REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000500090008-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 16, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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REVIEW OF THE WORLD
SITUATION
Published 16 August 1950
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
The USSR is proceeding methodically to
capitalize upon the advantages won through
its tactical departure in Korea of initiating
limited, local war by non-Soviet Communist
forces. The Soviet return to the UN has en-
abled the USSR to use this forum for a polit-
ical-warfare offensive as well as to hamper
US action in the UN.
The USSR has diplomatic freedom of action
because it has maintained the thin fiction of
having no responsibility for the actions of the
Soviet-advised, Soviet-equipped Communist
forces in Korea. Meanwhile, the unparalleled
public information facilities of the UN are be-
ing exploited fully to charge the US with "ag-
gression" and illegal intervention in the "civil
war" in Korea.
Behind this political warfare facade, the
Soviet-controlled North Koreans are driving
down the Korean Peninsula, drawing into ac-
tion the greater part of the combat-ready
armed forces of the US. At the same time,
the USSR is building up threats of aggression
at many points around the border of the So-
viet sphere of influence. An armed attack on
Taiwan by Chinese Communist forces could
be launched without necessitating the slight-
est change in Soviet policy and propaganda as
presented at the UN. While the long-range
effect might be to strengthen UN opposition
to Soviet aggression, an attack on Taiwan
would probably for the short-run sow con-
fusion and discord among the non-Soviet pow-
ers because of their fundamental disagree-
ment over the Chinese Communist recognition
problem. In other areas, comparable targets
for aggression (Indochina and Yugoslavia,
for example) are almost as inviting as Taiwan.
These threats of Soviet-sponsored aggres-
sion are forcing the Western Powers to begin
to mobilize military forces sufficient to deter
the USSR either from mounting new local
military aggressions or from exploiting its
own steadily increasing capability of openly
attacking the US and its allies. Despite gen-
eral recognition of the need for a greatly ac-
celerated rearmament program in response to
the Korean crisis, the efforts of the European
members of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT)
as presently planned fall short of the require-
ments for an effective defense of Western
Europe. An adequate program to form an
effective power-grouping on the continent
will require great US initiative and pressure,
a more closely integrated common effort un-
der the NAT, and a determined campaign to
lift European morale from its present apathy.
Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The information contained herein
is as of 11 August 1950.
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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Soviet Intentions.
Since the beginning of the Soviet-sponsored
attack in Korea, the USSR has been maneu-
vering to maintain maximum freedom of
diplomatic action and simultaneously has
been building up Soviet and Satellite capabili-
ties for direct military action. During the
next several months, Soviet leaders can
choose their own time for committing the
USSR to a particular tactical course of action.
Soviet leaders themselves probably have not
yet reached a firm decision as to whether the
USSR will profit more in the next few months
from: a) further Soviet-sponsored aggression;
b) Soviet-sponsored "peace" moves, preserv-
ing most of the advantages of the Korean
military adventure and providing ammuni-
tion for a vigorous campaign of anti-US po-
litical warfare; or c) initial adoption of the
"peace" move tactics, designed to soften and
disorganize the embryonic anti-Soviet coali-
tion in the UN, followed very shortly by fur-
ther aggression. Thus the USSR has the
initiative completely on its side, whether it
chooses to make the next clash with the non-
Soviet world a military or a strictly political
battle.
The USSR is exploiting the advantages won
through its tactical departure in Korea of
initiating limited, local war by non-Soviet
Communist forces. Not only is the USSR
waging a political and propaganda offensive
against the US, but it is also setting up for-
midable military threats of aggression at
many points where the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence borders on the Western world.
At this juncture and for at least several
months ahead, the USSR is in an excellent
strategic position. The main powers dedi-
cated to the containment of Soviet-controlled
Communism (the US, the UK, and France)
have become embroiled in costly military op-
erations in Asia, where, among other factors,
the indigenous nationalist revolt against
Western colonialism has enabled the USSR to
gain influence and harass the Western nations
with a minimum expenditure of Soviet effort.
Most of the combat-ready forces of the US,
the UK, and France are now deployed in Indo-
china, Malaya, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Korea. There have been powerful political
and economic reasons for Western commit-
ments in Asia, but the result has been a steady
drain on the military resources that otherwise
would bolster the defenses of Western Europe.
