MEET THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100160001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 28, 1962
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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PLEASE CREDIT ANY QUOTES OR EXCERPTS FROM THIS NBC RADIO AND
TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "MEET THE PRESS."
MEET THE
PRESS
Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak
SUNDAY, JANUARY 28, 1962
MODERATOR: Ned Brooks
GUEST:
PANEL:
Representative Chet Holifield (D. Cal.)
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy
Marquis Childs, St. Louis Post Dispatch
Robert McCormick, NBC News
Jack Raymond, New York Times
Richard Reston, Madison (Wis.) Capital
Times
4?11,
MR. BROOKS: This is Ned Brooks inviting you to MEET THE.
PRESS.
Our guest today is the Chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee of Congress, Representative Chet Holifield of
California. He also is the Chairman of a House subcommittee
dealing with the problems of civil defense.
And now here is the first question from Robert McCormick
of NBC News,
MR. MC CORMICK: Well, Mr. Chairman, the Russians have
finally put themselves and us.at Geneva in such position as
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it would seem to make a nuclear test ban absolutely impossible.
Do you think that this endangers any further in any way our
security or to put it another way, do you think we are in
any greater danger now then we were before the collapse of
these talks?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: No, I do not. I never
had confidence in these talks from the very first. I visited
Geneva and witnessed some of their conferences and I felt
411 along that they were insincere.
MR. MC CORMICK: Well, do you think now that it has
become official that it makes it essential we resume testing
in the atmosphere?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I do not believe that the
continuing of conferences on this subject should have any
effect an whether we should test or should not test. 'I think
the security of the United States and the free world is
the paramount question and we should set our program
along that line without regard to the conferences.
MR. MC CORMICK: Well, do you think we should resume
atmospheric testing?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD;. I think the time will come --
and that depends upon at least two points, maybe more
onlab
when it will be necesszry to resume atmospheric testing.
The first point I think is the status of our technological
art and the second would be the President's decision that
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all other factors would be favorable or at least not
unfavorable to resuming testing when we consider the fact
that the security of the free world may depend upon the
weapons we test.
MR. MC CORMICK: Do you think we should resume atmospheric
testing soon?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I think that we will have to
resume atmospheric testing within a few months.
MR. MC CORMICK: Within a few months.
Well, I believe you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, that
you thought the Russians probably made some gains at least
in their series of tests last fall. In what respects do
you think they might be now equal with us or ahead of us?
REPRESENTATIVE ROLIFIELD: I believe that any nation
that tests 40 or 50 different types of,atomic weapons
must of necessity gain some scientific and technical knowledge
which they didn't have before. The Russians had a series of
tests, of different types of tests, different sizes, and
undoubtedly different aonformation of weapons. We do
not know yet because the analysis is not complete. exactly
how their technology has been improved, but we do know from
some of tlle analysis that we have had that it has been
improved in some instances.
MR. MC CORMICK: Well, does that improvement indicate
to you that we should speed up the resumption of our atmospheric
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tests? Is that dangerous to us?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Well, it indicates to me that
after some 36 months of moratorium on testing that there are
many weapons which have been developed in our laboratories
that do need testing and we are testing some of those under?
ground in Nevada at this time. / believe that every test that
is possible should be made underground, from the standpoint
of minimizing radioactivity. But if the time comes -- and
I believe that it will come -- when certain types of weapons
have to be tested which can not be tested in the ground, then
I think we need to test them in the air.
MR. BROOKS: We will be back with MEET THE PRESS and more
questions for our guest, Representative Chet Holifield, but
first this message.
(Announcement)
MR. BROOKS: And now resuming our interview, our guest
today is Representative Chet Holifield, the Chairman of the
Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress.
You have just met Robert McCormick of NBC News. Our
other reporters today are Marquis Childs of the St. Louis
Post Dispatch, Richard Reston of the Madison, Wisconsin,
Capital Times, and Jack Raymond of the New York Times.
