SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100280023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 8, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

STATOTHR
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CONFIDENTIAL
SURVEY
OF
COMMUNIST BLOC
BROADCASTS
C25 JULY ? 7 AUGUST 1963)
CVOLo XVII NOa 16)
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C O N TENT S
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Bitter Moscow-Peking Recriminations Focused on Test Ban Treaty . .
1
Moscow Claims Soviet Initiative on Test Ban
CPR Says Agreement to Test Ban "Betrays" Soviet People
USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"
Moscow Says Nonaggression Pact Next Logical Step
Hiroshima Conference Scene of Violent Sino-Soviet Debate . .
8
Pyongyang, Hanoi Endorse CPR Stand on Test Ban Treaty . . . . . .
11
LATIN AMERICA
Castro Renews Call to Revolution in Latin America . . . . . . ,
13
Havana Poses as Sino-Soviet Neutral
CPR Continues Routine Attacks on Indian "Aggressiveness" . . , ,
16
Peking Denies Reports of Troop Concentrations
CPR Foreign Ministry Notes Carry Standard Charges
Peking Remains Cautious on Pakistani-Indian Differences
CPR$ Soviet Reactions to Air Exercises and VOA Agreements
Peking Vents Bitterness Over Soviet Aid to India
(continued)
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CONTENTS (Continued)
BLOC RELATIONS
Moscow Presses "Trotskiyism" Charge Against Peking . . . . . . . . 22
KOMMUNIST Assails CCP Leaders' "Deviation"
Moscow Defends Record on "National Liberation Movement"
CEMA Meeting: Autonomy Agitates Soviet Bloc Propaganda . , . . , , 25
Conference Communique Skirts Autonomy Issue
Soviet Bloc Responds to CPR's Anti-CEMA Sallies
THE USSR
Supreme Economic Council Meeting Underlines Chemical Priorities . . 28
Additional Investment Resources Sought From Construction
Ustinov Position Remains Ambiguous
COMMUNIST CHINA
PEOPLE'S DAILY Cracks Down on Historian's Views of Confucius 31
Liberal Line on Study of Confucius Tightens
Historian's Theory on Confucius Linked to Modern Revisionism
THE FAR EAST SATELLITES
DRV Regime Reacts Sharply to Novel's "Sour Criticism" . . . . . e e 34
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
BITTER MOSCOW PEKING RECRIMINATIONS FOCUSED ON TEST BAN TREATY
The conclusion of the partial test ban treaty evokes an out-
pouring_ of acrimonious propaganda, with Moscow citing the
treaty as concrete proof of the correctness of the Soviet policy
of peaceful coexistence and Peking characterizing it as a
nuclear fraud perpetrated with the imperialists to maintain
the nuclear monopoly. The increasingly vitriolic exchange is
climaxed by the 31 July CPR Government statement which charges
the USSR with betrayal of the Soviet and other socialist people,
and the 3 August Soviet response which characterizes the CPR
statement as "impudent" and again accuses the Chinese of trans-
ferring ideological differences to the realm of state relations.
This bitter propaganda exchange is followed by a direct and
violent confrontation at the Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons
conference. The Chinese delegate, according to NCNA, went so
far as to charge that the USSR cannot be trusted to live up to
the 1950 treaty of mutual alliance. This charge is the more
brazen coming after the Soviet Government statement had pointedly
asserted that its nuclear shield insures the security of the
socialist countries "including the CPR."
