CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300150005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 5, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved. For Release 2003/10/14: CIA-RDP67
May 5, 1965
Lion or aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, or
after December 31, 1963, to or for the use of
any armed force of the United States for any
research, development, test, or evaluation, or
after December 31, 1965, to or for the use of
any armed force of the United States for
the procurement of tracked combat vehicles,
unless the appropriation of such funds has
been authorized by legislation enacted after
such dates.'
'SEC. 305. No funds may be appropriated
after June 30, 1966, to or for the use of any
armed force of the United States for use as
an emergency fund for research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation, or procurement or
production related thereto unless the ap-
propriation of such funds has been author-
ized by legislation enacted after that date.
"SEc. 306. Section 8074 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by adding the fol-
lowing new subsection at the end thereof:
" `(c) The Militar At,. Trans rt S i
y
o er
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - DOUSE 9255
HOUR OF MEETING ON TOMORROW leader, established a government and de-
In order to attempt to do this, Mr. clared Vietnam's independence. The French
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent thIat Communists advised Ho Chi Minh to go slow
when the HOUSe adjourns today it ad- and not to act in haste to the detriment of
journ to meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow. ? the French Communist Party.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to port The the French French Government, with y, f sup-
The
request of the gentleman from Ho Chi Minh. . Stalin at Communist t first Party, mmunn o adhered fought
S to
Oklahoma? the French Communist line and refused to
There was no objection. recognize Ho Chi Minh's Republic of Viet-
p
v ce s PERSONAL EXPLANATION
redesignated as the Military Airlift Com-
Mr. MEEDS, Mr. Speaker, at the time
of the taking of rollcall No. 90 on yestejr-
day on H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably d--
tained. Had I been present and voting
I would have voted "aye."
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall
No. 90 on yesterday which was taken on
H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably detained.
Had I been present and voting I would
have voted "aye."
The Senate bill was ordered to be read
a third time, was read the third time and
passed, and a motion to reconsider was
laid on the table.
A.similar House bill (H.R. 7657) was
laid on the table.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members have 5 legislative days in
which to extend their remarks on the
bill just passed.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South
Carolina?
There was no objection.
ADDITIONAL LEGISLATIVE
PROGRAM
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 -minute and to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
I take this time, for the purpose of yield-
ing to the distinguished majority leader,
the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr.
ALBERT].
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I am taking this time,
after conversing with the distinguished
minority leader, to announce first of all
an addition to the program.
The gentleman from North Carolina
[Mr. BONNER], chairman of the Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, advises that he will undertake to
call up under unanimous consent the
bill H.R. 7855 to authorize additional
funds for the construction of 17 small
Coast Guard vessels.
And, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman
from Michigan will yield further, I
would like to advise that we have made
such good progress today, thanks to two
committees which have expeditiously
handled two very important bills, if we
can finish the NASA authorization bill
and the transportation bill which have
already been scheduled for tomorrow, it
will be my purpoes to ask that we ad-
journ over until Monday next.
Approved
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall
No. 90 on H.R. 2985, I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present and voting
I would have voted "aye."
CITIZE ' WHITE PAPER ON
V VIETNAM
(Mr. RYAN asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, the situa-
tion in Vietnam is one of the most com-
plex issues ever to be before this Congress
and this Government. In order to aid
the Members of the Congress in their deg
liberations concerning this vital issue, I
wish to bring to their attention a recent
paper. This paper, entitled "A Citizen's
White Paper on American Policy in Viet-
nam and Southeast Asia," was written by
Marcus Raskin, codirector of the Insti-
tute for Policy Studies. I believe that it
is a keen analysis of our policy in south-
east Asia and its historical background,
and I include it herewith:
A CITIZEN'S WHITE PAPER ON AMERICAN'
POLICY IN VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
(By Marcus G. Raskin)
In 1943 at the Cairo Conference and then'
again at the Teheran Conference, President
Roosevelt stated that American and Indo-
chinese interests were best served by Indo-
china losing its status as a French colony
and becoming a U.N. trusteeship area. It
was to become what some now call a "neu-
tralized area." Roosevelt said-that the area
had been milked dry for 100 years by the
French, and that that was quite enough.
However, by March 1945, the French wanted
Indochina back in a quasi-colonial status,
Originally, this proposal did not meet with
00446R000300150005-8
nam. In December 1946, Maurice Thorez,
the Communist Vice President of France,
countersigned the order for "military ac-
tion" against the Republic of Vietnam. Even
after the French Communist Party tempered
its oposition to Ho the Russians still re-
fused to recognize or give support to Ho.
In May 1950, the United States and France
worked out the contours of the Schuman
plan, an attempt to fashion a coal and steel
cartel for Europe which was thought to be
one more concrete step in the dream of a
united West Europe tied to the United
States, Coincident with this plan, Dean
Acheson and Robert Schuman, the French
Foreign Minister, joined in announcing the
new American involvement in VietnanI: After
all, if a Western community was to come into
being, and the United States intended to be
its leader, then, it was said,. we had to "share
responsibilities" in non-European states
that the West Europeans once controlled. In
Indochina that meant:
1. Primary responsibility would continue
to rest with France and the people of Indo-
china;
2. U.S. aid would be given to promote
and restore "security" and the "genuine
development of nationalism"; and
3. U.S. aid would go to France and the
associated states of Indochina "in order to
assist them in restoring stability and per-
mitting these states to pursue their peace-
ful and democraic development.
Of course this meant that the United
States could deal directly and openly in the
Indochinese area. Although estimates vary,
American aid to France for Vietnam totaled
about $1 billion between the summer of 1950
and the spring of 1954. But the French, who
until 1954 had primary responsibility there,
were unable to organize indigenous political
groups that would rally around either the
French puppets or the American cause of
anticommunism.
In January 1953, President Eisenhower held
a review of Indochinese policy. The Eisen-
hower administration thought that the in-
gredient which the French needed to win
the Indochinese war was. a comprehensive
military plan. He made increased American
aid contingent on effecting such a plan.
Named after Gen, Henri-Eugene Navarre,
the plan called for the creation of indigenous
forces to undertake garrison duties so that
French forces could be released for an all-
out military effort. It was no more success-
ful than any of the other plans, and by May
of 1954 the French had lost their militar
y
position In Vietnam at Dienbienphu.
Between January and May of 1954, the
French, British, and Russians undertook ex-
ploratory talks to bring the war in Vietnam
to a close. This drew strong opposition from
Secretary of State Dulles, Senate Majority
Leader Knowland, Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robert-
son, Admiral Radford, and Vice President
Nixon, who pushed hard for "united action"
against the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Mr.
Dulles used Life magazine as his instrument
the a war with China. He was undismayed
alienate the French when it appeared that by
the American-Soviet split was irreparable, Indochina rable, In possibility of Chinese forces entering
to engage the white Western wows
and American planners wanted to forge the err. Yet, tibility Yet, this did not reflect Eisenhower's
Western Alliance. view. He was much more reticent about a
In Vietnam other forces were at work, land war In Asia, as was General Ridgway,
Immediately after the surrender of Japan, the Chief of Staff of the Army. After the
Ho Chi Minh, the nationalist Communist United States sent 200 Air Force technicians
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9256 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 5, 1965
to Indochina, Eisenhower said that he could jected elections of 1956. But this hope was In October 1955 Diem held an election in
conceive of no greater tragedy than the not regarded as a Vital French interest. which the people were to choose between
United States becoming involved in a war in French foreign policy in Vietnam was now Bao Dai, the absentee playboy, and himself.
