MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00134R000200040011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 10, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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10 March 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Measures for Strengthening the Counter-
intelligence Posture of the United States
Attached are comments on certain recommendations of the
President"s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated November 22,
1963, and forwarded with your memorandum of February 8, 1964.
In accordance with Mr. McCone's telephone conversation
with you, I have responded to Recommendations 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13 and 21 in my capacity as Acting Director of Central
Intelligence, rather than as Acting Chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board.
Comments on Recommendations 14, 15, 16 and 17 represent
the joint views of the DCI and of the Department of State. Because
of the extreme sensitivity of these subjects, this portion of our
response is contained in a specially-classified annex.
With respect to Recommendation 7 (dealing with the use of
the polygraph), coordination between officials of CIA and of the
Department of Defense is proceeding. A good deal of new ground
must be broken in implementing this recommendation, and we are
not in a position yet to make definitive comments to you.
MARSHALL S. CARTER
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Attachments
Copy to President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
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RECOMMENDATION
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Att. #1
That, within each sensitive agency where the practice is not now being followed:
(a) strict personnel security standards, including standards of personal conduct,
be applied to all personnel having access to sensitive information or sensitive
operations; (b) that these standards be applied equally to civilian and military
personnel regardless of rank; and (c) that serious questions of doubt concerning
personnel having such access be resolved in favor of the national security.
Comment
Concur. It should be the goal of the intelligence community to estab-
lish standardized and strict personnel security criteria for all personnel,
military and civilian, participating in intelligence activities. All personnel
having access to sensitive information or sensitive operations should meet
like security criteria prior to access and their continued security wellobeing
should be monitored thereafter on a generally uniform basis.
A standardized security program for all intelligence personnel could
best be achieved by each agency developing centralized security control from
an organizational standpoint together with uniform criteria and standardized
techniques for the application of the criteria. Such standardized security
programs would greatly facilitate the exchange of personnel between depart-
ments and agencies and would enhance greater participation in joint projects
without security variations.
A standardized security program for intelligence personnel would
lead to a more uniform approach to the resolution of questions involving an
individual's suitability and would certainly foster the protection of national
security interests.
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The Security Committee of the USIB could assist in the development
of uniform personnel security standards and the preparation of guidelines
for the monitoring of personal conduct.
That, as a means of achieving major counterintelligence objectives, actions
be taken within the sensitive agencies, as required, to assure the conduct of
periodic, comprehensive, inspections concerning the adequacy of compliance
with approved policies relating to personnel security investigations and
clearances, security suspension of employees, physical security, document
control, and the like.
Comment
Concur. An inherent part of an effective security program is a system
of periodic inspections to ensure the adequacy of all aspects of security. Such
inspections are best conducted by an independent authority such as the inspector-
general facility. In addition, security officers themselves should continuously
study and seek improvement in the programs they implement and administer.
Since the USIB Policy Statement on Counterintelligence and Security
Responsibilities (USIB-D-1. 5/24 Approved 18 July 1962) calls for semi-annual
reports on security and counterintelligence developments in the agencies,
inspection-inspired changes could be included in these same reports. The
Guide on Security and Counterintelligence Practices and Procedures to the
Policy Statement sets forth the essentials of a basic security program, and
utilization of this Guide as an aid to security surveys would be beneficial.
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The Security Committee, USIB, will, if called upon, assist in the development
That arrangements be made within each sensitive agency, as required, to assure
that security counterintelligence-oriented personnel participate in the timely
review at the Headquarters level of all questionable personnel security cases
which develop within that agency.
Comment
Concur. Each agency or department should have a system providing
for security-counterintelligence reviews of questionable personnel security
cases. Such security cases should be reviewed and closely monitored by
security personnel with the highest degree of understanding and sophistication
in opposition penetration techniques. All investigative assets and capabilities
should';be utilized to the fullest extent in such cases.
That, in the continuing effort to instill an enhanced sense of security responsibility
on the part of all personnel in the sensitive agencies, the case be used
in the security indoctrination processes of those agencies as a striking example
of a most serious espionage penetration and of the failure to inculcate the degree
of security consciousness which should obtain among the personnel of all sensitive
agencies.
25X1 Concur.
and similar cases, properly presented,
can be used effectively by security education officers throughout the intelligence
25X1
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community to enlighten personnel on the subversive efforts of the opposition.
Actual cases serve to illustrate clearly and dramatically the techniques and
approaches utilized. There are definite advantages to the preparation of
standardized write-ups for the use of various agencies and these could be pre-
pared by the Security Committee of USIB.
