REMARKS BY MR. RUSSELL S. MCCLURE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AT THE WORLD AFFAIRS WEEK, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON EUGENE, OREGON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100750001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1960
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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REMARKS BY
MR. RUSSELL S. McCLITRE
OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS WEEK, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
Eugene, Oregon
10 November 1960
12 noon, (PST)
COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF LATIN AMERICA
Recent events in Cuba underscore the growing Communist Bloc interest
in Latin America as the strategic and vulnerable "backyard" of the United
States. For the past five or six years Moscow has conducted a hide and
.seek policy in Latin America designed to capitalize on spot situations
and to advance Soviet-bloc aims as opportunities arose.
During recent months, however, it has become clear that these
sporadic and often disconnected Sino-Soviet efforts are gradually being
coordinated into a major political, economic and cultural offensive to
promote Communist Bloc aims in the Western Hemisphere.
Considering conditions in Latin America, it is in a way surprising
that this offensive has been so long in coming and that Communism has so
far had so little impact in the area. Latin America exceeds the United
States in both area and population; it has a population growth as high
as any region of the world; and its untapped natural resources probably
rank with any in the West.
But Latin America also suffers from poverty, disease and a low
level of technological advancement; mal-distribution of land, illiteracy
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and wide extremes in standards of living. More important from the communist
point of view, it is an area of vital importance to the United States.
Several of these countries harbor deep resentment from their historical
relations with the "Colossus of the North." In part this is the normal
nationalistic resentment 'so common to underdeveloped regions, but for Latin
Americans it is intensified by the powerful position of US business interests
and a feeling that North Americans have done too much to them and not enough
for them.
Though. without a colonial history comparable to Asian-African areas,
many Latin Americans feel their association with the United States is too
near a colonial relationship, because of their economic dependence on the US.
While still generally poor by United States standards, notable economic
advances have occurred in many countries. The region as a whole remains
predominantly agricultural, producing chiefly primary commodities. Much
of it is backward, and some is downright feudal; the contrasts are indeed
striking.
Industrialization is progressing - with consequent urbanization,
increasing wages and aggravated social conflict. These peoples, emerging
from poverty but lacking the tools and training for a modern society,
provide a receptive audience for the blandishments of Communist claims for
rapid economic and social progress.
The Communist Bloc to date has not been particularly successful in
promoting a swing to the extreme left. With the exception of Cuba, most
governments have great antipathy for Communist methods and only a small
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portion of the population finds a home in Communist Party membership.
Moscow's present objectives, therefore, are not concentrated on the
outright seizure of political power by Communist forces but rather on
building a favorable image of Communism; on keeping the pot boiling in
areas of tension; and on playing whatever assets it has toward eroding
the interests of the United States.
In the next few minutes I shall sketch briefly the main tools and
methods for Soviet penetration of Latin America, noting both progress
and problems. The opportunities for Communist exploitation seem end-
less, the conditions ideal, but thus far, again with the exception of
Cuba, the results of Bloc wooing are not impressive, if measured in
terms of official recognition or dollar value of. trade. However,
Communist progress is impressive if measured in terms of penetration,
of exacerbation of anti-US attitudes, and the mobilization of action
cadres in target groups.
Communist activities in Latin America, as in the rest of the
free world, are part of a worldwide pattern to establish the victory
of Communism in every quarter. Latin America is by no means the most
promising area of Communist operations, but it does present a unique
opportunity for harassing the United States, as events in Cuba so
painfully demonstrate.
Following World War II, stepped up Communist militancy through-
out the world was manifested in Latin America by rapid Communist Party
gains and increased subversive activities. These alarming events,
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however, resulted in the severance by many Latin American countries of
their diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union - ties which had only been
established during the war under pressure from the United States for
wartime solidarity. At present, out of 20 Latin American countries,
only 8 have resident bloc diplomatic or consular missions and only 1.
of these have such ties with the Soviet Union:. Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay
and Argentina. Communist China had not been recognized by a Latin
American country, until Cuba broke ranks last September. These figures
in themselves, while no measure of Communist influence or activity,
indicate the magnitude of the task facing the Communists.
