THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
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December 9, 1963
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Approved For.Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170010-3
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 22759
junta in South Vietnam be squared with our
policies toward ruling juntas In the Do-
THE SITUATION IN VIETN M 14
(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks and to include extraneous
November 4.)
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, under
permission to revise and extend my re-
marks, I include the response I have re-
ceived from the State Department on
questions I asked on Vietnam in the
House of Representatives on Wednesday,
November 4.
Regrettably, the letter does not rep-
resent a satisfactory reply to my ques-
tions, but is largely an exercise in State
Department gobbledygook. In all fair-
ness it must be understood, however, that
all the facts could not be made public
at this time.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., November 26, 1963.
HON. CLEMENT J. ZADLOCKI,
House of Representatives.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZADLOCKI: I am writing
you in response to the questions you raised
regarding Vietnam on the floor of the House
of Representatives on Wednesday, Novem-
ber S.
I shall list in sequence each of the ques-
tions and 'then provide a response based on
the Department's best knowledge and judg-
ment' of recent developments in Vietnam.
1. "Was the advisability of a coup against
Diem and the U.S. role in such a development
the : subject of high level discussions subse-
su6nt to the August 20 raid of Buddhist
pagodas?"
Coup reports have been endemic to the
Vietnam situation for at least 3 years; their
frequencyincreased in the period of tensions
letweenthe GVN and Buddhists leaders. The
tl.5. -Government has regularly sought-even
at the highest levels-to evaluate the credi-
biiityof such reports.
'The coup d'etat of November 1, 1963, was
a thoroughly Vietnamese affair. Although
we were *ell aware of increasing Vietnamese
dissatisfaction With repressive measures tak-
er by the Them regime and had received re-
ports of various coup plottings, we had not
reached a determination on the basis of
available information as to whether any of
these reports would prove to be correct.
2, ""When the decision was made to cur-
tail ` U.S.`economtc and military assistance
to` the Diem regime, was consideration given
to the effect such action might have in en-
couf aging "the military to perpetrate a
coupp?"
ollovring the visit of Secretary McNamara-
and General Taylor to Vietnam, certain of
out" aid programs were put under review.
The purpose `bf these actions was to carry
out President Kennedy's declared policy of
eLlppbrt for those things that furthered the
wax cilort against the Communists and of
i5piositton "to those things that impeded the
War effort; and to indicate to President Diem
the increasingly urgent need to use our aid
more effectively and to take measures to
regain the dangerously waning. support of
his own people in order to pursue the war
ef'fort' succetsfully. To be sure, our aid cur-
taillnent'1nvolved S. calculated risk that our
actions "ziight encourage coup plotters.
Given the circumstances, however, this was
a risk that we were obliged to accept in the
light of the greater risk that the war would
be lost if we took no action.
S. "How can our policies toward ^the ruling
inican Republic and Honduras?"
There is little similarity between the sit-
uation we face in Vietnam, where an active
war against communism is in progress, and
that prevailing in Latin America, where our
relationships are Influenced by our commit-
ments as a member of the Organization of
American States.
The Revolutionary Council In South Viet-
nam displaced an increasingly authoritarian
regime; it has committed itself to free elec-
tions, religious liberty, a free press, and con-
stitutional government. The new Cabinet is
essentially civilian In composition; it is
made up of 11 civilians and 4 military per-
sonnel. In adition, the Revolutionary
Council has established a "Council of
Sages" which will act as an advisory group
in the political field. Martial law has been
lifted, the press has been given greater
freedom, and the curfew restrictions have
been ended. Immediately after the coup all
Buddhist prisoners and most other non-
Communist political prisoners were released.
On the other hand, the coup d'etat in the
Dominican Republic involved the overthrow
of President Juan Bosch who had been elect-
ed President by the Dominican people in De-
cember 1962. These elections were remark-
ably free of violence and fraud, according
to OAS observers. As the constitutionally
elected President, Bosch had the full support
of the U.S. Government. He had been in of-
fice only 7 months when his administration
was overthrown by a military coup on Sep-
tember 25, 1963. On October 4, Secretary
of State Rusk stressed the importance of rep-
resentative democracy in the attainment of
the goals of the Alliance for Progress and as
a requirement for normalization of relations
between our two countries. As reported by
the President in two recent news conferences,
we have been in consultation with authori-
ties in the Dominican Republic with a view
toward their taking steps to bring about
more representative government which would
enable the United States to reconsider its po-
sition on nonrecognition. To date, these
conversations have not yielded results that
would make it possible to reconsider our po-
sition.
