them. I; believe that I out in the early part of the testimony.
and others have stated that it would be It was stated not once, but several
a very great disappointrment, which I times. We asked the witnesses what
believe is quite different from offense. the next step would be, and that is the
It would be a great disappointment to area in which the statements were made.
the other members of the society of na- Yesterday, I admit, the President re-
tions, not only the original parties but affirmed what the Senator has said.
the others, if we rejected the treaty. But Once before he did so. The Senator
that is quite different from offense. I from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], asked
am not a bit concerned ebout offending to see the letters and correspondence
those people. The word has a connota- pursuant to the treaty. I do not know
tion of our being servile and afraid of whether they were ever made available
to the Committee on Foreign Relations
them. That is not the point at all. If
or to the Senator
the Senator has reference to anything from Iowa [Mr,
that I have said or heard, will not the HICKENLOOPER].
Senator agree that Senators who are for Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. I
the treaty are not for it because they do apologize to him for intruding on his
I do speech at this late hour. But :feeling so
not wish to offend another nation?
strongly
believe that statement to be accurate. in disagreement with some of
the statements that the able Senator has
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator has
made;
a great service. I have un- I did ask him to yield. I thank
him for the courtesy of his doing so.
derstood it in that way. If I have under- Mr. GOLDWATER. I think the next
stood it in the way I have said it, I have sentence would have solidified the point.
understood it wrong. We were con- We raise questions about implications
cerned about an offense that the treaty beyond the wording of the treaty and we
might bring to the e othe other $0 nations that are told- that everything is contained in
have signed the treaty. In the course the wording of the treaty, that no impli-
of the complimentary remarks made by cations beyond it should be drawn.
the distinguished Senator from Arkan-
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The chairman pf tle e9rijmittee will That shouldnot. be taken in such a large one. I have not followed the mat-
the hearings literal sense. I do not believe it is in- ter too closely, but I have read the news-
rather assiduously. The next step is tended that way. Papers. What they are doing is phasing
the point about which I Kaye most, doubt Mr. FULBRIGHT subsequently said: out the B-47's and putting in the B-58's,
in my mind. I know it could be any one Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent which I believe are called the Hustlers.
Qf a :number of things. I would think to have printed in the RECORD imme- That to me
does not mean disarming. By
that during the course of?the debate that diately following the exchange I had taking out the B-47's they are merely im-
would be a point which, the Senatgr. about the preamble of the treaty a short proving the striking capacity and quality
would wish to spell out very carefully, quotation from Isaiah, as follows: of the weapons. I thought that was the
Indiscussing the treaty with Senators And He shall judge among the nations, reason why they might be destroying the
who agree with me on, my stand on the, and shall rebuke many people: and they B-47's:- It is the same reason why they
treaty, I find that they agree that such shall beat,their swords,into plowshares, and are getting rid of some of the old missiles
points as principal political advantages their spears into pruninghooks: nation which are now obsolete. I was told that
have?riot been spelled out, at least to our shall not lift up sword against nation, net- the missiles'were obsolete in Turkey and
satisfaction ther shall they learn war any more. in Italy because the Polaris is the much
Mr. FULBRIGHT, If. I may respond I think that is rather appropriate. as better missile.
to that statement, in all good faith I do to the preamble to the treaty, which was I never consider things like that dis-
not believe. anyone has affirmed that discussed earlier this afternoon. armament. I say quite frankly to the
there will be a next step. It is hoped that Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will Senator that I am not pleading for dis-
there will lZe a next step. Our Govern- the Senator from Arkansas yield? armament in this country, and certainly
ment quite positively stated that we Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. not for unilateral disarmament.
would not consider a nonaggression pact Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it might I would question, in the present state
as a part of the treaty. Our representa- be well to place in the RECORD the pre- of the world, even whether multilateral
tives said, "That is out. If you insist amble of the Constitution of the United disarmament is very wise.
on such a pact, we might as well stop, States, which reads: The treaty is not a disarmament
now, 11 We the people of the United States, in treaty. This will be merely a slowing
On the other hand, we do not take order to form a more perfect union, estab- down of the acceleration of the prolifera-
a position which would foreclose any lish justice, insure domestic tranquility, tion of weapons. It seems to me that is
further movement We hope that as a provide for the common defence, promote quite different from disarmament.
result of a favorable experience under the general welfare, and secure the blessings Mr. GOLDWATER. The B-47's will
the treaty, and after some tangible evi- of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do naturally be out of the inventory by
ordain
dente of performance by the parties to th
e U and establish this constitution for 1968 or 1969. If we enter into an
the treaty, then further steps would be the United States of America. Y
- - - agreement such as that which has been
possible, reasonable, and, would be sub- That is a great statement of purpose, proposed, the B-47's will be out of in-
mitted to this body. The Senator surely to which every article of the Constitu- ventory by 1965 or 1966.
would not want to take a position which tion is dedicated, and to which yet un- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is that not amat-
would exclude any further steps. born, generations will have to dedicate ter of judgment to be made by the mili-
Mr. GOLDWATER. No; the Senator their efforts for its ultimate fulfillment. tary people themselves, as to whether
does not. I believe preambles have a particular those are efficient instruments?
Mr. FULI~RIGHT. I am sure he does place in all great documents, primarily Mr. GOLDWATER. They are quite
not. the place of challenging the future. efficient, but they are old.
Mr. GOLDWATER, But tonight the Mr. GOLDWATER. One of the rea- Mr. FULBRIGHT. And slower.
Senator from Georgia voiced the feelings sons why I have an apprehension on this Mr. GOLDWATER. Like many of us,
of those of us who find ourselves in op- subject relates to the work of the Dis- they are wearing out.
position to the treaty. He spoke not armament and Arms Control Agency. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree. I thought
about the fear or the concern about dis- The Senator will recall my interrogation the reason they were taking the planes
armament. I think all of us want dip- of Mr. Foster, which occurred probably in out was that better ones were available.
armament, but we wish to make sure that January or February of this year, in re- Mr. GOLDWATER. We do have bet-
we are not the only ones disarming. Bard to the reported proposal that, we ter ones, but we do not have enough of
I think the Senator right now has said should destroy 30 B-47's a year and that them.
what the Sepator from Georgia was try- Russia would destroy 30 Badgers. Since, Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
Ing to elicit, namely, that any changes in I have learned, the figure was to be 30 a the Senator yield?
the treaty would have to be approved by month. Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield.
two-thirds gf this body. I wrote to .Mr.Foster some time ago, Mr. HUMPHREY. It is well known
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Absolutely. I. am probably in July. While he made no as- that the military has made some plans
convinced of that. I am very dubious sertive statement, he said that was still for phasing out th,; B-47's. The ques-
about those. who speak of disarmament. under consideration, ' tion is, do we wish to phase them out all
That word-is used much too loosely, The This is the type of thing about which alone, or would we like to get the Rus-
preamble of, the treaty, as with many we have concern. So long as these things sians to phase out some comparable air-
preambles, is a statement in. rather fine are being considered by the Disarmament craft?
language of aspirations. Such aspiras and Arms Control Agency, it causes con- These are similar to the oversea bases.
'tions occur in many documents. corn. We are all vitally interested in the Everybody knows that we shall have to
Mr. HUMPHREY. Such as the Con- military strength of our country. We are give up our bases in North Africa one
stitution. concerned because we realize that one of day, or else it will be necessary to pay for
st1Mr. FULBRIGHT. As my friend the the ambitions expressed by the statement them about 10 times. Do we wish to give
Senator from Minnesota has said, it is of September 26, 1961-I believe it was up the bases all by ourselves, or would
not a little unlike some of the expressions .1961-was the reduction of the number we like to negotiate with the Russians'
in our Constitution and Declaration of of vehicles capable of carrying nuclear and have them give up some bases?
Independence. We are far from achiev- weapons. I am sure the Senator, who is a dis-
ing some of those aspirations. We are I explain this to the Senator so that he tinguished military officer in his own
struggling toward them. I do not think may understand our apprehension about right, knows full well that since we are
that ;that, statement about disarmament this general field of disarmament. I to phase out the B-47's it might not be
is one whigh,fnust be taken seriously and must follow that immediately by saying a bad idea to try to get the Russians to
for, tbe,,foresVeable future., It is Merely that every American is interested in dis- phase out something, also. That seems
a ,tatW. brad statement of .a vague armament, so long as we are not the only to be sensible to me.
aspiration that we hope we could at least nation engaging in it. The point is that we are not phasing
limit armaments, Personally I cannot Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the out our military strength. Our airpower
imagine a world without any armaments Senator. There happens to be a B-47 today is more than it was a year ago.
at all. base at Little Rock, which ris rather Our Polaris strength today is more than
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it was a year ago today. Our missile the plan still is under consideration. I of the Senate Preparedness Subcommit-
strength today is more than it was a year for one do not agree with it. I do not tee and God knows we have heard that
ago. think it would work to our advantage. advice accorded all the respect of a Sun-
So all of the strawmen that are This is extraneous to the particular day supplement mystery story. -
raised-as to the fact that we are en-, debate before the Senate, but it might It is obvious from the thousands of
gaging in some kind of a "sellout" on a be informational. If we depended upon words of testimony and questioning that
unilateral basis of disarming-are plain the bomb bays in SAC for 75 percent of there are all of the doubts and reserva-
strawmen, and are easily knocked over. our nuclear striking force and we di- tions that I and others have mentioned
Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator minished that capability before we on this floor, and it is obvious that these
wants to call them strawmen, I suggest planned to under a natural phaseout of are sincere and reasoned.
