VERBATIM MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 7117, FEDERAL WORKS BUILDING ON FRIDAY, 16 JUNE 1949 AT 2:00 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000100120011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 16, 1948
• Content Type: MIN

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COTI T TEE
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ALSO PRESENT
Verbatim Minutes of Meeting held in Room 7117,
edera Works Building
on ~, 16 June T9-46 at 2:00 P. 1~1-
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter,, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the chair
Pte. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Major General A. R, Bolling, Acting Director, GSUSA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Major General Charles P, Cabell, Director of
Intelligence, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations, USAF
Mr;, William C, Trueheart, Representing Atomic
Energy Commission
Major General Walter E. Todd, Deputy Director,
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
Mr. Prescott Childs, Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel Merritt` B. Booth, Department of State
Mr'* Allan Evans,' Department of State
Lt,, Col. Edgar J. Treacy, Department of the Army
Colonel Allan D,MacLean, Department of the Army
Captain P', Henry, USN
Captain J. * M,' Ocker, USN
Lt. Cola C; M. DeHority, USHC
Major W, C Baird, De artment of Air
Central Intelligence
Agency
Central Intelligence
A
Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTOR: The agenda for the meeting today is the NIS Program; to see what
might be worked out. I think the thing we ought to get in is the target date and
I would like to recommend the date of 1952 - that the Ad Hoc committee drew up.
Anyone want to discuss that?
ADM. INGLIS: I can't meet that date with present funds and personnel for
75 NIS's. If that is what you mean.
DIRECTOR: Yes.
ADM. INGLIS: The maximum production during the pressure of war when we had
unlimited funds and personnel, working seven days a week, was 12 per year. That
is the most they ever turned out and we cauldnit hope to exceed that with our
present funds and personnel,
DIRECTOR: That is for three years - four years
ADM. INGLIS: 12 a year - that would take six and a half years. We couldn't
do more than Six in 19148. It takes time, to recruit and train people,
MR. ARMSTRONG: I wonder how we can establish the target date until we
know whether we can got funds and.personnel. That is the criteria on which the
speed of the program depends,
DIRECTOR: We mould also like to bring up how we are going to ask for funds.
Shall we, put it all into one? We would also like to got an estimate of what
funds you need, so we can stick it into the next budget. Shall it be for all of
the Departments? We talked about this thing this morning, The non-IAC agencies
gave us a terrificly large amount of funds needed,
ADM. INGLIS: And you w ll reallocate that?
DIRECTOR: I think it would be better to do it that way rather than leave it
to each Department, The first would get it, the second would have a little
argument, and the rest wouldn't get anything,
I:IR. ARMSTRONG: If the money is appropriated to the Departments, you let
the Budget have a crack at it. S ECRCIA
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DIRECTOR: That is right. We ca~g`' Ad Hoc committee to make up an
estimate.
ADM, INGLIS: I have my figures now.
MR. AH 'STRONG: So have I.
ARM. INGLIS: I would like to make this reservation that, even though we do
get additonal funds, there is grave doubt as to whether we can get the additional
personnel to correspond to the additional funds and train them,
DIRECTOR: It might be difficult,
ADM. INGLIS: To meet a 1952 deadline, tine think, even though they are both
possible, their trying to push it that fast would be uneconomical, inefficient.,
and would result in probably an inferior product..
DIRECTOR: There is a lot to do.
ADM INGLIS: 12 per year is a very large substantial start. That is the
maximum they produced under the pressure of vrar4
GEN. CABELL: I don't quite see the necessity of meeting those deadlines in
the lower priority groups. Why not leave off the unimportant ones in order to
meet the deadlines on the important ones.
ADM. INGLIS: I had the same thought. I inquired about that and was told
that out of 105 that were wanted 75 were .considered of sufficient urgency to be
listed by the JCS as wanted in a comparatively short time, I still think, however,
a lesser number than 75 would meet the requirements. I was also told that the
JCS had overlooked one of the important areas - Italy was given as an example -
and it is a sensitive spot and should have been included,' I was also told by a
person working on the Editing Board, working on this program., that they will be
working along on a certain area and then a crash and the decision is to drop that
and start on something else, It brings about inefficiency also,
GEN. TODD: That happened recently and if vie can interest the planners more
in a continual review of these priorities we might gain some time and avoid these
stoppages.
