PROMOTING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000200160032-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 6, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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88TH CONGRESS t HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES S REPORT
2d Session f No. 1708
PROMOTING THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Auousr 6, 1964.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the
following
REPORT
[To accompany H.J. Res. 1145]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1145), to promote the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security in southeast Asia, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend
that the joint resolution do pass.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On August 5, 1964, the President of the United States transmitted
to the Congress a message (H. Doc. 333, 88th Cong., 2d sess.) request-
ing the Congress to take appropriate action to carry out certain recom-
mendations relative to preserving the peace in southeast Asia. The
text of the message follows:
To the Congress of the United States:
Last night I announced to the American people that the North
Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against
U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had
therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facil-
ities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been
carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two
U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.
After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress,
I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution
expressing the unity and determination of the United States in sup-
porting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.
85-006
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These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a
new and grave turn to the- already serious situation in southeast Asia.
Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They
were first; made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further
defined in the Southeast, Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by
the Senate in February 1955,
This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United
States and other members to act in accordance with their constitu-
tional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the
parties or protocol states.
Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged
smce 1954. I summarized it, on June 2 in four simple propositions:
1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall
honor our commitments.
2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia- as a whole. A threat to
any nation in that region is a :threat to all, and a threat to us.
3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or terri-
torial ambitions in the area.
4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on erery
front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to
South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping
these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.
The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear.
The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought, to take over
South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the
Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a
campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and
supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in
South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime
has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration
into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat opera-
tions?all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.
In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have
become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of
Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook recon-
naissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Govern-
ment of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining
the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing
inspection by the International Control Commission. When the
Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort
fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest
North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct
attack on Armed Forces of the, United States.
As President of the United States I have concluded that I should
now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national
determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the pnited
States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of
the area to defend their freedom.
As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no
rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that
the United States is united in its determination to bring about the
end of Communist subversion and aggressionm the area. We. seek
the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed
in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again In
Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.
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I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress
for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist
nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same tune, I assure
the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of
political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Com-
munist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the
nations of the area.
The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted
by the Congress in the past?to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955,
to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat
in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and
support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks
against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace
in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United
States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to
enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence
to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole,
that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward?and that
the peace and security of the area will be preserved.
The events of this week would in any event have made the passage
of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional
reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of
political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in
such a period the United States will continue to protect its national
interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 5, 1964.
In response to the request of the President for appropriate congres-
sional action the chairman of the committee, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan,
introduced House Joint Resolution 1145 on the same day. Identical
resolutions were simultaneously introduced by Hon. Frances P. Bolton
(H.J. Res. 1146) and by Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (H.J. Res. 1147).
In view of the serious situation set forth by the President, the chairman
convened an executive session of the committee on August 6 to receive
testimony from the Secretary of State, Hon. Dean Rusk; the Secretary
of Defense, Hon. Robert S. McNamara; and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on that testimony, the
approval of the resolution was warranted and the committee, by a
vote of 29 to 0, with 2 members voting present, reported the resolution.
This is not the first time the Congress has had before it resolutions
supporting the President in Cmes of serious international tensions.
In 1955 Congress passed a resolution relating to the defense of
Formosa; in 1957 Congress gave its approval to the President's use
of armed forces in the Middle East to resist armed aggression from
any country controlled by international communism; and in 1962
with regard to Cuba and to Berlin.
In its consideration of the resolution the committee gave special
attention to certain basicfquestions.
Geographical limits
Section 2 of the resolution expresses the congressional view that
"the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world
peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia." The resolution does not define geographically the area of
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southeast Asia. Incorporated in the resolution, however, is the refer-
ence to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the ac-
companying protocol. That treaty entered into force in February
1955 and was ratified by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. Article VIII of the treaty defines the "treaty area" as "the
general area of southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of
the Asian parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not
including the Pacific area north of 21?30 north latitude." The ac-
companying protocol to which the signatories unanimously subscribed
niches clear that the protection accorded by the treaty should extend
to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia. While
Laos currently is tin. concern of the International Control ('ommission
and Cambodia has unilaterally taken itself out from the protective
arrangement, the language of . the resolution is sufficiently clear to
permit- the inclusion of these two countries.
