CUBA, PLUS 1 YEAR EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200240062-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: November 4, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

A6868
Approved For Release 2004/06/23 : CIA-RDP65B00383R000200240062-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
November 4
questioner described) are excellent examples
of deliberate concealment.
Secretary Korth's October 11 letter of
resignation to the President gave as his only
reason the need "to return to private bust-,
ness to attend to my pressing private affairs."
In his prompt reply (October 12) accepting
the resignation, Mr. Kennedy made no com-
ment on the reason for it given by Korth,
confining his composition to generous-and
deserved-praise of the Secretary's "advance-
ment of national security interests," and
said these had put "the Nation in your debt."
Therefore, the explanation supplied by this
exchange, the one the President said he
"would like to see" deemed sufficient, stands
in the official record merely as this:
Secretary Korth resigned only because the
pressure of "private affairs" overcame his
dedicated desire to continue to support the
leadership of our national defense by the
President and Secretary McNamara. * * *
Mr. Kennedy's estimate of Korth's service was
high and without qualification.
If the press had accommodated the Presi-
dent's stated preference, and let it go at
that, the subject would not have been revived
by a question later in the news conference.
Perhaps the detailed nature of this second
inquiry persuaded Mr. Kennedy he must go
beyond the official record he previously had
said he would like to have accepted as an
adequate explanation. However, go beyond
it he did, condoning in words a breach of the
ethics to which he pledged his administra-
tion in the campaign of 1980 that he had al-
ready redeemed in action.
SPEEDY RESIGNATION
As soon as he learned of Korth's lapses
from this code of official ethics, the Presi-
dent conveyed the word to his Navy Secretary
that immediate resignation was in order. In
so doing, Mr. Kennedy acted with firmness
and promptness in highly favorable contrast
to the performances of two previous adminis-
trations in comparable circumstances. But
*by his words at the press conference he
strangely diluted his very creditable deed.
The amount of the subscription to TFX
loan to General Dynamics by the bank from
which Korth had come to public office, said
the President, had, after all, "been a rela-
tively small amount of money as bank loans
go;" so there was "nothing improper" in the
Navy Secretary's participation in the deci-
sion to give the contract to General Dy-
namics. And, as for Korth's letters on Navy
stationery, including an offer to the bank
to include some of its "best customers * * *
in a little party" on the Secretary's official
yacht Sequoia, the President dismissed them
by saying: "This [TFX affair] has nothing
to do with any opinion I may have about
whether Mr. Korth might have written more
letters and been busier than he should have
been in one way or another.
WHITE HOUSE ATTITUDE
That part of Mr. Kennedy's news confer-
ence comments furnishes only another il-
lustration that the stern ethical attitude of
presidential candidates is prone to undergo
a softening process when they enter the
White House.
The admirable quality in President Tru-
man that evoked greater intensity in his
friendship when his friends got themselves
in trouble was supplemented by his fierce
protective instinct for his party when some
of these friends got his administration in
trouble, too. And President Eisenhower long
and stubbornly justified acceptance of gifts
by Sherman Adams that engendered the
public disapproval which finally persuaded
Adams he was seriously injuring the Presi-
dent by retaining his most influential White
House post.
On June 18, 1959, 3 months before Adams'
resignation, President Eisenhower gave a
news conference his views on the ethical
issue involved, of which the following are Question. Dr. Banda, what steps could we
the pertinent excerpts: take to have better relations as regards racial
"A gift is not necessarily a bribe. One is questions in this country?
evil, the other is a tangible expression of Dr. BANDA. I don't think you should drag
friendship. * * * Anyone who knows Sher- me into that. All I can say is that I am
man Adams has never had any doubt of his greatly encouraged to see that the President,
personal integrity and honesty. * * * But his brother, and many other people, in this
* * * in not being sufficiently alert in mak- country are doing what they are doing. Be-
ing certain that the gifts of which he was member that during the time I was here as a
a recipient could be * * * misinterpreted student things were not as they are now. I
* * * as attempts to influence his political am staying at the Palmer House now. I was
actions * * * to that extent he was * * * in the Winter Park Hotel in Washington, I
'imprudent.' * * * Personally, I respect him was in - the Hilton-Statler in Boston. I
because of his personal and official integrity. couldn't have been in those hotels when
I need him." I was here as a student. Today what do I
it men
h
entation portraits to judges and campaign
funds via testimonial dinners, etc., that have.
attained a peak of frequency in Washington
ask no better ethical clearance than this.