As the North Atlantic Powers begin the criti-
cal race against time to mobilize military
strength sufficient to deter or meet open So-
viet aggression, they have over their heads
the disconcerting threat of further limited
local aggressions, particularly in Asia, where
an attack on Taiwan or even on Indochina
could be disguised as local, nationalist civil
war. Such aggressions might draw off West-
ern combat resources almost as fast as they
are mobilized.
At the same time, the Western world can-
not overlook the ultimate Soviet threat of a
general war in which all Western Europe and
most of Asia probably could be quickly over-
run by the USSR. By securing military con-
trol of the Eurasian land mass, the USSR
would acquire a vast new economic potential
for war. Although its economy is weak in
some respects, the USSR is at present capable
of fighting a major war on a large scale for at
least a limited period of time. There is no
assurance, therefore, that the USSR would
not accept a substantial risk of war with the
US. Soviet leaders might consider it neces-
sary to accept such a risk in order to take
limited aggressive action that would, if suc-
cessful, prevent the US and its allies from be-
coming fully and effectively mobilized. If
they accepted a substantial risk of war with
the US, Soviet leaders in doing so would be
relying on their enormous combat-ready mili-
tary machine and the tactical unpreparedness
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of the Western world to outweigh US superi-
ority in strategic (atomic) bombardment ca-
pabilities. They also would hope to divest the
US of its allies, its forward bases, and most of
its combat-ready forces before the final show-
down came. In fact, if the Soviet leaders
should ever deliberately decide to resort to
open war to end US resistance to Communist
expansion, the USSR might find it profitable
to invite and finally provoke war with the US
by gradually badgering the US into declaring
war under circumstances that might cause
US allies to falter.
2. Malik's Return.
The preliminary tactics of the Soviet repre-
sentative, A. J. Malik, indicate that the USSR
returned to the UN Security Council to con-
duct a political-warfare offensive against the
US rather than to beat a strategic retreat from
the Korean adventure.
The reappearance of Malik to preside over
the August meetings of the Security Council
was an implicit admission that the Soviet tac-
tics of boycotting the UN were working to the
disadvantage of the USSR. By withdrawing
from its usual obstructionist role in UN de-
liberations and by denying itself the use of
the UN as a sounding board for Soviet propa-
ganda, the USSR had permitted the UN to
mobilize the non-Communist world in oppo-
sition to Soviet-sponsored aggression. In the
first few days of discussion, Malik has suc-
ceeded both in obstructing further UN action
and in playing up the current Soviet propa-
ganda line.
This propaganda, designed largely for the
quasi-neutral non-Communist countries of the
Far East, tirelessly asserts: a) the South
Koreans started the fighting in Korea under
US instructions; b) the war that has ensued
is basically a civil war for the unification of
Korea by Koreans; c) US intervention in the
Korean civil war constitutes open aggression
against an Asiatic people; and, d) the US is
intent on dragging other UN nations into the
struggle, broadening it into a worldwide war.
The USSR, of course, is portrayed by Malik
as a nation which has no responsibility for
the Korean incident, deplores US "aggression"
and "illegal" manipulation of the UN in sup-
port of US intervention, and has returned to
the UN in the interests of a "peaceful settle-
ment" in Korea. Reluctance of the Western
nations to state categorically that they hold
the USSR responsible for the whole North
Korean military adventure strengthens the
hand of Malik in the UN war of words.
Without winning its point on a single vote
in the Security Council, the USSR already
has benefited from its return to the UN by
confusing and obscuring the critical strategic
issues raised by the fact of Soviet-sponsored
aggression in Korea. The USSR may intend
by its tactics to confuse some and frighten
others among the non-Communist nations as
well as, perhaps, to hinder or prevent the
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and Mutual
Defense Assistance (MDAP) nations from tak-
ing the steps necessary to strengthen them-
selves against the threat of Soviet military
aggression.
At the same time it is waging propaganda
warfare, the USSR retains its diplomatic free-
dom of action to settle the Korean issue in the
UN. There is at present no sign that the
USSR will accept any Korean settlement that
brings less political and military advantage
than the Soviet-directed North Koreans have
already won. So long as US-UN forces con-
tinue to retreat, the USSR is under no imme-
diate compulsion to seek a settlement of any
kind. The USSR at some point during the pe-
riod when US-UN military fortunes are at low
ebb may well go beyond its proposal for a
cease-fire and withdrawal of UN "foreign"
forces from Korea. The Communists are al-
ready liquidating hostile leaders in occupied
southern Korea and proceeding to give a sem-
blance of reality to the organization of a uni-
fied all-Korean government. The USSR
might even sanction all-Korean elections un-
der some kind of limited UN supervision, but
only if advance preparations by the invading
forces virtually assured a North Korean-Com-
munist victory. Such proposals, which would
bring the Communists all the fruits of mili-
tary victory, can scarcely be described as "ne-
gotiated peace."