Lawrence E. Spivak, our permanent member of the MEET
THE PRESS panel will be back with us soon.
Now we will continue the questions with Mr. Childs.
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MR. CHILDS: Mr. holifield, I'd like to go back to this
matter of ducleav testing. Presideat Kennedy and Secretary
McNamara and otaers have said siice the latest Soviet series
that they believe the United States is still ia the lead in
auclear weapoary. Now I know you follow this very closely.
I wonder if you would agree with that?
REPRESENTATIVE UOLLFIELD: I would agree with that based
on the knowledge that, I have. The degree that, we are ahead,
however, I think is impossible for the gentlemen you named
to estimate or for me to estimate, because tho analyses of
the Russian tests have not been completed and we may find
more knowledge about that before they are completed.
MR. CHILD I know top secret information is available.
to you. Would your information lead you to believe that we
were well ahead before the Soviet test series?
REPRLSENTATIVE UOLIFIELD: Yes. I believe that some
36 months ago we were substantially ahead in variety of
weapons and probably in inventory of weapons. However,
during the past 36 months the Soviets have been busy in
their laboratories and now they have performed the
tests which always come after laboratory work. On the
other hand we may have been busy in our laboratories, but
we have not performed the test to verify our laboratoryexperiment
theories. Therefore it would seem reasonable to me that
with such a tremendous number -of tests that the Soviets
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could have picked up a great deal of information and they
might be approaching parity with us.
MR. CHILDS: If the final analysis should show -- and you
say it isn't complete yet -- that we are in the lead still,
would you think even so it would be necessary to test in the
atmosphere?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I certainly would, because
weaponry does not stand still. The nation that stands still
with weapons which may be in existence at any one time, soon
falls behind and it is necessary' in this particularly
dangerous world that we live in, I think, that the United
States retains its superiority and retains its lead rather than
remaining even or falling behind, because there are many
other advaatages which the Soviets have that we do not have
geographic for one.
MR. CHILDS: Recently the Under Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric said this: "We want to get away from
the conception of a race, a competition, a struggle always to
be ahead."
He seemed to be suggesting that there might be some
point at which we could end this seesaw of first one ahead and
then the other ahead. Now do you see any point at which that
might be possible?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I do not. I think this is
the reasoning which they used when they started the
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moratorium on the tests. The Administration under Mr.
Eisenhower started that moratorium in October of 1958 and
time and events have proven that they were completely wrong
because it takes two to make an agreement.
MR. CHILDS: Then you see no end to the nuclear arms
race?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I do not at this time.
MR. CHILDS: Short of a nuclear war?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: No? I didn't say that. I do
not consider there is any end to the armament race unless
there is an agreement to stop and it takes two to make
the agreement. It takes the Soviets and the United States.
I think the United States has gone far beyond the Soviets
in trying to reach an agreement, and I wish that the agreement
had been successful because I would like to see the arms
race stop myself. But when the other fellow won't stop,
then you are put into a desperate competition and the only
way to stay up with him is to keep on testing, in my
opinion.
MR. RESTON: Mr. Chairman, to go to another problem for
a moments the whole atomic energy program rests on scientific
information. Many of our scientists are working part time
far the government, part time for private industry and the
universities.
Is there a problem here in the nation's conflict of
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interest laws at the moment?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: This is a complicated subject
and I think there could be a possible conflict of interest,
particularly when certain scientists are privy to secret infor-
mation and they are also consultants to competitive companies
who are competing for orders in weaponry. I can see very
easily where there could be a conflict of interest. I do
not say that there is because this would be the challenge
the integrity of some of these scientists, and I do not do that.
MR. RESTON: When President Eisenhower left the White House
? he said he was Worried about the excessive influence of
? industry, of the military and science, on government policy.
Now does this worry you?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: It does. I think that was one
of the wisest things President Eisenhower has ever said.
