HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECUIRTY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100290001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AMB. BRUCE TESTIMONY.
HEARINGS HOLD FOR RELEASE
SUN OCT 201963 AM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND 9PERATIONS
OF TH -~ ... ._._..._
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-855 WASHINGTON : 1963
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chaffrman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska JACK MILLER, Iowa
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JAMES B. -PEARSON, Kansas
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ARTIIDR A. SHARP, Staf Editor
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman
HUX,,ERT H. HUMPHRE,Y, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island JACK MILLER, Iowa
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director
ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant
RICHARD S. PAGE, Research Assistant
JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk
LAUREL A. ENGBEBG, Minority Consultant
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CONTENTS
Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson--------------------------
197
Testimony of the Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer---------------------
198
SEPTEMBER 18, 1963
Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson ------------------------
233
Testimony of the Honorable David K. E. Bruce -----------------------
234
Memorandum of the Honorable Samuel D. Berger on "Foreign Service
Staffing and Operation Problems and the Role of the Ambassador"
(with introductory note by Senator Henry M. Jackson) ----------------
258
EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1. Organizational chart, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan ------
223
Exhibit 2. Organizational chart, American Embassy and affiliated agencies,
Tokyo, Japan----------------------------------
----------------
224
Exhibit 3. Personnel strength summary, 1952-63, American Embassy
and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan-------------------------------
225
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 1963
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington., D.C.
[This hearing was held in executive session and subsequently ordered made
public by the chairman of the committee.]
The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present : Senators Jackson, Pell, and Miller.
Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W.
Tufts, chief consultant; Robert C. Fisk, research assistant; Judith J.
Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.
Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today our subcommittee continues its hearings on the role of U.S.
ambassadors and the missions they head in the conduct of our relations
with other nations.
This subject forms part of the subcommittee's broad nonpartisan
study into problems of national security administration.
We opened this phase of our hearings last month with testimony
from two recently retired career ambassadors-the Honorable Ellis O.
Briggs and the Honorable H. Freeman Matthews. Today we hear
from an outstanding noncareer ambassador.
We are pleased to welcome the Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer,
Ambassador of the United States to Japan. Ambassador Reischauer
did his undergraduate work at Oberlin College and his graduate work
at Harvard University. He has had a distinguished career as a
student and teacher of Far Eastern affairs, and was called from his
professorship at Harvard to his present post. Over the years the
Government has frequently drawn upon his knowledge and experience
for advice on important matters.
He is the author of a number of books, including Japan, Past and
Present (1946) ; Wanted. AnAsian Policy (1955) ; and United States
and Japan (1957).
Ambassador Reischauer is a gifted linguist and a distinguished
scholar, qualities which have contributed greatly to his work in a
country of very great importance.
Ambassador Reischauer, we are all happy to have you with us today.
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198 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
I believe you have a prepared statement, and if there is no objection
on the part of the subcommittee, we shall include it at this point in
the record.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, AMBASSADOR TO
JAPAN
Ambassador REIsCnnuim. lam very pleased to be here with the sub-
committee today to discuss the administration of national security with
particular reference to the role of the Embassy in Japan. Some idea
of the amount of coordination required for the administration of
national security problems in Japan may be gained by noting that
there are 21 different departments and affiliated agencies of the U.S.
Government represented in. Tokyo in addition to the State Depart-
ment. As a matter of convenience, I attach to this statement two
organization charts, the first giving the division of work in the
Embassy itself, and the second giving the Embassy's relationship to
affiliated U.S. Government agencies.
The important things to note in looking at these charts are first,
that USIS operates as an integral part of the Embassy, forming one
of its five major sections, and second, that with a few exceptions,
which I will refer to at greater length below, each one of the other
affiliated agencies is administratively attached to an operative section
of the Embassy itself. Thus, for example, the Federal Aviation
Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the U.S. Trade Center,
the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Travel Service, the Office
of International Finance of the Treasury Department, the Bureau of
Customs of the Treasury Department, and the small remnant of
AID left in Tokyo are assigned for administrative purposes to the
economic section. Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service are assigned to the
consular section, the General Accounting Office to the administrative
section, and the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, with its labora-
tories in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the political section.
Several offices are for administrative purposes assigned directly to
my own, which includes the. office of the deputy chief of mission. This
is the situation with respect to the scientific attache, who coordinates
closely with representatives in Tokyo of the Atoinic Energy Commis-
sion, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of
IHealt.h. The same is true of the Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG) and the attaches of the three military services. All these
offices also coordinate very closely with the political section. With re-
spect to MAAG and the service attaches, a special branch of the polit-
ical section, the politico-military branch, is constituted for the spe-
cific purpose of coordinating matters with the military sector. Thus,
the politico-military branch has responsibility for day-to-day coordi-
nation of all matters coming under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, the
Security Consultative Committee, military aid program, and so on.
Again, althougli the scientific attache and the service attaches are,
as I say, attached to my office, the latter also attend the staff ineetings
of the political and economic sections at least once a week, and a rep-
resentative of the scientific attache attends political section staff meet-
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iiigs`daily. For purposes of even closer coordination in the important
scientific sector, the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission
also sits in once a week at the political and the economic section staff
meetings.
You will have gathered even from these preliminary remarks that
-good deal of staffing is required for proper coordination of the mani-
fold duties performed by the Embassy and its affiliated agencies, and
in order to permit representation of the U.S. Government in Japan
to be orchestrated so that they are in harmony with each other as well
as with overall U.S. policy toward Japan.
It might therefore be of interest to you if I proceeded to set forth
in somewhat more detail the staff meeting schedule established in the
Embassy for the purpose of that orchestration to which I have referred.
All the operative sections of theEmbassy as a general rule have morn-
ing staff meetings shortly after the opening of business each day.
One of the functions of these meetings is to sift out important mat-
ters to be taken up at my own staff meeting, which is usually held
daily at 10 :30 a.m. This is attended by the chiefs of the political, eco-
nomic, consular, and administrative sections and by the Director of
the U.S. Information Service in Japan, as well as by the deputy chief
of mission, my special assistant and staff aide, the press attache, and
such other officers as each regular participant might consider as con-
tributing usefully to any subject which may be due for discussion on a
particular day.
In addition, a country team meeting and a so-called large staff meet-
ing are held alternately each Thursday in place of my usual staff meet-
In g. The "large staff meeting" is attended by the representatives of
all the sections in the Embassy and of all affiliated agencies in Tokyo.
At this larger meeting, we discuss matters which are of wide common
concern, such as, for example, cotton textile negotiations, or thebasic
elements of the problem created by the U.S. Government's desire to
have nuclear-.powered submarines visit Japanese ports.
At this point, I should like to speak in more detail about, the country
team and its place in the formulation and implementation of U.S.
policy in Japan. In my view,. the execution of U.S. national policy
and the coordination of policy recommendation and guidance have
been greatly facilitated through the agency of the country team. Thus,
the country team has provided an excellent mechanism for continuous
discussion and coordination of action relating to such significant prob-
lems, for example, as the implementation of provisions of the security
treaty with respect to U.S. military forces in Japan, the military as-
sistance program, and the overall review of situations in nearby trou-
bled areas as they apply to U.S. objectives in Japan. As these and
other problems have become more and more complex, and have re-
quired greater joint efforts by U.S. Government officials and agencies
in Japan, the system of fortnightly meetings of the country team re-
ferred to earlier has evolved. By providing a forum more suitable for
complex discussion than earlier informal luncheon meetings, which
were the means used to bring together, what is now the country team
prior to 1956, these fortnightly meetings have increased the value and
usefulness of the coordination process.
A significant increase in the value of the country team concept has
also resulted from the participation of a wide range of U.S. officials in
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team meetings. While the formal members of the country team include
only myself, the commander, U.S. forces, Japan, and the Chief of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group, regular participants in team
meetings in Tokyo, and in the day-to-day work of the team, include
in addition the deputy chief of mission; the minister for economic
affairs; the minister for cultural and public affairs (USIS) ; the polit-
ical counselor; the Army, Navy, and Air attaches; the chief of the
internal affairs branch of the political section; and the chief of the
political military branch of the political section.
