BASIC ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: STUDY

1
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDF65B00383R000200010023-6
88th Congress 1
1st Session I
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
BASIC ISSUES
A STUDY
SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 332; 87th Cong.)
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations
93171 WASHINGTON : 1968
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2064/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOHN L. McCLELLAN. Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
HUBERT It. HHUMP1IREY, Minnesota JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
ERNEST ORUENING, Alaska
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WALTEn L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman
IIUBERT 11. IIUMPhIREY, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JACOB K. JAVITS, Now York
DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director
ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, Special Consultant
RICHARD S. PACE, Research Assistant
JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk
LAUREL A. ENGBERG, Minority Consultant
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
Free men are engaged in a bitter contest with powerful and resource-
ful foes. At stake is the safety of the Nation and the future of indi-
vidual liberty. The challenge is mortal and the tests ahead will be
exacting. The machinery of our Government must therefore be a
help and not a hindrance to both policymaking and action.
In May 1962 the Senate established the Subcommittee on National
Security Staffing and Operations to review the administration of
national security at home and in the field, and to make findings and
recommendations for improvement where appropriate.
The subcommittee is a successor to the Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery. In the 2 years since that subcommittee submitted
its first reports, a new administration has taken office. It has made
important organizational changes and important changes in national
security policy. The two may not be unrelated. But difficult
problems of administration remain, and may hamper prompt and
effective action.
The present subcommittee is concerned with the administration of
national security-with getting good people into key foreign and de-
fense posts and enabling them to do a job. It is not inquiring into
the substance of policy.
The subcommittee's approach to its task is nonpartisan and profes-
sional. The executive branch has extended its cooperation.
During the first stage of its study, the subcommittee has sought the
views of present and former officials of the Government, eminent
military leaders, and distinguished students of the national security
process. Its staff has prepared several background studies on the
problem of the inquiry, and has taken a firsthand look at staffing and
operations of U.S. missions and military establishments in Asia and
Europe.
This initial staff report examines a number of the central issues
before the subcommittee. During the present Congress, the subcom-
mittee plans to hold hearings covering the main subjects discussed in
this report.
JANUARY 18, 1963.
HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing
and Operations.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
CONTENTS
Foreword ---------------------------------------------------------
I. The President's problem_______________________________________
Page
III
If. Dilemmas of administration____________________________________
2
The President and the national security organisation----------
2
Decision at the center and delegation________________________
3
Planning and action---------------------------------------
5
III. The President, the Secretary of State, and the problem of coordination-
6
The Secretary of State's coordinating role____________________
7
The interagency task force__________________________________
8
IV. The ambassador and the country team___________________________
The planning function in the field___________________________
The reporting function_____________________________________
Personnel for the country team_____________________________
The division of labor_______________________________________
Military advice-------------------------------------------
Regional organizations_____________________________________
V. Executive responsibility for administration_______________________ 16
Environment of excellence__________________________________ 17
Management flexibility------------------------------------- 18
VI. Communications---------------------------------------------- 19
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
BASIC ISSUES
1. The President's Problem
The other point is something that President Eisenhower said to me
on January 19, 1961. He said, "There are no easy matters that will
ever come to you as President.' If they are easy, they will be settled
at a lower level." So that the matters that come to you as President
are always the difficult matters, and matters that carry with them large
implications.
President John F. Kennedy, telecast interview, December 17,
1962
By law and. practice the President is the chief maker of national
security policy. He conducts foreign affairs. He is Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. He makes the crucial decisions on the
budget he submits to Congress. He is the Nation's Chief Executive,
responsible under the Constitution for taking care that the laws are
faithfully executed. As such, he supervises the departments and
agencies. Although he is not in any simple sense their manager-
for their responsibilities run not only to him but also to Congress-
he is the only coordinator our constitutional system provides.
The new complexities of national security make the task of a Presi-
dent more difficult today than ever before.
The boundary between foreign and domestic policy has almost been
erased. Foreign policy, military policy, and economic policy are now
intimately linked. The United States has relations with over 100
countries, mutual defense treaties with over 40, and participates in
scores of regional and international organizations. Policy must be
made and executed in the context of fast-moving and world-shaking
events-the deadly contest with, and perhaps within, the Communist
world, the building of new structures in the free world, the emergence
into statehood of new nations with great expectations and greater
problems, and advancing technologies that may upset the balances of
power.
A President must look to the national security departments and
agencies for help in initiating and carrying out national policy. The
Departments of State and Defense, the military services, and related
agencies at home and in the field are for the most part staffed with
experienced, capable, and dedicated people. They are a vast store-
house of information, historical perspective, skills, and resources.
But these assets are not automatically available to a President. He
must know how to put them to work in planning and executing na-
tional security operations-how to make them serve his needs while
they carry on the important tasks that cannot receive his attention.
The art of administration is to staff and organize for this purpose.
The very size of the national security organization is one of the
problems. It is too big for any one man to know all about it. It is
so big that unusual astuteness and knowledge are required to draw
on it.
1
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
2 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
Congress, of course, influences national policy and sets limits
within which a President can act. It creates departments and
agencies; it authorizes programs; it influences the size and com-
position of the Armed Forces and the nature of aid and information
and related policies; it appropriates funds for the conduct of national
security policies; the laws it passes affect the Government's ability
to hire and hold good people; its attitudes reflect the American people's
understanding of national security problems and their willingness
to support national security programs.
On the whole, the United States has adjusted quickly to the shifting
demands of a world in change. But the process of adjustment has
only begun and success is not assured. Many emotionally charged
areas must be realistically examined and calmly appraised.
If the Nation is to pass the tests that lie ahead, the Presidency
and State and Defense and the other national security agencies must
handle their jobs with new excellence. And Congress, too.
H. Dilemmas of Administration
* * * it is at this point that we rut) headfirst into the system of
"checks and balances" as it applies to the executive departments.
* * * This is really a method of requiring power to be shared-even
though responsibility may not be-and of introducing rival claimants
from another department with a different mission into the policymaking
or decision-taking process.
