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.Annrovdd Foe 00100210007-3 16071 1963' h e s . ...??---__ _ Then he dropped his deptn charge: "Recently, however, reports came to our PHILIP HART, Democrat, of Michigan, said the drug firms to participate. The only American attention that members of the pharmaceu- closed-door hearings will begin "as soon as concern to join the experiment was McKee- tical industry in Colombia-who were offer- possible." son, which bought a 50-percent interest in ing their products under trade names-had a Colombian drug manufacturer, Droguerias started attempts- to block or to slow the In the interim, the subcommittee will hear Aliadas, Inc. generic program in Colombia and to interfere from Herman C. Nolen, board chairman of McKesson marketed 322 pain-killing, life- with its extension elsewhere. McKesson & Robbins, who has charged that saving drugs at dramatically low prices. An "At first, we were ready to discount much his company is the target of a concerted antibiotic used in treatment of respiratory of-this as healthy competition. More and and malicious campaign to stop the sale of infections and typhoid sold for 3.6 cents per more, however, we grew alarmed at the ex- low-cost drugs in Latin America. capsule, compared with the trade name tent and severity of the concerted attack Also to be heard will be the drug manufac- product that sold for 29 cents. An arthritic against the generic program." turers and the PMA. They deny the charges. was able to buy a month's supply of pred- Mr. Nolen then made these accusations: Along with the principals in the dispute, nisilone for $2 instead of the $16 it had cost the subcommittee will hear from the Depart- before. The drug industry in Colombia, which in- Doctors were advised that is was impos- ment of State and Justice and the Agency for eludes 15 American firms, fought back. Bible to produce qualitTy pharmaceuticals at International Development. Early this year McKesson told Senator Estes the prices being offered. These doctors re- * * " * * Kefauver, chairman so the Senate Anti- 1. ceived a sizable amount of literature attack- Senator HART said that "on the basis of Trust and Monopoly Subcommittee, that it ing generic drus. Some of this literature these hearings, the committee would then be was the victim of a "concerted and malicious originated in the United States. in a position to decide whether to go ahead campaign" to stop the generic program and "Pressure on medical journals"-Colom- with a full-scale inquiry, and whether public prevent its spread to other sections of the bian medical journals consistently refused hearings should be held on the adequacy of world, including the United States. McKesson advertising, while at the same time existing law to deal with situations of this they carried "extensive and distorted articles kind. Herman C. Nolen, McKesson chairman, and editorials critical of generic drugs." "These hearings will also influence the de- "Refusal to sell activities"-the campaign cision as to whether the existing subpenas went to Washington to outline his charges against generics "has even involved the cut- should be modified," he said. that the drug industry was ganging up on Ting off of supplies necessary for the continu- Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, his firm, the Nation's largest wholesale drug ing success of the generic program-that is, of New York, a member of the seven-man house. the refusal of certain pharmaceutical manu- subcommittee, said he joined in the unani- He testified in secret session before the facturers to sell us raw materials useful for moue action "as the fairest method of han- Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June the generic program." Mr. Nolen made it dling this investigation." 25. Mr. Nolen said his company was meet- clear that some of these firms are V.S. drug "I am sure the subcommittee will proceed ing "'organized interference" which serious- manufacturers and licensees. promptly and diligently as outlined by Chair- ly endangered the Colombian generic pro- "Interference with extension of the generic man HART," he said. gram. program"-There are reports from other After the 90-minute meeting, Senator * * * * * South and Central American countries that HART told reporters that some members of What is behind this violent struggle to strong efforts were" being made to stop ge- the subcommittee wanted to go ahead with prevent the sale of low-price generic drugs? aerie drug programs in those countries be- the investigation, some wanted to call it off, The late Senator Kefauver may have ex- fore they got started. and others wanted more information before plained it when he wrote in a letter to the Serious charges by the respected head -of deciding what to do. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association one of the Nation's largest corporations. He said the subcommittee now lacks infor- on July 24: Made, June 25, they are still being bounced mation "to take a fish-or-cut-bait attitude." "Such information as we have now indi- back and forth between various Government Previously, over the bitter opposition of cates that the main issue is simply the desire agencies and congressional committees. Senators HART and Kefauver, the subcommit- of some major American drug companies to + + * " " tee voted to turn "for counsel" to the Senate continue to sell drugs in Latin America at -Industry argued that: Foreign Relations Committee. these exorbitant markups, a willingness on (1) The disclosure of the matters called In what was widely interpreted as a de- the part of some other American companies for would gravely injure the U.S. pharma- feat for Senator Kefauver, the Foreign Rela- to sell at more modest though still saxisfac- ceutical industry in its Latin American op- tions Committee conducted its own closed- tory markups, and certain alleged concerted erations and would endanger all private door hearings and concluded that the in efforts on the part of the former to prevent foreign investment in the area; (2) industry vestigation should be carried on by the De- the latter from doing so." was working toward solutions of its own partments of State and Justice. The influential and respected Bogota news- problems; (3) the balance of payments would paper, El Tiempo, quoted Health Minister be hurt if oversea drug profits were out, and (By Martin J. Steadman) Patino on sales prices to the Colombian pub- (4) industry produced its records for the In Venezuela recently, the drug manufac- lie. Dr. Patino cited as an example vitamin subcommittee, the information contained in turers' association was advised to "fight the B1,, which costs 21 cents to produce and sells them might be inimical to the foreign policy government" because that was easier than under trademark at $12 to $14. of the United States. opposing the huge American wholesale drug When the generic program began, the price After the executive session, the Foreign company, McKesson & Robbins, and its low- was slashed to $1.20. Dr. Patino said that the Relations Committee advised Senator Ke- priced line of generic drugs. raw material prices charged by the manufac- fauver that the investigation should be con- In Bogota, Colombia, where the McKesson turer to other companies producing generi- ducted either by the Department of Justice program has its base, the Minister of Health cally included the cost of research plus profit. or State. told the nation's Senate he had evidence The Health Minister clearly implied that Yet State' had already said it couldn't that rival drug concerns were tampering with the trade-name manufacturers could also sell conduct the investigation, and Justice said the low-priced drugs. at the $1.20 figure and still cover their re- it could only look into possible violations In Costa Rica, the pharmacists association search and development costs, at the same -under existing antitrust laws leaving a wide and the largest drug distributor, which ex- time making a profit. area unexplored. elusively represents five major American Dr. Patino was especially resentful, accord- There the matter lies. firms, vowed to do "everything in our power ing to El Tiempo, of the failure of the drug Unless Senator HART is successful today, to see that, through every Central American manufacturers to bring down the cost to the the investigation is "for all practical pur- association, McKesson does not establish in consumer of B12- poses" ended, the Herald Tribune was told. Central America." 'There are cases such as that of vitamin -This spokesman summed it up this way: In Washington, D.C., a secret meeting was B 11 he said, `which was quoted in 1961 "The State Department and AID say they held between representatives of the Colom- at $1,600 per gram, and in 1963 at $125 * * * don't have the resources to do an investiga- bian drug industry and this Nation's 140- its price (to the distributor) dropped 92.1 Lion,' The Foreign Relations Committee has member Pharmaceutical Manufacturers As- , but the price of the drug to the washed its hands of the matter. The De- sociation. The South Americans urged "an percentpublic did not go down." t partment of Justice is only interested in appeal from government to government;' pieces of the testimony." and asked. that the United States intervene 1\3cl esson supporters told the Herald to arrange that only certain drugs be sold INTERIM REPORT BY PREPARED- Tribune:. generically in Colombia. NESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOM- "Thii is exactly what was designed to What was developing-and is now the sub- happen." ject of a Senate investigation-is a huge MITTEE commercial war to stop the sale of low-cost Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have (By William Haddad) lifesaving drugs, some at prices one-tenth before me a copy of the interim The Senate Anti Trust and Monopoly Sub- the prevailing rates. The prices hinge on the by the 15reparedneof Iheeinteriirig Sub- report committee voted unanimously yesterday to difference between generic and trade names. " * * * committee on the treaty. I ask unani- ufactut heav axe n charges facturers are e exerting The struggle began when Colombia pub- molls consent that the title page, the g pressures t to o drug prevent that man- the sale of low-cost drugs. lished a decree last year proclaiming a new letter of transmittal, and pages 1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-.RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved Fo 22n~oo~~/pp33 ~1 ARBP65B00383R000100210007-3 16072~E,yICJIVAL CORD SENATE Septembe1 1 31 through 14 of the report be printed in the RECORD as in the morning dour. because we have main fined clear military superiority and the ability to inflict unac- ceptable damage upon hint has the would-be aggressor been deterred. The basis of our -deterrence is military superiority which, in turn, is based on our nuclear weapons pro- ,gram and nuclear retaliatory forces. It is vital to our survtyal that no step be taken which In any mannjer would impair the ,.Integrity and credibility of our deterrence or degrade the ability of out military forces to protect our security if e should be chal- lenged militarily by a ho ,Is nuclear power. 1I. Background and scope of report The chairman of the subcommittee, in opening the hearings on ~eptember 17, 1962, stated: "The Senate Committee on Armed Services has legislative ree}}ssponsibility for the common defense generaijy and for matters affecting the size compostion, and equipage of the Armed Forces. It as a direct and leg- itimate interest in any; and all activities Which affect or may affect the development and procurement of weapons and the size and quality of our flghti g forces." He also said: "Since weapons development and testing go hand in hand, we will inquire into the status of our nuclear test activities with respect both to weapons developments and weapons effects. Technical data now available on this question will be considered as well as information relating to our posi- tion :in this field as compared with the .progress, of the Soviets." In the months that have followed the sub- committee has made an e#haustive effort, on a scope and scale which is believed to be unprecedented as far aq the Congress is concerned, toobtain complete and full in- lormation about the relationship of nuclear testing--in all environments-to the integ- rity of our deterrent forces and the ability of our retaliatory or secoiid-strike forces to survive and respond to a nuclear attack. During the hearings thus far 2,800 pages of testimony were received from the 24 wit- nesses who are listed in alphabetical order in appendix A. Most of this testimony involved highly technical discussidns relating to the needs and capabilites of our present and future nuclear weapon systems. he overall objective of the subcommittee in this Inquiry has been {to develop as im- partially, as objectively, aid as fully as pos- sible all available military and technical in- formation bearing upon he subject matter so as to insure that the re would have mailable to it essentially'; the same body of military and technical evidence as is avail- able to the executive branch of the Govern- ment in its formulation of nuclear test ban policies and1 in its weighing of their secu- rity implications. This objective has, we be- lieve, been attained. The military, technical, and security problems associated with sus- pensions of nuclear testing have been iden- tilled, explored, and assessed These prob- affairs, and relations with other countries--- are relevant in an overall assessment of the treaty. These are not within the scope of this report. When they are considered, as they must be, each individual must :reach his own judgment about the wisdom and de- sirability of the treaty on the 'basis of per- sonal philosophy, past experience, current knowledge, and relative weight which he as.. signs to the various factors involved. IV. Comparison of U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons programs In this section we will endeavor from the testimony we have received to compare the nuclear warhead knowledge and state of the art of the United States with that of the Soviet Union. This includes, of course, the important field of nuclear weapons effects. The criteria we will use are the number of tests conducted within important yield ranges and the yield-to-weight ratio (the ex- plosive energy released per pound of bomb) achieved in the test programs. We will com- pare the situation prevailing in 1958 prior to the moratorium and that prevailing to- day. A. Multimegaton Weapons Capabilities In 1958, at the onset of the 34-month. nu- clear test moratorium, the United States had conducted slightly more tests above I mega- ton in yield than had the Soviet Union. Of these U.S. tests, one-fifth were in yield ranges above 10 megatons. No tests had been conducted by the Soviet Union in this high yield category. As a result of this experi- mental program, the United States held a clear superiority over the Soviet Union in the yeld it could achieve in a given thermo- nuclear weapon throughout the range of de- liverable weights. Following the abrogation of the morato- rium by the Soviet Union, the test and per- formance records altered drastically. In 1961 and 1962 the Soviet Union conducted in yields above 10 megatons twice the num. her of tests which had been conducted by the United States in that yield range through- out the history of its nuclear test program. The total number of Soviet tests above 1 megaton was approximately four times that conducted by the United States In the same period (1961-62). In terms of yield-to- weight ratios, the Soviet Union, as a result of its aggressive test program and its con- centration on very large yield weapons, has demonstrated clearly superior performance in all yield classes above approximately 15 megatons where the United States has had no testing experience since 1954, It is also worth noting that the scientific witnesses were unanimous in expressing uncertainty about the particular designs employed by the Soviets, to achieve the results observed in their very high yield experiments. B. Low-Megaton and Submegaton Weapon Capabilities There being no objection, t,, he portion of the report referred to was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as .follows: INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PRO- GRAM: INTERIM REPORT BY PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE, ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRO- POSED LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, PREPAREDNESS INVESTI- GATING SUBCOMMITTEE, September 9, 1963. HOD. RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is trans- mitted herewith art interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the military implications of the proposed limited nuclear test ban treaty.' The interim report deals, specifically with the military and technical advantages and disadvantages which flow or might flow from the agreement. The subcommittee reached its conclusions after hearing 24 witnesses over a period of 11 months. Among our witnesses were many of the most informed and knowledgeable people in the Nation upon the military and technical aspects of the pro- posed treaty. The subcommittee report is signed by my- self, as chairman, and by Senators STUART SYMINGTON, HENRY M. JACKSON, STROM THUR- MOND, MARGARET. CHASE SMITH, and BARRY GOLDWATER. Senator SYMINGTON,' however, has filed additional views which are also transmitted herewith. Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL has declined to sign the report, and his dissenting view is likewise transmitted herewith. Respectfully, . JOHN STENNIS, Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. INTERIM REPORT ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 1. Introductory statement Since September 1962, the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee has engaged in a comprehensive and extensive inquiry into the military and technical implications and aspects of the various nuclear test ban pro- posals. Although the inquiry was originally di- rected to the entire field of nuclear test ban proposals from the standpoint of their po- tential impact upon our military posture and preparedness, the negotiation and sign- ing of the three-environmental nuclear test bar agreement in Moscow caused the sub- committee to focus attention on the poten- tial Impact of that treay Gpon the future of our Miliary Establishment and strategic forces. This interim report is directed specifically to the partial test ban agreement. It deals 'ems will be discussed in, this report With Below a few thousand pounds in weight particular emphasis upon' their relation to and a few megatons in yield, the evidence the treaty banning nuclei' tests in the at- available to us indicates that the United mosphere, outer space, and underwater. States continues to hold a lead in weapon III. Summary of and or findings design and performance. f For a variety of reasons the United States 1. From the evidence we are compelled to has chosen to concentrate its development conclude that serious-per#Iaps even formid- efforts on weapons yielding from a, few mega- able-military and technical disadvantages tons down to fractions of kilotons. Conse- to the United States will flow from the rati- quently, it probably continues to hold some 11 prevent the unites States from provid- viet Union in these areas and in the ability wages to the United Sates which flow or might flow from the argument. Political ing our military forces With the highest to maximize the yield which can be achieved considerations, and matters involving foreign quality of weapons of which our science at a given weight and- size or, alternatively, to co international matte, as suv are not and technology is capable,fi package a given yield in a device of minimum within the scope l this report. as 2. Any military and technical advantages weight and size. which we will derive from the treaty do not, However, the rate of testing below 1 mega- In considering the impact and effect of in our judgment, counterbalance or out- ton indicates that the Soviet Union is at- the proposed test ban it is important to re- weigh the military and technical disadvan- tempting to challenge seriously the U.S. lead member that for nearly two decades this Na- tages. The Soviets will not be similarly in- in the lower yield weapon categories. Prior tion has been confronted by an adversary hibited in those areas of nuclear weaponry * to the 1958-61 moratorium the United States who has openly and repeatedly proclaimed where we now deem them to be inferior. had conducted somewhat more than twice as that his dominant goal is to destroy the na- 3. Admittedly, however, other important many tests at yields below 1 megaton as had tions of the non-Communist world. Only factors--such as foreign policy, international been detected in the Soviet Union. By the Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For RggSI81VAt' JIl5BfAFff0100210007-3 end of 1062 this ratio had dropped signifi- cantly. More important, the 1961-62 Soviet test series included more tests in this yield range'than had been conducted in its entire program from 1949 through 1958. Even ac- cdt ,nting for -tests to assess the effects of ex- plosions aiid' tests to confirm the yield of stgokpiled weapons-, this constitutes impres- sive evidence that the Soviet Union has no intention of permitting U.S. superiority in weapon design and performance at yields be- low 1 megaton to go unchallenged. It is in this range of yields that the testing under- ground ppermitted by the treaty can be ac- cRmplisied readily. Furthermore, there is a serious question about the adequacy of our knowledge of the nuclear devices employed in the Soviet ex- periments in the lower yield range. Detec- tion, indentification, and analytical capa- bilitiesare degraded at the lower end of this yield spectrum, particularly in the low and 5ubkiloton area. Consequently, our confi- dence in any conclusions concerning the So- viet state of the art in weapons yielding up to a few kilotons is correspondingly low. While we believe that U.S. superiority extends to these very low yield ranges, hard evidence on this point does not exist and, accordingly, we accept the judgment of our Atomic Energy Commission witnesses that while some intelligence exists on which to base an estimate of U.S.S.R. tactical nuclear capa- bility, the dearth of information [does] not permit a comprehensive United States- U.S.S.R. comparison. [For] future develop- ments a credible V.S.S.R. development capa- bility can be made by assuming a capability similar to ours. 0, Weapons Effect's Program's Important as are programs associated with the acquisition of new or improved types of weapons, the advent of the missile age and the adoption of a second-strike or retalia- tory strategic policy by the United States has elevated to a first priority tests to deter- mine the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened missile sites and control centers, on reentry bodies in flight, and on radar, electronic, and communications systems. Of equal importance have become tests to deter- mine what unique effects are produced by nuclear explosions in space, the atmosphere, and underwater so that the knowledge gained might be exploited for defensive pur- poses or our own weapon systems designed to resist them. From the testimony before the subcom- mittee, it is clear that neither nation has conducted a weapons effects test program of sufftcient size and complexity to resolve Whatever doubts may exist about the ade- quacy of the design and the survivability of their nuclear weapon systems; nor has either tested sufficiently to fulfill the needs of their system designers and military planners. h ow;ever, the necessity and the motivation t0. conduct such experiments is clearly greater for the United States than for the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960's, the deterrent strateg',y of the United States has been based substantially on second-strike missile 'systems, that is, missile systems which; can survive a massive first strike by a nuclear-armed enemy and still retain the ability to retaliate in such force as to destroy the attacker. By the mid-1970's this Na- tion's Nuclear deterrent will probably reside primarily in land-' and sea-based missile systems designed to achieve that degree of survivability. To date, only Polaris has been li jacted to 'd full-scale system test, Includ- ing"the explosion of the nuclear warhead. kinuteman,' Atlas, and Titan have never been so tested, nor have models of the base complexes of the hardened underground Minuteman' and Titan systems been sub- jected to close-in high yield nuclear explo- sions"to prove the adequacy of their design. No. 145-s reasonable confidence in the ability or these systems to fulfill their missions, it is clear that some unresolved questions exist and f de uate design and vul- a q that the absence o nerability data has necessitated radical over- Development of ABM warhead with max- design, redundancy, and excessive develop- imum lethality and minimum blackout ment and construction costs. Only by at- properties. Development of very high yield warheads, mospheric testing can needed answers be equal to or surpassing Soviet achieve obtained to the important unresolved Determmination of very high yield nuclear questions. weapons effects. However, there is one area of weapons Determination of underwater nuclear effects knowledge in which the Soviet Union weapon effects for improved antisubma- ASW tu of i e r e probably holds a distinct lead. By v eaponscquiring less Development of its large, multimegaton weapon tests, it is fissionable material than present designs. prudent to assume that the Soviet Union Development of pure fusion warheads----_ has acquired a unique and potentially valu- Development of reduced fallout weapons--- erformance and reliability tests le ll P p sca u able body of data on high yield blast shock, - communications blackout, and radiation and of minuteman and Titan missile sys - te. electromagnetic phenomena which is not Yield verification tests of stockpiled weap- available to the United States. Further- ons up to approximately 1 megaton. more, due to the absence of comparable ex- Yield verification tests of stockpiled weap- . periments, the United States is not now in a ens above approximately 1 megaton. Troop and crew training tactical exercises position to evaluate realistically the military using nuclear weapons. - effectiveness of the Soviet 50 to 100 megaton Can be done under treaty No. No. Yes. Yes. No. Yes. No. No. terror weapons. VI. Military implications of treaty In the field of weapons effects experiments related to the design and development of The primary objective of the hearings held an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) sys- by the subcommittee was to determine tem the evidence, although less conclusive, 'whether or not a suspension of, or limita- indicates that the Soviet Union in 1961 and tion upon, nuclear testing would or could 1962 conducted a series of complex high alti- result in overall military and technical dis- tude operations which, if properly instru- advantage for the United States. While the the mented, a and important d thave provided o on various typs bof radar net result of~the us to the proposed treaty would that blackout and nuclear effects. These Soviet military disadvantage, there was consider- experiments were clearly dictated by an able divergence of opinion among the wit- ABM development program. nesses on the question of whether the disad- The United States has conducted no ex- vantage was acceptable from the standpoint periments comparable in complexity to those of the Nation's security and whether the Soviet operations and a disturbing number risks involved were acceptable on balance. of the U.S. high-altitude-effects experi- A. Military Disadvantages ments which were conducted were com- The military disadvantages associated with promised either by considerations unrelated the treaty which were discussed in testimony to the technical objectives of the test pro- before the subcommittee were as follows: gram, by inadequate or faulty instrumenta- 1. The United States probably will be un- tion, or by operational inadequacies. Based able to duplicate Soviet achievements in very on the testimony we have received, there high yield weapon technology: Though can be little doubt but that the quantity U.S. weapons laboratories are capable of de- and quality of information available to the veloping and stockpiling designs yielding United States on high altitude nuclear greater than 50 megatons without further effects Is Inadequate for the Nation's military experimentation, their weight and size would needs. be incompatible with any existing or pro- V. U.S. needs for nuclear test gramed the missile delivery of ehi l . It is well In assessing the Senate of the treaty which , It oratories to equal and to surpass the Soviet is now w before the Senate for ratification, it is important nt to understand the kinds and achievements, but to do so would require a objectives of certain nuclear test programs number of atmospheric nuclear tests. 2. The United States will be unable to ac- which, in the opinion of the subcommby it, ittee quire necessary data on the effects of very and based on testimony received ii n u- high yield atmospheric explosions: With-would be ture S. nuclear or programs, in any y fu- out such knowledge it is unlikely that a real- The following e ichart pro summgrams.arizes the sub- istic assessment can be made of the military T committee's conclusions and distinguishes s value of such weapons, or that plans can be formulated to protect military weapons sys- ectives between selected test oderground test which can tems against their use. The data possessed gr realized through t those underground ergroubee by the United States on high yield weapons gams and those which could only b effects are inadequate to permit confident acchieved through atmospheric testing. extrapolations to the higher yield categories. Survivability and responsiveness of hard- ened site missile launch complexes to high yield nuclear explosions. Response of hardened underground struc- tures to blast and cratering from high yield surface burst nuclear weapons. Response of hardened underground struc- tures to ground motion. Determination of missile warhead and nose-cone vulnerability to nuclear ex- plosions during atmospheric reentry. Reduction of missile warhead and nose-cone vulnerabilities to nuclear explosions. Study of atmospheric and high altitude radar blackout phenomena. Study of communications blackout phe- nomena from high yield nuclear ex- plosions. Full-scale operational tests of ABM sys- tems. Can be done under treaty Yes. No. Yes. No. No. 3. The United States will be unable to ac- quire data onhigh altitude nuclear weapons effects: Such data are important to the de- sign of anti-ballistic-missile system warheads and radars. Again, this is an area in which Soviet experiments may have provided them with greater knowledge than that now avail- able to the United States. Throughout our hearings there was considerable dispute on this point. The treaty proponents accurately observed that the ABM warheads could be de- veloped through underground testing and that development of acquisition and tracking radars was an electronics problem not di- rectly dependent upon nuclear tests. It is clear, however, that the characteristics or specifications upon which such warhead de- sign and development should be based are not sufficiently known and cannot be deter- mined with confidence without additional high altitude effects tests. Approved For Release 2004/03111 ,CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 A roved For I acne 2004/03/11 ? IA-RDP65B00383Rnnn1nn,1nnn7-3 16074 pp CONGRESSIONAL R1CORD -SENATE September 1:d As the Atomic Energy Commission ob- suit that with the passage of.time knowledge later,, wrote in Homsom.olskaya Pravda, that served: "While our knowledge of * * * black- of the Soviet state of the art-in weapons the Soviet Union can "prove its complete out phenomena provides some limited guid- undergoing tests will be seriously degraded, military superiority over the United States." ante in the determination of [ARMI wa.r- The efen.+ f th - t - o e reat Will could only be chosen after continued atmos- States by Soviet secrecy. VY4 " ' y11+ The Joint Chiefs of Staff in testimony be- pherle,testing. Whether or not significant B. Counterar,mer+a_ fore the subcommittee identified a number And again: "The minimal [warhead) specs- A clear majority of the witnesses agreed collective judgment, would flow from the Stations ? ? can met within-the frame- that the treaty would result in military and treaty. However, their assessment of the de- work of existing technology. [But, assum- technical disadvantages when compared. with sirability of the treaty was not based on ing that a minimal warhead will not be-ac- the Increases in performance confidence and military considerations alone. Their con- ceptable,) testing both underground and in in the quality of weapon systems which would elusions on the -matter also reflected their the atmosphere robot u required totom- be derived from unlimited atmospheric test- judgment of the political and foreign policy plete the development." ing- advantages and disadvantages which would It was stated however 4 The United St that It is t h il b t , . , a es w c arac l e unable to de- er- result from it. Their joint conclusion was termine with confidence the performance and istic of the experimental sciences that enough that, on balance, the political and foreign reliability of any the stem deuce ed data is never available to doatisfy the scientific policy advantages to be derived from the y y y developed for knowledge. The testimony without benefit of atmospheric operational y was treaty outweighed the limitations which the, system tests: An ABM system will be re- unanimous that, except in the field of very treaty would impose on the Nation's weapon quired to function in the nuclear environ- high ;yield weapons, the United States today systems programs. went created both by its own defensive war- holds a clear and commending lead in nu- However, the Joint Chiefs qualified their head ex lte b and those own the live war- clear weapon systems over any one or any support - of the treaty by making their ap? P combination of potential !enemies. enemy. Under such circumstances it is im- This superiority menal conditional on gu ds"cdesi in d to portant to be as certain as possible that no a larger and was said to result from reduce ion of four "safeguards" designed to element of the system possesses unknown more diversified stockpile of reduce to a minimum the adverse effect the vulnerabilities t to nuclear effects. All unknown nuclear weapons, by more numerous, varied, treaty would have on our weapon programs. tronics components nuclear the ground arrays aelec- nd and sophisticated delivery systems, and by On the basis of these "safeguards" Senator missiles must function; of the missiles must a greater capacity to produce nuclear ma- JACKSON on August 14, 1963, offered a mo- be capable sites must of operating t the p terials:, weapons, and delivery systems. tion which was unanimously adopted by the thermal, and blast the the eesn must e of it was also asserted that a cessation of subcommittee, and was subsequently ap- bucle thmuse be resistant to nuclear radwar- io- atmospheric nuclear testing would in no case proved by all members of the Senate Com- nea s. It t be resistant nuunless - des a radia- prevent qualitative improvements being mittee on Armed Services, requesting that tam of such complexity is tested in it op- made in our weapons systems which would the Joint Chiefs' of Staff submit as soon as te of environment, there will in a low flow from a vigorous noniauclear technology. possible, and in any event prior to commit- era i of confidence in its ability to perform Some witnesses noted that potential im- tee action on the treaty, a statement of the level the mission cfor which its was designed provernents in missile accuracy and reliabil- specific requirements to implement the the produced. Many unknowns will arise tand he Ity would continue to be exploited. Some "safeguards" proposed by the Joint Chiefs. course of the ABM development program noted that uncertainties in ABM radar per- Senator JACKSON'S motion, which sets forth which can only be explored and roisfied formance when confronted with the various the proposed safeguards in full, is attached through the medium p atmospheric and forms of blackout induced by 'nuclear ex- as appendix B. t r gitthe nuclear testing. plosions could be compensated by the de- By a letter dated August 15, 1963, Senator 5. The United Staar est e unable to vacs- ployment of greater numbers and wider dis- RICHARD RUSSELL, chairman of the Commit-will fy the ability of its hardened underground persal of the radars. tee on Armed Services, transmitted the Jack- the ability systems hardened to underground Uncertainties concerning reentry vehicle son motion to the Secretary of Defense, and second- high-yield nuclear explosions: (See warhead vulnerabilities could be reduced by requested a statement in response to the lo discussion nuclear the heading explosions: of "Weap- a factor of 2 or 3, based on present knowl- motion. the Effects Program" on edge and without further testing, by straight- Responses to the motion were received ons rt. pp. 4 to 5 of this forward engineering improvements, it was from the Joint Chiefs and the Office of the ) said. 6. The United States will be unable to C Som witnesses noted that Secretary of Deaee attached as August appendix 24, indix 9 . verify the ability of its missile reentry bodies uncertainties which might roe far u any These responses are considers l under defensive nuclear attack to survive and survivability of tike arise about the The subcommittee ratified, it h be on- to penetrate to the target without the o urviv second-d-stri missile forces that, if the treaty is ratified, the recom- to penetrate test nose target and warhead the de- were concerned, these could be compen- mended "safeguards" be implemented fully signs i cone and by additional redundancy in missile and that detailed and specific programs to signs in a a nuclear ar environment nunder d . y- systems, by greater numbers of missiles, and so implement them be presented by the exec- 7. The treaty will provide the Soviet Union by greater dispersal. It was also noted that utive branch. U.S. war plans tend to be'' conservative con- The administration has expressed y an opportunity to equal U.S. accomplish- cerning the percentage of the second-strike publicly i ments in submegaton weapon technology: force surviving a nuclear attack and in esti- the its responses intent regarding the the motion b safeguards both or there can be no doubt that a treaty limiting mating the number of warheads capable of JACKSON and in statements by s Senator the enemy tendngoto a or underground environment targe t fa at a. the towill r at reaching rgin for er gets and so provide ade- President,the Se other YoftState,and the end of the yield spectrum. Economic factors In summary, it was the contention of wit- Secretary of Defense. Such statements are will play a part since costs rise significantly nesses who supported the treaty that it will set forth in appendix D. with relatively modest Increases in yield for tend to stabilize the advantages which the To permit the U.S. Senate to monitor the underground tests. There are also testing United States now maintains in military nu- treaty safeguards it is necessary that the ex- limitations arising from the type of strata, clear superiority over the Soviet Union. pressed good intentions be supplemented by geological uncertainties, and engineering fac- While recognizing that doubts concerning definitive programs against which progress tors. Whether or not either the United the quality of some of out weapons systems can be compared. At this time, we have not States or the Soviet Union will choose to do exist, they maintained that these doubts received details of testing, preparedness, and test underground at yields much greater can be compensated by "brute force" tech- detection improvement programs which will than approximately 1 megaton is not known. niques by which quantity is substituted for permit; the safeguards to be monitored in an In any case, it appears that the race for nu- quality at considerably greater cost to achieve effective manner. If the treaty is ratified it clear technological superiority will be con- approximately the same results in military is`the intention of the Preparedness Investi- fined to that area where the United States is system effectiveness. gating Subcommittee to monitor the imple_ believed to now hold a margin of superiority. It is interesting and sobering to note that, mentation of the safeguards, and it would The result, with time, will probably be the as we proclaim our nuclear superiority and also be our hope that other committees of achievement of parity by the Soviet Union our determination to maintain it, the So- the Congress havin in this area without any equivalent o or- g jurisdiction important tpro- PP diets gus A dispatch from Moscow areas would cooperate in this pro- for the United States to attain equal- dated August t 30 90, , 1969, qu es Red Star, , the e gram. sty in very high yield weapon technology. Soviet armed forces news paper, as saying However, we wish to emphasize that even 8. The treaty will deny to the United States that Russia today possesses superiority in the most rigorous and conscientious imple- a valuable source of information on Soviet nuclear power "and has no intention of re- mentation of the JCS safeguards will. not nuclear weapons capabilities: The results ac- linquishing it." Red Star also said that, alter, modify, or reduce the military and quired from the analysis of radioactive debris while the United States intends to continue technical disadvantages listed herein which generated by nuclear explosions has long underground testing, the hopes of the Pen- will result from this treaty. No safeguards b een a basic source of intelligence on Soviet tagon of attaining any "advantage in nuclear can provide the benefits of testing where nuclear nod et teswe ponder programs. By driving power by means of these explosions are illu- testing is not permitted, nor can they assure ng ground, this intelligence sory." And on September, 3. 1983, Marshal that this Nation will acquire the highest will be denied the United States with the re- Rodlon Malinovsky, the Soviet Defense Min- quality weapon systems of which it is cap- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved ForRel se 2004103h1,:_ 004/0311 ?' CIA-RbP651 0383'R000100210607-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE able_yr e ux. ans for achieving that ob- From the evidence we have learned that jectiveare denied the Soviets h a, veovertak . I : _ _ cn and gurpassed us V1i1. Detection and ideaitipcation in the design of very high yield nuclear wcaporis that they may possess knowledge A brie' ,word should be said about, the of weapons effects and antiballistic missile pro`~lem of detection and identification in programs superior to ours; and that under conii?ctton with the proposed treaty. "De- the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible tectie7 " means , determination ,that an that they will achieve parity with us in low :event} 11as oQcury .without implying that it yield weapon technology. These things are has been ldentiflgd as a nuclear, explosion. " not grounds for complacency. We believe Identete6tion".moans that an event is not very strongly that Soviet secrecy and du- only detected but that it is identified as a plicity requires that this Nation possess a nuclear detoxlatho n. substantial margin of superiority in both the During the previous negotiations on test quality and the quantity of its implements ban treaties, the major controversy in this of defense. field lids centerei around the ability to Although we have concluded that there detect, identify, and fix the location of un- will be a net military disadvantage to us if dergrouand explosions. The proposed three- the treaty is ratified, we recognize the exist- environment treaty, by permitting under- ence of other factors which, while not within ground' testing, considerably reduces the the scope of this report, are pertinent to a problems'involved,in detection and,identifi- -final judgment on the treaty. Among these cation by does not eliminate them entirely. are matters related to International affairs, The capabilities of our verification system foreign policy, and relations with other epun- dlscuse.d in, detail in all unclas- tries. When these are taken into considera- shied document, However, notwithstanding tion the question becomes one of weighing anticipated and programed improvements in relative risks, and our hearings provide am- the system, it will, still posess both detection ple evidence that the overall assessment of and identification ,"thresholds;' below which the relative merits and demerits of the treaty clandestine testing is' possible with a low is a'complex and difficult matter on which probability of detection. . equally patriotic, informed, and dedicated The yields at which clandestine tests may persons may and do disagree. In the final be conducted and-probably escape detection analysis, then, each individual must reach will vary with altitude and geographical his own judgment on the basis of personal location, and some uncertainty exists in this philosophy, past experience, current knowl- field. There is alto some controversy as to edge, and the relative weight which he as- whether signiflcant,military advantages can signs to the various factors involved. be obtained by clandestine testing in the ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR STUART prohibited environments. plore these problems in detail. It Is Our pur- Since 1955, when I was appointed a mem- pose here to point out that, under the ber of the Joint Subcommittee on Disarma- limited treaty, problems of detection, idpnti- ment, I have followed closely the activity of fication, and- verification .,still remain our Government in arms control, a- although they are of a lesser order of magni- ment, and nuclear test ban proposals; als; and tude than would be true of a treaty banning specifically have studied carefully the three- underground testing. environmental test ban treaty signed by our Ix r r 3'?s;m + + M Government in Moscow on. August 5, 1963. From the extensive evidence presented to data contained in the report of the Prepared- us,' we have come to the conclusion that the ness Investigating Subcommittee is correct . proposed treaty banning nuclear testing in But I believe the findings and conclusions the atmosphere, underwater, and in space are overly pessimistic as to the effect of the will affect adversely the future quality of this treaty on our national security. Nation's arms, and that it will result in As a member of both the Foreign Relations serious, and perhaps formidable, military Committee and the Preparedness Investigat- and technical disadvantages. These disad- tag Subcommittee, I listened to and ques- vantages, in our judgment, are not out- tioned many responsible witnesses-both in weighted or counterbalanced by the claimed and out of Government. Most of these ex- military advantages. At the same time, we perts testified that our national security are not convinced that comparable military would be adequately protected under the disadvantages will accrue to the nuclear terms of the treaty. Weapon programs of the U.S.S.R. Much of this testimony was before the Looking at the matter from the military Foreign Relations Committee and, therefore, aspect and from the effect of the treaty upon is not emphasized In this report. our military preparedness and posture, we Based on the record, I am worried about cannot escape being impressed with the tes- the treaty; but more worried about the pos- timony of Gen. Thomas S. Power, com- sibility of an all-out nuclear exchange some mander,in chief of the Strategic Air Com- day in the future-particularly if there is a Inand, and Gen. Bgrnard A. Sebrlever, com- proliferation of nuclear weapons among mander of.,the Air Forge Systems Command, more countries. This treaty, a very small Who adc ressed. themselves to the problem step, nevertheless could be the first step to- exclusiyo}y from the military point of view. ward bringing nuclear weapons under some General Power, after stating that he did not form of satisfactory control, which action think the treaty "is in the best interests of t should promote the possibilities of a just he United States," said: "I feel, that We have under law. military superiority now, and I feel very peace strongly that this has resulted in a world Therefore, I plan to vote for the treaty. that has been free from nuclear warfare. I This does not deter me from signing the have a lower confidence factor that we can Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee re- and will maintain that military superiority port. The record made by the subcommittee under the test ban treaty." is, to the best of my knowledge, the most General Schriever told the subcommittee complete record'ever made on this vital sub-}fie "axe definite military disadvan- jet by anybody on the military and tech- aes" o the treaty and that, as amilitary nological implications of nuclear test ban Tda#i Tie, f'elt, he cQpl.d protect the country treaties as they relate to our national se- letter wltlqut the treaty than with it, curity. It is a record which should be of Of course, the endorsement of the treaty inestimable future value to the Congress by Gen. Curtis E. l;,eMay, Chief of Staff of and the country. the Air .,,Force, was, considerably less than DISSENTING VIEW OF SENATOR LEVERETT enthusiastic, and he testified that heprob- SALTONSTALL ably would have recommended against the As one Senator who attended the hearings +L... ............._, _+_-_ treaty had it still hoer. i n 16075 Committee and the Preparedness Investi- gating Subcomittee on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty, I find that I cannot, as a member of the Preparedness Subcommittee, concur with its report because I feel that its general tenor and its specific findings and conclusions are unduly pessimistic as to the effect of this treaty, if ratified, upon our na- tional security. As a U.S. Senator, I intend to consent to the ratification of this nuclear test ban treaty. I believe that the factual data contained in the report of the Preparedness Subcom- mittee is accurately stated. However, the nature of the conclusions drawn from this factual data are, in my opinion, overly ad- verse. It must be remembered that respon- sible Government officials such as the Sec- retary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leading scientists, and many others, some of whom appeared only before the Foreign Relations Committee, testified that our na- tional security would be protected under the terms of the treaty even though some im- portant atmospheric nuclear tests could no longer be conducted. This testimony is not sufficiently emphasized in the report, al- though I realize that some of it was not necessarily given in the hearings conducted by the Preparedness Subcommittee. The Congress must insist upon an active, constructive, and energetic implementation of the four safeguards suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that our security will be maintained while the cause of peace and the lessening of tensions in the world are advanced. HOW TO WASTE MONEY WITHOUT EVEN TRYING Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, an edi- torial in the Evening Star, Washington, D.C., on September 3, 1963, called atten- tion to a most curious document, pre- pared at the expense of the taxpayers, under the direction of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This Department of Health, Education, and Welfare book is 814 pages long. It is titled, "Programs, 1963: A Guide to Pro- gramed Instructional Materials Avail- able to the Educator by September 1963." This book is actually a bibliography , It contains a list of publications which it states may be of use to the Nation's educators during the upcoming school year. I think my discussion of it might well be made under the heading "How To Waste Money Without Even Trying." Ordinarily one would assume that a list of materials which are available for the use of teachers in the classroom would be commendable. But the Eve- ning Star said that one section of this bibliography actually is concerned_with describing an "Official Girlwatcher's Manual" which is available for the use of our educators. I thought to myself- Surely, this must be a jest. Newspaper- men, in the dull heat of a late summer afternoon are wont to amuse themselves and, they hope, the public with gentle barbs directed at the civil servant. it seemed unbelievable that even under the New Frontier's concept of "sophisticated budget management" the hard-earned money of America's taxpayers would be used for the assembling, publication, and distribution of such obvious nonsense. But, being of a curious nature, I could not let this rest at that. I wanted to see for myself this library of strange and forgotten lore. I found my intellectual foray beset with obstacles cunnin l l id g y a conducted by both the YForeign Relations by a shy and reticent Department of Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16076 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 Any answer is OIS. That's all. Just any old answer is OK. It does not make' any difference that the taxpayers of this country are paying $21,850 to produce the bibliog- raphy which contains material like this-because any old answer is OK. Question 19, on page 123, also deals with the salesman's call report. This question reads: Maybe you said, "Like hell, I don't agree." Well, is money important to you? The answer to this 'question, again prepared for the use of our Nation's teachers, and distributed by the U.S. Government is, and I quote: If you. answer "No," you're sick, plan, sick. Health, Education, and Welfare. In short, they just did not seem to, want to let me see a copy. Perseverance had its rewards. I ob- tained a copy of this book, whose produc- tion was paid for by the taxpayers of the United States, and now, Mr. President, I would like to describe for you briefly its contents, its price tag, and its distribu- tion. I must be frank and say I still am not able to describe its purpose. It seems that this book, which has con- tract No. OE-3-16-012, is an 814-page compilation of Library of Congress index cards. By working a month or so at the Library a good secretary could come up with a similar list. Yet the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ad- mits to paying $21,850 to the Center for Programed Instruction, Inc., for this card catalog fascimile. This material, prepared under author- ity of the National Defense Education Act, purports to assist educators in their selection of instructional materials. As a supporter of the NDEA, this perversion of its purposes and waste of its money appalls me. Mr. President, let us see what we get for this $21,850. I think a" random sampling of the book pretty well tells the story. It might well also have some bearing on the wisdom of involving the Federal Government in Federal-aid-to- education programs involving Curricula, classroom activities or the payment, se- lection, and supervision of teachers and school administrators. When 'the Fed- eral Government spends taxpayers' money to publicize certain books and articles, it autoinatically involves itself in the implication that such' publica- tions are desirable and authentic. By publicizing some and ignoring others it inferentially recommends the former and rejects the latter. When it goes as far afield as in the instant case it, also indi- cates a complete lack of realism and a virtual disdain for the taxpayers' problems. I should like to quote from page 506 of this document, specifically' a sample page from "How To Follow the Stock Market" One question which the au- thors apparently feel is essential to mod- em education, goes like this : - But before you contact a stockbroker, you should decide what type of stock buyer you are going to be and what kind of ___- you want to buy. The answer is "stock." Another question states: You could be one of two types of stock buyers: A speculator or an investor. Specu- lators speculate and investors The answer is, strangely enough, "in- vest." Pages 122 and 123 are concerned with the salesman's call report. Question 18, on page 123 states: Let's see why and to whom call` reports are important. First of all call reports are im- portant to you. Do you agree? In all honesty, Mr. President, at this point l too was sick. I have seen many publications intelligently written and sensibly produced by the Federal Gov- ernment over the years. But in recent months there is some legitimate cause to question the uses to which the De- partment of Health, Education, and Wel- fare puts its multibillion dollar appro- priations. This bibliography is but the latest example of taxpayer financed frivoli ty. Starting with page 132,-the next 15 pages are devoted to fun and games, including "How To Watch a Football Game," "How To Score Bowling," coin collecting, roller skating, one course on chess and three on bridge. I am sure all of these games bring joy to the soul; but I must question the use of the public purse to finance this excursion into these forms of unalloyed happiness. Mr. President, I will go one step fur- ther. I do not think the general welfare clause of the Constitution was designed to promote books on hdw to watch foot- ball. Up to this point I was merely as- tounded, but when I noticed this bibli- ography devoted pages'521 and 522 to a description of an "Official Girlwatcher's Manual" I was disgusted. I shall quote these 2 pages in their entirety because, frankly, Mr. President, if I did not you would not believe what they contained. Page 521, Official Girlwatcher's Manual: Official Girlwatcher's Manual; Jac D. Mea- cham? Grafioroll Systems, :inc.; Joe Beagin, founder, International Society of Girl- watchers. Published by,Graficroll Systems, Inc., 4215 Calavo Drive, La Mesa, Calif. 110 pages, 51/2 by 8 inches, $4.95. Table of contents. Constructed responses usually used, branching; no multiple choice. Developmental (field test) population(s) : Any member of International Society of Giriwatchers and other interested males. Prerequisites: 20/20 vision or corrected as required. Additional material 'required: glasses, binoculars, notebook. Average time: 21/2 hours (estimate). The answer to this question, and again Next revision: February 1963. (One sample 11 Page 522, Official Girlwatcher's Manual: Official Girlwatcher's Manual; Meacham, Beagin; Graficroll Systems; one sample page : OFFICIAL GIRLWATCHER'S MAffi1JAL Directory of girls 17. The untouch- ables. 18. The girls that have a ten- dency to cry easily, or have chronic complaints, or appear to be nervous most of the time are the EMOTIONALS The. are usually good 'or watching when stopped by the law for speeding. 18. Emotionals. 19. The uNMENTIONARLE9 are not in the watchable categcry because they are generally those girls out of the past and you do not mention them to your wife or current date. They are _ _ - _ only in visions or dreams. 19. Watched. 20. The NOCTURNA'LS are those beauties who are always falling asleep on a date or early in the evening. The _.._- are very poosones for drive--- movies, but can be observed drousing in their favorite park or on the beach. 20. Nocturnals in. 21. The eocrosLES are not al- ways drinking Pepsi, but are usually flitting about like a fly in spring; at parties and -___ events. The socia- bles are very good to watch as they provide a variety of entertainment. 1,7 Now, Mr. President, there are those in the executive branch who will maintain, that this book serves a useful purpose in that it provides would-be users of teach- ing machines with a complete compila- tion of materials available along with their sources. If this material were not available anywhere else in the country, it might, indeed, be of real value, The fact is-and I speak from the ex- perience of serving as a former school superintendent--tha' any school official who has shown the slightest degree of interest in. this type of education has promptly been swamped with salesmen of every description, each with his bro- chure, each with a fully detailed list, along with samples of his wares. Teach- ers, department heads, and administra- tors have never been at a loss to find textbooks and teaching aids. The prob- lem, as any administrator will tell you, is sometimes how to avoid them. Each day's mail brings in a plethora of adver- tising material on all worthwhile books and publications. This very flood of available informa- tion makes the publication of such a bibliography-at taxpayer expense-a more patently ridiculous operation. Mr. President, this bibliography says that the authors and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare will wel- come comments on this book, along with suggestions as to how it might be im-? proved. My first comment is that the contract be declared invalid by the Comptroller General of the United States and that the $21,850 paid under this contract to the Center for Programed Instruction, Inc.., whether as a political reward or for Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For CRelease ONGRESSIONAL :RECW65Eff%W00100210007-3 The Senate has passed the Youth Em- ployment Act, S. 1, for the 88th Con- gress, and the legislation has been fa vgrably_ reported by the House Commit- tee on Education and Labor. As in the past several sessions, we are waiting for consideration of this bill in the House Rules Committee.' Often the argument is raised in op- position to Federal programs designed to meet urgent domestic needs that the American public really does not support such programs. I believe this argument is fallacious most of the time; it cer- tainly is fallacious in terms of the Youth Employment Act. The American Institute of Public Opinion, the research organization that compiles the Gallup poll, released the results of their latest survey, which dis- closes that 89 percent of the American public support the establishment of a Youth Conservation Corps. To quote from Dr. George Gallup's report of this survey: Few issues in polling history have received h overwhelming support of the American C a y, 16121 accepted by the military service. Many youth experts contend that this situation- in addition to providing a "breeding ground" for juvenile delinquency-constitutes a great waste of the Nation's manpower- overall-when asked about requiring such young men to go to youth camps- more persons approve of the mandatory approach than disapprove of it. Among Republicans interviewed, however, the prevailing sentiment is against requiring young men to go to the camps. Democrats and Independents support such an approach. Younger voters tend to vote against such a method of handling the youth camps; a majority of older voters are in favor of it. During the 1930's, upward of 2 million men were at one time members of the Civil- ian Conservation Corps or its predecessor, the Emergency Conservation Work Agency. Gallup poll files show that no New Deal measure was so consistently popular with the public as the CCC camps. In July 1936-after the camps had been in operation. for 3 years-83 percent of per- sons in a national survey were in favor of continuing the CCC. In April 1938, another Gallup poll re- corded nearly 8 out of 10 in favo,of estab- lishing the camps on a permanent basis. SA public as has the proposal for modern-day No camps-modeled after those established AN ELOQUENT CONTRIBUTION IN by the Roosevelt administration in the 1930's. APRIL 1962 BEHALF OF CIVIL RIGHTS A GALLUP POLL-8 IN 10 FAVOR REVIVAL OF Let me emphasize what Dr. Gallup COC YOUTH CAMPS As in legislative session, has said: (By George Gallup) Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I Few issues in polling history have received PRINCETON, NJ.-As a way of dealing with have received a letter from John Maisel, such overwhelming support. the growing problem of out-of-school, out- a young American of Woodmere, N.Y. I This is a most heartening report on the of-work young men, the American public is wish every Senator could read this letter, feelings of the American public. It sus- highly cinf of the reviving the concept of the which an the letter came 30 cents. I supported by 8 out of 10 persons, such a have the nickel and quarter taped to a Conservation what the supporters of the Youth CCC Conservation Corps have maintained for proposal would set up youth conservation piece of paper. This is a handwritten years. camps for men between the ages of 16 and letter by a young man who is a fine and It also confirms the results of an ear- 22 who want to learn a trade and earn a good citizen. her Gallup poll on the popularity of the little money by working outdoors. YCC. On April 19, 1962, I reported to Such a concept is embodied in the youth Mr. President, the people of America the Senate that 79 percent of the Amer- training bills now before Congress, with and the world saw the spirit of democ- thousandsl whoa faces of maximum versions. of 150,000 those amanybrotherhood an public ill supported this issue. Since Senate gbAlcal s ford aHouse that came to ttime, still t stillo the total l 10 fo o,r an percent over- have youths in the program by the year 1965; Washington for the jobs and freedom. been added dd the House version would limit the number This is not the face of America which all w,There here g are 89-few, ifpercent any, vote of public issues be confidence. - to 12,000 at any time over a 3-year period. too frequently is portrayed on the front T To see how the public feels about the fore Congress that could command a general principle of modern-day CCC pages of our newspapers and on TV. comparable majority. It seems to me camps, Gallup poll reporters put this ques- If the march replaced the faces of fear onhate ly li with day, then it faces of co age and love that this matter is beyond dispute: The tion to a cross section adults: that the Federal Govern- afor nd American public want prompt passage of "It is proposed as the CCC ment set up youth camps-such a great deal. Of course, the march did are the Youth eminently Employmcorrecet nt on Act. this And matter they. 22 camps years of who the want 1930's to -for learn a young trade men and 16 earn accomplish much more than this. While youth unemployment dipped a little money by outdoor work. Do you Occasionally I fear we are beginning slightly in August, the rate is still 14.1 think this is a good idea or a poor idea?" to believe what we read about ourselves Percent on the front pages of the newspaper. As percent, hardly a figure designed to The vote nationwide: President Kennedy indicated at the press bring comfort or reassurance. Further- Good idea--------------------- --- 79 more, I have-little doubt that the rate poor idea----------------------- ---- 16 conference yesterday, the schools in 157 will soon be climbing back toward 20 No opinion----------------------- 5 cities have been desegregated this year. While our attention has been focused on percent unless remedial steps are taken the disorders which have occurred in at Analysis shows that the youth camps win . once. overwhelming support in all regions of the Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- Natign-East, Midwest, South, and Far west. Alabama, we have failed to note that sent that the Gallup Poll released over Big majorities of older voters-who recall over 150 other cities have desegregated this past weekend relating to the Youth the Ccc camps of the 1930's-as well as almost without incident. determined Here' is the true Conservation Corps may be printed in younger voters endorse the idea of youth that justice and t reedom will become d the RECORD. I also ask unanimous con- ca Although the proposal has bipartisan sent that the poll taken in 1962 demon- port at the grassroots level, amodern -day This morning's mail brought a fresh - strafing similar support be printed after CCC has more appeal to Democrats and sup In- reality. the new survey. dependents (83 and 80 percent approval reminder of the basic decency of the There being no objection, the articles respectively) than it does to rank-and-file large majority of Americans on issues very fab were ordered to be printed in the REc- Republicans (70-percent approval). which cut so directly to the A you ng ric of ORD, as follows: Although the public supports the basic our SEPTEMBER 1963 principle of, youth conservation camps, the from Woodmere, Long Island, 1q.Y., John question of whether youths who are out of Maisel, has sent me his week's allowance PUBLIC BACKS CCC-TYPE YOUTH CAMPS school and out of work should be required of f 30 cents to help in the cause of civil (By George Gallup) to go to these camps provokes some o 30 sending I'm PRINCETON, N.J.