STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA ANNEXES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 9, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/05/24'x- 0383R000200030003-6
9 May 1963
OCI No. 1652/63
Copy No,
STAFFING PROCEDURES AND PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
ANNEXES
CIA Contribution For Subcommittee on
National Security Staffing and Operations
to the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAN-
ING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS TITLE
18, USC, SECTION 793 AND 194, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH
IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW
Approved For Release 2000/05/24SM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
80038 03-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/2SEi [IP65B00383R000200030003-6
Page
ANNEX I. STAFFING A CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSION.
ABROAD +
ANNEX II THE STAFFING OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY
AGENCY. . . . .. . . 12
ANNEX III. STAFFING AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT . . . 17
Approved For Release 2000/05/2 , p 65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 20Z!IA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
STAFFING A CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSION ABROAD
The model staffing pattern of a Chinese Communist em-
bassy offered in the following paragraphs is an amalgam
of excellent covert reports on several Chinese Communist
missions. -abroad. Not all Chinese installations abroad
will do all of the things discussed or do them in the
same way, but the general pattern probably holds.
General Principles
The Chinese Communist Party controls all overseas in-
stallations whatever their function. The unit through which
this control is achieved is the installation's party com-
mittee. Formation in the mid-1950's of such committees
was in fact described as a "big step forward for the party
in its leadership of diplomatic work." At our model in-
stallation, the committee is headed by the ambassador
and includes the second ranking embassy official, the
military attache and commercial attache. It meets at
least every other day and makes all decisions with re-
spect to the operation of the mission, from whether the
ambassador will accept a luncheon invitation to the tone
of his conversational remarks if he goes.
It oversees the indoctrination, training, and disci-
pline of all personnel. It organizes the same kinds of
campaigns among mission personnel that the party is em-
phasizing at home. It runs the basic foreign ministry
study programs designed to train personnel in embassy
duties. These study programs are needed because many
officers are sent abroad with little formal training
in diplomacy.
The committee also organizes the basic party groups
at the mission and oversees the semi-weekly indoctrination
meetings which are compulsory for all embassy personnel.
Minutes are kept of these meetings and are sent back to
the Organization Department in Peiping. Directives on
party matters generally come to the mission's party com-
mittee from the Organization Department.
The party committee serves as the basic field coordi-
nating unit for foreign operations run by a variety of
Chinese Communist agencies. Each of the functional sec-
tions at the mission reports back to its counterpart in
Approved For Release 21SW] TCIA-RDP65BOO383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
MILITARY
ATTACHE
ORGANIZATION OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST MISSION ABROAD
PARTY COMMITTEE
AMBASSADOR
COUNSELOR
COMMERCIAL ATTACHE
MILITARY ATTACHE
INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT
COMMERCIAL
ATTACHE
Economic Affairs
Trade Promotion
CULTURAL
ATTACHE
Files
Communications
Clerical
GENERAL
AFFAIRS
SECTI ON
Accounts
Finance
Security
SECRET
Research
Cultural'-&
SocialAffairs
CONSULAR
SECTI ON
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24Sk&ft B00383R000200030003-6
Peiping. Regular mission personnel report to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the military attache to the Defense
Ministry, the commercial attache to the Foreign Trade Minis-
try, and the intelligence representative to the Party's
Investigation Department. These people get their assign-
ment, direction,salary and operating expense from their
parent organizations. They all, however, are subordinate
to the party committee of the mission.
In case of conflict which cannot be resolved satis-
factorily by the local party committee, the parties to
the dispute report the problem to their respective home
offices in Peiping. If the matter can't be resolved at
this level it is referred to one of the Central Committee
departments or the Central Committee itself.
Personnel from the Investigation Department operate
with a greater measure of autonomy than the others. The
practice seems to be keep the Ambassador and the party
committee informed on some intelligence operations, but
not by any means on all. These people can send reports
to Peiping without getting the Ambassador's O.K.
In the interest of using assigned personnel effec-
tively, the ambassador has the authority to organize the
mission as he sees fit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is frequently consulted and does make suggestions. Travel-
ling inspectors from the Ministry call periodically to
check on mission organization and operations. Across the
board economy measures are sometimes ordered by the Minis-
try. The chief Of mission has some latitude in deciding
how the cuts will be absorbed.