This is the "foulup factor" in. our methods * * *
Whether or not this itch to get in the act is a form of status seeking,
the idea seems to have got around that just because some decision may
affect your activities, you automatically have a right to take part in
making it * * * there is some reason to feel that the doctrine may be
getting out of hand and that what was designed to act as a policeman
may, in fact, become a jailor.
Robert A. Lovett, Statement before the Senate Subcommittee
on National Policy Machinery, February 23, 1960
Argument between conflicting interests and views is healthy-indeed
indispensable-if kept within reasonable bounds. But it may be
carried too far and create what Robert Lovett has called the "foulup
factor."
A continuing Presidential dilemma is whom to listen to, and how
much, before he moves.
One can appreciate a President's desire to let advisers have their say,
and to hear as much as possible before committing himself. Yet it
may be best to err on the side of small groups of responsible officers
and to avoid large free-for-all sessions which are as likely to confuse
as to clarify the choices he faces.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
The needs of a President and the needs of the departments and
agencies are not identical-and herein lies a source of administrative
difficulties and misunderstanding.
What does a President need to do his job?
Essentially he wants to keep control of the situation-to get early
warning of items for his agenda before his options are foreclosed, to
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12: CIA-RDP6 00010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURIT0$ ~ -
pick his issues and lift these out of normal channels, to obtain priority
attention from key officials on the issues he pulls to his desk, to get
prompt support for his initiatives, and to keep other matters on a
smooth course; with his lines of information open, so that he can
intervene if a need arises.
As top officials meet the President's urgent requirements, their
other duties necessarily receive lower priority. Their regular meet-
ings are canceled. They become less accessible to their subordinates.
Ad hoc procedures. are devised. Much is done verbally that would
normally be put in writing. This all becomes exceedingly hard on
subordinate officials, for it interferes with their handling of the usual
run of business.
What do the officials of our vast departments and agencies need to
do their job?
Essentially they want orderly, deliberate, familiar procedures-
accustomed forums in which to air their interests, a top-level umpire
to blow the whistle when the time has come to end debate, and written
records of the decisions by which they should be governed.
It is no secret that the abolition of the Operations Coordinating
Board came as a disappointment to many at the middle levels of
government, who found in it a way of getting within hailing distance
of the center of power. Vocal status seeking is one of the curses of
government and increases the "foulup factor." But middle-level
yearnings for some equivalent of the OCB involve more than status
only. They have their origin in the desire to have one's views heard
through some set, certain, reliable procedure which binds the highest
levels as well as other agencies.
It is worth recalling that the National Security Council was.chiefly
the inspiration of James Forrestal, who wanted to enhance the defense
role in peacetime policyinaking and especially to insure regular con-
sultation by future Presidents with their principal civilian and military
advisers. The purpose was at least as much to make the Presidency
serve the needs of the departments as to make the latter serve the
former.
It is not surprising that the departments often find a President's
way of doing business unsettling-or that Presidents sometimes view
the departments almost as adversaries.
A continuing dilemma, demanding a subtle appreciation on all sides
of the needs of aPresident and the departments, is how to manage the
Government so that Presidential business is transacted to his satis-
faction, and so that the normal run of business, also vital to the
national interest, can be transacted in a fashion suited to the needs of
large scale organization.
DECISION AT THE CENTER AND DELEGATION
A President can make only the smallest fraction of the total number
of decisions relating to national security. His are the guiding or
directional decisions, but millions of supporting operational decisions,
and associated actions must be taken by men in the long lines radia-
ting from the White House through the headquarters of the national
security agencies to officers in posts throughout the Nation and the
world.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
4 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
Delegation is therefore not merely desirable; it is unavoidable. It
is the way an organization gets the day's work done.
Clearly, however, there are powerful forces which push and pull
issues to the President's desk and make decentralization difficult.
First, Washington is the center of power and the center has a
strong magnetic attraction, especially in a period remarkable for its
ease of travel and communication. Because issues can be referred
to Washington by radio, cable, and airmail, they are. Because
embassy officials can travel to Washington and Washington officials
can travel to the field, they do. Foreigners are also attracted, and
visits to Washington by heads of state, prime ministers, foreign minis-
ters, and others are increasingly popular. The visitors tend to bring
issues with them for decision-because they want to take home some
good news.
Second, issues seldom present themselves nowadays as one-depart-
ment or one-country problems. But Washington is organized into
departments and the field into country missions and this pushes
decision-making and operations coordination toward the White House.
Only the President stands above all departments and agencies and
only he and his principal lieutenants can see the problems of a country
or a region in the perspective of national policy as a whole.
Third, history records a number of instances in which delegated
authority was used unwisely, sometimes with serious consequences.
Fourth, the higher that issues are pulled for decision, the greater
the chance that the pressure of special interests can be resisted, that
irrelevant considerations will be screened out, and that material con-
siderations will be properly weighed.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, in a period when war or peace
may hinge on the way in which a quarantine of Cuba is handled,
there is a strong tendency for a President to exert control from the
center, because of the risks of leaving delicate matters to subordinates.
It scarcely is an accident that one characteristic of the second Cuban
crisis, perhaps in response to lessons learned from the first, was tight,
detailed control from the Cabinet room over a host of subordinate
operations.
Yet delegation of the right issues with appropriate guidance to able
subordinates is of critical importance. The Nation's security de-
pends not only on a President's skill in handling crises and major
issues but also on the steady and competent handling of less vital
matters by the department chiefs and the national security organi-
zation as a whole.
Without successful delegation, problems will pile up on the Presi-
dent's desk and the talents of key officials in Washington and the field
will be underemployed. More important, too much of a President's
time and energy will be dissipated on matters of less than first priority.
The key to delegation is a clear and reasoned basic policy line au-
thoritatively stated to department and agency heads-and defining as
part of the decision itself the priority the policy is to receive. Under-
standing, more than command, is the secret of successful teamwork.
