MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN DIRECTOR'S CONFERENCE ROOM, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON 20 OCTOBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000100140002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MIN

DRAFT
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Co erence Room, Administration Building
Centr telligence Agency, on 20 Octo er 950
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
Presiding
dBERS PRESENT
Department of State
Department of Army
Department of Navy
Department of Air Force
Atomic Energy Commission
Joint Intelligence Group,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Mr. Fisher Howe
- Major General R. J. Canine
Colonel Hamilton Ilowze
- Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson
Captain John N. Ocker, USN
- Maj. General Charles P. Cabell
Brig. General E. Moore
- Dr. Walter F. Colby
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson
- Brig. Gen. Vernon E. Megee,USMC
Captain R. G. McCool, USN
Federal Bureau of Investigation- Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz
Central Intelligence Agency - Mr. William H. Jackson
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/,The agenda of the meeting was "Policies and Procedures of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee."
C.I,4 Qevv-toe ,e" ~-S
2.In opening the meeting, General Smith gave a brief resume of
some of the problems affecting the Central Intelligence Agency
which were deemed of interest to the members of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee. He referred specifically to certain drafts of
proposed NSC directives,which were under discussion at the time
General Smith took over the duties of Director of Central Intelli-
gene-between representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Department of State and the Department of Defense. In general.,
the drafts under discussion were designed to implement NSC 50.
h h ov of the Director of Central. Intelligence, the
Department of State and Department of Defense, further consideration
of these drafts was terminated on the basis of General Smith's
assurance that NSC 50 constituted a sufficient directive at the
present time. General Smith stated that NSC,_ giving -t effect (-
substance to the recommendations of the so-called Dulles Committee
Report, had not yet been carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency but that it was his intention promptly to carry out this
directive except in one respect. The exception related to the merger
of the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordina-
tion, and the Contact Branch. of the Office of Operations. This
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merger was considered neither practical nor advisable at this time,
;as-# C o t t t b General Smith t ' the coordination then
offices., recommended by the Dulles Report and he
n
National Security Council., could be achieved by more effective
cooperation without actual merger. General Smith's position in
regard to this aspect of NSC 50 had been made clear to the National
Security Council at its meeting on 12 October 1950 and had been
approved by the Council.01eneral Smith also stated that he had
encountered another problem in the Central Intelligence Agency
which arose out of confusion as to the position of the Office of
Policy -Coordination in relation to the Central Intelligence Agency
4P~'s
and to guidance from the Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Defense. General Smith said that he construed NSC 10/2,
though somewhat ambiguous., as giving clear responsibility and
authority to the Director of Central Intelligence for the activities
of the Office of Policy Coordination. He said that guidance from
the Department of State and the Department of Defense was essential
for the success of these operations and that, as a matter of procedure,
he was willing that such guidance be given by representatives of
the Department of State and the Department of Defense directly to
Mr.'Wisner. However, Mr. Wisner would act under the authority and
subject to the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, who,
under NSC 10/2, was responsible for Mr. Wisner-s operations.
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S ,In referring directly to the work of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee in the future, General Smith expressed his opinion that
this Committee should meet more often and for longer periods
UJ~?
although, as chairman, he wi-1-1 make every effort to keep the meetings
as brief as possible. He stated that the Intelligence Advisory
Committee must be geared for rapid cooperative work
s the~best rote ig6fi`ce ra rie in h
f? 6. r 4i-%-pe-i-nt C` neraFSmith read from a memorandum itten by
Mr. William H. Jackson, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as
follows:
The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for
National Intelligence Estimates,
One of the princ#al duties assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency '"'for the purpose of coordinating the
j intelligence activities of the several Government depart-
ments and agencies in the interest of national security"
is "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
the national security, and provide for its appropriate
dissemination." The Central Intelligence Agency is thus
given the responsibility of seeing to it that the United
State has adequate central machinery for the examination
and interpretation of intelligence so that the national
security will not be jeopardized by failure to coordinate
the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on
all available information.
Although the Act provides that "the departments and
other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelli-
gence," the statute does not limit the duties of the Central
Intelligence Agency to correlate and evaluate intelligence,
except by the standard of "national security."
The purport of the National Security Act can be
understood and justified in the light of the history and
general objectives of the Act. Behind the concept of a
Central Intelligence Agency lay the necessity not only for
the coordination of diversified intelligence activities,
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and for the performance by the central agency itself of certain
services of common usefulness, but also for the coordination
of intelligence opinion in the form of reports or estimates
affecting generally the national security as a whole.