=Few issues in polling his- controversy. any a s you tory have received such overwhelming sup- Authorities estimate that as find tSs I al Dean SENATOR: the money could help a Negro m- w so port of the American public as has the pro- million young men _ each year posal for modern-day CCC camps-modeled selves out of school, out of work, and not or donate to a Negro fund. I am sending after those established by the Roosevelt ad- ministration in the 1930s, Nearly 9 out of 10 persons interviewed in a nationwide Gallup Poll say they think such camps-enabling young men to learn a trade and earn money by outdoor work-would be a good idea. In the proposed Youth Conservation Corps, young men between the ages of 16 and 22 could earn money through participation in Federal conservation programs. The "Home Town Corps," which would be open to both young men and women, would provide work experience and increase em- ployability through work in State or local projects. To get the public's views on the principle of the youth camps, Gallup Poll interviewers put the following question to a representa- tive sample of 1,588 adults from coast to coast: "It is proposed that the Federal Govern. the CCC ment set up youth camps-such men who camps of the 1930s-for young want to learn a trade and earn a little money by outdoor work, Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?" The vote nationwide: percent Good idea---------- ----------------- 89 r s 6 Poor idea ------___ ----- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16128 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13, 1963 this money to you because I know you'll do my request. He signs the letter in his own hand- writing as "Your friend." Mr. President, that is a wonderful thing-"Your friend, John Maisel." From John's letter it Appears that he still is in elementary school. To this Senator such a letter is a heartening in- dication that the cause of full civil rights for all Americans does enjoy the support of a vast majority of persons in this Nation. Both the old and the young- like John Maisel-know that transform- ing the promise of -equifi rights into real- ity takes personal commitment and sacrifice. From John's perspective, the contribution of a week's allowance rep- resents such a sacrifice. I commend this young American for speaking out on the side of freedom and justice. Such ac- tion should not go unnoticed, for it dem- onstrates that America-as a Nation-is determined that the right shall ulti- mately prevail. For John's information, I intend to forward this contribution to the NAACP legal defense fund. For many years this worthy organization has sought to secure full civil rights for Negroes whare such rights have been denied. I am confident that John's allowance will be wisely in- vested in the cause of freedom. In fact, this 30 cents will be paying dividends for many years to come. This letter and Its contents have brightened my day coisiderably. Let us be thankful that the future of this great Nation eventually will rest in the hands of such young men as John Maisel. .ADJOURNMENT'TO MONDA NEXT AT I10 A.M. States of America to the seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. John Gorham Palfrey, of New York, to be alternate representative of the United States of America to the seventh sessi f th on o e Gen- eral Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. James T. Ramey, of Illinois, to be alternate representative of the United States of Amer- ica to the seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Frank K. Hefner, of Virginia, to be alter- nate representative of the United States of America to the seventh session of the Gen- eral Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. UNITED NATIONS The following-named persons to be repre- sentatives and alternate representatives of the United States of America to the 16th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than De- cember 31, 1963: To be representatives Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois. EDNA F. KELLY, U.S. Representative from the State of New York. WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, U.S. Representative from the State of California. Francis T. P. Plimpton, of New York. Charles W. Yost, of New York. To be alternate representatives Mercer Cook, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Republic of Niger. Charles C. Stelle, of Maryland. Jonathan B. Bingham, of New York. Sidney R. Yates, of Illinois. Mrs. Jane Warner Dick, of Illinois. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, in accordance with the previous order, I move that the Senate stand In adjourn- ment until 10 o'clock a.m. on Monday next. The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 32 minutes p.m.), under the previous order, the:Senate adjourned, in executive session, until Monday, Sep- tember 16, 1963, at 10 o'clock a.m. CONFIRMATIONS Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate, September 13, 1963: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENEnGY AGENCY Frank K. Hefner, of Virginia, a Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be the deputy rep- resentative of the United States of America to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Glenn T. Seaborg, of California, to be the representative of the United States of Amer- ica to the seventh session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The following-named persons to the posi- tion indicated: Henry DeWolf Smyth, of New Jersey, to be alternate representative of the United Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For hel 220p~441L0p33/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 S KESSIONA L RECORD P PNI A 7r>~ uo the ?r LVUui-Ilea TO. vOlltlcs betrayed the 1,076,245 casualties of who did iterwere not prosecuted. Chapter asury of the United States. World War II, and the 157,350 casualties of f ter chapt records accusing history, My second suggestion is that a thor- the Korea war. Now we are losing the Martin Dies has written a record, small in ouh.,investigation be made within the miscalled cold war." Depa{bent of Health, Education, and This striking para content but huge in stature. The final grh Welf re to determine Dies' Story." The an who ehead d "Martin the the chapter cold summarizes lost anfar we d e have who authorized House Commttte on Un-Ameri Read it how n Q_ approved this n a ssess your can Activitiesti onsense It esmate of our national securit y. . so introduces his grim account of what might be interesting to my colleagues to mounts to betrayal of the Nation by diverse The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is see just, how widespread this appalling factors: Political ambition; recklessness of there further morning business.? If not, wa3te.h138 become. Unless We stop such method; misguided ignorance stimulated to morning business is closed. lincoliscionable waste now we may expect falsehood and calumny; official stupidity and it tO morning and to expand. Surely lax security; unwillingness to admit stly suggMr. e MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I there must be more a fault; a small ggest the absence of a quorum, ppropriate methods group of dedicated Communist Of complying with the Presidential man- agents infiltrated into official position. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The date tQ get, America going again. This is a terrifying story, a striking warn- clerk will call the roll. Ing from a devoted I as1 that the editorial in the Washing- whose head and political and Texan been The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the ,ton Evening Star to which I alluded ap- opened the vials of twrath of thehigno ant roll. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, i pear at Ws 'Point in the RECORD. the dupe, the traitor, and the well-meaning These being no objection, the editorial fool. ask unanimous consent that the order was ordesec to be printed in the RECORD, Here is the record of what the Dies corn- for the quorum call be rescinded. w sollows: mittee did, what it tried to do and what The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- [From the Washington (D,C.) Evening Star, tIt Was he an teced ntsdleafrom doing. ecorded are d ng to the formats n of out objection, it is so ordered. dept. 3, 19631 the committee with Dies at its head in 1938 Lies, AND LERRN and the events of the next 8 years when THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY The ma11 has brought to our desk a doc- it functioned through the most extraordinary The Senate, as in Committee of the storm Of cri vit lament ($14 pages) which is sponsored by blocking maneuver inuoperation, and effort- Whole, resumed the consideration of the Repartment of Health, Education, and political history. Welfare, and nwhich t of Health, to do with n, and a remarkable foreword, Dies, now 62, Executive M (88th nuclear 1St ,the lfarenstJClaetin. points out that he is writing the record not treaty banning nuclear weapon n tests in One sestia, believe it or not, is concerned merely to, inform posterity but to save it. the atmosphere, in outer space, and with all "Official Girlw not, Manual." "If our children do not learn of these in- underwater. s Any males terestgd are told they will need credible blunders, they are doomed to repeat Mr. JACKSON obtained the floor. prerequisites them. i must speak out, lest I be asked on Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Additional "Z/2o v ulon or corrected Judgment Day, Why did suggested material you sin by silence the Senator from Washington allow me includes glasses or binoculars. Another sec- when you knew the truth?"' doll, cos;Ce ed with social studies, states Here he does speak out, and how. The Dies Pr JAC for . one-half Certainly. minute? that thgresis only one continent larger than committee directed investigation on no single Mr. JACKSON. Certainly. MANSFI. hrica? and? this. is Asia. Then comes the enemy target but on all. The Roosevelt ad- Mr. unanimous lrr.n Mr. President, I question; ",So, the enormous chunk of rock munists, tried to keep It off went after Reds as the well as ask unanimous consent to have inserted t?iat,is,AWca is (a) the largest continent; the Nazis. in the RECORD at this point that excerpt (b) the second largest continent." from the transcript of President Ken- If Ob Iiny can come up withhather correct In logical result, itproved hnsg'er tQ this one, he is, we home disbelieving official opp o its inthethexiste nedy's news Conference on yesterday Tee Npt sC the taxpayer. He will have to here of the Communist conspiracy, having to a with the question of amerid- make up the difference between the cost of Critics of the Dies committee then ignored, file the treaty. producing these massive volumes and the as they do now, the careful documentation In this particular excerpt the question 1:8ceipts derived by the Government Print- of its facts. In the heart of this book, asked by the reporter is answered lug Office, from selling them at $2.50 a co Martin Dies asks how many of those critics Cisely and in some detail by the P esi- li"ortunately, y that , it isn't likely this bonny knew what they were talking about. The dent. The answer, reaffirms the consti- (toggle will Iaead to a best seer list record is all there. The report of the hear- tutional right that the Senate has, and lugs has been preserved in 10,387 pages in has had since the founding of this Re- T-7-71Z, -=--*-' seven later volumes on the executive session. "III`I DIES', STORY" Here is retold the tragic story of Dr. Wil- public, to advise and consent on any lam A. Wirt. Remember the Gary, Ind. amendment to any treaty, and to do so !1r, THURMOND. Mr. President, educator who, after a Washington dinner, on the basis of two-thirds of the Sen- "Why did you sin by silence when you reported that New Deal leftists planned de- ators present and voting. blew the.truth?" These are the words liberately "to overthrow the established social So what the President said in his press Q1 a great American in telling the world order"? He was pilloried and harried to an conference emphasizes what every one of w iy he wrote the book, "Martin Dies' early death. the 100 O ,xf * is PaLrlot was maligned, s1rie}'e4, and persecuted because he 49IC, to eJ>ipose a conspiracy that today is threatening to bury us. If we had -1,ie.e.derj. advice the world would be mucl f7,e. er to the illusory peace we seek 'tQd th ay a e expense of t our security. The danger Martin Dies warned about has been flmpliDod A hundred times over. I recommd that every American read this dynamic. exposure. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a review of the "Martin Dies' Story" by William R. Ruggles as printed in the Dallas Morn- ing News, be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the review was .ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as . tollows: A Booi Foe CONSERVATIVES: "MARTIN DIES, Senators here knows, and that n the floor of Congress, a Representative ch>.roara +1,.. a is that If +w,.-_ been jailed for pro-German activities, m treaty, that amendmentawilllbelreferred plete untruth, New York's O'Connor, who to the enate for its advice and consent headed the committee that assailed Wirt, and apSproval on the basis of a vote of 6 years later expressed his own regret for two-thirds of the Senators present And his part, making a frank public apology. voting. little-k mi tee Is t ecompl tnow ben Pthat earl the cons- The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is had Harbor a report that included a map of Japan _ there objection to the request of the Sen- uawal Islands an d the Par East. The State There being no objection, the excerpt Department prohibited publication. The re- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, port was viewed by Army and Navy but still as follows: Pearl Harbor occurred. Here are details of the investigations of AMENDING THE TREATY Communist Infiltration of American labor Question. "Mr. President have opponents unions and again the storm of invective fear the that test once ban the treaty treaty have has expressed th- against the investigators. o si l e Exec rati- Here are the stories of Earl Browder and utv e It - action to then be amend treaty so to Sam Carp, of the exposure of front after further limit the freedom of action of the front for the Reds. Here is the tragic story United States. What is your reaction to of gullible and/or vindictive Americans, of these suggestions?" the president's wif e questionin th ge com- Answer. "No;. I can give a categorical as- (Reviewed by William R. Ruggles) mittee's action. And of the Truman adman- surance that the treaty, as you know, cannot "We Most World War II. It was not the a Istration gainst Parnell liThomac a lattetr chairmanProf threechange brave men who offered and gave their lives the committee, for a ver g be amended without the agreement of the be basic signatories. The treaty cannot who lost it for us. It was the politicians. tice but one for which otherCongressmen signatories, and the others, without the con- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16078 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000160210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 sent of the Senate. There would be, of course, any proposal to change the treaty would be submitted to the usual ratification procedure, followed by or prescribed by the Constitution. "In addition, there would be no Executive action which would permit us to in any way limit or circumscribe the basic understand- ings of the treaty. Quite obviously, this is a commitment which is made by the Exec- utive and by the Senate, operating under one of the most important provisions of the Constitution, and no President of-the United States would seek to, even if he could-and I strongly doubt that he could, by stretch- ing the law to the furthest-seek in any way to break the bond and the understanding which exists between the Senate and the Executive and, in a very deep sense, the American people, in this issue." Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, the limited nuclear test ban treaty we are considering has been described by some as a step toward peace and by others as a step toward war. If it were plainly the former, the Sen- ate would of course promptly and enthu- siastibally give its advice and consent to ratification. If it were plainly the latter, we would of course refuse to ap- prove it. We have held extensive hear- ings and are now engaged in debate because the issue Is not plain. The fact of the matter Is that although the treaty Is indeed a step in some direc- tion, we do not know, and moreover we cannot know, in what direction it leads. For the' treaty does not determine the direction. What we do from now on, and what the rest of the world does from now on-these are the determining factors. Even those who most seriously doubt the' wisdom of this treaty have not argued that it seals our fate. And most of those who strongly support the treaty have taken pains to underline the risks inherent In it. The consequences hinge, at least in large part, on the wisdom of our future policies and the will and de- termination with which we pursue them. Obviously, this is no routine agree- ment: it has major foreign and defense policy implications, and its provisions relate directly to the present and future credibility of the military deterrent which has been the free world's main- stay In stopping aggression and keeping the peace since World War II.. It has seemed clear to me from the outset that this treaty would not serve the interests of peace and security un- less we Centered upon its undertakings with a firm understanding- of the lines of policy required of us in the new cir- cumstances created by the treaty. We most understand what is required to pro- teet and maintain the free world's abil- ity to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to respond effectively against any aggressor. We must be ready to pursue the necessary policies without reserva- tions of mind or heart. It was for this reason, Mr. President, that on August 9, prior to Senate con- sideration of the treaty, I propounded on this floor a number of national security issues on which, in my Judgment, frank and adequate assurances 'from respon- sible officials of the executive branch wereneeded before the Serrate could pru- dently determine whether to give its advice and consent to ratification. It Is for this same reason that the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach great im- portance to what they call safeguards. In their testimony before the Prepared- ness Investigating Subcommittee Of the Armed Services Committee, and before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Joint Chiefs defined certain safeguards which they believe can reduce the dis- advantages and risk of the treaty. These safeguards include: (a) The conduct of comprehensive, ag- gressive, and continuing underground nu- clear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future. (b) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theo- retical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the continued application of our human nien- tific resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends. (c) The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to Institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or a uy of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union. (d) The Improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to moni- tor the terms of the treaty, to detect viola- tions, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino?Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements. On August 14 the Preparedness In- vestigating Subcommittee unanimously adopted a motion which I made and which was subsequently unanimously adopted by the Armed Services Commit- tee, a motion calling On the Joint Chiefs to supplement ther testimony by provid- ing to the Armed Services Committee a statement of the specific requirements to implement the necessary safeguards they had. defined. Senator RUSSELL forwarded this motion to the Secretry of Defense. The part of the response made public and included in the intel'im report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee consists of two items: One, a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense setting forth in some detail both the assurances that the safeguards stated by the Joint Chiefs are recognized and accepted at the high- est levels of the Government and also the standards that will be observed and a preliminary outline of the measures that will be taken to implement these safe- guards; and, two, a letter from the Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs enclosing a memorandum defining "Criteria To In- sure Fulfillment of the Safeguards Pro- posed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield. Mr. SALTONSTALL. I say to the Senator from Washington that I thought his motion in the Preparedness Subcom- mittee, emphasizing the importance of these four safeguards, was a great con- tribution. It helped me very much in making up my mind to have these four points emphasized and to get the answers to them. I believe that the Senator made a real contribution to the whole situation. Mr. JACKSON. I appreciate the kind comments of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I hope and trust that the bill of particulars in connection with the safeguards will help protect in the future our military advantage, which has been the means by which we have kept the peace. Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is extremely Important, as I tried to emphasize in my remarks-and as I believe the Senator believes also-that Congress itself-not only the Senate but the House also- should be very sensitive to its, responsi- bilities to see to it that these safeguards are lived up to. Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is entire- ly correct. The future security of our country depends on our ability to protect the means by which we have kept the peace. This has been not nuclear parity with the Soviet Union or nuclear equal- ity, but nuclear superiority in relation to the Soviet Union. This is the, reason why the Preparedness Investigating Sub- comi.ttee unanimously asked for the bill of particulars in connection with the four safeguards laid down by the Joint Chiefs.. It should be emphasized that there has been no disagreement on the part of any - one in a responsible position in the exec- utive branch about the importance of action to implement the safeguards. On the contrary, there has been endorse- merit of the position that the United States will take determined, willing, and vigorous action to honor the safeguards, and the Senate is entitled to assume that no reservations attach to this resolve. This commitment should be recognized by every official of the executive branch having anything to do with the actions needed to fulfill these safeguards. It is equally something which should be rec- ognized by Congress, for it may well be that Congress, contrary to the expecta- tions of many people, will have to vote additional appropriations in order to translate the commitment into effective programs of action. Secretary McNamara's testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee already indicates, for example, that in order to compensate for uncertainties which could only be .removed or reduced by tests forbidden by the treaty, we may have to produce and deploy greater numbers of delivery systems and radars and to dis- perse them more widely than would have been necessary without a treaty. Thus the Secretary acknowledges that If we are going to design around uncertainties, we shall have to have additional mili- tary hardware. It is apparent that this may well mean among other things greater numbers of present delivery sys- tems and new mobile systems to reduce vulnerability. All of this costs money. I believe it would be unwarranted to as- sume that under the new environment of the treaty our security requirements can be maintained by less expenditures for national defense, or even by the same level of expenditure. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield. Mr. MILLER. Is it the Senator's opinion that the same conclusion could be made with respect to the national de- fense expenditures of the Soviet Union? Mr. JACKSON. I am not in a posi- tion so to indicate, because I am not fully aware of what they have available. I do Approved For Release 2004/03/1' : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 -Approved For RttVKESSAi~W5B0100210007-3 'not know that anyone has that informa- tion; Mr. The Senator indicated that we could well expect an increase in the national expense costs of the United States, 1 , T -1 his. bring opi for had any opinion as wondered whether we might expect that the Soviet Union might also have #o Provide a greater out- lay for its own national defense costs. Mr, JACKSON. That would depend on the intentions of the Soviet Union. It is clear that their basic aim is to domi- nate the world. It is clear that the So- viet trniop will do everything it canto overcol?e the present military superiority enjoyed, iy the United States. r should like to emphasize that, because the So- viets ,could attack with all of the advan- tages arid benefits of surprise, they do not need, to have military superiority; parity or equality would be sufficient for their purposes. Therefore, it is essential, in or- der to maintain peace and to prevent a nuclear Catastrophe, that we maintain at all times nuclear superiority. We must pay d price, because of uncer- tainties with respect to Communist power and the obvious advantages of'secrecy wwiich the Soviet Union possesses. We shall have to have more than we would normally` require of the key items that go to' make up military superiority. Mr. MILLER: I thoroughly agree with the Senator's statement. It is well to bring that point out. Ffas the Senator seen any evidence to indicate that the Soviets have'any inten- tions of reducing' rather than increasing power vis-a-vis their military the United States? Mr, JACKSON. Not at all. Mr.,, ULLEI'. If that is so, would it not bi- a, reasonable assumption that if the United States has to increase its na- tional defense budget in order 'to main- tain its deterrent capabilities, the So vie,ts, can: be expected to increase their national" defense budget in order to close the gap Mr.JACKSON. The Soviets know we will not lpake a surprise attack on % them. The pvjets are now inferior vis-a-vis_ the United States in military power. They know they have not been attacked, even thou h we have had superiority. Therefore, they have an advantage over us in theramount of arms that they need to maintain and protect their interests. The am9unt of arms they maintain goes upp acid goes down. They have in- creased and decreased it from time to time.Their defense budget depends on meeting the long-range military objec- tives of the Soviet Union and their for- eign policy objectives. The Secretary of State concedes that there can be no ideological coexistence With the Soviet Union. 'Mr. Khriushchev intends to bury us. The Chinese intend to do the same. As I understand it, there is no argument about that. There may be a difference as to the means used by the Chinese and the Russians; but both nations seem to have in mind a ,(un ra1 for the United States and the Western nations. ''T'heir leaders openly admit tis. xVlr, ^r MIL LER. I thank' the Senator from Washington. Approved For Release 200410311.t : cJA DR658O0383R0001002"1OC07=3 Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, will"~ the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is some sig- nificance as to the difference in means that the Soviets may employ, is there not? Mr. JACKSON. Yes; the argument between the Chinese and the Russians is over the means, not the end. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does not the Senator think it is rather significant to us which means is pursued by the Russians? Mr. JACKSON. Yes. On the other hand, we must be prepared to deal with any and all means. I am confident that if the Russians should obtain parity or equality with the United States-I am talking about nuclear or thermonuclear parity or equality-they might risk a surprise attack on the United States. Therefore, the key point I wish to make is the importance of maintaining nu- clear superiority, which is the means by which the United States has kept the peace. Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I mean is that nuclear warfare is not the only means that could be pursued. There are those who believe that the remark about burying the United States means that the Soviets intend to outperform us in ways other than the waging of war- fare. That is a possibility. Mr. JACKSON. We all agree that the challenge is total, not merely military. It includes economic and political fac- tors. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is not al- ways clear from statements emanating from some quarters. Some persons be- lieve it to mean only nuclear warfare. Mr. JACKSON. I personally have never subscribed to that point of view. We are engaged in all-out competition with the Soviets. They will use what- ever means they feel are best at the time in their long-range effort to achieve their objective of world supremacy. There is no doubt about that in my mind. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield? Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Sen- ator from Missouri.- Mr. SYMINGTON. Following the questions asked by the Senator from Iowa-and I believe I understand what he was getting at-it is true, is it not, that underground testing will be con- siderably more expensive on any broad basis than atmospheric testing? As the Senator has pointed out in his able ad- dress, the United States intends to con- tinue-and we have the assurance of the administration that underground testing will proceed. If the Soviets follow that line of action in order to maintain their position as against ours in this field, it will cost them more money to test in the future than in the past. Is not that correct? Mr. JACKSON. There is no question that if the safeguards set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are honestly and conscientiously implemented and I be- lieve we have received adequate assur- ances that theyve l -it will cost much more to test, underground. If the test- ing is vigorous,-as I expect it to be other- wise we should get out from under the treaty, it will cost more money to con- duct tests in accordance with the safe- guards laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield? Mr. JACKSON. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Suppose it were stated categorically that the Soviets knew the United States would not attack them. I agree that the United States- and I certainly hope and believe so- has no intention of doing so. Would it not be more reasonable to use the term, "prevailing over us," in the sense of not wasting their substance on added test- ing, but to demonstrate to the world that they could have a better educational system, could provide a better way of life for their people, and that they could create a society which satisfies more nobly the aspirations of the human race, rather than to build additional weapons? If they have that assurance, as the Sen- ator believes they have, why should they not pursue such a policy, if they are reasonable people? Mr. JACKSON. I am not in a posi- tion to read the state of mind of the leaders of the Soviet Union. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said he had read it to the extent that he knew that the Soviets knew we would not at- tack them. Mr. JACKSON. I can only point out that the Soviets have maintained a for- midable force. I can only point out that they were able to beat us in a critical race of discovery-that is, the intercontinental ballistic missile. That all leads me to believe that they are using their military power concur- rent with all their other capabilities- political, economic, and sociological. Name it, and there they are. I cannot say that merely because they are concentrating on other areas of com- petition, they will downgrade their area of military competition. The point that must be made, and made over and over again, is that it has been the very su- periority of the United States in the nuclear and thermonuclear fields that has prevented a catastrophic thermonu- clear war. Some people keep telling us that we now have enough such weapons piled up to blow the world apart. We have been in that position for a long time, since shortly after the Soviets ob- tained their atomic bomb in 1949 and their thermonuclear bomb in 1953. That condition has existed during all that period. The reason there has not been a catastrophic nuclear war is that the United States has had nuclear su- periority. That is what has chiefly de- terred the Soviets. The Soviets have exercised great skill in using military power in association with their political objectives. One of the first moves they made in Western l;urope, the taking over of Czechoslo- vakia, was in association with their ground forces. Other moves have been made elsewhere. To some extent, they used their- achievement in obtaining the ballistic missile before we did to exert strong political pressure on other coun- tries, effective pressure in some coun- tries, ineffective in others. We have re- 16080 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00303R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13" feared to this as ballistic missile black- mail. So we cannot minimize the relation- ship of military power to the other ob- jectives on which the Soviets are con- stantly working. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree ; but the Senator does not believe the treaty would in any way disarm the United States, or is intended to do so, does he? Mr. JACKSON. It will not, provided we exercise our right under the treaty to withdraw when it becomes apparent that our security is threatened; and if we fully carry out the safeguards the President of the United States has said will be carried out. Mr. FULBRIGHT. That will depend largely on the Congress, too, will it not? Mr. JACKSON. One of the things I believe the Joint Chiefs are concerned about is the state of euphoria, to which I shall refer a little later. It will depend upon the will of the American people. If they get the idea that, somehow, we have reached a point where peace "is breaking out all over," and that we can relax and let our guard down, we will be hurt, and will lose our superiority, because that attitude will then be reflected in the attitude of Con- gress. Therefore, it. seems to me that the answer to the question of whether we maintain that superiority will de- pend upon our attitude-our will and firm determination to protect our deter- rent, which has been the means by which we have enjoyed peace. That is my point. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield? Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield. Mr. SYMINGTON. I remember that when the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Twining, came back from Moscow, after the remark about "`burying us," had been made, he said that in his opinion they did not intend to "bury us" in military fashion. So I do not believe there has been any disagreement on that point. The pri- mary effort would be to "bury us" in any way they could. It might very well be done economically. Mr. JACKSON. But the end result would be the same. Mr. SYMINGTON. That is correct. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It would not really be quite the same, though, would it? Mr. JACKSON. A few more people might be living-but living not, as free- men but as slaves. Mr. SYMINGTON. I should like to ask the Senator from Washington whether, based on the rise in the popula- tion and strength of the Red Chinese, he believes that the Soviets would be prone to let their nuclear force deteriorate, especially when they are so outnumbered in manpower by the Chinese. Mr. JACKSON. As the Senator from Missouri is probably aware, the Russians are expanding their nuclear capability, rather than contracting it. Mr. SYMINGTON. I should think it would continue, because of the fact that we know that in China things are now moving along these lines; whereas the Russians probably would not have any apprehension about an attack on their country by the United States. But the Russians might well have apprehension about the possibility that the Chinese Reds would go on the offensive against them, unless they had On adequate nu- cleax position and the ; capacity to de- liver the weapons. Mr. JACKSON. I believe there is no .question about that. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield? Mr. JACKSON. I axon glad to yield. Mr. MILLER. The Senator from Missouri has just made the very point that I was trying to make earlier: That is, that we can reasonably expect that the Soviets will be spenng more money, not less, on their mil tary capability. Therefore, the argument} that the motive behind the Soviets' anal willingness to approve this treaty sterns from the fact that I.~hrushchev is now subjected to heavy pressures from the Russian people, who wart more economic well-being, does not measure up to that fact of military and financial life. Mr. JACKSON. I should like to com- ment further, in response to the ques- tion . the Senator from Iowa has just propounded to me. I thought he was asking me what I thought the Soviets would do in the future. I can only point out that currently they are expanding their nuclear effort, rather than con- tracting it. Mr. MILLER. There'; is no evidence to indicate that they a e cutting down their military capability;vis-a-vis that of the United States, is there? Mr. JACKSON. Certainly there is no evidence which would warrant the con- clusion that they are reducing their strategic capability. They do cut back from time to time on their ground forces; but later they build them up again. They are expanding their sub- marine forces and other naval forces; certainly they are expanding their stra- tegic long-range delivery systems; and their nuclear output. Those are facts which I believe we can fairly accurately rely upon. Mr. MILLER. Is it the Senator's opin- ion that since they are' supposedly be- hind us in tactical nuclear weapons de veloprnent, but since they can, over a period of time-as testified to by some of the witnesses before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee-catch up by means of stepped-tip underground testing programs-probably they will step upi their underground besting program, in order to catch up to the United States in the tactical nuclear Weapons area? Mr. JACKSON. Since the end of World War IF, their whore effort has been to obtain a balance in their favor, mili- tarily speaking. This is so clear that I do not believe we need to emphasize it. They went all out for the atomic bomb. They went all out for the thermonuclear bomb, and they went all. out for the de- livery systems-long-range bombers; al- though they did not build a great many of therm.. But then theT heat us in the vital,race to discover t intercontinen- tal ballistic missile. What they have done in space is, I believe, clear. They have it net advantage In that overall area. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ED- MONDS.oN in the chair). Does the Sena- tor from Washington yield to the Sena- tor from Vermont? Mr. JACKSON. I am glad, to yield. Mr. AMEN, One factor which I believe may have influenced the Russians' re- cent change in position as regards the treaty is the fact that the requirements for their domestic economy--for their agriculture, their transportation, and their social life-are astronomical, com- pared with the. requirements of the United States for the same purposes. The people of Russia will not go on for- ever without shoes; neither will they long be willing to pay $40 to $50 for a pair of shoes. They will not go on for- ever paying $1.75 a pound for chicken meat or for any other kind of meat. They will not go on. forever paying $2 a dozen for eggs, on earnings of $100 a month,. of 'which $20 is promptly taken out for rent. If such conditions con- tinue, there is bound to be wholesale dis- content within that country. if the Soviets have to choose between continu- ing military expenditures at their pres- ent level or facing the wrath of an aroused public, I am satisfied that they might use any excuse whatsoever to stabilize their military expenditures, in order to be able to meet the perhaps more dangerous demands of the Russian public, who cannot go on paying $200 for a coat that would sell for $50 or $60 in the United States-which is approxi- mately the present ratio between the costs of living in these two countries. I believe that situation does have a bear- ing on their willingness to take a small step toward relieving the tensions be- tween Russia and the West, particularly when tensions are rising in other quarters. Mr. JACKSON. There is no doubt that Khrushchev has growing internal prob- lems within his country. The point I wish to make again, how ever, is that, we must maintain our mili- tary superiority. Let us do nothing that would let the Russians overcome the ;su- periority we now have. The peace has been kept because of the military su- periority wE: have had in relation to the Soviet Union. Mr. AIKEN. There is no question that they could hold their expenditures at their present level and still retain the power to inflict irreparable damage on the West-just as we could inflect on them. Furthermore, I know that we cannot reduce our expenditures. Congress would not permit it, and the administra- tion will not ask for it. In fact, the other day, Secretary McNamara told us that he was going to ask for more next year, regardless of the test ban treaty. How long can we continue to increase our expenditures at the rate of $4 billion a year, as we have been doing? It may be that we shall have to find some point at which we should level off in our ex- penditures for military purposes. I realize the fears on the part of some people who have feared that they might be out of work or out of income. I have Approved For Release 2004/03/1.1 : IA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 Approved For FLe 3 /(ffi1L: 0100210007-3 no fear that there would be any such re- duction in the military costs of the Gov- ernment contracts of the United States. Such fears are groundless. From time to time we may divert to other purposes- such as space exploration, which is also of military importance-more funds than we are now expending for that pur- pose. But I believe that we must stabilize somewhere or at least slow,the rate of in- crease of we can. It will cost a few hun- dre, million. dollars to provide the safe- guards which will- be required as an ac- cessory to the approval of the treaty. Mr, JACKSON. I do not know what the cost will be. The point is that we need to do whatever is required of us to maintain our military and nuclear superiority. Mr. AIKEN. That is correct. Mr. JACKSON. If stabilizing and lev- eling off will still give us the superiority that is essential to our security and our freedom, surely we wish to see those ex- penditures level off. But it is a relative Mr. AIKEN. I do, not know what the cost of providing the necessary safe- guards will be. I am merely making a rough guess that a few hundred million dollars more will be involved, and . we shall have to provide that amount. Whether those safeguards are kept will depend on two things: First, whether the Congress provides the money for them; and second, whether the Pres- ident applies them once the funds are provided; Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I shall now rettlrp to my text.- The commitment to an effective safe- guards program needs emphasis now, Mr. President, because voices are already being heard outside Government to the effect that the safeguards should not be implemented and are indeed inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty. For ex- ample, the well-known physicist, Dr. Leo Szilard, in a statement submittted to the Foreign Relations Committee, argues that if the United States were to proceed "with an extensive program of under- ground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just Lest there be a misunderstanding in- side or outside Government on this criti- cal issue-a misunderstanding that Alight seriously interfere with the full execution of the safeguards,progfam- the legislative history being written here should make it clear, that the executive branch has given responsible assurances of effective action to carry out the safe- guards and that the. Senate, through its appropriate committees, will monitor the actions taken for this purpose.. In this connection I wish to cite the following passage from the interim report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- tee: If the treaty Is ratified it is the intention of the vPreparedness Investigating Subcom- nuttee tC r ionitcs ,the implementation of the safeguards and it would also be our hope that' ottXieir Committees of the Qpngress hav- ing Jurisdiction in these areas would coop- No, 145-4 At this time I wish to single out the distinguished chairman of the Pre- paredness Investigating Subcommittee, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STEW- Nis] who, for more than a year has been conducting hearings on the problems in- herent in a nuclear test ban and arms control. Those hearings have been con- ducted in the usual way in which he conducts hearings-with great judicial restraint. The effort has been to get the facts, the truth, and the whole truth. III my judgment his service has been in- valuable in helping to understand fully the importance of the American deter- rent and our military superiority in maintaining the peace. Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. President, will, the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. Iam happy to yield. Mr. ROBERTSON. First, I join the distinguished Senator from Washington in the praise that he has just offered to the distinguished Senator from Missis- sippi [Mr. STENNIS], who is chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigating Pre- paredness, which conducted not days, .but months, of hearings on this overall program. Mr. JACKSON. For a whole year. Mr. ROBERTSON, He has been out- standing in that field. ? I also commend the Senator from Washington, because first, for bringing to our attention, the development of atomic: energy and atomic bombs and the whole military phase. Last week, be- fore I had the advantage of the report of the committee, I issued a statement. Is it not true that the members of that committee have access to all the top sec- rets of our Defense Department? Mr. JACKSON. I think that is a cor- rect statement. We have had access to every bit of information that we have requested. I assume that we have had available to us all important information. Mr. ROBERTSON. Is it not true that only a minority of the Members of the Senate enjoys the privilege of having ac- cess to all military secrets? Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Mr. ROBERTSON. Is it not true that the committee heard testimony which it cannot make public and which will never be made available to the public? Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Mr. ROBERTSON. Is it not true that every member of that committee agreed that the statements of fact, in the com- mittee print-which was a preliminary report because the committee did not have time to get the evidence-were cor- rect? Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Two Senators- Mr. ROBERTSON. They disagreed as to conclusions. Mr. JACKSON. There is no question about the findings of fact contained in the report. I believe inferences were drawn by two members of the committee that differed from the conclusions reached by -others, but the differences were not of great significance as far as the overall report was concerned. One of the Senators, as you know, did not sign the report. 16081 Mr. ROBERTSON. I commend the distinguished Senator from Washing- ton warmly for the work he has done, not only in relation to the test ban treaty but, over a period of years, in the scien- tific field and in the military field. I know he is as anxious as anyone; who 'Is out in front waving the flag for peace to see a peace program which we could honestly and sincerely endorse, provided we are protected from duplicity and being doublecrossed, as we have been in the past-in.other words, an agreement that would contain a provision for full and free access and inspection of any disarmament program. Is that correct? Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. Mr. ROBERTSON. The Senator is making a significant speech. I am happy to be privileged to hear him. When I heard him mention, our mutual friend the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STEN- Nis], and select him for commendation, I interrupted in order that I might also commend the Senator from Washing- ton, because he is an outstanding Sen- ator in every respect. But especially we value his opinion in relation to the mili- tary aspects of the treaty. After all, since the treaty is a military. treaty, we cannot ignore the military aspects of it. I happen to know, from all the testimony and also.inside confidential advice, that not a single military expert has recom- mended the treaty to us from a military standpoint. Is that correct? Mr. JACKSON. From a military standpoint, that is correct. There is no doubt that there are military disad- vantages to the proposed treaty. I thank my distinguished friend from Virginia. He is being very modest in his remarks by leaving himself out of con- sideration. For many years he served as a member of the Committee on Ap- propriations. He has served as? chair- man of the subcommittee for the Depart- ment of Defense appropriations, and has followed very closely all the defense fea- tures. I know that he has had access to sensitive information in connection with our national security and our defense effort. Mr. President, I believe that the Sen- ate has played a constructive role in this critical matter. The understanding that has been reached between the executive branch and the legislative branch will be helpful in the months ahead. It may be of even more importance when respon- sibility for national security passes to men who have not been engaged in the consideration of this treaty and its im-. plications. I have become persuaded in the course of studies of the national security process over the past few years by subcommittees of the Government Operations Commit- tee that a key problem faced by every President is to make his views and inten- tions prevail throughout the vast organi- zation he heads. His statements have to be interpreted in the course of policy ex- ecution, and even subordinates acting in good faith sometimes read their own views into their interpretations of the President's will. I hope and believe that the discussion, of safeguards has helped Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 to bring about the kind of understanding throughout the executive branch that is the key to effective action in harmony with the intentions of the President. As we approach a decision, I believe that my colleagues may find helpful the opinion of a great American, the distin- guished former Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett. Since his retirement as Secretary of Defense, Mr.,ovett has continued to serve the Nation in a num- ber of sensitive assignments and is emi- nently qualified to advise us and the country on the mattQr before us. In a letter addressed to the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in response to a request for his views, Mr. Lovett states the case for ratification in an'admirably balanced way: On the basis of the testimony so far pre- sented, particularly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, there would seem to be positive assurances that this ad- ministration has, first, the necessary will and determination to continue our research and developmental laboratories at the level of activity necessary to permit us to retain any nuclear superiority we may currently have and to improve, if possible,. our relative posi- tion in this field so that our deterrent capa- bility is not lessened by deterioration of either effort or facilities; and, secondly, that our policy, after signing the treaty, will be to continue actively those tests permitted un- der it and to maintain as insurance a pro- gram for atmospheric tests in a status per- mitting prompt use in the event of abroga- tion or other emergent events. Under these ponditions-which represent my understanding of definite assurances given by these officials--I believe that con- sent to ratification can properly be given. Mr. President, this is also the conclu- sion I have reached. In light of the testimony that has been given and the understandings that have been reached with respect to the policy of the admin- istration in safeguarding the national in- terest, and in light of considerations I shall state in a few moments, I believe that the Senate may prudently give its advice and consent to ratification. I now wish, Mr. President, to indicate the other considerations that have led me to this conclusion. They emerge from the testimony presented to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- tee and to the Foreign Relations Com- mittee and from-my own long concern with national security affairs. First. No responsible official has based his recommendations on the view that basic Soviet. purposes have changed. Their purposes remain incompatible with ours. In response to a question of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RussELL], Secretary of State Rusk said: Mr. Khrushchev has made it very clear that there is no such thing as ideological co- existence. His purposes remain to work to- ward a Communist world. And that is deep- ly obnoxious as an idea to us, and the prac- tices which would be used to pursue that idea would be hostile to our own interests. Second. No responsible official has dis- puted the view that in the future, as in the past, our national security will de- pend on, among other things, a favorable military position. In response to a ques- tion of mine addressed to Secretary Rusk, the following exchange took place: Secretary Rusx. Senator, I believe that the United States must maintain in its own secu- rity interests a very large overall nuclear superiority with respect to the Soviet Union. This involves primarily the capacity to dem- onstrate that regardless of who strikes first, the United States will be, In a position effec- tively to destroy an aggressor. Senator JACKSON. I ant glad to hear you say we should maintain not a balanced but a superior position in order to maintain peace. Is this essentially your view? Secretary Rusx. That is correct, sir. Third. No responsible official has rested the case for the treaty on a belief that the Soviet Government can be trusted. The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] raised this issue, which troubles many Senators as well as many citizens who have written to us about the treaty, and was assured by Secretary Rusk that the treaty did not rest upon the element of faith and trust. The See- retary added: We will know if there, are significant vio- lations of this treaty, we will be free to do whatever is necessary in our own security, and I would think that this is not a matter of trust. Fourth. Secretary of Defense McNa- mara and the Joint Chiefs have testified that the balance of military power is in our favor at the present moment. Fifth. With respect to the effects of the treaty on the future balance of mili- tary power, we enter, of course, a more controversial area. Although the views are not necessarily inconsistent, there are notable differences of emphasis. Sec- retary McNamara believes that there is nothing in the treaty which will shift the balance. The Joint Chiefs, accord- ing to testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee by General-LeMay, examined the military and technical aspects of the treaty and came up with a net disadvan- tage in that field, but as General, Taylor stated: The Joint Chiefs have reached the de- termination that while there are military disadvantages to the treaty, they are not so serious as to render it unacceptable. General Power and General Schriever, however, attached grater importance to the military and technical disadvantages in their testimony to', the Perparedness Investigating Subcommittee. And I think it is correct to say that'scientists holding responsible posts recognize that the treaty definitely ifriposes limitations on research and development, though they differ greatly in their views about the disirability of the treaty. From the evidence' presented to the Senate I am compelled to conclude, as indicAted in the interim report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, that the treaty involves serious-perhaps even formidable-military and technical dis- advantages. It should also be added, in the words of that report, that: No safeguards can provide the benefits of testing where testing 1,s not permitted, nor can They assure that this Nation will acquire the highest quality weapons systems of which it is capable when the means for achieving that objective are denied. Mr. President, I have followed mili- tary, scientific, and technological devel- opments with interest and care during my service in the House and in the Sen- ate. I have great respect for the views of those men who, like General Power and General Schriever and like Dr. Foster and Dr. Teller, have serious doubts about the wisdom of this treaty or who actually oppose its ratification. But I am also convinced that these men, and the many others who work with them, are men of dedication, imagina- tion, and ingenuity, and that they will employ these qualities to offset insofar as it is possible the undoubted military and technical-disadvantages. It is in- deed in large part because men of their talents will be devoting their energies to ways to overcome these disadvantages that I believe we can accept the risks we necessarily will run. Sixth. The administration in effect recommends acceptance of certain mili- tary and technical disadvantages and their attendant risks in the hope that certain gains may be made in other fields. Upon examination, these hoped-for gains are either rather precise but insubstan- tial or they are quite difficult to speci- fy but hopefully significant. Secretary Rusk testified as follows: This is a limited treaty. The President listed the things it does not do, and we must keep them in mind in judging its signifi- cance. At the same time, if-as seems likely--- most of the nations of the world adhere to the treaty, and if they observe its obliga- tions, this will in itself bring concrete gains. First, the United States and the Soviet Union already have enough nuclear power to inflict enormous destruction on each other. Still, the search for bigger, more destructive weapons goes on. Each generation of ma- jor weapons has been more expensive than the last. Each has involved an increasing burden, an increasing diversion of resources from the great unfinished business of man- kind. Yet greater armament has not dem- onstratably brought greater security. The treaty, if observed, should slow this spiral, without damage to our relative strength. I do not know, however, how to re- concile this alleged gain with Secretary McNamara's testimony, already cited, where the possible need for additional appropriations for greater numbers of delivery systems and radars and wider dispersal is brought out. It is my con- clusion that it would be a mistake to count on any reduction of the armament burden as a result of this treaty. On the contrary, the evidence points to an in- crease in the burden. Secretary Rusk's testimony continues : Second, the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons. We cannot guar- antee it. Most of the countries with the ca- pacity and the incentive to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade or so have al- ready announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. These countries do not include, by the way, main- land China or France. While this does not guarantee that they will never become nuclear powers, their re- nuniclation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent by making it much more dif- ficult and expensive for them to develop nu- clear weapons. r, Efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons deserve our serious attention. But I believe the role of the treaty in in- hibiting proliferation has been generally overestimated. Most of the countries that have signed the test ban, or will Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved for RelSase2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 CZ3I~GR SSIONAL 1 UCO1 fl - SENATE 16083 sign it, do not have the capacity or desire to develop nuclear weapons: France, it shoM1d' Se noted, is already regarded by the administration as a nuclear power aria is proceeding with an independent nuclear program. The major concern we have is with ,the development of nu- clear, capabilities 'y Communist China, which has rejected the treaty. f doubt. that anyone wishes to argue that some- thing Called world opinion is likely to have an inhibiting' effect on the deter- mination of Peiping to become a nuclear power. Secretary Rusk's testimony continues: Third, the treaty will reduce the radioac-' tive pollution of the planet. The increased radioactivity from nuclear testing has thus far stayed within tolerable limits, in a sta- tistical sense. But as the President said: "This is not a natural hazard, and it is not a statistical issue. Moreover,. if testing were not restricted, more and more countries would conduct tests, Many of them would lack either the incentive or,, the means to minimize the fall- out. We have a high obligation to safe- guard life and health and the genetic in- tegrity of the human race. Today no one can say for certain how much fallout is too much.. But if this treaty is observed it will go a long way to assure that we do not trans- gress those limits. There is little doubt, I believe, that this argument weighs heavily in the pub- lic mind.'. But unpopular though it may be to say "so, there is also little doubt that the fears that have been aroused are out of all proportion to the hazards. Other things being equal, we should of course minimize fallout. But if other things are not equal, and they may not be, we may be compelled at some future date to accept the small hazards of fall- out to protect ourselves against larger hazards to peace and security.' Never- theless, I believe that it is proper to con- clude that the reduction of fallout is a positive advantage of the treaty. Secretary Rusk comes next to his last and most important point: 'F'or 18 years we lave held the Communist drive in check largely by the deterrent force of our massive military strength. We shall maintain that overwhelming strength until we are certain that freedom can be assured by other means. But throughout we have known that a lasting peace could not be founded upon armed might alone. It can be secured only by durable international ' institutions, and by a respect for law and its procedures. The problem has been ' to convince the Communist world that its' interest also lay in that direction. The most important thing about the treaty is therefore, what` It may symbolize and what new paths it may open. That, no one can now foretell. Almost at once, however, in response to a question of Senator RUSSELL'S Sec- retary Rusk put this, his fourth and, in his eyes, his most important point, in perspective in these words: We have pressing issues with the Com- munist world in ong form or another right around the globe, with almost a million men in uniform outside the continental limits of a hhe United States because of these issues, in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba, Berlin, and other places. There are other practices, some of them bilateral in character, which do cause friotlon." I do not anticipate, to come spe- cifically to your question, sir, I do not antici- pate that there is much chance or much wis- domin an attempted compre'hensive' nego- tiation. It would not be for Washington and Moscow to try to sit down -in some way and resolve all of these problems or even try to resolve them because the interests of many, many nations are involved and, quite frankly, the total question is probably too big to take hold of all at once. And so despite the fact that there are some highly inflammable questions we still think we ought to keep open the possibility of finding particular points of agreement in the hope that if those can be achieved, it might reduce the fever somewhat and throw some different atmosphere and light on some of the more dangerous problems so we would be prepared to consider other questions. At the moment I cannot report that there is another question which is highly prom- ising at this-as of today. I repeat, Mr. President, that we are being asked to accept certain military and technological disadvantages in the hope of making certain small gains and of opening up new paths, though the Sec- retary cannot see, as of today, any issues which may be negotiable. The Secretary is to be commended for his frank state- ment . He has not encouraged great expectations. But hope, Mr. President, is not to be dismissed as a basis for action, even the slender hope held out by Secretary Rusk. It is largely because'we are deeply com-' mitted as a nation to do what we can to keep alive the hopes of men every- where for a decent future-including, I trust, the peoples of Russia and China- that we shall ratify this treaty. ? In doing so, what are the risks we run? Let me emphasize five among the many that might be mentioned. First. There is the risk that we will relax and fall back into a state which the Senate has learned to call euphoria- which is, if I may play the same game, a state in which one believes that he has serendipity and is therefore likely to dis- play velleity for vigorous action. Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. I yield. Mr. DOUGLAS. I am really quite im- pressed with the language which the Senator from Washington uses in this paragraph. He has given currency to a word which is being widely used at present-euphoria. Now he has sprung upon the public these other two multi- syllabic and revatively unknown words- "serendipity" and "velleity." As I read these words I wondered at first where they came from. Then I re- memberedthat- they, were probably launched upon the world by the English writer Horace Walpole, who was the founder or originator of the so-called Gothic novel, notably the Castle of Otranto. He lived on Strawberry Hill on the estate outside of London which he had inherited from his father, Sir Robert Walpole, who had been Prime Minister of England and probably the greatest eoriui Tonist in`the history of England. His father had accumulated a fortune which he passed on to Horace. Horace Walpole built himself, on Straw- berry Hill, a Gothic castle similar to our Smithsonian Institute and originated a literary style as Gothic and as elaborate a the castle in which he lived. I do not know why the term "euphoria" is being given modern circulation. It may have been originated by the military. Is that true? I mean the modern usage of euphoria. Mr. JACKSON. The current use of this word appears to originate with the military. Mr. DOUGLAS. Apparently .military men are becoming writing men. I would remark that Horace Walpole was not a fighting man, but a writing man; in fact, he was quite a sessile man-if I may also spring an archaic word-who considered movement of any kind to be distasteful. Mr. JACKSON. I point out to my friend that there are now quite a num- ber of Ph. D.'s in military uniform. This may account for some of the change. Mr. DOUGLAS. It is fine to have a literary background, but we should not substitute writing for being ready to fight in defense of freedom. That is all I wish to say. Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is en- tirely correct. In this regard, our previous record as a Nation is not too reassuring. On oc- casions when we should have stayed awake, we went to sleep. Through half- hearted support and the pinching effect of the budget, critical programs have been degraded and vital policies stifled. My good friend, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, has said we need hopers, not doubters. I wonder whether he would accept a change of emphasis. We need men of hope and skepticism and action. Skepticism, not cynicism. Our task, as I see it, is, while-remain- ing skeptical, to act with hope and pur- sue those policies which may safeguard the opportunities to move the world along a path toward peace. Second, there may be a serious mis- judgment of the basis for the change in Soviet policy. It is to be hoped that it is in fact our strength and not a major Soviet mili- tary-technological advance that has persuaded Moscow that this agreement is advantageous. But the pessimistic possibility cannot be dismissed. It could be, as some witnesses suggested, that the Soviet Union has learned some- thing important that, in its judgment, we do not know but might learn were we free to continue testing in any and all environments. The Soviet Government may believe that what it has learned can be the basis, as its development work proceeds, for upsetting the military balance. If we come to the conclusion at any time that this is the case, we must be prepared to exercise our right of with- drawal from the treaty. Third, we run the risk of planned abrogation of the treaty by the Soviet Union. The safeguards program is de- signed among other things to enable us to take necessary measures promptly in the event of Soviet bad faith. Fourth, it` is generally conceded that the Communist Chinese are now engaged in a substantial nuclear weapons pro- gram and that in the very near future they will be testing in the atmosphere. The advent of this new unchecked nu- clear power may well require us to with- draw from the agreement. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16084 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September Fifth, it is altogether possible and in- deed, in my opinion, probable that a group of nations, with Soviet encourage- ment, will seek to amend the treaty in the not distant future so as to ban,un- derground tests without inspection or with wholly inadequate arrangements for inspection. In this connection I noted with interest the statement of former Ambassador Dean to the Foreign Relations Committee : We will undoubtedly be urged, in the spirit. of amity and good will, to halt under- ground testing. But in my judgment with- out an adequate and effective treaty banning underground tests this would be a tragic mistake. We may find ourselves under strong pressure in the months ahead to accept an amendment to the treaty banning un- derground tests without satisfactory in- spection. We must be prepared to take our knocks, if necessary, and remain firm in our resolve that a ban on under- ground tests must be conditioned on fully satisfactory arrangements for inspection. I trust that the Department of State will be alert in this danger and will do what it can to forestall an effort to isolate the United States on this matter. It is my belief that these and other risks that we will inevitably run under this agreement are tolerable: Provided, that it Is firm national policy to keep alert and to protect the present and fu- ture credibility of our military deterrent; and provided, furthermore, that It is firm national policy to use the protections provided in the treaty when, as, and if needed to guard vital national interests, including the right'of withdrawal and the right to exercise the veto by withholding our consent under article 2 to any at- tempt to change the treaty by amend- ment in a form imperiling our vital In- terests. These protections constitute our explicit rights under the agreement, they form a basic part of the document, we deliberately had them included, and we should be ready to exercise them if emergent events so require. Mr. President, the essence of my view on this treaty, which has been referred to as` a limited treaty, Is that it is indeed limited,, Actually it is not a treaty, but a loose commitment, a statement of present intentions of the parties not to engage In nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space or un- der water. This Nation's commitment will rest on the assumption that cer- tain conditions are met-including the condition that the supreme Interests of this Nation are not jeopardized. Should those interests be jeopardized we shall be released from our commitment. In conclusion, Mr. President, the na- tional security interests of this country are of course' deeply involved in a num- ber of other situations quite apart from this treaty. For example, the development of NATO and the obvious efforts of France to.reduce its importance; the question of economic and political relations be- tween the European Common Market and other Western European countries, especially the United Kingdom; the strengthening of the international posi- tion of the dollar; the security of West Berlin; the removal of Soviet forces from Cuba, and the ' neutralization of Cuba as a base for Communist subver- sion and penetration. in the Western Hemisphere; the question of American policy in southeast ,Asia, particularly Vietnam; and the question of appropri- ate American policy toward the develop- ing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This series of problems certainly gives us no excuse to relax. , If this debate helps, the people of the United States really understand what they have to do to provide for the safety of the Nation and the preservation of their freedoms, then any time and atten- tion given to this test ban agreement is well spent. The Senate will have done what it can to put the treaty in the proper perspective. Mn President, I as* unanimous con- sent to have printed at this point in the RECOED various memorandums, including questions about a limited test ban treaty that I asked on the Senate floor on Au- gust 9; the motion that I made in the Preparedness Committee, and letters on the safeguards we rec lved from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric and Gen- eral Taylor, including the criteria that General Taylor enclosed in his letter. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: QUESTIONS ON THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (lay Senator JACKSON, on Senate floor, August 9, 1963) 1. Can the United States afford a position of pally or equality with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons technology and systems? Does the United States require for an effec- tive deterrent a margin of safety and superi- ority in these matters' in view of Soviet secrecy? 2. In what areas of strategic and defensive nuclear weapons systems do the Soviets know as much or more than we do? In what areas of nuclear weapons research and weapons effect must we progress in order to protect and maintain our deterrent? 3. Can we make the progress necessary to protect and maintain' our deterrent by underground testing within the limitations of the proposed treaty? For example: (a) What steps are possible within the terms of the treaty to determine and evaluate the military effectiveness of the very high yield Soviet thermonuclear weap- ons, and to devise means of defending free world civilian populations and retaliatory weapons systems against their use by the Soviet Union? (b) What steps are possible under the treaty to obtain information on the effects of Soviet nuclear weapons on our new deterrent military Weapons systems, in- cluding the ability of our missile launch complexes to survive a Soviet first strike, the ability of our missflo warheads to pene- trate a Soviet nuclear defense, and the abil- ity of our vital military communications, radar and other systems to survive and to function under Soviet nuclear attack? (c) Is an. effective anti-ICBM system achievable? Can an effective anti-ICBM system be de- signed and deployed without atmospheric testing? - 4. What assurances will we be given that all the experiments involving testing per- missible under the treaty and required by our nuclear weapons rlesearch laboratories will go forward in a vigorous and sustained manner, and not be stifled by the qualified, halfhearted, stop-and-go support character- istic of the recent past? 5. What steps will be taken to deal with the possibility of a planned abrogation of the treaty by the Soviets-that Is, the pos- sible use of the treaty by Moscow to degrade our laboratory programs in nuclear research and our test organizations while secretly preparing to abrogate the treaty and carry out another massive atmospheric test series? What steps will be taken to -give us an im.- mediate standby capability for atmospheric testing? 6. What assurances will we be given that our weapons laboratories will have full and wholehearted support, so that the budgets of the laboratories will be adequate, the morale in the laboratories will remain high, and the best men will not drift away to more attrac- tive positions? 7. What can and will be done to deal with the new difficulties in information-gathering which would reinforce the difficulties already imposed on the free world by the closed So- viet society? Will a special effort be made to obtain information on possible secret So- viet preparations for atmospheric testing? 8. What is the capability of our nuclear test detection systems for the atmosphere, high altitude, outer space, and underwater? What would be the effect of the proposed test ban treaty on our capacity to improve nuclear test detetcion systems? What steps will be taken to Improve these systems with- in the limitations of the proposed treaty? MOTION BY SENATOR JACKSON (Adopted by the Preparedness Investigat- ing Subcommittee on August 14, and by the Armed Services Committee on August 1.5. ) I move that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sub- mit to the Senate Armed Services Committee as soon as possible and in any event prior to committee action on the test ban treaty, a statement of the specific requirements to im- plement the safeguards proposed by the Joint Chiefs for reducing the risks and disadvan- tages Of the limited test ban treaty, which safeguards are set forth in the statement presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this committee on August 14, 1963, as follows: "11. Recognizing the foregoing disadvan- tages and risks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff be- lieve that they can be reduced through cer- tain safeguards. These safeguards include: "(a) The conduct of comprehensive, ag- gressive, and continuing underground nu- clear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military pasture for the future. "('b) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theo- retical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the con- tinued application of our human scientific resources to these programs on which con- tinued progress in nuclear technology de- pends. "(c) The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nu- clear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abro- gated by the Soviet Union. "(d) The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to moni- tor the terms of the treaty, to detect viola- tions, and to maintain our knowledge of 81no-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements." THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1963. Ron. RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter responds to your letter of August 15 transmitting the motion adopted by the Preparedness Investi- gating Subcommittee on August 14 asking for information on the four safeguards that Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP-65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Reef e'2004/03111 C - P 0001.00210007-3 `,~ f`111v~RF.C~,TONAi. E Oxx~ll .. r_ now order ito avoid injury` he test national secu-important ities are und rity in connection with the test ban treaty. will not be more restrictive than the spirit construction at the labolratories or are await :'.Ae.the chairman of the subcommittee rec- of the treaty limitations. ognized in his coloquy with General Taylor Safeguard (b) : "The maintenance of mod- ing fiscal year 1964 appropriations. If ad- on August 14 when the motion was under ern nuclear laboratory facilities and pro- ditional facilities should be needed at these discussion, the matters referred to in the gram in theoretical and exploratory nuclear installations in order to carry out the vig- motion not only transcend the responsibil- technology which will attract, retain, and in- orous and imaginative testing program which sties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also sure the continued application of our human we have discussed, funds for such facilities transcend the responsibility of the Depart- scientific resources to these programs on will be requested. and de- ment of Defense. For that reason, this re- which continued progress in nuclear technol- veIn add ti the tolaborato amea have facilities e- ply has been prepared after obtaining advice ogy depends." from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and after con- There are three major facilities in which personnel development activities including sultation with-the, Atomic Energy Commis- programs in theoretical and experimental nu- provision for in-service training, sabbatical sion, the Central Intelligence Agency, and clear warhead design technology are cur- leave, and outside educational opportunities the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. rently conducted and seven major DOD lab- at affiliated universities. When the motion was under discussion in oratories engaged in nuclear weapons effects The President, Secretary McNamara, and the August 14 hearing of the Preparedness research. The AEC facilities operating un- Dr. Seaborg have all expressed the firm com- Investigating Subcommittee, it was recog- der contract with the Atomic Energy Com- mitment of the administration to maintain- xized that the response, dealing with the mission are:' ing the quality and the.vitality of our weap- four subjects, wouldhave to be primarily in Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Ala- ons laboratories. The President in his press conference last terms of the criteria or standards which mos, N. Mex. are guiding the executive branch. I am glad Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, Tuesday referred specifically to the safeguard to bring, together here in one document the Calif. "that we should keep our laboratories acti- extensive assurances'which have been given Sandia Laboratory, Albuquerque, N. Mex. vated and vital." He said, "I've already met on the four subjects by the President, and by The major DOD laboratories are: with Dr. Foster and Dr. Bradbury; we have the Secretary of 'Defense, and the Chairman Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory, talked with others. We are going to do that." of the Atomic Energy Commission. Further- Bedford, Mass. Our standards in this area will be as fol- more, we have included here, or in a sepa- Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland lows: rate classified annex where appropriate, spe- Air Force Base, N. Mex. Adequate AEC and DOD budgets, modern a_y w- s ea F , a R.a,inhinlneical Research In- facilities, and positive personnel policies will - -- - M fully responsive as time and circumstances permit. safeguard (a) : "The conduct of compre- ground nuclear test programs uesigue'. vu add to our knowledge and improve our Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, and retain able and imaginative personnel weapons in all areas of tigniflcance to our San Francisco, Calif. capable of insuring the highest practicable Military Posture for the future." Nuclear Defense Laboratory, Edgewood, rate of progress that can be attained in all On this subject, the President, in his mes- Md. avenues of potential value to our offensive sage" of August 8, 1963, transmitting the Efforts to "attract, retain, and insure the and defensive posture. treaty to the Senate, said: "The United continued application of our human scien- Safeguard (c) : "The maintenance of the States has more ' ex'p erlence in underground tific resources" to the programs of these Lab- facilities and resources necessary to institute testing than any' other nation; and `we in- oratories depend primarily on their author- promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere tend to use this capacity to maintain the ized programs and their equipment and fa- should they be deemed essential to our na- adequacl of our arsenal. Our atomic Tabora- cilities. tional security or should the treaty or any tories will maintain an active development The AEC laboratories have been conduct- of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet prograth'including underground testing, and ing programs of research in chemistry, phys- Union. we will be ready to resume testing in the ics, metallurgy, computer technology, and The following steps are illustrative of what atn}osphere' itnecessary. Continued research biological sciences, in addition to their ma- has been done and what is being done in on developing the peaceful uses of atomic jor efforts in the design and development of this important area: 'energyy will be possible through underground nuclear weapons. They are also conducting improvement of test support facilities, in- testin 'Later in the same message, the development and exploration in applied nu- eluding preparation and maintenance of off- President referred to "our determination to clear physics such as reactors, controlled continent support bases and test sites, is now 'maintain our own arsenal through under- thermonuclear reactions, peaceful uses of nu- underway. Approximately $55 million is now ground tests." 'In his press conference last clear explosives, nuclear propelled rockets committed by AEC and DOD for fiscal year Tuesday, the President described the pro- and the development of a nuclear ramjet. 1963 and fiscal year 1964 for improvements to gram of `the last 2 years and.added: "[W]e The DOD laboratories have been conduct- Johnston Island to provide a partial oversea are going to continue to carry on, as I've ing programs of basic research in the nuclear test capability. laid, a vigorous`seraesof tests." weapons effects areas which have military To provide an airborne nuclear test capa- Secretary McNamara and Dr: Seaborg, in applications. In addition to making effects bility, suitable for most weapons proof and their testimony "before "the Senate Foreign measurements during nuclear test series, re- development tests, the following needs are Relations tomrriittee on August 13 and 14, search includes studies of airblast effects on being satisfied: Diagnostic aircraft (being reiterated ,these oints and elaborated on ground equipment and aerospace systems, accomplished by AEC and DOD) ; instru- them, General' Tayylor, in his-testimony on Initial nuclear radiation measurements, mented device or weapon drop aircraft (being Eugust 15'before the same cbrtimlttee, testi- shielding effects, protective structures, bio- accomplished by AEC and DOD); sampler fled that 'the President's position on this medical effects, underwater effects, electro- and other support aircraft available from the matter had" been effectively communicated. magnetic effects, and integrated effects and Air Force on short notice (being accom- The underground test program will expand phenomena. plished by DOD); suitable operating bases over that currently programed-for-fiscal year To support all of these studies extensive on Johnston Island for surveillance, weather, f964. l5etails of the program are sit forth simulation techniques and computer facili- sampler, and sampler return aircraft (joint in the separate, classified annex. ties are used. AEC-DOD construction underway), and in The Governmeht will apply the following These activities are expected to be more the Hawaiian area. criteria, `or standards, in the area of under- than sufficient to provide the necessary stim- For a high-altitude nuclear weapons effects `f ulus and challenge to attract and retain first- test capability the following steps are being ground testing: The underground test program will be rate scientific talent. taken: An oversea base, at Johnston Island coMprehensive. Therefore, it will be revised The next most important requirement after with adequate area and suitable facilities to to include` as many as feasible of the objec- the quality of the research program neces- support the tests, such as rocket launch pads, tives of the tests which we would `otherwise sary to maintain laboratory vitality is the assembly areas, etc. (joint AEC-DOD con- do under conditions of unrestricted testing. physical plant with which the scientists struction underway) ; instrumented ships The underground test program "will be must work. A continuous program of up- and aircraft available on short notice from vigorous. It will proceed; at a pace that will grading equipment and facilities has been the Navy and Air Force. exploit to the fullest the capabilities of underway at these laboratories since their Further, the AEC and DOD test organi- existing` AEC and DOD weapons laboratories. inception, and this program is planned to zation-the Nevada operations office and the If theses capabilities are' proved to be made- continue. The approximate capital invest- Defense Atomic Support Agency, including a quate to meet established requirements, they ment at each of the laboratories at the end nucleus joint task force-will be maintained will be ex anded _ of fiscal year 1963 was: Los Alamos, $226 at strength. This task force will be somewhat The inergrozrid test program' will be a million; Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, larger than the standby unit currently main- col7tinling program designed to insure the Livermore, $118 million; and Sandia, $122 tamed. Highest practicable rate of progress in nu- million. The approximate capital invest- It is planned that the regular continuing of the wea.nans effects nro- laboratory programs will include develop- Approved For Release 2044/03/ 1t _ CIA-RDP'65'800383R000100210007' 3 - ,L14ULC, DC 411eoUa, +,'au. '-' Ballistics Research Laboratory, Aberdeen, order to attract and retain competent sci- Md. entists in nuclear and related fields. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Broad and forward-looking research pro- 16086 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL iECORD -- SENATE September 13 meat of those devices which may at some knowledge of Sino-Sou let nuclear activity, that we will be able to identify all possible time require atmospheric tasting; that the capabilities, and achievements" violations of the treaty, the Soviets cannot laboratories will be encouraged. to carry their The United States now has substantial guarantee that we will not identify such ideas and studies to the point where final capabilities to detect,] identify, and to,some violations. Put another way, the Soviets device Construction can be achieved in a extent diagnose nuclear tests. These capa- will never be sure of the threshold for suc- time comparable to the time necessary to bil.ities exist in the resources of our conven- cessful evasion of our expanding and irn- implement an actual atmospheric_ test should tional intelligence community and in the re- proving detection system. And, third, as such tests be authorized; and that, develop- sources of the atomic energy detection sys- the President stated in his message to the ment of instruments needed or support of tern (REDS). Senate of August 8, we are determined to an atmospheric test program will be con- The role played by' the intelligence com- maintain our own arsenal through under- tinued by the laboratories. muity was discussed with the Senate Foreign ground testing and our readiness to resume The President has assured the Nation that Relations Committee on August 16 and with atmospheric testing if the actions of others a high state of readiness to test will be the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub- so require. maintained. In his television address on committee on May 22 by Mr. McCone, Director In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe, and July 26, he announced, "[S]ecret prepara- of Central Intelligence. The intelligence I trust you will agree, that the major deci- tions for a sudden withdrawal are possible. cmn,n?nato i,n.q". must be maintained, as we remain ready to ties and will continue to increase its activi- activl- withdraw, and to resume all forms of testing, ties to cope with the new conditions under if we must." And in his message transmit- the treaty. ting the treaty to the Senate he stated, Secretary McNamara, in his testimony be- "[W]e will be ready to resume testing in the fore the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- atmosphere if necessary." He: amplified the tee on August 13, stated that: "Our exaln- oi p "Alr d ea y we have begun to prepare g. Johnston Island for that unhappy eventual- ity, if it should occur. * * * [ W ] e are dredging the harbor, we're building some piers; there are * * * two dredges already out there, so I can assure you that we are going ahead very rapidly in that area." The position was supported by Secretary McNamara before the Senate Foreign Rela- tionts Committee on August 13. Dr. Sea- borg's remarks on August 14 were to the same effect. On being asked how long after a treaty violation it would take the United States to begin testing, the Secretary of Defense gave the. following reaction times as the objec- tives to be attained: Proof tests within 2 months from the decision to test, develop- ment tests within 3 months from the deci- sion to test, and effects test:, within 6 months from the decision to test. He ex- plained that such an effects-tests readiness posture-the most difficult one to main- tain-could be achieved by about a year from, now. With regard to logistics and finances, Sec- retasy McNamara emphasized that it was Important to keep up and expand the facili- ties on Johnston Island. He reminded that "we can provide a standby capability by utilization of the approximately $200 million in funds that the Atomic Energy Commis- sion and the Defense Department have re- quested for fiscal 1964 for test purposes, and by possible supplements to those funds for further standby facilities." The programs are designed to meet the following criteria With respect to the main- tenance of a readiness-to-test posture: The readiness-to-test program will be established on a Government-pride basis In support of a plan common to all participat- ing agencies. The required resources and facilities will be maintained in a state of could obtain no major results by testing in the atmosphere and deep space or under- water without incurring high risk of detec- tion and identification." He pointed out that "the only advantiages of illegal testing in the three prohibited environments Would be either to develop weapons with yields in the multimegaton range (since designs for weapons with yields lip to 10 megatons or more can be checked by lower yield tests underground) or to determine the weap- ons . effects of explosions which cannot be carried out at all, or not so well, under- ground. There will probably be no cost ad- to illegal testing in the prohibited environments because keeping the tests se- cret will add to the expense and difficulty of the experiments." In answer to a question about the future, Secretary McNamara re- ferred to augmentations of the detection and identification system which have already been approved and to further augmentations which are. under consideration-expanding upon the statement of. the President in his message of August 8 transmitting the treaty to the Senate: "There' is further assurance against clandestine testing in our ability to develop and deploy additional means of de- tection * * *;' Dr. Seaborg, in his summary before the same committee on August 14, said that. systems to detect possible violation of the treaty will be maintained and continually improved. The administration-as Indicated in the detailed testimony of Defense and ACDA officials before the Senate Preparedness In- vestigating Subcommittee on May 9 and 15- has under consideration proposals by which our present AEDS resources can be aug- mented to enhance our capabilities. The proposals now being reviewed are summa- rized in the separate, classified annex. The standards for the progra a d l m n p ans readiness, or earmarked, so that plans can are these: be implemented within the reaction times The current capability of the United established. States to detect and identify nuclear tests Reaction times for resumption of testing in conducted by the Sino-Soviet bloc will be the prohibited environments will be estab- improved to a degree which is both feasible lished and maintained within the constraints and remunerative. (Specific proposals for of militar re uire t d y q men s an reasonable costs. this purpose are currently under Gonsidera- Reaction times will vary for the broad cate- tion) gories of testing. As an immediate objec- A vigorous research and development pro- tive, we should be able to conduct proof gram will be pursued in order to improve tests of weapons in stockpile in about 2 equipments and techniques for nuclear test months; operational systems tests in about detection and identification. 2 to 3 months; weapons development tests Conventional intelli ence - g sources will con in about 3 months; and weapons effects tests tinue to complement the scientific i:ntelli- Listed below are the four safeguards and in about 6 months. genre techniques. the recommended criteria which should be There will be provision for periodic updat- In conclusion, the following additional einployed in subsequent examination of pro- ing of our test program plan and for check- important factors must be borne in mind grams designed to insure that each of the ing our readiness to test. In connection with the concern about safeguards is fulfilled. Safeguard (d) : "The improvement of our clandestine tests: First; the possibility of A. "The conduct of comprehensive, aggres- capability, within feasible and practical Soviet clandestine testa is lessened by the sive, and continuing underground nuclear limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, fact that they can test legally underground. test programs designed to add to our knowl- to detect violations, and to maintain our Second, although there than be no guarantee edge and improve our weapons in all areas r ......w.~ ,eauy been nistue and that executive action under these decisions is already going forward. I am assured-- and I can assure you-that if further deci- sions and actions are needed, the President will take them. Since the matters discussed above were also raised during the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee on the test ban treaty, a copy of this letter is being fur- nished also to the chairman of that com- mittee. In addition, since the contents of this letter are pertinent to an earlier inquiry from the Joint Committee on Atomic En- ergy, a copy is being furnished to the chair- man of that committee as well. Sincerely, ROSWELL GILP,ITRIC. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1963. Hon. RICHARD 13. RUSSELL, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. . DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to the request of your committee transmitted .to the Secretary of Defense on August 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed criteria for testing the adequacy of plans and pro- grams in. support of the treaty safeguards included in their statement on the limited test ban treaty made to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. These criteria, attached hereto, are necessarily general In language since additional study will be re- quired to determine specific standards and programs for underground testing, for the stimulation of nuclear laboratory activities, for the standby preparations for nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and for the improvement of our capability to detect clandestine test- ing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the inclusion of this statement of criteria in the letter of the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated August 23, which has been transmitted to you in further response to the request of August 15 mentioned above. They consider that the actions described in Deputy Secre- tary Gilpatric's letter meet the requirements as presently foreseen for implementing the safeguards proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce the risks and disadvantages of the test ban treaty. We appreciate this opportunity to amplify for your committee our views on this im- portant issue. Sincerely yours, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. SAFEGUARDS PROPOSED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH REGARD TO THE LIMITED Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 p equ pmen s an _-echn ques for nuclear our will and determination to remain (a) The underground test program should test detection and identification. be comprehensive. Therefore, it should be (c) Conventional Intelligence sources strong. ` must continue to complement the scientific Many persons have said in the past revised' evised to include gs many as feasible of the objectives of the tests which we would_oth- intelligence techniques. that America would grow tired of carry- erwise do under, conditions of unrestricted __ TRr vr~aLVmar~rr ing the burden of arms-and I am sure of significance to our military posture for (b) A vigorous research and development without emotion. Whether we keep the the future, program must be pursued in order,_to lm- I will depend in large measure on cRTr e FlrrA ro - i t d t ..i 1 e7VtT, .-rr- -- - 16087 the Communi t h b v c be be vigorous. It should proceed at a pace Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Senator e a rre a urden ' in period of that will exploit to the fullest the ca a- from Virginia. longer than any other our P history. In many ways, I think hink we e can bilities of existing AEC and DOD weapons Mr. ROBERTSON. Again, I C0111- be thankful to the Soviets, because they laboratorleg, If these capabilities are proved mend the distinguished Senator from have a genius for keeping us alert. I to be inadequate to: meet established require- Washington upon an able discussion of want to make certain that we are not ments, they should be expanded. (c) The , the pros and cons of a vital issue. I was lulled into a state of euphoria. underground test program should be a continuing program designed to insure happy that the former college professor, Mr. DOUGLAS. Or serendipidity. the highest practicable rate of progress in now the distinguished economist from Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. nuclear technology. Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS],, recognized the That is why so much depends on our will (d) The standards established governing quotation from an English writer. as a people; and that will is reflected in the type and magnitude of tests to be con- Earlier in.. the debate, the distinguished our legislators. ducted should not, be more restrictive than minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] indicated More specifically, I think the burden the spirit of the treaty limitations. that Benjamin Franklin had Para- of the distinguished B. "The maintenance of modern nuclear Senator from Mis- s s ave een counting on (bi The underground test program should will the Senator from Washington yield? this But we ha d th b retical and vV11bt,1Lui,ruuar wrrvenvron, wnen tine exploratory nuclear tech nology which wilt attract, retain, and insure the members were not making much'head- continued application of our human scien- way in forming a more perfect union, tific resources to . these programs on which Franklin said: de- continued progress in nuclear technology de- In this emergency, when we are grasping pends.'.' in the dark to perceive political truth and are X, CRITERIA Scarce able to perceive it when presented to (a) Adequate AEC and DOD budgets, mod- us, why has it not occurred to us to-ask the ern facilities, and positive personnel policies father of Light to illumine our understand- .should be maintained and augmented as ing? necessary in order to attract and retain corn- (b) Broad and forward-looking_ research programs should be carried on which will attract and retain. able and imaginative per- sonnel capable of ir}suring the highest prac- ticable rate of progress that can be attained in all avenues of potential value to our of- fensive anal defensive posture. C, "The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly ,.,nuclear, tests In the, atmosphere should they be deemed essential, to our national, security or should the treaty or any of Its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union." i, RITEaIA - - (a) The readiness-to-test program should be?e ta)?Ushed,.pn,a governmentwide basis in support _of a an common to all partici- pating agencies. The required resources anti facilities should be iiaaintalnedin a state of readiness, or earmark,ed, so that plans can be implemented within the reaction times established., (b) Reaction times for resumption of test- ing in the prohibited environments, must be established and malfrtalned wltih the con- straints of.military requirements and rea- sonable costs. Reaction times will. vary for the broad categories of testing. As an Im- nediate,objective, we should be able tocon- duot proof tests of weapons in stockpile in about 2 months; operational systems tests in about 2 to 3 i nonths; weapon develop- ments tents in about 3 zupaths; and weapon effects tests 1n about 6 months. (c) There must be provision for periodic updating of our test program plan and for checking our readiness to test. A. "The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to mon- itor the terms ofthe treaty, to detect vio- lations, and to maiptain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear and ac activity, capabilities, hievements:" I. CRITERIA (a) The current capability of the United States to,detect ana,identify nuclear tests coflducted by the Sino-Soviet bloc must be improved to the extent it is both feasible and remunerative. (Specific proposals for this purpose are currently under considera- Approved For Release 2004/03111: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 longer I live, the more convinced I have be- .come of the fact that God governs in the af- fairs of men. I used to know something about Shake- speare, but I must have read a misquota- tion of Hamlet, for I have frequently said, 'There is a destiny. But the Sen- ator from Illinois [Mr. DiRKSEN] cor- rectly quoted Hamlet as saying: There's a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will. I wish to ask the -distinguished Sena- tor from Washington a question. He has correctly outlined the military disadvan- tages, and has called upon the Secretary of State to do certain things. He has callect upon the Department of Defense to carry out the reservations of the Chiefs of Staff, as voiced by General Taylor. Last but not least, he said that we can get from under the treaty if we find we have a noose around our neck. I think there is a great popular de- mand for the treaty, on the assumption that it is a step toward peace. But if we ever try to get out from under it, once we are in it, there will be a more popular demand to remain with the noose around our neck. Has the Senator ever read the poem by William Wordsworth, in which occurs this program will be stupendous. it can be done. It has been done in the .field of atomic energy. I am confident it can be done in the overall military field; otherwise, I would not feel as I do. This is a problem as to which hon- orable men can reach different conclu- sions. However, this is the basis of my remarks today. . I thank the Senator from Virginia for his literary contribution. Macbeth has something to say that is not so happy: Out, out, brief candle! Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage And then is heard no more: it is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing. I hope we will not apply that passage. Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? s:J&CI QN. I yield. Mr. DOUGLAS. I congratulate the Senator from Washington for his fair statement and the extraordinary spirit in which he has approached the subject. He has made a well balanced analysis. One is always uncertain how closely one should question another on these matters, because they may involve ma- terial that is highly classified, and should remain so. The Senator from Illinois does not have access to classified information, and has never sought it. If my questions trespass in the field of security, I hope the Senator from Wash- ington will be very careful in his replies. Mr. JACKSON. I hope the Senator will feel free to ask any question. I shall endeavor to abide by the rules of security; I assure him of that. the line: Mr. DOUGLAS, I have been con- Mv heart leans un when r cerned about the problem of the anti- If the Senator has read that line, I th t if one nation possesses the anti- ask him if his heart leaps up when he baistic missile and another nation does beholds this treaty? or will he vote for it not, any attack from the nation which with his fingers crossed? does not have the antiballistic missile, Mr. JACKSON. My remarks on the but does have offensive weapons, can be floor of the Senate answer the Senator's successfully prevented, and that this question quite effectively. My heart 'is will leave the nation which has both the not l i I h eap ng up ope it remains antiballitiiild thffei .sc msse ane onsve steady. I hope the American people will weapons in complete possession of nu- approach the whole problem sensibly and , clear superiority? In, other words, the Approved For Release 2004/033/11 : "6 B003g3R000100210007 16088 CONGRESSIONAL RLCORD SENATE ,September 18 possession of the defensive weapon per- Mr. STENNIS. I, too, wish to corn- Mr. President, this decision has been mits the full use of the offensive weapon. mend the Senator from Washington one of the most difficult of all that have Mr. JACKSON. If, for example, the for his very fine speech. I have bene- faced me during my service in the Sen- Soviet Union had developed an effective fited from it, and I know that. others ate. Of course I respect and admire antiballistic missile which could destroy have. Senators who take a position either way our incoming missiles, it could well have I wish especially to commend the Sen- on the treaty, for in dealing with a ques- tipped the military balance in its favor. ator from Washington for the very fine tion as difficult as this it is not possible I hasten to point out that those in the service he rendered the Senate during for one to say he is positively correct. Strategic Air Command and in the Air the Preparedness Subcommittee's hear- Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will Force generally question whether an ef- ings--which now have lasted for a year- the Senator from Washington yield? fective antiballistic missile can be de- on the entire test bar' problem, and, in Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield. veloped. There is a sort of historic rule particular, during the last 2 months in Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to say to the that the offense has the advantage over connection with the test ban treaty. distinguished Senator from Washington the defense. There are limitations to His excellent knowledge and background, that his statement today will, I am sure, that rule. In recent months and years over a period of years, in the atomic en- have a very decided and positive effect there have been indications that a pro- ergy field and in regard to all related upon the thinking of many Members of gram involving an antiballistic missile matters-not only military matters gen- Congress and upon the thinking of the defense can be effective for a period of erally, but also military weapons,-make public. His support of approval of the time. If we do not have information him a most valuable Member of the Sen- treaty, after outlining the many diffi- about how the Soviet system works,'our ate. His contributiont to Senate debate, culties faced by one who must make this ability to penetrate. their air defenses either on the test bar;t treaty or on the decision, is most helpful. could be in serious jeopardy. day-to-day work of the Senate, are out- I wish to say that although some of Mr. DOUGLAS. I take it the Senator standing. us perhaps have been more outspoken from Washington believes that the field I know, too, of his deep concern about in our advocacy of the treaty-as the of testing which remains open to us is the treaty and about his vote on the Senator from Washington indicated was underground testing, and that in it we question of Senate approval of it. the situation in my case-we have had can achieve substantially the same re- No one has made clearer the limita- no less difficulty in arriving at our de- sults as those we would achieve if we tions, the hazards, and the gamble we cision, nor have we been any the less tested in the atmosphere. are taking, than has the Senator from concerned. Mr. JACKSON. I believe we can bb- Washington. The points he has made- I believe the debate on the treaty has taro enough information through under- and they were included in the resolution become one of the most important for- ground testing and, by extrapolation, he submitted during the hearings-with eign policy and national security debates from information we already have, to de- reference to the reservations the Joint Congress has had in many a year. In velop an antiballistic missile system of Chiefs of Staff have I are vital in con- fact, one of the beneficial aspects of the some type. We should keep in mind, fleet ion with the implementation of this treaty is its generation of penetratirLg and however, that there is a substantial dif- means, if the treat3t is adopted, and thoughtful analysis and evaluation of ference of opinion In this regard. Men constitute a most inportant contribu- our military posture, our relationships of great talent, such as Dr. Teller, feel tion. That resolution was unanimously with the Soviet Union, and the totality that an effective system cannot be devel- adopted by the subcommittee, and then of our foreign policy and our national- oped. Others feel that it can be done. by the full committee, which addressed security Policy, and the consequent abil- Personally, I feel that we can do a great it to the -Secretary bf Defense in the ity of Members to examine each of the deal if we make a vigorous effort; and, form of a letter written by the chair- many factors of those policies and then second, if we likewise improve our own man of the full committee: to reassemble them and to make the retaliatory capability in certain ways Later I shall refer to the responses, final decision. which will give it the ability to penetrate which I regard as among the most sub- The outstanding address by the Sena- even through known or immediately con- stantial contributions which have been tor from Washington impresses me with templated antiballistic missile defense made. Others helped; but the Senator his careful consideration of the many systems. from Washington took the lead and fur- different factors involved. After weigln- Mr. DOUGLAS. I take it the Senator nished a fine background of informa- ing them most carefully, he has fulfilled from Washington also feels that since tion. his responsibility as a Senator by reach- the testing will have to be done under- So I cannot thank him enough for the ing his decision on the basis of the many ground, it would be more expensive than Senate. As one Member, I, too, wish to points of view that have been expressed if done in the atmosphere. thank him most sincerely, and also from in testimony and also on the basis of his Mr. JACKSON. There is no question the point of view of ;my responsibilities own experience, for many years, as a that it will cost us substantially more to as chairman of the subcommittee, for member of the Armed Services Commit- test underground than to test in the the very diligent, constant, and con- tee. He has recognized, and has told us atmosphere. It will be more difficult to structive efforts he has made throughout of, the technical military problems and, obtain certain kinds of information from the hearings. as he described them, the disadvantages. underground testing than from tests in Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from Then he has made his decision in re- the atmosphere. Mississippi is very generous. gard to the overall impact of the treaty Mr. DOUGLAS. I take it the reason I wish to emphasize again, Mr. Presi- and its effect upon our security and our for this is that there cannot be as much dent, the fact that *hat the sub-- position in the world. space in which to operate. committee have been, able to do stems in I wish the Senator to know that I tried Mr. JACKSON. Yes, plus the fact a very definite way fro~nt the able manner to do the same thing. I am not merely that the whole problem of instrumenta- in which the distinguished Senator from a hoper. One is not elected to the Sen- tion, in order to get the proper record- Mississippi has presided over the sub- ate by hoping. One is elected by work- ings, is complicated; and it takes longer. committee's hearings. His diligence and ing, advocating, and having a healthy Time is of the essence in many of the his determination to get the facts are skepticism. situations. greatly admired by all of us who have I believe the Senator has put it well. Mr, DOUGLAS. I thank,the Senator worked with him for` a number of years. I agree with his emphasis. from Washington. He has performed a I say most sincerely that long before the Mr. JACKSON. I am sure the Senator very valuable public service, and has men test ban treaty hearings got underway- agrees with my comment. It was not in- extremely helpful to many of us. and these hearings go back more than a tended to be anything other than as Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator year-he rendered the Senate most valu- stated. from Illinois for his very kind remarks. able service by means of the conscien- Mr. HUMPHREY. I would be remiss in I am indebted to him for his questions. tious, objective, and impartial way in my own sense of public duty if I did not Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will which he always proceeds, as' chairman, say that I find that there is a need in the Senator from Washington yield? to deal with the matters which are stud- public life as well as in private sectors Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield. ied by the subcommittee. for people who come to the decision to Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Re 20p044~~pp I 1 -CI'A-RDP65BA0383 000100210007-3 ? Y 9 63 . __. c ? RESSI A . RECORD - SEMI 16089 The, senator, from Washingtn per- Mr. JACKSON, ,I think that it is fair forme4 a great service by his letter to - to assume that they probably know more. the Secretary, of Defense, asking for cer- The difficulty inso_much of this discus- taro information, His reuest- ultimately sion, as the Senator, knows,. is., that we resulted in certani assurancestpirst, from must assume certain things to be true the Department of Defense, and subse- unless we have information to,the. con-_ quently in the letter from the President trary. The Soviets have tested high- of the United states. I believe all of yield weapons with greater-destructive- that information has given us a better ness than anything we have. I think it .understanding of the treaty, its impli- is a fair inference that such .tests in- cations, and what we know to be the re- cluded effects tests.. Therefore I would quirements for making the. treaty effec- answer in the affirmative, tive if we are to live under, its terms. Mr. THURMOND.. I belivp that the I join the Senator in reminding our Soviets are further advanced in high- countrymen of the importance of eternal yield weapon technology. Is that true? vigilance. We should ever be mindful Mr. JACKSON. That. is correct. I that the strength of our Nation is the think it should be pointed out, that by greatest hope for peace in the world. I extrapolation we can produce a very feel that I can Come with rather clean high-yield weapon without tests. It hands on that question because in all the would not be as good as one produced years I have served in the Senate, when with tests, from the standpoint of relia- our friends on the Armed Services Com- bility or deliverability; but, according to mittee or the Appropriations Committee our best information, it can be done. have brought forth proposals or budgets Mr. THURMOND, I believe that the for keeping the country strong and keep- Soviets are considerably ahead of the ing its Military Establishment modern United States in antiballistic missiles. .and effective, it has been my privilege to Mr. JACKSON. Based on the infor- vote for such proposals and budgets. mation given us I believe they are deft- I have never ;felt that freedom was, nitely ahead from the standpoint of the cheap or that we could get it on the bar- extent to which they have deployed a gain counter. We must be prepared: 'I system. have never believed that we could have Whether they are ahead of us in the unilateral disarmament. I personally , so-called research and development believe that national security requires a phase, that is, new techniques and so on, constant attention to the balance of mili- is a question I cannot answer, tary power, foreign policy or our diplo- Mr. THURMOND, Under the treaty, macy, and an intimate knowledge of the the Soviets could attain parity with the social and political forces at work in the United States in tactical nuclear weap- world. I comm nd the Senator. I am onry, with respect to which it is thought confident that his message will be_ of we are not ahead, could they not? great . help in bringing about the two- Mr. JACKSON. They could, if we thirds or morg votes-that are needed for. failed to carry out the safeguards which ratification, call for vigorous underground testing. Mr. JACKSON. ' I thank my friend I think we could keep ahead in that from Minnesota yery much. I appreciate area.. We. are ahead now; and while his thoughtful comments. I know of his they will have the advantage of com- long and continued interest in the prob- peting in that area, if we continue to lem and the close way in which he has prosecute with great vigor our under- followed it over the, years. I thank him ..ground testing program, I believe we for his observations and comments. can remain ahead. Mr. T URMOND. Mr, President, will Mr. THURMOND. I believe there are the Senator yield? strong reasons to believe that the Soviets ,Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield know more about radar blackout effects to the Senator from South Carolina, that are crucial to. the development of Mr. THURMOND. The Senator from antimissile missiles. Is that correct? Washington is one of the ' most knowl- Mr. JACKSON. That is a question edgeable and valuable members of the . about which, as the Senator is aware, Committee on Armed Services and the there is a dispute among the scientific Preparedness Investigating Subcommit- and technical-people. I have had infor- tee. He has made an extremely interest- mation both ways. We have conducted Ing statement today. At times I won- approximately as many high altitude dered whether he was arguing for the tests as the Soviets have conducted. We treaty or against the treaty. To my do have a great deal of data in that way of thinking, his statements are area. Whether it is as good as theirs I rather strong against the treaty. do not know. There are a few points that I think Mr. THURMOND. It is true that the perhaps ought to be brought out to the treaty would bar the testing of nuclear American people. I should like to ask weapons to determine their performance a few questions. under operational conditions. Mr. JACKSON, Certainly. Mr. JACKSON. The treaty would pro- Mr. There is no ques- hibit any nuclear testing in the three tion Soviets have a definite prohibited environments, and this would silperlority in high-yield weapons, is include-operational testing. there?', Mr. THURMOND.In the development Mr. JACKSON, There is no question, of an antimissile missile, would we not Mr. THURMOND. There -is no ques- be greatly handicapped because the ?tion that the Soviets know more about weapon ought to be tested in the environ- ment .in which it would ultimately be usedto.,determine the success of it?. Mr. JACKSON. Naturally, it would be far more advantageous to be able to test the entire system, including the war- head. This means of course that we would not have the most effective anti- ballistic missile system. It could be a much better system if complete atmos- pheric tests could be conducted. As the Senator knows, the only fully operational tests with the nuclear warhead that we have conducted in the missile field have been those with the Polaris missile system. -Mr. THURMOND. In order definitely to determine the effects of a superbomb upon our missile sites, or our silos, would it not be necessary for tests to be con- ducted in order for us to gain the knowl- edge and technology that we would need to determine whether our sites would be able to withstand the electrical cur- rent that would accompany the big bombs? Mr. JACKSON. It would certainly be helpful; and we could have greater as- surance as to the survivability of our retaliatory striking force. As I pointed out in my remarks, we shall have to add to our retaliatory delivery systems because of these un- certainties. The Senator from South Carolina is aware that we are in an area of classified information, and unfortu- nately we cannot go into the subject in great detail. As the Senator knows, we have already taken certain steps to pro- tect our ballistic missile sites by reason of information we have gained from previous tests and previous knowledge. Mr. THURMOND. We would never be able to determine definitely whether or not our missiles would be able to take off, and whether their guidance and con- trol systems would be effective, unless we actually made those tests in the atmosphere, would we? Mr. JACKSON. A part of this prob- lem, however, can be solved by under- ground tests-a part of it, but not all of it. Mr. THURMOND. I thank the dis- tinguished Senator for his frankness in answering these questions. In closing I wish to read a very brief statement by Dr. Teller, made in January of this year, when he said: A test ban treaty with the Soviet Union would prevent vital improvements of our atomic explosives as well as foreclose the development of antimissile systems like the Nike-Zeus and the Nike-X. It would not keep the Russians from cheating. Such a treaty, in sum, would endanger our secu- rity and help the Soviet Union in its plan to conquer the world. The Senator knows Dr. Teller, of course. I know the Senator has high respect for him. I am sure the Senator would give great weight to a statement made by Dr. Teller. Mr. JACKSON. As the Senator knows, in the text of my remarks I re- ferred to Dr. Teller, Dr. Foster, Gen- eral Schriever, and General Power. I have great respect for all those gentle- Approved For Release 2004103/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16090 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 As Senators, we must look at all these er. I have had the privilege of working problems and then come to a judgment. with him for more than 10 years. He As I said earlier, I respect the judgment is a dedicated and fine officer. of my colleagues, no matter which way Mr. THURMOND. I have such-a deep they finally decide to vote on the issue concern about the treaty that I felt this now before the Senate. information should be brought out. In the last analysis, whether this Again I thank the distinguished Senator country maintains its superiority, which for his frankness in answering questions. is the means by which we have kept Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator the peace, will depend on our will and from South Carolina. determination to do so. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will Even if there were unrestricted nu- the Senator yield? clear testing, should we come to the Mr. JACKSON. I yield to my friend conclusion` that somehow we could cut back, we would then invite a thermonu- clear war, because we would lose our military superiority. Therefore, the overriding challenge the American people now face, and will face in the years to come, is, "Can we maintain a strong posture in a long- drawn-out conflict?" The Chinese Communists and the Russian Communists question whether we can do it. We have been doing it for 17 years. This is the area which causes me the greatest concern. It has in the past. It is my great concern now, and it will be in the years that lie ahead. I feel that those of us who serve on the Committee on Armed Services and on other com- mittees have a great responsibility to see to it that we do not let our guard down. Most sensible Americans expect us to follow that course. This is what I shall continue to do. I shall do it now and In the future, as I have tried to do it in the past. . I appreciate the questions the Sena- tor has asked. I know his deep concern. I share the same concern. We may come to different conclusions, but our concern exists, nevertheless: Mr. THURMOND. The Senator re- members the statement made by General Power, I am sure, that it is far too dan- gerous to sign the treaty. General Power made a very strong and impas- sioned statement against ratification of the treaty. He is the man who has charge of our delivery systems, the mis- siles and the planes, who will be respon- sible for wreaking destruction upon the enemy if that time should ever come. I am sure the Senator was deeply im- pressed by the statement made by Gen- eral Power. Mr. JACKSON. I was deeply im- pressed by his statement. As the Sena- tor knows, the Chairman and other mem- bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the treaty. Five leading officers, includ- ing General Shoup, support it. They in- clude General LeMay, who no doubt had different reservations about it from those of the other Chiefs. He served longer than any other commander as the head of the Strategic Air Command. Mr THURMOND. I am sure the Sen- from .Arkansas. Mr. 1a ULBRIGHT. I wish to associ- ate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished majority whip [Mr. HUMPHREY]. I compliment the Senator. I know he has had long experience in this field, particularly in respect to arm- aments, since he has served on the Com- mittee on Armed Services and on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I am gratified that after what no doubt has been much soulstarehing, judging from the Senator's remarks-as I also know from previous remarks-the Sena- tor has arrived at what I believe to be a sound conclusion. I compliment the Senator upon his judgment. I know there have been conflicting statements by many of the highest au- thorities. It finally comes down to a question of weighing in the balance the quality as well as the quantity of the testimony from different viewpoints. That is the decision which the Senator from Washington and all other Senators must make. I am extremely pleased that the Senator from Washington has arrived at the decision to support the treaty. I congratulate him for what I consider to be his good judgment. Mr. JACKSON. I thank my friend from Arkansas. Much will depend on how we as Americans conduct ourselves under the treaty in the years which lie ahead, and whether we shall be willing to exercise our rights under the treaty, which include the right to withdraw if the circumstances warrant it. We must act courageously. We must protect the superiority which we have maintained throughout the years in the nuclear and thermonuclear field. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sure the Senator will agree that we would have to do so in any event, even if there were no treaty. We cannot now insure fu- ture actions, We must pursue the same policies, even in the absence of the treaty. Mr. JACKSON. There is no question about that. Mn FULBRIGHT. The treaty does not prejudice that position. Mr. JACKSON. But-and this is what the Joint Chiefs were concerned ator remembers the statement made by about--a feeling of euphoria can set in; General Schriever, who commands our and that is something we must guard missile development, who said that he against. It happened in a previous arms cannot do his job properly if the treaty control period, in the 1920's, when we is ratified. signed. the Washington Naval Arms Mr. JACKSON. I do not recall his ex- Agreement. We became a little careless. act statement, but if that is the way it The signing of the London Naval Con- appears in,the record of testimony, I am ference Agreement had a similar result. sure it is correct. I have nothing but I make the point because our past con- the greatest respect for General Schriev- duct is a matter of great concern, and it may be an indication of the dangers that lie ahead. I believe the Senate has rendered a constructive service in developing the understanding with the executive branch of the Government concerning safe- guards. If we live up to the assurances that have been given and take advantage of the safeguards in the treaty and with- draw from the agreement if necessary, I believe we can maintain the peace. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sena- tor. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JACKSON. I yield. Mr. MILLER. I compliment the Sen- ator on his excellent speech. The Sena- tor from Washington has achieved the reputation-and with good reason--of being one of the most informed and con- scientious Members of the Senate so far as matters relating to the national se- curity are concerned. I point out one thing which the Sena- for from Washington brought out, which. I think it is well to stress, and that is that the argument made in favor of the treaty, that it, will tend to slow down the arms race is a faulty premise. On page 4: of his speech, the Senator from Wash- ington quoted Dr. Leo Szilard to the effect that "With an extensive program of underground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just the opposite." While I recognize that that statement was quoted by the Senator from Wash?- ington as evidence of the danger that may lie ahead in the future from the efforts of some people who will try to persuade the Congress to go contrary to the safe- guards proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, to use as an argu- ment for the treaty the contention that it would slow down the arms race is it faulty premise. In view of the state- ment by Dr. Szilard with regard to ex- tensive underground tests, in my view, the tests are a sine qua non so far as ratification of the treaty is concerned.. If such tests are carried out, they will mean a step up, rather than a step-down., in the arms race. This should pretty well lay at rest the argument that the treaty will slow down the arms race. As I said Tuesday, I did not want to be persuaded to vote for the treaty on the basis of the argument that it would slow down the arms race. Every Mem- ber of the Senate is in favor of slowing down the arms race; but to proceed from that desire to a ratification of the treaty on the basis that it would slow down the arms race would be a very unfortunate basis on which to arrive at a decision. The Senator from Washington has ar- rived at his decision after sharply re- pudiating this argument, which I know has been suggested by many as the basis for ratification of the treaty. Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator. There is no doubt in my mind that we would have to increase our expenditures under the terms of the treaty. I yield the floor. Mr. STENNIS obtained the floor. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved-For Release 2004/031,11 CIA-RDP65B00,3$3R000100210007-3 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE the absence of a quorum, for the pur- stantial." There is no compelling evi- right to the floor. ~Ihe.ItESTDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr.S' 'ENNIS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.'' The ]?RESIDING OFFICER, The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further pro- ceedings under the quorum call be dis- pensed with. The PRESIDINNc OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, without losing the floor, that I may yield 2 minutes to the distinguished' Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROVGH], The Pf2,ESII NG OFFICER, With- out objection, it 'is so ordered. THE NSCLt;AR TEST BAN TREATY XS A TINY LIGIfl' I~? A VERSO DARK WOODS;' LET'S NOT BLOW IT OUT .... .} ... . Mr, YARBOROTJGH. Mr. President, 11 more than 90 nations of the world have now ratified the nuclear test ban treaty pending before the Senate. This large number, accepting it,so soon, well illus- trates the toner, felt aroun5l the world pt the, consequences of the continued .atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons at the rate of the. past 2 years. This treaty is desirable as a way of at least slowing down the accumulation of radio- active fallout, It appears to be the scientific opinion that any additional amount of radio- ,activity, in the air we breathe or food we eat will have some genetic consequences, affecting. those of the unborn genera- tions, A line cannot be drawn at which it can be said there will be no adverse effects from fallout if the radioactivity stays below these limits. So it is in the interest of all. the people of the world to pursue attempts to limit the amount of radioactivity that is placed in the air. Of course, in the past we have prop- erly felt that the dangers of fallout were far overshadowed by the consequences of nuclear, war, should our unreadiness pro- vake anuclear attack. We have wise- ly tested when such testing was neces- sary to maintain a nuclear capability formidable enough to deter any enemy attack, There is no question that this policy in the long run will save more lives than will, ever be affected by any conceivable aount of fallout. We have no apology to make for the testing which has produced our present nuclear arse- nal; our armed readiness-quite likely has saved the world, But now we are, at a position where we think it wise to stop testing and cease adding .to fallout. Will this cessation j rejudice our ability to deter aggression? Although there is some difference of opinion among military and scientific experts, the great weight of the testi- mony, presented to Congress from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the leading nu- clear weapons, scientists, indicates that there, vv. ill be no substantial= prejudice to our nriltry position as compared with the Soviets. I emphasize the word "sub- dente that continued testing will great= ly aid our ability to deter aggression and defend ourselves. We must. be pre- pared for both. Maybe some time in the future there will be- such evidence that indicates we need to test-when that day comes we can resume testing. From the pattern of recent history, we can conclude that it is far more likely that the next nuclear test by the signers of the treaty will be made by the So- viets, as a surprise, in- hopes of catching us unaware. To those who'say that thus the treaty is a Communist snare, I say "maybe so," and "so what?" This coun- try will maintain vigilance and a readi- ness to resume testing if and when the treaty is violated. The best evidence is that the Soviets will not be able to jump ahead of us by such a violation of the treaty. I do not think anyone in this adminis- tration, or this country, is being lulled into a belief that the Soviets have be- come good peaceful neighbors just be- cause we ratify the treaty. We shall be prepared for the worst; we do not forget the missiles in Cuba less than a year ago. But when all the safeguards have been put in, as are in the treaty, and every possible allowance is made for all the duplicity of which the Communist mind is capable, we still find that it is to our interest, the world interest, and even the Soviet interest, to slow down the nuclear arms race. This is a first limited step. Il does hot end the cold war; it is not in any sense disarmament.' Cessation of contamina- tion of the air and water will do some good; it cannot do us any great harm. There are those who would prefer to dis- sent or express legalistic reservations to every constructive proposal that has ever been made. It is more difficult to be an advocate, more desirable to keep oneself ready to be able to say "I told you so." In human affairs, however, someone must be the advocate and take the affirmative. I am proud to be among those who affirm the desirability of ratifying the nuclear weapons test ban treaty. We must base our legislation on our hopes, rather than on our fears. We must have faith that mankind has the intelligence to march into a better future, and not, like a mass of lemmings, plunge over a cliff of no return, to a place of self-destruction. The treaty is a very tiny light in a very dark woods; let us see if it will light our way through these woods before we blow it out. PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the hearings before the _Preparedness Sub- committee extended for `almost-Y year. One member of our staff, Mr. Russell J. Fee, Jr., is particularly familiar with the hearings and the subject matter of nu- clear test bans. I ask unanimous con- sent that he be permitted to be in the Chamber during my discussion. Various points may arise on which he should be available for quick reference. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. STENNIS. The hearings of the Preparedness Subcommittee were origi- 16091 nally on the_ general subject of test ban treaties, with particular reference to the impact they might have on our military preparedness, our military posture, and the security, of our Nation and, for that matter, the Western World. After the test ban treaty was proposed, the hearings focused on it., _The- chair- ,man of the Armed Services. Committee, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RussELL], considered whether or not he would re- quest the Senate to refer the treaty also to his committee. Consideration was given to holding joint hearings with the Foreign Relations Committee. The Sen- ator,from Georgia finally told me that, in view of the fact that our, hearings were already in progress, and that our staff was familiar with the subject, he thought it well for us to continue the hearings, with special emphasis on this treaty. Therefore, the subcommittee proceeded in that manner, and concluded its hear- ings in time to make its report. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr, Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr, STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe it was just as well that the subcommittee proceeded as it did. There were so many Members sitting with the Foreign Rela- tions Committee that if a Senator wanted to explore a particular matter it was necessary to wait almost all day to ask a question, particularly if one was not sit- ting at the head of the table. In addi- tion, it required so long to hear a witness that we could not have - proceeded as rapidly as we did in the Senator's sub- committee, with a smaller number of witnesses. Mr. STENNIS. Yes. No issue is be- ing made about it. There never has been. I mentioned it only because the press had speculated as to how this pro- cedure developed. With all the testimony that has been taken, all Senators are faced with a diffi- cult question, which is: Would the pro- posed test ban treaty leave us able to protect ourselves militarily? I have to conclude there is great doubt about it; I do not believe it would. For that rea- son alone I shall be compelled to oppose the treaty. I will outline the reasons in my speech. Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. ROBERTSON. I welcome this op- portunity to express my heartfelt ap- preciation for the services the distin- guished Senator from Mississippi has performed over a period of years. For nearly a year he has been studying the test ban treaty. I issued a statement last week saying that I did not know whether the test ban was a prelude to a period of peace or the entry into a game of Russian roulette.- Some people may know what Russian roulette is, and some others may not. I do not claim to be an expert in the field, but as I understand, Russian roulette is a game which has come out of Russia. It is played to show one's sporting disposition. A player takes a six-shooter and puts a live shell in one chamber Then herevolveli-the chamber until he does, not now where Approved For-Release 2004/03/1,1 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16092 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 er to his temple and pulls the trigger, and hopes that he will not hit the live shell. If he does, it is night under the hill and he blows his brains out. The Senator had expressed some doubt about what kind of game we were get- ting into, and I said in my statement last week, knowing the popularity of the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who is sponsoring the treaty, and the great popular sup- port that committee has as a leader for peace in our time, that I wanted the as- surance of our military experts that if I voted for the treaty we would not be hurt. After all, this is a military problem. It is not a political matter, except col- laterally. Of course, we do consider good opinion in world affairs. I shall make a speech next Monday. I have relied upon the findings of the subcommittee which the Senator from Mississippi headed, the Subcommittee on Investigations, to give us the military aspect of the-treaty. I am relying on his report. Certain men, free from restraint, like Admiral Burke, General Twining, and Admiral Radford, are openly against the treaty. The man who is responsible for SAC is against it. The man responsible for the development of our Air Force missiles is against the treaty. Not a single military expert recommended the treaty. I will say on Monday that I side with my distinguished friend from Mississip- pi, and that it is clear to me that the mili- tary disadvantages outweigh the politi- cal advantages, with all due deference to those who do not agree with me, and without questioning in any way their sin- cerity. I will go along with the Senator from Mississippi and vote against the treaty. I commend him for his fine work. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr, STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Inasmuch as the junior Senator from Virginia has made reference to the treaty as my treaty, I .first wish to set the record straight. I did- not negotiate or initiate the treaty; it is my duty as chairman of the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations to present it to the Senate. I have studied it at length, and I am in favor of it. May I ask the chairman of the subcommittee who, in his judgment, is considered to be a military experts? Does he not consider the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be military experts? Does he not consider General LeMay to be a military expert? Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I consider him to be a military expert, not a political expert. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator consider General Wheeler to be a mili- tary expert? Mr. STENNIS. I consider him to be a military expert, but not a political ex- pert. - Mr. FULBRIGHT. And General Shoup? Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator will permit me to do so, I shall discuss this subject in my speech. Mr. FULBRIGHT. In his colloquy and questions, the Senator from Vir- ginia said that not a single military ex- pert approved the treaty. My point is that :1 consider all the! members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be military ex- perts. I consider General Eisenhower to be a military expert. He used to be so considered. I still consider him one. I think the world considers him one. He endorses the treaty; 'and the others whom I have mentioned endorse it. To let stand the statement: that not a single military expert endorses the treaty would be a gross misstatement of the fact. At the proper time, I shall refer to the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations hearings and the particular statements of military men. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish to be courteous to the Senator from Vir- ginia and to the Senator from Arkansas, but I wish to proceed with my speech. Mr. ROBERTSON. Let me correct' some,~hing I may have misstated. What I intended to say was - that no military expert approved the treaty from a mili- tary standpoint. The Senator has mentioned General LeMay. I asked General LeMay, at a hearing before our Subcommittee on. De- fense Appropriations, "Can you give me assurance that we will..not be hurt?" General LeMay said, "I cannot." If that is an endorsement, the Senator can make the most of it Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think he could give such assurance even if there were no treaty. Mr.:ROBERTSON. Certainly not. Mr. FULBRIGHT. He could not at- tempt to guarantee that the United States would not be hurt if there were no treaty and if there were a nuclear war. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall later yield most liberally to the Senator from Arkansas; but I request the priv- ilege of proceeding with my speech now. Mr.:FULBRIGHT. I apologize. The Senator from Virginia initiated this dis- cussion and made certain references to the chairman of the Committee on For- eign Relations which I thought should be clarified. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I shall yield to all Senators later, but I would like to proceed with my speech, if I may. Let me say, in the beginning, that in considering my decision on the treaty, I was not overly concerned by the so- called political advantages that some persons think would accrue to the United States. I do not believe any would accrue. I am greatly concerned, however, about the military disadvan- tages that all military witnesses firmly' believe would accrue to us. I am also concerned about the military advan- tages that is is believed would accrue to Russia as a result of the treaty. With matters of such importance of concern to me, I came to the conclusion that the major effect of the treaty would be to cut off testing where we need testing most-in the atmosphere--and to give a green light to testing by Rus- sia where Russia needs it most-under- ground. No one denies that. We can become emotional about these things. But the point which I make, no one can deny. We must start from the hard facts of life; and that is what l: am seeking to do in presenting my views. Today the Senate is sitting in a spe- cial capacity in serious consideration of a nuclear test ban treaty. It is not a question of running around before the debate starts and asking every Senator how he will vote, or tallying up how many here and how many there will vote this way or that, or speculating in the press and elsewhere as to how many votes one side has and how many votes the other side has. No. The Senate is sitting in a semijudicial capacity, some, what as a court of appeal. In express terms, the Constitution provides that no treaty shall be binding on the American people until it is ap- proved, not by a mere majority, but by a two-to-one majority of the member- ship of the Senate present and voting. That is one of the few senatorial powers that might be called a semiexecutive power, with which this special court of appeals, so called, is entrusted. If I correctly remember The Federalist,, grave consideration as given by the Constitutional Convention to granting this power not to the Senate, but to the Supreme Court. Also, consideration was given to vesting this power in the Congress as a whole and to require that a law be enacted. But these proposals were rejected. It was finally decided that that "court," the Senate, represent- ing the several States, should pass on such questions as treaties. The Found- ing Fathers were not wholly satisfied with that. They required that in such instances the aproval must be given by a 2-to-1 vote, instead of a mere majority. The American people have never been willing-and Congress has never reeom?. mended-that that constitutional provi- sion be changed. So we are not sitting here as nose counters or head counters, tallying the number for the treaty and the number against it. We miss the boat by letting ourselves get into such an atmosphere. It is not our sole purpose to determine the number of witnesses who testified one way and those who testified another way. We are not seriously concerned with the number of witnesses; our task: is to weigh the substance of what they said, whether they are authorities on the particular subject, and consider their ability to deal with the facts. Consider the case of a man who is tried for a misdemeanor which carries a fine of $10. The court will instruct the jury that they must not count the num- ber of witnesses in balancing the testi- mony and determining its weight. Even in these cases, the jury is instructed to consider the knowledge of the witnesses,, their authority in the field, their credi- bility, and then to weigh the testimony and reach a judgment as best they can. The Senate is now debating a matter which has grave and possibly even omi- nous portents for the future of our great Nation. The treaty which has been submitted for ratification or rejection brings us, for better or for worse, to a Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R0,00100210Q07-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE ball rolling. I say we should get back dent, by the question of why the Rus- to the facts. signs desire . this treaty. We proclaim 11, We may have gone far; but if it be true that we have present nuclear superiority that potential disaster lies ahead, the and that the treaty will stabilize this. Senate still has.,within its power the exer- But the Russians make precisely the cise of independent judgment. If that same claim. Obviously, both of us can- judgment is that the treaty should, be rejected, then Senators should unhesi- tatingly vote to reject it, regardless of how many nations, large or small, have affixed their signatures to it. I think we must all agree, Mr. Presi- dent, that in deciding whether this treaty is in the national interest and whether it protects adequately our security, safety and survival, we must rely solely on the facts and on the document itself. Few ,of us, I am sure, are willing_ to let any phase of our national welfare or secu- rity depend even fora moment, or even to the slightest degree, upon reliance on the good faith, honesty, sincerity of pur- pose, or trustworthiness of the Soviets. The cold, hard, and, unpalatable facts of history teach us that the rulers of the Kremlin cannot be trusted, and that truth-to them-is anything which moves them nearer to their goal of world domination. I need only remind the Senate that the Mr. Gromyko who negotiated and signed the treaty on behalf of the U.S.S.R. is the same Mr. Gromyko who, just short of 1 year ago, sat in the White House and blandly assured our President that So- viet missiles had not been, and would not be, introduced into Cuba. Even as he did so, photographs which had already been taken ultimately branded his as- surance a monstrous and deliberate falsehood. I do not know how many Senators were present last fall when. the Cuban crisis arose, just after Congress had ad- journed. I happened still to be in the city; and I remember, and shall always remember, that the same Gromyko who this year was the representative of his Government in initialing the treaty, then-a year-sat in the White House, and, when talking to the President of the United States, assured him that there were no Russian missiles in Cuba; that such rumors were just dreams; that no armaments of that sort were there. But, either then or shortly thereafter, the ini- tial photographs of those missiles in Cuba were on the President's desk and were being examined by experts at the Pentagon; and a day or two later there.. was confirmation that the missiles were there. At the very time Gromyko was conferring with the President of the United States, the President's experts were studging those photographs, which clear test program in human history. then or shortly thereafter were on the Now the United States is struggling with President's desk. Today our Govern- its conscience, struggling to deny the im- ment is dealing with. the. same man. plications of the evidence which is be- The lure of peace, desirable though it fore it, struggling to forget that it has is to all of us, can easily be a siren song been duped and deceived, and struggling leading to disaster unless there is clear to convince itself .that it can undertake, proof that our supreme interests are in the name of peace and humanity, and completely and adequately protected by without unacceptable risks, another the proposed treaty. agreement-with the, Soviet Union- I do no ,_aa d_to 4xell_.upon the many which will impose restraints on our vital instances o,fperfidy on the part of the weapons programs. Red rulers of ,Russia. I have just re- There is no uncertainty about what ferred to the most. recent and outstand- happened the last time we trusted Soviet ing instance, motives in nuclear test matters. The Approved .For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 world-a world, from which both war and the threat gf war have been forever banished. But it must be a secure. peace-not an illusion and a snare. We must be certain that we do not jeopardize our destiny by being trapped in a gi- gantic game of l=tussldn roulette. I fear that our overwhelming desire for peace makes it difficult' for us to ex- amine critically and objectively any pro- posal which seems to offer any hope, however illusory, to fulfill this desire. Yet, because it is easy to be mesmerized into believing that any document which bears the label of peace is in fact a real step toward peace, it is important that we explore it and its implications search- ingly. At the outset,, we .must bear in mind that what is represented to us as a first step toward peace may very well be to the Russians just another maneu- ver in the cold war or-even worse-a considered step by them toward a hot war in. which the cards will be stacked overwhelmingly in their favor. Therefore, much as we all thirst for a just and lasting peace, it is important that we do not, accept proposals urged in the name of peace at their face value and be satisfied with mere assurances that all will be well. The U.S. Senate must accept and be equal to all of the obligations and responsibilities which are inherent in the historic advise and consent clause, which provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treat- ies, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." It is sound, indeed, that this action was submitted as a treaty, and that no attempt was made to take this action. by an Executive order. The proposal is brought before the Senate as a treaty, which is the only rightful way of bring- ing it before the country. I trust there will be no future talk, as there was a little more than a year ago, of dealing with the situation through an Executive order. I do not impute such a suggestion to the President. He has sent the treaty where it is supposed to go. We must explore the facts fully and must exercise our independent judg- ment as to whether, on the basis of facts as we know them, the treaty is truly in our national interests. That is the only test. We must do this with full, knowl- edge that the destinies of the almost 200 million people of this Nation may hang in the balance. Mr. President, I have no sympathy with the argument to the effect, "We must go along with the treaty, now that 92 na- tions"-I believe that is the correct num- ber-'have signed it." Mr. President (Mr. SiMPSOrr in the chair),,I do not mean to be unbind in referring to the other signers but I must ask what many of them gave up when they signed the treaty? I speak with all due deference, to those nations and their representatives; but it is true that the ceremonies were conducted before news.-, reel cameras, television cameras, and newspaper photographers, and the news- papermen, and the columnists. That not be right. Possibly we are right; but who among us is gullible enough to be- lieve that. the Soviets would willingly freeze themselves into a position of in- feriority? If we are wrong, do not we court disaster by binding ourselves to this document? Later, I shall say more about the ques- tion of nuclear and military superiority. At_ this point I wish to emphasize the fact that I am hard put to understand why the Communists have suddenly re- versed their field, and now have agreed to a treaty which in the past they have rejected several times. We must beware of their new and smiling face, and must consider carefully what the treaty will or can do to our national security. We must not be too eager or too willing to walk in the direction in which they urge us. I am not so naive as to suppose that those of us who vote against approval of the treaty will be immune to charges that we are warmongers. I have already received that brand from the Chinese Communists, as a re- sult of the report of the Preparedness In- vestigating Subcommittee on the Cuban military buildup. We will hear such charges, not only from the Soviets, but also from those of our own people who honestly, sincerely, and with the highest sense of patriotism judge our decision to be wrong. I share with my fellow citizens a long- ing for peace with justice and integrity, but I am not convinced that the path of, peace lies in the direction this treaty leads. I would have been convinced of it in 1958. I would have been convinced of it in 1961, before the Soviet Union abrogated the 3-year moratorium on nu- clear weapon tests. I am not convinced of it now. . In 1958, our Nation held superiority, not only in the numbers of nuclear weap- ons and their delivery vehicles, but also in the knowledge of weapons design and weapons effects throughout the whole spectruln of nuclear technology. Today, the Soviet Union holds the lead in the design of the very-large-yield hydrogen weapons, and either has drawn even, or, is about to do so, in other important areas of knowledge. The Soviet Union conducted, in 1961 and 1962, the most comprehensive nu- 16094 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECWRD - SENATE September, evidence is clear that the Soviet Union never ceased to prepare for a resumption of nuclear tests. That is an important fact. During all of that moratorium the Soviet Union assessed its needs; It estab- lished its timetable; it prepared its test devices; it gathered its instrumentation; it organized its test personnel. And at the moment best calculated to achieve its purpose, it shattered the moratorium- ruthlessly, purposefully, and dramat- ically. My recollection is that the very day after they announced they would resume testing, they performed one of the highest degree of capability-thus showing preparation, not for days or for months, but for years. The U.S. program, which for nearly 3 years had stagnated-frustrated both by its inability under the moratorium to conduct needed experiments and by orders which prohibited even the ap- pearance of a state of readiness to re- sume testing-reeled under the demands suddenly -placed upon it by our alarmed Government. Mr. President, the state- ments I am making now are not my opinions; they are statements of the facts, as testified to under oath by our leading scientists. Proving grounds and test organizations had been disbanded. Delivery vehicles and instruments were either unavailable or inadequate for the needs; nuclear test devices were either nonexistent or were incompatible with a program to test advanced weapon and weapon-effects concepts. Test objec- tives were both uncertain and uncoor- dinated. When we resumed testing, we did not have the necessary means, vehicles, plans, or know-how. The U.S. test pro- gram staggered and faltered, and was un- able, for almost a year, to mount even a modest series of meaningful atmospheric nuclear experiments. That was our sit- uation in 1961. And in the meantime the Soviets, using three separate test organizations, each with a different technical objective, con- ducted test programs simultaneously at three different proving grounds. It was an outstanding example of what a nation can do when its security interests are given overriding priorities. By mid-1963, however, I believe the Soviet Union was faced with a dilemma. Secrecy, hypocrisy, and deceit had paid very handsome dividends for it in 1961 and 1962, but it was obvious that the U.S. weapons development program was be- ginning to recover its sense of mission and its momentum. It must have been clear that in 1964 and 1965 the areas of Soviet superiority in nuclear technology probably would be redressed. How could Soviet high-yield weapon superiority be maintained while at the same time pro- viding a means for achieving parity, and possibly superiority, in the lower yield weapons classes where the United States still retained a significant performance lead? The lower yield weapons can be tested underground. That is the area in which we are now ahead and they are behind. A readymade solution was at hand. On September 3, 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President Ken- nedy,confronted with the sudden Soviet violation of the 3-year riioratorium and aware of its meaning to'the security of the free world, had proposed to Chair- man Khrushchev "that tieir three Gov- ernments agree, effects immediately, not to conduct nuclear tsts which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fallout." Thee United States and the United Kingdom they said, were "prepared to rely upon existing means of detection, which they believe to be ade- quate, and are not suggesting additional controls." { The Russians would Bever agree to anything that involved inspection. Since :1945 in one form'or another, we have urged the Russians to adopt the original Baruch proposal; which provided for adequate inspection. To this day they have turned down t lat proposal but have now, for some reason, accepted the concept we have before us. The con- cept was subsequently embodied in a draft treaty presented at Geneva on Au- gust 22, 1962, as an alternative to a treaty banning all nuclear testing, which con- tained provisions for verification and on- site inspection and had proven objec- tionable to the Soviet Union. n These overtures were then rejected by the Soviet Union, for bvious reasons. At that time the Sovi is had not yet achieved superiority in very high-yield strategic weapons or acquired the data on weapons effects necessary for the de- sign and perfection of antiballistic mis- sile systems. This could come only from atmospheric tests cond cted before our programs could regain their momentum. It was important that the time gained by secret preparations be used to full ad- vantage. And it was. Let us make no mistake about it. The giant advances which tae Soviets have made in nuclear weap s and nuclear technology is directly attributable to the 1958-61 moratorium anti their duplici- tous abrogation of it. The Russians are nct smarter than we are. They do not ,,have more re- sources than we have. they do not have more ingenuity. They' took full ad- vantage of the moratorium. While we neither tested nor prepared for testing they made tensive prepa- rations and, as a resu't were able to mount two comprehensiive, complex and fullscale atmospheric test series. By comparison, our one series was hastily prepared and only partially successful. There is little doubt in, my mind that, since 1958, we are a least 11/2 at- mospheric test series ehind the So- viets. is there any w nder then that they have been able to `attain such re markable technological, achievements and to draw even withi and surpass us in several important eas? Is there any reason to believe tat they cannot utilize the cover of the pending treaty, if it should be ratified, again prepare for atmospheric testing In secrecy, abro- gate the treaty at their own convenience and leapfrog further ahead of us? The distinguished Senator from Min- nesota IMr. HUMPHREY] correctly noted in his floor statement cn September 10 that- It takes time to be able-Ito interpret what such a test means, to develop into weaponry 13 the information gained from such a test, to get the weapon into the arsenal and to phase it into military strategy. Although the Senator from Minnesota places a different significance on it than I do, this point is well taken and lies at the heart of my concern. It will take the Soviet Union approximately 2 years to digest the large amount of informa- tion which they acquired from their superior atmospheric tests series in 1961 and 1962, to translate the data into stockpiled weapons and to determine their military requirements for addi- tional tests. This process has already started. Like the farm families of my youth, they have cut and stored their firewood in the summer and in the fall; and now, in the quiet of the winter, while the treaty is in effect, they are consuming it-by the use of the testing data which they acquired. They can improve their weapons and conceive and develop new ones. - I am very much concerned that the full impact of the Soviet test series has not yet been felt and that, 1, 2, or 3 years from now, after having gotten full benefit from the test data, they will be able to develop and produce even su- perior weapons, including perhaps an ef- fective ABM system, and add them to their operational inventory. It is said that at the signing of the treaty of Moscow those present saw tears come to the eyes of Khrushchev. I do not doubt it. They could well have been tears of happiness as the self-proclailried leader of the Communist burial squad witnessed the victory of his deceit and planning for deceit. Whether the balance of power today lies with us or the Soviets today may be impossible to determine. I am convinced that, not merely on hope, but on facts, that it, lies with us. But I do know that, since 1958, the very heavy balance of nuclear testing in the atmosphere rests with the Soviets. We have been often told that it is a balance of power which maintains peace. Those who assert this misread their his- tory. Peace is maintained-not by a balance of power-but by an imbalance of power in favor of those who support and defend the cause of peace against would-be aggressors. My distinguished friend, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHTI, said in his eloquent speech in favor of ratification of the treaty on September 9: A continuing arms race, accompanied by mounting fears and tensions, has almost inevitably in the past led to war. I must question the accuracy of that conclusion. I think the true lesson which one should learn from history that it is the loss of the arms race by the peacekeepers, arid not the arms race itself, which has in the past led to war, This has been proven many times in the course of history and at least three times during this century that I can remember. The Kaiser unleashed his forces and pro- voked World War I only because of the weakness of the rest of Europe and his confidence in Germany's military su- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 Approved For Rel Q ~/p3L11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 RSSIONAL RECORD -.$F,NATE periority which he had, This pattern listed in the interim report of the Pre- to 1965 will be known to history as the was repeated in 1939 when Hitler, en- paredness Investigating Subcommittee Pax Americana and that history will re- couraged by the fact that his adversaries are factual and real. None of the most cord that it ended only when well-mean- were weak and militarily inferior, set out . responsible witnesses who appeared be- ing men injudiciously and illogically to conquer the world, by force of arms. fore us disputed their existence. The confused effect with cause and allowed On the other side of the world, in 1941, disagreement arose from differing evalu- military arms to degenerate in the face the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Har- ations of their significance. of the enemy. bor only because of their assessment of Mr. President, regardless of how any I repeat: Military forces are the result our military inferiority. In both World Senator may vote, the subcommittee's of political tensions and not their cause. War I and World War II we achieved report and its statement of facts were As a U.S. Senator I cannot, and I will victory only because we had-time to agreed to by every single member of the not, acquiesce in the impairment of our mobilize our industrial might and our subcommittee, except the Senator from military deterrent to war until the neces- material and human resources and over- Massachusetts. He issued a brief state- sity to deter is removed.. This is another come the enemy's original superiority. ment saying that he thought the facts reason why I will record my vote in op- There will be no opportunity for this in were too pessimistically stated. So the position to this treaty. a future nuclear war. Therefore, it is report stands before the Senate with The treaty proponents are under- important that. we recognize the basic the slightest exception-not even con- standably endeavoring to get maximum truth that even a power-mad dictator tradiction, but, only the slightest excep- mileage out of the fact that the Joint is compelled to stay his hand and keep tion-as a unanimous report of the sub- Chiefs of Staff support or go along with a leash onhis military might in the face committee on a factual basis. the treaty. of superior opposing forces. I am proud to say that I believe that I am proud that there is such value Only a year ago, when the President this Nation possesses a clear and com- placed upon the men who occupy these of the United States very properly made manding military superiority at this responsible positions. However, I am his demand that the Russians remove time. I affirm it and I applaud it. But bound to say that I think that "go along their missiles from Cuba, there was a I am concerned about the future. I am with" is the more accurate description demonstration of strength. It was not keenly aware that the decisions that of the position of the Joint Chiefs, be- merely his demand-not his words made this superiority in nuclear weapons cause if they are supporters they are, in alone-which brought about results; it and delivery systems possible were made my opinion, the most lukewarm support- was the power and the might behind 5 to 10 years ago and were based on a ers which the treaty has, those words; it was our readiness to pro- depth and a breadth of knowledge so I base this conclusion upon what those ceed. The President started forces in superior to that possessed by the Soviet gentlemen have testified. I have had no motion and moved them to Florida and Union as to discourage comparison. , private conversation with any of them other, places within striking distance. I am also keenly aware that the deci- about this matter, unless it pertained to The Communists were convinced that we sions we are called upon to make today when they could be available to testify had the power. They were convinced we will have their effect 5 to 10 years from or matters of that kind. They have had the will and the resolution to use it, now and that today we do not possess given me no "inside information." I That is when the tide changed and they an advantage in either the quantity or could not be honest with this body if I went hpme-at least, part of them went the quality of knowledge which will as- called them supporters of this treaty. home. sure that these weapons we develop and Let me say that I heard all members That is why it is so crucial and vital produce at that of the JCS testify that we be certain beyond all doubt that, distant date will possess at length in execu- that ehe treaty, and all superiority clear and commanding superiority over tive session and the only conclusion and under ttre ty, ourmil will not ri sity those of the enemy. I do not under- which I could reach was that their and stn teegrdvan. World note and stand-I cannot comprehend-the argu- hearts are simply . not with this treaty. our own safety d and survival a e peace an directly ment that because we now lead we will I know they said all the right words- oupendent upon the free world main- continue to lead despite our failure to particularly on the subject of political depend an uponlance of world main- probe the secrets of nature to the same considerations outweighing the admitted in its own favor, extent as has the Soviet Union, military disadvantages-but if I were a W. have a favorable balance, Humeri- Another argument in support of the tion, of a jury ould dng be on that at their they as Bally If one wioheb to count. weapons, treaty that concerns me involves the as-, my verdict wou they as sumption that the possession of arms in military men are really not for this unquestionably we have the greater and of itself is a cause of international treaty. power now. In spite of all that, it could tension. I believe that this accurately As military men they are not for this be quickly lost, should the Russians de- represents the position of the treat treaty. Why do I say that? It is be- velop vital and superior weapons which y pro- cause in their statements they had to could negate d relegate to the past the ponents. Otherwise, how can it be con- shift geam from the military disadvan- couldivene,ss .of this fine arsenal we have tended that the reduction of either the taxes to the political arena. All said, epared. quality or the quantity of arms will im- "However, when we weigh the political so If carveney the lly p preahould shift, and if the prove the international climate? And considerations of this matter-" and balance soviets, should attain real. and demon- how would the argument that this treaty they did not mean party politics, of Soviee military superiority, we can be represents a first step in the reduction of course, but world politics and consfdera- sure that they will not hesitate to strike, tensions have any validity? tions-"we must conclude, that the ad- either actually or by putting a blackmail Yet not a single advocate of the treaty vantages would offset the military risks." pistol to our head:. who came before the subcommittee That does not eliminate the fact that liven if they do not strike, if they at- would admit that the problems which they all testified that certain risks were fain e clear superiority we ke,l if they at- confront this Nation in Laos, in Cuba, in present. , in my opinion, if the mercy: Thus, or in Berlin arose from the Let us examine their testimo y. Gen- mercy would permit the U.S.S.R. if the arms race. All to whom the question was eral LeMay said, with characteristic trea such superiority, it will prove at- put affirmed that the causes of tension frankness, that "as an original proposi- be no uchg more or less than a pact to and mistrust had their origins in political tion, I would not support the treaty"- bationhlnnicide, o a I ask nd philosophical differences. How then, meaning that he had already run by the Let me make it clear, if I have not lieu dsby Senators, actions or these decisions tensions unrelated ageal judgment i on it and say yes o or done so, that my decision to vote against to their cause? the ratification of this treaty is not based ." He I believe that political "no litical consider already involved in say alone on my concern that .we have be- any actions which anything ngelseations. He could not say Cottle the victims Af another Soviet de- tions must t precede any acbtions which anything else. comfort or have Qf a t to our own affect the quality or the quantity of this At the very least, the testimony of the Nation's arms. I believe that we have Joint Chiefs was far from comforting wishful thinking. My decision is based kept the peace in spite of political and or assuring. i personally know these primarily on military considerations. philosophical differences simply by main- men. I make no attack upon them. The military disadvantages which will taming overwhelming military superior- They are high in honor, integrity, and result from this treaty and which are ity. I believe that the 20 years from 1945 ability. But I think the shoemaker did Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 ? 16096 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September. 13 not stick to his last. They got out of change in the general tenor of his pres- Mr. MORSE. The question of the their field. entation from what it would have been? Senator from Louisiana and the re- T'hey came before the Preparedness Mr. STENNIS. I beg- the Senator's sponse of the senator from Mississippi what Investigating Subcommittee in the role pardon. I was checking on another leave of t the in doubt as Senator from Missisthe ppi pis of the highest military authorities in the matter. land and with the express responsibility Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sena- on this question. Is it the position of to assure that our military forces have tor familiar with the press accounts of the Senator from Mississippi the best and most efficient weapons ob- today to the effect that General Power's Mr. STENNIS. I did not read the tainable and maintain the highest pos- speech before the Air Farce Association new story referred to. I do not under- sible state of preparedness and readiness. had to be cleared with tl e Pentagon be- stand the question. th I wt oumay ld be in- They said: Yes, there are military dis- fore he made it? advantages to this treaty. Yes, we are Mr. STENNIS. I am n t familiar with not be diverted from what I shall have inferior to the Soviets in several im- that press statement. T~iat is the gen- to say about the treaty. portant areas of nuclear development eral rule about security matters, how- but r. MORSE. RI I do of mean to do so, I and knowledge. Yes, the treaty will pre- ever. vent us from developing and procuring Mr. LONG of Louisi na. I do not fled. Is it the position of the Senator the highest possible quality of weapons. care to embarrass the Prsident or mem- from Mississippi that members of the Yes, the continued underground testing bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am military department should be free to which the treaty permits will afford the sure each is giving his vieew as God gives make any statements they wish to the U.S.S.R. an opportunity to catch up and him the light to see. jowever, in the American people? draw even in thg field of low yield weap- general field of the military advising us Mr. STENNIS. No; that is not my ons where they are now inferior. Yes, in connection with an executive dfeci- position. was veryecleaut be rly some forth a nnthe there are a number of unresolved and important questions about the possible vulnerability of our weapons and weap- ons systems which cannot be resolved without atmospheric testing. Up to this point they make a clear case against the ratification of the treaty from the professional military Viewpoint which, after all, is their real field of com- petence. However, they then crossed the Potomac and set up shop in the State Department's sphere of operation. They told us, in words having a perhaps coin- cidental resemblance to those used by the President and the Secretary of State, that after having considered the politi- dal and foreign affairs implications of the treaty, they had concluded that, on balance, the admitted military disadvan- tages and risks are outweighed by the political advantages and, therefore, with the reservations they carefully spelled Defense, and have him Gome to Congress out, they would go along with the treaty. ex lain the other side of the question. p That is a part of the picture. So far Serious support can be mustered for as I remember, among the statements of the theory that someo~ta must lead the all the witnesses who testified in the country in the executive branch; and have - __- inet f he h .J...... ers o was LIUVI. 11y M W- `Y and 11iem was the statement t of the Joint Chiefs cussed these matters and a decision has merely say that it depends on what the supporting the treaty. We had trouble been made, members 1of the executive facts and circumstances are, and what having small portions of other state- branch. should support the decision the issue is with respect to whether it is ments cleared for the public. I was agreed upon, which, generally speaking, desirable to have military men deal with called beforehand and told that the Is the decision of the. Chief Executive, the subject of political policy. This time statement would be ready for release. That being the case, I must say, as a they were directed to take a position on I was asked when I would release that Member of the Senate which is a sepa- foreign policy; otherwise they would have statement. It was desired to release itn- rate branch of this Government, that disapproved the test ban treaty. I said, `What about Dr. we should particularly keep that fact To prove that this was no casual or ill-- mediately . Teller's statement? We have been try- in mind when we are looking for advice considered view, the Secretary subse?- ing to have that released." Several given to us from the executive branch quently made it ?.official by a directive statements came in about the same time. of the Government. which he issued on May 31, 1961. I do But this was the only one that came in Mr. .TENNIS. The Senator is rais- not know what caused the reversal in cdvande with a version that had been ing a very timely point, and has ex- position since then unless it was the pressed it in a fine way? urgent need of the administration to cleared for security reasons. The au- I get Ihorit wanted released immey, t too.e With respect to the Joint Chiefs and at least a semblance of support for the wanted it released immeaiatelyo the other witnesses to whom I have re- treaty from the Joint Chiefs. I was not avedth back anything. I In his speech on Monday, the diistin- want@d to have the isiana. ny released. ferred, The Joint !Chiefs, it is clear, guished Senator from Arkansas, the Mr. LONG Senator yield? Mr. Presi- could approve the treaty only by going chairman. of the Committee on Foreigp dent, will the Senator yield? Relations, suggested that the. experience Mr. STENNIS. I yield. into the field of its political implications. and knowledge of the justly renowned Mr. LONG of Louisiana. not approve the treaty from Is the Sena- Mr. LONG of aty fand. the They military did nuclear physicist, Dr. Teller, "have only very limited relevance to the complexities for familiar with the account in the todayir aspect. of international relations." If we are Force A spapersssoc of the meeting of en- Mr. STENNIS. They had clear-cut going to invoke the shoemaker-stick-tc- eral your-last doctrine it is not amiss to sug- was reservations. eral Power's speecers spec ,h to beefofore effect that body that cleared by the Pentagon before he made Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the gest that it be applied across the board. it, the inference being that there had Senator yield? With reference to Dr. Teller, the re- perhaps been a considerable amount of Mr. STENNIS. I an glad to yield. nowned scientist, perhaps the Senator io years; in hula vvuy executiive makes a policy decision which Mr. MORSE. The Senator from M:is- presumably takes into' account both sissippi was able to obtain from the mili- military and political Aspects, military tary, in executive session, answers to officers, from the top don, are expected the questions that he sought to ask to support that decision. They are them;'was he not? made to "walk the plank," so to speak, Mr. STENNIS, That is correct. In if they do not. It is c end of their the hearings we got to the botton of their career if they do not f low it. Gener- testimony and gbtained the facts. ally speaking, if some one doubted the To continue with my statement, I had wisdom of a decision which had both not realized before, I confess, that it was military and political implications, the the obligation of the Joint Chiefs to take best that could be hoped for would be into consideration pure political and for to obtain advice from done officer who eign affairs considerations in making was expected to be out of the service their decisions as to the military needs in perhaps a month or two, or someone and requirements of the Nation. Per- who had already retired from his mili- haps I had an outmoded view of their tary responsibility, who; did not bear the responsibilities but, if so, I was in good burden of doing what would be expected company. Secretary of Defense McNa- bruary 17 F , e of him by his superior,-namely, the Com- mara, in-a TV interview on mander in Chief or the Department of 1961, voiced "a very simple and strongly iate for ' s inappropr held belief that it any member of the Defense Department to speak on the subject of foreign policy. That's a field that should be reserved to the President, the Secretary of State and other officials in the State Department." Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : pIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 subject, we will have our transcripts fully cleared on it, and it can be debated. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I call the Senator's attention to what General LeMay said; it is printed on page 355 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions. He was asked a question by the Senator from California [Mr. KuclEL] and a similar question by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. I remind the Senator that this is the statement of General LeMay: NO BRAINWASHING First of all, as to the brainwashing. I would resent very hush any attempt to put pressure on me to come up with an answer either way on this treaty. I recognize that I have not only'a responsibility to the Presi- dent and the administration but that I have one to the Congress and to the people of the United States also. So, I say again that there has been no pres- sure applied to me in this matter, and I have come up with the best possible answer that I could give, based on all of the knowledge that I have in the military profession in nuclear science, and with all of the input that I could get from everyone who could talk intelligently on this subject. As to the decision itself, we all feel that there are possibly some political gains that might accrue to the country that would be very important if this test ban treaty were ratified. I think each of us In the Joint Chiefs attaches importance to these political gains. As to how great they might be or how much benefit might accrue from them, I am somewhat more pessimistic than the other Chiefs are in this regard. Just following General LeMay's testi- mony, the testimony of General Wheeler appears. I do not wish to burden the RECORD, but I ask unanimous consent that the response by General Wheeler be placed at this point in the RECORD. It follows directly the testimony of Gen- eral LeMay on page 355. General Wheeler reiterates what General LeMay said. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: INDEPENDENT DECISION ON TREATY General WHEELER. Senator, my position as regards pressure is exactly that of General LeMay. I, too, would resent any pressure being put upon me. Of course, every public official Is subject to pressure. He has the pressure of his con- science, the pressure of his professional in- tegrity, and the pressures of his duty to the President. the Congress -4 t th ____ -- e o 8 military advantage as well as a 611`'' i nave said wnich impugns their the United States. I arrived at this con- political motives or questions their veracity.' To e advantage. lusion independently, and at the same time the contrary, he will find the reverse, arrived at the same point as did my col- Now, I certainly do not have any idea, leagues. gentlemen, that the Chinese Communists or with emphasis. the French are going to be deterred in any Mr. FULBRIGHT. I find it im os- All of us have reservations in thle area. degree in moving forward to become nuclear sible to reconcile the Senator's position in the the reservations are well to spelled on- powers, However, I think Mr. Khrushchev with that assumption. paper which purest enseeof t e the Con- is right when he points out that their ca a- agre In the she term any P Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has been agreement or treaty which hich limits the man- bilUl is negligible, will be negligible for any absent from the Chamber a part of the our weapons s s- foreseeable future that may affect us. _ ter represents which we develop y f ese able the smaljer the nuclear club the time while I have been speaking. He tams ra military disadvantage. better, particularly jf you can keep these might not know everything I have said, On the other hand, there can also be weapons out of the hands of more irrespo these I made clear my high regard for the military advantages, and certainly there can sible and perhaps more adventurous nations. Joint Chiefs. The Senator from Mis- be political advantages, to the overall good I would characterize these items as being siSSippi is basing his remarks purely correct on theco in saying I that think each of ufru LeMay is military advantages as well as political ad- his own judgment. Since the Senator assessed the various risks and the various vantages if they can be achieved, Senator, has made inquiry our record ~_____._ _ s s o that Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-ROP65BOO3&3R000100210007-3 WiN I J thSS1ONAL RECQRID - SE A ",E 16097 from Arkansas was correct when he said That is only a part of a long discus- General LeMay said he had been directed that his,experience had only limited rele- Sion. It strikes me that in this field to give consideration to political matters. vance.tq_the field of international rela- there is no clear-cut distinction; one If the Senator wishes to pursue that tions. llowevex Dr. Teller testified as a considerati i l , on s pure y military and an ,- scientist, and he gave very valuable testi- other is purely political. I believe Gen- mony. At one time he was in, the mi- eral Wheeler expressed it a little better, nority 3n the scientific field. However, although General LeMay and others as a result of ,is perseverance, and his mentioned the same point. They con- ideas we developed the hydrogen bomb. sidered the question as military men. I Ile was not the. sole originator of it, but believe that on the overall balance they he was a great driving force, when many have arrived at their conclusion. said he was wrong. What bothers me about the Senator's I wonder what effect it would have had position is that, as he said in the begin- on the number Of votes for and against ping, he is relying on military experts. this treaty if the Joint Chiefs had stayed I am not on the Senator's committee, but ti i en rely w thin the area of their profes- I do not know of any greater military ex- sionalcompetence and told us that, from perts than the Joint Chiefs, who are re- a military standpoint, this treaty is un- sponsible for our country's defense. To favorable to tie United States. The fact whom else are we to look? They come that the Chiefs cud in fact say that, from before us under oath and swear that they a miliary viewpoint, the treaty is unfa- approve of the treaty. Does the Sena- vorable to us, has been substantially ob- tor feel that he and his committee have scured by the fact that they added the greater judgment as to the military as- judgment that political considerations pests of the treaty than do the Joint outweighed the military risks and dis- Chiefs? advantages. Mr. STENNIS. No; not at all. It is highly important that this point However, probably my political judgment be fully and clearly understood by all might be equal to theirs, but their mili- Senators and by the people of the United tary judgments are based on experience States, and knowledge. It is my opinion that Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will their military judgment did not give the h t e Senator yield? treaty full support; they had to resort Mr. 'STENNIS,, I am glad to yield to to political judgment to support it. the Senator froln Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT I cann t o agree . Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the point of with the Senator. The Senator, having military and political questions, I do not great political experience, has allowed believe there is_a clear-cut distinction- his political judgment to overweigh the certainly not with regard to the testi- decision of the Joint Chiefs. mony and the considerations entering Mr. STENNIS. It could be. It might into the decisions made by the Joint very well be that, in political matters, Chiefs.. This question arose in the execu- my judgment equals that of the Joint tive session with the Joint Chiefs. I Chiefs. I have expressed my opinion, particularly invite the Senator's atten- Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is perfectly tion to a statement by General Wheeler proper for him to do so. on page 397 of the hearings, in the mid- Mr. STENNIS. I am not putting my die of the page. General LeMay had judgment against the Senator's, but already spoken on the subject, but Gen- only against the Joint Chiefs' on political eral Wheeler amplified the statement. I matters. I stated it as clearly as I could. quote a portion of his testimony: I will develop what General LeMay said. General WHEELF,g.I certainly agree with Mr. FULBRIGHT. General LeMay General +eMay so far as he has gone [de- also appeared before our committee. I leted].. I would go a step further in merely do not want it to appear that only the calling this political. It is politlcomilitary. Senator's committee heard General I think this matter of tensions is impor- LeMay. We heard him both in execu- tant. If a reduction in tensions can be tine session and in public session. He .achieved-although i would certainly argue made some very significant statements. w hether weapons cause tensions or tensions I am sure the Senator does not wish cause po to ity pto ns-depl erh with some l ofa then very to say that these distinguished gentle- sticky problems such as Berlin, Cuba, and men are prepared to deceive the Amer- others which plague us. ican people under oath. The matter of proliferation has been put Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from forward as bei i i a n l m g tary advantage. I Arkansas does not wish to impugn the would certainly say this: If we can restrict Joint Chiefs. He cannot find anything the proliferation of nuclear weapons. this is + 16098 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : QlA-RDP65B00383R00010021000,7-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE eptember 13 However, the net result you can read. We all agreed that In, toto the treaty is ac- ceptable. Senator KUCHEL. Even more than that, however, sir, is it fair to say that each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the language of the Chairman, "Supports its ratification." General WHEELER. That is correct, sir. Mr. FUIBRIGHT. Mr. President, I cannot in good conscience question the direct assertions of these gentlemen that they were free to exercise their judg-, ment. Certainly General Power exer- cised his judgment; and, to far as I know, nothing has happened to him. - _. in Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Washington has been waiting for me to yield to him. I have delayed while I yielded to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. JACKSON. I merely wished to make the observation, as one who has tried to follow the course of the treaty closely, as have other Senators, that the Joint Chiefs came to the conclusion that there was a net military disadvantage. General LeMay said to The Foreign Re- lations Committee, on page 358 of the hearings: We examined the militay and the techni- cal aspects and came up 'with a net disad- vantage in that field. order to approve the treaty, the Joint General Taylor state}l further, and I Chiefs were driven into the field of PO- quote from page 275 of the hearings: litical considerations in order to get a The Joint Chiefs have ached the deter- basis on which to stand so that they mination that while therb are military dis- could defend the treaty. That is the advantages to the treaty', they are not so substance of their testimony. serious as to render it unacceptable. Mr. FULBRIGHT. General Wheeler Mr FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will POLITICAL FACTOR FOR SUPPORTING TREATY Senator HICISENLOOPER. I have no quarrel with that. The question I am concerned with, so far as the Joint Chiefs' attitude is concerned: Which would you say, if you had to say--and I shall not force you, of course-was the controlling Consideration in the arrival at your conclusion to support the treaty? Was it the military security and advantage to this country that moved the Joint Chiefs or was it the political Implica- tions or arguments of a broad nature that had their effect? General LEMAY. I would say probably the key factor was political in this case. We examined the military and the technical aspects and came up with a net disadvantage in that field. Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the military? General LEMAY. In the military; yes, sir. Senator HICISENLOOPER. Yes. General LEMAT. Then we examine the po- litical gains that were possible, and we came up with a net advantage there which we thought offset the disadvantages if we were able to reduce those disadvantages by the proper safeguards. pointed out that there is a distinction the Senator yield? That fully sustains the argument the but one between the that is s alw alwcal ays and the impossible to dis- military, Mr. STENNIS. I yield- Senator from Mississippi has been niak- tinguish clearly. He calls it a politico- Mr. FULBRIGHT. When they say ing. military situation, such as the effect of "net disadvantage," dogs that mean an Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish the Senator t two lines the relations between the Chinese Com- absolute disadvantage, egardless of f the woul Mr d read the nexI have not read them. munists and Soviet Russia. I do not effect upon the Russians? Does understand the meaning of the Senator merely mean that they cannot do every- Mr. FULBRIGHT. They pertain to the from Mississippi's statement. It seems thing they would like ti) do, disregarding same line of questioning. This problem. to leave the innuendo, at least, that the the net effect upon they Russians? Does is not so easily disposed of. Also, l: be- Joint Chiefs were directed to reach a fav- it not mean a relative disadvantage? Of lieve this testimony should be read in orable result. I do not believe that is so. course we must assume' In order to argue connection with the executive testimony e Mr. STENNIS. I am merely citing the athe bide by the treaty. the the assumption to Mr i STENNIS. The lier. Senator from An. testimony. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- is that the Russians will not abide by it, kansas will have an opportunity to ash dent, will the Senator from Mississippi that they will immediately cheat on it, questions. yield? all these arguments re rather mean- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask Mr. STENNIS. I yield. ingless. But assuming that they abide unanimous consent that the remainder Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Has the by it, does the Senator consider that the of the testimony on page 358 and ex.- Senator ever known of any instance in Joint Chiefs' statement Is based upon tending through the first 3 lines on page which any member of the Joint Chiefs the ,assumption that n some way the 359beepern rig at this poet i the RECORD. of Staff _ has, before a congressional com- harm, the disadvant s, to the military no ob, excerpt mittee, directly opposed a position taken forces of the Unitedtates are greater was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, by the Commander in Chief. of the than similar effects upon the Russians? as follows: Army, Navy, and Air Force, who is-the I can easily understand how any mili- WEIGHING :MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES President of the United States? tary man might say,', "Yes, the treaty Senator HICBENLOOPER. General, let me Mr. STENNIS. I do not know. will restrict us. It has disadvantages." ky you disrespectful I dl don't can this question to Those questions arise sometimes. That does. not necessarily mean that if have eiseg a liul out connotation, your utld when Frankly, according to my observation, it restricts an antagonist in a similar you get the pocalled political field ge such men did not stay around very long way there is any net disadvantage to the which are basically out of your professional if they disagreed with the administra- country. Is that the point the Senator and technical field, overweigh the disa:dvan- tion on a substantial matter. makes? tages which are in your technical and pro- >,fr. LONG of Louisiana. If a person Mr. STENNIS. I m discussing the Was answer field, and cause If you come to the area a your major which, If left , solely would have who holds such a high office feels that testimony given by the Joint Chiefs. with his conscience requires him to differ with When one enters inter the political field, been a your major o m etentece or a dire his Commander in Chief does that not he can argue anything he wishes. It advantageous decision? tend to prejudice his future as a mili- is necessary to take political considera- General LEMAY. No, sir: I think I must tary officer, in that he is not likely to tions into view in reaching a decision disagree with you there. We have a broader be found entirely necessary to hold high when one is a part of he administration. duty, I think, to the country than just con- position which has both political and That is not to their discredit or that of sidering military questions. If we were com- military implications, or to be selected, the President. It is apart of our system. a anders,i ceheifield, oparrticular tlerlwautd / lower d be after retirement, to be a representative I say again that'. as military men, most solely in the military field. However, of the President before some interna- speaking from a military viewpoint, they even our unified commanders, particularly tional body? Is his position not im- did not aprove the treaty because of its those abroad, must enter into the political paired when he finds it necessary to take hazards and disadvantages. They had fields. issue with his Commander? to go into the political field in order to Now, for instance, General Lemnitzer in Mr. STENNIS. It is true that they do so. That is what they said. Europe today must handle not only military Mr. FULBRIGHT.I I do not believe problems but political problems, and they are military officers in high position; but probably give him more headaches than all at the same time they are a' part of the their testimony supports that conclusion. of his military problems. ministration in Regardless of the Chiefs. Mr. STENNIS. I read from page 358 So, I think we are in the political field u in power, the on to icy of the hearings of the Committee on to some extent. I think that it plays a sec- matters. eve I do not some oot t Critic criticize them e thfor Policy Foreign Relations. The Senator from ondary role to our military responsibilities, but I think we must consider these political doing so. I said that, as a diilitary mat- Iowa [Mr. HICKENLO*PER] was question- factors in the solution of our military prob ter, they did not approve the treaty. ing General LeMay.' I intended to de- gems, because they are important, and they Mr. FIILBI2,IGHT. What about Gen- velop something on tjtis point later. The do have a bearing on our solutions. eral Eisenhower? testimony was as follows' Senator HICxENLOOPER. All right. -11 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : IA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 ? Approved For Release. 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENA Mr. STENN'Z. I have n9t _ had, an This is au illustration of the fact that we should do so on opportunity to read that, In fact, the it is impossible to distinguish clearly assum tions p 16099 as ,. rep has handed to me only a few min- between a military consideration and a Mr..FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator rates a Political consideration. They are in- from Mississippi yield? l4fr. UL RIGHT I SJiolild like to extricably merged, in their judgment. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOR- read parts of it now, if I may. So I do not believe that the argument DAN of Idaho in the chair). Does the Mr. STENNIS. Very well. about military disadvantages is perti- Senator from Mississippi yield to the Mr. FULBRIHT. First, I read the nent. I believe that we must judge the Senator from Arkansas? following: treaty. on the basis of all the considera- General. Z+zM4X.- No, sir; I- think I must tions involved, disagree with you there, We have a broader Mr. STENNIS. Yes. .duty, I think, to the country than, just con- I wish to read one more question and sidering military questions. If we were answer at that point in the testimony: commaiders In. the field, particularly at the Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see. I suppose lower echelons, certainly our duties would be almost solely 1111 the military field. How- there are always some political facets to a ever, even our unified commanders, particu- thing of that kind. Well, I shan't pursue larly those abroad, must enter into the polit- this any further, Mr. Chairman. I was ical fleldos. , merely trying to see if we could divide the Now, for instance, General Lemnitzer in military from the political interlocking that Europe today must handle not only military apparently was joined in the Joint Chiefs' final summarization. problems but political problems, and they General LEMAY. I hope probably give him more headaches than all I was responsive to of his mi}itary problems. your question, Senator. But I believe So, I think we are in the political field to that we must consider those political factors some extent. I think that it plays a second- in all of our problems at the Joint Chiefs ai'y role to -our military responsibilities, but level, and I think we do generally. But to I think we must Consider these, political fac- answer your question, if you only considered tors in thRe.solution of our military problems, the military factors, just military alone because they are, important, and they do have a bearing on our solutions. I submit that that testimony does not indicate that someone held a gun at his bead, and said to him, "You must con- sider the political problems involved." Mr. STENNIS. Let me read the next two Questions and answers: Senator HICKsnsx.ooPER. All right. Well, then, General, let me ask you this to trim this downjust a little bit in my own thinking: If the question had been sub- mitted tp you as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as. to your views of , the de- sirability or lack of desirability from a secu- rity and nonpolitical standpoint to the United. States, what do you think the answer of the Joint Chiefs would have been? General LEMAY. I am inclined to think that we would have weighed these political factors in addition to the military factors in this case but if you automatically cut off the political factors from the pure military question then there are net disadvantages from the military standpoint. And if you consider nothing else, why that is it. That very clearly shows the substance of General LeMay's testimony on those points. Of course, we could read much more of it. Mr. Fi7 RIGHT. Well, Mr. Presi-, dent- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish to be courteous to the Senator from Arkansas; but I have not previously spoken on the subject of the treaty, and I still have a considerable part _of my speech?to deliver, I hope the Senator from A rl ansas will keep that point in mind, I '?hall not take much more time. Mr. VTfLBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Mississippi permit me to read one, more sQntence, on ,the same page? Mr. STENNIS, All right. Mr. MMRIGIfT. Just after the por- ion ,the?Senator from Mississippi read, We finctthe following: General LEMAY. Well, I certainly disagree With you there. If you are going to land on a shore, with an amphibious operation, one of the things you want to know is how are you going to ? be recp W by _the population. This is a politicallaactor, and it will affect your opera- which we did, there is a net disadvantage. But not so much of a disadvantage that we couldn't accept it for a possible gain in an- other field if our safeguards were applied. So there is no question about the general's position on that point. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator from Mississippi yield? Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield briefly to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The distin- guished chairman of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee made the point that in order to justify approval of the treaty, we must assume that the Russians will abide by it. Let me go a step further, and say that I believe the correct infer- ence from that statement is also that in order to justify casting his vote in favor of approval of the treaty. A Sen- ator must assume that the Russians will not cheat after the treaty goes into effect. But if we are to assume that the Rus- sians are not going to lie, deceive, mis- lead, and cheat us in every way they can, to their advantage, and if, based on that assumption, we make three or four major decisions, we might as well surrender right now. Mr.. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield? Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield. Mr. MILLER. I should like to echo what the Senator from Louisiana has just said. I hope perhaps the Senator from Arkansas will modify his state- 1VIr.__STENNIS. I yield-although I wish to continue with my speech. Mr. FULBRIGHT. But I hate to have an erroneous statement placed in the RECORD without any reply. Mr. STENNIS. Then, of course, I yield to the Senator from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I should like to call attention, on page 274, to the Joint Chiefs statement, as follows: However, the dangers of detection and the cost and difficulty of testing in outer space would tend to impose severe restrictions upon such clandestine testing. Other clandestine tests in the atmosphere or underwater, de- pending upon their size, would involve a fairly high probability of detection by our conventional intelligence or our atomic energy detection system. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the resulting prog- ess which the Soviets might make clandes- tinely to be a relatively minor factor in rela- tion to the overall present and probable bal- ance of military strength if adequate safe- guards are maintained. He was saying that the nature of the treaty is such that it would not be profit- able or in their interests for the Russians to cheat. That is exactly what I believe, because it would be idiotic for them to sign the treaty and then immediately begin to cheat, because by doing that they would only lose their standing, such as it is, with their own allies, not with us. I said it is true that a Senator who assumes, as a basic assumption, that the Russians will not at all abide by the treaty, should vote against approval of it. Our assumption is that it is in the interests of both the United States and Russia, and that both nations will abide by it. But if a Senator is convinced that the Russians will not abide. by it at all for any appreciable length of time, he should vote against its approval. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, to continue with my speech, let me say it is noteworthy, I think, that in their appearances before the Preparedness Subcommittee, the Chiefs were repeatedly urged to give their assessment of the treaty from a military standpoint alone. Although pressed on this point, they declined to give such an evaluation, and declared that they were unable to so limit their thinking. went, because I would suggest that if we Senators have pointed out that later must assume that the Soviets will abide the Joint Chiefs returned, went back to by the treaty, before any Senator will be the committee, and then said they had willing to vote in favor of approval of thought further about this matter; and the treaty, no Senator would vote in favor then-in response to the questions asked of approving it. by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HicxEN- The testimony of the most ardent pro- LOOPERI-they did attempt to make those ponents was given on the assumption distinctions. that the Soviets will break the treaty I think that it would be informative whenever it serves their interests to do. and enlightening for the Members of the so. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Senate to go to the office of the Prepared- Staff said, not long ago, "We assume that ness Investigating Subcommittee and they will cheat."__ _S0_1 -believe we must read the first joint position paper of the be very careful about all this; and if we Joint Chiefs, which was prepared and vote in favor of approval of the treaty, submitted prior to,the negotiation of the Approved For Release 2004/03111': CIA-RDP65B00383R000. 100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 , 16100 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13 treaty, and compare it with their second tended. That is what they said; and Mr. TALMADGE. I recall reading joint position paper, submitted after the we have never changed that rule. I that case several years ago. Any number treaty was signed. Certainly their believe that they were wise to put this of executive agreements which have been original testimony to our subcommittee restraint and check upon the executive upheld by the supreme court of the was carefully prepared and carefully branch of the Government. in passing United States have had the effect which submitted. upon treaties we represent the people this particular agreement would have, of General LeMay, I think, put the mat- of the United States and are, in a sense, annulling and voiding certain provisions ter in its proper perspective. He told us: their court of last resort. I-for one- of the Constitution of the United States. I think that if we were in a proposal stage will never accept the view that the Sen- I commend the distinguished Senator that r would recommend against ft. I think ate cannot or should not reject an un- from Mississippi for his vigorous uphold- one of the factors that weighs heavily with wise and ill-conceived treaty merely be- ing of the constitutional advice-and-con- me was the situation we find ourselves in in cause the executive department has sent clause of the Constitution of the having signed it. I think that is important. committed itself to it. We are a com- United States. It was intended by our That is the testimony to which I previ- pletely independent branch of the Gov- Founding Fathers that the vast treaty- ously referred. ernment-not a rubberptamp. We must making power not be vested in the hands Of course, this is one of the arguments make an independent assessment of the of one man or his subordinates, but that most relied upon by supporters of the treaty upon its merits and, if it is unwise, it be shared with the elected officials of treaty. The President himself, in his or if. its consequences' would affect ad- the Congress; namely, the Senate. l: television interview on September 9, re- versey our national security, it is our vigorously support that view. ferred to the unhappy consequences solemn duty and obligation, to reject it. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. which would result "if the U.S. Senate It does the Senate an injustice to suggest As usual, he has sound thoughts on the rejected that `treaty after the Govern- that we should vote for a treaty, how- constitutional question. ment has committed itself to it." ever ill conceived, merely because there Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will The Senator from Georgia is present are some who believe that we have gone the Senator yield? in the Chamber. I know that he indi- too far to turn back. In passing upon Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the majority cated he would like me to yield to him. treaties I hope the day will never come leader. I am glad to yield to him at this time. when any one of us gives any credence Mr. MANSFIELD. Unfortunately I Mr, TALMADGE. Does the Senator whatsoever to the theory that the execu- have not heard all of the Senator's draw from the statement of General tive department by unilateral action can speech, but so long as the subject of ex?- LeMay that he would have been opposed take us past the point of no return. ecutive agreements has been brought up, to the treaty had he been asked about it But there seems to be some difference since the time of George Washington the in advance; and that subsequent to the of opinion between the Joint Chiefs and idea of arl instrument known as an exec.- signing of the treaty it would be too the Members of this body on this point. utive agreement, which was an agree- embarrassing for him to say that he was General LeMay said that we are already ment culminated between the chiefs of opposed to it? committed, and he went into the politi- States without ratification by the Seri- Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is entire- cal arena to prove it.. But we are not ate, has been attempted at various times ly correct. As originally proposed, he committed under the Constitution. in the history of our country. But I would not recommend it, but now it has Mr.. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will point out to the Senator that what we gone beyond that'point. the Senator yield? are considering now is not an executive Mr. TALMADGE. In other words, Mn STENNIS. I yield. agreement, but a treaty, which under the General LeMay's military judgment die- Mn TALMADGE. Is it not true that Constitution should be and has been tated that he should recommend against during; the past several decades the ex- referred, under the advise and consent the treaty, but after it was signed-and ecutive branch of the Government has clause of the Constitution, to the Senate now I believe some 92 nations have also been making what are called executive for ratification by two-thirds of the signed it-his political judgment out- agreements, some of which have even Senators present and voting. weighs his military judgment and he is been sent to the Senate for ratification, So far as the particular instrument now for it. Is that the conclusion of the that have been binding upon our Nation before the Senate is concerned, this par- Senator? in several foreign areas and with for- titular President has been aboveboard Mr. STENNIS. That is a fair infer- eign countries? in his relations with the Senate and has ence. Substantially that is what he said. Mr. STENNIS. A great many such even gone so far as to say, not once, but Mr. TALMADGE. I thank the able agreements have been made. Not too several times, as has his agent the Sec- Senator. long ago in the Senate a proposed. con- retary of State, that if there is to be any Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator stitutional amendment limiting executive tampering with the treaty through the from Georgia. agreements failed by one vote. use of amendments, such amendments, In the statement which I quoted the Mr. TALMADGE. Was not the con- under the Constitution, will have to be President made a basic and fundamental stitutional provision in relation to treaty sent to the Senate for its advice and error. The Government has not com- requirements designed by our Founding consent, and for ratification by a two- mitted itself to this treaty. The Senate Fathers to prevent executive agreements thirds majority of Senators present and is a coequal partner in the treatymaking and executive abrogation of the con- voting. process and the Government cannot be stitutional authority? Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. The committed to any treaty unless two- Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct record is clear on that point. While the thirds of the Senators present concur. in his knowledge of constitutional law. Senator from Montana was absent from That is a quotation from the Con- I have a quotation which will sustain the his desk the Senator from Mississippi stitution of the United States. point the Senator has made, in the form pointed out that the President should In addition, this position represents of a statement made by Rufus King on be commended. He has done exactly a strange and degrading view of the the floor of the Senate. the right thing in proceeding by the advise and consent clause and the rol Mr. TALMADGE. Does the Senator route of the Constitution to bring the e of the Senate in the treatymaking recall that back in the early 1930's, the treaty to the Senate. The Senator from then President of tyre United States, Mississippi further said that he heard process. President Roosevelt, exchanged letters some discussion a year ago about an ex- That is one of the saddest things about with Litvinov, who was then Ambassador ecutive agreement, but that was not at- this entire picture-the degrading view from Russia, and the exchange was sub- tributed to the President of the United that has been taken of the advise-and- sequently considered to be an executive States or anyone close to him. consent Clause and the role of the Sen- agreement, which had the force and ef- It was discussed only to a limited ex- ate in making any treaty valid and bind- feet of voiding and superseding certain tent. The President has been consistent. ing upon our almost 200 million people. provisions of the Constitution and was so He sent this treaty to the Senate. It is our duty and responsibility to con- upheld by our Supreihe Court? It is his domestic Executive orders to not bjectsthe Senator from Mississippi sent to a treaty of~the facts, find, that nit is rect.. I remebr theecasSenator is e. I have cor- own appraisal truly in the best interests of the Nation. looked into it lately, but that is an out- Mr. MANSFIELD. The citation by the That is what our Founding Fathers in- standing case. distinguished Senator from Georgia was Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 19 6i9 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CiA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE that they shall be made, by and with the, advice and consent of the Senate; none therefore can be made without such advice and consent; and the objections against the agency of the Senate in making treaties, or in advising the President to make the same, cannot be sustained, but by giving to the Constitution an interpretation different from its obvious and most salutary meaning. I emphasize this not because anyone seeks to do otherwise with respect to the pending treaty, but because there has been an argument made many times. It was even repeated in a news conference, as I understand the report in the papers, when the President of the United States pointed out that we have gone so far we cannot turn back. A conclusion like that ignores, for the time being, the esential mandate of the Constitution of the United States that these matters can be concluded only in the Senate. Furthermore, do any of us here really believe that the role of this Nation as leader and protector of the free world rests on such an unsubstantial founda- tion as the vagaries of so-called world opinion? The sources of our power and our wealth will not be. altered by our rejection of this treaty. These are the bases for our claim- to leadership. Do these statements imply that our histori- cal role and our membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, the South- east Asian Treaty Organization, the Or- ganization of American States, our for eign aid and military aid programs, our defense of Korea and Berlin, and our support of the United Nations will be forgotten? Do such statements imply that our worldwide friendships and bi- lateral alliances will be shattered by the rejection of the treaty? I do not believe it at all. World opinion is too inconstant to be made the basis for, foreign policy. World opinion was not outraged when the Soviet Union shattered the 3-year moratorium on nuclear. testing in Sep- tember 1961, I challenge the contention that this Nation is such a feeble reed that it will bend under the temporary dis- pleasure of other nations which are sur- rendering nothing by signing this treaty, and which, in the final analysis, have a direct interest in the maintenance by this Nation of a strong and vital deterrent to the aggressive tendencies of- _ the Soviet Union. Let me saya further word about the Joint Chiefs-and their role in this mat- ter. From the testimony which I heard beginning last September I am convinced that the Chiefs were not fully consulted about the military aspects and implica- tions of the various nuclear test ban pro- posals. I am convinced that this is true with respect to the treaty now pending before us. Their role in this matter seems to have been consistently down- graded, and I am concerned about the thinking of those who would commit to us a treaty which has such a direct and momentous effect oll our Milital'y Estab- lishment without full, exhaustive, and thorough consultation with our top mili- tary planners. I say this again with all deference to all parties concerned, military and civil- ian. Even apart from the treaty, these correctly ,stated.` Such` did hapeii in the 11;3O's, tut', soI'ar as I know, nothing of that nature has happened within the past decade or so. Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. Mr. TALMADDGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Georgia. Mr. TALMADGE. The. Senator from Georgia made no such reference with re- spect to'the present treaty. Mr: MANSFIELD. I understand that. I. was merely bringing out the fact. Mr. TALMADGE. The Senator from Georgia was merely upholding the posi- tion taken by the distinguished Senator from. Mississippi that no treaty could have any force or effect without ratifica- tion by two-thirds of the Members of the Senate of the United States. The Senator from Georgia, also, was pointing out that there have been in- stances in our history when executive agreements have nullified State constitu- tions. Such agreements were never sub- mitted to the Senate; and the Senator from Georgia was deploring that fact.' Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia is exactly correct, as he usually is. When I came into the Chamber,I heard a reference town exec- utive agreement. Not knowing the con- nection, I wished to make doubly sure that so far as the instrument under con- slderation, is concerned there was no such thought in mind. I am delighted that both the 'benator from Georgia and the Senator from Mis- sissippi have indicated that the instru- ment now before the Senate is the kind of treaty which is subject to advice and consent and a two-thirds vote by Mem- bers of the Senate. Mr. TALMADGE. There was no con- tention to the contrary. Mr. STENNIS. I assure ' the Senator from Montana that this is one time when the Senator froip Georgia and the Sena- tor from Mississippi are not getting out 9f bounds according to the Senator's standards. Mr. President, I resume my remarks. The true role of the Senate in the making of treaties was defined by Rufus King on the floor of the Senate on Janu- ary 12, 1818. Senator King had been a delegate from Massachusetts to the Constitutional Convention. He later was elected U.S. Senator from"New York. This is what he said: In these concerns the Senate are the con- stitutional and the only responsible counsel- ors of the President. And in this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs of the Nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact informa- tion respecting the foreign affairs, and ex- press their opinion and advice to the Presi- dent respecting the same, when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice expedient. To make a treaty includes all the proceed- ings by which it is made; and the advice and consent of the Senate being necessary ip tlie,o king ol''treaties, must necessarily be so, touching the measures employed in mak ing the "same. The Constitution does not say that treaties shall be concluded, but Approved For Release 2004/03111.: CIA-RDP65BO0383R0001002I0007-3 16101 words need to be said. Not in criticism of anyone, but these words should be said with reference to the necessity of our top military men being consulted in advance. As General LeMay said, the decision had already been made. The lights had already been run-to say whether they were green or red is only argumentative. So far as the executive department is concerned, the matter had been concluded when the military men got into it in a comprehensive way. I know that there are those who have given assurance that the Chiefs were fully consulted, but let me cite the rec- ord. First, there is the fact that, for some strange reason, no high-ranking military officer accompanied the Harri- man delegation to Moscow. I asked Secretary Rusk. in the open hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations why one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or some other military representa- tive was not taken to Moscow. I received a very fine answer. He said it was not considered necessary. I do not know ex- actly how to interpret that. It could have been a short answer, although I am sure he did not mean to be curt. Giving it a literal interpretation, it was said that no military adviser was needed. Next I cite a question and answer ex- change from General LeMay's'testimony on August 16: Senator GOLDWATER. Did Mr. McNamara visit with you prior to the departure of Mr. Harriman to Moscow? General LEMAY. No, sir. Senator GOLDWATER. On this treaty? Has he visited with you since on this treaty? General LEMAY. No, sir. General LeMay also said Secretary McNamara "did not come down to a full meeting of the Joint Chiefs and discuss the 'treaty. He did not discuss it with me personally." Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations, when he ap- peared before the Subcommittee on Au- gust 23, was asked "did Secretary Mc- Namara consult with you about this specific treaty?" He replied: To the best of my recollection, Secretary McNamara did not discuss this particular treaty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff while I was present prior to the first of August. There was then the following question and answer: Mr. KENDALL. Then I take it that you are saying that there was no discussion by Sec- retary McNamara with you or the Joint Chiefs when you were present prior to Mr. Harriman going to Moscow and proposing this treaty. Admiral ANDERSON. On this particular treaty, that is correct. The fact that the Joint Chiefs were not consulted and given the opportunity to present their views as to, the military implications of the treaty prior to our commitment comes through loud and clear on the record before the Subcom- mittee. Let me now discuss rather briefly the military and technical aspects and im-. plications of missile tests bans-a subject on which the Preparedness Subcommit- tee held hearing for 11 months. There is little doubt that the depth and range of these inquiries was greater than any Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE conducted by any other committee of the Congress on this subject in a long while. Before entering into a discussion of the military implications of the treaty, how- ever, I would like to point out a fact that seems to have been generally overlooked. This fact is that exactly one-half-12 of the 24, to be precise--of the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee are identified by backers of the treaty as being proponents of it. These were Adm. George Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations; Dr. Norris E. Brad- bury, Director of Los Alamos Laboratory; Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering; William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Leland Ha- worth, then with the AEC; Gen. Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff; Dr. Franklin Long, then ACDA's Director of Science and Technology; John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Adm. David McDonald, Chief of Naval Opera- tions; Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. Going back over the several pages ofthe Senator's manu- script, it seems to me the impression may be gathered, on the basis of the testimony cited, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were under some compulsion to ac- cept this treaty. I wish to state for the record that is not so. I know the Sen- ator from Mississippi has not stated that and does not intend that, but I am afraid the implication may get out that some sort of pressure was used. I recall, for example, that the dis- tinguished Chairman of the Defense Committee asked the question directly of General LeMay and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if there was any pressure exerted. The answer was "No.,, I can well imagine anyone exerting any pressure on members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the caliber of General LeMay and his colleagues. Then, during the course of the execu- tive hearing, since which time 'the rec- ord has been cleared, the question was asked specifically by the Senator from Montana-now speaking-of each mem- ber of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if he was in favor of the ratification of this treaty, and the answers came back, yes, they were, provided the four safeguards- which the Senator knows about-were included. To the best of my knowledge, every single Senator was then and is now in favor of these safeguards. To the best of my knowledge, there were no pressures used on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To the best of my knowledge, each member of the Joint Chiefs, when asked, indi- vidually stated he was for the ratifica- tion of the treaty, provided the four safe- guards were included. In the statement made by the distin- guished chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, I point to the fact that he has stated that "exactly one-half- 12 of the 24, to be precise-of the wit- nesses who appeared before the subcom- mittee are identified by backers of the treaty as being proponents of it." Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I interrupt the Senator frpm Montana? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. May 1 inquire why the Senator from Montana asked the Sena- tor from Mississippi to yield? Does he have a question to propound? Mr. MANSFIELD. I beg the Senator's pardon. As I said in the beginning, I was not disagreeing with what the Senator said, but I was -concerned about what interpretation might be placed on it. I thought, for the purpose of the RECORD, it might be well to bring up this question. Mr. STENNIS. Go ahead and finish your question, please. Mr. MANSFIELD. No; that is enough. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. MILLER. The Senator from Iowa has been sitting here during the Sen- ator's very able speech. I thought per- haps I should make clear that my in- terpretation of what the Senator from Mississippi has been getting at is that, first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not coerced-- Mr. MANSFIELD. No; were not con- sulted. Mr. STENNIS. That is second. Mr. MILLER. Second, at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said had it not been negotiated and signed by many other countries, he probably would have been against the treaty. As I deduce what the Senator from Mississippi is getting at, the so-called unilateral action or so-called world opinion being putforward as a consid- eration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not, in his opinion, a fair consideration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have to evaluate. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Iowa. I thank the Senator from Montana, too. The Senator from Iowa has summed up the situation. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me in connection with the question of the Senator from Iowa? Mr. STENNIS. I will always yield to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. FULBRIGHT. On page 394 of the Committee on Foreign Relations hear- ings-and this particular part was orig- inally taken in executive session- Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator from Arkansas will permit me before he goes into that; subject, I wish to be courteous to any Senator, but there is some con- sideration due to a Senator who has the floor. Will the Senator permit me to complete my remarks, which will not take very long? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly. The Senator has every right to complete hl remarks without any interruption. It was only because the Senator from Iowa injected this -thought and left it in the air that :i thought- Mr. STENNIS. I thought the Senator from Arkansas was about to discuss what General LeMay said. September. 13 Mr. FULBRIGHT. It had to do with the point which the, Senator from Iowa raised. Mr. STENNIS. I want to be courteous to the Senator from Arkansas, who is compelled to be absent from the Cham- ber part of the time, but I should like to complete this speech. It was on the basis of all of the testi- mony which the subcommittee heard that we reached the conclusion that the treaty would result in the following military disadvantages : First. The United States will not be able to match the performance already demonstrated by the Soviet Union in weapons yielding more than about 30 megatons. We are told that the United States has no requirement for such weapons. The statement is not fully ac- curate. The record will disclose that a military requirement for such a device has been expressly stated. It has not been granted, but its requirements have been stated.. Second. The United States, by being unable to test such very high yield weap- ons, will continue to be unable to real- istically assess their military value. The reference here is to so-called big bombs. Third. The United States will not be able to acquire the knowledge it needs on the performance of weapons at high altitude. Without such tests there will be unresolved uncertainties about both the warheads and radar performance of any antiballistic missile system employ- ing nuclear weapons. Fourth. The United States will be unable to prove the performance and re- liability of antiballistic missile systems under conditions in which the defensive missiles, the radars and the warheads are exposed to nuclear explosions. With- out the confidence that such testing alone will bring, I believe it is unlikely that any program as demanding of na- tional resources as this may prove to be will ever reach operational status. Gen. Curtis LeMay told us: I think you probably can build one (an ABM system) that will work, but how well it is going to work, . what degree of effi- ciency it is going to have is something else again * * * The thing you will not know is how effective our radar and control and guidance system is going to be * * * under conditions of nuclear war. This we do not know * * * and I would prefer to test. That is a military man speaking on a military subject. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Wyoming. Mr. SIMPSON. We are all deeply con- cerned about this matter and gravely J.n- terested in it, of course. Because of the experience of the Senator from Msssis- sippi, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, I wish to ask him whether it is not correct to say that in the course of the testimony adduced be- fore this committee it was revealed by the witnesses that the high-test yield of Russian bombs enabled them to procure advantages from the standpoint of the antiballistic missile missile. Mr. STENNIS. Yes; they are related. Mr. SIMPSON. Would it not be pos- sible that by the very use of the high test explosive they did procure some infor- mation with respect to the electromag- netic; energy bomb, which would enable Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 19 63 , Approved For Rel " I -Rppg B00383R000100210007-3 ~ LJ I3 ?11AL 4ECOR - SENAT 16103 .1.1111 them to do away with our effort to retali- ards that are involved in the reservations scientists on various points. However, -ate on our so-palled second strike? with which the Joint Chiefs labored, and there is nothing clearer in all the testi- Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is a possi- which, in their judgment and in their money, I believe, than his testimony, and bility. It is one of the grave questions recommendations are to be cut off thi i ti , , s s par cularly within his field. In involved. I shall mention the second- Seventh. The treaty will allow the response to a query by the subcommittee, strike feature later in my remarks. Soviet Union to equal U.S. accomplish- Dr. Foster said: Mr, SIMPSON. If the electromag- ments in the design and performance of The operation of an ABM system (United netic energy bomb had such a potential, tactical weapons-that means smaller States or U.S.S.R.) is almost certain to in- would it not be possible to neutralize, in weapons-without any equivalent op- volve more than one nuclear burst. The .their silos, the Atlas, Minuteman, and portunity for the United States to draw first question to ask in connection with any the other missiles? even with the Soviet Union in very high- ABM system is whether it will work after a Mr. STENNIS. That is certainly a yield weapons. nuclear explosion occurs in the vicinity. possibility. I say "possibility" because This point is put in the technical fan- The Senator from Wyoming mentioned it is not known. guage that I mentioned in the beginning. that point. - Mr. SIMPSON. I come from a State The treaty denies us testing in the Such a detonation could be the result of where missile sites are located, and atmosphere, where we are weakest. one of our own warheads intercepting an therefore I and my people are very much This is what should be done with regard enemy warhead, or the detonation of an interested in this subject. to the missile launchers in Wyoming and enemy warhead. The problem posed by our Mr.. STENNIS. The senator from elsewhere, when the missiles met air own detonations is one which must be solved Mississippi will mention that point next. filled with effects of nuclear explosions. if we field any ABM system. It Involves the I Commend the Senator for his interest We would be cut off from testing in that various blackout and other electromagnetic ra- in the subject. area, in which the Soviets are strongest. dar,nas well as the hardness oftouridefensive Fifth. The United States will not be They need testing with respect to weap- missiles. A suitable preliminary test would able to verify the ability of its hardened ons that can be tested underground. be to attempt to shoot at one incoming underground missile systems to -d Vi 11+11 Th ve t s un er es lmnny can be ignored. It is clear as the bases will function if they are not at- those conditions. Testing has not been crystal, positive, and definite. He may tacked. There is doubt concerning their completed. These are some of the haz- have been contradicted by some other vulnerability to an actual attack. This lack n g e not known in any detail or accuracy. to verify how our missile launchers development of an ABM system and the would react under attack, and whether determination of possible warhead, re- Those are not my words; they are the they would work; and we would not be entry vehicle, and missile launch site vul- conclusions of Dr. Foster, the man in able to verify the ability of the warheads nerabilities. This directly bears on the charge of our radiation laboratory at "'at the, of ter end,. to survive and reach military disadvantages of the treaty. Livermore, Calif. the target in a nuclear environment. I cannot understand how Dr. Poster's There is assurance through exercises that We have not made complete test d t t ening, and we are told that we believe strengthen or improve our own military While we will try and find one, experience they will withstand a concussion from a posture. shows that such simulation expi:riments nearby explosion. However, they have The military disadvantages which will measure at best only the weaknesses of the not been tested in that respect. We do flow, from this treaty are clear, concise, system tsted which ce have already beenweak eak- not know how they will react from the and almost indisputable. The political tined, with been assurance that the main - tress has been found. standpoint of their electrical system and and foreign policy advantages which are A third area where atmospheric tests seem what their response will be to nuclear claimed for it are, in my view, nebulous, to me to be required is that of vulnerability effects should there be an explosion uncertain, and unconvincing. of our bases and, possibly, of our missiles nearby. Let me give the Senate the benefit of while in powered flights. Here again, the Sixth. The United States will be un- the views of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the main reason for nuclear tests is not a clear- able to verify the ability of its reentry very able director of the Livermore Lab- cut theoretical one, but stems from the fact vehicles and warheads to penetrate to oratory of Lawrence Radiation Labora- that these bases, together with their missiles, enemy targets under defensive nuclear tory, upon the relationship of and neces- are probably the most complex systems we attack. have ever built, and that the effects of a sity for continued atmospheric testing in nuclear burst on even simpler systems are That means that we would be unable several important areas includi th 5 e reaty would deny a vai- close-in high-yield nuclear explosions. uable source of intelligence to the United This is where the Wyoming missile sites States on Soviet test programs gained come into., the picture. They have been from the analysis of radioactive debris. tested as to their workability in calm- It will reinforce the difficulties already tress and peace and tranquillity, and imposed by Soviet secrecy practices. they work that way. However, we do Furthermore, we were told by the De- not know how they will work with a nu- fense Atomic Support Agency, which is clear explosion, somewhere near them. responsible for coordinating defense re- When I say "near" I do not mean a direct quirements for weapons effects tests and hit or nearby. I mean a near miss. for conducting such tests that, under They have net been tested under-those this treaty, it could not fulfill its mission conditions, Tile fact is not generally or satisfy the needs of our military serv- known.. They have not been tested as to ices. Similar statements were made by their survivability, even though they are Gen. Bernard Schriever, commander of hardened. They have not been tested the Air Force Systems Command, and as to their Survivability in case of a high- Gen. Thomas S. Power, Commander in yield nuclear explosion. I do not mean Chief of the Strategic Air Command, that they would, not survive physically, which repeatedly emphasized the need but there is a question as to the effect of for operational testing of SAC's weapons electromagnetic phenomena upon them. systems. Mr. SIMPSON. Recently the Senator That is the operational testing that from Wyoming, with the distinguished has been discussed. Not a single senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. RoBERTSO v], military officer claimed that the treaty made an inspection of the missile sites in would improve our military posture. Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. Reference was made by General What the Senator has just now started Wheeler, and perhaps by others, to the was discovered with respect to the hard- possibility that there might be some ben- ening process and also with respect to efit from stopping the Soviets from test- the fact that they had not been tested ing in the atmosphere and that this out, would accrue to our benefit. However, Mr. STENNIS. We talk about hard- no one claims that the treaty would Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 a previous defensive burst has been exploded. All of the questions having to do with such a test have not been resolved to date. It must be borne in mind that their resolution will not?comei from having a general picture of the physical phenomena involved, but from actually verifying that thousands of components work after being exposed to a nuclear explosion. That is the test he would require. Since we have made no such tests, we do not know how closely we could space our defensive burst from either the radar or the missile vulnerability standpoint, and there- fore we do not know what kind of an at- tack any ABM system we may propose could defend against. The inverse problem of penetrating an en- emy system- That is, the targets- i.e., of finding out the hardness of our own warheads and reentry vehicles, algo requires atmospheric tests. The main destructive ef- fect of a defensive burst probably comes from the combined effects of the neutrons it puts out and the blast pressure it causes. We do not know at present of a reliable way to test vulnerability to these combined effects un- derground. We shall be limited to underground testing, and we do not know how to make Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210Pe iPe7nber 13 16104 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE of knowledge cannot help Influencing our treaty advocates that th treaty is an would be a treaty to stop nuclear testin?t, policy in the f`nture. "important first step." The fact that it with each nation verifying the other's t step" troubles me actions by having reasonable and fully "fi rs Those are serious words, indeed. How is viewed as a ,roots., 1 era.vely fear that the next enforceable on-the-spot inspection. we act with any confidence if we stop the very kind of testing which this man says is necessary to demonstrate what will happen, with detail and accuracy, at a time when our bombers have stopped coming off the line. Those in the inven- tory are being decreased in numbers every day, and we are more and more, with each setting sun, depending on mis- siles as a defense for ourselves and the Western World. Until we know more about their vulnerability and their re- liability under the most adverse condi- tions, how can we deny ourselves the needed testing? In assessing the relative military ad- vantages and disadvantages of the treaty and in determining where superiority will ultimately come to rest in the field of nuclear weaponry and delivery sys- tems, it is important that we bear in mind that our information is limited by the closed nature of the Soviet society and by our intelligence capabilities. Even John McCone, the able and re- spected Director of Central Intelligence, will concede that intelligence is far from being an exact science and that available evidence does not always answer fully the difficult questions which our policy- makers must ask. In the absence of so- called hard intelligence, intelligence judgments must be substituted, and such judgments are always correct. They are particularly uncertain when they relate to the future military capabilities and intentions of an unfriendly nation. These carefully worded qualifications emphasize that no matter how thorough are the processes of intelligence collec- tion and evaluation, uncertainties can and do remain. I do not have to remind the Senate of the failure last fall of the intelligence community to detect the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba until photo- step may involve even '.. mule AGi+v ??~ danger to our security. in our talks and negotiations, claimed The preamble of the treaty recites were necessary was 30, then 20, then that the parties have "as their principal down to 15, and on down to 12. Then aim the speediest possible achievement we said that seven would be sufficient of an agreement on general and complete and at least one of our civilian high de- disarmament" and also that they-the fense officials has indicated that he parties--seek "to achieve the discontin- thought five would be adequate. uance of all test explosigns of nuclear Mr. President, as I have stated, I have weapons for all time." grave and serious misgivings about the I am compelled to raise the question treaty. Upon the information which is of what our commitments will be if the available to me, I can only view it as a rading the security of d d t eg owar treaty is ratified. What will the next step step be? Will we be presented with a the United States-not as a first step treftty banning tests in all environments toward the peaceful world we all desire. accompanied by the argilment that the I agree wholeheartedly with the con- Senate has already endorsed such a clusion of the report of the Prepared- treaty in view of the preamble of the ness Subcommittee that serious-per- present treaty? Will a nonaggression haps even formidable-military and pact follow? Are we, by endorsing this technical disadvantages to the United treaty, including its preamble, indicat- States will result if the treaty is ratified. ing in advance that we approve the con- Those are not just my words. Those cept of an agreement on complete gen- words are concurred in by every mein- eral disarmament? ber of this seven-member subcommittee, I do not suggest that such a treaty except the Senator from Massachusetts will be submitted. I do not suggest that [Mr. SALTONSTALL1, who thought they anything has been done along this line were a little too pessimistic. that has not been made public. I am I repeat that I agree wholeheartedly saying that possibly this twill be the next with the conclusion of the report of the step, and that we have not given proper Preparedness Subcommittee that seri- consideration to the implications of the ous-perhaps even formidable-military first step as it may have a bearing on the and technical disadvantages to the second step. Certainly there is more to United States will result if the treaty is the picture than merely the treaty itself. ratified. In my judgment. these are not Much as I fear the erect of this so- outweighed or counterbalanced by the called first step I have even greater fears somewhat doubtful political advantages of what it may portend in the way of which would result. I, for one, cannot further compacts with tlse Soviets which find it in my heart in today's world, to may affect the quality; or quantity of cast my vote in favor of approval of a our Military Establishraent even more treaty which admittedly will make it Jim- drastically. It has already been sug- possible for us to develop and produce gested that there be a reciprocal burning the highest quality of weapons of which of bombers and that we, unilaterally cut our science and technology are capable. back on the production of nuclear weap- Particularly is this true when all of the ons to a substantial extent. Is this evidence available to me leads to the treaty a first step toward activities of conclusion that the Soviets will be in- this type? I do not say it is; I simply hibited by the treaty primarily in the raise the point that very possibly this will fields in which they already have superi be a part of the picture. We are not ority. getting the proper concessions. We are For all of these reasons, I will cast my not getting any kind of inspection agree- vote against approval of the treaty. ment.. We are not committing Russia Mr. President, I have concluded my in the fields in which she needs most to speech. vbe committed. We ha~e given h the . en h the . Lof testing uilde grounder The dents w llNthe SenatorLouisiana from Mississippi treaty within itself does not snake any yieThe real PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART progress. h % Does the Senator from h graphs of nearly operational missile sites were obtained at the eleventh hour. Cuba is only a short l0 miles from our shores and it only recently became a po- lice state. Think how much greater the margin for error is when we are oiler- sting against a state which has developed and perfected its security techniques for more than a hundred years. The reference to our intelligence with to Cuba is not a reflection upon regard anyone. It merely points out the great difficulties and the terrifying uncertain- . _._ .... rate i these e l d ate . If our intelligence estimates of So- cesssve steps are conteuiP viet military capabilities and intentions ag SinLwWonder whether et heret ratification in from waiting, [Mfi. F LBRIGR ? T hThne 1? are significantly far error, then, this treaty may impose far greater disadvantages of its preamble, as expressing the sense will yield to the Senator from Louisiana. and risks than we can now anticipate. of the Senate that it approves in prin- I had previously asked the Senator from. In any event, in order to safeguard our- ciple of an agreement; banning all nu- Arkansas to wait. selves against possible intelligence errors clear testing without proper inspections, Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from and deficiencies; it is essential that we or that, it approves in principle of a gen- Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] and other Sena-, maintain a clear and safe margin of mil- eral and complete disarmament treaty. tors have raised question about execu- itary superiority over the Soviets. We People ask me, "What kind of treaty, tine agreements .I have had prepared io memo with possess such a margin now. I believe then:, would you agree, to?" tandum on this had ; and if the Sena.- that it may be impossible to maintain it is not necessary to agree to a treaty tor from Mississippi will and if agre margin in future years if this treaty with someone in whom we have no con- like to have Mississippi printed in the e I should. this - is ratified. fidence. As I see it, in the beginning, it RECORD. Finally, Mr. President, I offer one last the really fair and square treaty, the Mr. STENNIS. I am very glad to word of warning. We are told by the only kind that would be acceptable, agree. I am sure the Senator from Ar?- e c air . I doubt that we can appraise inteili- in t gently the desirability of this treaty as Mississippi yield to the Senator from a first step unless we know what suc- Louisiana? - STn+1 TTa Since the Senator Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release; 2004/03111.: QAA-RDP65B00383R0001109210007-3 ere ei g no jection, t e me pass resolutions prohibiting the President randurn was ordered to be printed in the from getting us into situations of war poten- RscoRD, as follows: tial, without the consentt,gf the Senate. ExECVrzvE AGREEMENTS, Indeed, without this treaty, the President During discussion of the nuclear test ban would clearly have had the power to suspend treaty there have been references to the pos- tests underground, without the advice, and ilbllity that the President by executive agree_ consent of the Senate. Now with the treaty ment.may seek to amend the treaty. he has committed himself not only to all The President has stated unequivocally other parties, but to the Senate in particular, that all amendments to this treaty Will be to undertake no amendments without our submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. consent, Nevertheless it may be helpful to What more can we ask? the Senate to refresh its recollection on the Mr. FULBRIGHT. With regard to subject of executive agreements. this question of consultation, I would not Broadly speaking, the terms "executive like to have the RECORD indicate that agreement" encompasses two types of agree- lL kans# s. i. derstands l iy remarks about might have suspended tests on the basis of same is true as to proposals for other such , px,Gutive ?agreements, and under- an Executive agreement with Mr. Khru- treaties-it was discussed by various ad- stands,Qiat r,xo,attack on him was being shchev and, short of impeachment or some ministration witnesses with the Commit- made. ` other type of punitive congressional action, tee on Foreign Relations and also with he could have gotten away with such an Mr,` ~tLI#1lIbHT. I merely wish to agreement at least on a short-term basis. the Senator's subcommittee. This par- submit It" information of the, Sen- But this is our constitutional system of titular treaty was discussed with the ate. This has,aSways been a rather trou- checks and balances. We can conjure up all Committee on Foreign Relations prior blesome subject, and still is; I thought kinds of bogeymen, if we set out to do so. to its being initialed. All its terms were the memorandum would be interesting to Every Senator knows that the President explained and discussed with the full Senators. can create situations which would put this committee. There was a very full at- Mr., TALMAI?GE. Certainly I have no country at war, despite the constitutional tendance; the treaty was then in its final Objection, provision that Congress has power to declare mo- war. It would do no good for the Senate to form, for all practical purposes, except Th n ob b h meats: First are executive agreements authorized by act of Congress. In these instances, ac- cording to Charles Cheney Hyde, "the Presi- dent has been deemed * * * to be the mere agent of the legislative department of the Government" (Hyde, vol. 2, p. 1406). The second type of executive agreements encompass those undertaken by the Presi- dent on the basis of his own authority. Thus, to take simple cases, the President might agree to exchange Ambassadors with another country, convene a conference, or conduct joint military exercises with another country. Yet in even these simple cases which do not involve a legislative mandate before the agreements are made, the Congress can negate them. It_can refuse to cpnfirm the Ambassador, or fail to appropriate funds for the conference or the joint, military enter- prise. Obviously executive agreements of the type I am now discussing can be on more signi fleant subjects and might even approach such significance as to require approval by the treaty process. In these borderline cases, the President -acts at his peril if he resolves doubtful cases against submitting them to the Senate for its advice and consent because of the puni- tive action which can be taken by the Con- gress, including impeachment. Another quotation from Hyde is helpful on this point. He writes: "The exact provisions of the Constitution concerning the making of treaties did more than prescribe th manner in which they were to be concluded. The declaration that the President 'shall have Power by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur' (art- II, sec. 2, par. 2) sustains the conclusion. that it was not to be rendered abortive by recourse to a different procedure for the use of .which no provision was made, and that there were to be found tests of improper evasion in the character of what was sought to be achieved have been changed during the conference in Moscow. On page 22 of the report of the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, Senators will find a section with regard to "Con- sultation of Joint Chiefs of Staff." The normal procedure, as I understand, is that the Secretary of Defense usually consults with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and it is the duty of the Chair- man to take up these matters-not only this matter, but any matters of conse- quence-with the Joint Chiefs them- selves. But I understand that they do not customarily consult with each indi- vidual member of the Joint Chiefs, Is that not the usual procedure? Mr. STENNIS. I believe it depends on the circumstances and on the im- portance of the matter involved. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair). Does the Sen- ator from Mississippi yield to the Senator from Arkansas? Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me read a brief part, because I do not wish to have the RECORD leave the impression that the administration is trying to put anything over on the military or on Congress without their being fully aware of it. Mr. STENNIS. I have not made such a suggestion, Mr. FULBRIGHT. But I believe it could easily be concluded-from portions of today's debate-that the Joint Chiefs were not consulted. Mr. STENNIS. Yes, that some of the Chiefs were not fully consulted. Mr. FULBRIGHT. If I may read- this statement is taken from the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations report, which, in turn was given during the hear- ings. General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, offered this comment: The Chiefs have been * * * dealing with various types of test ban agreements for a couple or 3 years * * * . You will recall that General Taylor * * * testified that starting on about the 15th of June, he asked the Joint Staff, with the knowledge of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to start to review a possible limited test ban proposal, although we had no specific word- ing to deal with. en th L g , on various occasions, of this particular Lreaty. Of course, the hib otherwise, the scheme for. the co- about the general program of the test precise language of the treaty could not operas action. of the President and the ban treaty. Is that not correct? have been discussed then, because at Senate would have been a relatively value- Mr. STENNIS. That is correct. We that time it had not yet been drawn conatitu- less. injunction and the solitary have been held the hearings; and we called Mr. up, but they were considering the gen- tional guide for contracting would have been of slight worth. Foster first, We have a con plete ,record eral test ban picture. Actually, for all There is no point in denying that a Presi- of all the testimony, practical purposes, this treaty-aside dent has -tremendous power. The Presi- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to state, from its provisions regarding under- dent cad,, suspend tests, as President Eisen- for the RECORD, that prior to the initial- ground testing-is quite similar to the however did rl?rino the ,Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R00010021 0007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - $E NA 16105 the Joint Chiefs of Staff or with Con- gress,. and especially with the Subcom- mittee on Preparedness, of which the Senator of Mississippi is chairman. Last year, on several occasions, this mat- ter was brought up before the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations and its Dis- armament Subcommittee, as well as before the Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness. Is it not a fact that in 1962, Mr. Foster came before the sub- committee and discussed this matter at some length? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Foster was our first witness at our ,hearings, which we started in September of 1962, Mr. FULBRIGHT, And in August, 1962, Ambassador Dean, I believe, who has been our negotiator, discussed this with the subcommittee, did he not? Mr. STENNIS. I do not recall that he did. Mr. FULBRIGHT. According to rec- ords supplied me he was there on August 2, 1962. Mr. STENNIS. No. We did not start our hearings until September; and Am- bassador Dean was never before our sub- committee. Mr. FULBRIGHT, Then the infor- mation given to me must be wrong, On September 17, apparently, the Pre- paredness Subcommittee again met with Mr. Foster, and on September 17, with Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. STENNIS. I stated the list of witnesses who appeared before us in con- nection with our consideration of the treaty. Mr. FULBRIGHT. My point is that 16106 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 t CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 I read further: very brief statement by General LeMay This arose as a result of talks. between in response to a question; of the Senator a European political leader and Mr. Khru- from California [Mr. KUCHEL] in execu- shchev. tive session. It is contained in the now The European political leader referred printed record. It elaborates and Ciari- to there-was Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, who fies a statement the general had made at met with Khrushchev: That, I believe, the public hearing. He said that the was the first intimation that a treaty statement ought to be put into the public very similar to those previously offered, record, and it is here. On page 394 of the but not then acceptable to the Russians, hearings appears a paraphrase of Gen- might now be acceptable to them. eral LeMay's statement that the Senator I read further: from California [Mr. KUCHEL] read, You will also recall on the 2d of July Mr. which I need not repeat. General Le- Khrushchev made a speech in East Berlin, May's answer was as follows: at which time he laid down in rather general I said I thought I would probably be terms the type of treaty that would be ac- against it. But I have spent a lot of mid- ceptable to him. At that time, we stepped night o;Ll on this particular question, on the up the tempo of our activities. And then, treaty, we had in our hands that we could of course, we were aware that the Harriman look at, looking at the disadvantages, look- mission was going to Moscow. General Tay- ing at the advantages, and trying to come up lor, himself, participated in meetings of the in my own mind with a recommendation that committee principals on this subject. He I would give to you people. I have spent a lot did make us- of time. That means the Joint Chiefs of Staff- Incidentally, that does not indicate aware of the results of these deliberations. that he was not consulted but rather the And during the course of the meetings with opposite because he said he had burned Under Secretary Harriman. in Moscow, cables much midnight oil studying the problem. came back and the Chairman briefed us con- Continuing to read General LeMay's cerning their contents. statement: I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff position on past proposals was well known within the I haven't spent as much time on any other Government. And certainly we knew on a subject that has ever come before the Joint day-by-day basis the trend of the discussions Chiefs of Staff, and it has worried me a great in Moscow. deal as to whether I came up with the right Parenthetically, it should be noted that answer or not. the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought the views of Now, with all of that time that I have spent the commanders in chief of the nine uni- trying to come up with a specific recommen- fled commands on the treaty. Seven of dation on a specific treaty-- these nine supported the treaty, one opposed He is talking about the treaty now be- fore fore the Senate and not some other That was General Power- treaty-- and one disqualified himself, on grounds of to be asked some hypothetical question of insufficient knowledge. what I would do, I don't know exactly. I I submit that that is a normal degree just say I think I would, but I am not sure. of consultation between the Executive Mr. STENNIS. What was the ques- and those in the highest positions in the tion to which General LqMay responded? military field. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The question was Mr. STENNIS. May I ask the Senator as to whether he would have approved who made the statement which he has the treaty had it not already been signed. read? That was the hypothetical question he Mr. FULBRIGHT. General Wheeler. was referring to which he had been Mr. STENNIS. Yes. asked at the public session. Mr. FULBRIGHT. During the Com- I have read what General LeMay said mittee on Foreign Relations hearing. As in the executive session that same after- the Senator well knows, General Wheeler noon. It seems to me to be a clarifica- is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. tion of his original statement. At the Mr..STENNIS. I know. very least it does not warrant the clear- Mr. FULBRIGHT. The record should cut statement that General LeMay said be clear that I do not believe there was he would not be for the treaty had it not any neglect of the military. As long ago already been signed. Ile said: as 1958-59 General Eisenhower made I spent more time on 'it then any other proposals of a somewhat similar import. subject before the Joint? Chiefs, and after First, I refer to the proposal for a ban due consideration, I just say I think I would, on nuclear testing in the atmosphere of but I am not sure. weapons up to 50 kilotons. They were Like a great many other people, he was all aware of the implications of such a troubled about the treaty. But he did ban at that time. not make the unqualified statement that I have made no investigation, but I he would not be for the treaty if it had do not recall that the military objected not already been signed. His statement strenuously to General Eisenhower's pro- clearly indicates that lie prayed over it posal. All during this period the main at great length. There is no other sub- controversy was in relation to an inclu- ject on which he had spent so much time sion of underground testing. That sub- as he did on this. ject is left out of the treaty. Therefore, With regard to the necessity of testing, the objections to that kind of testing I wish to comment th 't general Power would not apply to the treaty. in his testimony, referring to page 10 of Much has been said about General Le- his testimony before the Preparedness May having intimated that, if he had Subcommittee, said: been asked prior to the signing of the We have not tested any of the operational treaty what he would do, he would have warheads in our inventory. That includes been against it. I should like to read a all missiles and the bombs. Senator STrNNis. Let me interpose there. The test ban would not change our policy on that because we are not doing it anyway. What is your response to that? General PowER. I would urge they do it. I have repeatedly requested that they do it. The only point I wish to make is that even without any ban the military has not been testing operational warheads. Why? Because someone in the military deems it to be unnecessary, I assume, even though General Powers has re- quested it. Mr. STENNIS. I believe that is an erroneous conclusion. Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the lan- guage mean? The Senator asked the question. What does he think it means? Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has made the statement that in his opinion some- one in the military thought it was not necessary. I do not believe that that statement can be borne out by any testi- mony. The decision was made elsewhere. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Sen- ator- Mr. STENNIS. Let me finish, please. I am directing my remarks to the state- ment which the-Senator from Arkansas made that we have not been testing any- way, and he assumed that those in the military had not asked for it. I believe the military has been asking for testing. Mr. FULBRIGHT.. I specifically said that General Powers said that he had requested it. But he is only one part of a vast organization. Mr. STENNIS. The military people have been very anxious that the tests be made. Furthermore, the Senator from Mississippi thinks that the public has been led to believe that our missile sites and launching pads are far more secure and invulnerable than has been estab- lished by tests. They have been led to believe that our missiles, including their warheads, could penetrate to the target far more successfully than has been proven by tests. That point came out during-the 'hearings. It is fully known now what we will be cut off from if this treaty is ratified. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like. to ask the Senator one or two further ques- tions to determine whether I am correct in my understanding. Mr. STENNIS. Certainly. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I gather from the Senator's statement that he feels that the Russians have made great advances and that they are probably ahead of us as a nuclear power. Mr. STENNIS. No; I said very posi- tively that I thought that on the whole we were ahead. I made that statement two or three times. What I said along that line was that when the Russians broke the moratorium, they stored up a great storehouse of information or test results. I likened it to storing wood in the summer and fall for burning in the winter. The Russians already have a storehouse of knowledge and test re- sults that we have not been able to equal in the scant testing that we have done. They can utilize that storehouse of knowledge and test data doubtless to their great advantage, whereas, since we were not testing on a similar scale? we do not have such results. This treaty will cut us off from testing in the at- Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 Approved For Release 2004/03111: CIA-RDP65800383R000100210p07-3 C'b1V'GRESSIONAL RECORD SSNATt mosphere. TwoF or 3 years from now, due to the storing up of those testing re- suits, they could. emerge with very dis- tinct advances ahead of us. Mx?. t LPRIG"HT. May I read to the Senator from the committee report? Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I refer to the re port of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions , on page 16, in the testimony by Dr. Brown, whom the Senator knows is the head of Research and Development at the Pentagon. In this same context, Dr. Brown was asked to compare the number of atmospheric tests conducted by the United States with the number conducted by the Soviet Union. He replied that "we have had of the order of 200 atmospheric tests and the Soviets have had of the order of 180." He also stated that In the past 2 years, "we have had something over 130 atmospheric and underground [tests] as compared to something like 160 in the IS years before that." The Soviet Union has, of course, crone very little testing underground. Mr. STENNIS,. I should like to ask the Senator_a question. What did Dr. Brown say about whether those were high yield tests which we made, or whether the tests which Russia made were high yield tests? Mr. FULBRIGHT, If the Senator means, by "high yield," the 30-, 40- or 50-megaton weapons, we all know the Russians have had them and we have not. We did not have them by deliberate choice of our own people. Going back to 1954, the testimony shows that this question came up, as to whether we should proceed to develop a 50- or 100- megaton weapon. Our people thought it would be improvident and unwise to do so because it was not based on the mili- tary value, not worth putting the money into it. They felt it would be more worth- while 'to develop smaller weapons which Would have greater accuracy and reliabil- ity, particularly with regard to their de- I read another,point, found on page 15 of the report, which also quotes testi- monyby Dr. Brown: With respect to high-altitude tests carried out for the purpose of determining the ef- fects of nuclear bursts on communications blackout, radar blockout, and nuclear weap- ons vulnerability. "Soviet and United States experience appears to be comparable. Each side has had about the same nwtiber of tests, over yield ranges and altitude ranges which are comparable though not identical. Enough has been learned in the United States to verify the existence, nature, and rough dependence of blackout characteristics on yield and altitude, although important de- tails still havr not been explored. The same is' probably true in the Soviet Union. Prob- ably neither side understands the phenomena sufficiently well to permit theoretical exten- sion with complete confidence to some other altitudes, yields, and types of devices; but we have, and presumably the Soviets also have, enough information to enable us to take steps to design around our uncertainties. I do not wish to belabor that point. The point I was. leading up to, by use of the . quotations, is that if we accept the testimony of Dr,. Brown for the lpoment, there is a rough comparability .in this field, ,Granted, the Russians have tested a larger weapon. The point is that if the treaty is abided by and if, in effect, it de- 16107 celerates ' the activity in testing-cer- involved in the anti-missile-missile en- tainly it will decelerate it except for un- deavor, or in the development of an ABM derground testing-I do not see how it system. Underground testing is limited could be such a great disadvantage to us to about 1 megaton and, to obtain com- if; as the Senator from Mississippi says, plete data testing in the `atmosphere at we are not behind and possibly are ahead a higher yield will be required although as to the number of weapons, as well as not as much as 100 megatons. in the quality of the smaller weapons. I It may be classified as to what Titan do not quite see how there would be a dis- and the others involve, but they are `far advantage. above 1 megaton. I understand that it is an absolute dis- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Those are advantage that we cannot go forward to more than 1 megaton. make bigger weapons, but if the treaty I do not wish to delay this debate but restricts the Russians as it does us in the there is a point that puzzles me. The same environment, I do not see how this Russians have much less in the way of would be a disadvantage. It seems to me resources than has the United States, that the restraint on the Russiang would and less than one-half our gross na- be comparable to the restraint upon us. tiorral product; and I presume the same Mr. STENNIS. The error which is in- is true with respect to income. The volved, in the belief of the Senator from Russians must eat, at a minimum. Mississippi, which is based upon the tes- Granted, they do not eat as well as we timony, is the clear fact that we are far do, or dress as well as we do, or do a behind in atmospheric testings because few other things as well as we do, but of the unusually productive activity of there are certain essentials which they the Russians at the time of their breach' must have. What puzzles me is, How of the moratorium. I refer to high-yield can they have made such remarkable tests particularly. progress? Does the Senator think the I am no scientist, but as a kind of Russian scientists are infinitely more rough test, a 1-megaton explosion, or capable, astute, -and learned than our smaller, can be conducted underground. scientists? Mr. FULBRIGHT. That would be a Mr. STENNIS. I certainly do not, very big explosion, would it not? but we must remember that there is a Mr. STENNIS. Yes. However, as I very practical reason why the Russians say, tests up to that yield could be car- have made such progress. It is because ried on underground. Any test greater they have had very extensive atmos- than that would have to be conducted in pheric testing since 1961 and we have the atmosphere. not had it on the same scale. We lived The report sums it up in this way: up to the moratorium, and they did not. The total number of Soviet tests above 1 Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will megaton- the Senator yield? Which means those in the atmos- Mr. FULBRIGHT. The United States phere- - tested 2 weeks after the Russians broke was approximately four times that conducted the moratorium. We tested under- by the United States in the same period ground. (1961-62). In terms of yield-to-weight ra- Mr. STENNIS. Our tests were very in- tios, the Soviet Union, as a result of its ag- adequate. gressive test program and its concentration Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why was that? on very large yield weapons, has demonstrat- Mr. STENNIS. Because we were not ed clearly superior performance in all ready.. yield classes above approximately 15 mega- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was it because tons where the United States has had no our people were incompetent. wsrthg noting tingienoe that the since scien1954. tific It is also switnesses Mr. STENNIS. I did not say that. ' worth were unanimous in expressing uncertainty The Senator brought that point up. about the particular designs employed by the Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am asking the Soviets, to achieve the results observed in Senator for his opinion. their very high-yield experiments. Mr. STENNIS. I have tried to an- There is more involved in the high- swer. It is because we were not ready. yield test, the big bomb, than the size of Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why were we not the bomb. That is the basis for this ready? "stored up knowledge," as I call it. Mr. STENNIS. We had been standing Mr. FULBRIGHT. If I may complete by, as I stated in my speech, according my thought, the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the uncontradicted testimony, doing testified that they "have not regarded as nothing. We were living up to the mor- important the attainment of weapons in atorium. We were waiting. We had the 100-megaton range. They feel that faith. We had confidence. And we the types and numbers of megaton-yield were caught. weapons available to us now or in the fu- Mr. FULBRIGHT. During the testi- ture could give us an adequate capability mony we asked Dr. Kistiakowsky the in the high-yield weapon range." question about maintenance of the lab- And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs oratories during the moratorium. He of Staff, in response to a direct question testified that they were maintained. on this point, replied: In fact, the number of personnel in- I attach very little important to this, creased. frankly, Senator. The whole very high yield Mr. STENNIS. He was sharply con- weapons field is one which has very little, if tradicted by the other witness in that any, military significance. field. (At this point, Mr. MCINTYRE took the May I yield to the Senator from chair as Presiding Officer.) Washington? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Mr. FULBRIGI1T. The Senator'may same question of atmospheric testing is yield to any Senator he likes. Pipproved, Fob Release 2004/03111 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3' 16108 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 Mr. JACKSON. It is conceded by per- sons in the executive branch of Govern- ment that we were a victim of the planned abrogation by the Soviets dur- ing the period of the test moratorium. The best evidence we had, as I recall the testimony, is that for a period of at least 18 months prior to the Soviets' first deto- nation in September 1961, they had been preparing for the tests. We were not preparing for testing at a given time and place. Mr. FULBRIGHT. May I ask, why were we not? Mr. JACKSON. Some of us tried to get something done in this field, but no effort was made. I emphasize this be- cause it explains why the Joint Chiefs make the point that there must be standby capability to resume tests, to avoid the very bad experience we had with Soviet-planned abrogation. This is one of the safeguards now insisted upon. Unfortunately, that kind of pre- cautionary move had not been made under the moratorium. I think the test- imony is quite clear on that point. Mr. STENNIS. Very clear. Mr..FULBRIGHT. Let me refer to the testimony before our committee. Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, who, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is a repu- table scientist. Mr. JACKSON. He is a Nobel Prize winner. He is very reputable. Mr. FULBRIGHT. In response to a question-and I am referring to page 19 of the Committee on Foreign Relations report-Dr. Seaborg observed that "We didn't lose very many" scientists from the Commission's laboratories during the 3-year moratorium on testing. He added that the problem would be eased under the test ban treaty because of the con- tinuance of underground testing. Dr. York, a - former Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, stated that laboratory personnel grew by 50 per- cent during a period that roughly co- incided with the moratorium. He added that: Most of the new people added during the moratorium period went into research areas other than weapons development and test- ing * * * but these new people worked largely on programs which were scientifically related to the weapons program, and they were at the place where the knowledge was, where the equipment was, where the, com- puter programs were, and they could be and, in fact, were rapidly converted to weapons scientists- and engineers when that became necesary. Dr. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, comment- ed on the ability to resume atfhosphere testing promptly. His testimony is sim- ilar to what I have already read. I shall not take the time to read it, but it ap- pears on page 19 of the report. Mr. STENNIS. May the Senator from Washington respond? He has something to say on that point. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Mr. JACKSON. I do not think the increase in the number of scientists in the laboratories can be related to a state of readiness. One of the mistakes made was that our test facilities in the Pacific were not ready. We took on-the-shelf items and proof tested those weapons. The ones we wanted to test were not ready for testing. The Soviets had the obvious advantage of planning precisely when to resume. So the fact that we added scientists to our laboratories during that period does not relate, to the fact that we were caught off guard when the Soviets broke the moratorium, and we were not prepared to resume testing. This is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not want it to happen again. That is a vital part of the safeguards requested. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. resident, I wish to yield now to the Senator from South Carolinfi lMr. THURMONDI, who has an urgent engagement to 15eep. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to congratulate the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for the magnificent address he has de- livered here today. I hope every Sen- ator will take occasion to read the ad- dress. ]( have had the pleasure of serving on-the Preparedness Investigating Sub- committee with the able Senator from Mississippi, and I know of the careful manner in which the hearings were held. I concur heartily in the statements made in his address today. They are accurate and factual, and are based on the testi- mony. In his address the Senator referred to the preamble to the' treaty, the first few lilies of which read: Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agree- ment on general and complete disarmament. I believe Secretary Rusk, on March 11, 1963, and later President Kennedy, re- ferred to this treaty as L! first step, mean- ing a first step toward general and com- plete disarmament, as I understand it. I invite attention to what Mr. Khru- shchev had to say on January 16 of this year in East Germany on the subject of disarmament. These are his words: Disarmament primarily means dismantling the gigantic, war machines of the highly de- veloped countries. * * * General disarma- ment does not mean dis rming the peoples fighting for national liber Lion. On to con- trary, it would deprive the imperialists of the means to halt progress and crush. the struggle for independence. So it is clear that the Communists do not mean to disarm; they are attempting to deceive us into disarming. I congratulate the Senator from Mis- sissippi for referring to the preamble of the treaty, which I tjiink is an index showing where we are going if the first step is taken. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. THURMOND. invite attention also t:o"article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 36, which is in two part .graphs, reads as follows: 1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the partie$ refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and con- ventions in force. Paragraph 2 reads: The states parties to the present statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso factd and without spe- cial agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdic- tion of the Court in all legal disputes con- cerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law, I emphasize the words "interpreta- tion of a treaty." There is some question as to what the treaty may possibly mean. Questions have been raised about interpreting the treaty. For example, a question has been raised about nuclear explosions, and whether we could carry on tests for peaceful uses. The treaty is clear on that point. It would seem to prohibit it. Yet the construction that is being placed upon the treaty by important people, people in high places in our Government, indicates that we would not be barred from nuclear explosions for peaceful uses. But if the treaty should go to the International Court of Justice for inter- pretation, how would that court construe it? It seems to me we should have great fears asto what the International Court of Justice might say about the treaty if it should go there for interpretation. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in the interpretation of a treaty. I commend the able and dis- tinguished Senator from Mississippi for the address he has delivered. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I thank him for his contribution to the debate. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I had promised to yield first to the Senator from Vermont. I am delighted to yield to him now. Mr. AIKEN. I commend the Senator from Mississippi for having the courage of his conviction. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. Mr. AIKEN. And for expressing them on the floor. I cannot say that I agree with his conclusions, however. Since it is assumed that the United States would be the gainer through the resumption of atmospheric testing, I wish to ask the Senator from Mississippi whether the Preparedness Subcommittee had Dr. Foster, the Director of the Livermore Laboratory, before it. Mr. STENNIS. Yes; he was one of the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee. Mr. AIKEN. He was opposed to the treaty. Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is the sub- stance of his position. Mr. AIKEN. Very much opposed. Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. AIKEN. Did not Dr. Foster ad- vise the committee that if atmospheric testing were resumed, Russia would make gains faster than the United States? Mr. STENNIS. I do not remember his expressly covering that point. Gener- ally speaking, they might make gains immediately, but I do not believe that that situation would last. Mr. AIKEN. That is a matter which bothered me somewhat. When Dr. Pos- ter appeared before the Foreign Rela- tions Committee I asked him three or four questions. Would the Senator from Mississippi object if I took about 1 min- ute to read a statement of Dr. Foster into the RECORD? I believe it is pertinent to this point. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 y o '~ Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CL&-PDP65B0033-3R000100210007-3 4~ivc7 UISS ANAL GQRb SENATE Mr, S..TENNIS. Of course not. I am Mr. STENNIS. 16109 delighted to have the Senator do so. the Senator's question specifically as to Harborre The storm had delayed hem. js'. IEN. This testimony is found whether we-have a place now in view. Therefore, it was only an act of God that at page 619 of. the hearings, beginning The Senator from Mississippi has em- Prevented their being sunk also. at the , ddle Qfthe page: phasized three things about atmospheric The Japanese had weapons which Senates AsisErr. I do not know of anyone testing. The very high yield bomb may they had tested. We had torpedoes who advocates nuclear war. However, if the not be of extreme importance but testing had not been tested. We had torpedoes United States were to engage in nuclear war- in the atmosphere is necessary, i believe, that were no good, and would not sink fare, would It be more advantageous for us to for ABM development and for determin- anything. engage in it immediately or would we be in e comparatively stronger position after 5 Ing the vulnerability of our launch sites, If we have learned anything from that years of testing and the development of more warheads and re-entry vehicles. Those lesson, from the loss of our Pacific Fleet potent R eapons, both offense and defense? are the three things that I emphasized in World War II, should we not have Dr. FosrE3. Well, Senator AncEN, that is a, in my speech. learned we have an both a tactical military question and a ques- With respect to the big, big bomb, weapon, weadoinot know whether It~will tion of relative. rates of development of the without atmospheric tests we are cut off work? Soviet ITulion and the United States, as r from that, and we ought to have some Mr. STENNIS. It is not a weapon understaxtd it; is that correct? Senator it; is ,When do you think we experiments. I do not know whether until it is tested, until we know what it would ,me RA a str4lager position to engage in we ought to build it. will do nuclear evgrfare? I should like to say one word in re- bat and tions actual or simulated cam- Dr. FgsTEa. Today or in the future? sponse to the Senator's question. That Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The trouble Senator AmEN..To engage in it imme- part of Dr. Poster's testimony which the with the contact fuzed torpedoes was diately or after the conduct of tests for an- Senator has read is almost fatalism; it quite 5 or 10 years,. assuming that any enemy says we have already lost, because the posed e simple. make A contact was pin s brittle, t was sup- think we mould out~ce them? other alsp be conducting tests. Do You Russians are far ahead of us. I believe would crack on contact. When the pin lr? we ogul That, sir, is, I think, an issue a reading of all his testimony, including in the tip of the torpedo hit a ship, it that trascends the treaty. For 18 years the the portion the Senator has read, would would crack, rather than relay the shock United States, aware and concerned for the show that he felt they would remain to the firing mechanism. potential and growth, actual growth, of ahead of us unless we stepped up our own The trouble with our magnetic fuse armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, program of testing; was that the would go deeper by has developed in a restrained manner. Mr. AIKEN. I believe Dr. Foster testi- about -10 feet than it had been planned We have every year tried our best to reach fled before the Foreign Relations Com- to &4 this eons nt increase. in the development of go, so it would not go off. A sub- an agreement with the Soviets and to limit mittee before he testified before the Sen- marine would be sent hundreds of miles that period of 18 years the Soviets ator's committee. to sea to find out why the torpedo would Mr. STENNIS. The reverse is true. not go off. The skipper would come back have come from a position of relative hope- Mr. AIKEN. He is pessimistic as'o and say it was not necessary to have lessness to one that was described by Dr. the outlook, whether atmospheric testing sent the submarine to sea to determine Bradbury as rough parity, and I do not want is renewed or not. why torpedoes would not go ff. The to argue whether they are ahead or behind. Mr. STENNIS. If that interpretation a swere could have been found in front The gtergestti g, discouraging rttoo me, the is correct, he would want to get the treaty of the submarine station. discour in cur disco rrging point, is sic tua hat series and try from into effect instantly, to keep the Soviets Having that experience in mind, would recent atmospheric series, r see a very high from continuing to gain on us. I think it not be desirable for this Nation to con- rate of progress in the Soviet union cam- the testimony is the other way. pared to the United States. If this were to Dr. Poster's fear is that we might let sutinue to test its rvival certain? weapons, to make our continue, and I will mark this, Mr. Chair- them continue to get ahead of us in Mr. STENNIS. Certainly. That is a man, as one of the advantages of the treaty, atmospheric testing. has not It would be to the detriment of the United Mr, AIKEN. And that they would gain poMr. tJACKSON. yM rePres d nt ewiIl States. We have chosen to limit our efforts; these on us whether the testing were renewed the Senator from Mississippi yield? have been unilateral. or not. He is extremely pessimistic, if Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Senator Em And they have been mak pret his . Mr. . Before the is lug P ogressrIn the nuclear field much faster I1Mrr L ONG ofsLouis ana.1eMr. Presi- conclud dC today, I again wish, asbI said than we have? dent, will the Senator yield? Se k'os;rER. Xes, sir. earlier, to express my appreciation to the Senator A=x. Ye. And there is no reason to Mr. STENNIS. I yield. distinguished Senator from Mississippi believe that that rate would not continue? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The point for the important contribution he has Dr, Foss That is right. has been made that a great many of our made to the debate. It has been a trou- Senator AmEN. Then if we were to engage missiles, including some of our so-called The Senator's ,perplexing problem for all of us. in nuclear war at all, there would not be most modern weapons, have not been The Senator's thoroughness and wonder- much time to lose. tested, and the fur pons iof the problem of the Dr. FosTra. Tis correct. point has been made understanding senators That h That that we are not going to test such weep- weapons in this particular field and area of tvs who been of inestimable help to those He pointed out that as a result of the treaty orhnotWeIeshould hkeho ask ban last series of tests.the Soviets had made Senator if it is his impression that we for of more have been associated much with much greater progress than we had, and cannot rely upon any of our newly de- oat than a in the special hear- that if atmospheric testing were renewed, veloped weapons until they have been ing that has been conducted on arms It was hs opinion that the Soviets would actually tested, to make sure that they Mr. and test ban matters. continue t make more progress than we will work. . STENNIS. I thank the Senator Would, a from Washington for his compliment. I very I, an he admitted that he was I have in mind the history of naval appreciate his outstanding contributions discouraged by the outlook. warfare during the Second World War. in many ways during the conduct of the I can understand why he should be. Our to1?pedoes would not sink any ships. hearings, as well as in respect to the Dr. Libby expressed regret that we had They were no good. No torpedo that we other matters that are involved. not tested a 100-megaton bomb. I asked fired would sink a Japanese ship. That Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the him and other witnesses where we would was true of our magnetic fuzed tor- Senator from Mississippi yield? test a 100-megaton bomb, which would pedoes and our contact fuzed torpedoes. Mr. STENNIS. I w, xel LKe, a 6mpletely cleared space of not We had not tried them out on actual Mr. SIMPSON. I ield. associate myself res.. than 509 miles in diameter, as I un- targets. The Japanese had tried out with the remarks of the Senator from derstand. ,Does the Senator from Mis- theirs, and they sank our whole Pacific Washington with respect to the contrib- sisslpppi know where the United States Fleet, or every ship in the Pacific Fleet ution which the Senator from Missis- could test a bomb of that size? We know that they could find. Three of our big- sippi has made to the debate on the de- the Russians have the space, and they gest aircraft carriers were, fortunate fense are in a better position to t f t o es our country. high- enough not to make their schedule, hav- Did not n? 'm-_ megaton boxllbs than eve are. Approved. For Release 2004/03/11 81A" -RDP65BO0383RObO100210007.3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13 would be taking an incalculable risk with the security of this country if a treaty were approved prohibiting further test- ing in the atmosphere? Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor- rect. That was some of the strongest and most intelligent testimony we had, and from a highly informed man. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his contribution to the debate. I do not intend to retain the floor any longer than necessary. However, I wish to refer briefly to the questions with ref- erence to what General LeMay said con- cerning his first impression of the treaty. I refer to page 373 of the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the nuclear test ban treaty. At the bot- tom of page 373, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] made this in- quiry of General LeMay : I believe your answer in the subcommittee, and I .quote, was this: "I think that if we were in a proposal stage that I would not recommend-that I would recommend against it." That Is correct, is it not?' General LEMAY. I think I would. That is correct. Not only did General LeMay testify be- for the Preparedness Investigating Sub- committee that, as an original proposi- tion, he would not approve the treaty; but when he testified before the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from South Carolina recalled that pre- vious testimony to General LeMay's at- tention. He then reiterated what he had said by saying: That is correct. Nothing could be clearer than the proof of that fact, and nothing could be clearer, either, to prove his doubt and concern about this entire matter. As a military matter, he would not approve it; nor as an original matter would he approve it. He reiterated that point in the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations, as he did else- where. We have been over that point many times, and other testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations has been read by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHTI. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. To what date is the Senator referring? Mr. STENNIS. The testimony I just related appears on page 373 of the hear- ings. I cannot readily give the date. Mr. MANSFIELD. It was on the same day. However, I point out that later in the same day, in the afternoon-this is repetition, but it bears on the question- the same question was asked by the Sen- ator from California [Mr. KUCHEL] : As I left the Seriate'a few minutes ago to come down here, on the ticker, General IeMay there was a paragraph, which said tat had this treaty been in the negotiation stage and you were asked your own opinion, yriti w old have 'objected to it. You would eve felt that it should not be entered into. Was that a correct"quotation? That was a reference t(5 the testimony which the Senator from Mississippi just quoted. General LEMAY. I think I said that. May- be I didn't qualify my statement now. I said I thought I would probably be against it. But I have spent-a lot of midnight oil on this particular question, on the'treaty, we had in our hands that We could look at, looking at the disadvantages, looking at the advantages, and trying to come up in my own mind with arecommendation that I would give to you people. I have spent a lot of time. I haven't spent as much time on any other subject that has ever come before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it has worried me a great deal as to whether I came up with the right answer or not. Now, with all of that time that I have spent trying to -come up with a specific recom- mendation on a specific treaty, then to be asked some hypothetical question of what I would do, I don't know exactly. I just say I think I would, but I-am not sure. Senator KucHEC. I wish maybe on the open record that type of answer might be put in because that is the sort of thing many people-- General LEMAY. I have no objection to that answer going in the open record. We all like to have a second time, Senator. I wish I had said it then. It was on that basis that the testimony was declassified. But the emphasis has been on the statementmade earlier that day, not on the statement made in the afternoon. I thank the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Montana. It is rather strange that the testimony that the Senator from Montana read was cleared, but General LeMay's first answer, which was brief and to the point, was kept classified and marked specifically as being a security matter. Mr? MANSFIELD: No. The first statement was made iii open session that morning before three committees--For- eign Relations, Armed Services, and the senatorial half of the Joint Atomic En- ergy Committee-and the answer I have just read came that afternoon in execu- tive sesssion before the same committees. I was sitting next to the Senator from California when it was made. The first answer was given in open session that day before the three committees com- bined. What I have just read was testi- mony given in executive session. There- fore, it had to be given clearance, unlike the previous testimony. Again, I thank the Senator from Mis- sissippi. Mr. STENNIS. The original state- merit made by General LeMay was not permitted to be cleared in our tran- script. It was marked "classified" and was not allowed to' be cleared. But we later learned that the statement had ap- peared in the press, so on my own re- sponsibility I cleared the statement. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Mississippi acted correctly; but he will understand that the statement was made in an open hearing of the three committees, whereas the other testi- mony was before the Senator's sub- committee, in executive session. Mr. STENNIS. 'In one Instance he said he would not approve the treaty; later he changed his testimony in part. I do not understand why one statement would be classified, and the other not. Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree; . Mr. STENNIS. I am glad the Senator agrees. I thank him for his contribution to the debate. On page 122 of the hearings before t:he. Committee on Foreign Relations-and I shall cite from that page in a few min- utes--a question was raised about why we had not been testing and conducting experiments. The question was -raised by the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FwL BRIGHT] in connection with some ques- tions he asked the Senator from Missis- sippi as to whether I thought we were in- ferior to the Russians. - At that time the Senator from Missis- sippi replied that our military had not been permitted to make such tests and were not prepared to make such tests when the Russians broke the morato- rium. I refer now to the statement made by Secretary McNamara on page 122 of the hearings: I think we were reasonably prepared for the tests we conducted, but we weren't well pre- pared for the tests we didn't conduct. Those were, the tests that were important. I think it is quite clear that during the pe- riod 1958 to 1961 this country had relaxed its preparations for atmospheric tests and. suf- fered therefrom, and I think it is equally clear that we should not again fall into that trap. That is the testimony of the Secretary of Defense. It clearly covers the point the Senator from Mississippi spoke about; that Is, that we did not test be- cause we were not ready to test. Not only did we lose time as a result of the moratorium; we lost time afterward in making the major tests that the Secre- tary of Defense said were most iinpor- taut of all, because we had been lax and were not ready. As a consequence, we suffered. Earlier today I made the point that this very delay, for the 2 years or a years that the Russians may abide by this treaty if it is approved, would be a repe- tition, Of course, I believe we would do better in preparation this time. The fact that we are behind on tests of this kind is not due to our inability; it is due to the fact that we did not maintain a state of readiness. The Senator from Arkansas asked why we did not do it. There is a very good reason why we did not. Under both the Eisenhower administration and the Ken- nedy administration, the Defense De- partment not only had, by direct order, a prohibition of testing, but also had a direct order prohibiting anything that even would give the appearance of prep- aration for testing. So, under Executive order, during two administrations, there was a complete blackout; those under the Department were not even permitted to appear to prepare for a resumption of tests in case the Soviets broke the mora- torium. As a consequence, we were caught short. The Soviets built up their arsenal, by means of their tests and the informa- tion they thus obtained, which they can utilize if and when the treaty goes into effect. Furthermore, from my contacts with Secretary McNamara, I know he is deeply concerned lest we repeat that error, by not being ready to test. I believe all the hearings we have held have brought out Approved For Release 2004/03/111 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 19.63 11 Approved For Release-2004/03111 CIA-RQP65B60383R000100210007-3. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -.SENA , . 1 111 that point, made it clear, and developed .In my testimony` before` your committee, None of them was taken to Moscow for a proper way. This point explains why we lost all that time-not through inability, but because we refused to pre- pale. Someone asked why the Preparedness Subcommittee did not call the Secretary of Defense to t stify about the treaty. We did not call him-although I told him we would like to have him as a wit- ness-because he wrote us a letter, which is in our records, in which he said he did not think he could mike any useful contribution to our ,hearing. Some have asked why we did not. call General Shoup, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Of course, he too, is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We did not call him as a witness because, in response to a telephone conversation I had with him, he sent to us a letter in which he said he did not consider this matter to be within the province of the Marine Corps or, in the field of matters properly, to be considered by him as a member of the 17Oint Chiefs of Staff. So he took himself ; out of the picture. I was willing to have him called as a wit- ness. Later, of course, he was called be- fore the Other.-committee, and he testi- fled there, Of course that was all right. I mention the matter now because I have not previously commented on the reason Why we refrained from calling him. Although I did not know how Admiral Burke would testify, I called him, and asked him whether he would come be- fore our committee and testify. I did not have the privilege of being there the day when he testified; but I would not hesitate to call Admiral Burke at any time , to. testify on any subject with which he Is familiar, because I believe his testi- mony is always of value; and I have never known a fairer, a franker, or a more Courageous officer, or one with a more comprehensive understanding of military questions or more commonsense. General. Twining was called under the same circumstances and for the same reason. I tried to call General White, former Chief of Staff. I know he is not "under the gun" now; he is not now charged with such responsibilities. Today he is a free agent. But he said he could not appear before us then, because he was going abroad. However, he pointed out that he had written a short article-for Newsweek magazine, I believe-in which _ he had stated that after weighing the matter and after full consideration, he had decided to go along with the treaty. I am glad to announce that. It shows that I did not know how he 'Would testify. I still wish, however, that he had ap- peared before our committee and had given us the benefit of his fine consider- ation of these matters. We have been asked whether General LeM.ay was consulted. Ile testified that he was, not consulted about the treaty; he, said the discussion did not include him. my comments were restricted to consulta- the conference, of course; no steps of tion and discussion which I as a member of that sort were taken. I feel-on the the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally partici- basis of m con id ti f th t ti y s era on o e es - pated in with the Secretaly of Defense on the specific treaty before the Senate. The mony-that they were left out too insert for. RECORD supplied by General Taylor much-but not entirely. broadens the scope considerably to include Mr. HUMPHREY. I have been very earlier draft treaty proposals, disarmament, concerned about that point; and a week and related matters discussed over an ex- ago today I had printed in the RECORD tended period of time. Thus, my testimony some testimony relating to this matter- on the specific treaty proposal and General colloquy between myself and General Taylor's Insert for RECORD on the broad sub- Taylor. It appears on 296, 297, ject of treaty proposals, disarmament, and and 298 of appears hearings. pages I raised the related matters are not directly comparable. I have reviewed my testimony before your question pointblank, following inquiry subcommittee on August 16, 1963, and find by the Senator from California [Mr. it consistent with the facts as I know them. KUCHELI. I asked General Taylor this In other words, he reiterates his state- question: ment on that point. There is no question So that the record may be clear on this about it. Of course neither of these gen- point, General, it was testified to here that tlemen was falsifying in his testimony- there were no representatives of the Joint Chiefs in Moscow with Mr. Harriman, but even though there appeared to be a there was a representative of the Defense De- 'slight conflict. partment. My question is, Were the in- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- structions that Mr. Harriman received from sent that the letter from Secretary Mc- the President of the United States and the Namara which was sent to the subcom- Secretary of State based upon consultations mittee be printed in the RECORD. It is and discussions that had been hejd with dated August 26; and in it he said he the Joint Chiefs as well as with other mem- did not think he could make any useful hers of the aaministration2 contribution as a witness. - General Taylor then responded: There being no objection, the letter We discussed it in detail in the Joint was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, Chiefs of Staff, and I carried to the disea.1s- as follows: lion table at the White House the views of THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, the Joint Chiefs on that particular point. Washington, August 26, 1963. Later the following occurred: Hon. JOHN STENNIS, CHIEFS AWARE OF DETAILS OF TREATY BEFORE Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Sub- INITIALING committee, Committee on Armed Serv- ices, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. Senator HUMPHREY. Before the treaty was DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your initiated were you aware of its details? letter of August 20, 1963, concerning the pos- General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; by the cables. sibility of my appearance before the Senate Senator HUMPHREY. By cable? Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee General TAYLOR. Yes. with respect to the nuclear test ban. Senator HUMPHREY. Did you find the While I am, of course, at the disposal of treaty as initialed on balance in the inter- the subcommittee, I believe that my appear- ests of the United States? ance would serve no useful purpose since my General TAYLOR. Yes, sir. testimony would be substantially a repetition Senator HUMPHREY. Serving the interests of that which I gave to the joint session of of the United States? the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and General TAYLOR. Yes, sir; in the terms of Atomic Energy Committees on August 13 the statement which I read at the outset. when most of the members of your subcom- mittee were iu atteendapce,.. If you feel it I point out that while intimate details would be desirable, I would be perfectly will- may not have been discussed with each ing for you to include in the record of your member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hearings the statement which I presented at _ every day, the Chairman of the Joint the joint session. Chiefs was satisfied that he was kept Sincerely, constantly informed. In the colloquy, ROBERT S. MONAMARA. which is in the RECORD, he so stated. It Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. President, will need not be again printed at this point. the Senator from Mississippi yield? The Joint Chiefs were informed. De- Mr. STENNIS.. I am glad to yield. cisions were made. Consultation was Mr. HUMPHREY. I. should like to had. The President was fully informed clarify one point. I gather that the of the views of the Chiefs. Furthermore, Senator from Mississippi is not stating the Chiefs approved the treaty as it was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff. failed to initialed and presented to the Congress. participate in, the drawing up of the Mr. STENNIS. I know. I had many treaty - or were denied consultation in conversations with various members of reference to the drafting of the, treaty? the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to Mr. STENNIS. Let me say to the when they would testify, and so forth. Senator from Minnesota that during the They spent a long time, preparing the debate we have go_n_e, over .that point joint statements. I will not go Into any considerably-unfortunately, at times conversations. General LeMay's testi- when he had to be .Qut. of. the chamber. mony is rather clear about his participa- I do not know, of course, how much par- tion. tigipation there was. General LeMay General LeMay's testimony has been says he was not consulted at all. As for emphasized by the Senator from Missis- I, to , a statement, filed, by General how much the others were consulted, of sippi because of the_,genera 's long asst- Tay or, listed conferences on certain. course we are c6ntroiled by tfieir-testi elation with and-great, part.In the. crea dates Vie asked Genera Lei ay to mony. I wisay Rthat 4I do not believe tion of SAC. For . a long time , he,._ was commekltLLon that; and I read now from there was full consultation as to this par- the head of SAC. He is now Chief of totmellth of September 1963 sidcu ar eredtalong with mother Con ultat'ions, General Power,FGeneralaPower is now addressed now Approved ForRelease 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65b00383R00010021,0,007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : QIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16112 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 Chief of SAC. His testimony is clear cut I do this because the distinguished in exceptional circumstances abnormal lines and positive. General Power has charge Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] of communication are used or improper naili- of all the missiles. He has command of referred to the article. tary deployments are directed by political the major portion of the strategic strik- General White stated: authority it is essential that all hands in the chain of command be fully aware of the ing power that we have, including the These are some of the risks. Yet I am per- reasons. Under such circumstances com- not go into that subject, of course, but he is the direct fountainhead.. He is the man upon whom we depend. That is why his testimony is so much more valu- able than even the testimony of someone else of considerable rank, and who has stars on his shoulders. Our committee was asked why we did not call the Chiefs of the other unified and specified command. There is no one more important than the man who is the head of the strike command, but he is not directly concerned with stra- tegic nuclear forces. Certainly unless the commander of the unified forces in the Pacific has some direct connection with the problem, he is not specially qualified in that field. We called General Power because he is the man most qualified to know what the problem is and what the limitations on our weapons are. He is the man most likely to know what he would be talking about in connection with this grave subject. It seems to me that it is begging the question to say now that seven of the nine approved the treaty. Some of them have no specific responsibility in connection with the treaty. I have said nothing about the dangers of radioactivity. In that connection I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement by Dr. Norris Bradbury, Di- rector of Los Alamos Scientific Labora- tory, be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director of Los Ala- mos Scientific Laboratory, who has been quoted as a scientific advocate of this treaty, stated before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee that fallout from atmospheric testing was not a factor in his decision to support the treaty. He said: "I do not believe, I have not believed, that anything we have done in the way of at- mospheric testing, the fallout which in- evitably over the world that results, has had the slightest consequence on human life or on successive human lives. In fact, I regret that fallout from atmospheric testing has been so played up rather recently in public statements. I think this is an exaggerated situation far beyond the actual needs of the situation. * * * I infer that some of the words which the President has used may arise to haunt us if we return to atmospheric test- ing, not because they are true, but because they have been said." This view of the so-called dangers of radio- activity is consistent with testimony we also received from Dr. John Foster, Dr. Edward Teller, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the President and the Senate for their indulgence. I yield the floor. Mr. HUMPHREY subsequently said: Mr. President, I should like to have in- cluded in the RECORD, since it was re- ferred to, the item of September 9, 1963, from Newsweek magazine entitled "The Test Ban Treaty: Atomic Chess," writ- ten by Gen. Thomas D. White. important agreements with the Communist world. I ask unanimous consent that the en- tire ai t:cle may be printed in the RECORD following the remarks: by the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. $TENNNIS] because it will. be more relevant to the discusion at that point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Minnesota? The Chair hears none, and it, is so ordered. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TuE TEST BAN TREATY: ATOMIC CHEss (By Gen. Thomas D. White, U.S. Air Force, retired) The positioning of military forces-often improperly from a strategic or tactical point of view--to serve purely: political ends has occurred many times in history. In the atomic age it is a particularly dangerous gambit but it has its cold-war values. The United States did It nearly a year ago in the Cuban crisis-and it may have paid. off de- spite some bitter gruml,lings by military commanders. A classic example of military maldeploy- ment to serve a vital political purpose is cited by Barbara W. Tuchmari in "The Guns of August." On July 30,19t4, when World War I was about to break, the French Govern- ment ordered its armies to withdraw 10 kil- ometers along the entire, frontier with Ger- many from Switzerland to Luxembourg. It was essential to France :that Britain enter the war, and it was vital insurance to this end tVaa.t the onus of first attack be squarely on German shoulders. "The act of with- drawal, done at the very portals of invasion, was a calculated military risk deliberately taken for its political effect," wrote Mrs. Tuchman. Less than a year ago We moved large ele- ments of the Atlantic Fleet, the tactical air force, and some of our continental air de- fenses out of their optimum general. war positions in order to meet contingencies in the Caribbean. During the critical hours of intercepting Soviet ships at sea political offi- cers in Washington ignored the chain of command to give detailed orders to individ- ual ships and aircraft. On the other hand our strategic forces, main threat to the U.S.S.R., deployed, pre- sumably, in strict accord with plans for atomic war. Polaris submarines suddenly slipped out of their berths at Holy Loch in Scotland, aerial tankers :moved to optimum refueling bases, and bomber crews Went on increased alert. The whole political purpose of these de- ployments was to signal Khrushchev the unmistakable evidence that the confronta- tion was deadly serious. Whatever else may eventually develop from Cuba, Mr. Khru-. shchev read our intentions clearly and the overt crisis ended; Soviet ships turned around In midocean and some kind of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba followed. It seems to me that despite the grave risks and despite the anguish of responsible com- manders the game wag worthwhile. Yet there are lessons to be learned among which I suggest the following: 1. Integrity of command will always re- sult i.n a safer and smoother operation. If all responsibility except for technical execu- tion of the orders. 