STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 9, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 200"l 00383R00
9 May 1963
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
CIA Contribution For Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
When this cover sheet is removed the
paper is unclassified. CIA should not
be identified as the author.
Approved For Release 2
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
03 '~a ~t 00 I
30002-7
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9 May 1963
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Table of Contents
Page
I'* INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
.II. STAFFING THE PARTY . . . . . < . . . f 0 3
Staffing Requirements at Senior Levels 3
The Politburo and Secretariat . . . 7
The Second Level . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Next Generation . . . . . , . , 9
The Party and the State . > . . . . . 10
The Structure for Staffing Party Organ-
izations > > 11
The Leading Bodies . . . . . . . , . , 11
The Central Departments . , . , 14
The Control Commission . . . , . . 15
Regional, Provincial and County Posts 1.8
Party Personnel Administration 20
Admission . . . . . . . . . . , 20
Appraisal and Promotion . . . . . . . 22
Party Education . . . . , , 23
Party Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . 26
III. STAFFING THE GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . 28
Staffing Requirements for Senior Posts 28
Structure for Staffing Government
Offi . > . . . . . . . . . > . 30
The State Council , , > > 30
The Second Level . , . 31
Specialized Personnel . . . , , . . , 33
Ministries and Commissions . , . , 35
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Page
Government Personnel Administration ? .
36
Recruitment and Assignment
.
36
Transfer and Promotion +
39
Veterani?'' Preference . . . . .,
. . ? ?.
40
In-service Training < +
?
41
Government Incentives
42
IV. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT , ?
?
45
The Military Affairs Committee
.
45
The General Political Department
. ? .
47
The Ministry of National Defense
.. . ?
48
Overstaffing. . . . . . . . .
. ? . ?
50
Training . ? . ? ? ? . ? ? ? .
. ? < ?
50
V. MANPOWER AND EDUCATION ? . . ? ? . ?
. ? ? .
54
The Labor Force . ? . . . ? ? .
?
54
The Education System . . . ?
?. ? ?
55
Graduate Work ? . ? . . ?
. ? .
58
Use of Soviet Schools ? . .
.
59
Scientific Manpower ? ? ? . ?
? ? ? ?
60
IV. THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS . ? . . ?
? . . ?
62
Classified Channels ? . ? . . .
. . . .
62
The Party Press . ? . ? ? . .
. a . ?
63
Meetings
? ?
63
VII. AN APPRAISAL OF THE SYSTEM ? ? ? ? ?
? . ? ?
68
-ii-
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STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
I. I NTRODUCT I ON
This is a study of the theory and practice of
personnel management in Communist China.- It endeavors
to draw together information on how Chinese skilled
manpower and talent are selected, motivated, advanced
and organized in the pursuit of national goals. It
begins with a consideration of personnel requirements
at the senior levels of the party, surveying the broad
functions performed and sketching out the background
and character of the incumbents. It then takes a look
at the mechanics for staffing various echelons of,:the
party. This is followed by an examination of how.the
party actually handles its personnel.
These chapters are followed by a discussion, ar-
ranged along similar lines, of the requirements for
top government executives, the system of government
personnel administration and how it operates in prac-
tice. A special chapter is devoted to the armed'forces.
Later chapters take up in turn the educational
system and the means used by the leaders to communi-
cate with lower levels of the administrative apparatus
and the Chinese people. The concluding section is a
general assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of the whole system.
Several characteristics of the Chinese Commun-
ists' approach to this problem are, we think, deserv-
ing of special mention.
1. A striking feature of the Chinese system,
even in comparison with its Soviet counterpart, is
the pervasiveness of party control and manipulation.
Positions of real authority anywhere in China'are
Without exception held by party members. In fact,
no level of government, no military, scientific,
economic or educational organization, no activity
of any moment is without its party group, the mem-
bers of which effectively run the unit. Advance-
ment is unlikely if the party does not approve.
2. .Stability in the highest reaches of the
party has been unusual for a system which in other
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places has bred frequent change. Mao Tse-tung has
been the dominant figure for nearly three decades.
He has kept around him a group of associates he
trusts. Today, these men are old and overworked.
They present an all but immovable roadblock against
aspirants to high office. And it has also proven
a difficult matter to insinuate new concepts, es-
pecially in technical fields,,,,,.into the policy making
process. The leaders tend to turn for advice to
party figures who share the experiences and prej-
udices of the leaders.
3. Personnel management is highly centralized.
The system allows the men who determine national
security programs to commit available talent to these
programs in complete freedom. There is no outside
competition for talent.
4. China is, however, very short of top-flight
talent--administrators, managers, scientific research-
ers, tutors for graduate students, technicians, etc.
Still the Chinese leaders misuse what they do have by
a dogmatic refusal to trust fully those educated a-
broad, whether in the USSR or the West, and by forc-
ing everyone to spend much time in political indoc-
trination.
5. These political indoctrination programs and
the absolute control of all media of communication
permit the leaders to disseminate only such informa-
tion as they think fitting. This has contributed
to a unity of purpose throughout the system and a
willingness to work hard at tasks set by the leaders,
though the degree of dedication today is not what it
was several years ago.
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II. STAFFING THE PARTY
National security policy in Communist China is
directed to building China over the shortest histori-
cal span possible into a strong, modern leader of na-
tions with all the paraphernalia of power that implies..