The Act apparently gives the Central Intelligence Agency
the independent right of producing national intelligence. As
a practical matter, such estimates can be written only with
the collaboration of experts in many fields of intelligence
and.with the cooperation of several departments and agencies
of the Government. A national intelligence report or estimate
as assembled and produced by the Central Intelligence Agency
should reflect the coordination of the best intelligence
opinion, based on all available information. It should deal
with topics of wide scope relevant to the determination of
basic policy, such as the assessment of a country's war
potential, its preparedness for war, its strategic capabilities
and intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of direct
attack or indirect pressures. An intelligence estimate of
such scope would go beyond the competence of any single
Department or Agency of the Government. A major objective,
then, in-establishing the Central Intelligence Agency was
to provide the administrative machinery for the coordination
of intelligence opinion, for its assembly and review,
objectively and impartially, and for its expression in the
form of estimates of national scope and importance.
The concept of national intelligence estimates underlying
the statute is that of an authoritative interpretation and'
appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers
and planners. A national intelligence estimate should
reflect the coordination of the best intelligence opinion,
with notation of and reasons for dissent in the instances
when there is not unanimity. It should be based on all
available information and be prepared with full knowledge
of our own plans and in the light of our own policy require-
ments. The estimate should be compiled and assembled centrally
by an agency whose objectivity and disinterestedness are not
open to question. Its ultimate approval should rest upon the
collective,pespenslbility of the highest officials in the
lligence agencies. Finally, it should command
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Bence estimate.
Although the task is made more difficult by a lack of
general acceptance of the concept of national intelligence
estimates in the Government, it is, nevertheless, the clear
duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under the statute to
assele and produce such coordinated and authoritative
esti tes.
available and presumably the most authoritative intelli-
ion and respect throughout the Government as the
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5f 7 There followed a discussion of the above excerpt from the
memorandum and there was general assent at the meeting to its state-
ment of the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for
national intelligence estimates. General Smith stated that, in
order to discharge thy, responsibility of the "ter ^~ T 11 Bence
intelligence estimates, he proposed at the
earliest possible time to set up in. the Central Intelligence Agency
an Office n omates. This division, in his opinion,
would become the heart of the Central Intelligence Agency and of
the national intelligence machinery. Services of common concern,
now performed in the present Office of Reports and Estimates but
not including the production of political intelligence, would be
e-
placed in a separate office or division which mightb
called Office o of Research and Reports. The latter
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would confine its activities to the production of reports as a
service of common concern in fields assigned specifically by
directives of the National Security Council. It was pointed out
fact that the
by Mr. Jackson that the/Office of Reports and Estimates has in
the past produced both national estimates and miscellaneous reports
in various fields,whieh could not possibly be construed as national
estimates, had blurred and confused both the product and function
of the Office of Reports and Estimates. There 1 been insufficient
differentiation between the form and the coordination procedure in
connection with the two products and in their methods of production.
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General Smith said that, as to the matter of form, in the future
intelligence estimates produced by the Central Intelligence Agency
on the basis ofintelligence contributions from the various intelli-
gence agencies and concurred in or dissented from by the respective
agencies would be published under a cover showing plainly that the
estimate was a collective effort a -i wou -.?be labeled as a
zz national intelligence estimate. ,,;,,AU
e o owed in the ure n-c
ers:E
Be-
S. The Intelligence Advisory Committee will adopt an
intelligence plan, or more specifically, a list of
required national estimates in an order of priority.
~. In the case of a particular estimate, a frame of
reference and the assumptions on which the estimate
is based will be discussed and approved by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee.
Work on the estimate will be referred in the first
instance to the Office of Reports and Estimates, or
to the Office of Estimates when it is established
in the Central Intelligence Agency, and the several
intelligence agencies will be consulted and a time-
table fixed for contributions to the national estimate
within the fields of their respective interests.
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On the basis of these contributions, the Central
Intelligence Agency will produce a first draft of
the proposed national estimate.
This draft will be sent back to the agencies for comment
and modification and for further discussion if required.
On the basis of such comments and discussion, the Central
Intelligence Agency will produce a second draft of the
estimate.
This second, or later drafts if required, will be
submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for
final discussion a 4 resolution of differences and
iQZU&Wm approval.
If differences cannot be*resolved and i :e approval
all
obtained, the estimate will be published with notation
It was made clear by General Smith that this procedure would not
and could not be followed in the case of so-called "crisis estimates."
In the event of need arising for a quick or crisis estimate, a
procedure similar to that used in the recent instance when the
President called for a series of estimates prior to his depatture
fora meeting with General MacArthur would be followed. That is,
a special meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee will be
called and representatives of the various intelligence agencies
assigned at once to the production of a draft of the required estimate
for immediate submission to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for
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SECRET
Advisory Committee there would be discussion of'the frane of
references and assumptions to form the basis of an intelligence
estimate of the situation in Indo-China. t was also agreed that
General Smith will produce a paper fors mission to the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee indicating how he Central Intelligence
Agency will function in the theater of operation in time of war.
The next meeting of the Intelligencer'Advisory Committee was scheduled
for Wednesday, 25 October, 3:00 P.M
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