MEET THE PRESS AN NBC-TV PROGRAM BY LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000400120020-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 18, 1950
• Content Type: PREL

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MEET T PE:SS
An NBC-TV Program Produo d by Lawrence E. Spivak
SUNDAY, DECEMBER lu, 1950
MODERATOR: Ned Brooks
GUEST: John A. McCone,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
PANEL: Marquis Childs, St. Louis Post Dispatch
Peter Hackes,, NBC Nees
Arthur Krock, New York Times
Lawrence E., Spivak, Regular Panel Meaioer
Grouping of Questions and Answers by Subjects
1. NUCLEAR TEST SUSPENSION AND GENEVA TEST BAN
NEGOTIATIONS
A. : ffect of U.S. Suspension of Nuclear Tests
MR? SPIVAK: Mr. McCone, on October 31, 1958, we stopptid
all cuclear testing. What would you say we have accomplished
by halting our tests?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, we have engaged in a very
in"00Ise negotiation with the Soviets and the British in an
endeavor to reach agreement on the suspension 09 tests with
proper controls. The results or that effort have been
disappointing to date.
MR. SPIVAK: When I say ?7accomplished," . have we eased
npemylty of the
ree world
wee = ten; io'a, have we added to th
25 YEAR RE-REVIEW
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or have We added to our own security? Have we lessened
the chances of war?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: I don't think we have done any of
those things, Mr. Spivak. I think had we been successful
we would have started on a road of better understanding that
might have lessened the chances of war, but being unsuccess-
ful, I don't think we have accomplished any of those objectives.
MR, SPIVAK: There has been no gain then in your judgment
for either the United States or the free world?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Quite to the contrary I think there
might have been harm.
MR. SPIVAK: Now when you were on this program about a
year ago, I think it was on November 22, 1959, you said that
we ought to start testing shortly after December 31 of '59 if
we didn't come to some agreement.with the Soviet that we should
accept.
CHARIMAN MC CONE: That is correct, My words, as I
recall them, were that I would extend it only on a week-by-
week basis.
MR. SPIVAK: Now we have extended it again for over a
year. Why? Who is responsible for that?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: It has been a decision of the
Administration and it is understandable in the light of
events as they evolved throughout the year.
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M. SPIVAK: Well, why has the }resident dozes that
in the face of advice from people like you and some of his
military advisors?
Ch-IAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, he had to balance advice from
me' and from military advisors with advice he received from
others and make a determination as to what he felt was in
the best interests of the country with all risks involved.
You will remember that through the year there was a summit
.conference, there were a number of technical. conferences
a:e there were various events that took place, each of which
gave some thread of hope that a successful negotiation might
be accomplished.
B. Are the Soviets CondtletingNuclear Tests?
MR. SPIVAK: Would you say that during those two years
our security has been damaged in any way?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: I think so, I think so, For the
reason that we have no knowledge of what the Soviets have
been doing and without knowledge they may have been testing,
we do not know. We have no means of determining whether
they have ':)een testing or not and if they have been
testing -- and I feel that it is very possible that they
have been -- then they have made advances that we have not
made.
MR. CHILDS: Mr. McCone, you have made your views very
clear.agaln and again that you think that this mi).ratorium
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on testing is very dangeroi v and youxr belief that the
Russians ax'e secretly testing.
Now a distinguished scientist,. Dr. Hans Bethe, who
was a member of President Eisenhower's Scientific Advisory
Board and a pioneer in the atomic bomb takes the opposite
view, and I would like to read you a quotation from a
recent article of his.
"Having participated in the negotiations with the
Russian scientists in Geneva on three occasions, I believe
they are sincere in wanting a test cessation agreement and
do not intend to cheat on it."
Now that view was so much the opposite of yours, do
you think he was taken in by the Russians, or how did he
arrive at it?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, I don't know how he arrived at
it. There are a great many people who have that view, and
have so expressed it. Scientists and also others.