In the acse of Honduras, the military de-
posed a civilian representative government
which had been In office since December 1957,
and under which there had been substantial
progress, particiularly since the initiation of
the Alliance for Progress. The military ac-
tion was taken to prevent the elections
scheduled for October 13, 1963.
As you may know, in his statement of Oc-
tober 4, 1963, Secretary Rusk pointed out
that the events in the Dominican Republic
and Honduras had created a situation in
which there is no opportunity for effective
cooperation with the United States under
the Alliance for Progress or for normalization
,Of diplomatic relations.
We are now engaged in an extensive dia-
log with the principal elements in Honduras
in order to develop a reasonable basis for re-
storing normal relations.
4. "Is it not the policy of the United States
to extend asylum to save those whose lives
are in danger? Why was Ngo Dinh Can sur-
rendered to the military after the Diem-Nhu
experience?"
When an individual is granted refuge In
an American Embassy or consulate, he Is
not released until adequate assurances have
been received regarding his personal safety.
In the case of Ngo Dinh Can, Vietnamese au-
thorities gave assurances to Ambassador
Lodge guaranteeing Can's physical safety
and promising to deal with him "legally and
juridically." On the basis of these assur-
ances Can willingly departed from the Amer-
ican consulate in Hue and was flown to
Saigon in an American military aircraft,
where he was released to Vietnamese author-
ities.
5. "Did Ambassador Lodge go to Vietnam
with any Instructions which might have
made him sympathetic to a coup attempt?"
Ambassador Lodge did not go to Vietnam
with any instructions to show sympathy
toward a coup attempt.
6. "What effect will these developments in
Vietnam and U.S, involvement in the coup
have on our allies in SEATO, in Europe, and
most particularly in Central and South
America?"
So far, all of our allies in SEATO and In
Europe, as well as in Central and South
America, have shown a positive response to
the assurances that the new regime in South
Vietnam will strive to set up a democratic
form of government. Some of these coun-
tries recognized the new government before
the United States did, and almost each day
brings official statements of recognition from
other countries which recognized the preced-
ing government in Vietnam.
7. "Is there any evidence that the CIA and
the DIA might have been working at cross
purposes, with one of the agencies favoring
a coup and the other opposing?"
No.
8. "Does there not seem indeed to be a
need for a Joint Congressional Committee on
Intelligence to look into these matters?"
The Department of State has previously
expressed its views on this matter. In our
judgment, recent events in Vietnam provide
no basis for altering these views.
I hope that this information will be of as-
sistance to you. Please let me know if we
can be of further help on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
FREDERICK G. DUTTON,
Assistant Secretary.
Concerning the situation in Vietnam
itself, I regret to see that recent devel-
opments tend to confirm the fears I ex-
pressed in early November after the mili-
tary coup and brutal assassination of
President Diem.
My major concern at that time was
that the new military government in
Vietnam, by its initial acts of violence,
had jeopardized its chances of obtaining
the broad popular support so necessary
if it is to rule effectively and carry for-
ward the campaign against the Vietcong.
Let me assure those of my colleagues
who have expressed to me their own
concern over this issue that the Sub-
committee on the Far East and Pacific
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
will continue to study the situation in
Vietnam. In that regard, the subcom-
mittee will, from time to time, hold hear-
ings beginning tomorrow with 2 days of
executive hearings. It is my hope that
the testimony received in these hearings
ultimately can be made public.
As in the past, press comments on Viet-
nam are conflicting. There does seem,
however, to be rising criticism of the
policies of the new military government.
Therefore, I requested permission to in-
clude articles from the Milwaukee Jour-
nal, the Washington Star, the Washing-
ton Post, and the New York Times at
this point in the RECORD and commend
them to my colleagues:
[From the Milwaukee Journal, Dec. 6, 1963]
DICTATORSHIP LIVES ON
When the Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh
Diem was overthrown, people danced in the
streets of Saigon. The jails were emptied
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
f 4d political prisoners who had been held
and tortured for months and even years re-
joined their families and friends. To most
it seemed. like the dawn of a new era.
