COMMENT ON STAFF STUDY, 'A CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION ON THE FAR EAST' (TAB A).

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000300010012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 12, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

srANDARD FORM No.64 Approved for Release 2004/03/15: CIA-RDP67-00 9A00030
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO The Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates DATE: 12 December 1949
FROM :Chief, Global Survey Division
SUBJECT:Cpmment on Staff Study, "A Concept of National Intelligence
Production on the Far East" (Tab A).
Reference : EPB Notice No. 2-49
1. The Staff Study under consideration is unfit for submission
to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the National Security
Council. It should be withdrawn.
2. Detailed written comment in support of the foregoing
conclusion would include adverse criticism of every paragraph and
of almost every sentence in the Study and would greatly exceed the
Study itself in length. Urgent tasks of intelligence production
preclude the preparation of such a paper. I am, however, prepared
to support orally the following general criticisms.
a. The concept presented is Communistic in ideology
and consequently does not correspond with United States
policy objectives and security interests as authoritatively
set forth in public pronouncements and in NSC documents.
Its submission to the NSC for approval would be at best
naive, at worst offensive.
b. The estimate found in paragraph 2 is tendentious
throughout. Developed within the limitations of an exclusively
regional interest and competence, it is not a valid apprecia-
tion of the significance of the Far East in the global situa-
tion or in the global security interests of the United States.
c. This a priori estimate tends to prejudge the findings
of that program of intelligence production which it purports to
introduce. The occasional insertion of the word "possibly"
does not relieve it of that prejudicial character.
d. This wordy approach is totally unnecessary to accomplish
the action required. The salient intelligence. problems in
relation to the Far East can be identified readily enough
without this preamble. That is needed for their solution is
less abracadabra of "production planning", less propaganda to
gain attention for the area (which is now accomplished), less
diversion of thought and energy from the real work to be done,
and a better ooncortod effort to reach objective and well-
founded conclusions with respect to obvious, but unsolved,
intelligence problems.
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e. The conclusions presented in paragraph 3'are so
generalized, obvious, and incomplete that their approval by
the NSC would have no apparent meaning or utility. Indeed, I
would expect the NSC to question the professional competence
of a Director of Central Intelligence who submitted such a
question for Council action.
3. The foregoing observations are made with reference to the
text of Tab A'exclusively, in accordance with my understanding of
EPB Notice No. 2-49. I beg leave to submit, however, that, for
similar reasons, I question the validity and realism of the planning
concept of which Tab A is intended to serve as partial implementa-
tion.
25X1
cc AD/ORE
s/pP
Approved For Release 2004/03/15: CIA-RDP67-00059A00030001 @Q2 T