Moscow points up the "isolation" of the Chinese opponents to
the treaty by stressing the overwhelming worldwide approval
it has received, and Khrushchev at the 5 August signing
ceremonies in Moscow said that many states, "including those
in Asia and Africa, "'have expressed readiness to sign the ac-
cord. Propagandists claim that in addition to the Chinese,
the treaty is opposed only by some "wild men" in the United
States and by Bonn and Paris. All of the pro-Soviet satellites
promptly expressed their intent to sign the treaty, However,
Hanoi has joined Pyongyang and Tirana in echoing the Chinese
argument that a partial ban is militarily advantageous to the
west,
M25C Claim Soviet Initiative on Test Ban
In line with the attempt to portray the test ban agreement as a result of
Soviet "initiative," Khrushchev in his 26 July PRAVDA-IZVESTIYA interview
speaks of the "many years" the USSR has been striving for a ban, At the
same time, he states that U.S. and British negotiators should be given
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their "due," a graceful gesture which he repeats at the 5 August signing
ceremony, and leaves it to his propagandists to document in detail that
it has been the Soviet Union which has led the way in test ban proposals,*
Consistent with this claim of "initiative," Moscow, of course, obscures
the similarity of the present treaty with the U,S,-British proposal
of last Augusta And predicatably the account of the President's 26 July
TV speech omits his recollection that Washington and London had proposed
limited test ban treaties in 1959, 1961 and 1962, as well as his ref-
erence to U,S0 attempts to control nuclear weapons dating back to the
Baruch plane Peking, of course, highlights the similarity between the
treaty signed in Moscow and proposals advanced by the West to support
.its charge of Soviet capitulation, And to further document the Soviet
reversal, Peking media published textually past Soviet statements, in-
cluding those by Khrushchev himself, criticizing a limited test ban,
to keeping with Moscow's cautious optimism about a further relaxation
of tensions and agreement on at least partial measures, propagandists
indicate that it is only isolated circles in the United States which
oppose a detente0 Noting that some "wild men" in the United States are
opposing the test ban treaty, commentators refer to the "Pentagon" and
single out for special criticism Teller, and Senators Goldwater,, Jackson,
)irksen and Thurmond,
in keeping with the circumspect treatment of the President, the sub-
stantial TASS account of his 26 July TV speech omitted passages bearing
directly on the cold war such as his reference to the United States'
having stood on the verge of direct military confrontation with the
:Soviet Union in Laos, Berlin and Cuban TASS also omitted his statement
that Western policies have sought to persuade the Soviet Union to forego
direct or indirect aggression;** a home service commentator, however,,
did say that his words about improving relations are incompatible with
his "slander and attacks" directed al: the Soviet Union, and specifically
his statement that the USSR and other, socialist countries should ""re-
pudiate their aggressive plans," But commentators for the most part
"oviet audiences do note hear detailed accounts of past efforts for,
disarmament and a test ban, But a 28 July commentary to Germany says
it was not the "notorious" Baruch plan but the 1956 Soviet proposal
which was the first initativen And a broadcast to Britain the day Le-
Fore goes on from the 1956 proposal t:o list the May 1957 Supreme Soviet
appeal, the 1 March 1958 Soviet unilateral moratorium, and the Soviet
"initiative" on a test ban in November 1961
{?j= The NCNA account of the speech, which was interlarded with editorial
comment calculated to point up Khrushchev's "capitulation," included
this passage,
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played up his expression of hope that the test ban agreement would be
followed by progress on other disputes,
CPR Says USSR Agreement to Test Ban "Betrays" Soviet People
While Moscow stresses Soviet initiaii. in achieving the test ban agree-
ment and says that it is proof of the correctness of its coexistence
policy, Peking's attack on the Soviet role in perpetrating the nuclear
fraud becomes steadily more acriminous and voluminous. Thus, the
31 July CPR Government statement--which continued to be rebroadcast
through 6 August--goes beyond past indictments of the USSR to charge
that it has betrayed the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union,
of the peoples of the socialist camp, including China, and of all the
peace-loving people of the world. The statement blatantly goes on to
characterize Soviet policy as one of
allying with the forces of war to oppose the forces of peace,
allying with imperialism to oppose socialism, allying with the
United States to oppose China, and allying with the reaction-
aries of all countries to oppose the people of the world,
Making explicit earlier clear implications that Peking would not be
deterred from developing a nuclear capability, the Chinese statement
says of the treaty that "it is unthinkable for the Chinese Government
to be a party to this dirty fraud;" However, there has been no echo of
Kuo Mo-jo's 26 July statement that "it will not be long" before the
nuclear monopoly is broken,'` Consistent with propaganda since the 19 July
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the CPR statement points up the Soviet's
about-face in agreeing to a partial test ban. Thus, it again quotes
Kuznetsov's 29 August 1962 Geneva statement that the U,S,-British partial
test ban proposal would give them a one-sided military advantage, since
it'legalized" underground tests by which the United States could continue
improving its nuclear weapons, The Chinese statement also recalled Khru-
shchev's similar remarks of 9 September 1961--after the Soviet decision
to resume nuclear testing.
