AN APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PLANNING.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000400060007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 26, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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iw~
25X1A
DATE% 26 January 1950
SUBJECTt An Approach to Intelligence Production Planning.
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON "PLANNING."
Nearly every large group (institution, military force, etc.) has
to have a "plan" to regulate and coordinate its work. Traditionally a
"plan" is conceived as a document defining the MISSION of the institu-
tion (the group effort that is being planned), analytically breaking
the mission down into component TASKS to be performed, and assigning
the tasks one by one ;_p the several component FORCES available in the
group. An "intelligence production plan," according to this usage,
should define the mission of the "national (CIA) intelligence" effort
and describe the tasks involved with sufficient precision to permit
assignment of specific tasks to CIA and to other intelligence agencies.
It is important to note that in many fields of comprehensive and
complex planning (e.g., broad or "grand" strategic planning by the
armed forces), there seldom exists a comprehensive "plan" in the form
of a single document. The comprehensive "plan" is simply the general
content of the formal deliberations and informal understandings of
several planning staffs (e.g., Joint Strategic Plans Group of JCS and
Planning Committee of Department of State) as that content might be
summarized at any one time. In other words, planning is a continuous
process going on in the minds of the planners. A single documentary
"plan," if it should exist, would be simply a projection of that con-
tinuous process onto paper for the purpose of examining it critically
and using it for reulating subordinate activities. In short, a
comprehensive "plan" on paper is a cross-section of continuous planning
as summarized for review or study at any one time. Naturally planning
or a "plan" thus conceived will be definite and specific with respect
to what is planned for the next month, less definite and less specific
for what is planned with respect to the period two-to-six-months in
the future, and very indefinite and unspecific with respect to what
is planned for the period beyond six months in the future. An
"intelligence production plan" regulating the comprehensive and
complex activities of CIA and. the other intelligence agencies is
likely to have these characteristics.
It is also important to note that planning the work of a large
institution seldom has been effective unless it was done by some of
the most able and experienced workers engaged in the particular
activity being planned. Planning is part of doing work, the first
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phase and an inseparable phase of doing work. It cannot be neglected
if work is to proceed in an orderly and efficient fashion, but it
cannot be divorced from the actual work and the actual workers if
plans are to be of any use in regulating the work of the institution.
In the field of ""intelligence production," then, "intelligence pro-
duction planning" is the first phase of the normal work of the
intelligence producers. There should be a clearly understood assign-
ment of centralized responsibility for such planning in CIA, and
this responsibility should be assigned to professionally competent,
substantively informed intelligence producers, part of whose duty
would be to keep in close touch with the substantive intelligence
work of the agency.
In the light of the foregoing observations about "planning" in
general, the specific job of "national (CIA) intelligence production
planning" may be attacked in three phases. The first phase is the
definition of the mission of the "national (CIA) intelligence"
effort. This mission must be described in sufficient detail and with
sufficient precision to identify the main component tasks. The
second phase is to complete the analytical breakdown of component
tasks, carrying it out to the degree of detail and precision appro-
priate to each kind of component task. The final phase, of course,
is assignment of forces to accomplish specific tasks, and is less
an intellectual problem than an administrative one.
In an effort to escape the confusion resulting from conflicting
uses of jargon, I submit the following "anatomy" of the intelligence
process. It comprises phase "one" of "intelligence production
planning," i.e., the definition of the mission of the "national
(CIA) intelligence" effort insofar as it relates to the activities
of ORE. The-difficulties in defining the mission are mainly semantic.
Most competent intelligence officers have a pretty good idea of the
intelligence process, but they use different sets of words to
describe it. Consequently, this "anatomy" uses a number of sets
of words, scrupulously relating them with one another. Some words
are interchangeable and some are not. The careful use of any of
these sets of words to define the mission of the "national (CIA)
intelligence" effort will provide the basis for phase "two" of
planning, the breakdown into detailed or at least specific tasks.
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 General System
of Identification
of Com~':)onent
Tasks
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Parallel Categ;crius and Sub-cateories of component Tasks in t e "recess
Repertcrial B: Pre-
Time { The Historical Past
(The accumulated body
Knowledge)
Function Descriptive-Analytical:
Collation, Research, and
Analysis of Si nificant
2atterns or Trends in +crld
:'?ffairs, usually with
Analysis of Bearing of Sig-
I on US Security Interests
i sort** RE & M - J
Classification (Background Study: Historical
of CIA L dia of Analysis of Situation without
Dissemination Estimate of Future form and
nature of the Patterns and
Trends Revealed)
The Fleeting
Historical Present
(Continuous, piece-
meal Accretion of
Knowledge )
Repertorial A: Brief
Report of liew or Newly
Revealed :.'vents cr
Situations ("Spot"
information).
