USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS 'LIE DETECTORS' BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000100380001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 522
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

Ap USEdOFrPOLYGRAPHS 121 A 1t P M&1VW0 001-7
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Part 1-Panel Discussion With Private Polygraph
Practitioners
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
APRIL 7, 8, AND 9, 1964
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Government Operations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOE
WASHINGTON : 1984
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Illinois, Chairman
CHET HOLIFIELD, California R. WALTER RIEHLMAN, New York
JACK BROOKS, Texas GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia FLORENCE P. DWYER, New Jersey
JOHN A. BLATNIK, Minnesota ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
ROBERT E. JONES, Alabama GEORGE M. WALLHAUSER, New Jersey
EDWARD A. GARMATZ, Maryland JOHN B. ANDERSON, Illinois
JOHN E. MOSS, California OGDEN R. REID, New York
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida FRANK J. HORTON, New York
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin BILL STINSON, Washington
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut ROBERT MCCLORY, Illinois
RICHARD E. LANKFORD,Maryland ALBERT W. JOHNSON, Pennsylvania
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, Massachusetts
J. EDWARD ROUSH, Indiana
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania
CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, New Jersey
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
CHRISTINE RAY DAVIS, Staff Director
JAMES A. LANIGAN, General Counsel
MILES Q. ROMNEY, Associate General Counsel
J. P. CARLSON, Minority Counsel
RAYMOND T. COLLINS, Minority Professional Staff
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
JOHN E. MOSS, California, Chairman
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia GEORGE MEADER, Michigan
HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
JOHN S. MONAGAN, Connecticut OGDEN R. REID, New York
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
SAMUEL J. ARCHIBALD, Staff Administrator
BENNY L. KASS, Counsel
JACK MATTESON, Chief Investigator
HELEN K. BEASLEY, Clerk
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CONTENTS
Testimony of- Page
Backster, Cleve, Backster School of Lie Detection, New York, N.Y__ 12
George Lindberg, John E. Reid & Associates Chicago, Ill---------- 5
Inbau, Fred E., Northwestern University ?chool of Law; accom-
panied by Cleve Backster; Backster School of Lie Detection, New
York, N.Y.; John E. Reid, John E. Reid & Associates, Chicago,
Ill.; and George Lindberg, John E. Reid & Associates, Chicago, IlL 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by-
Backster, Cleve, Backster School of Lie Detection, New York, N.Y.:
Slide No. 2201-Interpretation technique--------------------- 77
Slide No. 3305-Interpretation technique_____________________ 85
Kass, Benny L., counsel, Foreign Operations and Government Infor-
mation Subcommittee: Excerpt of newsletter from the Academy for 118
Scientific Interrogation, March and April 1963___________________
Meader, Hon. George, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan: Letter from H. B. Dearman, M.D., psychiatry, John-
son City, Tenn., to Hon. John E. Moss, April 5, 1964------------ 44
Moss, Hon. John E., a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, and chairman, Foreign Operations and Government In-
formation Subcommittee:
Excerpt from exhibit 2C-Electronic marvel weeds out dishonest 114
and unfit applicants ___________---------------------------
Item D, polygraph question formulation______________________ 71
Letter from Hon. William L. Dawson, chairman, Government
Operations Committee, to Hon. John B. Moss, March 12, 2
1964-------------------------------------------------
Reid, Hon. Ogden R., a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York:
Excerpt from testimony of Fred E.Inbau -------------------- 49
Excerpt of letter from H. B. Dearman, M.D., psychiatry, John-
son City, Tenn., to Hon. John E. Moss, April 5, 1964--------- 51
Reuss, Hon. Henry S., a Representative in Congress from the State of
Wisconsin: Excerpt from an article in Law and Order magazine
by Cleve Backster, entitled "Don't Trust the Lie Detector 109
Versus Do Trust the Lie.Detector"----------------------- 189
Index------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIXES
Exhibits IA-iH-State statutes and codes relating to polygraphs and
other detection devices:
Exhibit 1A-Illinois (Smith-Hurd, Illinois Statutes, Annotated, title
38, sec. 951 et seq.), an act to provide for licensing and regulating
detection of deception examiners, and to make an appropriation in 123
connection therewith_________________
Exhibit 1B-Kentucky, Session Laws of Kentucky, 1963, chapter 78
(S.B. 63), an act relating to "Detection of Deception Examiners,"
for licensing and regulating same ----------------------------- 128
Exhibit 1C-New Mexico, Session Laws of New Mexico, 1963, regular
session, chapter 225, laws 1963, House bill No. 341, an act relating
to the practice of polygraphy: Providing for a licensing board;
and establishing procedure for registration, qualification, and 131
--
III
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Exhibits 1A-1H-State statutes and codes-Continued
Exhibit iD-Alaska, Laws of Alaska, 1964, chapter 36, an act relating
to examinations in which polygraphs or other lie-detector devices Page
are used---------------------------------------------------- 133
Exhibit 1E-California, chapter 1881 of Statutes and Amendments to
the Codes, California, 1963----------------------------------- 134
Exhibit 1F-Illinois, Smith-Hurd Statutes, title 38, section 736.2.
Lie detector tests-Restrictions on court _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 134
Exhibit 1G-Massachusetts, General Laws Annotated. 149, general
provisions as to employment, section 19B. Lie detector tests; use
as condition of employment: penalty__________________________ 134
Exhj it 1H-Oregon, regular session, chapter 249, laws 1963, House
bill No. 1453, an act relating to lie detector tests as a condition for
employment; and providing penalties-------------------------- 134
Exhibits 2A-2E-Articles dealing with the use of polygraphs and other lie
detection devices:
Exhibit 2A-"Unconscious Motivation and the Polygraph Test," by
H. B. Dearman, M.D. and B. M. Smith Ph'the- D______- 135
Exhibit 2B-"Do Lie Detectors Lie? WLile Debate About the
Lie Detector's Accuracy Continues, Where Does This Leave You
if Your Job-Your Life-Depend Upon It?" Reprinted from
Popular Science, September 1963______________________________ 138
Exhibit 2C-"Electronic Marvel Weeds Out Dishonest and Unfit
Applicants," reprinted from Bus Transportation, November, 1956_ 142
Exhibit 2D-"Fort Gordon Conference on Standardization," re-
printed from the Academy for Scientific Interrogation Newsletter_ 146
Exhibit 2E-"Don't Trust the Lie Detector," by Richard A. Stern-
bach, Lawrence A. Gustafson, and Ronald L. Colier------------- 147
Exhibit 2F-"Don't Trust the Lie Detector Versus Do Trust the Lie
Detector," by Cleve Backster_________________________________ 154
Exhibit 3-Summary of Federal polygraph use___________________ 156
Table of agency replies----------------------------------- faces p. 162
Exhibits 4A-4E-Biographical sketches of polygraph examiners appearing
before the committee:
Exhibit 4A-Cleve Backster____________________________________ 162
Exhibit 4B-John Martin Barron-------------------------------- 163
Exhibit 4C-Thomas Raymond Beck____________________________ 163
Exhibit 4D-Fred E.Inbau-------------------------------------- 164
Exhibit 4E-George Wakem Lindberg___________________________ 165
Exhibit 4F-John E. Reid------------------------------ ------ 165
Exhibits 5A-5B-Letter and study relating to the use of the polygraph
from the Atomic Energy Commission:
Exhibit 5A-Letter of June 26, 1953, from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy explaining AEC
decision to end use of polygraphs------------------------------ 166
Exhibit 5B-Summary of study by the AEC in 1952-53 relating to use
of the polygraph--------------------------------------------- 168
Annex A-Discussion outline for lie detector panel meeting and
comments of panel members, discussion outline for lie detector
panel meeting- - - 175
Exhibit 6-The Backster School of- lie detection polygraph examiner
training course-------------------------------------------------- 183
Exhibits 7A-7E-Material relating to the use by the Federal Government
of galvanometers:
Exhibit 7A-Letter from Lt. Gen. Harold W. Grant, U.S. Air Force,
Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency, to Hon. John E.
Moss, April 9, 1964------------------------------------------ 185
Exhibit 7B-Letter from Fred B. Kemery, program manager, Air-
craft development Service, to J. J. Watson, April 22, 1963-------- 186
Exhibit 7C-Letter from Fred B. Kemery, program manager, Air-
craft Development Service, to R. W. Inman, April 22, 1963 ------- 186
Exhibit 7D-Staff memorandum, use of lie detectors in Vietnam,
April 3, 1964------------------------------------------------ 187
Exhibit 7E-Letter from H. B. Montague, Chief Inspector, Post
Office Department, to Benny Kass, March 24, 1964-------------- 187
Exhibit 8-Polygraph laboratory at the Backster School of Lie De-
tection------------------------------------------------------ 188
Exhibit 9-Letter from M. W. Myatt, president, Academy for Scien-
tific Interrogation, to Cleve Backster, April 6, 1964-------------- 188
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DETECTORS" BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Part 1-Panel Discussion With Private Polygraph
Practitioners)
TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1964
b usE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SVBCOMMI' rEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room B-300,
Rayburn Office Building, Hon. John E. Moss (chairman of the sub-
committee) presiding.
Present : Representatives John E. Moss, Porter Hardy, Jr., Henry
S. Reuss, John S. Monagan, George Meader, and Robert P. Griffin.
Also present : Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher.
Staff members present: Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator;
Jack Mattison, chief investigator; and Benny L. Kass, subcommittee
counsel.
Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order.
I regret that the hearings today will not be, at least from a physical
standpoint under the most ideal of conditions, but if everyone will
be quiet, I think we can hear the witnesses as the hearings get
underway.
Several months ago Chairman William Dawson directed the Sub-
committee on Foreign Operations and Government Information to
study the use of polygraphs, commonly referred to as lie detectors,
in the Federal Government. The directive was based on the mandate
of the Government Operations Committee to study the operations of
Government activities at all levels with a view of determining econ-
omy and efficiency.
As the first step in the study, a questionnaire was sent to 58 Federal
departments and agencies to determine whether they use polygraphs
and, if so, the extent and conditions of the use. According to the
responses received, 19 agencies used polygraphs during fiscal year
1963.
These 19 agencies owned 512 polygraphs which were acquired at a
cost of more than $425,000. Some G39 examiners were hired to op-
erate the instruments, and operating costs, which are rising annually,
now approach $41/2 million.
Detailed answers to the questionnaire and a summary of the replies
are contained in the committee print entitled, "Use of Polygraphs by
the Federal 'Government." This preliminary study shows that these
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devices are used under widely varying conditions in the Federal Gov-
ernment. The training and qualifications of polygraph examiners
differ substantially from agency to agency as do the controls exercised
on the use of the instruments.
Serious questions have been raised by responsible persons as to
whether the polygraph is, indeed, an instrument which should be used
for any purpose. If used, what should be the extent and condition of
its use?
The subcommittee has neither condemned nor condoned the use of
polygraphs by the Federal Government. The inquiry is designed to
develop as much factual information as possible to clarify the prob-
lems involved in the use of polygraphs. The hearings will begin
today with a panel discussion with nationally recognized experts on
the use of polygraphs.
On the following days we will take testimony from representatives
of some Federal agencies which use polygraphs. By a careful, objec-
tive study of the problems, we hope to point the way to possible solu-
tions.
At this point I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a copy
of the letter from Congressman Dawson directing the subcommittee
to investigate the use of polygraphs in the Federal Government.
Is there any objection? Hearing none, the letter will be included
at this point in the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C., March 12, 1964.
Hon. JOHN E. Moss,
Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee,
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR COLLEAGUE: In April 1963 I directed the Foreign Operations and Govern-
ment Information Subcommittee to study and analyze the use of polygraphs
within the Federal Government. It is my understanding that the subcommittee
has compiled a great deal of information on this subject and now intends to
hold hearings.
I am sure the subcommittee will fully explore this area. Please report your
findings, with recommendations for action, to the full committee as soon as
possible.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Chairman.
Mr. Moss. Our witnesses today are Mr. Fred E. Inbau, Northwest-
ern University School of Law; Mr. Cleve Backster, School of Lie
Detection, New York; Mr. John E. Reid, John E. Reid & Associates,
Chicago, Ill., and Mr. George Lindberg, John E. Reid & Associates,
Chicago, Ill. Mr. Backster will be here very shortly.
Before swearing the witnesses, do any of the subcommittee members
wish to make any statements?
Mr. GALLAGiiER. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moss. We have as a very distinguished Member of Congress,
not a member of this subcommittee, Congressman Gallagher.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wish to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Dawson for forwarding
the letter that I sent to him requesting this investigation. I wish to
compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and the members o7 the staff and the
subcommittee, who made such an excellent preliminary study of the
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
problem, wherein they justified the need for the hearings that are be-
ginning today.
I am concerned with some of the basic rights which people sought
when they came to this new land in the face of great danger and hard-
ship, seeking to be free of the oppressive tyrants who ruled elsewhere
at those times. Among the basic rights perhaps the most precious
were individual privacy and human dignity.
One of the principal reasons for my requesting this hearing and
the investigation that proceeded, was to have this subcommittee con-
sider how far scientific progress and bureaucratic efficiency has in-
truded upon these basic rights. I am specifically concerned with the
fourth amendment of whether a person can take the fourth and not be
denied his basic right to employment.
Taking the fifth has become a familiar practice, but we should be
mindful that our Founding Fathers considered the fourth amendment
to have greater priority than the fifth in the constitutional Bill of
Rights. The fourth amendment to the Constitution states, among
other provisions, that the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search and seiz-
ures, shall not be violated.
Is not the fourth amendment violated if a condition precedent to
employment is the subjection to a polygraph test, a test that seeks in
some instances, and we seek testimony to this effect today, to deter-
mine not only the veracity but to probe the very thought process of an
individual?
A preliminary investigation by this subcommittee has revealed
widespread use, as Chairman Moss has pointed out, by the various
agencies of the Government. It is my hope that the purpose of this
hearing is to determine the extent and circumstances of the use of the
polygraph in Government and to some degree, perhaps later on, in
private-agencies.
It is my hope that these hearings will guide us in setting some
standards for the use of this instrument and to further establish some
.basic qualifications for operators. I have had called to my attention
abuses that seemed to go far beyond the point of seeking confirmation
of veracity through the use of polygra hs. Reports of attempts to
determine attitudes, through use of the device, are most disturbing.
I have in mind here, Mr. Chairman, of the many calls that I have
gotten and many of the letters I have gotten, such as a 17-year-old girl,
just out of high school, who sought employment and was subjected to a
lie detector test by the U.S. Government. This girl was asked many,
many questions concerning not only her private life but her sex life.
She was subjected to questions that were most embarrassing and she
suffered a humiliating experience, from which several years later she
seems not to have recovered. This was brought to my attention by
her mother, a constitutent of mine2 and in probing the extent of this
type of questioning I find that it is common practice in determining
intent.
I just wonder why a girl applying, at 17 or 18 years of age, for a
clerk-typist job in a governmental agency, must be subjected to this
type of probing. I am wondering w4hether or not we are not defeat-
mgg our purpose:
A typist or a plumber and the various people, for instance, in
NSA, who are subjected to this type of polygraph questioning, they
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4 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
do not make policy. It is sort of paradoxical to me that the people
at the top of these agencies are not subjected to this. Yet, we have
people right out of high school who must subject themselves to this
sort of questioning.
This girl, among other things, was asked-and I have four daugh-
ters and I know how outraged I would be if they were subjected
to this line of questioning if she were a homosexual. This type
of questioning, this line of probing it seems to me, goes far beyond
the need or intent to know whether or not a girl is qualified to take
a GS-2 position in the U.S. Government.
This is but one of the many examples that have come to my atten-
tion. I think that this is one of the things that this subcommittee
is concerned with. When you consider the appalling responsibility
that an operator assumes in being judge, jury, and investigator, and
interrogator of his fellow men and how he may influence this man's
destiny, I think you will agree that the time is at hand to make sure
that the operator is at least qualified and measures up to some
standards, overall standards, set by the U.S. Government.
Be mindful that there are now no standards other than those set by
the agencies using the polygraph, and in some cases, it appears that
not even a high school diploma is required. With a very grave re-
sponsibility in evaluation that the polygraph operator assumes, this
could possibly become part of the permanent record of the individual
tested.
The old Christian concept of rehabilitation and starting life anew
is no longer probable since a minor or major transgression must be
constantly brought up for consideration and is neither forgotten nor
forgiven even, no matter how long it may be since it occurred or how
straight the path since has been traveled.
I have in mind here an example of this as part of the permanent
record. An individual fills out a test for NSA. This should be a
very confidential and private matter. It turns out later on that for
some indiscretion in his youth he evidently did not get the job.
Yet, it has been brought to my attention that a year later he applies
for a job in the Bureau of Census. There is no great security aspect
in the Bureau of the Census. Yet this transcript appears for this man
as he applies for a nonsensitive position. So no matter what we may
say, the fact is that there is a very great probability of this transcript
or the evaluation turning up at some later date in another area of our
Government.
The investigation has led to the calling of this subcommittee hear-
ing and has revealed some rather significant facts with respect to
polygraphs by Government agencies. It shows that there is no Gov-
ernment-wide policy governing the use of the polygraph. There is
no established standard for operators. There are no specifications,
no overall specifications, for the machines, and no criteria for firms
with which the Government may contract for polygraph services.
If we are concerned with an increasing tendency to invade the
privacy of our homes through wire tap and other types of scientific
and electronic instruments, let us be doubly concerned with the wide-
spread use of these techniques that we speak of here today and these
instruments that may be used, and perhaps are being used, to invade
the privacy of a man's mind, which after all, is the most private of all
sanctuaries.
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So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and compliment you and your staff
and this subcommittee for the excellent preliminary job that they have
done, and I feel that you will render a great service to our Government
if through developing in these hearings we arrive at some legiti-
mate uses for the polygraph in the U.S. Government, and set some
:standards for its use, and set some qualifications for operators.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Moss. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
The Chair would like to observe that the witnesses present today
are an indication of the excellent cooperation the committee has re-
ceived from everyone concerned with the use of polygraphs. I have
been deeply impressed by the sincerity of those most deeply involved
in their use in seeing that appropriate standards are evolved.
As these gentlemen make their contribution to the committee, I
think it will become abundantly clear that we have many highly re-
sponsible persons engaged in this field, alert to its limitations, and
desirous of seeking improvement. I believe Mr. Monagan, that you
had some observations.
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, it is not exactly clear from Mr. Gal-
lagher's remarks to what extent these incidents relate to the polygraph,
although apparently some of them do. I would like to suggest that
the specific information that he has, the communications, and so forth,
be made available to the committee, so that the staff may determine
whether or not it is advisable to take further steps in investigating
these incidents.
Mr. Moss. We will consult with Mr. Gallagher for the specific docu-
mentation on that.
Mr. GALLAGHER. In reply, Mr. Chairman, all of the incidents that
I have mentioned relate directly to polygraph testing.
Mr. Moss. Will you gentlemen stand and be sworn?
Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give this subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
TESTIMONY OF FRED E. INBAU, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN E. REID, JOHN E. REID
& ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL. ; AND GEORGE LINDBERG, JOHN E.
REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL.
Mr. INBAU. I do.
Mr. REID. I do.
Mr. LINDBERG. I do.
Mr. Moss. Will you identify yourselves for the record?
Mr. INBAU. My name is Fred E. Inbau. I am professor of law at
Northwestern University.
Mr. REID. My name is John E. Reid, director of John E. Reid &.
Associates in Chicano Ill.
Mr.LINDBERG. 1Vly name is George W. Lindberg, associate director,
John E. Reid & Associates, Chicago.
Mr. Moss. The members of the panel have been given a series of
questions as a basis for their comments.
Mr. Kass, will you start the proceedin ?s at this point?
Mr. KASS. Mr. Inbau, could you tell the committee for the record
the part that the polygraph plays in the detection of deception.
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Mr. INBAU. The instrument itself, and that is what you are referring
to when you label it "polygraph," plays a rather minor role in the con-
duct of a lie detector or polygraph tests. There are several instru-
ments available commercially, some with few advantages over the
others, but almost any one of the polygraphs-and by that we mean
an instrument recording such things as respiration, pulse, blood pres-
sure, galvanic skin reflex, muscular movements, instruments of that
sort, not just one but a many tracing instrument-the instrument itself
does not reveal the lie.
There is no bell that sounds, no whistle goes off when a person lies.
It is merely an instrument which serves as a basis for a technique for
diagnosing deception. Consequently, the technique is no better than
the man who is making the diagnosis. Just as with any medical instru-
ment, it is of no value, in fact it may be a very dangerous thing in the
hands of someone who is not trained in the technique of making the
diagnosis.
This brings me to the point that I know you want answered in one
of these questions here, as to what kind of a man should be conducting
the test. The individual must be someone with a good educational
background, something comparable in our opinion to a college edu-
cation.
It isimplicit from what I just said he must be a person of intelli-
gence, and some degree of maturity. He also must be one that can
measure up to what Mr. Gallagher has just been insisting upon, and
I agree with him completely, someone who also has a sense of values
so that he is not only seeking to protect the public interest, the Gov-
ernment security, but who is also respectful of the rights of the
individual.
Someone who has less than these general qualifications I have just
outlined is much more likely to do what Mr. Gallagher said when he
referred to the 17-year-old oirl than someone who has the intelligence,
the educational back grounI, and the adequate training to utilize this
technique.
Not only must he have these basic qualifications, but in my judgment,
and I know Mr. Reid and Mr. Lindberg agree with me on this, he must
have had an adequate period of training under someone who is ex-
perienced and skilled in the technique. This is something that can-
not be acquired, in our judgment, by someone going to a school where
he is going to listen to lectures as a member of a group for a period
of a few weeks, learn how to take the instrument apart, put it back
together, run experimental tests on each other.
He must, in our judgment, have learned it my way of what we
may call an apprenticeship technique, working under the guidance
of someone who has a considerable volume of business of cases, con-
ducting cases himself under the supervision of a skillful examiner,
studying the records that this particular instructor may have avail-
able, and constantly reviewing the developments, and also observing
cases being conducted by this examiner and others who are experienced.
In our judgment only in this way can someone acquire the skill that
is required. I would like to go back, if I may momentarily, to a
point Mr. Gallagher made. In the technique as we are accustomed to
its use-and I refer there to Mr. Reid and his group and Mr. Lind-
berg-you don't do, Mr. Gallagher
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Mr. Moss. Pardon me just a moment. The Chair regrets that
the rules of the I-louse of Representatives as interpreted by the three
most recent Speakers, and the rules under which this committee must
operate, do not permit the taking of pictures during the time of an
active hearing.
The Chair will be willing to accommodate photographers at the
beginning or at the end of the hearing, but there shall be no taking
of pictures in this room in violation of the rules. It is not up to the
Chair to state whether he agrees with the rules, but he is bound to en-
force them.
You may continue.
Mr. INBAU. An examiner with the qualifications and the training
and skill that we have been trying to outline will avoid the sort of
things that Mr. Gallagher has mentioned. Taking a 17-year-old
girl and make an exploration into her sex and personal life to that
extent is not necessary in our judgment, in any sort of a security
operation.
There are times with the more mature people when an inquiry of
that sort may be highly appropriate. I have a feeling that not only
should we be mindful of the rights of the individual as prescribed in
the fourth and fifth amendment, but as Mr. Gallagher and all of you
gentlemen know, there is a preamble to the Constitution in which it
is stated that one of the purposes of it was to protect the public welfare
and insure domestic tranquility.
It seems to me that this technique has a very vital role to play in
governmental security operations. It can be used for that purpose
without infringing upon the rights of the individual to the extent
that the case related illustrates.
Also, as part of this technique, as Mr. Reid and his associates are
using it in Chicago, there is a degree of confidentiality that ought to
be part of the utilization of this technique. In other words, that
not only is the individual himself and his sensitivity protected to the
extent that is not required by the particular investigation, not only
must that sensitivity be protected, but also the confidentiality with
respect to various disclosures.
There is a practice among certain examiners in private industry
whereby they proceed to squeeze someone for something of an embar-
rassing nature, something by way of some indiscretion so it can be
reported to the employing agency, to indicate that this examiner knows
how to come up with something even though he may be very vague
as to whether this person is responsible for the thing that is under
particular inquiry. The technique in my judgment is a very valuable
investigative aid.
I think in view of the security measures that must be taken by
the Government, it is an indispensable investigative aid. But again,
I say that the agency using it must be respectful of the rights of the
individual. I don't think there is anything incompatible about this.
You can conduct the examinations very adequately without encounter-,
ing such objectionable practices or without utilizing such objectionable
practices as Mr. Gallagher has referred to.
Perhaps I have gone beyond answering this first question. I can
proceed, or make myself available for whatever questions the commit-
tee may have.
Mr. LASS. Mr. Reid, I would like to ask you at this point if you feel
that the polygraph testing technique is a scientific technique.
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Mr. REID. Mr. Kass, as we use it in our laboratory-and I am talk-
ing about technique as the professor stated here a short while ago-
the technique we use is a diagnostic technique wherein the lie detector
or the polygraph is used clearly and definitely without any interroga-
tive assistance.
The leads and the direction come from the examiner's interpretation
of the responses obtained, and the interrogation follows that with the
aim of obtaining a confession, if that is the aim.
So the instrument does stand in itself, together with the technique,
as a diagnostic instrument giving the examiner the leads as to what
points he should look for.
Mr. HARRY. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Hardy.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could inquire of Mr.
Inbau in connection with % ,statement he made right at the end, how
we safeguard this situation.
As I understood it, Doctor, you said in effect there is nothing incom-
patible with the use of the polygraph and protecting individual rights.
I realize those were not your words, but that is the way I interpreted
your statement a few moments ago.
Mr. INBAUU. I had reference particularly to the type of case that Mr.
Gallagher mentioned. Obviously, when anyone is subjected to this
test there is some invasion of privacy. Of course, one basic safeguard
against that is that it is not privacy.
upon an individual. It is a test
he will voluntarily submit himself to.
Mr. HARDY. The question of incompatibility, as I understand the
rest of your testimony, revolves around the competence:, the education,
the intelligence, maturity, and the sense of values of the person who
is administering the test. Is that the basis on which you determine
that the use of a polygraph is not incompatible with protecting the
rights of the individual?
Mr. INBAU. Yes.
Mr. HARDY. That. being the case, and I don't find any area of dis-
agreement on this thinkin, the possibility of actually arriving at
adequate protection of the' individual in our bureaucratic system is
difficult. So many of our procedures are no more equitable than the
people who are enforcing them.
The question of competence or maturity or having a sense of values
on the part. of people who administer these tests, it seems to me, is a
rather difficult thing to be sure of, is it not?
Mr. INBAU. That you do get this kind of set of qualifications?
Mr. HARDY. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. Yes, that is difficult. Let us face it, of the people who
are utilizing this device today, in my judgment about 80 -percent of
them are not measuring up to what standards we feel are required.
Mr. HARDY. Don't we have a pretty difficult job-and I recognize the
value of lie detectors in some activities that are tied to security-don't
we have an extremely difficult job to decide who is able to use one of
these things or give these tests on the basis of being completely objec-
tive, being able to submerge any personal ambitions? How do we do
that? Isn't the human element insuperable? Isn't that the ques-
tion?
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Mr. INBAU. I don't think so. In our book, Mr. Reid and I have out-
lined what we consider basic qualifications. It seems to me they are
thoroughly warranted. Government agencies would be thoroughly
warranted in establishing those as minimum standards.
Mr. HARDY. You can, undoubtedly, have basic qualifications insofar
as education is concerned, and insofar as an individual's IQ is con-
cerned, but how do you measure the moral fiber of an individual who is
operating one of these things? That is one of the things that is difficult
for me to understand. Isn't that the key to the whole thing?
Mr. INBAU. That is certainly part of it. Here again, I recognize that
perhaps of all of these factors that is one of the most elusive. We find
that true with judges, law professors, Congressmen, and everyone else.
Mr. HARDY. Unfortunately, we do. The judges when they come up
with an edict: It is pretty serious to an individual if the judges should
be biased or prejudiced. We Members of Congress, if we act on the
basis of prejudice don't stay in very long. People have a way of
getting rid of us and we haven't done too much damage. But where
you have an individual whose whole life can be messed up because some
operator of a polygraph had an ax to grind-that could be very
important.
Mr. INBAU. Don't you have some control, such as you have just out-
lined with respect to Congressmen? This individual can be removed.
from his assignment. I think this ought to be borne in mind, too. We
are always looking upon this technique as one that gets people in
trouble. Mr. Reid, in his work in Chicago, has gotten innocent peo-
ple who were caught in a web of circumstances out of trouble far more
often than lie has gotten guilty people into trouble.
I would like to give you, if I may, one example of that, because
it has an important bearing on this. An individual may be caught in a
web of circumstantial evidence by which he cannot extricate himself by
any of the conventional methods. This is one way in which to do it.
I would like to cite a recent experience of theirs about a year and
a half or 2 years ago, as I recall. A bank in Chicago was experiencing
a series of losses from the tellers funds. Every time the auditor came
in he found a few of these tellers short in their funds.
It happened with such frequency that the bank fired this group of
tellers and got new ones replacing them. The next time the auditor
came in, the same thing was happening. At this point the bank
employed the services of Mr. Reid to make some tests on the tellers
and he found out that these tellers were not responsible for the short-
ages, and he suggested that the auditor be asked to take a polygraph
test.
The auditor took it and he admitted he was the one who was taking
the money that was causing all these innocent people to be fired. He
was later prosecuted in the Federal court and I think he pleaded
guilty to the charge. Am I correct in that?
Mr. JoHN REBID. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. We should not lose sight of the fact that there are many
times when an innocent person is in a hopeless situation to establish
his innocence and this is one way to be done.
Mr. HARDY. I think I appreciate that. I don't want to get off your
line of thinking. In an organization as big as the Federal Govern-
ment, we all too often rely very heavily on mechanical yardsticks to
measure the human individual, and it is a little difficult to do.
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j~ USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
I can't think of any area of employment where it is more important
that we have an accurate measurement of an individual than of a
fellow who is going to run one of these polygraph machines. When
he runs his tests he can explore any avenue he chooses maybe his
maturity and education and intelligence lead him into some particular
area, he comes up with a finding and that goes into the subject's per-
sonal jacket and it stays in there. You don't get them out.
Mr. JOHN REm. Mr. Hardy, he is subjected to a polygraph test him-
self. I understand the Government does and we do it with our
examiners before we choose them. That should take care of some
of the integrity that we seek in the individual that may be subjected
to these standards.
Mr. HARDY. Is he subjected to a polygraph test with respect to the
test he has just conducted?
Mr. JOHN REm. He is tested prior to his employment in the Gov-
ernment and he is also tested prior to employment in my organization.
Mr. IIARDY. That might help for the time being and as it relates to a
particular situation.
Mr. JoHN REm. But the measurement is a lot greater than in the
choosing of other public officials when we choose polygraph examiners
in that manner. We are adding one additional thing. We are
not subjecting the employee to a technique that the examiner himself
was not subjected to.
Mr. HARDY. So you are going to determine his sense of values, his
sense of morality, his objectivity, in the beginning by giving him a
polygraph test and then you are going to know that is going to stand
up all the way through his performance. That is what bothers me
at this point.
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Hardy, that would be only one part of it. There is
no denying the fact that the selection of this examiner must be done
very carefully, and with this particular facet of his personality in
view. Also, we are suggesting here, at least we can suggest now, that
these, examiners ought not to be permitted just to roam around on
their own making these decisions all the time without some checkup
on them.
It seems to me the head of the particular agency, or someone acting
on his behalf should keep a close control and watch on the operations
of these people. If he finds one who develops some sadistic tendencies
or gets off balance in some other way, it seems to me that he ought to
be subjected to removal. That should not be much more difficult here
than in other governmental functions where you have people in very
sensitive positions making these very sensitive decisions. I can con-
ceive of someone in the State Department or any other branch of the
Government
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, may I interject before we get off
on another tangent?
Mr. Moss. Mr. Gallagher, the Chair regrets-he is very pleased to
have you sit with the committee and will. afford the maximum oppor-
tunity within the rules for you to participate-he cannot recognize
you for questions.
Mr. GALLAGHER. It was my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that as
a member of the Government Operations Committee that I would be
allowed to sit with this committee and participate as a member. I
was in the process of following up a question of Mr. Hardy.
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Mr. Moss. It would have to be by unanimous consent. The Chair
is not attempting to restrict the gentleman.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I ask unanimous consent.
Mr. HARDY. May I comment on this because I am pleased that Mr.
Gallagher is participating. I have been through some recent ex-
periences of this same nature. I would be glad for him to follow up
on my questions. In fact, I am ready to yield the floor.
On this question of permitting other members of the committee to
interrogate witnesses during a subcommittee hearing, I would have
some reservations about the wisdom of doing it because of the prob-
lems which might be created. I would say this, that if Mr. Gallagher
has specific questions, I am sure that any member of the committee
would be glad to pursue them on his behalf.
Mr. Moss. There is a unanimous-consent request.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I would have to object to that. I am
sorry. There is nothing personal about it at all, but I think from a
procedural standpoint, it would notbe desirable.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement. I am a
member of the Government Operations Committee and a member of
the Foreign Affairs Committee. Every time we invite other Members
of Congress to sit in we allow them the various courtesies. It was as
a result of my interest that this committee is meeting here today.
It would seem to me if we are just going to casually allow these
witnesses to present their views, then I don't believe that the commit-
tee is following the mandate of Chairman Dawson who suggested that
we get into this subject. If we are just going to go through a pro
forma performance here today, and if Mr. Hardy feels that there
should be no questioning, I am not quite sure what the purpose of the
hearing will be.
Mr. Moss. The Chair is going to have to terminate any discussion
or disagreement between the members. The Chair did not write the
rules under which the committee operates. The Chair is bound to
enforce those rules and those rules are very specific and they are
specific for a very significant reason.
In the course of any hearing where you have witnesses, there could
be a point at which you are forced to instruct the witness to respond.
Under those conditions, it would have to be a question by a member
duly appointed., to the subcommittee. Also, the time limitations re-
quire that the members of the subcommittee be accorded the fullest of
opportunity to explore their questions.
As Mr. Hardy has indicated, I think any member of the subcommit-
tee would be willing to pursue your questions. The Chair will, at the
beginning of a session or at the end, attempt to accommodate the
gentleman, but within the limitations imposed on him by the rules he
has no alternative where unanimous consent has been withheld.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, may I make just one other observation.
I have recently been through this same problem in another committee.
I regret to object, but I think in the interest of protecting the com-
mittee against further problems, it is the only thing to do. I have no
objection at all to Mr. Gallagher pursuing any subject he wants to
pursue, but I think if we start that we will be in trouble from now on.
Mr. GALLAGHER. I did ask unanimous consent.
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Mr. HARDY. I understand you did, and I objected because I think
every member of the committee ought to object. If the other members
of the committee want to pursue it in that manner, I have no objection,,
Mr. Chairman, to absenting myself.
Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will continue in regular order.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief observation?
Mr. Moss. Mr. Griffin.
Mr. GRIFFIN. All of us have before us a list of questions which the
staff has prepared, and we have some very able witnesses here today
who shall, as I understand, present some type of an educational forum..
I know I come to the hearings with some preconceived ideas and some
definite opinions, but I think it would be well if all of us could with-
hold opinions and restrain ourselves in asking questions until the ques-
tions prepared by the staff have been discussed by the panel. It is just.
a suggestion. Our time is short. I would like very much to hear what
these people have to say.
Mr. Moss. I think it is an excellent suggestion, one that the Chair
concurs. Before we proceed with the next question or continue the
discussion, I would like to swear Mr. Cleve Backster of the School of
Lie Detection, of New York.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this
subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
TESTIMONY OF CLEVE BACKSTER, BACKSTER SCHOOL OF LIE
DETECTION, NEW YORK, N.Y.
Mr. BACIKSTER. I do.
Mr. Moss. Will you identify yourself for the record.
Mr. BAC'KSTPR. My name is Cleve Backster, New York City.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Kass, will you continue?
Mr. KASS. Mr. Reid, will you expand on your comment that the poly-
graph is a diagnostic technique.
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes. The polygraph is one where, in our tech-
nique the questions are read to the subject beforehand. If there is
an, objection to the questions, the person could object to them at that
point. They are discussed and understood by the subject and they
are unambiguous so that they don't have any two-way answers. It
is a comparison of responses.
It is a scientific evaluation of the different reactions of the subject.
We compare relevant questions with control-type questions, and we.
establish a normal by using known-truth questions. An examination
consists of several tests and there are only about nine questions in each
test. There are at least five tests that we make our evaluation from.
So, the comparison of the responses is what indicates to us that the
subject is either withholding information from the examiner or is
telling the truth. The control question technique was developed b-T
myself in 1947, and introduces a lie in the polygraph chart to estab-
lish a yardstick so that we would know what the reactions really mean.
If the person responds to this control lie to a greater extent than he
does to the actual questions under investigation, we assume and estab-
lish the subject is telling the truth at that point. If the reverse is
true, we state that he is not telling the truth at that point.
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Mr. LINDmirG. I might add, if I could, just by putting the diagnostic
concept of a polygraph test in its proper perspective, our analysis of
the polygraph field as it exists today would make it appear that there
are basically two concepts abroad in the land as to the methodology
and the purpose of a polygraph test.
For the sake of accuracy and brevity, I will just read the few lines
I have prepared on this point by way of definition so that we under-
stand. The interrogative concept, which is the opposing concept, is
one wherein the test is used primarily to induce a confession.
This procedure is very common among examiners who only have
a few weeks training. This technique emphasizes the value of the
polygraph in obtaining confessions. Seldom, however, can its ad-
ocates clearly and reliably determine that a subject is either truth-
ful or deceptive unless he has obtained a confession from someone in
the case.
The diagnostic concept,, however, considers the polygraph procedure
to be primarily for determining truth and deception scientifically
through the course of several examinations without any earmarks of
traditional interrogations. Such a technique is capable of a decisive-
ness factor of better than 90 percent.
In other words, we can make decisions in better than 90 percent of
the cases tested, and an accuracy capability of less than 1 percent
error in those 95 percent. As a matter of record, I thought that might
be important.
If I might add one other point with regard to Mr. Gallagher's well
founded concern and that, of Mr. Hardy. The issues which are under,
taken during a security polygraph examination are no different than
they were before the advent of the polygraph, I presume, in Govern-
ment security clearances. That is, the same, roster of questions was
tolerated by the Government prior to the war and during the war,
that now exist.
The advent of the polygraph as a device to arrive at a more precise
determination is a secondary issue. The primary area would be to
delimit the scope of the inquiry which Federal agents are allowed to
discuss with a subject.
Mr. INIiAU. Not only allowed, but I presume in many instances this
kind of exploration is required. For instance, homosexuality in a
sensitive position, as Mr. Lindberg said. If this is the policy of the
agency to explore into this, presumably the polygraph examiner has
to do so, too.
Somewhere along the line it seems to me, you could make some sort
of delineation so that you would not run into the factor of subjecting a
girl right out of high school who is going to be a typist in a non-
sensitive position, to this kind of inquiry.
On the other hand, if someone is going to be put into an ultrasensi-
tive position, and is a mature individual-certainly by nature, beyond
the tender age of 17-it seems to me it might well be worth this sort
of inquiry, but it could be done in a sufficiently delicate fashion so that
it would not have the offensive tinge that it has had, I am sure, in
times past in certain situations.
Some years ago, I remember when Senator Morse became very
much incensed, and rightly so, to the use of what was then known as
a personal embarrassing question where the individual in a case that
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14 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
had nothing to do with the sex involvement, would be asked the ques-
tion that would provoke some shame on his part. It was very offensive
to people.
I wrote an article which was published in the Journal of Criminal
Law, Criminology and Police Science condemning this sort of prac-
tice. I think it is important to know that those of us who. have a
vital interest in this technique certainly share the views of some mem-
bers of the committee that you have to avoid this kind of an insulting
inquiry. But the test can be done without running that risk.
Mr. KASS. Does that mean that personal type questions would never
be asked?
Mr. INBAU. You may ask some. For instance, the control question
Mr. Reid refers to, where an individual is being questioned with
respect to the loss of $10,000, you ask him as part of a control, if he
ever had stolen anything in his life. You get this individual in a
position where he will somewhere along the line, say "no" and either
it will be a lie or he will be concerned about the complete truthfulness
of his answer.
So, you have something there to use as a control for comparison
with what happens or what doesn't happen when you ask him about
the $10,000. So, you have to get into some of this. You can't com-
pletely avoid it. What I am saying is it can be done discreetly and
quite inoffensively.
Mr. JOHN REiD. The disclosure that the subject may make regarding
the control question is never made part of our report. That is for
our own evaluation.
Mr. INBAU. This may avoid the thing that Mr. Gallagher was con-
cerned about. For instance, in questioning someone about a partic-
ular incident of a very serious nature, you use something of the sort
I mentioned as a control, but if this individual then tells you "Yes, I
stole a bicycle as a kid, I stole from an employer I worked for during
the summertime when I was in school," that is not divulged to the em-
ploying agency.
The examiner keeps that to himself. He should. There is no rea-
son on earth in putting this sort of thing in an individual's record.
You want to know whether he is responsible for this particular in-
cident or not. If he is not, these other things become totally ir-
relevant.
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I hate to interrupt on that, but this
raises a question that seems to me is important to try to settle at this
point. You are speaking now of the employer not being advised of
this control question or the reaction to the control question. Do I
understand you correctly?
Mr. INSAU. The disclosures that the individual makes following
the test, or when he is asked before the test, "this is the question I am
going to ask you, have you ever stolen an thin in your life?" And
he says, "I stole a bicycle in high school and I stole $5 when I was
working for some company during the summertime." This is not
disclosed and made a part of the record.
Mr. HARDY. I don't understand the ground rules that are involved
here now, but I have a hard time understanding how you would have
this kind of a withholding by the operator of a polygraph in one of
the military establishments, for instance. I would doubt very much
that it can be withheld.
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Maybe what you are saying and maybe what I am understanding
is that the polygraph ought to be operated by somebody completely
independent of the chain of command.
Mr. INBAU. He may be responsible to someone in a higher position,
but it seems to me this is one of the ground rules that ought to be
laid down.
Mr. HARDY. That is real fine, but if you find any situation in the
military that is not susceptible to orders from the chain of command.
I don't know where you can find it, and I have been monkeying with
this subject for a long time.
Mr. INBAU. You are in a better position to judge than I am. All I
am saying is that if the military is going to use this particular tech-
nique, they ought to be willing to accept tTiis limitation.
Mr. HARDY. That is the problem that bothers me about this. If
you could maintain complete objectivity and separate the operation
of the polygraph from the administrative agency itself, you might
be getting somewhere. But even the inspector general is susceptible
to the chain of command.
Mr. LINDBERG. Mr. Hardy, if I might give you a suggestion. We
conduct polygraph examinations of Chicago policemen for the Chi-
cago Police Department. In each of those instances, the issues are
clearly defined. There is a delineated group .of questions which we, as
examiners, are responsible for giving our opinion about as to the sub-
ject's truthfulness.
We have never had an incident where we have been challenged for
violating the confidentiality of disclosures that a policeman may make
to us regarding some wronggdoing. It seems to me that your sug-
gestion that the examiners be responsible to only one authority and
not to the various agencies might be a good one.
In other words, a central pool of polygraph examiners.
Mr. HARDY. Don't misunderstand me. I don't feel I am in a posi-
tion to make such a suggestion. I might observe in the position you
outlined, you were not susceptible to the administrative control of
the people you were working for.
Mr. LINDBERG. Perhaps polygraph examiners should not be either.
Mr. INBAU. He regards the superintendent of police in Chicago, all
he wants to know when he sends these suspected policemen to Mr.
Reid's office is, "Is he guilty of this bribery or not?" If, in the course
of the testing, whether he committed this bribery, this individual
policeman tells about other things he has done, it is understood. and
this is one of the ground rules, that it is not going to be reported. It
is not going to get into this file.
Mr. HARDY. I didn't mean to get off the track, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. JouN REID. I think one thing should be clarified
Mr. GALLAGIIER. Mr. Chairman, may I breach the veil of silence for
a moment? I think Mr. Griffin had an excellent idea that we do
listen to the witnesses. However, Mr. Hardy raises these new lines
of questions and my name gets mentioned in the pursuit of this ques-
tioning, and I am wondering whether or not the veil will continue to
be imposed if a line of questioning begins at which my name has been
mentioned.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Gallagher, I will have to rule that out of order. The
committee will be pleased to meet in executive session for a discussion
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of this issue-refer it to the chairman of the full committee--but this
is not the forum, this is not the time for this discussion to continue.
The Chair is not going to permit it to continue. The counsel will
continue in order.
Mr. GALLAGHER. May I ask one more question, please?
Mr. Moss. No, sir.
Mr. GALLAGHER. May I submit a series of questions that I would
like to have the Chair ask?
Mr. Moss. You may discuss the matter with the Chair. We will
proceed now in regular order.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Fine.
Mr. KASS. What qualifications and abilities should a polygraph
examiner have, Mr. Backster?
Mr. BACKSTER. As to the qualifications, I feel like an orphan. The
qualifications that a polygraph examiner should have are those that
involve an ability to create rapport with the subject, to make himself
understood, and not resented by the subject by his very exposure to
him, as much investigative experience as possible; of course, inter-
rogation experience in light of what we have said before.
We have talked of investigative experience. We have talked of the
fact that he must have interrogation capability or aptitude, where
he doesn't create resentment in the person that he is talking with. He
must have no physical attributes that would hamper his contact
with the subject, such as stuttering and thino-s which cause false emo-
tionality, perhaps to show up on the charts curing an examination.
He should have a desire to want to become a competent polygraph
examiner and enter deeply into this field that is far beyond the call of
duty, so to speak, of the 40-hour week or the 8-hour day, because
he will find himself in predicaments that do require many more hours
than that, because he cannot stop in the middle of a dilemma or ex-
amination. If he were to stop, he would lose the effective necessary of
the situation.
These are a few. There are many characteristics. I think this is
a little opinionated as to the individual who is analyzing the situation.
ment ? Mr. LASS. Mr. Reid, can an individual beat a polygraph instru-
Mr. JOHN REID. Actually, Mr. Kass, the more effort he makes to beat
the polygraph, the more he beats himself. If he makes overt move-
ments or secretive movements, we are able to detect that. We have now
learned to evaluate those as deception points. We have proven these
to be deception points by our interrogation and confession later.
Mr. KASS. Therefore, it is never possible to beat the instrument?
Mr. JoFIN RED. When the subject makes the effort to beat it. I don't
believe he can. But if the subject is of a low mentality, there is a good
possibility that he may very well show no response in a test whatso-
ever, and therefore, to an examiner who is leaning toward the innocent,
he may very well say that he is telling the truth.
However, in our technique, we feel that we cannot make an evalua-
tion where we cannot compare the responses between one and the other
and there are no responses whatsoever. We would relegate many of
these to the inconclusive class and would not make a determination
at all.
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Mr. KASS. You discussed the low mentality of an individual. Are
there any other mental or physical defects or characteristics of an in-
dividual which would render one incapable of taking a polygraph
test?
Mr. JoHHN REmD. Yes. Of course, with regard to anyone with a
mental or physical defect, there is a possibility that he may show an in-
definite reaction on the test or an emotional defect may also produce the
same results. The danger or where we could fail is to not recognize a
person who had a mental condition. We could make an error in that
regard.
Mr. KASS. Do you give all subjects who take a polygraph test any
type of intelligence examination?
Mr. JOHN RE ID. No, sir; not formally?
Mr. KASS. IIow do you recognize their mental defects?
Mr. JOHN RE, ID. We spend 20 to 25 minutes with the subject prior to
his test. We evaluate the speed with which he answers the inquiries
that are not delegated for deception purposes but to determine his
mental capacity. If he is talking completely strange to the questions
asked, we suspect there might be something wrong.
If a person appears to answer these questions properly, and he
reacts to a direct question in a manner that indicates he probably has
some uneasiness about it, or a misunderstanding about the questi on, we
certainly feel that roan is mentally capable of taking the test. I think
without formal aptitude tests we do, in the pretest interview, ade-
quately learn this point.
Mr. KASS. You stated about bodily movements. In other words, you
can detect all bodily movement that the individual subject is making?
Mr. JOIIN REID. Yes. We have an instrument in our laboratory that
I hold the patents to, that records all movements that the subject makes.
Any pressures that he applies on his thighs or arms or pushing down*
his arms, that could affect or change the test record is recorded. We
evaluate these in terms of deception afterward.
Mr. KASS. A recent study spoke about tensing or wiggling one's
toes. Would this affect the polygraph chart?
Mr. JOHN RE, ID. It would not affect it particularly because we estab-
lish the blood pressure normal to start out with. If we note that the
tensing of the toes or some tensing of the muscles has been entertained,
? the blood pressure record would start at a higher rate and, therefore, we
would suspect something wrong, and we would insist on his relaxing.
Mr. LiNDBEEG. I might supplement that, Mr. Kass, by suggesting
that guilty subjects, based on the review of our work, adopt one of two
methods of getting through a, lie detector test. They either sit very
quietly and cooperate and they are detected through emotional re-
sponses, or they make defensive efforts, such as the muscular move-
ments that you are referring to, so as to, you might say, "tilt" the
machine. This is probably the more primitive method of beating the
test. The value of the movement recorders is very important in that
detection.
Mr. KASS. Can you test a person secretly? In other words, where
he doesn't know that he is being tested.
Mr. LINDBERG. We believe not.
Mr. KASS. Why not?
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Mr. LINDBERG. Because the subject is not under the same situation,
for example, that a witness is in when he is on the witness stand;
namely, a compulsion to tell the truth. On the witness stand, the laws
of perjury are the compulsion, and in the lie detector environment it
is the fear of detection or concern about detection that conditions the
subject to respond during a polygraph test.
Obviously, the innocent person does not have these fears, or at least
such apprehension to induce a disturbance on the polygraph record.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster.
Mr. BAoKSPER. Yes, Mr. Kass. On this last point that we left sud-
denly, can movement distort the records or can movement cause the
person to beat the polygraph. There is an important factor which I
think needs to be emphasized here, that the lack of response and not the
presence of response is the dramatic and impressive thing in chart
interpretations.
In the technique that we are talking of now, Mr. Reid's technique,
and my technique, which is similar, and is based completely on the two
elements of Mr. Reid's teclmique; namely, a question to stimulate
the innocent and a question to stimulate the guilty. This person
should respond to one or the other of these two questions, but the
lack of response on the relevant question, and the presence of response
on the question to stimulate the innocent individual, means that the
person must go through the relevant questions showing no response.
Many people can create response in different ways. But we are not
impressed by the presence of response. I know of no way to create a
lack of response when a response should be present. So if we are
impressed by lack of response rather than presence, I think we have
something. In fact, research has certainly shown that.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Inbau, if a person doesn't have any faith in the
polygraph, if he doesn't feel it is very accurate or feels it is not com-
pletely infallible, will the polygraph still produce the desired results?
Mr. INBAU. He has got to have some fear of having his lies detected
by this technique. He has to have some respect for it. That is why,
as Mr. Reid pointed out before, you take an individual who is unin-
telli ent and uneducated, he may not appreciate the fact that when he
lies,he may get some internal disturbances. He may be an individual
who by reason of his cultural background or what have you, just may
not have any sort of internal disturbances.
It is a person like that who is most likely to go through a test with-
out having his guilt detected. Although in this pretest interview that
Mr. Reid described, and general observations of him, and you can
conduct some controls on him, you know he is this kind of individual
and very likely you will report him as indefinte rather than as telling
the truth or lying.
So, there is some built-in control in the technique to safeguard
against this. But more specifically, in answer to your question, if the
individual doesn't have this respect for the technique, respect for the
examiner, he will not be responsive. This can be created in the pre-
test interview with the individual.
You can do it with the running of a card test, which is part of the
Reid technique. It is the second in a series of tests. So along the
line, you will stimulate a response with respect to the control questions
in the innocent and stimulate a response in the guilty questions, the
relevant questions, with respect to the guilty.
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I think it ought to be pointed out here, this is not a matter of a one
test shot deal. You have at least three tests as part.of the entire ex-
amination. In some instances, even more beyond that. Because only-
I think these are Mr. Reid's figures, if I may use them-only in about
25 percent of the cases can you spot it in the first three tests, so that
anybody could appreciate the significance of the responses.
In about 65 percent of them, it calls for additional testing and skill
on the part of the individual who is conducting the test. I think
Mr. Lindberg may have something he may want to say by. way of sup-
plementation.
Mr. Moss. At that point, I would like to ask a couple of questions.