But the jails are fast filling up again.
The new regime, backed strongly by a sec-
tion of the military, has been making nu-
metous and arbitrary arrests. People are be-
ing seized without warning and hold with-
out charge. Under Diem, most prisoners
were allowed visitors twice a week. Under
file ,need regime, visitors are not allowed.
e arrests were to be expected. Some
axe usually necessary when a junta ousts a
regime-for those who remain loyal to the
old regime could be dangerous to the new,
But what troubles the Vietnamese people and
just jails people-without formal charge.
'Without chance of obtaining a lawyer, with-
out ally opportunity for defense. And most
arrests are purely political.
made,by the Government in its attempt to
lid, the countryside of Communist guer-
riRas. The Communists have increased their
activity and have won several recent engage-
ments. The new Government seems chiefly
tsken no steps to liberalize Itself or to plan
for elections as it had promised. The hopes
that were so high after the fall of Diem are
all but gone. Tragedy is still the fate of
the Vietnamese.,
[Prom the Washington Star, Dec. 8. 18631
BONY uI Vrsuus
Lsat month, when President Diem and
Mr. Nhu were brutally slain in South Viet-
nam's military coup, there was much talk
among the Starry-eyed about a new birth
of freedom and a new birth of democratic
order. Well, let us take note of the reali-
tiea: ..(1) There is continuing tension In
Qalgou and surrounding areas. (2) There
Is oontinuing political repression- And (3)
there is continuing danger of a great later-
nal blowup. Supporting evidence Includes
the fact that hundreds of individuals are
being held as political prisoners under grim
conditions. And the grisly rite of self-im-
molation still goes on.
The so-called Buddhists, of course, are
happy. Mr. Diem is dead. Mr. Nhu is dead.
And Madam Nhu, whose sharp tongue has
abmetimes spoken truths that should have
been listened to more attentively, is In exile.
But the affair Is not ended. Trouble and
Intrigue still plague South Vietnam, and
few things could be more foolish than to
drug off that fact. Ironically enough, the
day may come when the Diem regime will
be remembered as a relatively enlightened
one.
[From the Washington Star, Dec. 7, 1983 J
Nsfw VB6rauM MEia BrsING
(By Marguerite Higgins)
President Johnson is faced with a new and
ugly mess in Vietnam. And it is going to
become increasingly to light despite the ap-
parent determination of some American of-
Acigis. in Saigon to brush it under the rug.
The newest situation causing concern is
the police terror that the military junta has
launched, and that has already reached hun-
dreds, of hapless Vietnamese. They have
been thrown into jail without notification to
their families, without benefit of lawyers,
without even being told the charges against
them.
With few exceptions, the only apparent
reason is the suspicion that the imprisoned
Vietnamese did their duty in carrying out.
prior to the coup, the orders of the then
duly constituted authority, the late Presi-
dent Diem. In a word, they had been loyal.
On a tour of Vietnam in November, this
reporter talked to a half dozen persons who
had lost relatives to the military junta's
jails. And such was the atmosphere of fear,
that in evrey single case, this reporter was
asked not to write about it, until she was
out of Vietnam.
ISN'T HELPING MAN
Quite apart from the principles Involved,
the junta's wave of political repression isn't
helping the war against the Vietcong. For
the persons loyal to Diem were-like their
chief-deeply committed to fighting the war
against the Communists.
A case in point is the chief of Quangnai
Province in north central Vietnam, Nguyon
Van Tat, who has been fired and jailed. But
look at Mr. Tat's record. In I8 months as
province chief, he turned Quangnai, which
for 20 years had been overwhelmingly pro-
Communist, into a model and prosperous
area In which the peasant population joined
the military in beating off Communst attacks.
At the height of the Buddhist crisis last
summer, the leaders of the Quangnai pagoii
da approached Mr. Tat and informed hint
that the Buddhist leaders at the Xaloi pagoda
in Saigon had ordered them to go on a 72-
hour. hunger strike. The local Buddhists
added, that while they had nothing against
Mr. Tat, they could not very well disobey
an order from their religious higher-ups In
Saigon.
