STATE/DEFENSE STAFF STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000200040042-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 42
• Content Type: MEMO

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.T 7 wx
Analysis of th.3 Staff Study
the Director of Central InteLUgence for the production of national
intelligence, to that of a collective responsibility of the Intelligence
ISSG directive is to change the individual statutory responsib
1. The actual objective of sub ect study and its inplanentdagy
Advisory Committee.
2. The study accomplishes its actual objective in the NSC Directive
as follows:
ao by interpreting the National Security Act of 191L7 es
amended in paragraph 10 b and 10 c in the f ol.` oo .ng manner:
/:,1)
"4:.. Until the emergence of a national estimate or
study from the IA.C s collective responsibility is inescapable
under the Act of l9l:7 ."
1. ~.:.e full statutory respon 1 .bli ;y of the D/CI
for h e production r X na L.ional ln.?f~3.13.i.;a c? becomes operative
only when. . . 3 f'ia .l drafts of wr.r-.tior$al a: Umates or st:ad:'#.es
are recwtrie x ed, by, 'the L#.C to the biCJo
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1'. by defining national intelligence in paragraph 2 in such
a way as to rescrib?: it3 production as being a "cooperative process
of preparations (production `,y com-Attee) for the purpose of i tegratix.m.
(i.e. incorporating the substance of) the best intelligence opinion
of the departments.
c. by providing the lAC with responsibilities in paragraph 3
for planning, prescribing scope and terms of reference, initiating
projects, reviewing and accepting or rejecting drafts, and, in certain
cases, producing national intelligence estimates and studies, including
related liaison and coordinating functions presently allocated to
the D/CI and CIA.
d. by providing in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 an organizational
realign ent of the intelligence production facilities of CIA which
transfers the current intelligence and estimating facilities from
the jurisdiction of the D/CI (except for administration) to the
functional direction and operational control of the IAC, and further
which provides the IAC with responsibilities for functional direction
of the remainder of CIA's intelligence production and collection
machinery. (See Chart attached under Tab A.)
3. Using the National Security Act of 19117 as amended, the NSCID's,
the Dulles Report and NSC 50 as terms of reference, the study asserts:
ao that a Teri e a has indicated that the c uElI ty of national
intelligence estimates has not substantially improved since issuance
of NSC 50 (1 July 19149).
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b. that unwarranted duplication of effort as between the
various agencies has conti ed.
la. In support of these assertions, the study states that the above
conditions result in large measure f7ronis
a* disagreement betveen CIA and departmental agencies as to
the meaning of national intelligence.
b. inadequacies of existing mechanisms and procedures for
the production of national intelligence.
Co continuing internal CIA confusion between its responsibility
for producing national intelligence and miscellaneous research and
reporting.
5. The study concludes that remedial action required consists of:
ao re-defining national, intelligence in such terms as to
prescribe the principle of collective responsibility of the IAC
for its production as the criterion which distinghishes it from all
other kinds of intelligence.
b. Revising existing mechanisms and procedures in accordance
with the principle of collective responsibility.
CO reorganizing CIA to place its current intelligence and
ostiznating facilities unitr the functional direction and operational
control of the IAC, and the remainder of CTA's production and
collection facilities under the functional direction of the IAC.
6. Accordingly the study reecarnends that the NBC:
av approve and issue the I plementing NSC directive attached
to the studyr.
SEMEN
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SEMMT
b. place a limit on the strength of the proposed National
Intel'l.igence Woup, not to exnesd 100 officer and/or professional
personnel of wham not more than 20 may be detailed by the departmental
agencies. (Notes After the accumulation of operating experience,,
the D/CS, with advice and assistance of the IAC, will recommend to
NBC such modifications in strength and composition of the National
Intelligence Group as may be necessary.)
c. Note that the D/CI with advice and assistance of the
IAC will submit revisions of a string N$CID's and D/01', as may be
required to bring those directives into conformity with the attached
directive.
