A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENT PRODUCTION ON THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000300010005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 13, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

r SECRET: r-
A rove F pr Release 2004/03/15: CIA-RDP67- 0059A000300010005-2
Office Mem5ranaum o UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : -Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates
FROM : Chief, Transportation Division, ORE
DATE: 13 December 1949.
SUBJECT: A Concept of National Intelligence Production on the Far East
1. Pursuant to EPB Notice No. 2-49 of 9 December 1949, the following com-
ments are submitted with regard to Tab A "A Concept of National Intelligence
Production on the Far East."
2. I am in general agreement with -the subject document, but believe that
a rearrangement of tIe paper and a redraft of some portions would increase its
effectiveness. By being organized into (a) statement of the problem, (b) dis-
cussion, (c) conclusions and (d) recommendations, the paper takes the form of
a document which arrives at certain conclusions after presenting the necessary
supporting agruments to prove the validity of the. conclusions. Actually, how-
ever, the discussion contained in paragraphs b, c, and d of paragraph 2 is so
brief that it constitutes little more than comments on the various c c asions.
The assumptions, moreover, are essentially statements of fact which proven
or accepted without proof, serve to substantiate the conclusions. This applies
particularly to the first assumption. The conventional use of assumptions, how-
ever, in documents of this typed is for the purpose of arbitrarily limiting the
scope of what would otherwise be an unmanageably broad problem.
61.e*t,4
3 view of the foregoing, I believe that one of two alte &t4 w sh
uld
o
be he` paper; either the substantiating argument should be expanded to
several times its present length and really prove the case contained in the con-
clusions, or theonc_lusions should start off the paper (in which case the state-
ment of the par-ev ' 'becomes unnecessary) .and the present descriptive matter should
follow the conclusions as a brief commentary.
4. Regardless of any rearrangement of the material which may be carried
out, the following modifications and amplifications are recommended:
"The security objectives of the United States in the
Far East cannot be satisfactorily established except in
the context of the world-wide tension caused by the
aggressive foreign policy of the USSR and its exploita-
tion of international Communism to further its advance
to world domination."
SIRRET
Assumption (1) - To describe the foreign policy of the US as a ?
struggle for power with. the USSR "does not seem to be a lofty
description of our international objectives. I suggest the follow-
ing text:
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Assumption (2) "Unless a basis for mutual accorunodation between the
US and USSR is found, mounting tension will inevitably result in
it
I am confused as to whether sub-paragraph (b) under Assumption_()__
is intended to refer only to the Far East or whether it applies to^world
position of the two powers generally. The present phraseology appears
to cover the US to the same extent that it refers to the USSR, although
the further contents of the paper do not give any indication of possible
developments whit right produce an ao_eumulation by the US of elements
of power which14 eventually nullify the will and capacity of the
USSR to resist. If the paragraph refers only to the possibility of in-
creasing Soviet power, it should be entirely redrafted, possibly as
follows: Assumption 2__(b) the gradual accumulation by the USSR on
terms short oho `'nts of power in the Far East, including
limited armed force, which may eventually nullify the will and capacity
of the US to resist further Soviet expansion in that area."
Conclusion 3 a. "Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:
(1) Vulneraby of the Far bast, area by area, to control unfavorable
to the US or to action by the US calculated to increase its influence
in the formulation of national policies in these areas. (2) Capabilities
for the acquisition and exercise of control in the Far East and for the
interdiction by the USSR of any US plans designed to increase its in-
fluence in the area. (3) (Note: This isnew text) Prevailing circum-
stances and probable trends in the Far East which can throw light on the
capabilities of the US to deny control of the area to the USSR or to
institute successful action for -the increase of its own influence in the
area.
Conclusion 3 b. "Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peace,
including: (11) The possibility of the formation of a comprehensive
war-making complex in the Far East, independent from, but potentially
able to support (a) other centers of Soviet power, or (b) the US."
(Note: Careful study of all factors may lead to the conclusion that
certain areas are most likely to form a war-making complex in
potential support of the USSR while other areas can organize resources
of direct military value to the US.) -
Conclusion 3 b. (2) "The probable existence or emergence in the Far East"
tremainder of sentence as now drafted).
The foregoing suggestions for changes in the conclusions are based
on the obvious possibility that the US, as well as the USSRmay take
positive action to achieve desirable objectives in the Far East.
Generally speaking, the conclusions as now drafted give consideration
only to possible action by the USSR. It would be manifestly unsound
for US planning echelons to discard the possibility of US positive
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1W Itao
action Without having considered the problem. For such consideration,
however, intelligence estimates as to vulnerability, susceptibility,
etc. of various areas to given courses of US action are essential.
25X1
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