I FOUGHT IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200150037-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 11, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

19-6re'
ApproVed For Releive 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP66B00403R0 0150037-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- APPENDIX A3167
_
four tg or a fai a_ _mug ,_,?.,baSed , their
g anniqp: jh9.1ec9ssi.:ty
,
ffIb to -W-61:1( 4,0 fairit4hcf.44.
_irOctuatiqty. --ria--_6-iioi.:401.-eye that a Man
-prioUld 1/0 -re,p-TaCed- ba nut,, a-bolt, or a
.liansiStar Withenit protection of his rights
aS a_111,444# heing?
f9r ifirrier194,--PIE1*),idnoi?
riee'da. earli solution. . ,
,its
the rinaritime field-,managem.ent and
labor al4e?I find., the opinion exists that? it
is nellOnger a ,question as to whether we
W111 alltOinate, but _hex soon we will be
forced to'hyl. foreign competition. And
? indeed, 'if We are forced may be
forced out. It may thenbe too late.
Where :doeS ,that _leaye?Ais7_ . can recon-
cUe differences, meet the objections, and
WOrk out a plan of procedure?_
belieVe tho-but only through the pro-
cedures familiar to labor and management in
Working out collective bargaining agreements
it is the ,classic Method of A6P,..99r,aray?give-
- arititake, consideration 9.g.-..f.t4ernatives, of-
fers, and Counteroffers, compromise, and
finally agreement.
No solution formulated by one group and
forded on the others could possibly succeed.
It is useless for labor or management to look
to cfoyerrintent to hand_clOWn the answers
- from on high. Even if Government had all
the annexe, the ,problems would not be
solved 'Wif,thpUf willing agreement and Ca-
operation from all concerned, This must be
-a enoperative effort..
? Which_1;3rings me to 6., filial conviction rela-
tive' to_the?Arnerienli.,,nwehant ?marine. It
Is -phiS:. sticc4s,,In_tile.,?,fliture_ is in, our
hanc4-19e,o,Lincipstry, labor, and govern-
Meta. ,9.T.,..tigp,x4tiqu'i3 shipping
reAto_ senci_ey.,ery one of us. That
moos_ Wi ),?.97,gen, he,_-_gagy what we in-
-divIdUally: and collectively achieve.
It IS alciteniii?,tholight. Let us, then, all
'join in building_anAnnerican_ merchant ma-
-rine thrikrei.lisjarss any in the past be-
catite. it 4- taliqtatl to...nlaat the ?needs of our
NatiOn's Intwe?
In the ,woids of _o_nif PreSirlea,"Come, let
us 'reasonr tog ether."
, ?
San PeraankValley Clergymen Oppose
-DecherAmen,dmeni',
- rt.I4t_QX OF, s
? LiT.F04,NIA
THE HOUSE OF RFPRESBNTATIVBS
ThursdaY, June 11, 1964
? Mr. CORMAN, Speaker, it has
been charged that those .who oppose
the proposed i3ecker amendment _are
"against God," This has been com-
pletely refuted by the many religious
leaders of an faiths. whO have testified
aika $141.1ttPci, stalaments ta_the_liouse
Judiciary Committee_ against this pro-
posal. _
Now, 36 MilliSter5 Rfid rabbis from my
district Jaye isstied statement against
the Becker. airiendment. Their state-
ment recognizes the, threat to religious
freedoin ;rain ?this, proposal and calls
upon Congress to keep religion strong by
keeping it free from_Government inter-
ference, _
? I am deeply gratified that these clergY-
and exercise moral leadership on impor-
tant questions facing the Nation. This
is in the best tradition of religion in
America.
The statement follows:
STATEMENT OF 20 MINISTERS OF THE Wlisr_
VALLEY MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION AND 10
RABBIS
We, the ministers of the San Fernando
Valley, wish to protect and strengthen
America's heritage of religious freedom. We
are frightened by attempts to tamper with
the Bill of Rights; i.e., the Becker amend-
ment, which was the outgrowth of our
Founding Fathers' concern for man's spirit.
Therefore, we call upon our legislators to
preserve the first amendment to the Con-
stitution -rid its guarantee of no Govern-
ment interference with our faith.
Israel and the Front Door
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK?
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 11, 1964
? Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, last week
President Johnson took another step in
his continuing efforts to show that this
country is firmly behind our best friend
in the Middle East, the democratic State
of Israel.
By formally receiving Israel Prime
Minister Levi Eshkol, the President has
again reaffirmed our commitment to this
struggling young nation's security.
I commend to the attention of our
_
Colleagues the following column in the
May 31, 1984, edition of the New York
Xerald Tribune in which the elistin-
-guished columnist, Roscoe Drummond,
tornments on Mr. Eshkol's visit:
ISRAEL AND THE FRONT DOOR
(By Roscoe Drummond)
WsalInsrarow.?The I.Tnited States is host
this week to an important head of Govern-
...Merit who isn't asking for anything, doesn't
want anything, and against whom we have
been undiplomatically warned.
This should malre for interesting conver-
sation, when _the newPrime Isilihieter of
Israel, Levi Eshkol, sits down in the White
House to talk with President Johnson.
It v411 be, a unique, a valuable, and, to
some, an unwelcome event.
This is a unique event because, strange
as it is, this is the first time that an Israeli
Prime Minister has been officially invited by
the President to visit the United States.
David Ben-Gurion, during the 15 years he
was Prime Minister, came to the United
States numerous times?but never at the
formal invitation of the Government. He
conferred with U.S. Presidents, but never
officially and never in Washington. They
would meet unofficially?and almost sur-
reptitiously?usually in a suite in a New
York hotel.
President Johnson, a very direct individ-
ual, changed this way of dealing with the
Israeli Prime Minister When he gave a per-
sonal letter to Sargent Shriver to present to
Mr. Eshkol several months ago.
/ said that to some Mr. Eshkol's presence
in Washington is unwelcome--unwelcome
visit so much that they went to the extreme
and inappropriate length of directing their
12 Ambassadors to wait on Secretary Rusk
en masse. Undoubtedly their words were
punctilious, but their message was obvious.
The message was: don't be too cordial to
_Premier Eshkol.
I doubt that Mr. Rusk had any difficulty
with this odd overture. He undoubtedly
thanked his visitors for their courtesy and
their counsel and made it clear that, while
the United States esteems its friends?and
considers itself a good friend of the Arab
countries?it cannot allow its friends to
determine whom its other friends shall be.
President Johnson made that clear in taking
Premier Eshkol's name off the back door and
putting it on the front door of the White
House.
There is no doubt that President Johnson
has done this deliberately, not to be provo-
cative to Arab sensitivities but to make it
authoritatively clear that he stand undevi-
atingly behind the considered statement of
policy which President Kennedy made on
May 8, 1963, when he said that "if aggres-
sion occurred (in the Middle East) the
United States would take action through
the United Nations and on its own."