The goal is a China respected for its military and po-
litical power, honored for its culture, turned to for
its principled interpretation of Communist doctrine;
in short, a China restored to its rightful leading
role in the world. The present leaders are dedicated
to the proposition that this can only be done through
the development of an authoritarian, Communist system
of government in China.
The Chinese Communist Party, in power throughout
mainland China since 1949, is still in the early phases
of a big construction effort. The attempts of the lead-
ers in 1958-1960 to accelerate the process through "leap
forward" practices were a dismal failure. The country
is groping its way out of the rubble of that disaster.
It did not, however, shake the leadership out of the
conviction that Its cause and course are correct. Nor
has it shaken the present leaders from their dominant
positions.
Staffing Requirements at Senior Levels
Ultimate power, in the Chinese Communist system,
rests in one man, whose qualities determine in great
measure how the whole will operate. That man now is
Mao Tse-tung, father figure of the Chinese Communist
movement. The guiding principles and the programs
by which the nation operates are in the final analysis
his responsibility. Many issues can, of course, be
settled short of Mao, but he is the final arbiter.
During the nearly three decades of Mao's steward-
ship, the Chinese party has been transformed from a
small, hunted band of revolutionaries fleeing to the
barren hills of northwestern China into the ruling
element of the largest single group of people on the
face of the globe. This record of success has made,
and continues to make, effective challenge of Mao a
very difficult proposition.
To the Chinese party, Mao is the "greatest revolu-
tionary and statesman in Chinese history", and the most
prominent communist "among all living contemporaries."
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1956 Rank in
Central Committee
(2) Liu Shoo-chi
(4) Teng Hslao-ping
(6) Chou En-lai
(7) Tung Pi-wu
(8) Chen Yun
(9) Lin Piao
(13) Li Fu-chun
(14) Lo Jung-huan
(16) Lu Ting-i
(17) Lo Jui-ching
(21) Chen Yi
(24) Li Hsien-nien
(26) Nieh Jung-chen
Chairman, CCP Central Committee; Chair-
man, CCP Politburo
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro; Ranking Member, CCP Secretariat;
Secretary General, Central Committee
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Polit-
buro
Member, CCP Politburo; Secretary, Central
Committee Control Commission
Member, Standing Committee, CCP Politburo;
Member, Military Affairs Commission of the
Central Committee
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, Military
Affairs Commission of the Central Committee
Honorary Chairman, CPPCC;
Deputy, NPC
Chairman, People's Republic of China;
Chairman, National Defense Council;
Deputy, NPC; Member, CPPCC
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice
Chairman, National Defense Council;
Deputy, NPC
Premier, State Council; Chairman,
CPPCC; Deputy, NPC
Vice Chairman, People's Republic of
China; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Member,
State Planning Commission; Deputy,
NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Minister
of National Defense; Vice Chairman,
National Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman,
State Planning Commission; Deputy, NPC
Vice Chairman, National Defense Council;
Vice Chairman, NPC
Alternate Member, CCP Politburo; Member, Vice Premier, State Council; Deputy, NPC
CCP Secretariat; Director, CCP Propaganda Dept.
Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat
Member, CCP Central Committee; Member, CCP
Secretariat; Member, Military Affairs Comm-
ission of the Central Committee
Member, CCP Politburo; Member, CCP
Secretariat; First Secretary, Peiping
Municipal CCP Committee
Vice Premier, State Council; Vice
Minister of National Defense; Chief
of Staff, PLA; Member, National
Defense Council; Vice Chairman, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Minister
of Foreign Affairs; Director, Foreign
Affairs Staff Office, State Council;
Vice Chairman, National Defense
Council; Deputy, NPC; Vice Chairman,
CPPCC
Vice Premier, State Council; Director,
Staff Office for Finance and Trade,
State Council; Minister of Finance;
Vice Chairman, State Planning Comm-
ission; Member, National Defense
Council; Deputy, NPC
Vice Premier, State Council; Chairman
Science and Technology Commission,
State Council; Vice Chairman, National
Defense Council; Deputy, NPC
Secretary General, NPC; Vice Chairman,
CPPCC; Chairman, Peiping Municipal
People's Government
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Public speeches by Mao's foremost associates bristle
with fulsome tributes to Mao's insights, wisdom and
knowledge. Practicing experts in virtually any
field--ideological, economic, military, literary,
scientific--are advised to improve themselves by
studying Mao's works. Chinese policies in all these
fields are presented as owing much to the master.
Mao Tse-tung, born the son of a rich peasant,
has been a member of the Chinese Communist Party
since it was formed in 1921, and has been its
leader since 1935. He is a man of supreme self-
confidence. For years he has shown an ability
to adapt Marxist-Leninist formulas to suit his
own purposes as well as a certain talent for mak-
ing the right decision at the right time.
This talent may perhaps be diminishing; at
least, his more recent initiatives have not been
notably successful. The great leap forward, the
commune movement and the challenge to the Soviets
have all proved singularly inappropriate to China's
needs at this stage of its development.
Mao is widely read in the literature of Marxism-
Leninism. He writes well, frequently in a breezy
style full of pithy language which appeals to Chi-
nese. He has been able to attract and hold com-
petent subordinates, and has shown an ability to
balance them off, one against the other.
He has been outside China only twice, in 1950
and 1957, both times to the Soviet Union. His knowl-
edge and understanding of the outside world are lim-
ited. His grasp of internal Chinese conditions may
be slipping. Rumors have been trickling out of
China for the past several years that Mao's health
has been declining. Whatever the state of his
powers, Mao's speeches and writings have diminished
quite remarkably since about 1957. In recent years,
he has spent a good deal of time in various vaca-
tions spots away from the levers of power in Peiping.