It will be noted that in addition to Chief, MAAG, the commander,
U.S. forces, Japan, is a key member of the country team. This is es-
sential for the proper consideration of the many vital policy problems
which arise in Japan as a result of our security treaty and the presence
of some. 45,000 U.S. military personnel (plus an additional 55,000 de-
pendents) in the country. It will also be noted that unlike the situa-
tion in many other countries, AID is not a constituent member of the
team. This is because the economic assistance program in Japan has
been eliminated and only a residual AID office remains in Tokyo to
supervise offshore procurement, and third country training in Japan.
.Coordinating country team operations, staffing for position papers,
recording and distributing the minutes and preparing agenda for
country team meetings are responsibilities of the Embassy's political-
military branch. Happily, in spite of the relatively great distances
physically separating the basic elements of the country team-U.S.
forces, Japan, for example, is over an hour's drive from the Embassy-
coordination has been accomplished without serious difficulty.
It may not be inappropriate at this point to note that successful
coordination is at least partly a result of the excellent personal rela-
tions existing among country team participants. These relations al-
low the group truly to function as a. team and not merely as an
assembly of representatives of different government agencies.
The fortnight meetings are held in the Embassy conference room.
Complete flexibility in scheduling meetings is maintained, however,
and ad hoc meetings are held as necessary. Similarly, regular meet-
ings are canceled if none of the members has sufficiently important
business to justify holding them.
Basic procedure for preparing the agenda for these meetings is well
established. At the beginning of the week in which a meeting is
scheduled, the chief of the Embassy's political military branch com-
municates with (1) the Secretary, Joint Staff, Headquarters, Com-
mander, USFJ, and (2) the Orrice of Chief, MAAG, Japan, in order
to ascertain what, items those components of the team wish to propose
for inclusion in the agenda. This information, along with any agenda
items the various sections of the Embassy may wish discussed at the
meeting, is then passed to the Counselor for Political Affairs, who
outlines the proposed agenda to me at my daily staff meeting. On
the basis of the proposed agenda, and after such consultation with
other U.S. officials as may be required, I decide whether or not to
hold the regular meeting.
While the activities of the country team are most clearly focused in
fortnightly meetings, they are not limited to them, for by necessity
much work requiring sustained attention and. effort must be dealt
with on a continuous basis outside the structure of actual meetings.
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Indeed, matters which may require country team approval are most
often staffed through the country team mechanism without there being
any need to convoke a formal meeting. Further, it would be rare for
any item on the agenda of a given meeting not. to have been fully
staffed at the working level before becoming a subject of country team
discussion. To a great extent, therefore, the country team's work in-
volves reviewing recommendations worked out at the staff level and
arriving at an agreed position or course of action.
Thus, by means of a system of fortnightly meetings and extensive
staff work outside these meetings, the work of the country team in
Japan is coordinated, and discussion and implementation of U.S.
policy on a broad front .are facilitated. It is my belief that the system
which has been evolved is well suited to assist in the formulation and
execution of U.S. Government policy in Japan.
I would imagine that this brief statement of the organization of the
Embassy and of its role in the administration of national security has
raised some questions in your minds. My hope is that what I have
said will serve as a basis for a more detailed discussion of this subject
and I welcome any questions you might have.
(The two organizational charts referred to previously entitled "The
American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 163" and "The American
Embassy and Affiliated Agencies, Tokyo, Japan, July 1, 1963," appear
at pp. 223 and 224.)
Senator JACKSON. We are very happy to have your statement, Am-
bassador Reischauer. We will proceed now to ask questions.
Do you have any additional comments that you wish to make prior
to our questions?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I might just add a few remarks.
First of all, I am. testifying from a very different point of view from
your previous witnesses. Not having had a career in the Foreign
Service, all I can possibly add is a freshness of point of view of an
outsider who has been in it only a little over 2 years.
Some of the problems that have come up have been problems of
whether or not the overall diplomatic establishment was too large for
adequate policy coordination, whether or not the flood of messages
back and forth between the embassies and Washington was so great
that policy was somewhat lost sight of in this great flow of words.
My own feeling, after two and a quarter years' experience in Japan,
is that neither of these worries is really well founded.
We have in Japan a fairly large diplomatic establishment.
I have seen no problem of policy coordination, no problem of or-'
ganization. These certainly are not too large to handle, by any means.
It does take a certain amount of organization, perhaps, to see that
different diverse branches do not get in each other's way, but I have
not seen any serious problem of that sort at all in Japan.
And while we do have a tremendous exchange of materials between
ourselves and Washington, it has always seemed to me valuable. You
need this exchange at all sorts of different levels, and I think there
is a pragmatically efficient way, a very sensitive way, of sorting out
the important things for the right sort of attention.
There are perhaps ways in which this can be further perfected, but
the whole mechanism seems to me to work very well.
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202 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator JACKSON. You do not find any problems of excessive re-
porting?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Back here, perhaps, some people might
feel that way.
Senator JACKSON. I mean from your end.
Ambassador REISCHAVER. No; not from our end. Not from our
end at all.
There is this flood of paper, and one wonders whether it is all
necessary, but I think one finds that. there are, ways in which one can
keep on top of it, and then it all proves valuable.
In fact, we are always asking for more information on certain
things; and Washington is, too, the other way around. If there is
any danger, it is sometimes that we do not get the details back and
forth to each other fast enough.
Senator JACKsoN. What methods have you used to better utilize the
information that, flows in? You have a good, competent staff, I take
it. And are you able to delegate your work sufficiently?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes; I think so. I mean that is the
whole point in having an organization of this sort, to be sure that the
important thing comes to the top, and that the people at the top do
not get flooded by it.
I should say there is one problem in messages going back and forth :
at what level do you need clearance? This is a problem you always
have to keep watching, because every now and then people down the
line will send out a message expressing the view of the Embassy, and
I think if we express a view on something rather than just reporting,
you need fairly high clearance. There are problems of this sort.
Going the other way, I think there is sometimes difficulty in knowing
who is actually speaking to you in a message. They are all signed
"Rusk," let us say, but sometimes you know it did not come within
several ranks of the Secretary.
Senator JACKSON. There needs to be a code within a code.
Ambassador R.ETSCITAUER. And you can tell by the code this was
only cleared at a relatively low level, and therefore you should under-
stand it in that way, and that this is not necessarily the personal
opinion of an Under Secretary or the Secretary.
I think that maybe some codes within a code would be useful, as
you say.
Senator MILLER.. Could l ask a question?
How much of the time of your staff would you say is dedicated to
reporting?
Ambassador REISCHHAUER. It probably would vary with the different
types of people.
You mean reporting in the sense of just getting information back
that might be useful in Washington?
Senator MILLER. Preparation of a report to be sent back to Wash-
ington.
Ambassador REISCIHAUER. Telegrams and reports, and soon?
Senator MmLra . Yes; to meet the requirements of reporting on the
State Department end.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. It would be very hard to say. Between
a quarter and a half of the time, perhaps.
But, you see, much of this reporting is really their own research
work in keeping up with the field that they are following.
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 203
You take the man that is our contact man with the Government
Party. He is constantly trying to learn as much as he can about the
leaders of this Government Party, what they are thinking. He is
talking with them all the time. And every once in a while, when he
thinks he has enough information to be of value to Washington, he
writes it up as a report.
But he has done this basically for his own knowledge.
Senator MILLER. Yes. Well, I would want to distinguish between
what one does for his own knowledge and his own competence in
carrying on his assigned duties there and the work that goes into
getting that information back to Washington.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Well, there is a third category. There
are, you know, these routine requests for reporting on certain types of
things, that you do fairly routinely. I should say in the economic
field there is more of that than there would be in the political field.
I think the very fact of drafting it up into a message is itself a
valuable exercise for the reporting officer, because sometimes a person
can have a rather vague impression of the whole thing, but until he is
forced to put it in good format, he has not thought it through himself.
Senator MILLER. You do not think a certain amount of that crystal-
lization of his thinking could have already been gone through in the
course of the staff meetings that are held? I would imagine that at
one of his staff meetings or your own staff meetings, for this thing
to be articulated properly, it would require some thinking through.