Indochina. The Western Powers and Presi- dictated by the need to end French domestic Upon winning that election by a fraudulent
dent Eisenhower, over, Dulles' objections, instability, since many politicians believed 97-percent majority, Diem formally pro-
dropped the idea of united action, for the that the demoralization of the French peo- claimed a new state-the Republic of Viet-
British were uninterested, the American peo- pie and the precarious state of the economy nam. This move ended any possibility of an
pie were just recovering from the Korean were caused by colonial policies In Indo- election for all of Vietnam: an election that
trauma, and the French desperately needed china and Algeria. both Diem and the United States feared
peace. Indeed, Pierre Mendes France had n would have resulted in a victory for the
come to power on the promise that he could In 1954 the United States was dominated North Vietnamese.
make peace in Indochina. in its foreign policy thinking by those who Ho Chi M:inh's government resigned itself
In 1954 the great issue for the West view Communist nations rhetorically as to the existence and stabili-iy of South Viet-
European states was the creation of a Euro- implacable enemies to be liberated and con- nam. In the early years of the Diem regime
pean Defense Community (EDC). The tained. In reality, however, the Eisenhower the North Vietnamese emphasis was on con-
United States bent all its efforts to EDC's administration pursued an accommodation solidation in their zone. Indeed, such con-
creation, for it meant a substantial step in bargain by negotiating a stand-off in Korea solidation was necessary. In November of
the unification of West Europe: The French, with the Chinese and North Koreans a scant 1958 the North Vietnamese peasants staged
however, had grave doubts about the EDC. year before. The State Department in July, a revolt similar in intent to the Hungarian
They feared the rearming of West Germany, 1954, looked for a line of resistance in South- revolution. Ho admitted excesses, but con-
either independently or as the major element east Asia against "communism," much in the tinued many of them.
in a united West European Army, because it manner that was developed in Europe. Dul- What turned the wheel of fortune against
might have meant a possible German hegem- les thought that through the formation of South Vietnam and the West were the in-
ony over West Europe. The Russians felt the a separate state-South Vietnam had finally ternal policies of Diem's government. In
same way. Seeing the possibility of a diplo- found that line in Indochina. 1956 he staged a crackdown on the Chinese
matic success, they offered to intercede with The United States found 8 man, Ngo Dinh living in South Vietnam: those Chinese not
Ho Chi Minh in exchange for a French vote Diem, who could help in establishing that born in South Vietnam were disallowed from
against the European Defense Community. line. Diem, who lived in the Maryknoll owning businesses in 11 major categories
Pierre Mendes-France delivered the French Seminaries in the United States from 1950 deemed vital to the economic life of South
Assembly. And, in exchange, Russia pres- to 1953, was sponsored by Cardinal Spellman Vietnam. Diem estimated that the Chinese
sure4 the Vietminh into a peace Conference and various liberal American Catholic politi- comprised 10 percent of the nation, and yet
at Geneva, when He believed he could have cians (e.g., Senator John F. Kennedy and they owned, two-thirds of its businesses,
won control of all of Vietnam without having Senator MIKE MANSFIELD were strong sup- Rice exports came to a virtual halt as a re-
to arrive at a negotiated setlement. porters of Diem). In a complicated maneu- sult of Chinese reprisal to Diem's move. To
The Geneva conference turned out to be ver aimed at aligning South Vietnam to its further secure his power base in the South
typical in the history of diplomacy in the side, the United States pressured Bao Dai, Vietnamese Government, Buddhists were
20th century. No nation wanted to be there, the playboy puppet of France, into backing systematically excluded and replaced by
but'all knew that something had to be done. Diem against General Le Van Vien, a war- Catholics, while Catholicism became the
In attendance were Cambodia, the Demo- lord who operated gambling, narcotics, and officially favored religion. The Buddhist ma-
cratic Republic of Vietnam, France, Laos, prostitution in South Vietnam through the jority became the object of petty annoyance
Communist China, the state of Vietnam, the powerful Binh Xuyen, a crime syndicate; and persecution.
U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States. and General Hinh, who had been the first In 1957 Diem reorganized the police and
The conference dealt with all three states of choice of Bao Dai and the French for Viet- placed on the Government payroll a huge net
Indochina. It stated that no military base namese political leadership. To show its of informers. Diem's brother, Nhu, pro-
could be established by foreign powers in seriousness of purpose in establishing the ceeded to rid the Diem oligarchy of any per-
Vietnam and that the purpose of the Viet- line of resistance, the United States had son who did not favor the Diem government.
namese part of the agreement was to settle a, formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- Diem also took the advice of American ex-
military question. The military demarcation tion (SEATO) alliance. perts who said that the Viet Minh controlled
line (the 17th parallel) was not to be "in- The pact was a guarantee by Western between 40 and 70 percent of the villages
terpreted as constituting a political or terri- powers to "consult immediately in order which were not run by the religious sects, the
torial boundary." Furthermore, article 7 of to agree on the measures which should be Cao Daists, Buddhists, or Catholics. The
the declaration permitted the Vietnamese taken for the common defense" where polit- Americans argued that the Viet Minh was a
people "to enjoy the fundamental freedoms ical integrity or independence was.under at- threat to the internal security of the state
guaranteed by democratic institutions estab- tack. Dulles hoped to use the alliance to and would ultimately undermine Diem's
lished as a result of free general elections by protect the newly created state of South rule. "The de facto integration of South
secret ballot." An election was to have been Vietnam. However, the SEATO treaty had Vietnam within the American military de-
held in July 1956 "under the supervision of virtually no operational meaning or utility fense structure implied that the region ought
an international commission composed of since the last thing that the European sig- to be secure; and hence, ought to be purged
representatives of the member states of the natories of the treaty wanted was to get of anything which might, however remotely,
International Supervisory Commission." involved militarily in Vietnam. serve the Red cause.' (Philippe iDevillers.)
Article 8 provided that "The provisions of During the early part of his regime, Diem By 1958, Diem's police actions were trans-
the agreements on the cessation of hostili- seemed to be securing his own power and formed into military operations. The Gov-
ties intended to insure the protection of creating a national identity for South Viet- ernment, now with the active military sup-
individuals and of property must be most nam. He was able to isolate General Hinh port of the United States, began pacifying
strictly applied, and must, in particular, by deflating any support he had, while con- outlying areas. The methods which they
allow everyone in Vietnam to decide freely used were not dissimilar to those used by the
trolling the political and economic opera North Vietnamese a few years earlier in their
in which zone he wishes to live." tions of the Binh Xuyen, which strangled the e
The United States took note but did not city of Saigon and the countryside. On the treacherous pacification operation. Arrests,
sign the final declaration of the Conference. other hand, in North Vietnam the Com- torture, plundering, and "regroupment"
Instead, Undersecretary of State Walter munists, copying Chinese methods, insti- came to be the order of the day. These tac-
Bedell Smith read a statement saying that tuted a harsh tax system and committed tics greatly alienated the peasants and farm-
the United States would "(i) refrain from atrocities and wholesale murder against the ers, since Diem seemed to be offering only
the threat of the use of force to disturb landlords, bourgeois, and peasants in their torture without reform, or even ideology. In
(4) of the attempts to enforce collectivization and po- December of 1958, after the death of a score
them, tionsle 2 of prisoners in one of Diem's concentration
Charter of f the accordance
United with Nattions dealing with
e litical conformity in the North. The Geneva camps, armed bands of rebels sup in
the obligation of members to refrain in their accords provided for free movement of Viet- South med Vietnam, Their sprung p support by the
international relations from the threat or namese from one part of Vietnam to the peasants and the villagers was assured the
use of force; and (ii) it would view any re- other. Hundreds of thousands of people Diem's behavior.
aforesaid agreements with grave concern and was emptied of a potential resistance to no.
as seriously threatening international peace The experiences of these refugees seemed to
and-security." serve as the basis for a unifying bond against
South Vietnam was not a signatory and communism in the South Vietnamese na-
stated at the Conference that it was not tion. Many thousands of Catholics left the
bound by the Geneva accords. North for the South because of their hope
The French, on the other/hand, were not in Diem and material aid from the Catholic
dissatisfied with the agreement since their church. And Diem, the Central Vietnamese
primary purpose was to get out. They hoped Catholic, needed active support of Viet-
that once the dust settled a bit, political namese Catholics from the North to sur-
parties would form in Vietnam and a demo-- vive in South Vietnam, among the Buddhist
cratic nation would emerge from the pro- majority.
The foreign policy of Communist nations
is traditionally conservative when it comes
to foreign military involvements. The Com-
munists and rebels in South Vietnam forced,
the hand of the North Vietnamese govern-
ment to become active militarily. Until 1960,
the North Vietnamese restricted their efforts
to plaintive diplomatic notes to Diem. These
notes invariably included demands for the
restoration of communication (rail, post, sea,
and trade) between the South and the North,
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May 5, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 9159
confirms, and reiterates the Lassiter de- stitutional, where does he go for his crys- this last word is ambiguous and needs
cision.
--? aaie ueuision saga the House of Representatives and wit-
the States had broad powers to deter- ness the ovations and enthusiastic ap-
mine the qualifications of its voters. plause the members of the Supreme
Mr. HILL. That is correct. Court give the President in response to
To continue with the quotation: his voter legislation proposals?
'Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S. Ed. Who told the Attorney General? On
2d, 221, appeal dismissed 339 U.B. 946, 70 what basis can he declare this legislation
S. Ct. 804, 94 L. Ed. 1361. It was said last in the teeth of an opinion 2 years old?
century in Massachusetts that a literacy test What has changed since then? One
was designed to insure an "independent and
intelligent" exercise of the right of suffrage. thing; we have had demonstrations in
Stone v. Smith, 159 Mass. 413-414, 34 N.E. the streets, in the Capital of this coun-
521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit try, in the White House, 'and along 11
in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. 50-mile stretch of highway but nothing
We cannot say, however, that it is not an has changed in the law.
allowable one measured by constitutional Mr. President, throughout the hear-
standards. ings on this voting rights legislation the
"The ability to read and write likewise has
some relation to standards designed to pro- Attorney General repeatedly justified his
mote intelligent use of the ballot," the Court position on behalf of the bill by referring
said, Is this sentence difficult to understand? to a "living constitution"--one which
it says plainly and clearly that literacy tests defines equal justice under the law as
have a relation to standards designed for in- singling out a few States for arbitrary
telligent use of the ballot. and punitive treatment, a Constitution
The Lassiter case was decided on that declares all who come under it
March 13, 1963. At that time all of the guilty until they prove themselves inno-
present members of the Supreme Court cent.
were members. Note, if you will, that I find it difficult to adopt this new
the case of Lassiter against Northamp- "living Constitution," as the Attorney
ton is cited in the opinion with approval General calls it, and the weird concepts
not just once but again so that this of law and justice therein. I would
Court again ratified and approved that
decision that says a State may regulate
voting so long as it does not discriminate
by reason of race or color.
It may be well here to state the names
of some of the members of the Court who
have in the past affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the State passing on voter
qualifications. It is a "Who's Who" in
great and learned men-Justices Hughes,
McReynolds, Sutherland, atone-at
whose feet I was privileged to sit when
he was Dean of the School of Law at
New York University-Justices McKen-
na, John Marshall Harlan, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Cardozo, Roberts, Brandeis,
Butler, White, and many others.
Could there be a greater or more bril-
liant roll of great judges than those on
the list I have read, confirming the right
of the States to fix the qualifications of
voters? Two months ago the Court
again confirmed that right, in the case
cited by the Senator from Alabama,
Were they all wrong? Did none of
these Justices have a feeling for the Con-
stitution-for the rights of American
citizens? Did they all feel that an in-
dividual had rights protected but not
granted under the Constitution? Appar-
rather stay with what the Attorney Gen-
eral must consider the "dead" Constitu-
tion, the one that the founders of this
Nation pledged their lives, their fortunes,
and their sacred honor to. Our Consti-
tution was not written in a day, and I do
not think we should try to rewrite it in
a day. There are those who want revo-.
lutionary changes in all phases of life,
but such changes cannot and will not
last unless they are evolutionary, that is,
unless they come about by orderly proc-
esses. The task is hard and the way
may be long, but the promise of freedom
is the great gift of this Nation, and our
freedoms have not been won overnight.
Freedoms come and are protected by
good order-vigorous debate-people of
good will working together for the com-
mon good of all, not for a few.
Mr. President, in this speech I have not
endeavored to dwell in detail on every
line and section of S. 1564, the bill before
us, and to expose each and every drastic,
arbitrary, discriminatory, and punitive
provision of it. I shall continue my
arguments at another time. Suffice it
to say now, however, that I oppose S. ,
1564 and any other legislation as drastic,
ently they did for I find no dissents. Two hundred years ago, Mr. President,
to the present members of the Court before our Nation ever came into being,
now feel otherwise? They did not 2 Rousseau wrote "The Social Contract."
years ago when they reaffirmed Lassiter He wrote of the dissolution of the state
against Northampton. Would the At- and how it could come about. He wrote
torney General have us believe that the this:
Court has had a change of heart in 2 The same thing happens when the mem-
years, when 2 years ago civil rights acts bers of the government severally usurp the
dealing with voting were law and within power they should exercise only as a body;
their judicial knowledge? When voting this is as great an infraction of the law,
and results In even cases had been before that Court? are then, so to speak, greater
as many princes There
When the Court had had ample oppor- there are magistrates, and the state, no less
tunity to decide, declare, and legislate in divided than the government, either perishes
this field and failed to do so, but instead or changes its form.
reaffirmed its past decisions that qualifi- When the state is dissolved, the abuse of
cations of Voters-a literacy test-is a government, whatever it is, bears the com-
State function? If the Attorney Gen- mon name of anarchy. To distinguish,
democracy degenerates into ochlocracy, and
eral is so positive, as he was in all of his aristocracy into oligarchy; and I would add
testimony, that this present bill is con- that royalty degenerates into tyranny; but
body, begins to the as soon as it is born, and
carries in itself the causes of Its destruction.
But both may have a constitution that is
more or less robust and suited to preserve
them a longer or a Shorter time. The con-
stitution of man is the work of nature; that
of the state, the work of art. It is not in
men's power to prolong their own lives; but
it is for them to prolong as much as possible
the life of the state, by giving it the best
possible constitution. The best constituted
state will have an end; but it will end later
than any other, unless some unforeseen ac-
cident brings about its untimely destruction.
Let not the passage of this bill, this
S. 1564, be that "unforeseen accident."
Let us not be parties to bringing about
"its untimely destruction."
Let us not avoid the Constitution nor
destroy it.
Let us not be sold a bill of goods mis-
labeled and misconceived.
I say again to my colleagues in the
Senate and to all the people in all sec-
tions of this great Nation: "Caveat emp-
tor"-"buyer beware."
I implore the members of this body and
the people in all sections of this great
Nation, regardless of sectional differ-
ences and philosophical viewpoints, to
put above all things the need for ad-
herence to law and order and the integ-
rity of our constitutional system.
For, if we lose these, we have lost our
soul as a nation.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its
reading clerks, announced that the House
had passed a joint resolution (H.J. Res.
447) making a supplemental appropria-
tion for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1965, for military functions of the De-
partment of Defense, and for other pur-
poses, in which it requested the concur-
rence of the Senate.
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION
REFERRED
The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 447)
making a supplemental appropriation
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965,
for military functions of the Department
of Defense, and for other purposes, was
read twice by its title and referred to
the Committee appropriations.
ORDER OF BUSINESS-ADDITIONAL
APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET MILI-
TARY REQUIREMENTS
Mr. SPARKMAN obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Alabama yield to me,
without losing his right to the floor?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield under those
conditions.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
special appropriation measure has passed
the House, has been received in the Sen-
ate, has been referred to the appropri-
ate committee, and will be on the floor
for consideration, under the unanimous-
consent agreement agreed to yesterday,
at 3:30.
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9160 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SKATE May 5, 1965
I ask unanimous consent that at3:I5, Mr. PARK'MAN. Mr. 'President, 2 word and sentence of this bill-to see just
at the conclusion of the speech of the dis- shall analyze the voting rights proposal what it really means, we are not fulfill-
tiriguished Senator from-Alabama 1Mr. before this body on a section-by-section ing our oaths and we certainly are out of
SPAREMANI, there be a live quorum call, basis, While I intend to fight its adop- step with the history of Congress on the
so that at 3:30 the Senate may begin tion at every turn, I wish it clearly under- point of not wishing to pass legislation
consideration of the special approprla- stood that I firmly believe in the right because the pressures and anxieties of
nuldHow-
strathe moment axe aroused
flan measure under the specified time of every -qualified pe moon tohvote.
> demanding more yand mass more eg-
wtxr of New York in the chair). Is
there objection? The Chair hears noneo
and it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
the Senator from Alabama will yield
further--
Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad to yield
to the Senator from Montana, under the
same conditions as before.
Mr. MANSFIELD. This matter has
been discussed with the distinguished
minority leader, with the distinguished
Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSEL, who
will have charge of half the time, and
the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. SxsN-
N2s], who has been delegated by the
chairman of the committee to handle the
rest of the time.
It is anticipated that approximately
S hours will be spent on the Joint resolu-
tion this afternoon and evening.
Tomorrow, ' immediately after the
morning prayer, the Senate will return
to the special appropriation resolution
until it is completed.
Mr. President, to emphasize what I
have said, immediately after the morn-
ing prayer tomorrow the Senate will re-
sume consideration of the special ap-
propriation measure. There will be no
morning business.
Following disposition of the appropri-
ation measure, under the unanimous-
consent agreement of today, the Senate
will then revert to the Ervin amend-
ment.