'that we get a denial from Mr. Foster the weapon, I do not see that reducing -And yet are we sincerely preparing to
that this is being contemplated. It does our nuclear strategic striking capability debate changes in the treaty that would
not involve the obsolete aircraft that are would be of any great advantage to us. help resolve the doubts? Instead, again,
taken to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base This is, as I say, beside the treaty en- and again, and again we have only verbal
in Arizona and destroyed. This involves tirely. assurances. And again, and again, and
the removal of the B-47's which are Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeedit is beside again even the idea of changes in the
operable. I should like to have some as- the treaty. treaty have been derided as mischief or
surance in that regard. Mr. GOLDWATER. The ;Senator in- precluded as unnecessary, because of
I am not saying that the proponents of terjected it, and I merely wanted to get more and ever more verbal assurances.
this*plan are engaged in unilateral disar- these remarks in so that we might re- It Is because I have seen this body
mament. I merely mention what bothers fer to them some time. swamped by those assurances and in-
home of us who have studied this prob- Mr. IHUMPHREY. If the Senator will creasingly committed to them-no mat-
lem more from the military side than permit, I did not interject the B-47 is- ter the doubts, no matter the dangers,
from the political side. We are con- sue; the Senator from Arizona inter- no matter the real will of the people-
cerned. I think the day is ahead when jetted the E-47 issue. All I say is that that I have suggested one reservation
we shall not have enough bases overseas the proposal was merely a proposal for which would, at least, exact a price for
to put in our hat. That is entirely beside discussion. It makes more sense than ttreaty that we are told we must rat-
the point. That will be a natural phase- casting aside B-47's while letting the this hi We know of the price in must red-
out. I do not wish to see a speedup of Russians keep theirs. If we are to cast ify. that we are paying. price have asked
the phaseout, with no followon. aside the B-47's we should try to get the ness tha tha of we the are paying.
Mr. HUMPHREY. If we can get that Russians to take similar action. no The of e S y I discussed a reserva-
sians along with getting the Rus- Mr. GOLDWATER. If they had a tion e to the other
treatyy. That is what eserva-
sians to phaseout under some agree- fleet comparable to ours in ,size, I think treaty. That is w I have ught
ment, we would not alter the balance of I might be in agreement. up thin this.
power. If we can get 25 planes compara- Mr.HUMPHREY. If they do not have accused this his whole of various approaches a
ble to the B-47's phased out by the Soviet a fleet whiich is so. big, what are we wor- The reservation that I have suggested,
Union at the same time 25 B-47's are ried about? which would make the effectiveness of
phased out in the United States-which Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not worry the treaty contingent upon the removal
were going to be phased out anyway, about them so much. I am worried of the Soviet military presence in Cuba,
Russia or no Russia-it seems to me that about us. would set a price. It would at least sal-
would be sensible. We suggest caution about this first vage something from the Senate's deci-
Interestingly enough, we are not doing step and we are warned that we must sion to accept this treaty regardless of
that now. There was merely some think- think only of the next steps. doubt and danger.
ing out loud. Apparently there is an un- We hear witnesses who speak of prat- I want to make this perfectly clear:
written law in this country that one tical dangers and we are told of theoreti- It would not make the treaty one ounce
should not think out loud. If the Pen- cal hopes. We question theoretical more acceptable to me for I cannot accept
tagon or the Disarmament and Arms hopes and we are told that the treaty is it because of the peril in which it places
Control Agency expresses such a propo- all practicality, not based on trust. our security over all the world. But
sal publicly, it is suddenly attacked. If We hear that the sheer numbers of such a reservation would return to the
it is negotiated secretly, it is called a our nuclear weapons outweigh any quali- American people at least one portion
"secret deal." tative gains that the Soviets may make of purpose and meaning. It would, at
Whenever we negotiate for any type under the treaty and then we read that least, force this treaty to be weighed on
of arms control, we negotiate only in an the Department of Defense is studying a realistic balance, against a realistic
effort to improve our own position or to a cutback in our weapons procurement. testing of Soviet intentions.
keep on an equal plane the balance-of- We hear that the dangers of radioac- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
power structure as it now exists. For ex- tive fallout are the main thing guarded the Senator yield on that point?
ample, if we can get the Soviet Union against by the treaty and then we read Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield.
to give up 5 intercontinental ballistic that smog is a far more serious peril, Mr. FULBRIGHT. I had understood
missiles-and if we could be sure that that testing could be quadrupled with- his statement about the same matter,
they gave them up, and we could inspect out danger, the nuclear test ban treaty, which the
to find out that they gave them up-then We heard last year that maintenance 'Senator made, as appears at page 15546
we could give up 5 intercontinental bal- of our readiness to test on an indefinite of the RECORD for September 5, to be as
listic missiles and possibly we would not standby basis would be impossible. Now follows:
alter the balance of power at all, yet it we hear that such readiness is guaran- A reservation embodying this needed dem-
might help the world a bit. At least it teed. What has changed? onstration of Soviet intent could make the
would save a little money, and that ought I have listened to colleague after dis-? treaty proposal perfectly acceptable even to
to please some Members of this body. tinguished colleague warn of the treaty, its harshest critics.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator is question the treaty, worry over the treaty Mr. GOLDWATER. I may not be its
getting into the realm of the impossible and then say "but we must vote for it."
it it per-
clear critio.
that, I even want if to this make condition
now, because we have tried to do that. I have heard colleague after distin- harshest.
The basis of most of our concern is guished colleague say that the people fectly to be accedve not naive
am
would not not
military. I hope that during the de- demand this treaty and then report a, were enough to acceppte it will be--it -a d I this
bate-I intend to be present as often as flood of mail running heavily against make the treaty amore acceptable.
I can-it will be possible to have de- the treaty. y any n I was reading the
veloped the political advantages which 1 have read the constitutional require Mr. the treaty
Se was real speech
seemingly overweigh the military advan- ment that the Senate advise and consent speech today, and it anticipating struck me as r'ss quite
tages. I mention this field. I have been on treaties but what I have heard so far inconsistent with the Senator's position.
interested in it for nearly a year. I have assures one that all that is wanted is I wondered what had caused the Senator
not kept in constant touch, but in touch consent. God knows we have been ad-
once in a while with the agency; and, vising in such honorable hearings as that to change his mind.
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 1963. Approved For ReWONE MEEM&AM!"09
Mr. GOLDWATER. I have not. I within reason? Or does he 'think the
mex I said"harshest critic." I am not Russians are so bad that we should not
the harshest critic. attempt to do any business with them?
Mr. 'FITLBR,IGHT. If the Senator is
not a harsh critic, perhaps it will take
something less to change his mind.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I wanted to make
it clear that if this were the point, mak-
ing acceptance of the Senator's idea a
part ' of the bargain, I think then the
Senator could inject the charge of pol-
itics, and I do not care to do that.
Mr. _ FULBRIGHT. What really in-
terests me about the point the Senator
is making on his proposed amendment
is that it seems to me to be based on the
astumption that if the Russians have
come to us with a proposal and are beg-
ging us to take it, we can demand any
kind of terms we like, or terms the Sen-
ator suggests, whereas it occurs to me,
in accordance with the suggestion of the
Senator from California, that this is an
American proposal; we urged it in past
administrations.
How, are we in a position to ask for
extraneous and additional concessions
when it is our own proposal? Are we
interested in it or not? It seems to me
.it is an irrelevant consideration. The
only relevant consideration is, Is this
particular treaty in our interest, as writ-
ten? If it is not, we ought to reject it,
even if Russia should get out of Cuba.
If it is in our interest, we ought to ac-
cept it regardless of what is done in Cuba
or anywhere else.
I do not sec how the Senator thinks
this is an appropriate reservation. When
,I say-"appropriate," I mean wise. Of
course, he is within his rights to offer it;
but is it a wise reservation?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I think it is wise,
for this reason; We have tried,foar a long
time to get this kind of limited test ban
treaty with the Russians, and suddenly
there is evidence that she is desirous of
having it. If this is so, and if the major
purpose of the treaty is to ease world
tensions, what"would be better than eras-
ing one of the greatest tensions in the
world and forcing the world to recog-
nize that the creator of the tensions is
not the United States, but the Soviet
Union? This Is why I feel this reserva-
tion, and frankly, other reservations to
this treaty are not unwise.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In all honesty, I
cannot follow that line of reasoning. If
we.refuse to ratify the treaty if they aid
not do something, we would be the ones
accused of. creating, or.at least prolong-
ing, tensions by refusing to go forward
with our own proposal. I cannot help
thinking that if we made such a condi-
and T do not think anybody ought to
commit acts of aggression. If the Amer-
icans have been able to impress anything
treaty we worked at for so many years that we do hot believe in aggression any-
at Geneva-a complete test ban treaty where. So it was rather difficult to say,
with on-site inspections-was the an- "We will not discuss a nonaggression
swer to our problem. pact, except that nonaggression related
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Would the Sena- to the recognition of : certain satellite
tor approve that? countries and the power of the Commu-
Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator nist Party in those countries." But that
from Arizona has said many times that does not mean we are for aggression. It
he would. However, that discussion gets means we are against aggression.
far afield from this evening's discussion. Having once taken the Russians into
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the woodshed, so to speak, we have said,
the Senator yield? "If you want to discuss a nuclear test
Mr. GOLDWATER. In just a moment. ban treaty, here it is. We will negotiate
We find ourselves in a position of mak- it with you. But do not go into anything
ing a treaty that says, in effect, to our else and start a long talk about some side
potential enemies that "We feel we are deals. Do not bring in a nonaggression
well ahead of anybody in nuclear tac- pact that we would have to sign as a
tical weapons, but we are going to let you part of the test ban agreement."
continue to develop them underground, We took that position. Now the Sena-
and we can develop them, too." tor from Arizona says, "Maybe we were
So, frankly, I do not see a promise of wrong. I think we were wrong in prin-
peace in this treaty. I see a prolifera- ciple, because we really ought to have a
tion of weapons. I am concerned about tie-in. Let us tie in Cuba."
that particular point. Again, it is .a mil- Khrushchev says, "Let us tie in a non-
itary concern, and has nothing particu- aggression pact."
larly to do with what I am saying to- The Senator from Arizona says, "Let
night. I shall address myself, in a formal us tie in Cuba."
speech, more to these points. We ought to try to tie the treaty down.