I would hope by the time it got around to a staff meeting with you
he would have thought it through pretty well, and that anything
beyond that for the purposes of Washington would not be required.
I am trying to come up with your idea on how this can be improved,
because those of us who have. served in the military at both the head-
quarters level and at the field level know that this thing can get out of
hand.
And there have been time checks and all kinds of efficiency systems
evolved to try to cope with this problem. But I must say that I was
shocked when I first came across the information regarding the flood
of paper that descends on Washington.
That means somebody out in the field has to do something. And I
can see where you can even get bogged down. Sometimes these things
can be eliminated, and sometimes they can be streamlined and some-
times there can be summaries rather than full reports.
There are a lot of those things that we have found in the military
that can be eliminated. Somebody back here has to shuffle them
around. And when you eliminate just one, there can be a chain reac-
tion which can cut down a lot of time and overhead.
I just wonder if you have had occasion to review'some of the report-
ing required of you and your staff. Have you tried to eliminate some
of it, or streamline it?
Ambassador REISCIiAUER. I am not aware of any large bulk of mate-
rial that is not of value to ourselves in the drafting process. Of course,
the staff meeting tends to be a fairly informal thing, with us. I try
to get people to express their views and discuss them back and forth,
rather than having canned reports, and so it serves a somewhat differ-
ent function. It is an exchange of views, primarily.
I find, myself, the more routine reports of my staff are very useful
to me. I keep them on my desk, and when I have a little time, I catch
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204 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
up on them and read them, because there are lots of things I cannot
follow in as much detail as they are following.
They are often eager to write these, actually, because it is their way
of presenting the thing that they have discovered to the rest of us there,
as well as back in Washington.
In almost every case where there has been a real attempt to cut down
on this flow, there is somebody back in Washington that screams in
agony when it does not come in any more.
Now, mighty often these are people down at the research level, who
are doing the day-to-day work. I think it is very valuable to have
a research backup in Washington as well as with us, where the papers
are pretty well in detail.
Senator MILLER. In reporting to you, do you have them summarize
their topics ?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Almost all of our longer reports come in
with a summary statement at the beginning, and you can glance at
that and decide whether you want to read the rest of the report.
With my time as tight as it is, I must admit I often let the thing
go by with just the reading of the summary.
Senator MILLER. Would it be feasible, in lieu of some of these reports
that go back to Washington, to merely indicate a summary, let's say,
of a few points of what is contained in some of these studies, so that
the people back here could then determine whether to ask you to send
the whole report on or forget about it?
Ambasador REISC IAUER. Actually, as long as you have a pouch
going back and forth all the time, it in itself is not a real problem. It
is a problem of who is going to read it when it gets to this side.
And I suspect what happens here is what happens with us. The
busier people will glance at summaries and put it aside, whereas the
people who have the backup research function are the ones who are
going to read it and appreciate it.
So I doubt very much if this does cut into your time very seriously,
on this side, any more than it does with me there.
That is what I mean. It is a pragmatically worked out system, but
I do not think we waste much time reading things that are not neces-
sary to be read.
Senator MILLER. That certainly is one of our problems here, to fig-
ure out what to read. And I know that commanders have a time
problem.
And granted that staff people love to write reports, because this is a
good way of impressing the commander with your knowledge on some-
thing, I would hope they would save their time by writing summaries.
If you want to dig in, you can get them to give you the details.
A nutshell approach saves time.
Ambassador REISCUAUER. We always have a summary on the front,
of a report there. In fact, in some cases the title is enough for you.
You know you will not want to read the rest of it.
Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg?
Professor ENOBERG. I was much interested in your formal statement,
about how you prepare for these staff meetings. I recalled, after read-
ing that, an article Ambassador Matthews had put in the Foreign
Service Journal about coordination, and I was wondering what you
might give us as to your procedure.
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Ambassador Matthews pointed out that there is serious danger in
consulting with the top agencies, that you may not have coordination
throughout the lower areas. And he suggested that the ambassador's
task was finding out what was happening on all the lower levels, and
coordinating. This gets into the area that we talked about once be-
fore-the danger of each agency giving its own view only.
What is your thinking as to the lower level type of coordination, so
that you get the true picture when you have your top staff meeting?
Ambassador REIscnAUEa. Yes. Of course, through the meetings
of the sections, which bring together all these agencies that might have
a somewhat related interest, we do have coordination at that level, and
some of these agencies go to more than one of the staff meetings, as you
can see in this paper.
So the problem is : how can I keep in touch with all of this? And it
is a problem I felt very much.
When I first went there, I found that there was such a tendency for
all authority to stem from the top down that if the Ambassador spoke,
then no one else would speak. And this went away on down the line.
If I got the political counselor's views, I did not find out the view
of the man who had argued with him at it lower level.
I have done my best to make everything go the other way around.
In my own staff meetings, I never speak first. I always start with
them, to bring up all the problems they want, and get them all talking,
and I keep the Deputy Chief of Mission and myself to the very end,
to pick up the points that have not been brought up.
This is just exactly a reversal of the procedure that I had found
there. And I insisted I wanted to get the divergent views and not just
the view of the economic or political section as decided at the very top.
I wanted to have something of the argumentation that had gone on
below on the very same thing.
This does not assure me that it always does come through, and I
still have a feeling that I wish I had closer contact with the people
down the line. But I think this is a problem, and would be a problem,
in any large organization.
Senator JACKSON. I wanted to turn, if I might, to the matter of long-
range planning in the embassies.
We have found that for one reason or another, generally speaking,
the embassies have not been able to do this. Do you have the staff for
this purpose?
First of all, do you see a need for a planning staff or planning group
within the Embassy?
Ambassador RrIsCHAUER. I am not sure that I see a use for a sepa-
rate planning staff here. I feel very strongly that the Ambassador and
the top officers should themselves be thinking in long-range terms.
I just do not see how you could do a job of this sort if you do not
have a sort of philosophy of history, of where this all fits in. You
have to think in those terms, or you do not make any sense out of what
you are doing from day to day.
I do not see how you can give this to another group who are going to
be your philosophers, while you are the do-ers.
Senator JACKSON. You feel the operators should be the planners?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. I feel that way, and that is the reason I
am very happy when I find some of our best officers writing long-term
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206 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
think-pieces. What is happening in Japanese politics? We have had
some very good papers of that sort.
Some of these may seem awfully far away from immediate admin-
istration. But I believe thinking of this sort is important. I did a
paper last summer myself, trying- to think through the whole thing,
what we were really dealing with in roughly a 10-year period.
And one of our chief political officers did an extremely good analyti-
cal piece on the nature of the development of the Japanese parties, as
to what was happening there long term, and so what we were going
to have to deal with in the future.
The men who have the chief responsibility and the chief contact are
the ones that are best able to do this, and I think we just have to reserve
our own time to do this thing, as well as do the day-to-day work.
Senator JACKSON. Do you have the backup staff you need to help
you in formulating long-term policies as you see them develop in your
day-to-day operating experience?
In other words, you are at the top of the Embassy with your key
people, and you sit around, and you are confronted daily with the
host of problems that you have to meet.
Do you find the time to really sit down as a planning staff, as a plan-
Diing group, with your key people?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. To get it on paper, you have to find some
special time.
I did a big piece last summer, when I took myself a little vacation.
I went away for about 10 days, and I sat down and did this. It was
the only way you could do a job of that kind--come up with a long
paper.
But actually I think we use our staff meeting very much for that
purpose, because quite often we get away from the immediate issue
to talk about the long-range implications of it and where we are going,
and so I think there is a sort of oral tradition of this sort.
Here we are talking about this big problem, and where we stand. in
it, and our staff meeting does not therefore just stick to, "Well, here is
a document, and how do we answer it?" I am very happy to get away
from that and talk about the bigger issues.
Senator MILLER. What happens to that report when it comes back
here? Flow long are the think-pieces?
Ambassador REISCIIAUEIi. We get very interesting reactions here.
Senator MILLER. Where does it go? Does it go to a long-range
planning staff ?