With the advent of "peaceful coexistence" in the years since
Stalin's death, Communist tactics have become far better suited to
conditions in Latin America. The elimination of US influence and the
promotion of neutralism remain major goals. But the more refined
methods of current Bloc penetration are much better adapted to the
initial task of establishing a position of influence from which to
pursue these long-term objectives.
Current Bloc activity seeks primarily to establish this position
of influence and to win widespread acceptance in new areas. Trade,
aid, and cultural overtures set the stage for reestablishment of
diplomatic ties.
The Bloc has vigorously pushed a "friendship" and propaganda
campaign picturing Communism as "the wave of the future." Moscow
attempts to drive home the lesson that Communism is the best way
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to economic and social progress and offers the only alternative to the
so-called evils of capitalism. Through offers of trade, aid and technical
assistance the Soviet Union fosters its image as a great power as well
as an "alternative" to the dominant position of the United States. It
stresses the selfless, peaceful nature of its offers and contrasts them
sharply with "Yankee imperialism."
The response so far in Latin America has been very uneven. Soviet
scientific and economic achievements have boosted Moscow's prestige, as
they have in the rest of the world. There is, however, little support
for replacing US interests with those of another great power. Considerable
headway has been made in Cuba under the most favorable political conditions
for Bloc activity. But the big guns of an all-out Communist campaign are
only gradually being turned on Latin America and it is yet too early to
assess the reaction. Much will depend on the course of events in East-
West relations and even more on response of the US and the Free World to
Latin American hopes and aspirations.
The tactical elements of the Communist Bloc's offensive'are the local
Communist Parties. The parties in Latin America are typically small in
numbers. Present policies do not push membership drives; rather an
attempt is made to build. small, compact, flexible, well-trained and
indoctrinated cadres of party faithfuls who work from within non-Communist
organizations to promote Bloc aims.
Roughly a quarter of a million persons belong to the Party out of a
total Latin American population of about 185 million. This compares to
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a peak of nearly half a million members in 191+7. In nine countries the
parties have legal status, but in 11 they do not. Yet in some, where
legal, they are prevented from active political participation and where
illegal they play active and influential roles :in national politics.
Under Moscow's direction, the parties work ceaselessly to foster
latent anti-US feelings, to exploit tensions among the American states,
to promote neutralism, and to project the Soviet image for all to see.
They constantly exacerbate the social, economic, and political
difficulties facing their host countries. While outwardly joining
reform groups seeking change, they reject constructive solutions within
the established framework. They frustrate reform measures and foster
turmoil. They are not, of course, responsible for the conditions they
exploit, but they effectively strive to keep the pressure at or near
the breaking point.
In foreign affairs the Communist parties play heavily on the
Latin American's traditional resentment of foreign intervention in
domestic affairs. These feelings, as now expressed toward the Cuban
problem, demonstrate Latin American hostility to any situation which
smacks of foreign intervention - including Soviet as well as American.
The Communist Party has at times overplayed its hand in Latin
America, as in the postwar years, but in general the anti-imperialist,
anti-US theme has played an effective role in the Communist cold war
game.
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The local parties adhere to the most exaggerated nationalist
objectives within non-Communist groups to further their own interests.
As self-styled "nationalists" they join ultra-conservative movements
in violent opposition to foreign investment, to foreign exploitation
of mineral and agricultural resources - especially in the petroleum
field - and to US and international efforts to foster financial
stability. Their contribution to Cuban confiscation measures is
readily apparent.
The nationalist approach has proved fairly effective in winning
popular support. In addition, the success of such efforts has helped
to discourage or bar foreign investments which not only would make for
more rapid economic development, but also would strengthen the overall
Western position in Latin America. In effect, these efforts prolong
the very conditions of economic backwardness and stagnation in which
Communist purposes are best advanced.
To further their support and to achieve a greater measure of
influence than is possible through openly Communist organizations,
the Party in Latin America has energetically penetrated non-Communist
groups of great popular influence. These efforts have had considerable
success among labor, intellectual and student groups. Within military
establishments always a likely Communist target - little success
has been noted outside of Cuba, where a number of very high-level
military and government personnel are Communist or Communist oriented.
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In labor unions the policy is to infiltrate key positions rather
than to build a mass following. Weak labor unions in many Latin American
countries provide fine opportunities for dedicated, well-trained party
activists to exercise their considerable talents for organizational work.