Mission Personnel
Our model mission, which is in a non-communist coun-
try, has some 30 employees. This is 20 fewer than it had
before the last big austerity cut in early 1962. Although
some Chinese Communist installations abroad employ local
help, all 30 were sent out from China. They can generally
be classified into three groups; regular diplomats, profes-
sional specialists and service personnel. Practically all
are party members.
The Chinese Communist diplomatic service has a nucleus
of career officers who are shifted from post to post abroad
with an occasional tour in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Peiping. The ambassador, the.first secretary and several
of the younger officers are; such men. The bulk of the
Embassy staff, however, had no background of any kind in
Approved For Release 2000/05/2 jA jUf 5B00383R000200030003-6
Ulm Uj
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
SECRET
foreign affairs when they arrived. Few had even travelled
abroad. They were selected from the government at large.
Some had been surprised at their selection. Not all were
delighted.
Only half a dozen of the mission's staff members can
speak or read the language of the host country. And only
two of these are truly fluent. They are valued and have
been longer at the post than anyone else. It is expected
that this situation will gradually improve since the foreign
ministry is running intensive language courses back in Pei-
ping, and the students there have been assured by Foreign
Minister Chen Yi that it is not a deviation to become ex-
pert in a foreign tongue. Chen is said to have been dis-
appointed in the quality of linguists produced and to have
demanded that more and better ones be trained. Language
study is usually available at the overseas installation.
The ambassador, a man in his late fifites, has been
a Chinese Communist Party member since he was a student.
Prior to his present assignment, he worked in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Peiping. His only actual foreign
experience was an earlier assignment as a staff member at
an embassy in a Soviet bloc country.
The ambassador does not fill the popular image of
a suave diplomat. He is regarded by his subordinates.
as capable and efficient in his work, cold and methodi-
cal in his personnel relations. He is married, and has
several children.
His-wife, but not his children, accompanied him
to his present post. She works at the embassy. He is
fond of Chinese cooking and eats the food prepared by
the embassy cook. He smokes a great deal, but drinks
only moderately. Extremely hard working, he spends most
of his day at the office.
The number two man is the counselor, who is about
50 years old. He is a normal school graduate and has
been a party member since World War II. He has held a
series of party positions, but, prior to being assigned
to his present post, he had no previous experience either
at the foreign ministry or at other missions.
As in the case of the ambassador, the counselor's
wife, but not his children, has accompanied him. His
wife also works in the embassy. The counselor, a bluff,
outgoing man, is relatively free with his opinions. He
is well liked and considered competent by his subordinates.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/22E, VElP65B00383R000200030003-6
The third ranking man at the mission is the first
secretary. A man in his late forties, he has a college
education and is the most fluent linguist at the embassy.
A party member, he has been With the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs since the early 1950's, and has been at his pre-
sent post for six years. He has considerable administra-
tive responsibilities within the embassy. He also over-
sees the Embassy's Country Section which works on monitor-
ing local publications and takes a leading role in local
embassy reporting. He is not married.
The military attache, a lieutenant colonel, is about
45. He is a long-time member of the Chinese Communist
party. His entire adult career has been spent in the
military service.. He has only a secondary school educa-
tion. Prior to his present assignment he had a tour
of duty at another mission as an Ossistant military at-
tache.
In his present position, he represents all branches
of the Chinese Communist armed forces. He is a bluff,
straightforward man, completely loyal to the party. He
is married, but his wife is in China.
The embassy commercial attache is a man in his late
forties. A long time member of the Chinese party; he
has only a grade school education.. Both his commercial
and foreign service experience is scant. He was once
employed by a department store in a major Chinese city.
He was a member of a trade delegation to a Soviet bloc
country in the mid 1950's. This was his only connec-
tion with his present work, except for a brief tour to
various parts of China designed to familiarize him with
Chinese export products. His wife originally accom-
panied him to his present post but was forced to re-
turn in an earlier economy drive.
The cultural attache, a man of 50 years, is also a
long time party worker. After graduating from a techni--
cal school, he turned his hand to journalism and worked
for the New China News Agency for several years. This is
his first overseas assignment. His wife is with him and
works as his assistant at the embassy.