Secretary Rusk added this further explanation:
* * * It does not cover action to assist- any nation not a
member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or a
protocol state. It does not cover any action in support of
a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover
any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in
origin. The Southeast Asia 'Freak, includes a U.S. under-
standing, that it is directed solely against "Communist
aggression."
Powers of the President
As it. had during earlier action on resolutions relating to Formosut
and to the Middle East., the committee considered the relation of the
authority contained in the resolution and the powers assigned to the
President by the Constitution. While the resolution makes it clear
that the people. of the United States stand behind the President, it
was concluded that the resolution does not- enter the field of contro-
versy as to the respective limitation; of power in the executive and
the legislative branches. As stated in the committee report on the
Formosa resolution:
Acting together, there can be no doubt that all the constitu-
tional powers necessary to ineet the situation are present.
Duration of resolution
Given the persistent Communist pressures in southeast Asia, the
committee did not consider it advisable to insert a specific time limita-
tion on the resolution. The terinination of the resolution will be a
matter for Presidential determination that "the peace and security of
the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by
action of the United Nations or otherwise." The inclusion of. the
words "or otherwise" is sufficiently board to permit. the use of alter-
native courses of action that. may bring peace and security to the area
such as the effective operation of the several International Control
Commissions established under earlier agreements. In any case the
resolution specifically reserves to Congress the right to terminate the
force of the resolution by concurrent resolution. The language of
this section follows closely that incorporated in the Middle East
resolution passed by Congress in 1957.
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- APPENDIX
(Following are the texts of the statements presented to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs on August 6, 1964, by the Honorable Dean
Rusk, Secretary of State, and the Honorable Robert S. McNamara,
Secretary of Defense.)
STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
AUGUST 6, 1964
Chairman Morgan and members of the committee, I appear before
you in support of the joint congressional resolution on southeast Asia
now before your committee. If the committee is agreeable, I shall
proceed by explaining the purpose of the resolution. Secretary
McNamara will then describe to you the recent attacks on our naval
vessels and the U.S. response thereto. I would then propose to
Conclude by going over the text of the resolution itself and discussing
its meaning and scope.
?The immediate occasion for this resolution is, of course, the North
Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels, .operating in international
waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2 and August 4.
However, it is obvious that these attacks were not an. isolated
event but are related directly to the aggressive has
of North
Vietnam and to the policy that the United States has been pursuing
in assisting the free nations of southeast Asia an.d particularly South
Vietnam and Laos, to defend themselves against Communist aggres-
sion, and thus to preserve the peace of the area.
When indochin.a was divided and the independent states of South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were created, under the conditions of
the Geneva accords. of 1.954, it was at once clear that in the face- of
the North Vietnamese threat South Vietnam and Laos could not
maintain their independence without outside assistance. The Gov-
ernment or South Vietnam .turned to the United States for such
assistance, and President Eisenhower in December 1954 made the
decision that it should be furnished, stating that our purpose was to
"assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a
'strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or
aggression through military means."
In the fall of 1954,. Secretary Dulles negotiated, and the Senate
in early 1955 consented to, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, sometimes known as the Manila Pact. This treaty provided
for the collective defense of the parties to this treaty?Thailand, the
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France. It provided further that the
protection of the treaty should extend, under an annexed protocol,
to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia.
.I do not need to review' for you the subsequent history of North
Vietnamese efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and to
5
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do the same in Laos. Having found that South Vietnam would not
collapse of itself but was on the contrary making remarkable progress,
Hanoi in 1959 initiated a systematic campaign of terror and subver-
sion in South Vietnam, directed and supplied with key personnel and
equipment from the north. By 1961, the situation had reached a
critical point and the United States greatly increased its advisory and
supporting assistance to the Government or South Vietnam_
Despite this assistance, the task of countering the extensive Viet-
cong effort remains a long and arduous one, and as you know we have
moved. within the last 2 weeks to further increase our support while
recognizing always that the struggle in South Vietnam must essentially
be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese themselves.
In. Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 have been
consistently violated by Hanoi and in May of this year the situation
took on a more critical character when a Communist military offensive
drove neutralist forces from the area of the Plain of Jars they had
held in 1962. Our response to these events, the provision of addi-
tional T-28's to the Government of Laos and the carrying out of
reconnaissance flights, with the incidents resulting therefrom, are
well known to you.
The present attacks, then, are no isolated event. They are part
and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Viet-
nam., control or conquer Laos, and thus weaken and eventually
dominate and conquer other free nations of southeast Asia. One
does not need to spell out a "domino theory"; it is enough to recognize
the true nature of the Communist doctrine of world revolution and
the militant support that Hanoi and Peiping are giving to that doc-
trine in southeast Asia.
U.S. policy and objectives
Although the United States did not itself sign the Geneva accords
of 1954, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith made a formal state-
ment that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression
in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as
seriously threatening international peace and security." We have
repeatedly made clear that the independence and security provided
for South Vietnam under those accords was a satisfactory status for
South Vietnam. All that is needed, as I have myself often said, is
for Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone.
The same is true with respect to the 1962 accords for Laos. These
provided a reasonable arrangement for the status of Laos, and what
is needed, again, is simply that the Communist side should honor the
commitments it undertook.
Above all, there can be no doubt of U.S. objectives for these nations
and for the area as a whole. Here, as elsewhere, we behove that
nations are entitled to remain free and to develop as they se:!. fit.
This United States has no military, territorial, or political amintion4
for itself in southeast Asia. We seek only the restoration of peace
and the removal of Communist subv3rsion and aggression.
Essentially, the outcome of this conflict, and the course of events
in the area as a whole, is up to the Communist side.. It has tha option
of accepting the freedom and independence of neighboring nations,
or of continuing its aggressive tactics. For our part, as President
Johnson stated on June 23: "The United States intends no rashness,
and seeks no wider war. But tip:. United States is determined to use
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its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror
and aggression. We are a people of peace?but not of weakness or
timidity."
Purpose of the resolution
This, then, is the background of the resolution before you. We
have never doubted the support of the American people for the policies
that have been followed through three administrations over a period
of a decade. But in the face of the heightened aggression on the
Communist side, exemplified by these latest North Vietnamese attacks,
it has seemed clearly wise to seek in the most emphatic form a declara-
tion of congressional support both for the defense of our Armed Forces
against similar attacks and for the carrying forward of whatever steps
may become necessary to assist the free nations covered by the South-
east Asia Treaty.
We cannot tell what steps may in the future be required to meet
Communist aggression in southeast Asia. The unity and deteimina-
tion of the American people, through their Congress, should be declared
in terms so firm that they cannot possibly be mistaken by other
nations. The world has learned over 50 years of history that aggression
is invited if there is doubt about the response. Let us leave today's
aggressors in no doubt whatever.
I now turn to Secretary McNamara, who will describe the recent
attacks and our response.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA
BEFORE THE ROUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, AUGUST 6,
1964
Chairman Morgan and members of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, during the past few days, deliberate and unprovoked
military attacks by the North Vietnamese have given rise to the need
for us to appear hero today. I should like to review the attacks with
you briefly and to describe the responses we made to those attacks.
The first incident occurred on August 2. It concerned the U.S.S.
Maddox, one of our destroyers engaged in a routine patrol in inter-
national waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnam coast.
At about noon, when the Maddox was about 30 miles from the coast,
she reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course
heading toward the ship at a range of over 10 miles.
Two hours later, at approximately 2:40 p.m., the Maddox was
approached by a high speed-45 to 50 knot?craft. She reported that
the apparent intention of this craft was to conduct a torpedo attack
and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. She
was attacked by the three PT craft at 3:08 p.m. She opened fire with
her 5-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the
attackers. The PT's continued their closing maneuvers, and two of
the PT's closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The Maddox
changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed on
the starboard side at a distance of 100 to 200 yards.