Ambassador PEISCIrAUER. I presume the long-range planning staff
looks at that.
I am very much interested to see that all up and down the line the
officers over here will have read it, if it is something of real interest.
It goes around to CINCPAC. People like that come back and say,
"That was interesting. We think this is fine." And so on.
Senator JACKSON. I think we ought to point out that Ambassador
Reischauer is rather unique. He is a scholar on all matters relating
to the Far East, and Japan in particular.
Ambassador ItEISCFIAUER. I come with a long-range interest in this
particular area and problem ; and therefore look at it in those terms.
Senator MILLER. But is there a long-range planning officer over here
at State, that would take something from someone in the Philippines
and southwest Asia?
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 207
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes. The State Department's policy
planning staff does that. There is a tendency for the policy planning
staff to perhaps work more on crisis problems rather than noncrisis
areas such as Japan.
Senator. MILLER. How about long range? Do they not have long-
range planning?
Ambassador REISClIAUER. As I think back over the State Depart-
m.ent'shistory, they are always setting up groups that are going to
think in terms of the long range, and they are always being brought
closer and closer to the immediate present.
This has happened with various staffs I have watched over there.
There is this danger.
Senator MILLER. But the State Department's policy planning staff
is the one that has this function?
Senator JACKSON. They have the responsibility. The staff isheaded
by Walt W, Rostow.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Right.
Senator JACKSON. Now, when you are able to get in a good paper
on what you see the situation to be at present, and the direction it
is going; and so on, do you find that a document of that importance
gets to the Secretary of State and to the President?
Ambassador REISCIIAuJR. I am not aware that either of them has
read these particular ones I had in my mind. I dare say if they did
not see it, much of the thinking of it was transmitted to them in terms
of conversation with other people at the top, who have read it. It
certainly gets up to the Assistant Secretary level-things of that
sort.
Senator JACKSON. Well, it seems to me when we have a good ambas-
sador and a good embassy staff, they can be a very vital part of our
policy planning. When an ambassador is in a country as important
as Japan, lie has an opportunity' right on the scene to translate his
day-to-day experience into what the direction should be for the future.
And the operator can be the best planner. I think this is something
we need to really capitalize on.
Do we have a preapproved policy plan toward Japan that you
follow?
Ambassador RE, ISCIIAUER. Yes; we leave a paper. I forget whether
it is revised every 2 years, or something of that sort. I remember when
I first came in, a little over 2 years ago, they were in the process of
just finishing one up, and they gave me a chance to read it and make
some suggestions on it.
We are just going through another process of that sort now, I think
primarily from the policy planning group back here in Washington.
It has been over several' months' time that they have been putting
together something of this sort.
Senator JACKSON. Well, is this paper worked out in conjunction
with you and your people?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. It goes back and forth between the desk
officer in. State and us, and they rewrite it and so on.
Senator JACKSON. What is the genesis of it? Do you start it?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. This past one, as I remember, was written
up at the desk level here, originally.
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208 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
I happened to be back here in November-December for a couple of
weeks, and in between all the other things I was doing then, I read
it and made quite extensive changes in it at white-hot speed at that
moment. They did some further work, and then it came to us in
Japan,itand has been very much rewritten in our different sections.
Then has (zone back here, and they are doing some further rewrite
on what we did.
Senator JACKSON. Do you have a substantial influence in the final
version in the Embassy staff ?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Oh, yes.
Senator JACKSON. And then when that process was completed, did
the Secretary of State approve it, and did the President approve it?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I am not sure at what level it gets final
approval.
Senator JACKSON. But it is national policy?
Ambassador REISCI-IAUER. Yes. And what it turns out to be, then,
is pretty well descriptive of what people think the situation is, and
the thinking is at that moment.
It really does not plan too far into the future. But it is awfully
useful for anybody coming in new to the situation to see a statement
of what the thinking was as of that time.
Senator JACKSON. Do you find it adequate?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I think it is fairly adequate; yes.
Actually, once you have done it, the people who have taken part
in it find their minds going on, and they go beyond it fairly soon.
So I do not find myself going back to, "What does it tell us to do ?"
because we have helped draft it up, and we should go beyond it as
events unfold.
But I think it is very useful for the person who is only peripherally
involved in the Japan picture, and therefore needs this for reference,
or the man coming newly into the Japan scene.
Senator MILLER. How far in the future does it go?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. It does talk about the general future. I
do not mean it does not go into the future, but as we move into the
future ourselves, we begin revising it.
Senator MILLER. There are not two papers, one devoted to short
range and the other to long range?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. No. And it is based on a fundamental
assumption of what may happen over a 10-year period, just on the
kinds of things we have been thinking through in these specific papers.
Professor TUrTs. When Miss Fosdick and I were in Japan last
fall, we were told, if I remember correctly, that there was a planning
paper for USIS, which neither the present USIS group nor its prede-
cessor had had an adequate opportunity to participate in drafting.
There was some feeling that more consultation with the Embassy,
the USIS group in Tokyo, would have been helpful.
I take it this is not the situation in your relations with State.
Ambassador REISCUAUER. Well, they are now just in the process
of revising the USIS paper "Country Plan," I think they call it.
Our USIS man sent back one which he has written largely himself,
I think, so they may feel a little differently right now. This was some
months ago that you were there. Perhaps they had reference to the
fact that certain elements in it, some overall statements of objectives
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and so on, were dictated from Washington as of some time ago, and
people in the field would perhaps prefer to phrase it differently.
I remember the U.S. forces, Japan, at one time commented "Can't
you say this better ?" and that turned out to be the part that was from
Washington, that we could not change. So maybe they were having
reference to the fact that some of it was already set.
Professor ENGBnitG. I was wondering if the Ambassador had any
information on whether the Department of State gives the same con-
sideration to other ambassadors.
Ambassador Reischauer is an expert in his field, and I can well see
where they might seriously consider his recommendation on all these
long-term programs.
Do you know at all from your acquaintanceship with other ambas-
sadors and your various contacts whether or not the other embassies are
given the same consideration on planning papers that your office is
given?
Ambassador RBISCIIAULR. I had the impression they were, but not
having had that extensive experience in the Foreign ervice, I could
not say.
Senator JACKSON. Returning to the issues of reporting and planning,
when you have an important point to make, an important suggestion
that you feel is very vital in our relations with Japan and therefore
with the Far East, do you have any trouble getting that information to
the highest levels that are necessary in order to take effective action?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. No. That is what I mean by a fairly
pragmatically worked out system. Theoretically, the telegrams are all
the same. Sometimes limited distribution will get it higher. But you
use that usually for security reasons.
But you use the first person. If you say, "I did this," you see, this
almost automatically brings it up to higher attention. So there are
ways of drafting it.
I do not know if there is any rule book that describes this, but I have
found in practice there are ways of getting higher attention, by the
phrasing.
Senator JACKSON. Then, I expect, there are certain situations in
which you feel the issues involved are such that it would be better to
come to Washington?
Ambassador RBISCIIAUER. I have never had to do that.
Senator JACKSON. You have never had to do it. You have been able
to handle matters through written communications for the most part?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Well, there are many cases where you
probably feel as though you could have done a better job if you came
back here and talked directly with people.
Actually, this week I find myself having turned up quite by accident
at a very opportune moment on a very important problem that I prob-
ably could not have handled as well in Tokyo as by being here.
Senator JACKSON. Under Secretary of State Harriman indicated, in
his testimony to this committee, that if our ambassadors could come in
more often, this at least would help the reporting problem, and it would
be more useful both to the Department of State and to the ambassadors
themselves.
Do you have any comment on that?
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210 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Ambassador REISCHAUER. I have come back on an average of be-
tween 6 months and a year. I have found it very useful to come back.
I am not sure it would be more useful to come back more often than
that, because I think these messages on the whole are very adequate.
I am always very much impressed by how much aware they are of,
you know, that message you sent, if you sent it in the right form. And
I think it is just about as good as if you were on the spot.
Senator MILLER. What about the key members of the staff coming
back? Do they do that?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Very little.