In our system, two men have the chief responsibility for providing
this guidance-the President and his first adviser, the Secretary of
State. And to get the job done, the relation of the President and the
Secretary of State has to be close, marked by solid mutual respect.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
But even with ideal relations between these two, the objective of'
clear and reasoned policy guidance will be hard to reach and hold..
For the nature of concrete policy issues and the character of govern-
mental action processes push for a pragmatic one-thing-at-a-time-on-
its-own-terms approach.
PLANNING AND ACTION
`A President is concerned with fires and firefighting, and as with!
fire chiefs everywhere, firefighting has to have priority.
In many ways it is easier, though more nerve racking, to fight fires,
than to take steps to prevent them. The Government functions best
under pressure. When the alarm bell rings, its ponderous machinery
begins to move. A task force can be assembled and used to mobilize-
the resources of the departments and agencies for the job at hand.
But planning in order to stop trouble before it starts is more difficult,.
in part because it is hard for top officers to give it their attention and in
part because of confusion about the nature and purpose of planning.
It is not an ivory tower activity, which can be carried on, as some have
proposed, far from the hurly-burly of Washington, although it may
draw on the ideas of men working at the frontiers of knowledge.
Planning is critically dependent on the unplannable flashes of insight
which are usually sparked by worrying and wrestling with actual
problems. .
The European Recovery Program was not dreamed up on a campus,
though it was announced on one. It was the product of the interplay
of minds between Marshall, Lovett, Clayton, Acheson, and President-
Truman, who saw what was happening in Europe and were searching
for ways to reverse the trend of events.
The object of planning is not to blueprint future actions-although
there may be a limited utility in so-called contingency planning, or
thinking of the "what-would-we-do-if" variety.
The object is to decide what should be done now in light of the best
present estimate of how the future will look. Planners think about
the future in order to act wisely in the present.
Seen in this way, every action is explicitly or implicitly the fruit of
planning. One move is chosen in preference to another because its
anticipated consequences are preferred. The distinction between
the planner and the operator has been overdrawn. If there is one,
it is less in the time span with which each is concerned than with the
narrowness or breadth of their perspectives. The Air Force or the
Navy or the Army looks to the future when it advises on weapon-,
systems, but its perspective is narrower, more nearly that of a special
pleader, than the perspective of the President, the Secretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense when they, also looking ahead, consider
one weapons system in relation to a total defense system and the
latter in turn as one component of a total strategy for the defense and
advancement of national interests.
It is because of the need for wide perspectives and for fitting the
part into the whole that a President and his key advisers have essential
roles to play in long-term planning. $ut this activity competes for
their time-on unfavorable terms-with planning and action to
meet the crises of the day. Who could concentrate on Laos and
Cambodia in relation to South Vietnam, or on the Common Market
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
6 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
in relation to NATO, when Cuba threatened to engulf the world in
flames?
A continuing administrative problem, which every administration
has had to face and none has wholly solved, is how to fit what might
be called trouble-avoidance planning into days crowded with crisis-
coping plans and operations. There has been a tendency to think
that the first could be entrusted to planning councils or boards of one
kind or another or perhaps even to "think groups"-and such organi-
zations may make useful contributions. But not the whole con-
tribution, for in the final analysis, a top executive must do his own
planning. Otherwise, he will not be truly committed in his own
mind to plans that may bear his signature.
One is reminded that the National Security Council study known
as NSC 68 was little more than a paper plan until it was ratified in
the President's mind by the movement of North Korean troops across
the 38th parallel.
III. The President, the Secretary of State, and the Problem of
Coordination
President Kennedy "has made it very clear that he does not want a
large separate organization between him and his Secretary of State.
Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and
responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department,
and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and informa-
tion policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies
toward other nations."
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, letter to Senator Henry M. Jack-
son, September 4, 1961
The Office of the Presidency is the only place in which departmental
lines of decision and action converge. As a result a President can
rarely look to one man or one department for advice and assistance on
any major matter and must act as his own Secretary for National
Security Affairs. But he cannot do the job alone.
In this fact lies the problem of coordinating national security policy
and operations. The budgetary process offers the President unique
assistance in controlling the size and composition of the awned services
and the size and nature of aid and related programs, and in assigning
priorities in the . use of resources. But the budgetary process is of
little relevance to the day-to-day coordination of national security
operations. The President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs can help to keep the President informed about matters that
may require his attention and see that he isstaffed on issues that ho
takes into his own hands. With the help of his Office, therefore, the
President can coordinate policy and operations-to the extent that
he can take command. But when, considering the wise use of his
time, he cannot perform the coordinating role or chooses not to do it,
who can? The answer is that no one can but sorneone must.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES 7
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S COORDINATING ROLE
A key question is the proper role of the Secretary of State.
Subject to a President's direction, his Secretary of State is charged
with responsibility for overseeing the conduct of all aspects of the
Nation's relations with other states. In this broad area his interests,
though not his authority, are coextensive with the President's.
The Secretary is the President's principal adviser with respect to
economic and military aid, cultural and information programs, and
policies for the reduction and control of arms, as well as diplomacy,
and the President's agent for coordinating all these elements of for-
eign policy.
But he is not the President's principal adviser on defense policy,
and it is the skillful merger of defense and foreign policies that one
has particularly in mind when speaking of national. security policy.
Yet if planning and operations are to be coordinated, they must be
coordinated by someone. And someone is a singular word.
The logical choice for this well-nigh impossible task is the Secre-
tary of State. Of the Cabinet, only a Secretary of State is primarily
charged with looking at the Nation as a whole in relation to the world.
The nature of his post leads him, more than any other Cabinet officer,
to have a perspective closely approximating the President's.
But to have a fighting chance of success, a Secretary will have to
command unusual confidence and support of a President. Indeed,
the attitude of a President toward his Secretary of State can determine
whether he will be a great Secretary. When a President is close to
him, confides in him, and relies on him, the Secretary has a chance.
A President will have to be reluctant to intervene in those matters
he has put into his Secretary's hands, for if another Cabinet officer
can frequently obtain Presidential satisfaction when he is disap-
pointed, the Secretary will not be able to do the job a President needs
done.