The nominal head of the General Affairs Section, who
is about 35 years old, is actually the chief of the em-
bassy's Investigation Department unit. As such he is the
only officer at the embassy besides the ambassador per-
mitted to leave the embassy compound along. His wife is
with him and works as one of his assistants. Both are
very experienced in intelligence work, and both are long
time party members.
Approved For Release 2000/05/2 h D i65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000?E R I -RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
One of the employees of the Country Section was re-
cently sent back to China. He was a man of around 35, who
had come from a good family and had served in various
foreign posts since the early 1950's. He did not, how-
ever, get along with the ambassador, who, he felt, dis-
criminated against him. He was subjected. to several
long rounds of "criticism and self-criticism" at the
embassy, and, when he failed to display a proper atti-
tude, and was sent back to China for an indeterminate
period of corrective physical labor.
The Operation of the Mission
The business of the mission is to serve as the eyes
and ears of Communist China in the country concerned and
to do what it can locally to implement Chinese Communist
foreign policy. The ambassador once told the staff that
he considered the main tasks of the mission were: to in-
fluence local public opinion in favor of the Chinese Com-
munists; to turn the country from its pro-western stance;
and to help overthrow the government. There was not a
great deal of optimism at the installation that these
aims were at all feasible. It was recognized that the
embassy was hampered by lack of money and qualified people,
and by the.?party's insistence on regarding the mission as
a beleaguered castle in the heart of enemy country.
The main effort is of course to collect information
on the country in which the embassy is located. This is
accomplished in three principal ways: by close attention
to the local press and radio, by open contacts with the
local populace, and by covert operations. The mission's
linguists regularly read the leading local newspapers
and magazines. Articles judged to be of interest to Pei-
ping are translated. Those which comment on China are
commonly included, though there is a tendency to soften
some of the more critical material.
Items which contradict an official Chinese Communist
interpretation of a situation are often altered or ignored.
The translation pare airmailed to other posts in the area
and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This service forms
the bulk of the embassy's day-to-day reporting.
Reporting from the post does not draw heavily on in-
formed local opinion. This is probably due to the. fact
that the embasy does not expend great efforts to estab-
lish and maintain close contacts either in local official
or non official circles. Some staff members, including
Approved For Release 2000/Q_gEClC FRDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/0,5 DP65B00383R000200030003-6
the ambassador, tend to regard contacts with non-communists
as generally worthless and potentially dangerous.
They may have in mind the fate of an earlier officer
who was forced to undergo a lengthy session of self-criti-
cism both at the embassy and back in Peiping for having
had too wide and free contacts with the local population.
In addition, the military attache probably recalls his en-
tirely unsuccessful attempts to visit local military estab-
lishments.
Even contacts with the local communist party are none
too free. In the first place the leadership of the local
party has shown a tendency to lean toward the Soviet side
in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The ambassador and the coun-
selor have on several occasions expressed their disgust
with them, suggesting that their consuming interest in
personal comfort was no way to get a revolution going.
There are, however, several local communists who are
viewed with favor, probably for their more militant stands.
These are cultivated by the top people at the embassy who
have them in for talks and accept invitations to visit
their homes or offices. Other than this, the embassy's
contacts with the local party are limited to attempts to
place articles favorable to the Chinese Communist posi-
tion in local communist outlets. The principal objective
in dealing with the local party is to influence rather
than to learn. No attempt is known to be made to tap
the local apparatus for information and insights on the
local scene. The views which appear in the local commun-
ist papers are included in the material airmailed back
to Peiping, but the ambassador rejected an idea that
wider contacts would be useful on the grounds that he
knew more of what was going on in the country than the
local party did.
The embassy, along with a number of other Chinese
Communist missions abroad, has come under fire recently
for failing to understand conditions in the countries
to which they are attached. The embassies were criticized
for their failure to get and report "inside information"
and for their superficial analysis of such information
as wascollected.
The main reportorial effort goes into the semi-
annual policy and progress review. This is written by
the ambassador using contributions from each of the em-
bassy's functional components. It covers the objectives
pursued by the embassy in the past six months, the progress
made toward reaching them, theproblems encountered and
Approved For Release 2000 114-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
SECRET
a statement of what remains to be done. Such summaries
are apparently called for in the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fair's reporting schedule. They probably are used in com-
piling the Ministry's own periodic progress reviews.