I happen to believe -- I have studied their weapons
development. I can see what improvements they can make
by testing. I know that underground testing is very cheap
and can be done in a clandestine manner. I know there is no
possibility of detecting because we have no.instruments that
can detect and identify underground explosions that are
carried out in the Siberian heartland of Russia, and there-
fore I assume they are taking advantage of the situation that
th their weapons
they have 'in hand and are proceeding wi
development.
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MR. CHILDS: Do you think they are doing this now,
Mr. McCone?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: I think so. That is my opinion,
MR. CHILDS: Is there any proof of that?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, there is no proof of that, but
there can be no proof because there is no way of proving.
MR. CHILDS: And in the same article Dr. Bethe says
we today in the United States are very far ahead of the
Russians in the development of small atomic weapons. Is that
correct, in your opinion?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: I have no way of bowing, nor do I
know how he knows. I do know we have made advances, we have
developed small atomic weapons. That is well known, and they
are for tactical uses and for air defense and for other uses.
We know nothing of their developments whatsoever.
MR, CHILDS: We don't have any intelligence on that
at all?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No.,we have no information on that.
MR CHILDS: The point he makes from this supposition --
if it is that, apparently -- is that to resume testing would
enable them to catch up in the small weapons field. You
wouldn't agree with that?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I wouldn't agree with that. Of
course they would make developments just as we would make
developments. However, the developments that we can make if
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we would resume testing, and underground testing -- and I
want to emphasize that this I am speaking of because of the
fallout problem of atmospheric testing --~ the advances that
we make in my opinion would be very significant and we
should not forego this opportunity unless we are absolutely
sure that the Soviets have stopped also, and we are not
sure of that'now, sir.
C. Soviet,Weapons Development
MR. CHILDS: Khrushchev has said several times some-
thing about an amazing new weapon. Do you have any reason
to believe that they have some revolutionary new advance,
Mr. Chairman?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I have no way to know to what he
was referring. I do know his laboratories are working
energetically in a great many fields because I visited them.
MR. HACKES: Mr. McCone, could this super weapon that
Khrushchev has talked about be this business of carrying
a bomb in a satellite, which could be touched off at the
push of a button? Have we any indication that that is what
it Is?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: That in itself is not a weapon-,. That
would be a weapons system.
MR, HACKES : A hydrogen bomb o I am talking about,
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: That would be a weapons system.
He might be referring to something such as that. He might
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be referring to a biological weapon, or something that is
non-nucleonic, I do not know.
MiR. SPIVAK: Could it be the neutron bomb, the death-
ray bomb that they have talked a,great deal about?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: It might be, although I do not think
that he would refer to that in such a dramatic manner, although
that would be an exceedingly important development, particularly
for the tactical ground forces.
D. Problems of Inspection and Control Under a Test Cessation
Yrer
MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Chairman, we have insisted from the
beginning that we would not sign an agreement with the
Russians that couldn't give us proper inspection and control,
isn't that so?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: That is correct.
MR. SPIVAK: Now the agreement we are prepared now to
.sign, will that give us the protection we want? Will that
give us the inspection and the control that we-think necessary
for proper policing?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, if we can reach agreement with
the Soviets on the control system that we want and that we
have proposed, and if we proceed as we have proposed with the
improvements of seismic technology, then I think we will
accomplish that objective, yes.
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MR. SPIVAK: Well, now I am t,I king now specifically
about -- we want I believe 21 inspection posts, I belle;ve,
and the Soviets have offered us 15, is that correct?
CH IRRMAAN MC CONE: That is right.
MR, SPIVAK: The West says we need 20 on-site
inspections and the Soviet wants 3, is that correct?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: That is correct.
MR SPIVAK: Will the 20 on-site inspections that we
want and the 21 inspection posts be sufficient to protect
us against cheating?
