SALARY POLICY FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND GRANTS AT UNIVERSITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 7, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Releas A -RDP66RO"'
PR -
FOIAb3b
Salary Policy for Government
Contracts and Grants at Universities
Extra Compensation for Regular Faculty
In the past, two forms of extra compensation have grown up. Because
the academic year normally requires the presence of a faculty member at
the Universities only for nine months out of the twelve, it has been traditional
at almost all universities to permit the faculty member to earn extra money
during the summer either by teaching at a summer school or by working in
industry or elsewhere. Thus it was argued that when a faculty member stayed
at his university during the summer to work on a research contract or grant,
he should be entitled to extra compensation from his university, which should
be reimbursable to the university out of the contract or grant funds. Each
university ordinarily put a ceiling on the amount of extra compensation which
could be earned in this way, based on a percentage of the guaranteed annual
salary of the faculty member for the academic year. Practice has varied
widely in this regard, the fraction of the academic year salary which was
claimed varying from 1/5 to 1/3. The most common practice appears to be
2/9, but 1/3 or 3/9 has been permitted by most Federal agencies, and there
appears to be a trend for many universities to adopt this permissible limit
as standard practice, often irrespective of whether the faculty member
actually works during the three summer months or works for only two months
and puts in the other month of work on the contract at some other time during
the year. Since the actual academic year is closer to eight months than
nine months, it is possible for the faculty member to devote three full months
of work to the contract or grant during the entire year and still take one
month of vacation during the summer. On the other hand, some government
agencies insist that the three summer months actually be worked if 3/9
extra compensation is to be reimbursed by the government, regardless of
time put in on the contract during the academic year for which no reimburse-
ment is claimed.
The second type of extra compensation, which is much less common
than extra compensation for summer work, is additional compensation for
the faculty member who devotes all his effort during the academic year to
the work of the contract or grant and foregoes the privilege of outside con-
sulting activities ordinarily available to a faculty member. Additional
earnings of from 20% to 40% of the guaranteed annual salary have been per-
mitted on this basis. Other forms of extra compensation during the academic
year have been common. For example, a faculty member might be permitted
Approved For Release -RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releas'1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R0054000200050918-0
to obtain a consulting fee for work on a project supervised by a faculty
member in another department. A more common practice has been to
permit the earning of consulting fees from institutions operated by the
university but separated from the academic departments, such as engineer-
ing experiment stations or government financed off-campus research
centers. Many government agencies have refused reimbursement to uni-
versities for extra compensation of the above type, and the ACE has re-
commended against it.
It should be pointed out that when a faculty member receives 3/9
extra compensation and puts in only two months work in the summer, he
is in effect receiving extra compensation for work on the government
contract or grant during the nine month nominal academic year. Thus it
would appear to be inconsistent to prohibit the practices described in the
preceding paragraph while permitting 3/9 extra compensation for two
months of work in the summer, unless the academic year is to be defined
as eight months rather than nine months. On the other hand, a faculty
member on 12 month appointment is ordinarily entitled to one month
vacation with pay. With 3/9 extra compensation, the government is buying
one quarter of his total effort and therefore should pay for one week of
his vacation. Hence even in the 3/9 case, the man need put in only 2-3/4
months rather than 3 months of work during the summer.
Recently a few universities have attempted to redefine the academic
year as eight months and to claim reimbursement for 50% extra compensa-
tion to faculty members who put in a full year's work on a government
grant or contract. This is likely to be an increasingly important issue,
since a number of first rank universities are considering going on the
"trimester" system. In this system the ordinary guaranteed academic
salary would be for two trimesters, or 8 months, and the faculty member
could then work the other 4 months on a contract and 50% extra compensa-
tion could be claimed for him. As a matter of fact, on the basis of one
month vacation for the full year, and the government sharing the cost of
1/3 of the facation, the faculty member would only have to work 3-2/3
months rather than 4 in order to claim 50% extra compensation.
There are several general principles which the Basic Research
Panel feels should be applied to the question of extra compensation.
Clearly it is to the interest of both the Government and the Universities
that faculty members stay at the university during the summer months
and work on research and. continue the direction of graduate students.
