CIA'S DUAL ROLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780041-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 2, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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BUI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780041-8
NEWS
Circ.:
287,446
Front Edit Other
Page Page Page
Date:
MAY 2 1967
CIA's Dual Ro e
As e ministra procee ith Its
Inside investigation of the Cuban invasion
fiasco, the leading candidate for
No. 1 is obviously the CentraLliktra
- 1431 's elO'ak-and-dagger butfit, suc-
, Ces the wart e o..?s, was plairM-up
to i s ears no on y in e intelligence phase
but in the training, arming and "unleashing"
of the Cuban rebels. -
If we are to learn and apply the right
; lessons, however, we will do well to avoid
excessive haste or glibness in Pointing the
.blame. (As One high Administration spokes-
man glumly put it: No need to hurry, there
is enough blame to go around so that every-
' one concerned can be sure of getting an
ample slide.) And even while assessing CIA's
share of the responsibility, we can well draw'
? a sharp line?the very line that should have/
been drawn by Congress on thisaA long
ago-between its taitalikalk?.contradictory
?
?Vain '
the real question, if CIA blundered, is
whether it blundered most as an Wilma.
agency-on as a covert oi,iiitigency for
military or para-milita ven ures. It is
the latter function which the CIA, by the
very nature of its original charter; should
not have been assigned,' and should not be
assigned in the future.
One of the main reasons for creating the
CIA in 1947 as an independent agency di-
rectly under the National Security Council,.
after all, was tO take the co-ordination-of-
Intelligence job away from all the policy
agencies (Pentagon, State Department, etc.)
with their separate service or policy view-
points. In this way, it was thought, we could
avoid having intelligence colored or distorted
by the kind of wishful thinking that invariably
colors the attitude of anyone wedded to a
particular line df , action or policy.
But if this Was basic in the thinking that
gave CIA separate status in the first place,
it was compromised at the very oaset by the
fact that the CIA ivas comprised from the
beginning of'the remnants of the OSS, which
was very much an underground operating
(as distinct from intelligence-gathering)
agency throughout the war. The whole , ex-
perience of many CIA-men, in short, was in
plotting and counter-plotting, working with
foreign Underground groups and the like.
More and more in recent years, the
4111 criticism swirling around the CIA has con-
cerned its covert and sometimes clumsy
operations in the field of subversive warfare
rather than its primary role as an intelli-
gence agency. But If the original concept of
divorcing intelligence from operations was
sound?as we have even better reason now ' ?
to believe it was?then it makes sense to
reinstate that concept as one lesson of the
Cu_) Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780041-8
The Administration is reported plahning to ,
shift most of the operational functions, which.,1
the CIA has gathered uilder its wing ,by.1
special assignment from the National Secu-
rity Council, back to the Department of De-
fense which seems sensible to us. If we are
heading into an era of intensified counter-
subversive operations, of matching Commu-
nist infiltration fire with counter-fire, then
we had better develop this whole apparatus
for covert warfare under auspices separate
and distinct from the CIA. And we had also
better make sure that the foreign operations
in both areas?intelligence and coutiter-sub-
version7-are conducted under far stricter
supervision of the top civilian policy-making
echelons than has been the case on some sad
occasions of recent note. 4
_