PART 5 : LET'S KEEP THE RECORD STRAIGHT - A SELECTED CHRONOLOGY OF CUBA AND CASTRO - SEPTEMBER 13- OCTOBER 14, 1962 EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. DON L. SHORT OF NORTH DAKOTA

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200230034-0
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 24, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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C C~RBSSJONAL -RECORD - APPENDIX
else possible.
In helping the local community within
your territory to increase jobs, and expand
the benefits ofponomic growth, you also
are increa ipg your own business. It is a
natural combination, and fulfills the ba
aim of REA to bring progress to rural Amer-
Ica In many forms.
- However, ILEA leadership in stimulating
community development is not always tied,
to a direct REA power benefit. The manager
of a local electric cooperative in Pennsyl-
vania, for example, has led the drive in his
community to get four new industries, and
That is the prospect for the end of this
century, and the key to this century is pow-
er, on the farm, in the factory, in the country
as well as the city."
The role of the REA is not finished, it is
only beginning.
This, I submit, is sound policy and one
that will serve the Nation well. Let us,
working together, militantly carry it for-
ward.
It's Only Money
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. WILLIAM G. BRAY
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 31, 1963
each buys power from a private power sup-
plier.
The manager maintains, and correctly so,
that both the private and cooperative power
suppliers are benefiting, the co-op from new_
consumers who live In its territory. But
most importantly, the community, the peo-
ple, will benefit from new, opportunities.
I am encouraged to see the dedication and-
energy which local REA co-ops are giving to
the RAD program. Reports. from about one-
third of the REA borrowers indicate that
since July 1961 they have helped to launch
400 industrial and commercial projects. It
Is anticipated that they will directly create
30,000 new jobs, and indirectly, another 22,-
000. When reports are in from,all.co-ops,
undoubtedly these figures will be higher.
More than one-fourth of these new enter-
prises involve processing and marketing of
farm and wood products, which mean addi-
tional. outlets for farm and forest products
as Well as new jobs for rural citizens, This,
is a real "double shot" in the arm.,
It is also important to note that in these
newly launched projects, Government financ-
ing is playing a "seed capital" role by stimu-
lating the investment of much larger sums by
private and local sources, The REA figures
indicate .that, the 400 projects are being
financed by more than $250 million of pri-
vate capital compared with about.$15 mil-
lion from Federal Government sources.-
These projects are scattered throughout
the country. They include a lumber project
in Idaho, a furniture factory in Kentucky,
a, commercial recreation. enterprise In Illi-
nois, a packing plant in Nebraska, and a
chipping plant in Mississippi, In addition,
the 600 REA borrowers report they have as-
sisted their communities In launching a
number of.public facilities, hospitals, water
systems and sewerage systems.
Thus, we have, with your .assistance, made
a good start with the RAD program, but it is
only the beginning, ,for we have only
scratched the. surface of the need in rural
America,,
A good start means that rural electric co-
operatives will have more and more., to..do
as rural America responds to the challenge
of the sixties, as it moves.. positively forward
once again. And as these things take place,
demands for power will expand rapidly.
Presently. your members are doubling their
power need`s every 7 to 10 years. Today, the
power requirements of your systems are
about. 37 billion ,kilowatt-hours. .By 1970,
those requirements will soar to 68,6 billion (or more) and by 1985 to almost 200 billion
(or more).
President Kennedy has said that power
is the key- to this century, power on the
farms and in rural areas as, well as. in the
cities. At Oahe project in South Dakota
last summer he said, "The role of.the REA
is not fnishe as'some would believe. 7Mo.
be sure, most farms now have electric, lights.
Most RhA cooperatives and power districts,
are well established. But we are rapidly
approaching the time when this Nation will
boast a 300 Million
population, a $2 trillion
national income, and a grave responsibility
as the breadbasket and food; producer for
a world whose population will have doubled.
Mr. BRAY. Mr. Speaker, we have seen
a great many comments about the ad-
ministration's proposals to increase
spending by several billions of dollars
and to reduce Government income by
several billions at the same time. Per-
haps few of these comments are as much
to the point as the following editorial
taken from the January 29 issue of the
Washington Daily News:
IT'S ONLYMONEY
Sly adulteration and debasement of money
probably started with the first coinage. The
names of Polycrates of Samos (500 B.C.)
and Dionysius of Syracuse (400 B.C.) are as-
sociated with the great monetary frauds of
antiquity.
Besides setting fire to Rome, Nero reduced
the precious metal content of the coinage
by 10.percent and pocketed the difference.
Henry VIII of England is remembered for
his many wives. He also issued a silver-
plated shilling, bearing his likeness. When
the plating wore off, starting with his most
prominent feature, he was known as Old
Coppernose.
All this was done in the dark of night.