Provided with ample time and financial resources, a few key men
have succeeded in high-level penetration of many nominally non-Communist
unions which now advocate largely pro-Communist objectives. By play-
ing one labor faction against another, by leading strikes and harassing
US firms, the Communist Party members of a union exert far more power
than their numerical strength would indicate. The labor field is one
of the major areas of Communist activity; and is also one of the most
successful.
In other non-Communist groups a similar approach of infiltration,
identification with popular causes, and then molding the organization
into the Communist image is followed. Communist success in blending
party members into indigenous reform groups has been notable.
In Latin American academic circles the Communist parties have
made considerable headway. Student and faculty groups, usually in
the forefront of political activity, are the most vocal Latin American
advocates of neutralism in a cold war context. They also constitute
a noisy wing::.for demonstrations such as those which greeted Vice
President Nixon in Caracas in 1958. Here, as in labor unions,
Communist members usually are not openly in command but rather in
positions of influence near the top.
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In Cuba, the principal targets of Communist penetration have been
the agrarian reform apparatus, the trade unions, the government and the
Cuban military. In all these spheres they have been quite successful
under a regime where the terms "counter-revolutionary" and "anti-
Communist" are synonymous. Elsewhere in Latin America, especially in
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, local Communists are more active than in
any period since the immediate postwar years. The popular support for
Cuba among leftists and nationalists in Latin America has been grist
for the Communist mill on a scale rarely achieved before.
At present, the Communists do not have sufficient numerical strength
in any Latin American country, except for their powerful but numerically
small group in Cuba, to win and maintain political control. However,
as is now witnessed in Cuba and earlier in Guatemala, when a situation
of chaos ensues,, especially after the collapse of a dictatorship, the
Communists move quickly to extend their influence. They are often
the only well-organized group in existence with a blueprint for action.
Through maneuvering within political coalitions and other time-tested
Communist methods, the Latin American parties have come close to
genuine seizure of power.
In such circumstances the Communist leadership must walk a
dangerous path where too much success may prove fatal, not only to
the local programs, but to the entire Soviet campaign of image-building
in Latin America. Under similar conditions in Southeast Asia, India
and the Middle East, the Communists have ultimately subordinated
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seizure of power to image-building, and with far greater success.
Immediate Bloc priorities in Latin America probably put the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations with the major countries ahead of local
Communist success, without, however, abandoning plans for eventual
takeover. For the present, at the local level, it is sufficient to
build and maintain well-knit groups to be ready for whatever may happen.
Communist campaigns of a cultural-informational nature have been
directed heavily at Latin America in recent months. The purpose of
this mighty public relations effort is, first of all, to establish
and build an impression of the Communist Bloc as a center of progress,
achievement and culture. These activities are not, of course, confined
to Latin America; many of us in the United States viewed appreciatively
the traveling companies of Soviet dancers, singers, and musicians. But
in the underdeveloped areas these activities are pushed more vigorously
through cultural centers, friendship societies, literature, exhibits,
and exchanges of all sorts. The primary aim is not baptism at the
Communist fount, but rather the cultivation of a new Communist image
of prestige and basic respectability.
Travel between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Latin American
countries has increased significantly. Bloc press and radio coverage
of Latin America is rising and most Bloc news agencies have established
exchange agreements with Castro's new service, Prensa Latina.
Communist China is playing a key role in this part of the
offensive with a vigorous anti-American campaign and an effort to
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equate Latin American conditions with those in China. Here, as elsewhere,
they stretch the facts to fit the pattern and hold up the Chinese way
as a model.
In the past the Soviet diplomatic posts in Mexico, Uruguay and
Argentina have served as centers for public relations and propaganda
activity, as well as for subversive efforts. Now, new freedom of
action for Communists in Cuba has made Havana the new Mecca for Latin
American Communists.
While the travels of basketball teams, ballet companies, Chinese
acrobats and the increasing circulation of Pravda editorials are little
cause for immediate alarm, it is worth recognizing the aims of these
efforts and to take cognizance of the possible results.
Moscow and Peiping are a long way from acceptable guests in most
of the Western Hemisphere, but proper fertilization can improve even
barren soil given time and a proper climate. With the aid of local
Communists, the Bloc is establishing lines of communication with broad.
segments of the population. In the short term, these are not at
promoting Communism per se, but at gaining acceptance where at present
it is either unknown or unwanted. Further successes in this sphere
are likely.