The whole purpose of introducing this We can tie the treaty down, and if there
matter is to give the Russians an op- is a sense of honest performance of the
portunity to do what they promised to treaty, then perhaps there will be some
do and to do what the President of the chance to negotiate the Cuba matter
United States has demanded that they and to get these troops out.
do on two occasions. We are merely test- Mr. GOLDWATER. I get back to my
ing them. This does not become an first contention. I_ am not accusing the
amendment to the treaty. It merely Senator. However, there are certain dif-
says, "We will withhold the date of de- ficulties in our situation which are not
positing the resolution and do it later." uncommon to legislative bodies of the
We say, further, "You do this, and we world, because I believe most of them
will have proof by third party inspec- must ratify treaties. We are given the
tion."' charge of advising and consenting. If
It does not change the wording of the the treaty, which was not negotiated by
treaty; it merely puts in the resolution the Senate or by the Senate Committee
that it is the sense of the Senate, and on Foreign Relations, comes to us and
the American people, that this treaty we feel that it is not in our best interest,
will not be put into effect until we have we have the right to reject it.
assurances that the Russians will comply Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeed.
with what she has already said she would Mr. GOLDWATER. If any one of us,
do and what the President has asked. as the Senator from Georgia [Mr.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will RUSSELL], the Senator from Connecticut
the Senator yield? [Mr. DODD]-and other Senators have in-
Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield. dicated, feels that there could be some
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has improvement in it, I believe the Senator
acknowledged that the proposal now be- would admit that it would be our duty to
fore the Anate in the nature of a test ourselves and to the constitutional charge
ban treaty was, in its original draft, a to try to bring about the improvement
U.S. initiative and a U.S. proposal. that we felt was needed.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I would suppose I have read many of the debates on
so. treaties. There has been prolonged and
Mr. HUMPHREY. We initiated the intelligent debate on some of them. The
proposal. We discussed this proposal Treaty of Versailles got into trouble.
tion, or any such unacceptable condition, - with the Russians. Mr. Khrushchev,
a part,of the treaty, it would provide the
Russians with the greatest kind of prop-
aganda against us. They would say,
"The Americans made a proposal to us.
We accepted it. Now they will not con-
sider it."
I do not wish to prolong this debate;
but would any kind of agreement with
the Russians be,acceptable to the Sen-
ator from Arizona-that is, a proposal
in this field-other than one which would
ask hem to flay down and play dead
and say,. "I am sorry"? Would it _be
t
No. 144-11
AG 00210005-5 16021
said, "Yes; this is pretty good, but we
want to be sure that it is tied in with a
nonaggression pact."
We said, "No deals. ' No tie-in, Mr.
Khrushchev. We will discuss this pro-
posal. We will not discuss the rest of the
world. We are discussing this proposal.
No deals. No tie-ins."
Now we say, "We have discussed this
proposal. We want to tie in. We want
you to get out of Cuba."
I thinkthey'_ought to get out of Cuba,
Perhaps that was well. Who can tell?
The League of Nations got into trouble
because of reservations that Senators
proposed. The Connally reservation on
the World Court has been debated at
length as to whether it was wise or
unwise.
Mr. HUMPHREY. That was not a
treaty.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I merely suggest
that this is a negotiating point. I am
going to offer the reservation. As I said
earlier, I do not believe it has any more
chance of succeeding than an ice cream
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 Approved kF61~ft"SIZMJ3/AtC&]JbRaFWRW3ROO0100210099pemb'er
cone has on the corner of Washington
and Central in Phoenix, Ariz., on the 4th
of July.
At least I can say that I hare done
what in my conscience needed to be done
to the resolution, not to the treaty.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I hope the Senator
does not misunderstand me. He has
every right to offer any understanding
and any amendment and any reservation
that his conscience and his experience
and his political judgment compel him to
do. That is his duty, as well as his right.
All I am saying is that possibly the So-
viets felt the same way. Perhaps Mr.
Khrushchev-I will not say it was in his
conscience, because some people would
doubt it-felt that politically he had to
insist on a nonaggression pact and tie it
into the treaty on the limitation of nu-
clear weapons. Our Government repre-
sentatives said, "If you do that, there
will be no treaty; the game is over; we
are going home." That was our right.
If the Senator's reservation is adop-
ted-and he has given us some assur-
ance that it will not be, for which I am
grateful to him-
Mr. GOLDWATER. I could not
imagine that it would be adopted.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Incidentally, I
hope that it is not cold on the 4th of July
in Phoenix, Ariz., because the analogy
the Senator has used makes me hope that
the temperature will remain at the cus-
tomary 4th of July temperature not only
in Phoenix but also in Minneapolis.
Mr. GOLDWATER. We are con-
sistent out there.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. I hope the
Senator's prediction is consistent, with
respect to the fate of his reservation.
What the adoption of the Senator's res-
ervation would do to the treaty is what
would have been done *to the treaty by
the nonaggression reservation of the
Russians during the negotiations. That
would be the end of it.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Is the Senator
absolutely sure about that?
Mr. HUMPHREY. One is never abso-
lutely certain of anything. I suppose the
word "never" should never be used.
However the Senator is a man of sound
judgment, and he knows that the odds
are that if we should adopt his reserva-
tion, it would not accelerate the accept-
ance of the treaty. I have a feeling that
it might very well impede it for several
generations.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Let us suppose it
will put it off for several months fur-
ther, and the Russians keep their
promise and the President achieves what
he so courageously set out to achieve a
year ago? Other reservations are to be
proposed, in other areas. However, the
one I am proposing, inasmuch as the
treaty is said to be directed toward easing
world tensions, is an easer of tensions,
a diplomatic "Miltown"; and it might
possibly work.
But what have we heard of this at-
tempt to give Americans some measure
of profit in this excursion into the never-
never land of communism's grand
design?
We have heard that if we demand that
the Soviets get out of Cuba they will
demand that we get out of Germany,
that Egypt will demand Israel get out of
the Middle East, and so forth. By what
poor and tortured stretch of what fever-
ish imagination is our presence in Ger-
many or Israel's in the Middle East simi-
lar to the Soviet presence in. Cuba? Our
demand is made with justice and in keep-
ing with, not in violation of, international
law and order. If the Soviet should, in
fact, make such demands'; because of our
stand on Cuba then we would see com-
munism as it is and not as we may come
to regard it through a laze of treaty-
bred optimism.
Cuba can be a test of all the hopes and
fears of this treaty. Why should we fail
to make such a test?
We hear, however, that such a reser-
vation would require renegotiation with
all the nations that have signed it. That
simply is not true.
It is a reservation hot to the treaty
but to our instrument 4+f ratification.
It does not permit our ratification to be
deposited until the Soviets have cleared
out of Cuba. It does not involve other
nations--just the Soviet, It does not
involve the treaty-just the time of its
ratification. There would be no world-
wide renegotiation-just a pause while
the peaceful intent of the Soviet is put
to the test.
But, of course, it is the; recognition in
the State Department and on the floor
of this Chamber that the Soviet purpose
cannot be trusted-it is that very recog-
nition, that very truth that causes such
anguished. cries when someone asks only
to claim our share of justice, our price of
justice in. giving to the' Kremlin this
paper pie-in-the-sky, this abandonment
of half-a-decade's work to achieve a sys-
tem of arms control under unshakeable
terms of international inspection.
But we are told also that the Cuban
price is not appropriate to place upon
this treaty, it is not pertinent, it is an
extraneous matter, it opens up other
areas of the cold war.
What other areas? Since when has
the cold war been a series of compart-
ments? Since when has worldwide Com-
munist aggression and treachery been
divisible into little bureaucratic pigeon-
holes?
The suggested reservation goes to the
very heart of the treaty and is in no way
extraneous because it goes to the very
heart of the causes of tension. And what
is this treaty proposal if 'riot related to
world tensions? Of course, Cuba is per-
tinent. Nothing is more !pertinent.
State Department haitsplitters may
want to bend this treaty away from real-
ity and from all connection with the real
war in which we stand challenged by a
real enemy. But ask the American peo-
ple if Cuba is pertinent. ..
Ask them if Cuba is too high a price
to set on this treaty. A$k them if we
should only give, and get nothing.