During the Middle Ages the penalty for doc-
toring the coinage was to have the head held
under in a kettle of boiling water. After
Hastings, William the Conqueror decreed
mutilation, such as having the ears cut off,
for anyone caught fooling with the coinage.
As we note, this practice was frowned upon
into modern times. It took John Maynard
Keynes, in the depression years of the 1930's,
to figure out that legal counterfeiting not
only was respectable, it actually would help
the economy. Lord Keynes probably never
Intended to go that far but such, in effect, is
the deduction of his disciples who are as
thick as hors d'oeuvres around Washington.
Since, between Nero and Keynes, paper
money had been invented, probably' by
Kublai Khan or his mandarins, procedures
were simplified. It no longer was necessary
to melt up the silver and gold, adding copper
or other inexpensive metal in the reissue.
The printing presses merely could be turned
loose to print unlimited quantities of certifi-
cates that, at least looked like money.
That, in substance, is what we've been do-
ing in the United States for a generation.
The sum of this production is tabulated in
a major part of the public debt, now $305
billion in round numbers.
But just as the Romans found the new
denarius wouldn't buy as much as the old
one, Americans have found the new dollar
has lost its punch. At last acocunting it had
declined in purchasing power to 46 cents as
compared to what it would buy just less
than 25 years ago.
And the tax cut-spending program
thought up by the disciples of Keynes to get
the, economy moving again involves more of
the same-a great deal more.
In the administration plan it is contem-
plated that at the end of the 3-year program,
$8.5 billion a year in personal tax-cut money
will be pumped into the economy. Every
dime of this, and more besides, will be bor-
rowed money-which is just another way of
saying it will be printing press money. The
deficit for next year alone is very conserva-
tively estimated at just under $12 billion
and even Treasury Secretary Dillon can't look
ahead to the year in which the budget may
be balanced.
.This trick practically is guaranteed to
bring a quick flush to the economy. But
over the long haul it never has worked in
the whole history of money finagling-and
never will, except as a means of siphoning
away the savings of the people. It is with-
in the power of the Government to call 50
cents a dollar but no government ever has
been able to make it buy more than half a
dollar's worth.
But they never quit trying.
Part 5: Let's Keep the Record Straight-
A Selected Chronology of Cuba and
Castro-September 13-October 14,
1962
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. DON L. SHORT
OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, January 24, 1963
Mr. SHORT. Mr. Speaker, part 5 of
my chronology of Cuba and Castro be-
gins with a series of newspaper quotes
on our U.S. policy for dealing with Cuba.
While the Monroe Doctrine and its ap-
plication to the present situation was
endlessly debated by our newspapers,
our columnists, commentators, and news-
papers in other countries-our Congress
stubbornly went ahead adopting resolu-
tions upholding the right of the United
States to invoke the Monroe Doctrine,
protect our country, and protect the en-
tire hemisphere against an extension of
the Marxist-Leninist Cuban Govern-
ment.
Because of the reluctance of our NATO
allies to cease shipments of materials
and goods to Cuba which would be detri-
mental to the interests of this hemi-
sphere, the House of Representatives
boldly included amendments to our for-
eign aid appropriations bill which would
cutoff aid to any country that permitted
its ships to transport goods to Cuba.
This perhaps was not what we might call
a diplomatic approach but it certainly
was a practical approach to the problem.
It underlined the psychological approach
of appealing to self-interest when the
idealistic approach failed.
And on September 21, 1962, Adlai E.
Stevenson admitted-in-the United Na-
tions, in answering Soviet threats, that
it was officially known that the U.S.S.R.
was stuffing Cuba with planes, rockets,
and other arms..
It began to be clear to all who fol-
lowed the situation that some of our news
columnists were about to find themselves
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APP
with "egg on their face," because of their the grip of an unfriendly European power.
Weighty-and in some cases-frightened we have a right to blockade or occupy the
pronouncements on what we as a Na- Island; we would be saying too that the
Lion shouit3 do or what we could not do. Soviet Union has no such right to act against
the American military positions in Turkey.
A BEL&CrED CHRONOLOGY ON CUBA AND Iran, Pakistan, right on her own frontier.
September 13, 1962: U.B. policy for dealing
with Cuba: "If necessary we can take care of
Cuba; and If the necessity is obvious, the
Russians, despite what they now say, will
acquiesce. They do not have any greater
desire to fight a nuclear war over Cuba than
we do. Force might some day prove the less-
er of two evils for us; but it could never pro-
vide a solution for the Cuban problem"
(New York Times, Sept. 12, 1982). "The onl
plausible employment for [the Russ iansi
in Cuba ' ' ? Is to do more or less ex-
actly what the Americans are doing In South
Vietnam; that is, to train the local army to
fight a more advanced kind of war ... the
defense of Cuba against another Invasion.