The summer is often the most productive period during the year for a
faculty member, since he is less interrupted by other university responsi-
bilities and his graduate students are not diverted by classes, examinations,
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releal999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R005400200050018-0
-3-
and other activities. The resulting continuity of effort probably means
that more is accomplished in a given time in relation to the effort expended
than during the academic year. There is no more immediate way of
insuring the output of PhD's than making it possible for the faculty to
put in a full year on their university-based research activities. Thus some
extra compensation is clearly desirable. On the other hand, it does not
appear in the interest of either the universities or the government that
the faculty member be compensated at a higher rate for his effort on re-
search than for his effort on teaching. Thus any extra compensation which
the faculty member receives from his university for working on research
during the summer should clearly and demonstrably reflect extra effort
which he would not have been able to put in anyway during the normal
academic year. The salary policies permitted by the Federal Government
should encourage equivalent compensation and prestige for research and
teaching, and should discourage a sharp separation between research and
graduate teaching activities. This is in accord with the principles of the
Seaborg Panel report.
It is not in the interests of the Government or the Universities
for the Government to subsidize salary competition between universities
for key faculty members. Such a policy inevitably insures that the least
responsible salary practices of the least responsible universities will
gradually spread to the whole university system. The pressure of com-
petition will eventually force the more responsible Universities to adopt
salary practices which they consider contrary to sound administration
and fair treatment of their faculty, especially of non-science vs. science
faculty. Thus it is entirely proper that the Federal agencies agree on
some upper limit on the percentage of the guaranteed annual salary of a
faculty member which a university can claim as reimbursement for extra
compensation. Furthermore, this upper limit should reflect the maximum
extra effort which a faculty member could reasonably be expected to place
on his research compensated at the same rate as his regular academic
work.
In a time when research budgets are increasingly tight, raising
the rate of extra compensation does not buy more research, but merely
inflates the cost of research and decreases the total amount of research
and the number of graduate students who can be supported within a given
budget. Thus, at the present time, there is a strong incentive to "hold
the line, " consistent with reasonable fairness, on the permissible extra
compensation.
Most of the Panel believes that in the existing situation a limit of
3/9 would represent the best policy. To attempt to revert to 2/9 at this
late date when 3/9 has become so common would cause too much disruption
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Release' 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R0002000500118-0
and would be extremely difficult to administer. On the other hand, more
than 3/9 is so rare that cutting back to 3/9 in the exceptional cases where
more has been allowed would not pose serious administrative problems.
yven a clear statement of the 3/9 limitation might, however, encourage
the many universities which still permit only 2/9 to alter their policies.
Some of the Panel favored limiting the 3/9 payment to cases in which the
faculty member could be demonstrated to have spent 3 out of the 4 summer
months, June, July, August, or September, essentially full time on his
research. Other members of the Panel felt that 3/9 should be permitted
even when the faculty member had worked only two months on his research.
The more restrictive policy would have the advantages of discouraging
universities from changing from the 2/9 to the 3/9 rule, since payment
of 3/9 would undoubtedly entail much stricter time accounting of faculty
members who claimed this compensation. This policy would probably
mean in practice that 3/9 would tend to be the exception rather than the
rule.
As regards extra compensation for the academic year, the Panel
definitely favored permitting none. While it is recognized that there is
some justice in the contention that a faculty member who is willing to
forego outside consulting is entitled to some extra compensation for the
spare time he spends on his research, such a policy would be impossible
to police properly. Furthermore, it could be argued that a modest amount
of consulting actually increases the research capability of a faculty
member and serves to keep him in contact with what is going on in his
field outside his own project. Thus it is not in the long range interest
of his research project to encourage him to forego all outside activities.
We recognize that this strong position is somewhat arbitrary in view of
the fact that service on government advisory groups is still permitted.
However, this is easier to police.
There is a serious question whether faculty members or research
staff whose salary is 100% reimbursed by the Federal Government should
be permitted to receive compensation for government advisory work.
This question probably deserves special study. Certainly in cases where
the university salary is paid entirely from the funds of a single agency,
consulting for that agency for pay becomes a questionable practice both
from the standpoint of sound administration and from the standpoint of
conflict-of-interest. On the other hand, consulting for a different agency
on a subject not specifically related to the individual's research project
might be considered permissible. The Panel recommends that an effort
be made to ascertain present practice in this and similar regards, and
that definite guidelines be developed.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releas,pi1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R0054C00020005001P=0
Payment of Academic Year Salaries
The Seaborg Panel report recommends, and present government
policy permits, reimbursement of the University for that portion of a
faculty member's salary which represents the per cent of his total effort
spent on research in connection with a contract or grant during the
academic year. Due to the shortage of research funds, this policy has
never been fully implemented in practice, and its general adoption has
also been inhibited by the hesitation of many universities to become
dependent on the Federal Government for an appreciable fraction of their
long term salary commitments. It appears that the policy has been much
more readily accepted by both Government and Universities with respect
to annual and term appointments than with respect to tenure faculty.