Mr. President, while this procedure is
a little extraordinary, it'is made manda-
tory because of the fact that a number
of Senators were of the opinion that the
joint resolution would not come up until
tomorrow. Therefore, In the interests of
comity, I believe that nothing will be
exercueu uuauca ...,,, - __...-
In this belief I am strongly supported by themselves do not respec existing a
the very source of Federal law, the U.S. and, in fact, seem to wish not to use the
Constitution. full powers of existing law unless they
In the course of my speech, I expect to agree exactly with what they want.
show how our Founding Fathers sought I should like to emphasize that Con-
to prevent passage of laws under the 1783s tmooa d v out of rfimass phi d manst ale
pressure of emotional demonstrations. I like the one it faced on June 21,
wish to caution my colleagues about the tions 1783, when a large number of troops who
kind of hors ennandgenderrthe ed ed at- had mutinied and were demonstrating in
mosphere also in which . the streets with guns, surrounded the
wish also to touch upon on she the heave should re- statehouse in which Congress was sit-
ders of l M ll now ember resting Congress tg avolid ting and demanded that they be paid by
hers heated passion Mssion and embers o o to of f act for the e good of Pennsylvania State authorities. Con-
heated
the preservation of our form of govern- gress, in fear of bodily harm, petitioned
George Washington to send in regular
as avguiding instrument in our national
life.
We have heard on various occasions,
in this great Chamber throughout our
history, that we are at the crossroads of
either preserving our traditions of gov-
ernment or plunging out into uncharted
seas. Members of this body have heard
the eloquent voices of many men, includ-
ing Daniel Webster, warn in most schol-
arly and impassioned terms against cast-
ing aside the structure as well as the
spirit of the Constitution.
I do not speak as an alarmist, but I
say in all candor that never in my 28
years of active service in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate, have
I seen a proposal so bent upon changing
the spirit as well as the letter of our form
of government, all under the guise and
in the- name of providing the right to
vote to all qualified citizens, a basic prem-
ise with which I agree.
Let me add that during all the time
I have been a member of this body I have
troops to protect then.i. Then the dem-
onstrators repented and asked for for-
giveness, promising to help protect Con-
gress rather than to demonstrate and
mutiny.
Congress-then called the Continental
Congress-did not like the atmosphere
nor the exigencies of the moment and
passed a resolution on. June 24 to move to
Princeton, N.J. The language of this
resolution is important to us here today ;
it is filled with timely meaning. I will
quote it: "In order that further and more
effectual measures may be taken for sup-
pressing the present revolt and main-
taining the dignity and authority of the
United States."
In other words, Congress moved to
Princeton and away from the pressure of
mass demonstrations to maintain the
dignity and authority of the United
States, If we now respond to the highly
planned and purposely called demonstra-
tions in Alabama and elsewhere by en-
acting the proposed voting rights bill just
because Martin Luther King says that we
in opposition to the constitution of the of maintaining the dignity and authority
United States than this one. It violates of the United States. We will be doing
the principle, the letter, and the law of what the continental Congress of 1783
the Constitution in so many different re- told us that we should not do.
specie that I cannot see how it can pos- As a matter of fact, Mr. President, we
are in the District of Columbia at this
sibly ever be held to be-
This bill, however, would grasp upon a very moment simply because those early
purposely designed intense sequence of Congresses and our Founding Fathers of
public demonstrations in my own State the Constitution wanted Congress to be
of Alabama, and would bypass the nor- removed from the pressures of mass dem-
lost by it because Senators will have an
opportunity to study the RECOkn over-
night.
I repeat the announcement that the
5 hours under the unanimous-consent
agreement will be used today and to-
morrow, and there will be no morning
hour tomorrow.
T +h6nk the Senator from Alabama
make these comments. voting exists. it would expand an emo- feeling of the resolution of 1783, which I
tional so-called march as though it were just quoted a moment ago, held over to
FOR RECESS a balloon, and would use it as a justifica- the Constitutional Convention and re-
ORDER,
tion for the most harsh punitive measure suited in the 17th clause of section 8 of
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask on State governments that I have seen in article I of the Constitution, which I will
unanimous consent that when the Senate this Nation, short of actual military one- read:
completes its business today, it stand in cupation. The Congress shall have power-to exercise
recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow. This measure is fraught with iniquitous exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever
The PR. SIDING OFFICER. Without consequences. Let us not-Ignore this over such district (not exceeding ten miles
square) as many by cession of particular
objection, it is So ordered. merely to accommodate . Let mass this denionstra- states, and the acceptance of Congress, be-
come demands. Lus US look at this messss- come the seat of government of the United
VOTING RIGHTS ' ACT OF D65
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S, 1564) to enforce the 15th
amendment of ' the Constitution of the
United States.
ure f'n terms of whether the little good States, and to exercise like authority over
that may be accomplished can, in all all places purchased by the consent of the
fairness to justice and democracy, Justify legislature of the state in which the same
the terrible consequences on our form of shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
government and the Constitution. If we arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful
do not do this-if we do not look at every buildings.
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May 5, 1965
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 9257
and talks for elections, but little more. How- tration supported Diem, privately many compromise the differences between the com-
ever, in March 1960, North Vietnamese lead- American officials expressed great dissatisfac- peting South Vietnamese military and civil
' rs reexamined the situation in South Viet- tion with Diem, who viewed himself as the groups. He also used his stay in Vietnam to
nom-in part because the Chinese had con- savior of South Vietnam. Americans saw warn the North Vietnamese to stop their
tact through Laos with the South Viet- him as an aloof man, controlled by his fam'- military involvement in the South. The
namese rebels. The North-Vietnamese feared fly. Indeed, the liberal American interven Pleiku raid served as a "handle" (as it is
that they would be "moigsetrapped" by the tionists thought that if he were remove4 called in government) to air attack installa-
Chinese if they did not actively support the from the scene, the military, students, peas- tions in North Vietnam. This new turn of
South Vietnamese rebels. The wheel of ants, and Buddhists would be pacified, and the wheel was predicated on several politi-
fortune was given another turn. The mani- the war would go better. By the fall of cal and military theories. Politically it was
festo of the 18th, signed by leaders in the 1963, South Vietnam was in an uproar. The thought that the United States had nothing
spring of 1960 who opposed Diem, appeared army was plotting against Diem, with Ameri1 to negotiate about at a diplomatic bargain-
to make clear that he could no longer hold can knowledge and assistance from some ing table with Ho; since it had for all prac-
the support of the moderates. The stage was groups in the octopus-like American mission tical purposes "lost" the war, Military and
set for civil war. The Nam-bo Declaration, to South Vietnam, each of which had its own psychologically, the bombings were ordered
drawn by South Vietnamese rebels with the +,,.,.- ,+ _..__ _ ...
spring of 1960, detailed the list of grievances selves alive in protest aga
were ourning inst Diem. t(Anci
against the., Diem government. It stated in the American Government, high policy-
that the Veterans of the Resistance Associa- makers who had viewed the Buddhists as all
tion would fight to end the Diem regime and insignificant political force went scurrying
"to set up a democratic government of Na- around looking for American Buddhists wh6
tional Union in South Vietnam-in order to could explain to them what was going on.)'
realize national independence and demo- With the next turn of the wheel of fortune,
cratic liberties and to guarnatee a decent life Diem and his brother were murdered.
to the people." The military emerged with a weak stron-
They contended that only then could the man in January 1964, General Khanh. gHe
Geneva accords be implemented. alleged that some approaches had been made.
By December 1960, the National Liberation by Diem's brother during the last weeks of,
Front of South Vietnam began officially, his life to North Vietnam and the Liberation
under its own flag, to make successful at- Front. General Khanh, on the other hand,
tacks on South Vietnamese military forces. promised to prosecute the war to its end..
By 1961 the situation had deteriorated at a That was what American policymakers in
faster pace than had been expected by the Washington and Saigon wanted to hear, since United States. The South Vietnamese Gov- American policy was structured around the,
ernment expanded its repressive and punitive premise of a military victory against the
activities without being able to implement Communits and rebels. Reformist economic,
any effective economic or social plans for the and social activity was useful, but the Viet-
country. The Vietcong and the National namese operation was viewed by the Ameri-,
Liberation Front killed minor officials in the can mission and General Harkins as primar-
towns by the thousands, and stepped up ily a military effort. In Washington the
their campaign to win over the peasants in Vietnamese situation was looked at in more,
South Vietnam with a carrot and stick" sophisticated terms. But no one knew how
policy of reform and repression. As they be- to express that sophistication except mill-
came more successful, their need for repres- tarily, or in some pathetic organizational re-
sion dropped off considerably. sponse such as fashioning a counterinsur- .
