DCI BRIEFING OF CIA SUBCOMMITTEES OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES - FRIDAY, 10 JANUARY 1964 - 3:00 P. M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000400050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed
Services and Senate Appropriations Committees -
Friday, 10 January 1964 - 3:00 P. M.
1. The Director met with the combined CIA Subcommittees
of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees on
Friday, 10 January 1964, at 3:00 P. M. Senators present were:
Russell, Richard B. (D., Ga.)
Hayden, Carl (D., Ariz.)
Saltonstall, Leverett (R., Mass.)
Stennis,
John (D.,
Miss. )
Young,
Milton R.
(R., N. Dak.)
Aiken,
George D.
(R., Vt.)
Present from the Committee staff was William Darden.
Accompanying the Director were:
Richard Helms, Deputy Director (Plans)
John S. Warner, Legislative Counsel
There was a technical sweep of the room and no transcript was taken.
The meeting consumed approximately two hours.
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2. The Director was asked immediately about the Panama
situation. He pointed out that at his last meeting with the Subcommittee
on 29 October 1963, he had reported that according to
reports which had been received last August, Castro had told a revolutionary
leader from Panama that militants in Panama should launch a campaign
like that being waged in Venezuela. It was also indicated in October that
the Panamanians had been getting guerrilla training in Cuba and it was
further reported that in September we had received reports that the
elements in Panama with whom Castro deals planned to start such a
campaign in December.
3. The Director stated that the situation has been followed very
closely and we have received continuing reports concerning trans-
shipment of arms to Panama.
It was pointed out a e
riots there could not be considered simply student activities but may be
assumed to have been organized and directed riots. The flag incident
was not the real cause of the riots but was simply the spark that led to
the other activities which would have occurred in any event utilizing some
other incident.
4. It was pointed out that President Johnson has talked by
telephone with President Chiari of Panama urging him to keep control
of his people. The Director then utilized a map to discuss the actual
physical situation pointing out the slums along the border of the zone.
As to the flag situation, it was pointed out that U. S. students had raised
the U. S. flag which the school authorities immediately took down.
However, the students on Tuesday, 7 January, again put the flag up and
attempted to guard it. There were agreements concerning the question
of flying the U. S. flag at certain areas but this school was not one of the
areas. Thereafter, events got out of control with six Panamanians being
killed and also three Americans were killed by gunfire and some thirty
injured but not seriously.
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6. Mr. Helms stated that a 2:15 communication indicates the
President was attempting to be conciliatory and is asking the people to
be calm. On the other hand, there are crowds forming and there exists
the possibility of further trouble in connection with the funeral of the six
Panamanians who are to be buried today. In response to a question,
Mr. Mc Cone said there were no rioters brought in from outside of
Panama. The incident of the United Fruit boat at Puerto Armuelles,
Panama, was discussed. It was pointed out that last night, 9 January
1964, a mob of approximately 1500 people milled through the town destroying
property. The United Fruit was loading a ship at the time and were
prevented from loading and thereafter moved the ship out from shore.
This incident was discussed as an example of the organized rioting
although there were no riots outside of Panama City and this Puerto
Armuelles. In response to Senator Russell's question, it was stated
that it is not known whether all of the Castro men involved in the invasion
of Panama in 1959 were rounded up but certainly he has put more men in
and there is good information on this.
7. As to the make up of the students, it was pointed out that some
of these are "perennial students" running up to 35 years of age. When
asked a question, it was indicated that the President of Panama is not
known to have any Communist leanings but he is not known as a strong
man and does have a difficult political situation. It was stated that damage
to American owned or occupied property was quite serious, mentioning
the gutting of the USIA building and the new facilities occupied by Pan
American Airways. In response to a question, it was stated that it was
not known what damage had been done to property of other countries but
this was qualified by saying that our information is fragmentary.