AIDED HUNGER STRIKERS
After a hurried conference with Maj. John
Kelly, American sector adviser In Quangnai,
Mr, Tat told the Buddhists that while he
regretted their determination to go on a
hunger strike, he -would do everything pos-
sible to make their experience Be painless as
possible. With Major Kelly's help, he
brought In blankets, fruit juices, and medical
attendants. And the hunger strike went off
without Incident In Quangnai city hall, where
Mr. Tat had made arrangements for the
comfort of the Buddhists.
in a country starved for good administra-
tors, Mr. Tats purge scarcely seems in the
national interest of Vietnam.
Many of the firings and purges has been
based on hysterical denunciations in the
newly "friend" Vietnamese press, or even on
plain rumor. This seems to have been
largely true in the case of Ngo Dinh Can, the
elder brother of President Diem.
Mr. Can was handed over to Vietnamese
authorities even though be sought refuge
at the American consulate at Sue, and even
though English-speaking persons heard the
American consul promise Mr. Can that the
American Embassy would "assure him his
safety."
When a Catholic priest got William True-
hart, deputy chief of mission, out of a dinner
party to ask why the promise had not been
kept, he was told there had "been a mis-
lderetanding." But there has been a curl-
ova silence on the part of the Embassy
concerning the military junta's promise to
assure-Mr. Can of "due process of law." At
the end of November. Mr. Can had not yet
seen charges against him, and the American
Embassy had shown no visible sign of trying
to pressure the junta Into living up to Its
word.
QUERY US. ZMZNCE,
There are many Vietnamese who ask why
the Embassy and the State Department, who
were so vocal about Mr. Diem. have been so
quiet about the newest wave of repressions.
This is a question that President Johnson
Is entitled to press--even if It to embarrass-
ing to those Americans to Saigon and Wash-
ington who feel a certain sense of responsi-
bility for the military junta because It Is in
power by their encouragement.
Indeed. In leaving Vietnam, this reporter
gained the Impression that the three persons
most anxious for the coup d'etat-Ambas-
sador Lodge, Under Secretary of State Harri-
man, and Far Eastern Assistant Secretary of
State Roger Hileman-had unleashed forces
that are turning out far different than they
foresaw.
December 9
One thing is clear. The American Image
in Asia Is not going to profit from a kind of
double standard that helps get rid of one
government in the name of ending police
repression and then stays silent as the new
government Invokes the same tactics.
(From the Washington Post, Dec. 8, 19631
PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS VExxs SAIGON
SAIGON, December 7.-Reports of anti-
Catholic persecution and Communist agita-
tion among students today were causing seri-
ous concern to the new South Vietnamese
Government.
The Roman Catholic newspaper Living Re-
ilglon said that 600 Catholics in northern
Quang Nam province were terrorized and six
arrested and tortured since the November 1
coup that ousted the regime of President Ngo
Dinh Diem.
At the same time, reports from all over
the country said authorities were worried
about Communist subversion among stu-
dents.
The Catholic newspaper said Catholics were
afraid to go to mass and were taking down
altars In their own homes. Catholics are
outnumbered five to one by the majority
Buddhist population.
It also said that a Catholic leader has been
arrested and others have been forced to at-
tend Indoctrination courses. At the same
time, rumors were spread that Catholic
priests kept guns and that Catholics had
planned to murder Buddhists before the
coup.
[From the Washington Post, Dec. 8, 19631
DINH ENDS VIET TOUR rN TRIUMPH
Hor AN, SOUTH VIETNAM, December 7.-In
this remote coastal town, the man who is
fast becoming South Vietnam's most popular
figure made a spectacular finish today to his
stumping tour of villages and hamlets near
the Communist border.
His swashbuckling manner captivated vil-
lagers. His words came through forcefully.
He answered catcalls with a joke. -Students
paraded him on their shoulders.
Some saw potential danger In him; others
said he is just what South Vietnam needs.
He Is Maj. Gen. Ton That Dinh, 37, a lead-
er of the coup that toppled the regime of
President Ngo Dinh Diem in November.
Dinh gave his final speech of the tour from
a balcony at provincial headquarters in Hoi
An, 150 miles southeast of the Communist
North Vietnamese border.
PARADING ENDS TALK
Finishing with his characteristic flurry of
gestures, Dinh stood back as 6,000 students
burst into cheers. Then the students
charged up the steps, hoisted him to their
shoulders and carried him off.