By the same token, a Secretary must be willing to assert his own
position and exercise his proper influence across the whole front of
national security matters, as they relate to foreign policy. He should
also, of course, be quick to refer matters to the President when his
decision is needed.
All this depends therefore on a special relationship of trust and
easy understanding between a President and his Secretary of State.
Given this, a Secretary will seldom have difficulty in working with a
Secretary of Defense and will be able to assist his chief in coordinating
plans and operations for national security.
A question of importance is whether the Department of State, and
particularly the Office of the Secretary, is staffed and organized to
support the Secretary in exercising this responsibility, A complicat-
ing factor is that the responsibilities of the Secretary are wider than
those of his Department.
One hears a good deal these days about organizing the Secretary's
office around action-forcing processes. Much of the talk, however,
centers on analogies that are not necessarily apt.
The foreign affairs budget, for example, does not provide the same
leverage for the coordination of foreign policies that the defense budget
provides the Secretary of Defense. Although a Comptroller for For-
eign Affairs would therefore not be able to serve the Secretary of State
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
as the Comptroller of Defense serves the Secretary of Defense, the
possibility of using budgetary control as a coordinating device might
well be studied.
Sonic have drawn an analogy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But al-
though the Secretary of State, the Administrator of AID, the Director
of USIA, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency might coordinate foreign policies as the JCS coordinates mili-
tary policies, they could not integrate defense and foreign policies.
What are the action-forcing processes that might be more effectively
employed? Two suggest themselves: the preparation of recommenda-
tions for the President on national security policies and the sending of
instructions to U.S. missions and military commanders overseas.
In the early days of the National Security Council the Secretary of
State acted as chairman whenever the President did not take the chair,
and was responsible for preparing recommendations to the President.
One proposal is that this arrangement might be reestablished-and
applied also in any Executive Committee of the NSC.
Another proposal relates directly to the coordination of defense and
foreign policy. It is that better means should be found to insure that
instructions to U.S. missions and military commanders overseas are
consistent, are issued in such a way as to have the authority of the
President behind them, and are known to, and binding upon, all de-
partments and agencies concerned. This might call for a review of all
outgoing messages by an appropriate staff.
A third proposal is that the Secretary of State should play the key
role in the management of interagency task forces which are not led
by the President himself, and that his office should be staffed to
handle their management.
THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
The present administration has made much use of the interagency
task force as a device for the day-to-day handling of complex and
critical operations.
The Berlin task force is an interagency group whose members have
major responsibilities in their departments for the kinds of operations
which might be used to meet the crisis. It is chaired by State (orig-
inally by Defense) and reports to the President through the Secretary
of State. It is concerned with ongoing planning and operations for
the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin, including the coordi-
nation of American policy and action with the major European allies
and with NATO.
The Counterinsurgency task force is chaired by State (originally
by the President's military representative) and reports to the President
through the Secretary of State. It is concerned with planning and
operations to prepare the United States for intensified warfare where
conventional military forces and operations are not the full answer.
Recently the Executive Committee of the NSC, with the President
himself in active command of planning and operations, was in effect
a task force for the Cuban crisis.
An interagency task force is therefore an interdepartmental co..
ordinating committee. It is a flexible device, participation in which
can be adjusted to the needs of the situation. It may bring together
the highest officers of the Government or officers at the second or third
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES 9
level in the departments involved. For the time being they give
overriding or even exclusive priority to the task at hand.
At the same time, every improvisation, such as the creation of a
Berlin task force or an executive committee of the NSC, is an ac-
knowledgment that existing ways of doing business have proved in-
adequate, and that the President has had to spend time devising ad
hoc methods of making and executing policy.
The task force differs from the usual interdepartmental committee
in that it has a specific, limited job of great interest to the President
and goes out of active existence when the job is done, is action-
oriented, and puts a strong chairman-in some cases the President
himself-over strong members who can get things done in their
departments.
Superficially the interagency task force seems to provide the answer
to the problem of coordination, at least for critical issues. But the
experience-touched on here-has been mixed. Some have been
successful; others have been disappointing. The record is extensive
enough so that it should be possible to find out why one works but
not another.
It may be worth asking how a task force can be prevented from
becoming just another interdepartmental committee, with a production
of paper inversely proportional to its influence. Is one requirement
that there be strong Presidential interest in its work? Should a place
at the table go only to responsible officers of departments and agencies
which have genuine authority and responsibility for executive opera-
tions? Should the task force chairman be an Assistant Secretary of
State or higher ranking officer who enjoys the confident trust of the
Secretary of State and the President and has access to them? At
wh Rpiint domes the membership of a cask force grow too large?
Also, it is wo' rth asking`what would have happened if the Executive
Committee of the NSC had had to maintain the pace of the Cuban
crisis for 2 or 3 more weeks, with other important issues piling up,
and a whole new system of Executive Committee subcommittees
to bliet the executive branch.
be innin
,
t would be folly to conceive a government in which every inter--ti
agency task was assigned to a special force. On the other hand, a
satisfactory scheme of organization will surely provide something like
task forces to deal with certain problems that do not fit tidily within
departmental jurisdictions.
IV. The Ambassador and the Country Team
In regard to your personal authority and responsibility, I shall count
on you to oversee and coordinate all the activities of the United States
Government in
You are in charge of the entire U.S. Diplomatic Mission, and I shall
expect you to supervise all of its operations. The Mission includes not
only the personnel of the Department of State and the Foreign Service,
but also the representatives of all other U.S. agencies which have pro-
grams or activities in
* * * As you know, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission includes service
attaches, military assistance advisory groups, and other military com-
ponents attached to the Mission. It does not, however, include U.S.
military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
10 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
command of a U.S. area military commander. The line of authority to
these forces runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington and to the area commander in the field.