Standing just behind Mao in the power structure
are his six colleagues on the Standing Committee of
the Politburo. This inner circle of advisors joins
Mao in developing, formulating and coordinating
China's domestic, foreign and defense. policies.
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Considerable figures in their own right, they
are widely experienced in party, state and military
affairs. They are expected to look at issues which
come before them in a comprehensive, overall way.
They must watch the whole chessboard, not just one
of the pieces. Each of them, however, does appear
to have a broad area of specialization. Liu Shad-
chi and Teng Hsiao-ping seem to give the greater
measure of their attention the theoretical and
practical concerns of the party. Chou E n-lai's
chief concern is the government and its foreign
relations. Lin Piao concentrates on military af-
fairs. Chu Teh, generally inactive, sometimes
serves as a spokesman for Mao. Chen Yun spends
most of his time on economic matters, though he
has been out of the public eye for some time now.
These are men with a long history of devotion
to the hierarch, men who have thrived on decades
of the vicious in-fighting which characterizes
the system, men who are tough and ruthless, men
who speak a common language and hold common views.
They are men who have been conditioned by many
years of party work to understand the time for
debate and the limits placed thereon. The effec-
tive operation of the entire structure requires
that the men at this level be tightly knit. They
must know how and when to submerge differences
and show a common purpose to the other layers
of the party and to the people at large.
The continuity of this group is remarkable
for a system which in other countries and parties
has bred frequent bloody change. Turnover has
been limited. The five men who were on the party
Secretariat in 1945 are still formally in the
inner circle today.
Ranking next to Mao is Liu Shao-chi. To some,
he appears a classic example of the faithful serv-
ant. They point to his speeches with their many
sycophantic passages, and speculate that he will
not long outlast Mao. However, Liu does wield
great power in the party organization. Mao has
complete confidence in Liu's abilities and has
made Liu his heir apparent. The party presents
him as its leading theoretician, next to Mao.
His 1939 work, How to be a Good Communist, was
recently re-issu`ec and mane a subject of a
special party study campaign.
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Liu is a somber and a somewhat colorless indi-
vidual. After he was selected to succeed Mao as
head of government in 1959, an attempt was made
by the party's propaganda organs to paint a more
engaging public picture of him. The campaign
seems to have died away with doubtful results.
Liu's closest collaborator in party matters
is Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the youngest members
of the inner circle. Teng has risen rapidly in
favor and prestige since the mid-fifties. In
recent years he has been the party's chosen spokes-
man on a number of key issues, and in 1960 played
a large part in the Moscow conference of commun-
ist parties.
A short, bullet-headed man, Teng is said to
be hard-driving and aggressive. The party obvi-
ously regards him as a good organizer and sound
administrator. His several strategic positions
in the central apparatus give him powerful levers
over party matters.
Chou En-lai, the only premier the Chinese
Communist government has ever had, is perhaps
the best known of the Chinese Communists in the
West. Handsome and urbane, Chou for years was
the principal face which the Chinese Communists
turned to the world. He has travelled more than
his colleagues in the inner circle and he may,.
as a result, have a more sophisticated view of
the outer world. He is by all accounts a skilled
and resourceful negotiator. He showed at the
Bandung Conference in 1955 and in an early visit
to India that he is quite expert at building up
an aura of Chinese goodwill.
What should not be lost sight of is that
Chou is also a veteran communist, a high-rank-
ing member of the party for at least four decades.
He was once ranked ahead of Mao and has shown
a remarkable agility in getting along with who-
ever happens to be in power. Chou's wife is
the number two woman in the party.
The other active member of the inner circle
is Lin Piao. He is the youngest. A military man
for his entire career, Lin had apparently been
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ailing for a number of years. He leapt back into
prominence following the disgrace of Peng Teh-huai
in 1959. Lin was one of the most successful generals
produced by the Chinese Communists in their fight
against the Chinese Nationalists. His return coin-
cided with a renewed emphasis on the supremacy of
the party over the military.
The Politburo and Secretariat
Standing just outside this inner circle are
the remaining full (voting) members of the Polit-
buro. This body has considerable importance as
an advisory board, a discussion group and, some-
times, as a voting body. Decisions taken by the
Standing Committee have the full force of a Polit-
buro decision, but Politburo sanction may well be
sought for major policy shifts. Meaningful voting
in the Politburo is probably restricted to issues
on which Mao and his inner circle have not staked
out a definite position.
The advice of Politburo members is likely to
be sought prior to decision on a matter in which
the individual member is expert. All nineteen of
the voting members are men with a record of thirty
to forty years of faithful service to the party.
They represent a variety of backgrounds and are
capable of providing advice in many fields. Here
appear the top specialists in various aspects of
party work: Peng Chen has long been in party
organizational work and has represented the party
at important communist meetings abroad. Tung Pi-wu
is engaged in supervisory work, Tan Chen-lin is
concentrating on agricultural matters, Lo Jung-
huan is a senior figure in party control work in
the armed forces. Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun and Li
Hsien-nien are the party's top specialists, re-
spectively, in the government's foreign, economic
planning and financial affairs. Ko Ching-shah and
Li Ching-chuan are the top leaders in East and
Southwest China and may bring regional points of
view into the Politburo.
