(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090031-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORT

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Had an extended talk eith Mr. Farley of the NSC Secretariat respecting intell4
gence support for NSC activities. Farley indicated to me the tentative plan of
collecting a reference book for use by the President and we discussed informally
the sources that might be called upon to furnish material for such a book. I
explained to Farley the importance of the intelligence arrangements that had been
made under the National Security Act of 1947 and had been implenented through the
XAC* I emphasized the value of having national intelligence prepared upon a
coordinated basis. Accordingly I felt it important to insure that any information
within the competence of the IAC be obtained from the DOls who acts as intelligence
adviser to the President. We discussed briefly whether or not information respecting
forces of Allies, such as the Nato countries, should be furnished by the DCI or by
Defense. I indicated that I desired to discues this question with the DCI and,
indeed, that I desired to obtain his views upon the whole plan of activity upon which
1 the Secretariat was engaged, / also indicated briefly to Farley the fact that I
desired to strengthen and make somewhat more responsive to emergency requests the
intelligence support that was presently being afforded NSC, particularly in the
formulation of NSC papers in the NSC Senior Staff. With respect to this, I commented
that at present there seemed to be a gap in that intelligence requirements for such
NSC papers were not spelled out in enough detail to enable the intelligence
mechanism to devote itself to the specific questions of fact with which the NSC Staff
was concerned. Mr. Farley was extremely interested in this view and we both recognized
the obvious connection between this matter and the problem of periodic reporting by
the NSC Senior Staff which had earlier been raised by Ur. Farley in a discussion
with W. Dulles and myself. At the conclusion of this meetings I undertook to
(1) have a talk with the DCI and advise Mr. Farley of his views on the several
questions raised, and (2) ultimately give Mr. Farley an outline of how I thought the
NSC papers could be coordinated with National Intelligence Estimates. I shall have
to have to have an extended discussion with the DCI on the points raised at this
meetings probably in the evening. 16 JanuarYe 14
Respecting intelligence support for NSC, the Director indicated that he was
milling to send a memorandum to Jimmy Lay expressing the view that intelligence
2 support for NSC papers should be in the form of a coordinated intelligence estimate
and requesting assistance in defining the terms of reference for such answers as early
as possible. 22 January, 13 a
Another thing that concerned me was the lack of exact correlation between the
policy decision being made by the Ultima Security Council and the intelligence
prepared as a basis for such decisions. This was an extremely complicated question,
but / had already initiated steps to see that the intelligence Units were better
informed as to what was likely to cone before the Council and also to clarify the
3 neteee of the intelligence questions that would be asked, at the earliest possible
moment. To some extent this would have to be done on an neves only" basis with the
Us, but I felt certain that they would be able to see that their -working people
had sufficient guidance. 28 January, 7. 2. b
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Rad a meting
of a joint planners
reference to certain
Partridge read over
reams for approaching
and intelligence had lone
suggested to Gen. Bradley that eery liairen be exchanged, but nothine ha e as yet
resulted. It its my own feeling that eben this suggestion its considered in the
abstract, many fears and objectione -Joule be raised, but many of tbeee veuld likely
disappear in working upon a partioular project. Under the circumstance's. the China
project (which was now entitled SIB 3) seemed to afford an exoellent eheilce to try
out a joint operation. Gaa. Cabala eomeented briefly on the desirabilitr of
bitting this problem at its root. Be believed that veregameng should be left to the
*feint Chiefs of Staff, but be faller appreciated that it would be most desirable te
give /*relativity* to esti tee at the earlieet possibae stage so that they would be
directed to the real questions that were under consideration by the planners and
ultimately by the policy-mekers. After sone diecuesione it its agreed that if
SIC 3 were not in too advanced a state, CIA would have the terms of reference
reviewed by the Joint Chiefs' planners (the channel to the planners being Gen,
Partridge). Ewing this; review, tee planners could inlicate any additional questioes
they desired to have explored or eleAt suggest certain assumptions rhice Should be
stilted in the estimete. The meehanies and details were not as important as trying
to bring the estimate morc into he with the realities of the situatiae. I
explained to Oen. Cabell that this erocedure was almost exaatly parallel to the one
that had already been developed in dealing with the NSC Senior Staff Steorieg Group
and that I felt certain that it woad have a good prospect of success. 4 Arch, 2
L.