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8. It was pointed out that Panama has no standing army as such
but has a force of something less than 4, 000 gendarmes. Mr. Helms
answered a question about arms saying mostly small arms were utilized
in the riots, that is . 22 rifles and pistols. It was indicated that the U. S.
has exhorted the President of Panama to take action to quiet his own
people. Senator Russell inquired about General O'Meara's authority
and it was stated that all efforts are being taken to avoid U. S. military
forces going into Panama City and that there was no authority for O'Meara
to move troops out of the zone.
9. The coming election was mentioned indicating that this is
early in May but our source is not up for election although anti-American
attitudes will be prevalent for all candidates. The Director stated
the President is sending down a mission which left at 12 o'clock today
(10 January 1964) which includes the Secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance;
Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin; Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, Thomas C. Mann; and Ralph Dungan of the White House.
10. Senator Stennis inquired about Russian strength in Cuba.
The Director indicated that we estimate there are between 4, 000 and
7, 000 Soviet troops in Cuba and that we have noted no reduction in the
last three months. There has been some turnover, i. e. , replacements.
It was further pointed out that these troops are not in organized units.
Their purpose is a training mission to assist the Cubans in learning how
to use the equipment and care for it. With respect to the SAM sites, it
was pointed out that we have U-2s over Cuba every day. In a sense, we
feel better with the Soviets in control since they are not interfering with
the U-2s. A turnover of the SAMs to the Cubans might bring different
results since the SAMs are lethal with respect to the U-2s. It was pointed
out that some of the training in the past has been in training centers but
there is some deployment for training at operational centers. However,
control of the SAMs and control over the command communication channels
remains with the Soviets.
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11. Later, Senator Stennis returned to the Cuban situation
asking was it the Director's view that it was to the advantage of the
U. S. or CIA for the Russians to remain in Cuba. The Director said
he did not advocate that the Soviets remain and his previous statement
had merely pointed,up that while Russia controlled the SAMs they had
refrained from firing on the U-Zs but it was not known what the Cubans
would do. The Director made it clear that it was not to the advantage
of the U. S. for the Russians to remain and that if the SAM sites were
turned over to the Cubans we would have to simply accept the risk and
if they did fire on the U-2s this would bring the matter to a head and
undoubtedly appropriate action would be taken.
12. The Director also reiterated that all of the combat troops
have gone or else have been dissolved as units. He said this evidence
was based on photography, clandestine sources, and liaison reports.
He pointed out that the sites of the four armored combat grouxshad been
turned over to the Cubans. Mr. McCone said he was not optimistic about
Castro and Cuba and indicated that he believed Castro would be there a
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13. It was pointed out that the economy is worse than a year ago
but on the other hand Cuba is a fertile land and the peasants at least can
eat. It was also pointed out that with the rising price of sugar Cuba had
offset its decreased production and in fact had sold some sugar futures
at very high world prices and utilizing these funds had made its deal
with England for purchase of the busses.
14. The Director, in response to Senator Saltonstall, ran through
very quickly a few high spots on other Latin American countries. He
stated that while Venezuela is quieter now there had been some 15 events
since the elections with one serious burning of a warehouse of some
$700, 000 to $800, 000 damage. He stated there were noticeable guerrilla
activities in Honduras and unrest continues in Colombia. While Peru
remains under control, there are three distinct groups of guerrillas
which if they united could create a serious problem. As to Bolivia, the
situation remains serious but is relatively quiet at this time.
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ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE
16. In response to a question on development of the anti-ballistic
missile in Russia, the Director stated that while the Soviets have spent
a considerable amount of funds and effort they have not developed an
effective and reliable anti-ballistic missile system. It was stated that
we believe they will not approve large expenditures or widespread
deployment of the present system which has been observed at Sary Shagan
and Leningrad.
SOVIET ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
17. Senator Russell stated he would like to turn to an unpleasant
task and referred to the recent release of information by CIA concerning
the Soviet economy. His comments included:
"Not a function of CIA. It
"Leaves us with no defense against a joint committee. ?tl
"Frankly a mistake. it
"Probably should be released but not by CIA.
