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December 19, 2016
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April 11, 2005
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February 25, 1963
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Approved For Release 2006~r,~P65B00383R000400080029-1 STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE DF THE S~AF`k" OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS Approved For Release 2006':~I~-f~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 200ID9~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 25 February 1963 CUBAN SUBMERSION IN LATIN AMERICA I. Introduction The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders the - daily record of events in Latin America, and all agree on one sa en conc us on, a el Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com- munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America. Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support tapes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the cvmmunicat~.bns and technical assist- ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require. In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries. "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab- otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are then?, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup- port, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and special- ized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these-other Latin Americans any Cu- ban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad- visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them;. "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con- front regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance." So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stag?--and in fact even Castra~?:s Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had Approved For Release 200~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 to fight a pitched battle with regular military for- mations which might have required mare advanced weap- ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain- ing revolution wherever it flourishes. now a some un s move, genera y n cas y courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces 0 for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba. Venezaael~, is apparently number one on Cuba?s pri- ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said sv to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and $las coca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in s eeches in January. Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or- ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist- ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZ~ATTGtTI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres- ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In thise of course, they failed. The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it 25X1. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/Q.~Q~~P65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 200C1~~~~y'~bP65B00383R000400080029-1 this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and bolas government build- s ngs . We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train- ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. ?ur estimate is that more than 200 yenezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strop l supports the Betancourt administration. For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push- ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implica~on what nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac- tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestro of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said-that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over- turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestro. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, bath slating that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force. The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestro led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic- aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first Approved For Release 2006~0~~~~~2DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 200~~,'~~-~bP65B00383R000400080029-1 eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade- craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, in~l~iding veteran Spanish Communists. The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa- ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha- v~,na and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tong and b Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails,. explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home.' they stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland. Approved For Release 2006~~~-~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006/~~fl~i:~IP65B00383R000400080029-1 III . 7,'raining We estimate that:at least 1,400, grad perhaps as many a,s 1,5UQ persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the paassible e~cception of Uruguay, to receive ideo- logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train- ing or both. Nlox?e have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present. The largest contingents have some from Vene- zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina,, a,nd Bolivia.. Same of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely at- tended some conference or cel?bration and done a little sightseeing. t7ther courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological wax?fare. Approved For Release 2006/~r~I~+F~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2001 I~~~ ~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Under the cireumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,ODU to 1,544 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasmnably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, gust as we knew that it incresed in 1962 over 1961. Approved For Release 2006~9~~1~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~~~1$-~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu- bans among the bands acting as leaders instructors s f r h se forces In some cases, i as erne out that a reference to "a Cuban?' with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others,. rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence I1I. Weapons In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook far uerrillas in regard to prevision of arms . 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/Q~};~I~F~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006/p,~p~~~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 they are telling the guerrilla warfare s u ens anc eir leaders to obtain their own we~p- ona at home. e o.+~no eve a s ng a case w ere we are cer a n of the Cuban origin of captured arms. This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in- numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate securit forces to control all such channels. SECR E T Approved For Release 2006/02/09: CIA-RDP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat- ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Deedless to say, this is a matter that we consider of must ser- ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American Gauntries. V. Funding Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Qur evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying Gash. The following are a few examples of 'these operations. Approved For Release 2006~~O~~I~I~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~,':~-~i-1~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus- taining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob- beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The roost spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub- urb last year which netted almost $140,0?0. From n e ruary a an in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,x00 by men wearing FALN armbands. VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all Approved For Release 2006+~~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~p$,~I/~,r,~P65B00383R000400080029-1 times, with regularly scheduled and special broad- casts to specific countries as well as general trans- missions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op- portunity for revolutionary action against the "cor- rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressive- ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt. The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out- e ore commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta- tion broadcasts weekly a tots o ours and 5~ minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter- ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere. Radio Havana's international service was in- augura a on ay Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first in- ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week: English to Europe English to the Western Hemis- phere French to .Europe French to Canada French to Mediterranean Portuguese to Brazil Spanish to Europe Spanish to the Americas - 9 hr 20 min - 3 hr 2U min - 3 hr 3D min - 7 hr - 16 hr 55 min - 1Q6 hr 30 min Approved For Release 2006~~~-f~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006,~`~-I~''i,-I~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 In addition to the regularly scheduled inter- national service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs n order to take adva?n- tage of unique political situations. When serious Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities availa e o po tical groups from other Latin Ameri- can countries so they can beam programs to their home- lands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re- public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are ex- emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini- can Republic on 2S January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the ''demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re- public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the t'National Liberation movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Con- stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo. There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat mare subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States. The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some mi es Approved For Release 200~9~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~;~~F~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard alI over the world. Programs are a ng sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays. S~.nce the actober crisis, Fidel Castro has ob- viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos- cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Gastro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be- tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy-- ca11 it coexistence or ''two steps forward, one step back''--is reflected on the extreme left in. many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion. Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between var- ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de- liver the Latin American countries into the Comma- nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser- vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force. Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the set- ting up early in 1962 ?f a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the prob- lems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese Approved For Release 2006~~~!-~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006~~~i-~tDP65B00383R000400080029-1 languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the.. Alliance pro- gram in Colombia_-a showpiece of the Alliance. posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and work-~ ers? movements in Latin American countries" as top ics which will be studied by the institute. Re? salts of these studies will be published in the near future in a magaziwne called America Latina, intended especially for distribut ~o~nLat~America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the in? stitute, and entitled Alianza era e1 Pro reso, will in the words of its here sa ''unmas a economic ex~ pension of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1965. One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur Cher Communist subversive activities even in coun- tries where there are na Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argen? tine, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile, The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries~- Chile, the Ifominican Republic, Ecuador, E1 Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru??have no official ties whatever with any bloc country. Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com-~ monists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor~ tance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cu? bans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can con time to use the country as a-base df operations Approved For Release 2006/~Q~~l~~~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 Approved For Release 2006,~1'~,'?,~J~~P65B00383R000400080029-1 against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo- matic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re- tain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party Itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis- sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any .time. Approved For Release 2006~~~~-~DP65B00383R000400080029-1 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/02/09 :CIA-RDP65B00383R000400080029-1 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2006/02/09 :CIA-RDP65B00383R000400080029-1