Payment of tenure faculty seems to be much more generally used in
medical and other health-professional schools, and to some extent in
engineering schools than in other parts of the university. The policy has
been accepted without too much thought as to the basic philosophy behind
it or as to its long range effects on institutions of higher education.
Some of the arguments against the policy are the following:
1. The most obvious argument is the financial risk to the Uni-
versity, especially where tenure faculty is involved. Although Federal
research funds for universities have risen steadily since 1948 without a
break, the fact remains that they are still based on annual appropriations
and have been subject to the influence of the general climate of opinion in
Congress and in the public mind. The tide has been running strongly in
favor of basic research for many years, but it is possible the pendulum
may soon swing in the other direction. Most universities have used the
funds released through payment of faculty research time to expand their
faculties and to make other long range commitments rather than to build
up their reserves. This argument is probably not too serious, since a
drastic cut in Federal research appropriations would create other
economic effects whose secondary impact on the Universities would probably
be far greater than the direct effect of the research funds themselves.
2. To the extent which the Federal Government in effect assumes
responsibility for what is basically a financial obligation of the University,
the University may become subject to Federal control and interference.
The permanent faculty is the group which is responsible for its educational
policy. This group enjoys tenure exactly so that its intellectual freedom
may be guaranteed; if it is dependent on Federal funds, its intellectual
freedom may be at least theoretically limited. On the whole, this argument
appears rather academic, except possiblyrfor private universities such
as Harvard. Very few institutions could support their permanent faculty
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releas, 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66ROO544R000200050018-0
purely out of endowment income. Nevertheless, it is true that an in-
stitution may be more liable to give in to government pressures if it is
dependent on government for meeting its long range commitments.
3. The use of the funds released by Federal payment of permanent
salaries raises broad issues of Federal aid to education. To the extent
that the funds released are not used for science but are used to support
other parts of the university, it might be claimed that the payment of
faculty salaries out of research grants is a device to circumvent the intent
of Congress that Federal funds should not be used for generalized assistance
to higher education. It is our impression that funds released have usually
been employed to build up the tenure faculty in the area of science for
which the grant funds were awarded. It would be desirable to obtain more
information on this. In some universities payment of faculty salaries is
based on released teaching time, and this provides a guarantee that most
of the funds released will be used in the same general area, since new
faculty have to be hired to teach the unmanned courses. Nevertheless,
it is true, broadly speaking, that the Government has no control over the
use of the released funds, so that the argument that the salary reimburse-
ment is a disguised grant still has some validity, regardless of how the
University may choose to use the released funds in practice.
4. The steady growth in the practice of paying faculty salaries,
especially tenure salaries, out of grants may have absorbed much of the
increase in research funds in the last few years, and may thus in effect
have increased the cost of research to the government without actually
procuring more research. If the present trend continues and budgets
level off, there will be a tendency to support a smaller and smaller
fraction of proposals, and this may hit hardest at the weaker institutions.
We need to have more quantitative information on this subject. Analysis
of NSF proposals indicates that the share of the budget represented by
salaries of principal investigators has been increasing in the last few
years, but only rather slowly, and we do not know how this is divided
between increased payment of summer salaries and payment of academic
year salaries.
5. Federal payment of faculty salaries tends to result in "stock--
piling" of the best scientists at the leading institutions, while engaging
them less and less in the educational process. It aggravates the already
difficult problem encountered by the second string institutions in building
up their scientific faculties. Several private universities have doubled
the number of permanent posts in their science departments, largely by
the judicious use of Federal funds. However, there is little or no
quantitative information on this subject. It seems probable that the growth
Approved For Release 1-999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releas 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R005 000200050918-0
of non-academic research institutes has been a much larger factor in
the difficulties of second string institutions than has the recruitment of
faculty at leading institutions. Indeed, the administrative policies of
many academic institutions are such that it is questionable whether the
country would be better off if men now employed in research centers were
to move to such universities. There is a fundamental issue here concerned
with the degree to which the increase in output of PhD's is going to be
effected through existing centers of excellence and the degree to which
new centers will be built up. On the whole, it was the feeling of the Panel
that the role of national research centers was a more relevant and
significant issue than the payment of faculty salaries out of government
contracts in universities.