The main incentive for the USSR to relin-
quish political and military advantages already
won in Korea would be a Soviet desire to fore-
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stall an eventual US-UN counter-drive to or
beyond the 38th parallel in Korea. The USSR,
however, has the capability of preventing this
adverse military situation from developing in
Korea simply by sending Satellite military
forces into action in a diversionary operation
(if not initially as direct reinforcements in
Korea). There is no assurance in present So-
viet diplomatic conduct or in the present state
of Soviet military preparedness that the USSR
will make substantial political concessions
which would nullify or seriously reduce the
scope of Communist successes in Korea.
3. Target Taiwan.
As yet there is no conclusive evidence that
the USSR intends to exercise its option of dis-
persing and perhaps overstraining US mili-
tary resources by launching new local ag-
gressions of the Korean type, for example, by
an attack on Taiwan. Nevertheless, the line
adopted by Malik at the UN Security Council
meetings, urging that US intervention in
"civil wars" within the boundaries of a tradi-
tional state is pure "aggression," foreshadows
a propaganda broadside against US military
intervention in Taiwan. Such a broadside
may well be fired prior to or in the absence of
any military action, but it would be especially
effective in the event of a Chinese Communist
invasion of Taiwan. This fact alone raises
the possibility that the USSR anticipates an
early assault on Taiwan, resulting either in a
Chinese Communist military victory despite
the presence of US forces or in a defeat of Chi-
nese Communist forces at the hands of "ag-
gressor" US military units. The USSR might
hope in either case that the US would become
involved in a virtually endless war in which it
was cast as "imperialist aggressor" in Asia.
The strategic advantages that would accrue to
the USSR from such a development might
outweigh in Soviet minds the risk of perma-
nently prejudicing Sino-Soviet relations by
pushing the war-weary Chinese into another
protracted period of armed conflict. The di-
version of US effort and attention might in-
definitely postpone a powerful US-UN counter-
attack in Korea. The minimum gain to the
USSR would be the political disorganization
that probably would strike the present non-
Soviet majority in the UN because of the re-
luctance of several countries (the Indian,
British, and French governments in particu-
lar) to become associated with US interven-
tion on behalf of what they consider to be a
weak and discredited regime, the fugitive Chi-
nese Nationalist Government.
The Chinese Communists, meanwhile, ap-
pear to be proceeding with military prepara-
tions for the assault on Taiwan. Barring ef-
fective counter-action by US military forces,
Chinese Communist forces probably are ca-
pable of establishing a beachhead on Taiwan
and of establishing control over the whole
island within a few weeks.
The intention of the Peiping regime to "lib-
erate" Taiwan despite the intervention of the
US has become the principal theme of Chinese
Communist propaganda. Although no time
limit is set in Chinese pronouncements, from
a military point of view the most advantage-
ous time for a Communist attack would be in
the period before mid-September 1950. A suc-
cessful assault on Taiwan would strengthen
the Soviet and Chinese military position in
the whole Far Eastern area and would fur-
ther undermine confidence in US commit-
ments to contain Communist expansion.
4. Other Targets of Local Aggression.
Communist capabilities for initiating local
hostilities are by no means limited to Taiwan.
The Chinese Communists are capable of inter-
vening in Korea to prolong the fighting there
while the USSR builds up its propaganda case
against the US for "slaughtering" Asiatics
and "frustrating" Korean "unification" and
"independence". They are also capable of
invading Indochina and Burma or seizing
Hong Kong and Macao.
In all probability, these military adventures
are not scheduled to take place in the near
future. Although some of the alternate tar-
gets are almost as inviting or even more vul-
nerable in strictly military terms, the immedi-
ate political gains to be won in an assault on
Taiwan are greater than in any of the other
border areas. Moreover, military and politi-
cal exploitation of the Korean incident (let
alone an early Taiwan incident) might bring
broad advances of Communist influence
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through local Communist "liberation" move-
ments in Asia without direct military action.