No additions to the Politburo have been an-
nounced since 1958. Good bets for election to
the next Politburo are Tao Chu and Sung Jen-chiung,
heads of the Central-South and Northeast party bu-
reaus, respectively.
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Since Mao took over in 1935, only three men of
Politburo rank can confidently be said to have been
purged; Chang Kuo-tao shortly afterwards, Kao Kang
in 1954 and Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Several have
been demoted, others have died, but seven members of
to present Politburo were. on the 11-man body elected
in 1945.
The presence of a number of party elders in
these key groups should not be misconstrued. Though
they are relatively inactive, they do serve a definite
purpose by providing automatic support for Mao on any
matters put before them.
Another key top,level body is. the Secretariat,
the executive office of the party for day-to-day
operations. It is under the direction of the Stand-
ing Committee and the Politburo, and differs from
these bodies largely in that it is, formally, a
full-time body. Although the counsel of its mem-
bers is probably sought before new policy is finali-
zed, the Secretariat's main task is to monitor the
execution of decisions taken by its parent bodies.
The Secretariat may well be the party's instrument-
ality for directing and coordinating the party's
central departments.
The ranking official on the Secretariat is
Teng Hsiao-ping. His four leading associates are
all Politburo figures--peng Chen, Li Fu-chun, Li
Hsien-nien and Tan Chen-lin. Also included are
Lo Jui-ching, who is Chief of Staff of the armed
forces and a long-time security expert; Kang Sheng,
an intelligence man; Lu Ning-yi and Hu Chiao-mu,
propaganda experts; Li Hsueh-feng, industrial
matters; Liu Lan-tao, organizational and control
matters within the party; Wang Chia-hsiang, who
was once involved.in liaison with other parties
but has not been active lately; and, Yang Shang-
kun, who holds several top administrative posi-
tions. Lo Jui-ching, Fang Sheng and Lu Ning-yi
were added to the Secretariat by the tenth plenum
of the Central Committee in September 1962.
The Second Level
The Central Committee itself, nominally 97
full and 95 alternate members, has functioned under
Mao as a rubber stamp body, convened to be instructed
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concerning decisions taken by the dominant leaders.
By the time it meets the needs of the top command
for expert advice have been met and the line in
all essentials has been set. It could, as has
happened in the Soviet party, emerge as an important
deliberative body if an issue arose on which the
leaders were critically divided.
An individual's rank within the Central Com-
mittee is important as his mark of preferment.
The party's central departments provide the
staff to prepare position papers on matters coming
before the policy makers and to oversee, under the
direction of the Standing Committee and the Secre-
tariat, the party's day-to-day operations. The
men who run these departments are in charge of the
party's interests in propaganda, police, rural, in-
dustrial, finance and trade, communications, united
front, and party organization work as well as liai-
son with foreign parties. They make many of the
daily decisions on how party policies are to be
executed within their areas of competence. They
are in a sense going through the last and highest
training course which the party offers its future
leaders.
The committees (really sub-committees) under
the Central Committee are on the same level as the
departments but differ in that they tend to meet
irregularly as the occasion or the leaders demand.
Like other committees, they probably have permanent
standing bodies. Included are the Committee for
Organs Directly Subordinate to the Central Com-
mittee, the Committee for Central State Organs
and the Women's Work Committee.
Two important commissions, the Control Com-
mission and the Military Affairs Commission, also
come just under the Central Committee on party
organization charts. They are discussed belowl
The top levels of the party are nicely layered
according to age and party seniority. Virtually
all of the top leaders went through the crucible
of the Long March, a 6,000-mile hegira in 1934-1936
which transferred the party's base from Kiangsi to
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APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION IN 1956
CULTURAL AND
EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
(4%)
FINANCIAL
AND TRADING
ORGANIZATIONS
(5%)
COMMUNICATIONS
(2%)
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Shensi Province. The Long Marchers are getting on.
Mao is almost 70 and most of his key advisers are
over 60. The new generation will probably be domi-
nated by another brand of Communist whose forma-
tive years in the party were in the fight against
the Japanese.
After they take over, it is possible that many
of the old Maoist ways will go. The new group will
very likely not have the remarkable measure of cohe-
siveness of Mao's group. Most of the new men, in-
cluding its leading figures, will have made their
mark in the party apparatus. It is possible, how-
ever, that by the time the new group gets entrenched
officials who have made their mark in economic,
scientific or other specialities will begin to
exert greater influence in high policy making levels.
The Party and the State
In Communist China the party's field of direct
interest and influence extends into every nook and
cranny of the government and military establish-
ment, of every economic or scientific installation,
of every education institution. "The party must,
and can, lead all--the state organs, the armed
forces, the people's bodies," runs a typical in-
struction to party workers.
Party control is brought to bear by the as-
signment of trusted party members to positions,
usually of authority, in all non-party organiza-
tions. Called "leading members' groups", they
are assigned by an appropriate party committee.
The Central Committee determines the make up of
the "leading members' groups" in central govern-
ment offices; provincial committees do the same
for the provincial governments, county committees
for the counties. These "leading members' groups"
remain under the direction of their assigning com-
mittees, not under a "leading members' group" in
a superior non-party organization.
The party has a number of full-time workers
who perform no job outside the party, but the
majority work in government offices, in the mili-
tary, in economic and cultural establishments,
or in people's organizations. They remain under
strict party discipline. Failure to detect and
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report without delay the slightest shortcoming,
from the party's point of view, would open them
to serious charges.