6. Payment of faculty salaries by the government has tended to
reduce the time which senior men devote to undergraduate teaching and to
decrease student-faculty contact generally. It is doubtful whether this
argument can really be supported. Most members of the Panel seemed
to feel that undergraduate science teaching had significantly improved,
especially during the last few years. Indeed, to the extent that government
funds have helped science departments to expand their faculties, they
have indirectly benefited the undergraduate as much as the graduate
student. There are certainly problems in this area, but the Panel feels
there is no evidence that they have been aggravated by Government funds,
particularly those funds used to pay faculty salaries.
7. When the government reimburses the university for part of the
salary of a tenure professor, especially one listed as principal investigator
on a grant, it puts the professor in the position of being expected to raise
part of his own salary. If his grant is cut, he is in conflict with his own
administration as to whether the cut should be taken on the contribution
to his salary or whether it should be taken on the direct cost of his research.
The investigator could often justifiably argue that the University is using
the money raised through the reputation, effort, and prestige of the
investigator to cover an obligation which is basically the University's.
The inclusion of faculty salaries in a proposal budget often drags
irrelevant considerations into panel evaluation of research proposals, and
injects advisory panels, in effect, into the internal administration of
universities. The practice generates an inherent conflict-of-interest
between faculty and institution which is undesirable and corrupting in the
long run. This conflict-of-interest is especially severe when the salary
payment is made on a grant-by-grant basis as at present.
Some of the arguments in favor of the policy are the following:
1. It enables the institution to strengthen its science faculty much
more rapidly than would be possible within its own resources. This is
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Relear1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R0054GR000200050918-0
of great importance not only because of the increasing number of graduate
students, but also because of the continual appearance of new fields of
knowledge which need representation on university faculties. Fields
which 20 or 30 years ago might be considered as adequately covered by
a one-man department now require several faculty members for a
"critical size" effort, both in teaching and research. Examples are
oceanography, atmospheric sciences, molecular biology, and many others.
In some universities the alternative to expanding permanent faculty appears
to be to create an echelon of more or less permanent research staff, who
do not participate overtly in teaching, and who are often regarded as
second class citizens by their faculty colleagues.
2. It enables the University to move much more rapidly into new
fields, especially interdisciplinary areas lying between conventional
departments and even schools. This should be true in principle, but
there is no factual information to suggest whether it has been true in
practice.
3. It provides the University with essentially unrestricted funds
which can be used to compensate for imbalances produced by project
support. On the other hand, as pointed out under point 3 in the preceding
paragraphs, this is also in a sense a device to circumvent the purpose
for which the funds were given by the Government. We are almost
completely lacking in factual information with respect to this.
4. In expanding its research efforts, the Government is always
presented with a choice between supporting research in special centers
and institutes disconnected from the educational process, or supporting
it in intimate association with the educational process within universities.
Where the research is of a character appropriate for graduate and post
doctoral training, it is preferable that it be carried on within the uni-
versities. Given the limitations of private and state resources, the only
way this can be done is by enabling the universities to expand their
faculties on government funds. Research centers tend to go stale and
lose their impetus and sense of mission as their staff ages, whereas
faculties tend to be constantly stimulated and rejuvenated by the continuous
turnover of bright graduate students and research fellows.
Our Panel was in general agreement that some payment of faculty
salaries for research time during the academic year was appropriate.
On the other hand, there was also a strong feeling that this should be on
a cost sharing basis; that is, the University and the Federal Government
should share the cost for the research time of faculty members. One
hundred per cent reimbursement of the research time of tenure faculty
should be offered only under exceptional circumstances. There was a
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releas, 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R0054fiR000200050J t8-0
strong feeling in the Panel that cost sharing between a University and an
agency should be negotiated on an overall basis rather than on a grant-
by-grant basis, if suitable administrative arrangements could be worked
out. In other words, salary of permanent faculty should be handled in a
manner somewhat analagous to the present handling of indirect costs
under BOB circular A21. Faculty salaries is a much more appropriate
area for cost sharing than are indirect costs. It is recognized that there
are many serious practical administrative problems in working out such
an arrangement, but we believe it should be studied and attempted if
found feasible. There are, of course, certain dangers. For one thing,
the money brought to the university by the most energetic and productive
professors may be channeled into the support of the less productive people.