It was in this atmosphere that the U_S
increased at the beginning of the Kennedy
administration. President Kennedy's ad-
visers wanted to settle Laos as a neutralist
country since it was thought that the United
States could not, and should not, fight in
both South Vietnam and_ Laos. They be-
Iieved that with a neutralist government in
Laos under Souvanna Phouma, Diem's gov-
ernment could be secured. In the spring of
1961, the mission of Maxwell Taylor and Walt
Rostow, then White House advisers, recom-
mended that guerrilla tactics be used by the
United States and the South Vietnamese
against the rebels. Influenced by their ex-
perience in the OSS, Rostow and Roger Hils-
man, soon to become Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, thought that
the way to beat the tactics of Gen. Vo
Nguyen Giap, the Vietminh military com-
mander, and Ho was to emulate them. How-
ever, to fight that kind of war one needed
the support of the peasants, and by this
time the South Vietnamese peasants were
totally alienated from the central adminis-
tration. Commandos were not guerrillas.
On the whole, the peasants were not inter-
ested in giving support to American military
advisers or to Diem's army, which had
swollen to 400,000 under the insistence of the
Americans who believed that a ratio of at
least 10 to 1 was necessary to beat a guerrilla
force. (They never got beyond 5 to 1.) Yet
the economy of the country could not sup-
port a larger force. By the end of 1962, the
Vietnamese and American military in Viet-
nam. The South Vietnamese military offi-
cers chafed at the American insistence that
a civilian form of government be continued
even if it was a facade, and feared that the
United States would not expand the war thus
undercutting their military and political
raison d'etre. On the American military side
the decision to bomb North Vietnam was an
attempt to show the North Vietnamese and
the Chinese that they were not "paper
tigers." The American military, goaded by
Chinese propaganda and psychological feel-
ings of impotence, feared that they looked
like paper tigers because of their poor mili-
tary showing in South Vietnam. In review-
ing the comments and evidence on the mat-
ter I find that virtually no one believed that
the bombing had any military value, or that
the supply routes would dry up. After all,
those supplies came from us. After 41/.2
years, the guerrillas, with the use of Ameri-
can weapons-and their own abilities-ended
up controlling far more territory than they
did at the time of the massive American
military intervention in 1961. The wags of _
Washington were saying that if only the
United States would withdraw the South
Vietnamese Government's strategic position
would improve since the guerrillas would not
be as well supplied. Ninety percent or m
ore
deal with the organization, training, and ac- of the rebel's weapons came from captured
tivities of guerrilla forces. United States or South Vietnamese store
Almost no attention was paid to the conse- depots or the black market, not from Viei;-
quences of military operations where whole nam. U Thant made this point in a more
villages were destroyed in search of one snip- diplomatic, yet didactic way. He noted that
er. Although the United States had estab- communism could be controlled in southeast
lished its military presence with 20,000 mili- Asia if there was no American military
tary personnel, by the beginning of 1964 it present.
had accomplished little else. The vast ma- In February and March of 1965 the Bud-
jority of engagements with the rebels, the dhists, who found among their monks a
peasants, or whoever, they were, invariably penchant for politics sought ways to end the
ended in some measure of failure for the war. They initiated a peace movement under
South Vietnamese army and its American ' Thich Quang Lien, who held a master's de-
advisers. The changeover in the top com- gree'from Yale University. His aim was that
mand structure of the American missions in ' of forcing all foreign military units out of
South Vietnam changed nothing. General North and South Vietnam. Once the bomb-
Taylor, the American Ambassador, and Gen- ings in North Vietnam were Increased, vari-
eral Westmoreland, the American military ous nations of the world feared an escalation
commander, were as frustrated as any of their into a far reaching war. They did not be-
predecessors. lieve the aesopian language of those who
By the summer of 1964 events took on a said that our responses were "measured and
slightly more ignominious quality. The controlled." Indeed, the image of super
American reprisal in the Gulf of Tonkin in rationality was exposed rather quickly when
violation of international law led to the mils- one studied the events of the war with any-
tary disaster of Bien Hoa, where at least 28 thing more than casual interest.
American planes were damaged or destroyed For example, the use of nonlethal gas was
by a few guerrillas with mortars. Helicopters unknown to those concerned with a con-
were destroyed by the score; thousands of trolled response, or the order to lot pilots
people were killed monthly. By December choose their own targets in North Vietnam
1964, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who was de- gave -many pause to wonder what control
posed after several months in power, found meant in that context.
h
statement that the
imself making a bid for his return with the The Department of State white paper had Vietna would n t fight "to carry out mesehe military succeeded in arousing anger in many
- - - policy of quarters becau f i
i
United States was flying bombing and straf- ally iureign country.- Against official Amer-
United missions against villages where there was tary wishes, w elos s lo all at to the r
-
any suspicion of Communist support. tary. Formally, t that that battle . But t for
In- interesting reasons. . On February 7, the Viet-
discriminate bombing with napalm, and cong attacked Pleiku and Camp Holloway
atrocities against peasants who may or may killing and wounding 75 Americans.
not have helped the Vietcong were common- The attack came while McGeorge Bundy,
place. All of the Vietnamese suspicions the President's special assistant for national
about U.S. imperialism were now confirmed. security affairs, was surveying the detriorat-
Although publicly the Kennedy adminis- ing military situation and attempting to
se o
s pedestrian quality, its
failure to show how the war was controlled
from the north, and hence, why it was neces-
sary to bomb the north on a regular basis.
No arguments in that flimsy document were
adduced from international law, very few
from the facts of the situation and none
from history except that ersatz kind which
men who have control of vast bureaucracies
use to justify their personal (although be-
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9258 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 5, 1965 on n
with cause their power are translated into leaders, thus
Source (China) would Minh toe virtualeexcluson of the V et-
inInt tVie nal) actions. cong appears to fly directly in the face of the
In Vietnam the course eoh of events was ef- be struck if the war continued.
fected in new ways by the bombings. The The growing American involvement in stated policy of an independent South Viet-
United States increased its forces in South Vietnam was little understood in the United nam. It would appear that it was to Amer-
and agree totne-
Vietnam by mid-April to over 35,000. The States. Although Congress was silent on the ican
late vantagthe nVietcong egotiate
North Vietnamese responded rather mildly course of the war, privately there was anger go
to American bombings of their country per- and disbelief at the policies of the Johnson Front since they would, likely (and given the
h.aps for several reasons. They did not have administration. Some blamed the policies on emphasis on the regional character of the
the air power to engage or fend off American carryovers from the Kennedy administration. country) build their own political power
and South Vietnamese air attacks in any- They believed that the President was a neo- relatively independent of North Vietnamese
thing but haphazard ways. Also, North Viet- phyte in foreign affairs and had counted too domination.
namese policy was aimed at attempting to heavily on the advice of the military, the The President's speech which outlined the
isolate the United States on a moral level CIA, State, the NSC machinery: those who possibilities of the Mekong River Delta proj-
from its allies in the Western alliance and had a vested interest in the militarized for- ect while not something which could im-
in Asia since the bombings reflected little eign policy. By April of 1965, newspapers, mediately yield results would have the posi-
more than military inadequacy and our seem- liberal and conservative, called for a defini- tive effect of diverting war energies to more
ing willingness to apply any self selected tion of American aims. University professors constructive ends. What is important in this
means (with little care for cost) to obtain a and students held marches and "teach-ins" case is not that the Mekong project would
in favor of negotiation. The President spoke take a decade before it "here fruit," but that
self-defined end. new the toward cooperation
On the political level the North Viet- on April 8 to the American people in reply to is and reflects ects a nathe name of man. In that
namese leadership which historically favored the critics of the policy and the March 15 activity
the Soviets over the Chinese Communists declaration of the nonalined nations calling sense (and although both parts of the Presi-
wanted Soviet aid, but not Chinese inter- for negotiation. President Johnson's speech dent's speech reflected the terrible hubris
vention. The Soviet Union as in 1946, and on April 8 was predicated on the official of the United States) the second half of
even after the American bombings of North American position that North Vietnam con- that speech should be taken as a direction
Vietnam while Premier Kosygin was present trols the Vietcong in South Vietnam and in which the Unib~ bu t as good prepared to
neighbor,
in North Vietnam, did not want to endanger the course of the guerrilla war there. This participate not as
its own relations with the United States. view, enunciated in the Department of State's That view is quite far from the views set
In South Vietnam there was little change white paper was open to serious question. A forth in the first part of the speech which
in the course of the war. The rebel noose special Japanese envoy to study the situation left the impression that we could only be
around Saigon grew tighter, American in Vietnam for the Government of Japan, Mr. satisfied In international, affairs according
quarters were bombed regularly, the Amerl- Matsumoto, pointed out that the Vietcong to our values and principles since we did
rri-
see as tewas
can embassy was destroyed, and 75 percent is much like the French underground during tonot ry for such Nm unda ce things
or better (who really knew?) of the towns, World War II representing different groups Y colonies. it med
villages and countryside were in the hands in the country. "It can be said that the too great to pay for what we believed "right."