* A Prague broadcast in Serbo-Croat sees a discrepancy between this state-
ment and the CPR proposal for destruction of all nuclear weapons. Prague
adds that"itis even stranger when we take into account the Sino-Indian
conflict and Chinese maps of Asia with large territories of neighboring
countries indicated as parts of China," Peking has lashed out at Soviet-
oriented parties for their attacks on the CPR, and the press and NCNA
have carried detailed `repo.rts of statements by the French, Italian, Czech,,
Bulgarian and GDR parties,
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The charges against the USSR voiced in the CPR statement are echoed
in the 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial--blatantly entitled "This Is
a Betrayal of the Soviet People"-=which says that by its 1GO-degree
turn, Moscow has betrayed not only "their own correct stand and the
interests of the Soviet people, but also all those who had supported
them." The editorial in addition to repeating past public Soviet
statements opposing a partial test ban, claims that this appeared to
be the Soviet position "even up to early June this year," PEOPLE'S
DAILY says that after the agreement to hold the tripartite Moscow
test-ban talks, the Soviet Government had "formally" notified the CPR
that the Western countries` position "could not serve as a basis for
reaching an agreement" on a test ban, The editorial goes beyond the
CPR statement in its frontal attack on Khrushchev, After saying
that it is obvious that the treaty is aimed at tying China's hands,
PEOPLE'S DAILY says
Recently, while fraternizing with U0S, imperialism on the
most intimate terms, the Soviet leaders and the Soviet press
have gnashed their teeth in their bitter hatred toward
socialist China, They use the same language as U,S, impe-
r:?ia lism to abuse China, This is a U,S,-Soviet alliance
against China pure and simple,
Since the beginning of the talks, Peking has made sure that its audi-
ence is informed about the warm friendly atmosphere in Moscow,, Thus,
the 17 July NCNA dispatch on the opening of the negotiations quotes
Western press reports at ,Length on Khrushchev's good humor and con-
viviality, The NCNA press review for 29 July pointedly notes that
PEOPLE'S DAILY publishes a picture of Khrushchev embracing Harriman,
NCNA on 6 August cites REUTERS for the report that during the signing
ceremony Khrushchev was "bubbling over with good spirits," and that
he "went into a comic routine, pretending that his view of the signing
was blocked by the six foot aide of Lord Home," And a 7 August NCNA
report that Secretary Rusk had accepted an invitation from Khrushchev
to -loin him at a Black Sea resort says according to Moscow reports,
Rusk was gratified by the warm reception he received in Moscow, NCNA
concludes with the information that "when Rusk and British Foreign
Secretary Lord Home entered a Kremlin reception with Khrushchev on
5 August, the band broke into 'Love Walked In",' by American composer
Coorge Gershwin, ""
CPR Proposes World Disarmament Conference; Peking's concern over the
world wl e approval which would greet a test ban and China's isolation
in opposing it is pointed up by the call, in the CPR statement, for a
world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament, As specific::
documentation of the claim of a consistent struggle for peace and
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disarmament, the statement says that "as is known to the whole world,"
the CPR long ago proposed the establishment of a nuclear free zone in
the Asian and Pacific regions, NCNA on 1 August carries Senior General
Lo Jui-ching's statement of PLA support for the world conference pro-
posal, and on 4 August Peking releases Chou En-lai's letter to the
heads of all states formally advancing the proposal.
