SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1957
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEPAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas
PRICE DANIEL, Texas
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming
MATTHEW M. NE ELY, West Virginia
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas ARTHUR V. WATKINS,Utah
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri HERMAN WELKER, Idaho
PRICE DANIEL, Texas JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland
ROBERT MORRIS, Chief Counsel
J. G. SouRwiNE, Associate Counsel
WILLrAM A. RUSHER, Associate Counsel
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of Research
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CONTENTS
Witness :
Page
Andriyve, E-----------------------------------------------------
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Bialer, Seweryn--------------------------------------------------
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Rastvorov, Yuri--------------------------------------------------
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER ? 24, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE TIIE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF TIIE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12: 55 p. in., in room
318, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding.
Present : Senator Jenner.
Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, asso-
ciate counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benja-
min Mandel, director of research.
Senator JENNER. Mr. Karski, will you be sworn?
Do your solemnly swear that you will truthfully translate the
questions and answers put to the witness, so help you God?
Mr. KARSKI. Yes, Senator.
Mr. MORRIS. What is your name?
Mr. KARSKI. Jan Karski, professor, Georgetown University.
Mr. MORRIS. You have acted as interpreter for Mr. Bialer; have
you not?
Mr. KARSKI. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. MORRIS. All right.
Now, Senator, will you swear in Mr. Bialer?
Senator JENNER. Do you swear the testimony given at this hearing
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. BIALER (through interpreter). I do.
TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER (THROUGH JAN KARSKI,
INTERPRETER)
Mr. MORRIS. Your name is Seweryn Bialer.
Mr. Bialer, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, in connec-
tion with its activities in trying to understand the full nature of
Soviet activity, Soviet and Communist activity here in the United
States, is particularly interested in knowing something of the develop-
ments that are now taking place in Poland.
Among other things, we noticed that the American Communist
Party, through its official organ, the Daily Worker, is applauding the
activities of Gomulka and other Polish Communists who are taking
what appears to be an independent course of action from the Soviet
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3152 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Now, because events abroad and events here in the United States
are so closely interrelated, as you well 'know, we would appreciate, for
our official record and under oath and based on your own long
experience in the Polish Communist Party that you have related to
us, we would like your interpretation of these events.
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the subcommittee recessed.)
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2: 55 p. m., in the
-caucus room, Senate Office Building.
Present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; J. G. Sourwine, associate
counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin
Mandel, director of research.
TESTIMONY OP SERWYN BIALER-Resumed
Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, I think you have made clear to us that
there are two forces at work in Poland today. One is a force gener-
ated by the people and the workers for a liberalization, a relaxation
,of the heavy control on the part of the Soviet-controlled Polish Com-
munists that has existed.
That is one trend; is it not?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, basically, although I would add to it that this
force wants not only a liberation from the Soviet Union but is also
basically anti-Communist.
Mr. MORRIS. And then you have also told us, have you not, of a
second force, and that is a force that operates within the Politburo
of the Polish Communist Party, which tends to bring the Polish Com-
munist Party more and more away from the tight central control that
has existed in the past?
Have I stated that accurately?
Mr. BIALER. Basically, yes; but I would add too that it is not only
within the Politburo but within the whole party.
Mr. MORRIS. The international party, you mean?
Mr. BIALER. The Communist Party in Poland.
Mr. MORRIS. From the Politburo down?
Mr. BIALER. Yes; down.
Mr. MORRIS. At the present time, Mr. Bialer, which is the predom-
inant of those two forces?
Mr. BIALER. I think that the direct cause of the' present situation
in Poland was the first cause, the popular movement, the popular feel-
ing; and because of the strength of that force the present party lead-
ership could emerge.
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3154 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. MoRms. And you have testified to that effect in your previousl
appearances before the Internal Security Subcommittee, have you not?
Mr. BIALER. Yes.
Mr. MoRRis. And since your last appearance you findthat the trend
which you forecast at that time is becoming even more pronounced?
Mr. BIAI m. Yes; except that I was not so sure that Gomulka would
come to power.
The fact that he carne to power means a basic change in the reality
in Poland.
Mr. MoRRis. Since your last a pearance, then, the change that has
emerged has been the growth of Gomulka?
Mr. BIALER. Yes. The most important event which took place in.
Poland in the last month was that the popular movement became even
stronger and gave opportunity to Gomulka to get power within the
Communist Party.
Mr. MomRis. Now, Gornulka has always been a hard-core Stalinist
Communist, has he not?
Mr. BIALER. I don't think one could say this. I think that in the
years 1945-48 Gomulka held views which later on were strengthened,
and those views could not be branded as Stalinist views.
At that time, in the years 1945-48, there was no possibility for his
views to be implemented.
Naturally, basically he was always a Communist, always he was for
dictatorship; but on very many issues he held views which could not
be branded as Stalinist.
Mr. MoRRis. Now, I noticed the other day, Mr. Bialer, that there
was a reported phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr.
Gomulka on relations between the Polish Government and the Soviet
Government. Isn't it an unusual development that they should have
released the text of a phone conversation between Mr. Khrushchev and
Mr. Gomulka?
Mr. BIALER. It is a very extraordinary event and I understand it in
this way : Gomulka, realizing the anti-Soviet feelings among the
Polish masses, wanted the Polish masses to learn about the tenor of the
conversation, knowing that it would strengthen his prestige and power.
Mr. SouRwINE. Isn't it equally possible that Mr. Khrushchev would
have had to assent to the making public of this telephone conversation
before it would be done?
Mr. BIALER. One should not exclude any possibility, although as far
as I know this is basically against the rules, which are that this kind of
relation between the Communist leaders should not be known to the
general public.
Now, the second proof is that, although the text of the conversation
became known in Poland, it was withheld from the Soviet public
opinion.
Mr. MoRnis. You have prepared for us, have you not, Mr. Bialer, a
short paper, 91/2 pages of which I would like to make reference to at
this point, and that is a sort of a sketch, a historical sketch of events
leading up to the present crisis?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir.
Mr. MORRIS. I would like to place in the record at this time this
paper which I now show you, and let it appear at the conclusion of
the witness' direct testimony.
You have prepared this; have you not?
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Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moixis. Mr. Bialer, I know that you are uniquely qualified to
testify about events in Poland because of your long experience in
Poland, but in view of the fact that you also are a student of Com-
munist affairs generally I wonder if at this time you would be will-
ing to answer a few questions on the Hungarian situation?
V. BIALER. If I can, naturally it would be my pleasure to.
Mr. MoRRIs. In your opinion has there been a trend developing in
Hungary similar to that you have outlined in this paper here today?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, I am convinced that it applies also to the situ-
ation in Hungary, and this I"say on the basis of my acquaintances
with the Hungarian Communist leaders, as well as my status with
respect to present reality.
Naturally, the basic difference is that in Hungary at the last mo-
ment, in the last days, a bloody revolt took place which did not
take place in Poland.
And, of course, I would like you to keep in mind the basic
difference between the two situations. I would put it in this way :
In Poland the present Communist leadership got to power half an
hour before the revolt was to take place, and in Hungary half an
hour after the revolt actually did take place.
If Gomulka had not taken power in Poland exactly at that time,
most probably the same revolt would have taken place in Poland.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying, in other words, that the accession
of Gomulka prevented a revolt in Poland, whereas the accession of
Nagy followed a revolt in Hungary?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir, exactly.
Mr. MoRRis. Therefore, it would seem to have the effect-the im-
position of the Gomulka government on the one hand and the Nagy
government on the other hand were really attempts to put, as it were,
a stove lid on this uprising that has taken place ?
Mr. BIALER. Yes; both Gomulka and Nagy, identifying them-
selves with the anti-Soviet feeling among the masses, were a form
of isolation against anti-Communist movements.
Mr. MoRRis. And in the case of Hungary the thing got completely
out of hand; did it not?
Mr. BIALER. Yes; in Hungary Nagy came to power too late, you
might say.
Mr. MoRRis. In other words, this device of keeping the lid on a
popular insurrection succeeded in Poland and did not succeed in
Hungary?
Mr. BIALER. I would say that in Poland it worked and in Hun-
gary apparently it did not.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you feel that this trend, which you have told us
about in your previous testimony and again here today, as well as
in this short paper that you prepared for us-would you say that
this trend is still operative in Poland?
Mr. BIALER. Yes. You mean independence from the Soviet
Union?
Mr. MoRRIs. No. By "this trend" I meant this drive on the part of
the people to demand a certain amount of freedom and relaxation of
controls.
Mr. BIALER. Not only am I sure, that this continues, but it will gain
in strength in time because there are better conditions for it.
72723-57-pt. 45-2
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3156 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mr. MORRis. Do you mean that as more relaxation of controls is
granted to the people, the stronger will be their demands?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir, you are correct.