When you have referred to lack of response as indicative of low in
telligence or lack of education, could it also occur in a highly intel-
ligent, well-educated, but somewhat amoral person?
Mr. INBAII. He maybe immoral.
Mr. Moss. Amoral.
Mr. INBAU. Or amoral, about a particular thing, but at the same
time, he has some concern about being caught at it.
Mr. Moss. What happens about the highly nervous person who per-
haps has extremely rigid standards. Perhaps a very severe guilt
complex?
Mr. INBAU. I would like to refer that question to Mr. Lindberg.
I think he will have a satisfactory answer, Mr. Moss.
Mr. LINDBERO. The apprehensive or overly nervous subject is prob-
ably our best subject by reason of the fact that the control questions
are even measurably more significant to him if he is innocent on the
relevant issues than they would be on the average low intelligence
person.
In other words, we would expect a more dramatic reaction on the
control question if he was telling the truth on the issue question or
the hot question, as we refer to it. So he is our best subject, the high-
strung person.
Mr. BACIcSTER. May I comment on the nervous person point? Ner-
vousness as a condition shows up in a pattern. In other words, a set
distortion on the charts. A uniform distortion. A distortion, yes,
but in a uniform sense throughout the chart. We will utilize that
as somewhat of a norm and will look for deviation up and beyond this
usual distortion pattern that we are getting. It is no great problem
because everyone is nervous that takes the, test. They always have
been and always will be, very likely. The very first' thing we had
to do is circumvent any problems created by nervousness alone.
Mr. Moss. Now, what you gentlemen are setting forth here is your
views as to the minimums required. You indicated, Mr. Inbau, that
at least three examinations are required, so you are not normally rely-
ing on just one run through a polygraph.
Mr. INBAU. Three tests as part of the examination. They can be
at the same time interval.
Mr. Moss. So what you are really spelling out are certain minimums
in procedures.
Mr. LINDBERO. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reid, you have a patent on an added machine that
detects all bodily movements?
Mr. Joan REm. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Moss. Do you feel that this type of additional-it really is an
expansion of the polygraph, you are adding more graphs and more
readings
Mr. JOHN REm. That is right, sir.
Mr. Moss. That this is essential to a more careful diagnosis, a more
meaningful diagnosis?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. How widely are these machines used in the area of con-
cern to this committee, the Government of the United States?
Mr. JOHN REID. I think they are hardly used at all. Our instrument
is not used in the Government at all.
Mr. Moss. Then the question of adequacies of methodology in Gov-
ernment and adequacies of equipment would automatically arise if
you feel that there is a need for this additional type of measurement?
Mr. JoHN REID. Yes, sir.
Mr. INRAU. I think in all fairness, it can be said that you can detect
some of this, at least safeguard against it, without necessarily using
this particular device.
Mr. LiNDBERG. This instrument makes a permanent record of that
effort. That is the important thing.
Mr. Joz3N REm. I agree with Mr. Inbau that it is not necessary or
absolutely necessary in all cases. But it is the cases where the secret
muscular movements are applied that is the most significant to us and
that is where it is the most important.
Mr. Moss. And this is the element that is ordinarily lacking in
Government testing?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes, sir.
Mr. INRAU. I was asking Mr. Reid a question here. I thought I
knew the answer to it. I am sure that the mere fact that he patented
this wouldn't mean that he wouldn't want the Government to have it,
even perhaps with their own devices and so on. I think in all fair-
ness, he doesn't stand here to tell you
Mr. Moss. I don't want it inferred that this is being held tightly as
a monopoly in the office of John Reid & Associates.
Mr. LASS. Mr. Reid, if the subject is so convinced that the instru-
ment is infallible, is it not possible that he will resign himself and
thus in effect, cease to be excited by the polygraph exam and there-
fore., there will be no response?
Mr. INBAU. That is a possibility. That is pretty rare. Sometimes
you find on the third test after you have run him on the so-called card
test, he knows or he assumes it is working on him, he may then be
resigned to the fact that lie is guilty and on the third test you may
not find any response. It is possible, but it is a very rare occurrence.
Mr. LINDRERG. In the majority of situations that would be contrary
to human nature. There is always the instinct for self-help and
preservation. We find in the majority of the cases a guilty subject
becomes more responsive as the test proceeds.
Mr. Moss. You are dealing here with physiological and psychologi-
cal answers. The graphs themselves are physiological readings ; are
they not?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. The physical condition of a person, what significance
has this in taking these physiological readings and interpreting them
as evidence of guilt or innocence?
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Mr. REID. It is most important that the person is in a reasonably
proper physical condition at the time they take the test. They can't
be overinterrogated. They have to have a sufficient amount of sleep
the night before, and a number of items. I recall of a sheriff bringing
a subject in to me for a test one time, just to make the point, where he
and two others had broken out of the jail.
One man was shot on the way out and killed. The other roan was
captured. The third man that I finally got as a. test subject was
brought to me. It was after he had been on the run for 24 hours and
they had pulled him out of a sewer. He was hanging by his hands,
suspended in a sewer.
They brought him in. I think they had washed him out of the
sewer. They shot a lot of water at him and drove him out of the
sewer. He came, in almost that condition, for the test. I asked the
sheriff if the man had anything to eat. He said, "I want to tell you
something. This guy hasn't had anything to eat. He has not been
able to go to the bathroom," and he said, "He hasn't had any sleep."
He said, "He is in perfect condition for your test." It kind of sur-
prised him that I requested the prisoner be sent out, given a good meal,
and a 24-hour rest and then had him brought in for a test.
Mr. Moss. In our society today there is a very widespread use of
antibiotics and tranquilizers. What effect have these medications
on the subject of a test?
Mr. JOHN REID. Do you mind if I answer this, because we have some
secret information regarding a particular case that we handled. It is
for a certain group that we cannot disclose as to what happened. It
came to our attention, after examining 80 subjects, that 75 of these
men took tranquilizers prior to our test.
They made it a procedure before the test started. They would have
to go to the bathroom and take some of these tranquilizers. They
came back. We had the most significant responses from these subjects.
They were responding greater to our technique than the ones that
didn't take tranquilizers, because all they did was better condition
themselves for the test and fear of being caught regarding their
deception.
Mr. LINDBERG. They were all verified later.
Mr. Joi-iN REID. They were all verified guilty later.
Mr. Moss. There are many types of tranquilizers.
Mr. JotiN REID. There are. I think from our investigation, from the
pharmacology department at Northwestern University, in order for
a tranquilizer to affect a subject and assist him in the test that he
would have to take so much of it that he would be asleep. We have
had such individuals in our laboratory where when they were left
alone in the room, they were slapping themselves in the face and trying
to keep awake, so they would be ready for the test, and when the test
started they almost fall out of the chair. So we can recognize that
trouble.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Inbau, is it possible to review a polygraph examiner's
methods of operation?
Mr. INBAU. His general methods of operation? You mean appraise
them or review his case?
Mr. KASS. Perhaps review his case in each situation.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. INBAU. That is a pretty risky procedure. Perhaps Mr. Lind-
berg could give you a better answer.
T. LINDBERG. I think the answer is "Yes," if the examiner doing the
reviewing was trained in the same school of thought regarding poly-
graph tests. This is a very common thing-we do it as a practical
matter with our 10 examiners on an everyday basis. However, just
as cardiologists, neurologists, radiologists and these people in the
medical profession have difficulty reading each others records, if they
were schooled in different techniques, so also, polygraph examiners
suffer that same limitation.
If the reviewer is versed in the technique that the particular ex-
aminer is using, there is no reason why he could not review the ex-
aminer's work and arrive at the same conclusion.
Mr. INBAU. Just to supplement that, for instance, in the Reid
technique, there is what is called a stimulation procedure between test-
ing. In looking at a record on the third test, if you didn't know what
preceded it between the second and the third, and the first and the card
test, you would be perhaps coming up with some false appraisal of it
because it makes a big difference what may have preceded it in the
course of the conditioning prior to the third test.
In other words, what Mr. Lindberg is saying is that he could ap-
praise a record of Mr. Reid and vice versa, but someone else using a
different test procedure, I don't think they want to make an inter-
pretation from what charts he shows up with.
Mr. KASS. In other words, in many cases the examiner is on his own
in making a determination of deception or no deception and actions
can be taken as a result of this.
Mr. INBAU. Yes ; I think that is true.
Mr. KASS. Without any review or safeguard for the polygraph
subject.
Mr. INAU. The safeguards that would be meaningful would have
to be of another nature and not this case-by-case appraisal. I think
the only real safeguard is that you will have to get somebody who has
the required skill and these other attributes we have been talking about,
and then just keep check to be sure that he is utilizing the proper proce-
dures and that his personality has not become warped somewhere along
the line, and things of that sort. I think that is the only safeguard you
really have.
Mr. JOHN REID. I think, too, Mr. Kass, that there are about 25 per-
cent of the polygraph tests that practically anyone with some training
can interpret, but 65 percent of these charts require the greatest ability
to interpret. Sixty-five percent of them require certain additional
techniques that Mr. Inbau referred to in making his comments before.
This 65 percent of them has to be properly developed in order for
interpretation to be made.
Mr. INBAU. I think one factor that must be recognized here is that
the less skill an individual has in this, the more he is inclined to use
this as an interrogation prop. In other words, use the polygraph as
an interrogation prop. This is why, I think you run into so many
Hof these instances of abusive practices, the insult to the individual
and so on.
The polygraph or lie detector test itself is one in which the examiner
is able, when he is through with these series of tests, to say, and with
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considerable assurance and a high degree of accuracy, this individual
is lying or telling the truth without having interrogated him.
But if a person is not utilizing the proper technique, he will be in-
clined either before or after the test, to start interrogating everybody
on the assumption he is guilty and only report those guilty who con-
fess to him. That is not polygraph or lie detector testing as we view
it.
Mr. REUSE. May I ask a question at this point?
Mr. Moss. Certainly.
Mr. REUSE. Lying about what? Lying about the subject matter
of the inquiry or lying about something else?
Mr. INBAU. Lying about the particular matter under investigation.
If it is a preemployment screening device, then your objective has a
broader base than in an isolated case where you want to find out
whether this individual did or did not do this particular thing of
which he is suspected or accused.
Mr. REUss. I guess I should ask the chairman, I have a. whole series
of questions concerning m.y blank areas on the polygraph. They
into two categories. First, what is the real record of success of the
polygraph in showing the guilty, guilty and the innocent, innocent.
There have been assertions made about it but I would like to explore
that. The second major area of inquiry I would have would be what
do people do with the results of polygraph tests? What do the results
look like? What does the examiner say about them and what uses
should be made of them?
I don't want to interrupt counsel, but certainly if this inquiry is
to have any meaning, we have to bear on those two questions.
Mr. Moss. The hearing this morning is primarily for the purpose
of giving the subcommittee the benefit of the knowledge of the gen-
tlemen before us, who are among the most actively engaged in this
field in the Nation. They are recognized as authorities in using and
the use of the polygraph. This is a part of a series of hearings where
we hope to develop all facets of opinion on this. So those questions
you have which would appropriately be directed to these gentlemen,
we want to give you full opportunity to ask them.
However, the committee counsel has developed a line of questions
submitted so that we would have full response on them, and it would
be my hope that we would conclude that and then open it for the
committee members questions. I know I have quite a series. I think
all members will have.
Mr. REUss. That is entirely agreeable to me.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster, would you briefly, without going into all
of the techniques in here, explain the question of review which I think
you were going to address yourself to?
Mr. BAOKSTER. Yes. You mean review of the charts themselves or
review of another person's charts?
Mr. KASS. Another person's charts. Is it possible to review the
polygraph technique so that one individual examiner does not make
a decision which then is applicable without anyone checking or review-
in or supervising him?
Mr. BAOKSTER. Where a standardized system or approach is used,
which certainly should be the case within the same agency and cer-
tainly one of the things which may be accomplished as a result of
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these hearings, perhaps a standardization among all agencies in the
administration of a polygraph examination, is to avoid the saying,
which for years we have heard that one examiner should not examine
another examiner's charts or even look at another examiner's charts.
There is no reason in the world why he should not evaluate another
examiner's charts. My answer to those people is, What are you try-
ing to hide? If the same technique or a very similar technique is used
and the same safeguards and a coded symbol system to indicate the
environmental circumstances under which the tests were administed,
then the other examiner has just as much of an opportunity to recreate
the situation under which the test was given as does the original ex-
aminer who, after his memory may have failed him 6 months later
and perhaps dozens or hundreds of cases later, used his same system
to renew his knowledge of those circumstances that were involved. So
it seems to be a question of standardization. There is no reason in the
world why a person should not inspect another person's charts or
review them. Every test I run is run on that basis. With the client's
consent any three experts who are not motivated in my regard or in
regard to the case, are free to go into each chart and see exactly how
I arrived at the determination. It should be there.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Lindberg, would polygraph charts reflect the same
responses where an actual crime or other type of offense has occurred
and in a hypothetical situation which is merely created for the poly-
graph testing procedure?
Mr. LINDBERG. The answer to the question would not be that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to simulate a situation upon which poly-
graph tests could be profitably, so to speak, conducted afterward.
For example, to say to a man, we are going to do some research and
what we would like to do is have you lie about something during the
test. We are going to see how our new technique works on this simu-
lated or hypothetical deception. The experience of the field generally,
and one of the reasons why universities have had so much difficulty in
doing research in vacuo, so to s eak, is the fact that they do not have
the real live case situation. To the answer is that it is difficult to
simulate the hypothetical case.
Mr. Knss. What about for training situations?
Mr. LiNDBERG. Even for training. Other than for the purpose of
giving the examiner or the trainee procedural instruction. It might
be all right for that purpose. But not for the purpose of actually
arriving at a decision of truth and deception. He would have to
participate in the actual case environment, just as a surgeon does or
an intern who has taken a'(-year residency in surgery.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Inbau, could you explain what is meant by a single
reaction lie detector.
Mr. INBATJ. I think what you have in mind is a so-called lie detector
which consists of only one unit, galvanic skin reflex. It has been our
experience over the years that used alone it is practically valueless in
cases at large. It is the least reliable indicator of any on the polygraph
and to rely upon that one alone is just as foolhardy an undertaking
in my judgment. I understand one of the Federal agencies does it.
I think it has been a mistake over the years to rely on it, if what you
are seeking is to determine whether the person is lying or telling the
truth. If you are using it as an interrogation gimmick you could use
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that or a mimeograph machine or anything to make the subject be-
lieve that this is detecting his lies. If what you are trying to do is
detect deception and determine whether the person is lying or telling
the truth, you need something more than a single unit, this so-called
galvanic skin reflex.
Mr. KASS. Could you briefly explain for the record what galvanic
skin reflex means?
Mr. INBAU. I will defer to Mr. Lindberg.
Mr. LINDBERG. Simply stated, the galvanic skin reflex works on the
Wheatstone Bridge principle, which to those who have studied phys-
ics means it is an imperceptible current passed between two electrodes
on the subject's skin. It has been demonstrated under certain condi-
tions when the subject is under stress the potential of his skin, the
electrical conductivity of his skin, fluctuates apparently in relation to
the amount of stress. So the examiner simply watches a needle
to determine or to observe these fluctuations and the amount of current
going between one electrode to the other one.
The subject cannot feel this and there is no danger involved in it.
It is an unreliable criterion used by itself in determining truth and
deception.
Mr. INBAU. Experimentally you can get some very good results.
Mr. KASS. And in the field?
Mr. INBAU. In actual criminal cases it is by far the least helpful of
all of these physiolo .cal recordings.
Mr. JoriN Run. Several years ago, Mr. Kass, we made a study of
where we took 1,500 cases and evaluated the GSR responses and half-
way through we believed that the instrument was working just the
opposite of what we expected it to do and there were no responses on
the guilty and there were responses on the innocent.
We thought maybe we had arrived at something, so for the next
half we threw the whole study upside down and it did not come
through in the same manner.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster.
Mr. BACIcSTER. May I inject one point in defense of galvanic skin
response. My experience has not been that of Mr. Reid when the
technique structure in which it is utilized is actually groomed for
the nature of the response itself. My galvanic skin response tracings
have had direct correlation with the truth of deception of the target
issue as related to an arousal on the GSR or the tracings have been
nonproductive. But never in the opposite direction. I must say I
have never experienced that. I have specialized in GSR usage for
years.
Mr. INBAU. I think you would agree that you would not want to
rely upon that alone.
Mr. BACKSTER. I think that we should not rely on any one indite
alone but have one reenforce each of the other two. If we have all
three working for us, fine. On the law of averages, one of the indices
will not be producing. Should it be galvanic response at the time,
or breathing, or cardio tracing, we can still use the other two tracings
to arrive at a firm determination.
Mr. KASS. Where the monograph examiner has merely a galvanom-
eter, would you rely on this alone?
Mr. BACBSTER. Is this a recording or a visual galvanometer?
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. KASS. Either one.
Mr. BACKSTER. In the use of the visual, it is my opinion that he is
completely out of his mind and in the recorded he is partially with-
out sound reasoning.
Mr. KASS. I have just one further question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lindberg, should the results of a polygraph test be made known
to the subject?
Mr. LINDBERG. I would say that I think it is generally agreed that
except in cases where the giving of that information to the subject
would severely jeopardize the security of the country, which I pre-
sume there are some experts that could lay out those rules, our policy
has been and by law in the State of Illinois a subject is entitled to a
report or a copy of the report issued as a result of his polygraph
examination and the answer would be "Yes."
Mr. KASS. Mr. Chairman, may I submit for the record at this point.
a copy of the Illinois State law which Mr. Lindberg referred to?
Mr. Moss. Is there objection?
Hearing none, it will be inserted at this point in the record. (See
exhibit 1A, p. 123.)
Mr. KASS. I have no further questions.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Hardy.
Mr. HARDY. I have no questions.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Griffin.
Mr. GRIFFIN. How many different types or makes of polygraph
instruments are on the market?
Mr. JOHN REID. Fundamentally there are only two, two companies
that are making the instrument. The Stoelting Co. in Chicago, and the
Associated Research, which also is in Chicago. The Stoelting Co. also
manufactures my instrument.
Mr. GRIFFIN. You made reference that there are two or three differ-
ent responses that are measured in these two companies who produce
the instruments and they measure all of these.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. JOHN REm. Yes; the instruments are very similar.
Mr. GRIFFIN. How many different schools or established schools
are in existence for the training of polygraph operators?
Mr. JOHN REID. There are four that I know of. One of Mr. Back-
ster's in New York and Mr. Arthur in New York. That is two. There
is a Keeler Institute in Chicago. We have a training program and
Camp Gordon has a training program for the military.
Mr. GRIFFIN. To your knowledge, is the one at Camp Gordon the
only one that the Federal Government has?
Mr. LINDBERG. We understand that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation has an examiner whose job it is to train other agents in a 2-
week training course in the polygraph.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Now, on a somewhat unrelated matter to that line of
questioning, what about the use of hypnosis as a way of fooling the
lie detector? Has there been any research to see whether or not a per-
son could be put in a state of hypnosis ahead of time and could his
responses be different as a result of that?
Mr. LINDBERG. I think Professor Inbau, Mr. Reid, and I have specifi-
cally avoided getting involved in experiences involving hypnosis pri-
marily because we don't see a benefit in diagnosing truth and decep-
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tion. I think Mr. Backster has done work in that area or at least knows
something more about it than I do.
Mr. GRIrrIN. If you have anything that you want to add.
Mr. BACKSTER. I think it is untimely that we discuss that before
conclusions are reached. This is too much one-sample research re-
ported on already.
Mr. GRIFFIN. All right.
I have no further questions.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reuss.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman. And I should warn you gentlemen that
as of now I think the lie detector is largely "bunk" and I think I have
to be convinced about it, having observed it for some 30 years.
You have said that the lie detector is decisive in 95 percent of the
cases and that of those 95 percent of the cases it "goofs off" in only 1
percent.
Is that right?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Would you explain the data upon which this assertion
is based? This is the "nub of the coconut," it seems to me.
Mr. LINDBERG. It certainly is. The data upon which we arrive at
that conclusion-and by the way, the exact conclusion is that the tech-
nique properly conducted is "capable" of 95 percent or upward of 90
percent decisiveness and an accuracy factor of 1 percent error. We are
confronted with the same limitation in assessing our accuracy statistics
that that judges, juries, and other tries of facts, such as arbitrators are,
in determining whether or not they have been right in w number of
cases or wrong in x number of cases. We base our experience on a
group of samples such as a number of subjects and some in your States
where, I remember specifically, where 100 persons in a bank were tested,
99 of those persons polygraph records indicated that they did not steal
the amount in issue and the 100th subject tested did and subsequently a
confession by him verified that fact.
Compiling these statistics we arrive at an accuracy factor of less
than 1 percent error.
Mr. REUSS. That is fair enough if your tests show in the case put
that one bad guy has been stealing the money and 99 percent are in
nocent, and that .they all look the same. Ninety-nine don't show a
wobble on the polygraph and the 100th wobbles all over the lot and.
later by extraneous evidence he is established to be the sole thief, I
would concede that this is very persuasive evidence of the utility of the
polygraph.
However, show me the evidence. This is what this committee has to
examine. into as question No. 1.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, but I. think you would agree, Congressman, that
you are confronted with the same limitation that you would be if you
had to decide whether or not a neurologist or a group of neurologists
were correct, also. These people are also dealing with life and death
matters, so to speak.
Mr. REUSS. When we examine the neurological profession we will
give them an equal course of disputes but today it is lie detectors.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUSS. What evidence can you give the committee of the valid-,
ity of your findings that they work 99 times out of a hundred?
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Mr. INBAU. You will find a statistical presentation in the third edi-
tion of our book which Mr. Kass has involving a study of 5,000
subjects.
Mr. Reuss. I yield to Mr. Hardy.
Mr. HARDY. I appreciate that. This percentage figure that you have
used was based on statistics gathered with respect totests administered
by whom?
Mr. LINDBERG. We are referring only to our statistics, which recog-
nize the fact that there are examiners with far less impressive records,
so to speak. There are many who make decisions perhaps in only half
the cases. I am suggesting a capability, Congressman.
Mr. HARDY. That is what I wanted to be sure of. That is what I
understand. I am not sure the record correctly reflected that. You are
speaking now of tests conducted by John Reid & Associates, is that
correct?
Mr. LINDBERG. That is right.
Mr. HARDY. So this would not have any bearing on the accuracy
of tests conducted at random by others?
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. HARDY. That is what I wanted to establish.
Mr. LINDBERG. There are no industrywide statistics, so to speak.
Mr. HARDY. I wonder if there are any militarywide statistics.
Mr. Moss. We will have them before us.
Mr. HARDY. We will have them so we will have to try to develop
that.
Mr. JOHN REID. I think it should be understood, too, as Mr. Lindberg
stated, it is difficult in so many cases to establish the truthfulness or
verified truthfulness or verified lying of some individual in a case.
There are very few guilty subjects who, if we had made the mistake of
passing them, would volunteer that we were wrong. On the other
and, if we reported an innocent person as guilty, continuing police in-
vestigation would confirm this error.
Mr. HARDY. I wonder if Mr. Backster's experience would coincide
with this percentage evaluation.
Mr. BACKSTER. I will tell you my experience and then let you judge
whether it coincides. Actually, to me a statistic is a rather reverent
thing because it is something that you sometimes work for years to
arrive at. For that reason I avoid them in almost all situations and
talk only in terms of estimates. If I know that the complete validation
procedure has not been utilized, you can be quite sure that some one
may be waiting for you as they did in the Harvard Business Review
article. Some of you have had your statistics criticized before. It is
better not to give statistics but to talk in terms of what we are doing to
create proper groundwork from which good statistics can be accumu-
lated in the future rather than to attempt to justify alleged statistics
of the past.
This is what I have attempted to do in trying to coordinate a stand-
ardized approach through a note pack that would be used in each
examination of a specific nature. If you look in this note pack that I
have placed before you you will see that the groundwork within that
book, from beginning to end, is such that it lends itself very well to
statistics that can be gathered by the thousands from the difference of
examiners that have been schooled in this note pack usage.
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Mr. HARDY. Do I correctly interpret your statement to mean that
you are not sufficiently sure of your statistics to rely on them?
Mr. BAOKSTDR. If I don't have statistics I don't need to rely on
them. It is an estimate which I am relying on.
Mr. HARDY. You have to distinguish between estimates and statis-
tics in this case.
Mr. BACKSTER. I very sharply distinguish between them. I am
talking in terms of estimates and not statistics.
Mr. INBAU. I would like to make this statement, too, and it coin-
cides with what Mr. Backster said, and I am quite sure Mr. Reid and
Mr. Lindberg are not offering these figures as absolute. It is in the
nature of an estimate. By the very nature of things it has to be. I
would prefer to rely upon the statement that in competent hands
this technique works with a very high degree of accuracy and let it
go at that. It is a subject that is not suceptible to actual statistical
analyses and reliance if you want to talk in terms of whether it is 1
or 6 percent. Sato some extent I think that is true.
Mr. LINDBERG. For what it might be worth, Mr. Hardy, in the 30,000
cases conducted in our laboratory, Mr. Reid may want to correct this.
I don't recall nor do we have a record of an instance where we re-
ported a person mistakenly guilty. We feel we may well have passed
people who are innocent by reason of the fact that they failed to
emote. I don't know if you recall one or not. This is why we feel
confident. in the situation, even as we pointed out and' Mr. Inbau
agreed, these are not definitely ascertainable commodities, 'just `like
the situation of a judge's decision.
Mr. HARDY. Thank you.
Mr. REUss. I would like to return to this. I take it, Mr. Lindberg,
your assertion of 99-percent accuracy, which you said had been the
subject of a written work, is that contained on pages 110 through 113
of the 1953 edition of "Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation,"
by Mr. Inbau, and Mr. Reid.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes ; with the one exception. The clerical error
regarding the.0007. It should be .007.
Mr. REUSE. The decimal point is one decimal to the right of where
it should be?
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUss. I am referring to pages 110 to 113 in this book, and I
take it the authors of the books are two of the gentlemen that are before
us today.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUss. The reference is to some 4,280 people who were accused
of committing a crime and who were examined, 'and as a result of your
polygraph tests, 64.5 percent of the 4,280 people were reported inno-
cent.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUss. I then look down to the percentage of those reported
innocent which would be roughly, let me see, out of 4,280 people,
Mr. LINDBERG. They have it here, 2,759 people.
Mr. REUss. 2,759 people. Of those 2,759 people who were reported
innocent I gather only 323, or just a little more than 10 percent, were
actually verified as really having been innocent.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct, by someone else's confession.
31-647-64--3
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FE
Mr. REUSS. That is by no means a foolproof verification, is it?
Mr. LINDBERG. What better method is there, Congressman? I am
just suggesting that if you have a better lie detector to suggest where
we could verify these-it is a very difficult process.
Mr. REUSS. I don't have a better lie detector to suggest. What I am
suggesting is that a lie detector to me belongs in the same common-
sense category as does the guy who looks like a liar. Does he wring his
hands? Does he sweat? Does he pant? Does he palpitate? And so
on. This is a somewhat more scientific way of applying the common-
sense wisdom of the ages. I want to make this my initial inquiry
because then when we go on to what do people do with lie detector tests,
I am going to have some very searching questions to ask.
Mr. LINDIBERG. I am going to suggest that there is a definite limita-
tion in the amount of information that we can obtain along the lines
that you require.
Mr. BACKSTER. Congressman, do you hope to do that during the
brief hearing today, to bring yourself to that level?
Mr. REUSS. The answer is "No," but I have to do the best I can and I
did want to examine into the assertion that a lie detector has been
proved to be on target in 99 percent of the cases. It turns out on cross-
examination that in about 90 percent of the cases where the lie detector
reported a suspect as innocent, we have no real evidence as to whether
he was in fact innocent or guilty.
Mr. BAOKSTER. One thing I have never done, and that is to allow
myself to be asphyxiated with statistics. I stated the basic thing which
you said was a gimmick or nonsense. I would like to clear that up for
you in any way possible before we take up the statistical coverage.
Mr. REUSS. Clear me up-
Mr. BACKSTER. The statistics could be misleading.
Mr. Moss. I wonder if the gentleman would yield at this point.
The House is now in session and because of the complications of this
new building, I think it might be advisable to adjourn the hearings
until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, at which time the member may
resume his interrogation and other members will have time to fully
develop their line of questioning.
Mr. BACKSTER. Would that be the panel again, or another program?
Mr. LINDBERG. The same witnesses?
Mr. Moss. The same witnesses.
Mr. BACKSTER. All right, sir.
(Whereupon, at 12 :07 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to be
reconvened at 10 a.m., April 8,1964. )
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DETECTORS" BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Part 1-Panel Discussion With Private Polygraph
Practitioners)
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1964
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room B 300,
Rayburn Office Building, Ilon. John E. Moss (chairman of th subcom-
mittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives John E. Moss, Henry S. Reuss, John S.
Mona-an, George Meader, and Ogden R. Reid.
Staff members present : Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator;
Jock Mattison, chief investigator; and Benny L. Kass, subcommittee
counsel.
Mr. REUSS (presiding). Good morning. The Government Opera-
tions Committee will be in order. Let the record show the presence
of myself and the gentleman from New York, Mr. Reid.
The chairman is delayed for a few moments and will be here shortly
and has asked me to resume the discussion.
I have a number of questions to ask of you gentlemen. I want to
pursue the point I was pursuing yesterday about the accuracy of lie
detector tests and particularly starting with the point made by Mr.
Lindberg, I think, that at least as to lie detector tests conducted by
John E. Reid & Associates, the margin of possible error was only 1
percent of the total of tests given.
TESTIMONY OF FRED E. INBAU, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW; ACCOMPANIED BY CLEVE BACKSTER, BACKSTER
.SCHOOL OF LIE DETECTION, NEW YORK, N.Y.; JOHN E. REID,
JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL.; AND' GEORGE LIND-
BERG, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct. The estimated?
Mr. REUSS. Yes. I was referring to the volume, "Lie Detection and
Criminal Interrogation," published in 1953, and asked you whether
the following is not the fact: that of those who were reported guilty
by the polygraph test, consisting of 1,334 people out of a total of
4,280 people who took the test, whether it is not a fact that only 791,
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 Approved FosR leapsey20055/04/221y CIA-RDP~6A6B0040R3R0001100380001-7 OF APHS THE or 59.2 percent of those who were reported guilty were interrogated
with the aim of obtaining a confession.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUSS. Of those who were interrogated, only 486 or 61.4 per-
cent of those interrogated actually did confess.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr.REUSS. Therefore, if you take those percentages of a percentage,
is it not a fact that only 36 percent of those who were reported guilty
by the polygraph, were, in fact, found to be guilty?
Mr. LINDBERG. As verified by a confession.
Mr. REUSS. Or by any other method.
Mr. LINDBERG. Only by confession based on these statistics.
Mr. REUSS. I know, but over and beyond the 36 percent who were
found to be guilty by a confession, were there no others who were found
to be guilty by other methods, such as a trial and conviction?
Mr. LINDBERG. We would never count that in a statistic. A convic-
tion means nothing to us.
Mr. REUSS. Then on the innocent side, of the 2,759 people who took
the test and were reported innocent, only 11.7 percent of those who
were reported innocent were verified innocent by another confession.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUSS. So if you combine the two percentages, it is a fact, is it
not, that only 18.9 percent of the total who took the polygraph test
were, in fact, verified as either innocent or guilty ?
Mr. LINDBERG. Presuming your mathematics is correct, I will accede
to that. I don't know if they went into that point.
Mr. INBAU. No, those are his figures.
Mr. REUSS. My mathematics is based upon the combination of the
two percentages and your answer is taken subject to your reservation
on my mathematics. I would want that very clear.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. What figure did you give, Congressman
Reuss ?
Mr. REUSS. 18.9 percent of the total of innocent and guilty together
were verified as correct.
Mr. LINDBERG. Were confirmed, yes.
Mr. REUSS. That 18.9 percent verified correct is a far cry from 99
percent accuracy, is it not?
Mr. LINDBERG. Congressman, our statement on that is that we esti-
mate, based on, let us say, your figure of 18.9-percent verification, that
we have less than 1-percent error, because in that 18.9 percent verified
we were in error less than 1 percent.
So in arriving at our estimate we are extrapolating from the fact
that we were less than 1-percent error in the 18.9 percent of the cases
where the results were definitely verified and corroborated. So it is
a matter of extrapolation.
Mr. REUSS. I do understand correctly that actual proof of the ac-
curacy of the polygraph test was only obtained in 18.9 percent, assum-
ing my mathematics is correct.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Let me ask this question of any member of the panel,
incidentally. Cannot symptoms other than guilt produce swiggles
and wiggles on the polygraph, such as surprise, shame, embarrassment,
or any one of a number of human emotions that don't bear on guilt?
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Mr. JOHN REID. Yes, sir, but if the examiner is not qualified to
eliminate these and identify them as either guilty reactions or anger
or embarrassment or some other type of emotional upset, then he is
not much of an examiner.
We do have a guilt complex test that we administer when we get
reactions in the test that indicate some type of emotional upset. If
these are strictly based on some other emotion rather than fear of being
detected, then we should be able and we can identify these emotions
and this type of person as either guilty or innocent.
Mr. LINDBERG. I might paraphrase, in a properly conducted poly-
graph examination there are at least four runs of the graph, so to
speak, therefore the random phenomenon that you are suggesting
would have to occur at exactly the same place on four examinations.
In other words, the reason why we run several tests which consti-
tute one whole examination is to eliminate the probability that a ran-
dom emotional disturbance on a polygraph record, which there are in
any examination, will not occur at the same point throughout four
tests. A conclusive determination of deception requires consistency
of reaction on the relevant issue in each of those tests.
Mr. INBAU. I might add to that, if I may, Mr. Reuss, there is, as
we pointed out yesterday, a pretest interview of the subject so you
eliminate much of this at that level. On the matter of shame, you
avoid questions that have no relevance to the matter under investiga-
tion, such as the personal embarrassing question that I referred to
yesterday. So you minimize the risk of these things before the test
is even begun.
I think we should bear in mind that this test is not a 10- or 15-minute
deal. In many of these instances the examination of the one indi-
vidual consumes as much as an hour's time. So it is not a snap judg-
ment somebody is making from a wiggle in the graph.
Mr. LINDBERG. And all questions are prepared in advance with the
subject. He has been completely rehearsed in the issues that will be
covered on the test. So the element of surprise is eliminated.
Mr. JOHN REID. To further state that, Mr. Reuss, there are a num-
ber of occasions, say up to 10 percent of the time, that we have to have
the man return for further examinations at a later date. We call
these reexaminations, because we cannot establish the status of the
subject at the time we had him at the first sitting.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I add to that, sir, before we go on?
Mr. REUSE. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. This particular phenomenon that you mentioned,
of extraneous reactions, may I first clarify if that is by observation
of the charts, or observation of the individual? Everything that you
are now talking about would be on the chart, something that is re-
corded on the chart for study after the examination is completed?
Is that the understanding?
Mr. REUSE. Yes. For example, and without restricting the gener-
ality of what I have said, you might be examining somebody about a
bank defalcation of which the person may not have been guilty,
but he may have been guilty of some peccadillo unconnected with this
which would make him feel guilty. This is the problem I am explor-
ing. The panel's answers have been responsive on this point.
Mr. BACKSTER. I would like to respond further on that, if I might.
If the incident you might be thinking of involves the false positives
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 AppMved F$X PW999?D4/9 tcJjA j B 44;(ik3PMW00380001-7
and false negatives that have been widely covered by the press, as I
recall upon seeing the questions that were asked at that time, the fault
would lie within the polygraph examiner at the point of question
formulation rather than any other later portion of the overall proce-
dure. We have five distinct and separate phases in a polygraph
examination, the first one which involves getting case information
and not always the case facts.
Case information that will broaden us in the scope of the investiga-
tion concerning that particular point where we are knowledgeable and
can further approach the solution. After getting that which we feel
is adequate case information we must then select the most stigmatic
target, the thing that is most at stake for the person taking the
examination.
If it happens to be a multiple target situation, such as a rape,
murder, robbery, we would have to decide which of the three we
wanted to pursue and stick to only one of these during the examina-
tion. This selection is done not, in a random fashion, but actually
by evaluation of each of the possible targets numerically. In setting
up the scoring system-the target which has the highest score would
be pursued first.
As the second step, the selection of the target, is completed, we then
go into question formulation. Here the questions must be questions
that allow no room for rationalization or confusion on the part of the
subject. This is the very early area, in fact the second step of the
five, where, in that particular incident of the bank defalcation, I
think a grave error was made.
The question involved something similar to this, and I am stating
this from memory, so I can't guarantee its accuracy. Have you ever
stolen money from the bank or a bank's customers? As it turned out,
this individual had a mother that had a bank account there and I be-
lieve either a sister or brother who had a bank account in that bank.
If anyone absconded with money, or there was just a mild irregularity
even at home, the person would have shown on the questions asked
because they were so broad. Because the person would have stolen
from a bank customer, but at home, instead of at the bank.
In the bank example this would charge itself off as examiner error
right at that point without going further. But then the next overall
step, after our question formulation, is that of embracing these ques-
tions in the proper technique structure which is also important. This
involves running the actual test itself, then of evaluating the charts
that are produced by that test. If anyone of the links in this chain
is broken or is weak, the old saying the chain is no stronger than its
weakest link, is certainly true here. Actually in a rather methodical
pursuit of this matter which has been of grave concern to me in the
last 4 years, I have tried to set up a form that would lead the examiner,
in a systematic sense, through these procedures ; all five of them. He
would then be accountable for each of the steps as he went along, and
accountable for each portion of the step.
If he did become slipshod or he did become inadequate in any one
of these steps, we could tell exactly where it happened when later in-
specting the note pack that he was using. When you come to the
interpretation of the charts, this involves not just one asking of a ques-
tion, as Professor Inban and Mr. Reid have said, it involves a number
of askings of the question.
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In this particular system we require at least 12 separate chart evalu-
ations regarding the issue at stake. In other, words, two evaluations
per tracing. Each of the three tracings is handled as a separate and
distinct evaluation having no relationship to the other two tracings
when a strong relevant question is asked.
The issue is covered twice during each chart, giving six completely
independent comparisons. When we run two charts, it makes 12, and
three charts 18, separate intercomparisons to see if the person is
being truthful or not. Anything that happens in an accidental sense,
in 1, or 2, or 3 of these 18 times, is insignificant because it cancels itself
out.
Mr. REUSS. Thank you very much. I have just one, more question.
In the 4,280 cases which were the subject of these percentages that
we were discussing recently, those I gather, were all people suspected
of criminal offenses.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. These were specific issue cases as opposed to
screening cases.
Mr. REUSS. It is a fact, is it not, that in addition to being used as
a method of criminal detection in criminal matters, polygraph tests
are-widely used in industry and Government as a method of deter-
mining whether a proposed employee ought to be hired or not?
Mr. LINDBERG. As one of the testing devices; yes.
Mr. REUss. Is it not a fact that both in industry and Government
there are frequent cases where seekers after employment are not hired
because of the results of the polygraph test?
Mr. LINDBERG. Congressman, I wouldn't be able to comment on
whether it was the polygraph test which was the sole basis of their
rejection. Frequently it is combined with other evidence and results
in a decision not to hire.
Mr. REuss. Whether alone or in combination with other tests, the
polygraph is frequently relied on in industry and in Government as
a means of refusing employment to a prospective applicant; is it not?
Mr. LINDBERG. I would say that is true.
Mr. INBAU. May I add something to that?
Mr. REuss. Yes, please.
Mr. INBAU. I would like to give an example of how this works so
you know the basis upon which an applicant for employment may be
rejected. In the vast majority of instances it is not just the ex-
aminer's opinion but the disclosure on the test that the employee, let
us say if he is applying for a position of trust, had stolen previously.
So you have that to go on as well. I would like to give you a good
example in Mr. Reid's experience.
Mr. REuss. I think we could put to one side cases where, by cross-
examination, by a polygraph test or by extraneous evidence, the
prospective employer, industrially or governmental, does establish
that the man who wants the job is a criminal. Let us put that to one
side.
Mr. INBAU. But can you, Congressman, for this reason
Mr. REUSS. There is a clear example-
Mr. INBALT. I wonder if you can put that aside.
Mr. RE, uss (continuing). That the applicant would not want to go
through.
Mr. INBAU. When you are evaluating the technique. I don't think
you can put that aside on fairness that it should be put aside because
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except for the polygraph examination this would not have been dis-
closed.
Mr. Reuss. I didn't mean to put it to one side and say it is value-
less. I meant to put it to one side because I would completely agree
with you that in a case where a prospective bank teller is found to
have a record of larceny, whether that record is disclosed by a poly-
graph, by looking at the police records, by confession, by somebody
else, verifying, or in any other way, in such a case the bank does not
want to hire the prospective teller.
However, is it not a fact that in considerable numbers of cases in
industry and Government, though criminality in a specific case is not
established, either by breaking down under the polygraph test or by
confessing or by the evidence of third parties, is it not a fact that a
negative result in a polygraph test deprives the man of his opportunity
to get that particular job?
Mr. JOHN REiv. It is not based on the negative results alone. There
is a margin of error that you speak of, and we speak of, and if there
is any doubt we lean toward the innocent and assist the person to have
that job.
Mr. REUSS. Are you saying that in no case you have ever heard of
has a person been refused a job because he flunked his polygraph test?
Mr. LTNDBERG. That is true.
Mr. REUSS. Leaving aside cases where criminality is established.
Mr. LINDBERG. Certainly there are cases where that happens.
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Reuss, I think you gentlemen ought to be made
aware of this practice, too. The mere fact that an individual apply-
ing for a position has admitted having stolen money from others or
previous employers doesn't mean he is automatically rejected either.
As a matter of fact, I know this used to be my practice and I am
sure it is the practice of Mr. Reid and Mr. Backster and other people
that are established in this type of work, that many times you will
recommend a fellow like that for the position.
Mr. REuss. It depends on the position.
Mr. INBAu. There is some therapeutic effect in having disclosed
this and going on a job and starting out clean. So it doesn't mean
every time a fellow admits having done something wrong that he is
automatically rejected. I think that factor ought to be borne in mind
in evaluating the application of this entire technique.
Mr. LINDBERG. Frequently a field investigation of an individual will
bring up certain factors by neighbors and other people who have a
grievance against this individual on a personal basis and say, "Look,
I have heard that this fellow has been stealing and stripping cars for
years."
This issue is brought up as part of the information brought to the
polygraph examiner and the examiner is able to verify the fact that
the subject is not guilty of this hearsay. I think that is important
also. To answer your questions, there are instances where a subject
will be refused employment in industry solely on the basis of the fact
that he failed to pass a significant question on the polygraph test.
Mr. REuss. You say in industry, but what about Government?
Mr. LTNDBERG. I can't speak for Government.
Mr. BAGKSTER. I would like to comment on that, sir, if I might.
Mr. REUSS. Yes.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 37
Mr. BACgsrER. I can only speak or be responsible for my own evalu-
ations in regard to which employer, or which Government agency, has
rejected a person based on indications of the polygraph alone. In my
own experience, the system that I have tried to use or caused to be
used consistently does not allow for rejecting a person based on
polygraph examination results alone.
The main influence that the polygraph examination might have is in
bringing forth statements by the applicant himself. These state-
ments are that which is cause for rejection of the applicant by the
employer or the Government agency. In fact, in the method of formu-
lation explanation on every single report that I have mailed out in
over 16 years during which I have been doing this full time, the evalu-
ation is based on the job applicant's results on a written risk factor
examination, and oral risk factor examination, electronic risk factor
investigation and evaluation of current attitudes.
All information in this report except as otherwise stated is as stated
by the job applicant. In other words, it is his own statements con-
cerning each of these things in the procedure that is cause for rejec-
tion by the polygraph, if that is the reason he is rejected.
In most cases there are three or four other separate factors. His
road test, if he is going to drive on the job. His battery of psychologi-
cal tests, if that is the case, his personal interview, the medical ex-
amination, all of which are coordinated as to whether the man will be
acceptable or not.
I personally do not make recommendations other than to establish
what degree of risk exists in the overall areas concerning the man's
employment and then leave it up to the agency concerned, or the em-
ployer concerned, to take it from there. That is done by a risk factor
estimate.
Mx. REUSS. By the, agony concerned, you mean the governmental
agency?
Mr. BAOXSTER. It could be that; yes.
Mr. JOHN REID. Mr. Reuss, may I comment here. There should
be some knowledge as far as the committee is concerned regarding
the difference between a screening test and the type that we speak of
and we base our statistics on. A screening test is one in which we are
using a very broad question, "Did you ever steal anything from a
former employer," such as that, as against the criminal test where we
ask, "Did you shoot John Doe at Sixth and Main Streets last night,"
very direct and there is clear cut reaction.
With the employee, the applicant for the job, why we guard our-
selves so closely in making an analysis of his reactions regarding these
responses is because it could cover so many things, and after the first
group of tests we would question him regarding these reactions, at
that point his explanation may be regarding something very minor,
and further testing would indicate that this relieved the tension of the
question and we could dismiss him as a result of that.
Some of them may make quite strong and big admissions regarding
things and the reactions are still on the test after the first test is com-
pleted, so further testing is necessary. This might be important to
show the line of distinction between the specific type test in a criminal
case as against the screening test in industry and most likely in
Government.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I make one comment on that?
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38 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. REUss. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. I am glad Mr. Reid brought up this distinction be-
cause the distinction is so important, where we will be going from
question to question, one of your questions which may be concerning
screening and the other, which may concern a specific incident. We
have two broadly different types of tests that are used.
One we call a probing peak of tension test, which is actually what
a preemployment examination amounts to where we have numerous
background areas, and where the person may show chart reactions
only on the area that is most bothersome to him. In fact that area,
by our basic psychological principle, that of psychological "set," would
cause him to draw to that area to the exclusion of others where he
may also be attempting some deception.
In the other type of examination, the specific case, we do not have
that situation at all. It is very, very different where we ask the man
the direct question, did you commit so and so act, his answer then
being evaluated in terms of truth and deception. There is no other
factor to detract from that, except one that is deliberately put in.
The Reid control procedure was the first usage of that, where if he
is not wrong on the issue itself-the crime let us say-then he will
be concerned with that which has been injected to detract from the
relevant question's natural stigma which may have shown up if the
control procedure had not been there.
Mr. INBAU. May I just make a very brief statement here?
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Inbau.
Mr. INBAC7. What I am trying to do is put this whole problem in
its proper perspective. So frequently the notion is that you take an
innocent person out of high school and give him a polygraph test and
for reasons of his admissions or other reasons he is rejected for em-
ployment.
This test is now being used in the Chicago area, not only in industry
but in the testing of applicants for positions on police forces. If you
talk about the protection of the individual, here is one area where this
technique is rendering a real service.
Mr. Reid's experience in the testing of applicants for positions on
police forces in the Chicago area, in the suburban police departments,
Evanston and some others, have come up with some frightening dis-
closures as to the extent of thievery, narcotic addiction, and what not
of people applying for positions on police forces. Their rejection rate,
Mr. Lindberg and Mr. Reid can give that, is quite high.
So I think this technique is rendering a service not just on one side,
but I suggest to you by reason of this development that it is producing
something in the interest of the individual. You talk about the indi-
vidual's rights and liberties and securities if you get on the police
force, somebody who is a burglar himself, w1io is a narcotic addict, and
guilty of other things, with a record like that back of him, he is the
type of policeman who is going to be abusing civil liberties and civil
rights.
I suggest to you that we ought to keep this in mind, too, when we
decide whether this is a good thing or a bad thing.
Mr. Russ. Thank you.
Before calling on Mr. Meader I would like to apologize to the guests
here in the room because of the fact that I notice many are mopping
their brows. Our air-conditioning system is not working very well. I
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 39
would remind members that we operated on a very limited budget in
setting up this building. We will try to improve it.
Mr. Meader.
Mr. MEADER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Reid, as I recall the
testimony yesterday, there were no reliable statistics of cases where
the polygraph has been used.
Mr. JoiHN REID. By reliable statistics
Mr. MEADER. You had statistics for your own use. I am talking
about a nationwide basis.
Mr. JOAN REID. No, not on a nationwide basis.
Mr. MEADER, The polygraph is widely used by State police, city
police, FBI and so on. Are they not required to report the incidents
where that is-aren't those statistics accumulated anywhere in the
FBI or anywhere else?
Mr. JOHN REID. As far as I know, the statistics are not accumulated.
I think this is a failure, on the part of these different agencies and State
groups, and they should.
Mr. MEADER. Are you required to report to any other agency, State
or National, the results of your use of the polygraph?
Mr. JOHN RE ID. No, sir, we are not. We are held under a licensing
law in Illinois but we are not required to report any statistics any
place.
Mr. MEADER. Is there any informal trade association or other asso-
ciation that makes it its business to accumulate statistics on the use
of the polygraph?
Mr. Jouzx REID. No, sir; I think we are kind of a bastard child, sir,
and I think it is important that we do have the committee to hear how
poorly we have come from nothing and we have been in amateur hands
in all these years. I think it is time that some professional group or
Government gave us some assistance in this field.
Mr. MEADER. Do I understand there is no trade association of poly-
graph operators or polygraph manufacturers?
Mr. Jon7N REm. We have three different associations but I think
all of us operate independently of each other and it is not really a trade
association but an interchange of ideas between ourselves and that is
about all.
Mr. MEADER. What are those associations called?
Mr. Jorrx REID. The American Academy of Polygraph Examiners,
the one that Professor Inbau and myself started. Then the Academy
for Scientific Interrogation, the largest, one of the group. The third
one is the National Board of Polygraph Examiners.
Mr. LINDEERO. There is a fourth one, I believe, called the Interna-
tional Association.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, International Association of Polygraph Ex-
aminers, which is the second largest in membership.
Mr. MEADER. Could you give one some idea of the size of those orga-
nizations with respect, to membership?
Mr. LINDBERo. I think the American Academy of Polygraph Ex-
aminers has 50 members. We have a spokesman from the ASI here.
Ile, may want to tell you what his membership is.
Mr. Moran, do ,you know ?
Mr. MORAN. (An individual later identified as Kenneth W. Moran
of the Council of Polygraph Examiners, 437 Merchandise Mart, Chi-
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40 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
cago, Ill.) I would estimate about 300 in the American Academy for
Scientific Interrogation.
Mr. BAC.KSTER. May I correct that? It is nearly 400. I have the
last count on that. (See exhibit 9, p. 188.)
Mr. LINDBERG. I think there are 20 members in the National Board
of Polygraph Examiners and I have no idea how many the Interna-
tional Association has.
Mr. LINDBERG. There are many people who hold mutual member-
ships in each of the organizations.
Mr. MEADER. Let me ask you about the Illinois law. Is there any
requirement in the Illinois law for the licensing of examiners?
Mr. LINDBERG. The purpose of the Illinois law was to license poly-
graph examiners and regulate them as to formal education, training,
and competency. We require a college degree, 6 months' internship
training, and a rigorous written test and practical test as to compe-
tency. Those are the three requirements of the Illinois law.
Mr. MEADER. There is no requirement of a law degree?
Mr. LINDBURG. No; college degree. It was hard enough getting
that, Congressman.
Mr. MEADER. No specification of any courses that would be taken
in college, psychology or anything else?
Mr. LINDBERG. No, we avoided that because we felt that all colleges
give the same basic liberal education during the first 2 years. We
felt that was a sufficient base upon which we could build specific or
teach specific subjects such as physiology and psychology.
Mr. MEADER. Let me ask you gentlemen whether it is an advantage
to an examiner to have had not only a, law degree but some practical
expperience in trial work?
Mr. LINDBERG. Not particularly.
Mr. INBAU. I would like to believe that, having had it myself, but
I don't think this is something that really ought to be imposed as a
basic qualification.
Mr. MEADER. I didn't ask that question, Doctor. My . question is,
whether a trial lawyer, for example, would be a better examiner than
one that never had any legal experience at all.
Mr. John REID. I believe not.
Mr. MEADER. Are you a lawyer?
Mr. JOHN REID. I am, sir. I say in this type of business we are not
in the game or not in the position of cross examining subjects. We ask
our questions directly in the examination tests and when we get around
to the point of interrogating the subject for confession purposes it is
more of a psychological approach that we use rather than a cross exam-
inational type. I think, sir, if I might say, that as far as the qualifica-
tions are concerned I would rather have a man come right out of col-
lege and come to me for training rather than have any particular back-
ground in any of these disciplines.