Apart from General Arab antipathy to
Israel, the threat of military action against
Israel has been specifically and, in recent
weeks, repeatedly made by President Nasser
of Egypt. _
Here are Nasser declarations which give
deep concern to Premier Eshkol and genuine
anxiety to President Johnson:
"The triumph of peace and freedom lies
In * ? * the liquidation of Israel's exist-
ence."
"Israel will not be able to escape this
fate."
Premier Eshkol is not asking for U.S. arms
to offset the sale of Soviet weapons to the
United Arab Republic, but he is hopeful that
President Johnson will sense from their first-
hand talks what it means to live under the
gun.
'U.S. policy is not anti-Arab?it is anti-
aggression from either side. Our goal is
genuine peaceful coexistence. Mr. Eshkol's
official presence in Washington is quiet but
,91,9ar_elrldell9,0 that President Johnson does
not intend to allow Mr. Nasser to be unaware
'Of his position.
I Fought in Vietnam ti
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 11, 1964
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker,
last month I called to the attention of
my colleagues a timely and revealing
article in the May 18 issue of the U.S.
News & World Report which was based
on information supplied by Mr. Robert
L. Moore, Jr., a freelance writer who
was attached to 'United States and Viet-
namese fighting units in South Viet-
nam. Since that time Mr. Moore has
returned to this country and has come
to Washington where a number of the
Theinbers of the Armed Services Com-
mittee andothers question him at
Men have spoken opt_on this _vital issue. to the Arab nations despite the fact that length about his experiences and ap-
bl?clnitiacetra "e um- .t,say&trioiumeasgitgogr,151.1VA?RDpescBoo403RO:A 200140037tan with respect to
m thol ta.tpinwrit.
the conduct of the war against the Viet-
that the clergy can be _positive force The Arab governments disliked the Eshkol . Through the good offices of
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP6"403R000200150037-2_
A3168 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX -Atne--11
Chairman CARL Vntsort, Mr. Moore's
views were also made known to high
ranking Defense Department officials.
Because of the importance of Mr.
" Moore's knowledge of the situation and
the continuing crisis over developments
In southeast Asia, under leave to extend
my remarks in the RECORD I wish to make
available to all Members of the House
the substance of Mr. Moore's criticisms
and recommendations. These are con-
tained in an interview appearing in the
June 8 issue of the U.S. News & World
Report.
The interview follows:
"1 Foucierr Thr VERTNAM"?INTERVIEW WrrH AN
AMERICAN JUST RETURNED FROM THE FRONT
(What's really going on in America's jungle
war with the Communists in South Vietnam?
(Is it true that U.S. troops are being crip-
plied by redtape?and by inept Vietnamese
officers who don't want to fight? Is it time
for the United States to Move in, take com-
mand of a war that is costing heavy casualties
and a million dollars a day?
(You get candid?and knowledgeable?
answers from an American observer, who,
though not a member of the Armed Forces.
was permitted to go into combat with U.S.
guerrilla fighters. In this interview with
News & World Report, Robert L. Moore,
Jr., tells how the war is being lost?and how
he thinks it can be won.)
Question. Mr. Moore, we note that Mem-
bers of Congress have been interested in your
story. Why?
Answer. They're trying to get at all the
facts about the war in Vietnam. I've told
them all I know from the level of the fight-
ing man. I spent 5 months in the field on
patrols, slogging around, getting shot at and
shooting back. I don't know the diplomatic
story, except as / heard it in Saigon from,
again, more fighting people.
Question. What's the point of view of the
GI in Vietnam?
Answer. They call 'it the "war of no
thanks." They say nobody back home knows
what's going on, and doesn't give a damn.
Question. What about the other GI's?the
Vietnamese GI's?
Answer, The Vietnamese GI's are good little
fighters, and they do what they're told. It's
too bad that Americans aren't telling them
more of what to do and their Vietnamese
officers less. The problem Is Vietnamese lead-
ership.
Question. Do people out there feel that
Secretary of Defense McNamara knows what
is going on at the fighting level? teered?
Answer. I think he's finding out more and Answer. They're double volunteers. They
more, but there are some big gaps in what volunteered. first, to be paratroopers, and,
he is being old, secondly, to be Special Forces.
Mr. McNamara has been to Vietnam live Question. But did they volunteer to go to
times, wanting to learn what is going on, Vietnam, as such?
but he keeps getting a "snow job.' It has Answer. If you volunteer for Special
become a sort of joke among the troops. You Forces, you go all over the world. They
know, during his fourth visit, they called it know, when they volunteer, they're subject
"Saigon's fourth snowstorm." And then came to being called into an office, given orders,
"Saigon's fifth snowstorm." and not seeing home again for 6 months.
The trouble is this: There are top officers Question. Are these the new Marines?
and civilians who do not want to get across Answer. They do a different job from the
to him the acute problem which American Marines. The Marines are shock troops.
officers?the lieutenants and captains and Special Forces are not shock troops. They're
majors in the field?face with their Viet- not assault troops. They are primarily de-
namese counterparts. signed to be dropped into, or put into. an
By and large, the Vietnamese officers just area under enemy control and to take native
don't want to fight. They don't want to get people. tratn them, and lead them in guer-
killed?and who does? But in their own war, rilla war, or in an antiguerrilla war.
In their own country, they object to fighting Question. Are they making any headway
more than the Americans. We're willing to in Vietnam?
go in there and fight. Answer. They're very successful in Viet-
I think that Mr. McNamara is walled off nam in their area.
from the lower ranks. Now, the way they work, each Special
Question. How do Americans get out there Forces A team has perhaps a 25-mile-diam-
in the first place? Do they volunteer 2
_ for eter circle_ agroneh they gct
eeno
duty in Vietnam? Approved For Raiealsei behled
Answer. They volunteer for Special fut. They oonstantly harass, will attack
Forces?and now mm talking only about Spe- when they're very much outnumbered. They
cial Forces, which makes up 8 percent of
the Americans in Vietnam. The rest of the
Americans are just sent out there as needed.
Question. What's the job of Special
Forces?
Answer. Special Forces do the direct anti-
guerrilla fighting. They're the ones who are
on the ground fighting directly with the
Communist Vietcong.
Question. Are they the only ones in direct
combat?
Answer. They are the only Americans who
are in daily personal combat with the Viet-
cong. yes.
Question. What are all the other Ameri-
cans doing?
Answer. Well, there are 15,000 troops there,
Of which about 3,000 are actually in the field
doing a job. Roughly 1,000 of those are
Special Forces. Many of the other 2,000 are
battalion advisers, or are in some way work-
ing with the battalions and regiments that
are actively engaged with the enemy.
Question. What are the other 12.000 do-
ing?
Answer. They're in support positions.
They're doing all the jobs that it takes for
support?logistics.
Question. Are the Special Forces lumped
in with the 3.000?
Ammer. They weren't?until May 1, that
is. Up to May 1. Special Forces was more
or less an autonomous group over there.