The U.S.S. Ticonderoga, which was operating in waters to the south-
east and which had been alerted to the impending attack, advised she
was sending four already airborne F-8E (Crusader) fighters with
rockets and 20-millimeter ammunition to provide air cover for the
Maddox. At about 3:21 p.m., the third hostile PT moved up to the
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beam of the Maddox and received a direct hit by a 5-inch round; at the
same tune it dropped it torpedo into the water which was not seen to
run. Machmegun lire from the PT's was directed tit the Maddox.
However, there_ wits no injury to personnel and no damage. The
Maddox continued in a southerly direction to join with tk sister de-
stroyer, the C. Turner Joy, as Ticonderoga aircraft commenced at-
tacking the PT's. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 millimeter strafing
attacks were directed against two of the PT's, and they were damaged.
The third PT rei named dead in the water after the direct bit by ire
Maddox. At 3 :2 pin., the engagement terminated awl the aircraft
escorted the Maddox southward on its patrol course.
On Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that
he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements
with enemy craft. Ile instructed the Navy, first-, to continue the pa-
trols in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the force by adding an
additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; third, to provide a
combat air patrol over the destroyers; and fourth, to issue instructions
to the combat turcraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack any force
winch .attacked them in international waters, and (b) to attack with
the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it.
At the same time as1 hese instructions were being broadcast through-
out the world, the State Department., acting pursuant to the President's
further instructions, took steps to deliver a note of protest to the
North Vietnam regime. The note was also widely publicized. Tt
concluded with the words, `"Phe U.S. Government- expects that the
authorities of the regime in North Vietnam will be under no mis-
apprehension its to the grave consequences which would inevitably
result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against
U.S. forces."
Our hopes that the firm defensive action taken in response to time
first attack and the protest to Hanoi would end the matter were
short lived.
After the first attack on Sunday, the Maddox joined with its sister
destroyer, the U.S.S. Twiner joy, in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed
its patrol in international waters, as directed by the President.
Nlonday, August- 3, was uneventful.
The patrol was also uneventful during most of the daylight hours of
Tuesday, August 4. In the early evening of August 4, however, the
Maddox reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who
were paralleling its track and the track of the Turner Joy. It was
740 p.m. when the Afar/doz. reported that, from actions being taken
by those unidentified vessels, an attack liv them appeared imminent.
At this time the faddca was bending southeast, near the center of the
Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately (55 miles from
the nearest- land,
The Maddox at 8:30 p.m. established new radar enittact with two
unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this
time, U.S. lighter aircraft were launched from the 7'6cm/dem/la to
rendezvous with the Maddox and the Tamer Joy to provide protection
against pessible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft., ut
accordance with the President's previously issued directives. Shortly
thereafter, the Maddox reported that the unidentified aircraft had
disappeared hum its radar screen and that the surface vessels were
remaining at a distance. The aircraft front the Ticonderoga arrived
and commenced defensive patrol over (Inc Maddox ancl Ole 7 orner Joy.
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At 9:30 p.m., additional unidentified vessels were observed on the
Maddox radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer
patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued
to close rapidly from the west and south and the Maddox reported that
their intentions were evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported
at 9:52 p.m. that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were
engaged in defensive counterfire.
Within the next hour, the destroyers relayed messages stating that
they had avoided a number of torpedos, that they had been under
repeated attack, and that they had sunk ?two of the attacking craft.
By midnight local time, the destroyers reported that, even though
many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits or
casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the Ticonderoga were
illuminatinffb the area and attackinc, the enemy surface craft. Shortly
thereafter, they reported that at b least two enemy craft had been
sunk although low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations.
The Turner Joy reported that during the engagement, in addition to
the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while
being illuminated by searchlights.
Finally, after more than 2 hours under attack, the destroyers re-
ported at 1:30 a.m. that the attacking craft had apparently broken
off the engagement.
The deliberate and unprovoked nature of the attacks at locations
that were indisputably in international waters compelled the President
and his principal advisers to conclude that a prompt and firm military
response was required. Accordingly, the President decided that air
action, in reply to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken against
gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which
had been used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday evening, after
consulting with congressional leadership, he so informed the American
people.