2. At the first sign of hot war, command must be returned to the fleet, field, and air commanders. In the test ban treaty we now have a sweeping example of higher political purpose dictating limitations In an area of vital mili- tary importance. Some military men as well as scientists are convinced that the test ban gives the U.S.S.R. a significant technical. ad- vantage. More importantly, based on Amer- ican history, they fear that the people of the country will let down their guard, our de- fenses will be allowed to deteriorate, and the United States would be slow to resume test- ing even if the U.S.S.R. violates the treaty. There are others who see the break with Mao Tse-tung and the test ban treaty linked in a colossal hoax, preliminary to confronting a sleeping Western World with Armageddon. These are some of the risks. Yet 1: am persuaded, on balance, that the test ban treaty is worth the gamble-and gamble it is. It is a small beginning which could lead to vitally important agreements with the Communist world. - But we must remain forever on guard- as long as communism exists. We now have the "hot line" telephone between the presi- dent in Washington and Mr. Khrushchev in. Moscow. Nonetheless, in atomic chess, as played in Cuba and now in process with the test ban treaty it seems to me that actions will always speak louder than words. Mr. HART obtained the floor. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will. the Senator,yield so that I may make a, unanimous-consent request? Mr. HART. I yield. ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1963, AT 10 A.M. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when. the Senate adjourns today it adjourn to :meet at 10 o'clock on Monday morning next. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With. out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of Senators, it is the intention of the leadership to have the Senate continue to come in early and remain late. Senators can anticipate long sessions for the duration of next week during the consideration of the treaty until its details are fully consid. ered and a final vote is reached on it. I serve notice to all Senators that the Senate will concentrate: on the question of the disposition of the treaty, remain with it, come in early, stay late, until the treated is acted upon, one way or the other. Mr. HART. Mr. President, in a sense this debate was initiated by the distin- guished majority leader, wheh he ad- dressed the Sedate on September 4. In the course of the majority leader's brief but eloquent statement, the case-in my judgment an unanswerable case-for this treaty was set forth in full outline. With all respect to my colleagues, I doubt whether any of us can find new argu- ments for ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty that have not been set forth in that speech. Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDF65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE That remarkable speech of last Wednesday put the case for the treaty in a way which answers a fundamental-if not always diplomatic-question which must be asked and answered before we can vote intelligently. That question, put bluntly, is: "What's in it for us?" The majority leader answered that question to my total satisfaction. No one in this Chamber-no one in this coun- try-no thinking person anywhere be- lieves that this treaty will, in and of it- self, forever, and irrevocably, prevent further nuclear testing even in the pro- hibited environments-in outer space, under water, or in the `atmosphere. Yet It can help stop them. It can be a step toward the kind of world in which such tests are no longer an annual horror to which the human race is subjected by the unilateral decision of one or another of the nuclear powers. The treaty may stop such tests-the rejection of the treaty by this body will make the continuation of such tests a virtual certainty. I submit, Mr. President, that when we set foot on Constitution Avenue after a hard day in this Chamber, we have only a 'probability of getting home alive through traffic. Traffic laws, enforced with rigorous severity, can only help pre- vent traffic accidents. I have never heard anyone suggest that 'we annul traffic laws because they do not guar- antee against violations. But what, I have asked, is in the treaty for us? It is to this question I would turn our thoughts. I want to cite just one of the benefits that will accrue directly to every Senator as an ilidivid- ual, and to every man, woman and child in the United States. It is the cessation, for so long as this treaty is effective, of further pollution of the air we breathe and the food we eat by radioactive by- products of each and every nuclear test-and particularly, though not uniquely high-yield thermonuclear tests. I shall try to avoid technicalities, Mr. President, and I shall try, too, to avoid an overstatement of the fallout problem. There is no justification for ignoring the fact there is serious divergence among those scientists who are best informed on the fallout question. In the printed record of the hearings on the treaty, there occurs a good deal of testimony on the effects of radioactive fallout, and the importance of these effects to the Nation. The witnesses, predictably, com- ment -on the fallout question differently, according to the views which they have of the broad political and strategic value, or danger, of, the treaty itself. Dr. Willard Libby, of the Atomic En- ergy Commission, and now a member of the chemistry department of UCLA, told the committee: I have been concerned about fallout from the beginning. But never so concerned about its effects that I thought this ought to swing in any major way the decisions about the armament ,of the Nation. Dr. Edward Teller, who is perhaps the most articulate and respected scientific figure standing in opposition to the treaty, asserted before the committee that: We have' increased the effects of natural radiation by 10 percent. The effects of nat- ural radiation have never been proved to be harmful. The fallout question is really not close to the heart of the matter of this test ban treaty. On the other hand, Dr. Glenn Sea- borg, who is Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated in the hear- ings that the amount of fallout thus far released "has certainly led to some ad- verse health effect, and presumably some genetic effect." To be wholly fair to Dr. Seaborg, let me say that in the same context, he stated that the fallout up to now-I em- phasize those three words, "up to now"- "has not led to a serious situation." Not all the qualified, scientific testi- mony which was presented to the com- mittee took the line that the fallout question was unimportant. Dr. Daniel Deykin, a physician, of Boston, Mass., speaking for the Physi- cians for Social Responsibility, testified at some length about the effects which existing fallout has had upon the health of our own people. I quote briefly from the testimony offered by Dr. Deykin: The level of radioactive strontium 90 con- tent of teeth and bone is 10 times higher in childern born in 1957 than in children born in 1951, and the level of strontium 90 fallout is expected to increase still further, Such an increase in radioactivity is particularly alarming in view of the evidence that the unborn child is much more sensitive to a given amount of radiation than the adult. A recent study suggests that the fallout from the combined tests of the U.S.S.R.-United States in 1961-62 will cause an increase of 10 percent in childhood cancer mortality. I ask Senators to pay particular atten- tion to those words: An increase of 10 percent in childhood cancer mortality. Mr. President, those were the chilling words of Dr. Daniel Deykin, whose views on matters of health and genetics can be considered, from a point of view of the dSlntent of hisprofessional training, to be at least as significant as the views on the same subject of a trained physicist. Prof. Matthew Meselson, associate pro- fessor of biology at Harvard University, testified before. the committee to the effect that fallout from tests already conducted will cause 50,000 children to be born with gross physical or mental defects. Muscular dystrophy, blindness, and dwarfism are among the disheart- ening catalog of defects mentioned by this witness- There, There, Mr. President, is a sample of the scientific testimony presented to the Senators entrusted with the grave re- sponsibility of making a recommenda- tion to the Senate on the ratification of this treaty. Many people'- who are deeply committed to the treaty would like to be able to say that the scientific testimony is overwhelmingly in support of the contention 'that fallout has al- ready killed many and will kill more. Not all the testimony can thus `be de- scribed, although much of it cautions us that this is so. 11 - Senators who are stronglyfopf opposed to ratification may want 'to` argue that the 16113 testimony justifies the claim that fallout is unimportant, but, as I indicated earlier, the testimony as to the relevance of the fallout problem seems to me to vary with the views of the witnesses as to the over- all wisdom of the treaty. The question of fallout, most witnesses seem to indi- cate, should be taken in the larger con- text. It was suggested, during the hear- ings, that the fallout problem could be likened to the effects of water on the hu- man body-that sustained immersion can result in drowning, while an occasional refreshing glass is necessary for life it- It is like arguing that because a little salt helps the stew, therefore a large quantity of salt will-make the stew better. The analogy, while a refreshing one, is hardly valid. I have examined the hear- ings carefully, and over past years I have read a good deal of expert testimony on the fallout question. I have seen opin- ions as to the "statistical insignificance of the effects of nuclear debris." But never once, Mr. President, have I heard the most ardent supporter of nu- clear tests assert that "a little fallout is good for you." Never have I heard ex- pert testimony to the effect that any- body's group had "20 percent fewer cavi- ties with strontium 90,:' or that "you may feel left out of things if you are not just a little bit radioactive." Fallout, Mr. President, is seen as a threatening monster, or as a small gob- lin, depending upon the viewer's precom- mitments. But no one has yet cloaked radioactive debris in the guise of a bene- fit to "hitherto unfallen-out-upon man- kind." If we return to the testimony, Mr. Pres- ident, once again we see that the only difference of opinion among the wit- nesses is the degree and the immediacy of the danger presented by fallout. Dr. Seaborg says: Certainly the less fallout we have the bet- ter it is for everybody. At another point, Dr. Seaborg says: I think that all scientists would agree that further radiation should be avoided if at all possible. I would imagine that most of them * * * would not use the word "dan- gerous" * * * a great number of them would probably employ the word "harmful" having in mind that according to the best, according to an interpretation made of the sparse data by a number of expert biologists and geneticists there will be a certain num- ber of cases where there will be adverse health effects of genetic effects. In_ other words, Mr. President, the so- called "controversy" about fallout seems to be whether this man-made pollution of our air and our food is "dangerous" or "only harmful." There would seem to be, if one care- fully examines the. hearings, general agreement that fallout is not a useful natural resource, but rather that it is a hazard, to be weighed against other hazards in arriving at a conclusion about this treaty. Even Dr. Teller-the most outspoken foe of the treaty, and the most insistent adherent to the notion that fallout has not posed. any serious health problems to date-when asked what he would Approved For Release .2004/03/11 ;GIP-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16114 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 recommend if we did not ratify the treaty, urged that we "unilaterally adopt a ban on the amount of radiation re- leased into the atmosphere" by our own testing efforts. What do those say who contend that the fallout problem is not a serious one? Basically, they seek to persuade us that the most careful measurements and ex- trapolations from observable data lead to the conclusion that somatic and genetic damage from nuclear tests thus far conducted-and I note with interest that almost every witness who dismissed the dangers of fallout, added that in- teresting qualification, "from tests thus far conducted"-is statistically insignifi- cant. Mr. President, 50,000 defective chil- dren may be "statistically insignificant" in the eyes of the historian of 100 years from this night, Two thousand or five thousand deaths from bone cancer may be "statistically insignificant" in the jargon of those whose profession leads them to devise words such as "overkill." But there is a fundamental inhumanity underlying each of those concepts which I refuse to accept as a rational basis for judgment. I am sure that the idea of a "statis- tically insignificant" death is as coldly scientific as the idea of "overkill." But I submit that we can become so coldly objective as to lose touch, not only with sentiments and scruples that make us flinch from reality, but from the concepts and sensibilities that make us human. "Conscience doth make cowards of us all," says Hamlet. Conscience, Mr. Pres- ident, should make men of us all. Con- science-sentimentality, if you will- leads most of us to reject the thought that a single child blinded by the deadly mist from a thermonuclear cloud is ever "insignificant." Conscience is the pre- cise quality which differentiates us from the animal. And so, Mr. President, I am led to the conclusion, from the same hard facts that appear in these hearings, that the "statistical insignificance" of which the weapons speak is wholly relevant to the question of the ratification of this treaty. It so happens that I reach a conclusion wholly opposite from theirs. I fully agree with the rather home- spun philosopher who reasoned that no rat -poison is exactly the right amount of rat poison to have where children can get at it. What are we really being asked to do in ratifying the treaty? We are not asked to stop all nuclear weapon development or manufacture. We are not committing ourselves to dis- mantling our vast arsenal of thermo- nuclear weapons. We are not signing a warranty deed to eternal peace on earth, nor are we giving up a single strategic interest now in" our grasp. This is a limited treaty. It binds us only so long as this country does not unilaterally de- cide that our supreme interests have been jeopardized by any events, to re- frain from testing nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The President, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary Harriman who negoti- ated it, and all the responsible officials who bear the awesome burden of our national survival and security, have told us that this treaty will not bring the millenium. Its effects are limited. Its risks are even more limited. So let us examine the question, of the danger of fallout, not in the absolute terms which can lead some to ta4 of it as "statis- tically insignificant," but in terms of the world we can grasp, a{ld in terms of the minor changes in that world which this treaty will make. The "statistical" insignificance, of which some opponents speak when they look at fallout dangers, exists in terms of worldwide incidence. Though most fall- out thus far has made its way to earth in the Northern Hen}pishere, the per- centages of additional radiation in the air may not be past the controversial "danger point" for the entire Nation. But there are hotspots in these United States where the level of radioactivity has suddenly grownto thepoint of dan- ger, no matter who defines it. In the Stab,, of Minnesota, and in the State of Utah, just such hgtspots have ap- peared, from the col cidental and un- predictable actions of winds and rain collecting radioactive, debris and de- positing it in a given $pot. Perhaps the neighboring States were spared some of their "statistical" share of the fallout they might otherwise ;have received be- cause the winds and rain of 1962 fell on Minnesota and Utah. ; If we continue to test weapons, if the Russians continue to test weapons, if other, nations decide to join in the nuclear race, perhaps with less sophisticated devices, this year's rains or next year's winds may capri- ciously present Nebraska or South Caro- lina or New York or Florida-yes, Michi- gan--with a sufficiently excessive share of the fallout harvest so that those States, too, may be raised out of "statis- tical insignificance" to, reach the dubious designation of "hotspots." Certainly, I may be accused of specula- tion. Certainly, I am speculating on what can happen. Those who talk about the effects of fallout on the next genera- tion, in terms of the tests already con- ducted, and who say we should not ratify this treaty are also speculating. They are speculating that the effects of fallout in the past and in the present will some- how not he magnified in the future, even if we continue testing. They are speculating that, somehow, from in- creased atmospheric tests, we can derive some benefits which in some way might overcome the impact on, and even the loss of, our children. I am speculating, Mr. President, on the assumption that no amount of fallout is good for us; that whatever the effects of tests already conducted may have been, the effects of more tests will be even greater; that eventually we reach the point where we must, Indeed, decide whether the poisoning of our own atmos- phere and our food reasonably can be justiliied. And I suggest, on the basis of those speculations, that we ratify this treaty; that we accept, this limited hope, that we husband the small flame of this single candle of reason in a world dark with irrationality, before we have to make that hard choice. Mr. President, in a setting such as this, when minds appear to have been made up on this question, I have heard oc- Cupants of the galleries ask, "Why do Senators continue to make speeches?" If we look into our own hearts and each one of us asks himself that question, I suspect it will be hard for each of us to explain why we do get up and make a speech. In all likelihood, it will not change a single mind. We are all captives of history. I be- lieve each of us has the wit to know that the flow of history surges, really without much influence from the voice or vote of any of us. But many of us have chil- dren, and I am sure that their verdicts of our performance will be measured more importantly on our voice and vote on this question than anything else that will be presented to us, no matter how many years it shall be given to us to-sit here. That is one reason why I desired, even at this late hour, and realizing it will not influence a soul, to speak into the REC- ORD for them, my hope for their future. I am no scientist. I am no technician. In a way, I voice the viewpoint of most unscientific, most untechnical Ameri- cans, only a few of whom are permitted to speak into this RECORD. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HART. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the distinguished Senator for the remarks which he has just made. While it may be true that what he has said will not change a single vote, nevertheless what he has said will, I think, give additional hope to the upcoming generations in this country who need that kind of outlook from their elders and from those of us who are charged with responsibilities of government in this most difficult day and age. Perhaps the likelihood is that no Sen- ator's vote will be changed at this late hour, but I would hope that Senators who have decided to vote for this treaty, as I have, along with the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], and other Senators, will be heartened by what has been said. Certainly,. we are all deeply and person- ally moved by the remarks froral the heart which the Senator from Michigan has just delivered. While some people may scoff at the effects, genetic, physical, and otherwise, of nuclear explosions, nevertheless, I be- lieve they are a shadow overhanging the discussions of the treaty now before the Senate. I wish to express my deep and per- sonal appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Michigan for the remarks he has uttered on the floor of the Senate this afternoon. He has marked a sub- ject too seldom mentioned in this great debate. He has, in his remarks, put the importance of man over the im- portance of megaton. Mr. HART. I thank the Senator. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, :l am very happy to be present in the Senate at the particular hour when the able and gifted Senator from Michigan Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1963 Approved For Release 2004/03111 : CIA-RDP65BO0383ROO0100.210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE delivers his address on this all-'important step in American foreign policy, wherein the, res3.dent of the United States has asked t`kio Senate to advise an4' consent to the treaty which has been negotiated between the tJntted States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, to pro- hibit nuclear weapons testing in the en- .vironments of the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. The Senator from Michigan ' has di- rected his remarks toward a subject mat- ter that has been of deep concern to the 'overwhelming majority of the American people; namely, tile health, welfare, and -safety of the American people, in a period when a new form of energy; namely, atomic energy, has been harnessed for destructive purposes. The Senator, speaks about something that Senators should know something about; namely, the concern that mothers and fathers have for their loved ones, a concern that a fellow citizen ought to have for his neighbor, his community, and his country, , I have said during this debate that molt of us have spent a great deal of our time on the scientific and military aspects of the treaty. I say again in' all candor that the. scien- tific and military aspects are extremely complex. Without in any way trying to judge my colleagues, and speaking only for myself, I have spent several years as chairman of a subcommittee in the field of arms control and disarmament, lis- tening to the testimony of hundreds of so-called experts on the subject of a nuclear test ban treaty. Time and again I have heard the words- of scientists, and the expert testimony of technicians and scientists. in recent weeks I lis- tened to the testimony of the outstand- ing military officers of our Government, outstanding scientists, outstanding lead- ers of our civic life. Most Senators are not competent to 'judge the scientific, technological, and military aspects of the treaty. We can have a point of view and an opinion, which we ought to have; but when it comes to discussing the complex- ity of a nuclear device or a warhead or the difference between fission and fusion, or the difference between an atomic bomb, a hydrogen bomb, and a neutron bomb, I am sure our knowledge is surface deep and-that it does not approach pro- fessional competence. When it comes to a subject matter which ,deals with what happens to the lives of people, at least we can express from our heart our concern. The Sen- ator from, Michigan as did the majority leader in his memorable address of about 10 days ago, has given us reason. to re- flect, and after this moment of medi- tation, to .vote for the treaty. I have continued to be concerned about radioactive fallout. As the Senator has so well stated, we do not know how much -successful negotiation of this treaty, I radioactive fallout the human body can predict that he will go down in history absorb, without 'damage, but we do know as one of our great statesmen. Why? that it is not good. for us. We do not Because he has put people above power. know hcw n uch arsenic the llun?a body He has put life above death. He has ,put can aklsor but we know that if enough hope above c"leshair. Senator from is absorbed,_a person will die. We do not know L how niuch strain and, tension a human body can take, either, but if there is enough strain and tension over a long enough period of ~ime, a person will break down. What the Senator from Michigan has said is that we need to.have some assur- ances from this Government about the danger of radioactive fallout. We have been asking the generals and the Presi- dent of the United States to give us as- surances. We have said: "Give us assur- ances, Mr. President, that we shall 'be able to test weapons underground. Give us assurances, Mr. President, that we will keep our laboratories going. Give us assurances, Mr. President, that you will send a big enough budget to Congress to make sure that we can test in our laboratories. Give us assurances that there will be no great radioactive fall- Thank goodness, the President has done it. That is what is in this treaty. What President Kennedy has done in this treaty by sending it to the Senate is to give assurances that it will be a benefit to other generations if the nations will abide by the treaty, and that man will not continue the danger of further radioactive fallout by reason of nuclear weapons testing. That is a 'very impor- tant assurance. That is the kind of assurance that we ought to have. I have expressed concern over some of the provisions of the treaty. I have heard others express concern, to- day and on other days, about the risks that we take in ratifying the treaty. Thank goodness the Senator from Michigan has told us about the risks we will take if we do not ratify the treaty. It is the risk of continued nuclear test- ing. Yesterday President Kennedy, at his news conference, told. the entire world that if the treaty is rejected it will be the go-ahead signal, the green light, for continued testing by the present nu- clear .powers and by nations soon to be- come nuclear powers; there will be all- out testing. Let that specter be before The Senator from Michigan, in his humble, kindly, and thoughtful manner has again alerted the Nation to its moral responsibility. Senators are elected not only for the purpose of reviewing the military posture and scientific achievements, but also to express, or at least indicate, some moral responsibility for this Nation. I thank God that there are men like the Senator from Michigan, and others, in the Senate who put at the top of the agenda the moral responsibility of elected-public of- ficials, and not merely the fact that we should produce a bigger bomb. Perhaps what we should produce is a bigger and better idea about the kind of world in which we ought to live,-- If the President, of the United. States never does another thing in his term of 16115 so eloquently and magnificently and forcefully today. Mr. HART. I appreciate the kind re- marks of the Senator from Minnesota, whose active leadership In this field over the years has given hope to those who seek a world made to endure in peace the. decency, and also the kind remarks of' the majority leader. The Senator from Minnesota made the point that we should underline the fact that weapons are powerful bombs, and that reaching the moon is spectacular, but that ideas are the most powerful of all instruments. We are reminded time and again that the dinosaur was the most powerful thing in the world, but there are no more dinosaurs in the world. Ideas are what we should forge, and effective forging of ideas means survival and the assurance of the maintenance of freedom in our society. Weapons alone will not be the answer. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, if his- tory teaches us nothing else, it teaches us, In the words of Santayana, that: Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. From what I perceive of the current debate, I would venture the guess that too much history has been forgotten. I would voice the fear that many of us will share the responsibility for reliving the history which shrieks so loudly now, "Beware of the nuclear test ban; you are negotiating with the tailors of your de- feat." I was privileged to sit through the open hearings held by the Foreign Rela- tion and Armed Services Committees. I was impressed by the forthrightness of Secretary McNamara, the easy fluency of Secretary Rusk, and the grudging assent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I was far more impressed with the articulate warning from nuclear scientist Dr. Teller-"father of the H-bomb"-who spoke with sincerity and conviction of the military loss inherent in this pact with the powers dedicated to our de- struction. The thread of commonality connect- ing the testimony of proponents and an- tagonists alike was the warning, some- times subliminal, but often patent, that despite the categorical promises of sur- veillance with vigor and instant pre- paredness, we are gambling our mili- tary superiority, casting aside the shield that protects the free world. It has become popular conversation in recent days that a perpetual arms race has always been the real cause of wars. That is a,spurious argument without weight or substance. .1 p,iggest that the abandonment of ini- tiative, the sheathing, of the sword, the false sense of security, and a preoccupa- tion with material comforts have con- tributed* far more to the triggering of wars tlianhas any arms race.. 'I think Korea and World War II are excellent examples of the fallacy of the arms race and war theory. It was no arms race that propelled leader of this country has offered to us- was a clear indication that he would a.great opportunity and a great respon- meet no effective _ resistance-that his sibility. I salute the Senator and join political fences had been adequately Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3' Approved For Release 2004103/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 September 13 16116 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE built with the Soviet Union. Hitler felt assured of easy conquest as he loosed his war machine. It was not the arms race that sent the Korean hordes over the 38th parallel in 1950 to inundate grossly inadequate American defenses. America was en- gaged in no'-arms race during the months which prefaced those two conflicts. We were instead basking in the euphoria of de facto disarmament, telling ourselves that the thing called peace is pretty nice, and maybe if we just do not look up and notice the war clouds on the horizon, a nice warm wind from Washington will dispel them. The end of complacency came with a shattering swiftness in Europe and Asia, but not because the United States was engaged in an armaments race. The race came later, and we were sorely strained to rebuild our military might. At the outset, Mr. President, let me say that I was much disturbed during a visit home to find Washington press re- ports that the Senate must not alter the test ban pact because it might force the treaty to be renegotiated. The thinking apparently is that Chairman I hru shchev, who has never been interested in assuring the readiness of American defenses, might not like our amend- ments. Therefore, the treaty would not survive additional negotiations, I Intend to devote a portion of these remarks to the discussion of several treaties the Senate has considered or amended and also to the often heard proposition that chaos will envelop America If the Senate "tampers with the will" of the Executive and alters the treaty. This debate, I feel, could benefit from Patrick Henry's "Lamp of Experi- ence": I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experi- ence. I know no way of judging the future but by the past. I suggest that the pages of history are replete with excellent precedents of the Senate exercising its constitutional re- sponsibilities for treaty amendment. No- where in these precedents have I per- ceived the intention of mollifying a dic- tator,who has sworn to destroy us. If the Senate does advise amendments to this treaty and if the document should by chance die in renegotiation, despite the apparent sincerity of Khrushchev, on whose shoulders would the responsibility descend? There are those in this Cham- ber who have- stated that the . Senate would be the executioner because Rus- sia's master would not accede to Senate inspired treaty revisions. That Premise, Mr. President, is specious on its face. The Senate's decision on ratification ,must be predicated entirely and solely upon the effects the treaty will have on -America's military and political posture. It cannot be based upon the supposition of what may happen to the document if we protect our interests as they relate to it. The Senate's judgment must take into consideration only the United States- no other nation, no other political phi- losophy. There is necessarily inherent in such decisionmaking the possibility that the treaty will not emerge from debate with its language unscathed. I - sincerely hope the text can be al- tered, and I plan to direct my efforts to that end. The oath we have taken as Senators ends at; our shores. We are not consti- tutional internationalists. Our alle- giance and our singular responsibility is to the United States. We have not been certified as arbiters of the so-called Sino-Soviet dispute. We have no au- ascertain the "good and the bad" communisms on the theory that we - should support-through this treaty--the brand of communism which may appear slightly less evil. To the argument that the Senate would be remiss to tamper with an Executive judgement, I would like to quote a statement by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts at the turn of the century, Henry Cabot Lodge. There was at that time a great cam- paign of vilification in the British press regarding the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Senator Lodge noted that the British papers "seemed to have a general belief that the Senate amendments" to the treaty "were in some way a gross breach of faith, a view not susceptible of expla- nationn but very soothing to those who held It," To this criticism the Senator replied It Yeas been the uniform practice of the Senate to amend treaties whenever it seemed their [sic] duty to do sd * * * the Senate can only present its views to a foreign gov- ernment by formulating them in the shape of amendments which the foreign govern- ment may reject or accept or meet with counterpropositions, but of which it has no more right to complain than it has to com- plain of the offer of any germane proposition at any other stage of the negotiation. Those words uttered by a great states- man of his time could well be repeated to anyone who would question the right and responsibility of the U.S. Senate to alter the language of a treaty in any way it considered proper. The Senate is a coequal partner in the matter of treaties-an ',especially salient point of this discussion. In the opinion of some Senators, the, treaty contains errors, deficiencies, and anomalies that can only be corrected, by the Senate. The right of this body to share in treaty- making at every stage has always been fully recognized both by the Senate and by the Chief Executive. The power of the. Senate to amend or recommend ratification conditionally is, of course, included in the larger powers expressly granted by the Constitution to reject or confirm. Since the administration is asking the Senate not for its advice but only for its unquestioning consent to a treaty on which the Senate has, had no oppor- tunity whatsoever to propound sugges- tions, it is quite fair to notb that the administration would have been follow- ing many .very well established prece- dents, one as far bacl as 1789, had it asked this body its sense on the treaty language before Mr. Harriman initialed As a point of precedent, I note the Senate in 1795 amended the Jay Treaty, ratifying it on the condition that the 12th article should be suspended. Sen- ator Lodge writes that Washington "accepted their action without a word of comment as if it were a matter of course, and John Franklin, in his `Life of Wash- ington,' has treated the Senate's action on that memorable occasion in the same way.,, That Great American statesman, Thomas Jefferson, is reported to have told President Washington on March 11, 1792, that it was: Advisable whenever possible to consult the Senate before the opening of negotiations since its subsequent approbation was neces- sary to validate a treaty. Wealso have a direct and unanimous declaration by the U.S. Supreme Court in Haver against Yaker. Mr. Justice Davis, delivering the opinion, said: In this country a treaty issomething snore than a contract, for the Federal Constitu- tion declares it to be the law of the lane. If so, before it can become a law, the Senate in whom rests the authority to ratify it must agree to it. But the Senate are (sic) not required to adopt or reject'it as a whole? but may modify or amend it, as was stone with the treaty under consideration. Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. SIMPSON. I yield. Mr. CURTIS. I congratulate the Sen- ator from Wyoming. He has conducted research on matters of vital importance. He has correctly pointed out the func- tion of the Senate in treatymaking. Apparently it is presumed by some that the Executive makes a treaty, and then the Senate is asked to approve it, in the same way In which the Senate might confirm the appointment of an Individual. But such is not at all the case. As the Senator from Wyoming has well stated, a treaty is the law of the land. The Constitution vests in the Senate part of the treatymaking power. I call attention to the fact that the statements to which the Senator from Wyoming has referred are based upon section 2 of article II of the Constitution, which provides: He shall have power, by and with the ad- vice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senate present concur. The point I wish to make is that the Senate Is part of the treatymaking proc- ess, and, as such, the Senate exercises not only a constitutional duty, but also one which has been adhered to through the years. It is difficult for me to understand why some persons have become so enamored with their own ideas and their own ]pro- jections that they do not dare trust free government to operate, and have no faith in constitutional procedures. If we believe in free government un- der law, certainly we must not be afraid to follow constitutional procedures. Mr. SIMPSON. I am grateful to the Senator from Nebraska for his very per- tinent observations. Let me say that I am cognizant of the section of the Con- stitution he cited, and I thank him for his contributions. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved 16117 CON*RESSTONAL_ RECORD SEtS Av "E ''To avoid further burdensome statls- tics, let the at this point, Mr. President, mention three "-postwar instances in which . the , Senate, the Committee on Foreign 13,elations, or individual' Sena- tors were consulted or otherwise were involved in treaty discussions. I ask that there be printed in the RECORD, as insert To. 1, a memorandum on them; and, as insert go. 2, a memorandum which .,refers to earlier precedents for advice ' by the Senate in regard to treaties. There being no objection, the memo- randums?were ,ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: No. 1 Following are three postwar examples of eaty negotiations in which the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations, or individ- ual Senators were `consulted or were other- wise involved: the Vandenberg' resolution, which was ap- proved unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations and adopted by the Senate by a vote of 64 to 4. Thus the President was "advised of the sense of the Senate" that the United States -,should, among other things, associate itself with regional se- curity arrangements for effective self-help and mutual aid, and should make clear-its determination to exercise the right of indi- vidual or collective self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Under Secretary Lovett, who conducted complex negotiations with the European powers, discussed preliminary drafts with both Senators Vandenberg and Connally, so that when the latter assumed the chairman- ship of the Foreign Relations Committee after the elections he was well informed about the negotiations. Dean Acheson, who became Sec_ertary of State in January 1949, continued the con- sultations-, qn Capitol Hill. The important exchange of views between the State De- partment and the Committee on Foreign Relations at informal meetings led to many changes in the'draft treaty. The most im- portant of these applied to article 5, which embodied the key principle that an "armed attack" on one or more of the members of the North Atlantic area would be considered an attack on all. Apparently at the insist- ence of Senators Vandenberg and Connally, a phrase was introduced committing each signatory only to "take such action as it deems necessary * * * to restore and main- tain the security of the North Atlantic area." Thus was forestalled any Senate objection to an "automatic" commitment to go to war, which would have been counter to the con- stitutional right of Congress to declare war. The Senate consented to ratification on July 21, 1949, by an 82-13 vote. 3. FAR EAST SETTa.EMENT. Preliminary executive-legislative planning for the charter began with conversations be- tween State Bepartment and congressional ofilcials, then took form with the appoint- fluent iii 1942 of an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, which included both executive -and legislative personnel. The Fulbrigl t:and Connally resolutions'of 1943 committed both Horses in principle to par- ticipation in an international security organ- ization. 'The prospects for nonpartisan con- SideratiQn were improved by a declaration-by Senator'.w`arrenAustin, Senator Arthur Van- denberg,'and other Republicans, and by the agreement of Secretary of State Hull with John, Foster Dulles, as Dewey's delegate, to avoid the subject as a presidential campaign issue. The final stage of legislative-executive re- lations regarding the charter was the estab- lishment 9f direct congressional participa- tion In the formulation and approval of the charter itself. Secretary of State Hull asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March., 1944, to appoint a subgroup of four Democrats and' four Republicans to. confer with him concerning the charter. After its first meeting on April 25, 1944, this commit- tee of eight met regularly and discussed at length all major aspects of the draft charter proposed by the State Department. Although Secretary Hull did not urge any congressional leaders to attend the Dumbar- ton Qaks ' conference, he told senators Van- denberg and Connally and Speaker Rayburn that lie would keep them informed of the 11 progress' of the conference and would let them know If any 'radical changes were made in the ' plan approved by the committee of eight. Between the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the San x'rancisco Conference there were further State bepartment meetings with the Senate committee of eight and also with leading Members o the House. Another im portant step was taken when Senators Con- nally and' Vandenberg and Representatives Bloom and Eaton Were appointed as delegates to'the S'au Francisco Conference. Nonparti- San ekecutive-legislative cooperation con- at-the the San Francisco Conference and afterward, until the charter was finally ap- proved b'ythe Senate on August 8,`1945,'by a vote of ; to 2. g L . N O R T AA T L A NTIC TREATY Secretary of State Marshall and his Under Secretary, Mr. Lovett, on behalf of a Demo- cratic kresident, began a series of informal The following is an excerpt from Randall H. Nelson, "legislative participation in the treaty and agreement making process," Western political quarterly, volume 13, March 1960: 154-171,, The treaties involved were. the. Japanese Peace Treaty and two Pa- cific security agreements-the Anzus Treaty and the Philippine Treaty. All three were ap- proved by the Senate on March 20, 1952: "More recently, the constant consultation and collaboration between Ambassador (later Secretary of State) John Foster Dulles and the members...Qf_.the, Senate _Coxuituittee.on Foreign Relations which marked the negotia- tion. and conclusion of the-, Japanese Peace Treaty drew high praise from both the Sen- ate and the Department of State. When Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, presented the treaty on the floor of the Senate, he remarked : " `As chairman. of tile.. Foreign Relations Committee I want tO_S.Qngratulate the execu- tive branch, and particularly the Honorable John Foster Dulles, for the effective way in which these treaties were -,negotiated. From the very beginning, Senator Dulles conferred with the Foreign Relations Committee and ,,he kept in constant.touch with us throughout the negotiations. Since the conclusion of the United Njon rter, I believe that the Japanese Peace Treaty represents a high- water marl. in,_the. geyeiopment_,of closer executive-legislative teamwork in the formu- lation of foreign policy _It is significant that eight Members of the Senate were named by the President to serve as members of the V.S. delegation to the San Francisco Peace conference.' "The ranking minority member of the committee, Senator ALEXANDER WILEY, Re- pai c llir otlle Foreign Relations Com publican, of Wisconsin, also had praise for Yi'iitte@,,and Mr. Dulles, a Republican who - Mr. Dulles: know that Ambassador Dulles, a former Re- publican Senator from New York, was the one principally responsible for negotiating the treaties. He did a grand job in keeping members of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee constantly informed of his negotia- tions. He consulted with us time and time again to give us a' general outline of what was going on. Ultimately the American delegates who signed the treaty, including a number of Members of Congress, were chosen on a completely bipartisan basis.'" Mr. John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in an address before the American Society of International Law, commented most favorably upon the cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate during the negotiations of the treaty. He said in part: "The conclusion of these treaties was an effective demonstration of cooperation be- tween the executive and legislative branches of the. Government.: "From the time he was appointed by the President on September 8, 1950, as chief U.S. negotiator until just 1 year later on Septem- ber 8, 1951, when the treaty was finally signed, Mr. Dulles and his associates in the Department of State made a deliberate ef- fort to keep the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate informed of what they were doing and the way in which they were doing it. During this pe- riod there was a series of meetings between Ambassador Dulles and the members of the Consultative Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee. At all important stages in the negotiations of the treaty, Ambassador Dulles consulted with the subcommittee and, on several occasions with the whole cplnittee pi,.,,speclfic ,problems that arose. Suggestions were received from members of the committee as to how many of these problems might be solved, and these sug- gestions played a real part in the determina- tion of the final text of the treaty. "Not only were members of the Foreign Relations Comittee kept informed but Mr. Dulles made it a practice to discuss treaty matters with influential Members of the Senate who were not members of the Foreign Relations Committee but who would be called upon to pass final judgment on the treaties themselves. There were also several meetings with members of the Foreign Af- fairs Committee of the House of Representa- tives. While the House of course has no direct part In the 'ratification of treaties, nevertheless, it does have a part in passing implementing legislation by which treaties can be carried out, and it was therefore believed important that as many Members of Congress as possible should be kept fully informed. When the time came to send a delegation to San Francisco to sign the treaties, members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives were included on the delegation. This procedure, providing continuous consultation with the Congress, was proved to be justified when the treaty came before the Senate, It was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Com- mittee and was then overwhelmingly ap- proved in the Senate itself by a vote of 65 to 11. It has been demonstrated that the people at the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue can cooperate effectively when both are convinced whatthey are doing is for the true and lasting benefit of their country. No. 2. EARLY PRECEDENTS FOR ADVICE BY THE SENATE IN REGARD To TREATIES (From "Treaties: Their Making and En- forcement," by Samuel B. Crandall, second edition, ch. 6.) In 1789 'President Washington personally briefed the Senate on a proposed treaty with Approved.-f9- Release 2004/03/11. ; ClA-RDP65i$0038.3R000100210007-3 Foir Release 2004/03111 : CtA.RpP65800383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16118 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 13 the southern Indians. History tells us that the Senate "seemed unwilling" to give its advice and consent without having first fully considered articles contained in a short paper read by the President regarding seven spe- cific points of negotiation. It is further noted that the Senate maintained Its right to exercise an Independent judgment by voting in favor on a part only of the propo- sition submitted. President Waphington by special messages of August 4, 1790, August 11, 1790, January 18, 1792, and March 23, 1792, sought Senate advice as to the conclusion of treaties with Indian tribes. The advice was given in each case, and the treaties were carefully drafted to be in conformity with the wishes of the Senate. In a communication to the Senate on Feb- ruary 9, 1790, concerning differences that had arisen between the United States and Great Britain, as to the Northeastern Territory, the President stated that he considered it advisable to postpone any negotiation on the subject until he had received the advice of the Senate as to the propositions to be of- fered on the part of the United States. It is notable there that the Nation's Chief Executive in that vitally important negoti- ation with Great Britain on our northeastern territory would not act until he had received the advice of the Senate. By message on May 8, 1792, the President inquired of the Senate whether it would ap- prove a treaty it one were concluded with Algiers for payment of ransom and peace money. President Jackson, on May 6, 1830, sought the advice of the Senate in advance of a treaty. President Polk on June 10, 1846, asked the Senate for Its advice as to the conclusion of the proposed Oregon Treaty. President Buchanan communicated with the Senate on February 21, 1861, again in regard to an Oregon Treaty. The Great Emancipator, Abraham Lincoln, was com- pletely in concurrence with the principle of requesting the Senate's advance sense on treaty negotiation. He did so March 16, 1861, and again on December 17 of that year. At that time President Lincoln transferred to the Senate for its advice the draft of a con- vention with the American Minister in Mexico regarding the payment of claims urged by European powers. There are also precedents for the sub- mitting to the Senate of treaty drafts purely for advice and discussion, after which the language Is put in a formal treaty for the consummation of negotiations. The treaty then returns to the Senate for the procedural advice and consent. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, al- though nations have balked at the trea- ty-amending powers of the Senate, no President has ever questioned the right or obligation of the Senate to amend a treaty. I hope the present administra- tion will maintain that extremely ethical perspective throughout the test-ban treaty debate. Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of War to President Polk, rendered, on February 26, 1846, an opinion that the Federal Con- stitution has made the Senate a coordi- nate branch of the treatymaking power. Without its advice and consent, no treaty can be concluded; and in Mr. Buchanan's words: This power could not be trusted to wiser or better hands. Mr. President, I should like to address myself to two other aspects of this de- bate, both of which are germane to the question of amending the treaty. The distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Donn] has offered five statements of understanding to this treaty. I have readthese statements, and I am sympa- thetic with their language. However, what we must consider here is that ac- tion taken to interpret or clarify the treaty must be of such a nature as to af- fect the contractual relationship. With- out such effect, the action is of no conse- quence. It is my hope the Senator will offer his proposals as amendments. As the debate has shown, only a de fac- to amendment or reservation will alter' the international obligation of the United States to this tr aty. It is this ob- ligation, and that of the Soviet Union, which must be crystal, clear before the pact is ratified. At this juncture of, the proceedings, Mr. President, I request unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD an ar- ticle entitled "Soviets May Have Ultimate ABM," which was publjshed in the mag- azine Missiles and Rockets on September 16, 1963. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: SOVIETS MAY HAVE ULTIMATE ABM-ELECTRO- MAGNETIC ENERGY FRO41 HIGH-YIELD BLAST MIGHT NEUTRALIZE U.S.! lMISSILES IN SILOS, LEAVING MAGINOT LINE bETERRENT The Soviet Union may be developing an antiballistic missile system capable of de- activating U.S. missiles in their silos with the electromagnetic energy from exploding high-yield Soviet nuclear weapons, Missiles and Rockets has learned, This possibility, supported by U.S. in- telligence gathering on the 1961-62 Soviet high-yield test series, is behind strong oppo- sition by many high military officers clear scientists to the tent ban treaty. The Soviet lead in antiballistic missile de- velopment has been acknowledged even by administration supporters in the test-ban debates. It is based on the long-range abil- ity of strong electromagnetic pulses to crip- ple the electronics systeEn of a missile so that it cannot be fired. - It could mean that the United States has invested billions of dollars in a "maginot line" of Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman mis- siles that could be rendered useless by the new Soviet development. POLARIS SAFE Polaris missiles beneath the sea would be relatively. immune, as would manned bomb- ers on patrol far from U.. shores. This point was made b Dr. Edward Teller when he told the Senate: "By expanding and perfecting the Polaris *iissile system, we could ameliorate the situation," U.S. knowledge of Soviet developments in this area has. been given the highest national security classification and has been discussed only in closed sessions of Senate commit- tees considering the treaty. U.S. information comes from monitoring satellite, aircraft,' and 'other intelligence -sources. Soviet achievement of such a capability could effectively neutralize the major por- tion of the U.S. deterrent force in its silos, this magazine is told. This belief 1s based oA the fact that U.S. military strategy relies; on second-strike capability, which concedes the first strike to the Soviet Union and' bases the U.S. de- terrent on the ability to survive the initial attack and still retaliate. NO SECOND STRIKE Achievement by the Soviets of the capa- bility of using their first strike offensive weapons simultaneously as defensive weap- ons that would destroy the electronics of U.S. silo-based missiles could wipe out the ability of the United States to retaliate. This fear was expressed in depth by Gen. Thomas S. Power, commander of the Stra- tegic Air Command, in his testimony before a closed session of the Senate Preparedness, Investigating Subcommittee. The testimony was severely censored before release, with, any reference to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) phenomenon deleted from the text.. The possible effect of the burst of electro- magnetic energy from an exploding high- yield weapon on the electronic circuitry of a missile is described as similar to what hap- pens when lightning strikes a radio. It is believed to be capable of fusing wires, burn- ing out circuits, and causing other extensive damage that would leave the missile inert in. its silo, incapable of being fired or easily re- paired. In an article on radiation effects, John Crittenden, consultant in this field for Gen- eral Electric, stated last week: "The detona- tion of (nuclear) weapons produces radia- tion over the entire electromagnetic spec- trum. "The prompt gamma pulse will affect electronic devices sensitive to ionization, and the radiofrequency signal propagated carries enough energy to damage electronic circuits drastically." Experiments have shown these electromag- netic effects are effective far beyond the normal heat and blast effects of an ex- plosion. In space, a 1-megaton explosion can harm electronic systems over a radius, of 110 miles or more, according to GE. Extrapolation of this information to the! effects of perhaps a 60-megaton Soviet weap- on exploded in the atmosphere is difficult. This is one reason some U.S. military officers and scientists would like to see the United States undertake high-yield testing. It is known that pulse radiation of Soviet; high-yield nuclear tests in 1962 crippled the electronics of a U.S. satellite, possibly the one used to monitor those same electro- magnetic effects. HARDWARE AFFECTED The destructive effects of electromagnetic pulse on electronic systems include deteriora- tion of semiconductors, current leakages, displacement or breaking of printed circuits and swelling of potting compounds and In- sulation used in electronic hardware. As an example of the range of the effect, it can be disclosed that one of the U.S. nu- clear tests in Nevada popped circuit breakers on power lines more than 100 miles away in. California. Nevada tests are restricted to yields of 20 kilotons or less. A Russian warhead of, for example. 60 megatons, releases most of its energy in the form of velocity of particles. This leaves about 10 percent-5 percent conservatively-, distributed across the electromagnetic spec- trum from hard protons of the gamma type all the way down to the very soft radio waves. One scientist emphasized to Missiles and Rockets, "and 5 percent of 60 megatons is one helluva lot of energy." In regard to electromagnetic effects of high-yield weapons, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.. director of the Lawrence Radiation Labora- tory at Livermore, Calif., told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee August 211, "It is simply that the question of how hard anything is to electromagnetic phenomena: be it antiballistic missile defense or hard- ness of silos, has to do with matters that.. in my opinion, are not sufficiently well un- derstood to be able to say with full confi- dence that they will function as designed in a nuclear environment." He warned the committee that it would be taking an incalculable risk with the secu- rity of the country if it approved a treaty prohibiting further testing in the atmos- phere. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 ilita;y already is financing de- centered upon antiballistic missile develop- signified their intention to join in a 11 velopme o elec ronic equipment less sen m , Th t en , e repor stated treaty if the principal parties create one sitive )0 dlatiol than, that I.QW used in "It is prudent to assume that the Soviet through ratification. g y s es but its effectiveness against Union has acquired a unique and potentially explosions will be questionable. valuable body _of data on high-yield blast The language on which we are asked hi h miel 'I,iSNG ~ir. Ttls sl,tiplxs shock, communicatipia. blackout and. ra,,alia- to, advise ratificat ion is a mere projec- with,..ElYll? in examination of Gen- tion and electromagnetic pulse phenomena tion for. a treaty, not a treaty in any eral PoweF`s testimony before the Senate which is not available to the United States." way watsoever-a point that is made ex- subcominlttee es l es clear f r concern wit But concern over what lessons may have plicit in the proposal itself. the phenomenen. (In the testimony quoted been learned from high-yield tests was not If the Senate should so choose, it below, deletions made for estim L limited to EMP, A Hill spokesman said there y. reasons could advise ratification with conditions have been replaced by the languagge which may be other exotic effects. and amendments, and could instruct the might have been used. This deleCion and Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, Democrat, of West Vir inia, a member of the Armed Services in Chief Executive to delay fulfillment of its replacement is indicated by being enclosed Committee, was preparing last week to make the treaty's third article or third brackets) part Senator STROM 'HURMOND, Democrat, of a speech on the Senate floor expressing his until the provisions as to Senate advice South Carplina. we are going to secure fear that the Russians, through their high- had been met. By instructing the Chief the second strike, then we have to be sure megaton explosions, have gained other tech- Executive to hold ratification in abey- that our .nJssiles can make that strike. And nical advantages the United States may not ance until changes in the treaty had been if (the Soviets) have tested and found out possess, renegotiated by the principal parties, the certain weapons effects and'have found out These, he felt, might enable them to create that a cettgln yi,e]d weapon or a certain a communications blackout that could ren- secondary parties would be precluded strength' weapon- can destroy our missile der U.S. missile sites, silos and electronic altogether from having any voice in these sites OF destroy the [electronics] system, and equipment useless. Senator BYRD also was discussions. After new language had if we cannot test any more to catch up with expected to point out his suspicion of the fact been worked out, the secondary parties the knowledge they have gained, then can that the Russians, after previously refusing could accede to it. of to sign test ban treaties, have reversed them- I we assure immunity of our second strike , ri short, Mr. President, there i no our second missile 7 ystem?" selves about a year after conclusion of their foundation for the argument that the General ','own,, s `I would say this would last series of tests, about the time it might Senate be a tremendous advantage to the Soviet have taken to analyze the data, in this s treaty, involve order nearly make mend- Union and a tremendous disadvantage to us, Mr. SIMPSON. I wish to read two ments. That t a just is s not to so. make The United a Ts again depending on what they have found paragraphs from the editorial comments Out." (This was followed by a classified States, Great Britain, and Russia have discussion of IrMF,) with respect to the article; yet to create a treaty; and until such senator ' '$URMQ5D, "And if they render The article on page 14 of this issue prob- a time as they do, we are dealing only our missiles inteerational through the ably is the most important published by with the details of a proposal-a pro- knowlgdge they have gained and through the this magazine since its founding. It brings posal which, in my opinion, does not power they will have with this strike out into the open the critical and highly adequately protect the interests of the then if ti.41 eituation should come, to pass, classified problem which has been at the we don't have the manned bombers to make heart of the opposition to the nuclear test United States militarily, politically, or it, then where would we be?" ban treaty by many nuclear scientists and in principle. General awsa. `We would be in trouble high-ranking Air Force officers. The fact is It must be remembered that since if this [electromagnetic] weapons effects phe- that the Soviets may have found the answer 1789, the U.S. Senate has been asked to nomenon actually was as you described it. ,to their antiballistic missile problem by at- consider 1,358 treaties. Of that number, The point is I think we must find out. We taining the ability to render U.S. missiles 944 have cleared the Senate without must determine whether or not these things inoperational in their silos. amendments; 252 have cleared with are true." The possibility is more than a threat to amendments; 119 of the 944 received no The reference by senator THURMOND to the effectiveness _of .U S. missile forces. If rendering, missiles inoperational, in contrast true, it threatens to..negate the whole de- final action; and 1,196 proposed treaties to their destruction ?by blast or heat, may be terrent posture of this Nation by making have been concluded. In short, Mr. considered , significant clue to the mpor- possible enemy deactivation of the heart of President, an amendment does not nec- tance of , ELardening and, dispersal of U.S. nuclear strength, essarily plant the kiss of death on a U.S. missfeeites had been based on calcula- ? + ._ + * treaty. But whether or not it be a kiss tion of heat and, blast effects whith would It now appears that the Soviet Union, of death or a stimulus to debate is inci- require almost a direct hit to destroy a mis- as a result of its 1961-62 high-yield nuclear dental to the prime factor of the treaty's sile in its silo. E*, however, might be tests, may be developing an ABM system that Capable of incapacitating a great number of can wipe out the electronic brains of U.S, effects on American interests. missiles at Qnce. missiles with,_eit,txemely powerful electro- Finally, Mr. President, there is the firi1oiT P$O $AMING sRASEA magnetic pulses which would leave them protagonist's argument of the great p0- The alt-inertial guidance system of U.S, inert and useless in their silos, litical setback, so-called, that would be Titan mantle Minute- Mr. President, it is not enough to pro- suffered eaty tumbthe le finiitts trip eth o ugh the are s base s don staring of target da once data on magnetic tapes or drums, In pound understandings or interpretations Senate. lyf inuteman silos, for example, a magnetic or any of the lesser measures. State- Mr. President, I quote now from the drum mounted ont]re silo wall. contains in- ments of clarification and _administra- Foreign Relations Committee memo- formation on more than one target, with se- tion pontifications will carry scant randum which appeared on page 15668 lected target data fed to the, miss' ,before weight when balanced in international of the Senate debate of September 9. launch. A burst of, electromagnetic, energy judgments against the actual ambiguous might be capable of erasing such information, language contained in this treaty-the The memorandum states: 'according to informed sources. If the Senate' calls this treaty into ques- General Power tgla,the subcommittee that. language the Senate is asked to approve. firm with a reservation or other qualification, if it is found that a high-yield nuclear weap- In this debate, I have heard it said it will invite the scorn of the civilized world; on has such destructive electromagnetic ef- that any Senate action which forces re- it will open the floodgates of Communist feces, the'United States would want to em- negotiation would, in effect, force the propaganda and give communism, a move- ploy its own ICBM's to do double duty as involvement of 91 Signatories. If my in- ment that has been largely emptied of its in- antiballistiovl'issile system. _ terpretation of treaty law and of the test ternatfonal force and appeal in recent years, "That Would, give,, you much greater ca= ban treaty language is correct, there will renewed vigor. pability automatically," he said. "So it is a be no treaty until all of the original par- I should like to quote also from an two-edged sword." ties, including the United States, have Associated Press article dated September The subcpmmitteo in its report to the completed ratification. Senate, after listenipg to 21 military and 10, quoting Secretary of State Rusk. scientc witnesses, declared: There are two classes of signers of this The Secretary prophesied that if the test "The Soviets have gvertaken and surpassed treaty: the original signatories-who are ban treaty were not to be ratified, "the ~~~?s,;in d sign of very high-yield nuclear weep- the United States, Great Britain, and possibility of exercising any control over may possess knowledge of weap- Russia-and the secondary signers. Un- armaments would vanish. The possibil- ons elfec and, antiballistic missile programs less and until the treaty is cleared by ity of settling dangerous political prob- superior to ours." , the Senate and. is ratified by all of the isms would be greatly reduced." RUSSrs TESTA MS,principals, there will be no treaty to The article also paraphrased the Sec- It noted that the pharacter f th hi h Q e recent w c the secondary signers can be a retary that a U.S. turndown would cost Soviet high-Meld tests indicated ti.ey, were party. These ether nations have simply America the.cori dencc ofmany Nations, Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R00010021p0073 16120 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 would poison the atmosphere with more We admit they have not kept their nuclear tests, intensify the arms rue, in- pledge to remove their war machine from crease tension, and enhance prospects of Cuba; yet some castigated- a distin- war. guished Senator of this body-a Senator Mr. President, that is a rather fore- with an unimpeachable military back- 'boding prophecy. All these evils are to ground who dares suggest that a with- descend on our Nation because of the drawal is required before we give Russia manner in which the Senate might elect a treaty. to perform its', constitutional duty. I We admit they prepared for at least suggest that predictions such as these a year to violate the first nuclear mora- are grossly intemperate and do harm to torium; yet we rush pellmell now to re- this debate's objectivity. Consider, if you will, that the Soviet Union has maintained a virtually cease- less initiative in the cold war since that day in 1945 when Winston Churchill an- nounced the fall of an Iron Curtain "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic." That the Soviets have perpetuated this initiative cannot be questioned. It was not appreciably hin- dered by the Hungarian blood bath in 1956 when Soviet tanks slaughtered women and children in the - streets of Budapest. Photographic evidence of that Russian brutality dispatched through- out the world did nothing to shatter the military-political phalanx of Com- munist initiative. The concrete and barbed wire wall di- viding Berlin has not erased Soviet con- quests. The infusion of missiles in Cuba-an act which ostensibly brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war- has not made communism less palatable to the cold war nations. Are we then to subscribe to the ridicu- lous proposition that one act of the Sen- ate-an act entirely compatible with its constitutional obligations, its duty under the law, and historical precedent-will cause irreparable damage to the image of America? The administration's pro- nouncements notwithstanding, I believe the answer is patent. Rejection of this treaty will not have any significant ef- fect upon America's relationships with other countries. To -put this question in perspective, I realize that there will certainly be an amount of adverse reaction around the world if this accord is rejected or amended. There will also be adverse create another identical situation. We admit the Soviets tested their way into vital new fields of knowledge with their chicanery of 1961 and 1962; yet we seek to consummate a treaty that would bar us from that knowledge. Russian-dominated 'Communists are killing American servicemen in the dirty little war in Vietnam; yet we negotiate a treaty and utter euphoric catch phrases alluding to some nebulous and imminent rapprochement. We have the views of the Preparedness Subcommittee that the treaty contains significant military disadvantages; yet we tell ourselves that we will consider only the possible political advantages. We admit we cannot trust the Rus- sians; yet we foolishly placate ourselves with the panacea that trust is not a fac- tor in this treaty. Equally alarming, we have apparently subscribed to the theory that labora- tories and scientists can be suspended inderiinitely in limbo and still be ready to function at a moment's notice. The administration disavowed that thinking once--but has apparently subscribed to it aga;in. The Chief Executive, in his communi- cation read by the minority leader, said: This Government w1JlI maintain strong weapons laboratories in a vigorous program of weapons development, in order to insure that the United States -Will continue to have in the future a strength fully adequate for an effective national defense. In particplar, as the Secretary of Defgnse has made clear, we will mantain strategic forces fully in- suring that this Nation will continue to be in a position to destroy any aggressor even after absorbing a first strike by a surprise attack. reaction from many quarters here at This assurance can hardly be recon- home if it is ratified. The adversities tiled with the Chief Executive's state- that may accrue to the United States, ment in March 1962, that- whatever its action, will be irconsequen- In actual practice, particularly Ina so- tial compared to the scorn and the vi- ciety of free choice, we cannot keep top- tuperation directed many times in re- flight scientists concentrating on the prepa- cent years at the Soviet Union. Russia ration of an experiment which may or may before and during Khrushchev's dicta- not take place on an uncertain date in the torship has sponsored myriad travesties future. Nor can large technical laboratories on morality, integrity, and the law in vir- be kept fully alert on a standby basis, wait- tually every country on earth, but the ing for some other nation to break an agree- Soviets have continously increased their ment. This is not merely difficult or in- convenient. and stature. convenient. We have explored this alterna- scorn of the civilized world tive and found it impoible of execution. Has the irreparably damaged the Soviet Union? In a nutshell, our laboratories cannot Hardly, for they stand today on the brink be maintained on an endless alert for the of the very type of agreement the Presi- moment of operation that may never dent said they would never get from us come. again-an uninspected moratorium on Mr. President, this treaty could possi- nuclear testing. bly be the first step toward peace, but it View the contradictions. could. more likely be a first step toward We admit that our intelligence cannot piercing America's rliilitary shield that provide hard evidence of Soviet military has protected the free world for nearly strength ? yet we reach an optimistic 20 years. The treaty does not guaran- I am reminded of a former slogan of an American industry, "The priceless ingredient of every. product is the honor and integrity of its maker." Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, this treaty does not have that priceless ingredient. I am frank to say I am troubled, wor- ried, and skeptical, along with millions of others of our countrymen. We will be tied by honorable intent, and the enemy who has promised to bury us will, be free to violate the treaty because of no code of honor. They already excel in. atmospheric atomic power, and with their slave labor, they will excel in other dimensions. America has learned that the best insurance against war is pre- paredness for it. The treaty contains not one iota of the quid pro quo that constitutes the moral strength of any treaty. It does certainly include a give-and-take-the Soviets taking the advantages given by the United States. The Air Force Association, opening its annual convention in Washington Wed- nesday, said the treaty would impose "unacceptable risks to the security of the Nation and the free world." I am sure my colleagues are aware of the Air Force Secretary's reaction to the association's stand. Mr. Zuckert re- neged in anger on an association-spon- sored reception in his honor. As we seek the truth on this question, it is proper to ask whether the Secretary's mind is so closed that he cannot believe others act from as honorable a motive as he. A story from the Washington Post contains additional comments on the association's stand. I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion. of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Wyoming? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. S:IMPSON. Mr. President, we have seen the report of the Senate Pre- paredness Subcommittee. We are aware of its contents. We are aware that the questions raised by that pessimistic statement cannot be satisfied in the pres- ent. language of the treaty. We have heard expressed the fears bf competent American scientists, and all of us here realize that the treaty is poorly drafted and replete with ambigu- ities. Senators who apparently plan to vote for ratification, nevertheless, have not hesitated to express their reserva- tions. They hesitate to actually propose changes in the treaty's composition due to the unfounded :fear and the continu- ous assertion that an amendment is a rejection. I have attempted in these remarks to dispel that false trepidation. Americans are taught to believe in the power of positive thinking and the open mind, but as noble as is that philosophy, it cannot be the touchstone for treaty discourse. Nowhere in Senate debate is the jaundiced eye and the negative ap- proach more important than in the mat- ter of treaties. Unlike a criminal trial, a comparison of strengths. tee the direction of this first step. treaty must be assumed guilty until We admit that of 52 major agreements If this could mean'a guaranteed peace- proven innocent. Protagonists are they have broken 50; yet we hasten to or even a first step !toward guaranteed charged with the task of proving the provide a 51st opportunity. peace, I would be for it. treaty's worth to the United States. The Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1961 Approved For R"- burden is entirely upon the proponents. STALEX4ATE FEARED rM Mr. THURMOND. I commend the e us t build th i h ym r e ouse on .demon- Now the pursuit of nuclear superiority is able and distinguished Senator from drably sound logic and with unquestion- being replaced by the pursuit of a nuclear Wyoming for the masterly address he able proof that this_ treaty-that a,ny stalemate," the AFA declared. has made today against the nuclear test treaty under discussion, whether it be It said that manned aircraft systems are ban treaty. I hope every Senator will being abandoned in favor of underground the ? nlri of , nuclear gre or the and underwater missiles and that the "stated take occasion to read this address. It is establishment gf fishing agreements- official hope is that the Soviet Union will a very penetrating statement, and should will apt in the interests of the United similarly recast its own strategic forces." be helpful to any who have not made up States, and our constitutional. form of. Such opposing missile forces, the AFA said, their minds. government.., nullify each other-unless Russia breaks the The Senator from Wyoming is a true The advice of the Senate was not stalemate by secretly achieving a break- patriot and a great American. He has sought In advance of this proposed through in strategic nuclear weapons-and made a fine impression among the Mem- treaty. The negotiations were done. in vethe world balance of power will revert to con- bees of the Senate since he came to this secret .in, the capital city of the Soviet in fitional military forces. Union.None of our nuclear ore "Adherence to a policy of nuclear stale- body. I commend him for the outstand- mate," the AFA policy statement went on, ing address he has made today. expertQ participated. Communication "is an open invitation to Soviet aggression Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator with the Senate.was withheld ,until the on terms which the free world cannot meet from South Carolina. He is overkind language was an accomplished fact. and is not prepared to meet." and overgenerous in his remarks, but I Now we are asked to give our carte America's European allies, it was said, are appreciate very much its flattery. blanche endorsement of the. Verbiage. reluctant to follow the U.S. lead in bolstering Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the This is,Somethiilg.that we must not do, conventional forces for fear it would bring This treaty must be altered, and it not the acceptance of the concept of nuclear stale- pending test ban treaty should be viewed mate and accompanying political pressure to against the background of the last 15 responsibility of the,Senate to see that drop tactical nuclear weapons for fear of years of our foreign policy. If placed it is. escalation. They said, the AFA said, that in its true perspective, the treaty must There have been a number of sugges- such a conventional war with Russia would be framed, surrounded, and pointed up tions, including those by the Senator be fought in their homelands. by the continuing chain of events we from Lou liana [Mr, LONG],and the Sen- To support U.S. conventional forces caps- have come to know as the cold war. ator frolu, Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER]. I ble of meeting those of Russia, it was as- eted it is generally agreed that the Berlin may offer this week or next reservations men , and would mean "immense numbers of blockade in 1948 ushered in the era of in the hope of making the agreement w huge sums money" of almost world War II size over ver of an indefinite number the cold war, and so far our foreign poi- more palatable. ,I may also join with the of years. "Most unpleasant of all," the AFA icy planners have not been able to phase Senator from Arizona in his efforts to declared, this would require draft calls of it out. We are all well aware of the make the treaty contingent on Soviet wartime size. drama staged in the air corridors be- troop withdrawal from Cuba. _ That In its across-the-board criticism of Amer- tween our bases in West Germany and would be one tangible indication of Soviet loan military policy, the AFA called for a West Berlin. There is no need to dwell sincerity and at least one sign. of the re- greater military space effort, and the devel- on the heroism and frustration that ciproeal accommodation that 1S now opment of advanced bombers and aircraft interceptors "to avoid a dangerous over- marked those many weeks and months. totally'a&.king in the proposed accord. reliance on missile systems." In one form or another, American boys If the treaty cannot be altered to bet- DISLIKE SUBSTANCE, PRESENTATION have been called upon to display that ter respect the vital interests of the In explaining its stand against the test same brand of heroism, and have met United States, I intend to vote against its . ban treaty, the Air Force Association said with the same type of frustration in al- ratification. It was troubled both by its substance and most every year thereafter and in almost I pray to God that my colleagues will "the manner in which it has been thrust every part of the world. do likewise. upon the Congress, our military leadership, But the Berlin blockade set another EXHIBIT I and upon the American people." precedent aside from that of frustrated (By John G. Norris) Military leaders, it said, are in disagree- ment about the technical and military risks policy. The blockade, as well as the re- The Air Force Association, opening its involved in the treaty. suiting airlift, was an American under- annual convention, here yesterday, strongly As for the political advantages which the taking, executed and paid for almost opposed ratification of the test Dan treaty administration has said outweigh any mils- entirely with American dollars. There and sharply criticized the Kennedy adminis- tary risks, the AFA said, these apparently was, of course, good reason for that in tration defense policy. amount to no more than "the vague expecta- 1948 because what was left of free Eu- A policy statement, prepared by the AFA tion that the United States will now be able rope lay in ruins. The Marshall plan board of directors and approved by the con- somehow to transact business on easier vention after limited discussion, said the terms." had not yet begun to take effect. There limited nuclear .test ban agreement would . "Whenever a nation limits its freedom of was no one around to pay the bills and impose ''unacceptable risks to the, security technical initiative in any important field, supply the men, planes and material of the Nation and of the free world," its security is endangered," the statement except the United States. The military Members said there was a, considerable concluded. "It is our conviction, therefore, cost to us amounted to $229 million and fight within the AFA board of directors over that even if the promised safeguards should we paid- it ungrudgingly. We realized the association's taking a direct stand oppos- materialize, ratification of the proposed test that what was good for West Germany ing the treaty at a closed meeting Tuesday ban would entail unacceptable risks to the and what was good for free Europe was night. security of this Nation and the, free world." also good for America. ;.AMENDR(RNT DEFEATED ?. -Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the This operation seems to have set a A move was, made within the board of Senator yield? Precedent. Indeed, it set two precedents directors, an AFA spokesman said, to amend Mr. SIMPSON. I yield to the Sena- which we were to follow almost reli- the policy statement so the association would tor from Nebraska. merely warn that the test ban involves giously through the intervening years. "grave" rather than "unacceptable" risks, it Mr. CURTIS. Not in a long-time have When Stalin blockaded Berlin, we first was defeated by a a-to-I vote, the spokesman I heard a better prepared speech, which conferred with our Allies-with France, said. contained more sound reasoning. The Great Britain, and, I presume, with West About one-third of the AFA's members are Senator has added much to the enlight- Germany. When a plan of action had in the active Air Force. Most of the rest are enment of the Senate and of the country been agreed upon, that plan was put into retired and- former: USAF personnel-and de- in the speech which he has made on this effect and the bills were paid by uncle fense industry officials. Active Air force of- fi treaty, and I commend him Sam. cgrs a~z1}ea :c, ,nnot vote, but the associa- -Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the Senator Since that Berlin blockade, which t .oxl ua y reflects Air Force views, The Ai'Apolicy statement declared that for his kind remarks. marked the beginning of the cold war, "until rgce4tly" the, "keystone" of U.S. de- Mr. THCJRMOND. Mr. President, will we have paid bills amounting to a grand fence policy had been maintaining a clear the Senator yield? total of $629 billion in the military de- suneriority of nuclear tti rikin r AR- - _ - - g IMPSON I field of Approved For Release 2004/03/11: CIA7RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16122 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 lion was direct military assistance. This to pay Chiang Kai-shek's bills from the The Berlin precedent has remained overall figure also includes the following beginning, and who is doing it today? unchanged, although the economies of military costs: - The answer, of course, is that we have our allied countries have grown strong [in millions of dollars] been and we are still. Andwe are there and prosperous and they are well able to Berlin airlift, 1948------------------ 229 alone. Yet, obviously, Formosa is im- do their share. But I earlier mentioned Korea __---------------------------- 18, 000 portant to the free world. At least,. we another precedent which keeps company Lebanon, 1959______________________ ` 120 think it is, but to look at the contribu- with the first. When it comes to dealing Taiwan, 1969------ ,,.._____ _________ 78 tions of our erstwhile allies one would with Russia, our allies have taken the at- Berlin buildup, 1961-62_____________ 8, 247 never think so. To date, our expends- titude in the past of "do nothing unless Callup of 2 National Guard divisions- 419 tures in Formosa have amounted to $4.5 you consult us." This was also a prece- Support of U.N. operations in the billion, dent of the blockade and it has been re- 85 The current picture, in Vietnam is spected with varying degrees of faith 54 Congo Cuba, Congo 1962-63 __ _through____ Dec. ___ _31,___ _ 1962___________- _ 18b much the same. Over 12,000 of our ever since. It was best and most re- These figures represent the direct dol- men are now serving, adgising, and dying cently illustrated when we found it nec- lar cost of the military operations which in that unfortunate corner of the world. essary to go running to West Germany the cold war, and the protection of the The bill. mounts up at the rate of a to assure Bonn that the treaty implied free world, and especially our European million dollars a day, we are told, and no recognition of East Berlin. allies, forced upon us. Now, should we our costs to date are in'excess of a half But the treaty itself represents to me add the economic aid, as well as the gifts billion dollars. What price tag can be a break with this precedent because we and sales of our surplus commodities, the put on the lives of our American military did not get the consent of France, of total expenditure would be in excess of men, numbering over 100, which have West Germany, or Italy before signing three-quarters of a trillion dollars, or been lost in Vietnam, a, place where we on the line. To me this is a healthy indi- over $750 billion. have' no trade, commercial or historical cation, and I hope it is carried forward In 1947, the British had pulled their ties, and where we should not have be- in our future foreign policy. I have long forces out of Greece, leaving that country come involved in the first place? felt that it was next to impossible to get to stand alone before the onslaught of The security of the free world depends the major powers of Western Europe to Communist guerrillas. In keeping with upon the security of South Vietnam, so agree on anything of substance. Arid I our policy, we stepped in alone to fill the our planners say. There is no doubt have asked the question: "Why should void. The advent of the Truman doc- some truth in this.- But the so-called we let this fact of life tie our hands so trine in Greece was to mark the first of free world is compose( of many other securely?" I have consistently advocated the nasty little brush fire wars that we nations besides the United States. that as long as our shoulders are bear- have become involved in all over the Where are they? The grandstand is ing the burden of the free world, we world at considerable expense, and in- filled with nations hoping against hope should deal directly with Russia in an variably alone. Indeed, if there Is one that we will-win the struggle, but very attempt to ease the tensions and soften feature which marks each of our involve- content to sit clapping,' their hands. our burdens. ments in the farfiung trouble spots over Without mentioning the other coun- Thus far, I have attempted to place the where we have treaty in the framework of the cold war. the last decade and a half, it is the num- tries of southeast Asia ber of times we have found ourselves gone to a great deal oft trouble and ex- I have shown how the events of the past fighting alone in defense of the entire pense to create little armies In the hope 15 years, and our attitude toward them, free world. of containing communism, but where we have drained our national substance and There are other times when our allies know full well that if trouble breaks the lifeblood of our economy. The effect are more than willing to stand side by out we will have to step into the fray our- it has had on our balance of payments side with us, however, and I shall develop selves, let us turn our attention to the and our gold supply is well known. It this point later as it relates to the test situation in Western Europe. can be safely said that the cold war has ban treaty and the benefits we seek to In Europe we find 4Q0,000 of our men' seriously weakened the American giant; draw from it. - stationed to maintain' the status quo, at the same time, its effect has been to The next of the brush fires, or what as bars between Western Europe and the greatly strengthen our European Allies. some choose to call police actions was, of claws of the Russian bear. Our military For the last decade and a half we have course, Korea. This conflict cost our bases clot the lanscape, and our dollars been trying to fight communism by pre- country an estimated $18 billion, and make up an important part of the Euro= venting its spread, but with only small. thousands of American boys killed and pean economy. Yet how much aid are success. So long as we bear all the ex- wounded. There are some who call this we receiving here, where we are plugging penses, as is the case now, the ones to war a U.N. action, but it was a U.N. the mouth of the cannon with our men benefit will be our allies. While we :have operation more in name than in reality. and machines? Our friends are very' been protecting them militarily, they Here again we put up by far the great- happy to have us on their shores. They have been busily building up their econo- est portion-over 90 percent-of the men, welcome us with open arms. "But please mies until they are now in a position to money, and material involved on the side don't ask us to put up any of the cost; hurt us in the markets of the world. of the free world. - we carmot afford it," they say. So we And while we protect them from the And what do we find in Korea today? bear the burden alone. hated Communists, our allies are rnain- Whom do we find standing beside the 21/2 And actually why should they offer to taining trade with Russia and her satel.. divisions of American boys we maintain assume a part of the expense, so long as lites in excess of $5 billion annually. We there? There are the Korean divisions we do not insist that they do so? Their are told that they are vigorously trying we have trained and supplied, of course. present policy represents good business; to expand that trade, while we are act- But I am informed that except for these, as long as America is willing to pay and ing as the guardians. To my mind, this the so-called U.N. peacekeeping opera- pay, as long as we do tiot insist that the is a strange set of affairs. tion is staffed by less than 350 military picture be changed, Nir. President, you If the Senate should fail to ratify the men from other nations. To add insult may rest assured that, it will not be. . test ban treaty, it appears to me we face to injury, we finance the logistical sup- I have described one of the precedents two alternatives, and either will be de- port of these troops, with the exception set by our action during the Berlin structive of our way of life. We may of two Britishers, two Australians, and blockade-the fact that when trouble eventually drift or be forced into a nu- two Canadians. In other words, just breaks out anywhere in the world, it is clear war with Russia, or we will go broke enough are kept on hand to allow it to we, and we alone, who step in and do attempting to maintain the status quo be said that Korea is still a ON. opera- what must be done. When brushfire indefinitely. Does any intelligent per- tion, rather than American, as it is in wars start, we sometimes attempt to ob- son believe we can continue to pour out fact. Korea is still costing us over $500 tain assistance from our prosperous al- between $50 and $60 billion per year for million per year, aside from the cost of lies, but with little' success. Almost any length of time without doing vi- maintaining our own forces there. without exception we find them saying, olence and much harm to our economy And then, from Korea, we move to "That is your baby; `go and take care and our way of life? I for one do not. Taiwan, Formosa. Who is assisting to of it. Don't worry, we'll be pulling for I have stated that the treaty in itself maintain this outpost? Who'has helped you. Good luck." does not offer too much hope. It is of Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 A roved for Release 200A10 /11 CIA-DF-109 83RQ00100210007-3 X96 pp CONGRESSIONAL RECORD _ SENATE 16123, major importance, however, in that it In this regard, It should be pointed people to think more for themselves, I bTe the precedent of otp kiaving to out that this -provision will act to safe- said it would soon prove more and more o t ent of ou alli e con b f d t l s r es e ore guar he interest of all concerned. But difficult for the Russian leaders to hold 1~1 p tang with Russia. It isy also of it is even more important to remember the people in line. I based this on the ranee because -of what it may lead that should the treaty be broken b R y us- fact that educated Russians with whom I to an the utt}. It may lead to a first sia, we could.mi_thdraw from it immedi- spoke were extremely inquisitive about step that wii7 result in a real thaw of ately, rather than 3 months hence. our way of life. Even more important, the cold war. jt may lead to the dispe1l- The above summarizes what I believe they demonstratad a desire, if not a coin- ing' of the fear that presently-exists be-, to be thema_inpoints of the treaty docu- pelling urge, to go behind catchy Red u s ' s and-ti ssia. ment. I am receiving protest mail to the slogans, and to do their own thinking. Tt appears that there is a great deal of effect that, based on past experience, we I went on to express the belief that as mfsunllerstanding about the, treaty cannot trust the Russians to honor the Russian population became more ed- amongthe public. I know this is true treaties and. agreements, There is much ucated, they would become less prone to -in my own Louisiana, and I suspect it truth in this, but-this.treaty is not based accept at face value the grossly distorted is true throughout the Nation. To help on trust. It is simply an agreement to description of life in the United States clarify the matter, I, would like to take stop testing nuclear weapons in the at- which the propaganda system drones in- a moment here to discuss the main mosphere or underwater for the sake of sistently and consistently into their ears. Pointsof the treaty, and coment on each our children and our children's children. The production of propaganda, of of 'them. I must apologize for doing If the terms of the treaty are broken, our course, is an extremely sensitive and this, because many Senators who pre- scientists will know. of it, and this fact dangerous art. The propagandist can ceded me discussed the subject. I wish has been stressed. -by a preponderance of never be sure when the course of events merely, to repeat what may have been the expert testimony before the com- may turn his words on him with the said, only for emphasis. mittees of the Senates And if the treaty force of machinegun bullets. In 1956 In article I_ _ft, original signers-Eng- is broken by Russia, it will no longer and 1957, I predicted that this was likely 'land, the United States, and Russia- be binding _upon the United States. to happen in Russia. I believe it is in agree to refrain,from testing any nuclear Meanwhile, we have been assured that fact what has happened. This is ex- devicein the 'atmosphere, outer space,. or our. guard will be kept strong, and pre- underwater,' tremely important, for in my opinion, it The treaty also stipulates parations will be maintained to insure does much to answer the question of that the signers will refrain frgmunder- the immediate .renewal.. of testing by us why the sudden turnabout of the Russian ground testing if these experiments will should there be a violatign. - -- leadership on the test ban treaty. clause the spread"of radiation beyond the I sincerely believe that the document Take the increasing education of the nation% borders., contains ample safeguards to adequately Russian citizenry, add to it the intellec- The,Senate ii.s been repeatedly as- protect the interests of our country. If tual curiosity which such education sured by our experts that atomic ex- I did not so believe, I would do my utmost brings, and then pour into this mixture plosions which occur above the surface to defeat ratification. the output of a propaganda machine of the, earth can be effectively detected Mr. President, this is not my first at- which is consistently and insistently and pinpointed by our scientists and that tempt to argue in support of the limited preaching "peace, peace, peace." The there is little dnger such testing can test ban treaty. For many years I have mixture will begin to boil and bubble and take place without our knowledge. been supporting the idea of such a treaty, spell trouble for any leader, no matter underground experiments, of course, and the benefits which this country and how strong and how well insulated from are much more difflcult to detect, Ne- the world may expect to gain from it. the popular will, who refuses to act re- gotiations over suitable means to guard In a radio address which I delivered be- alistically to avoid war. against and detect underground nuclear fore the pending treaty was initiated in I found this passage on page 12 of my explosions have dragged on for years, Moscow, I believe I was one of the first 1956 report: beginning with the Eisenhower admin- Senators to go on record in favor of it. As a matter of fact, the Russian leadership istration. While. it is true. that Russia . Indeed, I first took this position in has done much to make any effort on its may test nuclear devices underground if 1956, after my return from an inspection part to generate a warlike spirit extremely she chooses, it is, also true that our coun- tour of Russia on behalf of the Senate difficult. Throughout the countryside were try will be able to make continued use Appropriations Committee. During that posters bearing the legend: "Peace." The of our extensive and well-developed un- tour I spent many days traveling within Russian radio repeated the message that derground testing facilities. It is my the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. After Russia desires only peace. The Russian peo- hope and expectation that we will con- my return, I submitted a length and doc- ple have been conditioned to expect peace, tinue to use our underground facilities umented report of our operations and I feel it will be extremely difficult for to develop more and more peaceful uses abroad, which contained several succinct co Soviet nflict without creating fear omet and tions of atomic energy,, - recommendations as to what future within the U.S.S.R., conditions which could Article I of the treaty also contains course our policy should assume, especi- perhaps result in a violent reaction among the another very important point, for here ally in regard to Russia. Russian people, the signing nations agree to refrain from Although I did not mention a test ban Similar passages, I might add, are participating or aiding in any atomic treaty specifically in that 1956 report, I found in each of my subsequent reports testing which may be carried out by any believe it is plain that I was looking to- which deal with the U.S.S.R. other nations in the world. ward the benefits which we may derive The fact that this treaty has come into I have long been disturbed that atomic by dealing directly with Russia. At that being at all is evidence that the change capacity would spread throughout the time, and on other occasions, my efforts I predicted is taking place. I believe the world-into the political boiling pots of and recommendations were . either time is now ripe for the fuller imple- the Middle East, for example-and it ignored or roundly criticized. The rec- mentation of the policies and recom- would be only a matter of time before ord will show, however, that I have held mendations I have been advocating for catastrophe overtook the world, this position consistently for many years. a number of years. Article II provides that amendments The question has arisen, why did the We must have a greatly expanded ex- to the treaty must be approved by a ma- Russian leadership, which refused so change program, and we must do every- jority of, the signing nations, but no long to consider a test ban treaty in any thing possible to increase the person-to- amendment may be adopted without the way, shape, or form that they thought person contact between the citizens of approval and vote of England, Russia, we might accept suddenly decide to sign America and Russia. We must learn and the United States. This gives us a the document under discussion? With that we cannot fight communism by pre- sate veto power to protect our future all due respect, I believe a partial expla- tending it is not there; we cannot defeat interests. - nation can be found in my comments of y vilification. '~s 6 Baal point,_article IV of the treaty 1956, 1957, and 1961 pertaining to Russia, it b I not fear at our American - 17Pdstide that any nation signing the After pointing out that my experience zensdwill become containated bycthe treaty has the right to withdraw at any in Russia had led me to believe that the evils of communism. I have more faith requires only that notice of an Russian educational system offered the in our people and our way of life than intent to withdraw be given to other greatest hope for ultimate Russian free- that. I have seen more of Russia and nations 3 months in advance. dom, and that education was causing the the way the Russian people live under Approved For Release 2004/03/11_:_CIA-R0P65B00383R000100210007-3 16124 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 13 communism than perhaps any other Senator and all but a few American citi- zens. The more I see of it, the more I abhor it. At the same time, I realize that communism has given to the Rus- sian people a far better way of life than any they have known in the past. New ideas are working in the minds of the Russian people. Visitors to the West have seen our way of life, and have re- turned home to wonder why It is that they and their families cannot have more of the good things Americans and Euro- peans take for granted. This wonderment is what we must en- courage in the years to come. I have here a newspaper article from the Wash- ington Post, dated September 10, 1963, telling how the newspapers in Russia are commenting more and more on the shoddiness of the consumer goods, and demanding that the quality and amounts of these goods be improved. We have also had reports that much of the Russian production is being boy- cotted by the people, who are demanding more and better things. Who ever heard of such events taking place in the U.S.S.R. as little as 5 years ago? Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the article be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) EXAMPLES CITED And the stories give a partial answer er to the Soviet bloc's inability to boost- trade with developing countries. The bloc com- mands only 5 percent of the total foreign aid turnover of nonindustaie.l regions. Consider for a moment these experiences related in the Communist press: Of 5,000 pairs of shoes prepared in Hun- gary for export, 4,200 were found unusable. In Bulgaria, consumer complaints about a lack of shoes were met With this explana- tion from the state-controlled industry: "The hammer and sickle plant didnt sup- ply its annual quota of 600,000 pairs, and we had to reject another, 350,000 pairs be- cause they weren't any good." In Moscow, two types' of cameras were put into production just as they were being retired in Czechoslovakia for being obsolete. And in Rumania, a Bucharest newspaper reported the misfortune of a citizen named Ionu ;Baku, who bought a camera with a shutter that jammed instead of clicking at the appropriate moment. Two attempts to have it repaired produced no improvement. A month. after returning it for the third time, Bai u was told by the store manager: "We can do nothing, there are several component parts missing from. the mechanism of the camera." "But I paid for it," Baicu protested. "What can I do with a camera like this? I can't use it for a salt shaker." ..__ __ ~_ ..di " the store manager dema ng u s hind be replicas. ,.o '- Without have it camera at all." agreed; but it is also well known that on f ew a artment build- that we have agr'eed n ns i Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, as a final point, let me say once again that I hope the precedent set by this treaty- a precedent which allows us to deal di- rectly with our most formidable enemy- will become a continuing part of our foreign policy. It cannot help but work to our benefit, and it is plain to me that we cannot spent the next 15 years as we have spent the last. Perhaps the treaty will prove to be an opening through which we can move to a better world. I have no doubt that it will have the effect of dispelling much of the fear that has existed between us and the Russians over a long period. Let us not take steps that will instill more and s Potential tenan o p any occasio Inge meant to ease Moscow's housing short- and I am very much pleased that the age better be good at climbing stairs. Elea Senate can listen to the observations of vatorii aren't very reliable, according to Vechernaya Moskva, one of the city's news- a Senator who has served on so many papers. of our committees, and who surely can.- While investigating one new building, the not be accused 'of softness toward any paper found, "to goad the elevators into form of totalitarianism. He has given movement (and not always successfully), the very thorough and very thoughtful con- tenants have to jump up and down and go sideration. and study to all the impliea- through a complicated routine of other gym- tions of the treaty. nastic "the exercises. tenants of another house, the I believe the statement of the Senator "For o eight-story No. 2B on Novovostankinskoye from Louisiana will be of great help in Street no amount of jumping produces any resolving the doubts some persons may effect. Whether they jump or not, the lift have, and in encouraging others to take remains immovable." a forthright position on this highly im- TROUBLE BEGINS AT HOME portant matter. But it is inside the Russian home that I wish to commend the Senator and trouble really begins. Light bulbs are no- to tell him that I regard it a privilege One paper reported that it to have been in the Chamber at the time oor iousl t . y p or is common for bulbs to burn out immediate- when he made his statement. I find deeper fears among the Russian people ly, explode, or go dead within 2 weeks. myself in agreement with a great deal of by refusing to ratify a document that 171/2' p Trent one light bulb goodsfwas de that what he has said. we were instrumental in bringing into tive. Mr. ELLENDER. I thank the Seri- alreaiea. Since 91 .e nations to the have A Moscow firm turned out an electric iron ator. aldy affixed thhe eirs signatures the n one side and ice cold on Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, a t d h o o was re document, it would be calamitous for the other. short time ago the Senator from Wy- us not to ratify. A Kiev enterprise marketed a paint that oming [Mr. SIMPSON] addressed the Sell- ExHIBIT 1 wouldn't dry. ate. At that time I was unable to en- [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, And a Minsk factory' manufactured such gage in colloquy with him; I had to Sept. 10, 1983] defective TV sets that the picture tubes con- leave the fl oor for a moment; and when LACK OF QUALITY IN GOODS CITED BY ant.tiy broke before the sets ever left the I returned, he had completed liis ad- RED PRESS plant. Pravda reported that of five transistor dress. (By James Hoge) radios tested, none avoided a quick break- After I returned to the Chamber, I The Soviet press, docile on most matters of down. Once that ha# happened, Pravda told the Senator from Wyoming that I state, is proving a scrapper' when it comes added, one might as well discard the sets, wished to make a comment or two on tocriticizing the quality of domestic indus- because repair shops can't fix any of them, one or two portions of his address, and trial and consumer goods. there being no spare parts. my comments would be related to Government officials here, responsible for The production of industrial equipment is that tam testimony o s oh had been taken keeping tabs on Soviet newspapers, have apparently no better than consumer goods. certai certain n wh c had been noticed, a steady barrage of criticism aimed There are innumerable:, accounts of tractors at all kinds of goods, from shoos to tractors. that fall apart, generators with missing parts The Senator from Wyoming said: When compiled, these accounts make the and 'machine tools that are badly designed. The advice of the Senate was not sought Soviet economy appear -as one huge Rube The general picture It one of an industrial in advance of this proposed treaty. The Goldberg machine, turning out faulty prod- complex that is rife with inefficiency, care- negotiations were done in secret in the cap- ucts with maddening regularity. lessness, and bad planning. In many sec- ital city of the Soviet Union. None of our Certainly the compilation win prove in- tions of the economy, there are obvious de- nuclear or military experts participated. teresting reading for Western businessmen, ficiancies in the durability, performance, and Communication with the Senate was with- tempted by the Soviet drive to increase its design of goods and In the availability of held until the language was an accomplished exports. spare parts. fact. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana on his address. I particularly commend him for his warning to the Senate and the Nation of what the effect of a failure to ratify the treaty might be in terms of future relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is well recognized in the Senate that the Senator from Louisiana has given much of his time and attention to a study of the Soviet Union, its econ- omy, and its political structure, and that he has an understanding and knowledge of the political leaders in the Soviet Union. I was pleased that the Senator re- minded us once again that the Soviet Union, like other areas of the world, is subject to change, and that changes have taken place. He has reminded us of the impact of education. I well recall that part of his report in 1956-57. It seems to me that his support of the treaty is highly significant, because the Senator from Louisiana is known as a practical, sound, and tough-minded po- litical leader. He is not given to over- emotionalism or to soft thinking. It is well known that on some occasions the Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 1968. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIARDP65B00383RQ00100210007-3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE M . President, I merely rise to state tk~hu? know to a the factual record. ors , of all, the great general who is C iaitp z of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deri.. xwe11 Taylor, has testified-and his statement has been-placed in the RECORD several ,.times-that all during the . negotiations in Moscow, he, as Chairman of the., Joint Chiefs of Staff, was kept fully infrmed as to the nego- tiations and as to the, language of the treaty; that this information was made available, bycable, on a regular basis; and that he, in turn, discussed these matters with the. chiefs of the other military services. General Taylor, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told us that he was in consultation with the President of the United .States during the negotiation of the treaty, and prior to the Harriman mission. He told us that he had bean consulted by the President with. to the instructions that were to be given to Secretary Harriman when Sec- retary Harriman was first dispatched to Moscow to carry out, for this country, the negotiation. of a nuclear test ,:}pan treaty. Dr, 54borg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has repeatedly told Senators in .the ?Joint Committee on Atomic )Energy,. in , the Committee on Armed Services, and in the committee on Foreign Relations that he, as the re- sponsible Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was one of the prin- cipals In working with the President of the United States in the designing of the treaty and in the instructions to Mr, Ilarrinan, the U.S. negotiator. .,in Moscow. n,fact, the development of warheads ,and . the development of our whole nu- clear arsenal is, in the main, the respon- sibility of the Atomic Energy Commis- sion,, of which Dr. Scaborg is Chairman. Dr, Harold Brown, the Director of De- Tense, Research, and Engineering, of the Department of Defense,, also was eon- sulted,oii the J_ uage of the treaty, the .implications o he treaty, and the im- pact of the , treaty upon the national security, before the treaty was ever nego- tiated, or before it was even sent to Moscow. The Secretary of State and the Secre- 11 tary of Defense were also consulted, as was Mr. Foster, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In fact, any matter of this sort and of this :importance is the subject of many eon- sultations, many meetings, and much discussion among. the President and, principal advisers-military, economic, and scientiilc---arid, of course,among the members of his Cabinet. I say this as chairman of the Subcom- mittee-on Disarapiament of the Sente ,Com i.utteeox .Foreign Relations, because oeepp Rd similar positions, have testified before that subcommittee, starting in .1956, and continuing in 1957, 1958, 1959, and unto the present time. -Mr. President, the treaty before us is similar to one of the proposals tabled at Ge ?y by the U.S. mission, on Au- gust 1962. Two treaties were tabled 16125 there by our representatives. The first On September 17, 1962, the Prepared- was a comprehensive treaty to ban all ness Subcommittee met with Mr. Foster, nuclear tests in all_environments-un- the Director of the Arms Control Agency, derground, underwater, outer space, and who presented drafts of the limited trea- in the atmosphere. It was a compre- ties offered in Geneva on August 27, 1962, hensive treaty which would have pro- hibited all nuclear weapon explosions in all environments, provided there was atomic inspection, surveillance, and monitoring, including on-site inspection. As we know, that treaty was the subject of months, of negotiation but to no avail. The second proposal tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962, was a treaty in the nature of the one we have before us now. We called it ,.a limited nuclear test ban. treaty; it was designed, to_prohibit tests in three environments-Qutex space,. un- derwater, and in the atmosphere. It was the subject of months of cQnsul.tatign, prior to its presentation and tabling at Geneva. So let it be,said that the scien- tific and military advisers of the Gov- ernment have been consulted repeatedly. Was the Senate consulted? Indeed it was. In fact, I say it is not true that the Senate was not consulted prior to the signing of the treaty by the representa- tive of the executive branch. I_say that on numerous occasions in 1962, the Com- mittee on Foreign Relations; its Sub-treaty. ' h I committee on Disarmament, of whic am privileged to be chairman; the Pre- paredness Subcommittee, of the Armed Services Committee; and, indeed, I may add, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, met with representatives of the executive branch to discuss the test ban treaty negotiations and the problems raised thereby. or example, on July 25,.1962, the Dis- armament Subcommittee met with Wil- liam C. Foster, head of the Disarmament Agency, to discuss the four possible U.S. positions in the current disarmament conference. I 'have before Inc the testimony taken from July 25 through August 2, 1962; it is ' printed under the heading "Renewed Geneva Disarma- ment Negotiations-Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on For- eign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th. Con- gress, 2d Session." I am quite familiar with this docu- ment, inasmuch as I presided during every minute of the hearings. On page 4 of the printed hearings appears an item entitled "Four possible U.S. positions on the disarmament conference." Position No. 1 is the April 1961 treaty, as modified. Position No. 2 is the proposed treaty banning weapons tests in the atmos- phere, outer space and underwater-a treaty similar to the one now before us. Positions 3 and 4 related to variations of those two treaties. Mr. President, on August 2, 1962, the committee met with Ambassador Arthur Dean, who was our chief negotiator at Geneva. He dealt with'such questions as our ability to trust the Soviets in the context of a limited test ban treaty. That testimony is also in the same docu- inent to which I have referred. I have a document before me ,entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament Hear- ings Before the._Preparedness Subcom- which, it is admitted by every Senator, was the basis for the present treaty. It is quite obvious that the executive branch consulted not only on the lan- guage of the treaty now before the Sen- ate, but as the treaty was being developed stage by stage. Several draft treaties, as they were being developed, were amended, altered, and adjusted during the processes of the negotiations. On September 17, 1962, Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense, appeared and was questioned at length by the Pre- paredness Subcommittee on August 27, 1962, on the limited nuclear test ban treaty, which is the body and substance of the treaty that is before the Senate. The primary difference between that draft treaty of August 27, 1962, and the one before the Senate is that this treaty provides for an easier procedure for withdrawal from the obligations of the treaty, which procedure was asked for by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That within itself indicates that the military officials were consulted on the language of the The treaty before the Senate was changed from the August 27, 1962, draft at the insistence, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who desires, a more flexible with- drawal provision. The President of the United States, listening to the advice and counsel of his military advisers, made the change in the language of the so- called withdrawal article of the treaty. The second provision that was changed after consultation with our scientists and military officials was the so-called plow- share program-the so-called testing for peaceful purposes. Why? Because there was a suspicion on our part that the So- viets might cheat under that provision. They likewise were suspicious that we might cheat and that nuclear explosions that were described as being for peace- ful purposes might well be for military purposes. So the treaty eliminated that particular provision. I point out that on September 12, 1962, Dr. Franklin Long, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Science and Technology of the Arms Control Agency, presented a statement on the technical difficulties of policing the limited test ban treaty with- out on-site inspection. He made that presentation before the Senate Commit- tee on Foreign Relations. It was my privilege to preside at those hearings. On August 11, 1962, Secretary Rusk appeared before the full Committee on Foreign Relations and was questioned at length by the Senator from Minnesota and others on the so-called draft treaty proposal for a limited test ban treaty. Those are gnly a few examples of the consultations that have taken place be- tween the appropriate committees of this body and the executive branch. In the 88th Congress, on Monday, March 11, 1963, test ban negotiations and disarmament were the subject of hearings before the Committee on For- eign Relations. The chairman of the committee, the Senator from Arkansas Approved For Release 2004/03/1 f CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3 16126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September _I3 [Mr. FULBRIGHT] called for the hearings. Finally, after Mr. Harriman had ini- I have presided over hearings on this He turned the hearings over to the senior tialed the treaty in Moscow on behalf of subject when it was not possible to get Senator from Minnesota, who is chair- the United states, we were again ad- two people to come to listen, because it man of the Subcommittee on Disarma- vised as to the text of the treaty. was an unpopular subject and nobody ment, and we heard from Dean Rusk, So there have been no secret negotia- wished to be bothered. the Secretary of State, and from .Adrian tions, no side deals, no jack of commu- I can remember when I nearly gave up S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms nication. The Senate' was advised. in despair, because it did not seem as if Control Agency. We questioned those Senators were kept informed. Military anybody wished to pay any attention to distinguished public servants at length and scientific officials Were consulted. this subject matter. on the proposals that our Government The Joint Chiefs of Staff, our atomic With the cooperation of the executive had tabled at the Geneva disarmament scientists, and our military specialists branch, the constant diligence of the conference, namely, the comprehensive were consulted. Chairman of the Committee on Foreign test ban treaty and the limited nuclear I believe the record speaks for itself. Relations, and the interest of a few Sen- test ban treaty. I know it is late. I am as tired as any ators, we kept abreast of the negotia- I believe that the argument of the other Senator. I do this tonight because tions. We kept the Senate informed. Senator from Wyoming [Mr. SmIPsoN]- so many doubts have been raised. It My colleagues can look at the record. namely, that the advice of the Senate seems to''me that when these doubts and I fulfilled my responsibilities as Chair- was not sought in advance of the pro- uncertainties-some of them sheer man of the Subcommittee on Disarms- posed treaty; that the negotiations were done in secret in the capital city of the Soviet Union and that none of our nu- clear and military experts participated; and that communications with the Sen- ate were withheld until the language was an accomplished fact-cannot stand the exposure of the testimony and the facts before the Senate and the appropriate committees of this body. Finally, before the treaty was even ini- tialed, the Secretary of State, Icon. Dean Rusk, speared before the Senate Com- mittee on Foreign Relations with the treaty language that had been discussed in Moscow. That was before Mr. Harri- man had initialed the treaty. That was several weeks before the treaty was signed. The Secretary of State, in ex- ecutive session, took up the language of the proposed treaty word by word, line by line, and explained to us what he thought It meant. He asked us for our advice and counsel. As a result, changes were made in the treaty. One change that was made was that there would be no requirement for all of the instruments of ratification to be deposited in the three capitals of the principal countries. That is why we do not accept the East German document of ratification. That has been. deposited in the Soviet Union, not here. The origi- nal language might have permitted that document to be deposited here. Senate committees asked that that language be changed; and asked for other changes. We were consulted. Let the record be clear. Individual Senators with heavy responsibility in this body and in the Committee on Armed Services, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, were consulted daily by re- sponsible officials of the executive "strawmen"-rear up, it is necessary to meet the doubts head on with the testi- mony, the facts, and the evidence. If one has no facts and no evidence, the doubt gains validity. If a strawman is set up, and the facts and evidence are available, the strawman should be knocked down. I do not want the CONGRESSIONAL REC- ORD of'this debate to indicate that Sena- tors were not consulted or kept informed. It is true that every Member of the Sen- ate may not have been. But, under the law-under the Reorganization Act of 1946--we have placed the responsibility for surveillance over treaty negotiations, for hearings upon treaties, and for elicit- ing responses from witnesses relating to treaties on the Committee on Foreign Relations. That is the law, just as much as the income tax is the law. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FuL- BRIGHT], the distinguished chairman of the committee, has fulled his responsi- bilities with honor. a ciency, delibera- tion, and application tb duty. Moreover, time after time, the execu- tive branch officials a7cked Senators to attend, and it was necessary to tell them we had other things to do; that we were holding hearings on mutual security, and that other matters were before us. So in this instance the executive branch, possibly with the historical memories of what happened to the Ver- sailles Treaty, went out of its way to keep us informed. Mr. Harriman, after having initialed the treaty, came back,, before Secretary Rusk went to Moscow with a Senate del- egation, and talked with appropriate committees of the Congress as to what he had initialed. It was clearly under- stood from the testimony of Mr. Rusk and by the testimony of Mr. Harriman before the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions that, even though Mr. Harriman had initialed the document, if we found In that document something which should not be in it the initialing did ment by reporting regularly to this body as to our discussions, our hearings, and any conclusions we could reach. That did not get any headlines. I must say, in all candor, that not only was the public not interested, but also the press was not interested. In the minds of some, it was an exercise in futility. But I had a duty to perform, and I ful- filled that duty. Now we are at the point where the treaty is before the Senate. I want it crystal clear that the treaty has the over- whelming support in numbers of the top military officials of the country, of scien- tists, and of political leaders; and that it was the result of active consultation among military leaders, scientists, Cabi- net officers, and Members of the Con- gress. President John Kennedy did not serve upon us an edict. What he presented to the Soviets in Moscow this past summer was the product of two administrations and hundreds of sessions of negotiations by Americans in America. It was not secret. It was testified to before the committees of the Congress. This is it treaty that we designed. It is not a Russian treaty. It is an Arrmeri- can treaty. It is not a secret treaty,. It is a treaty which is the product of many minds, after much consultation, with many advisers consulted. It is not a Democratic treaty. It is an American treaty. Its negotiation was conducted first by Mr. Arthur Dean, a famous lawyer, con- fidant of the former President of the United States, General Eisenhower. The negotiations were conducted fur- ther by Averell Harriman, an eminent American who has gained a position in. American life of respect and admiration. There is nothing to apologize for in the treaty. The only thing we need to be concerned about is, "Will mankind have the moral integrity to abide by it?" Some were consulted and advised by the Secretary of State. Others were consulted and advised by Mr. William Foster, Director of the Arms Control Agency; by Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director, or by one of the Assistant Sec- retaries of State. We were kept con- stantly advised of what was going on in Moscow. Furthermore, there were items in the newspapers. Secret negotiations? While it is a fact, of course, that some of the private discussions were kept pri- vate, daily the American people were in- formed of the negotiations that were going on. The basic substance of the treaty was well known before the official language was revealed. not compel us to accept the document for GALLUP POLL DISCLOSES 89 PER-. the purposes of signing it. In other CENT SUPPORT FOR YOUTH CON- words, we could change the language or SERVATION CORPS the meaning. As in legislative session, I attended the meetings diligently. I Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President suppose I have been involved as deeply while the Senate is debating the 9;ues-? as any other Senator in the matter of tion of ratification of the nuclear test the so-called nuclear test ban treaties. ban treaty, let us not forget the domestic Many times r have written reports or at- problems that warrant the action of Con- tended conferences, and been at Geneva gress. Surely one of the most urgent or at the United Nations as an adviser to domestic matters is the continuing crisis our delegation. of youth unemployment. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210007-3