I would add this, that the Polish people for the first time have
learned that they are strong, that they can win certain of their de-
mands.
Before they were as if asleep under the Communist terror. Now
they are as if awakened.
And I do believe that, once being awakened, they will continue this
process.
Mr. MoP.Ris. Now, do you feel that this device of, as it were, a stove-
lid government, used to keep this thing under control, was something
initiated by Khrushchev?
Mr. BIALER. I don't think so.
As far as I understand the situation it worked this way : Indeed
after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership
wanted certain minor changes which would deceive world public
opinion as to the nature of the Soviet methods. However, once they
started this, it got entirely out of their control and assumed such pro-
portions that I could not identify the present state of affairs with their
original initiative.
I would go further. I think that the present Soviet leadership will
have to recognize the developments in Poland and in Hungary, al-
though certainly it will not mean that they are satisfied with it.
They realize that they are too weak to put it down.
Mr. MORRIS. But they do have, as it were, the situation under control
in Poland?
Mr. BIALER. I don't think that they have the situation in Poland
under control presently.
I believe that Gomulka has under his control, at least partially, the
situation in Poland. This does not mean, however, that it is the
Soviet leadership which has it.
Mr. SOURWINE. If, as you have described them, both Gomulka and
Nagy are a sort of prophylactic against freedom, or as Mr. Morris has
said, stove lids on the flame, if Khrushchev did not apply the prophy-
lactic or put on the stove lid who did?
Mr. BIALER. Well, I would put it this way : I think that the leader-
ship of the Polish Communist Party, all the leadership of the Commu-
nist Party-and for that matter also of the Hungarian Communist
Party-do not like Gomulka or Nagy. They probably consider them:
as precisely stove lids, in this situation which has emerged in Poland..
However, they are forced by circumstances to recognize them.
Mr. SOURWINE. They are using them for their own purposes, in
other words?
Mr. BIALER. Yes. These people, they pushed Gomulka in order
to save the situation, but they do not have any intention of indentify--
ing themselves with what Gomulka really is.
I consider that Gomulka really wants more freedom from Russia.
presently.
Mr. SOURWINE. You make a distinction between wanting freedom
and wanting freedom from Russia?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, yes, I think this is a big difference. What is
freedom? It is freedom from communism.
Mr. SOURwINE. Go ahead and explain that a little bit, will you?
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Mr. BIALER. Gomulka is a Communist, but he wants the Polish
Communist Party to be as much independent from the Soviet Union
as possible. He wants to be a master in his own house and he wants
his party to be a master in their own house.
However, this I would differentiate from giving freedom, since
he wants communism to dominate in Poland, and this means the
dictatorship of one Communist Party in Poland.
Mr. SOURWINE. Would you say that Gomulka is interested in Polish
freedom from Soviet domination if it does not also involve power for
Gomulka?
Mr. BIALER. Yes; I think that such is the reality, such was the
development of events.
Although he came to power originally thanks to the support of the
Soviet Union, finally he assumed the position which you defined.
Mr. SouRwixE. I am afraid I don't have an answer that I under-
stand yet.
I am trying to find out if you think that Gomulka divorces his own
ambition for power from his desire to have the Communist Party
of Poland sever its ties with Russia.
Mr. BIALER. Yes, sir; this is as you say.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, Nagy, the counterpart of Gomulka in Hungary,
is the one who called on the Red army to keep himself in power.
Would not that reflect a relationship, if Navy is the counterpart
of Gomulka, which would be slightly at variance with what you
have told us today?
Mr. BIALER. Well, I don't think that I am at variance with my
previous statement, since I maintain that the problem concerns only
power, and both Gomulka and Nagy are prepared to use Soviet
forces in order to maintain themselves in power.
The best proof is that in the years 1945-48 it was exactly due to
Soviet support that Gomulka got power in Poland.
But there is a difference of circumstances in Hungary and Poland.
In the case of Nagy, in order to obtain power, he needed Soviet
forces. Gomulka had a different situation. He got power without
the help of Soviet forces, and having actually achieved power he does
not need any more the Soviet forces.
Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you are saying that the mainte-
nance of themselves in power is the important thing, the most im-
portant thing to both of these men ?
Mr. BIALER. Yes, undoubtedly.
Whatever differences they have with the Soviet Union, they have
one thing in common : it means maintenance of communism.
Mr. MoRRIs. Have you read the statement of Tito which is reported
in the morning apers today?
Mr. BIALER. May I see it?
Yes, I read it before.
Mr. MORRIS. It would appear from the account of that statement
which I have just shown you, Mr. Bialer, which appeared on page 20
of the New York Times for October 30, 1956, that Tito is opposed to
the uprisings in Hungary.
Mr. BIALER. I understood it the same way.
Mr. MORRIS. The basis of his opposition to the developments in
Hungary is that the developments, such as they were, in his opinion
damaged socialism in general, as well as peace among nations.
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Mr. BIALER. Yes. 'As far as I understood Tito's statement he con-
demns everything which took place in Hungary which would under-
rnine the position taken by Nagy, which means everything that would
amdermine basically the Communist regime in Hungary.
Mr. MomRis. Excuse me, did I understand you to say that Tito's
,position would be opposed to Nagy's position?
Mr. BIALER. No; Tito would oppose in Hungary all those forces
,which wanted to undermine basically the Communist regime as such-
the national Communist regime.
Mr. MORRIS. But to speak concretely, the Nagy regime?
Mr. BIALER. The Nagy regime.
Mr. MORRIS. So that anything that went further than the imposi-
tion of the so-called stove-lid government of Nagy in Hungary was
the thing that drew opposition from Mr. Tito?
Mr. BIALER. As I understand it, Tito realizes that in Hungary
there are two streams-one powerful stream supporting a national
communism independent from the Soviet Union, and represented by
Nagy, and the second stream which opposes communism as such.
Tito supports the first force, which means national communism
headed by Nagy, and violently opposes all other forces which would
like to strive against communism.
This is what I understood from Tito's statement. Of course, I do
not know if from one article we can understand the position of Tito
.as such, basically.
Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I understand the limitations, but Tito in the state-
ment refers to "reactionary elements that use the present events for
their antisocial aims. By those he means the people that would upset
Nagy?
Mr. BIALER. That is the second stream I was speaking about, against
which Tito pronounced himself.
Mr. MORRIS. Yesterday afternoon I had a session with a person
who was a very important Soviet official but who defected from the
Soviet organization. His defection, however, considerably antedates
yours. But he did know on a very personal basis all of the top
functionaries of the present Russian Communist Party. He interprets
the present developments in this fashion. May I present his views
and get your comments on that?
He believes that the top councils of the Soviet Union decided that
they would be more effective in their efforts to control the whole world
if they use the device of independent Communist Parties. By using
independent Communist Parties they would be able to carry on their
insurrectionary work in the various countries of the free world without
the stigma of Moscow. And it is his contention that a very small
group being privy to this plan could carry on and accomplish the
present results, whereas at the same time the rank and file of the party
would not necessarily have to be privy to that development.
I wonder, Mr. Bialer, if you could give your view, in juxtaposition
to this other view?
Mr. BIALER. I find one weakness in this type of speculation. This
speculation takes it for granted that a kind of a plot in an elite group,
a small number of people, can decide the issue, while as we know the
masses came into play presently and of course the masses complicated
entirely the picture.
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It does not work as that small group of people planned it to work,
even if it was true that they did it.
However, I must stress that the gentleman is absolutely correct
when he says that such were the plans of the Soviet leadership.
I.remember in 1954, when still I was in Poland, that the official line
was : Poland is an independent country. That means that we were
required to say to the world that Poland is an independent country.
However, the difference is that at that time Poland was not an inde-
pendent country, while today there are certain changes in Poland.
So, I would conclude in this way : Whatever were the plans-and
plans there were, as that gentleman told you-the reality developed
in a different way. It got out of control. The masses entered the
picture and now the situation is not as planned but as the masses
dictate.
The strategy of Khrushchev basically wanted events to go in this
direction, but the reality got out of control, new factors entered the
picture, and things went much further than they wanted them to go.
This is why I doubt if what is actually happening behind the
Iron Curtain could be called Soviet strategy:
Mr. MORRIS. We had an instance last week of a refugee, a Polish
refugee, returning to Poland and we noticed that the arrangements
for that were handled by the ?oviet Embassy here in Washington.
That situation, Mr. Bialer, points up the primary concern of the
Internal Security Subcommittee with these developments. It is of
prime importance to the subcommittee that we analyze the various
activities of the officials in the Hungarian Legation, the Soviet Em-
bassy, and the various delegations to the United Nations.
Don't you think that the fact that the Soviet Union handled the
redefection of a Polish immigrant was of some significance at this
time?
Mr. BIALER. I couldn't give you, sir, any specific answer, since I
I would have to know who the immigrant was, what the circumstances
were, and so on. Perhaps such a procedure was necessary.