The U.S. military response was carefully planned and effectively
carried out. The U.S. air strikes began approximately at noon
Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gunboats,
their bases and support facilities. These reprisal attacks, carried out
by naval aircraft of the U.S. 7th Fleet from the carriers Ticonderoga
and Constellation, were limited in scale?their primary targets being
the weapons against which our patrolling destroyers had been forced
to defend themselves twice in the prior 72 hours.
Specifically, our naval air forces launched 64 attack sorties against
4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a
major supporting oil storage depot. Strike reports indicate that all
targets were severely hit, in particular the petroleum installation where
10 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90 per-
cent destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet. Some 25
North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.
Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged. One of
the pilots is believed to have crashed with Ids plane between two PT
craft he had under attack. Another pilot reported that he was eject-
ing from his downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at present listed as
unknown.
In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international
waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to
deter escalation is to be prepared for it, the President and his principal
advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were re-
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quired in southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area
are therefore now underway. These include:
(a) transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific coast to
the western Pacific;
(b) movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into
South Vietnam;
(c) movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;
(d) transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from
the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;
(e) movement, of an antisubmarine force into the South China.
Sea; and
the alerting and reading for movement of selected Army
and Marine Forces.
In the meantime, U.S. destroyers with protective air cover as
needed, continued their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf
of Tonkin.
The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are
in my judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps
can be taken very rapidly if the situation requires.
This concludes my descriptions of the two deliberate and unprovoked
Noith Vietnamese attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas; of
the U.S. reprisal against the offending boats, their bases and related
facilities; and of the precautionary deployment and alerting steps we
have taken to guard against any eventuality.
(Continuation of statement of Secretary Itusk, August 6, 1964:)
I now turn In the specifics of the resolution before you.
The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself. It spells out in the
simplest and shortest terms possible the fact of North 'Vietnamese
attacks, their relation to the overall campaign of aggression by North
Vietnam, and the purposes and objectives of the United States in
southeast Asia.
As to the operative sections of the resolution, section 1 declares
the approval and support of the Congress for actions, ill response to
armed attack on U.S. forces, which the ,President has the authority
and obligation to take in his capacity as Commander in Chief.
Turning next to section 2 of the draft resolution, let me make clear
at the outset what the resolution does not embrace. It does not cover
action to assist any nation not IL member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization or a protocol state. It does not cover any action in
support of a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover
any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in origin. The
Southeast Asia. Treaty includes a U.S. understanding that is directed
solely against "Communist. aggression."
The language, "to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force," is similar to the authority embraced in the Formosa
resolution of 1955, the Middle East resolution of 1957, and the Cuba
resolution of 1962. Copies of each of these have been made available.
to you for comparative purposes. The Formosa resolution authorized
the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States."
The Middle East resolution stated that the United States was "pre-
pared to use armed forces." The nearest parallel to the language of
the' presentresolution is in the first clause of the Cuba resolution, that
the United States is "determined * * * to prevent by whatever
means may be necessary, including the use of arms" Cuban subversive
activities extending to ally part of the hemisphere.
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I shall not take your time this morning to review the constitutional
aspects of resolutions of this character. I believe it to be the generally
accepted constitutional view that the President has the constitutional
authority to take at least limited armed action in defense of American
national interests; in at least 85 instances, Presidents of the United
States have in fact taken such action. As I have said before, we cannot
now be sure what actions may be required. The Formosa resolution
of 1955 was followed by the use of U.S. warships to escort supply
convoys to the offshore islands in 1958; the Middle East resolution
was followed by President Eisenhower's sending of troops to Lebanon
in 1958; the Cuba resolution was followed by the well-known events
of October 1962. I do not suggest that any of these actions may
serve as a parallel for what may be required in southeast Asia. There
can be no doubt, however, that these previous resolutions form a
solid legal precedent for the action now proposed. Such action is
required to make the purposes of the United States clear and to protect
our national interests.
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