FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
22
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 3, 1999
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
OPEN
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2.pdf928.47 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 { LEIGH ;CO!T9.11IC ITJTEI,.t,IG: ICE RI;QUTL'ti 213TTS IIELATIIG TO THE I.I.W1011AL SECURITY S--E-G R- E-rf Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 SFr-CRET APPEZM3 X B DREIU i ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REQUIF..1 NTS ...... MM-M - A SAS .t T- I. Functions of Foreign Economic Intelligence as i~t Relates to the cc~ur 'fir of e~ 0 _. ",. A. The primary function of foreign economic intelligence in the service of national security is to provide the basis for United States policy formulation and action by: (1) providing a factual understanding of the economic situation in foreign countries; (2) foreseeing probable future devolopments through analysis of economic trends; and (3) assisting,, on the basis of economic evidenced in dotormining the feasibility and probable consequences of alternative courses of action open to the United States. B. A ' groat many agencies of the United States Government in the discharge of their on special missions collect economic information and perform economic research concerning, foreign cowatries.$/ Virtually ail of this information and research is or m W be relevant to one or another specific problem of national security. It is t ho primary duty of the agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Council to see to it that data collected for many purposes is brought to bear on national security problems, and that such additional information is collected as mwf be necessary to furnish the aver.-, to critical security problem. survey of the nature and extent of such economic intelligence is included in this report as Appendix C. -Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDPP-'0605MA'bOt1000s0003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 5-E-~Qit-FrT Accordingly this paper, while recognizing the need for the fullest interchange among all interested parties, concentrates its attention on the requirements of the T,AC agencies for economic intelligence relating to the national security. Ce In order to determine how the relatively limited economic intelligenco facilities, both within and outside the government, can make their mimmm contribution, and in what directions their efforts most need to be augmented, it is necessary that there be established and maintained machinery for combined economic intelligence analysis, on a priority basis. Such machinery is recommended elsewhere in this report. The purpose of this statement of requirements is to sugst the perspective in Phich a continuing program of priority intelligence problems might be viewed. Do Such a program must include: (1) Defining authoritatively the economic reports most needed in support of United States national security policies and actions. (2) Determining the particular economic research studies, of an ad hoc or continuing character, most urgent and essential as a- basis for the reports listed in (1) above. (3) Organizing the requisite economic reports and research studios, including the allocation of tasks among the various interested and competent agencies and the merging of the results of individual analyses,, S-E=C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 . -k - C -7kT (4) Defining and arranging for the collection of the econcmic information, not already available in government, which is most essential to the preparation of the estimates and research studies listed in (1) and (2) above. (5) Reviewing the processing facilities (translation facilities, industrial registers, document indexing, map production, etc.) and the techniques of analysis needed to exploit raw intelligence materials most effectively. The following section (Section II) attempts a classification of the reports and studies needed primarily for government policy and planning purposes. Section III outlines the categories of operational intelligence interest which must be covered by one or more of the intelligence agencies on a continuing or ad hoc basis. The outline of research and information requirements must be designed to support the intelligence studios outlined in Sections II and III, and wrl.ll, in part, grow out of these studies as they progress. Sane suggestions are made in Section 17 an to the facilities and techniques required, II. b orei, Economic Reo.,orts and Estimates Most Needed in !Mort of NatIonal. Security P' and Pow A. Introduction The gravest threat to the security of the United States and the free world within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet ;system. At least for the immediate future, therefore, first priority should be given to economic analysis in support of policies relating to the conflict . -3-- Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP6L7 00D59A000100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 between the Soviet and the non-Soviot worlds. This requires intelligence relating to the capabilities, the vulnerabilities, and the intentions or enrobable courses of action of three main groups of countries: (1) the USSR and its satellites, including China; (2) (3) a band of countries on the fringe of the iron curtain not now clearly in either camp, but potent-dally contributing to the strength of one or the other. Also 'important to national security is intelligence relating to particular resources in the rest of the world, principally in Africa and Latin America, :tich contribute significantly to the