As a major arm of the coordinated Sino-Soviet offensive in Latin
America, the now familiar trade and aid overtures are being employed
in an effort to establish permanent working relationships with these
countries. To date, the so-called economic offensive has not paid off
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well as a vehicle for seeking reestablishment of diplomatic relations
and as a means of building Bloc prestige.
Bloc trade with the area is still a relatively unimportant factor
in the economy of the region as a whole. Last year total Latin American
trade with Bloc countries was about $280 million, up some from recent
years but well below the peak of 1955 when the total reached nearly
$31+0 million. The bloc's share of Latin America's total trade has
also increased slightly in the last few years but is still less than
3 percent. The impact is concentrated in a few key countries, and
only in the cases of Cuba and Uruguay has the Bloc's share of an
individual country's trade reached significant proportions.
Certain obstacles are apparent which have impeded the success of
the Bloc effort. Only a limited economic rationale exists to support
trade. It is true that Latin America is basically a producer of raw
materials which can be exchanged for whatever type of industrial
products the Bloc can supply. But many of these primary commodities
compete with Bloc exports. Petroleum, wheat and tin are perhaps the
best examples. Furthermore the Bloc has been a poor market for other
important Latin American exports; here coffee and meat are the out-
standing examples.
Bloc trading practices, particularly the insistence upon bi-
lateral trade agreements, have also been an obstacle to more extensive
trade with Latin America. About 80 percent of Latin American trade
with the Bloc is conducted under bilateral trade agreements. The
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inherent restrictiveness of bilateral trade has long been recognized,
but these are the terms under which the Bloc operates.
Bilateral trade is usually considered by the Latin American
governments as a temporary measure to meet an economic crisis and the
long term faith in and support of multilateral trade are subordinated
to the situation. The agreements are usually favored by producers,
exporters, and workers and fostered by leftwing political groups
as the way to economic salvation.
On the other hand, importers have generally been less enthusiastic
and are slow to adjust to Bloc trade techniques. Trade with state
agencies is far different from what traders are accustomed to in their
relations with the United States and Western Europe.
Bloc goods have often proved shoddy or in short supply. Further-
more, Bloc capital goods are often technically different if not
inferior to those of the West and this limits the usefulness of Bloc
products in countries primarily oriented toward US or West European
technology. Availability of spare parts for Bloc equipment has
sometimes been a problem.
Consumers accustomed to US and Western goods are slow to accept
untested products. Latin American tastes are generally more sophis-
ticated than in many underdeveloped areas and are not satisfied with
second rate products acceptable elsewhere. So long as expanded
exports to the Bloc must be linked to bilateral arrangement requiring
larger imports of Bloc goods, many Latin Americans continue to view
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expanded Bloc trade with skepticism. This is particularly true when
exports to the Bloc merely replace exports that might have been made
to hard currency areas, and this is the case more often than not.
Still another barrier to expanded trade is to be found in the
basic trade policy of the Soviet Union. Despite tactical deviations,
Soviet economic policy remains autarkic, and this striving for self-
sufficiency provides little room for sizeable and permanent trade
outside the Bloc.
Finally, it should be noted that many Latin Americans recognize
the political motivation which lies behind much of the Bloc's trade
promotion efforts. This has often produced a tug of war between
those who, for one reason or another, favor expanded trade with the
Bloc and those who fear it because of the political risks involved.
Controversy of this type has been particularly acute in Brazil in
recent years but it characterizes all of Latin America to some degree.
It seems clear, therefore, that a number of important factors
are at work which limit the Bloc's opportunities to expand its
economic contacts with Latin America. But we must also recognize
that there is another side to the coin and that the factors listed
above are mitigated by forces operating in the Bloc's favor.
While it is correct to observe that the economic basis for
trade is limited, it is by no means nonexistent. The Bloc does
need a number of important Latin American exports such as wool,
hides, vegetable fibers and oils, etc. The Bloc does export a
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considerable list of commodities that are adequate substitutes for the
comparable Western products.. Basic iron and steel products, chemicals,
and newsprint.are good examples. Furthermore, while some Latin
American countries are important petroleum producers, it is neverthe-
less true that several of them, notably Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Cuba, are also large petroleum importers. The Soviet Union has
exploited this fact and petroleum has assumed an increasingly
important role in Bloc trade with those countries during the last
few years.