The only major propaganda followup comes in the 2 August editorial
ostensibly directed against the United States for saying that the
Chinese proposal is so "sweeping and unrealistic" that it stood little
change of being considered seriously, PEOPLE'S DAILY says that all
those who are sincere in defending world peace will welcome the proposal,
and "only U.S, imperialism and its collaborators fear it," Earlier,
the editorial says that U,Se dismissal of t e proposal shows U,S, in-
tent to use? export, manufacture, test and stockpile nuclear weapons,
And it adds that "the very words prohibition of nuclear weapons are
not found in the much vaunted treaty," The Soviet G vernment statement's
dismissal of the proposal as "propaganda" has so far occasioned no
direct reply from Peking,
USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"
Moscow did not acknowledge the CPR @overnment statement until it re-
leased its scathing response on 3 August which characterized as "impu-
dent" the charge that Moscow has "betrayed" the interests of the Soviet
people. The statement is published in all Moscow papers and PRAVDA and
IZVESTIYA carry the text of the Chinese statement as well, with the
prefatory note that the "shameful" document is unworthy of space in
the Soviet press but is being carried so that the Soviet people may
see "how far the Chinese leaders have gone."
The Soviet statement says the Chinese have provided one more bit of
evidence that they have transferred ideological differences to state
relations, and that the USSR and "other socialist countries" regard
the CPR attack as an unprecedented, most regrettable act, As though
to point up the "correct" Soviet behavior, the statement in two separate
passages notes that the Soviet nuclear shield has insured and will
insure the security of the CPR as well as other socialist countries,
The statement reveals some sensitivity, however, to Peking's charges
of the reversal in the Soviet position on a test ban when it says that
the CPR "in artificially selecting quotations,,,forgets that science
and technology are developing tempestuously, and what was unacceptable
only yesterday might prove most useful today," Moscow says sarcastically
that the test ban treaty can only be objected to by people who "cover up
with flashy phrases about the most radical disarmament measures their
lack of desire or readiness to achieve disarmament,"
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The Chinese position on the test ban treaty was scored in a Yur.iy
Ziiukov article published in PRAVDA on :29 Jisly which expressed "astor"ish-
in ent" at "responsible" Chinese leaders acting in concert with the
['l ench to defend nuclear testing, After the Zhukov articles a steadily
??.rreasing volume of radio and press commentary attacked the Chinese
position,
osca,7 Saks Nona resslon Pact Next Logical Step,
Moscow's elite and routine propaganda continues to give wide play to
the notion that the test ban agreement should be followed by a NATO=
Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement, Thus, Khrushchev in his 26 Jury
interview places it in "first place" and-=putting his own interpreta-
t_.on on the 25 July communique--says agreement was reached in Moscow
t:at after both sides had consulted with their allies, discussion should
be continued with a view to reaching an accord,;; '."his interpretation
was repeated in a 28 July home service broadcast, and in the 29 July
PRAVDA editorial, In his remarks, at the signing ceremony on 5 August,
Khrushchev describes the nonaggression pact as the "next step," and
tke 3 August Soviet Government statement speaks of it as a "primary"
While Khrushchev (and the 3 August statement) expresses concern for
settlement of the German problem, he as well as lesser propagandists
remain vague on the relationship between the nonaggression pact and
this issue "on which the liquidation of international tension most
depends," Reporting President Kennedy's 1 August press conference,
;ASS includes his remark that "we must, ?discuss the nonaggression
pact with our allies, review their interests and our interests, re
view them from the point of view of one problem-,-Berlin--and then
set out once more for the Soviet Union and explain what the situation
The account omits, however, the President's assertion that one
). his interests in a nonaggression pact would be ,greater security tor
Berlin,
Aside from singling out the nonaggression pact for priority considera-
tion, propagandists generally fail to indicate an order of preference
[- r the partial measures listed by Khrushchev in his 19 July speech-
for control posts to guard against surprise attack, a reduction or
f.,cezing of military budgets, and reduction of troops and exchange of
military missions in Germany--or the forum in which they should be
The communiques said in fact that the allies would be consulted about
continuing discussions,
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discussed. Khrushchev in his interview with PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA merely
lists these measures (without specifying that the measures to prevent
surprise attack include the establishment of ground control posts)
and in his 5 August remarks he alludes only to "specific problems"
which he has mentioned recently "more than once." According to the
TASS account of the 30 July plenary session in Geneva, Tsarapkin listed
all of Khrushchev's partial measures with the exception of that for
surprise attack. And the account of the 1 August session notes the
Bulgarian representative's suggestion that the Geneva negotiators dis-
cuss a nonaggression pact, the proposal for the reducing of military
budgets, and the creation of nuclear-free zones--which scattered com-
mentaries continue to press as a desirable measure.