They reported through the theater command-
er, Gen. Paul D. Harkins, but they were
pretty much on their own. They had their
own funds and fought in their own way and
did an excellent job. That is what Special
Forces was created to do. It's what President
Kennedy gave them a tremendous boost for-
ward to do.
Question. It's a kind of elite corps, isn't
it?
Answer. It is, very much so, yes.
Question. Has something happened to
hamstring them?
Answer. Yea. As of May I, the generals
decided that this was not the way for them
to operate. They would have to operate un-
der MAAG?Military Assistance Adv.'.sory
Group?which in turn works under
MAC-V. which is Military Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam.
It's a step backward for Special Forces.
Now they're put underneath conventional-
thinking staff officers who do not appreciate
the value and need for Special Forces and
who are now trying to make them conven-
tional. They weren't created to be conven-
tional.
Question. You said they've all volun-
completely demoralize the Communists with-
in their area. But there are only 40 A teams
in all of Vietnam, and that's not very much
to cover the large area they have.
Question. What is an A team?
Answer. A Special Forces A team is made
up of 12 men-2 officers and 10 enlisted men.
These people are trained in at least three lan-
guages. In the case of Vietnam, one of them
always speaks Vietnamese, another always
speaks French?perhaps they wll have a man
who speaks Chinese. They have two doctors.
When I say doctors, they're medics, but
they're as accomplished as any doctor when
it comes to war wounds and tropical diseases.
They have two specialists in weapons?
one heavy weapons and one light weapons.
They have a specialist in comunications.
They have specialists in intelligence. And
they have specialists in all the important
skills which are required for guerrilla war-
fare or antiguerrilla warfare.
An A team can be divided up into two A
teams of six men each, if necessary?and this
is done frequently in order to expand the
amount of territory they can cover.
Question. Then do the Vietnamese have
parallel A teams?
Answer. Yes, they do.
Question. And the American and Viet-
namese teams work together?
Answer. They work together.
Question. Are men in the Vietnamese
teams able people?
Answer. Not usually. That's the trou-
ble. Up until recently, the Vietnamese A
teams have just been soldiers with good
political connections.
Question. But you said the enlisted men?
Answer. The Vietnamese Special Forces
enlisted men aren't much good in this par-
ticular situation.
When I was talking about "the little man
that fights," I was talking about the aver-
age private in the Vietnamese Army, or the
average paramilitary type that Special Forces
trains, who isn't even a regular soldier.
They're Vietnamese civilians who sign a
contract to fight for 6 months or a year
with Special Forces, paid by American Spe-
cial Forces. But unfortnately, the rules
read now that they have to be commanded
by Vietnamese Special Forces officers, and
the American Special Forces can merely
"advise" their counterparts. This has been
the big problem.
In spite of this, the American Special
Forces have been tremendous at getting
results. They've had to trick their coun-
terparts into ordering their men to fight;
they deceive them into it; they do anything
to get the job done.
Question. Are these Americans supposed
to be fighting, or are they just training the
Vietnamese to fight?
Answer. They're supposed to be training
the Vietnamese to fight, but they're in ac-
tual combat themselves.
Question. Are there more Vietnamese
than Americans involved?
Answer. There are 12 Vietnamese Special
Forces men and 12 American Special Forces
men. They work side by side, theoretically.
And then under them are between 300 and
600, generally speaking, civilian irregulars?
paramilitary types?who theoretically are
being led and trained by the Vietnamese
Special Forces. The Americans are telling
the Vietnamese, their counterparts, how to
do this job.
Question. lent most of the fighting ac-
tually being done by the regular Vietnamese
Army units?
Answer. I'd say most of the fighting is
being done by the Special Forces groups and
their irregulars. In spite of the problems,
still these irregulars are doing most of the
n
chlaindaarey're the ones who are going 1t50.03weare the ones who
are going in and ambushing. They're acting
as guerrillas.
1964 Approved .Fo? l3T
To pre _you an exampleof no* they work:
? $2.41_94.e_:pf:?Myflest-opetatfo'fis, we spent 7
AO'S behind -eneiril lines. We Were in an
, area .f4hakt..w _"?ompletely_ controlled by a
Vietcong regfnient. in Dariae "PiMarice, an
areXibellt.00. /Oat' -#0.03,00. I _
inethuot; which
is a pacified center?as
peaceful a town as you'll ever see. But
miles .aWaY, from "there is this area Ofmaybe
30 or 40 square miles that --ebin-plefery
dominated " by a Vietcong regiment, Plus
? other hard,-core, Vietcong's coming in all the
Two Special Forces Men; Americans, went
in with twO ViefUeMese'Opeeial_Porces Men
and .100_,of.,pheit yon,trIoned clvilj.sn ji:rszu,
Montagnards liaiOnntaiii'iribesine'ni in
this eitie,"and-far-0-dayaJUSfroanied-thrOUgh
there, keeping off Of paths: We set up three
'ambushes. We'd kill -maybe only two or
three, people in an ambush, but We'd wound
" others, who would go off into the woods?
and that *as even worse."_f4r, the7Vietcong,
becatiSe they'd die slowly." We deSlroyed 10
tnne, of fe-O9 On thel,,,,Operati,bsi:4,14:*otroyeg
one Vietcong *Wage.
Then we, got hit the 'last The
sergeant" led these MOntagnards right --UP a
hill and drove the Viejcprig_ off. They had
caught up with us, finally, and had Us pinned
down. But this ?ia.,,the?VAY the Special
Forces Operate. And these are the people
"
Who are daily in contact With the Vietcong.
? The ; AliV11,".hattalions_ sOni-eth*s.,will go in
and sometimes
Question. What do YOU
Answer. army of Vietnam. They're called
Question.?Did you get "air siipOrt in that
hpacl,of operation?
? Answer. 4o, we couidn't,peauself we had
air support it would show_ whefj_weWere,
We were guerrillas, never operating on paths,
always up and down throughtangled under-
growth. "We'd come across a path, set up an
ahtbuk oxiiit, and when the yjeteeng would,
- &Abe along We'd kill them, take their
Weapons. . .
p Captured a Chinese copy of a Russian
suhroachiri,o gun. Also, we captured one
Vietcong ,alive with_a_message_frouiliis head-
quarters 'telling hfrri to find Opt what was
going on in the area: All of a sudden the
Vietcong commander Was hearing_ fire fights,
people weren't showing up, no communica-
tions. The. Vietcong wanted to know,
"What's happening?"
Bo this sort of, operation can immobilize
a whole Pom.Kahnio regiment. In other
words, we're doing to them just what they
Were doing to us. This is what US. Special
Forces are doing.
Question. Were you dropped by para-
chute?
Answer. No, we infiltrated _
?- Question., Thep you fought your way out
again?
'Answer. Yes - -
-,Question. Iipw is tl-Og May 1 order going
to change that kind ef eperation?