Securely ktrorrreatiow
n. Cabal arse Gee. Partridge to explore the possibility
ict to eatimate the situation in China, with specific
recent cables. Both Oen, Cabell and Gen.
After they Imuldone so, I explained ey
s Tbe possibility of liaison betmeen planners
neideratioa. The Director bad recently
Gen. Cabal and Oen. Partridge hand-carried to the Director the decision of the
03S making arrangements for Val** with the planners* Following aar meeting with
00e. Smith, I net brieferwith Oen. Cabell and Oen, Partridge and explained what
had in mind in organizing an IRC. Gen. Cabell, particularly, was infaeor of such a
developnent, 7 berth, 14
Attended a resting between the NSC Steering Group and the Board of National
Estimates. The followine points were brought outs
64 litre Poblen indicated that it would be most helpful to have estimates
an the table (tiring the discuesion of the various policy papers and I
endertook to have thin dens*
6 b,Yr. Noyes of Defame indiaated that some indication of what had previeuely
been covered would he molt helpful. Dr, Sent stated that 0/SE had prepared
a card index of the Deb/Asa:A eatter of the National and Speeial Estimates
which ahead be of value in this respect, Such indexed= be distributed
to Steering Oroup members.
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int
ee Mr* Schlen pointed out thef estimates tended to emir shorteterm periode,
*t3* policy pawn mere tended for a longer tem It mould be moot
some of the **bates could cover longer tarriII co se to be
the policy ?vers, We underfedk to leek into this question*
de Various nowhere of the Star expressed interest In having mere eatisates
severing the irplicatieee of verieue contemplated ?curses of action* It was
pointed out that we ?meld helve to reeeive notice of west ceureee of elation
iere contepplated in order to prepare suet papers, but would be glad to do
80 if Stvec adequate netieee
e* I emphasised thn desirability of the Staff members themselvee reviewing
term of referenee and Sr. Bohlen emphasised the value to the senior
Staff of bovine drafts of eetinates, prior to the final product, while
they mere considering v *Weer peper. We undertook to been sreh drafts
distributed to than*
, of the Staff indicated the deeirebility, particular
of elternate vie= and dissents tf- various Tee membere,
W tond to eharpen up the conclusions of the papers.
o a disc ion as to the value of factual tabs, and it was
such tabs meld be extremely helpful on some, ateough not
re. It 1rae felt that such tabs should not be distributed
coneumerv, but it would be of value to the Staff nenbere to have
attached to the evtleate.
S*
he Dr* Sent raised the
worked out in some d
item felt the_t the
language than they had
not the attar +e conStriOtS
the estimative terms,
estimative language that had been
d the reaction was mixed, although
idtratger cleaner from the point of
I. Lay seriously questionedmtether or
eould ever be educated as to the meaning of
is As respects the use of aphs and mope, the taft eembers mere unanimous
an to their values
itro Livermore, am, indicated that it mouldbe of value sometimes) mhen
=estimate maz bawd an a round-up of evidence mode sore tile prior to the
seteal isguenoo of the oetinite to inClude a etatemant to the effect
*This paper based upon late *
Palceine the meetthg T spoke to
oopies of all Mars sent to Senior S
to
MCA
and requested him to ineure that
be sent simultaneously bete to
Mr. Dunce and myetelf? since we +veld at 41 times be advised as to itett the various
Seam Staff people were receivile. 10 April, 10
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d r. Mae rang that Vie Direetor would probably vieh to coalent on
it came before the lt3C. Mr? Armstrong suggested that if a tumult
upon this progress report, an effort would probably be made to
ticism of intellirenoe support. I explained that ire fulky appreciated
armed It.* Amory that we might well have to write what in attest
brief on this subject, 7 Nagrit 5
Mr? Gleason of the NSC Secretariat phoned and stated that after reeding over
our paper :enacting intelligence Supert far economic eetivities, he obtained
the ispreesice that the policy agencies were seeking to use intelligenoe an a *tipping
post for failures of policy, X ird'ormsd him that an expresa statement to that
effect had been deleted from the driginal courant* khl. Gleason indicated no concern
at the 000rdination of economic 'warfare actirities. I intoned him that both Mr.
Dulles and Ur, 'Signer were loll are ef this and were raking representations to thzt
effects but there was a limit to mbieh CU could inject itself into the making and
enferosiant of policy.. Ile sold that he ultderstood the point and indicated that he
tread peeve his suggestions with State, 5 Ames 7
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