Whether ]the Russians] are troops or tech-
nicians Is at bottom immaterial ... in the
sense that the Americans cannot very well
aepert the right to intervene, whatever the
Russians are. Doubtless, in a perfectly or-
dered world, the Monroe Doctrine would
require the removal of these alien intruders.
But in the Imperfect real world, where the
Americans keep troops along the border of
the Communist block (in one case, within
it; remember Berlin), and claim an unhin-
dered right of access to these outposts, it is
going to be awkward, to say the least, to ex-
pel or blockade the Russians In Cuba. Mr.
Khrushchev has made the neatest of moves
in the international chess ggame; take my
pawn in Cuba. he says, and you rick your
castle In South Vietnam-or your Berlin
queen. If Dr. Castro is one' day replaced
by a democratic government, it will not be
as a result of the one threat against which
Russian advisers can give his army any real
help-a regular invasion, a is a-day, from
over the sea. The United States learned Its
Cuban lesson In April last year. The United
-States can perhaps help to organize and sup-
ply a rebellion, as the Communists do else-
where; it cannot import a rebellion, pre-
packaged. Given enough time, and enough
rope, the Cuban regime may yet produce
the internal disaffection, that will be its
downfall. If [Dr. Castro's] support in the
countryside begins to fade, one of the condi-
tions of a successful revolt against him will
have been established. And if the test ever
came, it would be far harder for the Russians
to keep an unpopular government in office
in Cuba than it is for the Americans to do
a similar job in other parts of "the world
which are better left unnamed. Mr. Khru-
shchev has no 6th or 7th Fleet to keep his
supply lines open. If things go the way the
United States hopes-if discontent grows in-
side Cuba-any further Investment In Dr.
Castro is going to look very risky Indeed to
Moscow. Patience, not a choleric lunge, is
the Americans' best policy" (Economist, Lon-
don, Sept. 8, 1962) .
"In the hemisphere, In the United Nations.
with the uncommitted nations, the reaction
]to a U.S. invasion of Cubal would be most
unfavorable for us" (New York Times, Sept.
14, 1982). "The United States is, of
course, able easily to blockade Cuba. But
stopping ships under threat of seizure or
sinking would be an act of war not only
against Cuba but against the `Soviet Union.
The invasion of Cuba would, of course, be
an act of war against Cuba. But what we
could not be sure of doing is to prevent
the retaliatory moves to which we would have
laid ourselves wide open, moves against Ber-
lin or against Turkey, or against Iran. For
we would have acted on the rule that a pos-
sible threat against our security or our
interests justifies us in going to war. We
would be saying that because Cuba Is In
ment does not wash. It would be rejected,
probably even laughed at, not only by all
neutrals but by powerful elements among
our closest allies. We could go to war if
Castro Injures us. But we cannot go to war,
even against Castro, because of what he may
do in the future. We cannot wage a pre-
ventive war against Castro without estab-
lishing the rule that a preventive war is
legitimate against our military position in
Berlin, Turkey. Iran, Pakistan, Thailand,
South Vietnam, Formosa, Okinawa. South
Korea. and Japan" (Walter Lippmann. In the
New York Herald Tribune. Sept. 18. 1962'.
"Cuba has made Mr. Kennedy look like a
man with not one, but two, Achilles heels
IBerlln and Cuba]. Americans are suffering
from the all too familiar affliction of frustra-
tion. They think that they were Ineffectual
in dealing with the Berlin wall and they
fear that the administration Is going to be
ineffectual again in dealing with Cuba ? '
acknowledging that an - armed Invasion of
Cuba would mean tj4e deaths of thousands
of Cubans, of an untold number of Amerl-
cnns. Not totally precluded are landings by
anti-Castro Cubans. avoidance, this time. of
a Bay of Pigs disaster and the start of seri-
ous guerrilla warfare. Almost everyone Is
perfectly aware of the dangers of Cuba be-
coming the scene of another Spanish civil
war, in which Russians as well as Cubans
would no doubt kill and be killed.
"Perhaps the chief restraining factor on
bitter American Impatience Is that action
by the United States against Cuba, Including
a naval blockade, might tempt Mr. Khru-
shchev to snap shut the trap In which Berlin
finds itself. Yet the administration's own
view of the world remains essentially un-
altered. It is still thought that Mr. Khru-
shchev will not in fact risk a third and final
world war over Berlin: that, whatever
happens there, he still has his own difficulties
and that one of them is that his own
country is changing, on the whole for the
better: and that an eventual easement of
tensions through disarmament and bans on
nuclear tests is in Russia's interest as well as
the West's. Recent events suggest, however.
that Mr. Khrushchev. having grasped the
fact that general war has become impossible,
is tempted as a result to be more rather than
less provocative" (Economist, London, Sept.