At Wittenberg College, October 17, 1960,
Presidential Candidate Kennedy promised
that, if elected, he would impose "a single,
comprehensive code on conflicts of interest
* * * drawing a clearer line between pro-
priety and impropriety * * * protecting the
public against the unethical behavior. * * *
All America seeks a Government which no
man holds to his own interest. * * ** The
next President must set the moral tone, and
I refer not only to his language."
This was the part of the pledge which
Mr. Kennedy failed to serve by excusing, in
words, the official actions he had, by deed,
certified as inexcusable.
Full -Text of Chicago Press Conference
With Nyasaland's Prime Minister
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
Or
HON. BARRATT O'HARA
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, October 28,1963
Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker,
by unanimous consent I am extending my
remarks to include the coverage in the
University of Chicago magazine of Octo-
ber 1963, of a press conference in
Chicago with Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda,
Prime Minister of Nyasaland:
Question. Dr. Banda, is this the first time
that you have been back to the United States
since your student days?
Dr. BANDA. No, I was here 3 years ago after
I came out of jail. You know that I was in
prison for 13 months. After I came out it
was the American Committee on Africa who
invited me here.
Question. Were you happy when you were
here as a student?
Dr. BANDA. I was very happy. I was very
fortunate when I was here as a student in
that I had friends both among colored and
white here in this city and elsewhere where
I lived. There was a family which claimed
me as their adopted son, as long as I lived
here.
to shoulder, with Negroes fighting for the
rights not of the white man, not of the white
woman, not of the white boys and girls, but
of Negroes. The Government is taking a
hand to the point of using Federal troops to
enable a Negro to go to a university. That
didn't happen when I was here before. I
believe that things will continue to improve.
But of course I stress that I am expressing
a personal opinion. I have no intention of
interfering in your internal politics.
Question. Dr. Banda, is there a unique role
that you feel Nyasaland can play in Africa's
evolution?
Dr. BANDA. I think so, I believe in a policy
of negotiation When negotiation can work,
but of course when negotiation does not
work you have no choice. Therefore my
role in Nyasaland and my role in Africa is
to try to be a mediator where there is con-
flict. I believe in negotiation. I don't be-
lieve in bitterness and that is why I like the
British. Now, some people say the British
Commonwealth is being dissolved. I say peo-
ple like that [the British] will maintain
their Commonwealth in one form or another
for a thousand years to come because they
know when to retreat, when retreat is the
best policy.
Question. Dr. Banda, do you think that
turbulence among the emerging nations of
Africa would have occurred In any case, or
could It have been avoided by the colonial
powers * * *?
Dr. BANDA (emphatically). It could have
been avoided. It could most certainly have
been avoided by the colonial powers. Any
colonial power which refuses to recognize
the right and demands of Africans for self-
government and independence is the one
that is selling the white man down the
river. Communism would have come to
Africa if Britain and France had refused
to yield to nationalism. The only place I
know now where communism is organized
as a party at all among Africans is in South
Africa. That's because of the policy of
apartheid. That is why I would like to see
the United States and Britain exercise any
kind of pressure on South Africa to change
her policy. Because there is where you have
danger in Africa. Explosive situation.
Question. Do you mean that South Africa
is in danger of going Communist? .
Dr. BANDA. I say that the apartheid policy
is the breeding ground for communism or
any kind of upheaval. Allowing the Africans
to organize their own governments is a sure
guarantee that there will be no communism.
Not only that, but white men will not be
driven out of Africa.