Mr. MEADER. May I ask all of you gentlemen at one time, and I mean
you to answer the question seriatim, do any of you know of instances
where a polygraph examination showed the subject to be lying where
he subsequently confessed, but then later on there was absolute proof
of innocence?
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Mr. INBAU. I know of no such cases that where as a result of the
polygraph examination he confessed and it was later disclosed that he
was innocent. I know of no such cases.
Mr. BACKSTER. I know of no such cases including the Anderson case
in the Saturday Evening Post.
Mr. MEADER. How about you?
Mr. JOHN REID. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. LINDBERG. The only one that comes close to that was the one
reported in the 1963 journal-American Journal of Psychiatry, re-
ferring to a bank teller.
Mr. MEADER. Are you referring to the article by II. B. Dearman,
M.D., and B. M. Smith, Ph. D., "Unconscious Motivation on the Poly-
graph Test"?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. MEADER. Appearing in the American Journal of Psychiatry,
volume 119, No. 11, May 1963?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. I have no independent knowledge of that par-
ticular case.
Mr. MEADER. Mr. Reid, weren't you aware of this article ?
Mr. JOHN REID. I heard of the article but I didn't recall it at this
particular time.
Mr. LINDBERG. His innocence is not confirmed.
Mr. MEADER. Have you read the article?
Mr. JOHN REID. I read parts of the article.
Mr. MEADER. How about you, Mr. Inbau ?
Mr. INBAU. I have not read this.
Mr. MEADER. Are you not familiar with this?
Mr. INBAU. I am familiar with it but I have not read it.
Mr. BACKSTER. I am familiar with it.
Mr. MEADER. You have not read it?
Mr. BACKSTER. I have read it.
Mr. MEADER.. You don't regard that as an example where a poly-
graph test showed the subject to be lying and he confessed to embezzle-
ment of a thousand dollars and subsequently it was shown that he did
not embezzle any such sum.
Mr. BACxsTER. I would like to know the system they used to verify
the fact that he didn't embezzle a thousand dollars other than an audit
that didn't show any money missing at the time.
Mr. LINDBERG. Congressman, I might point out that frequently it
occurs that there are confessions of embezzlement from funds that are
very difficult to audit. I think if you were to consult the auditors
they would tell you it is possible to steal money fairly easily from a
bank which will not show up in an audit.
Therefore, the alleged confirming evidence in that case, namely, an
audit disclosing that there was no loss, is no proof whatsoever that
the man is not actually guilty of the embezzlement. In Mr. Reuss'
state, for example, I got a confession from a man, verified, that he had
stolen $22,500. Yet they were only able to establish $816 stolen.
The banker readily acknowledged that he had stolen the money as he
said from the exchange funds and these are not auditable in many
banks. So the fact that the bank records failed to disclose a loss is not
conclusive proof that an error was made. As I understand, there were
five different polygraph examiners involved in that case, each one
arriving at the same conclusion.
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42 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. MEADER. You mean in the Dearman case?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, according to what Dr. Dearman says in that
article. I believe it adds up to five independent polygraph examina-
tions.
Mr. 3 EADER. Mr. Chairman, as long as we referred to this article, I
would like to suggest that it be incorporated in the record at this
point.
Mr. Moss. If there is no objection, the article will be incorporated in
the record at this point. (See exhibit 2A, p. 135.)
Mr. MEADER. Let us pass to the second question. Are any of you
aware of instances where a polygraph examination showed the subject
innocent, but he was subsequently proved guilty ?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, I had one of them.
Mr. I NBAU. Yes.
Mr.JoxN REM. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. We can answer that all together.
_11r. LTNDBERG. I think every examiner has been embarrassed by such
a findin r.
Mr. JOAN RETD. That is where our margin of error is as far as we
know.
Mr. MEADER. Let us return to the Dearman article, just a moment.
Dr. Dearman is a psychiatrist and this bank employee was subse-
quently examined by him as a psychiatrist. The question that was
asked on which the examiner concluded that he was lying and guilty
was this one : "Have you ever stolen any money from the bank or its
customers?"
Then the doctor goes on to show from his psychiatric examination
that the patient, first, had a strongly ambivalent feeling toward his
mother. She had divorced his father and 7 years later married a man
with whom he did not get along with. , He felt neglected and so on.
Second, the patient's wife was 2 years his senior. She had been
previously married and was similar to his mother in many respects.
He had been involved in financial affairs with both his wife and his
mother, one to the extent of approximately $800 and another incident
$1,100, one of which was related to wrecking his mother's car.
The psychiatrist emphasized the bank's, customers and both the
mother and wife were the bank's customers and he explained; that he
had this guilt feeling because of the customers and not the bank.
Was the question properly framed?
Mr. INBAU. I think that has been referred to before. The question
was not properly phrased. I think we ought to acknowledge the fact
that these things can happen. As a matter of fact, that is all implicit
in what some of us were referring to as questions. If you get someone
who doesn't know how to utilize the technique he can make this kind of
mistake. If you get an examiner who will browbeat everybody who
takes the test hoping he will get a confession from the guilty ones and
be able to report these people are lying, these things can happen.
We will acknowledge it. The point is, though, you minimize this
kind of a risk very well when you insist upon a different kind of ex-
aminer than may have been involved in this case. With respect to
psychiatrists in this area, while I have the highest respect for what
they are contributing in making or in helping people with their per-
sonal problems, what I would like to see the psychiatrist do instead of
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speculating and picking out an isolated case, is to go out in the field
and find out what is actually occurring and that is what they will
not do.
They will sit in the armchair and theorize about it and pick out a
case like this and make a mountain out of it, but they don't go out
in the field and find out how the instrument is working to the ad-
vantage of the public and the individual himself.
Mr. MEADER. Some might be lying on their couches.
Mr. INBAU. That is right.
Mr. JGIIN REID. As far as thm question is concerned, we in our book
advise that the question should be directed to the subject in a direct
unambiguous manner. We should not have an "and" or "or" in the
question because the subject may be guilty of one and not the other.
It is a double meaning question in the first place. If the examiner
was asking the question properly it should have been : did you steal
any money from the bank? Did you steal any money from the
bank's customers? That is two different questions.
Mr. MEADER. Let me get back to this matter of the size of this in-
dustry again. Outside of the State of Illinois, are there any States,
or are there any Federal agencies or any other agencies which re-
quire some form of licensing of polygraph examiners?
Mr. LINDBERG. The State of Kentucky has a bill which we feel is
generally inadequate. (See exhibit 1B, p. 128.)_
Mr. MEADER. A bill or a law?
Mr. LINDBERG. A law, requiring a high school diploma and a 6 weeks'
course. We feel this is inadequate. Speaking for Professor Inbau,
Mr. Reid, and myself. Other agencies in the Government have regu-
lations regarding the screening of their own polygraph examiners be-
fore they are employed as such. I am not familiar with them.
Mr. JOAN REID. New Mexico also has a law that is similar to
Kentucky's.
Mr. Moss. At this point in the record a reference will be made to the
summary of Federal requirements for operators which are contained
in a committee print prepared by the staff. Will you find that page so
Mr. Meader may have it.
Mr. INBAU. It is facing page 14 of the committee print.
Mr. MEAnER. May I inquire, perhaps it is in the committee print
also, what is the total number of polygraph examiners in the country.
Mr. LINDBERG. The figure we were discussing this morning, it is
difficult to say, but we estimate, aside from Federal employees, that
there could be in the area of a thousand to 1,500 people who purport to
operate polygraph or conduct lie detector examinations.
Mr. ME, ADER. How many are licensed in the State of Illinois?
Mr. LINDBERG. The licensing procedure has just begun. It is only 2
months old. Therefore no official licenses have been issued, although
about 30 have been approved.
Mr. INBAU. There was -a grandfather clause in that legislation so
that those who were in already will be blanketed in.
Mr. MEADER. How many are they, do you know?
Mr. LINDBERG. We feel. that there could be between 50 and 100 who
will be accepted under the grandfather clause.
Mr. MEADER. I don't want to monopolize the time, Mr. Chairman.
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44 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. BACKSTER. May I add one point to follow your line of question-
ing?
Mr. MEADER. Yes.
Mr. BACgsTER. This is a question of licensing and also the question
of grandfather clauses that came up. It is of little concern to me, in
fact a little depressing to think that I must go through my natural life
putting up with the shenanigans of the people who become licensed
under the grandfather's clause. This is enough., by their sideline effects
alone to eliminate the science in many other ways other than one of
just basically licensing or no licensing.
I would like to emphasize at this point that I think it is extremely
important that we have regulation by law as well as licensing by law.
Even though a man is qualified, and does qualify by virtue of a license,
this does not mean that he is going to perform in the prescribed man-
ner, even though he could, if he wished to.
The important half of the two considerations, in my estimation, is
the performance of the, man or regulatory legislation that will make it
illegal for him to do many of the things that he chooses to do now.
Mr. LTNDIERG. I think, Mr. Backster, that is implicit in the Illinois
bill. There are rules of misconduct specifically stated in the bill.
Although I will admit they are rather broad I think it is regulatory.
Mr. BACx5TER. The reason I am mentioning this is that all of the
difficulty mentioned concerns licensing legislation. I think it should
be licensing and regulatory legislation, so that we don't get a one-sided
aspect.
Mr. INSAU. This grandfather clause was not our idea in this bill.
Without it thebill would not have passed and we thought this was to
be preferred over no long-range licensing plan at all.
Mr. MEADER. The chairman received, I guess this morning, a letter
from Dr. Dearman in which he attached copies of this article we have
referred to, dated April 5, 1964. I think the letter should be in the
record, too.
Mr. Moss. I agree. If there is no objection the letter will be included
in the record immediately following the article which has been already
furnished for the record.
Mr. BACKSTER. Is that a lengthy letter? May we hear it?
Mr. MEADER. I will read it if you want me to, because I want to base
a question on one paragraph anyway.
Mr. BACKSTER. All right, sir.
Mr. MEADER. The Honorable John E. Moss, Democrat, of Califor-
nia, I-louse of Representatives, Washington, D.C. On the letterhead
of H. B. Dearman, M.D., Psychiatry, 208 East Watauga Avenue,
Johnson City, Tenn.
DEAR MR. Moss: Today I read an article in our local paper, the Johnson City
Press-Chronicle, In which I learned of the Government's use of the polygraph
and of your committee which will begin public hearings on the use of the poly-
graph on Tuesday of this week.
I am writing to you for two reasons. First to send you several copies of an
article written by me and Dr. Burke Smith of the University of Virginia, having
to do with the polygraph, which appeared in the May 1963 issue of the American
Journal of Psychiatry and second, to express to you my views on the uncon-
stitutionality of the use of the polygraph whether in industry or criminal work.
In my opinion the use of the polygraph violates the fourth amendment as
regards search and seizure. I am also of the opinion that its use violates the
fifth amendment. I am aware that proponents of the use of the polygraph fall
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back on the statement that no one is forced to take a polygraph test and use
this as a means of satisfying the constitutional requirements. However, this
is of little or no avail because the examinee does not realize that not only will
his conscious thoughts and his autonomic responses to them be recorded but
his unconscious thoughts will also be delved into and consequently he will give
autonomic responses to unconscious thoughts or to put it another way, he will be
giving autonomic responses to thoughts of which he is totally unaware. This, is
never explained to the examinee and I doubt if the examiner himself is aware
that this is taking place.
It is my opinion that the polygraph is used mainly as a mental blackjack to
obtain a confession. In one of the bulletins put out by a concern that sells
polygraph instruments and also gives a course in its use, it is stated, "that a
confession is the only real check."
This same bulletin states, "the polygraph is a scientific instrument, through
proper use the properly trained, skilled examiner can diagnose truth or decep-
tion just as the skilled roentgenologist or internist can diagnose hairline frac-
tures or aortic regurgitation."
This they claim can be done by a man with only 6 weeks training and 6
months experience in the use of the polygraph. The training of the roentgen-
ologist and internist requires about 8 years. The polygraph recording is a
recording of the blood pressure, pulse respiration, and sweating of the skin
and its interpretation is certainly as difficult if not more so than the interpreta-
tion of an electrocardiogram. At least with the cardiogram we are dealing
with the presence or absence of physical changes in an organ by the recording
of autonomic and electrical impulses. However, with the polygraph, we are
dealing with the highly abstract concepts of truth and deception. I do not
believe that 71/ months of training can equip anyone to deal with such con-
cepts.
I trust that the reprints may be of some value to you and your committee.
With kindest personal regards, I remain,
Very truly yours,
H. B. DEARMAN, M.D.
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment on that?
Mr. MIADnx. That is why I read the letter. I want you to com-
ment particularly on the constitutional aspects.
Mr. INBAU. This is from a psychiatrist, I understand.
Mr. MEADnn. That is right.
Mr. INBAU. By what right does a psychiatrist have the right to ex-
press himself as to constitutionality of anything. I have been a law
teacher since 1945 and I am sure some of you gentlemen are mem-
bers of the legal profession yourself. In determining what is or is not
constitutional, it requires the skill of a lawyer.
In this day and time he has to be awfully good to even anticipate
what is coming next.
Mr. MEADEB.. May I underline that.
Mr. MONAGAN. Maybe a psychiatrist is best qualified.
Mr. INBAU. For this psychiatrist to embark on this area is typical
of what has been going on generally in the field of psychiatry. Again
I say what this gentleman ought to do other than sit down in his arm-
chair or lie down on his couch and speculate on this, he ought to go
to some place where these tests are being conducted and find out what
actually is going on.
At one time it was said that the bumblebee according to the laws of
aerodynamics should not be able to fly, but the bumblebee hadn't
heard about this and went ahead flying anyway. Let me give you
another example. I would like for the record to show it because so
often we get taken in by this kind of an opinion from someone who
doesn't know what he is talking about.
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4 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL `GOVERNMENT
Mr. MEAnER. I can appreciate all that, Doctor. I think you ought
to comment on the fourth and fifth amendment.
Mr. INBAU. I may be trying to cover too much territory, I agree.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Inbau, the Chair would like to make this observa-
tion. Being fully qualified, a lay member in both law and psychiatry,
I think any citizen or any thinking person has a right to express a per-
sonal conviction.
Mr. INBAU. Oh, sure.
Mr. Moss. I would say he is undoubtedly as well qualified in law
as many who operate polygraphs are in physiology and psychology.
I think it. would be far more productive if we direct ourselves merely
to the merits of his dicussion rather than to the substantive nature of
his own opinion.
Mr. INBAU. With respect to that, as his letter points out, one of the
answers to it is that the individual is not forced to take this test. That
is one aspect.
Mr. MEAnER. How about the point he makes that you are examining
not only his conscious but his subconscious? He is not aware that his
subconscious is also to be examined.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I comment on that, sir?
Mr. MEADER. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. First I can only comment as an expert in polygraph
and not on the merits of his observation as a psychiatrist. In not
one single case in nearly 17 years of full-time usage of the polygraph
have I found this to be true. That I can comment on.
Mfr. MEADEE. Which to be true?
Mr. BACKSTER. The comment that the psychiatrist made about
something unknown to the subject coming forth on the records, delv-
ing into his subconscious, as well as his conscious. Not even concern-
ing the aspect of delving into subconsicous phenomena, have I found
one single case where that possibility exhibited itself as a problem
area, in 17 years of full-time usage of the, polygraph.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Backster, I would refer you to a rather carefully
written article by Dr. Dearman and Dr. Smith which you have pre-
viously indicated you have read and are familiar with. He deals in
great detail, in very finite detail, with the nature of subsequent ex-
aminations undertaken on this young bank teller to determine why
they had received the responses which had led to his signing a
confession.
Again, professing no expertise in the field of psychiatry, I would
say that it appears to be a very rational detailing of events which
could certainly occur. And they would indicate the exact opposite of
what you have just stated, because there was here a subconscious in-
volvement.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, there well may have been a subconscious in-
volvement but the question does still remain unanswered as to whether
the subconscious involvement was that which showed on the polygraph
charts. From a polygraph examiner's standpoint, I think that we
have a much more simplified method in which to criticize the entire
examination that was given and successfully so, too.
Mr. Moss. But the point that Congressman Meader was dealing with
was the statement by the doctor, which I think perhaps should be read
again, "In my opinion the use of the polygraph violates the fourth
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amendment as regards search and seizure. I am also of the opinion
that its use violates the fifth amendment."
It is to these points specifically that the questions of Congressman
Meader are directed. I think it would be helpful if you would respond
only to those points at this time.
Mr. BAC7iSTER. May I state that I would like an opportunity to re-
spond on the other points which I started on prematurely, and also
state that I am not in any way qualified to testify on the points you
have just raised right now.
Mr. Moss. Fine.
Mr. INBAu. I have gone into this as a criminal law teacher since
1945. I have tried to be on top of this situation with respect to the con-
stitutionality of these techniques as well as others. I see no involve-
menthere of search and seizure. Certainly in the traditional sense it
is not a search and seizure. Since the individual is not compelled to
take the test, and. that is another basic principle with respect to the
use of this technique, I don't think we are encountering any con-
stitutional difficulties here, at least as matters stand at the present
time.
The Supreme Court could well come up and say that at any time you
explore into the mind of somebody it is unconstitutional. By the same
token it seems to me a psychological examination given to an employee,
industry, Government or what have you, to find out whether he is stable,
involves an intrusion into this person's will, into his mind, his subcon-
scious.
The psychiatrists themselves are doing this and doing it in industry
and in Government. It seems to me if you want to avoid constitutional
issues completely let us do away with all of these things. It is also an
invasion of privacy when you check on what the neighborhood thinks
about this particular individual and what they know about him. That
is an intrusion on privacy. Let us label it all unconstitutional.
Mr. MEADER. Let me ask you this, Doctor, to :get right down to this
specific point. When the consent of the examinee is obtained, is he
warned that the questions may elicit unconscious reactions as well as
conscious answers?
Mr. INBAU. Yes. In any properly conducted test the individual
knows what the subject of the investigation is. He knows precisely
what questions will be asked him. It is not bringing out these deep-
rooted unconscious things. It is coming up with something very spe-
cific. Have you ever stolen from a place where you worked? Did you
steal this particular item? That is not digging down deep into his un-
, t75
conscious. That is on his conscious mind, as to whether he stole it.
Mr. MEADER. I would assume that no examiner has ever warned an
examinee that we are asking questions which may bring out uncon-
scious reactions.
Mr. Jouw REID. I don't believe they will, sir.
Mr. LINDBERG. There is no evidence.
Mr. JOHN REnn. Absolutely not.
Mr. BACUSTnR. Sir, concerning the procedure which you suggest,
as a practicing examiner and testifying as an expert polygraph ex-
aminer, I have never done so and hope I will never be caused to do so
because there is not one element of proof that this is the case.
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Mr. LINDBERG. It is speculation only. Let me suggest, Congress-
man, if I might, that Dr. Dearman's article be given the probative
value that should be given to an exploration of one single case. I
might point out that Dr. Dearman was not known to this field, nor
have I ever found a polygraph examiner who was consulted by Dr.
Dearman, as is the case also with the Harvard Business Review expert.
I know of no polygraph examiner who even had any connection
with Dr. Dearman whatsoever. As far as I can see, his is strictly an
ex parte investigation with no relevance Ito the field of polygraph
examinations as it exists in the United States today.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Meader, we have a quorum call that commenced a
few minutes ago.
Mr. MEADER. May I just ask, to close this, these gentlemen if they
would like to submit anything further in writing on the constitutional
point raised by Dr. Dearman, or if there are any articles on constitu-
tionality generally.
Mr. INBAU. That issue is discussed in part in this book of ours.
Mr. MEADER. Would you make references that could go in the ap-
propriate part of our hearings?
Mr. INBAU. Yes, I will.
Mr. Moss. The Chair is requesting all witnesses to return at 10
tomorrow morning. Members have additional questions. We hope to
conclude with you gentlemen tomorrow morning so that we can start
with other witnesses tomorrow afternoon.
Congressman Reid, you will be recognized immediately following
the conclusion of Mr. Meader's questions tomorrow.
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Chairman, the legal status and the legal issue
regarding the lie detector technique are in this book of ours at page
122 on.
Mr. Moss. The staff will identify it for the members.
We have to leave now because of the quorum call.
(Whereupon, -at 11:13 a.m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m. Thursday, April 9, 1964.)
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS AS "LIE DETECTORS" BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Part 1-Panel Discussion With Private Polygraph
Petitioners)
THURSDAY, APRIL 9, 1964
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room B-300,
Rayburn Office Building, Hon. John E. Moss (chairman of the sub-
committee) presiding.
Present : Representatives John E. Moss, Henry S. Reuss, John S.
Monagan, George Meader, and Ogden R. Reid.
Staff members present: Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator;
Jock Mattison, chief investigator; and Benny L. Kass, subcommittee
counsel.
Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order.
At this time I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Reid.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gen-
tlemen.
Mr. Inbau, I want to go back slightly over some of your testimony on
Tuesday and the general question of standards with regard to the use
of the polygraph. You stated initially that you thought it was an in-
dispensable investigative aid and a basis of a technique for diagnosing
deception.
You also said, just as with any medical instrument it is of no value,
in fact it may be a very dangerous thing, in the hands of someone who
is not trained in the technique of making the diagnosis. Then, if the
transcript is correct, when you were asked about the general subject
of qualifications, you indicated the following :
Yes, that is difficult. Let us face it, of the people who are utilizing this device
today in my judgment about 80 percent of them are not measuring up to what
standards we feel are required.
I was wondering whether you would care to comment on that because
if some of this 80 percent are some of those that are using it in the
Federal Government, if 80 percent are not adequately trained and if
the instrument in the hands of unqualified persons could be dangerous,
that seems to me to be a matter of rather serious concern.
49
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FURTHER TESTIMONY OF FRED E. INBAU, NORTHWESTERN UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW; ACCOMPANIED BY CLEVE BACKSTER,
BACKSTER SCHOOL OF LIE DETECTION, NEW YORK, N.Y.; JOHN
E. REID, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL. ; AND
GEORGE LINDBERG, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL.
Mr. INBA-u. The figures I have there-and again I don't present that
as a statistic that I could support, it is just my estimate, and I think
that is shared by Mr. Reid and Mr. Lindberg; that is across the board.
I am much more familiar with the situation in police departments and
among private investigators, much more familiar with that, than I am
as regards the military and governmental operations or utilization of
the technique.
The extent to which a figure could be struck, an estimate, if you re-
strict it to the governmental functions, that I wouldn't dare to say,
although I am quite confident that across the board that figure repre-
sents a fairly accurate estimate.
Now within the Government, as I see the data that was presented to
us, I find in there that certainly a percentage of the people don't meas-
ure with respect to educational qualifications, which I consider a very
necessary set, of qualifications, or one of the necessary qualifications.
To the extent that they don't measure up on that, I would say that
the probabilities are there, is a considerable percentage within govern-
mental operations who are not measuring up to the standards that we
think are required for the effective utilization of the technique.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Then might I ask you-and I am not concerned
whether it is 80 or 70 percent-I take it from your inference that there
are a substantial number that may not meet what might be considered
minimum or adequate standards of training or perhaps even maturity
in the use of the polygraph.
Would you care to deal rather more specifically with the kind of
standards, the kind of training program, that you think should apply
in the Federal Government.. I know there has been talk of the
need to train an individual for 6 weeks or 6 months. We had testi-
mony of a doctor yesterday who said perhaps it should even be 8
years.
What would be, in your judgment, minimal and adequate safe-
guards-and when I say adequate, I mean adequate in the sense that
the operator will be fully trained so that the rights of the individual
will be as fully protected as possible.
Mr. INBAU. In my judgment it would require a period of apprentice-
ship training of approximately 6 months. By apprenticeship train-
ing I mean the individual would receive instructions, would receive
case experience, day in and day out of the working days, under the
guidance and supervision of an experienced, competent examiner, one
who had a sufficient caseload to give this kind of apprenticeship train-
ing.
In my judgment it can't be done adequately by schooling and cer-
tainly not the kind of schooling that prevails in some quarters of 6
weeks.
Mr. OLDEN REID. Could we try to define a little more precisely the
several standards. Perhaps any of you gentlemen may wish to com-
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ment. You feel that as a ininimuni there should be a college degree?
Mr. INBAU. Yes.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Added to that should there be any kind of medical
or psychiatric training?
Mr. INBAU. You mean on the part of the individual?
Mr. OGDEN REID. I was trying to start first with the minimal train-
ing and the selection of the individual, and then with the length of
internship, if you will, that would be required.
Mr. INBAU. Congressman, on this point I would defer to Mr. Lind-
berg, because the views he expresses on this I know are mine and he
can answer you it little more specifically.
Mr. LINDBEEG. Congressman Reid, I was somewhat prepared for
this question because I think it is the essence of this hearing. So I have
prepared what we have agreed will be the minimal standards in the
areas that you suggest. I will read them..
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you.
Mr. LINDBERG. Then we can go back and discuss certain of them.
The most significant assistance in establishing polygraph service of the
highest caliber would be to reevaluate the selection and training of
examiners in the Federal service along the following lines :
Select only those persons who (a) possess a degree at the bacca-
laureate level; (b) who regardless of prior investigative background
have a tested scientific aptitude and a desire to become a career ex-
aminer; and (c) who have reached 21 years of age and display a stable
and mature attitude; and (d) who will undergo a polygraph exami-
nation regarding previously undetected acts of gross criminal behavior
or continuing pattern of antisocial behavior.
Then establish uniform training programs which, (a) teach the
scientific assessment of truth and deception, rather than the interroga-
tive features of the procedure ; (b) which permits and insures that the
student will participate in no less than 500 actual examinations over
a period of at least 6 months ; and (c) which provides immediate per-
sonal supervision for 6 months after the initial 6 months of formal
internship; and (d) which includes supplementing the trainee's stand-
ard college courses in the fields of physiology and psychology with
specific information from these sciences as it relates to the detection
of deception; and (e) which affords the trainee opportunities for in-
dependent research and study and also requires such research; and
(f) which will. accurately test, and classify the trainee's competency
at the end of the 6 months' formal internship and the 6 months'
supervisory internship.
Mr. OGDEN Rein. Thank you, Mr. Lindberg. I think it is very help-
ful to get that on the record. Might I direct a question to the points
you raise. Dr. Dearman had this to say :
They claim this can be done with a man with only 6 weeks' training and 6
months' experience in the use of the polygraph. The training of the roentgenolo-
gist and internist requires about .8 years.
Specifically here he notes that the polygraph recording is a record-
ing of the blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and sweating of the skin
and its interpretation is certainly as'difficult if not more so, than the
interpretation of an electrocardiogram. This I assume to be some=
thing of a medical judgment as to the need to know the systems of the
body, the physiology, metabolism, and the like.
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Would you care to comment on Dr. Dearman's statement that the
interpretation is as difficult, if not more so, than an interpretation
of a cardiogram?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. I can take part of the comment on that. I
would certainly differ with Dr. Dearman on that issue for this reason.
In the course of conducting over 30,000 polygraph examinations, as
we have done in our laboratory, we are not confronted with the com-
plexities which arise from these neurological or cardiology recordings,
as in the case of the electrocardiogram that Dr. Dearman suggests occur
in the polygraph test.
I think if Dr. Dearman were to study a polygraph facility in detail
he would find that his suggestion is not correct.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Yet if I understood the testimony yesterday, there
is a figure mentioned that Mr. Reuss developed of 18.9 percent of the
tests carried out by the polygraph which were susceptible to subsequent
affirmative checks either as to innocence or as to guilt.
There is also some testimony as regards the accuracy of the poly-
graph in the first instance, quite aside from whether it is susceptible
to subsequent confirmation. If there is some difference according
to some judgment, there is a rather substantial area of potential error.
Doesn't this suggest that we need much more stringent standards and
perhaps very real medical knowledge of the use of this instrument?
Mr. INBAU. May I make a comment on that, Mr. Reid?
Mr. OGDEN REID. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. The polygraph examiner doesn't have to know what
particular physiological defect is present here. IIe can make an
appraisal on the basis of the appearance of the individual, his gen-
eral behavior, the nature of the tracing, as to whether that person
has anything wrong to a sufficient degree to interfere with this limited
kind of testing, namely : Is he lying or telling the truth about this
particular matter?
As Mr. Lindberg said, it is far less complex than making a medical
diagnosis of a person to find out what ails him. We are not con-
fronted with the same complex determination that confronts a neu-
rologist, a doctor, a psychiatrist. It is of a very limited nature. We
certainly disagree on the point that somebody ought to have 8 years
of training and all these phases of medical science.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Am I correct, Mr. Inbau, that the multiple-unit
polygraph measures blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and galvanic
skin responses, and am I not also accurate in stating that the way
the question is asked is not dissimilar from the reaction of polling? In
polling there are all kinds of bias errors depending on whether the
question has various nuances or whether it is a loaded question. So
you are talking right at the beginning with four medical variables plus
the accuracy and the objectivity of the questions.
It seems to me this calls for rather sophisticated background to
use it with any degree of real reliability.
Mr. INBAU. It does call for a degree of sophistication but I don't
think to the extent that the psychiatrist you referred to has suggested.
Mr. LINDBERG. Might I add, if I might, Congressman Reid, that on
the cases which have been verified, as you pointed out, the figure is 18.9
percent. Try as we may, we can't seem to get more verified than that.
But,of the 18.9 percent, we were in error in less than 1 percent of those
cases. It means 1 percent of 18.9 percent.
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It seems to me the statistics speak for themselves in that regard.
Of course, considering the limitation of statistics. But the, fact of the
matter is that if expert polygraph examiners did suffer the limitation.
that you suggest, it seems to me that the record would not show the
tremendous successes we have had in the field of detecting deception.
The fact of the matter is that we run perhaps 5,000 cases a, year in
our laboratory alone, and if we did not have the sophistication that
you are suggesting, I am sure our office would be in a state of chaos.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Of course, what I think this hearing in large
measure is directed toward is not whether this has been used in a few
instances by highly skilled professionals, but whether it has been used
properly in the Federal Government, whether the individual has been
given adequate protection of his constitutional rights. Also, in pur-
suance of the analysis of the polygraph' whether the Government has
any kind of what might be called minimum standards that are at all
adequate in the professional terms you are talking.
I gather it is the judgment of you gentlemen that the standards in
the Federal Government today, from what you know of it, do- not
measure up, and that they indeed may be dangerous.
Mr. INBAU. Congressman Reid, may I offer this suggestion, and I
offer it on behalf of Mr. Reid, Mr. Lindberg, and myself. I had not
conferred with Mr. Backster on this, so he can speak with reference
to it if he wishes.
We would like to suggest to this committee that it recommend to
the various governmental agencies utilizing the technique that a com-
mittee be established-an intergovernmental or interdepartmental
committee-to look into this matter of examiner qualifications2 stand-
ards, the type of questions that should be asked, what limitations
should be imposed upon them, and that intergovernmental committee
call upon people such as those of us here at the panel, and certainly
the three of us volunteer our services for that, to see what could be
developed by way of some standardization with respect to all these
various facets of the polygraph technique.
It seems to me it is important that that be done and at the earliest
possible moment.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Has there ever been a suggestion made by any of
you gentlemen that such a committee be established? Do you know
whether there has been any progress made in that direction?
Mr. JOHN REID. Mr. Reid, I would like to-answer this. In fairness
to the representatives of the Army, a year ago they invited me down
and they were most anxious to establish some standards for the field,
at least in their area. They are looking to that and I think they
would welcome it.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Do you know if any of the groups that were
mentioned yesterday, such as the International Association for Poly-
graph Research, American Academy of Polygraph Examiners,
Academy of Scientific Investigators, and others, sought to establish
minimum standards in any kind of consultation that would apply
to the several users in the Federal Government?
Mr. JOHN REID. We have a standard of principles set down, but I
don't think we have required each individual to practice our technique.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Do you know whether any of these groups have
met with the Federal Government at a top level to try to develop
overall standards?
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Mr. JOHN REID. I think Mr. Backster has met with them.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I comment on that?
Mr. OGDEN REID. Please.
Mr. BAOKSTER. In the folder that you have before you is an article
which if you will refer to is entitled "Polygraph Professionalization
Through Technique Standardization." This article is reprinted from
the April 1963 issue of Law and Order magazine, published by the
Copp Publishing Co. of New York City.
In this article, the situation, I feel, is quite adequately put on the
line as far as the profession is concerned and suggestions are made as
to that which could be done and should be done. These suggestions
revolved around the use., by examiners in the field, of a standardized
polygraph examiner notepack, which was to be provided and has been
provided by our research efforts at my school in New York City to
all examiners in the field at an actual printing cost-plus-postage basis.
To date 13,000 of these note packs have been disseminated at the
request of people in the field and are in use. A number of the schools
are teaching the use of the notepack in regard, to a standardized ap-
proach and the lone Comparison test connected with it. Fort Gor-
don has featured this test in the training of governmental personnel
and we have used this technique to train military and Government
personnel in our school in New York.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be in order
at this point in the record to insert pertinent portions of the com-
mittee print which pertain to educational requirements and the length
of time required for training.
Mr. Moss. Without objection that portion will be inserted in the
record. (See exhibit 3, p. 156.)
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, may I make a comment on that particular
aspect?
Mr. OGDEN REID. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. Having been a director of a 6-week school continu-
ously since 1951, at this point a few words could be said on behalf of
the 6-week training, plus the 2 years supervision of the individuals
once they go out in the field. This is accomplished by virtue of a
work project, which includes their mailing in typical cases on which
comments are made and returned to the examiner in the field, thereby
keeping some supervision over him and in connection with which free
attendance, tuitionwise and supplywise, is offered to the work con-
ferences that are held during the 2-year period at a minimum. This
is done in order that he can keep up to date on the training and the
new technique facets being introduced in the field.
After listening to the standards that have been set up, I am a little
amazed how we can excuse away the success of the 6-week graduates
that have graduated by virtue of 6 weeks' training, including a sizable
number of the individuals that belong to the organizations that Mr.
John Reid has fostered and developed.
These people were 6-week trainees themselves. I know, because
I have trained a number of them myself that are members of that
organization. They seem to be doing very well. I am wondering
how we can explain this. Actually my experience has been that a
sizable number of 6-week graduates receiving adequate supervision at
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the field level, have done very well as far as success is concerned and
are reported to be excellent polygraph examiners.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Backster, what is the basis for the 6'-week trainee?
What requirements have you in selecting a person for that training?
Mr. BACKSTEn. These requirements are outlined by the University
of the State of Now York who provides our private trade school super-
vision and they are also in the folder before you. (See exhibit 6,
p. 183.)
Mr. Moss. I would prefer to have it stated by you as succinctly
as possible for the record at this point. Briefly, don't you have them
in mind?
Mr. B CKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. That is all I want.
Mr. BACKSTLR. The State requires that a person who is nonspon-
sored by Government agency or military service have 2 years of col-
lege as indicated by 60 credits transmitted directly from the college
concerned to our school.
The individual who is sponsored by a governmental agency needs
to have a high school diploma or an equivalency certificate in order to
be admitted if he is being sponsored by his governmental or military
organization concerned or law-enforcement organization concerned.
In addition to that there is an age minimum of 21, I believe. I
would have to refer. It is either 21 or 23 years old. Also, the private
sponsored individual must have an interview with school officials dur-
ing which it is ascertained whether he is desirable in our opinion for
acceptance in the school.
Mr. Moss. Then the educational qualifications briefly stated?
Mr. BncKsTi;it. Two years of college if nongovernmentally spon-
sored; a high school graduate, or a person having a certificate demon-
strating equal knowledge if governmentally or law enforcement
sponsored.
Mr. OGDEN RLID. Mr. Chairman, I just have two more questions of
Mr. Inbau, if I may. If a polygraph is put in the hands of an un-
trained individual or not sufficiently trained, as we have said earlier,
you commented it is dangerous.
Would you, therefore, say that this instrument should not be. used
either by individuals or an agency in the Federal Government in the
absence of adequate professional standards?
Mr. INBAU. Yes. Congressman, sometimes a police department or
other agency may recognize that it will only be used as a psychological
gimmick for inducing confessions from the guilty. If it is used as
an interrogation prop and nothing more is expected of it, and if you
are not using it for- the detection of deception as such,- then perhaps
it may be all right to use it if it is generally recognized that is the
limitation.
But we are talking here about detection of deception and conse-
quently, for that purpose, I think the statement I made before correctly
represents my views.
. Mr. OGDEN RLID. Then in pursuit of that, in terms of unclassified
figures, we know there is something on the order of 512 polygraphs
being used and I think the classified information would indicate that
a substantial number in excess of that are being used in other areas.
Obviously they are concerned with some areas of deception. There-
fore, if that is true, your last statement, and the fact that perhaps 80
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P BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
percent or a -substantial number are not sufficiently trained, that means
in the Federal Government today it might well be that a majority of
those using the. polygraphs are not trained and the use of the poly-
graph by those individuals or agencies should be discontinued forth-
with until a governmental panel could be set up to establish standards
or until it was determined there was feasibility and need for it.
Is that a fair statement?
Mr. INBAU. I don't know that I would be as drastic as to say discon-
tinued forthwith.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Would you suggest that they continue if we have
agency X which has a substantial number, and we will say that their
examiners have had unsatisfactory training, a 6-week course, and
inadequate educational background? Would it not be your recom-
mendation that they stop use of the polygraph until such time that
professional standards are determined. Alternatively, should they use
the polygraph at all if they cannot hedge it in with adequate safe-
guards?
Mr. INBAU. I think in view of what I said in the hands of an un-
trained person if it is used for the detection of deception and decisions
are made upon that basis, there is danger in an agency tolerating the
testing where you have ill-trained, incompetent examiners.
Wliat I am concerned about and was many years ago and voiced my-
self on it both orally and in writing, I would have some fear for the
safety of this country if a person of the type we consider inadequately
trained, incompetent, making a decision that this person is trust-
worthy in this particular sensitive position, if they were giving 'a con-
siderable weight to the results of a polygraph test.
On the other hand, of course, as he mentioned earlier it can be
hurtful to the individual himself and unfair to him, as I say, while I
express these views I am not out for pulling the rug from out of this
thing at once. I think it could be done gradually. We have put up
with this fora number of years.
What I would like to see is to have this transition come about rather
gradually and perhaps we would fare out a lot better than just putting
a complete stoppage to it at this moment.
Mr. BACKSTF.R. Mr. Reid, I would like to comment if I might. How
many individuals have received-and I don't know whether it is proper
to direct a question to my copanel members-how many individuals
have received this 6 months' training of the 2,000 or 3,000 examiners
that exist in the field today?
Mr. OLDEN RED. I would suggest that Mr. Kass might want to re-
spond to that. I don't have the precise figures in front of me. But I
think our information, as evidenced in the table in the committee
print, is that perhaps a substantial majority of those conducting these
tests do not meet the standards that you gentlemen have mentioned
this morning.
Mr. KASS. That is substantially correct. .
Mr. BACKSTER. The standards that the gentlemen mentioned this
morning do not include my views on the standards as far as the length
of the training course is concerned. So we cannot preclude that 6-week
trained individuals are automatically inadequate in the field.
Mr. OLDEN REID. Would you hold that there should be a college de-
gree and adequate educational background quite aside from the period
of internship?
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Mr. BACKSTER. It would certainly be desirable to have some. It is
now not practical in the average police department throughout the
country.
Mr. OGDRN RE ID. We are not talking, Mr. Backster, about the aver-
age police department. We are trying to protect the rights of the
individual in the Federal Government. The question here is whether
the Federal Government has adequate standards. If they do not now
have adequate standards, should they not stop the process until they
can review the whole matter and determine what is valid? I would
like to ask Mr. Inbau just one final question.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I finish my comment?
Mr. OGDEN REID. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTEr,. I would like to state for the record without reserva-
tion that it is not my opinion that a, 6-week course, plus the supervision
period during the 2 years of field project work and the advanced
training through work conferences that are available, are inadequate.
I would like to again ask if I might, the only source for the 6 months'
training is Mr. John Reid's school itself, how many 6-month trainees
he has graduated?
Mr. OGDEN REID. I believe that the presumption must be, and the
responsibility of the Federal Government must be, that we are pro-
tecting the rights of the individual as well as the best interests of the
Government of the United States. While Government service is a
privilege and not an automatic right, on the other hand, I think most
of us who are concerned with civil liberties would never uphold any
process that we thought was an infringement-technically or other-
wise-of basic rights of due process.
I think we have a situation here today from what we have been
able to determine in the committee and the standards your gentlemen
in general subscribe to-either initially in terms of college education
or subsequently in terms of internship, where you disagree a little
bit-a situation substantially where we have widespread use of poly-
graphs, and a majority of these polygraphs apparently in the hands
of individuals who may not or, in fact, do not have sufficient training.
I think that is a reason for concern. I would like to ask Mr. Inbau
one final question.
Mr. BACKSTER. I didn't finish my point, for the record.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Let me go back to Mr. Inbau for one final point.
Mr. Moss. The Chair would like to make this observation to any of
the witnesses. The purposes of witnesses before this committee is to
develop for the committee the information which it, in its judgment,
requires. As a member undertakes a line of interrogation, he deter-
mines whether your response is adequate to satisfy him. If he is satis-
fied, it is not necessary that the witness also be satisfied.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, may I submit in writing supplementary ma-
terial?
Mr. Moss. Any request you might have for amplifying your testi-
mony in any manner can be made in writing to the chairman and it
will be considered by the committee. For moving along smoothly
here, Mr. Reid has the right to determine whether the response is
adequate for his needs.
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558 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. OGDEN REID. Mr. Backster, trying to clarify this so that you
feel that your point of view is fairly presented, as I understood the
thrust of your question and comment, you were concerned with the
6-week training period and the adequacy thereof.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. OGDEN REiD. I think what we are trying to determine here this
morning is the question of overall standards, particularly as they apply
to the Federal Government relating to both educational background
and maturity and a period of internship. As I understand it, you
have said that you think a college degree is desirable, where I think
the other gentlemen have more nearly suggested that it was virtually
essential.
You have indicated that you think a 6-week training period should
not be precluded, whereas the other gentlemen on the panel have
tended to suggest that a longer period was required for truly profes-
sional standards. Is that a fair statement of your position, or do
you want to add to it?
Mr. BACicsTER. May I comment on it?
Mr. OGDEN REID. You may indeed.
Mr. BACJisTER. Sir.
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. The reason I took issue with this is because of a
statement you made earlier in the record already concluding that a
6-week training period was grossly inadequate or improper.
Mr. OGDEN REID. I am not professionally competent to say what is
adequate or not. I am just saying that the trend of the testimony
suggests that we need uniform and higher standards than appear to
be the case. Exactly what those standards are is one of the reasons
for this inquiry in this hearing this morning.
I am not trying to prejudge it but the burden of the testimony this
morning is that we need higher standards. One member of the panel,
Mr. Inbau, said it may be a figure as high as 80 percent of those in
Federal Government who are not adequately trained. We are not
trying to pick a particular figure but merely indicate that a substantial
number, whether it is 30 percent or 50 percent or 80 percent, may not
have adequate training.
I am not trying to make a precise judgment as to where that line is.
Could I ask Professor Inbau one final question and conclude. If we
are faced here with the situation where the training standards do not
appear to be adequate in some instances, whatever the figure is, and
if we are faced with some judgment that the utilization and operation
of a polygraph takes very substantial and sophisticated training and
further there are areas of potential error, should there not in a legal
sense also not be some means of review of utilization of a polygraph
test or some means whereby the rights of the individual can be more
fully protected than could be the case?
Have you given any thought to what kind of review mechanism
within the framework of the interests of the Government on the one
hand and the constitutional rights of the individual on the other?
Mr. INBAU. I am not sure, Mr. Reid, I understand the full import
of your question when you say review. Do you mean as to the report
in every given case?
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Mr. OGDEN REID. As I understand it, if you are having either pre-
employment or postemployment inquiry, you have an investigation.
At a certain point in this investigation the individual is apprised that
it would be appropriate for him to take a polygraph test. It is true
that he has the right to say no, but if he, says no, this obviously does
not enhance necessarily his posture, the way some of these cases have
proceeded.
Therefore, it is not wholly a voluntary process. He, in effect, has to
submit to a polygraph under certain circumstances. It is clear that
sometimes the polygraph operator is either insufficiently trained, or
the machine itself may admit of error, or the totaling up of the evalua-
tions of the responses may admit of error.
I was addressing this more from the standpoint of the rights of
the individual. The question is, Should there not be some kind of a
review mechanism in the use of these polygraphs that would protect
the individual more fully in the Federal Government?
Mr. INBAU. I would think that within the agency there would be
some review. Take the case you just mentioned, the individual re-
fuses to take the test, for instance. On this matter of the significance
of a refusal, I would like to answer the question in the context of the
framework of the particular kind of case under investigation.
It seems to me if you have a case where it is a question whether this
individual did this particular act that involves a crime, it is an isolated
instance, let us say in police circles, a refusal there may be subject to
inference different I think than what we could subject it to in govern-
mental operations, where you have the individual on one side and gov-
ernmental security on the other.
I would say if the individual there refuses, the kind of supervision
that ought to be involved here is to inquire as to the reason for the
refusal. Some people may have a good reason for it. He may well
say') I don't trust the quality of the examiner conducting the review. I
dont trust the instrument that is being used.
In one governmental agency they have been using the galvanic re-
flex. If any friend of mine or any individual came to me for advice
as to whether he ought to subject himself to a test on a galvanometer
I would say refuse. I think that individual is entitled to have some
consideration given as to the reason for his refusal, and I think in
that case he has good and sufficient reason for refusal.
On the other hand, if he is before an agency which is using a poly-
graph, has an individual or a group of individuals competent to con-
duct, the examination, and he refuses, just a flat refusal without any
reason for it, I would say, weighing the rights of the individual against
the security of the country, that that refusal ought to be given a sig-
nificance that would be inimical to the best interests of the individual.
Mr. OGDEN REID. But also should there not be a review mechanism
on the general professional expertise in the use of a series of polygraph
examinations, reviewed at a certain technical level, because I think
every one admits the possibility of error in diagnosis, regardless of
whether the finding is plus or minus.
Should there not be a review mechanism from the technical as well
as from the rights of the individual standpoint?
Mr. INBAU. I would like to refer that to Mr. Lindberg, if I may.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Yes.
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Mr. LiNDBERG. As a practical matter, Mr. Reid, the suggestion that
you are making is a thing that does actually happen in our laboratory
and many other labs around the country, wherein the results of one
examination are in fact reviewed by a panel of three or more colleagues
of that particular examiner.
Many times, for example in our laboratory, if there is a dispute
among the examiners as to the significance of a particular pattern of
reactions, the subject is brought back for a reexamination. But in
every case the final conclusion is the result of a panel of examiners.
This affords the subject a considerable amount of protection.
Mr. OGDEN REID. To your knowledge, Mr. Lindberg, is there any
such review mechanism operating in the Federal Government today?
Mr. LINDBERG. Only from my casual knowledge of the operations,
I think there is an informal review of every case subject. Obviously
no examiner wants to make a mistake on anybody. He would seek
the assistance of his colleagues in rendering any significant opinion.
So I do believe as a practical matter it does occur. I might suggest,
however, that the main area for the protection of the individual is in
the agency's limitation of the scope of the inquiry. We are well
aware, both in private industry and in Government, that inquiries
are made that don't have any direct relevance to the issue of security.
I think in fairness to the rights of the individual, the scope of the
inquiry should be the first matter of business of any committee.
Mr. OGDEN REID. To sum up, may I ask this of you gentlemen, sev-
erally? Is it your joint conclusion that there should be set up at the
earliest date an intergovernmental committee to set up what would be
minimum professional standards?
Second, that this consideration or this committee should consider
the right of an appropriate review panel, either from a technical stand-
point or from the standpoint of the individual?
Third, Mr. Inbau, am I correct in assuming that you think where
there is clear evidence today that the operators are unqualified that
that agency or department should either go extremely slow in the use
of the polygraph, or terminate it until such time as adequate standards
can be developed?
Mr. INBAU. That correctly explains my position. May I add one
thing here in fairness to Mr. Backster, and I certainly feel he is entitled
to this, with respect to the 6-week course, when we say-and I repre-
sent Mr. Reid's and Mr. Lindberg's views-that we think 6 months is
the right time for someone to be trained under this apprenticeship
system we are talking about, we think that is what it ought to be.
In saying that, we don't mean to suggest that every person who has
come out of Mr. Backster's school or any other schools with 6 weeks
is for that reason incompetent. Following that 6 weeks, if over a
period of time he does acquire skill in the practical operations, with
some kind of supervision, say over a 2-year period, at the end of 2
years he may well be a competent examiner.
I think there are some people in this country today who have de-
veloped into competent examiners. What we are objecting to is to
have a man go to a 6-week school-and I know of one such school-
where they don't get this kind of postgraduate supervision, shall we
say, of this individual planted in a governmental agency or some other
police department or what have you, or in private industry, and let
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him at the end of that time start making these kinds of serious
judgments.
That is what we are opposed to. That is where I think there is a
real danger, both as to the governmental agency, if it be a govern-
mental agency, and to the individual who gets into the hands of a per-
son with that kind of training.
Mr. OGDEN REID. I understand that exposition of Mr. Backster's
point of view, but might I return to one point you said in your testi-
mony, that there may be as many as 80 percent of examiners in the
Federal Government who are not sufficiently qualified, and this, if so,
is a very dangerous thing. Therefore, what we are concerned about
it correcting that situation in the Federal Government.
Mr. INBAU. If there is a substantial percentage, then certainly it
is a matter that deserves some corrective measures at the earliest pos-
sible moment.
Mr. OGDEN REID. You said dangerous, so I assume you mean both
from the standpoint of the individual and from the standpoint of the
overall numbers involved that it is a matter of serious concern that
should require prompt action.
Mr. INBAU. That is my view.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you.
Mr. JOHN REID. Mr. Reid, there is one statement I might make
here. Regardless of the competency of the examiner, if the agency
using this test or if the examiner is not working at it constantly but
only a few cases a month, he, too, can be relegated to the incompetent
examiners. They should be full-time examiners.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Monagan.
Mr. MONAGAN. With respect to this matter of the extent of the
training, is the point not that there may not be competent people who
have had the shorter training, but rather the question of the danger
that might come from not having the more extensive training?
Would you agree with that?
Mr. LINDBERG. That is our position.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir.
Mr. MONAGAN. I don't think anyone has suggested that some of
these people may not do a competent job, but in the broad picture,
as I understand it, the point is made that it is more likely that there
would be less danger to individuals involved through the broader
preparation.
Mr. BAOKSTER. May I comment on that, sir?
Mr. MONAGAN. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. I don't understand by virtue of these standards
that are so stipulated how with less than perhaps 50 people who have
acquired their training by this method, the other 2,000-some exam-
iners have managed to get along.
Mr. MONAGAN. It is not that they have not managed to get along,
but it is the degree of competency. and the degree of protection to the
people who are being tested that is the question here. It his been
suggested that protection would not be afforded to the same extent
by lesser preparation. I think that has been covered sufficiently.
Professor Inbau, when you were talking about the fourth and fifth
amendments, I believe that you raised some question as to the compe-
31-647-64--5
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62 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
tency of Dr. Dearman to testify because of the fact that he was a
psychiatrist.
Mr. INBAU. My point was this. I don't know this individual him-
self and my remark was not directed to. him.
Mr. MONAGAN. I know that.
Mr. INBAU. What has been troubling me is this. I will try to
answer your question. Would you repeat it for me, please?
Mr. MONAGAN. The question is whether you didn't raise a ques-
tion as to the competency of Dr. Dearman to testify on the constitu-
tional question because he was a psychiatrist.
Mr. INBAU. Yes, I did.
Mr. MONAGAN. As I understand it, you have been teaching criminal
law for something like 25 years.
Mr. INBAU. I have been full time at the Northwestern Faculty since
1945 teaching criminal law.
Mr. MONAGAN. You have been reading the decisions of the Supreme
Court in that period?
Mr. INBAU. Yes, I have.
Mr. MONAGAN. Have you ever thought that psychiatric training
might not be a pretty good thing to have in following those decisions?
Mr. INBAU. Yes, sir.
Mr. MONAGAN. As I understand your point though, more seriously,
you feel that traditionally the fourth amendment has applied more
to the case of physical restraint; that is, taking papers out of a house,
or forcibly removing an individual, that sort of thing.
That the fifth amendment has traditionally applied more to self-
incrimination and that sort of thing.
Mr. INBAU. Yes, traditionally that has been so, although the
Supreme Court in this Wong Song case indicated that verbal state-
ments following an illegal arrest are to be excluded for that reason,
on the basis of the fourth amendment.
Mr. MONAGAN. Where it is tied in with an illegal physical re-
straint?