The USSR may be inclined to discourage the
commitment of Chinese Communist forces
outside territory which is traditionally Chi-
nese, not only to bolster the propaganda
theme of US "aggression" in Asian "civil
wars" but also to keep the various non-Chi-
nese "liberation" movements tied to Moscow
rather than Peiping. The crossing of a well-
recognized international border, even those
of Hong Kong and Macao, would undermine
the Soviet campaign which aims to slow the
common defensive efforts of the North At-
lantic Powers and to "neutralize" such hesi-
tantly anti-Soviet states as India.
The factors militating against open move-
ment of military forces across international
frontiers also make Taiwan a more likely tar-
get for military aggression than Yugoslavia,
which nevertheless could be attacked virtually
without warning by the armed forces of the
nearby Soviet Satellites, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, and Albania. The forces of these
Satellites, substantially strengthened by a
steady increment of Soviet supplies and equip-
ment during the past year, probably are ca-
pable of overrunning the northeastern plain
of Yugoslavia. The ability of the Tito re-
gime, once driven from this area, to control
the remainder of the country is problematical
and depends largely on the feasibility of
prompt military assistance from the US and
its allies. The importance the USSR attaches
to Tito's heresy against Moscow-controlled
Communism suggests strongly that Yugo-
slavia eventually will be a target for attack if
the USSR proceeds to sponsor further local
aggressions through the medium of non-So-
viet military forces.
Other European and Near Eastern border
areas are less likely targets than Yugoslavia
for the immediate future. In Iran the neces-
sity of using Soviet rather than Satellite
troops to capture the country tends to inhibit
action against an otherwise vulnerable target.
The geographic position of Greece and Tur-
key, and the resulting logistic difficulties that
would beset a combined Satellite effort against
either of those countries, make Yugoslavia the
more likely target in this general region under
present circumstances. Similarly, the time
does not seem to be ripe for action in Austria
or Germany. The East German paramilitary
force being trained and equipped by the USSR
at present has no greater military capability
than to take over West Berlin. Unless the
USSR were willing at the same time to stop
the movement of Western reinforcements to
Berlin by reimposing a blockade, thus inviting
the US to attack Soviet forces and precipitate
war with the USSR, action in Germany is
likely to be postponed while the East German
forces increase their strength and combat ef-
ficiency.
5. Mobilization of the West.
These threats of Soviet-sponsored aggres-
sion are forcing the Western Powers to begin
to mobilize military forces sufficient to deter
the USSR either from mounting new local
military aggressions or from exploiting the
Soviet Union's steadily increasing capability
of openly attacking the US and its allies. In
response to the Korean crisis, the European
members of the NATO have recognized the
need for a greatly accelerated rearmament
program. However, their efforts as presently
planned fall short of the requirements of an
effective defense of Western Europe.
Behind this European reaction are several
political, economic, and psychological factors.
Most important, all the countries are fearful
of the impact of rearmament on their still
delicate economic stability. The desire of
armed-service chiefs and defense ministers to
proceed with building up effective forces is
still, as earlier among the Brussels Pact pow-
ers, blocked by the professed inability of the
finance ministers to divert the necessary
funds from the civilian economies. On the
continent in particular, the Europeans still
lack a firm conviction that any level of effort
on their part will suffice to prevent invasion.
It is this general pessimism that prevents a
more positive European response to the chal-
lenges implicit in the Korean crisis.
The comparatively modest British rearma-
ment proposal is based on the assumption
that the continuance of economic recovery in
Europe is a first-priority objective of both US
policy and Western defense. The British pro-
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posal is advanced as the utmost that can be
undertaken without going over to a wartime
economy. The Labor Government is reluc-
tant to try to lead the British workers very
fast or very far in the direction of curtailment
of living standards. As long as the British
feel that Western military power is primarily
a deterrent, and war does not seem imminent,
the British would certainly prefer that the
main rearmament burden be borne by the
vastly superior resources of the United States.
France, whose unstable government feels
that its delicate economic and political condi-
tion prevents it from undertaking the all-out
effort it clearly recognizes is necessary, is pin-
ning its hopes on shifting the financial bur-
den to the US through a combined or "pool"
rearmament program. Of the lesser NAT
countries, only Italy displays a strong deter-
mination to make a maximum effort, which,
of course, must remain within the sharp limi-
tations of the Peace Treaty. In view of the
reluctance and, to a large extent, inability of
the European allies of the US to make the
necessary sacrifices, an accelerated program
to constitute an effective power-grouping in
Western Europe will require US initiative and
pressure, even greater US economic and mili-
tary aid than now contemplated, a greater,
more closely integrated common effort, and a
determined campaign to lift European morale
from its present apathy.