I have not enough material to pronounce myself one way or the
other.
Mr. SOURWINE. I should like to ask this : First, as a preliminary
matter, we all know it's very difficult to know what a political reality
is. If Mr. Gomulka does something which we presume Mr. Khru-
shchev wants him to do, we never know whether he does it because Go-
mulka wants to do it or because Khrushchev wants Gomulka to do it.
On the other hand, there is a reality which we can look at, and that
is the matter of military control. The Soviets control the military
in Poland, and they control the military in Hungary. Their own
forces are in Hungary. They have Rokossovsky in charge of the
Polish Army. They massacred the flower of the Polish. Army at
Katyn.
The purpose obviously, or a major purpose, at least, was to emascu
late the Polish Army as a Polish force and to create a situation in
which Soviet officers would be in the top echelon. And that situation
has been created.
Now, would you agree that as long as the Soviet Union controls the
military with its own forces or, as in the case of P'oland',. with its own
officers, there can be very little freedom in that nation: from the Soviet
Union, in the last analysis?
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Mr. BIALER. Yes, I understand your reasoning, sir, where you are
driving at, and I am in full agreement with you.
But the situation in Poland, as I see it presently, does not respond
to your description. Rokossovsky is no longer minister of defense
and commander in chief of the Polish Army. He left. He left yes-
terday. His successor is definitely Gomulka's man.
The control of the Polish Army is no longer exercised by a man who
is outside of the Polish Communist Party, as was Rokossovsky; it is
directly under the leadership., of the Polish Communist Party.
As far as we can suppose om Gomulka's statements, the so-called
Soviet experts are in the stage of leaving Poland.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You say that Rokossovsky is no longer commander
in chief of the army?
Mr. BIALER. No.
Mr. SouRwINE. Who took his place?
Mr. BIALER. Bordzilowski, and above all Spychalski, both Go-
mulka's supporters.
Spychalski was in jail several years for anti-Stalinism and Bord-
zilowski is a genuine Polish general-well that word "genuine"-I
do not remember now exactly his past, but I am sure I could put it
this wa~yy : he is not a Soviet general.
Mr. bOURIVINE. Would you say that this presages the withdrawal of
the Soviet officer corps in the Polish Army and the turning over of
top command throughout the army to Polish officers?
Mr. BIALER. I am deeply convinced of this.
Mr. SOURWINE. If that is done what would you say it means?
Mr. BIALER. I interpret it this way: thatindeed Gomulka and his
followers want a genuine internal independence from the Soviet Union
and want to have full control of the Polish armed forces themselves.
Mr. SouRWINE. In the same vein, do you foresee the withdrawal of
Russian armed forces from Hungary?
Mr. BIALER. I think that this is more than probable.
Mr. MORRIS. At any rate, a gage of your view will be whether or
not there will be an early evacuation of Soviet forces from both those
countries, will it not?
Mr. BIALER. I didn't understand.
Mr. MORRIS. A gage of your interpretation will be whether or not
there is an early withdrawal of Soviet forces from those two countries?
Mr. BIALER. We are speaking about Hungary and Poland now?
As far as Poland is concerned, I do not believe that the Soviet divi-
sions will be withdrawn from Poland.
But I believe that the leadership of the Polish Army will be taken
by the Polish Communists.
As far as Hungary is concerned, it seems to me that the Soviet forces
will indeed leave Hungary.
As for the degree to which the reality proceeds as I thought, I re-
member around 1 week ago there was a general conviction here that
Rokossovsky would be Minister of Defense. I was stating publicly
that he would not be Minister of Defense, that they would liquidate
him completely. And it happened yesterday. Although I must say
that I did not foresee that the process would take place so soon. I
thought that it would take place 3 months after the general elections,
which are supposed to take place in January. Well, it took place yes-
terday.
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STAThS .5101
Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bialer.
Thank you, Professor Karski, for assisting us once again.
(Whereupon, the subcommittee adjourned.)
(The portion of Mr. Bialer's statement placed in the record by Mr.
Morris at p. 3154 appears below:)
DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS
The beginnings of the most recent events in Poland are to be found in the
second half of 1953. The development of events during the years 1953-56 can
be divided into the following periods :
First period: Second half of 1953 until the end of 1954
During this period, discussions within the Polish United Workers' Party
(PZPR) began, regarding errors in economic policy and, above all, the police
methods of ruling the party and the country. These discussions were not widely
made public. There were not even mass discussions within the party. The party
leadership was not personally attacked. The party leadership, following the
example of the Soviet Union, began limiting the power of the secret police.
Even in this period these limitations were greater in Poland than in Russia.
Second period: The end of 1954 until the beginning of 1956
Above all, this encompassed the party intelligentsia. The discussions in the
Party Activ began to develop even at official meetings. The voices of criticism
began to reach the press. The criticism was very frequently directed personally
against individuals from the party leadership. The power of the security ap-
paratus lessened even more. To a great degree it became isolated from the
party itself, where the concealed aversion to the security apparatus began to
break out to the surface. The party leadership was forced under the pressure
of the Party Activ on the highest levels to declare democratization and a change
in policies, but it retreated, only step by step and began to introduce these
changes into life only with great delays and inconsistencies. Frequently the
attempts made by the party leadership to restore calm to the Party Activ were
unsuccessful.
During the period 1955-56, opposition to the party leadership grew significantly.
Within the party, the Party Activ achieved a rather large measure of freedom of
activity in comparison to Russia and the other satellite countries-this despite
the wishes of the party leadership. The following convictions resulted in the
Party Activ :
Either Rusisa takes a serious step ahead, on the road to de-Stalinization, and
in the meantime that which has already changed in the party in Poland be
sanctioned and develop further, or else nothing will change in Russia and in
the meantime there will be a rightist-nationalist deviation in the Polish party.
It should be stressed that both in the first and in the second period, the movement
against the party leadership, and in part, against the Soviets, embraced in a mass
fashion only the Party Activ and, above all, the party intelligentsia. The
party masses did not emerge from their lethargy and the overwhelming portion
of the bureaucratic party apparatus continued in its practical work forward,
however, even to a lesser extent than was postulated in the speeches of the old
leaders of the party. The people just began to feel certain changes in the situa-
tion. Most of all they began to become less afraid-this because of the great
lessening of police terror. They, however, were still distrustful of these changes.
They saw no conditions permitting action and they did not know how to over-
come their many years of silence. The crisis which was developing within the
party was concealed from the people by various means.
Third period: From the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union until June 1953
Krushchev's.anti- Stalinist campaign which developed in a controlled, predeter-
mined manner in the Soviet Union, evaded the control of the leadership in
Poland. The internal party crisis broke through to the top and encompassed the
entire party. Bierut's absence increased the crisis. The chief force in the
party stepping out against the leadership continued to be the party intelligentsia.
For the first time, however, in the whole post-Stalin period the masses began to
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3162 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
move. The distressing economic situation which resulted from the 6-year plan
and the frequent promises of improvement after Stalin's death was especially
felt as the police terror was fundamentally weakened.
Fourth period: June 1956 to October 1956
At the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the party in October 1956,
the Politburo presented its resignation to the Central Committee. Personnel
changes in the Politburo were not accomplished through the removal of certain
members and co-opting new ones, but in the form of removing the existing
Politburo and electing a new one in its entirety. This is a fact of great im-
portance, characterizing the situation which unfolded in Poland from June to
October 1956. The form in which the election of the new Politburo was ac-
complished is unheard of. With this it should be remembered that a party
congress is to be held in March. Hence there was the possibility of a painless
evolutionary changing of the Politburo. The change was accomplished, how-
ever, in the severest form. This in reality rules out an evaluation of these
events which would state that this was a predetermined plan. This was a
change resulting from a struggle and a critical situation.
What forced the Politburo to a collective resignation-in other words, what
developed in the period from June to October 1956? It appears that the fol-
lowing were the factors :
(a) A basic undermining, and in many aspects, loss of control by the party
over life in Poland : The most active strata of nonparty individuals ceased being
afraid. The Poznan events were only a small example of the tremendously ex-
plosive popular sentiment which arose in connection with political and economic
matters, and was approaching the point of explosion. The hatred of the Polish
people existed even in past years but, for the first time, conditions arose which
threatened its explosion. The decline of the authority of the State and of the
leadership of the party among the people on the basis of the bankrupt policies of the
leadership during the past 10 years, the weakening of terror as well as irresolu-
tion in its present policies, was tremendous. It appears that this was the basic
fact, without which Gomulka's return as first secretary, in the fashion in which
it was accomplished, would not have been possible.