Mr. INBAU. An illegal arrest, yes. With the polygraph technique,
the individual is not forced to do this. It doesn't follow an illegal
procedure of any sort.
Mr. MONAGAN. I understand.
Mr. INBAU. The test is not given to someone who is unwilling to take
it. So I don't think we get involved in the constitutional issue for
that reason, unless the Supreme Court comes along one of these days
and says that any time you investigate a person it is an intrusion of
his privacy and then at that time we better take to the hills.
Mr. MONAGAN. I think when you began your testimony you said that
the instrument plays a minor role in this operation. Could you give
any rough percentage indication as to what degree that was, or would
that vary?
Mr. INBAU. I might relate it to medical examinations. What is a
stethocope to the individual using it? To someone untrained in diag-
nosing illness, it wouldn't mean anything. To a doctor it means a
great deal. Just what it means to him would depend upon his skill,
drawing upon his training, his experience, his innate skill, or other
medical instruments.
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The electrocardiogram. and so on, if you give it to an untrained per-
son, it doesn't mean anything. You need it to make a diagnosis, but if
you want a percentage, a 10 to 90 percent, the important factor is the
adequacies of the individual who is trying to make the diagnosis.
Mr. MONAGAN. You say 10 percent would be the instrument and 90
percent the individual?
Mr. INBAU. Maybe Mr. Lindberg can give you some figures on this.
Mr. MONAGAN. I realize you can't do this with mathematical exact-
ness but I am just trying to get an approximation.
Mr. LINDBERG. The question, Congressman, is obtuse in that sense
because it is 100-percent examiner. The results of a polygraph test
mean nothing to an untrained person, just as I could not read the steno-
type tape that is coming out here. The machine is no good to. that man
without training, you see. The same with the polygraph examiner. It
cannot be relegated to percentages. The examiner can't work without
the instri ent, the instrument is useless without a trained examiner.
Mr. MONAGAN. It is sufficient to say that the examiner's importance
is very, very substantial.
Mr. INBAU. It certainly is.
Mr. LINDBERG. A hundred percent.
Mr. MONAGAN. In the whole operation. There was some discussion
on the first day in the case that Mr. Gallagher cited of some questions
that were asked of an 18-year-old girl
Mr. INBAU. A 17-year-old girl.
Mr. MONAGAN. A 17-year-old girl. It was not clear to me and I
asked the question at the time as to what function or role 'a polygraph
had in this. Did you understand that the polygraph was involved in
that in some way?
Mr. INBAU. As I understand it, what Mr. Gallagher said was that
in the course of a polygraph test of this 17-year-old applicant for a
governmental position she was asked something about homosexuality
and that is what was found to be offensive to Mr. Gallagher and to
others.
As Mr. Lindberg pointed out the first day, I don't think it is fair
to say that the polygraph examiner is the one at fault there because
the agency for which he was working insisted apparently, if this case
be true-and I don't know anything about the particular case-that
this matter be explored. If they tell him that this is what should be
explored he has to go ahead and do it.
Again, as Mr. Lindberg pointed out, these were matters subject to
inquiry perhaps even before they began using the polygraph tech-
nique. This is one area where we think this committee could set
up some standards to determine what are the limitations for this kind
of an exploration into an individual's personality.
Mr. MONAGAN. The reason I am asking the question is that as 1
understood it, your objection was rather broad scaled. But you would
concede, would you not, that there would be instances in the Govern-
ment, particularly in security areas, where a question of that type
might well be appropriate?
Mr. INBAU. Absolutely. I trust I made myself clear. I certainly
hoped to do so, that I didn't mean to suggest that this is an inappro-
priate question in all instances. I think it is a matter that should be
reconsidered as to whether in a case of a girl out of high school ap-
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plying for a typist job, and as Mr. Gallagher said, in a nonsensitive
position, whether you should go into this.
Perhaps reserve it for a later time when this girl is considered for
a position that is of a sensitive nature and perhaps maybe there is
something or some reason to suspect she, might be homosexual. I
didn't mean to preclude that kind of inquiry altogether; no, sir.
Mr. MONAGAN. It does point up the need either for agency super-
vision or regulation or for proper selection of the individual ad-
ministering the test if in fact the question was his own idea.
Mr. INBAU. Yes, sir.
Mr. JOHN REID. Mr. Mona-an, this might be a suggestion, whether
it is taken or not, if an applicant for a fob in the Government was
given the questions or the areas which the polygraph test would cover
and allowed to decide whether or not he wants to take this job, whether
or not these areas are fair, then he could come and take the test. If
the areas are unfair, they should write and say they have another job.
Mr. INBAU. I think what Mr. John Reid is suggesting is that the
person applying for a position ought to know just what kind of in-
quiry he will be subjected to or that will be conducted and how per-
sonal it will get and the individual decides before coming into the room
to take the test whether he wants to subject himself to this kind of
searching inquiry.
Mr. MONAGAN. That is why I did suggest that we get more facts on
this case because it is possible that it could be cleared up if we knew
the background.
Mr. BAOKSTER. Sir, in commenting on that, and also to illustrate
that I am not opposed to all aspects of the material presented today as
it might seem, I am strongly in favor of regulation that requires each
and every question to'be reviewed word for word with the person taking
the examination before the start of the chart upon which it is used,
with no exception.
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. John Reid, when you testified on the first day,
you said something that I would like to ask you to expand on. You
said that the instrument does stand in itself and the techniques as a
diagnostic instrument giving the examiner the leads as to what points
he should look for. Is that a fairly correct statement?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes; it is fairly correct, sir.
Mr. MONAGAN. Could you give a specific example as to just what you
mean by that?
Mr. JOHN REID. Ina specific case where we are looking into, let us
say, a robbery, a man is suspected of this robbery andhe is brought in
for a test and agrees to take the test. If there are responses on the con-
trol questions that I explained the other day and not on this particular
robbery, then after three tests we don't have to go further but just
shake his hand and turn him back to the people who brought him in.
Mr. MONAGAN. In other words, the broad question was whether he
had ever stolen anything during his vacation or when he was a boy or
something of that sort?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes, sir. But if in the first three tests we find out
that he has reactions that are similar one to the other MONAGAN. What would these reactions be?
Mr. JOHN REID. They could be changes in blood pressure, they could
be suppressions in respiration. There could be some muscular pres-
sures that the man is applying that normally should not be on the chart.
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It may also be on a control question as well as on the question regard-
in , g throbbery. Then it is necessary for us to move that on and it
gives us some leads now to find out what we have to do with this
person.
Mr. MONAGAN. In other words, he reacts in a certain way to the first
question?
Mr. JOHN REID. Yes.
Mr. MONAGAN. His pulse stays the same or something like that?
Mr. JOAN REID. Yes.
Mr. MONAGAN. Have you previously told him that you were going
to ask him this question ?
Mr. Jorn REm. Everything is previously told.
Mr. MONAGAN. Then you ask the second question and he has been
told that he is going to be asked that one?
Mr. JOHN RED. Yes, sir.
Mr. MONAGAN. And you compare the different items, pulse and
temperature and so forth, with those that existed at the time of the
first question?
Mr. JozzN REID. Yes, sir. As far as the statement is made there, if
certain things occur in the test we go on further. If we cannot estab-
lish after five tests which responses are the most significant we may ask
the man to return fora further examination at a later time. Those are
the leads I refer to.
Mr. MONAGAN. In an easy case all of the responses might be. dif-
ferent. You might have cases where some responses would be the same
and some would be different.
Mr. JOHN REID. Barring a nervous person, sir-an overly nervous
person-an easy case is the innocent person. He gives all the coopera-
tion in the world. Whereas the guilty person may very well try to
do some mental gymnastics or secret muscular movements to throw
the machine off. This may distort the chart.
Mr. MONAGAN. And the subjective judgment of the examiner from
demeanor and other evidence is also involved in this final judgment.
Mr. JOHN REm. Yes.
Mr. LINDBERG. Mr. Monagan, if I might suggest that the technique
that Mr. John Reid is referring to and the one that is in his 1953
edition of "Lie Detection" is one which uses normal questions to de-
termine what this subject's status is under these circumstances today.
It also has questions which are known lies as Mr. Reid explained be-
fore. The unknown issue is the degree of emotional involvement on
the hot question. Simply stated, if the subject's reaction-emotional
reaction-on the hot question is more similar to the normal., he is tell-
ing the truth. Of course, this is over a period of several. examinations.
If it looks more like the control question or is in excess of the control
question as far as the emotional. display is concerned, and this occurs
consistently, which is required by scientific method, then the subject
is reported as deceptive on that issue.
Mr. MONAGAN. Speaking of emotional involvement, couldn't an in-
nocent person have more of an emotional involvement than someone
who was guilty and how do you protect against misinterpretation be-
cause of that?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. That, of course., is the crux of the polygraph
examiner's job. It is the thing we work with every day. The answer
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bb~b USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
is that an innocent person is primarily concerned about the control
question or questions. There are more than one in the examination.
Therefore the focus of his emotional attention is reflected on the con-
trol question and not on the murder or the homicide or whatever the
specific issue is that he is being questioned about.
This is the heart of the technique. It is a comparative technique.
You can say to yourself, it seems to me if I were a subject and I were
innocent just the mere fact of walking into the polygraph room would
be sufficiently disturbing emotionally that I would react on the theft
of the thousand dollars.
But that is not a fact. You will react on the control question as pre-
pared by the examiner with you before the test and you would be de-
clared innocent.
Mr. JOHN REID. In addition to that, sir, 25 minutes or 25 minutes
we spend with the subject we spend beforehand in a pretest interview.
We attempt to allay all his fears or most of his fears and put him at
ease before we start the test-reading the questions, identiing the
areas which we are looking into with the subject., letting the' subject
know that the control question is not to be reported.
Mr. MONAGAN. We lave been talking more, I think, about what you
might call investigative use in the sense of criminal investigation
than any other. But it is true, is it not, that preemployment is an
increasing area of the use of the polygraph?
Mr. LINDBERG. Preventive security.
Mr. MONAGAN. How would you say the volume of use there com-
pared with police investigation, enforcement, and so forth?
Mr. LINDBERG. Are you referring to the Federal Government use?
Mr.MONACAN. I think we should confine it to that.
Mr. LINDRERG. I certainly wouldn't be qualified to say but I would
suggest that there is a considerable greater use of it as a screening
device than as a criminal investigative device, although I don't speak
with any authority on that statistic.
Mr. MONAGAN. Do you have experience which would permit you
to say how many people are excluded from employment or what per-
centage by virtue of these tests?
Mr. LINDBERG. In industry?
Mr. MONAGAN. I think we should confine it to the Federal Gov-
ernment.
Mr. LINDBER,G. I don't have any statistics.
Mr. MONAGAN. Let us ask both those questions with relation to in-
dustry as long as you do have the figures.
Mr. LINDBERG. Our statistics reflect-although it depends upon the
industry involved as to whether it is a financial institution or whether
it might be, let us say, a warehouse operation-the general statistics
reflect that approximately 30 percent are rejected and 70 percent are
accepted.
Mr. MO- AGAN. How about the volume of its use in industry, do you
have any figures on that?
Mr. LINDEERG. Apparently our statistics for 1963 indicated that
about 25 percent of the tests that we conducted involved preemploy-
ment assessments. That would be a figure of roughly 1,700 out of
5,000.
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Mr. INBAU. I would just add this footnote, that of this percentage
of rejection, it is not based on an opinion of the examiner, but in the
course of the examination or after the examination the individual will
come up with information which pretty clearly rules him out. For
instance, in the case they have had, and it is not too unusual at that, a
inan applying fora position, one of these check-cashing services where
the trucks go around cashing company payroll checks and so on, this
young fellow out of the Army several months, applied for a position
at this check-cashing agency, and the lie detector technique disclosed
he had stolen money and so on. The posttest interview brought out
the fact that this boy, between his Army service and the time he ap-
plied for this job, had been involved in some burglaries, robberies.
Obviously, he is not fit to get on this check-cashing truck. I think in
fairness to the individual as well as the company it is better that he
works in a warehouse, ,somewhere where he might not be as dangerous.
Mr. Moss. Would you yield on that point?
Mr. MONAGAN. I would be glad to.
Mr. Moss. The type of information you have just given regarding
an application for employment is information which in the course
of any well-conducted investigation should have been developed any-
way, isn't it?
Mr. INBAU. No, sir; I think these cases that they get, particularly
applicants for the police department, have passed all the standard
tests. Mind you, this boy had not. been arrested for anything. He
had not been arrested at all. There was no way in which a check
with the neighborhood he lives in and so on would reveal he com-
mitted burglaries. This is one way you, could find it and. I know
of no other way in which you could do it.
Mr. LINDBERG. I might amplify if I could, Mr. Moss, on that point,
that without the use of the polygraph on an industry a job would
go to one of two types of people. Either an. honest person who has
conducted himself in an honest manner and is entitled to a job,: or
a highly successful criminal who has not been detected by law en-
forcemexit. I don't know what the exact statistics are. but it is quite
a high percentage. Frequently, these young people, and I am re-
ferring specifically to the ones who are applying for police depart-
ment jobs, some of the people applying for police department jobs,
have been extremely successful criminals. They have not been de-.
tested as evidenced by one we had a month ago who had committed
400 Chicago burglaries without detection and was applying for a
police department job and was highly indignant at this invasion of
privacy because he had learned from another policeman who he identi-
fied "as much of a criminal as I am," in his words,. said as long as you
have a criminal record you will get the police department job. This
he thought was a trick and, an outright invasion of his privacy. He
was entitled to keep secret the fact that he had committed these
burglaries.
Mr. BACK.STER. Sir, may I comment on this?
Mr. Moss. I will undertake my own questioning later.
Mr. MONAGAN. The only other question I have is whether or not,
you, Mr. Backster, can add anything to the answers with respect to
the volume of use of the polygraph either in Federal preemployment
tests or private or both.
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E OF POLYGRHS 13Y THE
Mr. BACKSTER. On one occasion or another I have been a consultant
to most every Government agency that is using the polygraph today,
and I have known at certain times what their volume was and can only
estimate what it would be now. I do know that in setting up the
program for Central Intelligence Agency and being active in that
program for a period of time, that the amount of derogatory material
that was uncovered, that was important and uncovered by the poly-
graph as compared to the field investigation with no reflection on the
competency of those doing it at its very best level as far as investiga-
tive effort is concerned, was approximately 25 percent of derogatory
information uncovered comparing it to the total uncovered simul-
taneously, and with no coordination of the two procedures. Actually
using the polygraph as a theoretical 100 percent-25 percent on an
average of that information was uncovered by field investigation.
Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you.
Mr. LINDBERG. They are notoriously unproductive, field investiga-
tions.
Mr. MONAGAN. Did you say that one individual had committed 400
burglaries?
Mr. LINDBERG. In the Chicago-land area over a period of approxi-
mately 5 years, I believe it was. He was 21 or 22.
Mr. MONAGAN. That is more than one a week.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. MoNAGAN. None had been detected in any way?
Mr. LINDBERG. No. He had also participated in over 50 Chicago-
land and Midwest laboratories, one of which there was a John Doe
warrant on file for him in Chicago.
Mr. MONAGAN. Was he prosecuted subsequently?
Mr. LINDBERG. No.
Mr. MONAGAN. Why not?
Mr. LINDBERG. The arrangement that we have with the employing
agency is that the polygraph shall not be used for the purposes of
detecting criminal behavior for prosecution but only for assessing the
applicant's qualifications. These people would not make these dis-
closures if they were concerned that they would be prosecuted the next
day for them.
Mr. MONAGAN. What about the duty as a citizen that an examiner
would have. Four hundred burglaries is a pretty good number, but
you could also conceive of other crimes of a more serious nature. Is
there any obligation on the part of the examiner to report such a
thing to the police?
Mr. LINDBERG. We don't believe so, Mr. Monagan, and no legislative
body has imposed that on litigation that we know of. Professor Inbau
may have a comment on that fact. We have confessions of murder
and homicide also occurring in our laboratory which are not at issue
and they are not disclosed?
Mr. RErss. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr, MONAGAN. Yes.
Mr. RErss. I suggest, Mr. Witness, that you are guilty of sup-
pressing quite a few felonies and it is the duty of citizens to report
these matters.
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Mr. INBAU. Not under Illinois law. If these were Federal offenses
it might be something else. Under Illinois law there is no requirement
for the disclosure of this information.
Mr. MEADER. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. MONAGAN. Yes.
Mr. MEADER. Do you think there is a privilege between an examinee
and examiner such as the privileged relationship between attorney and
client and doctor and patient?
Mr. INBAU. There is certainly no statutory privilege. This infor-
mation could be obtained from these gentlemen by a court pursuant
to a court order.
Mr. MEADER. In other words, if I discovered that Mr. Lindberg had
information concerning the commission of 400 burglaries and I should
call him before a grand jury he could not invoke the privilege against
testifying that an attorney could?
Mr. INBAU. I think that is right because his relationship with this
'person, even though Mr. Lindberg is an attorney, is not an attorney-
client relationship, so he could be compelled to disclose this. Inci-
dentally, in this particular case of 400 burglaries, this doesn't mean
stealing furs and this sort of thing. With a young fellow most of
those were of a minor nature. It certainly revealed that this indi-
vidual was not the kind that ought to be employed on the police force.
The one case of a breach of this confidentiality, as a case Mr. (John)
Reid had and it was a troublesome one and he conferred with me about
it, we finally came of the conclusion that this one was of such a serious
nature it had to be reported to the authorities. It was a young fellow
who committed a very serious arson. He was a menace to the com-
munity. I was talking about collective menace because this boy could
set fire to a hospital, school, or what have you. In that instance his
attorney was urged to disclose this and the attorney refused to do it
and Mr. Reid, after considerable soul-searching, did breach the con-
fidentiality in this case. But in the other cases it just can't be. done in
order to successfully carry out this preemployment screening operation.
Mr. MEADER. The examiner customarily, or as a rigid rule of proce-
dure, always advises the examinee that the statements made will be
treated confidentially?
Mr. INBAU. With respect to the control questions and answers.
George, do you want to answer?
Mr. MEADER. I mean before you commence the examination, do you
assure the examinee that the statements he makes during the exam-
ination will be treated as confidential?,
Mr. INBAU. No. If you are checking with him with respect to some
particular offense, robbery, murder, rape, what have you, he is not told
that. One of the purposes frequently is not only to determine whether
he is lying or telling the truth but if he is lying to interrogate him after
the determination of lying has been made with a view to getting him
to admit his guilt. That is subject to disclosure. But as regards the
control questions the standard procedure is to keep that within the
res of the examiner himself.
Mr. LINDBERG. As a practical matter, Congressman, when I sug-
gested and'told you that regarding the 400 burglaries and 50 robberies
and the other plans this man had for felonies this material was re-
ported in our report to the authority to whom we respond. This hap-
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949O1 00380001-7
pens to be the counsel, I mean the attorney for the city and for the
police department. As regards the privileged communication, one
may arise as the result of that fact. That is, the fact that we did
respond to the attorney for the city.
Mr. M ONAGAN. It is rather surprising and somewhat shocking to
realize that this exists. First of all, I don't think that you should put
a dollar tag on the question of whether or not you are going to report
a crime, and secondly, it does seem to establish a sort of seal of a con-
fessional or a new privileged relationship and puts the question of
whether or not a report is made either upon the examiner, or if you
identify him with his employer, upon the employer. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I have no further questions.
Mr. Moss. Briefly, back to the perpetrator- of 400 burglaries and
50 holdups.
Mr. LINDBERG. Robberies.
Mr. Moss. Robberies. A rather impressive record. Could this
young man have been a psychotic who just sort of expanded upon
fancy and had a field day for himself ?
Mr. LINDBERG. We were concerned about that. I am not qualified
as a psychiatrist to speak as to whether he is a psychotic or not. He
has shown no indications of that and he did verify the locations of
certain of these burglaries, and certain of the robberies, and also cer-
tain routes of armored cars which he planned to "tip over," as he used
the phrase.
Mr. Moss. Isn't it true that there are a great many people who come
forward every year and impose burdens on police departments by
confessions of crimes never committed?
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. And this could occur in the course of a polygraph exam-
ination?
Mr. LINDBERG. It certainly could.
Mr. Moss. The polygraph, and I think this is what we must look at,
is essentially an instrument that undertakes to measure certain physio-
logical responses of a human being. In that sense it is a scientific in-
strument. In that sense, it is an accurate instrument. It measures
the blood pressure, it measures the respiration, and it gives you a
reaction on a galvanometer of certain surface responses. It may have
other measurements that it takes. In this sense it is no different than
the electrocardiogram, or as you indicated Dr. Inhau, the stethoscope.
So, there is no lie detector as an instrument; is that correct?
Mr. INBAU. Yes; there is no instrument that automatically does
that.
Mr. Moss. The lie, detector is a human being. One of the things he
relies upon is an instrument giving him a series of graphs indicating
physiological reactions of a human being. Mr. Backster, in your fol-
der you apparently endorse the use of the galvanic skin meter : Is that
correct?
Mr. BACK5TER. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Mr. Moss. And the electrical impulses that are transmitted to the
instrument you feel are adequate in the hands of an operator with a
high-school diploma, 6 weeks of training, and 2 years of supervised
case experience to make a determination as to the guilt or innocence
of another individual ?
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Mr. BACZCSTER. No, si.r ; I do not maintain that at all. In the first
place, in applicant screening, and especially in the specific type screen-
ing, I feel it is not the capacity of the polygraph examiner to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of any one. That is the capacity of our
court system and review systems, and God Almighty, perhaps.
Mr. Moss. Then we will say the honesty or dishonesty.
Mr. BACIcSTER. Let us say the truth or falsity and that would be
the extent of my particular findings in a specific case.
Mr. Moss. A response to this one instrument is adequate to deter-
mine truth or falsity'?
Mr. BACIcsTER. No, sir.; it is not.
Mr. Moss. You didn't let me finish.
Mr. BACKSTE . I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Moss. When used under the conditions I have stated, those in
the hands of an operator or with a high school diploma, 6 weeks of
training, and 2 years of supervised field work.
Mr. BACICSTER. I repeat, no, sir, it is not.
Mr. Moss. All right, then, you add the other conditions.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir; in the first place, the picture here is a schematic
of galvanic skin response and there is always the breathing tracing
at a minimum accompanying it. Unfortunately; in printing this,
the word "schematic" that was printed on the chart itself was covered
over with oiie of the overlays. But aside from that, with breathin
and with galvanic skin response properly used, the result,can be useg
only as an interview guide during a pre-employment. exam and never
to determine even deception, let alone guilt.
Mr. Moss. All right, then, you are saying that the use of these two
indices, that of respiration, and the surface reactions of the skin are
adequate in the hands of an operator with the training previously
mentioned?
Mr. BACKSTEIR. Adequate in )-,,hat regard, Sir?
Mr. Moss. To develop the truthfulness of an individual.
Mr. BACKS TER. No, sir ; they are not adequate to do that.
Mr. Moss. What do you require in addition to this? How signifi-
cant are the readings that you take from the polygraph in the deter-
mination made by the operator?
Mr. BACKSTER. In the determination made on a preemployment test
that involves more than one issue in the same chart you are no longer
running a direct question-type test in which you can determine the
truthfulness or the falsity of the individual concerning that particular
question, but you are then running a probing peak of tension test to
which the subject may respond only to the one problem area that
bothers him most. He may be bothered by other problem areas. In
the long run in determining whether he was telling the truth or was
attempting a deception by some other method, it may be found that
he was attempting deception and showed nothing on the polygraph
tracings.
Mr. Moss. The basic determination goes back to the readings of the
polygraph in the hands of the operator?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir, as a, guide.
Mr. Moss. That is what I am getting at, sir.
Mr. BACKSTER. Asa guide in interrogation only, not as an indication.
Mr. Moss. You have expanded on this guide. You fall back to the
readings from the polygraph?
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Mr. BACKsTER. In making a report, sir?
Mr. Moss. In your statement.
Mr. BACKSTER. In any pre-employment report, not one report in
17 years of continuous usage of these indices, have I ever reported
that an applicant was attempting deception.
Mr. Moss. I didn't ask you that.
Mr. BACKSTER. Or an applicant truthful either.
Mr. Moss. I didn't ask you that either.
Mr. BACKSTER. What is the question?
Mr. Moss. I asked you in your determination of the truthfulness of
the person, these were significant. Then you went on to elaborate-I
could have the reporter read it back-and you said that the "peaks,"
I believe is the term you used, become significant. That is the question
I asked you.
Mr. BACRSTER. Yes.
Mr. Moss. In the determination of the operator.
Mr. BACKSTER. In what determination, sir? That is where we are
at odds.
Mr. Moss. What determination is he there to make?
Mr. BACKSTER. He is not there to make a determination by this tech-
nique of truth or falsity.
Mr. Moss. What is he to determine?
Mr. BACKSTER. He is to use the chart indices as a guide in his inter-
view procedure in the pursuit of the interview of that individual.
Mr. Moss. For what objective?
Mr. BACKSTER. With the objective in mind of finding out if the per-
son does have some serious consideration that falls within bonding
company realm that is bothering him concerning a particular back-
ground topic.
Mr. Moss. What are they concerned with?
Mr. BACKSTER. They are concerned with the topics you have outlined
here on this sample report. Indebtedness to see if there are financial
pressures that would cause a person to be tempted to steal. Marital
tranquillity only to the point of whether there is complete tranquillity,
or pursuit for alimony, support, garnishees of wages, because of this;
but only to a degree that does not become ultrapersonal. The extent
of gambling, if this is done to a promiscuous extent. Extensive drink-
ing if it is done to excessive extent.
Mr. Moss. This is s, psychiatric examination.
Mr. BACKSTER. So is every personal interview, then.
Mr. Moss. What does the psychiatrist attempt to do?
Mr. BACKSTER. I do not feel qualified to answer that.
Mr. Moss. Behavioral problems; isn't it?
Mr. BACKSTER. You are the psychiatrist.
Mr. Moss. I am not a psychiatrist.
Mr. BACKsTER. Did I understand you right that you had psychiatric
training?
Mr. Moss. No, sir. What you overheard me comment this morning
to a member of my staff
Mr. BACKSTER. This was yesterday, sir.
Mr. Moss. Yesterday, that he had supplied me with a very dry bit
of reading.
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Mr. BACKSTER. That was today.
Mr. Moss. Entitled, "The Manipulation of Human Behavior" by
Biderman and Zimmer. I manfully waded through it. I qualified
myself yesterday, I thought rather pointedly, by acknowledging that-
I was a layman both in law and medicine.
Mr. BACKsTER. That is what I heard. May I clarify one mistake
that many people make in regard to preemployment type screening?
It is the very one that I fear a number of committee members may have
in mind. They may think that preemployment exams are for the
purpose of determining truth or deception regarding any given target
area.
Mr. Moss. Do you deal only in preemployment type examinations?
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir.
Mr. Moss. Do you deal in examinations of the type where a deter-
mination of truthfulness is the end objective?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir; I certainly do.
Mr. Moss. All right, let us confine ourselves for the moment to that
type of case.
Mr. BACKSTER. All right, sir. That would be a specific incident-
type examination.
Mr. Moss. What use do you make of the instrument and what type
of instrument do you utilize in those cases?
Mr. BACKSTER. During the type of examination where you are at-
tempting to determine the truthfulness or the falsity of the individual
regarding a given target that is being pursued during this type exam-
ination at a very minimum the three indices should be used without
exception and preferably more than the three basic indices.
Mr. Moss. All three should be used?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Blood pressure?
Mr. BAOKSTER. Yes, and the breathing and the GSR.
Mr. Moss. And the breathing and skin response?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Have you determined what other physiological problems
of a person could produce similar responses to those which show up
on these graphs, and would have a bearing on the operator's interpre-
tation?
Mr. BAOKSTER. Yes, sir; I have pursued that at great length.
Mr. Moss. Through what type of training?
Mr. BACKSTER. May I start in by stating that the very basis of the
procedure that is being used is not based on allowing extraneous
factors to distort the examination results to any degree of consistent
fashion by the very nature of the intercomparisons and the number
of intercomparisons that are used throughout the examination
procedure.
Mr. Moss. You know, Mr. Backster, you remind me of a hearing I
had last year where we were inquiring into television ratings, and
audience measurement. We had instruments there and they were very
important. They formed the basis of one system and under exam-
ination they were not important, and then they were important. They
either have or have not a significance.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, in this case, I think it may be of importance
because this is the same system that I am talking of that is used as a
standard at the Fort Gordon school.
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74 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. Moss. I think it is most important and that is why I started my
line of questions with you, because in the presence of this committee,
yonstated that you aided in establishing the system used by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. And you were, I believe, the adviser in the establishment
of the system now used at Fort Gordon?
Mr. BACKSTER. That is right.
Mr. Moss. For the training of polygraph operators for the Federal
Government?
Mr. BACKSTER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Moss. So I am interested in your system to find out the role
the polygraph plays.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, may I ask you a question? I have just several
colored slides that would take a few seconds to project that could help
you greatly in understanding this.
Mr. Moss. I think you could explain it, can't you?
Mr. BACRSTER. I will try to. It involves chart interpretation.
Where you gentlemen yourself, within a few minutes, could interpret
charts that are the product of the propert technique leading up to chart
interpretation.
Mr. Moss. This is the thing that I find disturbing. It seems to me
that when we start to take readings of physiological changes in any-
thing as complex as a human being, it is inconceivable to me that
within 6 months' time
Mr. BACKCSTER. Six weeks, sir.
Mr. Moss. Six weeks, I believe. Six months in deference to the
others. That in 6 months a person with a minimum educational back-
ground which has been the concensus of the three gentlemen in one
instance and the high school qualification which you accept as ade-
quate, that these people can take, with any degree of reliability, and
fall back upon these physiological responses, unless they are fully
conversant with all. of the things that could go wrong in that body,
the differences between human beings, which could produce similar
responses. Whether the person before you is one who has, we will
say, been long under tension? Maybe he is not even aware of it.
Whether it is a very relaxed person? Whether it is a person who
has some serious illness undetected which could have an impact upon
the physiological responses? I don't see how, lacking this basic
training, a person is really competent to rely upon physiological
changes and indication of those changes as having pertinency to their
truthfulness in responding to questions put by the operator, again
who has no particular training in the field of psychology.
Mr. BACKSWIR. May I comment?
Mr. Moss. Yes, you can comment.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I wish only for the opportunity to be able to
convince you and the gentlemen with you that this can be done.
Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Backster referred to some slides.
Do you have them here with you ?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir, I Z.
Mr.111EADER. Why don't we see them?
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Mr. Moss. I think we will. I am willing to be convinced.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir, I am willing to try.
Mr. LINDBERG. Might I suggest, Mr. Moss, while Mr. Backster is
setting this up, that in the event his demonstration is not convincing
to each and everyone of you, that we have been working closely, not
only with Mr. John Reid for the past 20 years, but more recently
with the biomedical stair of Northwestern. University with the same
people who work with the psychiatrists with their problems, with the
surgeons with their problems, and with the physiologists and these
other people with their problems, trying to work on interdisciplinary
approaches to solve the problems of each field. They have established
to our satisfaction that we do use the same techniques, for example, in
analyzing records; namely, the impression technique that the neu-
rologists and these other people who are generally looked. upon as being
accomplished and accurate and definite and so forth. We use similar
procedures.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Lindberg, you use similar procedures, but you must
concede that you do not have similar training.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. Yet you are dealing with the same thing, the human
being.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. Moss. If you had a very recent thorough physical examina-
tion of your subject, and perhaps some psychological examination of
the subject, then I think there might be a basis to move ahead with
that person coming into your office and submitting to an examination,
frequently under great duress. Because while we talk very easily
of the voluntary nature of this, the fact that it becomes a requirement
for employment brings in an element of compulsion. It may be
economic forces that make the individual submit to something which
otherwise in the true voluntary sense he would not submit to.
Mr. LINnrrrG. Might I suggest, Mr. Moss, that it is the same
compulsion that causes many also to take the written examination
as to intelligence of the physical exam?
Mr. Moss. I realize that.
Mr. LINDBErG. The same compulsion and nothing in excess of that.
Mr. Moss. Here we are talking about a very new field.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Where we rely significantly upon the physiological reac-
tion he has as an individual.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. But it is the type of reactions that are rather
well known in medicine, for example. They have prevailed now for
50 or more years.
Mr. Moss. In the hands of a doctor I wouldn't have the serious
questions. Well known in medicine but not well known in the hands
of the average, rather deficiently trained operator.
Mr. LINDBERG. Might I suggest that the expert in the polygraph
field is trained specifically in the art or science of the detection of
deception and in that regard no psychiatrist, psychologist, doctor,
or neurologist is better qualified?
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76 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. Moss. I wouldn't argue with you on that if that person also
had the training which could inform him that the response I am
getting might be an indication of deception or it might be an indica-
tion of some very basic physiological problem in that human machine.
Mr. LINDBERG. Frequently, if those problems evidence themselves
in the polygraph records, we do consult with the people that you are
concerned with. Over the years, we have built quite an impressive
record of research.
Mr. Moss. Today we are using many exotic drugs and medications.
The full impact of those upon the human body is at the moment not
understood by the medical profession. We had to enact far more
stringent testing requirements. You recall that we have had some
rather shocking side effects of many of these drugs.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. It is suspected that many accidents occur on highways
because people routinely use something which interferes with the
normal function either of the mind or of the body.
Mr. LINDBERG. We have been consulted by people who are inter-
ested in studying the effects of those drugs. We are working in the
biomedical area on that. They want our learning.
Mr. Moss. They want your learning but there is not still in this
field the active participation of the qualified medical researcher, the
qualified researcher in psychiatry, that I would like to see.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, there is.
Mr. Moss. You say yes, there is. Maybe there is academically.
Mr. LINDBERG. We are the practitioners and the researchers as
well. But there are other people in the background.
Mr. Moss. What is your qualification in medicine?
Mr. LINDBERG. I am a practitioner of polygraph examinations.
Mr. Moss. Of law. What is your background in physiology?
Mr. LINDBERG. Fairly substantially. I don't work with it every
day. I have had practically every physiological course.
Mr. Moss. How closely do you follow the reports of new drugs
and medications?
Mr. LINDBERG. We receive a significant amount of literature in
the field.
Mr. Moss. One of the great problems today is even attempting to
keep up with the literature when encountered in daily practice.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is why so many of them are so uninformed in
the area of polygraph because they don't have the opportunity.
Mr. BACKSTER. May Ihave one statement, please?
Mr. Moss. I am going to have some questions for you, too.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know before the demon-
stration starts just what is being demonstrated here and how long
it is going to take.
Mr. Moss. He said it would be very brief.
Mr. BACKSTER. Very brief; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. He would explain as he goes along.
(At this point, the showing of slides began with slide No. 2201.)
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78 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. BAC.KSTER. Gentlemen, in this particular chart, we have repre-
sented by color code, two distinct and different types of questions used
in an examination. This is really meant to be green, my color photog-
raphy is not so good. We have, with color code, indicated by red
where a strong, relevant question was asked which was designed to
cause a response and the guilt of the individual was later confirmed.
We have asked at each of these two locations, where the green color
code is, a question designed to stimulate the innocent person, later
verified. He should not respond, in this particular case to both of
these questions.
So, we have the green color code as an indication that a question de-
signed to cause a person that is innocent to respond regarding the
target issue and the red designed to produce a response within the
individual that is later confirmed guilty. The question formulation
must be proper. It must be ideal in order to set the charts up in this
manner. Here, also, is the basis applying the color code to the John
Reid system. They have a control question which, in this particular
case, we call a probable lie question. Something about the earlier
portion of the individual's life that we feel steers clear of the actual
area and avoids the time element of the particular current incident
that is involved.
Here, we have each beat of the pulse all the way through from the
beginning to the end of the chart slide which represents about 80
seconds of time. This 80 seconds of time embraces three questions.
Here, by a series of lines going up and down we have represented a
relative change in blood pressure. This is a relative change that is
indicated and recorded but not measurable as such.
As the series of lines stop going up and down as you see through
certain. areas of that chart, we then have no emotional impact or no
physiological impact regardless of its origin.
In making the intercomparison here, we will look to see if the
red zone question which is a relevant question produces what appears
to be the major response in the overall chart that we see here. We
will then look to the opposite category question to see if there is a
corresponding lack of response there.
In this system there must be a presence of his response: in one of the
two categories of questions and lack of response in the other and not
a lack of response to both to any degree whatsoever.
Here you see, sir, and I could ask you where you see an irregu-
larity. By what question do you see the series of lines go up and
would you be able to state that, sir?
Mr. Moss. Let me ask you : Is this a continuous reading without
int.erru nti on ?
Mr. BACKSTFR. Yes, it is, sir.
Mr. Moss. Starting over here at the first green?
'fr. Ii:AC.FcsTFrr. Yes, sir.
Mr. doss. Continuing to the last green ?
Mr. BAC.-resTrR. Continuing rimht on through.
Mr. floss. Durinm this time three questions were asked?
Mr. BACKSTFR. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Were these the beginning three questions?
Mr, BAC,TESTER. No, sir. In this particular case, there were some
lead-in questions.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY T
Mr. Moss. Are they on this chart?
Mr. BACKSTER. No; they are not meant to be on a spot analysis
chart. We are training our people to look at one relevant question,
to make a separate, independent rating at that time. There are
two other tracings that could be read. They are coded. They are
mixed in other verified truth and innocent. cases and he is given them
back without realizing they are not related to this case.
Mr. Moss. I can tell you what I can interpret from the chart,
that the subject was relaxing gradually as you went along.
Mr. BACKSTLR. Yes, sir; that would be a good observation. What
question was he tense on before he started to relax?
Mr. Moss. I don't know. It is gradual progress down so it is
relaxing.
Mr. BACKSTER. The peak is at this point and the relaxation beyond,
which constitutes the relief. This is the question that worried the
individual. In fact, he was even relieved when we got on to the rel-
evant question, instead of disturbed. So, here we have a lack of
response on the red zone question designed to stimulate the guilty
and we have a response on the green zone question designed to stimu-
late the innocent. In this case, we would give a determination of
truthfulness at this isolated location.
In 1 chart, we have 6 of these locations; in 2 charts, 12; 3 charts,
18 separate individual evaluations in order to have an opportunity
to do exactly this. I will put one more chart on.
Mr. Moss. Let me ask you this while you have that chart on.
Mr. BACKsrER. I am sorry, sir. I will see if I can back this slide up.
Mr. Moss. From a medical standpoint, could you take a reading
of a person and get that without asking any questions?
Mr. BACKSTER. You would not get the intercomparison of concern
or lack of concern.
Mr. Moss. Are you certain of that?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir; I am certain of that, sir. A distortion
because of medical reasons is a distortion throughout but we know
of no medical ailments that will isolate themselves to one color cate-
gory of questions and not the other.
Mr. MEADER. This line indicates only the pulse rate?
Mr. BAOKSTER. You mean the tracing?
Mr. MEADER. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER.. Yes, sir. This indicates each and every beat of
the pulse and every relevant change in blood pressure of the individual
but does not measure the blood pressure. It does measure the pulse
rate per unit of time. We have a standard or constant as far as time
is concerned.
Mr. REUSE. Let us keep this on here, because I don't begin to un-
derstand this at all. What do you mean by questions that make the
innocent gurgle or whatever it does?
Mr. BACKSTER. They don't really gurgle. These are questions that
involve earlier-in-life situations. I?the man is not telling the truth
on the relevant issue, because that is the one that can hurt him im-
mediately as far as his self-preservation is concerned or his well-
being; if he is not telling the truth to the relevant question the earlier-
in-life questions become insignificant because they are then remote
compared to his immediate problems. But if he is being truthful
to the relevant issue question, then he has no concern other than a
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
natural stigma which used to be a problem before we had what is
equivalent to our green zone question as a safety device, introduced
by Mr. John Reid. Before we had this, we sometimes got artificial
stigma to the relevant question even to an individual later identified
as innocent.
In this present-day technique, the content of the earlier-in-life ques-
tion is adequate to solicit the concern of the individual and thereby
produce response and the elimination of any response that might have
occurred on the relevant questions.
Mr. Moss. What was the type of question on that green line?
Mr. BACgsTER. That would be such as "during the first 18 years of
your life, do you remember ever doing something to hurt somebody
who trusted you?"
Mr. LINDBERG. It is a control question.
Mr. Moss. Suppose you didn't recall that but you recalled some-
thing that was rather interesting or stimulating, would you get the
same response?
Mr. BACgsTER. We suspect that they will recall something and re-
spond to it if they are not concerned with the relevant issue.
Mr. Moss. How do you know whether the response-and this is
a physiological response-is because it is relevant or because in the
quick recollection it is something that sort of gives them a boost?
Mr. BACgsTER. Either way, we are happy it happens. We get it
consistently. That is the main consideration.
Mr. REUSE. Just take the case you have put, where your first green
question on the left-hand third of the chart is, as you say : "During
your first 18 years, did you ever do anything to hurt someone who
trusted you ?" I might say that everybody in his first 18 years ob-
viously does do something to hurt somebody that trusted him.
Mr. BACKSTER. We count on this ; yes, sir.
Mr. REUSE. Then you get a little upward squiggle of the needle at
that point, and are you thus inferring that the fellow must be level-
ing with you because he gets a little perturbation because, as you
know, he must have done something to hurt somebody who loved
him ?
Mr. BACgsTER. Sir, we expected him to respond to that particular
question if he were not wrong on the relevant question. His psycho-
logical perception set if he were wrong on the target issue, if he were
later verified guilty, would be aimed toward that which could hurt him
most and he would go right by the first and second green zones show-
ing no significant response. This is a verified principle a.nd validated.
Mr. REuss. Where did you get this great truth from?
Mr. BACgsTER. Mr. John Reid is the one who got the initial great
truth regarding this, and I am very happy for it because it was the
first breakthrough in lie detection for years.
Mr. RErrss. You say Mr. Reid got it. What is the psychological
and philosophical basis of what I take it is the assertion you are
currently making that a human being won't flutter at all on a fairly
innocent question if he is already to flutter on a big and important
question.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, we have no fluttering as one of the types of
reaction.
Mr. REuss. I don't mean physically fluttering. I mean causing
the needle to wiggle by his blood pressure.
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Mr. BACKSTER. The needle does not in this case wiggle too much
differently. The blood pressure goes up forming a rise in the base line
and the top line.
Mr. REuss. That is what I mean by the needle wiggling. Where
did you evolve the observation about the human mechanism which
you have just described which I will try to paraphrase by the follow-
ing black-letter statement : that human beings get their blood pres-
sure up when asked a question of relatively innocent past conduct
but don't get it up when they are lying in wait for a question of
criminal or guilty conduct? I think that is what you are saying?
Mr. BACKSTER. When they are right or wrong on the relevant
issue.
Mr. REuss. Where did you determine all this, that this is what
happens to a human being's blood pressure? How do you determine
that at a particular point, for example, the subject didn't stir in his
chair or some silly thought entered his mind which caused this to
happen?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, in all probability, a silly thought did enter
his mind that caused it to happen because of the earlier-in-life situ-
ation. The fact that it was not a wiggle or movement is evident
by the chart itself because there would be a broken pattern that is
quickly recognizable as a movement in most cases.
Mr. REuss. I thought what you were saying is that if a guy is a
bad guy and guilty in the red sector
Mr. RAOKSTER. Sir, I didn't use that term.
Mr. RFUSS (continuing). That he won't have any blood pressure
changes in the first green sector.
Mr. BACKSTER. That is correct, sir. He should not have.
Mr. REUSS. This is a major assertion about human beings.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. REuss. I hope you can document this rather fully.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir; I can.
Mr. Moss. Could he have had a thought there that had nothing
to do with his earlier life? Maybe at that point 'hie might have
thought to himself, "This is sort of a ridiculous procedure to be sub-
jecting myself to." Could that have caused him to pop up and
down?
Mr. BACKSTEI. Sir, if he would be kind enough to think that each
time we asked that kind of question it would serve the same purpose.
Mr. Moss. What purpose would it show?
Mr. BACKSTER. It would show that were his psychological set.
This psychological set principle is in any basic psychology book. It
is broad enough to interpret and listen to and perceive and distribute
the perception of the stimuli around him and not be tuned in and
localized to something that he is afraid of as related to his well-being,
be will hear and perceive and react in varying degrees to various ex-
traneous stimuli. In fact, the very reason that this theory initially
was explored was because I was showing a great deal more anxiety
than many of my subjects to distractions or disturbances or interrup-
tions in the interrogation room.
I traced back to find out by verified charts only which category
seemed to be mostly disturbed and right down the line it ended up
being the individuals who were verified truthful or innocent an the
target offense that were showing disturbance where their perception
was open enough.
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Mr. Moss. Verified truthful. by whom and what method?
Mr. BACKSTER. The only way or at least one of the few ways of
verifying the polygraph case result is by the confession of the man
himself where he gives enough identifying detail where it could not be
a confession by a psychopathic.
Mr. Moss. If he is a successful liar, you don't know it.
Mr. BACKSTER. If you are so successful a liar that you don't realize
you are lying you will not show up on the polygraph.
Mr. Moss. How do you know I am a successful liar that knows
I am lying or doesn't?
Mr. BACKSTER. His reputation before they ever get to us in our
polygraph testing situation-this is usually pinpointed.
Mr. Moss. How do you know the successful liar who knows he is
lying is going to react differently than the successful liar who
doesn't ?
Mr. BACKSTFR. We have had no successful liar who got away with-
out showing reaction.
Mr. Moss. You have no chronic liars. You have no people who are
very amoral and have no standards and lie at the drop of the hat
and have no guilt. complex?
Mr. BACKSTER. I would classify this as a habitual liar and not a
psvchopathic liar.
Mr. Moss. Habitual or chronic.
Mr. MEADER. Have you ever given a lie detector test to Drew.
Pearson?
Mr. BACKSTER. I don't know if lie has even been tested, sir. I can
again only state that. during my nearly 17 years of giving examina-
tions I have been confronted with only one or two in that entire period
of time that were strongly suspected of being psychopathic liars.
Mr. Moss. Let me ask you this : In your 17 years of giving tests,
have the results of your examinations 'been independently evaluated
by outside research?
Mr. BACKSTvR. The results of the examination in order to be con-
sidered verified or unverified or semiverified have had to meet certain
standards.
Mr. Moss. Whose standards?
Mr. BACKSTER. The standards set up, I would certainly think, by the
polygraph profession, in general.
Mr. Moss. I am talking of a postaudit of your results.
Mr. BACKSTFR. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Not your in-shop research.
Mr. BACKBTER. That is right.
Mr. Moss. Outside, independent evaluation of this 17 years of
records?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I would be awfully happy if some facility would
be set un to do exactly that. It is expensive.
Mr. Moss. Isn't it essential that sort of evaluation of these results
be, made if we are to regard them as having reasonable reliability?
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir; I don't feel it is necessary under these
circumstances.
Mr. Moss. You think your own evaluation of your work
Mr. BACKsTER. I don't believe one should do the final evaluation n-F
his own work. I have had many others evaluate my work besides my-
self. Users in the field.
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Mr. Moss. You have had users, you have had clients, who have
accepted your results?
Mr. BACIisTEn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. These are not polygraph specialists, necessarily?,
Mr. BACKSTER. Not necessarily; no, sir.
Mr. Moss. It could be it corporation?
Mr. BAC7~STER. Yes, sir. It may be a personnel officer.
Mr. Moss. What kind of an evaluation can a personnel officer make
as to the techniques employed and the results obtained?
Mr. BACH.5TER. The employment of techniques is our job. The inter-
pretation of our results to many
Moss. How many of these people, in the 17 years that you have
said after careful screening, "This is a person who is a desirable em-
ployee," have subsequently absconded with something?
Mr. BACKSTER. I believe that there is no way I will ever know, sir.
Mr. Moss. That would be very significant.
Mr. BAcKsTER. You are now speaking of preemployment screening?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. BAC1zsTER. That would be very significant. This preemploy-
ment screening is an entirely different category.
Mr. Moss. No, it isn't. It is the use of this machine in determining
certain human behavior or the probability of certain inherent behavior
patterns in human beings. If we took all of your results, you have
cleared all these people, you have said to the employer, "They appear
to be A-1 material for employment by you," what followup would
indicate whether your judgment was good, bad, or indifferent?
Mr. BALI 9TER. Certain of our accounts using the service, for exam-
ple, one is Davidson Transfer &, Storage, who keeps excellent statis
tics, has done so. Here and in the Baltimore- and New York area they
have kept good statistics on the results and correlation of the pre-
employment tests as compared with the behavior of the driver after he
is on the job. They have given talks really praising in great degrrce
the preemployment system as a means of hiring.
Mr. Moss. You don't know how, many of these people have com-
mitted crimes and absconded with something?
Mr. LINDBERG. Might I answer that, Mr. Moss, because I have some
statistics, not direct ones. One company who I would prefer not to
name, but I will if necessary.
Mr. Moss. I think in the interest of the committee's being able to
evaluate with reasonable accuracy the testimony of the witnesses, if
we are going to use statistics, the committee will want to have an op-
portunity to verify them. I don't want and I know that my colleagues
join me in this, to undertake an evaluation of a subject as important as
this without being able to validate that statistical information we
have.
Mr. MEADER. Is it necessary to make the name of the company pub-
lic? Couldn't that be furnished to the committee ?
Mr. Moss. That can be furnished to the committee.
Mr. LINDBERG. I will be glad to furnish it. The particular company
is a large Chicago retail house. I don't have these emphatic statistics,
only the word over the telephone of the security director who told me
he would be willing to give me the specific statistics if I came over there.
He indicates that on people who have undertaken polygraph examina-
tions before being employed regarding their prior honesty as a predic-
tion of their future performance with regard to honesty that the
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margin of established error, established by the fact that the man sub-
sequently did steal after he had been cleared through our laboratory,
was approximately 1 or 2 percent, as opposed to the nonpolygraph sec-
tion which runs upward in the area of 10 to 20 percent.
I don't have the direct figure. But it is at least 10 times higher than
among people who were not-
Mr. Moss. Mr. Lindberg, wouldn't it be true that there might be
some sio ificant dropoff if an employer merely said that everyone who
applies ere will have to take a polygraph test .
Mr. LINDBERG. Most definitely.
Mr. Moss. You might even have a dropoff if you said that everyone
who applies for employment here will have to be fingerprinted and get
a certificate from the local police chief that they have no prior record.
Mr. LINDBERG. Most definitely.
Mr. Moss. So, you have certain psychological factors that come into
play and to thoroughly validate this we would have to have some sta-
tistical data on these other categories and correlate it.
Mr. LINDBERG. In this particular company I mentioned, those other
safeguards are not present. They rely almost exclusively on the use of
the. polygraph for that purpose.
Mr. Moss. We are going to have to suspend; there is a quorum call,
and it is now quarter past 12. The, committee will stand in recess until
2 this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 2 p.m. the same day.)
(The subcommittee reconvened at 2:30 p.m., Representative John
E. Moss (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.)
FURTHER TESTIMONY OF FRED E. INBAU, NORTHWESTERN UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW; CLEVE BACKSTER, BACKSTER SCHOOL
OF LIE DETECTION, NEW YORK; JOHN E. REID, JOHN E. REID
& ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL. ; AND GEORGE LINDBERG, JOHN E.
REID & ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILL.
Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order.
Before we continue with Mr. Backster's presentation, I would like to
dismiss the witnesses from the Department of Defense, because of prob-
lems in the House which in all probability will require a number of
quorum calls this afternoon. It does not appear as though we have
reasonable expectations of completing in time to hear from you. I
ask that you be here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. Before we re-
sume our discussion of the slide, I would like to insert in the record
a copy of the slide which has been discussed in the presentation by Mr.
Backster. It is identified as "No. 2201.." (See p. 77.) When the
staff reproduces this, because of our inability to reproduce color, I
would instruct that the first dot be keyed as green and the second red
and the third as green.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, we merely use a small g and a small r.
Mr. Moss. Now, you may resume your presentation, Mr. Backster.
This slide is identified as No. 3305 and a copy of this will also be in-
serted in the record at this point.
(New slide No. 3305 follows:)
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Mr. BACSBTER. First I would like to correct any false impression
that I might have given in this morning's session that the ease with
which you can interpret a finished chart, one that has been led up to
properly, means that the study of polygraph is, thereby, drastically
shortened to only a few days instead of the 6-week course we have re-
sponsibility of. The main efforts leading up to the eliciting of a chart
such as this are really what requires such a study as far as the poly-
graph is concerned. This involves the ability of the examiner to pro-
gress through four of the five major steps in order that he would get a
sound fifth step, or readable charts. If he does not know how to
interrogate, to obtain his basic case information and evaluate it, and
if he does not know how to select the proper target to pursue, if he
does not properly word the question that involves his target, and if
he does not put this question in a. sound polygraph procedure, any
one of these weak links in the chain of events can ruin his chances of
having an ideal chart such as this in the last of these steps.