In particular, a far greater degree of inte-
grated NAT effort seems absolutely essential
if European strength is to be built up as a
serious deterrent to the USSR. Tentative
moves in this direction are already underway
and the strong French and Italian pressure
for an integrated European army, combined
military budgets, and a combined high com-
mand will reinforce the trend. Such a pro-
gram will of course meet serious obstacles in
the inherent conservatism of national mili-
tary thinking which exists in all the NATO
countries.
6. Reaction of the Non-Soviet World to the
Current Korean. Situation.
The response of non-Soviet nations to the
US-UN intervention in Korea has continued to
be almost uniformly favorable, but there have
been many reservations and sober second
thoughts.
Among the Commonwealth nations, the UK,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have
supported the US position and have offered
military assistance to the UN forces. The
North Atlantic Treaty countries as a group
have promised moral and, in most cases, ma-
terial support, but so far have confined them-
selves to token commitments of military
forces. The offers of military assistance
from Thailand and the Philippines have been
particularly significant because they help to
disprove the Soviet propaganda line about
unilateral "Western" US attacks on Asian
peoples.
On the whole, continental Western Europe
still appears to be anxiously awaiting the out-
come of military operations in Korea, which
they fear to be doomed to the dreaded double
catastrophe of invasion and liberation. There
are increasing fears that the US cannot pre-
vent and perhaps cannot even substantially
delay the use of military force by the USSR.
Despite official efforts to accelerate mutual
defense preparations, a sense of defeatism
probably will be widespread and will lead to
dissatisfaction with the form and amount of
US assistance. These attitudes spring from
an enforced abandonment of wishful think-
ing. The nations of Western Europe have
been relying largely on a US atomic monopoly
and technological superiority to protect them
against Soviet aggression, despite the realiza-
tion that the USSR's military preparations
were resulting in ever-increasing strength.
Now, while there is growing awareness of the
need for a strong military force-in-being in
Western Europe, the accompanying sense of
helplessness may undermine NAT efforts.
In the Near and Middle East, the Korean
crisis has failed to shake the will to resist ag-
gression of the three border countries receiv-
ing US military aid : Greece, Turkey, and Iran.
They are seeking to strengthen their military
forces, and Turkey has responded to the chal-
lenge of Korea by offering troops to the UN
with a view to furthering its aspirations to
join the North Atlantic Treaty group. Israel
and Pakistan have meanwhile exhibited a
greater recognition of the extent to which
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their fates are bound up with the West. De-
spite continuing popular resentment of the
US-UN record in Palestine and the example
of Egypt's decision. to abstain in the Security
Council's vote on sanctions in Korea, the Arab
governments have in varying degree come
around to support the US-UN action in Korea.
The behavior of India and Afghanistan,
however, reflects a strong reluctance on their
part to become identified with the West. Al-
though India has backed the UN effort to re-
pel the North Korean invaders, Indian efforts
to mediate the Korean question and willing-
ness to support Soviet maneuvers to seat Com-
munist China in the UN indicate that Indian
thinking is still dominated by the desire to
remain "neutral" and a preoccupation with
India's position in Asia. The ambivalent at-
titude thus displayed is epitomized by its offer
of a detachment of medical troops for use in
Korea. Afghanistan, having recently con-
cluded a four-year trade agreement with the
USSR, is clearly bent on maintaining good
relations with its powerful neighbor to the
north.
Finally, their responses to the UN request
for assistance in Korea indicate that the
Latin American nations will give little mili-
tary assistance, at least under present circum-
stances. Their failure to make any consider-
able offers of direct military assistance is due,
in part, to local considerations (such as im-
pending elections in Brazil and isolationism
in Argentina), and also to an awareness on
the part of most of these countries that they
are unable to furnish aid of more than token
dimensions. In some countries the principal
support for direct military aid is within mili-
tary circles, and interest among other seg-
ments of the population is not strong enough
to provide a political basis for direct aid.
Points of difference between the US and vari-
ous Latin American governments (particu-
larly Brazil), and the feeling that the US has
subordinated Latin American interests to
those of Europe in the post-World War II pe-
riod, have cooled enthusiasm for US leader-
ship. Finally, the present situation seems to
most Latin Americans to offer no immediate
danger to themselves.
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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