(b) The decline of the Politburo's authority in the party itself : The dis-
solution of party discipline had gone so far that the principle which is the con-
dition of the existence of the party, namely, the principle that, despite various
views, once resolutions were made they must be followed, was undermined
publicly. The dissolution of party discipline and the decline of the Politburo's
authority led not only to the fact that the control of the party slipped out of
the hands of the leadership but it also made the mastering of the situation
among the people unusually difficult. The party was no longer a well-oiled ma-
chine executing orders of the leadership against the people. If we speak of the
rank-and-file of party members, of whom the overwhelming portion was never
Communist but entered the party either under force or for economic gain or
for career purposes, then this mass of the membership diffused, so to speak,
among the people and lost its separate identity.
(c) The decided opposition against the party leadership on the part of the
party intelligentsia which, in many articles in the press expressed in reality a
vote of no confidence regarding the leadership, did not recognize its leadership,
and more important, passed from discussion to practical activity. The party in-
telligentsia transformed itself from being a connecting link between party lead-
ership and the party and the people, to a group separating the Politburo from
the party and nonparty individuals.
(d) There was lack of unity in the Politburo, divergence of opinion, lack of
a figure with sufficient authority and popularity who could unify the Politburo.
In such an intense period, the Politburo did not have a clear program of action
or a platform for change. The situation demanded-If everything was not to
disintegrate--a decisive program, even a Stalinist one, which with the aid of
terror could attempt to master the situation, or a program of far-reaching
changes which would prevent an outburst and would eventually permit the re-
covery of leadership within and beyond the party. In the meantime, the policies
of the party leadership during the period June to October was a policy of sta-
bilization. Hence, a policy which was not one in favor of withdrawal, but at
the same time one indecisive in regard to further developments. Hence this was
not a policy of real power. It appears that the wavering and lack of a platform
of action by the Politburo resulted among other things from divergence within
the Politburo, indecision, the burdens of the past and lack of strength in its va-
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3163
rious components. Beyond this, even if some group or individuals in the Polit-
buro had a decisive program for change, perhaps one no different than the
present platform of Gomulka, it is possible that they lacked authority to bring
about its realization.
(e) The lack of unity in the Central Committee and the decline of authority
of the Politburo in the Central Committee. The Central Committee could be
persuaded but it could be no longer dictated to. A part of the Central Commit-
tee stopped believing that the situation in Poland could be mastered by the
directorship of the then reigning Politburo.
(f) The actual situation in Poland and in the Soviet bloc had immense signifi-
cance. First, the crisis of the Polish economy and the political forms of ruling
Poland were revealed with great force. Secondly, the weakening of Soviet con-
trol and the decline of the authority of the Soviet leadership had developed to
the point where publicly announced orders by the Moscow dictators were some-
times disregarded (for example, Bulganin's command, included in his speech
of July 22, 1956, in Warsaw).
DYNAMIC FORCES BEHIND THE INCIDENTS IN POLAND
In the present situation in Poland, two dynamic forces led to the existing state
of affairs.
The first force is the active pressure exerted for the first time since the war
by large groups of people, especially factory workers and working and univer-
sity youth. The basic character of this pressure is anti-Soviet, favoring full
independence of Poland from the Soviet Union. It is also anti-Communist. It
should be stressed, however, that the anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland is of
greater strength than anti-Communist feelings. At the present time, the chief
enemy is the Soviet Union.
The second force is the pressure exerted by a large segment of the party
against the Soviet Union for the acquisition of independence from the Soviet
Party in internal matters. Its aim is greater freedom within the party in public
life and a serious reorganization of the economic structure of the country. The
main stress is on internal reforms. The question of separation from the Soviet
Union is only a necessary precondition for this.
The two dynamic forces came together and, in some cases, blended under the
impact of present incidents in Poland. For a certain period of time, their
interest became the same. In practice, a temporary alliance was concluded
joining both forces in the matter of gaining a greater measure of independence
from the Soviet Union. The degree to which both of these forces want independ-
ence from the Soviet Union is different. The reason why both of these forces
want independence from the Soviet Union is also different, but for the present
moment they have a common avenue of action.
The objectives of these two forces in internal matters are, generally speaking,
completely different, but again the direction of their activity has, at the present
moment, a number of common points. These are not opposed to the objectives
of the people, that is, the internal changes in the economy and the political life
which are desired by groups in the party who have come out in favor of changes.
The people do not want to stop at these changes, because they are opposed to
communism even if it is improved.
The two forces which were mentioned above are not isolated from each. Other.
They mutually react on one another. The principal directions of this reaction
could be described in the following manner :
The influence of the attitudes and activities of the people on the changes de,
sired by groups in the party depends primarily on the fact that, as to date, the
party is being forced in the direction of more responsible activity. Proposals are
put forth which go further than the party itself would want. This favors putting
forth at the lead the most radical elements in the party and in the leadership
who, without the existence of the first force, would never so easily have obtained
their present position and would not have so strong a position. As far as Go-
mulka is concerned, it would seen very unlikely that, without the existence of the
tremendous pressure of the first force, he could have aciheved his present position.
Hence, with the existence of this first force, he found support not only from
the side of his adherents in the party but also from the side of many opponents
who saw in him a lightning rod which could absorb the more threatening inci-
dents and could weaken the anti-Communist pressure of the first force. Paren-
thetically speaking, the difference between Hungary and Poland is based, among
other things, on the fact that in Poland Gomulka achieved power before the rev-
72723-57-pt. 45-3
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3164 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
olutionary outbreak in the capital and fulfilled to a large extent the role of a
lightning rod. In Hungary, on the other hand, Imre Nagy was brought to power
In the course of the revolutionary outbreak and was incapable of mastering the
situation. Beyond this, the influence of the first force results in the fact that
the party has a stronger position in dealing with Moscow. (This applies, above
all, to such a situation where the first force does not lead to mass anti-Communist
uprisings.)
The opposite influence of the activity and work of segments of the party who
desire change, on the activity and attitudes of the population is such that, if the
desired changes favored by elements of the party come to the fore and are suffi-
ciently radical, they will ameliorate the anti-Communist activity by the popu-
lation. This is for the short run at the present time. By placating certain de-
mands of the people and setting forth prospects of righting the political and eco-
nomic situation, they help neutralize the anticommunism of the first group or,
strictly speaking, defer its expression to the future. It seems, however, that
the long-range effect of deferring the solution of this problem, can be different in-
asmuch as it will embolden the first force and create a better climate for its
activity.
Inasmuch as in the present situation in Poland there occurred a temporary
alliance of both forces, it is certain that, together with this development, a
moment must come when the first force will press forward and the second force
will not want to move ahead. And hence, the time will come when the perma-
nent contradictory interests outweigh the temporary coalescence of interests.
It seems that, given the situation which now obtains, it cannot be said that there
must come at this moment a stoppage of further changes by the party. Under
the constant pressure from the bottom and in strengthening the rightist forces
in the party, it is possible that there will be an evolutionary development which
will transform Poland into a country of ever-increasing elements of real
democracy.
It appears that for the most desirable development of events in the future,
that is, such which could harm a retrogressive trend and simultaneously press
the leaders continuously forward in the direction of change, it would be necessary
to have a situation where the uprising of the masses would be a primary poten-
tial threat but that the movement of the masses would take a peaceful form but
in general. The following area few of these views :
When one speaks of Gomulka's views in this period, a very important factor
must be considered, namely, that those views were in reality just forming and
absolutely not yet fitted into some kind of finished system. He did not yet
state them in their entirety or, all the more, introduce them into life, nor, I am_
convinced, did he think them through himself. The entire period of his power
in the party falls in the years of a fight for power, and building the very bases
of Communist rule in Poland. It was only the last period of his leadership (the
second half of 1947 and the first half of 1948) that there was a beginning in
deciding how the economic structure and the political system in Poland would
look. And Gomulka was not a theoretician. his views were primarily based
on practice. Even then, however, there were in his views clear elements of
contradiction not only with Soviet policies but also with the Communist ideology
in general. The following are a few of these views :
(a) Gomulka had a negative attitude in regard to the activity of the Com-
munist Party of Poland during the prewar period and to the activity of its
predecessor, the SDKPIL. This negative attitude resulted from his critical
evaluation of the fact that these parties subordinated the national Polish
problems to the affairs of the international Communist movement. Gomulka
thought that the policies of the Polish Socialist Party (an anti-Communist
Party) were better in many regards, in any event, better from the point of view
of national considerations. He wanted to separate the party he directed from
the traditions of the Polish Communist Party. So far, that for the members
of the party he did not want to use the name, "Communist," since this in Poland
signified something Muscovite, something anti-Polish. This was not just a
tactic with Gomulka. His colleagues in the Politburo and Moscow agreed to
this in the early period because of tactical considerations since a battle was
being waged for power where no political trick could be neglected. But in
1947-48, other leaders of the party and Moscow considered that it was time to end
this tactic. Gomulka, however, regarded this matter seriously and not just as
a tactic.