As he passed through the crowd, he called
out:
"I am not a politician as some of you news-
men seem to think."
But the fact is that this boyish-looking
military officer Is emerging as the strongest
national figure in Vietnam.
Since the deaths of President Diem and his
brother Nhu, the country has been under the
control of a revolutionary junta headed by
Maj. Caen. Duong Van Minh and Maj. Gen.
Tran Van Dong.
In the junta. Dinh is a second vice chair-
man, Minister of Security, and commander
of the Vietnamese 3d Army Corps.
He led the army units that stormed Diem's
palace during the coup and is credited with
engineering the revolt, despite the fact he
had served as the military governor of Sai-
gon under Diem and Nhu during the Bud-
dhist religious crisis.
QUES'T'IONED ABOUT NHU
During his speech at Rol An, a handful of
students heckled him on his relationship
with Nhu. One shouted:
"You supported Nhu before the revolution,
but then you overthrew him, Why?"
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CONCTRESSI?NAL RECORD-, HOUSE Decern-bgr -.a
very procession of his triumph, at the very - Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the the relationships among Federal agen-
beglnning of his most notable achievements. American banking system has recently ties exercising coordinate or related
He can no longer lead us In the struggle been the subject of intensive study and jurisdiction over banking have deterio-
for justice and decency. And yet, somehow, debate. Such as the Commis- rated steadily
he leads us still. groups . Inevitably, such deterio-
+,cu,ue ua m p,ana ior we crew rrontIer
that made the soul of America stand taller.
There was deep conviction In his voice and
intellectual authority In every glowing
phrase.
His was a bold, uncompromising call to
truth-a call to arms against Injustice and
oppression that'keeps on ringing in our ach-
ing hearts.
We hear him yet. We see him as he stood
before us, smiling, self-assured, and, oh, so
tragically young. He is there--head high,
waving to the cheering crowds, rushing for-
ward to shake a friendly hand.
Such a man cannot be eliminated by a
madman with a gun-no, nor by the madness
that walks abroad in the world. Such a man
lives in the hope of every citizen, growing
with the growth of the great country he
served, alive and indestructible in our memo-
ries of those few short years when his own
stature grew to match those other great
Americans to whose ideals John Kennedy
devoted his life.
Time erects his monument and history will
build It high. We weep that Israel has lost
this cherished friend. We are outraged at
the disgrace that befell our land and took
away our leader.
But we are proud that our beloved Presi-
dent, in death as in life, stamped the profile
of his magnificent courage across the con-
science of mankind.
He asked not what his country could do
for him. He asked only what he ecould do
for his country-and no man could have
done more,
On this untimely day of atonement, as
we sit In the synagogue along with all the
generations of Israel, we pay homage to our
sacred dead,
We honor the, image of his remembered
glory, his wisdom, wit, and eloquence. Our
spirit is warmed again by the fire that lighted
his love of America.
In his name, let us resolve to strengthen
the sinews of our national integrity, to pro-
tect the principles of liberty, justice, and
equality for which he gave his life.
That is the greatest tribute we can pay our
fallen hero in eternal gratitude for his ulti-
mate sacrifice, while our hearts follow him.
along with our fervent prayers, to that fur-
ther New Frontier he is entering tonight.
let us rise, beseeching eternal peace and
the blessing of Almighty God, as we join in
a minute of silent prayer, for the immortal
soul of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 35th Presi-
dent of the United States.
In the last paragraph of the last speech he
ever wrote, he expressed some of this phi-
losophy for himself, for his country, and for
the world :
"We in this country, in tjlls generation,
are-by destiny rather than choice-the
watchmen on the walls of world freedom.
We ask, therefore, that we may be worthy of
our power and responsibility-that we may
exercise our strength with wisdom and re-
straint-and that we may achieve for our
time and for all time the ancient vision of
peace on earth, good will toward men. That
must always be our goal-and the righteous-
ness of our cause must always underlie our
strength."
THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM:
SUBJECT OF INTENSIVE STUDY
AND DEBATE
(Mr. LINDSAY (at the request of Mr.