ADII, INGLIS: The important areas change, '10-Te have to bear in mind every time
they change them it will slow it down.
GEN. TODD: It may be a 150 turn instead of a 900 turn, as in some cases:,
ADIT. INGLIS: We got the money vie asked for. I assume we will get it - it
has passed the House and the Senate, I'Te haven't got the bodies, but I think vie
can recruit over the period of a year, But six is the maximum this year, even if
you gave us ten million dollars, We still couldntt turn out more than six, And
if vie get the same funds in our appropriations in ensuing years, and can estimate
a build-up to an annual rate of 12 a year, after the Fiscal Year 1949, and that
would mean re could produce 42 by Jk 2, or 75 by April 1955. That would
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be the Navyts target date under currEc't?`I3~'~..!nstances. Now if it is insistant
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DIRECTOR: I think that is one of the things we have to hook into the
Security Council.
ADM. INGLIS: It wasnit your idea in presenting your estimates to Congress
that you would take over the entire expensel, it is only additional funds,
DIRECTOR: Additional funds.
ADVT. INGLIS: Because if it were the entire expense we could give you that
figure.
DIRECTOR: I think additional funds.
ADM. INGLIS: I think it should apply to all the Departments. If you are
going to absorb the whole cost, it will be more th
DIRECTOR: We could put that either way,
IR. ARMSTRONG; Ours is capable of being refigured as well as the Navyts
because we are currently at almost zero on capability of doing the studies. But
to meet the program of 74 or 7; studies in four years from the time we got fully
recruited., that .-rould be a four-year period., we figured it would run an annual
DIRECTOR: I think we will put those in.
GEN. CABELL: It vmuld be awfully difficult for us to segregate that part of
our shop that would be working on NIS exclusively., and their determinate cost.
I recommend we only call upon CIA for the additional cost,, rather than for the
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entire program. Then I have another reservation, I would like to say that the
bottleneck with us is going to be the weather data and the availability of IBI4I
machines, At the present moment we need some 30 machines to take care of the
weather chapters in these reports. And we are having difficulty in getting those
machines. We may wish to ask for CIA encouragement in getting those machines. I
don't know what vie are going to be able to do, but it seems the IBM Company., or
rather Agencies, would rather get new customers than to serve the older customers.
I don't know whether you have a requirement in CIA for IBM equipment,, If not vie
could use your prestige as a new customer to get these machineso
DIRECTOR: We have some IBM machines, Maybe we can do that.
ADU. INGLIS: It is a change in business policy from that of the corner grocery
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store - they give the chops to the old customers.
GEN. CABELL: They don't sell these., they are all leased material,
DIRECTOR: Do all the agencies have money to do any work this year?
This Fiscal Year, and the one coming up?
MR. ARMSTRONG: We do not,
,ADM, INGLIS: We have money for that - I am morally certain we have, We
estimate we can get the personnel to turn out six,
DIRECTOR: That is a good start,
ADM. INGLIS: And from then on the personnel have to be educated. That is
the best estimate we can make now.
GEN. BOLLING:. We are going to need additional funds for 1950 and 1951.
DIRECTOR: We will put in for these additional funds. We have a better
chance if just one asks for it, Park, what would you need in extra funds this
year to get started on this?
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M. ARMSTRONG: To approach the program on full-scale business, that
I Jbviously if you are going to swing into it slowly, and
we could do a lesser number, then the full program would call for in one year
a lesser amount of money, I don't have an estimate on a graduated basis,
DIRECTOR: We have some money for it now. It was originally set up for
printing, binding, and maps. We might spare a little of that for the agencies
not having the money.
ADM,T. INGLIS: Reduce the number you originally set up, and reduce the amount,
That money could be diverted,
'I'M. ARMSTRONG: We could certainly, in a short time, arrive at estimates
and cost on the basis of six the first year, and an ascending scale thereafter
to show what you have to ask for the current Fiscal Year..
DIRECTOR: I think you ought to get that part in anyway, We won't get in
any more this year.
MR, ARMSTRONG: Unless you are getting a deficiency appropriation.