II. Discussion
1. The principle of collective responsibility of the IAC for the
production of nationaa intelligence is hither present nor implied in
the National Security Act of 1917 as amended. On the contrary this
responsibility is clearly an individual statutory responsibility of the
Director of Central Intellig a and the Central Intell igeance A?enoy,
as evidenced by the references cited below.
a. Reference Section 102 do "...it shall be the duty of
the , . - . (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to the national security . . . using Wam appropriate existing
agencies and facilities. . . . Provided further, that the departments
and other agencies sha2.l continue to collects evaluate, correlate
and disseminate deepartae tawl intelligence.
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91ORET
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believed that this assert-Lon is more valid in theory than in fact. CIA
has negotiated =Interdepartmental Operating Procedure designed to
accomplish an interchange of information on projects undertaken by each
of the departmental intelligence agencies. Until very recently only the
Department of State has canpl.ied with the procedure. then and if the
procedure becomes fully operative within each departmental agency there
will be a basis upon vhich action can proceed to reduce such duplication as
may arises
8. The assertion that "continuing disagreement between CIA an the
one hard and the departmental agencies on the other as to the meaning of
national intelligence" is true, as evidenced in subject study. CIA cannot
accept the definition of national intelligence which the subject study
recoamnends in view of the fact that the definition prescribes the principle
of collective responsibility of the IAC for its production as the criterion
hich distinguishes it from all oar kinds of intelligence. Accordingly
CIA has re-defined national intelligence in terms of content and end use
and as an ixdividual statutes responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence and CIA. A copy of this definition is incorporated in
Section 10, paragraph 1 of the attached CID under Tab B.
9, The at r further annrges that existing mechanisms and procedures
for production of national intelligence are inadequate on the grounds that
they do not insure its production in accordance with the principle of
collective responsibility. Aoordin.gly, CIA,, for reasons expressed under
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amended, that thie princip .e haa been disav 3 by to Natio l amity
Council in 3ISC rC dated I Julir I91k9, and further, tiat this princsiple is
invalid on the =c nds that it -violates the concept of a strong dental
Intelligete a Agt ne r, reww:s the control and authority of the Dirp-ator
of Central Intcaii.i. e aver :: cbexttsra present available to him to
discharge responsibilities fc -~iich. he is held solely respcdnsib , and
that it imposes deities w3m the dewartmentai a ies which ez ea their
particular respo? ibik.itiec and catLot teuceo
That a Subject stems= ted at the late .I . a
level of the Departanent in vi o 1t o oaig re dMAWNW. to one of tim
fourA etron prc ~~ b x
- _3. - irct,.. aaiu~a j.ot st r v Q st otild
pre or NSC aotioat on its nttachM draft NSCID0 -
IPa_ Reco m endat:ko
1. That jO-u- '1''a-
Hr0 Webb, c los a copyr (W the XD inc1
TMIAM BA 3ITT
Assistant Director
reports and {' tin, tea
CONC1 R1 EN'C1
Executive, CIA
General Coel
Chief.$ COAR3
Chief,, 031
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Accompanying the State/Defense S
NATIONAL
IhMLLIGEN03 GROUP
(NIGr
*1 Composition of IAC s me as at present
,X1B';LLIGEKGE
STAFF
(CIS?
NATIONAL
ESTIMATES
STAFF
SB=
SECRET
ai:4 }~s rr~~c ... grj3ti
f Study t-5- - t l ,?onai IntreUl i ' on tu.IEi 1".~ G`4~.tly a.CA.; si,i i xld v.i. ~:1Zw"
+a ted I a r ? 925+
r
Performs functions of the IAC not requiring action by head
of agency
*3 Each me-mbe& of 1AC shall designate one f jJ.4j r ,presentative
on 1AC staff, except that JIG and ALC representation is optional
:4 Chief, NIG, is D/CI"s representative on IAC staff
Approved For Release 2002/
4? ;;r to 100 officer and/or
'o:n3.rated by departmen al
 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL ECR T~
SENDER WILL CHILE CLASSIF'^ATION TOP AND BOTTO
oved For Release 20
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
INITIALS DATE
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2
3
5
FROM.
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7-7APPROVAL'
INFORMATION C- (SIGNATURE
I JACTION
I DIRECT REPLY II RETURN
COMMENT
PREPARATION OF REPLY FI DISPATCH
CONCURRENCE
II RECOMMENDATION II FILE
REMARKS: T
GXai
0j
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Aim
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