(b) Gomulka regarded the matter of alliance with Russia as a state prob-
lem. He explained the need for this alliance by the German question. He put
national considerations at the forefront in this alliance saying practically noth-
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3165
ing of a common-party ideology of both countries. The entire tenor of his
speeches and views was permeated with caution in a positive evaluation of Rus-
sia, mistrust in relation to Russia as well as constant stressing of the unsuit-
ableness of the Soviet example for Poland. In the meantime, the impression
arose that he was for Soviet troops in Poland and for Russian intervention in
Poland since this was necessary for him to come into power, but that after
getting power he would gladly get rid of the protectors.
(e) Gomulka was an opponent of the collectivization of agriculture. He
did not feel this suitable given Polish conditions. He did not have any positive
program.of transforming the Polish villages. He was concerned with retaining
the status quo. Apparently he was an opponent of violent measures in the in-
dustrial field. He attached many hopes to cooperatives in trade.
In short, it can be said that in his views Gomulka differed from his colleagues
in the leadership and in Moscow mainly in that he wanted to wield control over
Poland himself without submitting reports to Moscow, that he wanted to de-
velop communism in Poland in a more evolutionary manner, that he wanted to
avoid those forms in the building of communism which in his opinion were con-
trary to the national Polish character. He wanted to feel less a leader of the
party and more a director of the state.
GOMULKA AND HIS STRENGTH IN TIIE POLISH PARTY AT PRESENT
Both the movement within the party which began after the death of Stalin
as decreed by Moscow, as well as the movement within the party which began
to develop at the same time, went much further than Moscow wanted and was
a kind of rebellion against the leadership of the party and the ideological
dictatorship of Moscow. It was not a Gomulkaite movement inside the party
and particularly in the Activ. The slogan "democracy" was not associated
with Gomulka whom the Activ knew to be a dictator from 1945 to 1948. The
attachment to Leninist tradition and outbursts of hatred toward Russia in con-
junction with the revelation of the Polish Communist Party affair (KPP)
(1. e., its destruction by Stalin after 1938) was also different than the attach-
ment by Gomulka to the traditions of socialism and his nationalistic anti-
Russian stand. As far as the leadership of the party is concerned, which to an
overwhelming extent retained its leading functions up to the present within
the scope of a Gomulkaite Politburo and government, it appeared a month or
two ago that it maintained the basic accusations leveled against Gomulka in
1948 and did not intend to return the leadership of the party to him. It is
doubtful that in the intervening 2 months that their basic views of Gomulka
and his past errors could be so generally revised that the party high command
would voluntarily relinquish to Gomulka the leadership of the party. I believe
that it is more sound to say that a majority of the party high command was and
is negatively predisposed to Gomulka and gave him power under the pressure
of a threatening situation, of their own irresolution and the conviction that lie
is capable of mastering the situation. It appears that the initiators of this move
was that more clever (or perhaps that supporting) group of the leadership who
even before the Plenum (Ochab and Cyrankiewicz) had already come to an
agreement with Gomulka and in this way saved themselves with the rest. How-
ever, it also appears likely that Moscow was warned by the stubbornly Stalinist
part on the party leadership. It therefore appears that in the party leadership
and present setup Gomulka has more enemies and wavering supporters than
decided friends. This situation will however probably change.
First. Garnulka already has introduced some of his people into the, Politburo
and central committee, for example, Loga-Sowinski, Kliszko, and Spychalski.
Second. It will be easier for the Polish Socialist Party portion of the party
leadership to work with Gomulka than with the former leadership. They have
more points in common in the past as well as now.
Third. I doubt that the majority of the present members of the leadership,
who were simultaneously favored in the years 1950-55, will long remain in the
leadership. Gomulka has already proposed the creation of an impartial com-
mission that will occupy itself with an examination of who is responsible for the
the crimes of the past ; that is, crimes not committed by Gomulka.
Fourth. In March there is to be a party congress. Gomulka, who at the
present time wields enormous authority and power, will undoubtedly utilize this
congress for selecting a central committee favorable to himself.
As far as the Party Activ and the party intelligentsia are concerned, it appears
that while supporting the main points which he accepted in his policy speech
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3166 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(independence from Russia, putting a brake on collectivization, production of
consumer goods), they are not tied to Gomulka but approach him with many
reservations. The main strength of Gomulka is the basic party organizations.
It appears that his support here is enormous. This also applies, so it would
seem, to the workers, youth, and military organizations. Their attitudes differ
from the feelings of the people primarily, and sometimes only in that they want
the party to continue to rule in Poland. For that reason their support of
Gomulka will most probably continue as distinct from support of the people,
who want independence from the Soviet Union, internal reforms, and are
simultaneously anti-Communist.
At the VII plenum of the central committee of the party, 3 months ago, when
it was decided to reinstate Gomulka in the party, this was no doubt done on the
condition that he accept the existent political platform of the party. However,
Gomulka became the first secretary of the party despite the ruling of the VII
plenum without accepting the party line which was confirmed at that time by
the central committee and the politburo. From this first policy speech it is
evident that he considers as improper the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 which
condemned his position despite the fact that these resolutions are formally bind-
ing since they have never been revoked. Gomulka made it clear that he still
maintains the position he held then in matters to which Moscow and the Polish
central committee were opposed.
Second. Gomulka made it very clear that he considers the general party line
not only in the years 1948-53 but also the years 1955-56 (and hence from Stalin's
death until he (Gomulka) took power) as fallacious. This is at the same time
a condemnation of the slowness and half measures of the changes which were
accomplished in Russia since the death of Stalin.
Third. On the basis of Gomulka's first speech, it is difficult to estimate exactly
what his general line will be, that is, how far he has progressed in the views he
held in 1948. Such an estimate can only be made after the elections in January
and the party congress in March.
The following factors might be of primary importance in influencing the
difference in Gomuika's- position and views as compared to his position and
views in 1945-48:
In the years from 1945 to 1948 Gomulka ruled Poland under conditions of com.
plete Soviet control over the life of the country. This control hampered the
freedom of his moves and views. Presently, under conditions of basically
weakened or perhaps even severed direct Soviet control, Gomulka has a freer
hand to vent his views and bring them to life.
Second. The years 1945-47 were a period of struggle for power in Poland.
At that time it was a question of life or death for the Communist Party in
Poland. In such a period the differences of opinion between Gomulka and the
Soviet Union as well as the pro-Soviet Polish Communist leaders had to give
way to the more important pressing problem of getting and retaining power.
The present period in this regard does not hamper Gomulka as it did then.
Third. After Gomulka personally experienced the full meaning of
Stalinism and the Soviet system. He went to prison. He had the incentive
and time to think through and examine the differences between Polish interests
and those of the Soviets and traditional Communist ideology.
Fourth. In 1948 Gomulka did not have any support in the party. The party
accepted his removal with hardly any resistance. At the present time Gomulka
has certain groups of activists who support him because of his views. He has
certain groups of activists who support him because of fear of the return of
Stalinism. At the same time, he has strong backing among the mass of rank-
and-file party members who for the first time in party history pulled themselves
out of their lethargy and bonds of party discipline. This strengthens the posi-
tion of Gomulka and should have the effect of making him stronger in his
demands.
Fifth. In view of the fact that in the years 1945-48 Gomulka fought against
the people, he did not have their support. At the present time however, he has
their support. Thanks to this support, above all, he was able to achieve the
position of ruler of the country. This support which at present is his strength
and trump, simultaneously limits his freedom of movement and rather presses
him to a position of supporting the most far-reaching changes in internal policies
as well as in relations with the Soviet Union.
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,Sixth. In the years 1945-48, Gomulka helped create the Stalinist system in
Poland. He himself later became a victim of this system. In coming to power
in 1956, Gomulka found a basically weakened and disorganized power of the
secret police, an awakened active public opinion, and full discussions in the
press. Ile rose to power on the wave of a general conviction that he will want
to further develop these beginning elements of change. It is doubtful if in these
conditions he will want or could return to such a system as he built in Poland
in 1945--48. All of these above factors rather press Gomulka in a direction
further differing from the traditional Soviet-Communist views than the views
he held in the period 1945-48.
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1956
UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE TIIE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON TIIE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 35 p. in., in the office
of Senator William E. Jenner, Senate Office Building.
Present : Senator Jenner (presiding).
Also present : Robert Morris, chief counsel.
Senator JENNER. Mr. Rastvorov, do you solemnly swear the testi-
mony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. RASTVOROV. I do.
Mr. MORRIS. Senator, at the last appearance of Mr. Rastvorov be-
fore the Senate subcommittee, he told us in his testimony that he knew
Sergei Tikhvinsky, a member of the.NKVD, an official whose job it
was, according to his own direct knowledge, to recruit Japanese pris-
oners into the Soviet apparatus and then send them back into Japan,
and at the time of his appearance he said Mr. Tikhvinsky had just
been appointed by the Soviet Government as the head of the official
trade mission to Japan and it was thought at that time that he would
be the Soviet Ambassador to Japan.