DIRECTORI No, if a new Congress comes in. And it also depends on who is
elected, It takes a terrible argument to get a deficiency appropriation? They
ask you if you get this money t4hether or not you are coming back to ask for a
deficiency, "Remember, if you are going to get this, you are not to ask for a
deficiency, rr
ADM. INGLIS: That brings up another point, I think it would save a little
embarrassment all the way around if we do decide to submit the request for
additional funds for CIA that we make it clears and give the specific amount of
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how much each department is already contributing to this department; make it
clear what you are asking for so we can go up and s is for the NIS
program. Then they won't say to us that we have already given that,
DIRECTOR: We can put in a statement,,
ADM2. INGLIS: A table as to what each agency needs, That would certainly
help me and get me off the hook,
DIRECTOR: It seems like a strange question, and I probably know the answer,
is there any way of allocating personnel doing other work? Does anyone have spare
personnel?
ADM. INGLIS; Speaking for ONI - it is a hope that we can get the bodies.
11R. AR,ISTRONG: We haven't any slack at all,, and have at present only a very
small percentage of our personnel applied to similar studies that would be dropped
when this program starts. Like the SID.
DIRECTOR: It is agreeable then that we put down as one of the conclusions
that you will let us know what extra money will be needed for next year so vie can
take that up and get the Security Council's backing on it and then put it up in
the budget as soon as the boys meet again.
ADM. INGLIS: Are you convinced that we must turn out 75 by 152?
DIRECTOR: If it can't be done, it. can't be done.
ADM. INGLIS: I yr n't say it can't be done. We feel it will be wasteful and
will result in not so good a product if we take it slower,
DIRECTOR: What are your ideas on that "Wee"?
GEN. TODD: I think that problem should be put up to the users,, Recently
the need for the review of priorities came to my attention and information they
wanted concerning countries along the Mediterranean Coast. And in one breath
they say they need it before they-cah.complete certain studies, and that they
don't want to review the priority on the basic intelligence areas, I think it is
strictly a problem on which we should get recommendations from the users.
COL. MacLEAN: Speaking of these 75 studies, the Joint Planners have dipped
way doom to the bottom of these studies for one and they want it by the 15th of
July.,
GEN. TODD: That is the problem.
ADM. INGLIS: They make it impossible to fulfill their demands,
GEN. TODD: And they want to compromise... They say vie don't want to disturb
the priorities, but vie want some material vie can do research work on ourselves,
And I do think if they gave a little more time and a little more consideration
to the importance of cutting down these priorities.,or of the arrangement of them
before it is too late, we will saveSE(MCcl BET
money and get a better product.
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ADMO INGLIS: I viould like to make a recommendation that we report to the
users that the maximum output under war pressure was 12 per year, and that we
feel that is a maximum which can be demanded, Unless the users have need of
something urgent, which we must accept, it will start vrasteful practices and
inferior products. Tell them if they will accept 12 per year we can complete
this program by 1955. If they insist on us meeting that date of 1952, what it will
then cost,, whatever the cost, in addition to the current funds, and that we
recommend that 12 per year be accepted,
GEN, BOLLING: Of course, we go for a little more speed. Our latest date
is completion by June 1952, We fully realize that we have a start in this. We
are working on it now and are pushing the other outfits. I think it would be
very poor policy to put out an inferior product and sacrifice efficiency for
speed,
GEN. CABELL: About what I said a while ago - I think that 75 is a little
unreal on their part, and we have to ask them if that is unreal, But I should
think, and this is a generality, that if our speed during the war was 12 per
year, with the approved techniques and method of coordination, we could shoot
that up near 20 a year, It would be a reasonable expectation? I viould offer
the figure of 20 per year,
ADM. INGLIS: They can't turn out airplanes now faster than they did during
the war.
GEN. CABELL: A little more slowly.
GEN. BOLLINGI And better airplanes,
GEN. TODD: And we were not confronted with the problems of money and
personnel.
ADM. INGLIS: During the war money meant nothing. We had all the personnel
we needed, and now we can't get either the money or the personnel; and you worked
6 and 7 days a week during the war, now you work five? And I think probably the
quality of the personnel is not as good as it was during the war; which I can't
substantiate before the Law.
GEN, TODD: VTould it be possible to farm out any of the tasks to the agencies
that do have the talent - the universities, etc.
GEN. BOLTING: That is being done now.
GEN. TODD: Increase the amount that is being farmed out,
GEN. BOLLING: That depends entirely on funds,
ADM INGLIS: I would like to ask my advisor on that - have we looked into
that?
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that an COL. DeHORITY: We investigated hat an decided against its,
ADM. INGLIS: Because you didn't think any outside agency was competent
to do it?