The Panel recognizes that arrangements for block payment of
salaries cannot be worked out overnight. Until it is worked out, we believe
there is no alternative to the present system of grant-by-grant negotiation.
However, we believe that even under the present arrangements, agencies
should insist on some degree of cost sharing on academic year salaries
for research time of permanent people. As a tentative suggestion, we
would propose that not more than 50% of the research time of a tenure
professor be permitted to be charged against a government grant or
contract. For junior people on a term appointment of three years or more,
we would suggest that not more than 50% of the total salary be reimbursable
by the government. For individuals on annual appointment we would propose
no limitations; the government would be permitted to reimburse the
University for the full percentage of effort devoted to the contract or grant.
From our general knowledge of the internal situation in many universities,
we would guess that the above suggested limitations would impose no
serious hardships, although a few exceptions might have to be made for
special research .centers intimately associated with a department, such
as the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley, the Stanford accelerator, or
the Cambridge Electron accelerator. Such exceptions are sufficiently
rare and unique so that they could be easily negotiated on an individual
basis.
A somewhat different policy might be followed in the case of so-
called research training grants. In this case the Government may reimburse
the University for time spent in formal teaching related to the subject of
the grant as well as for research time. In such cases we believe it to
be a sound principle that not more than 50% of the total time of a tenure
professor should be reimbursed by the Government, with essentially no
restriction on term or annual appointees. We recognize, however, that
such a limitation may be impractical in many cases because of commit-
ments already made; however, we believe the 50% limitation should be
applied to any future grants. Such a restriction should not apply, of
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releav1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00544000200050Q %-P
course, to career awards of the type recently instituted by NIH. There
should be no restriction on the use of institutional base grants or NIH
institutional grants for faculty salaries, and these should be considered
as university unrestricted funds rather than government funds for purposes
of cost sharing. On the other hand, we feel it advisable that the University
itself exercise some restraint in the use of such funds for tenure salaries,
and should carefully calculate the financial risks involved.
Research and Teaching
It is the present practice on research grants that reimbursement
during the academic year can be claimed only for research effort. The
Panel believes this to be a sound principle, if only to prevent misunder-
standings with the Congress, which has appropriated the funds specifically
for research. However, research activity itself is very diversified and
includes not only time spent in the laboratory but also time spent dis-
cussing results with colleagues and disseminating research results to the
scientific public. The Federal Council has already given explicit recog-
nition to the fact that dissemination of research results is an inherent
part of research through authorizing the payment of publication "page
charges" out of research grants. Thus in estimating the percentage of
effort devoted to research it should be recognized as legitimate to include
time spent in participation in research seminars, occasional lectures on
research results, including both colloquia and guest lectures in formal
courses, reading in the library, informal discussions with colleagues,
supervision of thesis research provided it is supported by the grant or
contract, supervision of post doctoral research related to the grant,
attendance at scientific meetings and conferences which is considered to
contribute to the research, visits and conferences at other laboratories,
and work preparing articles and monographs reporting research results.
In estimating research time, it would not be proper to include time spent
in lecturing for or preparing lectures for formal courses listed in the
catalogue and offered for degree credit. It would also be improper to
include time spent on university committees or other administrative work
related to university business or time spent in preparing research pro-
posals. An exception to this might be time spent on a thesis committee
concerned with a dissertation resulting from work on the given grant or
contract, which should count with graduate student supervision.
A question might be raised as to whether a highly specialized
advanced course offered for credit might not legitimately be considered
as research time, especially if it is attended mainly by students who are
expected to go on to do research related to the grant or contract. A case
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 ? Approved For Releasa~1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00544R000200050Q11?--O
could be made for this, and perhaps some of the time devoted to lecture
preparation could be considered as research time, but for administrative
"cleanness" we consider it preferable to count such courses as teaching
time.
In the case of research training grants, it is proper to consider
teaching time as reimbursable effort provided the teaching involves mainly
advanced material related to the subject area of the grant and that the
course is regarded as necessary preparation for research in the area of
the grant. Undergraduate courses would almost never be included in this
category, especially elementary courses. There might be exceptions in
cases where the elementary material is regarded as necessary for research
in the area but is not part of the usual preparation of students entering
this field of research, e.g., advanced calculus or electronics for medical
research people.