The pattern of party influence brought to
bear by party members is repeated at the working
level. Every basic level installation, be it
factory, mine, collective farm, or military
unit, has its own party organization appointed
by an appropriate party committee. It is the
duty of the party organizations to transmi 'g
party policy and see to it that the policy is
understood and implemented completely. They
must adapt. the policies, as necessary, to local
conditions.
The Structure for Staffing Party Organizations
The Leading Bodies
The 1956 party constitution declares that
the National Party Congress is the "highest lead-
ing body" of the party. It is elected. But the
timing of its election, the number of delegates,
and the manner in which they are elected are con-
trolled by the "in" group. The "in's" reserve to
themselves the right to run members of superior
party organizations "who need to be elected" in
local elections. They also can cancel the elec-
tion of anyone they deem "inadequate." The present
Eighth Congress was elected in 1956 for a term of
five years. It is still in office. Its opening
session was attended by just over 1,000 delegates.
The party's first congress, in 1921, was attended
by twelve.
A party congress provides a forum for the
airing of party policies, but its most important
task is to elect a Central Committee to act for
it when it is not in session. The importance of
this. provision derives from the infrequency with
which National Party Congresses are convened.
The Eighth has met but twice, in 1956 and 1958,
despite provisions in the party constitution,
which it adopted, that it meet once a year. In
fact, during the six and one-half years it has
been in office it has met in session for a grand
total of 32 days.
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The present Central Committee, the eighth,
came to office in 1956, the result of a carefully
contrived electoral process designed by the party
center to bring minimal disturbance to the then
existing hierarchical arrangements. It was an
"election with leadership." The top leaders de-
cided on the number of candidates who would stand
for election, named them and arranged the elec-
toral lists in proper order of precedence.
All of this took a lot of arranging, and may
have prompted a leading party figure to warn that
"too many elections are unnecessary and may handi-
cap our work." The party has generally followed
his advice.
Theoretically at least, ultimate authority
for the disposition of important personnel matters
rests in the Central Committee. The 1956 party
constitution spells this out: the Central Com-
mittee, it states, "takes charge of and allocates
party cadres." (The term cadre, in Chinese kanpu,
is applied by the Chinese Communists to officials
and functionaries in both the party and the govern-
ment and is used in either an individual or a group
sense.) When the Central Committee is not in ple-
nary session, its powers and functions, including
those involving the disposition of cadres, pass to
the Politburo, its Standing Committee and the Secre-
tariat, all elected by the Central Committee. The
Eighth Central Committee has met in plenary session
ten times for a total of some 75 days since 1956.
In practice, therefore, its authority over
cadre regulation is delegated to its continuing
bodies. The highest authority in personnel, as
in all other matters, doubtless rests with Mao
Tse-tung, It is likely that Mao still takes an
active interest in assignments to key positions,
since any other course could carry grave dangers
for him. A number of lesser personnel actions
may ultimately be referred to him for decision.
There is bound, for example, to be serious competi-
tion among various departments of China's national
security setup for skilled manpower and managerial
talent, which are among the nation's scarcest re-
sources.
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.He is very likely assisted in his delibera-
tions on these matters by his four active assist-
ants on the Standing Committee with Liu Shao-chi
and Teng Hsiao-ping representing the party's in-
terests, Chou En-lai the government's and Lin Piao
those of the military establishment. Communist
China is not known to have a system, as do the
Soviets, which specifies just which non-party
jobs require the stamp of approval of what party
body. The Chinese system is in general highly
centralized, and the Standing Committee may well
require that it pass on all recommendations for
appointments to key jobs in the party central
organs, in the government's top bodies, in eco-
nomic, cultural and scientific enterprises of
national security significance, in the armed
forces and in the regions and provinces. The
Standing Committee doubtless reserves for itself
the right to determine just what constitutes a
"key" assignment requiring its O.K.
In acting on proposals for filling "key"
jobs, Mao and the Standing Committee rely heavily
upon the Secretariat, through which related per-
sonnel records and data are channeled. As the
directing and coordinating agency for the regular
central organizations of the party, the Secretariat
can probably approve on its own appointments to a
range of positions below those on which the Stand-
ing Committee and Mao act. In any case, the princi-
pal figure on the Secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping, is
also in Mao's inner circle, a circumstance which
doubtless gives him vast authority in the personnel
field. He is, at a minimum, the needle's eye through
which a man must pass on his way to a position of
real authority:
Teng's assistants on the Secretariat oversee
the work of one or another of the party's central
organs and through them exert considerable influence
on central government offices. These assistants
are very likely responsible for advising Teng and
the Secretariat on those aspects of a candidate's
party standing and qualifications which fall within
the competence of their particular departments.
They can probably act directly on a certain level
of position within their own areas. Most of these
secretaries have had long experience in party organi-
zational work.
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The Central Departments
Neither the Standing Committee, the Politburo
nor the Secretariat is Sufficiently rich in per
sonnel to discharge in detail the constitutional
charge which devolves on them "to take charge of
and allocate cadres." The size of this job is
suggested by the fact that in 1956, the last year
for which figures are at hand, there were over
3 0,000.party cadres at the county committee level
add higher. The 1963 total is surely higher. So,
again, much of the function is delegated to bodies
which the Central Committee has set up, and staffed,
to be its executive agents in its "diverse businesses."
Among these are the Organization Department, the Con-
trol Commission, the Committee for Party Organs Di-
rectly Subordinate to the Central Committee, and the
Committee for Central State Organs. Other central
departments play lesser roles.