I am confident that their reply would
be firm where some replies I have heard
recently are frightened and fearful.
We hear that the proposal to remove
Soviet .troops. and weapons from Cuba
merely is partisan. Has t been merely
partisan every time the administration
itself has said that the matter of Soviet
troops in Cuba is not negotiable? Is it
partisan to say that this treaty should
not be negotiated while nonnegotiable
Soviet aggression haunts our southern
shoreline? Is everyone who speaks for
his beliefs in this treaty consideration to
be called partisan? Is conscience par-
tisan? Are the voices we hear in opposi-
tion to the treaty or in support of safe-
guards and changes, voices on both sides
of the aisle, merely partisan? No. There
is in this consideration only the partisan-
ship of each Member's own sou].-search-
ing decision, the partisanship of prin-
ciple, the partisanship of duty and re-
sponsibility.
Mr. President, as I have said before, I
intend to offer a reservation regarding
Cuba. I will ask that it be considered
and debated at the appropriate :moment.
I will ask that the Senate, which has
placed so small a price upon its delibera-
tion of this treaty so far, will at the mo-
ment of final decision at least place upon
the treaty itself a price which the Soviet
can and must pay.
I should like to make a parliamentary
inquiry of the Chair. I should like to
inquire whether under rule XXXVII a
reservation to the resolution of ratifica-
tion may at any time be sent to the desk
to be printed and to lie on the table until
called tip by the mover of the reservation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Seri-
ator is correct. A reservation may be
printed and lie on the table.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I send it to the
desk and ask to have it printed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The res-
ervation will be received and printed,
and will lie on the table.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I will call it up in
due time.
BOMB TESTING REAPS WHIRLWIND OF POISON
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, there
are risks for our Nation with or with-
out the treaty, which has been the sub-
ject of lively debate. Absolute security
cannot be achieved. No nation in the
history of this world, at least for long,
has been able to reach and maintain a
position of absolute supremacy.
A few days ago I received from Mr.
Alexander P. de Seversky a statement
sent to each Member of the U.S. Senate
in which opposition to the treaty was
forcibly expressed by this eminent Amer-
ican. Mr. de Seversky states bluntly that
the Soviet Government has "nuclear
superiority." He believes Russia is a-head
of us in many areas in the field of nuclear
weaponry and defense.
My reaction to this is, I suppose, that
of the average American. If scientists
devoting their lifework to this cannot
agree, how can I know? If military men
cannot agree, how can I decide?
However, I am convinced absolutely
that there is a basic fault in the argu-
ment made that we must have more
testing-without treaty-in order to
catch up.
If we are behind-and the burden of
testimony and the accumulative evidence
suggests we are not-then what makes
anyone think. we are going to catch up
if there is unrestricted testing in the at-
mosphere, in the water, underground,
everywhere, by everyone?
We had the A-bomb first.
We had the H-bomb first.
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We have been spending fantastic sums
on our defenst structure. In this effort
we are spending about $50 billion each
year, 50 times more than our entire Fed-
eral Government cost a half century ago.
We have sought to create a massive
deterrent. In my opinion, we have
achieved this.
There has been no restriction, of con-
sequence, of expenditure of funds in the
field of nuclear weapons and deterrents
so far as the United States is concerned.
Yet it is suggested that in spite of our
great expenditure and effort we not only
have failed to retain our lead, but have
positively lost it.
These arguments would have us be-
lieve, first, that although we have been
running as fast as we can run, the Rus-
sians have outstripped us; second, that
if the treaty is 'rejected and the arms
race continues unabated, the American
people can be confident that we shall
recapture the lead and surpass the Rus-
sians. I fail to be convinced by the va-
lidity of any such argument.
Would it not be just as easy to argue
that, if the treaty were not ratified, that
if both nations continued to have free-
dom to spread fallout all over the world
in search for perfect weapons and for
perfect deterrents, then we might find
ourselves even farther behind than some
of the opponents of the treaty claim we
now are?
As every other Senator has, I have
received many, many letters from treaty
opponents asking me if we can trust
Khrushchev.
I do not see what that has to do with
the situation.
If I as one Senator believed the Com-
munist side of the world did not present
a clear danger to our life here and the
life of those elsewhere joined with us,
I would never vote year after year as I
do vote for these tremendous defense ap-
propriations. I would be infinitely hap-
pier to be voting instead for appropria-
tions to improve the well-being of our
own people, to provide a better life for
our own citizens and, to the extent of
our abilities and our desires, for people
elsewhere. It is precisely because I be-
lieve the peril which confronts us and
haunts us is not a fantasy of the imag-
ination that I vote for those appropria-
tions and shall continue to do so for so
long as they are needed and so long as
I am here. The proposition of trusting
Khrushchev does not enter into this at
all, so far as my own.analysis and my
own conclusions are concerned.
I trust the President of the United
States.
I trust the Secretary of State.
I trust the leaders of our Armed
Forces who have testified for the treaty.
Much has been said, much has been
made, of warning signals which have
been raised by some members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Too little empha-
sis has been placed on the fact that each
of them did endorse the treaty. I take
comfort in this. I would expect any
military leader of this Nation to resign
from his service rather than to endorse
a proposition which on balance he
thought absolutely detrimental to the
security of the United States. Does any
one of us for one minute believe that the
honesty and integrity and patriotism of
these men would not have brought about
their resignations almost automatically
if they had thought the arguments
against the treaty were prevailing in a
military sense?
I trust the predominant testimony
given in favor of the treaty.
I am a layman. I must take the
judgments )f others, analyze them, bal-
ance them, and then make up my own
mind as every other Senator must make
up his or her mind, and then vote ac-
cordingly.
In considering the many aspects of
this treaty Senators should give atten-
tion to the importance which ratifica-
tion would have on the dangers caused
by radioactive contamination.
A cessation of atomic testing in the
atmosphere would mean, in time, an
The hazards of fallout, the radioactive
residue from atomic blasts which poi-
sons the air we breathe, the ground we
walk, the food we eat, are still largely
unknown to science and to civilization.
They are not understood, they are un-
derestimated, and largely ignored.
Federal officials charged with the pro-
tection of American citizens from radio-
active hazards have consistently, from
Hiroshima to the present day, placed the
most optimistic interpretation upon
these hazards. The Russian officials,
with similar responsibilities to the Rus-
sian people, have always denied, reso-
lutely, that such hazards even exist in
the Soviet Union. There can be no
doubt, however, that they do exist.
There can be no doubt they are more
dangerous than past American interpre-
tations would make them seem. That
fallout does exist, that it does now con-
stitute a peril to children and to children
yet unborn is undeniable. Equally un-
deniable is that should testing continue
unbridled, it will constitute a truly sub-
stantial risk. This will be a risk to
American children, to Russian children,
to European and, yes, to Chinese chil-
dren. This is a fact which the world
must recognize; this is a fact which is,
I believe, recognized in the test ban
treaty.
I have repeatedly called the attention
of the Senate to the inadequacy of our
Nation's research efforts in the field of
radiological health, to the confusion
which now exists in the determination of
acceptable levels of contamination for
large population groups, and to the
sparse, hit-or-miss nature of our radia-
tion monitoring and surveillance activi-
ties.
We are capable, apparently, of deter-
mining the size of a Russian atmospheric
test the day it is shot; we are unable,
however, to determine the amount of
iodine 131 in a child's glass of milk in St.
George, Utah, 3 days after a .shot of our
own in Las Vegas.
The Atomic Energy Commission and
the Division of Radiological Health of
the Public Health Service have seldom,
to my knowledge, acted upon their own
initiative to step up their research and
surveillance activities. Consistently
they have but reacted to public or scien-
tific outcry. This is truer today than
it has ever been for there has been much
recently to react to.
Slowly and painstakingly our knowl-
edge of the effects of radioactive con-
tamination is increased.
Step by step our too-optimistic esti-
mate of acceptable levels must be scaled
downward.
There have been several important
scientific studies published recently. I
shall attempt to summarize them. In so
doing, I cannot avoid simplifying; I can-
not include all the many qualifications,
the ifs, the perhaps, the assumptions
which must be added if these compara-
tively small-scale studies are to be mean-
ingfully applied for large population
groups.
In the August 1963 issue of the Canad-
ian Medical Association Journal, Dr. L. J.
le Vann, of Alberta, publishes a statisti-
cal analysis of birth deformities in that
Province. In 1959 there was no atomic
testing. In 1961 there was. In 1959
there was a ratio of 7.76 physical abnor-
malities per 1,000 children born. In
1961 there was a ratio of 13.8 physical
abnormalities per 1,000 children born.
Dr. le Vann breaks down these figures
into area groups and finds that the great-
est increase in the abnormality ratio is in
the areas which experienced the greatest
precipitation. As Senators know, It is
the rain which brings radiation contam-
inants. Dr. le Vann attributes the in-
crease in birth deformities to the increase
in fallout between the two time periods.
In Edmonton, with an average precipi-
tation of 20.9 inches, there were 16.76 ab-
normal births per thousand. In Left-
bridge, with a precipitation level of 12.9
inches, the abnormal birth rate was 13.07
per thousand.
Dr. le Vann's thesis has a post hoc
propter hoc aura to it; he may not be
right. The size of his sample was but
slightly more than 30,000 infants. His
data were but for 2 years. It will be
necessary to have additional data for
additional years before his work can be
verified. It is, however, undeniable that
indications of such importance to us all
should be followed up with, more exten-
sive studies.