These periodic studies supplement and summarize regular
classified pouch and cable messages in which the embassy
sets forth its observations on the local scene. These are
neither particularly voluminous nor frequent. Added in-
formation is provided by the local representatives of the
Investigation Department.
In the first half of the 1950's, the Chinese shifted
the intelligence gathering function among different party,
government and military agencies. Beginning in 1956 it
was gradually brought under more centralized control.
The function came to rest in the party's Investigation
Department under Tsou Ta-peng. The department is not
listed in any unclassified official government or party
documents and can be considered a completely clandestine
organization. This organization sends its own people
abroad under the cover of government agencies which have
legitimate overseas connections.
Personnel sent abroad under foreign ministry cover
conform to the general standards for diplomatic personnel.
Both length of tour and conditions of service are similar
to those of the ministry. Wives of intelligence officers
are frequently sent abroad. There seems to be a decided
preference for husband-wife teams in Chinese intelligence
work. Wives not only do secretarial work, but in many
cases serve as couriers or agent handlers.
Generally, but not invariably, intelligence personnel
are placed in the middle range of foreign service assign-
ments. Whatever..the cover position, the individual is
accorded treatment inside the embassy in keeping with his
party status. Persons whose cover position is of a lower
grade than his real position with the Investigation De-
partment are paid the salary of the cover position; the
difference is credited to his bank account in Peiping.
The embassy's intelligence people draw heavily on
the local Chinese community for agent personnel. Major
intelligence targets include political, economic, scienti-
fic, industrial and military developments in the country
where the embassy is located as well as in nearby nations.
Regional groupings, the impact of US economic and military
aid and the extent of the US influence are other subjects
of interest..
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/26J 65B00383R000200030003-6
The embassy is also instructed, from time to time,
to try to promote cultural and commercial exchanges.
The commercial attache, for example, returned from a
recent home leave to push more aggressively the sale of
Chinese products in an attempt to earn more foreign ex-
change. Previously trade had been seen largely as a
device to influence local people. On his return he
set up an exhibit of Chinese products and visited a num-
ber of firms in an effort to stimulate their interest
in Chinese products. He was not highly successful but
did get a few nibbles.
The cultural attache tries to see that Communist
China gets a good press locally. He takes charge of
distributing the New China News Agency's daily news.bl-
letins, and responds eagerly to requests for information
on Communist China. He supplements the press clipping ef-
forts on the embassy's research staff by sending extracts
of local press stories and editorial opinion back to the
New China News Agency in Peiping. On occasion he has gone
to nearby countries to cover special events for the agency.
Money is a big factor in communications between the
embassy and Peiping. Telegraphic traffic, compared to US
standards, is miniscule. Three to four telegrams a day
are sent in very heavy periods. At other times only one
telegram is sent every three or four days. The embassy
probably averages around one to two a day. There is a
full time code clerk to handle classified traffic, and,
although the volume of incoming traffic is not known, he
certainly is not overworked. A diplomatic pouch is picked
up by a pair of the ministry's forty couriers about once
a month. These couriers, incidently, are among the most
highly indoctrinated of Chinese Communists. The product
of a most painstaking clearance process, they get a three-
month, full-time reindoctrination course every year. Yet
they almost always travel in pairs. The bulk of the class-
fied exchanges between Peiping and the embassy go by these
pouches. The open mail is used for some normal business,
such as the transmission of the daily press translations.
As it does within China, the party relies heavily
upon personal briefings to keep abreast of what its over-
seas installations are up to and to keep the installations
appraised of the latest policy developments in Peiping.
Area conferences for ambassadors are held periodically.
At times the ambassadors are called back to Peiping for
consultations. At least 21 ambassadors, more than half
the total, were brought back to be briefed after the Central
Approved For Release 2000/05/24,JJ5B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 200046Z'-RDP65B00383R000200030003-6
Committee's tenth plenum in September 1962. When the am-
bassadors return to their posts, they pass along to key
members of their staffs the substance of the information
received. Embassies occasionally are visited by touring
officials from Peiping, who usually brief the embassy
staff.
As a general rule, the members of the mission feel
isolated from Peiping and have been at times embarrassed
by the lack of specific policy guidance. Many Chinese
foreign service personnel, for example, were not able to
interpret either the commune program or the Chinese posi-
tions in the Sino-Soviet dispute to Peiping's satisfac-
tion. In some cases even the ambassadors were not filled
in well enough to discuss important matters with members
of their own staffs.