'Answer.. Well, they're changing the con-
' cePt. I hope they're not going to destroy
it. T,hey're certainly_ changing the whole
cowhand aspect, so that .Special Forces no
longer command thernsubTS.,_ They're now
going to have to get permission through the
United States and Vietnamese. armies' con-
ventional eQhlmands,to go out on these op-
erations.
The whole secret of these ,things is to go
out suddenly, not having to clear it, be-
cause there, are so _many people that are
talking, on the V,letnenleee,side_that by the
time it goes all , the ,way up the chain of
. American apinwia .a4 down, the Viet-
namese connnahd?swne0octy on the other
side is apt to know. . ,
, ,
Question._ Bow dogs, the casualty rate run
if 'Americans do ,get ?ti4ghtl
Answer. On the ? '1 ." eNtgagAR9 I
- _
_was describjng, we had no casualties, _even. ,
It4tRakilV5fiaittET6A4913f
' -
though they ambushed us. We killed three
in the ambush.
It Was only because an American sergeant,
a real combat man who had fought begin-
ning in World War II, got the Montag-
nerds up and made them charge, and so sur-
prised and scared the Vietcongs and took
_them off balance that we were able to swarm
all over them and kill and drive them off.
The Vietnamese Special Forces leaders
seemed frozen. And we probably would have
11 been killed if we had let ourselves be
pinned down.
You have, you know, seconds?less than
seconds?to react in e case - like that. _ It's
amazing?not one man was even wounded.
In feet, it was the first time, this sergeant
said, he had ever seen it happen. I'm glad
that was the one I was on.
Questions. Are there generally many
casualties, though?
Answer. Yes. American casualties run
about an average of 2 men wounded out of
every 12 in action, and maybe 1 out of 24
gets killed. That's the way they figure it.
Of 12 men who come over, they know they're
going to get at least 2 men wounded.
Question. In what period of time?
. Answer. In 6 months. I'm talking about
Special Forces.
Question. Would you clear up one point
on this A team business? You say that for
12 Americans on a team there are 300 to 600
irregulars under them?
Answer. Right. When you're talking about
Special Forces operations, you're really talk-
ing about a lot of people. There are 40 A
teams. The average A team has about 400 ir-
regulars?some have more, some a little less.
Question. How reliable are these Viet-
namese irregulars? Are some the kind who
fight one week with the Vietcong and one
week with South Vietnam?
Answer. You can figure about 10 percent
in every camp is questionable. But, by and
large, the irregulars are very good. They've
been battle _tested. They're good fighters.
I've been out with them.
Question. Do they fight at night and work
in the field during the day?
Answer, No. They live in a camp, and
their families are there. They've got their
wives, and kids running all over the place;
their pigs, their goats?everything is in the
camp. The whole family lives with them, in
a very well-fortified camp right in the middle
of Vietcong territory. They go out from this
camp on patrols. That's the way they oper-
ate. _
Question. How did the U.S. Army happen
to give you permission to go to Vietnam with
the Special Forces in the first place?
Answer. Well, it was actually then Vice
President Johnson's military aid who
worked it out for me.
I'm writing a book on Special Forces right
now. I've been working on it for a year. So _
Mr. Johnson's military aid questioned thein
at Port Bragg, N.C., about My linking -titiiiith
Special Forces. He got back a message:
"Send him to Jump School and then we'll
talk to him." They figured I might get
through one day of that and give up.
I think I'm the only civilian who's ever
?been through the regular military jump
school. I went through at Fort Henning,
Ga., in June of 1963. And when I got through
with jump school all right, and got my jump
wings, then they said: "Give him another
test and put him through Operation Swift
Strike," which was partially a Special Forces
operation. It was a 90,000-man operation in
South and North Carolina and Georgia last
year. So I went through that and made a
night jump with the Special Forces and went
with them through the swamps in their
training exercises?which, incidentally, was
harder than anything I ever did in Vietnam
except for the patrol I just described.
ekttICIPPgaTIWAlieylat mPgo to the 3- ?
month course of guerrilla training at Fort
A3169
'Bragg, end / went through the Special Forces
guerr COurse. And after that, they finally
gate -ine an Olt to "go to Vietnam. X had
complete 'carte blanche. " I'd just get into an
"afr-Plane-arid go to any Special Forces camp
I wanted to, fight with them, live with them,
go to another one.
Question. Were you permitted to fight?
Answer. Yon get ambushed sometimes or
into a situation where the only thing to do
is to be armed and try to keep the enemy at
bullet's range?protect yourself by .hitting
him first.
WHERE EQUIPMENT IS GOOD
Question. Do they get good equipment in
Special Forces?
Answer. Yes. This is one place where you
can't criticize. The equipment is good.
They've got all the ammunition they can use.
And they've got just what they need.
They've got new types of weapons which
are marvelous. They have the new M-79
grenade launcher?we call it the elephant
gun?which is the finest weapon ever. This
is one of the things which, I think, maybe
kept us from suffering casualties in the am-
bush I mentioned. It launches a grenade
almost 200 yards. It looks just like a shot-
gun. You carry it, and you shove the gre-
nade in the back just like a shell, and shoot.
This will wipe out about eight or 10 people
where it lands. And the minute you get
into an ambush, you start letting go with
those things and then follow them up. It's
a tremendous weapon.
Question. What are some of the other
weapons?
Answer. The great Special Forces weapon
is the AR-15, which is being manufactured
now by Colt in Hartford, Conn. This is a
.22-caliber weapon, but it has tremendous
hitting power. It destroys, it kills, no mat-
ter where it hits. If it hits you in the hand
it will break the bones all the way up and
the shock will kill. And yet it's very light.
I would carry as many as 400 rounds of am-
munition on my belt without even feeling
it.
Question. Is it a rifle?
Answer. It's an automatic rifle which fires
in 20-round clips. It's so light that it makes
a carbine feel heavy after you've been car-
rying one of these things around. This is
the Special Forces standby weapon, and it
is magnificent.
Question. Do we issue those to the Viet-
namese,' too?
Answer. They did for a while, and the
Vietnamese were losing them to the Viet-
cong.
Question. Are most of the Vietcong weap-
ons captured U.S. weapons?
Answer. I would say certainly many of
them are. For every bunch of weapons you
capture from the Vietcong, you find maybe
30 percent were made in the United States.
You find a lot of old French weapons?and
now you're finding a lot of Chinese copies of
Russian weapons.
Question. Any Russian weapons?
Answer. I never saw one. I never heard
of a Russian weapon being used by the Viet-,
cong.
Question. What are the Chinese weapons
like? Are they good quality?
Answer. No, they're not very good. One
that we captured on about the second day
of the patrol?one of our irregulars was car-
rying it when we were ambushed, and it
jammed twice on him as he was going up the
hill. He threw the thing down and got his
own. In fact, we killed the man who was
carrying it in the first place. We're getting
a lot of Chinese weapolis now. They copy
Russian weapons, they copy our weapons
as best they can.