"Bad practice to start this type of thing. i?
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Senator Stennis then said he agreed with Senator Russell and each
pointed out that they had not discussed it with one another or with the
members of the Committee. Mr. McCone then stated that he also
agreed and had taken steps to see that this did not happen again and
that it would not happen again.
18. Mr. McCone then gave some of the background on this
mentioning briefing of the NSC and congressional chairmen and
subsequent discussions of the desirability of the information itself
becoming known for two reasons - (a) the question of long-term
credits to the Soviet Union, and (b) the effect on certain people who
are on the fence. There were further discussions with President
Johnson and Secretary Rusk and consideration of the DCI briefing the
heads of state in Europe. It was hoped that there would be some way
of bringing this information out covertly. Mr. McCone stated that
subsequently some of this information began getting around and the
press was directed to CIA. He stated attribution to the Agency was
unfortunate and that this would not happen again.
20. Senator Russell said that since the Agency has a flat promise
from DOD this should be worked out with them. The Director stated
that what would resolve the problem would be for Russell to sign an
appropriate letter. Senator Russell indicated that he had previously
prepared a letter which would reduce our budget about $10 million to
$12 million and that he thought the Agency would have to take some
reduction, adding ttjust to let you know that the Congress is around.'"
Russell said he had discussed this with Mr. Cannon on occasion as well
as with Mahon and Ford.
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21. Senator Russell commented that the Agency has certainly
hypnotized Mr. Cannon. He pointed out that we were the only Agency
in Government that Cannon would give anything it wanted. He added
that Cannon regards the Agency as his pet. The Director pressed
again for a solution and Senator Russell repeated that he thought the
Agency could take some cut mentioning that half the year has passed
and he thought the Agency could well get along on the Reserve of
adding that if the Agency needed
any more it could be secured from DOD, using words that implied the
Committee would see to it that it did. Senator Russell concluded by
saying he would work on this.
SOUTH VIETNAM
22, The Director then discussed his recent trip with McNamara
to South Vietnam and briefed on the basis of the attached paper dated
21 December 1963. He first touched on the reporting situation, i. e. ,
reporting on the conduct of the war indicating this had not been good and
that both AID and the military were misled. The weakness stems from
the fact that the reporting organization was in control of the province chiefs.
He indicated that he and McNamara had gotten people in from the field and
gone into this in detail. He pointed out that the Military Revolutionary
Committee has recognized this situation and is replacing a number of the
province chiefs.and district chiefs.
23. The Director discussed the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai province
situation and the hope for utilization of the sects in these provinces as
covered in more detail in the briefing paper. He also mentioned the
indigenous support in the Delta area for the Viet Cong and the resistance
to the strategic hamlet program in that area and the reasons for it. Also
discussed were the flow of arms and cadres from North Vietnam. He
mentioned the appearance of major weapons such as recoilless rifles,
mortars, and anti-aircraft guns in the Delta area in recent months.
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a. It is my conclusion that the coup came when there was a
downward trend which was more serious than was reported and,
therefore, more serious than realized.
b. The military government may be an improvement over the
Diem-Nhu regime, but this is not as yet established and the future of
the war remains in doubt.
c. The Viet Cong are receiving substantial support from North
Vietnam and possibly elsewhere, and this support can be increased.
Stopping this by sealing the borders, the extensive waterways, and the
long coast line is difficult, if not impossible.
d. The VC appeal to the people of South Vietnam on political
grounds has been effective, gained recruits for their armed forces, and
neutralized resistance.
e. The ability of the GVN to reverse this trend remains to be
proven. Much depends on the ability of the MRC to deploy their forces
and pursue the conflict in a manner which will ensure the security of the
people and provide them desired freedom, privileges, and some tangible
benefits.
f. The lack of an outstanding individual to lead and absence of
administrative experience within the MRC are ominous indicators.
g. The political stability of the new government under the MRC
is subject to serious doubt. Conflicts of ambition, jealousy, differences
of opinion over policy matters are all possible, could develop serious
schisms, precipitate further dissensions and coup attempts all of which
will affect the war effort against the VC.
h. Overcoming the VC movement by the GVN is formidable and
difficult, but not impossible. The problems can be intensified by continuing
increased support from NVN and political failures by the MRC. Hence,
in my judgment, there are more reasons to doubt the future of the effort
under present programs and moderate extensions to existing programs;
(i. e. , harrassing sabotage against NVN, border crossings, etc. ;) than
there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of our cause in South
Vietnam.