Dr. E. J. Sternglass, in an article pub-
lished in Science June 7, 1963, comments
upon Dr. Bryan MacMahon's report in
the Journal of the National Cancer In-
stitute, 28: 1173-91, 1962.
Hitherto our knowledge of cancer and
leukemia resulting from radiation ex-
posure has been limited to cases in which
individuals received massive doses, doses
as high as a thousand roentgens. Esti-
mates of cancer and leukemia incidence
among large population groups from the
relative small amounts of radioactivity
carried by fallout have been based until
now upon interpretation of these cases.
Dr. MacMahon ran a statistical
check on 734,243 children born in 37
maternity hospitals in New England
during the years 1937-54. He found
10.6 percent of the mothers had received
X-ray exposures which would have had
the effect of subjecting the unborn infant
to some radiation. Dr. MacMahon com-
pared the exposed group of infants with
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September if 2
a control group made up of children
whose mothers had not been X-rayed.
Present X-ray exposures now averages
between 75 and 100 milliroentgens. In
early years of the test periods, exposure
levels of X-ray were higher-4 to 8 times
higher.
Dr. MacMahon's results were startling:
The death rate from leukemia and can-
cer was 40-percent higher for the chil-
dren whose mothers had been X-rayed
than for those who had not. This ap-
pears to be direct, hard, evidence that
small levels of radiation can cause serious
harm. It also offers evidence that the
human foetus is between 20 to 60 times
more sensitive to radiation than an
adult.
Dr. Sternglass in his Science article,
suggests that MacMahon's data also in-
dicate a direct, linear relationship be-
tween cancer deaths and radiation dose
increases.
Utilizing these new statistics, Dr.
Sternglass estimates that the effect of
the 1962 test series will be-as a result
of the short-lived contamination alone-
materials such as I181-a 2.5- to 10-per-
cent increase in childhood cancer for
children born in this year. Put a dif-
ferent way, 4,000 out of the 4 million
children born in the United States in
the last year may die of cancer and
leukemia. In evaluating this staggering
interpretation, we must remember that
it is based on fairly complicated) assump-
tions and interpolations. As such, it
may be very wrong. However, Consumer
Reports, a journal with a good deal of
knowledge in this field, has said with
respect to the Sternglass article that
its results are "apparently generally
although not unanimously accepted."
And lead "one to conclude that present
radiation tolerance may have to be
revised downward.".
The conclusions of Drs. le Vann, Mac-
Mahon, and Sternglass become of greater
concern when we turn to recent reports
of detailed monitoring in Utah and
Nevada.
During the month of July 1962, five
test shots were set-off at Yucca Flats
in Nevada. All five carried substantial
amounts of I11 into Utah. Shortly after
one of these tests, Dr. Robert C. Pendle-
ton, radiation safety officer at the Uni-
versity of Utah, while demonstrating
monitoring procedures to a class of stu-
dents, discovered, purely by accident,
extraordinary background radiation
levels. Because of this discovery, the
Utah State Department of Health de-
cided to collect milk samples on a regular
basis from 39 stations located across the
State. The levels of Il" in the milk dis-
covered were extraordinary.
The Radiation Protection Guide sets
100 micromicrocuries of I" as an accept-
able level of exposure for large popula-
tion groups. Anything higher than this,
if caused by "peacetime uses of atomic
energy," would call for the possible ap-
plication of countermeasures and in-
creased surveillance.
Utah officials determined that if it is
assumed the average Utah citizen con-
sumes 1 litre of milk a day (1.06
quarts), he would, in 1962, have received
58 thousand micromicrocuries of I11.
This is almost one and a half times the
acceptable RPG limit. It was found that
contamination levels varied widely from
dairy to dairy, from cold spot to hot
spot. Some sample areas had undetect-
able levels of radionuclide contamina-
tion. Other areas had 'average intake
levels ranging as high a$ 800 thousand
micromicrocuries. This evel is almost
10 times higher than the highest levels
ever before reported in thy; United States.
The above figures are based upon a daily
consumption of one litre of milk.
Studies undertaken by the Public
Health Service indicate that 10 percent
of all male infants under 1 year of
age drink 1.3 litres of milk a day or
more. Such children receive, of course
1.3 times more radiation than the av-
erage citizen referred to above.
A recent study by R. T.; Morrison indi-
cates that a young child has a r~ thyroid
uptake of 50 percent, 20 percent more
than that previously assumed. This
means that 20 percent more radioactive
material is absorbed by the thyroid than
scientists have calculated in the past.
Usually I'll milk samples have been taken
on a pooled daily basis. Figures released
weekly by the Division bf Radiological
Health report contamination levels of a
composite quart made tip of carefully
derived contributions from the major
dairies in the area of testing. The Utah
report makes clear what I have long
suspected:
Milk pool values can be misleading indexes
of group exposure. Our measurements of
milk from one major Salt Lake dairy indi-
cated total intake of 117,000 micromicro-
curies of I311 for individuals consuming 1
liter of :milk per day. Whereas at a second
major Salt Lake dairy, the total intake was
only 3,400 micromicrocuries pf I' For com-
parison, the current yearly radiation protec-
tion guide of 0.5 rad to the thyroid gland of
members of the general population is con-
sidered to correspond to the intake of about
29,000 micromicrocuries of r111 by the young
child.
Mr. President, if wd assume the
average infant thyroid of 12-gram weight
absorbs a conservative 30' percent of the
h 81 intake, the average child in Utah re-
ceived a dose of 1 rad n 1962 during
the month of July, and the range of ex-
posure stretches from 0 tq 14 rads. The
seriousness of this contamination is
seen when it is noted that the radiation
protection guide sets 0.5 rad as the max-
mum acceptable amount of contamina-
tion permissible on an average basis to
large population groups. This, in turn,
is based upon an acceptable 30-year ex-
posure of 0.5 rad.
These Utah figures presented to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in-
dicate that some children in the month
of July of last year received almost three
times as much radiation exposure from
I131 as is considered acceptable over a
30-year period from all radiation sources.
In his testimony befor the Subcom-
mittee on Research Development and
Radiation, Dr. Charles M.ys made some
rough estimates of the total thyroid dose
received by Utah children prom tests pre-
vious to the 1962 series. ! These figures
are general. Information on the 80 or
more aboveground nuclear test shots at
Yucca Flats between 1951 and 1958 is still
difficult to obtain. The AEC has been
slow to release data for the earliest tests
in Nevada. According to Dr. Pendleton,
at least one of these tests-May 7, 1952-
released more I13' in Utah than the tests
in 1962. It is only recently that the irn-
portance of I"' has become generally rec-
ognized. The Government did not begin
monitoring the I"' levels surrounding
the Nevada test site until 1962. Dr.
Charles Dunham, Director of the AEC
Division of Biology and Medicine, has
explained this lapse with "we were too
busy chasing strontium 90."
Dr. Mays summarizes his estimate of
infant radiation dosages as follows:
Recognizing that some children were ex-
posed at age 0-1 and again at age 1-2, ap-
proximately. 250,000 Utah children have been
exposed to crudely estimated average thyroid
doses of 4.4 rad prior to age 2. Individual
doses, of course, range from much higher to
much lower.
A study, similar to that of Dr. Mays
and the Utah State Department of
Health, but completely independent of
it, was conducted by the Technical Divi-
sion of the Greater St. Louis Citizens
Committee for Nuclear Information. I
cannot here do more than summarize the
contents of this scholarly 50-page study
presented to the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee.
Perhaps the most important point
made by the St. Louis study is that cur-
rent AEC measurements of fallout levels
after Nevada test shots are measure-
ments of external radioactivity--that is,
the total beta-radioactivity deposited on
a gummed film placed on the ground or
of beta activity in the air. This does
not take into accord the effect of radia-
tion in the ecological food chain. Let
me explain this:
Iodine 131 is a radio contaminant with
a very short half life-no more than 8
days. This means that within the first
8 days of its existence, it loses over one-
half of its potency. It is really danger-
ous to man for only these 8 days. After
a test shot, it falls to earth fairly quickly,
where it falls determined by wind and
weather. If it falls on wheat or grains
or pasturage which is cut and stored for
longer than 8 days, it is harmless. If,
however, it falls on grass which is eaten
by milk cows, it is far from harmless.
It reappears, and very quickly, in the
milk produced by these cows. This milk
in turn, if it is pasteurized and kept for
a week or two, is harmless. If, however,
the milk is pasteurized and immediately
sold, it is far from harmless. It can be,
and from time to time is, heavily con-
taminated with I"'. Young children
drinking this milk are particularly sus-
ceptible to dosages for three reasons:
First, the small size of the child's
thyroid; second, its greater sensitivity to
radiation; third, the long, post irradia-
tion lifespan during which effects may
appear. These effects may take as long
as 10 to 20 years to appear. We will not
know for many.years to come what the
full effect of atomic testing has been
upon us and our progeny.
The St. Louis study, like the Utah
study, is per force but a reputable esti-
mate. According to the St. Louis report:
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fir..