Senator MILLER. What about the comments from the headquarters
here, or the State Department's policy planning staff going out there?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. We do not see too much of the policy plan-
ning staff, that I am aware of. I think I would like to see them more
often.
Senator MILLER. Do you think it would be helpful to have the policy
planning staff come out to the field once in a while?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes. For instance, I have not been able
to persuade Mr. Rostow to come out. He promised me one time, and
was not able to do it because other crisis areas absorbed his time.
Senator MILLER. But how about one or two of his right-hand :men
coming out?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. I think it would be very good.
I do not remember cases of top people in policy planning coming
out. It may be just a slip in my memory. We do see a great number
of other people. I am very happy to see them. I think it is very
useful.
We have a constant flow of Government officials through Tokyo,
State Department people and others who are involved in foreign
policy.
Senator MILLER. Probably too many.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. One could think that way, but I do not
think it can be too many.
Senator JACKSON. Depending on the quality.
Senator MILLER. But you would like to see somebody from the policy
planning office?
Ambassador REISCHAUrR. Yes ; that would be useful, I am sure.
Senator JACKSON. To return for a moment to the policy guidance
that you get, do you find that it is clear and unequivocal, so that you
can pretty well carry out your duties and responsibilities as Ambassa-
dor? Or is there a lot of improvising and are there ad hoc arrange-
ments that do not always leave you with clear-cut guidance as to the
course you should pursue?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. It is usually clear cut, I think. Some-
times it is slow in arriving, because so many of our important prob-
lems in Japan are interdepartmental problems-economic ones involv-
ing Commerce, Agriculture, Fisheries, things like that, and then the
military.
Senator JACKSON. On the fundamental questions? I realize an
issue will come up in a specific area that does not actually change- your
broad general directive. Do you find that you are pretty clear in
your own mind as to the course you should pursue, based on the writ-
ten policy statement?
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Ambassador RE, ISCIIAUER. Yes; I think so. But that may be simply
because I have a clear idea in my own mind. I think our general
statement is quite clear, our overall policies, and so on.
Senator JACKSON. This is one of the things that has concerned us.
For a while I think the government tended to be too precise and
formal on these things, and now there may be a tendency to go the
other way, to improvise and to be a little too flexible.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, perhaps we have a somewhat dif-
ferent situation in Japan from what you have in many countries of
the world. We do not have a rapidly changing situation there. You
have to have an overall interpretation of where things are likely to
go over a certain period of time, and I do not think in Washington
or Tokyo there has been any fundamental revision of that general
attitude.
This does allow, then, an ambassador within that general frame-
work to have his own fairly clear-cut ideas of just how it should be
played.
We do not have a change from year to year because of some revolu-
tion or change of leadership in the country. So I do not think this
would be a typical case, at all.
I think you would have much more serious problems, let's say, in
the countries of Southeast Asia, where you might have to have a
fairly rapid change because of a great upheaval.
Senator MILLER. Could I pursue that one idea you have had?
You have indicated you would like to see lpore of the policy plan-
ning staff people come out in the field. What about their counter-
parts in some of the other agencies? For example, from Commerce,
coming out. Do they do that?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes; we get people like that all the time.
Senator MILLER. So the liaison on a visitation basis is pretty good
except when it comes to the policy planning office in the State De-
partment ?
Ambassador REISCITAUER. Yes. Specifically, I do not remember
those people coming out very much. We do have a large number of
people from Defense, Commerce-all of the departments that would
be involved in things of this sort.
Senator JACKSON. Turning to the defense area, which must tie in
so closely with our foreign policy objectives and operations, what is
your relationship with the military, and how do you in general get
along? Do you have any comments on that?
Ambassador REISCTIAUER. This is the most important coordination
problem we have in Japan, without a shadow of a doubt. We have
45,000 men in uniform there, which gives you a population of over
a hundred thousand on. the military side in Japan.
And the most difficult and crucial aspect of our relations with
Japan is with defense, because this is the controversial issue of Japa-
nese politics, making this our most difficult problem. And so liaison
between the Embassy and the U.S. forces in Japan is absolutely
essential.
Actually, we have an extremely close relationship. We have a
country team which formalizes this relationship, but the essence. of it
is the fact that the commander of the U.S. forces in Japan-up
through this month it is Jake Smart, an extremely fine man-he and
I are in very close contact.
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212 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
It is like the traditional school, one person at, each end of a log. We
are two people at each end of a sofa, and we get together all. of the
time and talk over each of our problems, and when we have staff work,
we have a country team meeting that comes every 2 weeks.
But we never dream of doing anything that involves the other with-
out consultation. He gives me his speeches, if he is going to make a
speech, or anything like that. Ile comes and tells me his problems, and
I discuss mine with him.
Senator JACKSON. And this runs pretty well down through all. the
levels?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Down through the levels, the same kind of
very close relationship exists. We draft an important message to go
to Washington, sent ostensibly from the Embassy. Just the day I left
there was a very important message coming out. It did not say "coun-
try team" or anything like that. There were two colonels and a Navy
captain backstopping me on this, coming over from the headquarters
of the U.S. forces in Japan, because it deeply involved them. This is
the kind of relationship we have.
Senator JACKSON. I am certainly glad to hear that, because we have
had some experiences where Defense and State get rather out of
touch-take for example the Skybolt problem. And certainly in
Japan you have a whole series of sensitive areas, in which the military
are involved on a day-to-day basis, and that have of necessity to be
closely coordinated with the job you are doing.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Yes. We have a third element in that,
and that is our MAAG, of course, the Military Aid Assistance Group,
which is, according to the charts, part of the Embassy. But it has to
have very close relationships with the U.S. forcesin Japan.
And so there is a three-way coordination. But the kind of thing
they are in on tends to be more of a technical mature, weapons and that
sort of thing. There is very, very close staff coordination, but it is
not as crucial as the coordination between General Smart and myself
on things that have an overall relationship with Japan.
Senator JACKSON. You find it is the quality of the people as much
as anything that makes the difference?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. This is the basic thing, of course. You
cannot have a fine organization if you do not have the right people,
and if you have the right people, you do not really need such a detailed
organization.
Senator MILLER. I hate to have to leave. It has been nice to get
acquainted with you.
(At this point Senator Miller withdrew from the hearing room.)
Ambassador REISCHAUER. We have the danger of General Smart
and myself getting together without sufficient staff behind us, so we
had to go back to a more formal type of meeting so that it could
be properly recorded.
Professor TUFTS. In terms of developing our relations with Japan,
what are the most important tools with which you have to work?
I suppose they are economic to some extent, and military to some
extent,'and informational to some extent. Do you feel, as you have
watched this over the past couple of years, that we are making effective
use of these tools?
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What I am leading to is: What if anything do you see as the prob-
lems in making better use of these instruments for influencing
relations?
Ambassador REISCUAUru. I think the policy is just as with any com-
plicated problem, to subordinate the minor to the major.
We have loads of, let's say, minor-economic problems, that help to
roil things up, and therefore make major political relationships more
difficult. You have got to keep them in perspective. It is awfully
hard to do, because each one of these belongs to somebody's particular
area of administrative control over here, or political concern, and so on.
Just the coordination of these things is a very difficult thing, if you
are thinking in terms of specific instrumentalities for improving the
relationship.
And of course, economic problems are very much involved. For
instance, cotton textiles is a very good case in point. This can cause
a great deal of ill will-this of course goes both ways-over what turns
out to be a very small item in the huge overall trade.
On the military side, the relationship of our military to the Japanese
public is a vitally important thing. Very fortunately, our military is
very much aware of that. If we had military men who were not aware
of this public relations problem, we could have endless trouble. But
we are very fortunate in having from the top on down in our military
in Japan people who seem to be extremely well aware of this, and work
awfully hard at it.
Perhaps the most important instrumentality is the information side,
or cultural exchange, or whatever you want to call it, or intellectual
contact.
People do not like to use the word "intellectual," but this is perhaps
the most important aspect of it there, the USIS and all the aspects of
its activity.