MR. RAYMOND: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to clarify one
point on the nuclear testing: I gather you would favor
nuclear testing regardless of any advances that the Soviets
might have made in this recent series. Now if that is so,
why do you think we have delayed in this country the
resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: We have delayed because we
thought for some 34 to 36 months that there was a chance of
stopping testing in the atmosphere. We came to the conclusion
when the Soviets so abruptly turned a double somersault
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in the air and reversed their position against atmospheric
testing, by brutally and abruptly starting testing, that we
then realized that we had been dealing with
people who were not sincere.
MR. RAYMOND: But Mr. Holifield, you said that you didn't
believe that the Russians would come to an agreement with
us and I gather that there are others in government here, who
didn't believe that either.
What I am trying to get from you, sir, is your view on
why we did state -- did the majority think we would have an
agreement or did many people
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I think the President of the
United States, who ordered the moratorium, thought
we could come to an agreement. I didn't agree with him
then and time and events have proven that he was wrong.
MR. RAYMOND: Do you know sir whether the President
is one of a minority in this government who has been opposed
to resuming nuclear testa in the atmosphere?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Are you speaking of the
. present President?
MR. RAYMOND: Yes, sir%
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: The present President has
stated that he has ordered testing underground and he has
ordered preparations for testing in the air when it is
justified. Now it is up to him to make the decision. He
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has access to all information, even a great deal more
information than I have, and I might criticize a position that
he might take, but I might do it without knowing as much as
he knows about the subject.
Now I believe that we will eventially have to test in
the atmosphere. One of the reasons I believe this is that
the United States today finds itself incapable from a military
standpoint of stopping incoming intercontinental ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear warheads. I think.it is very
imperative that we perfect -- develop, perfect and test .anti-
missile missiles.
Now when that time comes and I am not saying it is
going to be this week or next month or just when it will
come when that time comes and if it is determined by
the weapons experts that this anti-missile missile cap not
be tested underground, then ,I think it should be tested
in the high reaches of the atmosphere or possibly above
the atmosphere.
MR. RAYMOND: Sir, one important point on the question
of agreements: Do you have any hope at all of at least,
a limited agreement with the Soviet Union that would prevent
the spread of these atomic weapons to others, notably Red
China?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: This is one of the fallacies
of those who have been against testing. They think
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an agreement with the Soviet Union would stop the spread
of weapons. While we were having the negotiations you may
recall that France went right ahead and tested weapons and I
can not conceive of anyone being so naive as to think that
Red China if it had the scientific capability would cease
testing its weapons in order to attain the strength that
it wants, just because somebody else stopped.
MR. RAYMOND: What is your best estimate of whether or
not the Communist Chinese will bet nuclear weapons soon?
How far do you think they have progressed?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Well, any guess I would make
would just be an estimate --
MR. RAYMOND: You have nothing better than just a guess
on that subject, sir?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: That is right, because it
depends upon the scientific technology and I am not aware
of just how strong their technology is.
MR. BROOKS: Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the anti-
missile missile the Nike-Zeus, I presume. How would
you evaluate the information you have on the effectiveness
of that weapon?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Well, this weapon, of
course, is in process of development. It has not been
developed to the extent that it is necessary to have. It
is not effective at this time either in ranq,e, in electronic
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guidance or in known weapon effects. The only way you are
going to be able to find out whether a Nike-Zeus is effective
or not is to explode one with a nuclear warhead and then
you will be able to get the weapons effect in the high
atmosphere or in space.
MR. BROOKS: Do you think such a test should be made
now?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I would have answered that
question "Yes" if you hadn't said "now." I think the tests
should be made as soon as the technology indicates that it
should be made.
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ME. MC CORMICK: Mr. Holifield, do you think the Russians
were working on an anti-missile missile as part of their
last serift of tests?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I would be very nadve, if I
didrnt think they were.
MR. MC CORMICK: Do you know whether they have come even
close?