At ie Leven times since X952, Washington part of the State. During the winter prevent the proliferation of atomic weap-
Utah, children received thyroid they exist largely on lichens, mosses, and ors-this surely is the path of mad
d
in the ,6 to lap rad range or higher
ii5ni
Gamma radigtion taken May 19, 1953 . sedges. These plants, unlike most plants, and despair. ness
from Shot henry" indicate that_a draw their nutrients directly from the Already this
-child at that year fallout levels are
time would have received 50 rags, air. They sift the air a,4d in this process, twice what they were last year. And
absorb large quantities of radioactive still but one-third of the contamination
It is the belief of the St. Louis scientists materials. These in turn are taken up in the atmosphere has fallen to earth.
that contamination levels far, far exceed- by the caribou when they eat the lichens. Even without the resumption of tests,
ing radiation guides, have been experi-
enced repeatedly across he The Arctic caribou are heavily radioac- fallout will be a public health hazard for
country in tive. The Eskimos, who live north of
places as far afield as Troy, N.Y.; Ros-
the Arctic Circle, to come.
well, N. 1VIex,; and Rock Springs, Wyo. , in turn depend during The resumption of tests would bring
well N. Beach and Dolphin of Springs, W yo. the winter months on caribou meat as for us all, free and Communist alike, a
Kingdom ach tomic Energy Authority, their principal food. As a result, there whirlwind of poison.
y, on is the very real and present danger that When we, as U.S. Senators, vote on the
the average 35 cases of thyroid cancer the Eskimos themselves may obtain high
may be experienced per million persons ratification of the treaty, we must con-
exposed to and unacceptable levels of radioactive Sider many things. We must consider
1. rad of thyroid radiation: contamination from their food supply. the strength and continued strength of
14 terms relevant to the present testimony, That this is a real problem has only our Nation and of the free world; the
one in 286 children exposed to 100 rad thy- recently been recognized. Figures are effect a cessation of testing would have
roid radiation. may develop thyroid cancer. sketchy and inadequate. The only reall
By any standard, this is an unacceptable y this 'strength; the guarantees eie
risk. useful figures we have were taken last that the terms ms o of the treaty will be en-
n-
year when whole body counts of Alaska forced; the assurances that we shall have
Concurrently with the release of the natives were taken at several points in adequate protection should the treaty be
Utah report, the Atomic Energy Com- Alaska by a team of scientists from the violated.
mission made public a study which it Hanford Laboratories. The levels of These we must consider; let us also
had, commissioned by Dr. H. A. Knapp, strontium 90 and cesium 137 contami- consider what continued testing, con-
Fallout Studies Branch, Division of nation found were fairly high. Higher tinued fallout, would mean, now and in
Biology and Medicine, AEC. This report than any found anywhere else in the future years.
attempts to formulate an acceptable United States. They were, however, still In this atomic age there are great
procedure for the calculation of I"' largely within range 2-or acceptable- risks-risks with and without treaties. I
levels.in milk,on,the basis.o .o.ther meas- levels as determined under the RPG. believe this treaty is an acceptable risk.
urements of fallout contamination on Earlier this year I insisted that more I believe it can be an important step Lo-
the ground. 3 In his report Dr, Knapp extensive and comprehensive monitor- ward the goal which all men everywhere
speaks of I _ levels as high as 78,000 ing be done in the Arctic. I am pleased must desire and long for and should work
to 06,000 micromicrocuries per liter of that this summer the Hanford team was for. I intend to vote for its ratification.
milk, This is, as we have seen, over able to take whole body counts all the I urge its ratification.
twice the yearly, and I emphasize yearly, way across Alaska. It was expected that Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President,
acceptable amount of I'"' for a child to contamination levels would rise, and earlier today, the distinguished senior
consume under the terms of the radia- they have, substantially. Senator from California [Mr. KuCHEL],
tion protection guide. In testimony before the Joint Com- the minority whip, delivered a remark-
The Knapp report has stirred up a mittee on Atomic Energy last month, able address in the Senate. I was not
good, deal of controversy both within the manager Of the Hanford Laborator- privileged to be present during his pres-
and without, the AEC. Again, his ies, Dr. H. M. Parker, verified that cesium entation, but he was thoughtful enough
methods and his assumptions are 137 body burdens have increased over to supply me with a copy of his prepared
debatable. They are debatable but they 1962 burdens by as much as 50 percent. remarks. I join other Senators in their
are .hqt absurd. Their implications are In 1962 cesium 137 levels in several cases commendation of his address.
very grave and they must be seriously bordered on the so-called maximum ac- The senior Senator from California,
considered, ceptable limit of the radiation protection like his own leader, the distinguished
Each of thesix papers to which I have guide. It is fair to assume that this junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DiRx-
referred, utilize methods and procedures year they will have exceeded this level. sEN], demonstrated the finest
open to question, This qualities
T grant. There is no field more spongy The problems of radioactive contami- of bipartisan statesmanship in this re-
than that pf radiological health. No two nation of the Arctic are different in kind markable address. He has analyzed the
scientists agree on any detail. Increas- and degree from those of more temperate treaty item by item and article by article,
soily, however, almost all detail.
zones. We know very little about them. and has brought to our attention once
agree
that the field is an extremely important logical Health Division, the Atomic En- but the President's message to the Senate
one. The problem is a national one. The ergy Commission, and the Arctic Health in submitting the treaty. He has re-
responsibility is a Federal one. I xegret Research Center joined in proposing a minded us of our duties and obligations
that I must say, as I have said before, study of the contamination of the Arctic under the treaty. He has again called
that the.,Federal Government is duck- flora and fauna. This proposal is of to our attention the assurances that have
ing its responsibility. Last year we spent very substantial importance. It has not been given to the Senate by the President
but a, total of $18 million in the field of as yet received final approval from the of the United States.
radiological health research monitoring Atomic Energy Commission. I am de- The Senator from California emuha-
and, surveillance. This is not enough to termined that it will soon receive such sized in his address what the senior Sen-
altive, the to lives say of 180 nothing of million our children's Americans
now approval. Arctic Alaska is America. ator from Minnesota sought to empha-
children now al and their children. Alaskan natives are American citizens. size; that is, that the overwhelming body As Senators will recall, the hazards They are being exposed to hazards about of evidence presented to the three com-
of which we know little. It is our responsi- mittees that listened to the witnesses
radioactive contamination are of partic- bility to insure their protection. supports the ratification of the treaty
ular import to my own State of Alaska.
Time and time again I have pointed out My speech today makes grim listen- and underscores the fact that the treaty
the dangers which continued, and in- ing. The recital of these new findings is in our interest and the interest of the
creased contal,lination of the Arctic food and studies in Canada, in Utah, in St. world.
chain could mean to Alaska native citi- Louis, and in Alaska is not pleasant work. The Senator from California has also
It is, however, I believe, important that reminded us of the limitations of the
e ,Arctic food chain is,not unlike the Senate should have this in. xxnation treaty, which I believe are important to
the grass, cows milk chain which I have and that it should have it now as_ we bear in mind.
just the
described,, On the Arctic slopes of debate the test ban treaty. But once having noted the limitations,
Alaska_ there are great herds of caribou To continue atomic testing, to con- the initial step, as it has been called, is
numbering 'into the thousands. These tinue to step up the frequency and inten- of the utmost importance to the relation-
roam back anc forth across the northern sity of these tests, to make no effort to ship among nations as they struggle to
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relieve the tension on the international testing has increased fractionally radiation to develop a defense system capable of pre..
scene and to find ways and means of risks due to natural sources. It put the in- venting destruction of a major part of its
crease in hereditary effects die to testing up population and industrial establishment.
establishing a peaceful world. to 1961 at 11 percent and the increase in Let me review some of the technical prob -
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- somatic effects from 15 to 23 percent. The lems which make a real defense impractical.
sent to have printed at this point in the U.N. group found that the concentration of Imagine a heavy attack launched by each
RECORD an editorial, published today in carbon 14, with its afterlife of thousands of side against the other. (Let us not be un-
the Washington Post, entitled "The years, is now 25 percent above the concentra- necessarily paranoid-we may suppose a mu-
Treaty's Great Boon"; a letter, written tions resulting from natural processes. This tual large-scale attack, triggered against the
by Prof. Walter Selove, on the subject: of nuclide wall continue to irradiate future gen- real desire of both sides.) Consider first the
an adequate missile defense; and the re- erations for thousands of ,years. Only after problem of a defense for the United State::.
20,000 years will 90 percent og the total dote We may reasonably imagine that the attack,
marks, by Dr. Frank Graham, On the due to carbon 14 be delivered. if it occurred say 2 or 3 years from now,
test ban treaty, as published in the Dr. Herman J. Muller, o4 Indiana, who would include:
Chapel Hill Weekly of August 28, 1963. won the Nobel Prize in 1946; for discovering 1. Several hundred submarine ;.aunch, a
Dr. Graham's remarks were made on that X-rays cause changes iii our genes, has missiles (time, launch-to-delivery, about b
August 26, at the Southern Baptist As- calculated that the fallout radiation re- minutes or less for most targets).
2. Several hundred large ICBM's, of 50
sembly Grounds, at Ridgecrest, N.C. Dr. suiting from the above-group .testing of a megatons each, with a number of decoys.