Question. But are these weapons made in
China?
3 R0002 GO4500374
Question. Did you ever see any evidence
of direct for the Vietcong?
eft
Approved For Release 2005/01/05: CIA-RDP660t403R000200150037-2.,Juns..11
A3170 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? APPENDIX
Answer. I've never seen it, and I don't
know about it. What there is an Indication
of?and this is something I haven't read
about yet?is we are hearing that individual
Frenchmen are helping.
Question. Helping the Vietcong?
Answer. Yes, on an individual basis.
I know of an ambush which was set out in
the II Corps area to try to hit a small
Vietcong group that was coming through?
It was a small ambush in platoon size, by
our side. They were waiting for the last
man to come through and then they would
hit.
Well, they waited 21/2 hours for the last
man to come through, and they just held
their breath ,that this column coming
through from east to west?in other words,
penetrating deeper into Vietnam?would not
see them. As they were watching, every so
often a Caucasian, speaking French, would
walk by with the enemy. This happened in
early April of this year.
Question. Do you mean the French are
operating as a sort of special forces with the
Vietcong?
Answer. I wouldn't say "the French," but
there are Caucasians, speaking French, who
many believe to be Frenchmen.
Question. Are there many of them?
Answer. There's another one they call the
"cowboy" who has been seen. He wears a
cowboy hat, Is barechested, wears Levis and
boots.
Question. But they aren't there in great
numbers?
Answer. No.
RED atravx: INCREASING
Question. How many men are going into
South Vietnam from the North?
Answer. It seems to me a never-ending
procession.
Question. Is it increasing?
Answer. It seems to be increasing. We
feel it is.
Question. How do they get in there? Do
the Communists come in directly across the
border between North and South Vietnam. or
do they come down through the Ho Chi
Minh trail through Laos?
Answer. They almost never come in direct-
ly across the border between North and South
Vietnam?almost never. They come down
over the Laotiao border, came in through
Tayninh Province, generally, where it is be-
lieved is the headquarters of the whole Viet-
cong operation.
Question. Is that all in Laos, or in Cam-
bodia, too?
Answer. They come through Laos and
Cambodia. I was with several special forces
camps along the border. The Vietcong come
down from North Vietnam and just make a
little jog through Laos and into South Viet-
Question. How about Communist weapons?
Is it true that some are shipped by boat into
Cambodia, and then sent across?
Answer. Not necessarily. Intelligence
sources feel that the weapons are coming
down from China by junk, coming by sea
right to the delta region of the Mekong River,
. coming directly to the Vietcong in South
Vietnam. There just isn't much you can do
about it.
CUTTING OTT SISPPLIES
Question. Can that land traffic be stopped
In any way, other than carrying the war into
North Vietnam?
Answer. Yes. I have one proposal which
I feel would help. Instead of having only 40
special forces A teams, have 100. We've got
plenty of them mowing the lawns at Fort
Bragg. As a matter of fact, the joke is that
the master sergeants say: "Sive got no sweat.
I'm a master sergeant. I get a power mower
at Bragg, and the rest of them have to push
hand mowers," officers who are slowly coming in so that
are the most mature fighting men in the
world, and What are they doing??mowing
lawns.
Question. You want to see 100 teams, In-
stead of 40?
Answer. I'd like to see it. And this is what
I think special forces would like to do.
Question. Why can't that supply route
through Laos be cut?
Answer. Go into Laos from Vietnam?
Well, there's no reason why we couldn't.
except that it's not the policy of the U.S.
Government to do it now.
On the other hand, we don't really have to
do it. If we put 40 or 50 Special Forces teams
right up to the Laos border?each one 20 or
26 miles from the next?these guys would
hold them off, because the Vietcong never
go into one of these 25-mile areas dominated
by Special Forces. They go around them.
They would do anything rather than go
through a Special Forces area.
Question. When you said the U.S. equip-
ment and weapons are good, were you talk-
ing only about the Special Forces?
Answer. I'm talking about the ARVN, too.
I've been out with the ARVN battalions.
Questiop. What about U.S. airplanes?
Answer. Well, the airplanes are different.
Question. You're familiar with Captain
Shank's letters? (Capt. Edwin Gerald
Shank. Jr., whose letters were published in
the May 4 issue of U.S. News & World Re port.
was a US. /Ur Force flier who was killed
while on a combat mission in South Viet-
nam.)
Answer. Yea, indeed I am. I spent a lot
of time with the Air Force. They're naturally
concerned about getting the best equipment
possible. I went down to Bien Hoe.. Bien
Hoa and Soc Trang are the two areas where
most of these fliers are. They won't talk to
a reporter if they can avoid it. because it's
their career if their name is mentioned in
connection with any criticism.
Question. Is the Air Force getting leas
consideration, less new equipment, than the
Special Forces get?
Answer. That's comparing oranges and
apples. Special Forces has its own logistical
operation.- Now, unfortunately, that's end-
WC and logistics will come under the dom-
ination of MAAO and MAC-V. But this was
the greatest logistical operation I've ever
seen, up In Nba Trang. It could resupply
In hours, if necessary, any Special Forces
camp that needed It. Special Forces is set
up to support another 100 teams.
Now U.S. high command in Vietnam is
changing things. This is what I can't under-
stand.
You see, conventional military men don't
operate the way Special Forces do. What
happens is this: You have a conventional
officer writing the efficiency report for a
Special Forces officer, and he'll say: "This
officer here has wild Ideas. We don't under-
stand him. He doesn't like us. He called
me a `leg.' " That's what you call anybody
who doesn't jump?"leg."
Now, this is wrong. You can't have men
who have been trained 10 or 12 years to be
unconventional, and then shove them under
conventional control.
Question. And this is in the process of be-
ing done?
Answer. It was done May 1.
Question. Mr. Moore, is there a feeling that
the United States is getting ready to pull
out? Is that the feeling?
Answer. I don't think it's to pull out. I
think it's to fight a different kind of war.
They have changed this whole thing. Spe-
cial Forces efficiency is being greatly dam-
aged by having to work under officers and
generals who are not oriented toward un-
conventional warfare?and yet, that's the
war we've got to fight In Vietnam.
Question. Do the Vietnamese people seem
to want us there?
Answer. Oh. yes.
WHO REALLY TIGHTS?
Question. Is it a popular war?
Answer. Yea. One thing I haven't touched
on is that perhaps a third of the population
are Montagnards, and they get along ex-
tremely 'well with us. Our best fighters are
Montagnards.
Question. Are they in the irregulars?
Answer. Yes. The problem you have.
though, is that the Montagnards and Viet-
namese hate each other. Until recently, the
Vietnamese used to bomb the Montagnard
villages indiscriminately, claiming they were
Vietcong villages. But they're beginning to
pull this together now. Maj. Gen. Nguyen
Khanh (South Vietnam's leader) is making a
big effort to get together with the Montagn-
ards.
