NEEDED: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770054-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: April 26, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

e 2013/05/07 1 CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770054-5
Declassified and Approved For Releas
LEWISTON (Idaho)
TRIBUNE
Circ.:
Front
Page
16,003
16,426
E Other
ge Pa e
APR9 26 4961
Date:
?1/4
Needed: A Closer Look At The CIA
As the pieces fall slowly intalacOol-,
lowing last week's disastrous ad
c..;4104-the part played by the Ce
ligente Agency becopae,saillere 9 slas-
pect. The picture thqwkopreS
f t,ablAirt,40.944,64. It failed titt ?to
Clear assessment of internal condi-
Cons in Cuba. Had an accurate estimate
been made, the ill-fated launching ,of the,.
counter revolution might tieyer. have_ peen_ I
undertaken. ?
President Kennedy has assumed person-
al responsibility for whatever role the Unit-
ed States played in the invasion, but there
have been statements that the original plot
was hatched during the adminikration of
President Eisenhower. It does not particu-
larly matter which administration was re-
sponsible. The CIA: provided intelligence
data to both, and any role played by this
country was based upon tivat dath.
siok of the secretary of state. Former Vice
fiE'vkid,ent Nixon also is said to have recom-
m&itXd' to President Kennedy a shakeup
within the, CIA to separate its spying and
direct' action functions.
Blith of these suggestions are aimed at
accomplishing the same thing?elimination
of the CIA's privilege to take unilateral ac-
tion. At present the agency is empowered
not only to ferret out intelligence; it can
also use this intelligence by becoming di-
rectly involved in subh affairs as the Cuban
fiasco,
Ili2saillx41,01 that ?CIA intelligence,
workin Cuba andiamong the counter revo-
lutionaries of Florida and in?South Ameri-
can nations wa14Aujtato a degree thal
makes the whole ?organizailon suspect. The
two Chief elements of failure were not
kno*ing whether there would be a popular
response to a counter-invasion, which there
wasn't; and not knowing the full extent of t
arms supplied to Cuba by its Communist
allies. Had the CIA spy network functioned
? propeily the counter revolutionaries would
have thought twice. before storming the
Cuban beaches only to be put to route with-
in 72 hours.
The failure of the intelligence system to
operate in Cuba makes it mandatory that
the agency's power to take direct action be ,
reviewed. Surely, if its spies cannot provide
reasonably accurate information, as they
were unable to do in the Cuban affair, the
CIA should not hold in its hands the power
to participate directly in any foreign adven-
ture involving the United States.?T.Z,Cj
_
aAn offlpring of the , Wise of Stipygliz,
Se6irdai auririg ,VcrorlA tIA
the most-- .E6iiiPletely independent agency of
the government. It is responsible directly
to the President. Its operations are known to
Congress only in a general way; the number
of its employes and its budget are closely
guarded secrets. ?
Since the Cuban debacle there have been
demands that the CIA be reorganized, or at
least called upon to explain its failure in
this particular instance, Sen Mike Mansfield
of Montana, the Democratic leader of the
? Senate, has urged a thorough overhaul of
he agency and placing it under the supervi-
--
?
-' A dPnr Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP67-00318R000100770054-5