Vietcong is not directly connected to Com- Not surprisingly the speech was read by
in the Vietcong. of Marines The es to top places States in sent re- which munist Chinese in the context of the military
the wn China sequently, or the Soviet Union. it is not certain that the buildup by the United States in Vietnam, its
the whole countryside was controlled by the consequent
Vietcong. In the Da Nang area, for example, Vietcong will give up fighting because of the increased raids and military titillation of the
the American military garrisons were present boming of North Vietnam. In Vietnam I Chinese border. The North Vietnamese,
at the sufferance of the Vietcong. American often heard it said that the Vietcong is a while rejecting the offer of "unconditional
military officials openly admitted that the nationalist movement. This means the discussions" seemed more disposed, accord-
South Vietnamese army was unrealiable: Vietcong will not give up resistance until ing to East European sources, to take the
they have achieved their objectives. Mr. President's offer seriously even to the extent or mem- that many s berattion were front. Vietcong Matsumoto said that no one could really of neutralizing both .North and South Viet-
bras e the Liberation The supplied by by define the character of the Vietcong and that nam. Most diplomats in the East and West
d the Am that erican it was forces but n not trained only by supplied them as even our own administration in Saigon esti- agreed that no negotiations or unlimited
the Am mates that the Communists only include 30 discussions could be entered into until the
well. percent of the Vietcong. The Japanese post- United States stopped bombing North Viet-
m dy- nam. Since the military purpose in such
In France those generals who studied Pon would seem to comport with the
Aerican military tactics at the beginning namics of revolutionary or resistance move- bombings were admittedly infinitesimal and
thought the monsoon nes rainy season of 19 ments. Those who in fact do the fighting, since, as the President said in his speech,
m they witnessed a w?ia vu to dheit their "We have no desire to devastate that which
own military campaigns May 1954. very quick to hand which ended at live through hardship nd Over and their pow it pow,er are to an an-- the people of North Vietnam have built with,
Dienbienphu in May other, be it Ho Chi Minh or Mao Tse tung. toil and sacrifice," cessation of bombings in
rned. andain the wheel tfinal fortune Irony, also Ironically, the interests of the North Viet- North Vietnam would hardly be costly to
turned. And fall of a way 1fe4, De was the Gaulle and the e namese and the Vietcong further diverged the United States.
Fr the late anted r c whose objective once the United States undertook to bomb IV
French ly s a conference ente t gtthe the North Vietnam. Although the North Viet- Since the Second World War, American
could only result in a settlement along namese were suffering in their own country policymakers have developed America's for-
1943 and prop 1944. In President Roosevelt In. the Vietcong continued to flourish. If this is sign policy role as that of world's policeman.
In In Jthe Central Intelligence was said e true it would mean that Ho Chi Minh may We assumed this role in Vietnam, a place
Agency Washington (CIA) that the had made it very difficult to stop the war. There where we did not begin to comprehend the
A(CIA) or others had made approaches are four ways of looking at this "reality" in
negotiations, complex cross-currents of politics, national-
greeted Hdeted Chi eceMinh for. terms of American policy: ism, personality, tradition, history, and other
through but were but intermediaries
and the
Yet De Gaulle said that the Chinese annd the 1? That the official U.S. position is correct; people's interests. To support our role as
North Vietnamese wanted to negotiate and that Ho controls the Vietcong enough to stop policeman our military and CIA programs
the war; insoutheast Asia grew to mammoth propor-
w needed at preconditions as 2. That the United States has been foiled tions without rhyme or reason. These pro-
to ha co that better not stipulate
badly ly as the North Vietnamese. nds the as by its own ideology which insists on continu- grams often reflected little more than the
badly as the 4 wanted the United And States ing Communist conspiracy as the way of power struggles of the agencies of American
tossup port who the Geneva eva Agreements, U explaining revolution or civil war move- bureaucracy, rather than anything which
too n includ- meats; went on in Asia. A report on Vietnam and
In g the he provision for elections, , now w seemed 3. That the United States wishes to sta- southeast Asia prepared by four Senators
to favor cou American military in bilize the-southeast Asia area and in due time on the request of President Kennedy in 1963
precarious situation southeast Asia beccaauuse e of of the will offer Ho Chi Minh and his group reader- stated:
Malaysia, , and situation Indonesia. between its creation, ership in an attempt to countercheck the "It should also be noted, in all frankness,
power of Communist China; or that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act
Government dent b5, diplomatic the of the ar America 9 4 p4. That U.S. planners really accept the in- in uniform and enlarging patterns have re-64 was almost othe end of December who terpretation of the Japanese, knows that sulted in an expansion of the U.S. commit-
commit,-
int sted t totally t s in iegh Vietnam tarize i Those 'who there is little connection between the south- ment in some places to an extent which
interested the war is into o North wern rebels and North Vietnamese controlled would appear to beax only the remotest rela-
eclipsed b the war merely wanted to were ex conspiracy mask its unwillingness to settle tionship to what is essential, or even de-
pand y per who merelly wamb the war. - sirable, in terms of U.S. interests."
anddgo war per se who wanted a bomb
and negotiate. The latter policy became the The American rationale may be predicated The United States, by the military and
policy of the doves. The previous deterrent on the third point; viz, that the United covert way it operated in Vietnam in the
to a substantial military involvement in States wishes to counterbalance the power of past 10 years, has nurtured strong anti-
southeast Asia, war with China, seemed to Communist China by_ using Ho Chi Minh white and anti-Western feelings in south-
become the spur or objective. "No more and the anti-Chinese feelings of the North east Asia. Whether we called it "respon-
sanctuaries," the Chinese were warned by Vietnamese to counterbalance the Chinese. sibility" or empire, the facts were that the
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May 5, 1965
CONGRESSIONAL
United States succeeded to the Japanese and
French hegemony in Asia without really
knowing why or with what purpose. Em-
pires are very seldom built by design. They
start almost accidently; their dynamics and
actions define what they are. Each empire
has its own characteristics, although histori-
cally they all seem to involve defense of
some allies, suppressing certain regimes in
favor of others, and a powerful ideology.
Ultimately, there are common characteristics
in the lack of judgment on the part of their
leaders who no longer are able to distin-
guish between real and chimeric interests
because of the empire's octopuslike ten-
tacles. Those tentacles, especially if they
include extensive military involvement
strangle the judgment of its leaders.
Relating to Vietnam militarily has cam-
ouflaged America's real interests and dis-
torted the type of diplomacy and politics
which should be employed there. The meth-
ods we have followed in Vietnam may not be
without their costs in terms of our own
Nation's stability and freedom of choice.
Thus,, when we ask the military to under-
take projects which are inherently unmilt-
tary, we are courting great danger. It is
overdramatic to say that the United States
will be faced with a French Organization de
L'Armee Secrete (OAS) situation with our
military if we substantially expand the war,
and then attempt an accommodation, but
such seeds are easily sown. For example,
the official American policy in South Viet-
nam is to support a civilian government in
Vietnam, whereas the rank and file military,
including high-ranking American military
officers in Vietnam, support the South Viet-
namese military. Bad habits are learned
in such wars and they may too easily be
applied at home.
It is hard for American civilian leader-
ship to learn that the military Is not a
machine which can be started and stopped
by pressing a button. By definition of
their mission, the military want to follow
-through to a military victory. We will find
that each day that American policymakers
procrastinate on a political, settlement, the
war will escalate upward militarily just by
its own momentum. In this regard the mili-
tary bureaucratic course of the war is quite
instructive. The special forces and the
Army were the military forces- under Presi-
dent Kennedy who were given responsibility
for the war. After the apparent failure of
these forces to pacify the country, the Air
Force lobbied for involvement.
Using the Gulf of Tonkin as the pretext,
the Air Force sent planes to South Vietnam
as a deterrent. But deterrents are vulner-
able and can be easily destroyed by guerrillas
as these were at Bien Hoa. Here the psy-
chology of the paper tiger played its part.