With respect to academic people, a question arises as to what
constitutes "effort" in computing percentage of effort. It is tempting to
argue that the University pays a man for a 40 hour week, and that effort
should be computed on the basis of the percentage of 40 hours devoted to
research each week. Such a criterion might be used to specify the minimum
amount of time; e. g. , 50% effort would be at least 20 working hours a week.
However, the time of a professional man cannot be so precisely quantified,
and in general the percentage of effort should be based on the total time
and energy devoted to professional work. A certain amount of looseness
is inevitable here, which can be resolved only by good sense. The
principle involved is that the individual should treat the government
supported part of his work in the same way he treats the university sup-
ported part. For example, it would certainly be improper for an individual
to work a 40 hour week on his research, spend nights and weekends pre-
paring course lectures, and then claim100% reimbursement for research
time or even claim 100% "effort" as a basis for cost sharing research
time. A rough rule of thumb is that a faculty member engaged in "full
time" academic duties could not be expected to claim more than 50% of
his time during the academic year as devoted to research, thus putting
an effective limit with cost sharing of 25% reimbursable time during the
academic year.
Consulting
A long standing tradition permits faculty members working full time
to earn money by outside consulting during the academic year. One day a
week is often considered as "customary. " Some universities place a
limitation on total outside earnings, and others merely insist that the con-
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For ReleaE 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R0054 0002000500JJ=0
suiting work not interfere with his academic duties. Faculty opinion
usually enforces a certain degree of social sanction against excessive
consulting. Outside activities tend to be regarded as legitimate in inverse
proportion to the amount of income derived therefrom. Thus, an
individual who devotes a great deal of time to unpaid professional society
work is not usually criticized, and a man who devotes a good deal of time
to government committees is less criticized than a man who receives
large consulting fees from industry or who operates a profitable business
on the side. Universities usually encourage a certain amount of consult-
ing, especially in engineering and medicine, because it enhances a faculty
member's professional standing. In pure science consulting has been
less highly regarded, but is thought to be desirable if it involves creative
work and brings a man into broader contact with his special field. Through
his consulting contacts, a scientist can often orient his own research and
that of his students into more productive channels. This is especially
true in fields such as solid state physics or organic chemistry, in which
industry is doing very similar work to what is done in universities.
If a faculty member is paid only partly out of government funds,
especially if the total payment is less than 50% throughout the year, the
consulting issue does not present very serious problems, since it can be
considered as being done on university time. A more difficult question
arises when a man is on a full time research appointment entirely
reimbursed by the Government. For this case we believe that the same
policies should be applied to the full time man as to the regular faculty
member not paid at all out of government funds. We believe that this can
be justified to the Government provided the consulting time does not
average more than one day a week throughout the year, i. e., about 50 days
in a 12 month year. There does not appear to be any reasonable way of
monitoring this, other than the conscience of the faculty member, or
research appointee, or that of his superviser, or the criticism of his
colleagues. Abuses will show up now and then, but we believe they should
be tolerated for the sake of the benefits to the research which result from
faculty consulting. It is especially important that the faculty member not
place himself in the position of being paid twice for the same work, even
inadvertently.
The writing of a book or monograph reporting research results or
critically reviewing a field related to the work of a contract or grant should
be considered as a research activity. A question might then arise with
respect to royalties or honoraria received in connection with such a book,
since the time and effort may have already been paid for by the Government.
Ordinarily we would say that the author is entitled to keep the royalty or
honorarium if this is the policy of the University with respect to similar
work done on its time. The same would be true of the work of preparation
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546R000200050018-0
 Approved For Releai1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00544F000200050018-0
13-
of a lecture or lecture series for which an honorarium is received. The
lecturer should be permitted to keep the honorarium even if the lecture
were prepared on time paid for by the Government. The argument for
this is that the honorarium is payment for a specific end product and not
for so many hours worked, and the Government has an interest in
encouraging such productions. On the other hand, if the Government pays
for secretarial time used in preparation of a book manuscript, the atthor
should be expected to reimburse the Government for such expenses out
of the royalties, at least if substantial sums are involved. Time spent in
preparing a general textbook should not ordinarily be considered as research
time.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP66R00546RP00200050018-0