REPRESENTATIVr. HOLIFIELD: We cannot tell at this time
from the analysis of the debris as to whether the weapons
were pointed toward that particular problem or not.
MR. MC CORMICK: I believe one Russian defense or military
man bragged in a public speech that they now had an anti-missile
missile.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Yes.
MR. MC CORMICK: We don't have any information to back
that up?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I am aware of that particular
statement and if I knew a great deal about it, I think it
would be unwise for me to state in public my opinion on it.
MB. MC CORMICK: One other question, Mr. Holifield:
We are told that we have _gained a great deal of propaganda
advantage by not resuming atmospheric testing in spite of
the fact the Russians aid. How important do you think that
factor is in deciding whether we do resume testing in the air?
REPFESENTATIVE HOLIFTELD: Well I think world opinion is
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quite important. I believe the strong attempt that we have
made and the concessions that we have made to obtain a test
ban treaty which was realistic and at the same tine would stop
the development of these weapons gave us a great deal of good
opinion throughout the world. Now you have to balance a world
opinion along with the security of the nation. I note that
the Soviets paid very little attention to world opinion. They
reversed themselves completely and in effect flouted world
opinion by a great number of tests in a very short length of
time when they thought it was in 'their national interest to
do so.
Now I don't know why the United States should be scared of
doing the thing that is necessary to preserve the United States
and the free world, if after sober consideration they decide
that.
ME, CHILDS: Mr. Chairman, the administration is proposing
a shelter program, to cost about $700 million. Now that is far
below what I believe the Gaither Report judged was necessary ---
I think $1C billion -- and T believe you favor a massive
shelter program loll civil defense.
Do you think there is very much point in proceeding with
such a small program, since it fall p so far below what you and
others have considered essential?
REPFESENTATIVL HOLIFIhM: dell we are faced, of course,
with the problem of allocation of money for many different
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programs. The President has asked for about seven times or
eight times more money than was asked for by the previous
Administration in the last year. He has started on what
I consider a program to find out what kind of shelter spaces
are available in America. If the $700 million program which
he has advocated is the end of his program, I would say
that it is totally inadequate. My committee, after many
years of study, came up with a figure of $20 billion spread
over a possible four or five year building period. This would
be a little more than $100 per person in the United States,
and it was estimated by very fine people who figured this
out -- weapons effect people in the Pentagon -- that in
a certain type of war there would be at least 80 percent of
the people who would otherwise be killed would could be
saved by having radiation shelters -- simple shelters some
three feet underground. This would cost as I say about
$20 billion. And so if the $700 million advocated by the
present Administration is the end of their program, I say
it is totally inadequate. If it is a first step, then I
would concede it is a feeble step.
MR. CHILDS: Have you any indication that this is a first
step or that it will go on from hereto spending much larger
sums of money or have you had any reason to believe that it
is a first step?
JUPRESENTATRVE HOL1IIELD: My subcommittee will start
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holding hearings on February 19 to give the Administration
a chance to explain its program and to find out the answer to
that very question.
MR. CHILDS: Some weapons experts have been saying that
as the offensive steps up -- that is as the bombs get
bigger and get into the 50, 70 and.100 megaton range,
it is impoasible to have any adequate or really safe shelter.
Certainly within the area of blast and the area of firestorm.
Would you say that is true?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: No, I would not say it is true
and I would say in any kind of a war that you have there
are weapons that are larger than the defensive measure of
the individual. A blockbuster, for instance, would make a
foxhole a very feeble defense, but you can't put a block?
buster on every foxhole. And I would not deny any person
the right to have a reasonable type of defense against
any type of weapon. If he happened to be in the impact
area of one of these large weapons, regardless of what kind
of a shelter he would have he would be lost. But if he
was on the perimeter, many miles out where he would be
dilled by radioactivity, he could be saved in a shelter of
the type I spoke of.