Although this means that the Chief of the American Diplomatic
Mission is not in the line of military command, nevertheless, as Chief
of Mission, you should work closely with the appropriate area military
commander to assure the full exchange of information. If it is your
opinion that activities by the U.S. military forces may adversely affect
our overall relations with the people or government of , you
should promptly discuss the matter with the military commander and,
if necessary, request a decision by higher authority.
President John F. Kennedy, letter to American Ambassadors,
May 29, 1961
In the postwar years the United States greatly expanded its over-
seas operations. Alongside the old diplomatic missions large, semi-
independent organizations for economic and military aid and cultural
and information programs grew up. Labor, Agriculture and other
agencies sent representatives abroad. American military bases and
installations, with sizable American forces, were established in many
countries. Many of these organizations and representatives had
their own lines of reporting to Washington and had statutory authority
and responsibilities defined by Congress.
The volume and variety of American business with foreign countries
dramatically increased. The texts of international agreements be-
tween the United States and foreign governments concluded in the
12 years between 1950 and 1962 fill 30 large volumes occupying 7 feet
of shelf space! Many of these agreements dealt with highly technical
matters and had to be negotiated with the help of experts from
Washington.
All of these developments placed the authority and prestige of the
ambassador in doubt and put great strains on the old diplomatic
machinery. In 1951 President Truman took steps to support the
ambassador's primacy. The concept of the country team, with the
ambassador at its head, was initiated. Further steps in this direction
were taken by President Eisenhower. President Kennedy's letter
of May 29, 1961, is the most recent attempt to confirm the ambassa-
dor's leading position,
But in the field, as in Washington, the task of coordination has
grown more complex as the instruments of national policy have
multiplied. The major elements of the modern diplomatic mission
are State, AID, USIS, the service attaches (Army, Navy, and Air
Force), military assistance advisory groups (MAAGS), and CIA.
Often there is also an area military commander.
Although all members of the country team acknowledge the
ambassador's position, respect his precedence as chief of mission, tell
him about their work, show him their cables, and invite his comments,
their dependence on him and their desire to be coordinated by hum
differ greatly. As a general rule, their readiness to accept his right
of decision varies with the degree to which they are involved in
operational matters, such as the conduct of aid programs, and have
their own reporting lines to Washington.
The political counselors and other old-line members of the diplo-
matic staff are most dependent on the ambassador and have the
greatest interest in supporting him. They have no line of reporting
except through the ambassador-and informal letters to colleagues
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 ApA'DMI eddTFor Release 20 4/0L/12 : IA-RDP65cB00~3 83R00101200010023-6
NiSATION OF in Washington. At the other end of the spectrum is the MAAG.
Its work is highly operational, it has its own lines to the Pentagon,
and it tends to take a restricted view of the ambassador's right to
interpose himself between it and the Pentagon on budgetary, pro-
graming, and operational decisions. The other groups fall somewhere
between these positions. CIA is closer to the MAAG model, while
USIS falls closer to the diplomatic model and AID somewhere in the
middle.
Country team processes have, therefore, quite different meanings for
the several participants, seeming almost a waste of time to those
heavily involved in day-to-day operations. The fact that deadlines
and other decision-spurring pressures seldom hit the participants at
the same time contributes to the unevenness of interest in the work of
the country team. What is usually involved is action by one group
at a time on a matter of great moment to it and of little immediate
interest to the others. In the eyes of, say, a MAAG chief preparing
his budget, the other members seem at best to be little more than
spectators and at worst a threat. On particular issues, however, the
ambassador's support may be helpful and this strengthens his position.
But in general each group of operators would be happy to be left alone
by the others.
To a degree the primacy of the ambassador is a polite fiction, especi-
ally where budgetary and programing decisions are concerned. Most
elements of the country team do not, in other words, regard them-
selves as parts of the ambassador's staff-rather they look outside the
country, to intermediate headquarters or Washington, for guidance
and support and their loyalties tend to run in the same direction.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that a strong ambassador can pull a team
together and exert great influence.
Some suggest that an ambassador should have responsibility for
preparing a complete country program and for reviewing and approv-
ing all parts of it, so that the final program would be his and so that
he would be put by the nature of the process in the role of umpire and
adjudicator of competing claims for resources. Because of the way
agency programs are prepared in Washington, however, this would
present great difficulties. A consequence is that decisions on military
and economic aid and other programs are pulled toward the Presi-
dential level in Washington and that the competition for resources
tends to run between overall appropriations for military versus
economic aid, and so forth, rather than between the need for military
aid in comparison with economic aid in a particular country.
Despite these observations the field is refreshingly free of inter-
agency strife. In general the deep jurisdictional clashes evident in
Washington are absent. Divisions are present but are watered down,
partly, no doubt, because the team acquires a certain solidarity by
virtue of common experiences in dealing with the local government,
on the one hand, and with Washington, on the other.
One of an ambassador's problems is that the country team is an
interdepartmental organization which has no corresponding organiza-
tion to which it is responsible or to which it can look for guidance,
direction, and support. In Washington the decision-making process
is, so to speak, vertical-up departmental lines which converge only
at the Presidential level. In the field, coordination is horizontal,
with differences being resolved and policies harmonized by the
ambassador.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Apq~pve~ or Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
1G A STRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN THE FIELD
Ideally, one would suppose, the country team should be the chief
source of country plans. It is on the spot and should be familiar
with the obstacles to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives.
Yet with few exceptions little planning is in fact done in the field and
what is done is patchy.
The operational groups are so deeply involved in day-to-day
operations that they have little time for planning, even if they have
officers with the training and experience for the planning task. And
they seldom do. There is, furthermore, no stated requirement for a
coordinated. country plan or program, in which economic and military
aid, cultural and information programs, and other elements of Ameri-
can policy are drawn together and focused on U.S. objectives. There
is no place in the embassy where this task could now be done.
Among the best people in the field are some of the political and
economic counselors and their staffs. But the reporting content of
their jobs and the burden of representation and negotiation is so great
that they have little time for thinking about what the United States
is trying to accomplish in the country and what combination of activi-
ties would best serve American purposes.