In the language of the NSCID's, there is a vague correspondence
between Category r1 and "Basic" Intelligence, between Category i4;
tt tr
and "Current" Intelligence, and between Category f3 and Staff
Intelligence. This terminology has been worn out with thoroughly
ambi ous usage, and accordingly has been dropped in this "anatomy."
The Re.ort Classification of CIA !:edia of issemination
anatomized intelligence in two broad cateorijs, described as
"Reporting, Reviewing, Analytical Intelligence (roughly equivalent
to Category 1-1 and Category of this Anatcmy , and Synthesizing,
stimatin;h Intelligence (rc:u_,hly equivalent to Category -3 in this
anatomy. 25X1 A
liminary Estimate of
Character and Scope
of Change in Sig-
nificant .Patterns or
Trends as Altered by
New Events or itua-
tion_s
IP :ties y
ARE & IL : Group E
("Spot" Re~aorts )
The 'robable Future
('ro jection of Knowledge into
future)
i"stinative: Synthesis of Significant,
Patterns or Trends in yucrld Affairs,
Contingent -Prediction of future form
and nature cf these patterns or.trends,
and Estimate of their Future Bearing
on US Security Interests
ORE & IS7: Group r r
.(Analysis of Situation and Its BearingEms,
on US Security Interests with an
Estimate of Future Situation and
Bearing on US Security interests)
ORE a IM: Group B
(Analysis of Selected Factors in a
Situation and "Their Bearing on US
Security Interests with an Estima(
of Selected Factors in Future Situa-
tions and Their Bearing on US Security
Interests)
ORE & IM: Group C (1)
(Estimate of Future Consequences of
Hypothetical Action)
(Estimate of Future Consequences cf' heal rlctJon)
Division Jorkin; Papers
CIA Monthly
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-4-
IV. ANALYTICAL BREAKDOWN OF COMPONENT TASKS IN THE INTELLIGENCE
PROCESS.
Accepting the identification of main component tasks as listed
under Categories #1, 72, and #3 in the foregoing "anatomy" table,
there is considerable variation from category to category with respect
to the problem of further breaking down the tasks in detail and draft-
ing a production plan. Thence stems most of the confusion about
proper procedure in "intelligence production planning."
To dispose of the simplest case first, in Category #2, there can
be no planning beyond establishing media for dissemination of this
kind of intelligence and encouraging regular informal conferences
among the intelligence analysts who sift through the daily accretion
of "spot" information. This kind of planning is being carried on
adequately.
On the other extreme, in Category #1, production planning can
be comprehensive and detailed. Essentially a plan for this category
will be an encyclopedic cros=s-index of all the nations, regions, or
blocs in the world with all the topics of general political, economic,
and military significance. The NIS basic outline is an example of
the comprehensive and detailed character of this category of intel-
li-ence production and the plan for it. It is a summary of all the
information that is of use in national intelligence production rather
than of direct use to US national policy makers. The outline or
"plan" is relatively static because it describes an accumulated body
of knowledge. Keeping intelligence studies of this kind up to date
merely means revising the material periodically to introduce new
information. The "plan" remains the same. Perhaps the NIS basic
outline should be revised, but something like it, perhaps the out-
line of the SR series, is the "plan" for Category #1 intelligence
and is in existence.
For the most part ORE production probably should partake of
little of the nature of Category #1 intelligence. For certain purposes,
however, when the emphasis in intelligence studies is on the present
bearing of significant patterns or trends in world affairs on US
security interests, a simple "production plan" would be useful. In
effect it would he a priority listing of a comparative) few general
topics and a comparatively few nations or power-blocs of major sig-
nificance in US policy -pla ng. It is this latter kind of produc-
tion plan that D/FE and Dhave been directing their efforts toward.
If kept brief, such topical listings are useful as priority guides
for directing the work of analysts in CIA as well as farming out work
to other intelligence agencies. If extended, of course, they become
variants of the NIS basic outline.
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A working group of the committee seized of the "production
planning" problem can in a few weeks put together an outline priority
guide of this kind, coordinated within ORE and ready for coordination
with the other intelligence agencies. Essentially it will embrace,
25X1A as DAVE suggests, "foreign conditions or emergin?
situations w is affect US security or US vital interests.
What the committee should produce for this guide, which would have
to be revised at least quarterly, would consist of two lists. First,
it would contain a list of topics comprising the aspects of foreign
conditions or emerging situations that probably would affect US
security and vita]. interests. With this list would be a list of the
major nations, regions, or blocs in the world, indicating roughly
the priority of their significance to US security and vital interests.
In what detail the definition of "security" and "interests" would
need to be spelled out explicitly is a matter for discussion.