MR. RESTON: Mr. Chairman, everybody is talking about
the military uses of atomic energy. What about the
peaceful uses? Has this country made any more new breakthroughs
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in this area?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: We have made a consistent
development in the field of peacetime uses and I have pushed
that very hard. In fact, I have pushed it harder than
the Eisenhower Administration, or the Kennedy Administration
has pushed it.
We have made developments that are very valuable. Over
1100 industrial applications of atomic energy are now in
being. And industry is using them.
We have many curative devices in our hospitals --
scanning devices for cancer and thyroid troubles and many
other diagnostic methods that we use isotopes for. We have
developed some very fine rust-free oats ,
and seed for wheat and there are other developments that
we have made.
MR. RESTON: Does this present a problem on the local
level? We are now distributing radioactive material to private
industry, hospitals, universities all over the country.
What happens in the case of an accident? Do the local
authorities, health, fire and police -- are they well-informed
enough to take care of something like this?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: It does present a problem,
the same problem that was presented when radium was distributed
to hospitals. It has to be taken out carefully. It is the
same problem that we have in deadly chemicals. We have to take
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great care.
I would say as the spread of this knowledge and thib
deadly material increases that we have to increase the
policing requirements.
MR. BROOKS: We have about three minutes, gentlemen;
Mr. Raymond --
MR. RAYMOND: Mr. Holifield, on this civil defense
program, again, you have indicated you did not think it was
big enough, particularly if it is to be limited to what it is
now.
In the past Congress has repeatedly cut civil defense
appropriations requests. Now what do you think the Congress
will do this time?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I think that the Congress
might continue to do that because as up to this date there
has been no effective civil defense program presented to the
Congress of the United States and the men on Capitol Hill
who deal in these defense weapons and these committees
who handle these tremendous modern weapons of war, know
the difference between an effective system and an ineffective
one. I shall oppose any system that is not in my opinion
effective in the future as I have in the past.
MR. RAYMOND: That includes the Administration's present
program, sir, is that right?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: I am not at all impressed
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by what Administration is in power. My only thought is that
the people of the United States should have protection
against radioactivity in the event of a nuclear war and
that is the primary objective in the viewpoint of my
consideration and that of my committee.
MR. RAYMOND: Sir, on another point, you knew John McCone
and still know him quite well, I assume -- he was head
of the Atomic Energy Commission. And there have been
some questions raised about his appointment as the head of
the CIA.
Will you comment sir, on his qualifications?
REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD: Welltas you know the members
of the Senate are the ones who have the responsibility for
confirmlna. Presidential appointees, not the members of the
House.
I will say this, in my dealing with John McCone as Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, that he dealt with ale and
my committee in fairness and in honesty and that he was
an efficient administrator.
MR. MC CORMICK: Mr. Holifield, you have been interested
for a long time in the development of nuclear?power plants
for missiles and for airplanes. Are we making satisfactory
progress in that fiaid?
REPRESENTATIVE HCLIFIELD: in the field of central station
power for use in our domestic economy we are not making
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adequate progress in my opinion. The 'aircraft program
has been abolished, practically.
In the field of nuclear rockets, in the Rover program
and some other programs, we are making good progress, I
think.
MR. BROOKS: Gentlemen, on that optimistic note I
believe we will have to suspend our questions.
Thank you very much, Congressman Holifield, for being
with us.
I will tell you about next week's guest on MEET THE
PRESS after this message.
THE ANNOUNCER: For a printed copy of today's
interview send ten cents in coin and a stamped, self-addressed
envelope to Merkle Press, 809 Channing Street,N.E., Washington,
D. C.
MR. BROOKS: Next week our guest on MEET THE PRESS will be
the President of American Motors Corporation, Nr. George
Romney. He is frequently mentioned as a possible
candidate for Governor of Michigan. Also as a dark horse
possibility for the Republican Presidential nomination.,
Now this is Ned Brooks saying good bye for Congressman
Chet Holifield and MEET THE PRESS.
?IP 41M a OW
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