CHAYRMAN MC CONE: The 21 inspection posts and the 20
on-site inspections would protect us in cheating in larger
size underground explosions, Those are.above the seismic
signal of 4,75 or the equivalent of about a 20 kiloton
explosion.
Now the proposal goes one step further, Mr. Spivak. It
proposes a coordinated research program to improve seismology,
to improve the instrumentation in these stations so that
the threshold of their capability can be lowered,
MR. SPIVAK: But that number would not give us the
protection we now seek?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: The number of twenty-one?
MR. SPIVAK: The number of twenty and twenty-one. Is
that the number of on-site inspections and the number of
inspection posts?
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CHAIRMAN MC CONE: NOD t wo' . not. The protection we
seek would evolve through the seissic research which we have
proposed as part of this very proposal of which you speak.
MR. SPIV?AK: And this would take time.
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: it would take two or two and a half
years in our opinion.
MR. SPIVAK: Can we afford to go on not testing during
that period of time that is being developed?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: We propose, if agreement is reached,
that these stations be installed and as they are Installed
they be put in ope . ratioin and the system start to work and I
think this is a workable plan, yes.
Now the Soviets have countered by proposing that if they
do agree on the system that the whole system be installed
and that nothing be done in the way of operating it until it
is completed and that is four years from now and hence they
would enjoy a four year unpoliced moratorium and that would be
unacceptable to us.
MR. KROCIC: Now let's assume that the horse hasn't
gotten out of the stable yet and that before we finish the
negotiations that we can get a treaty. That is a very wild
assumption from my standpoint because I don't think the
Russians would want one and it seems to me if I was in their
position I would rather negotiate than act. Negotiation in
.this case being the very enemy of action.
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Suppose we get a trey ., ho a .vra and It has all these
various Inspection arrangements and of course We never would
have a treaty unless they thought it was to their advantage
to have this treaty. Otherwise how could we have one.
All right, we have one that they find In their advantage
and we all sign up. And then the Russians decide it is to
their advantage to violate this treaty and that if they are
caught the consequences would be far less important to them
than the advantage they get by the cheating,
What sanctions possibly could they fear, or to the free
world apply or the rest of the signatories apply if that was
their procedure?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, I would think that the only
sanctions that could be applied would be the -- it would
mean the end of the treaty, and the parties to the treaty
would be free to proceed on their own, I don't see how
there could be any other sanction,
E. Should the U.S. Resume Nuclear Tests?
MR. SPIVAK: What do you personally think will contribute
more to the security of the United States and the free world,
a nuclear test ban which we seem ready to sign, or a resump-
tion of underground testing and testing in o ,ter space on
our part?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, that is a . difficua.t question,
Mr. Spivak. I think that the resumption of underground testing
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and outer space testing would probably contribute more to
the security of the free world because It will advance this
technology.
On the other hand, an agreement might contribute greatly
to relieving tension and it might pave the way to agreements
in more important areas of disarmament, and that is the hope
that lies.behind this undertaking.
MR, KROCK: On the point of the time of the moratorium,
Mr. Chairman, it has gone on:now for almost two years,
hasn't it, or perhaps a little more than two years?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: A little more than that, sire
MR. KROCK: And I suppose you can assume that if the
administration did not end the moratorium by this time that
it could naturally not take a step of that magnitude affecting
as it would every policy of the next administration, that we
must assume that nothing from here until Mr. Kennedy becomes
President will be done in this field.
That, as I understood his plan, it would involve --
perhaps he would make one more try, he says. That would
involve a few more weeks or perhaps months.
Does that make any difference any more? If the
Russians had been cheating, haven't they had enough time now
to perfect something that would give them a great advantage
already?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Yes they would have time. Of course
weeks are important in my opinion, However as you say this
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is an extremely important policy mat'-ar for Mr. Kennedy's
administration, and he said he was going to make a good hard
try to reach an agreement and I think he should be given that
opportunity.