But you have the U.S. military in the same effort to have an overall
influence. And I should say our whole Embassy is really doing a sort
of USIS job. There are ways in which we could make it more effective,
but as long as we all realize this is important
Senator JACKSON. The military insofar as their base commanders
are concerned-are they fully indoctrinated before they come, and then
after they get over there, on rather a continuous basis, to know what
the problem is in their community, what approach they should take
toward the local citizens, and so on, this being one of the troublesome
problems that you have to face?
Ambassador REISCIIAUnr. I dare say there is good indoctrination
before they come. I am not sure on that point. I think perhaps the
main thing is the leadership of the commanding general. Ile under-
stands it and helps indoctrinate people on down the line.
Of course, the chief men in every service are very important, and
we are very fortunate in that. And people down the line begin to take
the lead from those above them.
Professor TUFTS. I remember that you attached a great deal of im-
portance to the point of communications in your book, in 1955, Wanted:
An Asian Polio,. And in that book you made a strong case for the
importance of having people not only speak the language but under-
stand the culture enough to be able to express what they have to say
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214 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
in a way which would make it understandable to the people they are
talking to.
To what extent do you think your staff meets these requirements
now, in the USIS staff and other staffs that are involved in this?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Well, you probably never achieve perfec-
tion in this. But we have made a lot of advances. The Embassy has a
fairly high degree of linguistic skills. We have built that side up quite
considerably.
You cannot go too far. You want a balance of people who are not
deeply in the Japanese scene, too, in key places, also. I think you have
to have that balance.
So the Embassy itself I think is fairly well balanced that way. Per-
haps USIS could use a great deal more linguistic skills. They just
are not available as yet. We have a pretty good training program for
the young men, in rather large numbers.
Professor TUFTS. That was the next point I wanted to raise. This
committee has been quite interested in training problems.
You say you have a training program. Do you think it is it good one?
Or could it be improved in some ways?
I wanted to ask what sort of a training program would in your
judgment best prepare the young officers for their work.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. There has been it lot of experience be-
hind this. The one problem is the problem of weeding people out
of this kind of work who do not have the real talents for it. And
we keep setting up a system.
Recently we started a system whereby it person would have a trial
period there, and a trial period in the field, to see if he is really
suited for work in Japan and has linguistic skills worth developing.
After he has proved both of them, you give him it full course. The
only danger is the one of human frailty, where everybody wants to
be so kind to everybody else that it is awfully hard to bust it person
out of the system. There may be sort of a black spot on his record.
But, it is not a kindness to him to keep him in if he does not have the
talents for it.
Professor TUFTS. In this same book of yours, you said that :
The specialist who learns the native language and becomes an expert in the
native culture and psychology is likely to find his accomplishments hindrances
rather than aids to his promotion.
Our Foreigh Service-
you said there-
is geared to produce fine mixers with other Americans rather than to produce the
all-important contact men with Asians.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. When I wrote that, I think it was de-
scriptive of the system. I trust this is being changed. But there is
always this prejudice. It is a problem.
Professor TUFTS. What does this suggest to you about tours of duty
and about the need for opportunities for people who do want to special-
ize in a particular language and culture and so on? Do you think
we need people in the Foreign Service who will spend a large part
of their lives working on Japanese matters?
Ambassador REISCHAUER. There are certain areas where I think it
is necessary, absolutely necessary. Japan is probably an outstanding
example. Korea is a place where if we had more of that, we probably
would be in a much sounder position than we are today.
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ADMINI
The China area-of course, we do not have much of a China area to
deal with-has always been in the same position exactly. That is,
these are countries that have very different languages from ours, and
really utilize them as a medium of communication.
India, after all, uses English. Africa still is using western
languages. And you do not have quite the same problem that you do
in the Far East.
There used to be a special Japan and China Service, back before
the war. It was necessary in those days. I think it will be necessary
for a long time in the future. That means people who are expected
to spend a much higher percentage of their career in one area than is
true of the Service as a whole.
Professor TUFTS. Do you have such men on your staff there?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Oh, yes, we have lots of them. And we
are training men all the time. I get the impression that half of their
foreign service would be spent in contact with the country of their
special interest.
Professor TUFTS. And do you find that they are getting promotions
adequately?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I think so; yes. The really able ones
are; yes. I think there has been a change in that regard.
Senator JACKSON. Senator Pell ?
Senator PELL. Thank you. Excuse me for being late. I had an-
other meeting.
In connection with your table of organization, I notice that you have
the military attaches reporting directly to you, not to MAAG and
then to you. Some thought is being given to the idea that the MAAG
commander's office should be combined with the position of Defense
attache? What is your view on that?
Ambassador RE, ISCIIAUER. MAAG is a very specialized job with us,
a highly technical job, and their problem of relationship there is
between them and the U.S. forces, Japan.
We have a large military there. They have a very close working
relationship. In the chart they come under us, but the three of us
work very closely together.
Among the various service attaches in a country like Japan, where
you have the large military establishment already there, you have a
somewhat anomalous position. They tend to be just liaison officers,
to help liaison between these various elements.
Senator FELL. Who serves as the liaison?
Ambassador RElsciiAuER. The service attaches.
Actually, I think someone should look into the whole problem of
what the function of a service attache is in an embassy in a country
where there is a large American military establishment that quite
overshadows the service attaches.
I think the military itself are beginning to think about this prob-
lem, because obviously U.S. forces, Japan, has taken over a large part
of the function that would normally be in the hands of a service
attache.
Senator PELL. This is a question I had hoped to lead into, because
I had been of the view that the commanding officer at MAAG should
also be the Defense Department attache as well, and when this would
happen, there would be happier relationships with both the embassy
staff and perhaps some of the other people.
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216 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Ambassador IlEISCIEADER. It is a perfectly conceivable concept, ex-
cept, that we have somebody even more important, and that is the com-
mander of the U.S. forces in Japan, who is really the Defense Depart-
ment representative there.
And for anything of a military nature, and as I was pointing out
earlier, the most difficult problems we have are of a military nature,
since this is a crucial area, in Japan--on things of this sort my rela-
tionship with the commander of U.S. forces in Japan is the important
thing.
Senator PELL. Which is the senior Defense attache?
Ambassador R,EISCIIAUER. We do not have one. The Naval attache
is responsible for the maintenance of all the facilities for the rest of
them ; but he is not over them.
Senator PELL. When you get into the other islands around Japan,
the R.yukyus and others, do they come under you?,
Ambassador. R,EISCIIAUER. The Ryukyu Islands are a great problem
for us, but they do not come under us. That is probably where the
problem exists.
It is a Department of the Army area, and the commanding general
is directly under the. Army, the High Commissioner. And yet the
great political problem is the fact that there are 900,000 Japanese-
speaking people who regard themselves as Japanese, and therefore
this is a built-iii major problem between us and Japan.
So the Japanese and we have a very special relationship over the
Ryukyu Islands. But we have a rather curious three-cornered situ-
ation as a result, because the High Commissioner has his channel back
to Army and not, of course, to State.
Senator PELL. What is t he general view in Japan with regard to
the development of the natural normal trading relationship between
the industrial area of Japan and the agrarian area of China?
Ambassador REISCiIAUER. Japan has an emotional feeling about,
"Here is this great mass of people next door, and it is only natural. to
have them as customers of ours," and so on.
The general public has leaned in that direction, and there is a great
tendency and desire for not only trade relations but diplomatic rela-
tions. This is a great embarrassment to the Government there, be-
cause they try to cooperate with us in the general free world stand.
They have therefore taken what they call a forward-looking attitude
toward trade with China.
Actually, the peoplo who know much about it do not expect any
great trade to develop, because the Chinese have not developed an
economy that can trade with Japan very much. They could absorb
endless Japanese things, but they do not have anything to pay with,
either in the way of foreign exchange or goods.
I think the Japanese Government feels that the best way to educate
the Japanese public on this sitilation-that there is not very.much. in
China trade-is to give enough rope, so that they can find out through
experience.
Senator PELL. Who do the Japanese people consider their natural
enemy?
Ambassador REISCnAUEn. Russia. This is normal, sort of emo-
tionally built into them. They have felt that way about the Russians
for a long time.
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator PELL. Like we used to consider the British Empire in our
first century?