Now, from our point of view, it was an extremely important intelli-
gence development, that we have the spectacle of a man that trains
Japanese into Communist agents from among Japanese prisoners,
sends them back to Japan after they are trained, and then that he is
sent there as the head of a mission, so that he is in a foreign country
working with agents of his own organizing and training.
Now, in following up the. particular point, we noticed here last week
that the son of Prince Konoye died in a Japanese prison camp, and we
asked Mr. Rastvorov if he knew anything about that particular devel-
opment and he said he did, and we are asking him to give testimony
on that particular subject.
What do you know about the son of Prince Xonoye?
TESTIMONY OF YURI RASTVOROV
Mr. RASTVOROv. The Soviet Intelligence Service had a very special
group organized in 1947, 1948, to recruit a number of Japanese prison-
ers of war held in prison camps all over the Soviet Union
Mr. MORRIS. Excuse me. What position did you occupy at that
time? You were then in the Soviet Military Intelligence?
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Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time I was an officer of the MVD. I my-
self was engaged in the recruiting of Japanese prisoners of war.
The Soviet Intelligence Service was interested in Japanese prisoners
who occupied important positions in their country, as I testified before.
All of those people were targets for recruitment. Among them were
several prominent Japanese, including the son of Prince Konoye.
Officers whom I know personally, for instance, Colonel Vashkin, par-
ticipated in the attempt to recruit him.
The son of Prince Konoye, in spite of the persistent attempts to
recruit him, did not collaborate, and refused to act as an agent of the
Soviet Intelligence Service in Japan.
Mr. MORRIS. There were offers that he would be repatriated if
Senator JENNER. If he collaborated?
Mr. RASTVOROV. If he collaborated, but he would not. After they
failed in their recruitment attempt, they tried him and sentenced him
as a war criminal. I don't know what the sentence was, but he would
get a long term in prison.
Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that, Mr. Rastvorov?
Mr. RASTVOROV. I know it from people who were engaged in this
operation.
This man I mentioned, a Colonel Vashkin, participated in the at-
tempted recruitment of the son of Prince Konoye. I know Vashkin
personally; when he was in Tokyo I worked with him. He was chief
of the MVD group in Tokyo, where he worked under the cover name
of Volgin.
Mr. MORRIS. And what was his cover assignment?
Mr. RASTVOROV. His cover assignment was chief of consulate of the
Soviet mission in Japan.
To continue, I learned from Vashkin and others that the Soviet
Government refused to free the son of Prince Konoye, and decided to
keep him in the Soviet Union in order to avoid revelation of all that
had happened to him in connection with attempts to recruit him. The
Soviets realized the reaction of the Japanese people and people of the
free world if Prince Konoye revealed his experiences, so he was sen-
tenced as a war criminal and, I assume, reduced to living conditions
which would shorten his life, following the principle that "Dead men
tell no tales."
Mr. MORRIS. That is an assumption on your part, that they delib-
erately shortened his life?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes, that is my assumption on this particular case,
based on my personal experience in the MVD.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, are there any developments since our last session
about Sergei Tikhvinsky.
Mr. RASrvoROv. No; I don't know all the recent details about Tikh-
vinsky. I know only that he continued to stay in Tokyo in spite of
the fact that the Japanese knew his real assignment is to expand
Soviet intelligence operations in Japan, and to recruit new agents,
to replace those who were uncovered by my defection.
Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Rastvorov, since your last testimony there
have been reports that Col. Gen. Serov, who I think you told us is
the ranking MVD officer now
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes ; the press announced the appearance in Hun-
gary of General Serov, chairman of the KGB, formerly called the
MVD. He was appointed chairman of the KGB after the arrest of
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Beria, and since then has held this position. Previously, in 1943, he
headed the special task force which was engaged in the deportation
of national minorities in the Soviet Union from the Caucasus area,
such as the Kalmiks, Chichans, Ingushi, Crimean Tartars from their
homeland to the interior of the country, mainly to Kazakhstan.
Mr. MORRIS. In other words, in 1943 his assignment was to specialize
in mass deportations and mass relocations of populations ?
Mr. RASTVOROV. He was in charge of the operation.
Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Because I participated myself.
Mr. MoRRIs. With him?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.
Mr. MORRIS. And what was his rank at that time?
Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time, he held the same rank, General, and
was deputy of the minister of MVD.
Mr. MoRRis. What was your rank at that time?
Mr. RASTVOROV. At that time I was a captain.
Mr. MORRIS. And you were one of his assistants, and, therefore,
you knew?
Mr. RASTVOROV. No; I was not one of his personal assistants. I was
a member of a huge group established for the deportations of national
minorities.
Senator JENNER. You were an officer in that?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes.
Mr. Moms. And General Serov is now in Hungary?
Mr. RASTVOROV. According to newspaper reports, which have been
confirmed several times.
Mr. Moiuus. Senator Jenner, the Internal Security Subcommittee
today took testimony from several Hungarians who have been in the
country less than a week, that they witnessed and experienced the ef-
forts on the part of the Soviet Union to effect extensive deportations
from Hungary to the Soviet Union, and in view of that development
and the reported arrival of General Serov there, we were particu-
larly interested in getting Mr. Rastvorov's testimony about this
specialty of Serov.
Mr. RASTvoROV. For that particular job-to continue my state-
ment-after the successful deportation of the whole population from
one area to another he was awarded several decorations.
Serov also was head of a special group which was organized after
the defeat of Germany. The task of this group was to arrest and
deport to the Soviet Union so-called Fascist elements and anti-Soviet
persons. This also involved rounding up German scientists, especially
nuclear scientists, who now are helping them to build atomic weapons
in the Soviet Union.
For all of these operations he was decorated as a hero of the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Moms. And you know all of this from your own experience.
Mr. RASTVOROv. From my own experience i yes.
Serov was also in charge of the liquidation of rebel groups in the
Ukraine who fought against the Soviet regime during and after the
war.
I can add also that Serov was called the master of deportation, be-
cause of his experience in this particular job. I also have assumed
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3172 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
because of my experience as a former NKVD officer, that the Soviet
Government sent him to Hungary to liquidate revolutionary resistance
against the Soviets who dominate Hungary and would like to add
that special MVD divisions, called divisions of special assignment
were established during the war and participated in the liquidation of
these nationalistic groups in the Ukraine and the deportation of mi-
norities from their homelands. I assume that these divisions are now
active in Hungary, along with Soviet Army units.
Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ambassador Rodionov?
Mr. RASTVOROV. He is an admiral of the Soviet Navy. He was ap-
pointed as Ambassador to Sweden in 1948 or 1949.
Originally, he was one of the deputies of the chairman of the Com-
mittee for Information, and I worked under him at that particular .
time.
He went to Sweden as the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, and
stayed there until recently, when he was forced to leave by the pressure
of Swedish public opinion, in connection with his espionage activity
in that country.
He started in this profession in the early 1940's, as one of the lead-
ing figures of the Navy Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union
Mr. MORRIS. Was he head of the Navy Intelligence Service?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; at one time before the establishment of the
Committee of Information.
In 1948, after the merger of all the military intelligence services of
the Soviet Union and the intelligence service of the MVD, he was
appointed a deputy of the chairman for the Committee on Informa-
tion. At that time, the chairman of the Committee of Information
was Molotov, who was succeeded by Vishinsky and then by Zorin, for-
mer ambassador to Bonn.
Mr. MORRIS. So Zorin, too, was an intelligence man acting under
diplomatic cover?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; he worked as an intelligence officer under
diplomatic cover in Germany.
Mr. MORRIS. And I think that you told us previously that Ambassa-
dor Panyushkin was, to your knowledge, a high-ranking official of
the Soviet intelligence Service.
Mr. RAsTvol.ov. Yes ; I know him personally as a high-ranking in-
telligence officer.
Mr. MORRIS. What was his military rank?
Mr. RASTVOROV. He was a major general, and after he returned to
the Soviet Union he was appointed as a deputy of the chief of the
Foreign Directorate of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party. We can say that this directorate is the same thing as the Com-
intern-in other words, it functions as a clandestine comintern.
Senator JENNER. Was the Comintern dissolved during the war?
Mr. R.ASTVOROV. Yes; it was.
Senator JENNER. Well, was it actually dissolved?
Mr. R.As'rvORov. No; not actually. Only nominally.
Senator JENNER. It went ahead functioning?
Mr. RASTVOROV. Yes; just the same, basically.
Mr. MORRIS. In fact, is there any difference whatever in their activi-
ties before the so-called dissolution, and after dissolution?
Mr. RASTVOROV. No ; they continued to work the same way, using the
same methods.