The embassy has found that its quickest and most
direct contact with the party line is Radio Peiping. The
ambassador has made it compulsory for all personnel to
listen to two one-hour programs every day. He feels
that this contributes to the embassy's understanding
of what is going on in Peiping and provides useful ma-
terial for the regular study sessions. The ambassador
himself gets an airmail copy of the People's Daily, which
generally arrives three days after printing, The daily
bulletin of the New China News Agency are also received
by airmail. All party men at the embassy subscribe to
the elite theoretical journal Red Flag, but it reaches
them by surface mail about a mon h aver publication.
Difficulties in communication are particularly
irritating to embassy officials since they must con-
stantly refer even seemingly trivial matters to Peiping
for decision. All requests for visas, for example, have
to be checked with Peiping, as do such matters as who
is to be asked to the annual observation of National
Day.
Life Abroad
Members of the embassy lead a highly insular existence.
Not only are they cut off from home by distance and poor
communications but the party's approach to the problem of
running an embassy in a capitalist country cuts them off
from rewarding personal relationship's with local in-
habitants. Life at the embassy is viewed as a constant
struggle against the "corrupting influence of the capital-
ist world." The ambassador regards the struggle as parti-
cularly acute in his embassy since all personnel are daily
Approved For Release 2000/q?/ '. jRDP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/2S:.Fi1i65B00383R000200030003-6
confronted with the palpable difference between what the party
has taught them about a capitalist country and the reality
around them.
The party's answer is to try to recreate the living
and working conditions of Peiping at the embassy. The
ministry, for example, has gone to the trouble and ex-
pense of sending a Chinese cook to the embassy. Everyone
eats Chinese food prepared by him. They eat well by Chi-
nese standards, but not lavishly. Most staff members
wear the plain style of trousers and jacket popularized
by the Chinese Communist leaders, although the top people
sometimes don western-style clothes when leaving the em-
bassy precincts. Only the highest ranking men, or Investi-
gation Department personnel, can leave the embassy alone.
All others must leave in pairs. Even so, the ambassador
recently instituted a requirement that those leaving had
to sign out, stating where they were going, and why, and
when they would be back.
Except for the ambassador and his wife, all staff
members eat in the embassy mess hall and sleep in embassy
quarters. Both are in the same building with the embassy
.offices. The ambassador and his wife live in a separate
house, and while he sometimes joins the staff for a meal
he usually eats in his office with his wife or another,
colleague.
The embassy is open for business from 8:30am to 6:00pm.
Recreation is planned in advanced and taken in groups. It
generally involves short trips to nearby places. At other
times reading, listening to the radio, watching televi-
sion or an infrequent movie sent out from China are the
chief forms of relaxation. Such moves were more common
prior to the big 1962 austerity movement than they are
now. A dinner will sometimes be sponsored by the embassy
at a local Chinese restaurant, say, to celebrate Chinese
New Year's or the anniversary of the founding of the Chi-
nese Communist government... Hoavever, invitations to diplo-
matic functions even from embassies of the socialist bloc,
are closely monitored by the party committee and not in-
frequently rejected. Some are accepted and then ignored.
The atmosphere inside the embassy building is one of
mutual suspicion. Petty admonitions are common. The more
progressive elements are constantly on the alert for sug-
gestions of deviationist tendencies. For example a simple
act like turning on the embassy television set might'.open
one to charges of being attracted to the bourgeosie life.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24 ,
IA DP-65B00383R000200030003-6
EGR_
 Approved For Release 2000/05/SLV(PPP65B00383R000200030003-6
Such a charge, once made, can easily develop into an ex-
tended and uncomfortable period of self-criticism at the
embassy's regular study groups.
Homesickness is common. Tours of duty are long and
only senior officers have their wives with them. The
younger officers serve without their wives, who are left
behind in China with the children, For such officers
the news of hardships at home for the past few years has
been particularly upsetting.
Bachelors fare little better. They are warned against
fraternizing with local girls and can'under no circumstan-
ces marry one. There are no female employees except for
the wives of higher-ranking officers. One bachelor at the
embassy had been engaged to a girl back in China. She mar-
ried someone else when he could not get leave to return
to China.
There are, however, saving elements in the situation.