Ambassador RETscrIAUER. Even a more hostile feeling.
Senator PELL. But they are more hostile to the Soviets than to the
Chinese?
Ambassador REISCIIAUEIt. Yes; it is a traditional thing that actually
goes back about 150 years, this attitude toward Russia. And the end
of the war experience was a very unpleasant one, where the Russians
came in just to take advantage of our victory.
Senator PELL. But the feeling toward the Chinese is one of-what?
Ambassador RETSCIIAUER. Well, it is a very complicated one. I used
to say there is a guilt complex in it. China is their Greece and Rome,
you know, source of ancient civilization, and they have a sort of senti-
mental feeling about it.
On top of that, they have a sort of guilt complex about having ruined
China in modern years. Unquestionably there is a certain race ele-
ment involved. The Chinese seem more like natural people and they
share a lot culturally with them. They have a strong emotional bias
in their favor. At the same time, they have underneath it all a sort
of contempt.
Senator PELL. And what is the view with regard to Formosa China
with its 10 million people and Mainland China with its 750 million
people?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Fora long time the Japanese disregarded
the Formosans completely. More recently, they have developed a
much more healthy awareness of Formosa, and the fact is that their
trade with Formosa has tended to be larger than their trade with the
continent.
And now they are developing a real pride in the fact that their great
advance is largely a result of Japan's investment in Formosa in the
colonial period, and they have a pride in that the Formosan popu-
lation is very definitely pro-Japanese, one of the few colonial popu-
lations that have come out with a nostalgic love for their former rulers.
Senator PELL . I remember going to Columbia University-we had
a course for naval officers, and we used Formosa as our case study for
military government. We were taught while they did not like the
Japanese too much, they accepted them. If there were any people
they disliked more, it was the Mainland Chinese. This was Navy
doctrine in 1944.
Ambassador RETSCHAULR. A lot of this has been a sort of subtle
way of showing disapproval of the existing governments. I do not
think they love the Japanese that much.
Senator PELL. One final question is in connection with the proposed
Foreign Service Academy. I was wondering if you had any views
one way or the other.
Ambassador REISCiHAUER. I just cannot see any point to it, myself,
because I do not think it is that technical a subject that should be
boiled down and cut off from the rest of the thing.
In fact, I thought the whole effort of the Foreign Service was to
draw people into it with as broad experience as possible. A few years
ago, it was standard policy to not encourage persons to, come directly
out of college into the Foreign Service. They wanted people to have
a broader experience than that.
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218 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator PELL. They wanted. the boys from the East to go West, and
the boys from the West to go East?
Ambassador ItEISOHAUER. And some other kinds of contacts, more
than just the academic one, before you went into Foreign Service work.
I think that is all very sound. Certainly you do not want the
academic experience of a specialized kind of academy that cuts them
off from the rest.
I just cannot see it in those terms, unless it means an in-service train-
ing for people after they have gone in.
Senator PELL. Have you any views as to the consensus of people
within the career service with regard to the Foreign Service Academy?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I can give you. a guess as to this from my
personal friends. I think it would be disapproving.
Senator PELL. I would agree with you.
Senator JACKSON. For clarification, when we talk about the acad-
emy, the initial proposal was for an undergraduate academy, and now
there is the proposal for a graduate academy.
Senator PELL. Yes. I am talking about the graduate academy.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. I would have a rather negative view to-
ward this concept.
Senator JACKSON. The truth of the matter is that this type of post-
graduate work is available in our existing institutions of higher learn-
ing, or can be initiated there, and then you have the opportunity of
going to the various centers throughout the country.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. If I had the problem of training people
for it, I would want to get them scattered widely and then bring them
into the Foreign Service.
Senator PELL. I think one thing that would be really beneficial to
them after spending 15 years in the Foreign Service would be to get
them sent. out to St. Louis.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. I think it would be very good to give
them sabbatical leave from the Foreign Service in something of this
sort, but not in a Foreign Service Academy.
Senator JACKSON. I think Mr. Engberg had. a question or two.
Professor ENGBERG. I have been interested over quite a period of
time in this matter of personality in the ambassador's office and this
matter of legal control. There is a sort of contrasting type of thing,
here.
We run into situations such as the Ambassador talks about in
Japan, where they have the same legal situations as in other embassies
so far as responsibility to State and to Washington, and then we run
into other areas where some of our other testimony has indicated that
things have not worked nearly as smoothly.
So I have a couple of questions I would like to have you consider.
I am not at all sure that they are really within your area of knowledge.
Do the different agencies here in Washington, when they send out
people, throughout all this great listing of folks that you have on your
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ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 219
country team=do they make any attempt to deliberately select indi-
viduals who are not only trained as persons biit trained technically to
fit that particular country ?
Ambassador REISGIIAUER. Some of them do, very definitely.
We had a new attache recently who came in very well prepared, I
thought, who had been working on these problems back in Treasury
here, and was well grounded in what he was going to run into in
Tokyo.
Professor ENGBERG. Is he well grounded in the area of his work so
far as Japan is concerned?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes. That is what I mean. He is quite
familiar with these things. I would not say this is true in all cases,
but I think quite a few of the people who have come are very well
grounded.
Professor ENGBERG. Another question along that same line : So
many of these agencies that are set up by statutory authority send out
people that you work with in your country team. Then you take
over your position and, to use the terms of the President, you are sup-
posed to be in complete "coordination and supervision" of that
program.
And I think Mr. Herter at one time used the term "vehicle of de-
cision." I took that directly from an article that Mr. Herter wrote."
Your control over your country team, then, is much more of per-
sonal relations than it is of legal control?
Ambassador REISCZZAUER. This is not really a country team, whit
we have here. This is all built in as some things attached to the
Embassy. So I think we have a considerable amount of even legal
control, because these things have to go out through the Embassy
channels of communication.
Senator JACKSON. You operate under President Kennedy's letter,
too.
Professor ENGBERG. The point I was getting at, Senator Jackson, is
that the Congress has established a lot of these areas. Some of these
areas are really not directly under the President. They become the
Ambassador's domain when they end up in Japan.
Senator JACKSON. I think the real problem here is that while these
people-like a Treasury attache-are attached to the Embassy, you
do not have the control over their efficiency reports, their promotions,
and so on. Therefore you confront the very human problem : where
does the particular employee look? Does he look to our Ambassador?
Does he look to his superior in the States ?
Is this not part of the problem?
I assume, on the other hand, that if a given employee or representa-
tive of Treasury or Commerce or any of the other departments fails
to measure up, a letter from the Ambassador indicating that he just
has not conducted himself properly over here, has not done a real good
job, is not going to help him within his own department.
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220 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
But there are problems where the agencies' own ideas on a given
policy conflict with those of the State Department, so the tendency
of the employee or representative, I would think, would be to follow
the lead of his own department or agency.
In that particular situation this makes your problem a difficult one
in exercising proper managerial control.
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Yes. I see the problem in theory. - But I
can only say in theory, because I cannot remember any example of
anything like that. You are assuming that one of these boxes repre-
sents a group in Washington that now has a very different policy.
Senator JACKSON. I think what it gets down to is that Ambassador
Reischauer's leadership has been such, and his attitude toward his
people has been such, that tho ordinary or normal technical and legal
problems that might appear have not appeared because of the way he
has handled things.
Professor ENGBERG. That is exactly the point, Senator Jackson.
Ambassador RE115CIIAUEr. I have never felt any distinction between
the people that belong in these boxes and the people that belong in our
own boxes here.
Senator JACgsoN. That is perhaps just the reason why it works.
Professor ENGBERG. We have been talking about staffing, and here is
an almost perfect example of what we would have State set up in
areas in terms of personality and control and getting results.
And when you start looking at the boxes and the legal type of thing,
you say, "Well, the ambassador doesn't have any real control over this,
but it works because of the type of staffing that has been done."
That is the point I was interested in bringing out.
Senator JACgsoN. I think it is a very good point.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. Of course, we could have a much more
serious problem with the U.S. forces in Japan, where there is no even
theoretical subordination there. If we had a real divergence of
opinion there, I think we would be in real trouble.