strength of either center of pogo Studios directed at the capabilities of a country or complex of countries should be designed to reveal what limitations the economies of these countries place on what they can dos now and in the future. This relates not only to their capabilities to take military action and cold war measures, but also to their capacity to provide their populations with the rising standards of living necessary to political stability under free institutions. Vulnerability studies focus on the susceptibility of one country to the application,, by another power, of selected devices designed to reduce its capabilities; in other Swords, howie can hurt them or they can hurt us. Studies of intentions or o~r bable courses of action seek to presen evidence which will reveal which of several alternative courses of action a country will follow. It is tempting to divide intelligence problems into those concerned with the maintenance of the peace and the strengthoning~of free institutions, and those relating to the conduct of war if war should become unavoidable. S- --C R- T `. r r w ~.. r Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 This dichotomy overlooks the twin facts that policies to maintain peace must be based on the best possible intelligence as to relative military strength and intentions, and that the outcome of a war, should it come, tiaill depend importantly on the stability and effectiveness of civilian economics. Hence in illuminating the major policy problems facing uss, intelligence as to military capabilities must be closely blended with analyses of civilian economic development. The framework of the outline below reflects United States security interests in they capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action of the three sets of countries noted above and in the strategic resources of the rest of the world. Within this framework are examples of reports and estimates that should be given priority treatment in the foreign economic intelligence effort. Ho Econcnic Analyses Rely to the USSR and its Satellites The problem of economic intelligence relating to the iron curtain countries is a special one in several respects. Considering the present state of our knormledge, this area probably has a higher priority for additional :intelligence effort than any other. On the other hand, the collection of information is more difficult and costly than elsewhere, and hence the sharp definition of priority requirements for collection is more urgent. Also the cost and difficulty of collection place a greater rrr:ium here than elsewhere on the development of special techniques to rtracte maximum amount of information from the limited data obtainable. in 'ricw of the hostile intentions of the Soviet bloc, analysis of its capabilities for military and non-military aggression, its vulnerabilities, and its intentions must take Priority at the moment over estimates of its S-E-C-EP-T Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 S-E-R-Fr-T capabilities for peaceful economic development. In general our present knowledge of particular industries and segments of the Soviet economy, ;chile weak, is bettor than our knowledge of the aggregate resources and capabilities of the economies as a whole, either of the USSR proper or of the whole Soviet bloc. While it is recognized that Soviet control over Communist China is possibly loss rigid r rtd direct than that over the Eastern European satellites it is believed that within the framework of this paper China should most logically be classified as a satellite, Examples of high priority economic intelligence projects are as follows x (1) Analysis of the- economic capabilities of the USSR and its satellites to engage in military action or to emplo "cold war" measures against the United States and its allies or against "neutrals" a. wartime Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Meet Essential Civilian and Military Requirements for Selected Critical items (e.g., electronics equipment, copper, tin,,. aviation fuel, specicl machine tools, ferrc--alloying metals, precision instruments, natural rubber, ate.) b. Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Develop and Produce Selected L:tilitary Stems (e.g., Atomic weapons, guided missiles, germ warfare agents, radar, long range jet bombers, tanks, submarines, etc.) o. Effect on Soviet Economic Capabilities for Prolonged War of the Acquisition by the USSR of Additional Areas, such as a) Western Europe, b) the Middle East, c) Japan, d) Southeast Asia,. Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 S-E-C- R-Eai de Overall Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc as a'F:'hole Simultaneously to Conduct Specified Military Campaigns and Maintain Essential Civilian and Military Production. e. 'Effect of the Korean War Combined with Western Export Controls on the Capabilities of the Chinese Economy both With and Without Soviet Assistance. f. Economic Capability of the European Satellites Unassisted by the USSR to Wage War on Yugoslavia. Requirements for Soviet Assistance. Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Wage Economic Warfare Against Pion-Soviet Nations. (2) Ant sis of the economic vulnerability of the USSR and its uatellites to measures of economic warfare, psychological warfare and to military attack, including strategic bombing. Z. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Eoonoaniesp Including Chinas s, to Strategic Bombing with Particular Referenco to Their Vulnerability to A-Bomb Attack. b. Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc as a Vole to a 1-4 Western Program of Economic Carfare. Relative Vulnerability c. Vulnerability of the Chinese Econor to Western Controls on (a) 1sports to China (b) Shi ppin o -7Q- Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 S-E-C-R-E-T d. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Economies to a Program of Induced Defection of Key Technical and Industrial Personnel. e. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Food Supply to Biological 117arfareo (3) Analysis of economic indications of probable Soviet and satellite courses of miles, and political action and analysis of all indications of probable courses of economic action. a. Economic Activity Within the USSR and Its Satellites Which Might Reveal Their Intention to Resort to .Military Action. b. Patterns of Allocation of EconaUc Resources for the Production of Military Items Within the Soviet Bloc Which Might Reveal the Kind of Military Operations Contemplated. c. Courses of Action Likely to be Taken by the USSR in Response to an Effective Western Program of Export Controls, d. Soviet Economic Measures With Respect to China Which Might Reveal the Extent of the Political and Economic Integration of These Countries(, e. Evidence Which Might Suggest What Air Target Systems 25X6 the Soviets Would be likely to Adopt for Western Europe. This group of countries poses very different intelligence problems from those of the Soviet Bloc. In the first place, a great deal S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 S-FrC-R-E-T of detailed economic information about them is either actually or potentially available. Secondly much more work has been done in analyzing the aggregate resources and capabilities of these countries than in the detailed analysis of particular industries, facilities, and services. Nevertheless, this detailed information can be secured with much less cost and risk than in the case of the USSR. Hence special research techniques to exploit every scrap of data are less urgent than effective programs of data collection, collation, end analysis by more conventional means. Since the intentions of these countries can be more directly observed, a lower priority attaches to economic evidences of their intentions than in the case of the USSR. Their capabilities to contribute to the military stre.lgth of the !'.est are important., but their capacity to stabilize and develop their overall economies is of equally great concern. Since they are in the main industrially mature economies, the intelli,,ence about them of concern to us generally relates less to basic resource development than in the third and fourth groups (Sections D and E.below) and more to economic organization., finance, and industrial structure. Their eeonomnic vulnera- bilities to military attack., sabotage of all kinds and economic warfare are subjects of very high priority. 25X6 Sample priority research projects are: var" in conjunction with the United States against the USSR and its sate 9- S-Er-G-R-E-T Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDeg -G9tS9. 00100050003-2 r r .~ w r. b. Capabilities of the non-Soviet Nations in a Joint Mobilization Effort to Meet Essential. Civilian and Military Requirements for Selected Strategic and Critical Itetts (e.g., sulphur, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum., coal, steel,., manganese). C. Importance of Western Europe and the Middle East-to 25X6 United States Economic Capabilities for Var. b. Capabilities of Selected Allied I atio:is_ to Carry Out Programs of Civilian Capital Formation and Improvement of Productivity Concurrently With the Discharge of Their Military Obligations . Southeast Asia. Requirements for Foreign (primarily United States) Assistance. d. Consequences of Cessation of 'rade vrith the Soviet 131ce for the Capabilities of Sell oted Allied Nations to Contribute to the Allied Military Effort and Dovelop Their Economies. Approved For Release 2000/08/28: CIA-RDP67-00059A000100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 S-E-C-R-E-T es importance of Foreign Econanic Assistance (primarily United States) to the E onomic and Political Stability of Italy, Greece, and Turkey. f, Essential Elements of a Raw Material Program Designed 25X6 to tdeet the Requirements of Both western Rearmament and Western Economic Stability and Development, Requirements for Economic Assistance in Korea During e War and During the Post-War Period of Rehabilitation. as Vulnerability of the onmyy o Non-Soviet a ion to Strategic Bombing, i.e.., to Target. Systems Most Likely to be Adopted by USSR. b. Vulnerability to Sabotage and Similar Covert Measures of Raw Material Supplies and Production Facilities of Strategic Importance to the Joint Mobilization Effort of the Non-Soviet Nations. Protective Actions 1.4ost Effective Against Such Measurese c. Vulnerability of the Non-Soviet Nations to a Soviet Bloc Program of Economic warfare. Relative Effectiveness of 3-E'-C4:-.Gl -T Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RSDPL6009,,1000100050003-2 a gment Yzith and support for proms and measures affecting the seourit of the United States. S-E-aC-R-F- Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00100050003-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/28: CIA-RDI 6 _q9j 59 000100050003-2 In general, our economic information is inadequate on these countries not because ue are denied access to it, as in the case of the Soviet bloc, but bacause it has never been assembled by anybody to anything like the extent pr^;valent in Western Europe. Strategic resources are nportant in many of t37eso countries, but i e have a great interest in their total economic position as vmll as in their specific commodity and service contri- butions. .ca