The political motivation that inspires much of the Bloc's trade
effort is of vital importance in this connection, particularly in
the case of the USSR. The political stake of the Soviet Union in
Latin America has been the foundation for its recent purchases of
Cuban sugar and for its agreement, concluded last fall, to buy
larger quantities of Brazilian coffee. Of course both of these
commodities are of economic value to the Soviets, but in terms of
primary Soviet needs and goals, it seems clear that the purely
economic significance of these products is quite marginal and that
the basis of this particular trade is largely political.
On the Latin American side, the disadvantages of trade with
the Bloc are offset to some extent by the region.'s overriding need
to expand its export markets. Deteriorating terms of trade, chronic
foreign exchange shortages, and surpluses of basic export commodities
are all symptoms of this need. These facts have caused many Latin
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Americans to look with longing at what they imagine to be the vast
unexploited market of the Communist Bloc. Furthermore, in the eyes
of some Latin Americans, Bloc trade is regarded as a means of ex-
tracting greater attention from the United States. Thus, the political
motive operates on both sides to reinforce purely economic factors.
So long as economic development remains hampered by difficulties
in the foreign trade sector, Latin American governments will continue
to feel pressure from those who urge Bloc trade as a panacea for all
economic ills. Such pressure is not to be taken lightly, for it comes
not only from leftwing groups but from some conservatives., as well,
such as the exporter seeking new outlets or the nationalist seeking
to free his country from what he considers excessive dependence
upon the United States.
So far I have confined my discussion of the Bloc economic
offensive to its trade aspects, but most of the considerations
listed above also apply to Bloc economic aid programs. The Bloc
political motivation in this connection needs no discussion.
Latin American reaction to aid offers has been. conditioned
by many of the same factors which have affected Bloc trade proposals.
Bloc aid does not provide free exchange but rather consists of a
grant of inconvertible credits which can be used only for the import
of Bloc capital goods, and this equipment is often not highly
regarded or desired in Latin America. The political motivation
underlying Bloc offers has generally been recognized Latix American
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governments have been cautious about the political risks involved in
the acceptance of Bloc aid.
On the other hand, the need for development credits is acute and
the desire to find a new alternative to United States aid also operates
to make Bloc aid prospects attractive.
In Cuba the Bloc has its first opportunity to develop an ex-
tensive aid program. Following Mikoyan's visit to Havana in February
1960, and the conclusion of large-scale trade and aid ties, the ground-
work has been laid for assistance from all major bloc countries. The
Soviets have extended a $100 million development credit, Czechoslovakia
$20 million and the Poles and the Chinese have promised industrial
deliveries on credit terms.
Having cut off private western investment, Cuba has negotiated
with the Bloc for more than 50 "complete factory" projects, ranging
from small workshops to a one million ton steel mill to be built by
the Soviet Union. All these plans are, of course, in the preliminary
stages and are scheduled over more than five years, but obviously a
big drive is now on in Cuba.
Experience has shown that the initial enthusiasm for such
assistance will probably be tempered as concrete discussions prove
Bloc experts every bit as hardnosed and practical as their counter-
parts in the United States. Nevertheless, Moscow is clearly
committed to a development program in Latin America for the first
time and other countries will follow its progress with interest.
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In every country except Cuba, the balance of conflicting forces so
far has been in favor of a cautious approach to Bloc aid. Bloc offers
have also been made at various times to Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico
and Bolivia, but so far only Cuba and Argentina have accepted significant
amounts of assistance. Argentina has accepted a credit for $100 million
to develop its petroleum industry. This credit agreement was modified
last spring to include other than petroleum equipment. However, even
though the credit has been on the books for two years, the Argentines
have drawn only about 15 percent of the total.
It is widely held that Argentina accepted this offer to placate
ultra-nationalist opposition to foreign investment in the petroleum
program. Buenos Aires later received more than $1 billion in private
capital for the same program, far overshadowing the Soviet contribution.