All over Vietnam, I've heard Montagnard
leaders come up to the Americans and say:
"How much longer are you going to stay
here? Because, if you leave, we're not going
to fight any more. The Vietnamese don't
care about Us. We're fighting for you."
And the Americans say: "No, you're not
fighting for us. You're fighting for your
Vietnamese Government in Saigon."
To this the Montagnards reply: "Well, we
don't care about them. We're fighting be-
cause the Americans are here and treat us
well, pay us well, build good villages for us,
give us pigs, take care of us."
Question. In spite of the effectiveness of
the Special Forces, the reports are that the
war is being lost?
Answer. Yes, but we would have lost it a
lot faster if Special Forces hadn't been in
there.
Question. Are we going to lose It now?
Answer. If we don't change the ground
rules, we're going to lose it This is what
everybody says. Just change the ground
rules enough so that, with our equipment
and our good officers and sergeants and our
communications ability, and bringing in new
planes?as Secretary McNamara says we're
going to do?we can make these people win.
But we can't make them win unless we are
in a position to say: "Do this, do this, do
this"?and see that they do it.
WHY UNITED STATES MUST TAKE OVER
Question. Does that mean the United
States must have operational control of the
war?
Answer. Operation control.
Question. Of just Special Forces?
Ammer. No. the whole thing.
Question, What role do you see for the
conventional Vietnamese Army there?
Answer. For one thing, it's the job of Viet-
namese battalions to do what they haven't
done so far, to clean out Vietcong strong-
holds. One example?an area in Darlac con-
trolled by a Vietcong regiment. The Viet-
namese regulars have never dared go in there
because, as they say, "too many Vietcong."
Question. So must the United States take
operational control of Vietnamese Special
Forces plus Vietnamese regular forces?
Answer. Right. Air forces as well as
ground forces.
Q. One U.S. officer per battalion?will that
provide effective operational control?
Answer. With his sergeants it should, yes.
Question. With no fighting will among the
Vietnamese troops?
Answer. I didn't condemn the troops. The
troops will fight, if properly picked and prop-
erly led. The officers, by and large, don't
know how to lead them. They won't take
advice, so we've got to go in there and give
them commands.
We are creating enough good Vietnamese
Here are men who tuOipproivednForoRelecattew2005/01Y05?619V-RIDP6013004031R00020131Bonwv can relinquish
10 years?I'm talking about enlisted men, Placer operattonat control ?But, if we don't
sergeants?to be the finest fighting men, and Answer. We should be there to win, take it over now, we're going to get licked.
Approyed ForRee2005/01105' ? CIA-i4DP66B00403R0 00150037-2
CONGRESSIONAL
'? b1114
19- RECORD --= APPENDIX A3171
Oa 15 I wail' In Was 'the 'flth of - them part time, farrnpart time, but are still tha'sjr"Aeria the Y have -all come up under, and
, May, in the delta near Tan Phu, and the sympathetic enough to take up arms and that means that all Khanh's friends came up
ViatitanteSe?tvio battalions?thought they fight, the same way. They're all interlocking lam-
Were ein-i to ernah a-couple' of Vietcong Question. You talk about winning. When 111es, interlocking powers, and, much as he'd
conipanles. Instead of th'at, it turned out it Is the war won? like to, there are many people Khanh can't
was a Vietcong regiment. It surrounded the Answer. That's only part of the question. just go in and relieve. That's one of our
Vietnamese for the day. -- ' - ' Suppose you clean up all the VC; suppose problems?Khanh can't do it.
. ? The Vietcong 'lobbed in mortar shells and you get South Vietnam back to normal? Question, Could he agree to the kind of
.. ? -
hit them "-With recoilless 'rifles. I could hear you can drive on the roads, and the farmers operational control that you're talking about
the American advisers on the radio saying, can farm and all that?then the tougher for ARVN?
. _
"We're surrounded." It lasted that way for question is: How do you keep it won? Answer. Yes. I think he maybe actually
the day until, at 6 o'clock, the Vietcong just I should think the war Is basically won has already agreed to it, and maybe the prob-
disappeared. If under American operational when we can pull out safely and not have lem now is how to carry it out.
control?the advisers felt?the Vietnamese to worry about further outbreaks of fight- I should think he would be in 'favor of
would have fought their way out, or, better Ing. At that point you have not gone be- giving the Americans operational control.
'still, would riot have fallenInto the trap in yond the borders of South Vietnam. For one thing, that way, an American officer
Question. Do you have to reunify North could remove General Khanh's best friend's
Question. Are 'American advisers becoming and South Vietnam to get a final peace? son, if that became necessary.
defeatist's as a result of' this? Answer. That gets under polities. All I As it stands now, you can see flagrant ex-
Answer. No; they're not?they're not at all, could do is tell you what you know as well amples of nepotism and covering up and
? They fight and they aren't 'defeatists at all. as I do. "face saving." I saw an example in front
? If anything, the more rebuffs they get, the Question. Beyond Vietnam, what's at stake of my eyes where a Vitnamese officer actually
? harder they fight to get operational control. in the whole of southeast Asia? Will there used VietnameSe irregulars to ambus an
I've had a lot of good friends killed and ever be a really trained South Vietnamese American officer--his American counterpart?
WOltlided=hattaliOn'adViserg, ea Well as Spe- Army, or a trained Thai Army able to with- and tried to kill him. Well, they hit an
cial Force's. Incidentally,' -the" Special War- stand aggression by the Communists? American sergeant instead. Fortunately,
fare 'School at Fort Bragg has 'trainedmost Answer. Thais, Laotians, Vietnamese? they didn't kill him. ,
Of the battalion adviserS, as well as the Spe- they're all the same, basically: They're de- But this was a very cleverly set up ambush.
cial Forces people. 'Mese men never lost lightful people, socially. They're good, hard- So what did they do with the Vietnamese
heart, no matter how teugh things were, working people. The officer corps of Thai- officer? They merely shifted him to another
,,rhey still stayed in there and they still kept land is made up of the most delightful peo- special forces camp.
, advising and trying in any way they could pie I've ever met. The Thai officers went to Question. With a chance to shoot some-
to _get their message acrOSS' to the' Vietnam- the same U.S. schools as the Vietnamese. body else?
eSe. When I left they were still just as But they have the same problem in Thai- Answer. Yes, exactly.
. , ,
_ eager and hardworking and hardfighting as land, because they aren't combat leaders, Question. Where are Vietnamese special
- ? ----- - -?- , - - really, and I don' '
t know how were going to forces teams trained?
' ever. ' - .
Question. Do all these Special Forces pee- keep Red China from engulfing the whole Answer. They haven't been trained very
ple see their roles being weakened? thing. I really don't. That goes beyond my much up till now. They've been taken -dl-
Answer. As some Special Forces' say, "We scope. rectly from the army or were trained in
Were killed on NOvember- 22, -also" (the day Question. Getting back to South Viet- Saigon rather haphazardly. But there is a
PresidentltenendyWas aseaSSinated) . That's nam big new special forces training camp just
the thing yOu hear. Preelderit Kennedy was Answer. Yes, how to stop losing and start about finished?north of Saigon. In fact,
' the one who kept it going. -- winning, the first class should just be coming through.