Once we have arrived at the final step it is somewhat, like the painter
who has been skillful in painting a, portrait of somebody that now
looks like somebody that they are painting. It was the skill of the
painter through all the steps that he needed to go through that caused
the end to be easily recognized as you may recognize it here. Here we
have the general color code meaning that a question was asked here to
stimulate the truthful individual or the later verified innocent indi-
vidual, and here a question was asked that was a strong relevant ques-
tion to cause stimulation within the person who was later verified as
guilty of the offense or he was attempting deception regarding the tar-
get issue. Did you yourself steal most or all of that $5000, whatever
it happened to be, tying it in properly timewise ? Over here we have a
new entry on the scene which is the third of the three basic components
in the zone comparison test. In the trizone comparison test, we have
basically three separate blocks approximately 20 seconds duration.
Each time block represents a zone during that particular zone the per-
son is under the effect of one of three basic natures of questions. Here
the question about earlier in life that would stimulate the person who
had nothing more important on his mind particularly as related to the
relevant question. Here a, strong relevant question was asked that
should elicit his concern if he is guilty as later verified. Here we have
a question that is asked in which we accomplish the purpose of evalu-
ating the degree of trust that the subject has in the polygraph exam-
iner. This question is a symptomatic question. Actually there are
two of them asked during each examination chart.
This is what I would term to be the last important contribution that
rounds out the, overall scope of our polygraph examination problems.
With the considerations of each or all of these three basic types of
questions a situation in which we can detect that something is wrong
and needs remedying. We can then suggest to ourselves through a
correctional table exactly what should be done to remedy our bad
characteristics, if they are not readable.
In this particular case you will notice that GSR changes upon giv-
ing answer to the relevant question. We must remember that the gal-
vanic skin response is over to the left approximately 5 seconds from
the marking stimuli in order to miss the other two pens on the chart.
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As this galvanic skin response pen swings up and down it misses the
two short pens recording the breathing and the cardio. So we must
look to the left for 5 seconds which is from mark to mark in order
to see where the action is really taking place. Here recognizing the
content of the question the person went up in a preliminary arousal
and topped it at the point of answer at this point. He showed an
arousal and relief thereafter relieving down through and at the time
that this symptomatic question was asked which was stated, Are you
completely convinced that I will not ask you a question on this test
that has not already been reviewed. That would be the one at the be-
ginning? Here would be the one, asked toward the end, Is there
something else you are afraid I will ask you a question about even
though I promised you I will not?
If the person does not have confidence in the polygraph examiner
and is hiding something from him as an outside issue that is very ex-
plosive, he will show to this question and will not show to either these
as he should, one or the other. We have eight combinations of
what could occur, showing stimulation to the innocent questions only,
to the guilty questions one or both of them, or to one or both of the
symptomatic question zone. Each of these has a special meaning and
each combination tells us exactly what we must do about it in order to
correct the situation. In this particular case, because we have a pres-
ence of response on the red and lack of response on the green generally
speaking we can make a determination of deception at this particular
spot or location.
Mr. Moss. How?
Mr. BACKSTER. We have designed our two basic types of questions
so that the red zone question which is the relevant question is designed
to stimulate the guilty.
Mr. Moss. Who designs the question?
Mr. BACKSTER. The polygraph examiner in the third step that I
mentioned to you of the five important steps.
Mr. Moss. These questions are designed to in themselves affect some
stimulus to the subject, is that correct?
Mr. BACxsTER. Did you yourself do such and such? Very direct?
Mr. Moss. That is not what I asked you. I asked you if they are
designed to generate some physiological responses?
Mr. BACKsTER. They are designed to produce emotional response,
sir.
Mr. Moss. Will you tell me how an emotional response differs from
a physiological response if you are going to determine its occurrence
by taking the blood pressure, respiration, and skin stimulus effects.
Mr. BAOKSTEI. There is actually a chain of events where the emo-
tional response is .the first to occur causing physiological response.
But we cannot identify that emotion involved by inspecting the physi-
ological response.
Mr. Moss. You are reading the chart. Is it a reading of a physio-
logical. response?
Mr. BACicsTER. This is a physiological response.
Mr. Moss. That is what I asked you about.
Mr. BACKSTM. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. We have covered a lot of ground and gotten nowhere.
Mr. BACKSTER. Will you repeat the question?
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Mr. Moss. It is already in the record. Is it necessary to repeat it,
or do you recall it?
Mr. BACKSTER. I believe your question, sir, was, Is the question de-
signed to produce physiological response?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. BACgsTER. My answer is that. the question is designed to pro-
duce that which ends up being physiological response; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Isn't it designed[ to produce that which is defined as a
physiological resporse?
Mr. BACgsTER. Sir, we are not trying to isolate or cause a physiologi-
cal change in the body. We are trying to do with a certain emotion,
the emotion of being afraid or having fear of apprehension. This is
what we aim everything toward and not toward a beating of the pulse
faster or broader or any other phenomena such as that.
Mr. Moss. If you fail to bring about some effect upon the physiology,
then, we are not able to make any measurement.
Mr. BACKSTER. If we are not successful in, toi ng that we are not able
to make a measurement.
Mr. Moss. Whether or not you design it, you achieve, you hope, a
physiological response.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. If it makes it more comfortable for you to respond by
regarding it as emotional rather than physiological you may do so.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir ; it does make me more comfortable.
Mr. Moss. These questions are developed by the operator?
Mr. BACgsTER. By the examiner, sir.
Mr. Moss. The examiner. Is he different than the operator?
Mr. BACgsTER. He certainly is.
Mr. Moss. Always?
Mr. BACgsTER. Yes; in our language he is.
Mr. Moss. The language in context with our discussions today, the
person who has been trained, is there a difference in the training period
of the two?
Mr. BACgsTER. Sir, there has been one suggestion that this be the
case.
Mr. Moss. That is not what I asked you. I asked you if there is a
difference?
Mr. BACgsTER. A generally accepted different?
Mr. Moss. No ; in your own personal experience in the type of
schooling that you provide and that you have recommended here to-
day, is there a difference?
Mr. BACgsTER. Yes, sir; because when a person says operator it costs
him 10 cents each time at our school.
Mr. Moss. Are we in a matter of personal pride or are we in a mnat-
ter of semantics?
Mr. BACgsTER. We are in a matter of standard phraseology used in
a hiehly refined field.
Mr. Moss. So far this inquiry has been concerned with the poly-
graph operator. I think it has been generally discussed in that con-
text here, and the 6 weeks training. 2 years supervised field service.
Now, are we talking in that context about an operator or an examiner?
Mr. BACgsTER. Sir, the proper phrase is examiner.
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Mr. Moss. You will be most patient and indulgent with the Chair
if he is not familiar with the terminology of the-you are making me
self-conscious, I have difficulty now in selecting the appropriate word-
industry or profession or what do we call it?
Mr. BACKSTER. In my profession, sir.
Mr. Moss. I would hope so, too. What are you talking about?
Who makes up the question?
Mr. BACKSTEP,. The polygraph examiner.
Mr. Moss. Is that the person who has been trained for 6 weeks, and
given 2 years of fieldwork under supervision?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Does he ever operate a polygraph?
Mr. BACKSTER. We don't like that phraseology, sir.
Mr. Moss. Does he ever operate a polygraph?
Mr. BACIcsTER. In that terminology, no; he does not.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Backster, I do not care in the slightest what you like
or dislike. I merely want the reflection on this record of as many
facts as it is possible to elicit. I think you would be far more help-
ful to the committee if you avoided being cute or technical.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I am not.
Mr. Moss. And within a, sense of reasonable latitude here responded.
You know full well what I am discussing.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I will agree with any phraseology you want to
call it.
Mr. Moss. I don't ask your concurrence in my terms. I merely
ask that you be patient with me and respond when you know what I
am talking about.
Mr. BACKSTER. I will do that.
Mr. Moss. Please do so, then. Does the examiner ever operate a
machine?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; sir.
Mr. Moss. Now, this examiner who has had this training prepares
the questions which are designed to bring forth differing emotional
or physiological responses, is that correct?
Mr. BACKSTER. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. What kind of a course does he have that informs him
as to the type of questions which will bring forth these differing
responses?
Mr. BACKSTER. This is part of his training in the instruction period.
Mr. Moss. I assumed that. I asked you what type of training does
he have?
Mr. BACKSTER. As a background, sir. I don't understand your
question, sir.
Mr. Moss. All right, we take a man with a high school diploma,
and he is going to be trained for 6 weeks. Where background stops
in that training and where it might begin I am not going to judge.
But in that 6 weeks what type of training does he receive which
fits him to draft the questions designed to bring forth the varying
responses reflected on that graph?
Mr. BACKSTER. The breakdown of the course, sir. One section is
the question formulation. Actually we are getting into semantics
during the question formulation instruction.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. Moss. The first one here is supposed to recall something years
passed.
Mr. BACKSTER. Earlier in life; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. The next one is to bear directly upon his guilt or his
innocence.
Mr. BACIKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. The term guilt-
Mr. BACKSTER. His later verified guilt.
Mr. Moss. You are asking him the question now and the chart is
made now, and you are telling me this is on his later verified guilt.
When is the chart made?
Mr. BACKSrER. Sir, I am talking in regard to his deception to the
target issue.
Mr. Moss. I can only hope that the course is far clearer than the
responses have been. Mr. Reuss, do you think you might bring some
order out of the chaos I have gotten myself into?,
Mr. REUSE. I would like to ask one question. Look, whether he is
a.n operator, an examiner, or whoever it is, there is just one human
being there who asks the questions and operates the machine, is there
not?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; there is only one.
Mr. REUSE. In addition to that one fellow called a subject.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr.REUSS. He is the fellow who is examined, so there is a total of
two, is that correct?
Mr. BACKSTER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. REUss. I think this unravels the mystery of the operator and
the examiner. The same fellow.
Mr. Moss. Yes; I had elicited that, Mr. Reuss, but I have not yet
been able to learn what is it they are given in the way of training in
this 6 weeks to qualify them to draft questions to bring forth from
anything as complex as a human being the specific types of reactions.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I have this enumerated, in fact, the entire course
breakdown, in the material given to you this morning, if I may refer
to it.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Backster, if I had time to take the correspondence I
would not have to call you in. That is why I had hoped you would be
able to cut through some of the material that you have presented to
me and clarify it.
Mr. BACxsTER. Sir, you have me at an unfair advantage. I can't
answer that.
Mr. Moss. You mean
Mr. BACKSTER. You would consider it impertinent.
Mr. Moss. I what?
Mr. BAOKSTFR. You would consider my answer impertinent and I
would not want that.
Mr. Moss. I would prefer you let me decide what is impertinent.
If you are answering in good faith I will even tolerate impertinence.
Mr. BACKSTER. I am answering in good faith.
Mr. Moss. Let us have it.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, the answer is : as a student I would find it much
easier to deal with you than as a Congressman.
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Mr. Moss. I would hope as a student I would find you much clearer
than I have as a Congressman because if I did not, I would indeed
fail the course. Let us take a look at the training curriculum. I think
this is most important to try to get on this record, in some reasonably
concise form, the nature of some of your instruction, again in view
.of the fact that yours is the more relevant procedure because it is the
one most commonly employed in the training of those who operate
polygraphs for the Federal Government. I can-at the risk of pre-
judging-say that I have not been reinforced in my seeking assurance
that the best technique has been employed. I assume that this is sec-
tion D, polygraph question formulation :
This course section strongly emphasizes scientific selecting of the strongest
possible examination target through evaluation of intensity, adequacy of avail-
able information, and distinctness of issue. Also emphasized are strict rules
governing the formulation of the relevant questions covering the target selected.
These rules involve singleness of issue, clarity of issue and literally touch upon
the science of semantics. (See exhibit 6, p. 184.)
In 6 weeks.
Mr. BACKSTrR. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. The science of semantics. There are many who have
regarded it as a lifetime study. "Adequate formulation of questions
for reliable stimulation of the innocent is emphasized." Are the ques-
tions always made up ahead of time before a subject is hooked up to
a polygraph?
_
Mr. BAOKSTvx. Most of the time, sir, they are made up with the
subject before he is hooked- up to the polygraph so that he may have
the choice of taking or refusing the test.
Mr. Moss. Is there during the course of the presentation of these
questions a conscious or unconscious evaluation by the operator of the
probable guilt or innocence of the subject?
Mr. BACIiSTER. I can speak for myself, sir, on that.
Mr. Moss. In your course, is care taken to insure that this does or
does not happen?
Mr. BACKSTER. We take great care to insure that this does not hap-
pen, sir.
Mr. Moss. Because it is brought to my mind rather forcefully when
it here refers to the stimulation of the innocent. "Adequate formula-
tion of questions for reliable stimulation of the innocent is em-
phasized," which would indicate to me some prejudgement in the
formulation of questions. If I am wrong I would like to have the
record reflect the facts.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, there is prejudgment and you are not really
wrong. But it is prejudgment by question purpose if that is the case
it is implied by the relevant question also. Each eventuality is pro-
jected.
Mr. Moss. In the 6 weeks, in 12 hours, we are going to get the science
of the semantics.
Mr. BACKSTER. That is touched upon.
Mr. Moss. Then there is an evaluation made before the questions are
in their final form.
Mr. BACKSTER. Evaluation of the questions; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. No ; of the subject.
Mr. BAGKSTER. No, sir. As far as his guilt or innocence is con-
cerned, or his truth or deception.
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92 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reporter, would you read back the answer to the
question I asked over here?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Moss. I asked the question because I find myself somewhat
confused by your two answers. I asked very clearly if there was an
evaluation and you said, yes, that I was not wrong. Then I repeated
essentially the same question here in different context and received a
different answer which was that I was wrong. Now, which is it?
Mr. BACxsi R. Sir, during the pretest procedure and the formula-
tion of the questions that are to be used during the examination, I had
at all costs attempted to avoid any premature opinion as to the truth-
fulness or deception of the person in regard to the target issue. But
I do evaluate the questions and apply rules to each of the questions
to see if they will stand up against each eventuality, that the person
be telling the truth and the person not be telling the truth to the tar-
get issue.
Mr. Moss. Now, is all of this taught in the 12-hour course?
Mr. BACKSTE.R. Yes ; it is in each note pack, outlined step by step
where they check the list.
Mr. Moss. Do you realize, Mr. Backster, that you have in a 12-hour
period of instruction undertaken to cover a very extensive field. You
are going to teach them to formulate questions designed to bring forth
a specific type of stimulation of the subject. I would imagine it
would take a rather skilled psychiatrist, really, or it would take some
instruction in psychology to do the kind of think you are planning
here, and yet you achieve all this in 12 hours.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I have given 20 courses and achieved it. We
are on our 20th course now.
Mr. Moss. You have given 20 courses. How do you know you have
achieved it?
Mr. BACKSTER. We do keep contact with these people when they go
out on their field projects and they return for the advanced conferences
we hold for them.
Mr. Moss. This is always an in-shop evaluation of your own people
and your own system?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, we would welcome one from outside the shop.
Mr. Moss. But you have not had it?
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir; we have not.
Mr. Moss. This, I think, is the thing that is significant here. You
feel that the 6-week course is thoroughly adequate and that the
high school diploma is a sufficient base upon which to build a career
as a polygraph examiner.
Mr. BAcKsTER. No, sir; I do not.
Mr. Moss. Then what do you feel would be an absolute minimum
for an adequately trained operator or examiner, whichever you prefer
to use?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, to give an absolute minimum and give anything
other than 6 weeks that we are giving now would be in conflict with
myself. I can give a suggested length for the course, but not con-
sidered as an absolute minimum.
Mr. Moss. Don't you have an idea after many years as to the absolute
minimum to be desired in this type of instruction?,
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. On an absolute minimum to be desired I
have. That would be 6 months easily.
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Mr. Moss. And the qualifications of the trainee?
Mr. BACKSTER. The qualification of the trainee, the more college
the man had the better, the more investigative experience the better.
Mr. Moss. Don't you have a minimum qualification? You are deal-
ing here with a very important subject, the human being. I not only
'have a strong feeling that he has the rights granted under the law, but
I think as our Constitution states God-given rights.
Mr. BACKSTER. I agree with you, sir.
Mr. Moss. There is an area where much damage and mischief can be
.done with the unskilled.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, this is an area in which I have worked harder
than most to see that such damage is not done.
Mr. Moss. Then you must have an idea as to the absolute minimums
to be desired to achieve the type of operator in whose hands we would
.entrust what could well be the individual fate of a human being.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, may I comment on what I think is a difference of
opinion that really is not so if we think of it in terms of reality.
Mr. Moss. I think it would be most helpful if you would respond to
my question as to your judgment of the minimums.
Mr. BACKSTER. That is what I am trying to do, sir.
Mr. Moss. To that you may respond.
Mr. BACKSTEI. Sir. I think you have handicapped me where I
can't. I was to talk of the disciplining; of the examiner once he is
operating in the field. There is a restriction of his behavior.
Mr. Moss. I think it most important that you have certain basic
training rather than go into a period of self-evaluation.
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir; self-regulation.
Mr. Moss. Or an evaluation by the same system that produced you
in the first place.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I am speaking of self-regulation. Regulatory
-measures to be sure that these things do not happen.
Mr. Moss. The basic question here is whether there is sufficiently
established as a science, a skill, or a field of knowledge, to be depend-
-ent upon to the extent it is now being dependent upon by agencies of
the Federal Government. So it is an evaluation of it as it is, and the
things it should be if it is not now adequate. You have responded
to my request as to whether you regard the 6-week training period as
adequate by saying that you do not.
Mr. BACKSTER. I do not consider it as-I can't
Mr. Moss. You either do or you don't, Mr. Backster.
Mr. BACKSTER. Under the circumstances I do consider it to be.
Mr. Moss. Under what circumstances?
Mr. BACKSTER. Under the circumstances that do not allow college-
grade people to be available at police departments to train them at
the present time and they cannot be away 6 months.
Mr. Moss. If a minimum requires a college education to do an ade-
quate job, then we should not be satisfied with less than adequate
because if we are we are abusing people. If you have strong con-
victions as to the rights of individuals, certainly you can see that.
Do you have a personal opinion as to the minimums?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, I have a personal opinion by desire.
Mr. Moss. Do you desire to have this record reflect?
Mr. BACKSTER. Certainly.
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Mr. Moss. Then state it.
Mr. BACKSTER.. As quickly as it can be accomplished and where the
police departments are having available to them or avail themselves
of college graduates in sufficient quantity to satisfy this college re-
quirement I feel they should do so. In the meantime they should not
terminate all their services because they do not have a college level
examiner. As far as the basic experience is concerned, prior to train-
ing, I think the more investigative experience a person has the greater.
The University of the State of New York has not chosen to put a
minimum on thaat. I only can offer what they have asked or imposed
upon us through their State board.
Mr. Moss. In other words, you feel that the end justifies the means?
Mr. BACKSTPR. No, sir; I am the last to think that.
Mr. Moss. I wonder if we might have some comments from you,
Mr. John Reid, again getting more specifically into this question
of qualifications which you have set forth-no, Mr. Lindberg, I be-
lieve you set it forth-about five points this morning, if I recall
correctly.
Mr. LTNDBEIiG. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Do you feel that constitutes an adequate minimum for
operators of the polygraph?
Mr. LINDBERG. The points I brought forth this morning?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. This is our present opinion.
Mr. Moss. And that additional knowledge as to the physiology of
the human body is not required beyond that.
Mr. LINDBEIiG. No, I don't believe that at all. I pointed out in these
comments that the training facility which, of course, forms the exam-
iner, and my point (d) it must be one which includes, supplementing
the standard college courses in the fields of physiology and psychology
with specific information from these sciences as it relates to the detec-
tion of deception.
Mr. Moss. Would there be any difference in the responses you
might receive from a person who has this smoking habit as badly
as I have and one who does not have it at all?
Mr. LINDBERG. We don't find any relationship.
Mr. Moss. Have you undertaken a study to determine whether
there is?
Mr. LTNDBERG. Not specifically, no.
Mr. Moss. Yet we are told that this has quite an effect on the physi-
logy of the body, particularly blood pressure, and respiration. If
you had a subject who had been a heavy smoker and was in the mid-
dle of a test and was not smoking at the time, what might it do to his
responses?
Mr. LINDBERG. Our experience reflects the fact that it does noth-
ing relevant to our recordings. It does not result in any erroneous
responses.
Mr. Moss. Sometimes when I go someplace where I can't have a
cigarette now and then, and I am not particularly enthused about
the proceeding I find I become very restless.
Mr. LINDImRG. I do also.
Mr. Moss. Isn't it reasonable to assume, then, that it would have
some very definite effect?
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Mr. LINDBERG. Congressman, we don't think so. We know that
the contrary is the truth. But if it did affect it would have a similar
reflection on the normal questions. The questions that are in
the examination, for assessing for us the subject's present physiologi-
cal status.
Mr. Moss. You don't think the longer the period of time-not hav-
ing a cigarette would change that pattern?
Mr. LINDBERG. It might but it would change all of the control pat-
terns which are used for the comparative study.
Mr. Moss. You indicated you have a problem of wanting a cigar-
ette. The longer you go without one do you find you are more com-
fortable or less comfortable?
Mr. LINDBERG. I quit 2 years ago. I don't have the problem any
more. But to be responsive, I think the answer is that the subject
tends to be more uncomfortable in a very specific manner.
Mr. Moss. Do you determine what that manner is?
Mr. LINDBERG. Well, you might say, discontent.
Mr. Moss. You should really know precisely what it is, shouldn't
you? If you have a subject in there who is a heavy smoker and is
not smoking during the course of the examination shouldn't you know
what the effect is of not having another cigarette midway between
the examination?
Mr. LINDBERG. Our evidence indicates not.
Mr. Moss. What evidence do you have?
Mr. LINDBERG. The 30,000 polygraph records that are part of the
basis of the whole science or art as it stands at this point.
Mr. Moss. How do those records reflect which are smokers and
which are not, which are one pack a day, two packs a day, or more, and
how long they have been without a cigarette in the course of a poly-
graph examination?
Mr. LINDBERG. Unless the examiner specifically inquired of the
subject they don't reflect that at all.
Mr. Moss. Then if this is scientific, and this has been set forth as a
scientific field, you should know and that should be a standard ques-
tion on every single examination, and the effect of that upon the sub-
ject should be fairly well established so that it can be considered in
the course of getting or reading the graphs taken throughout his
examination.
Mr. LINDBERG. I don't believe, Congressman, that there is any scien-
tific support for that statement.
Mr. Moss. Do you know of any scientific support to contradict it?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Would you cite it.
Mr. LINDBERG. The body of_ polygraph records upon which we have
formulated our technique:
Mr. Moss. I think we can agree those would not be relevant because
the determination has not been made in that body of records. If you
are talking of science-you are talking of a procedure whereby you
attempt to observe phenomena and determine their ability to repeat
themselves under the same conditions, or the manner in which it
differs under varying conditions. Smoking is one of the most wide-
spread habits that American people have. In fact., I imagine that at
the present time under the pressure of considerable press comment
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and studies released within the last few years, that may even en-
fender on occasion certain guilt complexes. What might that effect
be on a person who is discussing a wide range of subjects in the course
of a polygraph examination?
Mr. LINDBERG. Based on our experience, none.
Mr. Moss. Again, have you undertaken this evaluation in your ex-
perience in each case in order to correlate it and determine whether or
not it has validity?
Mr. LINDBERG. No, we have not.
Mr. Moss. Therefore you have no experience on it, have you?
Mr. LINDBERG. No, I would not say that either. You asked for a
scientific
Mr. Moss. You referred to this as "scientific." If your case his-
tories have any validity, it is only as they are correlated and certain
determinable facts are extracted from them. Whether it is a ease
of how many aspirin did you take this morning-which I believe has
a depressing effect upon the blood pressure-what type of antibiotics
are you using, what types of pressure have you been under? In the
case of employment maybe someone is desperately seeking employ-
ment, and while it may be characterized as voluntary he is told, You
either take it or you don't get the job," so there is an element of com-
pulsion. All of these things, if these records are to mean anything,
must be extracted from the records and must be-reflected in the records
and must be evaluated and must be analyzed and must be correlated,
or we merely have 30,000 individual cases, not a body of scientific
information.
After all, in scientific research and evaluation, the most painstaking
recordkeepmg is undertaken that characterizes anything in human
endeavor. This is one of the things, as I have reviewed over the
months-the work of the subcommittee staff, I have found most dis-
turbing, that is, this element of scientific objectivity in the work of the
polygraph operators. I know Dr. Inbau, you used the term this
morning in the case of training of people, I believe, with police forces
where you said : "Oh, on occasion it is not important if you regard this
as a psychological gimmick."
So I assume on occasion it is regarded as a "psychological gimmick."
I believe I am correct. I wrote the term down here.
Mr. INBAU. I said, Mr. Chairman, that there were some people who
were using the polygraph as a psychological gimmick for interroga-
tion. Some of these people could not make a diagnosis at all as to
whether the person is lying or telling the truth. I think either this
morning or yesterday I said you actually don't need to invest in a
ppolygraph, you can use a mimeograph machine for the same purpose.
be I think that was my statement, that it is used by some people as a
psychological gimmick for interrogation purposes only, not for a
determination of truth and deception.
Mr. Moss. If it is used it should be used with great care, with ob-
jectivity, by the most experienced person available in interpreting the
results obtained from it.
Mr. INBAU. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. Do you have further questions?
Mr. REuss. Yes, I have several questions. Mr. Backster, I think I
heard you testify just a few minutes ago in response to a question from
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Congressman Moss, that 6 weeks was not really adequate to train a
competent polygraph examiner. Did I misunderstand?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I avoided stating that I felt it was inadequate
because if I felt it inadequate I would have no part in doing it now or
doing it for the last several years ever since 1951. I think it could be
improved upon, but I do not th'ini it is inadequate.
Mr. REUSE. Do you think in 6 weeks you can train a polygraph
examiner so that he is capable of conducting both criminal and pre-
employment tests?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. We do do this. This is a matter of record.
I mean we have to put in late hours at night and work Saturdays
sometimes and really cram the instruction more than we would like
to. But we do accomplish a basic groundwork by which they can do
this when they leave.
Mr. REUSS. As I understand it, you have set up the Army Lie De-
tector School method at Fort Gordon.
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir. They have adopted a fair amount or por-
tions of the combined method that I assembled, that was really made
up from all techniques in the field. It should not be distinguished as
mine as such.
Mr. REUSS. Is your standardized polygraph note pack in use by the
Army School ?
Mr. BACKSTER. To a limited extent sir, yes.
Mr. REUSS. What do you mean by 'Za limited extent?"
Mr. BACKSTER. They don't seem to have the availability of the funds
to even buy the material at basic printing cost.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Lindberg, you testified with respect to certain
polygraph test conducted by your organization in recent years, and
I think you testified that in one case as a result of the polygraph tests
you verified that the subject had committeed some 400 burglaries and
50 robberies.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Were those armed robberies?
Mr. LINDBERG. As I recall, the report, I think there was a mixture of
strong-arm and armed robberies.
Mr. REUSS. I think you also testified that there is a canon of ethics
in the profession whereby you do not turn over to the law enforcement
authorities the information of criminality which you adduce in your
examinations.
Mr. LINDBERG. No, there is no canon as such. Of course, we are at
the present time, just as you gentlemen are, evolving codes of practice
in that regard. Our present attitude
Mr. REUSS. I hope you are moving faster than we are, but go on.
Mr. LINDBERG. There is some evidence that we are not. The prac-
tice has been in the field to retain adverse information that the subject
may state during an examination that is not relevant to the
inquiry.
Mr. REUSS. I think you testified that in your experience there had
been one exception to this rule and that was in the case of an arsonist.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REUSS. This evidence of criminal arson you did turn over to the
prosecuting authorities.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. The subject had expressed an intention to
continue his arson that very day or the next day.
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9S USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. REUSE. I think you said that you first tried to get, the subject's
lawyer to voluntarily turn this information over to the authorities but
the lawyer refused to do so.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. We suggested to the lawyer the imminence
of the danger here--the attorney said, "I don't think we will take
any action on that." He was not impressed with that fact. So we
stated to him that we felt a responsibility in this regard and that we
would wait 3 days for him to take appropriate action: which might be
psychiatric counsel. When I called him 3 days later, he said, "No, we
are not going to do anything about that." It was in regard to that
response that we acted.
Mr. REUSS. By acting, you mean turning it over to the State's attor-
ney?
A /Fr. LINDBERG. Yes. In the particular case it was the juvenile
authorities.
Mr. INBAU. It was actually turned over, Mr. Reuss, to the judge of
the juvenile court. It was given to him.
Mr. REUss. Did the prosecuting and judicial authorities proceed to
do something on the basis of this?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, they did.
Mr. REUSE. Was there a conviction obtained?
Mr. LTNDBERG. There was a partial conviction on 12 arsons and an
acquittal on the 13th.
Mr. REUss. Was this the only case of turning over information as to
criminality to the law enforcement authorities ?
Mr. LINDBERG. It is the only one I am aware of, other than in the
screening of police officers. As I expressed this morning, any dis-
closure regarding robberies, burglaries are relevant information as
defined by the nature of the examination. Therefore, that informa-
tion is turned over as the burglaries were.
Mr. INBAU. In that instance, isn't it true that the individual knows
that these disclosures will be made? He knows that in advance of the,
test, Mr. Reuss.
Mr. REUSE. When he is taking an examination for a police officer?
Mr.INBAU. Yes.
Mr. REUSE. When, however, he is taking an examination for any one
of the other occupations and callings
Mr. LINDBERG. No disclosures.
Mr. INBAU. That is reserved.
Mr. REUSE. I think you said, Mr. Lindberg, there have been several
murders uncovered by the polygraph.
Mr. LINDBERG. There have been instances where murders have been
admitted by subjects undergoing polygraph examinations for other
issues. For example, private polygraph examiners do -a considerable
amount of testing for defense counsel. It could be during the course
of such an examination that an individual might admit of other
crimes.
Mr. REUss. I did not ask you for hearsay.. I asked you only for
your own experience and your organization with which you have a
personal familiarity.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is our experience.
Mr. REUss. And you have uncovered several murders?
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USE Mr. LINDBERG. They have been admitted to by the subject. We
don't have ;personal direct knowledge.
Mr. REUSS. But in several cases the subject admitted committing
the act of murder?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. And you kept that information confidential?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Do you have in your organization a standard polygraph
room?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes; six of them.
Mr. Rruss. You have six such rooms?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. That is in the city of Chicago?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Are they substantially identical in their architecture?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Will you describe a typical polygraph room in your
organization.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. They are a room approximately 12 by 14 con-
taining, in our particular instance, a Reid polygraph, which I think
has been adequately described, a chair for the examiner to conduct his
examination from, a chair for him to conduct his interview from, and
a chair for the subject to be seated in.
We try to avoid any distracting decorations or anything of that
nature. Most polygraph laboratories are also afforded the psycho-
logical mirror, as it is called, or the two-way mirror.
Mr. Rnuss. Does yours have a two-way mirror?
Mr. LINDBERG. I believe five of them do.
Mr. REUSS. Am I right in thinking that a two-way mirror is a mir-
ror which looks like an ordinary mirror but which permits someone
to stand behind the mirror and look out?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. REUSS. You say five of your six rooms have such a mirror?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes ; that is correct.
Mr. REUSS. What does it look like to the subject, just a mirror on
the wall?
Mr. LINDBERG. Just a mirror.
Mr. Ri,uss. Where is it?
Mr. LINDBERG. It is located right in front of the subject in most
cases. In every case in our laboratory.
Mr. REUSS. Can he see his face in the mirror?
Mr. LINDBERG. No, he cannot. It is positioned in such a way that he
would hopefully be seeing nothing more than you would be looking
at this wall he looks around can he see the mirror?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. The mirror is forward 5 feet and to the upper
right 3 feet, let us say.
Mr. Rruss. As a matter of standard operating procedure is some-
one positioned behind the mirror to observe?
Mr. LINDBERG. No. It has the function of training new examiners
and also in cases where a woman is being tested, we may station a
laboratory secretary behind the mirror; although there has never been
an incident, if we feel the nature of the case is such that might pre-
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100 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
cipitate such an incident we would station a laboratory secretary behind
the mirror.
Mr. REUSS. Is the subject told of the existence of the two-way
mirror?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, if he asks, but if he does not ask
Mr. REUSS. What percentage of the subjects ask?
Mr. LINDBERG. I would say 5 percent, perhaps. Practically every
policeman that may be examined does.
Mr. REUSS. What percentage of your subjects are policemen?
Mr. LINDBERG. I really don't know, but I would say it is probably
in the area of 5 to 10 percent.
Mr. REUSS. So if you leave aside policemen, practically zero per-
centage realize that they are subject to surveillance from behind the
two-way mirror.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is correct.
Mr. REuss. In addition to the two-way mirror, are there any other
things that do not meet the eye, so to speak, of the subject, outside
of the polygraph machine?
Mr. LINDBERG. There is a room community or, an intercom system
in our lab, which is exposed to every subject. As to whether or not
he perceives it as such, I really don't know. No subject has ever
commented on it.
Mr. REUSS. Is there a microphone?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. It is a. talk-a-phone as you would have-an
intercom. It is what they call-I don't know what you call it-in my
office if I wish to listen to that laboratory I could.
Mr. REUSS. Where is that positioned?
Mr. LINDBERG. Right at the polygraph instrument. Right on the
desk at the polygraph instrument.
Mr. REuss. Is it a standard intercom with an obvious loudspeaker
device in it?
Mr. LINDBERG. It is a commercial model. It is made right in Chi-
cago. We bought it right off the stands. It is not concealed or in any
way designed to avoid the attention of the subject. If the subject
says, is this a microphone or whatever you might want to call it, the
answer is "Yes," and there is no effect to conceal it. We have no reason
to do that, Mr. Reuss.
Mr. REUSS. If the subject does not say anything about it, is he told
of its existence?
Mr. LINDBERG. No. Because usually there is nobody listening any-
way.
Mr. REuss. Are recordings made of the subject's responses?
Mr. LINDBERG. Tape recordings?
Mr. REUSS. Yes.
Mr. LINDBERG. No.
Mr. REuss. Any other types of recordings?
Mr.. LINDBERG. Yes; the examiner makes notes as he proceeds
throughout the examination.
Mr. REUSS. But there has never been a case in your organization of
a tape recording made?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. If there is a specific case that, we want to make
a tape for, one, for example, we anticipate might be a good training
aid or an unusual case, we may preserve it for tape recording or by
tape recording.
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Mr. REuss. Yours is a private organization, is it not?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REVss. While you do work for public agencies, you have no
official status?
Mr. LINDBERG. My answer is we do not have any official status.
Mr. REVss. Without reference to your organization, of course, but
bearing in mind the confessions of criminal action which I gather
frequently occur, would there not be an opportunity for unscrupulous
private polygraph examiners and operators to use information ob-
tained from a subject for the purpose of blackmail or extortion?
Mr. LINDBERG. I presume that is possible, yes.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Inbau, you testified, I think yesterday, con-
cerning a very elementary type of detector, which I believe you felt
was discredited, which consists not of the three-part devices which
measure-check me if I am mistaken-blood pressure, respiration,
and skin sensitivity, but which in the case of this discredited device
records simply skin sensitivity. Do you recall your remarks on that?
Mr. INBAr. Yes.
Mr. REUSS. Do I state what you said correctly?
Mr. LINDBERG. I think you do essentially. Essentially what I said
specifically was that one particular unit alone is totally inadequate for
the purpose of detecting deception. (See exhibits 7A-7E, pp. 185-
187.)
Mr. REUSS. By that one particular unit?
Mr. LINDBERG. The galvanic skin reflex.
Mr. REUSS. Which shows skin reflexes?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REVss. Educate me a little bit on this skin reflection business.
I have the general impression that by and large someone with a guilty
conscience may have a clammy hand, a sweaty hand, not perhaps drip-
ping with sweat, but indicating some changes in either the temperature
of the skin or the amount of liquid that approaches the surface. Is
this a solid psychological observation that I am making?
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Lindberg answered the question yesterday with
reference to the galvanic skin reflex. I would like If I may defer
to him in answer to your question specifically.
Mr. Reuss. I will give him an answer in just a minute.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reuss.
We have a quorum call. Can we take a 20-minute break?
Mr. REUSS. Yes; I will resume this question.
Mr. INBAU. I don't want to evade your question.
Mr. REUSS. I know you don't.
Mr. Moss. We are going to recess for about 20 minutes to permit the
members to respond to a quorum call.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)
Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will resume. Mr. Reuss.
Mr. REVss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Inbau, proceeding on
the subject which we were discussing, which is the effectiveness of the
single method testing device for testing
Mr. INBAU. The galvanic skin reflex.
Mr. REUSS. I would like to have you tell me, and later on to the
extent that he can add something I will ask Mr. Lindberg to add to
it, I wish you would tell me what the galvanic skin reflection detector
detects and why it is not a reliable gage of whether somebody is telling
the truth or not.
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Mr. INBAU. There is a considerable difference of opinion just what
is this galvanic skin reflex. It does have something to do, with the
skin resistance. There is an imperceptible current of electricity that
goes through the electrodes. It has been our observation over the
years that while experimentally it can be helpful in detecting a lab-
oratory lie situation, in actual cases its utility, at least this has been
our experience, is limited pretty much to what is known as the peak of
tension test. When you are dealing with an actual case situation of the
type we are talking about where you use your control question and
your relevant question, there the galvanic skin reflex is of very
limited value and utility.
You depend upon the respiration, blood pressure, plus traceage
rather than upon the galvanic skin reflex.
Mr. REuss. What is the galvanic skin reflex? What does this
meter show?
Mr. INBAU. As I say, there is a difference of opinion and some vary-
ing explanations just what it is you are picking up here and this is
a pretty involved thing here. Perhaps Mr. Lindberg can capsule it
as I think he did the other day. What I am saying is that it is a
very sensitive recording you get. Experimentally, it will pick tip
these little things that don't get to the deep-rooted emotional factors
that are involved when a person lies about something of considerable
consequence such as a crime and things of that sort.
Mr. Rrrrss. Let me ask you this: What is the technique of the- gal-
vanic skin lie detector? Where do you attach it to the subject? To
his hand?
Mr. INBAU. The hand, the fingers.
Mr. REUss. The palm of the hand?
Mr. INBA[?. Yes, or the fingers.
Mr. REUSS. That suggests to a layman like myself that it may have
something vaguely to do with the ancient, commonsense manifesta-
tion that a sweaty or clammy hand or palm is an indication that you are
dealing with somebody with some guilt feelings. Is that what the
galvanic device tests?
Mr. INBAU. It will pick up that sort of a condition, a physiological
change, yes. As I said before, this is not looked upon, at, least in our
opinion, as a reliable indicator because you have all these other factors
entering into it.
Mr. Moss. Doesn't it measure a surface current,? It is simply a
galvanometer that is similar to that used in electrical work. It is a
little more sensitive and you are measuring the flow of current on
the surface of the skin which is usually stepped up because of more
moisture, and change in the temperature.
Mr. INBAU. That i s correct.
Mr. Moss. It. is simply the measurement of an electrical current.
Mr. INBAU. Yes.
Mr. REuss. Suppose in this connection you gave me a galvanic skin
test today in. this room, and let us suppose you had given me such
a galvanic skin test. in this room yesterday, you recall how uncom-
fortable it was, how much like a Finnish sauna, and you asked me the
same innocent question both days, wouldn't I have displayed more
galvanic dynamism, or whatever the phrase is, yesterday than today?
Mr. INBAU. I think you would find a difference.
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Mr. RBUSS. Yet, I would be as innocent or guilty one day or another,
would I not?
Mr. LINDBERG. Not from one question to another, if I might make
that observation. It is a continuing condition yesterday as it is
today. In other words, you are not asking a man yesterday a, normal
question and then today under a different atmospheric condition, so to
speak, of humidity, asked him if he killed a person. He is being
asked both the, normals and the relevant questions under the same
basic condition of humidity or lack of humidity.
Mr. Moss. Would you yield at that po i nt ?
Mr. REUSS. Surely.
Mr. Moss. Again, I think this goes to the heart of whether an
activity is a science or whether it is not. Mr. Reuss has raised a
question as to the responses you would have gotten. yesterday when
this room was very warm and uncomfortable in contrast with condi-
tions prevailing here today when it is far more comfortable. Mr.
Lindberg, you said between questions there would have been no dif-
ference. Isn't it quite conceivable that there would have been? You
are not as relaxed, you are a little more on edge, perhaps irritated at
the surroundings; you find you are perhaps a little jumpier. The
natter of the immediate environment has it strong impact upon peo-
plee A few warm days that are humid and people become short
tempered and they are not the sweet souls they were when the weather
was cooler. Doesn't this have some significance in determining the
response even between questions? Maybe they might be very mildly
irritated today, but yesterday the irritation would have been much
greater.
Mr. LINDBERG. That is a good observation. That is correct.
Mr. Moss. From the standpoint of applying it to a science, it is a
significant factor which would have to be considered, and some cor-
relation determined, if we are in fact proceeding in a scientific manner
to develop the techniques for the interpretation of the graph readings
obtained. Not only that, but respiration is affected in like surround-
ings, blood pressure probably is affected in like surroundings. So, the
results you get, unless you are air conditioned in your laboratory in
Chicago, might be different in the summer than they are in the winter.
Have you studied this to determine what the correlation might be?
Mr. LINDBERG. The degree of responsiveness of a subject at any par-
ticular time, and I mean by time from one day to the next, may
definitely change. Ile may be far more responsive on the control
question on every question on the examination on one day than he
would the next. But within the examination itself, this heightened
sensitivity to which you are referring occurs on the normals for that
day. The purpose of the normals is to reflect the condition that you
are suggesting, Congressman.
Mr. Moss. How do you establish the fact that is the case?
Mr. LINDBERG. By observation. Probably the oldest scientific
technique known.
Mr. Moss. The oldest scientific technique known and therefore in
the observation you note the results of the observation and then you
attempt to correlate it with the other case histories to see if the phe-
nomenon repeats. Have you done this?
Mr. LINDBERG, Which phenomenon ?
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Mr. Moss. The difference that might be obtained in asking a series
of questions from similar subjects under varying environments.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, it is a continuing study.
Mr. Moss. How is the study carried on? What type of records do
you keep on this? In these 35,000 cases, can you o back to them and
give me some idea of the environmental conditions
Mr. LINDBERG. Most certainly.
Mr. Moss. That is recorded on your forms?
Mr. LINDBERG. I hope I know what environmental conditions you
are speaking of.
Mr. Moss. Immediate environment.
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, definitely.
Mr. Moss. Whether the room is hot or cold?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Or humid or dry ?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes. If there are no notations to that effect on the
question sheet, it is presumed that it was within
Mr. Moss. You cannot presume in science. You can't say if it isn't
there. You must say it is there and noted and observed as a part of
the phenomena on each and every case and at some point we determine
certain patterns exist. If you do not do that, you have not undertaken
a scientific procedure.
Mr. INBAU. Mr. Moss, I wonder if I might speak to that point?
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reuss has the floor.
Mr. REtss. Why don't you speak to that.
Mr. INBAU. It seems to me we are making a scientific evaluation
here. If you have 30,000 cases and you come to ,a conclusion as to inno-
cense and guilt and subsequent developments substantiate you to the
degree that we say are substantiated, it seems to me we are safe in
concluding that this is a reliable technique, even though we are not
giving it the various kinds of evaluations that perhaps you give to
certain other types of activities or testing. This one doesn't lend itself
to anything more than what we have put it to.
Mr. Moss. Is it true that it doesn't lend itself or it is not perhaps
within the economic framework of the undertaking to extend the inves-
tigations to include these other factors. You say that 30,000 cases
where you have determined guilt or innocence. Once that case goes
out into the field, do you have a follow-up on each of them to deter-
mine whether you have made,a correct judgment?
Mr. INBAU. Yes; to the extent that we can.
Mr. Moss. You know, Doctor, far better than I. You have been
associated with the university for many years and I imagine you have
many friends and colleagues engaged in scientific pursuits, that when
you talk of science you are not talking of "if and when" it is con-
venient. You are talking of something that is very precisely followed
in infinite detail and we are here dealing most certainly with diagnosis
of human reaction. It is science. But whether the techniques em-
ployed here are those scientific techniques-and I believe we have a
right to expect this, if we people are to be subjected to this type of
examination-is an important question before this committee. Be-
cause, at the moment, our Government engages extensively in this.
It impinges upon the rights and the privileges of our citizens. Yet,
there does not seem here to be from your records the scientific pro-
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cedure which would produce the answers which I think come from
any reasonably probing examination. I don't think the questions I
have asked are unreasonable or unfair.
I believe that if we are to use these devices and operators rely
upon them to interpret human responses, then we should have the
scientific notebooks full of the data that will fully support their
reliability.
Mr. INBAU. I suggest to you that they are full to the extent that
they can be filled for this reason.
Mr. Moss. No; to the extent that you have done it, not to the extent
that they can be. You could follow each and every case. You could
follow each and every case from the day of examination to the day of
ultimate death or resignation. That could be done. If it were to be
scientifically undertaken, you would follow it perhaps more exten-
sively than you have. You folk)w it now within the framework of the
economics of the activities in which you are engaged. But it is being
treated as a science. I have serious doubt that it is a science.
Mr. INBAU. The limitation that I was referring to is this. ]Mere is
some money stolen. There are six people that have likely had access
to it. You test them all and report that they are all innocent. Now,
nothing ever comes to light disclosing who it was that stole that.
There is ability in practical limitation here. You cannot take the con-
science of these people apart on an operating table and find out that
one of the six you said were innocent actually was guilty. It seems
to me you just have a limitation.
Yet, I don't know that you can overcome it in any other way. You
can't subject this technique to laboratory experiments. You can't set
up hypothetical crime situations. That is too far removed from actual
criminal cases.
Mr. Moss. You are not only using this in criminal cases, you
remember.
Mr. INBAU. Yes; personnel.
Mr. Moss. A great number of instances of use in Government re-
lates to personnel screening. So, we do conduct extensive experiments
in human behavior and the human psyche, don't we?
Mr.INBAU. Yes.
Mr. Moss. We spend millions of dollars every year attempting to
learn why people behave as they do. In this field of personnel screen-
ing, I think it is extremely important, if we are going to employ a
technique that is very reliable. We are supposed to protect every-
one to the best of our ability, and a system that might catch 94-percent
accuracy, we will say, but condemn the other 6 percent to some disad-
vantage because of its failures is not at all in accord with our prin-
ciples, is it?
Mr. INBAU. I don't know that I followed your statement carefully
enough to give it the answer. But again I say, and this is about the
only answer I know we can give, that here we have a certain type of
test procedure, a certain type of testing, that can only be checked upon
to the extent that there are disclosures which ultimately develop that
either prove or disprove the accuracy of the diagnosis that has been
made. It seems to me that if you have 30,000 cases and you have these
developments establishing nothing more than 1 percent of error in
that diagnosis, that you have a foundation there upon which to build
the conclusion that it is a reliable aid.
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106 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. Moss. I thought Mr. Reuss developed the fact yesterday that we
didn't have the 99-percent accuracy. Actually, your cards could be
more complete. We have discussed two things here today. I dis-
cussed the matter of cigarette smoking. Your cards don't reflect this.
I don't know if you have assurances from men well versed in the field
of human physiology that there is no important reaction here. I don't
know whether you have gone to the trouble of determining from the
best psychiatric sources that perhaps there might not be some possibil-
ity of an impact of an emotional nature of this if a person was sub-
jected to a lengthy test and deprived of his cane. But your records
don't reflect whether he is a heavy user or not. We talked about the
immediate environment, the hot room with lv h humidity and the cool
room with relatively low humidity. This is rot reflected in your cards.
These are factors that are unevaluated.
Mr. INBAU. I think there is one factor that is being overlooked here,
that you are recording not only involuntary physiological reactions
but very voluntary ones, such as in respiration. If you give a man a
test, you have the control questions-let us say this happens-you ask
him the control question and you get this suppression in respiration
characteristic of a lie reaction.
Mr. Moss. Is it characteristic of any other reaction?
Mr. INBAU. The suppression of respiration?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. It could be if you depended on that one reaction alone.
But here you have it on the control question and you don't have it on
the cruc' ' question.
Mi'. Moss. What other reactions could it be typical of ?
Mr. IN,BATJ. The individual suppression at that particular time?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. INBAU. It could be an accide~ tai occurrence.
Mr. Moss. Could it he symptomatic of some other physiological dis-
turbance?
Mr. INBATT. If it is, you are going to have something of that nature
throughout the record or a repetition of it throughout the record. You
are not going to have it isolated in these particular questions and have
it duplicated on a series of tests.
In other words, on three tests, you will get this suppression in res-
piration at the control question. You don't get it at
Mr. Moss. Are you saying that it is impossible for it to occur on a
series of questions?
3Zr. INP,ATT. I wouldn't say anything is impossible here, but it has
been our experience that it just doesn't work out that way. I don't
know anything else we can rely an.
Mr. Moss. You have taken it on the basis of a response to a question
without relating it to the overall physiological function of the person
before you.
Mr. LINDBFno. I might respond that the same problem that you are
suggesting, of course, would require considerable more definition than
you are allowing us at this point and considerable more explanation.
But the, random occurrences that, you are suggesting are also the
problems which the other sciences, as I think you would agree they
are sciences, cardiology, neurology, and these other medical sciences,
are confronted with that same element of probability. They are
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 107
dealing with everyday life and death matters. I might also suggest
or ask of you, Mr. Chairman, if you would give its some direction in
answering your question as to what science you would consider ade-
quate, what medical practice is adequate for us to more or less parallel
in our recording of observational physiological data. I presume you
have one in mind.
Mr. Moss. No, I haven't. I am going to attempt before we complete
the hearings on this subject, to seek, however, opinions from medical
specialists and from specialists in the field of psychiatry, and if pos-
sible, arrange an appropriate panel where this matter can be discussed.
I know I go in for electrocardiograms at, least twice a year and the
operator who gives them to me is a very competent operator. But I
would not want to rely on her interpretation of them, her diagnosis of
my then current condition.
I look to my doctor who has had many years and is alert to all of the
things that could bring about those little peaks and valleys in that
reading.
Normally, he is not going to make a judgment just on that. He is
going to have many other tests taken. Then his diagnosis is prob-
ably going to be made with considerable humbleness on his part,
recognizing the large latitude existing for error. But here we are
also dealing with what could be economic life or death for an in-
dividual.
Mr. LINDBERG. Or life and death possibly.
Mr. Moss. Or life and death. Yet, we haven't the same highly
qualified diagnosis. You are using the same basic material. You
are having the body report on its functions, and you are diagnosing
them but the diagnosis is made in most instances by a person with less
training by far than that nurse who gives me my test.
Mr. LINDBERG. I would suggest that it would be very illuminating
in order to place the polygraph field in its proper perspective as a
science to subject these psychiatrists that you are going to call and the
medical people to the same type of cross-examination that you have
engaged in here for the purpose of comparing the two.
Mr. Moss. We would. Most certainly, we would.
Mr. I,INDBERG. I would be interested to see if there is a significant
difference. Because our people at the Northwestern Biomedical Engi-
neering Staff have been unable to find any immediate corrections
in our procedures that would bring more of what you desire into
our field.
We are constantly working on these problems. They are not an-
swered. One of the limitations is obviously money. We are private
individuals engaged in private enterprise. I would hope that one of
the results of this committee meeting might be some real good research
in these interdisciplinary sciences.
Mr. Moss. We would hope it would lead to improvement, too.
Again, I have not with intent, Mr. Reuss, taken the floor from you.
You have the floor and I think you should be permitted to continue
your questions.
Mr. REUss. If I could just go back to the galvanic skin detector
which Mr. Inban and I think your colleagues have said is worthless
or practically worthless as a sole test. I still don't quite understand
how this thing is supposed to work. Who figured out that a given pat-
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108 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
tern of responses stigmatizes the liar as opposed to the truth-teller, or
are you all prepared to say that it is absolutely worthless?
Mr. LINDBERG. Are you talking about the galvanic skin reflex.?
Mr. REUSS. Yes.