The officer abroad gets a clothing allowance and free
medical service. His food and lodging are provided at
nominal charges. Most of them are able to build up their
savings, and some officers at the embassy deposit up to
50 percent of their salaries in their accounts in Peiping.
Need for local currency is limited, but the officers do
like to purchase and send back to relatives items such
as clothing which are hard to come by in China. One of
the ranking officers has taken advantage of his present
assignment to pick up a number of luxury items for him-
self. He has bought a radio, a television set, a German
camera, a Swiss watch, a record player and new clothes
for himself and wife.
It is likely that, despite the restrictive aspects
of his life abroad, the average employee of the embassy
considers himself better off than if he had remained in
China. As one of them once remarked, "If I had not joined
the party, I would probably still be an insignificant
school teacher back in China."
Approved For Release 2000/05/ 9P65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/1jk65B00383R000200030003-6
THE STAFFING OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY AGENCY
The Chinese Communist regime must maintain public
order over a territory.-of 3.7 million square miles and a
population of almost 730 million people. Although the
Chinese regime places great emphasis on persuasive meas-
ures to achieve political stability, the coercive aspects
of this national security goal are also extensive.
The Ministry of Public Security represents the
coercive arm of the government. The Canton Public Secu-
ity Bureau one of the Ministry's geographical subdivi-
sions, is an important part of the security system. Can-
ton in Kwangtung province is the fifth largest city in
the country and is located in part of China which has
extensive foreign contacts. Many Overseas Chinese come
from Kwangtung. Canton is close to the free world border
at Hong Kong. Daily social and business traffic between
the two cities is substantial. Canton is a natural head-
quarters both for external intelligence operations and
for operations designed to counter foreign penetration
attempts.
Comparatively detailed information on the staffing
policies of the Canton Bureau have provided by a
man who worked in the Economic Security Department of
this Bureau for about four years. Prior to his defec-
tion in 1958, he was charged with investigating the poli-
tical reliability of the employees of government economic
agencies such as industrial plants, banks, and commercial
units. The personnel of the Economic Security Department
were essentially plainclothes investigators. One of
their functions was to screen employees of economic
agencies. By 1958, the Economic Security Department
had investigated and maintained files on more than
80,000 persons, almost four percent of the city's
population.
The Canton Public Security Bureau employed about
7,000 persons, of which some 2,000 were professional per-
sonnel. The professionals represented a fairly homo-
geneous group with respect to age, social origins,
and political status.
Approved For Release 2000/05/2,=,F65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05tel&?PDP65B00383R000200030003-6
The employees of the Bureau were all:. young. With the
exception of the head of the Bureau who was in his late
forties, almost all full-time professional personnel were
under 30.
Most members of the bureau staff were not natives
of Kwangtung. They were recruited largely from northern
China and thus had few personal ties with the local .popu-
lation. The family background of employees was closely
checked. No family connections with either substantial
wealth or anti-communist. political movements were permis-
sible. The individuals themselves could have had no af-
filiation with a political movement other than the Chi-
nese Communist Party. No foreign associations were per-
mitted, either travel abroad or relatives residing over-
seas.
All 2,000 professional employees of the bureau were.
party members, and many others on the staff were Youth
League members. The senior people represented a hard
core of experienced personnel. Each of the top five
had had more than 20 years of experience in Chinese Com-
munist intelligence work. Together they probably made
up the bureau's party committee.
All other professional personnel had been recruited
from one of the four following groups: 1) young men in
party or Youth League work, recommended by the party
officials in charge of these groups as being particularly
"progressive" and promising; 2) exceptionally bright high
school graduates, recommended by school authorities and
.selected by the bureau on the basis of competitive ex-
amination; 3) former police or intelligence operatives
of the Kuomintang, employed as agents for specific pro-
jects because of their special knowledge of either tech-
nique or locality (use of such individuals was more com-
mon in the early 1950's than in 1958); and, 4) wives of
bureau employees. In 1958 there were about 500 women
employed in the bureau.
With the exception of the third category, most em-
ployees had virtually no experience in police work when
taken into the bureau. Recruits entering on duty were
given a basic training course in public security opera-
tions at the bureau's training center, the Canton Insti-
tute of Public Security.. This was followed by a six-
months probationary assignment. Successful completion
of this pair of programs resulted in the recruit's full
integration into the public security force.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24EC,I ;F 65l300383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05eIDP65B00383R000200030003-6
Thereafter personnel of the bureau were trained em-
pirically on the job. Formal instruction was offered
after hours in. general investigation and surveillance
techniques. Many availed themselves of this opportunity.