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3173
Mr. Mouuis. Mr. Rastvorov, it has been suggested that the present
policy of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at this time
should be one of assisting the Soviets in effecting a series of detach-
ments of the satellites from the Soviet Union. The United States
Government is being urged to lend its good offices to aiding the Soviet
Union in negotiating these detachments of the satellites from the
Soviet Union and that by so doing we would be contributing to the
peace of the world. The reason for all of this being that the satellites
have become a liability to the Soviet Union.
Mr. RASTVOR,OV. Well?
Mr. MoRms. Let me finish.
Based on your long experience as a Communist and particularly as
,in officer of political intelligence, can you tell us what your analysis
is of events in the satellites and generally the meaning of Soviet
policies.
Mr. RASTVOROV. The Western world has welcomed de-Stalinization
with a mixture of confusion and wishful thinking, the recent form of
which may be more aptly termed an indulgence in "great expecta-
tions." The belief that the present Kremlin leadership has inaugu-
rated a departure from Stalinist terror and brutality has been de-
stroyed by the recent events in Eastern Europe.
A. key to the present situation was Khrushchev's conditional con-
demnation of Stalin for such acts as the extermination of many lead-
ing old Bolsheviks, while conveniently ignoring the forced collectivi-
zation of the Russian peasantry through mass annihilation.. The
practical nature of the Communist system was thereby shown. A
leader was condemned for certain errors alone, his general policy of
oppression was not rejected, in either internal or external matters. As
far as the latter is concerned, the expansionist policies of the Soviet
Union were entirely in keeping with Lenin's philosophy, and certainly
not attributable to Stalin alone. The present leaders of the Kremlin
will continue to advocate the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism,
without the limitations imposed on them by the reactionary brutality
of Stalin.
De-Staliniza.tion can be considered as the basis of the policy being
applied at present by the Soviet regime in its efforts to seek new, flexi-
ble political forms in relationship to its own people, the satellite popu-
lations, and the inhabitants of the Western World. This has been
made necessary by the realization that there is evolving a growing
opposition to communism and its leadership. The denunciation of
Stalin was forced by the realization that his methods, essentially rigid
and reactionary, were not consistently applicable in present circum-
stances. They have realized that a more elastic political form was
long overdue, in which they could appeal to the wishes of the populace
by the institution of temporary and artificial reforms. This must be
recognized as not being a departure from the basic principle of control,
the very essence of the Soviet system.
The entire program of de-Stalinization has been projected on a
barrage of propaganda designed to create the illusion of the advent of
a new era devoted to the pure form of communism. However, so-
called de-Stalinization does not mean a departure from the central
theme of communism, the basic tenet of which is "the dictatorship of
the proletariat," or more correctly stated, "dictatorship of the party
henchmen over the working masses." This dictatorship is impossible
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3174 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
without the application of the identical methods of Stalin-terror and
oppression. This same resort to violence will be found in the new
flexible political policies of the collective leadership. A perfect exain-,
ple of the application of this flexibility can be shown in the develop-
ments in Poland and Hungary. In the first case, control has been
maintained by the application of this rapid political maneuvering
called for in Leninism, the use of the principle of retreat in order to
regroup and reorganize preparatory to advancing. The political and
economic domination of Poland by the Soviet Union is unchallenged
to this moment, despite the liberal reforms attributed to the Gomulka
regime. Should the situation in Poland have presented an opportun-
ity for the emergence of an opposition party, the Soviets would not
have hesitated in the application of the violent elements of their new
policy of flexibility.
In the case of Hungary, the world has witnessed a perfect example
of the more practical aspects of the new Soviet flexibility. Unen-
cumbered by moral principles, the Soviet regime set about systemati-
cally to liquidate an entire nation. The Kremlin leadership quickly
recognized the appearance of new political forces, representing a
fatal threat to the strategic position of the Soviet Union in Hungary.
The end result was inevitable. Despite resolutions of condemnation,
protestations, and appeals to moral principles, I believe that the
Kremlin leadership under no circumstances will relent from its com-
plete domination of Hungary. In reference to the possibilities of
liberating Eastern Europe by peaceful means, may I quote Khrush-
chev, to the effect that the Soviet Union will depart from the princi-
ples of Marxism-Leninism when "the shrimp learns to whistle." The
Western World must recognize that de-Stalinization is nothing more
than a reaffirmation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, and
is essentially a much more cynical and complete system, embodying
both the ruthless oppression of Stalinism and the more subtle means of
political manipulation.
Keeping this situation in mind, I believe that the Kremlin, in spite
of its saber rattling, is genuinely concerned with the preservation of
peace-for a limited time. It must be noted, however, that peace is
desired by the Soviets and the Western World for completely differ-
ent reasons. The high ideals of the West fit precisely with the prac-
tical considerations of the Kremlin. The biggest factor in the plan-
ning of the Soviet Union is time. They need time to build, time to
consolidate, and time to establish a state of preparedness, from which
they can enter the inevitable conflict with a reasonable hope of success.
Mr. MORRIS. I think that is all.
Senator JENNER. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record, following which, at 4 p, in., the subcom-
mittee recessed, subject to call of the Chair.)
(The following testimony by E. Andriyive, a Soviet defector, on
May 16, supplementing a previous excerpt which appears in part 21
of Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States, was ordered into
the record by Senator Arthur V. Watkins, presiding, at a hearing on
February 20,1957:)
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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3175
CONTINUATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF E. ANDRIYVE ON MAY 16,
1956
Mr. MoRRis. How do you interpret recent events in the Soviet
Union based on your experiences as you have set them forth?
Mr. ANDRIYVE. You obviously refer to "de-Stalinization," sir, to
the famous Khrushchev's speech of February 24, 1956. It seems that
the meaning of the "new Soviet turn," as far as the West is con-
cerned; has been correctly understood here. Khrushchev did not
change a bit the old Soviet ultimatum to the West : Capitulate or
perish. His "new" line is not to abandon the old Stalin policies but
to make them more efficient.
On the other hand, the reasons why the "de-Stalinization" cam-
paign has been launched are being explained here in various equally
unconvincing ways. Yet, to understand the functioning of the Soviet
system it is very important to know those reasons. I claim no patent
for knowledge of the Soviet system, but still have a sort of my own
theory.
Some experts say that the "de-Stalinization" is a consequence of
acute internal troubles and that Stalin was sacrificed as a scapegoat
in view of the prevailing well-known mass discontents in the Soviet
Union and in satellites.
It is easy to expose the inconsistency of such explanations. The
mass discontents have been deeply rooted in Russia and in the satel-
lite countries; they are an inalienable part of the Soviet system.
Unless the 300 million people were taken for morons, the Kremlin
gangsters could not even dream of alleviating those discontents
merely by using Stalin's corpse as a "scapegoat." Consumer's goods
and some human rights could have done the job, nothing else. And
precisely these things the Kremlin gangsters could not give the people
without undermining.the very basis of the Soviet system. On the
other hand, unless they were suicides, the Kremlin clique could have
never thrown their most valuable Stalin's icon overboard, and face
innumerable (and easily predictable) difficulties just for try.
I know some of the Kremlin gangsters personally and know their
modus operandi very well. There must have been some imperative
reasons for them to do such a disadvantageous thing.
Let's establish a few basic points that could easily be proved by
facts and on which most observers apparently agree :
1. The present Kremlin masters, as past accomplices in all Stalin
-crimes, are just criminals themselves, with characteristic absence of
morals, honesty, conscience, or pity; they are guided by Communist
'expediency only.
2. Under Stalin they lived in constant fear of physical extermina-
tion by him. They are prepared to go to any length to prevent a
reestablishment of that sort of personal terror.
3. There has been going an acute struggle for the supreme power
among them.
4. Being the disciples of the same Marxist-Communist school, they
fear each other and distrust each other.
5. Terror has been the only principle of Soviet succession to the
throne.
These features will help in discerning their motivations.
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Stalin used his secret-police machine for two distinct purposes :
(1) As a weapon of his government against the people; (2) as his
personal weapon against any of his henchmen. Historical facts as
well as the structure and organization of Soviet police amply prove
this assertion.
After Stalin's death, Beria, holding this dual weapon tried-quite
logically-to seize the throne. Unfortunately for him, his comrades
were alert enough to forestall the trouble by killing him off first. It
is interesting to note in this connection that there is not a slightest
proof to the official contention that Beria was tried in December 1953
and subsequently executed. On the contrary, many facts indicate
that he was killed off on the spot in June 1'953, and that the sham
trial (in absentia) was staged half a year later for propaganda
purposes.
Should Beria have grabbed the supreme power he would undoubt-
edly have liquidated some of his comrades as the latter would not
have left his position unchallenged. That's why murder of Beria
was an act of preventive self-defense on the part of his comrades.