The Air Force's pride was wounded and it
decided to involve itself more fully so that
it could prove itself. Once this occurred, the
Marines and the Navy (but less so) lobbied
for an expanded role which was granted.
Not wanting to be left out, the Army also
wanted greater involvement. This was also
granted by the White House. Finally, SAC
In a nonnuclear way also wanted involve-
ment. Paradoxically, the military may have
wished for that involvement because they
feared that the war would end, because the
politicians would negotiate military with-
drawal before they had a chance to test
themselves in battle. Although that might
have been their fear, objectively, because of
such a massive military involvement in the
war in a political sense it becomes very hard
to impress our opponents of peaceful inten-
tions, or to counter those groups in the
American Government and the public who
want a win in the military sense of the term.
The Vietnamese operation as a military
venture is not one in which very many can
take any particular pride. The bad habits
RECORD - HOUSE
of that war have included torture, napalm-
ing, defoliation, and inability to understand,
what means could yield suitable ends. 41-
though governments are, . by their nature,
notoriously uncritical of themselves, democ-
racies, by their nature, have a better char cc
of holding their governments and the ac-
tions of the individuals in that government
to account (even though personal responsi-
bility for actions is not a very fashionaille
virtue in government). Too often govern-
ments, that, is men in government, are ex-
pected to operate by inverted meanings 'of
responsibility and morality or forget abokit
them while in government. (Indeed, one !of
our former Secretaries of State, Dean Ac 'e-
son, gave such behavior ideological gloss in
his Amherst College address in December
1964.) This sort of responsibility and mo-
rality can be seen in Vietnam. Where, as in
the case of Vietnam, three out of four Ameri-
can until the middle of 1964 were not even
aware that the United States was involved
militarily, officials seem to have felt theih-
selves free to allow sadistic and totalitarian
methods in the name of fuzzy objectives.
Such methods spread easily, and unthink-
ingly, in governments. It is best that they
v
With the realization that neither tide
United States alone nor the Western Powers
together can dictate a result in southeast
Asia, does there remain any role which these
countries can play in that area? Most cer-
tainly it is not that of policeman or white
man's burden for Asia. That lesson wRs
learned, or should have been, 10 years ago.
Perhaps the moderately clever even learned
it at the end of the Second World War. Npr
is it likely that pacts such as SEATO, which
do not comprise the great nations having
real or geographical interests in southeast
Asia, Japan, Indian, and Burma can ever
mean anything. If the great powers are to
,pxercise a role, and if, there is to be a lone_
term settlement, it will have to be in concert
with other nations; that is, through the U.N.
Although the present line of the Chinese
Communists and the North Vietnamese is
to oppose U.N. involvement, because they
fear that the Geneva and Laotian agree-
ments would be scrapped, any new settle-
ment would necessarily be predicated on the
1954 and 1962 agreements. The purpose of
U.N. involvement would be to guarantee
that the terms are kept.
While the U.N. machinery appears to tl)e
West to be unwieldy and leaves much room
for improvement, the facts are that the
U.N. in the southeast Asian area has dome
more to stabilize that region than either the
SEATO arrangement or the American mili-
tary intervention. For example, the U.N.
was instrumental in ending the 1961 Laotian
crisis whereas SEATO was unable even to
agree on what the crisis was. The prob-
ability is that America's allies in SEATO
would be more likely to act under U.N.
direction than under SEATO auspices in
southeast Asia, since SEATO, as an inter-
national or regional institution, has abso-
lutely no moral or political force behind it.
Furthermore, the nations of southeast Asia
are more favorably disposed to the U.N. be-
cause of the voting power of the Afro-Asian
and Latin American nations in the General
Assembly than they are to pact alliances
which are comprised principally of white
Western powers. The prescription of action
is not an easy one, for it will mean that we
shall have to reconsider how the United
States is to relate to the world, and to
itself. No doubt there are other courses
that parallel the one I outline. The policy
I've drawn is illustrative as any policy must
be until it is put to the hard test of negoti-
ation and practice.
1. Recently more and more evidence has
been reported in the United States about
the torture and napalming of the Vietcong
and peasants by the South Vietnamese Army,
with either American participation or ac-
quiescence. This brutality and torture can
only revolt those who are concerned with
politics rather than sadism. We cannot con-
trol the torture of the North Vietnamese. We
are responsible for what we do and for what
our agents do. That is, we are responsible
for our torture of prisoners and napalming
of villages. In the spirit of shouldering our
responsibility we must immediately put a
stop to the bombings and torture now either
allowed or sanctioned by the United States.
That policy is shortsighted politically and
foolish militarily. It has not resulted in any
advantage to the United States. If a politi-
cal settlement is the objective aimed at and
elections are held, those South Vietnamese
who supported the torture and napalming
will be defeated. The only way that the
South Vietnamese, whom we support and
prop up, will change, is for us to change.
When that happens, they may be able to re-
train some favor in South Vietnam.
Although there is evidence which makes
clear the historic roots of torture in Indo-
china as a method of politics, there is suf-
ficient evidence to show how Western meth-
ods have updated the more "primitive" Viet-
namese ways. At the very least, we should
adopt and enforce the Prisoners of War
(POW) and Red Cross Conventions as they
apply to that war. There is another point
to the sadism and torture. Bureaucracy and
organization may involve itself in such
things almost antiseptically. That is a
dangerous trend in government and should
be stopped. An independent investigation
(along the lines of the Warren Commission)
of the activities and directives of American
personnel and policymaking in regard to the
conduct of the war would do much to restore
responsibility in statecraft. Such an inves-
tigation would help set standards by which
the various agencies of the American Gov-
ernment operate internationally. (The new
CIA Director could benefit greatly from such
a review.)
2. Under the 1954 Geneva accords an elec-
tion was to have been held in July 1956 in
South and North Vietnam to determine the
type of government it would have as auni-
fied nation. A conference of the 14 powers,
similar to the Laos negotiation, but now with
U.N. sponsorship, should be convened (pro-
vided for in article 4, Geneva accords of
1962) to negotiate a permanent cessation of
all military activities. As evidence of its good
intentions, prior to the convening of the
conference, the United States should stop the
bombings of North Vietnam. The United
States, with the other great powers, should
now join in guaranteeing the borders of the
area as a member of the 14 nations confer-
ence. That conference would set the out-
lines for a confederated state of Vietnam
which would come into existence after cer-
tain agreed upon conditions were met. The
International Control Commission (ICC) or
another agreed-upon body would act as the
investigator-enforcer. (It should be recalled
that this method was adopted in the Pales-
tine-Israeli situation and has worked well.)
A political amnesty in both North and South
Vietnam would be declared and all elements
of the population in North and South Viet-
nam would be free to seek political repre-
sentation by democratic means. This would
be enforced by the ICC under U.N. sponsor-
ship. North and South Vietnam would be
admitted to the U.N. as separate states. Once
confederation was achieved the Vietnamese
would have single representation.
3. The ICC could be greatly strengthened
if it received its authority from the U.N.,
and became a responsibility of the U.N. Its
task would be to investigate complaints, act
as a police force, conduct the initial elec-
tions in Vietnam and make continuous re-
ports, to the U.N. about any border difficul-
No. 80-19
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9260 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE May 5, 1965
ties. Responsibility for serving on the ICC The North Vietnamese position as sup-
would rotate among members of the U.N. ported by the Chinese and the Russians has
Payment for this activity should come from been reasonably consistent since the Geneva
the great powers to the U.N. earmarked for Conference of 1954. Their demands flow from
the ICC. Further, with V,S. support, the the Geneva accords themselves. As I have
ICC should act to negotiate out the differ- stated, on February 4, 1955, they proposed
ences between Thailand, Cambodia, Laos. restoring normal road, rail, sea, air, and
and North and South Vietnam, that have postal relations between the two zones, as
mounted over the past 10 years. was promulgated in the Geneva accords and
4. The situation in Laos will continue to general elections. The problem with the
deteriorate unless the United States under- Geneva accords was that no nation which felt
takes diplomatic means to stop the war in any responsibility for stability In southeast
Vietnam. To insure Laotian stability, the Asia cared to guarantee the agreements of
United States should lead in efforts which that Conference. France was In no position
will give the ICC greater power and author- to carry out for the whole of Vietnam a
ity to act in the whole southeast Asian guarantee as enunciated in the accords, espe-
sector. The ICC should request, through cially in the face of American objections. If
U.N. good offices, troops from Burma, the a Geneva conference were held along the
Philippines, Nepal, New Zealand, Tugo?? lines of the 1954 Conference with the differ-
slavia, and Algeria. They would police bor- ence being that the United States would join
ders and serve as an inspection unit for arms and guarantee the results, the probability is
control in the area. National responsibility that Vietnam would maintain-or attain-
for troops detachments would be on a rota- an existence which would be independent of
tional basis, Communist China.