Few members of the bureau were sent out of Canton for
further training. At higher levels of the public secu-
rity system, study for as long as two years at, the Na-
tional Public Security Institute in Peiping was manda-
tory. Such a course of study-was a prerequiste for
promotion to the section chief level in a provincial
public security bureau.
The Canton municipal and Kwangtung provincial public
security organizations each had. their own schools. These
specialized in part-time training courses, offering poli-
tical as well as technical courses.
Day-to-day political indoctrination at the bureau
was the responsibility of the party committee. Sessions
were both frequent and thorough. Besides attendance at
the usual sessions of his political study group the
party member had to present himself at meetings con-
ducted quite often by the bureau's party committee which
contained a large measure of political instruction.
There were no overall educational standards for
employment in the bureau. Self-improvement was encour-
aged in all walks of life in Communist China and any de-
sire for schooling was encouraged. The staff did not
appear to be under any strong pressures, however, to
improve.its educational level.
Promotion in the bureau was based on a combination
of the individual's ideological sturdiness and his pro-
fessional ability. Below the level of section chief
at the bureau, the departmental party committee could
recommend promotion to the political department of the
bureau. The actual promotion action was taken by the
political department. For promotion to section chief, the
departmental recommendations was reviewed by the party
committees at both the Canton and the Kwangtung Public
Security Bureau, It was then submitted to the Canton
Party Committee for final action. Department heads
at the bureau were appointed by the Canton Party Com-
mittee with the approval of the State Council.
Transfers were fairly frequent within the public
security system. The former bureau employee worked
for four years.as an investigator in the Honan Pro-
vincial Public Security Bureau before being transfpired
Approved For Release 200010512
- 65BOO383R000200030003-6
SE&Op
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24
to Canton. His transfer was also a promotion. When he
got to Canton, he was assigned administrative responsi-
bilities for the first time and was appointed deputy sec-
tionchief in an organization doing the same type of
investigation work that he had done in Ronan. Trans-
fers also occur to jobs which require security training
outside the public security agencies. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, for example, gets it security person-
nel from these agencies. Special training necessary
for a new assignment--such as the complicated physical
security measures needed to protect an embassy in foreign
territory, or the use and detection of electronic de-
vices--is provided by the security agencies prior to
transfer.
The grade and classification system used in the
Canton bureau in 1958 was still provisional, although
other civilian and military ranking systems had been
fixed by about 1955, A rank classification committee
had been established in Peiping of representatives
from the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Com-
mittee of the Party, the State Council, and the General
Political Department of the armed forces. The committee
was set up to study the Soviet public security organiza-
tion and to formulate standards for classification and
the assignment of Chinese public security personnel. As
far as the former employee knew, it had never issued its
findings,
Public security employees enjoyed a relatively high
standard of living and a measure of prestige. The pro-
fessionals as a group were extremely young. Their edu-
cation was no better than moderate. Yet they held re-
sponsible positions in an organization which exercised
a considerable measure of control over the general popu-
lation.
Living standards for public security personnel at
the professional level appeared to approach the levels
enjoyed by officers of the armed forces. Only single
men were required to live in barracks. In 1958 only
about 1,000 out of 7,000 employees did so. The em-
ployees were well uniformed and enjoyed both food and
drink on a scale not granted to the average Chinese,
Salary payments were considered adequate.. And it was
possible to incur operational and entertainment expenses
in the line of duty if they were substantiated by author-:
ized receipts.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24 g L4IW165B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/04ef1 fDP65B00383R000200030003-6
Discipline within the public security force was
largely a party responsibility, since almost all em-
ployees were members. Punishment depended, of course,
on the nature and severity of the offense, but it al-
ways included a crawling session of self-criticism be-
fore the relevant party committee. If the misdeameanor
was serious enough, self-criticism could be followed by
removal from position, demotion in either grade or
salary, dismissal, or actual criminal prosecution. Dis-
ciplinary action could be taken for reasons that extended
well beyond job-related misconduct into an individual's
private life. The former employee was once disciplined
by the party after his wife, herself a party member,
reported that he struck her. More damaging, however,
was her second charge that he frequently criticized
party meetings in private for being dull and time-con-
suming.