Increasingly, the United States is seeking to accomplish its goals
through regional programs and international organizations, but it has
not yet taken adequate steps to relate country missions to regional
planning.
As things stand in the field, apart from exceptional cases, Washing-
ton cannot rely on the country team for planning. Yet satisfactory
arrangements for preparing coordinated country and regional plans
are still to be devised in Washington also. This is one of the major
problems of staffing and organizing for national security. Whether
efforts should be made to staff the missions for planning, or whether
country and regional planning groups should be organized in Washing-
ton, or whether some combination of the two should be found are
questions that demand attention.
THE REPORTING FUNCTION
Reporting occupies a very large part of a mission's time and ener-
gies. The volume of messages between Washington and the field has
reached almost astronomical proportions. The daily volume of tele-
graphic traffic alone between State and the embassies is more than
300',000 words! Much is necessary but much is of doubtful usefulness.
Despite the volume of reporting Washington often feels and is
poorly informed. The reason is largely that the decision-making
process is not well enough understood so that headquarters can
identify a need until it arises. Reporting requirements are therefore
not clear. No one knows how to issue general instructions on who
should be told what and when. As a result the rule seems to be:
Report Everything. The field tries to cover every base and to an-
ticipate every requirement in the hope that any information Wash-
ington may need will be available when wanted. The resulting flood
of information swamps Washington's absorptive capacities.
This reporting is of very uneven quality. Some is brilliant, but the
top executives seldom have time to look at it. Most is routine. But
all of it must be read by someone-a fact which accounts for a great
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12: CIA-RDP65B00383R000220~0010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
deal of employment in Washington. Some of this talent could, one
is confident, be employed in more useful ways.
Moreover the whole personnel system encourages reporting. Young
officers get credit for writing reports, especially voluntary reports on
matters outside their assigned responsibilities. An officer's reports
are an important basis for evaluating his performance and recommend-
ing promotions. This may be sound personnel practice but it burdens
the system with too much reporting and encourages wrong ideas
about the proper allocation of time between direct observation and
study of a country's problems and report writing.
Good reporting is essentially operational, directly serving the needs
of inen who must make decisions and direct operations. Much re-
porting at present is remotely related, if at all, to the decision-action
process. Top executives are so heavily occupied that they have
virtually no time for reading anything not immediately relevant to the
day's problems.
Many countries are deeply involved in far-reaching political, eco-
nomic, social, and military programs. The United States is assisting
these programs of modernization and reform in many ways. Analysis
of great depth and sophistication is needed as a basis for planning.
What strains are these programs putting on the political system? Can
they be carried without political collapse? What groups are gaining
power and influence and which are losing? What political adjust-
ments would strengthen the system? Are they feasible? How can
the United States assist the process of adjustment?
The kind of knowledge and understanding needed to produce
answers to such questions is not likely to be gained at a desk, reading
second-hand accounts of what is happening in a society. Direct
observation and study and a wide acquaintance in many social groups
are needed.
But in addition the analyst needs to know his audience and its
requirements. Scholarly analyses of great brilliance will be of little
use unless they point to operationally significant conclusions. The
definition of reporting requirements depends therefore on a clear
location of responsibility for policy planning, and close contact
between the analyst and the planner.
The reporting function should be carefully reviewed. Some suggest
that reporting relevant to day-to-day decisions should be provided
on a day-to-day basis in response to requests from the ambassador or
Washington. The feasibility of this suggestion depends on the
technical adequacy of the Government's communications system, and
especially on the disciplined restraint of both the senders and the
receivers of messages. Without such restraint, even the best com-
munications system will soon be overloaded.
Some suggest that the kind of analysis needed for planning and
programing should be a joint undertaking of teams consisting of
members from Washington and the field and linked closely to the
planning and programing. process. This would require more frequent
travel between Washington and the field, but might cost less and
produce better results than present practices.
Whatever changes are made, intensive efforts are needed to develop
officers who can produce the kind of political and economic analyses
that are basic to the radically new nature of American foreign policy.
There are now very few officers who have shown an ability to make
"depth analyses" of the forces at work in society.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
14 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
PERSONNEL FOR THE COUNTRY TEAM
Every mission has some first-rate people. But the number of big
jobs is far larger than the number of able people available to fill them.
With over 1010 missions to be staffed-more than double the number
only a few years ago-every personnel system has been strained.
Every Washington headquarters, is evidently robbing Peter to pay
Paul, trying to cover the most critical spots by shifting its best people
around. There is no prospect that recruiting will overcome the
deficiency of good people in the near future.
It is therefore all the more important that good people be well used.
But under present practices each department and agency must staff its
own overseas posts. All too often the result is that an ambassador
cannot use his best people in his most important spots. He needs
freedom with respect to his own mission to move his good people
where they are most needed.
Obviously, however, this runs headlong into existing practice.
Personnel systems are organized by departments and agencies.
Promotions, assignments, career development programs, organiza-
tional loyalties--all work against it. Whether the conflicting needs
of the ambassador and of the career services can be reconciled is a
serious dilemma of personnel administration.
The personnel problem is intensified by the problem of the division
of labor between Washington and the field.
There is little doubt that the abilities of most missions are under-
employed. The country team is familiar with local issues and prob-
lems-from important questions of policy to minor details of mission
housekeeping. Many matters could be handled locally, with action
being reported to, but not cleared with, Washington. Ironically,
"Washington clearance" often means that a junior officer in Wash-
ington is secoind-guessing a senior officer in the field--and second-
guessing him on matters the latter is better qualified to decide than
an equally experienced officer in Washington.
Some progress has recently been made in delegating authority to
the field for administrative decisions on such matters as housing,
travel, and hospitalization. This shift is desirable and should be
encouraged.
No similar trend is evident in policy matters. In fact, the con-
trary is true. More and more issues are being referred to Washing-
ton, or handled by officers sent from Washington, or settled in Wash-
ington in negotiations with visiting foreign officials.