The Organization Department, though no longer
the power it once was, still plays a strong hand in
the administration of patty cadres. Prior to 1954,
it controlled most aspects of party personnel manage-
ment. It had responsibility for recruitment, train-
ing, assignment, promotion, transfer of party cadres
as well as the maintenance of party personnel records,
the collection of party dues and the investigation
of party members' reliability. In 1954 the party
elders discovered that the then chief of the Organi-
zation Department, Jao Shu-shih, had been attempting
to use the office to unseat them. He was removed
forthwith, and the Organization Department was shorn
of many of its powers.
A 1959 study, written by the Research Office
of the post-Jao Organization Department for the use
of its cadres, explains the role of the Organization
Department as that of a "deputy and staff chief" to
party committees for cadre administration. The study
is studded with warnings that the Organization Depart-
ment ought not "stick its nose into the proper busi-
ness of others." It must, rather, keep to its "own
share" of the administration of party cadres and
party members.
This share is not inconsiderable. The study
explains that the Organization Department remains
active in the selection, promotion and training of
party cadres and in "developing" party members.
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It still handles the records of party personnel. It
probably still has much to do with the placement of
party men in positions which the higher levels, the
Secretariat and the Standing Committee, do not keep
in their own hands.
The present head of the Organization Department
is An Tzu-wen, who was a deputy under Jao but defi-
nitely not his accomplice. An was once Minister of
Personnel of the Central.Government, and played a
large part in the big initial effort to staff the
new government (1950-1954).
Some of the functions formerly given the Organi-
zation Department have probably been entrusted to the
.Committee for Party Organs . Directly Subordinate to
the Central Committee. Little has been said about
this unit, but its name suggests it was conceived
to supervise the party's central organs, keep them
informed on policy matters, and, perhaps, to assist
in handling their ordinary staffing needs. It is
headed by Yang Shang-kun, who is concurrently Director
of the Central Committee's General Office and an alter-
nate secretary of the Secretariat. Like An Tzu-wen,
Yang is not a party heavyweight. He has seemed, ra-
ther, to be a trustworthy administrative functionary
who sees to the routine office tasks of the Central
Committee, handles correspondence and maintains re-
cords.
Other of theold Organization Department's func-
tions probably-went to the Committee for Central State
Organs, which is believed to regulate the work of
party members who have been placed in jobs with the
central government. It is not known how big a role
this committee plays in the assignment, promotion
or transfer of party members in the government.
The pattern could possibly be an advisory role for
higher positions, a more assertive role for lower
ones. The committee is headed by Kung Tzu-jung,
who is concurrently an alternate member of the Con-
trol Commission, Yang's deputy in the General Office
and a Deputy Secretary General of the State Council.
The Control Commission
A principal element of Jao's power in the old
Organization Department, that of investigating, the
loyalty of party members, has passed entirely to the
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Control Commission. The 1945 party constitution
had provided for the establishment of both central
and local control commissions, but prior to 1955 they
were never set up. In their stead, a system of
discipline inspection teams was established. They
were empowered to deal with specific breaches of
party discipline only after they had occurred.
The inadequacy of these arrangements was clearly
exposed by the case of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih,
two prominent party figures who were expelled from
the party in 1954 for trying to split the party
and usurp supreme power. The party conference
which expelled the pair also decided to establish
strong control commissions, at both the central
and local levels. The new commissions were given
the power to investigate a party member before a
breach of discipline took place. They were c arged
with preventing a recurrence of so serious a case
as the "anti-party alliance" of Kao Kang and Jao
Shu-shih. Unlike the earlier discipline inspection
teams, the new commissions were specifically em-
powered by the conference to checkup on party
organizations, though'discipline was to be meted
out on an individual basis.
Working under the direction of party committees
at the same level, control commissions take disci-
plinary action against party members. and review
sentences meted out by lower levels, They do not
concern themselves with the minor day-to-day de-
relictions still handled by the Orginization,De-
partment. They are interested in major discipli-
nary problems like anti-Maoist plotting, and are
obviously immensely important in the party security
setup. Their influence on cadre selection is
likely to be large negative- 'A party member
coming under their purview is not a good candi-
date for further advancement.
The central Control Commission is an elite
group. It is set somewhat apart from other of the
party's central departments and committees in that
its leadifig personnel are elected. The Commission
was "strengthened" by the election of additional,
but unnamed, new members at the tenth plenum of
the Central Committee, September 1962. It has a
priority claim on personnel and its staff apparatus
appears to be one of the best developed of any
central party organ. It has been headed since
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its inception by Tung Pi-wu, the only original
founder of the Chinese Communist Party outside
of Mao Tse-tung still active. An aged though
not.inconsiderable.figure, Tung is ranked seventh
in the Central Committee and is the first Vice
Chairman of the Government. Among Tung's princi-
pal deputies is Liu Lan-tao, who combines a posi-
tion on the commission with being a member of the
powerful Secretariat. Another is a high ranking
officer in the General Political Department of
the Army, the office charged with the political
indoctrination of.the army. A third was until
1960 Minister of Interior (previously Minister
of Supervision). The three would seem to be the
principal figures in overseeing the conduct of
members working respectively, in the party, the
military establishment and the government.
Other central organs which play a role in
personnel management include the Propaganda De-
partment,? which handles the education and indoc-
trination of party members. This..3s an immense
job on which the Chinese Party lavishes time,
money and effort. The Propaganda Department is
headed by Lu Ting-yi, who is also a member of
the Secretariat. The Social Affairs Department
plays a shadowy and unexplained role in the
never-ending job of policing the party. Li Ko-
Hung was the head of this organ until his death
in 1961. It may have declined in importance
since his death.