Mr. LINDBERG. There are examinations or tests that can be given
which in a very substantial number of instances will detect certain
types of deception. I might suggest one, where the subject answers
no to a series of questions as to whether or not he chose a particular
card or a number. When he is instructed to answer no to all of the
cards, even when the number that he chose is called, frequently,
and even in our laboratory conditions, you will find a rise simi-
lar to the one that was seen on this chart here. But, then, when you
immediately proceed into the specific issue framework, we have not
found in the technique that we use, that there is sufficient consistency
for the reliability needed for a scientific assessment, as we conceive
of it.
Mr. BACIcsTER. Sir, is it possible to comment on that?
Mr. REUSS. Let me proceed, and I do have a question of you, Mr.
Inbau. Getting back to this question yesterday of the accuracy of the
assertion in the 1953 work by Mr. Inbau and Mr. John Reid, which
was the subject of considerable questioning by me yesterday, doubt
about the validity of those statistics was also expressed by three peo-
ple who wrote an article in the November, December 1962 issue of the
Harvard Business Review. (See exhibit 2E, p. 147.)
Mr. Backster, you wrote an article in the 1963 issue of Law and
Order magazine, did you not, which had something to say about that
Harvard Business Review article?
Mr. BACTcSTER. Yes, I did.
Mr. Moss. Do you have any more questions of Mr. Reid or Mr.
Lindberg?
Mr. REUSS. I have one of Mr. Lindberg. Going back to the busi-
ness of the two-way mirror which was rather infrequently used in
your five polygraph chambers, do you ever use that to give prospective
clients or police officers or company officials or governmental officers
who might be contemplating the employment of your agency as a lie
detector unit-do you ever use that double mirror to give them an
opportunity to observe polygraph tests in action?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes, so long as they have no interest in the individual
case itself.
Mr. REuss. When they do observe this, this is done without the
knowledge of the subject that they are being observed by these people?
Mr. LINDBERG. Yes.
Mr. REuss. Let me conclude, then, before Mr. Lindberg and Mr.
Reid go-well, thank you very much.
Mr. Moss. I want to thank you gentlemen for appearing here and
I regret that we have had so many delays. I hope you catch your
train.
Mr. LINDBERG. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. JOHN RETD. Thank you, sir.
Mr. REuss. Now, Mr. Backster, I was going to read to you from
your February 1963 article in Law and Order magazine. Do you
have a copy of that in front of you? (See exhibit 2F, p. 154.)
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, I do.
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Mr. Reuss. I will just read the relevant sentences and you check
me so that I don't misread any of them. The title of your article goes,
"Don't Trust the Lie Detector Versus Do Trust the Lie Detector."
Then you say:
The first of the above titles "Don't Trust the Lie Detector" is actually that
.of a feature article which appeared in the November-December issue of the
Harvard Business Review. This shocking injustice to the truly scientific brand
of lie detection was authored by Richard A. Sternbach, Lawrence A. Gustafson,
and Ronald L. Colier. An insert paragraph states that two of the authors are
"professional psychologists who have been doing extensive research with poly-
graph techniques, the third is a graduate student at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology who has studied commercial practice."
One thing you can be certain of is that none of them are authorities, or even
well-known practitioners, in the field of scientific lie detection. For these indi-
viduals to take it upon themselves to be so critical of a field they know so little
about is like this author writing a critical article on the Rorschach inkblot test
or the Bernreuter personality inventory, both of these being important tests in
the field of psychology.
Despite our justification to challenge these individual's right to present such
a totally destructive criticism of a specialty they mistakenly may feel within
their realm-,the sad part of it is that we, within the polygraph field, have pro-
vided them with the ammunition to fire at us.
Then, let us go.to page 2, second full paragraph :
In their subsection entitled "Acepracy and Error" in the Harvard Business
Review article, the authors severely criticize the vague, incomplete, and erro-
neous published polygraph statistics as well as the methods by which they were
calculated. We have now been called to task for inadequate statistics released
during past years-and what defense do we have? I know of none, and further-
more, if we attempt to defend such statistics of the past we are playing the
psychologist's game with his rules and on his home grounds.
The statistics which the Harvard Business Review article authors
were criticizing were the statistics of Mr. Reid and Mr. Inbau, are
they not?
Mr. BAcKsTEn. I am not sure if they localize themselves to them but
I can check.
Mr. REUSS. Will you take a look at the article and having refreshed
your recollection, answer my question?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir ; they quite closely stick to the book "Lie
Detection and Criminal Interrogation."
Mr. REuss. Is it your opinion from the 1963 work I was describing
which asserts that among the some 4,200 polygraph cases listed there
was only 1-percent inaccuracy-that those statistics are vague, incom-
plete, and erroneous; is that correct?
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, I was told this by a statistician whom I con-
sulted to see if there was foundation for the criticism on their part.
I know nothing of statistics. I am not an expert in that. I was told
that there were some grounds to criticize.
Mr. REUSS. And on the basis of your conference with that statis-
tician you referred to the 1953 assertion and the statistics back of it
as vague, incomplete, and erroneous, did you not?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir ; I did.
Mr. REuss. Thank you; I have no further questions.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Reid.
Mr. OGDEN REID. I have just one or two questions of Mr. Backster.
What are the facts, Mr. Backster with regard to preemployment
screening in the industrial field? What is the percentage of individ-
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110 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
uals that fail to get the job they are applying for on the basis of a
polygraph exam or largely as the result of a polygraph being part of
the preemployment personnel inquiry?
?
Mr. BACKSTER. I could only make' an estimate, sir, because we have
no facility or no structure set up for centralized statistics because we
.are dealing among competitors doing this work, this is not an excuse
for not having them but is the excuse so far.
I would judge or estimate that about one out of every four that
would undergo and have gone on the job by virtue of the conventional
forms of screening would have disqualified themselves by their own
assertions during the polygraph examination.
Mr. OGDEN REZD. Does that strike you as a high figure?
Mr. BACKSTER. I would say initially it struck me as a high figure;
yes, sir. I am not shocked by it any more.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Is there any parallel between that statistic and the
operation of some of our Government agencies? In other words, are
a large number, that is 25 percent, denied reasonable opportunity for
employment because of polygraph examinations?
Mr. BACKSTER. In the private practice, and now we are comparing
it to use in the Government, and by projection which really is not too
fair, they are not deprived of the job by virtue of the polygraph but by
virtue of their own behavior during past years.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Did you have any experience with the State of
Delaware Police Department?
Mr. BACKSTrR. Yes, sir.
Mr. OGDEN REID. What, approximately, were the figures in preem-
ployment screenings that pertained there?
Mr. BACKSTFR. I didn't do any screening there, if that is what you
mean. I did train an examiner for the State police.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Are you familiar with the figures of the Delaware
police?
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir; just offhand, I am not.
Mr. OGDEN REZD. To recapitulate, I would just like to ask Mr. In-
bau-Dr. Inbau-of the testimony
Mr. INS>AU. Incidentally, for the record, I am not a doctor. I hold
three degrees. I am not a doctor. I didn't want to interrupt before.
It sounded pretty good. It was not bothering me but I think I should
correct it.
Mr. OGDEN REm. You are very distinguished.
Mr. INB AU. Thank you, sir.
Mr. OGDEN REID. To recapitulate today, are you concerned about
the level of training in the Federal Government wherein the poly-
graph is used?
Mr. INBAa. Yes, sir.
Mr. OGDEN REZD. Would you say that a substantial number, perhaps
a majority, are inadequately trained?
Mr. INBAU. I would say a substantial number, yes.
Mr. OGDEN REZD. Therefore, this is a matter that you think is a case
for very serious concern?
Mr. INBArr. Yes, -sir.
Mr. OGDEN REID. And would you recommend very prompt studies to
develop standards and cessation,,perhaps, of these tests until adequate
standards and review procedures'
rocedures for the protection of the rights of
individuals can be more nearly assured ?
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Mr. INBAU. I would say a phasing out of some of this so that this
matter could be corrected as quickly as is reasonably possible.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Are there some areas in the Government where
there is no need for polygraph examinations at all in your judgment;
where it is being used indiscriminately? I can see given great pro-
fessional competence and for the great security needs of the United
'States, the National Security Agency perhaps, where there could be a
-clear need for an investigative function in this area properly ad-
ministered and carried on. But has the polygraph, in your judgment,
spread to too many agencies in the Government in relatively nonvital
,areas?
Mr. INBAU. That is my impression. But I have no basis really,
to say so definitely. I think there will be a tendency for it to reach
,out beyond the scope necessary for security purposes, yes.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Have you seen it in any agency yourself where
.you thought it was spread too widely?,
Mr. INBAU. No.
Mr. OGDEN REm. You have not?
Mr.INBAU. No.
Mr. OGDEN RE ID. You are convinced that there is a serious lack
of standards in the Federal Government today?
Mr.INBAU. Yes.
Mr. OGDEN RE, TD. Thank you very much.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr...MQss. Mr. Inbau,. in discussions of the polygraph it has been
emphasized that they are always used voluntarily, is that correct ?
Mr. INBAU. Yes.
Mr. Moss. How would you define voluntary in the sense of the
person agreeing to take these tests?
Mr. INBAU. Insofar as the examiner is concerned, if this individual
realizes, let us say he even vocalizes this, you understand you don't
have to take this, are you still willing to take the test, yes. Why
back of it this individual may feel that there is some measure of com-
pulsion. If he wants the job he has to take the test.
I am viewing it in a rather localized sense insofar as the validity
of the test he is undergoing is concerned.
Mr. Moss. In other words, it is important that it be voluntarily
taken, is that correct?
Mr. INBAU. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. What happens if it is not voluntarily taken?
Mr. INBAU. If the individual is willing to take it he can defeat it
very easily by muscular movements. Ile cannot sit still and cooperate
to the extent that is required for an adequate tst. There are all sorts
of ways in which he could prevent the examiner from attempting any
diagnosis. whatsoever.
Mr. Moss. You could get unreliable readings?
Mr. INBAU. No; the examiner would not make any attempt to ding-
nose the deception if lie was not getting the cooperation from the sub-
ject himself. This person may initially have had some resentment
of the idea that he had to take this test. But the standard operating
procedure, I know as John Reid uses it, you spend some time with this
individual in a pretest interview to allay his concern about it, to assure
him of the kind of treatment he is going to undergo during the test,
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and that individual? I am very sure in the vast majority of cases,
rather readily is satisfied that it is all right for him to go ahead and
take this. He may even feel it is a good thing generally to do it.
Mr. Moss. You do the work for police departments and private
employers?
Mr. INBAU. I am no longer active in this field, Mr. Moss, I used to
be.
Mr. Moss. The normal clients are the law enforcement agencies and
private employers, is that correct?
Mr. INBAU. Are you addressing your question to me where I as an
individual were doing it?
Mr. Moss. The Reid Co.
Mr. INBAU. No; I am not a part of the Reid Co. at. all. I am no
longer actively engaged in these tests. I used to be and I worked with
Mr. Reid on these publications and that is the extent of my activity
at the present time.
Mr. Moss. I was interested really in your interpretation of what is
voluntary. If it is the required policy of an employer that they be
taken, we will say, for initial employment or in some instances for
advancement, and the person has a desperate need for the employ-
ment, is that a voluntary taking of it?
Mr. INBAU. I view it from the standpoint of the examiner at the
time when the test is conducted. If the individual himself at that
time is willing to subject himself to the test I rate that as voluntary.
I understand in the broader sense of the term that it could well be
said that if he is compelled, lie will be fired if he doesn't take it, it is
involuntary to that extent.
Mr. Moss. Or if it should adversely reflect on his record that he de-
clined to take it. In other words, there is a penalty for failure to take
it, is that voluntary.?
Mr. INBAU. In the broadest sense of the word ? no.
Mr. Moss. It could be those cases where a Mellow said, all right, I
will take it, but he has very strong feelings against it, and for all prac-
tical purposes he is not a voluntary subject, is he?
Mr. INBAU. Yes; I think in the broadest sense of the word it is in-
voluntary then. What I would suggest, Mr. Moss, if I may, and
here again this calls for discretion in the use of it for restricting its
scope only to those cases where it is necessary, that when you weigh
this fact in terms of national security, it seems to me that the one gives
way to the other. I am talking about the morality of this, expecting
involuntary to that extent.
Mr. Moss. We are talking here about a field that is not necessarily
national security at all. We talked of the private employer.
Mr. INBAU. I was answering your question in terms of the Federal
usage of the technique.
Mr. Moss. Even there we have to weigh the moral question of the
involuntary submission of a person to this sort of rather imprecise
testing, don't we? Mr. INBAU. I am sorry, I didn't get that.
Mr. Moss. Even in the field of security we have to give some con-
sideration to the requirement that a person involuntarily submit to
this or suffer a penalty, don't you think
Mr. INBAU. Yes; I think you give consideration to it.
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Mr. Moss. We can't have a society that says the end justifies the
means, can we?
Mr. INBAU. No, sir; I don't subscribe to that at all. I think there is
a middle ground that can be tread on this, though, where you are
giving all due deference to the individual, and stacking that con-
sideration up against the broader one of the security of the country.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Inbau, I want to thank you as I did the other gentle-
men for your appearance and express the hope that the lengthier ses-
sion that was contemplated today has not unnecessarily inconvenienced
you. I don't believe we have any additional questions. You are now
excused.
Mr. INBAU. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. OGDEN REID. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moss. Mr. Backster, if you would like to sit in the mid-
dle there, I think it might be more comfortable for you.
Mr. BACKSTER. Thank you.
Mr. Moss. What is this electronic marvel that weeds out dishonest
and unfit applicants?
Mr. BACKSTBR. These are terms that are applied by the author of
this article, and not by me.
Mr. Moss. Were you interviewed on it?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; I was interviewed on it.
Mr. Moss. Is the article accurate?
Mr. BALUSTER. Basically it is a fairly accurate representation; yes,
sir.
Mr. Moss. Would you tell me where it is inaccurate?
Mr. BACKSTER. May I get a copy-of the article?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. May I proceed?
Mr. Moss. Yes, certainly.
Mr. BACKSTER. This article was printed in Bus Transportation
magazine in November 1956, and the author who did the work on this
was perhaps a little too carried away in his claims. I don't abide by
the degree of enthusiasm that I think he placed in this, that here is a
machine that permits a prospective employer to know, everything
about a job applicant which might make him a bad risk as an employee.
That is not true.
Mr. Moss. You have bad this reprinted?
Mr. BACa5TER. Yes; I did at the same time the magazine printed it.
They printed up an x number of prints for me.
Mr. Moss. Do you use this in promotional work in offering your
services or sellingyour equipment?
Mr. BACxsR. No, sir; we have not for several years, sir.
Mr. Moss. Is this particular piece of equipment used by any Gov-
ernment departments or agencies?
Mr. BACKSTER. This equipment represents two portions of the three
portions used, and now we have added to it, in the last couple of years,
the third portion ourselves. This brings it back to a basic polygraph
again.
Mr. Moss. Is this equipment used by the Government?
Mr. BACxsrrR. The same component parts, not this equipment as far
as the stand is concerned, the evaluator stand, but the same component
parts that are in this are in use by the Federal Government; yes, sir.
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These are sectionalized and they are replaceable by standard replace-
ment parts.
Mr. Moss. On page 2 of the piece-
A number of bus companies are already using the Backster service and have
found it invaluable. For in an industry such as ours where employees often
handle money and are responsible---
That column; I want to find out if this is an accurate statement-
Backster says that through his evaluator he can give a factual report to a com-
pany, a report which covers past dishonesty and undetected dishonesty.
Is that a correct statement?
Mr. BACKSTER. I am looking up here-in fact by the time the job
candidate finishes his testing the Backster evaluator can predict
whether or not.
Mr. Moss. Right here, the second page of the enclosure. "Past dis-
honesty and undetected dishonesty."
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. The word "factual," I won't agree with.
It is actually as represented by the man himself. I think we want to
consider th at.
Mr. Moss. You can give a report but not a factual report, is that
correct?
Mr. BAGKIC5TER. Yes.
Mr. Moss. So we strike the word "factual" ?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; I would strike that, sir.
Mr. Moss. "Past dishonesty and undetected dishonesty," you can
give those? Remember this is referring to a particular piece of equip-
ment,, the one described in this article.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes.
Mr. Moss. What is the nature of that equipment?
Mr. BACKSTER. This equipment is actually the same as polygraph
equipment without the cardio section in it.
Mr. Moss. It is a galvanometer?
Mr. BACKSTEn. It is a recording galvanometer with breathing also
being used.
Mr. Moss. Where is the breathing if it only attaches to two fingers?
Mr. BACKSTER. The breathing is actually, as I mentioned to you,
this is a schematic diagram for simpli ication purposes. It has
schematic written on the orioinal diagram. This is merely to show
without the complications of breathing tracing being there-
Mr. Moss. I was trying to determine in the text of the article the
inaccuracies. It describes it as a simple electronic :
If this all sounds like a Buck Rogers fantasy, remember that this is the age
of electronic wonders, and anything can and does- happen. The man responsible
for bringing electronic evaluation to the personnel field is Cleve Backster, who
has yet to hit his 40th birthday, but is already recognized as an authority and
consultant in the field of polygraph, or lie detector, work.
In the course of designing and improving psychological laboratory equipment,
Backster conceived the idea of a completely new and extremely sensitive emo-
tional response evaluator which could be employed with oral and written tests
to screen the backgrounds of job applicants.
It says:
with the Backster evaluator the technique used is entirely different. Through
two little ring contacts placed on the fingers of the job applicant, it records
extremely minute physiological changes.
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If it is only the two little rings, how do you get the respiration?
Mr. BACKSTER. It says there are two little rings that do record that,
but it does not mention. that there are attachments. recording breathing,
At the time this system was introduced there was an attempt to portray
it without the stigma of the polygraph or lie detection connotation..
Mr. Moss. How is it sold?
Mr. BACKSTER. It was sold as an evaluation of the job applicant.
Mr. Moss. Then it was a galvanic skin metering or measuring
device?
Mr. BACKSTER. It was not metering. It was a recording device and
also with breathing being used.
Mr. Moss. Where was the, breathing connected with on this picture
of you in this chair?
Mr. BACKSTER. It is not on me, sir.
Mr. Moss. Then the article is incorrect in. describing that?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Moss. That is what I was trying to find out.
Mr. BACKSTRR. Yes, sir; it is incorrect in that regard.
Mr. Moss. So it could not do it as the article said?
Mr. BACKSTRR. Not without the breathing; no, sir.
Mr. Moss. On this one you didn't even have to ask any questions?
Mr. BACKsTI.R. You don't need to; no, sir. The question is not
important. It is the topic that you touch on at that given time.
Mr. Moss. You just. hook it up and start talking ?
Mr. BACKSTER. It is not tl:iat easy, sir. This system described here
has been used
Mr. Moss. What do you do, read into it?
Mr. BACKSTER. No; you ask very set questions at periodical intervals
but the questions all deal in terms of what the man is holding back
from you. Not a question that has to be changed with every person
and every topic you cover during the examination.
Mr. Moss. The applicant, therefore, is not put through the humili-
ating process of being grilled such as he would be in a lie detector test.
Indeed, he need not speak a word during the entire electronic evalua-
tion procedure. Just the mention of particular topics such as a past
arrest will cause a reaction on the machine so that the examiner knows
the man is disturbed about the question.
What do you do, just read a list of questions to him, then?
Mr. BACKSTER. That is right, you do that with the proper time-
interval in between and the association response or the disturbance in
the area and the question asked is very indictive.
Mr. Moss. Is there variation in the response of a person's ebb and.
tide of blood pressure. Between individuals, do they all have the same
time lapse between and up and down?
Mr. BACKSTFR. No, sir; there is quite a variation.
Mr. Moss. Quite a variation; isn't there?
Mr. BAOKSTER. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Not necessarily reliable, then, taken through a series.
Mr. BACKSTER. If the length of the test exceeds, I would say, 31/2 to
4 minutes, the arm discomfort factor enters into the situation and the
pain factor would distort the pattern to the extent that we would not,
consider it reliable in reading the areas of the questions.
Mr. Moss. Then this article is not accurate?
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Mr. BAOKSTER. It is not the most accurate article, sir.
Mr. Moss. At all.
Mr. BACKSTER. I wouldn't say it is not accurate at all. There is a
great deal that is accurate about it.
Mr. Moss. It is not accurate in describing the instrument.
Mr. BACKSTER. It leaves off the breathing tracer; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. It really is, then, a polygraph.
Mr. BACKSTER. Sir, the equipment that was designed for this was
turned over to the company concerned and became the standard
polygraph design. I am the person who designed the component
equipment feature to start with.
Mr. Moss. I raise the questions because you are the one that handed
me this.
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir; I thought it would be helpful. But maybe
I was wrong.
Mr. Moss. If there is no objection this reprint, "Bus Transportation
of November 1956," which has just been discussed, will be inserted in
the record. (Sec exhibit 2C, p. 142.)
Mr. Moss. Do you use a mirror in your laboratory when you are
interrogating subjects?
Mr. BACKSTER. Ordinarily I do not. There is not occasion to. I
do have the facility available for training purposes, particularly if it
is needed.
Mr. Moss. Not for training purposes. I am not interested in that
at the moment. I was asking when you had a subject under exam-
ination.
Mr. BACKSTER. This could also be instruction for a trainee examiner
to observe an actual test in operation.
Mr. KAss. Mr. Backster, are you familiar with this Popular Science
reprint of September 1963? (See exhibit 2B, p. 138. )
Mr. BAOKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. K.-Ass. Is the polygraph laboratory displayed here the poly-
graph laboratory of your school or your laboratory?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. (See exhibit 8, p. 188.).
Mr. Kass. Could you describe what these various panels are?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. The various panels are actual trays that
primarily hold objects. They are painted white, and have a mirror
over them, which is a 450 angle mirror and individually controlled
lighting over each of the eight little bins concerned.
When we run a peak of tension tests where we have objects to put
in these bins one of the objects may be the weapon used in the mur-
der case and each of the other bins would contain a weapon of a dif-
ferent caliber or make of gun where the person that was not involved
in the crime would make no distinction among the weapons concerned
and would show no disturbance or rise that is significant.
A person that was involved would show very strong response as he
built up to the booth that lighted showing his weapon that he knew
he used in the crime and it would enhance greatly our response.
Mr. LASS. This is used in what you call the peak of tension test?
Mr. BACgsTEii. Yes, sir. There is also a secondary purpose for this
mirror. It is specially coated so that it can be utilized from the back
side as an observation post.
Mr. KAss. Then this is a two-way mirror system described earlier
by Mr. Lindberg?
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL G VE
Mr. BACxsTER. This is not the same system.
Mr. KASS. But it is a two-way mirror system?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes.
Mr. KASS. And, therefore, people can sit on the other side and ob-
serve a test which is going on in this particular interrogation room
described in this article?
Mr. BACxsTER. Yes.
Mr. Moss. Do you take these people into the room when you give
them the polygraph test and you flash these various weapons on these
lighted trays?
Mr. BACxsTER. If it is a murder case and we have the weapon, sir.
In fact the murder case on the day that Mr. Kass visited
Mr. Moss. It sounds to me like this borders on a certain amount of
entrapment in a thing like that. Are some people disturbed by guns
whether or not they have used them?
Mr. BACxsTER. Sir, this is an example of its use. I am giving
you an example of a gun that has been recovered in a murder case
and shown to the individual. We do not have objects in those trays
during the ordinary examination that doesn't involve a peak of
tension test.
Mr. Moss. Might it be an item that was supposed to have been stolen
other than a weapon?
Mr. BACKSTER. Not usually in the lesser intense cases.
Mr. Moss. Might it be any item that might have association with a
line of questioning?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, that has a special meaning to the person who is
wrong.
Mr. Moss. In setting up for the Government have you established
any laboratories of this type for the Government?
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir.
Mr. Moss. At Fort Gordon?
Mr. BAcxsTER. This is the first and only one in the country, sir.
Mr. Moss. Is this part of a technique that you urge upon your
trainees?
Mr. BACxsTER. No, sir.
Mr. Moss. What is this, a pioneering technique that you are trying
to develop?
Mr. BACxsTER. It is a pioneering technique, yes, and it allows for
quite a realistic observation of the actual case as it unfolds before you.
Mr. Moss. Sort of a pretrial trial?
Mr. BACxsTER. I don't think so, sir. In fact this is the first adverse
comment I have had on it.
Mr. Moss. I would venture to say, Mr. Backster, it shall not be the
last.
Mr. BAOKSTER. I imagine so.
Mr. Moss. I want counsel to develop some questions on your back-
ground of association with the Government and then I think that will
conclude the hearings for today.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster, are you familiar with the Academy for
Scientific Interrogation?
Mr. BACXSTER. Yes, sir ; I am. -
Mr. KASS. Are you familiar with this newsletter from the academy
of March and April, apparently 1963? (See exhibit 2D, p. 146.)
Mr. BACXSTER. Yes, sir; lam familiar with that.
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118 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. KASS. What is your relationship with the Army Polygraph
School at Fort Gordon, Ga.?
Mr. BACKSTER. The relationship is no direct one as such, although
they have attempted and have actually utilized each of the basic tech-
niques that were popularly in use within the field of polygraph and
have sent individuals to work conferences or advanced courses that
we have conducted at the school in New York.
As such they have attempted and have done a good job in putting
these techniques to work down at their own school, at first on a trial
basis and then after a certain degree of validation have attempted to
standardize on the technique that they felt was most beneficial.
Mr. KASS. Have they in fact, adopted what you would describe as
the Backster zone comparison technique which you described to the
committee this afternoon and this morning by slides?
Mr. BACIiSTER. They, I understand, favor that, sir. They teach all
the techniques but favor the zone comparison one.
Mr. KASS. Are you familiar with this reprint?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. KASS. I believe you are an officer of the Academy.
Mr. BACI#STER. Yes, sir.
Mr. KASS. It is stated in. here that Cleve Backster's finally completed
standardized polygraph note pack and technique were adopted by the
Army school. From what I understand you have just said, they didn't
adopt it, they just merely accepted it among other techniques.
Mr. BACSSTER. I might say that they feature it, sir. They per-
haps spent more time on that. I understand, sir, that for five classes
they taught each class the Backster technique and also the John Reid
technique, and had the Students use both through the first half of the
class. In each of these they gave the student the choice to complete his
theoretical problem during the last half of the course using either of
the techniques that he thought would most beneficially produce for
him in their casework.
Within five classes I understand that not one person used other than
zone comparison, by his own choice.
Mr. KASS. Zone comparison. Would you identify that for the
record?
Mr. BACKSTER. Zone comparison is the test that I propose as a
standard.
Mr. KASS. I see. The next sentence of this newsletter states :
This is going to be used exclusively by the school and they hope to have all
examiners of the Army return to Fort Gordon Lie Detection School for work
conferences and instruction on Clews?
I assume Cleve is Mr. Backster-
standardized note pack and polygraph technique so that it could be used by the
Army.
Could you comment on that?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir. I think they have already had two of these
advanced courses where examiners have been returned to specialize in
this technique. I think eventually they hope to have more.
Mr. KASS. Do they return to your school in New York?
Mr. BACrsTER. No, sir; they return to Fort Cordon.
Mr. KASS. Do you ever go to Fort Gordon, Ga., for conferences?
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Mr. BACKSTER. This is the only time I have gone down to Fort
Gordon. The rest of the occasions they have had representatives at-
tend the school in New York or I have conducted a work conference
in the same place that one of their people were attending a work
conference.
Mr. Moss. Have you had Army contracts?
Mr. BACKSTER. Army contracts, Sir?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. BACKSTER. No.
Mr. Moss. Either as a consultant?
Mr. BACKSTER. I have had consultant arrangements. A personnel
-contract.
Mr. Moss. Yes ; have you had a working agreement with the
Government with the Department of Army where they have paid you
money for your services?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; by the day; yes, sir.
Mr. Moss. For how long a period of time?
Mr. BACKSTER. May I look at my records? I can probably tell you
accurately in a minute.
Mr. Moss. Yes; I will tell you in order to shorten the hearing, we
will hold the record and you will supply the staff with the con-
tracts, their duration and the amounts involved.
Mr. BACKSTER. I will be glad to.
(The contracts are to be found in subcommittee files.)
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster, have you had contracts with any other
Government agency ?
Mr. BACKSTER. Other than what, Sir?
Mr. KASS. Other than the Army.
Mr. BACKsTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. KASS. Could you identify for the record these agencies?
Mr. BACKKSTER. I have been a consultant with National Security
Agency, Physical Security Equipment Agency, when it was in ex-
istence, and directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. KASS. Were these
Mr. BACKSTER. In the Air Force, sir; I am sorry.
Mr. KASS. Could we hold the record at this point to identify these
,contracts for the record?
Mr. Moss. Yes.
Mr. KASS. Have you had any contact with the Central Intelligence
Agency ?
Mr. BACKSTER. I was a full-time employee of that Agency, sir.
Mr. KAss. During what years ?
Mr. BACKSTER. During the years-may I check my permanent rec-
'ords ?
Mr. Moss. Again, you can supply that for the record.
Mr. BACKSTER. All right.
Mr. Moss. The staff can meet with you following this session
this afternoon and you can supply from your records that information,
-or if you require other records in order to complete it, you will obtain
those and return tlim to the committee as quickly as possible.
Mr. BACxsTER. I will be glad to.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster, this was approximately before 1950; is
that correct?
Mr. BACKSTER. This was before 1950, yes, sir.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Mr. KASS. Did you help set up the polygraph technique and train-
ing program at the Central Intelligency Agency?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. KASS. Mr. Backster, you informed Congressman Reid earlier
that you were not, I believe you used the word, you had no inde-
pendent knowledge of the Delaware State Police percentage of indi-
viduals who were not eligible for employment.
Mr. BACKSTER. I have that up in New York I am sure.
Mr. KASS. You have no independent knowledge. In other words,
here in this room you have no independent knowledge?
Mr. BACKSTER. Not here, I don t.
Mr.KASS. Could you give us a rough guess as to how many indi-
viduals were not employed by the Delaware State Police on the basis
of the polygraph exam.
Mr. BACKSTER. No, sir. I can if you want, but it will be out of
the air. I don't have the foggiest idea what percentage was involved.
Mr. Moss. He can supply it for the record.
Mr. KA.SS. Mr. Backster, you answered Mr. Moss earlier that if he
were being subject to a polygraph exam and at a particular moment
when you asked a certain question, if I were thinking how ridiculous
a procedure this was, for example, that this would be ideal or good
in the event that he would think this continuously throughout the
exam; is that correct?
Mr. BACKSTER. If he were to think it continuously during that
particular block that involved the earlier-in-life question. If he were
consistent in his being able to concentrate and his psychological set
would allow him to divert from that which could hurt him if he were
wrong and would allow him the triviality of enjoying that thought
on the other type question, it would be a good indication that there
was nothing seriously wrong on the relevant question.
Mr. KASS. If he did not continuously think this and suddenly
switched to another thought, would that affect your reading of the
polygraph chart?
Mr. BACKSTER. If it were the thought of approximately the same in-
tensity it may show up about the same size.
Mr. KASS. What if it were not of the same intensity?
Mr. BACKSTER. It would not matter if there was a lack of response
on the opposite type question asked.
Mr. KASS. So, in any case, whatever Mr. Moss or the subject in that
particular case thought, it would not make a difference in your read-
ing the chart?
Mr. BACKSTER. It may produce an extraneous response by which
we are not bothered if we concentrate on the lack of response rather
than presence of response in interpreting the chart.
Mr. KAss. Does the school at Fort Gordon teach this particular
method?
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes; I believe they do. This is the basis of the whole
technique.
Mr. Moss. As long as you are talking about me, Mr. Backster, over
the course of many years sitting in hearings not always as lively as
these, I have sort of developed the defensive habit of wandering in
my thoughts and sometimes finding an opportunity to amuse myself by
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recollection, or maybe a little mental note on something that is hap-
pening that I find pleasant or unpleasant.
I imagine many people do this. I think it might not have a sudden
pattern that I suddenly had a quick thought that was a ridiculous
procedure. I assure you I would not continue to hold it. I might
hu7r to something else.
BACKSTLR. That, sir is very possible. In fact, we carefully
review the questions word for word several times to take the edge off
such feelings as that. Also, we invite the person to reflect any
thoughts that they have if they feel that the question is inadequate.
They can help to groom the question. After that is completed in
asking the question we will repeat the question throughout several
charts where we get a frequency of times where the subject is exposed
to that same question which certainly makes insignificant one or two
times when there has been a sporadic thought.
Mr. KAss. Mr. Backster, I have one final question. You spoke
earlier in answer to Chairman Moss, I believe, of the "stigma" of the
polygraph industry. Could you explain what you meant by his.
Mr. BACKSTER. In what framework is that used?
Mr. KASS. In the framework, I believe, in an article in Bus
Transportation.
Mr. Moss. That was the article of Mr. Reuss.
Mr. KASS. The "Electronic Marvel Weeds Out Dishonest and Unfit
Applicants."
Mr. BACKSTER. Yes, sir.
Mr. KASS. In answer to a question why you were not hooked up on
the breathing you referred to the stigma of the polygraph industry.
Mr. Moss. You used "stigma" in the sense of identifying in that
particular illustration the attachment of some device for measuring
respiration. You only had the two little rings on your finger and
you referred to it as a stigma.
Mr. BACKSTER. I don't know what framework in which I was
thinking that. The thing I was attempting to portray is that the
breathing attachment of the conventional type, the heavy type breath-
ing attachment, would look more frightening perhaps than it really
should. In fact, the employer was the one that was apprehensive
about these tests and not the employee.
Mr. Moss. Now, I would ask that you also supply for the record
as quickly as -possible 'a complete summary of your background and
qualifications, including any academic training that you Tiave taken.
Mr. BACKSTER. I would be glad to do so. (See exhibit 4A, p. 162.)
Mr. Moss. That completes the committee's requirement for your
presence and you will have satisfied the request for your appearance
when the material requested for the record has been supplied.
The committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning
when it will reconvene in room 1501 in the Longworth House Office
Building.
(Present at the time of adjournment: Mr. Moss.)
(Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Friday, April 10, 1961.)
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APPENDIXES
EXHIBITS IA-III-STATE STATUTES AND CODES RELATING TO POLY-
GRAPHS AND OTHER LIE. DETECTION DEVICES
(SMITH-HURD, ILLINOIS STATUTES, ANNOTATED, TITLE 38, SEC. 951
ET SEQ.)
AN ACT To provide for licensing and regulating detection of deception examiners, and to.
make an appropriation in connection therewith
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General
Assembly:
SECTION 1. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires : "Detec-
tion of Deception Examiner," hereinafter referred to as "Examiner" means any
person who uses any device or instrument to test or question individuals for the
purpose of detecting deception.
"Internship" means the study of detection of deception and the administration
of detection of deception examinations by a trainee under the personal supervision
and control of an examiner in accordance with a course of study as prescribed
by the Department at the commencement of such Internship.
"Person" includes any natural person, partnership, association, corporation or
trust.
"Department" means the Department of Registration and Education of the
State of Illinois.
"Director" means the Director of the Department of Registration and Educa-
tion of the State of Illinois.
"Committee" means the Detection of Deception Examiner Committee provided
for in this Act.
"Him" means both the male and female gender.
:Sac. 2. The practice of the detection of deception in the State of Illinois is
declared to affect the public health, safety and welfare and is subject to regulation
and control in the public interest.
SEC. 3. Every examiner shall use an instrument which records permanently
and simultaneously the subject's cardiovascular and respiratory patterns as
minimum standards, but such an instrument may record additional psychological
changes pertinent 'to the detection of deception. An examiner shall, upon written
request of a person examined, make known the results of such test to the person
examined within 5 days of receipt of the written request.
SEC. 4. It is unlawful for any person to administer detection of deception
examinations, or attempt to hold himself out as an Examiner, without a license
issued by the Department, except insofar as qualified by sections 5 and 12 of this
Act. Provided, however, That this shall not prohibit the use of detection of
deception equipment by a person licensed to practice medicine in all its branches
under the Medical Practice Act of Illinois when the results are to be used in
research.
SEC. 5. Any person may administer detection of deception examinations in this
State without license for not to exceed twenty days during any calendar year.
Provided, however, that any time prior to administering said examinations, such
person shall pay a registration fee and file with the Department a sworn affi-
davit that said person-
(a) is a citizen of the United States; and
(b) is at least 21 years of age ; and
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(c) has administered detection of deception examinations for a period of
at least two years using the instrumentation prescribed in section 3 of this
Act ; and
(d) has not been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
or a felony, or who has not been released or discharged under other than
honorable conditions from any of the armed services of the United States.
The registrant under this section is subject to all the provisions of this Act
relating to examiners except sections 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 26, and 30, and the
Director shall deny, rescind, or revoke the registration of any person who at any
time violated said provisions of this Act. The registration fee is nonrefundable.
SEC. 6. On the effective date of this Act, any person who has actually engaged
in the occupation, business, or profession of an examiner before April 1, 1963,
and who has used for that period the instrumentation prescribed in section 3,
shall, upon application within one year after the effective date of this Act and
payment of the required licenes fee, be issued a license hereunder, without
examination, provided, however, that the Director may require such applicant
to submit satisfactory proof that he has so engaged for such period.
SEC. 7. None of the powers, duties, or functions of the Department or the
Director thereof under this Act shall be exercised except under the action and
written report of the Detection of Deception Examiner Committee. Such com-
mittee shall be composed of five individuals appointed by the Director. The
members of the committee shall have been engaged continuously in the State of
Illinois for a period of at least five years as examiners. Three members must
be actively engaged in the private, or commercial, practice of detection of decep-
tion and two members must be primarily engaged in the detection of deception
for the State of Illinois or a county or municipality within the State of Illinois.
Each member shall serve for a term of five years.
The action or report in writing of a majority of the committee shall be suffi-
cient authority upon which the Director of Registration and Education may act.
In designating the persons to act, the Director of Registration and Education
shall give due consideration to recommendations by members of the profession
and by organizations therein. Whenever the Director is satisfied that substan-
tial justice has not been done in an examination, he may order a reexamination
by the same or other examiners.
SEC. 8. Applications for original licenses shall be made to the Department in
writing on forms prescribed by the Department and shall be accompanied by the
required fee, which shall not be returnable. Any such application shall require
such information as in the judgment of the Department will enable the Depart-
ment to pass on the qualifications of the applicant for a license.
SEC. 9. The license of an examiner which has not been revoked or is not
suspended shall be renewed annually upon payment of the required fee by the
examiner.
'SEC. 10. Each nonresident applicant for an original license -or a renewal
license, shall file an irrevocable consent that actions against the applicant may
be filed in any appropriate court of any county or municipality of this State
in which the plaintiff resides or in which some part of the transaction occurred
out of which the alleged cause of action arose and that process in any action
may be served on the applicant by leaving two copies thereof with the Director
of the Department. Such consent shall stipulate and agree that such service
of process shall be taken and held to be valid and binding for all purposes. The
Director shall send forthwith one copy of the process to the applicant at
the address shown on the records or the Department by registered or certified
mail.
SEC. 11. A person is qualified to receive a license as an examiner :
A. Who is at least 21 years of age ; and
B. Who is a citizen of the United States ; and
C. Who establishes that he is a person of honesty, truthfulness, integrity and
moral fitness ; and
D. Who has not been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
or a felony, or who has not been released or discharged under other than
honorable conditions from any of the armed services of the United States ; and
E. Who has passed an examination conducted by the Examiner Committee,
or under its supervision, to determine his competency to obtain a license to
practice as an examiner ; and
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F. Who has had conferred upon him an academic degree, at least at the
baccalaureate level, from a college or university accredited by the Department ;
and
G. Who has satisfactorily completed not less than six months of internship
training.
SEC. 12. The Department shall issue an internship license to a trainee upon
application and payment of the required fee which application shall contain
such information as may be reasonably required by the Department.
An internship license shall be valid for the term of twelve months from the
date of issue. The Department may renew or extend any internship license
upon good cause shown for any term not to exceed twelve months.
SEC. 13. Each license shall be issued for the term of one calendar year or
for such part thereof as remains, at the time of the issuance thereof. Each
license shall be renewed during the month of November of each year. Each
license not renewed during November of each year shall expire on December 1,
of that year. An examiner whose license has expired may be reinstated at
any time within five years after the expiration thereof, by making a renewal
application therefor and by paying the renewal license fee and all lapsed
renewal fees for each year since the expiration of his license. However, any
examiner whose license expired while he was (1) in Federal service on active
duty with the Armed Forces of the United States, or the State militia called
into service or training, or (2) in training or education under the supervision
of the United States preliminary to induction into the military service, may
have his license renewed, reinstated or restored without paying any lapsed
renewal fees if within two years after honorable termination of such service,
training or" education except under conditions other than honorable, he furnishes
the Department with satisfactory evidence to the effect that he has been so
engaged and that his service, training or education has been so terminated.
A license or'duplicate license must be prominently displayed at the principal
place of business of every examiner. Each license shall be signed by the Di-
rector and shall be issued under the seal of the Department.
Notice in writing shall be given to the Department by such license holder of
any change of principal business location whereupon, the Department shall
issue a new license for the unexpired period upon payment of the required fee.
A change of business location without notification to the Department and
without the issuance by it of a new license shall. automatically suspend the license
theretofore issued.
SEC. 14. The Department may refuse to Issue or may suspend or revoke a
license for any one of the following grounds:
A. Material misstatement in the application for original license or in the
application for any renewal license under this Act.
B. Wilful disregard or violation of this Act or of any regulation or rule issued
pursuant thereto.
C. Conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
D. Making any wilful misrepresentation or false promises or causing to. be
printed any false or misleading advertisement for the purpose of directly or
indirectly obtaining business or trainees.
E. Having demonstrated incompetency to act as an examiner as defined
under this Act.
F. Allowing one's license under this Act to. be used by an unlicensed person in
violation of the provisions of this Act.
G. Wilfully aiding or abetting another in the violation of this Act or of any
rule issued by the Department pursuant thereto.
H. Where the license holder has been adjudged mentally ill, mentally de-
ficient or in need of mental treatment 4s provided in the Mental Health Code.
1. Failing, within a reasonable time, to provide information requested by the
Department as the result of a formal or'informal complaint to the Department,
which would indicate a violation of this tact.
SEC. 15. Any unlawful act or violation of any of the provisions of this Act
upon the part of any examiner or trainee, shall not be cause for- revocation of
the license of any other examiner for 'whom the offending examiner may have
been employed, unless it shall appear that the examiner has wilfully aided or
abetted the actions or activities of the offending examiner or trainee.
SEC. 16. The Department shall prepare annually a list of the names and
addresses of all examiners and trainees and of all persons whose licenses have
been suspended or revoked within the previous year, which list shall be mailed
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 Appr%ed U OF POLYGRAPHS
to the county clerk of each county of the State and be held by such county clerk
as a public record.
SEC. 17. The Department may upon its own motion and shall upon the
verified complaint in writing of any person setting forth facts which if proved
would constitute grounds for refusal, suspension or revocation of a license under
this Act, investigate the actions of any applicant or any person or persons hold-
ing or claiming to hold a license. The Department shall, before refusing to issue
and before suspension or revocation of a license, at least ten days prior to the
date set for the hearing, notify in writing the applicant for, or holder of a license,
of the nature of the charges and that a hearing will be held on the date desig-
nated. The hearing shall determine whether the applicant or holder, hereinafter
called the respondent is privileged to hold such license, and shall afford the re-
spondent an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel in reference thereto.
Such written notice may be served by delivery of the same personally to the
respondent at the address of his last notification to the Department. At the
time and place fixed in the notice, the Committee shall proceed to hear the
charges and both the respondent and complainant shall be accorded ample
opportunity to present in person or by counsel such statements, testimony, evi-
dence and argument as may be pertinent to the charges or to the defense thereto.
The Committee may continue such hearing from time to time. If the Committee
shall not be sitting at the time and place fixed in the notice or at the time
and place to which the hearing shall have been continued, the Director shall
continue such hearing for a period not to exceed thirty days, unless extended by
stipulation of both parties.
SEC. 18. The Department, at its expense, shall provide a stenographer to
take down the testimony and preserve a record of all proceedings at the hearing
of any case involving the refusal to issue or the suspension or revocation of a
license. The notice of hearing, complaint and all other documents in the nature
of pleadings and written motions filed in the proceedings, the transcript of
testimony, the report of the Committee and orders of the Department shall be
the records of such proceedings. The Department shall furnish a transcript of
such record to any person or persons interested in such hearing upon the payment
therefor of 75 cents per page for each original transcript and 5 cents per page
for each carbon copy thereof ordered with the original ; provided that the charge
for any part of such transcript ordered and paid for previous to the writing of
the original record thereof shall be 25 cents per page.
In any case involving the refusal to issue or the suspension or revocation of
a license, a copy of the Committee's report shall be served upon the respondent
by the Department, either personally or by registered or certified mail as pro-
vided in this Act for the service of the notice of hearing. Within twenty days
after such service, the respondent may present to the Department a motion in
writing for a rehearing, which written motion shall specify the particular
grounds therefor. If no motion for rehearing is filed, then upon the expiration
of the time specified for filing such a motion, or if a motion for rehearing is
denied, then upon such denial the Director may enter an order in accordance with
recommendations of the Committee. If the respondent shall order and pay for
a transcript of the record within the time for filing a motion for rehearing, the
twenty day period within which such a motion may be filed shall commence upon
the delivery of the transcript to the respondent.
SEC. 19. Any circuit or superior court or any judge thereof, either in term
time or vacation, may, upon application of the Director or of the applicant or
licensee against whom proceedings upon section 17 of this Act are pending,
enter an order requiring the attendance of witnesses and their testimony, and
the production of documents, papers, files, books, and records in connection with
any hearing in any proceedings under that section. The court or judge may
compel obedience to its or his order by proceedings for contempt.
SEC. 20. Any person affected by a final administrative decision of the Depart-
ment may have such decision reviewed judicially by the circuit or superior court
of the county wherein such person resides. If the plaintiff in the review pro-
ceeding is not a resident of this State, the venue shall be in Sangamon County.
The provisions of the "Administrative Review Act", approved May 8, 1945, and
all amendments and modifications thereof, and the rules adopted pursuant there-
to, shall apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final ad-
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F ministrative, decisions of the Department hereunder. The term "administrative
decision" is defined as in Section 1 of said "Administrative Review Act".
The Department shall not be required to certify the record of the proceeding
unless the plaintiff in the review proceedings shall first pay to the Department
the sum of 75? per page of such record. Exhibits shall be certified without cost.
Src. 21. Upon the revocation or suspension of any license, the licensee shall
forthwith surrender the license or licenses to the Department and if the licensee
fails to do so, the Department shall have the right to seize the same.
Src. 22. The Director, on the recommendation of the Committee, may issue
regulations, consistent with the provisions of this Act, for the administration and
enforcement thereof and may prescribe forms which shall be issued in connec-
tion therewith.
Src. 23. No action or counterclaim shall be maintained by any person in any
court in this State with respect to any agreement or services for which a license
is required by this Act or to recover the agreed price or any compensation under
any such agreement, or for such services for which a license is required by this
Act without alleging and providing that such -person had a valid license at the
time of making such agreement or doing such work.
Src. 24. If any person violates the provision of this Act, the Director may, in
the name of the people of the State of Illinois, through the Attorney General of
the State of Illinois, apply, in any court of competent jurisdiction, for an order
enjoining such violation or for an order enforcing compliance with this Act.
Upon the filing of a verified petition in such court, the court or any judge thereof,
if satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that such person has violated this Act, may
issue a temporary injunction, without notice or bond, enjoining such continued
violation, and if it is established that such person; has violated or is violating.
this Act, the court, or any judge thereof,' may 'summarily try and punish' the
offender for contempt of court. Proceedings under this section shall be in addi-
tion to, and not in lieu of, all other remedies and penalties provided by this Act.
Src. 25. An order or a certified copy thereof, over the seal of the Department
and purporting to be signed by the Director, shall be prima facie proof thereof :
(a) That such signature is the genuine signature of the Director ;
(b) That such Director is duly appointed and qualified;
(c) That the Committee and the members thereof are qualified to act.
Src. 26. The fee to be paid by an applicant for an examination to determine his
fitness to receive an examiner's license is $50.
The fee is to be paid for an examiner's renewal license is $25.
'The fee to be paid for an internship license is $10.
The fee to be paid for a renewal internship license Is $5.
The fee to be paid by an unlicensed examiner to be registered under the pro-
visions of section 5 is $5.
The fee to be paid for the issuance of a duplicate license or a license indicating
a change of address is $5.
The fee to be paid for the reinstatement of an examiner's license within five
years of the lapse thereof shall be $5 and all of the lapsed renewal fees.
The fee to be paid for the restoration of a license which lapsed more than five
years preceding the application for restoration shall be $50.
This section in regard to fees shall not apply to any examiner in the exculsive
employment of the United States of America, the State of Illinois, any county,
municipality, or political subdivision in this State, any department, bureau or
agency of any of the foregoing, or any examiner thereof in the pursuit of his
official duties.
{SEC. 27. Should any one or more provisions of this Act be held invalid, such
invalidity shall in no manner affect any of the other provisions hereof.
Sr-,c. 28. Any person who violates any provision of this Act or any person
who falsely states or represents that he has been or is an examiner or trainee
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine of not less than $25, nor more than $500 or imprisonment in the county
jail for a term of not to exceed six months, or both. All fines under this Act
shall inure and be paid to the county in which the prosecution is maintained.
,Src. 29. At any time after the suspension or revocation of any license, the
Department may restore it to the accused person, upon the written recommenda,
tion of the Committee.
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p1 8 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL G
SEC. 30. An applicant who is an examiner, licensed under the laws of another
State or territory of the United States, may be issued a license without examina-
tion by the Department, in its discretion, upon payment of a fee of $50, and
the production of satisfactory proof :
(a) That the applicant is at least 21 years of age ; and
(b), That the applicant is a citizen of the United States ; and
(o) That he is of good moral character ; and
,(d) That the requirements for the licensing of examiners in such particular
State or territory of the United. States were at the date of licensing, substan-
tially equivalent to the requirements then in force in this State; and
(c) That the applicant had lawfully engaged in the administration of poly-
graph examinations under the laws of such State or territory for at least two
years prior to his application for license hereunder ; and
(f) That such other State or territory grants similar reciprocity to license
holders of this State.
SEc. 31. Appropriation.
ExIIIBIT 1B-KENTUCKY
SESSION LAWS OF KENTUCKY, 1963
CHAPTER 78
(S. B. 63)
AN ACT Relating to "Detection of Deception Examiners," for licensing and regulating
same
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
SECTION 1. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires :
(1) "Detection of Deception Examiner," hereinafter referred to as "Examiner,"
means any person, other than. on a trainee, who uses any device or instrument
to test or question individuals for the purpose of detecting deception.
(2) "Trainee" means any person who administers detection of deception
examinations under the personal supervision and control of an examiner.
(3) "Person" means any natural person, partnership, association, corporation
or trust.
(4)i "Department" means the Department of Public Safety of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky.
1(5) "Commissioner" means the Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
iSEc. 2. Every examiner shall use an instrument which records permanently
and simultaneously the subject's cardiovascular and respiratory patterns as
minimum standards, but such an instrument may record additional physiological
changes pertinent to the detection of deception.
SEC. 3. (1) No person shall administer a detection of deception examination,
as set forth in Section 1 of this Act, or any imitation thereof, without first
securing a trainee's license or an examiner's license. Each application for a
trainee's license shall be made to the department within ten days- of the com-
mencement of the trainee's internship., and said application shall contain such
information as may be reasonably required by the department. The department
shall issue the trainee license free of charge. Each application for an examiner's
license shall be made to the department in writing on forms provided by the
department and shall contain such information as is required by the department
to determine the eligibility of the applicant. Each application for an examiner's
license shall be accompanied by a fee of twenty dollars, which is nonrefundable.
,(2) Each applicant for an examiner's license, shall submit his fingerprints to
the department together with a sworn affidavit that said applicant :
(a) Is a citizen of the United States;
(b) Is at least twenty-one years of age ;
(c), Has administered detection of deception examinations for a period of
at least two years using the instrumentation prescribed in Section 2 of this Act:
(d) Has completed a course of formal training in detection of deception in an
institution. accepted by the department ; and
'(e) Has not been convicted of a misdemeanor involvolving moral turpitude
or a felony, or who has not been relased or discharged under other than honorable
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conditions from any of the Armed Services of the United States, or any branch
of the state, city or federal government.
(3) Upon receipt of an application for a trainee's license or for an examiner's
license, the commissioner shall investigate each application, and no license will
be issued until said investigation is complete.