So far the Bloc aid program in Latin America has not achieved
nearly the success that it has in other parts of the world. In part
this is because the Bloc has not made a very determined effort in
the area. The offers that have been made were often vague or
presented indirectly and with little publicity. Some appear to have
been propaganda gestures only or in the nature of trial balloons
rather than serious efforts to do business.
More specific offers with greater publicity and presented at
the right time might well have produced more results, especially
in Brazil. It is difficult to say whether the Soviets have held
back from a more vigorous drive because they felt that the reception
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.in Latin America would be unfavorable or because they thought that a
more extensive aid program would yield only small political gains
under present conditions. The fact that they have moved ahead vigorously
in Cuba when political conditions became favorable may indicate that
Bloc leadership is willing enough to commit large amounts of resources
to Latin American economic aid when the time is ripe for such a move.
On balance the prospects for broader Bloc economic ties with Latin
America appear to be only fair. Trade is currently increasing but this
is mostly due to the Cuban situation. Outside of Cuba, Brazil is the
only country which seems to be expanding its Bloc trade and it is
difficult to predict how far this trend will be carried.
Elsewhere, in Argentina and Uruguay, the prospects are not bright,
and the level of Bloc trade in 1959 actually declined slightly from
the year before. So long as the present political configuration in
Latin America is maintained, Bloc overtures will probably continue to
be received with some caution and circumspection. However, the Cuban
example shows how :quickly and dramatically this can change.
One final observation should be made concerning the economic
offensive. The fact that trade and aid have remained at a relatively
low level does not necessarily restrict its effectiveness in achieving
some Communist goals. This is particularly true with respect to the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Many groups feel that trade
with the Bloc has been small not because a good economic foundation is
lacking, but because their governments have not tried hard enougb';to
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exploit the potential. So long as there is a widespread belief among
Latin Americans that Bloc trade and aid offers even a partial solution
to their economic difficulties, pressure will continue on governments
to establish those relations, including diplomatic, which will make
such trade and aid possible.
The extent of Communist activity and influence in Latin America
is indeed a growing cause of concern. Diplomatically the Sino-Soviet
bloc has a long road to travel in the area. The Communist Parties are
increasingly active but there is little popular sympathy for their
solutions. Economic relations between the bloc and Latin America
probably will grow,. but they will be dangerous only where accompanied
by a serious deterioration of Western interests. Contacts of a
cultural and propaganda nature are likely to continue on a large
scale as the bloc seeks and obtains greater acceptance throughout
the world.
The primary aim of this offensive is not immediate seizure
of political power, but rather the cultivation of neutralism in
the Western Hemisphere. In pursuing this goal, however, the
Communists will work ceaselessly to exploit whatever opportunities
are presented. The potential danger is great in times of chaos, but
the Bloc must carefully weight local success against its area
interests as a whole and not provoke hostile reactions elsewhere
in Latin America.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100750001-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100750001-5
In Cuba the extent of Communist influence in all fields is greater
than perhaps anywhere outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and poses the danger
of an eventual formal Communist takeover. The Bloc has an important
opportunity in Cuba-to demonstrate a model of successful economi(f
cooperation to the rest of Latin America. Going too far at this time
might cause these plans to backfire. Cuba is not a typical situation
and developments there cannot properly be considered to have evolved
from long-range Communist policies.
The Bloc's success in exploiting the situation may be repeated
in other countries. However, events since the meeting of the foreign
ministers of the Organization of American States last August reflect
growing awareness and concern over Sino-Soviet intervention in this
Hemisphere, as now manifested in Cuba.
The success of Communist activities in Latin America will depend
in large measure on the response of the Western powers in meeting
the challenge of the area's economic development. The importance
of Latin America to the United States is obvious, in both political
and economic terms. Differences there are, but our overwhelming
mutual interests in the prosperity, stability and well-being of the
Hemisphere should override these differences.
We are coming-to recognize that the divergences between us are
not exclusively of Communist origin and can and should be settled
outside the battlegrounds of East-West conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow,
too, is rethinking its Latin American foreign policy and it is
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100750001-5
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likely that the Western Hemisphere will increasingly become a major
area for East-West competition. In our legitimate concern with
Communist activities, let us not lose sight of the great assets
we possess for such a struggle, nor lack the will and the vision
to turn them to our advantage and that of the free world.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100750001-5