The Women's Work Committee keeps an eye on
the interests of female party members. Roughly
10 percent of party members are women, although.
the percentage drops sharply as you move up in
the hierarchy. There are, for example, only
four women on the Central Committee. The ranking
female comrade, Tsai Chang (Mrs. Li Fu--chun), is
also head of the Women's Work Committee. The
committee works.t.o overcome "discrimination" a-
gainst women cadres and see that they get the
same opportunities for advancement as male cadres.
"Some organizations." Tsai Chang once complained,
"tend to promote more men than women even when
choosing between persons of equal competence."
The United Front Department takes charge of the
party's relations with cooperating organizations
and nationalities groups. It probably has some
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say in-the selection of individuals from such
organizations for various posts.
Regional,. Provincial and County Posts
The constitution permits the Central Com-
mittee of the party, as it deems necessary, to
establish bureaus covering several provinces.
Such regional bureaus existed between 1949 and
1954. They were abolished after the Kao-Jao
incident and were not revived until January 1961,
when the need for a more coordinated regional at-
tack on some of the party's problems impressed it-
self upon the leaders. The parallel government
and military bodies which existed in the 1949-1954
period have not reappeared, at least publicly. To-
day there are six regional bureaus of the Central
Committee--the Northeast, North, East, Central-
South, Southwest, and Northwest. Peiping has been
uncommonly sparing of detail concerning their re-
sponsibilities and make-up. The post-1961 versions
appear to range across roughly the same spectrum
of interests as party committees at other levels.
.Each of them apparently has the authority to create
such subordinate organizations as it-feels are
needed. Their staffing patterns seem still to be
in the developmental stage, though many of them
have begun to staff the usual run of subordinate
departments for propaganda, rural work, finance
and the like. No regional organization departments
or control commissions have yet been identified.
The ..leading personnel of the regional bureaus
are selected directly by the party center. The in-
dividuals named are probably then allowed to fill
out their own staffs. The present regional bosses
are senior party officials, drawn some from Peiping
and some from the provinces. The Northeast Bureau
is headed by Sung Jen-chiung, who was in charge of
an important central government ministry. The East
China and Southwest Bureaus, on the other hand, are
headed by individuals drawn from the Shanghai munci-
pal and Szechwan provincial party apparatus, respec-
tively. Both are Politburo members.
These bureaus probably do have certain personnel
powers and functions. They assist the party center
in assessing job performance of provincial leaders.
Since responsibilities at the regions are broader
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than in the provinces, the regional posts may be a
proving grounds for higher posts with the party
center.
The staffing pattern at the provincial level
is a virtual carbon copy of that in Peiping. Auto-
nomous regions and cities directly under central
authority (like Shanghai) are treated as provinces.
A provincial congress is elected, and elects in
turn a provincial committee to act for the congress
when it is not in session. The provincial committee
elects a standing committee to act in its stead
when it is not in session as well as a secretariat
to handle its "daily work."
These provincial posts are important--10 of the
21 Chinese provinces have populations of between 20
and 60 million--and the party center takes no chances.
It wrote into the constitution that the number of
members of a provincial committee will be set by the
Central Committee and that the members of a provin-
cial standing committee and, secretariat must be
approved by the Central Committee.. So must party
committee members in key industrial cities and cities
with a population of over 500,000 (of which China
has some 35).
Like its counterpart in Peiping, the provincial
committee has the constitutional authority "to take
charge of and allocate party cadres", but the Cen-
tral Committee establishes the controlling regula-
tions. In practice, effective provincial responsi-
bility over cadres is most likely exercised by the
standing committee (for the higher provincial jobs)
and by the provincial departments (for lesser posts).
Provincial Committees are empowered to set up
their own departments. Most of them have an organi-
zation department, the duties of which are determined
by the provincial committees. Provincial organiza-
tion departments are involved, when local conditions
and their instructions permit, in the assignment and
promotion of cadres coming under provincial control.
Provincial departments are under the authority of the
provincial party committee, not under the corresponding
department at the party center. The latter hasonly
what Peiping terms a "guidance relationship" with
its provincial counterparts.
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Other
Intellectuals
Industrial workers
10%
CLASS BACKGROUND
(Selected Years)
800,000 1,20r~0
Q
1921
1933
1937
1940
1945
Founded
Pre-Long
March
Post-Long
March
12,700,000
4.8%
14.7%
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The staffing of party organizations at the county
level is similar to the pattern at the more exalted
levels.
Party Personnel Administration
The party constitution says that membership in
the party is open to any Chinese, age 18 and over,
who works and does not exploit the labor of others.
The entrance process can be initiated by the individ-
ual or by the party. He must be sponsored by two
full members. In either case, the individual in-
volved must fill out a detailed application. The
most important entries involve his family and
personal background, communist works he has been
influenced by, a personal evaluation of his good
and bad points, and a statement as to why he wishes
to join the party. He must be approved by a general
membership meeting of a party branch. After being
accepted by the branch meeting, the application is
forwarded to the next higher committee for review.
This committee assigns a functionary to examine
carefully the candidate's application form and
to interview him in detail.
After approval by the committee, the appli-
cant becomes a probationary member of the party.