COL. DeIIORITY: It was a combination of that and that highly classified
material can't be made available to them in adequate amounts,
DIRECTOR: Park, anything?
MR. ARMSTRONG: Since we are starting virtually from zero, the difference
between 12 and 20 a year is a question of the rate of recruiting and the amount
of money, We could approach one probably as rapidly as the other. I haven't
any real preference for one over the other. In either case it would be the
figure, substantially or somewhat less, per annum indicated here.
DIRECTOR: I think if this is agreeable with everyone, the first thing we
will do is to take Todd's suggestion and see what the planners want and would
like to get. And at the same time we can give them the difference in costs.
Regardless whether or not you can get people - that is probably unknown - you
have to get the money. 12 a year and 20 a year, and the difference in costa
Let them take a look and see if their need is overridin the cost, which is
harder to get than it was during wartime,
1R. ARMSTRONG Get the data from each of the participating agencies on
those two bases in the terms of dollars and total them and you have a cost
program to present to them as a very important consideration on which they will
have to make a decision,
DIRECTOR: They ought to have that information on the cost of the thing.
To sit back and say we don't care how much it costs, we want to get it done -
that is getting away from reality,
ADM. INGLIS: We might as well make it 23 instead of 20 because if six is
the maximum we can turn out during 'L9, that gives you three years at 23 per
year,
DIRECTOR: Let's make it 12 or 23.
MR. ARMSTRONG: Six the first year?
ADM, INGLIS- That is all we can do the first yearn
DIRECTOR: I don't think anybody could get more than six this first year,
ZTR. ARMSTRONG: We can't do six without additional funds,
DIRECTOR: You let me know approximately what you need.
MR. ARLSTRONG: What it -uould cost for six the first year, and then alternate
12 and 23 for the years after?
AD 1. INGLI5: Do you want two figures in the terms of tih at we are already
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committed to do on the ;grogram, and a i Bona figures on how much more money
would be needed to speed it up. And the second category, that requires
appropriations from you?
DIRECTOR: Practically all of the cases. Then we can give it to the users
and tell them that money is going to be a question, It is more and more with
Congress that they are getting up there and saying we have to make more economies.
GEN. TODD: It seems to me the trained personnel will also enter into it
and would be worth while for the agencies that are preparing the material to
look into the practices followed by other agencies to see if some of them couldn't
be adopted - such as farming out the projects, and a view to getting better
material and compiling it at a more uniform rate of speed by the contributing
agencies, and perhaps a little faster.
DIRECTOR: Again it comes back to money. If you farm it out you have to
have money to pay for it,
GEN. TODD: It was my impression, when I was in the Intelligence Division,
that we could get it done faster and cheaper by farming it out,, That was the
impression I got. I don't know,
COL, MacLEAN: We are getting some chapters on 18 studies this year by
outside contract. When this program was started last fall,, we made arrangements
to have that done.
MR. AR:STRONG: I am reminded that one thing about farming this out is the
disclosure as to the priority of this program.
GEN. TODD: There are security considerations. The discussion will be on
the working level, but at a later date we might use some short cuts,
DIRECTOR: Any other remarks? Well, I think the first thing to be"done on
.this is to check on this and the additional money, and then the additional
amounts we will need in any case. Anyone else have anything on this?
There is just one other item. I am sorry we did not get it on the agenda,
but it did not come over from Sidney Souers' office until about 15 minutes ago.
It is a proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to downgrade paragraphs 3d
and 3e of NSCID No, 7 from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL, I don't see that it would hurt
us to do that. NSCID No. 7, "Domestic Exploitation," paragraph 1:
"The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for the exploita-
tion, on-a highly selective basis, within the United States of business
concerns, other non-governmental organizations and individuals as sources of
foreign intelligence information0"
Paragraph 3:
"Further to implement this undertaking, the intelligence agencies shall:"
d follows:
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"Obtain, to the maximum exten p ET ble, from their departments and
agencies the foreign intelligence information which the departments and
agencies have received as a by-product of the normal relationship with
business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and-individuals
in the United States in connection with non-intelligence activities, and
transmit to the maximum extent possible, the information to the Central
Intelligence Agency for editing for source security and for appropriate
dissemination,"
Paragraph 3e:
"Obtain, in so far as is practicable and within existing security
regulations., from their departments and agencies information concerning
business concerns and other non-governmental organizations and individuals
in the United States having foreign intelligence potential, which the depart-
ment or agency possesses or subsequently acquires, and make the information
available to the Central Intelligence Agency."