SEC. 4. On the effective date of this Act, any person who has actually engaged
in the occupation, business or profession of an examiner for a period of five years,
and who has used for that period the instrumentation prescribed in Section 2 of
this Act, shall, upon application within one year after the effective date of this
Act and upon payment of the required license fee, be issued a license hereunder,
without completion of formal training in an institution ; provided, however, that
the commissioner may require such applicant to submit satisfactory proof that
he has so engaged for such period and has the other qualifications of an examiner
as are set forth in this Act.
SEC. 5. (1) Each examiner's license shall be issued for the term of one calen-
dar year or for such part thereof as remains at the time of the issuance thereof.
Each examiner's license shall be renewed during the month of December of each
year, and each examiner's not so renewed shall expire on December 31, of that
year. A renewal fee of fifteen dollars shall accompany each renewal applica-
tion for the examiner's license.
(2) An examiner whose license has expired may, at any time within five years
after the expiration thereof, obtain a renewal license by making a renewal
application therefor and by paying a renewal license fee for each year since the
expiration of his license ; provided, however, any examiner whose license expired
while he was (a) on active duty with the Armed Forces of the United States, or
(b) called into service or training with the State Militia, or (c) in a training
or education program under the supervision of the United States preliminary
to induction into the military service, may have his license renewed without pay-
ing any intervening renewal license fee if within two years after termination of
service, training or education, except under conditions other than honorable,
he furnishes the department an affidavit to the effect that he has been so engaged
and that his service, training or education has been so terminated. The com-
missioner shall, before issuing the renewal license, investigate each applicant
during the expiration period.
(3) Each trainee's license shall be issued for the term of eighteen months.
The department may renew or extend a trainee's license upon good cause shown
for any term not to exceed eighteen months.
SEC. 6. (1) A license or duplicate license must be prominently displayed at
each place of business of every examiner or trainee. The fee for a duplicate
license is five dollars. Each license shall be signed by the commissioner and
shall be issued under the seal of the department.
(2) Notice in writing shall be given to the department by such license holder
of any change of principal business location whereupon, the department shall
issue a new license for the unexpired period without charge. A change of busi-
ness location without notification to the department and without the issuance by
it of a new license shall automatically suspend the license theretofore issued.
SEC. 7. Each nonresident applicant for a trainee's license or examiner's license
or a renewal license shall file an irrevocable consent that actions against the
applicant may be filed in any appropriate court of any county or municipality
of this Commonwealth in which the plaintiff resides or in which some part of
the transaction occurred out of which the alleged cause of action arose and that
process in any action may be served on the applicant by leaving two copies
thereof with the commissioner of the department. Such consent shall stipulate
and agree that such service of process shall be valid and binding for all purposes.
The commissioner shall send forthwith one copy of the process to the applicant
by registered or certified mail at the address shown on the records of the
department.
SEC. 8. The department may deny, suspend or revoke any license on any one
or more of the following grounds :
,(1) Material misstatement in the application for a license or in the applica-
tion for a renewal license.
(2) Wilful disregard or violation of this Act or of any regulation or rule
issued pursuant thereto.
(3) If the holder of any license has been adjudged guilty of the commission
of it felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
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(4) Making any wilful misrepresentation or false promises or causing to be
printed any false or misleading advertisement for the purpose of directly or
indirectly obtaining business or trainees.
(5) Having demonstrated unworthiness or incompetency to act as an examiner
or trainee, as defined under this Act, in such manner as to effect the interests of
the public.
(6) Allowing one's license under this Act to be used by an unlicensed person
in violation of the provisions of this Act.
(7) Wilfully aiding or abetting another in the violation of this Act or of any
regulation or rule issued pursuant thereto.
(8) Where the licensed holder has been adjudged mentally ill, mentally defi-
cient, or in need of mental treatment as provided in the Mental Health Code.
(9) Failing, within a reasonable time, to provide information requested by
the department as the result of a formal or informal complaint to the department,
which would indicate a violation of this Act.
SEC. P. Any unlawful act or violation of any of the provisions of this Act upon
the part of any examiner or trainee shall not be cause for revocation of the
license of any other examiner for whom the offending examiner may have been
employed, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the department that the
examiner has wilfully aided or abetted the actions or activities of the offending
examiner or trainee.
SEC. 10. The department shall publish, at least annually, a list of the names
and addresses of all examiners and trainees and of all persons whose licenses
have been suspended or revoked within that one year, together with such other
information relative to the enforcement of the provisions of this Act as it may
deem of interest to the public in the profession. One such list shall be mailed
to the County Clerk of each county of the Commonwealth and shall be held by
such County Clerk as a public record. Such list shall also be mailed by the
department to any person in the Commonwealth upon request.
SEC. 11. The department may upon its own motion and shall upon the verified
complaint in writing of any person setting forth facts which if proved would
constitute grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license under this
Act, investigate the actions of any applicant or any person holding or claiming to
hold a license. The department shall, before denial, suspension, or revocation
of a license, at least ten days prior to the date set for the hearing, notify in
writing the applicant or holder of a license of the nature of the charges and that
a hearing will be held on the date designated. The hearings shall determine
whether the applicant or holder, hereinafter called the respondent, is privileged
to hold such license, and shall afford the respondent an opportunity to be heard
in person or by counsel in reference thereto. Such written notice may be served
by personal delivery to the respondent or by mailing the same by registered or
certified mail with return receipt requested to the place of business last specified
by the respondent on the records of the department. At the time and place
fixed in the notice, the commisisoner shall proceed to hear the charges, and
both the respondent and complainant shall be accorded ample opportunity to
present in person or by counsel such statements, testimony, evidence and argu-
ment as may be pertinent to the charges or to the defense thereto. The commis-
sioner may continue such hearing from, time to time. If the commissioner shall
not be sitting at the time and place fixed in the notice or at the time and place
to which the hearing shall have been continued, the commissioner shall continue
such hearing for a period not to exceed thirty days.
SEC. 12. (1) The department, at its expense, shall provide a stenographer to
take down the testimony and preserve a record of all proceedings at the hearing
of any case involving the denial, suspension or revocation of a license. The
notice of hearing, complaint and all other documents in the nature of pleadings
and written motions filed in the proceedings, the transcript of testimony, the
report of the commissioner and orders of the department shall be the records
of such proceedings. The department shall furnish a transcript of such record
to any person interested in such hearing upon payment therefor of seventy-
five cents per page for each original transcript and twenty-five cents per page
for each carbon copy thereof ordered with the original : provided, however, the
charge for any part of such transcript ordered and paid for previous to the
writing of the original record thereof shall be twenty-five cents per page.
(2) In any case involving the denial, suspension or revocation of a license, a
copy of the commissioner's report shall be served upon the respondent by the
department, either personally or by registered or certified mail as provided in
this Act for the service of the notice of hearing. Within twenty days after
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such service, the respondent may present to the department a motion in writing
for a rehearing, which written motion shall specify the particular grounds there-
for. If no motion for rehearing is filed then upon the expiration of the time
specified for filing such a motion, or if a motion for rehearing is denied, then
upon such denial the commissioner may enter an order in accordance with recom-
mendations of the department. If the respondent shall order and pay for a
transcript of the record within the time for filing a motion for rehearing, the
twenty-day period within which such a motion may be filed shall commence upon
the delivery of the transcript to the respondent.
SEC. 13. Any circuit court, either in term time or vacation, may, upon applica-
tion of the commissioner or of the applicant or licensee against whom proceedings
upon Section 11 of this Act are pending, enter an order requiring the attendance
of witnesses and their testimony, and the production of documents, papers,
files, books and records in connection with any hearing in any proceedings under
that Section.
SEC. 14. Any person affected by a final administrative decision of the depart-
ment may have such decision reviewed judicially by the Circuit Court of Franklin
County.
SEC. 15. Upon the revocation or suspension of any license, the licensee shall
forthwith surrender the license to the department, and if the licensee fails to do
so, the department shall have the right to seize the same.
SEC. 16. If any person violates the provisions of this Act, the commissioner:
shall, in the name of the People of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, through the
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, apply, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, for an order enjoining such violation or for an order en-
forcing compliance with this Act. Proceedings under this section shall be in
addition to, and not in lieu of, all other remedies and penalties provided by
this Act.
SEC. 17. An order or a certified copy thereof, over the seal of the department
and purporting to be signed by the commissioner, shall be prima facie proof
thereof ;
(1) That such signature is the genuine signature of the commissioner;
(2) That such commissioner is duly appointed and qualified; and
(3) That the commissioner and department thereof are qualified to act,
SEC. 18. Section 8 (1), Section 5(l), and Section 6(1) of this Act, relating
to fees charged applicants for a license, shall not apply to any department of
the United States or any agency of the city, county or state of the Common-
wealth of Kentucky provided that no fee is charged for administration of the
test.
SEC. 19. Should any one or more provision of this Act be held invalid, such
invalidity shall in no manner affect any of the other provisions hereof.
SEC. 20. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, for
each violation, be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than five hundred
dollars.
Approved March 9, 1962.
EXHIBIT 1C-NEW MEXICO
SESSION LAWS or NEW MEXICO, 1963
Regular Session
CHAPTER 225, LAWS 1963
House Bill No. 341
AN ACT Relating to the Practice of Polygraphy ; Providing for a licensing board ; and
establishing procedure for registration, qualification, and licensure
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of New Mexico
SECTION 1. "Polygraphy" and "Practice of Polygraphy" defined. As used in
this act:
A. "Polygraphy" means the recording of tracings of several different pulsations
in the human body simultaneously for the purpose of determining veracity;
and
B. "Practice of polygraphy" means the employment of any instrument designed
to record simultaneously the physiological changes in human respiration, cardio-
vascular activity and galvanic skin resistance, or reflex, to determine veracity
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and to detect deception or the reading and interpretation of polygraph records
and results.
SEC. 2. License to Practice Polygraphy. It is unlawful for any person to prac-
tice polygraphy, offer his services in the capacity of a polygrapher or purport to
be a polygrapher without a liecense issued by the state board of examiners in
polygraphy.
SEC. 3. Board of Examiners in Polygraphy. There is created a board of ex-
aminers in polygrapby to be comprised of three members to be appointed by the
Governor for terms of three years: Provided, however, of the first board appointed,
one member shall have a term of one year, one member shall have a term of two
years and and one member shall have a term of three years. Any appointment
to fill a board vacancy shall be for the unexpired term. Board members shall be
qualified electors of New Mexico; one member shall be a licensed doctor of
medicine ; and two members shall be polygraphers actively engaged in the prac-
tice in New Mexico. The board shall meet annually in Santa Fe, upon a date to
be set by resolution of the board, for the purpose of transacting business. The
board members shall receive per diem and mileage as provided in the Per Diem
and Mileage Act, and shall receive no other compensation, perquisite or allow-
ance.
SEC. 4. Board Organization. Appointment of Registrar. Within sixty days of
their appointment the board members shall meet and organize, designating one
member president and one member registrar. The registrar of the board shall
be ex-officio secretary-treasurer of the board and may receive payment, for service
and remuneration for expenses in carrying out his necessary duties, in an amount
to be determined by the board.
SEC. 5. Duties of Registrar-Records. The registrar of the board shall keep a
registration book in which shall be entered the name of each licensee, date of
license issue, address of licensee, record of fee payments and any other informa-
tion concerning licensed polygraphers deemed necessary or desirable by the
board. The registrar shall maintain a minute book recording all transactions of
the board and shall keep financial records of disbursements and receipts in man-
ner prescribed by the director of the department of finance and administration.
The records of the board shall be maintained in Santa Fe.
SEC. 6. Applications for Registration and License. Persons seeking registration
and licensing as a polygrapher shall make written application to the board of
examiners in polygraphy, upon forms supplied by the registrar of the board.
Application forms shall be designed and prescribed by the board to elicit all
information necessary to determine whether an applicant is qualified to be exam-
ined as a polygrapher.
SEC. 7. Fees-Renewals-Suspension and Revocation. Each application for
registration and license shall be accompanied by a fee of one hundred dollars
($100) payable to the state board of examiners in polygraphy. This initial fee
is not refundable and shall cover the costs of processing the application ; and it
shall include, for successful candidates, the annual license fee for the year fol-
lowing registration and licensing. On or before July 1 of each year, every regis-
tered and licensed polygrapher shall transmit to the registrar a renewal fee of
fifty dollars ($50.00) accompanied by the person's name, address, and registration
number, and he shall receive therefor a renewal license certificate. A license
granted by the board shall be automatically suspended if the holder fails to apply
for renewal within a period of three months after July 1 of each year. Any sus-
pended license may be restored by the board upon payment of a fee of fifty
dollars ($50.00) in addition to the unpaid renewal fee. Failure to renew a license
within one year from the date of suspension shall cause the license to be auto-
matically revoked.
SEC. S. Qualifications for Licensing and Registration. To be eligible and qual-
ified for registration and licensing as a polygrapher, a person shall :
A. have attained the age of twenty-five years ;
B. be a citizen of the United States ;
C. be a graduate of a high school or have completed an equivalent course of
study, as determined by an examination conducted by the state board of edu-
cation;
D. be of good moral character ; and
E. successfully pass examination by the state board of examiners in poly-
graphy.
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SEc. 9. Examinations. The state board of examiners in polygraphy shall, by
examination, or -by such other means as it shall deem advisable, determine
whether each applicant ' for registration and license possesses the necessary
knowledge and skill required to practice polygraphy in New Mexico.
SEC. 10. Refusal to License-Suspension and Revocation. The state board
of examiners in polygraphy may refuse to issue a license or, if a license has been
issued, may suspend or revoke the license of any person found, by the board:
A. to have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
B. to have made false representations to the board for. the purpose of securing
registration and license;
C. to be chronically or persistently inebriate or addicted to drugs;
D. to have been adjudged incompetent or insane ;
E. to have been guilty of unprofessional conduct ; or
P. to be incompetent.
SEC. 11. Unprofessional Conduct. Unprofessional conduct consists of those
,acts, determined by the state board of examiners in polygraphy, to be incon-
sistent with the public welfare, and shall include conduct tending to, deceive
or defraud, obtaining fees by misrepresentation, charging unusual, unreasonable
or exorbitant fees, fee "splitting," and spurious advertising.
Sa.c. 12. Deposit and Use of Funds. All funds received by the registrar are to
be deposited with the state treasurer to be credited to the "state board of
,examiners in polygraphy fund." The funds shall be used solely for the admin-
istration of registration and licensing procedures conducted by the state board
of examiners in polygraphy. - -
Sac. 13. The state board of examiners in polygraphy is empowered to promul-
gate rules and regulations it shall deem necessary or desirable. The board
may obtain the assistance of the attorney general to obtain necessary legal assist-
auce. The board may expend the sums from the state examiners in polygraphy
fund in accordance with annual budgets approved by the department of finance
and administration. All expenditures shall be made upon vouchers signed by
the registrar of the board.
SEC. 14. Any person who violates any provision of this act is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
Approved March 21, 1963. - - -
CHAPTER 36
AN ACT Relating to examinations in which polygraphs or other lie-detector devices, are
used
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of AZaslca:
SECTION 1. AS 23.10 is amended by adding a new section to article 1 to read:
SEC. 23.10.037. Lie-Detector Tests. (a) No person either personally or through
an agent or representative may request or suggest to a person in his employ or
to a person who has an application for employment pending before him or re-
quire as a condition of employment that the employee or applicant submit to an
examination in which a polygraph or other lie-detecting device is used.
(b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply to the state or a political
subdivision of the state when dealing with policemen in its employ or with per-
sons applying to be employed as policeman.
(c) In this section "person" includes the state and a political subdivision of
the state.
(d) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment
for not more than one year, or by both.
Law without signature April 2, 1W.
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ExHrBrr 1E-CALIFORNIA
Chapter 1881 of Statutes and Amendments to the Codes, California, 1963, page
3866, reads as follows :
SECTION 1. Section 432.2 is added to the Labor Code, to read :
"432.2. No employer shall demand or require any applicant for employment or
propective employment or any employee to submit to or take a polygraph, lie
detector or similar test or examination as a condition of employment or con-
tinued employment. The prohibition of this section does not apply to the federal
government or any agency thereof or the state government or any agency or local
subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, counties, cities, cities and
counties, cities, district, authorities, and agencies."
EXHIBIT 1F-ILLINOIS
SMITH-HURD STATUTES
TITLE 3 8
736.2 Lie detector tests-Restrictions on court
In the course of any criminal trial the court shall not require, request or sug-
gest that the defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception test, common-
ly known as a lie detector test to questioning under the effect of thiopental
sodium or to any other test or questioning by means of any mechanical device
or chemical substance.
? 54.1 (Civil Practice Act, ? 54.1). Lie detector tests-Limitations
In the course of any civil trial or pre-trial proceeding the court shall not
require that the plaintiff or defendant submit to a polygraphic detection deception
test, commonly known as a lie detector test or require, suggest or request that
the plaintiff or defendant submit to questioning under the effect of thiopental
sodium or to any other test or questioning by means of any chemical substance.
EXHIBIT 1G-MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL LAWS ANNOTATED, 149
GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO EMPLOYMENT
? 19B. Lie detector tests; use as condition of employment ; penalty
No employer shall require or subject any employee to any he detector tests as a
condition of employment or continued employment. Any person violating this sec-
tion shall be punished by a fine of not morethan twohundred dollars. Added
St. 1959, c. 255.
Approved April 28, 1959.
EXHIBIT 1H-OREGON
Regular Session
CHAPTER 249, LAWS 1968
House Bill No. 1453
AN ACT Relating to lie detector tests as a condition for employment; and providing
penalties
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1. No person, or agent or representative of such person, shall require,
as a condition for employment or continuation of employment, any person or em-
ploye to take a polygraph test or any form of a so-called lie detector test.
SEC. 2. Violation of section 1 of this Act is punishable, upon conviction, by a
fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year, or by both.
Approved May 6, 1963.
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EXHIBITS 2A-2F-ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE USE OF POLY-
GRAPHS AND OTHER LIE DETECTION DEVICES
ExHIBI'T 2A-UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION AND THE POLYGRAPH TEST
(By II. B. Dearman, M.D. and B. M. Smith, Ph. D.)
(Reprinted from the American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 119, No. 11, May 1963)
A young bank vice president was referred to the senior author by his employer,
the president of the bank, because a lie detector examiner had alleged that the
man had stolen money from the bank. A complete audit of the books had
revealed no losses, and the president, expressing great confidence In his em-
ployee's integrity, wanted to "get to the truth of the matter." In the course of
giving the client a complete medical, psychiatric, neurological, and psychological
examination, a number of psychological, ethical, and possibly legal issues were
raised.
The use of polygraphs (lie detectors) in research and in law enforcement situa-
tions is well, known (7, 10) and need not be reviewed here, but our search of the
literature has revealed a dearth of authoritative reports of their use in business
operations. Business Week (2) describes the burgeoning of such services both by
reputable detective agencies and by individuals. This article also raises questions
as to the possible misuse of the technique by unethical "examiners" who are
subject to no legal regulations (except in Massachusetts) and who may make
claims far beyond the established limits of the procedure. The case reported
here exemplifies the hazards of using a method that is not totally reliable
even in the hands of the best trained personnel. The implication for the
person who is a "false positive" are incalculable, but in the present case they
could have cost him his job and could have made future employment difficult. In
the case of suspected criminals, unwarranted sentences could be assessed. It was
in view of the more extensive danger that this report is offered to a wider
audience.
The most frequent uses of lie detectors in business are to screen job applicants
and to examine employees periodically "to keep them honest." It was in a
routine testing of employees that this client gave "positive evidence of lying"
and was alleged to have stolen money.
The essential details of the case are here summarized :
The patient, a white, married, 27-year-old man was the only child of parents
of average economic status. When he was 7, his parents were divorced (because
the father drank too much), and he and his mother lived with her parents until
he was 13 when the mother remarried. The boy and his stepfather did not get
along very well, but he lived at home until he graduated, in the upper third of his
class, from high school. He went to college primarily "to get away from home,"
flunked his first year, but settled down and earned his degree. In his second year
of college he met the girl he was to marry 21/2 years later. They have one child,
He went to work for his present employer shortly after graduating from college
and was rapidly promoted to vice president and manager of a branch bank.
On the occasion of the "routine" polygraph test by the examiner from the
bank's detective agency, the patient showed a "violent" reaction to the question,
"Have you ever stolen any money from the bank or its customers?" And positive
responses to other questions concerning the bank. He also showed a positive
reaction to the supposedly neutral question, "Do you drink coffee?" The
patient was very upset by his failure to "clear the polygraph" and admitted to
some minor misuse of bank funds, such as including parking fees on his expense
account. The polygraph test was administered again, and again he "failed to
clear." The patient confessed to the polygraph examiner that maybe his worry
about personal problems, which he discussed with the interrogator, accounted
for the positive reaction, so a third polygraph test was made. Again the inter-
pretation was that the patient was lying and had stolen money. A final poly-involved. The
indiica indicated that an howedppeak l reactions at $800 and at $1,100. The
p machine test
I Formerly, chief resident psychiatrist, Department of Neurology and Psychiatry,
University of Virginia School of Medicine. Present address : 208 East Watauga Street,
Johnson City Tenn.
P Associate Professor, Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, University of Vir-
ginia School of Medicine.
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FEDERAL
patient was thoroughly confused because he could not remember taking any such
sums. However, since he had been convinced that he couldn't "fool the machine,"
he signed a confession that he had taken $1,000 -and told how he must have,
done it. The books were audited, and it was discovered not only that he had not
used the method that he had stated but that no shortage of that amount had
occurred in his branch since he had been employed there.
As a result of this dilemma, the patient was referred for examination. In the
course of the 7 hours of psychiatric examination (including a 2-hour sodium
ainytal interview) and subsequent psychotherapeutic interviews, the following
relevant material emerged:
1. The patient had strongly ambivalent feelings toward his mother. She had
divorced his father and 7 years later married a man with whom he did not get
along. In the interim the patient felt neglected by his mother and developed
positive feelings for his grandparents. He also felt that some of his mother's
behavior toward him was somewhat seductive. 2. The patient's wife was 2
years his senior, and she had previously been married and divorced. His wife
was very similar to his mother in many respects. 3. His wife and his mother
were both "customers of the bank." 4. He had been involved in financial affairs
with his wife sand his mother to the extent of approximately $800 and $1,100 and
abort which he felt somewhat guilty. 5. In a number of instances he uncon-
sciously identified wife with mother. His unconscious hostility for his mother
was apparently the motivating force for a number of incidents (including wreck-
ing her car and for which one of the sums mentioned above was involved).
It will be remembered that the question on the polygraph examination that
evoked the most violent reaction was, "Have you ever stolen any money from
the bank or its customers?" It seemed reasonable to assume that the patient
was responding to the "customers" part of the question inasmuch as he identified
his wife and mother as customers and inasmuch as he felt guilty about financial
transactions that he had had with each of them.
In order to test this assumption, an independent polygraph examiner (a
woman) was employed. She was given no background information prior to her
examination of the patient. She was asked to give the exact questions used by
the original interrogator and an additional set of five questions in which "bank,"
"customers of the bank," and "wife and mother" were separated.
This interrogator's interpretation of her findings prior to learning the back-
ground of the case was that the patient was lying and that he was guilty of theft.
A careful examination of the polygraph records shows, however, that only in
those questions in which the word "customers" appeared did the patient
consist- shore emotional reactivity on the polygraph record. On the basis of this
evidence. it was concluded that the assumption made above of the patient's
identification of wife-mother-customers was responsible for his emotional
reaction.
It is interesting to note, however, that at the time of the polygraph examina-
tion, even though this material was conscious, it still evoked autonomic responses.
It is of further interest that the positive response accompanying a truthful "yes"
to the question, "Do you drink coffee?" was apparently due to his mother's pro-
hibition of coffee during the patient's childhood.
The psychiatric diagnosis made for this patient was "acute anxiety reaction"
and "adult situational reaction."
The case presented above illustrates the major problems involved in the prac-
tical application of the polygraph technique to the detection of deception. In the
first place, the concept of "truth" is not easily defined ; nor is the concept of
"lying" any easier to clarify. Perhaps "truth" must he thought of in relative
terms.
In crime detection the usual and obvious assumption of the investigator is
that the suspect either did or did not commit the alleged act and that deviations
in the autonomic responses reflect conscious deviation in his verbal statements
from the "truth," as the "truth" Is conceived by the examiner. Laboratory and
field studies have shown that this assumption is not always valid. There are
many variables other than "intent to deceive" that can produce the observed
results. Some of the major variables will be discussed briefly, and the ade-
quately trained, ethical polygraph operator must be aware of and take into
consideration these factors in the conduct of his examination and interpretation
of his records.
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There is evidence of constitution) (biological) variability in automatic re-
sponsivity (8) "which may be at least partially an inherited characteristic."
Other studies have demonstrated correlations between autonomic sensitivity
and personality types and between autonomic sensitivity and various physical
and psychosomatic illnesses (9, 14). An anxiety reaction is, in one major aspect,
a hyperactivity of the autonomic nervous system.
Psychological factors other than conscious deception causing deviant auto-
nomic responses include such situations or stimuli that produce frustration,
surprise, pain, shame, embarrassment, etc. Some of these stimuli (e.g., startle
and pain) are almost universal (though there are some exceptions), whereas
others (frustration, shame and embarrassment) tend to be more idiosyncratic.
The polygraph examiner may not, and the commercial operations usually do not,
know enough about their clients to evaluate these idiosyncratic factors. This
aspect is even more complex when the client is, himself, unconscious of the
emotional quality of the stimuli.
Experiments in which polygraph recordings were taken during the admin-
istration of a word association test show that single words that have very
personal (and often unconscious) meanings for the subject will produce deflec-
tions of the styli (5). Such an emotionally toned word embedded in a question
could be responsible for a response that could be attributed to the question.
Compound questions such as were used in the initial interrogation of this patient
increase the possibility of misinterpretation of the record.
It has also been demonstrated (6) that learned emotional responses are re-
tained in the autonomic system long after evidence from the voluntary system
has dissipated.
The polygraph technique is a very useful research tool, but the courts are
wise in their policy of not yet admitting evidence from such procedures. It is
possible to get "false positives" and "false negatives." The possible harmful
effects on an individual who happened to be a "false positive" cannot be cal-
culated.
The moral and ethical problems related to the use of lie detection in business,
and even in criminology, are much too complex to be dealt with in detail in this
paper. It must be mentioned, however, that the standard procedure recom-
mended by the proponents of this technique stresses that the subject be im-
pressed with the idea that the machine can't be beat. The patient in the present
instance had been so convinced of this infallibility that he confessed even though
he was not guilty and consciously did not consider himself guilty. Thus, the
examiner in effect uses deception in his effort to detect deception.
Another ethical question touches the concept of invasion of privacy. In our
case the interrogator elicited private and personal information that was irrele-
vant to the sale purpose of the test, and his use of that information was ethically
questionable. Supreme Court Justice Pierce Butler (3) made the following
relevant comment :
It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well to remember, that
few, if any, rights of the people guarded by fundamental law are of greater im-
portance to their happiness and safety than the right to be exempt from all un-
authorized arbitrary or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their
personal and private affairs.
As stated above, Massachusetts is the only State that has enacted legislation
prohibiting the use of the polygraph examination as a condition of employment.
The National Labor Relations Board (1961) prohibited the use of polygraph
examinations to determine attitudes of prospective employees toward labor un-
ions by a Washington, D.C. employer.
A case has been presented which illustrates some of the psychological, ethical,
and possibly legal problems associated with the use of the polygraph examination
(lie detector) in commercial establishments.
The polygraph technique only provides measures of various autonomic re-
sponses. The stimuli that elicit these responses, the intervening variables (con-
stitutional predisposition, past learning, conscious and unconscious motivation,
etc.) and the interpretations made of the resulting graphs are highly complex
and are inferences made from more or less incomplete data. In any event,
these instruments do not identify lying per se. The interpretation of the poly-
graph record is based on inferences of varying levels of remoteness. Inference
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is subjective; hence, polygraph examiners can, and do, make different inter-
pretations of the same record.
It is our conclusion that the application of the polygraph technique as a lie
detector is fraught with too many variables and sources of error for it to be
used as it is currently being used in business and industry. Its use in criminal
investigations and in other situations involving the commonweal (such as screen-
ing employees for sensitive Government positions) should be carefully and con-
tinually scrutinized, lest we find that George Orwell's 1984 is upon us.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Alexander, L.: In Biological Psychiatry. New York : Grupe & Stratton,
1959.
2. Business Week, June 18, 104, 1960.
3. Butler, Pierce : In Guttmacher, M. S. (Ed.) : The Mind of the Murderer.
New York : Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1960.
4. Cannon, W. B.: Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage. New
York: Grune & Stratton, 1957.
5. Diven, K.: J. Psychol., 3: 291, 1937.
6. Gantt, W. H., and Dykman, R. A.: In Experimental Psychopathology. New
"York : Grune & Stratton, 1959.
7. Inbau, F. E.: Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation. Baltimore : Wil-
liams & Wilkins, 1942.
8. Jost, H. and Sontag, L. W.: Psychosom. Med., 6: 30.8,1944.
9. Jost, H., et al.: J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., 115: 35, 1952.
10. Larson, J. A.: Lying and Its Detection. Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press,
1932.
11. Marston, W. M.: J. Exp. Psychol., 2:117,1917.
12. : J. Crim. Law Criminol., 11: 551,1921.
13. : Ibid., 15 : 5, 1924.
14. Ruilman, C. J., and Gulo, M. J.: Southern Med. J., 43: 953, 1950.
15. Skolnick, J. H.: Yale Law Rev., 70: 694,1961.
16. Woodworth, R. S.: Experimental Psychology. New York: Henry Holt,
1938.
EXHIBIT 2B-Do LIE DETECTORS LIE?
WHILE THE DEBATE ABOUT THE LIE DETECTOR'S ACCURACY CONTINUES, WHERE
DOES THIS LEAVE You IF YOUR JOB-on LIFE-DEPEND UPON IT?
[Reprinted from Popular Science, September 1963, vol. 183 No. 3]
What are the chances that you'll be called a liar, a thief, a fraud, or a traitor
by an instrument that can, in the hands of an unskilled or irresponsible examiner,
make certain changes in your body seem to testify against you?
Better or-depending on how it's looked at-worse than you probably think.
For today, government, industry, and commerce all employ the lie detector to
decide whether you'll get the job you want or stay in the one you already have.
Under certain circumstances you may be requested to undergo an experience
once reserved for the criminal suspect only.
Rank, position, or good reputation are no protection against the possibility of
impeachment by polygraph (lie detector). This was demonstrated last April
during the Washington controversy over the TFX aircraft contract. Pentagon
investigators, trying to learn how the contents of an embarrassing document in
the case reached a newspaperman, threatened the Secretaries of the Navy and
the Air Force, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and a number of prominent
civilian and military officials, with lie-detector tests. President Kennedy inter-
vened, saying, "I think it was a mistake to suggest a polygraph."
As long ago as 1895, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminologist, claimed that
by taking a suspected man's blood pressure during police interrogation he could
establish truth or deception.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 139
The late Dr. C. G. Jung, distinguished Swiss psychiatrist, thought there was a
good deal to Lombroso's theory. Jung stated it as his conviction that the guilty
could be detected with a "psychogalvanometer"-an instrument that visually
indicates the skin's resistance to a very low electric current.
Early in this century, a Harvard psychology professor, Hugo Munsterberg,
reported that a liar's own physiology would trap him in his deceit and attempts
at evasion or falsehood. Others saw that there often existed a relationship
between a man's deception and his rate of breathing and blood pressure changes.
The development and use of the polygraph quickly moved ahead after World
War I. The 1920's, with their appalling increase in serious crime, provided
an ideal laboratory for investigators.
The modern detector
One of the most noted polygraph examiners was Leonarde Keeler who, after
majoring in psychology at Stanford University, joined the Berkeley, Calif.,
Police Department. There Keeler began to refine an instrument that simul-
taneously records a suspect's relative changes in blood pressure and respiration
during interrogation. Keeler got remarkable results and, from the thugs he
dealt with, astonishing confessions.
His hard-bitten customers could take a rubber-hose treatment far more suc-
cessfully than they could cope with the mysterious and somehow sinister lie
detector. It was a new kind of interrogative approach that didn't hurt until,
having confessed, they heard what the judge had to say.
Keeler, this country's most noted pioneer in the field;, can be credited with
today's basic lie-detection equipment. In 1930 he founded his. scientific crime
detection laboratory at Chicago's Northwestern University with money donated.
by that city's businessmen.
Keeler called his apparatus a polygraph-Greek for "many writings."
The lie detector is. not a machine, though it is often referred to as one. It
is a combination of three instruments : a breathing-rate recorder, connected
pneumatically to an attachment fitted around the subject's chest or stomach; a.
sphygmomanometer, a baglike rubber cuff connected to the "cardio" unit, that
responds to variations in blood pressure and rate and strength of pulse; and a
pair of metal contacts, attached to the hand or fingers, that evaluate relative
changes in skin response.
All three readings are recorded on a roll of graph paper that unreels under'
three separate pens activated by impulses from the instruments.
The questioning
During a lie-detector test, the examiner asks the subject a number of questions,
formulated to fit the case at hand. Some are designed to trigger an emotional
reaction if deceptively answered or shied away from.
Some questions are neutral, innocuous, so commonplace that they can be an-
swered without the graph showing evidence of emotional turbulence. Deliber-
ately keyed for a nil reaction, they might be such queries as, "Is your last name
Brown?" "Is your first name John?" "Were you born in the United States?"
The subject answers without any sense of stress. They excite no response.
The polygraph examiner can read from the graph the lack of such responses on
the chart.
But this is only the beginning.
Among the questions selected for lie-detector interrogation, there are several
that are crucial, from which a. reaction is expected if deception is attempted.
Experience shows that even hardened liars find it virtually impossible to control
their hidden emotions-though outwardly they may appear unaffected and
impassive.
On the reaction to these crucial questions, a determination of deception or
truth is made. Additional polygraph questions are now directed at the heart
of the crime under investigation. "Did you kill your wife?" Did you yourself
steal most or all of that missing $5,000?"
All questions, whether neutral or relevant, can ordinarily be answered by a
plain yes or no. An interval is allowed between each question and its reply so
that the polygraph can indicate the presence or lack of physiological response.
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140 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
How valid is it?
Here we reach an area where the debate about the lie detector's accuracy
and the validity of its findings begins. Experts agree that the technique of ques-
tioning a subject, whether for criminal reasons or not, is vitally important. The
questions asked and the manner in which they are asked exceed in importance
what the breathing unit, cardio unit, and skin-response unit may be charting..
The lie detector is as open to abuse as any other instrument. Because it is
associated with the search for deception, real or merely suspected, the subject
is at a disadvantage. Moreover, there are polygraph examiners who are not as,
well-trained, experienced, or ethical as they should be.
In the hands of an untrained or unethical examiner, the lie detector is no
better than a blackjack. Abuse, hostility, and expressed suspicion on an in
competent examiner's part can provoke reaction. But these reactions have no
true meaning or value since they stem from a source other than the fear of
detection.
Some subjects seemingly show no fear-of-detection response. The existence of
such individuals was established recently in a murder case in the State of
Washington.
Three men were involved, two of them under indictment for murder. The
third man was the prosecution's chief witness. When a lie-detector test was
run on the two charged with the crime, their reactions were not specific enough
to justify an opinion. The response of the prosecution witness was negative
throughout. He gave the examiner no reactions to read and so it was prema-
turely concluded that be was truthful.
Yet under later questioning, he admitted that he had been lying. He finally
confessed that he-not the two men he was to testify against-was the murderer.
On the other hand, the polygraph, used properly, has yielded astonishing
results.
One of the most dramatic instances was the Army Criminal Investigation Di-
vision's success in detecting deception and in securing a confession from Col.
Jack Durant and Mrs. Durant that, while on occupation duty after World War
II, they stole the crown jewels of the Duchy of Hesse. On another equally
memorable occasion, Leonarde Keeler employed the polygraph technique to put
his hands on eight Nazi POW's who had beaten a fellow prisoner to death.
Freeing the innocent
Credit must also be given the polygraph in the case of a young woman who
accused a man of rape. Her story of the outrage was clear and circumstantial.
Yet after examining the lie-detector chart of her reactions under interrogation,
a police officer felt there was something wrong. His deduction was proved right ;
investigation revealed that the girl had invited the accused man to her home.
When her husband arrived earlier than expected, she needed an excuse for her
behavior-a good one and in a hurry. The polygraph in this instance saved an
innocent man.
Police accomplishments of this magnitude have given the lie detector a reputa-
tion for near infallibility.
Polygraph examiners (who average $35 an examination) have a broad and
seemingly lucrative field in which to exercise their specialty. It is estimated that
there are currently 1,000 or more of them. Some are fly-by-nights intent on a
fast and dishonest dollar.
One of the largest users is the U.S. Army Provost Marshal's Office. Some
Federal agencies also employ the lie detector to check those suspected of being
security risks. Many banks, commercial houses, and department stores-places
where both temptation and opportunity for theft Fare present-use the lie de-
tector in employee checks. One large firm reported that a polygraph screening
of its help revealed that three out of every four workers admitted the theft of
either goods or money-or both.
The lie detector has never been popular. This is scarcely surprising. For
often its use may imply suspicion and distrust, without direct occasion for
either. For example, if you want to get a job as a truck driver with certain
bonded carriers, you must first be willing to take a polygraph examination. If
you happen to get an incompetent examiner you may not get the job, and you'll
wonder why.
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The mistakes
A number of question marks surround the entire procedure. Some are scien-
tific, some are moral and ethical. Not infrequently the untrained or Inexperi-
enced examiner makes mistakes. Or, more correctly, the polygraph's "many
writings" are erroneously interpreted. It takes experience, too, to recognize
a "false positive" reaction from the innocent or a "false negative" one from. the
guilty.
Today's leaders in the field of scientific- interrogation are keenly aware of the
critical storm lie detection has provoked from eminent persons in government,
law, and medicine. These men are as anxious to see reform as are any critics.
For example, Cleve Backster, head of New York City's Backster School of Lie
Detection, and a man who for the last 16 years has been a consultant to various
Government and law-enforcement agencies throughout the country, is especially
emphatic in demanding that standards be raised. He estimates that an alarming
percentage of U.S. polygraph examiners employ techniques that are obsolete.
"Hundreds of trained or semitrained examiners have entered the lie detection
field," he contends. "Because of this we are confronted with an important de-
cision. If we allow the present trend of polygraph misuse to continue, the result
can be devastating. Our only alternative is to do everything possible to upgrade
and standardize the many varieties of technique in current use."
Backster has worked tirelessly for better training, the use of more sophisti-
cated instruments, and standards of proficiency that must be met before an ex-
aminer is licensed.
Acutely conscious that shysters and incompetents have given the polygraph a
bad name, Backster has poineered new methods of evaluation. His fresh and
more reliable techniques have been adopted by the U.S. Army's Fort Gordon Lie
Detector School. They will now become standard procedure wherever Armed
Forces detection tests are administered.
Should you take a test?
The question is often asked whether one should refuse to take a lie detector
test. The best answer : It rests with you. It has been ruled legally that you
do not have to take a test. A polygraph examination cannot be Imposed on you
without your consent. This would be a violation of your constitutional protec-
tion against self-incrimination. The old argument that "refusal is evidence of
consciousness of guilt similar to evidence of flight" has been turned down by the
courts.
And what do you do if the polygraph seems to say you are lying when in fact
you are being truthful? Cleve Backster suggests : "Get in touch with the Re-
search and Instrument Committee of the Academy for Scientific Interrogation
(165 West 46th Street, New York City 36), to see if there is a record of the
examiner receiving bona fide training and whether he is listed as a member of
a reputable polygraph professional organization."
The moral seems to be: Choose your polygraph examiner as you would your
personal physician.
Legal recognition of the validity and reliability of lie detector findings has not
yet been won. The results of a polygraph examination are not admissible with-
out prior stipulation in any of the country's courts.
Does all this mean that the instrument lies? No, because the polygraph re-
ports truthfully the relative physiological changes taking place during question-
ing. That and nothing more.
At its best
Science still hestitates to give lie detection its blessing, principally because
modern polygraph techniques that contain the necessary safeguards have not yet
had widespread dissemination. What is reassuring is that lie detection by a
skilled examiner utilizing the latest equipment has reached a level of accuracy
that allows for consistent determination of the truth.
Today experts in the field are so confident that you can no longer fool a com-
petent polygraph examiner that they universally advise : If you hope to deceive
the polygraph, reconsider and avoid the examination. If, on the other hand,
the truth will vindicate you, you'll find the polygraph a strong ally.
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ExHIBIT 2C-ELECTRONIC MARVEL WEEDS OUT DISHONEST AND UNFIT APPLICANTS
(Reprinted from Bus Transportation, November 1956)
Two SMALL RINGS DETECT MINUTE PHYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES IN THE APPLICANT
WHENEVER A DISTURBING TOPIC IS MENTIONED. INVENTOR CLEVE BACB.STER
DEMONSTRATES How SIMPLE THE SETUP Is. Tories ARE MENTIONED OVER
INTERCOM WHILE APPLICANT Is ALONE IN ROOM.
The wonderful world of electronics has finally come to the field of personnel
hiring * * * and several bus companies have been among the first to cash in on
the incredible possibilities it offers.
With a special machine known as the Backster electronic evaluator it's now
possible for a personnel executive to find out, in 2 hours if necessary, just about
everything of importance in the background of a prospective employee * * * not
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only those things which are actually on his record, but even, for example, cases
of past dishonesty which nobody but he knows about.
In fact, by the time a job candidate finishes his testing, Backster evaluation
men can predict whether or not he really plans to stay with you, the possibility
of his becoming a personnel problem, and his accident probability. And all this
is based not on what the man says or writes on his application form, but on what
is actually in his mind.
If this all sounds like a Buck Rogers fantasy, remember that this is the age
of electronic wonders, and anything can and does happen.
The man responsible for bringing electronic evaluation to the personnel field
is Cleve Backster, who has yet to hit his 40th birthday, but is already recognized
as an authority and consultant in the field of polygraph, or lie detector, work.
In the course of designing and improving psychological laboratory equipment,
Backster conceived the idea of a completely new and extremely sensitive emo-
tional response evaluator which could be employed with oral and written tests
to screen the backgrounds of job applicants.
The Backster electronic evaluator resulted, after 10 years of research, but
Backster points out emphatically that it is not a lie detector. An ordinary lie
detector works essentially on the basis of relative changes in blood pressure,
pulse rate, and pulse strength-it demands questions which can be answered
yes or no, and depends on strong emotional "fear" responses on the part of the
person being questioned.
With the Backster evaluator the technique used is entirely different. Through
two little ring contacts placed on the fingers of the job applicant, it records
extremely minute physiological changes which take place whenever a topic is
mentioned which causes him any emotional disturbance whatsoever.
The applicant, therefore, is not put through the humiliating process of being
"grilled," such as he would be in a lie detector test. Indeed, he need not speak
a word during the entire electronic evaluation procedure-just the mention of
a particular topic, such as a past arrest, will cause a reaction on the machine,
so that the examiner knows that the man is disturbed about that question, and
can then pinpoint just what it is that's disturbing him.
A number of bus companies are already using the Backster service, and have
found it invaluable. For in an industry such as ours, where employees often
handle money and are responsible for the safety of countless lives, everything
you can know about the prospective employee is important.
Backster says that through his evaluator he can give a factual report to a
company-a report which covers-
Past honesty-and undetected dishonesty ;
Home life pressures affecting job performance ;
Financial burdens ;
Every place worked-and the real reason for leaving ;
Every unemployed period-and why ;
Military experience and courts martial ;
Gambling and drinking habits;
Real reason for applying for the job ;
Concealed mental or physical illnesses ;
All arrests, including juvenile trouble; and
Actual education, training, and experience.
All this, remember, can be reported in spite of what the man originally puts on
his application form-and in spite of what is on his official record.
As an example of how it works, we are reproducing on these pages an actual
report made by Backster evaluation service on a man who applied to an inter-
city bus company for a driving job, and, prior to being tested by Backster, had
tentatively been selected to join a training class.
As a result of the Backster screening, he and four others were considered too
risky to hire. Although the ordinary credit-type check run by the bus company
had failed to show up and derogatory information, the Backster evaluation
showed a background definitely unsuited to the job of driving and handling
money.
Only two out of an original seven proved acceptable risks-and the bus com-
pany was saved the tremendous expense of hiring and training men who would
almost certainly have proved unsatisfactory.
Here's the way the Backster service worked out on one of the five applicants
who was turned down. To protect the man and the company involved, all names
have been changed, but everything else is ex,u?tly as it appeared in the report
sent back to the bus company.
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11 G EN
First the man takes a written and oral "risk factor" test, then, if he signifies
his willingness, the ring contacts are slipped on his fingers and he takes the
electronic evaluation test. Actually, it has been found that even men who have
something to hide are not only willing, but eager, to try this entirely new method
of testing.
The examiner, who must be highly skilled in his work, then mentions a series
of topics, after first telling the applicant the exact topics which will be covered.
As a result of this test, the nian turned out to be a 90-percent general de-
sirability risk, an 80-percent honesty risk, a 90-percent permanency risk, and a
40-percent risk in accident probability.
This is shown to the bus company in a quick chart form.
The reason the applicant was rated this way is the heart of the entire
evaluation system.
By checking the "original test" portion of the graph pictured in this article
it may be noted that on certain topics, such as physical ailments, mental sick-
ness, and permanency intentions, the applicant's chart shows no rises. In other
words, there was no emotional disturbance when those subjects were mentioned.
But going farther to the right of the chart, we see a high rise where the
examiner mentioned his past employment history. Immediately the examiner
knows that there is something here that bothers the applicant-something which
merits further exploration. So he begins to cover topics which make it evident
that he is aware of the disturbance-and almost infallibly he'll come up with
the true story of the man's past employment.
Also pictured is a reproduction of a page from the examiner's report to the
,bus company, showing the applicant's actual employment record. Every job
marked by an "o" was omitted from his application form with the bus company,
while those marked with a "t" are jobs in which he falsified the time element in
order to cover up periods of unemployment, dismissals with good cause, etc.
Now, how does the examiner know he has gotten the true story from the appli-
cant. Check the bottom portion of the chart and you will see that the line barely
wavers the second time he was asked about his past employment. He has told
the examiner the true story, and now there is no more emotional disturbance to
cause a rise in the graph.
Notice, too, that on the subjects of indebtedness, overdue debts and criminal
arrests there are high spots on the upper chart which remain, although not quite
so pronounced, on the lower chart. These mean that the examiner never could
resolve all the man's troubles on those subjects-the applicant was still holding
back something which he was not willing to reveal and soon. the report a notation
is made that on this particular subject there were "unresolved evaluator
reactions."
This in itself might be considered damaging enough to the applicant to prevent
his being hired, but as we'll see, it was hardly necessary to consider it all in this
particular case.
Now let's look at some excerpts from the examiner's written report-excerpts
which show why the man was considered an all-around bad risk as a future
employee.
"Residence data.-Now separated from his wife and living with a friend. In-
tends to rejoin wife after birth of their sixth child. Address on your application
is wife's parents' address.
"Perraaneney intentions.-Has application pending with Smith & Jones Truck-
ing Co. Would prefer employment with your organization. No unresolved elec-
tronic evaluator reactions.
"Marital status.-Presently separated from his wife (did not check `separated'
on your employment application-has not been living with wife for more than
3 months. No unresolved electronic evaluator reactions.
"Accident record.-Has been a licensed driver for 13 years. Driver's license
suspended for 1 year due to auto theft offense. (Refer to arrests.) In 1953
brakes failed and applicant's car hit another auto head on-sold his car with-
out repairing-never paid other car's damages. Damaged fender of car which
he had rented 6 or 7 weeks ago-misjudged distance and hit another car. Still
owes rental company $30.
"Indebtedness.-$120 balance on finance company loan at $16 per month-4
months behind.
"$130 balance owed jewelry store at $20 per month-1 month behind.
"$80 balance on vacuum cleaner-several months behind on payments.
"$35 balance on clothing store account at $10 per month-5 months behind.
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"$30 balance owed car rental company.
"$120 in back rent owed landlord. Five months behind. Exhibits electronic
evaluator reaction whenever this subject is touched upon. In the opinion of the
examiner, applicant is still withholding information.
"Use of alcoholic beverages.-Presently drinks beer to medium extent. Used
to drink rather heavily while in service. Drank on job with R. & N. Bus Co. (on
,charters).
"Past employment termination.-New Jersey Shipyard-discharged for non-
payment of union dues.
"R. & N. Bus Co.-discharged for deserting bus and having a. `last fling' on a
summer run to Atlantic City.
"Kirby Meat Co.-discharged for misappropriating $350-has agreed to make
restitution * * * hasn't been in touch with them since December 1954. (Route
salesman for them * * * family bills pressing him * * * admits taking the
money.)
"Milton Detective Agency-discharged when they learned of his police record.
"U.S. Navy-discharged `under honorable conditions.'
"Arrests.-1943-Jersey City. Auto theft -1 year probation-license sus-
pended for 1 year.
"1949-Two Navy summary courts martial for being absent over leave. Fined
.and restricted to ship.
"1949-U.S. Navy. General court martial for being AWOL 18 days and missing
ship. Sentenced to 18 months in Philadelphia Naval Prison. Served 6 months,
released on probation. Probation revoked after 0 months. Served another 6
months in prison.
"1951-Fall River, Mass. Auto theft, in jail overnight. Still in Navy at the
time. First offense in Massachusetts, got $220 tine.
"1952-Union City, N.J. Stole wristwatch from girl and hocked it. Got 2
years probation.
"1954-Jersey City. Drunk and disorderly-in jail 21/2 weeks. Examined by
court psychiatrist and released as sane. (Demolished apartment while drunk.)
"Exhibits electronic evaluator reactions when this topic is touched upon.
In the opinion of the examiner, applicant is still withholding pertinent infor-
mation on arrests.
"History of employee dishonesty.-While working for R. & N. Bus Co. used to
keep overages. Has given wife `collected tickets' to use for transportation to
Atlantic City. Exhibits electronic evaluator reactions whenever this subject is
touched upon."
On the basis of all these, the examiner rated this particular job applicant
a bad risk, and used this reasoning :
"In the opinion of the examiner this applicant is a 90-percent general desira
'bility risk. (Note spotty occupation history, address misrepresentation, the
permanency risk factor, present marital status, drinking on job, past termina-
tions, difficulties in military service, arrests, and his honesty risk factor.)
"In my opinion he is an 80-percent honesty risk. (Note marital pressure,
financial pressure, termination involving dishonesty, arrests involving dishon-
esty, electronic evaluator reaction to arrests, dishonesty on the job, and evaluator
reactions to dishonesty.)
"Ile is a 90-percent permanency risk. (Note `short term' occupation history,
other job application, marital pressure, financial pressure, and post job ter-
minations.)
"I consider him a 40-percent accident probability risk. (Note marital pres-
sure, financial pressure, evaluator reactions to indebtedness, degree of drink-
ing, and reactions to arrest.) "
As we mentioned before, this man was not hired, and small wonder. But
the important fact is that he would have been if only an ordinary cheek had
been run off on him.
As a matter of fact, much of the derogatory information against him was not
,even on the record-he himself, under the skillful questioning of the examiner,
revealed derogatory information which nobody but he knew about.
This naturally poses the question as to whether or not it's unfair to make an
applicant submit to such a test.
Backster and the companies which use his system feel that an employer whose
money and property is to be handled by a prospective applicant has every
right to find out everything which can be found out about the man.
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F POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
And even further, they point out, it can be helpful to the applicant himself,
for at least he gets a chance to explain any previous mistakes-a chance which
he would not get if an ordinary impersonal check on his record revealed them.
Perhaps most surprising of all is that applicants themselves enjoy the ex-
perience of being tested, even when they find themselves revealing information
which will certainly cost them the job they are seeking. Almost Invariably they
go out shaking the examiner's hand, and often promising to take his advice
and look for a job where they won't have to be bonded and where they won't
handle money or other valuable property.
Since the service is relatively new, its uses are not even as yet fully per-
fected, and Backster himself is constantly working toward improvement of the
evaluator and of the techniques in using it.
But in spite of its newness, the system already has a group of enthusiastic
followers, who, once they start using it, are willing to go on record stating that
It's well worth every dollar they pay for it.
In fact, they say, it saves them money by cutting down on wasted dollars spent
in training men who don't stay, and by greatly reducing costly personnel
turnover.
And, according to Charles Langner, vice president of Quaker City Bus Co.,
the service has produced one other good effect for Quaker City.