Question. Do you regard Nkrumah of
Question. What was your favorite place Ghana a Communist?
when you were here as a student? Dr. BANDA. Definitely not. Kwame Nkru-
Dr. BANDA. Well, Washington Park. You mah is not a Communist. He has been ac-
see, I lived at 5925 Indiana Avenue and as a cused of that and of being a dictator. He
poor boy I couldn't afford to ride the street is not. I have known Kwame Nkrumah
car. So I would walk through the park to since 1945, and I don't mind telling you that
the University of Chicago and that was quite he is my personal friend, but I am not
a distance. And when you reached the uni- saying nice things about him because he is
versity, there was a big stone carving. (Dr. my personal friend. I am just speaking the
Banda here refers to the Lorado Taft sculp- truth. He is not a Communist. He is not
ture and fountain, at the end of Washing- a dictator. Remember there was another
ton Park where the Midway begins-Ed.) candidate for the presidency. He lost. When
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a ,
ETHICAL CLEARANCE read-white boys, white girls, w
white women march side by side, shoulder
 Cuba, Plus 1 Year
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A6867
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. OLIN E. TEAGUTE
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, November 4, 1963
Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker,
under leave to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I wish to include an article writ-
ten by Mr. William S. White, editorial
writer for the Star, entitled "One Year
After Cuban Crisis." I believe Mr. White
to be a most forthright writer, and his
columns are most penetrating and
thought provoking:
ONE YEAR AFTER CUBAN CRISIS
(By William S. White)
Another October finds an Immense change
in the American mood from that October of
a year ago when we stood at the brink of
nuclear war over Cuba. Determination and
sensible fear sensibly suppressed-but de-
termination above all-these were in the
American mind.
The new October has arrived with anxiety
largely gone and a new and understandable
but also largely unsupported hope and op-
timism hanging over most of the Nation.
We were right a year ago to stand fast as
a country in settled resolve to meet unavoid-
able peril In the spirit of men prepared to die
rather than surrender, even though happily
the dice of history turned our way Instead
of against us. But we are wrong now, as It
seems to me, In having rushed over. In a
single 12 months, from the thick but not
ably rational gloom of October, 1962, to the
very nearly irrational. best-of-all-possible-
worlds attitude prevalent In October 1983.
THE WHEAT SALE
The partial nuclear test ban with the
Soviet Union, though a defensible enterprise
and though just possibly some herald of a
true easing in the cold war, has not yet
either ended that war or given any assurance
whatever of the Identity of its eventual
winner.
From much that is happening now, how-
ever. one might suppose that if the worst
was not already past then a good bit of the
worst was in sight of being over. So we talk
happily of wheat sales to the Russlans--an
appealing notion no less to hard-line con-
servatives than to soft-line liberals, for con-
servatives are traders and trade Is an hon-
orable underpinning of the very capitalist
system itself.
We talk of cutting back on our multi-
billion-dollar space program-and this Is
good to hear by both -sets of different rea-
sons. The conservatives naturally would like
to save the money. The liberals have long
been resentful at those billions being act
aside for the moon when It all might be
spent on dozens of earthy welfarlst schemes
hatched or In incubation.
But wheat deals with the Russians, no
matter bow momentarily helpful to our
farm surplus problem, would nevertheless
undeniably strengthen the Russian where
they are weak. Have we waited for 17 years
for this weak spot in order now to dash In
to fill It-and without, apparently, demand-
ing anything in return except the price of
the- wheat Itself?
And should we really reduce the space ap-
propriation even though it is quite true
that the President has renewed suggestions
that we might cooperate in space research
with the Soviet Union? Surely not, If we re-
main aware of the towering central fact that
the power which In future is first In space
will be first as well In this world we live In.
What the President said, at any rate, never
meant we should lessen our own exertions.
It only restated an old American policy in
offering certain cooperative ventures to the
Soviet Union, as we have offered so many
others, if, as and when the Soviet Union
might like really to cooperate.
WISE APPROACH NEEDED
We still intend to be first In space. as Vice
President LYNDON JOHNSON has just pointed
out in behalf of the administration. Noth-
ing will change that, unless Congress and
country insist upon heedlessly withholding
the means to W do It. And a little cooperation
from the Russians-in the unlikely event it
was given-would do no harm to our cen-
tral purpose.
But even greater than the need for a wise,
calm-minded approach to all these specific
questions is the need for a national spirit
which rejects any notion that the game has
about been won.
Some say we need as well to shun the
opposite not-ion that no concessions what-
ever should be made In the cold war. To
this the proper Answer Is "yes"-but. It
is "'yes," wherever such a concession is
clearly matched by Soviet concession and
wherever refusal would be mere hysterical
reflex. It is "no" wherever concessions are
made simply In some vague notion that we
could thus, in some iffy way, somehow im-
prove the international atmosphere.
What Happened to President Kennedy's
"Profiles in Courage" in Korth Case?