It is a request from the Chief of Naval Operations for authority to downgrade
paragraphs 3d and 3e of NSCID No,, 7 from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL. Do you want to
read this? I frankly don't see why we can't do that, unless they want a more
complete dissemination,
M. TRUEHEART: I heard them say when it came up at another meeting that
they couldn't send it to the people who needed its and that it wouldn't be
implemented unless they could get it out,
DIRECTOR: If we can do it we should. As far as I am concerned I am
willing,
GEN. CABELL: I wonder if anybody here could give us the philosophy for
the original classification.
DIRECTOR: It is an occupational disease. Everything they touch is highly
classified.
ADM. INGLIS: I think there is a pretty good reason for being close-mouthed?
It is not so much the information they get from these commercial firms., but the
protection of the firms as sources. They will feel a lot happier if they know
that whatever they give us is very closely held, And some of it has to do with
competition.
DIRECTOR: That is what they said when we talked to them. They are willing
to give the Government the information, but they don't want to see it come back
later in the hands of the fellow across the street who is working against them.
ADM. INGLIS: That was probably the factor in having the high classification.
I.R. TRUEHEART: It should. The fact that every effort will be made to
protect them as a source - probably it vould be a good idea to publish it so they
will know that we are taking every precaution to protect them.
MR. AM,,ISTRONG: I don't see any objections,
M. BOOTH: I would like to check that.
DIRECTOR: We will send it around with a voting slip. I brought it up
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because we got it just before lunch. At first glance it looks as if it is all
right to do it,
The only other item is just for information. That is, DCI 2/1 is over on
Mr. Forrestal's desk and we don't know how long it will be there,
ADL INGLIS: You had another item all tied up with that same argument.
The preparation of NIS.
DIRECTOR: The NIS, that is going on now, There is a joint group doing
this work for the NIS program which could continue to do it. And since this
Navy-Air dispute is within the Military Establishment and doesn't materially
affect the NIS program, they will keep on doing what they are doing.
ADM. INGLIS: As far as I am concerned it is all right with me if the air
information is hinged around the AID, and as long as they continue to function
and produce the things for the NIS we can let this decision about responsibility
ride until 111r. Forrestal puts out his clarifying directive, If that isn't
satisfactory we had better go ahead .-.,-ith this,
GEN. CABELL: I don't see quite what you mean.
DIRECTOR: It is going along all right now and I don't think you should
interrupt it,
ADZ-1. INGLIS: That is all right with me, but I thought it was coming up
today. This volume here, which is an outline of the NIS, and on one page it
gives the tentative allocation of responsibility for the preparation of NIS.
There are four items here which I believe the AID is working on. One has to
do with civil air facilities, another has to do with military air business, etc.
It is the type of work that AID is working on now, Now Navy has dissented from
the responsibility without any qualifying phrases of that to the Air Force.
That dissent is still in the state of inanimate suspension and has not been
reconciled because it is tied up with this business which is on 711r. Forrestal's
desk. I don't think you care as long as it is continued,
DIRECTOR: You can't continue very long -without this thing being settled.
ADDS. INGLIS: Not indefinitely, but if you are willing to let it rest in
that inanimate suspension as to the designation of responsibility, but that AID
continue to produce the work, and are going to continue the work, that is
acceptable with us,
GEN. CABELL: We would propose to continue working on the basis of this
allocation under the assumption that after that inanimate suspension it would be
along the same lines,
ADII, INGLIS: That is where I differ, I can't agree with that assumption.
We would agree that the decision go Co vray, That is where the conflict is,
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GEN. CABELL: It seems to men in any case, it would come to an overlap.
ADM. INGLIS: There is no need for an overlap because it is AID stuff we
are working on.
GEN. CABELL: I don't see any reason to expect us contemplating the changing
of that allocation. That is the best evidence there is right now.
ADM. INGLIS: This has not been formally agreed to and if the lack of a
formal agreement interfers with the work, then it is serious and should be
dissolved right away. But if it is not we can continue.
GEN. CABELL: I don't see how with the lack of an agreement we could
continue.
DIRECTOR: We would like to have it continue. Ilavp you anything else.,
Prescott? Anybody else anything? We will call the meeting over. (2:15)
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