Graham, formerly president of the Uni- single 100-megaton bomb Would be like'.y e Several hundred large ICBkI's, each one
versity of North Carolina, was, as we to induce more than 10p,000 cases of leukemia bone cancer, and other fatal ills to fragmenting (at various distances from'tar-
know, a few years ago one of the most the present population of the world and a get) to several live 5 megaton bombs.
distinguished and dedicated Members of million harmful mutations in the next gen- What are some of the defense problems
the Senate. We are privileged to have eration. Against the total population of the against such an attack? First, lack of time
the benefit of his remarks. I know of world, in terms of percentag@s, these casual- to identify and intercept the attacking mis-
no one more dedicated to a just and en- ties are not great. They are staggering in siles. For the heavily settled east coast re-
during ng peace than this great citizen of terms of the total human suffering conjured gion, for example, many sub marine-launched
bombs could arrive within 3 minutes from
the United States, who is so much loved There up in the has mind been n a any great deal sensitive of man. political launch time, and within seconds, or minutes,
by peace-loving peoples throughout the conjecture about why the Soviet Union or (after initial destruction of defense in-
world. wished to sign the test bsn treaty. The stallations) tens of minutes from each other.
There being no objection, the editorial, reason may be much more Simple than our If 10 to 20 such bombs, out of perhaps hun-
the letter, and the remarks were ordered conjecture:;. As early as December 1961, N. dreds launched, reached their targets, the
reach 10 to 20 million
to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: P. Dubinen of the Institute of Cytology and toll the probably
coarobably st realone, ac0n there wouln
[From the Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1963] Genetics wrote in a Soviet scientific journal dead would
be vast the ea tict including i uld
an article on the Analysis;of the Effect of
THE TREATY'S GREAT BOON Radiation on Cellular Nuclei of the Culture try and transport facilities---the ports of
Debate over the test ban treaty has been of Embryonal Human Tissues." He con- New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore would
so crowded with examination of its purely eluded: "The effect of ioniajing radiation in probably be destroyed, for example.
military consequences that the virtue of the range of small doses, starting with frac- So far I have spoken only of the east
eliminating radioactive fallout sometimes tions of roentgens and higher, acting on coast, only of submarine-launched missiles,
seems almost to be lost sight of in the overall humanity as a whole, represents a real dan- and only of 10 percent penetration of a de-
discussion. ger to future generations of el threatens the fense system. Let us next consider the see-
. Senator HOLLAND and Senator PASTORE, irradiated individuals themselves as possible and item of the attack volley listed above.
among some others, have brought this forc- causes of malignant tumors." If one 50-megaton bomb penetrated the de-
ibly to the attention of the Senate. The The weight of the world's Scientific opinion fenses of New York (remember that perhaps
Senate and the country must not be allowed is that radioactive fallout from testing has 10 such bombs might be aimed there, and
to minimize this very tangible boon. In the increased (and future testing would further that they could come in a saturating volley,
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations increase) the hazards due to natural radla- together with hundreds of simultaneous cte-
Committee, and in the debate, there have tion; that any increase isj likely to cause toys or with scores of the fragmentation-
been frequent allusions to the relatively some additional somatic and genetic damage. type, live bombs of item 3)-if one such
minor risks to health Involved in testing. When this country had to weigh unilat- bomb-reached New York, New York would be
It has been stated frequently that the added eral suspension of testing ij was required to obliterated, with everything destroyed by
hazards involved in testing can be tolerated, place this hazard in the scales against the blast and fire out to tens of miles distance.
that the risks are not considerable, that risk that a failure to test (while others were and with shelters within that area being cone-
they are in fact less menacing than many testing) might handicap this country to the pletely useless unless equipped with inde
other sorts of environmental pollution. point that it would increase the likelihood pendent air supply.
The somatic and emetic damage that will of thermonuclear war with its calamitous It is not necessary to go into many further
g radioactive fallout, that one can think of (except
flow from the tests already conducted, by radioactive fallout, to say nothing of its di- for one that is probably worth mentioning,
any standard of measurement, are terrible sect effects on human lif$. The test ban and that is to have a 100-megaton bomb set
and horrifying. This damage might be mul= treaty committing others'; to refrain from a off New York bomb set
tiplied were indiscriminate tests by many testing, greatly diminishes this hazard. The a n or fired in red a ship 5 hamiles ve a
toward the city from such a ship)
nations to take place in the future. The suspension of atmospheric' testing, in these to begin to realize the basic point. A defense
consequences of testing alone, to say nothing altered circumstances, becomes an affirrna-
of the risk of war itself, might well work tine gain of the most enortrious consequences which would be even 90 percent effective (the
an altgration upon the environment of this to the human race. very first time It had to be used) and which
planet that would work dreadful Injury to would be that effective even though called
the health of all mankind. Events may disappoint the hopes and ex- upon to deal with decoy and other deceptive
- Scientists have had to proceed with cau- pectations of those who hive proposed this techniques of a type probably not anticipat-
treaty. It does not, by itself, and for all ed-even such a "defense!" could not hope
Lion into this unknown area and they have time, automatically preclude the resumption to prevent the killing of many tens of niil-
stated their anxieties conservatively but of atmospheric testing, but it may well re- lions of people, and the destruction of a vast
there is no mistaking their apprehensions. sult in that most desirable end. And if it part of the industry and the entire civiliza-
The report of the United Nations Scientific does, its adoption may spare unnumbered tied of the country.
Committee on the effects of atomic radia- thousands of our own countrymen, and per-
tion, last September, ought to be consulted paps millions, around the world, the pain And what about the Soviet Union? The
anew. These scientists asked that great at- and sorrow of terrible, wasting, lifelong in- attack on them would involve several times
tention be given this risk because, they said: And it may lift from mankind the as many missiles. Could the U.S.S.R. pro-
menace and dire threat of damage to tect its people? Even Dr. Teller, the fore-
"The effects of any increase in radiation ex- jury.
posure may not be fully manifested for sev- the genetic integrity of the human family most arguer for a continued bomb contest,
eral decades in the case of somatic disease, that would cast its dark shadow forward has said not only that the United States
and for many generations in the case of ge- through the generations down to children would probably not be able to save its cities,
netic damage." This report, like the reports born 20,000 years from now, but also that "it is not likely that the Rus-
of many other groups, emphasized that there scans will develop a foolproof missile de-
Is no threshold of added exposure up to fence." What then does Dr. Teller mean
which the tests are harmless. It stated: L:STTER BY PROF. WAt,T:ER SELOVE, when he states his guess that the Russians
"Geneticists have consistently found both in ASPEN, Coto. "know how to defend against oncoming rais-
mammals and other animals that the fre- The opponents of the test ban have made siles"? Does be mean that he believes they
quency of mutations is affected by radiation very misleading statement's about the possi- have, or can build, a 90-percent effective de-
throughout the range of doses and dose rates bility of creating an effective defense against fense? Does he mean that" he believes the
Investigated." massive nuclear attack. 8y any technique Soviets might be willing to accept 10 per-
This committee pointed out, as has been that One can now imagine' pursuing, neither cent penetration, . and to correspondingly
so frequently observed in the debate, that the United States nor the I.S.S.R. can expect suffer destruction of a major part of their
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 civilization? Does he meal that he thinks as an open forum of the world and as a safety still singing in the minds and hearts of the
that no ,,matter how much the_lJnited States valve for grievances and the release of ten- people of two hemispheres.
develops the penetration ability of its own sions, the United Nations has so far pre- They have come home again and must not
Missiles (by decoy techniques, for example) vented the beginning of the third world war. be rejected in the house of the Founding
the U.S.S.R. can still realistically expect to ac- THE TEST BAN TREATY Fathers,
tually achieve an interception rate as high Which America, the haven of the disinherited of
as 90 percent? Does he mean that he be- way America and which way the the earth and the home of a great revolu-
lieves the percent? pannot keep ahead of the world in this fatefully interdependent world? tionary faith in the days of her infant weak-
defense? Is it not clear that if either side For the first time in human history, through the scientific and ness should not, in the times of her great
were to engage in the installation. of a mas- technological revolutions,
man and his accumulated civilization can be power, become the home of a paralyzing fear
slue antimissile System, the other side could destroyed overnight. Also for the first time and a destructive intolerance.
nullify that system by merely sealing up its man has the capacity sons and daughters of the American
attacking force? pacity and opportunity in this Revolution must not become the fathers and
Arguments that the Soviet Union probably creative age to provide progressively for all moth people on the earth their needs for food, the very r the Amfrthe reckon evolu-s knows' how to build an effective defense,. clothing, shelter, education, health, well- the very prim iples of the American Revolu-
arguments tiiat the United States must pour tion.
enormous energies into the pursuit of a being and the opportunities for more beauti-
ful creations of the humans irit and nobler This reaction would abdic
ate the leader- d
good defense system that can protect the mansions of the human . ship of equal freedom in best opeful world
a
country-such arguments are completely soul. desperately in need of the bewhich Amer-
meaningless, and dangerously misleading, here may earth h where the essential atmos- ices has to give in this time of hazard and
unless one sout the quantitative per- p ere poisoned for generations and
unles o one spells talu t e qut. the panicked press of a button may end the hope for all people.
formance Is
human race, there is, in the midst of its fast Rather we must make clear to ourselves
I am not speaking for a policy of discour- accelerating and Inevitably fateful arms race, and the world that the great declarations of
agerneht. I am not speaking for a policy of the moral imperative for a be innin ste faith and freedom for progressive fulfillment
futility. I am not speaking for a policy of toward ending the race whoseg oalne p are not merely the historic and professed
laying down our arms. I am speaking for a human suicide. g sources, but are the present and living
policy of clear, balanced examination of the The ratification of the test ban treaty of America's faith in herself, the
technical facts. I am speaking fora clear
would be y world's faith in America and America's moral
understanding that our only real security developing beginning progressive a faith toward ea psreciprocally and and The influence and power ied the but world.