Although proposals for a nonproliferation agreement are not pressed
in current comment, Moscow has acknowledged various suggestions to this
effect. The TASS account of the President's 26 July speech includes his
reference to the desirability of a further: limitation on the dissemina-
tion of nuclear weapons. And TASS on 30 July says that Lord Home
indicated that along with surprise attack measures,""the next'lQAicil
step" would be a nondissemination agreement. Moscow also reports a
similar statement by Macmillan.
Although Khrushchev failed to mention underground tests in his 26 July
interview, other propaganda including the 8 August PRAVDA editorial
lists such a ban among problems that remain to be settled. In his
3 August message to the Hiroshima conference Khrushchev perfunctor3;:y
spoke of the need to ban "all" tests. Reportage on the Geneva talks
includes expressions of interest by various delegates in banning under-
ground tests.
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ooiIiT (~ COI I ERREl1CE SCFUF. OF VI O11; T ST :dO -SOVIET' DEPAIT
The 5 August Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference was
witness to the most severe public vituperation of the Soviet
Union by China to date, In unprecedentedly frank and detailed.
-reports, both Peking and Moscow media have described a climactic
verbal bout between their respective delegates in which the
Chinese representative all but rejected the CPR's alliance with
he Soviet Union and accused the Soviets of helping another
country to attack them,
At the same time, the Hiroshima conference revealed the di:sintegram
?pion of the "peace movement" in the wake of the heightened
=Uino-Soviet dispute, The conference was divided at its in--
c?eption by a break in the tenuous alliance of the Japanese "left".
as the socialist and Sohyo delegates withdrew,, in protest of
communist manipulations,, to form a separate conference, Like-
wise .n, a dilemma over the widening Peking,-Moscow rift A the
Chinese-oriented Japanese Communist party showed signs of con-
tusion over its own stand on the test-ban treaty,
11 view of the Moscow-PeKinp. propaganda exchange over the test ban treaty,,
debate at the Hiroshima conference was to be expected; however,, the
]agree of bitterness of the exchange,, acknowledged in broadcast:s from
th' sides, is unprecedented, Apparently Soviet delegate Yuri Zhukov
ip1.:.ed to a Chinese attack on the test ban treaty by using the Cuban and
:.iwan crises as examples of how the Soviet Union's nuclear might has
protected the security of the "socialist camp", he claimed that "more than
ice" we have "saved" the CPR from "attempts at aggression by Taiwan,,"
=a=nd he recalled that "we said bluntly that we would use atomic weapons
de-tend China,"
response, Chu Tzu-chi is reporter. by 11NNCNA to have asserted in part,
e following points,
that the Chinese won their revolution "mainly by their own efforts,"
did have "relied on their own strength" to "discourage U, S, imperialism
I.,orn attacking their country,"
that ""Zhukov'' a claim that the Soviet Union managed to protect
China
with its nuclear weapons was an insult to the Chinese people',""
that Xorea was strict.Ly a Chinese victory and that the Soviets cow=
rr.i.ted both the errors of "adventurism" and "capi.tulationism" in Cuba?