15, 1962)
On the same day, V.S. Senator BARRY GOLD-
WATER. Republican, declares that "the Amer-
lean people will not be satisfied with Presi-
dent Kennedy's reiteration of a do-nothing
policy toward Cuba."
September 15, 1982: Press reports state
that the V.S. Government has had little
success in persuading its Allies to withhold
ships being chartered to carry Soviet sup-
plies to Cuba. The Governments of Britain,
West Germany and Norway are reported to
have begun inquiries among their ship-
owners, but these are regarded as polite re-
sponses to U.B. diplomatic pressure, and cen-
ter on the question whether Allied ships are
carrying arms among their cargo to Cuba.
V.B. officials have pointed out to these Gov-
ernments that the use of Allied ships for
ordinary goods releases Communist-bloc
shipping for arms deliveries to Cuba.
September 17. 1962: V.B. Secretary of State
Rusk briefs members of the Senate Foreign
Relations and Armed Forces Committees at
a joint closed door session. "Rusk took
pains to assert a direct relationship between
events In Cuba and Berlin, particularly in
the next 3 months. ' ? ? It Is widely assumed
in Washington) that the Russians will make
the big push In Berlin before the first of
TX anuary 81
J
the yea-. but after the November 6 elections
fin the United States].
September 18,1962: Former U.S. Vice Pres-
ident Richard Nixon urges President Ken-
nedy to take stronger action on Cuba and
suggests a program Including a naval block-
ade of the Island and the obtaining of com-
mitments from U.B. allies that their vessels
will not be used by the Soviet Union for ship-
ments to Cuba. He concedes that the risks
of nuclear war are raised by a blockade, but
asserts that "the risks of inaction are far
greater." He adds that immediate action is
needed to "revitalize" the Monroe Doctrine.
The present state of the Monroe Doctrine
In relation to Cuba: "The policy of the
United States in the Western Hemisphere
is guided by two main considerations: its
own national security and the peace and se-
curity of Its hemispheric neighbors. On the
one hand, the United States has the tradi-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated
more than a century ago as a warning to
European powers that the United States
would move against intrusions Into the
hemisphere. On the other, the United States
is pledged, under the Rio Treaty of 1948
which formed the OAS, and under the U.N.
Charter. to abstain from unilateral military
action. The United States, nevertheless,
has affirmed that it would take whatever
steps are necessary to move, unilaterally if
necessary, against a clear and present threat
to Its security and that of its allies in Latin
America. ' ' * There is a vocal body of
opinion that the Russian shipments of arms
to Cuba Is a clear threat to U.B. security and
therefore a violation of the Monroe Doctrine
demanding immediate action. This opinion
holds that the Cuban buildup, in effect,
constitutes the establishment of a military
base by Russia in the Western Hemisphere"
(New York Times, Sept. 16, 1962) .
"The Monroe Doctrine has been modified
to apply only to situations which directly
endanger the security of the United States;
'The United States will consider any attempt
by European powers to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as danger-
ous to our peace and safety.' ' * 0 * Soviet
Russia has made this extension in Cuba, and
is amplifying the activity. But President
Kennedy has evaluated it thus far as not
endangering our peace and safety, thereby
narrowing the original scope of the Monroe
Doctrine. The fact is clear. But the only
administration spokesman who has publicly
conceded it is Senator HUMPHREY" (Arthur
Krock, in the New York Times, Sept. 18,
1962). "It is true, of course, that the Soviet
lodgment in Cuba is a gross violation of the
Monroe Doctrine. Yet we cannot invoke the
Monroe Doctrine. Why not? The crucial
point is that the American claim for the
isolation of the Western Hemisphere was
coupled with a renunciation of American in-
terest In the Eastern Hemisphere: 'In the
wars of the European powers in matters relat-
ing to themselves we have never taken any
part, nor does it comport with our policy so
to do.' ' $ * ? This basis of the Monroe Doc-
trine disappeared In the 20th century, in
the two World Wars, the Korean war and the
cold war. We cannot invoke the Monroe
Doctrine without meeting the question of
what we are doing all over Europe and Asia.
Our right to put Cuba under surveillance,
and if necessary to blockade an invader, rests
not on the Monroe Doctrine but on the ele-
mentary right of a people to insure its own
security. ' * ? This right can, however, be
exercised only when there is a clear and pres-
ent danger. Castro is an insulting nuisance
but he is not, and Is not now remotely ca-
pable of becoming a clear and present danger
to the United States. So we must practice
watchful waiting, and hold ourselves in
readiness, never for a moment forgetting the
vastly greater dangers elsewhere" (Walter
Lippmann, In the New York Herald Tribune,
Sept. 18, 1962).
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