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. H. R. GROSS
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, November 4, 1963
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, the vet-
eran correspondent of the New York
Times, Mr. Arthur Krock, writes as fol-
lows In that newspaper on November 3,
1963:
At Wittenberg College, October 17, 1960,
Presidential Candidate Kennedy promised
that If elected he would Impose "a single.
comprehensive code on conflicts of Interest
? * ? drawing a clearer line between pro-
priety and impropriety ? ? ? protecting the
public against the unethical behavior ? ? ?.
All America seeks a government which no
man holds to his own Interest ? . The
next President must set the moral tone, and
I refer not only to his language."
At his press conference on November
1, 1963, President Kennedy was asked
these questions:
Question. Mr. President. do you think the
letters that Secretary of the Navy (Fred)
Korth wrote made his resignation advisable,
and was requested?
Answer. I think the letters which Mr.
Korth and I exchanged, I think, explain the
situation as I would like to see it explained.
Question. Mr. President-
Answer. Mr. Korth, I think, worked hard
for the Navy and he indicated his desire to
return to private life and I accepted that de-
cision. But I think he worked hard for the
Navy.
Later in the same press conference, the
questioning on the same subject was re-
newed as follows:
Question. Mr. President. Navy Secretary
iFredl Korth had some correspondence
which indicated he worked very hard for the
Continental National Bank of Forth Worth
while he was in Government, as well as for
the Navy, and that during this same period
of time that he negotiated, or took part In
the decision on a contract involving that
bank's-one of that bank's best customers,
the General Dynamics firm. I-wonder if this
fulfills the requirements of your code of
ethics in Government, and If, in a general
way, you think that it Is within the law and
proper?
Answer. In the case of the contract, the
TFX contract, as you know, Mr. Mollenhoff,
that matter was referred to the Department
of Justice to see whether there was a con-
flict of interest and the judgment was that
there was not. That Is No. 1.
No. 2, the amount of the loan to the com-
pany, that bank was one of a number of
banks which participated in a line of credit
and it was relatively a small amount of
money, as bank loans go. So in answer to
your question, I have no evidence that Mr.
Korth acted In any way improperly in the
TFX matter. It has nothing to do with any
opinion I may have about whether Mr. Korth
might have written more letters and been
busier than be should have been in one way
or another.
The fact of the matter Is, I have no evi-
dence that Mr. Korth benefited improperly
during his term In office In the Navy, and I
have no evidence, and you have not, as I
understand the press has not produced any.
nor the McClellan committee, which I would
Indicate that in any way he acted Improperly
in the TFX. I have always believed that in-
nuendoes should be justified before they are
made, either by me and the Congress or even
the press.
What has happened to the Kennedy
"Profiles In Courage?" What has hap-
pened with respect to his bold and reas-
suring words as spoken when he was a
candidate for the presidency; when, for
political purposes, he was pointing a
finger at the Eisenhower administration
and the Sherman Adams-Goldfine
episode?
As Mr. Krock says:
As soon as he learned of Korth's lapses
from this code of official ethics, the Presi-
dent conveyed the word to his Navy Secre-
tary that Immediate resignation was in
order ? * ?. But by his words at the press
conference he strangely diluted his very
creditable deed.
Mr. Speaker, at this point and for the
information of my colleagues, I submit
for printing In the RECORD the entire
article as published in the New York
Times on Sunday last:
THE KORTH CASE: KENNEDY'S EXPLANATION
OF THE NAVY SECRETARY'S RESIGNATION
EXAMINED -
(By Arthur Krock)
WASHINGTON, November 2.-President Ken-
nedy expressed a desire common to occupants
of his office whom a subordinate has em-
barrassed when asked at his news conference
if he thought certain letters written by
Navy Secretary Korth made the resignation
of this official "advisable" and If the Presi-
dent had requested it. "I think," he re-
plied, "the letters which Mr. Korth and I
exchanged are the-explain the situation as
I would like to see It explained."
But whether or not Mr. Kennedy's choice of
words was inadvertent, no predecessor has
arrayed himself with such candor on the side
of the proposition that the press should not
explore the background of official explana-
tions of events In Government that, on their
face and in the attendant circumstances,
are plainly a coverup of the actual situation.
For the letters the President referred to
(which were not, of course, the letters his
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