- Question. Are there any difficulties put in There are two points I want to stress after Question. Does the United States have op-
the way Of Special Forces by State Depart- 5 months of being with it: One, we must take erational control of training?
policies or Wishes out there?
inent
operational control; two, Special Forces must Answer. Yes, they're running it. They're
Answer: The Special Forces follow what- be restored to what they were conceived to running the training base, and this is a
,
eter State Department policy is. Special be?and we must put in a lot more of them, wonderful sign for the future.
Force S are very careful, for instance, not to Operational control will automatically get There is one other wonderful sign, and
- violate the Laotian border. the ARVN doing what they are capable of that is the rise of one particular officer. His
I was there when, _a good friend of mine? doing, and Special Forces can do that border- name is Col. Lam Son. He's been made the
. , , _ .
Nie of our favOrite calitainsWent "down in patrol job?seal off the borders from the head of Vietnamese special forces?the Luc-
/ a recon plane, and we thought he might have -inside. We also need A teams to fight the Luong Dac-Biet. And he's a tough guy.
' gone Over the Laotian border. As much as Vietcong and keep them off balance in their I'll give you an example:
they wanted to get him, Special Forces never strongholds within South Vietnam. Then A real miserable Vietnamese special forces
Went across the border. They tried for 2 we can proceed to clean up the country. But captain was being complained about by his
Weeks, through: our diplomatic channels, to that doesn't mean that, when that job is American counterpart. Col. Lam Son went
.? get a sea.rCh made On the Laotian side of the done, the war is won in all of Indochina. up there, grabbed this 'Vietnamese captain,
border. so:Riecial Forces?even to get this A BUILDUP Is GOING ON made him take a small company out and
man: babfc---=rieiei Sb Milch as poked a toe _ Question. Did you get any feeling that deliberately headed him where he knew there
across the border. They were very careful there was a movement to carry the war would be fighting. When the captain lay
. not to; they are unconventional, but only 'north over the border, if necessary? down and started bawling, the colonel
within the confines of fighting the war in
Answer. I did get the feeling?and I know grabbed his rifle and said, "Well, you're re-
South Vietnam, ' - ' - - ' ' - ' -
for a fact?that we are building up and get- lieved?out!" And this is the waY this guy
Question. Are they going' to have to vio- ting ready for such an eventuality. Many is now conducting things.
late these borders- In order to cut the Com- ,of these 12,000 Americans who are not in the Question. So there is some progress
Answer e "can Win by staying within
munist suppliliries? ' ' ' ? ' ' ' 'field are obviously working on problems of
, -. . .
Answer. Yes, but to give you an idea of
? , W do it.
logistics and planning and setting up bases
"South Vietnam, if we have 47:feciaT Forces A
,teams solidly right up arid . _ _ to up to the I Corps area and the Viet-
what Col. Lam Son is up against: He went
in case it is decided
' ovin. the *hole ' Yes; there's a buildup going on?no doubt
border. - ' , namese general in charge of that area said,
Question. Are yon convinced that the about it.
, .
? Question. They're creating the capability?
In effect: "Well, you can stay 24 hours.
- United?Etates can win this war without Answer. The capability, if not already ere- You'll spend the night at your team, where
going' intO facia and into North Vietnani? ated, is almost created. my people can watch you, and then you'll
Answer-: I'm convinced of that. I'm con- be out of here. I don't trust you. I think
Question. Is General Khanh a goad man?
vinced tliat:ire-prot necesSafile'S'Orrib Vorth-- Answer. I think so. I think Khanh's the you are going to start a coup up here."
Vietnam. If yotiboinh-gOith Vietnam, that best we've got. If we lose him, we're in real They don't trust each other. That's an-
: 'Isn't going to Sto-P" those- 80,005 COMmitnists trouble, other one of our big problems. Every Viet-
in South Vietnam, No. matter what you do Khanh is an aggressive little guy and he's namese general thinks his colleague is going
to NorthVietnam,-the guerrlItis are going-to doIng his best against odds to surround him- to start the next coup.
' - be in the 'South. And they'll get supplied, one . self with aggressive people. Since Khanh Even without a coup, you get these little
way Or another. ' Ited China Will supplytlicn has been in, you get the feeling he's doing power plays where all of a sudden one guy
?
1"--4.9",
-, - his best But he's got big political problems. is suddenly in jail for some reason and you
o ?
There are people he can't relieve because their don't see him any more, and someone else
QueStion. Where aid you get that figure offamilies are.tocr important one way or an- is in command of a unit. Even under Gen-
80,060 ValieePhearing-25,506" ' other. He has a very tenuous hold. Sure, eral Khanh, there's this constant undercur-
, , . . _ . ._ ,
America is behind Min, but= rent 'of one officer overthrowing another on
O" North VietnallaeiltprkplgecatirReteaster05/9p5 : ciA0Dp66BooiymponfrEl 50033MitiOnal control, we're
.. there. But they , _e t them may e nswer. , yes. e am has power u jus gcTifig- to be a 017 mercy of these little -
-_ i'60,000 to -everi -80,000 irregulars-Who-fight for pOlitical families. The mandarin system is things which we can't understand.
- , .
A It' 86 000" Th
, , ,
Ccivanallhists from North, Vietnam, question. Are there powerful families over the next level. This is another reason why,
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 ? CIA-RDP66600403R000200150037-2
A3172 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX Jim* 11
I remember hearing this said at MAC-V
headquarters: "Every time we see a lot of
motion going on and no attacks against the
Vietcong, then we know that we're going
to be missing a Vietnamese general in a pow-
er play." This is one of the problems. Col.
Lam Son has got this tremendous opportu-
nity to shape up Vietnam's special forces,
and a lot of people would like to get him
before he makes a big record for himself?
becomes a general, or forces some other gen-
eral to step aside.
WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO
The gist of everything I've said boils down
to just two things:
The first is operational control.
The second is much more utility of Spe-
cial Forces?the best trained, most mature
and courageous fighting people we've got,
and the least used.
This is the most wasted asset the U.S.
Army has?Special Forces. . We use only 40
teams in Vietnam and keep the rest of them
mowing lawns at Fort Bragg.
Heinsohn Scare Real "Red" Plot
E:XTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
OF =rem
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 11, 1964
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, very
often information of key nature can, in-
terestingly enough, be found in our news-
papers' sports sections, especially when
we recognize the pride that all nations
take in their athletic accomplishments.