deeends on the ultimately rational behavior long unfuifill yet enrolling
of the Soviets (and theirs on ours). I am effective universal disarmament. This be- speaking for the understanding that the ginning step would be without any appease- ideals elthe American Revolution have pro-
ment of totalitarian tyranny or any sur- gressivy opened doors of political equality
pursuit of a defense against massive nuclear
render wClics, hich and long eopl clcolo to Jews, Ca and ndless attack is, on the basis of the technical facts, of the great democratic goals and
hopes of the equal freedom, justice, and women. The post disinherited colored people and
most likely, the pursuit of a mirage. The The most d,
dangers from a continued bomb contest are peace for all the people on the earth. We people in
not a mirage-they are very real and urgent, have faith and hope in the physical descent erica are the migrant workers, mostly
and spiritual ascent of man toward the fam- colored, who wander in search of work, root-
and have been spelled out well enough not ily of man and the Kingdom of God, less, homeless, sometimes defenseless and
to require repeating here. often hopeless pilgrims in the land of the
To say that there is extremely little hope Yet we must also realize that, with man's Pilgrims' pride. They are on the unfinished
that an effective defense can be developed is moral freedom of choice of good and evil, American agenda today.
not to say that work on an ABM Iantiballis- the present potential juncture of the explo- At the end of the 18th century Thomas
tic missile) should be abandoned. In the sive power deep in primitive inheritance and Jefferson victoriously led the people in mak-
-present uneasy state of the world no one subco scions natures man and the explo- ing States rights-a theory nobly conceived
could realistically recommend that work on power deep in the nature of and sometimes ignobly used-the sword of
an ABM should be dropped. thermonuclear force, may break through the liberty against the national hysteria and
The Senate lass the great and proper re- thin crust of civilization and quickly end the Federal tyranny of the alien and sedition
sponsibility to examine minutely the reasons human species long slowly evolved on this laws. These laws out of fear of the French
for or against the test ban treaty. I hope Planet. Revolution and the lack of faith in robust-
there will remain no question, when the Great decisions in historic times are often ness of our own American freedom, sought to
Senate finally votes, that the idea of a de- made in the smaller decisions of the days subvert the American Bill of Rights. Later
fense is illusory, and that it is the true and the years of accumulative time. The States rights became for a time, the shield
interest of both the United States and the present accumulative decisions carry in of slavery in the South; and later, the weap-
U.S.S.R. that has brought this treaty to be themselves the fateful alternative between a on of exploitation of women and children in
signed. beginning step in the test ban treaty toward the sweatshops of great cities in the North;
slowing down the arms race and the accumu- and today the armament of massive resist-
[From the Chapel Hill Weekly, Aug. 28, 1963] lative steps toward totally ending the human antes to the law of the land for the equal
WHICH WAY AMERICA AND THE WORLD rye freedom of all Americans.
(Remarks by Dr. Frank P. Graham on Au- THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARCH
gust 26 at the Southern Baptist Assembly In this interdependent world with its ON WASHINGTON
Grounds at Ridgecrest. Dr. Graham, for= accumulating decisions, the crucial alterna- The present American revolution of the
mer president of the university here and tive is between this accumulating downward Negro people did not get its impulse or its
U.S. Senator from North Carolina, is now drift toward universal annihilation and the impetus from Moscow but in such centers
a United Nations mediator) patient upward struggle toward more effec- of the ex-Confederate South as Montgomery
In this kind of a world, a war or a depres- tive international cooperation through the and Greensboro. Its older sources are in
"Alen this kind involves all people everywhere. United Nations. Hundreds of millions of Carpenters' Hall and Independence Hall,
There can never again be any isolation from people looking east and west for signs of Philadelphia, in the revolutionary rendez-
the skies above, the seas around or the coati- humane hopes must not in this hour find a vous of the American people for equal free-
nents beyond. The splendid American isola- negative approach toward a beginning step dom and human dignity. Their farther
tion behind the two great ocean moats did in the test ban treaty or a prolonged fili- headwaters rnsurgently arise in the Judean
not keep America out of the First World War. buster against the program for the equalizes- Hills and resurgently flow from the Sea of
Staying out erica
the League of Ndid not tion of the basic freedoms and rights for all Galilee where the Carpenter's Son lived,
Stap nee United States out, Nations
the Second Americans in the progressive fulfillment of taught, suffered, died and triumphed over
Worl War. ke pd the U Tde American People Second our Hebraic-Christian heritage and our the death for the sacredness of all persons as
the hard way and then decided that, instead American revolutionary hopes. children of one God and brothers of all
of staying on the outside and being drawn In the midst of the American Revolution, people.
into the World Wars after they start, they because of their own values and out of a The youth, in their movement for the
would join the United Nations and seek more decent respect for the opinion of mankind same service for the same price, in sitting
effectively on the inside to prevent the third the great Virginian, Thomas Jefferson, de- down, are standing up for the American
world war which would cost millions of clared for all the American principle of equal dream. They are not trying to overthrow/
American lives, hundreds of billions of Amer- freedom, opportunity and self-determination the Republic but fulfill the promise of the
scan dollars and mayhap all people on the of all people. Republic. With the Bible and Constitution
earth. v This was the first universal declaration of in their hands, hymns and prayers on their
The very year,1945, in which atomic power human rights ever adopted by the chosen lips and nonviolence and brotherhood in
made its entrance into history the United delegates of any people. their hearts, they are in many ways the most
Nations made its entrance on the stage of the Immortally declared by Jefferson, heroical- religious in their faith and the most Ameri-
world. With all Its weakness and frustra. ly embodied by Lincoln, and universally can in their hopes.
tions, the United Nations has cooled. off seven proclaimed by Wilson and Roosevelt, these Martin Luther King is not consciously or
hotspots where a local fire might have become revolutionary principles went winging around unconsciously an agent or ally of fascism or
a global conflagration. By its very existence the th _
i
ng
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exist-in the continuation, growth, and
the acceleration of radioactive fallout.
Today, many people in this country are
deeply concerned about this develop-
ment-particularly people in the Mid-
west and Far West, who today, as we
know, are witnessing a doiubling of stron-
can bulwarks for freedom against totali-
tarianism, racism and colonialism in the
world today.
The question these August days is not
whether there will be the people's pilgrim-
age to Washington with their petition under
the Bill of Rights for the redress of griev-
ances, but whether it will be unruly, violent
and self-defeating or nonviolent and im-
pressive in personal dignity, human decency
and public influence. The spiritual quality
of the leadership and the patriotic spirit of
the volunteer pilgrims reinforce our faith
that this pilgrimage and petition of the peo-
ple will be influential in the meaning of
America at home and in the image of Amer-
ica in the world in her leadership in the
partnership of nations for equal freedom,
justice and peace under law and human
brotherhood under God in this time of
mortal peril and immortal hope for all man-
kind.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Furthermore, Mr.
President, this morning's Washington
Post editorial, entitled, "The Treaty's
Great Boon," is more than an editorial; it
is a dissertation upon the benefits of the
treaty. It relates in large measure, of
course, to the fact that the treaty will
make a great contribution in one area,
in particular: the reduction of nuclear
radioactive fallout.
This itself would be enough to benefit
mankind; and the fact that in this de-
bate, we have not stressed this benefit,
ticism of nuclear weaponry and strategy
the potential danger that does exist-
and is shown by scientific evidence to
tiunl 90 in their milk supply, and are
finding a. dangerous quantity of iodine
in food particles, with a consequent in-
creased possibility of leukemia and other
forms of malignancy or cancer.
These facts cannot be denied; and the
fact that the treaty is directed toward
reducing the danger of radioactive fall-
out should not be minimized. I have
been asked repeatedly to state the bene-
fits of the treaty. One of the benefits is
that it may save lives. ', I believe that
question is as importantas the question
of whether the treaty will limit scientific
exploration in regard to, how to destroy
lives. The Senate shotild try to find
ways and means to make the lot of man-
kind happier and the continuity of life
surer, rather than simply to dedicate its
efforts to the ascertainment of how to
overkill or how to destroy larger numbers
of people or greater amounts of property.
This is our opportunity to fulfill one
of the real purposes of democratic citi-
zenship: to secure the blessings of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness:
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY--
AMENDMENT
Mr. RUSSELL submitted an amend-
ment, intended to be proposed by him,
to the resolution of ratification of the
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
the atmosphere, in outer space, and
underwater, which was ordered to lie on
the table and to be printed.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY--
RESERVATION
Mr. GOLDWATER submitted a reser-
vation, intended to be proposed by him,
to the resolution of ratification of the
treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW
AT 11 A.M.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, if
there is no further business to come be-
fore the Senate, I move, pursuant to the
order previously entered., that the Senate
stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock to-
morrow morning.
The. motion was agreed to; and (at 7
o'clock and 4 minutes p.m.) the Senate,
in executive session, adjourned, under
the order previosuly entered, until to-
morrow, Friday, September 13, 1963, at
11 o'clock a.m.
NOMINATION
Executive nomination received by the
Senate September 12, 1963:
DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE
W. True Davis, Jr., of Missouri, to be Am-
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to Switzer-
land.
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