"It has given us a substantially better type of employee," Langner says, "and.
after all, when you have service to sell that's important."
And John P. Carey, Jr., of Carey Transportation, Inc., in New York City,
has this to say :
"We made a survey of the 30 men who have taken the (Backster) test in the
past 6 months, and the results have been most satisfactory as compared with
employees hired under the investigation system. By the application of this
machine we feel we have reduced some of the major problems of a company
when it puts new men into service * * * and reduced the danger to the point
where it becomes a calculated risk."
EXHIBIT 2D-FORT GORDON CONFERENCE ON STANDARDIZATION
(Reprinted from theAcademy for Scientific Interrogation Newsletter)
Your editor was Invited to attend a conference at Fort Gordon Lie Detector
School the 15th, 16th and 17th of April which proved to be most interesting. The
host for the occasion was Thomas R. Beck, ASI member and Director of the Army
School of Lie Detection at Fort Gordon. Guests were ASI President J. Frank
Faulk, ASI Members Cleve Backster and Les Thompson and a distinguished
guest, Mathew J. Wargovich, of the Biological Research Branch of the U.S.
Army, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Md.
From your editor's viewpoint, the conference was most interesting and educa-
tional. I believe it was a "first" in the history of lie detection. One of the main
pieces of business was the standardization of a lie-detection technique. Others
in attendance at the conference were school staff instructors and ASI members-
Mark Briehl, Bob Berry, Tom Puckett, and ASI Applicant Ben Malinowski. All
other staff members of the school attended the conference.
It was one of the most interesting technical conferences that your editor has
had the privilege of attending as there were many technical questions and prob-
lems discussed regarding the standardization of a lie-detection technique. Cleve
Backster's finally completed "Standardized Polygraph Notepack and Technique
Guide" and the "Backster Zone Comparison Technique" were adopted by the
Army school. This is going to be used exclusively by the school and they hope
to have all examiners of the Army return to Fort Gordon Lie Detection School
for the work conferences and instruction on Cleve's "Standardized Polygraph
Notepack and Technique Guide" so that it will he used throughout the Army.
The general atmosphere of wholehearted enthusiasm and genuine acceptance
of something in lie detection by all those concerned at this conference was really
something to behold. It was a conference of open-minded individuals attempting
to seek a solution to something that has been a problem for years. It was most
gratifying to observe and to participate in this conference- where each and every
one of the individuals in attendance have undoubtedly reached a degree of im-
measurable success from their own efforts in the lie detection field. Here a group
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of lie detector examiners were able to sit down, with open minds, and resolve
their own problems regarding lie detection and arrive at a solution which has
far-reaching effects. It was not an atmosphere of any individual reaching or
aspiring for any personal recognition, but it was impressive to see a group of
intelligent lie detector examiners able to sit, think, talk, challenge, and accept
theories and ideas that have been controversial to some extent in the past, now
proven and worthy of acceptance for a school for instruction and indoctrination.
It was inspiring to see what can be done and what must be done in the field
of lie detection today.
On behalf of President J. Frank Faulk, I would like to express our apprecia-
tion for the efforts and warm hospitality extended to us by Tom Beck, his staff,
and other members of the Fort Gordon Provost Marshal General School's staff
in making our visit most productive and interesting.
EXHIBIT 2E-DON'T TRUST TIIE LIPS DETECTOR
(By Richard A. Sternbach, Lawrence A. Gustafson, and Ronald L. Colier)
The use of the polygraph or "lie detector" in industry is increasing.
Companies have used it in questioning employees about theft, union
activities, and many other topics. "Lie detector" firms are claiming
great accuracy for the method.
Is it possible that the value of the polygraph is greatly overrated?
Can it do more harm than good when used in the ways mentioned?
Yes, argue the authors of this article-two of them professional psy-
chologists who have been doing extensive research with polygraph
techniques, the third a graduate student at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology who has studied commercial practice. These men con-
tend that
1. Polygraphic measurements are not valid.
2. The results obtained are not reliable.
3. Serious moral questions surround "trial by polygraph."
Psychologists have for years attempted to understand and predict human be-
havior, and have devised many ingenious instruments to assess and categorize
various character traits. One well-known personality test, for example, not
only rates persons on such factors as neurotic tendencies but includes a "lie"
scale, which estimates how truthfully the test was answered. Industrial psy-
chologists have used personality, aptitude, performance, and preference tests for
hiring and job classification programs. In addition, they have sought, through
motivational studies and studies of group processes, to increase job efficiency
and employee satisfaction.
But what about employees' morality? Thefts and embezzlements reached
$400,000 a day last year.' And no one knows how many research and develop-
ment secrets were given competing companies by disloyal employees, beyond the
fact that this kind of betrayal hurts many organizations badly. To make the
problem more important still, no company contemplating classified work for
the Federal Government can expect to receive contracts if its employees cannot
obtain security clearance because there are unresolved suspicions about their
loyalty, or because their behavior on or off the job is susceptible to blackmail.
Traditional screening procedures seem not to be effective enough to detect
dishonesty- or disloyalty-prone employees. What can be done? One. response
to the need has been a great increase in the number of polygraph (lie detector)
operators in business. From a handful of persons who specialized in lie detec-
tion before World War II, there are now over 500 companies in major cities
throughout the country offering their services to interested clients. The income
of such organizations has been increasing sharply. John F. Reid & Associates,
one of the largest security companies, reported an increase of 26 percent in 1960'
over 1959.2 While continuing to engage in lie detection for police departments
1 "Business Thefts Add 5 Percent to Cost of Goods," New York Times, business and
financial section, June 17, 1962, p. 14.
2 "To Tell the Truth," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 17, 1961, p. 1.
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and courts in areas where this is legally permissible, security firms now receive
80 percent of their income, according to Business Week, from "manufacturers,
merchandisers, and service organizations that want to know whether their work-
ers are, ever have been, or might become dishonest."'
With so much reliance being placed on this technique of lie detection, it seems
timely to examine it in some detail. How does the polygraph work? What
claims do the operators make for it? Howaccurate is the method?
The polygraph method is based on the common observation that one or more
physiological changes frequently accompany changes in our feelings. For ex-
ample, many of us have sweaty palms when excited or anxious (remember how
damp those test papers got when you. took examinations in school). And when
a person blushes, we are usually convinced he or she is- embarrassed, no matter
how vehement the protests to the contrary.
Attempts to use physiological changes as an index to lying are not new. Sev-
eral hundred years ago, a woman accused of witchery had to chew and try to
swallow dry crackers in public "trial." If the task proved difficult because she
had a dry mouth, it was assumed she was afraid of detection and therefore guilty
of being a witch.
What modern polygraph operators assume, as did the medieval witchfinders, is
that attempts at deception or lying will produce a unique pattern of physiological
changes which can be differentiated from other states. But while this may
sometimes appear to be the case, other factors often produce physiological
changes which are very similar. For example, there is the real danger that the
changes which occur are not the result of a "feeling of guilt" itself, but rather of
recalling some information, or of a shift in attention, or perhaps of some sudden
fear of the consequences of being pronounced guilty. It has been noted else-
where that "there is no way of identifying the emotion by study of the ac-
companying physiological changes." 4 We can be sure that those hapless women
of earlier times, whose mouths were so dry, were experiencing sufficient legiti-
mate fear to give every appearance of guilt-a complication which, unfortunately,
still exists today.
In the first quarter of this century several polygraphs were built for lie detec-
tion. These consisted of somewhat crude, completely mechanical devices for
measuring respiration, heart rate, and an index of blood pressure. Sometimes
electrical devices were included for measuring skin resistance (which changes
with changes in sweating). The activity of each of the variables was recorded
simultaneously on a sheet of moving graph paper, which gave rise to the name
"polygraph."
In 1962, the instruments marketed by Associated Research Inc., and C. H.
Stoelting Co., the two largest manufacturers of polygraphs for lie detection,
offer only slight modifications from the models used more than 25 years ago.
Although a very knowledgeable area of medical electronics has appeared in the
last several decades, the manufacturers and commercial operators have been
content to use the older kind of equipment and the same physiological systems.
Apparently, they have made no attempts to determine whether other physiolog-
ical responses might offer better results.
The National Board of Polygraph Examiners, an organization of polygraphers
which recently disbanded, approved certain Instruments as being adequate and
set forth minimum standards for polygraphs. These standards were so simple
that virtually any instrument that recorded breathing and a crude index of blood
pressure could qualify.'
Meanwhile, back at the laboratory great advances have been taking place in
other areas of polygraph work. Making use of more refined electronic circuitry
and the increased variety of sensing (pickup) devices available, psyhologists and
physiologists have been doing extensive research on some of the applications and
limitations of the polygraph. They have devised polygraphs consisting of a
6 "Business Uses of the Lie Detector," June 18, 1960, p. 98.
4 Benjamin Burack, "A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method, and Limitations of
the `Lie Detector'," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, vol. 46,
1955, pp. 414-426.
s Norman Ansley and Raymond J. Weir, "Selected Papers on the Polygraph," Wash-
ington, National Board of Polygraph Examiners, 1956, app. II, p. 21.
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 149
number of sensing devices which are attached to the subject. Amplifiers receive
the output of these pickup units and the amplied signal is finally displayed on
a moving paper chart. The basic principle is exactly that of your record player
except that amplied signals go to, oscillographic pens instead of a speaker. A still
more advanced form of this sort of recording is used with our astronauts. Physi-
ological changes are telemetered to ground stations via radio frequencies requir-
ing complex little packages which sense, sort, convert and amplify the signals
being monitored.)
Changes measured
The most commonly recorded physiological systems in lie detection are pulse
rate, breathing, relative (blood pressure (not absolute pressure as in'a physician's
examination), and sometimes sweating of the palms. These have been chosen
for two major reasons--their accessibility, and their susceptibility to change.
Other, possibly more valid systems, such as changes in the amount of adrenalin
circulating in the blood, or constriction and dilation of the pupil of the eye, are
more difficult to measure with portable equipment, and so are ignored.
The relatively primitive devices used by commercial operators, as compared
with those in use in laboratory and aerospace applications, are only part of the
limitations on the polygraph technique. Even with better instruments, the real
problem is not acquiring the data but interpreting the data. (We will discuss
this difficulty more fully in another section.) It is no exaggeration to say that
commercial operators are using the equivalent of biplanes in a rocket age.
Vendors of polygraphic services can point to a variety of industrial uses of
their product:
Some employers have used polygraph information in the effort to detect specific
losses.
Some companies have used the polygraph in attempts to determine loyalty and
honesty prior to promotion.
Banks, large department and chain stores, and other institutions where a num-
ber of persons handle money are especially confirmed clients.
Some businesses have attempted to keep employees on their toes by having
periodic checks of conduct made by commercial operators.
Some corporations give routine preemployment interviews for the stated pur-
pose of screening out criminals, sex perverts, and those who "don't intend to stay
long." (Note that rejection here is not on the basis of acts committed, but for
"tendencies" or "Inclinations.")
We should also mention that another use businesses have found for the com-
mercial polygraph operator, that of questioning employees about their union
activities, has recently been ruled unlawful by the National Labor Relations
Board.
Judging from all the indications, the commercial operators have not been doing
badly. What claims do they make for their lie detection method?
Accuracy and Error
Some commercial operators, in approaching prospective buyers of their services,
claim up to 95 percent accuracy and less than 1 percent error, with remaining
cases being called "inconclusive." In their book, "Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogation." Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid offer some figures purporting
to justify such claims, but the figures are extremely misleading.' For example,
they state that out of 4,280 cases run over a 5-year period, 64.5 percent were
reported innocent of the crime, 31.1 percent were reported guilty, and 4.4 percent
were indefinite (p. 129). The reports were based solely on the polygraph
records. Of the group of persons reported guilty, only 791 (59.3 percent) were
"interrogated with the aim of obtaining a confession," and of these only 61.4
percent did confess. In other words, only 36 percent of the individuals who
were reported as guilty on the basis of their polygraph records were actually
verified as such. And only 11.7 percent of the cases reported as innocent were
later verified as such. Together there were 18.9 percent of total cases verified
as correct. The percentage of verified errors was 0.07 percent (the figure of
0.0007 percent cited in the book is incorrect).
These figures leave us with no information at all as to the correctness of
"reported guilty" in about 40 percent of the cases, and with no such information
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150 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
at all in almost 90 percent of the "reported innocent" cases. This is a far cr.-
-from the claim of "95 percent accuracy."
Most of the claims by others for the effectiveness of this method are not even
documented with a number of cases. What it all adds up to is that, aside from
the misleading figures of Inbau and Reid and a few others, there exists no
public body of knowledge to support the enthusiastic claims of operators. There
are no publications in reputable journals, no facts, no figures, tables, or graphs.
In short, there is nothing to document the claims to accuracy or effectiveness
except bald assertions.
The curious fact about this polygraph business of lie detection is that very
few adequately controlled studies of its effectiveness have ever been made.
And the useful studies have been done not by the people in the business itself,
but by "academic workers," mainly physiological psychologists. The results of
their studies indicate that the degree of success is close to 70 percent, much
lower than the figure reported by the commercial operators.' The controlled
laboratory studies are criticized vehemently by the commercial operators as
being contrived and artificial, not "real life" situations. This is true. But until
figures from less artificial yet controlled studies are presented, these figures
must be accepted.
Bole of dramatics
Much of the apparent success of the commercial operators is due to the
dramatics they use in interrogating their suspects, rather than to the method
itself. An aura of infallibility is created, so that subjects really believe "the
machine can tell if you're lying." The operators create this aura as an aid in
securing confessions from the guilty.
Similar dramatics are used in selling the method to employers. The hiring
officer will be told to choose a card, or pick a number, from one of a series, and
then to submit to examination by the operator, who has his portable polygraph
with him. Because he is often successful in telling which card is held, the
operator is frequently hired. This example points up a confusion that often
exists over the difference between "guilty knowledge" and "guilty person."
The operator is safe in conducting his test because the hiring officer is the
"guilty person" who also has the "guilty knowledge" of the card or number.
When, however, a difference exists, as In the problem of distinguishing an
accessory from a thief, the operator's successes may decrease markedly because
he must rely even more than usual on hunches or tricks.
We have heard of an operator who, after screening all workers in a large
supermarket as a precautionary measure, was retained by the company simply
to walk around the store every 0 months, saying "hello" to all the employees.
Such dramatics may be very effective in reducing thefts, but the effectiveness is
not in the polygraphic technique. One could do as well, we suspect, with sugar
pills described as "truth serum."
"Moral vaccination"
Clarence D. Lee, in his book, "The Instrumental Detection of Deception" 9 con-
tinually emphasizes that the role the polygraph plays is that of keeping indi-
viduals from committing thefts. "The only real deterrent * * * is fear of the
possibility of discovery and punishment, and when possibility is turned into
certainty, the effect is increased manifold." Lee sees the threat of possible de-
tection by the polygraph as a tremendous moral force. Later he continues,
"Getting caught on the lie detector is a sort of moral vaccination, a shot of in-
tegrity in the arm."
The unfortunate consequence of this kind of weapon is that once the hoax
is discovered there is very little left of the polygraph's role in detection. In
this respect a short tale is often quoted in the lie-detection literature:
"Whenever a crime was committed within his jurisdiction, the prince had all
the suspects rounded up and brought into his court in the palace, where they
were instructed to stand against the wall with their hands behind them. He
then informed them that in an adjoining darkened chamber was a sacred ass
which would bray when his tall was pulled by a guilty person, and that they
were to go into the room, one at a time, pull the ass' tall, and then return to
? See, for instance, Douglas G. Ellson Roland C. Davis, Irving J. Saltzman, and Cletus J.
Burke, "A Report of Research and 1Jeteetion of Deception,' 1952; distributed by the
Department of Psychology, Indiana University.
e Springfleld, Ill., Charles C. Thomas, 1958.
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their original positions against the wall. When this had been done and the ass
had not brayed, all suspects were ordered to extend their hands in front of them
for examination, whereupon it was found that only one of the group had come
out with clean hands-the guilty one. The prince had dusted the ass' tail with
black powder, and those with clear conscience had pulled the tail and soiled
their hands." 6
One can imagine that once this story got around the trick would not work
again. Similarly, the value of the lie detector as a deterrent would surely col-
lapse quickly in an organization once its weaknesses became known.
Quality of training
The training of professional operators is often less than adequate. There is
no governing body which stipulates requirements to be met and passes on candi-
dates, as in the case of doctors, lawyers, accountants, clinical psychologists, and
many other groups. The operator may simply have read a book on the subject,
or taken a course lasting from a day or two to 6 months.
There are at least three "national" associations of commercial operators.
Unfortunately, they seem to have been formed for promotional purposes. The
associations sometimes "recommend" that an operator be a college graduate of
"high moral character" (presumably one who has passed a lie-detector test).
Needless to say, the qualifications of many operators must be suspect.
There are marked divisions and even distrust among various groups of com-
mercial operators. The Reporter, in a two-part series on the use of the poly-
graph in Government, referred to the fact that various operators judge the
number of qualified operators as between 10 and 40 30 Probably the latter are
fellow members of the same national group.
In any event, it seems clear that there are not nearly enough topnotch op-
erators to serve many companies.
TECHNICAL DEFECTS
Although thoughtful businessmen may find much to quarrel with in the way
industry uses the polygraph and in operator training, these still are not the only
limitations. Far from it. There are far more serious defects in the lie-detection
process itself. These defects are inherent and render the polygraph virtually
useless. Any measurement procedure of this kind is of value only to the extent
that it satisfies certain basic principles :
1. Validity.--This refers to the extent to which an instrument measures what it
is supposed to measure, as defined by some independent criterion.
2. Reliability.-This refers to the extent to which an instrument can produce
the same results on subsequent tests, despite the factors tending to cause varia-
bility.
We will now discuss these principles briefly as they affect present-day lie
detection.
Question of validity
The validity of a measuring instrument is basically a statistical concept,
referring to an estimate of the extent to which it correlates with some inde-
pendent, arbitrary criterion. For example, IQ tests are frequently validated
against scholastic achievements, which serve as the index of intellectual capa-
bility.
Some measuring instruments have a high degree of validity for certain pur-
poses but not others. For instance, a yardstick is fine for measuring the length
of a table, but it is no good for measuring the length of a virus or the distance
to the moon. Similarly, the commercial polygraph is good for some things,
such as recording the fact of a physiological change, but it cannot record lies,
thoughts, feelings, or anything but physiological activity. Furthermore, the
extent to which changes in physiological activity may be related to lying or
feelings of guilt is not known, and can only be determined in individual cases
by confessions. There are no standards of normal "truthfulness" on the poly-
graph comparable to, say, 98.6? body temperature for fever or 20/20 vision for
eyesight.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
1? See Dwight MacDonald, "The Lie Detector Era," the Reporter, June 8, 1954, pp. 10-18;
June 22, 1954, pp. 22-29.
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Any test may contain questions which only appear to be related to what the
test giver is trying to measure. For example :
Asking a person "yes" and "no" type questions about his childhood might seen
to be a valid way of measuring how much of this or that he experienced when
young. However, we have no guarantee that his answers reflect what actually
happened in his childhood. Such a procedure is said to have only "face validity."
Most forms of lie detection seem tobe of this sort; they have merely a superficial
appearance of validity.
It is much more important that a test have what is called empirical validity ;
that is, a high correlation between the test score and some independent criterion-
This is where lie-detection tests frequently are given credit where it is not due..
The physiological changes which accompany lying may also accompany many
other things. Consequently, only a low correlation will exist between the poly-
graph test and the confession criterion.
To be sure, there are many cases in the records, both in field and in laboratory
situations, where the physiological response to a given question is markedly differ-
ent from the responses to other questions, and where it has been found that a
lie was told at the time. Despite our critical attitude toward commercial
lie detection, we have encountered this case many times in our laboratories, and
do not overlook its occurrence. But this fact does not justify what is done
in commercial practice. Here, when markedly different responses occur to sev-
eral questions, the tendency of the less rigorous investigator is to call all such
responses "lies" without ever knowing if they really are.
Due to the nature of the field situation and also to the inadequate instrumenta-
tion in commercial lie detection, more often than not one is left in a position
of never knowing how often some sort of unique physiological response occurs,
when lying does not occur, and how often lying occurs without any unusual'
response. While there is some equivocal evidence on these questions from experi-
mental studies where the lies are always known, there is no really sound in-
formation about them fro-in actual field situations. Consequently, the only
validating criteria available at present are confession of guilt and absolute proof'
of innocence. Without these, the operator's judgment or report is useless.
Earlier we mentioned a study by Inbau and Reid. It is a good example of
what we have been discussing. We have no idea of how many of the responses
on the polygraph records reportedly indicating guilt were responses actually
caused by something else; nor do we know how many of the records which were
judged as indicating the person was innocent simply failed to show physiological
responses when lying actually occurred.
Until such information is produced, businessmen should not endorse the use
of polygraphic lie detection in industry. A lie detector simply records certain
physiological changes. Sometimes these may be related to lying or guilt, but
the burden of proof in such an important matter should be up to the commercial
operators who give the tests, not those exploited or possibly harmed.
Question of reliability
The reliability of an instrument is the statistical estimate of the correlation
between repeated measures obtained. We would expect repeated measures of a
table's length obtained by a yardstick to yield high reliability scores. If this
did not occur, and we had reason to believe that the table was not growing or
shrinking, we would rightly suspect that something was wrong with our yard-
stick.
What about reliability in lie detection? Commercial polygraph operators
hardly even repeat their tests, and consequently cannot stipulate the likelihood
of an individual's pattern of responses being repeated. It is significant that
when the National Board of Polygraph Examiners set up some minimum stand-
ards for polygraph instruments there was no mention of reliability.
Much of the work done in the laboratories of psychophysiologis,ts and others
who are investigating the relationships between psychological and physiological
events has been concerned lately with this problem of reliability. Unfortu-
nately, polygraph measures appear to have a high degree of unreliability unless
a number of factors, such as room temperature and humidity, time of day, con-
centration of various constituents in the air, the subject's. previous activities,
and so forth, are rigidly controlled (which would be very difficult or impossible
In industrial practice.) Such factors are not taken into account by the corn
mereial operators.
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Another question concerns the relationship between the level of physiological
activity prior to stimulation and the kind of response produced by the stimulus.
If a person's blood pressure is at a very high level prior to a leading question,
there is little chance that it will increase much more in response to that
question. The response may even be in the opposite direction. Furthermore,
the amount of change will often depend on the preceding level of activity even
when this is not extreme. This phenomenon is known as the law of initial
values. For example, an increase in heart rate from 75 to 85 beats per minute
is not at all the same thing as an increase from 85 to 95; the percentage increase
is quite different.
In order to evaluate a physiological response properly, the preceding level
must be taken into account. Commercial operators do not consider this problem.
In fact, their equipment typically has no quantitative measure of blood pressure
at all, just a line which fluctuates up and down with relative changes in pressure.
And many of the newer polygraphs now include circuits which-automatically
recenter all pens after a given time, making it impossible even to get an idea of
their baselines. Consequently, such factors as the subject's anxiety about the
test procedure and its effect on his career, his feelings about the electrodes, his
reaction to the operator, and other concerns, all of which alter his physiological
levels of functioning and therefore his responses cannot be taken into account.
,Cutoff levels
Even with the best of tests, errors of classification are made.. These can be
of two kinds: (1) "false positives," those erroneously judged guilty; and (2)
"false negatives," or undetected guilty persons.
The proportion of false positives to false negatives will depend on the criterion
established by the operator as to the level of response he will consider guilty.
If he sets this level too low, so that the slightest variations are considered sig-
nificant, ?then the operator will incorrectly judge too many persons to be guilty ;
he will have too many false positives. If he sets his cutoff level too high, so
that only extreme deviations are considered significant, then the operator will
miss too many guilty suspects; he will have too many false negatives. .
Ideally, a compromise should be possible, and it is in most psychological test-
ing. But in commercial lie detection, operators simply cannot discover their
false negatives, and so cannot make such a compromise. Therefore, claims of
90- to 100-percent accuracy are meaningless.
Of course, most of the false negatives are quite happy to remain in this cate-
gory, as they would hardly want to refute the stamp of innocence. On the other
hand, especially in preemployment exams, the false positives are given little
chance to prove their innocence. Aside from the great inconvenience caused
the individual by misclassification, problems are also created for business. For
instance, if there are only a few persons available for a given position, the
price of rejecting an applicant because of misclassification may be very high.
This is especially true in highly skilled areas and at executive levels.
Level of costs
The costs of polygraphic lie detection are quite prohibitive, considering what
the employer is getting. The average cost for screening charged by the commer-
cial operators is $20 to $30 per person. Add to this the number of guilty persons
who go undetected (false negatives), the costs to the reputations of those persons
unjustly accused (false positives), and the possible loss of valuable manpower
through unjust accusations-and the expense, in a larger sense, becomes con-
siderable.
MORAL QUESTIONS
For policymaking executives in particular, the lie detector raises more than
technical issues of validity and reliability.
The use of polygraphic techniques either to detect or to avoid hiring certain
persons constitutes a subversion of judicial processes to "trial by polygraph."
An individual is persuaded by social pressures to testify against himself through
a distorted, error-ridden medium ; he may be denied the right to work without
ever knowing the reason why ; he may be "convicted" of certain "tendencies"
without having committed an illegal act ; and he has no defense against the
operator's report, since it is unknown to him and he has no rights in the process
by which it is drawn up and used.
If management permits the polygraph to be used in corporate work, surely it
cannot expect employees to be oblivious to matters like these. Indeed, most
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USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Americans are highly sensitive about their rights as employees. Surely, too, the
polygraph will be viewed as a symbol of management suspicion and distrust. The
atmosphere for work will inevitably be affected. One can easily Imagine resentful
employees making increasing use of words like "sneaky," "underhanded," and
"Gestapo" in their characterizations of the company.
What is the answer, then, to the problems of screening employees for security,
detecting crimes, determining loyalty, and learning other types of information
that workers may not want to divulge?
The answer, simply, is that there is no really effective mechanical technique
yet available. The problems still exist, and there are no pat answers. The
polygraphic method will be effective only as long as people believe it is a real
"lie detector," and confess their guilt when confronted with fancy-looking
squiggles on chart paper. But it is going to be increasingly difficult to delude
them in this respect. While those who "beat" the machine naturally are not
going to brag about it, the inherent weaknesses of the polygraph cannot be
concealed for long from discerning employees. And there will always be the
cries of the innocently accused.
Management has other ways of gaining information about employees-tests,
questionnaires, interviews, and probably best of all, firsthand observation of
performance. These ways may be slower and more time consuming, but in the
long run they are still the best a company can use.
EXHIBIT 2F-DON'T TRUST THE LIE DETECTOR VERSUS Do TRUST THE LIE
DETECTOR
(By Cleve Backater)
[Reprinted from Law and Order magazine, February 19.63 issue, Academy for Scientific
Interrogation Section]
The first of the above titles "Don't Trust the Lie Detector" is, actually that of
a feature article which appeared in the November-December issue of the Harvard
Business Review. This shocking injustice to the truly scientific brand of lie
detection was authored by Richard A. Sternbach, Lawrence A. Gustafson, and
Ronald L. Colier. An insert paragraph states that two of the authors are "pro-fessional psychologists who have been doing extensive research with polygraph
techniques, the third is a graduate student at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology who has studied commercial practice."
One thing you can be certain of is that none of them are authorities, or even
well-known practitioners in the field of scientific lie detection. For these indi-
viduals to take it upon themselves to be so critical of a field they know so little
about is like this author writing a critical article on the Rorschach Inkblot Test
or the Bernreuter Personality Inventory, both of these being important tests in
the field of psychology. Despite our justification to challenge these individuals'
right to present such a totally destructive criticism of a specialty they mis-
takenly may feel within their realm-the sad part of it is that we, within the
polygraph field, have provided them with the ammunition to fire at us.
The area of polygraph statistics is one where we have left ourselves wide open
to any statistician who cared to attack us. We must presume one or more of the
authors, Sternbach, Gustafson, or Colier, to be well grounded in statistics, or
certainly to have obtained sound information from a properly informed source.
We must acknowledge the fact that research statistics are well within the scope of
recognized capabilities of numerous psychologists. One lesson we certainly
should learn from this article is to seek proper advice before presenting statistics
on polygraph accuracy or effectiveness.
Chic Hanscom, of the University of Minnesota, emphasized this during a pres-
entation "Statistical Evaluation of Examiner Success," before a group of nearly
100 polygraph examiners attending the polygraph examiners clinic conducted
by Los Angeles State College, September 4 through 7, 1962. The lie detection
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field is one that embraces an extremely difficult set of conditions which prevent
an adequate "verification" followup as to the ultimate answer regarding a poly-
graph subject's guilt or innocence. In the past it has also been virtually im-
possible to identify that portion of succes which was due to the psychological
impact of the procedure, as compared to that portion of success based on deter-
minations initially arived at exclusively through evaluation of the polygraph
charts.
In their subsection entitled "Accuracy and Error" in the Harvard Business
Review article the authors severely criticize the vague, incomplete, and erroneous
published polygraph statistics as well as the methods by which they were calcu-
lated. We have now been called to task for inadequate statistics released during
past years-and what defense do we have? I know of none, and furthermore if
we attempt to defend such statistics of the past we are playing the psychologist's
game with his rules and on his home grounds. In my opinion our efforts should
be directed toward the accuracy and soundness of future statistics rather than
toward attempts to justify those of the past.
In this section of their article authors Sternbach, Gustafson, and Colier state
that much of our apparent success is due to dramatics we use while interrogating
our polygraph subjects rather than to the polygraph method itself. They further
state we create an aura of infallibility so that polygraph subjects really believe
"the machine can tell if you are lying," and that this aura of infallibility is used
as an aid in securing confessions from the guilty. Later in their article they
state that "once the hoax is discovered there is very little left of the polygraph's
role in detection."
During nearly 5 years as chairman of the Research and Instrument Committee
of the Academy for Scientific Interrogation, I have continually voiced criti-
cism in my talks and published papers of the large number of polygraph examiners
in the field today who are using obsolete techniques and are relying far too
heavily upon interrogation and the psychological impact created by the very
presence of the polygraph equipment. Further I have loudly voiced the need of
greater uniformity in polygraph examination technique.
Fortunately the accuracy of the claims of the authors of the article "Don't
Trust the Lie Detector" centers around outdated techniques and those examiners
who still use such obsolete methods.
,The allegedly thorough research efforts of the authors of this article apparently
missed completely the existence of updated polygraph techniques, and the very
existence of the work being conducted by our research and instrument committee.
I do not know of a single visit or contact by any of the authors with our committee.
Although directed primarily toward the private or commercial examiner the
widespread circulation of such a journal as the Harvard Business Review can
render a near fatal blow to the use of the polygraph-not only the commercial use,
but its use in law enforcement also. The stigma of such an article can surely
create an atmosphere in which antipolygraph legislation can more easily be ac-
complished. With the passage of such legislation how can the law enforcement
examiner request a citizen to take a polygraph examination where, should a
business executive make the same request, he would be subject to a heavy fine or a
jail sentence, or both.
A sound polygraph technique does exist and does not fall within the areas of
weakness criticized by the article under discusion. There are many examiners
who do not use this, or a similarly sound technique. It is vitally important that
this group of examiners alter their approach if lie detection is to perpetuate itself
as a useful law enforcement technique. It is also extremely important that law
enforcement leaders monitor the efforts and methods of commercial examiners,
practicing within their jurisdiction.
Fill out the below checklist and see if you, or the polygraph examiner within
your department, are following sound and modern polygraph techniques and
procedures. If the score is low, we urge you to act now to seek information or
retraining for those responsible for operation of your polygraph. The very
existence of the polygraph profession is at stake. The next move is up to you.
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156 USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In response to a subcommittee questionnaire, 19 Federal agencies reported that
their policies permitted the use of polygraphs in carrying out Government busi-
ness. The replies of these 19 agencies, broken down by their constituent units
which use the device, are shown in tabular form at the end of this exhibit. The
following narrative explains the terms used in the table and provides a general
analysis of the data.
A. PURPOSES FOR USING POLYGRAPHS
1. Security.-Cited by 14 of the 19 agencies, the most frequently reported pur-
pose for the Government's use of polygraphs involves security matters. In this
context security ranged from investigation of security leaks to operational uses
in intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
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The number of defense organizations included among the 79 users under-
lines the importat role the instrument plays in the many-sided efforts to safe-
guard the Nation's security. Each of the military services was accounted for,
with the Intelligence Corps and the military police both. reporting polygraph use
within the Army, and the Marine Corps and naval intelligence answering the roll
within the Navy Department. The Office of Special Investigations was the sole
reported Air Force user. Civilian components of the Defense Establishment
also were well represented. The Central Intelligence Agency reported extensive
polygraph use, as did the National Security Agency. Also within the Defense
Department, the Defense Atomic Support Agency and the Defense Supply Agency
acknowledged use of the instrument. Several nondefense agencies also, indicated
that their activities in the security field involved use of polygraphs.
2. Criminal.-Investigation of criminal law infractions was listed by 10 agen-
cies as an area in which polygraphs are employed. Private citizens as well as
Federal employees came within the scope of such investigations. The Agricul-
ture Department, for instance, has considered the results of polygraph tests
conducted outside the Government in investigating cases of alleged fraudulent
transactions with the Agricultural Marketing Service.
3. Misconduct.-Investigation of employee misconduct was a reason given by
eight agencies for utilizing polygraphs. This category included offenses not
considered to be criminal violations.
4. Personnel screening.-The Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency indicated that polygraph testing is included as a routine part
of preemployment personnel screening. The armed services also reported a
similar use during fiscal 1963 in connection with the program of enlisting Cuban
refugees. This was a unique situation, however, since the military normally
does not employ the device in recruitment or induction processing.
5. Medical measurements.-The Health, Education, and Welfare Department
reported that three of its bureaus-the National Institutes of Health, the Public
Health Service, and St. Elizabeths Hospital in the District of Columbia-used
polygraphs for medical purposes. As a device which measures pulse rates,
respiration rates, and blood pressure, the polygraph has been used to record the
reactions of patients under anesthesia.
The device also has found use in cases involving patients with mental or neu-
rological disorders. More frequently, it has been employed on animals under-
going experiment.
B. ExTRNT OF POLYGRAPH USE
Except for the personnel screening category, the user agencies declared that
polygraphs were not used in every case. The Atomic Energy Commission, for
instance, said that the device was involved in processing only 1 of 29,300 security
clearances processed during fiscal 1963. Similarly, the machine was employed
in 0.14 percent of the FBI investigative matters handled in fiscal 1962.
The frequency of polygraph use in Air Force investigations varied from once
in every 43 cases in 1959 to once every 18 cases In 1962. The Internal Revenue
Service, which restricts polygraph tests to employees who request them, reported
such tests were used in fewer than 10 cases in the last 10 years.
Other agencies indicated that investigative techniques affected the extent of
polygraph use. The Defense Atomic Support Agency said the device is used
normally "to gain information not otherwise attainable by other investigative
techniques." The Coast Guard replied that polygraph tests are administered
when "there is conflicting evidence, [or] the subject requests an examination, or
it appears that an examination would materially aid the investigation." The
Post Office Department limits the device to "cases of more than average im-
portance where the investigation is at a standstill because the inspector cannot
prove a suspect guilty or eliminate him from suspicion even though he has
exhausted all normal investigative techniques."
Several agencies referred to the polygraph as an investigative "tool" or "aid"
which was used "seldom" or "on rare occasions."
In the area of personnel screening, the two agencies concerned-the CIA and
the National Security Agency-were not clear as to the exact extent of polygraph
utilization. The CIA flatly answered that "all applicants and employees are
afforded polygraph examinations as part of security screening procedures" while
also implying a less-than-mandatory practice by saying that a refusal to. take a
test would be "considered along with other information developed in processing
an applicant." The NSA advised that polygraph interviews are a required part
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of preemployment processing for all civilian applicants. After becoming a NSA
employee, however, a person is subjected to such a test only in connection with
matters "extensively investigated but difficult to resolve." In the past, polygraph
examinations have not been required of military personnel before their acceptancca
for assignment to NSA.
C. POLYGRApII TESTS CONDUCTED DURING FISCAL 1963
The Federal Government conducted 19,122 polygraph tests during 1963, accord-
ing to the answers to the subcommittee's questionnaire. And this amount did
not include the thousands of tests which the CIA and NSA gave to "all applicants
and employees," since the agencies claimed the number of tests must be classified
as "security" information.
The information compiled by the subcommittee showed the Army to be the
heaviest Government user of polygraphs. During fiscal 1963, the Army con-
ducted roughly 12,500 tests or more than half of all those reported by the Gov-
ernment. Screening of Cuban enlistees, a situation presumably unique to the
period reported, accounted for 3,494 Army tests with the polygraph. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation reported 2,314 tests.
1). Poi,YGRAPII TESTS REQUESTED DURING FISCAL 1963
Not all Government unity using polygraphs maintain their own specialized
staffs and facilities to carry out the tests. On some occasions, agencies do not
have their own equipment or operators available at the scene of investigations.
During fiscal 1963, these conditions led to 322 polygraph tests being requested
by Federal agencies. The Post Office Department accounted for 134 requests
while the Secret Service requested 110 tests.
Although there was uniform reluctance to specify the agencies to which the
requests were directed, it was generally implied that such matters remained
within the Federal Government. The General Services Administration, how-
ever, requested 10 tests during the year and indicated that an unspecified number
of these were performed by local law enforcement agencies.
At total of 512 polygraphs or other so-called lie detection devices were reported
as owned by the Federal Government at an estimated acquisition cost of
$428,066. This does not include the CIA and NSA which claimed that the
number and acquisition value of the polygraphs they possess is classified as se-
curity information.
The Army led the statistics in this department, possessing 261 devices which
cost an estimated $182,700. The Navy Department was next with 86 machines,
including 9 owned by the Marine Corps, followed by the Air Force with 72, and
the FBI with 48. The Post Office Department reported they own 17 "lie detec-
tion" devices, 13 of which were acquired more than 10 years ago and employ
only a one-phase, skin resistance detection procedure. The Post Office Depart-
ment stated that they intend to dispose of these one-phase instruments in the
current fiscal year.
F. AUTTIORIGED POI,YGRAPIT OPERATORS WITTIIN TILE GOVERNMENT
Federal agencies reported 639 employees are authorized to conduct poly-
graph tests. Their salaries during fiscal 1963 amounted to slightly more than
$4.3 million. However. administering polygraphs examinations is only one of
ninny assigned duties to the great majority of these Federal workers. For
example. the FBI reported that the 46 special agents authorized to perform
polygraph tests spend an estimated 6 percent of their time on such activity.
Accordingly, the FBI contended that only 6 percent of the agents' $610,667 an-
nual salaries-or $37,000 per year-can be directly attributed to work involving
the polygraph. On this same point, authorized Army military policemen devote
less than 5 percent of their time to polygraph activities, averaging 1.8 tests per
month for each examiner. Post Office Department inspectors reportedly aver-
age less than 3 percent of their total effort with the device and the Secret
Service attributes less than 1 percent of the total operators' salaries to work
involving the machine.
The National Security Agency and the CIA are the only organizations indicat-
ing that handling polygraph tests is the primary duty of any employees.
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Numerically, the Army again was highest, reporting 3:58 polygraph operators on
its rolls in fiscal 1963. The Navy Department followed with 106 examiners-86
assigned to naval intelligence and 20 to the Marines. Next on the list was the
Air Force with 73 authorized operators.
Once more these figures do not include CIA and NSA which claim they are
exempted by statute from disclosing information regarding the nuii)ber and sal-
aries of their employees. CIA claims as authority 50 U.S.C. 403(g),' and NSA
claims as authority section 6 of Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).'
G. OTHER ANNUAL CosTS
More than $56,000 a year in costs related to polygraph use was reported by the
19 agencies. This figure is a bare minimum, as such costs were very sketchily
estimated. due to widely varying recordkeeping. Intended to be included in this
category were traini-rig and travel expenses of polygraph operators, maintenance
of the polygraph machines, and similar recurring costs. In addition, the Air
Force reported an expenditure of $24,9.53 during fiscal 19,61 for a contract with
Fordham University (New York) on studies in lie detection.
H. SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUALS
Included in the subcommittee questionnaire were several queries designed to
reveal the steps taken to safeguard the rights of individuals who undergo poly-
graph tests. In this regard the agencies were asked what relative weight is
accorded polygraph test results or refusals to be so tested, whether the use of
polygraphs is subject to review, whether tests results are available. to the individ-
ual, whether an avenue of appeal exists, and whether an individual's physical
and mental condition are considered.
1. Effects of refusals.-In response, every agency provided assurances of one
form or another that polygraph tests are given only with voluntary consent from
the person to be tested. Even in the employment screening programs of the CIA
and the NSA, where polygraph tests approach the point of being mandatory,
applicants may refuse to submit to polygraph testing. Whether a refusal would
dim a job appilcant's chances is not clear. The CIA simply said that refusals
would be "considered along with other information developed * * *" while the
NSA indicated an applicant's refusal would require "more exhaustive
investigation."
A number of agencies expressly declared that refusals do not prejudice
the outcome of an investigation. The Air Force, for example, stated "no
inference is or may be made from * * * refusals" whle the Army military
police assured that "failure to volunteer for an examination is not construed
as a tacit admission of guilt." Similarly, the Defense Atomic Support. Agency
said that a refusal "cannot be construed as an admission or even a partial
admission of guilt" and the Post Office Department asserted the refusals can-
not form the "basis for any recommendation."
While the Marine Corps went along with most agencies in saying a refusal
"is not considered as proof or evidence of facts sought to be confirmed,"
the Office of Naval intelligence thought otherwise. "It is safe to say," stated
ONI, "that this Office realize [sic] that some subjects refuse to submit to exam-
inations on the basis of moral scruples which they consider valid, in other
cases a refusal may be considered a tacit, admission of guilt."
The Defense Supply Agency also had some doubts about refusals. "While
only limited significance is attached to data developed by the polygraph test,"
DSA said, "in a clear-cut `did-you-or-didn't-you' situation refusal * * * is con-
sidered as an unfavorable reflection on the credibility of the individual's
statement."
;a 50 U.S.C. 403 (g) states : "In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section
403(d)r(3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency
shall be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of title 5, and the provisions of
any other law which require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided,
That in furtherance of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall make
no reports to the Congress in connection with the Agency under section 947(b) of title 5."
3 Svc. 6(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, nothing in this act or
any other law (including, but not limited to, the first section and section 2 of the net of
August 28, 1035 (5 U.S.C. 654)), shall be construed to require the disclosure of the
organization or any function of the National Security Agency, of any information with
respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of the persons
employed, by such agency.
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A member of the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department
can be ordered to take a polygraph test, and be subject to disciplinary action
if the order is disobeyed, but for any other suspect a refusal "can be given
no weight as to guilt or innocence."
With the exception of the District of Columbia Police Department, all agen-
cies reported that refusals by employees to take polygraph tests are not noted
in their personnel records, although such matters might be mentioned in in-
vestigative reports.
2. Weight accorded polygraph test results.-No agency admitted attaching
great significance to the results of polygraph examinations, but there were indi-
cations that such tests influence at least the course of investigations.
The Atomic Energy Commission reported that polygraph test results alone
were not conclusive but if they were at variance with the findings of field in-
vestigations, additional fieldwork would be carried out to resolve the dis-
crepancies. The Defense Atomic Support Agency and the General Services
Administration stressed that they attached no weight to such test results with-
out confirmation by subsequent admissions.
The results are not used by the National Security Agency in "reaching any
finding" but only to "identify areas in which the individual should be ques-
tioned further." In a similar vein the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration said the device is used "for formulating additional investigative
coverage."
A balanced statement on this point was issued by the FBI, which said the "poly-
graph can be helpful to implement an interrogation and provide investigative
direction but it must not be relied on solely or used as a substitute for logical
investigation."
The Internal Revenue Service seemed inclined to give the individual being
tested the benefit of the doubt. "Where such test is favorable to the subject, it
might be given considerable weight," IRS said. "When the test is unfavorable, it
would simply be considered with all other information * * *."
The polygraph was felt to be an invaluable investigative aid by the Office of
Naval Intelligence, which also cautioned that an accuracy rate of 70 percent is
considered optimum.
3. Review of polygraph use.-Almost all of the 19 agencies indicated that use
of polygraphs is subject to review by authorities higher than those persons imme-
diately involved in handling investigations.
One reported exception to this review practice was the CIA. That Agency
apparently considers a system of review for each instance of polygraph utilization
as unnecessary since the Director of Central Intelligence has established the
policy that all applicants and employees will be afforded polygraph examinations
as part of security screening procedures.
Likewise, polygraph tests are a required part of the National Security Agency's
preemployment processing of civilian applicants, and there is no process to re-
view each applicant's case to determine whether the testing is appropriate. How-
ever, there is a system for reviewing the decision to test NSA employees.
While the Defense Supply Agency maintains a review process for all recom-
mended tests in criminal investigations, security operations are handled differ-
ently. The use of polygraphs in DSA security matters is decided, without subse-
quent review, by the intelligence officer in charge at the field activity concerned
or at DSA headquarters in Washington.
4. Availability of results to individuals tested.-Five agencies-Central In-
telligence Agency, Defense Supply Agency, Department of the Air Force, Na-
tional Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation-indicated
they do. not make known the results to individuals undergoing polygraph
examinations. All other agencies: using the machine said they either routinely
advise the individual tested of the results or provide the information upon
request.
5. Appeals of polygraph test results.-A number of agencies reported that
they have no system permitting the appeal of adverse polygraph test results.
Most of these agencies reasoned that an appeal limited to the results of poly-
graph tests is unnecessary since no action is taken against individuals solely
on the basis of such examinations; however, these agencies went on to say
that any administrative action resulting from an investigation would be
subject to appeal.
The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department answered that the
right of administrative appeal does not apply in its uses of the machine "since
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all criminal cases must ultimately be presented to a court of law and the
results of polygraph examinations are not admissible in these courts."
But a sizable number of agencies and their components said they provide a
means of appeal, usually by conducting a new test with a different operator.
Agencies allowing an appeal or reexamination of some sort are the Army,
the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Internal Revenue Service, the Secret
Service, the U.S. Information Agency, and the U.S. Park Police of the Interior
Department.,
6. Consideration of physical and mental conditions.-Each agency reporting
the use of polygraphs, and all of their affected units, informed the subcom-
mittee that consideration is given to the physical and mental conditions of
individuals to be tested.
A few agencies, including the Air Force, the Commerce Department, the
Defense Atomic Support Agency, the National Security Agency, and the State
Department, said they obtain professional medical advice when there is a
question of physical or mental suitability to undergo polygraph tests.
While most other agencies simply indicated that consideration is accorded,
few further details were volunteered. The Post Office Department, for ex-
ample, noted that "susceptibility tests are given to determine * * * mental
suitability." Similarly, Naval Intelligence said : "It is well understood the
physical-mental conditions of many subjects will render them unsuitable as
testing subjects either on a temporal or permanent basis."
The U.S. Information Agency was slightly more specific, stating that the
matter "is left to the prof essionalization of the [polygraph] operator."
I., QUALIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT POLYORAPI3 OPERATORS
In order to ascertain the qualification of the polygraph operators within
the Federal Government, the subcommittee asked those 11 agencies that
employed polygraph operators for a breakdown of the minimum requirements
for the operators. Included among the criteria were age, education, grade or
rank,. years of investigative experience, any character investigation or agency
check, and type of special polygraph training.
1. Minimum age.-Although most agencies have set 25 years as the minimum
age. for a polygraph operator, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department allows a policeman aged 21 to conduct the polygraph tests, The
Coast Cruar4 minimum age Is 22, while CIA "prefers" their operators to be 30
years . old. There, is no minimum age requirement in the FBI, but all examiners
must be special agents and the minimum . age for. such an agent is 23 years.
2. Educational requirements.-The educational requirements for polygraph
operators in the Federal Government vary from agency to agency. The mini-
mum requirement is a high school degree, although an Army military policeman
must. have 2 years of college education before becoming eligible to perform
polygraph tests. CIA,. NSA, FBI, Office,of. Naval Intelligence, and the Secret
Service all require a college degree.
3. Grade or, rank.-The minimum grade or rank requirement for polygraph
operators varies greatly throughout the Government. The District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department has no special requirement, while the Central
Intelligence Agency requires its polygraph operators to be a GS-11 (with base
annual.salary of $9,004). The FBI requires its polygraph operators to be a
special agent, which has the grade of GS=10 ($8,450). Other grade or rank
requirements include: Army Intelligence, E-5 ($4,738) ; Army Military Police,
warrant officer ($6,632), NSA, GS-11 ($9,004) ; and Post Office Department,
PI'S-13. ($12,639).2
4. Investigative experience.-Three agencies-the District of Columbia Metro-
politan Police Department, the FBI, and the Marine Corps-have no minimum
requirement for years of investigative experience. The remainder of the agencies
employing polygraph operators vary in their requirements from 1 year to 5 years.
5. Agency check or character investigation.-Ali prospective polygraph opera-
tors within the Federal Government must be given either an agency check or
a background investigation prior to approval as an operator. NSA reports that
all applicants for polygraph operator must pass a polygraph screening test.
a Salaries derived from tables found on p. 13415, Congressional Record, Aug. 6, 1963.
51-647-64-12
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6. Training program.-The majority of agencies that employ polygraph opera-
tors train them at the Army Provost Marshal General School, Fort Gordon, Ga.
The Coast Guard and the Post Office Department also make use of a private
source of instruction-the National Training Center of Lie Detection in New
York. CIA requires polygraph trainees to take an internal academic course for
5 weeks plus an additional 4 months on-the-job training. The FBI also conducts
an internal training course and advanced training seminars.
7. Other requirements.-No one agency can be compared with any other in
their "other requirements" for authorizing a polygraph operator. The require-
ments range from a thorough understanding of communism (NSA), foreign
language fluency and physical ability to travel extensively (CIA), to emotional
stability and lack of distracting scars or impediments (Air Force).
EXHIBITS 4A-4F-BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES SUBMITTED BY POLY-
GRAPH EXAMINERS APPEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE
EXHIBIT 4A-CLEVE BACKSTER
Mr. Cleve Backster received his initial polygraph training directly from the
late Leonarde Keeler. Prior to this specialized training, which was in 1948,
he had been serving in the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps as an interroga-
tion instructor at their Fort Holabird (Md) headquarters.
From military service, he accepted a position with the Central Intelligence
Agency, as an interrogation specialist. In 1949, as part of his duties as the head
of a section, he instituted the polygraph examination program, which to date
is still active. Mr. Backster left CIA to accept the position of director at the
Leonardo Keeler Polygraph Institute in Chicago, Ill., and during 1950 con-
ducted classes heavily attended by military and Government agency personnel,
as well as law enforcement personnel.
In 1951, he founded Cleve Backster, Inc., which is the owner and operator
of the Backster School of Lie Detection. This school is unique in that it is the
only nonmilitary polygraph school conducting advanced courses in polygraph
usage. During the period of 1959 through 1962, Mr. Backster was also the direc-
tor of the National Training Center of Lie Detection. During this 4-year period,
this organization handled the polygraph training initially conducted by the
Backster School of Lie Detection. In the latter part of 1962, the training func-
tion again returned to the Backster School of Lie Detection.
Since 1949, Cleve Backster has at some time served as a polygraph consultant
to most every Government agency who has made use of polygraph. He is the
current chairman of the Research and Instrument Committee of the Committee
of the Academy for Scientific Interrogation, a post to which he has been reap-
pointed to each year since 1958, and is also the cochairman of the Research and
Instrument Committee of the International Association of Polygraph Examiners.
During his intensified research efforts, which started in 1958, Mr. Backster
made compatible, coordinated, and added to various existing polygraph tech-
niques prevalent in the overall polygraph field, and as a result compiled the
Standardized Polygraph Examiner Notepack. This notepack has been widely
adapted as a standard throughout the polygraph field, and is featured at a num-
ber of polygraph examiner training schools, including the Fort Gordon (Ga.) U.S.
Army Polygraph School.
Mr. Backster has been a member of the Academy for Scientific Interrogation
each year since its start in 1948, and has been on the board of directors during
the past 2 years. For the past 3 years, he has served as editor of the polygraph
and interrogation section sponsored by the Academy for Scientific Interrogation,
which has been published monthly in a widely circulated law enforcement pub-
lication. He has also been active in helping design the present day polygraph
equipment, has authored numerous articles circulated within the polygraph pro-
fession, and has compiled a manual on the "Zone Comparison Technique," this
being the consolidated technique widely used in the polygraph profession today.
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