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? that the Soviets not only do not help China but that they "and U,S,
imperialism have been helping a third country with arms to attack
socialist China,"
4 that China cannot trust the alleged protection of Soviet nuclear
power because the Soviets have "violated Lenin's teachings and the
interests of the Chinese people, the socialist camp, and the people
of the world," and have "betrayed the interests of the Soviet people,"
+ that, by voting in favor of the dispatch of U.N. troops to the
Congo, the Soviets "helped,,,in the murder of Patrice Lumumba,"
+ that while the Chinese "can list 100 cases of your capitulation to
imperialism," the Soviets will never be able to give a single case of
Chinese capitulation,
+ and, that the Soviets "show far less; courage, if any, than the
Japanese religious circles,"
Moscow. PPeking Pre-Conference Maneuvers: In the 19 July PEOPLE'S
71LY editorial Peking had revealed Its concern that the conclusion
of a partial test-ban treaty could cause the CPR to be estranged from
the peace movement, The editorial noted that "some kind-hearted
people" may view even a partial test ban as a "step forward"; but
that the imperialists must not be allowed to exploit the people's
desire for an end to tests, Peking's resolution to attempt to use
the conference to garner opposition to the treaty was evident from
the fact that Chinese speakers at the 1 August Peking rally supporting
the Hiroshima conference concentrated on attacking the test ban treaty,
The Soviet delegation seemed initially to be willing to try to avoid
a direct battle with Peking, However, after failing in an apparent
attempt,through the efforts of the representatives of the World Peace
Council, to give all overseas delegates the status of observers,
rather then delegates, the Soviet delegation countered the Chinese
offensive by urging the conference to endorse the test ban treaty,
Each side claims to have succeeded in its aim--Peking media emphasize
the anti-imperialist content of the final conference report (which
makes no mention of the test ban treaty); and Moscow claims, in a
7 August: commentary on the conference, that the majority of the
authentic representatives of the world's people supported the treaty
and that the Chinese delegates "looked particularly out of place,"
The Position of the Japanese Comunists: The Japanese CP has pro-
esse to a neutral in the sino?oviet conflict but has in fact backed
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ing" s stand on important issues, On the question of the merits of
test ban treaty,, a par -`.s sensitive is sue in Japan the Ji- P
been inconsistent ani seems to be attempting to avoid a direct
jec r,Ion of the treaty, .efiectinp the dilemma? a 24 July JCP AKAHATA
itorial implies some credit for the expected test ban agreement is
due the 1962 anti-nuclear weapons conference whose declarations and
"commendations "have made great contributions to the suppression o
iaperiai.ism, "" And a 29 July AKAHATA editor i,al declares that ""the
ar test ban agreement will have positive significance if it is the
step toward a world ban on nuclear, weapons,"
to ? August JCP statement on the Hiroshima conference presents a
-usition differing in emphasis significantly from the previous modicum
optimism by declaring that the view that the treaty represents a
.rst stems toward a reduction of the threat of nuclear war, and to
-
'ir word peace with a total ban on nuclear wea,"Dons ? " does nct Iac
;c;:urd with world reality in Japan, The JCP acknowledged its pcliticcal
pnohlem when it proposed in this same statement that the conference
" hould not be forced" to pass a resolut:Lon supprDrting or opposing? the
i ceaty % "'for the sake of preserving unity." The JCP" s basic desire
maintain the unity of cr"e Japanese groups in the antinuclear
;;apons movement was also given by the statement as the reason why
"e conference should similarly avoid a position on the question of
)posing; nuclear tests bar `any country--the issue which split
year ? s meeting,
been unsuccessfui in its attempt to prevent the polemics at
c.on7=erence and to avoid the disintegration of the Japanese "peace
,cuvemenr," the JCP has pubiicly ignored the conference chaos, Thus-,
e JCP statement on the "successful opening` of the conference passes
ally over the sociaiis t--Sohyo walk-out of the first day, appealing
both to safeguard uni y and, AKAHATA has made no mention to data of
hitter, Sino-Soviet exchanges?
g has reproduced in its press JCP s::atement;s. editorials and
,:~deFs" rremarks on the cconference and the test-,.ban to give the
. opression that the JCP favors the CCP"s views, The Chinese and J(.:'':'
tions while close, are not: identical? Peking, obviously would have
Bred the conference to have opposed the treaty--Chu Tzu mch de-
ed that the treaty was a "crime" and that the conference should
epu.udi