I do not think it should take him long to determine the
true intentions of the Soviets because he has close to him suc'i
men as Senator Anderson and Mr. Holifield, the new chairman of
the Joint Committee, Senator Gore and Senator Jackson, all who
have been following this matter very closely.
MR. SPIVAK: Mr. McCone, Senator Humphrey suggested the
other day that if we don't get an agreement at Geneva by June,
1961, we ought to resume testing.
Would you want to wait that long?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: .I don't think it is within my province
to set any date for the new Administration. However, I don't
think it is necessary to wait that long.
MR. SPIVAK: Well, do you think it would be wise to wait
that long?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I don't think it would be wise to
wait that long.
II. ISRAELI REACTOR PROGRAM
MR. KROCK: Mr. Chairman, it seems to be fairly established
now that the Israeli government has built or is building a
reactor -- I am not familiar with the technical terms, but as I
understand it, this is an installation that has weapons capability,
is that correct? And is the statement correct in the first place,
that the Israelis have built such an instrument?
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CHAIRMAN MC CONE: We have only informal and unofficial
information on the program of the Israeli government to build
a nuclear reactor, The nuclear reactor itself does not
create a weapons capability. However, all nuclear reactors
do breed plutonium and plutonium is a weapons material. Our
information is unofficial and informal and we have asked for
further information from the Israeli government.
MR, KROCK: Well, then, since you say that the weapons
capability is, of course, there, it becomes a question of
intent. The Israeli government, as I understand it, says
they have no thought of producing weapons through this
medium, or any use of plutonium for that purpose.
Would it not be a very perfect opportunity for the
government of Israel, consisdering that it has been the
beneficiary of great help from the United States government
and that their contributions to the state have been made tax
deductible by Americans, would it not be a remarkably fine
opportunity for them to agree to be the model for an inspection
system whereby the benevolence of this intent could be proved,
not only to us but to the world?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Yes, that is entirely possible,
Mr. Krock. A system of safeguards has been developed, it has
been developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Each one of our bilaterals with countries, including our
research bilateral with Israel provides for safeguards which
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are ameans of verification that the r.Eaterials produced in
the reactor will be used for civil rather than military
purposes and this all could be installed, and this would
allay fear in the minds of the people throughout the world
that a country was building a reactor for the purpose of
developing a weapons capability-
MR. KROCK: There is one more thing: Obviously, if we
have made informal inqu rtes, this is a surprise to us?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Yes, it is,
MR. KROCK: It was done in secret.. I don't know anything
about the subject, but-how could the government of Israel
perfect this installation without the aid of some other
nuclear power? So isn't the element of secrecy a rather
astonishing thing in the circumstances,; and what could that
power be that rendered the assistance that it seems to me
was required?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, there are a number of countries
that might have rendered assistance, if a country indeed did
render assistance, and w6,-really do not know enough about it
to say what assistance, if any, was rendered,.
MR. KROCK: So it was done secretly?
CHAIRMAN MC.CONE: The development was not revealed to
.us. We did not know about it until we learned about It
informally and unofficially, very recently.
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III. NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS FOR NATO
MR. HACKES: Mr. McCone, you have just returned from
a trip to Europe, including a visit to General Norstad
who is the NATO Military Chief.
In your opinion should -- as there is great pressure
apparently now -- should the United States be called on to
set up NATO as a nuclear power and if so, under what provisos
or restrictions, if any?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, there are restrictions under
the law that provide that nuclear weapons supplied by us must
be under our custody and cmztrol. Actually the situation is
that we are dependent upon the forces of the NATO Alliance to
defend the free world and they are going to do that with both
nuclear and conventional weapons. And some means must be
developed so that.those forces, the nuclear forces, can respond
if called upon to respond against a monolithic enemy that
can strike almost instantly. This is General Norstad's
problem.