The effort should be to have one priority guide, not several,
and the guide should represent insofar as possible the global common
denominator of the priority suggestions of each area Division in
ORE. D/LA obviously would like to work out its priority guide in
terms of US "interests," and might persuade the committee to adopt
this system for all areas or permit a special sub-section of the
priority guide for D/LA. Other Divisions might have similar special
problems. But the composite guide or "plan" should have global
coverage. It should lay down a "plan" or priority for a period of
about a year and should be revised at least quarterly. The EPB or
some agent with delegated authority should be responsible for
approving this "plan" or priority guide and keeping it up to date.
It would constitute the first portion of the overall "intelligence
production plan."
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In a sense policy-makers "need" all the kinds of information that
fall into Category fl, because they will need intelligence reports
based on all this information. But submission of a detailed NIS-type
outline to top policy-makers for approval would be useless because
it would have no relevance to the specific problems confronting
them. Submission of a priority guide--the first half of a "produc-
tion plan"--also would be useless. This would be true partly
because it would be so general in content that policy-makers never
would have any grounds on which specifically they could approve or ,~
disapprove. It would be true partly because this part of the plant'
would refer to intelligence needs that would continue over a period
of a year's duration and policy-makers usually are thinking in terms
of a specific issue that needs to be settled within a month or at
least within a few months.
Because the US national policy-makers are usually preoccupied
with immediately urgent problems which they treat in specific terms,
the job of planning production in Category #3, which should bulk very
large in ORE's work, is of an entirely different character. Here is
where the specific "needs" of policy-makers enter the picture.
Anticipation of these "needs" must come from two courcess 1) a
careful scanning of the significant patterns and trends in world
affairs, particularly new or newly discovered situations with a direct
bearing on US security interests, with a view to contingent prediction
of their future form and nature, as well as their future bearing on
US security interests; 2) continuous formal or informal liaison with
the staff element at policy-making levels of the government (princi-
pally NSC staff, JCS staff, and Dept/State Planning Staff). This
process, which is the first phase and an inseparable phase of producing
estimative (Category 03) intelligence, must be continuous. It must
go on in the minds of the intelligence officers concerned with sub-
stantive production. At any one time a cross-section of the composite
judgment of a representative group of intelligence officers, globally
competent and with adequate liaison with policy staffs, would con-
stitute a specific schedule of projects defined by topic and/or
nation, region, or bloc..
If put on paper, this cross-section of the judgment of the
intelligence analysts would be a "plan" for Category #i intelligence.
It would have to be revised weekly or perhaps semi-monthly to be of
any use. Its coverage would extend to a period of between three
months and a year. In the plan as put on paper at any one time,
the projects listed for the ensuing month would be specific and
concrete. It would be to a considerable extent a "schedule" of
production and, with the addition of recent, unforeseen specific
requests from policy-makers, an actual "schedule" of production in
process. It would become less specific, less a "schedule" and more
a "plan" for the second month, and successively more general month
by month into the future until it was virtually indistinguishable
in content from the priority guide kind of "plan" produced for
Category +1 intelligence.
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This "plan" for Category #3 intelligence would be, speaking
precisely, a "tentative schedule of projects. The committee seized
of the problem of intelligence production planning could in a few
weeks make a "tentative schedule of projects," working with the
actual schedules and improvising in lieu of analyzing the results
of actual liaison with policy staffs. The reliability and usefulness
of this "tentative schedule of projects" would vary with the com-
petence and imagination of the group of intelligence officers
entrusted with revising it regularly. This group could also be
assigned the job of keeping up to date the "priority guide,"which
would need revision less frequently. In any i, put priority
guide, which we have called the first part of a production plan,
together with a tentative schedule of projects, which would then
constitute the second part, and you have an "intelligence production
plan" with the component tasks broken down in sufficient detail to
permit assignment of tasks to the forces available--i.e., CIA and
the other intelligence agencies.
V. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS TO AVAILABLE FORCES.
If a prototype intelligence production plan prepared by this
committee should be perpetuated b a competent group of professional
intelligence officers in CIA (ORE), an administrative aspect of
this group's work would be the assignment of various of the component
tasks (or various aspects of them) to the other intelligence agencies.
Thus a great deal of Category #1 intelligence is farmed out at
present, and the same principle would apply for farming out certain
units in the general priority guide part of the production plan.
Coordinating the priority guide and the tentative schedule of
projects with the other intelligence agencies would reveal a great
deal about the capability and intent of the other agencies with
respect to shouldering some of the burden of work. In assigning
specific tasks or aspects of tasks, the authority of D/CI would have
to be invoked and regular procedures followed, but the ORE profes-
sional group or unit responsible for production planning would have
to keep in touch with the process and adjust their production plans
accordingly.
As part of a plan on paper., the assignment of tasks would be simply
some coded indication of primary responsibility for the several
listings in the priority guide and the tentative schedule of projects.
Presumably CIA (ORE) would wish to take primary responsibility for
the most com rehensive national intelligence projects of the estimative
(Category #33 type, farming out projects of narrower scope in Category
#'3 and farming- out as much of all Category +1 intelligence work as
in practice proved feasible.
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