Recommendation No. 10
That investigative and security-review personnel associated with sensitive
activities be provided with more sophisticated and professional information
and guidance concerning the nature and potential security implications of
abnormal sexual activities, such as homosexuality and perversion, which
they encounter in the course of their inquiries and interviews.
Comment
Concur. Security review personnel must operate on the highest level
of sophistication in such matters as the adjudication of security cases in-
volving abnormal sexual problems. Such professionalism can be enhanced by
the exchange of approved definitions and criteria. There is information and
material within the community which is suitable for distribution. Exchanges
can probably best be accomplished through controlled security channels such
as the Security Committee of USIB and such exchanges should be made.
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That consideration be given by the several agencies concerned to the establish-
ment of an interdepartmental counterintelligence mechanism for the purpose
of assuring (a) the promulgation of adequate counterintelligence policy and guidance
to all agencies concerned; (b) timely and carefully controlled exchange of all
counterintelligence-related information (other than that of a strictly operational
nature), including information on approaches made by hostile intelligence serviced
to U. S. personnel; and (c) effective coordination of our counterintelligence
effort, including the allocation and use of our counterintelligence investigative
resources.
The Central Intelligence Agency firmly believes that existing organs
of counterintelligence and security coordination, and the utilization of bilateral
channels for case work are adequate and are achieving the purposes outlined
in the Recommendation.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which of course is vitally con-
cerned in this matter, has not as yet received the Board's recommendations.
Accordingly, the Bureau's views cannot be reflected at this time.
There is apparently some favorable sentiment in some quarters of the
military establishment toward the recommendation.
This response should be considered of an interim nature, pending re-
view by the FBI.
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Recommendation No. 12
That, apart from any action taken on the preceding recommendation concerning
the establishment of a counterintelligence mechanism, immediate action be taken
to assure that any agency having action responsibility in a personnel-security
type case is promptly furnished all pertinent information possessed by other
departments and agencies.
Comment
Concur. The rapid exchange of security information on critical cases
is of the highest order of importance. Effective action depends upon collation
and evaluation of all pertinent information and these activities should be
conducted as expeditiously as possible. The agency having action responsibility
should promptly make known its need for information to all agencies which
could be of help. All agencies so notified should ensure that the responsible
agency is furnished pertinent information on an expedite basis and should offer
all possible assistance.
That the National Security Agency, and other sensitive agencies as appropriate,
take steps to assure that the "need-to-know" principle is applied rigorously in
the granting of access to sensitive information.
Concur. Access to sensitive information is, for the most part, highly
controlled and maintained through established systems of compartmentation;
for example, the systems established for T-KH and communications intelli-
gence. The number of clearances for access to such information is intended
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to be carefully controlled and the granting of a clearance should only follow
a clearly justified "need-to-know. " This general philosophy is followed within
each of the agencies and departments within the intelligence community.
The degree of access of an individual once cleared is.;a problem for
each component and office within the community to consider and resolve. The
strict enforcement of the "need-to-know" principle within this framework is
difficult to assure absolutely. However, each of the components and offices
is aware of the requirements of the "need-to-know" principle and it should
not be necessary for the principle to be reaffirmed anew periodically since it
is already the most basic tenet of security within the intelligence community.
The complex nature of systems of compartmentation governing access
to sensitive information does not lend easy solutions to problems which are
inherent in the management and operation of the systems. The management
of the T-KH system is currently under study by CIA and. the broad problem
of sanitization and downgrading of sensitive intelligence is currently under
study by the Security and COMOR Committees. The results of such studies
will be available to all agencies of the community.
The Security Committee of USIB can serve to disseminate any data,
information and results of studies as well as continuing to serve as a forum for
the discussion of such problems.
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Recommendation No. 21
That the White House be informed promptly of developing situations indicating
the likelihood of the existence of a serious penetration of any sensitive activity
of our Government.
Comment
Concur. The USIB department or agency having primary responsibility
in a case involving possible penetration should notify the Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, and the USIB. Notification
should be made in those cases which have developed to the point where a
serious penetration of a U. S. intelligence activity is indicated.
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26 February 1964
In connection with the recommendations contained in the
Personnel Security Survey, Colonel White advised me that action
has been implemented to accomplish recommendations a, c, and d;
and that action has been initiated to accomplish recommendations
b and e.
25X1
J. S. arman
Inspector General
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