He stays in this status for one year, during which
he is subjected to an "elementary party education"
and to the close observation of the party branch,
When the test year is over, his. case again comes
before the branch meeting. His party age is com-
puted from the day he is accepted by the branch
as a full member, though he must still go through
the formality of being approved by the next higher
committee. At any point in this process a strong
objection by any one involved can kill the appli-
cant's chances.
Admission into the Chinese Communist Party is
achieved more easily in .the periods when the party
runs drives to add new members; for example, there
was a big upswing in admissions during the commune
and "leap forward" movements in 1958-1959. These
are followed by periods of consolidation when
entrance requirements are more strenuously applied.
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Since 1956 there no longer have been different
procedures prescribed for applicants of different
class backgrounds. But it is, nevertheless, rela-
tively easy for a Chinese with a "clean" class
background parents who were workers or peasants--
to get into the party. Such an individual would be
more likely be asked to apply, and he might even
find his probationary period shortened. On the
other hand,, it is not unknown for an applicant
with an "unclean" background to be met with delay-
ing tactics which might last several years. In-
deed a bad background--a parent who was in the
Kuomintang, for example--could in practice preclude
admission.
Members in good standing of the Youth League,
a sort of junior party organization, are accepted
almost automatically. Another rich source of
party material is in the ranks of the non-party
"activist." This is one of the very best ways for
an outsider to come to the favorable notice of
a local party boss. An "activist" serves the
party by leading the less active masses at study
meetings and during production drives.
The qualities which the party wants in its
members include an unquestioning zeal, a strong
measure of asceticism, and a dash, no more, of
individuality. The party wants a man who will
place the interests of the party above his own,
a man with no aims or ambitions, indeed no life,
outside the party. He must demonstrate instan-
taneous zbedience to party discipline. It is
his "holy, duty" to carry out party policy without
reservation even if he disagrees with it, though
at the same time he is expected to be skilled in
adapting the policy to local peculiarities. He
must in all things be an exemplar to the masses,
while-sharing their "jobs and sorrows, their hard
and frugal life." He should display leadership
potential.'
Of course not all Chinese Communist Party
members measure up to these high-flown standards.
What.the party gets in practice is considerably
more limited, especially at the basic levels.
Here the party is apt to settle for obedience and
political reliability.
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Appraisal and Promotion
The basic party organization, the branch,
makes periodic appraisals of each of its members.
The appraisal process begins with the individual's
own analysis of himself. This is then discussed
by his branch colleagues who have been observing
him and forming views as to his suitability. The
"self-criticisms and criticisms" thus collected
are supplemented by regular personal interviews
between the individual member and one of his party
betters. Another higher official may collate and
sum up all of this material. Branch appraisals
are supposed to take into account the member's per-
sonal history and work record, his merits and de-
merits, his capabilities and limitations. They
become a part of a member's permanent party re-
cord..
Over a period of time these appraisals enable
the party apparatus to make judgments of a member's
particular worth and identify those who are ready
to be moved to positions of higher responsibility.
Although there have been hints that a sort of rough
grading system does exist within the party, it is
not apparently as firm and well-developed a system
as exists in the Chinese government and military.
An individual's rank in the party seems largely to
be determined by the level of the apparatus at
which he works and his duties at that level. There
are references, for example, to party secretaries
at the county level which suggest that the party
regards this as equivalent to a grade designation.
According to party instructions, the selection
of cadres for promotion and transfer should proceed
on the basis of a systematic plan and on a "unified"
--that is, controlled by the higher levels--basis.
The entire history and work of the member being con-
sidered for reassignment is to be taken into account.
His party record, likely to be a voluminous file
for any but the newest recruit, will be studied,
and the opinions of his superiors, his equals and
his subordinates sought. He may be brought in for
a personal interview by a ranking member of the
office for which he is being considered, Even if
he is not selected, the party argues that this sort
of screening is good. The individual gains a better
understanding of his strengths and weaknesses, while
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the party is enabled to place him in his proper
spot.
"Sin our fundamental evaluations of a member's
work," Mao has said.,"we must establish whether his
achievements amount to 30 percent and his mistakes
to 70 percent, or vice versa. If his achievements
amount to 70 percent, then his work should in the
main be approved.,, Most of the criteria advocated
by the party to guide the selection process are,
however, highly subjective (e.g., a high degree of
communist conciousness) and leave the selectors with-
out much meaningful guidance. Hence, much to the
party's professed .=annna.nce great emphasis is put
in practice on seniority and personal relationships.
A former party member has recalled that the prime
requirement for most any post was to have served a
certain length of time in,the party. The more re-
sponsible the post, the longer the period. Others
have testified that the prejudices of the higher
cadres constituted a most important factor.
Party writings make it very clear that the.
leaders want advancement based on other criteria.
Guidelines from the Organization Department to
party workers involved in the assignment and promo-
tion process stipulate that they should resolutely
avoid the practice of assigning and promoting solely
on the basis of seniority. Teng Hsiao-ping has called
this reliance the most serious defect in the party's
cadre policy.
The party says it wants advancement to be based
both on the member's "virtue," meaning his ideologi-
cal reliability, and "ability," meaning. his tech :.;
nical qualifications. As the party's role has
broadened over the years, and especially since it
took over the Chinese mainland, the emphasis put
on the second part of the equation has increased.
A recent party work, for example, declared that pre-
ferment in the Party will increasingly depend on
how well the member improves his technical skill.
But the party has not, and probably never will, per-
mit the latter to outweigh the former.
Party Education
Great emphasis is placed by the