The comrades jealously watching each other decided, for the sake
of their mutual security, to truncate the secret-police machine so that
it won't be able to perform its function No. 2. No. 1 function was
left intact. As outward manifestations we saw reshufflings and
shooting on the highest level of the police. Two chiefs of the Inves-
tigative Section of the Division for Protection of Leaders (Ryumin,.
Vlodzimirsky) were shot. Precisely this section was instrumental in
liquidation of the comrades in arms by Stalin. V. S. Abakumov, one
of the police chiefs, was shot for fabrication of cases against party
leaders. Many lesser figures in the police were shot.
The propaganda line at the time was : "Beria-the Fascist dog and
agent of imperialists," his police machine is being reorganized to
provide better "justice" for citizens. Beria agents were extirpated
everywhere. A typical Stalin pattern of handling the two lines-
words and deeds-separately and independently.
Lacking legal successor and rivaling with each other, the comrades
agreed on the idea of committee rule the famous collective leadership..
Reluctantly they agreed to recognize Malenkov as their No. 1 man.
The choice of Malenkov could not be accidental, however. It meant.
that Malenkov was the most influential man at the moment; he had.
greater backing from the comrades themselves and from the Central
Committee than any other member of the clique. He had strong and
long-established connections with the party and its Central Commit-
tee, the fact dangerous in itself. So the comrades put the old blabber,
demagog, and alcoholic Khrushchev between Malenkov and the party.
But Malenkov clearly was not satisfied with his position; he maneu-
vered further. He was first to condemn Beria and his inadmissible
methods, and thus capitalized on the universal hatred against Beria.
and his methods. Then Malenkov offered a program of boosting the
production of consumers' goods at the expense of heavy industry,
thus striking at the most sensitive point of the people and gaining
exceptional popularity. That was a real danger to the comrades and
to the system. They began to realize that without the police Malenkov
could demote them one by one and subsequently do away with them..
By raising the real. wages of Soviet workers from their normal below-
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subsistence level Malenkov could shatter the very foundations of the
Soviet system. He became too dangerous:
Now, by all Stalin canons and by their own standards the comrades
had to shoot Malenkov with or without a frameup. Yet he was only
moderately disgraced and demoted. He publicly read his unfit-for-
leadership confession, and was appointed as a minister of electric
stations. Thus he disqualified himself for any future bid for the
supreme power. Why the comrades spared Malenkov?
Apparently because by that time (February 1955) all comrades
deeply realized that the committee rule in earnest was the only way out
for all of them. No more killings among the members of the gang;
there were enough enemies and capitalists around to be killed. They
were watching with schadenfreude us and discussing our "struggle for
power."
Each member of the Kremlin gang knew others as crooks and was
suspicious of them. Each was equally determined to prevent any
comrade from grabbing the throne. This was not a case of mutual
rivalry so common in the Western cabinets. It was a case of survival
for every member of the gang. This unusual situation has resulted in.
an unusual decision. Two least capable and least influential members
of the gang were selected as outward representatives : Bulganin for
the "government," Khrushchev for the party.
With all important governmental matters discussed in the Presid-
ium and decided upon by majority vote, the rule of the two represent-
atives could seemingly be reduced to that of announcers of the will of
the Presidium, and the setup looked safe.
The two clowns we immediately recognized in the West as the
Premier and the party boss. Conditioned by long years under Stalin
the people at home have also recognized them as the head of the gov-
ernment and the head of the party. Perhaps unwittingly the clowns
from the very start got more recognition than their comrades had
planned. They began their extensive travels at home and abroad, for
the first time enjoying some of the freedoms they had been denied by
Stalin. Despite their buffooning, alcoholic blab, and tactless pranks,,
their prestige steadily rose as they were the recognized representatives
of the all-powerful Communist empire. Such occasions as the, Geneva
Conference only boosted their prestige.
We do not know how far their personal feelings about their impor-
tance had gone, nor what sort of designs for the throne they had made,,
but we do know that their comrades in the Presidium got worried
again. Besides, the safeguards already taken were felt inadequate
anyway. A situation could easily develop when an influential member
of the Presidium (say Molotov, or Mikoyan, or Kaganovich) using his.
personal prestige and connections and intriguing within the Central
Committee could gain an exclusive support of that body. With no
police support, without palace revolt, he still would eventually be able
to climb the throne.
Additional safeguards were in order to repel early all such attempts.
The Central Committee had to be permanently attuned for rebuff.
Hence repeated denunciations of the cult of personality which the
comrades had practiced in general terms for some time. But the
comrades got themselves into an untenable situation. All right, the
cult of personality was wrong. Was it wrong under Stalin? Presum-
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3178 SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
ably, yes. Then, what Stalin had done was wrong? Apparently no;
because the post-Stalin changes were insignificant. Or a part of Stalin
deeds was wrong? Which part? Or the cult was right under Stalin
and wrong? Why?
Combined with the profound genuine hatred toward Stalin in prac-
tically all strata of Soviet society, such questions prompted anti-Soviet
fermentation. Stalin's crimes against many party chieftains were
fresh in the memory of their pals in the CC. Some of his victims were
still alive in jails and camps. A number of slandered innocent victims
were released. Cases of others were reviewed. Some were not re-
leased, not exonorated. Why ? Were they Stalin's enemies or also
the present gang's enemies? Unhealthy talks began at home and
abroad. And what was most important, 'how could the CO positively
react against a concrete carrier of the cult when the cult was so loosely
defined? Was one-half of the Stalin cult OK? Was three-fourths
of Khrushchev's cult and a little of Bulganin's OK?
Something unequivocal and drastic had to be done. Not only the
departed leader had to be mentioned by name but a definite part of his
,crimes had to be clearly exposed and condemned; theexact degree of
allowed criticism (for party members so-and-so much, for the rest
so-and-so much) had to be clearly announced. That was a very diffi-
cult decision to make. Between February 1955 and February 1956,
the comrades apparently discussed the burning problem many times,
Pravda reflecting the situation by on-and-off references to the great
leader or total omissions of the controversial name. January 23, 1956,
Pravda used the term "party of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" for the
last time. Since then Stalin's name was dropped.
To be sure the adverse consequences of an anti-Stalin course loomed
clearly on all sides. The comradeswere to sacrifice the icon of their
demigod which was most valuable for the central control of the
empire. They could safely go on using the icon for justification of
practically any policies; for, after all, what Stalinism was? Just
anything designed or used to help the Kremlin and to destroy the
West. Communist dialectics could explain away- anything.
Yet in spite of the adverse forebodings the comrades decided to do
away with the Stalin icon. Many facts indicate that the decision was
not unanimous. Yet, the majority drive to enlist the full power of the
CC against any member of the gang who might attempt to grab. the
power singlehandedly has finally prevailed. The cult of personality
had to be condemned in theory and in practice in the strongest terms
and at any price. Vital personal interests, bare instinct of self-
preservation, not the supreme Communist motivations, lay at the root
of the anti-Stalin campaign. Comrades, let's preserve our hides what-
ever losses to the cause. Should we lose our hides, the cause will be
lost completely.
But there were some brighter aspects, too. Deep hatred toward
Stalin could be conveniently exploited. Many little palliations (intro-
duced for improving the operational efficiency of the regime) could
be presented as a proof of benevolence of the new line. The approach
to the neutralists and liberals in every noncommunist country seemed
to become easier. As to the diehard imperialists, they won't bother -
us. Not only would they miss the opportunity to rout us at this criti-
cal moment, they will fail to comprehend the nature of our difficulties.
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 Approved For Release 2010/05/11 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000100140002-4
SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3179
We need to recall only the words of our great leader and master Lenin :
"The bourgeoisie is organically incapable to combat communism";
which the bourgeoisie has been beautifully proving the last 39 years.
Such were the reasons-as we see them-f or the famous Khrushchev
speech of February 24, 1956.
In the light of subsequent serious losses communism suffered
throughout the world, was the Khrushchev speech a mistake? We do
not think so. The partial exposure of Stalin had only one aim: To
stabilize the Kremlin gang. So far that aim has been fully achieved.
No external or internal vicissitudes have shaken the gang. And that
is the main thing. Western press predicted many times a fall of
Bulganin's cabinet, or a fall of Khrushchev, and so forth. Nothing of
the kind happened. The reason has been simple : The Bulganin
cabinet in the Western sense does not exist in nature. On the other
hand, many powerful means that the West really possesses have never
been used against the Kremlin gang.
1. The present Soviet regime is of necessity a genuine committee
rule, the collective leadership. It has been successful, so far, and it
may be successful for many years to come.
2. Khrushchev and Bulganin are not the bosses of the Kremlin gang,
but only its outward representatives. They can be substituted by
other members-the fundamental course of the regime will not change.
The Kremlin crooks can abandon their great final plan no more than
the Americans can abandon dollar.