MOSHER) was given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Committee on Financial Institutions, as
well as several committees of Congress,
have given serious attention to our fi-
nancial structure both In its broader
aspects and in detail. They have con-
sidered whether the dual banking system,
with its complex of State and Federal
laws and overlapping jurisdictions of
State and Federal supervisory agencies,
remains an effective mechanism for the
allocation of capital and credit. They
have addressed themselves to the ques-
tion whether existing statutory and
administrative restrictions upon bank-
ing-many of which have their origin
in the economic collapse of the thirties-
are suitable in the light of present-day
conditions. They have examined the
organization of the Federal agencies
responsible for monetary regulation and
the supervision of our banking institu-
tions.
Out of these manifold inquiries have
come many proposals for change. Some
of the proposals are embodied in bills
pending before committees of the Con-
gress, others are not.
I do not Intend to speak to the merits
of these proposals. I will address my-
self instead to the circumstances which,
in the opinion of many informed ob-
servers, have made legislative action
upon the more far-reaching proposals-
and even upon the more modest sugges-
tions-unlikely, if not impossible at this
time. These circumstances arise in the
main out of sharp conflicts in policy
among the various Federal banking
supervisory agencies-conflicts further
aggravated by the absence of procedures
for consultation and coordination among
these agencies. The absence of broad
agreement within the banking industry
upon the need for many of the proposals,
or the form in which particular pro-
posals should be cast. Is a further factor
inhibiting legislative action.
The proceedings of the American
Bankers Association annual convention
held in Washington during theweek of
October 7 revealed in harsh outline the
conflicts in policy and approach on the
part of the several Federal banking
agencies exercising jurisdictio i over ma-
jor portions of the banking Industry.
The Congress is not unfamiliar with
inconsistent policies on the part of agen-
cies of the same Federal Government,
and conflicting aspirations on the part
of segments of the same industry. In-
deed, informed legislative action Is built
In large part upon judgments shaped by
the clash of -competing interests and
contradictory views both within and
outside the Government. However, Con-
gress has a right to expect that agencies
of the executive branch will ultimately
fortunate polarization of their policies
on matters of vital importance to the
banking community.
Intervention by the President, in my
judgment, is long overdue. While, con-
cededly, the President lacks direct con-
trol over some aspects of Federal
monetary and banking regulation, the
very substantial measure of control
which he does have, together with the
prestige of his office, afford a proper
basis for his immediate action. The
President. in my opinion, should desig-
nate a high ranking Federal official-
perhaps an Undersecretary or Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury-as the co-
ordinator of relationships among all the
Federal agencies concerned with bank
regulation. These Federal agencies in-
clude the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, with jurisdiction over na-
tional banks; the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, with juris-
diction over State-chartered member
banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, with jurisdiction over State-
chartered insured nonmember banks;
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
with jurisdiction over federally char-
tered savings and loan associations and
member State-chartered savings and
loan associations. Also involved in
banking regulation to a growing degree
is the Department of Justice, which has
advisory responsibilities to some of the
agencies mentioned heretofore, as well
as direct responsibility for the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws as they relate
to banks. Finally, there is the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, which
has recently asserted jurisdiction over
certain of the fiduciary functions of
banking institutions.
It should be the responsibility of the
-President's designee, in concert with the
agencies concerned, to work out a de-
tailed procedure for their continuing
consultation, and for coordination of
their major policies. That official
should be responsible for seeing to it that
the procedure so formulated is adhered
to. It may well be that such action, if
taken promptly and vigorously, will ob-
viate in the long run any need for a
drastic legislative overhaul of the struc-
ture of Federal banking supervision. In
any event, intervention by the President
would serve as a useful, indeed a neces-
sary, interim measure to ameliorate ex-
isting discord, and to prevent further
impairment In significant intragovern-
mental relationships. Most importantly,
it would serve to end the present uncer-
tainty in the banking industry and else-
where as to whether the administration
has a banking policy, and If so, what
that policy really is.
compromise their differences so that the OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY
legislative branch may proceed with OF THE UNITED STATES
some assurance that its action is ac-
ceptable (Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
expert to those upon whom it relies for
expert advice. There is no evidence at mission to address the House for 1 min-
this time that, such a consensus is even ute and to revise and extend his re-
a remote possibility. On _the contrary, marks.). ,
Approved For Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170010-3