Washington: can of course assert its authority in any matter. But
it should not assert it in every matter. There is a need to re-examine
the division of labor between the two.
A proposal worth consideration is that issues might be left to the
ambassador unless they are of such sensitivity, complexity, or im-
portance that they demand attention of an Assistant Secretary or
officer of higher rank. That is, an ambassador might indicate to
Washington that he intends to act in a certain way by a certain date
unless otherwise instructed. And Washington might exercise greater
self-restraint in issuing instructions-with the philosophy that it may
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES 15
be better to act a little less than perfectly rather than employ the
time of Washington officials in a search for perfection. Some may
even doubt that the sun always shines more brightly in Washington
than in the field.
A shift of greater action-responsibility to the field by such rules of
thumb might lead to important economies: Too much time is spent
in Washington on matters that could be left to the mission, thus
double-teaming talent when there is not enough talent to go around.
This tendency shows itself in the habit of Washington and the field
to "live on the cables"-to keep each other busy debating points on
which it might have been better to let the mission act by itself under
its general instructions.
Obviously there are no iron rules for dividing responsibility. What
:seems to be called for is more respect in Washington for the judgment
of ambassadors and more restraint in second-guessing them.
MILITARY ADVICE
Today's ambassador frequently has to make decisions and give his
views on military questions.
Every mission has three service attaches. Many have a MAAG
chief. A few must work with an area military dommander. To which
of these should an ambassador turn for military advice?
A reorganization of the military advisory function seems to be
needed. The number of military representatives reporting directly
to the ambassador is too large-a fact which tends to reduce rather
than increase their influence in the mission. Partly in order to deal
with these representatives and with an area military commander, if
any, a new politico-military post has been established in many. mis-
sions. This officer, usually a career foreign service officer with some
special training, assists the ambassador with the coordination of
political and military activities. In some cases he serves as the execu-
tive secretary of the country team.
A suggestion meriting serious consideration is that a single defense
attache might be designated by the Department of Defense, with such
'assistants as necessary from the three services. Presumably the
defense attache would be an officer of the U.S. military service that
was also the most important service in the country-an Army officer
in countries where the Army is the principal military organization,
:and so forth.
Another proposal is that the functions of the MAAG chief and of
the attaches might be combined in a single officer, who might be called
the defense attache. The objection l at the military aid program
should be clearly separate from the normal attache functions needs to
be reexamined. The combination has been successful in some places.
Where there is an area commander of U.S. forces, the possibility of
placing the MAAG under the joint supervision of the ambassador and
the commander might be considered. In any event, where there is
such a commander, an ambassador tends to rely primarily on him for
military advice.
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
There are now four American Ambassadors in Paris: the Ambas-
sadors to France, NATO, OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development), and DAC (Development Assistance
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
16 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
Committee). This is the extreme case. But it illustrates the growing
importance of regional organizations in the conduct of American
policy.
The task of an ambassador to an international organization is more
confining and limited than is generally understood.
He is, of course, constantly involved in promoting or opposing par-
ticular actions by the organization which may have an important bear-
ing on U.S. national security policies. But if he is not to commit the
United States to positions inconsistent with our national security re-
quirements, he must remain closely tied to Washington. The Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State require information and advice from
him. But be is dependent on them not only to set policy lines but
also to give him his major assistance in carrying out those policies.
He can expect to get results when the United States, working with its
allies through bilateral discussions or in other small groups, has de-
veloped a position which can command support in the organization.
At the present stage international organizations are more decision-
ratifiers than decision-makers. Things go well in NATO, or the
United Nations, for example, when the United States and other key
countries have reached a common position.
The growth of international organizations is one of the powerful
forces pulling decision-making into Washington. Rational, effective
negotiation on complex and critical matters, like a multilateral NATO
nuclear deterrent or the reduction and control of armaments, requires
unified guidance and instruction to those conducting the negotiations.
This is a basic principle of sound administration and avoids the dangers
of crossed lines.
The unified source of instructions can only be the President him-
self (not others in the White House or the Executive Office), or the
Secretary of State, acting for the President, or, in appropriate cases,
an Assistant Secretary of State acting for the Secretary. In this con-
nection, the post of Assistant Secretary of State has achieved a new
importance in the policy process.
Certainly U.S. missions to regional and other international organi-
zations should not, and cannot successfully, operate as little foreign
offices. Such confusion of responsibility reinforces a tendency to give
undue weight in policy formulation to considerations that necessarily
seem more important in Paris or New York, for example, than they
seem to the President.
The Government has not yet fully faced the problem of adjusting
its organization and procedures to the problems created by the growth
of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and
the regional organizations in Europe and Latin America. This is one
of those emotionally charged areas that needs careful study.
V. Executive Responsibility for Administration
The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of
finance, the application and disbursement of the public moneys in
conformity to the general appropriations of the legislature, the arrange-
ment of the army and navy, the direction of the operations of war,-
these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be
most properly understood by the administration of government. The,
AND-
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES 17
persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different
matters are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants or
deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account, they ought to
derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination,
and ought to be subject to his superintendence.
The Federalist No. 72, March 21, 1788
The view that what is called "administration" is separate, sub-
ordinate, and of little relevance to national security policy needs
correction. The problem was understood by the writers of The
Federalist papers 175 years ago. They correctly linked administra-
tion in the large sense--big "A" administration-with the selection
and superintendence of assistants-little "a" administration.
The making of policy and its execution are aspects of a continuous
process, and responsibility for both needs to be lodged in the some
hands.
The best laid plans have to be modified as time passes. Circum-
stances change in unforeseen and unforeseeable ways. Unanticipated
opportunities arise and unexpected obstacles appear, compelling
adjustments of staff and operations and sometimes fundamental
revisions of policy.
Top executives are strongly tempted to give administrative problems
low priority. They have enormously heavy demands on their time.
They know that they will be in office a relatively short time and that,
except for a few key appointments, they will have to work mainly with
the staffs they have. Many suspect, furthermore, that the payoff
from efforts to improve administration is likely to be small, especially
in the short run.