I place into the RECORD an article
which appeared in yesterday's Washing-
ton Evening Star by Columnist Steve Gu-
back, discussing a recent tour by the Na-
tional Basketball Association under State
Department auspices,
For once, the State Department spon-
sored an intelligent and practical tour,
sending over an outstanding group of
American athletes who are certainly a
credit to their sport and to the Nation.
The success of the conuietltion, as well
as the public relations success scored by
this team, should merit the serious atten-
tion of the State Department, so that
similar groups such as this might be uti-
lized in oversea programs, instead of
having the Nation embarrassed by me-
diocre performers or neurotic members
of the entertainment world.
The article follows:
SPORTS SPOTLIGHT?HZU4S01121 SCARE REAL
"RED" PLOT
(By Steve Guback)
Those National Basketball Association all-
stars won all 21 games on their recent over-
see tour, but it was in Poland that Red
Auerbach, the local boy who has made good.
obviously scored his greatest personal tri-
umph.
As almost everybody knows, Auerbach is
the coach of the Boston Celtics?that is,
when he's not busily occupied with his bas-
ketball camp, making speeches. or on good
will junkets for the State Department. One
of his stars is Tom Heinsohn. a large 218-
pound party who made the oversee trip and
I s not easily intimidated, except in rare in-
stances.
Auerbach. leaned back 1101p,KIPdretbir
other day, with a little t le4r In his eye.
He had the look of complete satisfaction, as
if, he had just devised a new play that was
guaranteed to produce three points at any
time.
"Now If elnsohn is a Gem= name." Red
began, "and you know how the Polish hate
the Germane, with good reason, I guess.
"So we got these two coaches in Poland
and rehearsed them. We dressed them up in
trench coats, with hats pulled down over
their eyes and brief cases."
It sounded sinister and It was, and you
began feeling sorry already for Heinsohn
because, if there is one thing about Auer-
bach. It's that he knows how to plan and
follow through. Six consecutive NBA titles
illustrate that.
At any rate, the two Polish coaches
trudged up to Heinsohn's hotel room while
Auerbach and Bob Cousy hid down below.
The officials rapped hard on Heinsohn's door,
drew him outside, angrily demanded to see
his passport, and then marched him stiffly
off?one on each aide.
Heineohn's startled pleas got him nowhere.
The Polish coaches couldn't speak English
and Heinisolus couldn't speak Pollen.
Auerbach and (lousy watched the scene,
muffling their laughter. "Geez, he was
chain smoking and everything," Auerbach
guffawed.
"I went up to him and said: 'What't the
matter, Tom, you look kinds. green?'
" dunno,' Beinsotm said. 'These guys
are arresting me or something.' "
With a wave of his hand, Auerbach took
command. He interceded, suggested that
everybody have a drink, and marched the
group into the bar, where the rest of the
NBA stars were waiting.
"When Heinsohn saw the team in there,
he exploded," Auerbach reported. "He real-
ized then it was a gag. As he screamed,
(lousy and the rest of guys roared in the
aisle with laughter. People in the hotel
must have thought we were crazy or some-
thing," Red added brightly.
People in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Egypt and
Poland also must think a bit more now about
American basketball after the pros' grand
tour. The U.S. amateur team, Auerbach said,
had left a terrible impression when they lost
most of their games overseas. But the pros
won all 21 games by a margin of at least 20
points and quickly restored the idea that
the Americans are still the best in the world.
"The people over there don't know noth-
ing except who wins," Auerbach explained.
"They cannot believe we'd send over a
team like that amateur club unless it was
our best. They do not know the difference
between amateur and pro. They can't under-
stand that some of our best NCAA players
are still in school."
It's Auerbach's belief that the United
States should never send a team overseas
unless it is representative of our best, and
It makes sense.
"Alt this jazz about good sportsmanship,"
Auerbach shrugged. "That's part of good
will but most countries respect ability.
What they see is what they think."
Auerbach will explain this in great detail
to the State Department when he makes his
report later this week. However, It is un-
likely that the Heinsohn episode will be
mentioned. The State Department always
gets uneasy when they hear of "Red" plots
even if the last name is Auerbach.
A Prayer for Civil Rights
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW FORK
IN OF REPRESENTATIVES
ReleaSeiriNSICIPaie:AlhilDP66B020 n g
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, Rabbi Uri and India are
Miller, president of the Synagogue Coun- this move.
THE
HOUSE
cal of America, has written the following
prayer which expresses the belief that
our people are one people and that when
one part of our society suffers we all
suffer.
/ commend Rabbi Miller's prayer to the
attention of our colleagues:
PRAYER OS RABBI URI MILLER PRESIDENT OF
SYNAGOGUE COUNCIL OF AMERICA, ON CIYLL
Emars
Our father's God, God of the spirit of all
flesh, we invoke Thy blessing upon this
assemblage of citizens who have gathered
here to demonstrate for freedom, bread, and
the dignity of man. Thou bath endowed all
men equally with the right to life, to lib-
erty, and to the pursuit of happiness. En-
able us, through this demonstration, to sen-
sitize all Americans and especially those in
position of power and authority to this con-
cept of equality. May we understand that
when we deprive our fellowman of bread and
dignity we negate the Iselen Elokin?the
image of God in man?and delay the fulfill-
ment of Thy kingdom.
Enable us to understand that our society?
the American people?is of one piece; that
when any part of this society suffers, we
all suffer. May we understand that he who
discriminates is as morally hurt as is the
one discriminated against, physically hurt;
that he who is prejudiced may injure the
object of his prejudice, and also degrades the
society of which he himself is a part.
Above all we pray we become cognizant
in ever-increasing measure that our reli-
gious ideals must be fulfilled in actual liv-
ing experience. Our traditions must be given
flesh in the form of social justice now. Free-
dom, pride, and dignity must be not empty
words nor even sincere ideals projected into
some messianic future, but actualities ex-
pressed in our society in concrete and tangi-
ble form now.
May we never forfeit our liberties or con-
done cowardice, prejudice, and self-indul-
gence. May we ever expand the area of
human freedom in our midst and thug serve
Thee and Thy love of law and justice. May
we demonstrate our gratitude for the blessed
privilege of living under the Stars and Stripes
by giving to bigotry no sanction, to persecu-
tion no assistance. Banish hatred, pride,
and arrogance from our midst and inspire
us "to do justice, love mercy, and walk hum-
bly" with Thee.
Hasten now the coming of the happy day
when the message of Thy prophets shall be
fulfilled; when men shall break their swords
into plowshares and their spears into prun-
ing hooks and no longer learn the art of
war; when the earth shall be filled of the
knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover
the sea.
Some Exporters and Importers Would
Wreck International Textile Agreements
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
Or
HON. W. J. BRYAN DORN
OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, June 11, 1964
Mr. DORN. Mr. Spef.ker my atten-
tion was drawn recently to press reports
that an effort may be made to use the
recently enacted one-price cotton law
as a weapon against the international
agreements under which trade is now
being done in cotton textiles.
it130,1087a2 importers of
rom japan, Hong Kong,
the interested parties in