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The Director pointed out that Secretary McNamara's report to the
President was somewhat more pessimistic stating that "current trends
unless reversed in the next two to three months will lead to neutralization
at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state."
25. The Director indicated that actions in Cambodia are a result
of their sensing the trend in South Vietnam. In response to a question,
the Director indicated we cannot get out at this time but must find a means
to settle the problem. He pointed out that not only at stake was the entire
Southeast Asia area but Malaysia and Indonesia. Mr. McCone pointed
out the curious situation where the Es so Corporation pays tribute to the
Viet Cong to run their trucks in the area and the similar situation of a
rubber plantation paying tribute to the Viet Cong to conduct its business.
26. Senator Saltonstall said he thought this last report by McNamara
had not gotten across to the public and they still have in mind his previous
more optimstic report. After some discussion, it was agreed the
pessimistic tone of his report is tending to become known. Mr. McCone
added that this trip was a real awakening to both McNamara and himself.
In response to a question, Mr. McCone stated his view that taking U. S.
divisions into South Vietnam to cope with the Viet;Cong would not be
effective.
27. The Director discussed Soviet military forces in accord with
the attached briefing paper of 8 January 1964. He listed the 60 to 75
divisions at combat strength (85% or more) and 50 to 55 divisions at
reduced strength (60% to 70%) or at cadre strength (of 250/o or less).
Thus, the total military forces and strategic forces come to about
2, 500, 000 to 2, 750, 000 with 700, 000 in the strategic defense and
strategic attack forces. The Director listed satellite ground forces at
62 divisions comprising about 950, 000 men.
28. It was pointed out that the Soviets could place 50 to 60
divisions including some satellite divisions on the line against Western
Europe within about 30 days which would comprise a force of about one
million men. The Director stated that considering this time factor he is
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less and less concerned about this threat as the satellites move on
more independent lines. He mentioned the travel back and forth
between Austria and Czechoslovakia, indicating 40, 000 Austrians
had travelled to Czechoslovakia in October and November and 1, 000
Czechs had gone to Austria during December. He touched on the
other satellites competing in exchange of travellers and trade efforts
mentioning Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. He commented on the
recent purchase by Rumania of a steel mill although steel production
was not provided for under the Soviet economic plan into which
Rumania was integrated.
29. Mr. McCone stated he did not believe the Soviets could
reverse this trend which will develop and grow and the Soviets cannot
clamp down on it. The thought of Soviets supplying troops over satellite
territory in the face of this situation reduces the danger of armed
conflict. Mr. McCone agreed that the exchanges between East and West
Berlin is another case in this pattern of movement. The Director
concluded by saying that the Soviet Bloc is becoming less monolithic
and more of a federation.
30. The Director commented on the sharp debates going on in
the government and the military and as to what course to pursue. It
seems that there have been compromises, although it is clear they will
continue their ICBM program and the Director commented on the marked
activity at Tyura Tam. He stated that he believed the Soviets will develop
a large missile capable of carrying a 100 megaton warhead. He indicated
we do not know of Soviet development of a solid fuel missile.
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 ~ - 6F T
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
OGC/LC Attn: Marie
2
7 D 01
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Marie:
Here is your M/R, 17 Jan 64. The att.
did not come across our desk, but we will keep
an eye out for it.
marge - 5/21
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
R0004000 0
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
FORM 10. 237 Use previous editions (40)
n U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282
001-0