IMPROVEMENT OF FIELD REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000400140012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 4, 1949
• Content Type: MEMO

..STANDARD B RM P. 84
Approved For Relqpe 2000 8 RRVV"IA-RDP67-0004,,,9A000400140012-9
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
.TO Assistant Director, ORE P C /
DATE: 4 August 1949
FROM : Chief, Latin America Branch
rc r me~i~tr",pf Field Reporting of Intelligence
rv-
1. 1 i .-reeoommended bratthe attention be called to the implications
of a 24-hour suspension of official communications from Guatemala City during the
recent revolt withhview to steps being taken to prevent a recurrence of a similar
situation.
2. About noon on 15 July, Colonel Arana, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces,
was shot and killed. By evening of the same day fighting broke out in Guatemala
City involving the use of small arms, rifles, artillery, tanks, and aircraft.
Sporadic revolts and disturbances developed also in the provincial cities. Dis-
orders persisted until about midnight of 19 July. There were over 300 casualties.
3. From 6 p.m. on 18 July until the evening of 19 July practically all re-
liable channels of communication between Guatemala City and 'Nashington were out.
During this period the US Ambassador was unable to reach his post in Guatemala
City; the US Embassy could file only plain telegrams subject to government censor-
ship; SO channels of communication were cut; official and private US cable and
telephone traffic between the provinces and Guatemala City and between Guatemala
City and the US were inoperative for intelligence purposes; radio broadcasts
emanating from Guatemala City were subject to government censorship; and the con-
dition of the country's highways, airports, and railroads made it impossible for
US personnel within the country to cross the frontier and report on events. It
is true that during this period CINCARIB, alerted with respect to the situation
in Guatemala, was able to establish radio contact with the US Air Forces Mission
sub-base at La Aurora airport on the outskirts of Guatemala City. Since, however,
the fighting at and around the airport made it impossible for the mission to main-
tain contact with the US Embassy or other US personnel in the country, or with
other parts of Guatemala, little accurate information could be obtained through
this channel.
4. The 24-hour break in communications meant that Washington vas without
reliable information on which to base an estimate of the situation from the even-
ing of the 19th until the morning of the 20th. This short interruption may not
have been important in the estimation of medium- and long-range factors, such as
SECRET
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the effect of the revolution on the policy of the Guatemalan Government toward
the US. But it was damaging and might have been disastrous in the estimation
as to the degree of danger to the 1,900 US citizens in Guatemala and the planning
of adequate protection for them.
5. Much of Latin America is presently going through a period of consider-
able unrest which could reach serious proportions in the event of a worsening
economic situation. Civil disorders such as those which occurred recently in
Guatemala will probably occur in other of the American republics during the next
12 months.
6. It is the efore, in -our, vie , a matter of the highest importance that
positive action be taken by the appropriate authorities to permit Washington
intelligence agencies to maintain contact with field collection sources at all
times and to prevent a recurrence of the loss of contact such as occurred during
the recent Guatemalan disorders. It is also important that these methods of
contact not be interrelated; that is, that they not all be concentrated, for
example.,-in the US Embassy quarters, or in the hands of a limited number of per-
sonnel, since the existence of alternate independent channels is of the greatest
importance. One possible solution might be the supplying of US missions in the
other American republics with emergency radio transmission and receiving equip-
ment independent of local power sources
and o a1/fJ/.o raters.
these independent and alternate channels for intelligence reporting at the
earliest possible time.
25X1A
;-. st measures be taken to provide
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Approve or ease 21311310708723: CIA-KL)VbT--0DTI5-9AUUU4U
SEP 1947 9
UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECR T'
`JSENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)
ed For Release 2000/08/23 : -RDP67-00059AO004
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