We have avoided any feuds, and we have fortunately seen things
the same way. In getting a new man, if it turns out he has very
divergent views from myself, then I think we would have a real prob-
lem of coordination there, at which point I think the only possible
solution is a reference back to Washington, and Washington would
have to decide to change one or the other in that case.
Senator JACgsoN. Yes.
Incidentally, is there any interchange on appointments of that im-
portance, which involves not just the ordinary military command re-
quirement? Are there consultations with State in this respect?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Not that I am aware of in this regard.
I just hear of the fact that General Preston has taken General Smart's
place.
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ADMINISTRATION OF N T
Senator JACKSON. As you may know, under the stimulus of hearings
before the predecessor to this subcommittee, a State-Defense exchange
program was started. We encouraged this several years ago-a pro-
gram between State and Defense, wherein officers from DOD go over
to work in State, and vice versa. And we have tried to impress upon
both departments the importance of this and other coordinating efforts.
I just wondered : In a case like this, it seems to me that the pri-
mary job of an officer going out there is to have a full comprehension
of diplomatic and political problems.
Ambassador REISCHAUER. They have tried to cooperate in the fol-
lowing way. I think they have chosen the man without consultation
with us, but General LeMay was out when this was announced, and
your new man here in plenty of time for
I said to him, "Can't you Cart?"
this overlap with General Senator JACKSON. Is this an Air Force job?
Ambassador RxisCHAUER. It is an Air Force job, because the chief
job there is Air Force. The commander of the Fifth Force is con-
currently commander of the U.S. forces in Japan.
Senator JACKSON. They have a large naval establishment?
Ambassador REISCHATJER. It is, but it has somehow been made an
Air Force thing.
I said to LeMay, "Can't we have a big overlap there?" And he said,
"Yes ; we will see General Preston. comes out there," because I wanted
him to observe Smart and the attitudes he has taken and the contacts
he has made. I thought it would be very helpful to him to get the
thing off in the right way.
Senator JACKSON. We might close on this question : In your fine
book, Wanted : An Asian Policy, you state :
Why surrender the offensive to communism? The defensive can never win in
Asia ; only the offensive can, and, by all that we believe in, it rightly belongs
to us.
Do you think that we are making any progress in this direction?
Ambassador REIscimurR. I think we could be more on the offensive
than we are in many places. I certainly have tried to take the
offensive in Japan.
I spend most of my time-it is a strange attack I am making, but
I am making an attack on classical Marxism. That is our real enemy
there. And I never miss an opportunity to take a dig at it, although
the word is never mentioned.
But it is, "Let's talk of a new view of history."
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222 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
The whole thing is, "You know, these are the guys that are really
out of date, and we are the wave of the future," and this kind of thing.
So I am continually on the offensive, and they recognize it as such.
They always refer to it as the "Kennedy-Reischauer offensive." I
am very flattered to be hyphenated there.
Professor Tur s. What about in Asia generally?
Ambassador REISCIIAUER. Well, I still think in many places we
too much give ourselves the image of defense rather than the offense
in the sense of establishing prosperity, freedom for people, and even-
tually democracy, rather than just sitting back and trying to hold
off the other people, who are on the offensive.
It is more a frame of mind for yourself, often, but I think the whole
country sometimes has this difficulty.
When you look at America from abroad, you keep wondering why
Americans are so worried and pessimistic. Ask any Japanese what
has happened in the last few years, and he will say, "We are making
terrific progress as opposed to the other side."
Senator PELL. Along the lines of that same thought, I was wonder-
ing what the Ambassador's reaction is to the terns "counterinsurgency,"
which tome is an unfortunate term, because our Nation was born in
insurgency, and we encourage insurgency of the right kind.
Ambassador R]ISCIIAUER. I have not thought in terms of that par-
ticular thing, but that is a good example of the way we approach
this problem.
Senator JACKSON. On behalf of the committee, Mr. Ambassador,
I certainly want to express to you our appreciation for your fine state-
ment, and the helpful counsel and advice you have given us. We
are very grateful.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject
to call of the Chair.)
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EXHIBIT I
OPGi NIZATIOTTAL CHART - ABIERICAN ti3dBiSSY; TOKYO. JAPAN
POLITICAL SUCTION
L~t,rnal Affaaira
Branch
External i##airs
=arc..
Jliti C?-Hilitaryf
1 __fa'S. n~ Sa^Ch
Labor Affairs
i_t.:r c-y
Translation
I Se-vices Branch
~ - I
ECON3UIC S^C_"I09;
PTsheries Unit
i Trans?,>orietic^_ ands
Co?rr_ications Bolt i
Trade and
Irdrs_c r Branch
r^ra?cn conc.ricj
~rn
Cr c~-cio Bra~ei
I i!gsnCY for IntCI'natiGnal I
I_ F'--kTFI 30x3AL
KCB-8521" 1111
IIIwORTTION DIVISION
Press Drench
Publicati ors Branch
Radio Brach
Motion Pictae Br.
Television Branch
Exhibits Branch
COIIS:'L:rTB i :Oi'
CULTURAL DI V SION
Educational Exchange
Branch
Field Programs Branch
Cultural Programs Br.
ACC's in JAPAN
TOKYO, YO'C -S`zMIDAG,
NIIGA'_'A, SAPPORO, NAGOTA,
KFSAZA'WA, KOBE, OSAKA,
ANGlO. HIBOSHIMAs FTK~YJKA
CONSULAR UNIT
BURL
NOSE:
Dctted lines indicate subcrdirration for purposes
of coe:dioet'ion within the Rabassy of agencies
rspreseniir9 branches of the United States
Government other than the Depart.,msrt of State.
Consulate General
Tokyo/Yokohaae
General Consular
Branch
I Citizens' i*. Branch I
r i'_sa Lrenct.I
Endnot & Fiscal Branch LabocY na eE. '~ gna eE. '~ g
Branch
General Scr rices Branch
Personnel Branch
______________________
AI',_':INT'STR;,TIVE SECTION U. S. IiFJRMATTON SERVICE
!---_- -_-__
Security Branch
Office of Plans,
Research Bvaluotions
Staff
Co-~?.nicetidns & Records
Bra~ch
LLB
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224 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
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EXHIBIT 3
Personnel strength summary, 1952-63, American Embassy and affiliated agencies, Tokyo, Japan
[Figures as of June 30 each year] -
1. COUNTRY SUMMARY
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
American
Local
American
Local
American
Local
merican
Local,
American
Local
American
Local
State (all programs) ---------------------------------
USIS
213
304
217
315
214
322
219
318
218
313
209
305
_______________________________________________
AID
46
321
41
327
46
337
47
350
48
355
49
359
________________________________________________
Affiliated agencies___________________________________
6
83
19
63
4
74
17
52
11
72
22
47
29
64
32
44
29
58
35
45
32
57
34
46
Military attaches___________________________________
MAAG/Japan
37
21
41
22
46
21
43
21
40
19
40
18
--------------------------------------
Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission
-167
38
165
890
148
44
165
938
196
40
200
210
203
231
199
244
186
________________
948
49
954
48
895
48
827
Grand total________________________________
590
1,783
569
1,836
625
1,897
661
1,922
672
1,861
679
1,775
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
American
Local
American
Local
American
Local
American
Local
American
Local
American
Local
State (all programs)___ --_-_
USIS
221
306
221
314
209
320
205
277
233
358
196
313
__------------------
AID
:
-
58
388
57
367
48
305
46
293
82
361
52
417
-
- --------
-- -------------------------------
Affiliated agencies
36
34
30
32
21
22
------
-----------------------------------
Mihtary-attaeh -_==___ _____ ____ `___=___
72
----3`-
50
---..._46-
64
------- 37
46
1b.
60
....-.--37_
40
....15-
45
-----38-
14
----14
41
" -- -44-
16
43-
1
0
MAAG/Japan-------- ------------- - -
omic Bomb Casualty Commission-- -----------
332
46
7
812
318-
-----
52
730
_-_- _
---
-
Grand total___________________________________
800
1,823
769
1,835
427
1,432
334
598
400
48
249
730
Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000100290001-1
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