MR. HACKES: Couldn't we accomplish the same thing by
maintaining the setup as it now stands with Britain and the
United States In control of whatever nuclear weapons are
needed by NATO? Why does NATO have to have its own. strike
force?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well,, NATO is an assembly of 15
independent countries, each of which face the Soviet threat
and therefore each must have a voice in its own defense,
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MR. HACKES: Won't this plan strike a rather sensitive
nerve In Congress when the session begins In January?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, I can't forecast the attitude
of Congress. I think Congress when they realize the problem
vIll take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper defense
of the free world.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF NEW AEC CHAIRMAN
MR. CHILDS: You have indicated, Mr. McCone, that you
are goirr to stay on the commission after January 20 although
you will not be Chairman because that falls within the purview
of the new President to name a Chairman. Now I would like to
have
CHAIRMAN MC CONE : I have not indicated that.
MRo CHILDS: I thought in your last interview in the
U.S. News and World Report, you said you
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I don't think that question was
asked.
MR 4. CHILDS: Well, I thought you indicated you would --
are you going to stay on?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I do not intend to stay on the
Commission after January 20. 1 think that President-
elect Kennedy should appoint his new Chairman and I think at
that time I intend to return to private life.
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ARO CHILDS: I see. you could stay on as a member of
the Commission, could you not, Mr. MoCone?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well,, this seems to be the practice,,
that you are appointed for a term of years, and I presume I
could stay on as a member of the Commission, yes,
MR, CHILDS : And yours runs until 1963?
CHAIR~'~iAN MC CONE: I think so, yes.
MRa CHILDS: Well, do you feel with your knowledge,
background and experience that perhaps you have a public duty
to stay on as a Commission member if not as Chairman?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No, I carne at President Eisenhower's
request with the understanding if my services were satis-
factory I would stay for the balance of his term. I told him
at that time that at that time I would have to return to
private life, and that is what I intend to do,
MR. CHILDS: You would not think that condition would
apply to the other Commission members, only on the Chairman?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well? yes. I would think it would
apply more to the Chairman than to Commission members.
F . HACKES: Mr. McCone, have you been asked to confer
with anybody in the incoming Kennedy Administration?
CHAIRMAN MC CONE : No, not at all.
MR. HACKES; Have you yourself made any overtures to
discuss anything with an eye toward carrying on this transition?
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CHAIRMAN MC CONE: No. I pointed out to Mr. Clark
Clifford shortly after the election that there was a vacancy
on the Commission and that if Senator Kennedy would cesignate
the man he wished to be Chairman there was a possibility that
that man might receive an interim appointment for the
intervening months and in this way the transition could be
accomplished in an orderly way.
Ycwever, I think that Mr. Kennedy has been extremely
busy with his Cabinet, and no suggestions have been made
MR, KROCK: What other steps have you taken to make
sure you will get out of here on the 20th of January, so
unlike other Republicans who are unable to part?
CHARIMAN MC CONE: Well, my wife is in Los Angeles
opening my Pasadena home, and some of ray staff are out there
and an automobile has been sent West, so a few steps have
been taken' Mr, Krock.
V. McKINNEY REPORT ON ATOMS FOR PEACE, PROGRAM
iR. HAG S: one of the gentlemen who has been mentioned
as a possible successor to your post, Mr. Robert McKinney, has
recently made a number of charges against the AEC, the main
charge is that there has been some footdragging particularly
in the Atoms for Peace Program, and I think he is referring
mainly to the power reactor program.
How do you answer these criticisms -- and they were
very strong in the Joint Committee report.
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CHAIRMAN MC CONE: Well, I think that the Atoms for
Peace Program has been going along very well indeed, and I
think the fact that several power companies are now in
active negotiation, for building large plants, nuclear plants
on a competitive basis indicates that Mr. McKinney's
statement is not quite right.
I have on my desk right now a proposal from one
company, and expect another one from a second company, to
build very large plants on a purely competitive basis, and
I think that verifies that progress has been made.
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