Approved For Release 2000/05/ ,6 DP65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24E jfr P65B00383R000200030003-6
ANNEX III
STAFFING AN INDUSTRIAL PLANT
A basic policy of the Chinese Communists is that the
key positions in state-owned enterprises must be filled
by trusted party officials, regardless of their tech-
nical qualifications. This rule has been relaxed slightly,
but only slightly, since 1960 when the party decided re-
luctantly that,it would have to begin giving greater re-
spect to technicians. Trained persons are being given
more authority over actual production processes, but the
chief of a plant is still invariably a long-time party
official. Most of his key deputies still come from the
party organization rather than up from the ranks of tech-
nicians, Exceptions exist mainly in very tiny enter-
prises or those employing especially complex processes.
In such cases the deputy will probably turn out to be
a non-party technician. In general, however, non-party
persons can aspire to reach only the third echelon, be-
low the manager and his deputies.
The party further insures control by providing
the officials that staff the plant's Party Committee.
This committee is a sort of board of directors supply-
ing policy guidance and overseeing operations. Full-
time officials on the committee rank with senior manage-
ment. Friction between party and management oca.siq~n~q..
ly occurs, but the party generally is able to keep it in
check. It is not uncommon to have the same person serve
concurrently as plant manager and as secretary of the
Party Committee.
Information on current staffing practices in Chi-
nese Communist enterprises can be obtained from the
large number of refugees who are constantly leaving
the mainland of China for Hong Kong. Probably a typi-
cal staffing pattern is the one that exists in the
Peiping Machine Tool Plant Number Two. A man who worked
at this plant until 1962 says it is average in size
and level of technology. It employed 3,800 workers
in 1960, a total that was cut to 2,400 during the na-
tionwide industrial retrenchment of 1961-1962. Its
products are metal-cutting machine tools (two models
of a grinding machine, a shaper, and a boring machine)
which it sells for the equivalent of $1,800 to $20,000
each, Its quality standards are high, and it managed
to export 50 shapers in 1962.
Approved For Release 2000/05%1' P65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/2,tP65B00383R000200030003-6
The manager of the Machine Tool Plant has three de-
puties, who run the production, supply and administra-
tion, and personnel departments. Like most Chinese
enterprises, this plant is organized on three levels of
administration: departments, sections, and basic-level
units (such as workshops and warehouses).
Senior personnel at the plant were described by the
refugee. The chief, 45 years old, had participated in
the Long March of the 1930's. He has a ninth-grade
education, is married, and has three children. His
wife works in the Personnel Section.
The first deputy, 55, runs the Production Depart-
ment. He has the title of Chief Engineer although he
has no'technical knowledge and must rely on the Chief
of his Technical Section for technical. guidance. A
good political organizer, he has only a sixth-grade
education. The second deputy, 55, is in charge of
supply and administration. Also a veteran of the Long
March, he has a junior middle school (ninth-grade)
level of education. The deputy for personnel., 55;'and
a veteran of the Long March, boasts that he fought in
the civil war through the Hainan Island campaign of
January 1950.
The Chief of the Technical Section, 50, is a na-
tive of Peiping. He is a college graduate and the most
highly qualified technical man in the factory. He
actually does the Chief Engineer's work. The Chief
of the Plant Maintenance Section, 55, also-is a college
graduate. The Inspection Section, which has the vital
responsibility of controlling the quality of produc-
tion, is headed by a female, age 27, who is a Party
member,
The Chief: of the Security Section, 55, is a veteran
party member who transferred to this job directly from
the armed, forces. The Personnel Section is headed by
a 55-year-old female who was a lieutant colonel in'the
army. In the Chinese Communist system, army officers
receive full pay when they transfer to a.civilian
post; the Personnel Section Chief therefore receives
salary of 160 yuan per month, which makes her'the
highest-paid employee in the plant. In fact, ex-army
people are prominent in plants throughout China in
the vital personnel and security functions.
Approved For Release 2000/05/N,.66 P65B00383R000200030003-6
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24SgLojWf 5B00383R000200030003-6
Approved For Release 2000105 2kC &f P65B00383R000200030003-6