For this reason, problems of "administration" have been left largely
to administrative officers. In the process even the word "administra-
tion" has seemed to shrink.
When one speaks of "the Administration," one thinks of the Presi-
dent and the direction of the Nation's affairs. But when one speaks
of "administration," one thinks of accounting, payrolls, transportation
of persons and things, career development programs, personnel
management, and so forth.
The Government has had a great deal of experience with the
delegation of responsibility for administration to officers outside the
mainstreams of their departments. The experience confirms the
wisdom of the Founding Fathers.
It is easy enough to draw up a list of the qualities desired in public
officials: judgment, drive, imagination, courage, intelligence, de-
cisiveness, loyalty. If a President is to recruit. such persons, he must
provide scope for the exercise of these qualities. People possessing
them can, after all, make a success in any career they choose and are
not likely to remain in posts where they cannot put their abilities to
work.
Good staffing is thus related. to good organization. Perhaps the
biggest task facing an administration is to create an organizational
environment attractive to excellence. The challenge and the oppor-
tunity to perform at the limit of one's capabilities on tasks vital to
one's country is the greatest reward government can offer.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
18 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY-BASIC ISSUES
MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY
An important question about any administrative system is whether
the qualities which enable an individual to survive and advance in
the organization are the same as those which will enable the organiza-
tion to survive in a competitive environment.
The spirit of an organization is, then, of first importance. Whom
do able and ambitious junior officers seek to emulate? Are do-ers
rewarded? Or do cautious men-the do-littles-win advancement?
It may be largely through imitation of the successful that recognizable
types develop in organizations.
One of a top executive's most important jobs is to reward good-
and penalize unsatisfactory-performance. The quality of his deci-
sions in a few cases may tone up an entire organization and make it
an effective instrument for his use.
But we have made it extraordinarily difficult for Government exec-
utives to take such action. In the laudable effort to avoid favoritism
and assure fair and uniform treatment, the administrative scales have
been weighted in favor of protecting mediocrity.
Perhaps it would be wise in the national security area to give top
executives authority, within defined limits, to hire, promote, and re-
assign a certain number of people without the restraints and restric-
tions of the civil, foreign, and military service regulations.
It is ironic that the present Administration is busily searching for
outstanding people in their early forties to serve as ambassadors,
chiefs of foreign aid missions, and so forth, when there are many able
and experienced men in the civil and foreign services who are prob-
ably better qualified for these jobs than most outsiders.
As things stand, however, these men will not be promoted to the
highest classes in their services for many years. One of the dilemmas
of administration is how to advance people rapidly and out of turn
without disrupting the organization. The key is to act without fear
or favor in rewarding excellence. And in pruning out incompetence.
No organization is overstaffed with good people. But everyone
agrees that overstaffing exists in Washington and the field, with its
well-known vices: excessive layering, unnecessary clearances, over-
grown committees, needless proliferation of paperwork, and time-
wasting demands on top officials.
Nevertheless, overstaffing remains, like the weather, a common
subject of conversation but an infrequent object of action. And for
much the same reason: the top executive despairs, under the restric-
tions to which he is subject, of doing much about it.
Some say that veterans' preference legislation and other regulations
make it difficult to carry out reductions in force without disrupting
an organization, largely because they trigger a chain "bumping"
reaction. Others believe that these difficu'ties are exaggerated and
used as an excuse to avoid the always painful task of reducing staff.
Some say that the Government has not taken intelligent advantage
of the opportunities provided by the normal turnover of 10 to 20
percent through retirements, resignations, transfers, and death. If
new recruiting could be held to half this loss, substantial reductions
would be quickly possible. But the key is again authority for man-
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
agers to manage. Top executives need greater freedom to reassign
people, abolish and consolidate functions, and perhaps to replace
several low-ranking officers with an outstanding person or two of high
rank.
This is an area in which cooperation between the executive branch
and Congress might yield important results.
A change of attitude is needed at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue_
Too often officials of the executive branch regard Congress as an
opponent; they are less than frank about their administrative problems
when frankness would pay off; they try to minimize trouble by pre-
tending that matters are well in hand when they are not.
For its part Congress should concern itself less with efforts to pre-
vent executives from abusing power by restricting their ability to
manage and should instead give them the authority to act as executives
and hold thorn accountable for their use of it. There should be less
emphasis on restrictions, restraints, and regulations and more on
management flexibility with rewards for accomplishment.
VI. Communications
This [Cuban] experience underlined also the importance in times of
crisis of extremely rapid and reliable communications between govern-
ments. Rapid communication was instrumental in this case in averting
a possible war. But even more rapid communication would in fact be
desirable.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, address, Foreign Policy Associa-
tion, November 20, 1062
The problem of fast, reliable, secure communication with our
missions overseas and with other governments is at last receiving
top-level attention, largely as a result of the serious inadequacies
revealed in the course of the Cuban and Congo crises. The military
and intelligence services have good, modern facilities for communi-
cating with many key areas. Even their communications are poor,.
however, with many parts of the world, including most of Latin.
America, Africa, and Asia. The Department of State's facilities are
unsatisfactory in most areas. Serious delays have been experienced
and unfortunate restrictions on traffic had to be imposed in recent
months, even in communications with major capitals of Western
Europe.
Modern technology has made rapid, adequate, secure communica-
tion feasible. But the U.S. Government has not yet made full use of
this technology to build a satisfactory worldwide communications
system. Although the facilities required will be expensive, the cost
will be minimal in comparison with the costs of a failure of communica-
tions at a critical juncture and in comparison with our expenditures
on other parts of our national security programs.
A question of importance is whether a system can be planned and
built which would meet Government-wide needs without costly dupli-
cation of facilities and without subordinating the needs and legitimate
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
 Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6
interests of one department or agency to those of another. Congress,
as well as the executive branch, should give this matter its priority
attention.
The basic consideration is clear: there is every good reason why the
U.S. Government should have the best communications facilities that
modern technology can provide. It cannot afford less.
Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200010023-6