5. The United States, through the U.N. Barring the inability of the United States
should offer aid to Laos, South Vietnam, to control its appetite for military involve-
North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand in ment, there is a reason for some cautious op-
fashioning a common market between them- timism. There are two strong political cur-
selves, with a customs and payments union, rents in southeast Asia. One is nationalism
emergency funds to finance special quick and the other is fear of Chinese domination.
U ited States and U N file^ The direction of North Vietnamese and any
i
c
n
ff
the people of North and South Vietnam
should have one government and one politi-
cal system is their affair, not ours.
(e) Strengthen the ICC politically by mak-
ing it responsible to the United States and
militarily by fashioning a police force com-
prised of rotating detachments from nations
in the U.N.-Burma, the Philippines, and
New Zealand;
(f) Reinstitute the customs and payment:;
union between the nations of the area and
allow trade between North and South Viet-
nam;
(g) Compensate Cambodia for incursions
on its people and property;
(h) Develop a planning bank drawn in
such a manner as to provide for the mclu-
sion of Communist China, Involve the U.N.
Special Fund and ECAFE as the Instruments
for short- and long-term economic aid to
Vietnam and neighboring states.
St. Augustine lived his life in a debauched
way before his conversion. If debauchery
is a necessary prerequisite to redemption,
then the situation in Vietnam is ready for
the next step. We may be sure that no
policy a government follows Is holy. How-
ever, at least this policy would be in the
American national interest.
i,
s
proje
payo
are bulging with such projects) and along- future South Vietnamese leadership, assum- (Mr. FISHER asked and was given
term economic development project such an3 ing it is to have any sort of indigenous mass permission to extend his remarks at this
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for support, will be to achieve national political point in the RECORD.)
southeast Asia. Indeed, it could use the identity for their nations. This means that
Special Fund as its primary instrument for the local political and military leadership [Mr. FISHER'S remarks will appear
some of these projects. The Mekong River will work to lessen the influence of the great hereafter in the Appendix.]
i
hi
a
ted States, France, C
na,
nd
project, which is a striking plan for land and powers (Un
water development, has united Cambodia, the Soviet Union) in southeast Asia. They
-Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam in this are aware that they cannot get very far by
development activity. It 'is even said by having outside troops prop up their regime
those involved in the project that the Pathet or by being wholly dependent upon outside
Lao support the Mekong Delta project and forces politically, diplomatically, or economi-
that the North Vietnamese also would if it tally.
were extended into their area. No doubt this attitude will cause the great
Correctively, a "planning bank" whose di- powers some consternation, since historically
rectors would be Cambodia, North Vietnam, they have used the region of southeast Asia
Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, the United as a pawn in their game. However, that age
States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet of international politics is over. Will Com-
Union, could direct the expenditure and plan- munist China abide by that view? There
ping of short-term projects in South and is no question that U.S. relations with China
North Vietnam, and the Mekong project in will soon enter a new stage. To no little
southeast Asia. The planning bank could be extent what the United States does will dras?
funded by these powers under authority of tically affect Chinese activity. If the United
the United Nations using the Economic Corn- States helps in fashioning the political con-
.mission for Asia in the Far East (ECAFE) cerns of southeast Asia on real issues: water,
as its parent. The organizational structure food, and electric power, we will be in a
of the planning bank would allow for inclu- better position of blunting Chinese power
sion of both donors and recipients as board because the southeast Asian nations will
directors. The People's Repgublic of China have a reason for being independent. If we
would be invited to join in one of these make it possible for China to participate in
capacities. such projects peacefully we will have accom-
plished The United States should now tom n _ plished much in recognizing the legitimate
interests of 650 million Chinese, and will
sate for the bombings of Cambodian terra- have discouraged both their-and our-un-
tory, the destruction of their villages, of real interests. Settling the Vietnamese war
total innocents, and of their land. can be used as an opening wedge for im-
vi proving relations with the Communist Chi-
The North Vietnamese are anxious for nese in this next period of international af-
trade with the South. Except for food which fairs. The risks of that policy for the United
they received from the Russians in 1955, the States are incomparably less than a holy war
North Vietnamese would have continued the with China; a war which can only result
war In 1955 to obtain rice. They will do so in either in its nuclear demolition or a pro-
the future unless they are able to obtain rice longed land war which the United States
from some source. The resumption of trade would probably lose on China's mainland.
and the normalization of relations with The political outlines of action become
North Vietnam is a small price to pay for clear:
stabilizing the situation in the Indochinese (a) Investigate the conduct of the war as
area. Like South Vietnam, North Vietnam formulated and carried out by the United
has been under a crushing military and eco- States and adopt the POW _and Red Cross
comic burden. Its leadership has been Conventions as it applies to the war;
fighting for 25 years and is concerned that (b) Convene a 14-nation conference under
North Vietnam will lose everything in a war the aegis of the U.N. to arrange a cease-
that could spread to their territory. Again, fire;
the North Vietnamese are concerned to keep (c) Arrange for the guarantee of the bor-
control of their country from the Chinese and ders of southeast Asia countries through the
the Soviet Union. This can only be accom- 14-nation conference;
plishe'd In the context of peace. In a widened (d) Allow the Vietnamese to work for a
military action the Chinese would move a confederated North and South Vietnam, but
large military force Into North Vietnam. admit them separately to the U.N. Whether
MR. FOLEY OF THE LOS ANGELES
TIMES DOES A SUPERIOR JOB OF
REPORTING ON A SUBJECT THAT
SHOULD BE OF INTEREST TO
EVERY AMERICAN: TWO PROFES-
SIONAL ASSISTANTS FOR EACH
ME;VIBER OF THE HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES
(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, Thomas
J. Foley, of the Washington Bureau of
the Los Angeles Times, has written a
piece about the need for more adequate
staffing by the Congress of the United
States. I advocate each House Member
being provided with two professional
assistants.
Recently I made a speech on the sub-
ject and suggested that every Represent-
ative have two additional specialized
employees: First, a lawyer qualified to
evaluate proposed legislation; and sec-
ond, an economist equipped to weigh the
manifold problems of the American
economy with all of their social ramifica-
tions.
I have read every word of Mr. Foley's
piece and can take issue with none of it.
In the speech I delivered on the subject,
I stated that it would be necessary to
have a fourth office building in order to
accommodate all the Representatives
with their new employees. Howls went
up from one end of the country to the
other about another House Office Build-
ing. The reasons I gave for needing
such an office building, to keep pace with
the growth of each Congressman's work-
load and the growth of the Nation, were
lost in the catcalls. It took a good news-
man like Mr. Foley, with a sense of jour-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A2183
Old Sanborn Field
came an integral and creative force in
its culture.
The people of Poland have, since the
days of Jamestown and through the cen-
turies of events to the present, furnished
the bone and sinew of American growth.
At Jamestown Poles cheered and sup-
ported John Smith. During the Civil
War her soldiers fought on the side of
the Union while her daughters nursed
our soldiers on the battlefield. Through-
out the years these sturdy pioneers of
freedom have been a source of strength
to the country of their adoption, Today,
Polish Americans have set their purpose
to the ultimate liberation of their home-
land. In their hopes and in the attain-
ment of their prayers all Americans join.
Polish Constitution Day
SPEECH
OF
HON. -JAMES M. HANLEY
or NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 3, 1965
Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, it is my
great pleasure to commend the people of
Poland and their American brothers on
the anniversary of the Polish Constitu-
tion signed on May 3, 1791.
The country of Poland had been sev-
ered by Russia, Prussia, and Austria and
after that partitioning, Polish leaders
felt a sense of urgency to find a means
to prevent future national calamities.
They needed a format for the Govern-
ment designed to unite and strengthen
their country.
To this end in 1788, a committee of
the National Assembly, the Diet, was
formulated to draw up a constitution to
improve the Government. This com-
missioned body was comprised of liberal,
freedom-seeking, patriotic men. Dis-
contentment among the tired and dis-
gusted masses in monarchial Poland
was great. This state acted as a cata-
lyst; thus 3 years later, a constitution
was signed.
This first Democratic document in.
Eastern Europe, signed on May 3, 1791,
reduced the arbitrary powers of the King
by channeling his authority through a
council. The powers of the upper Cham-
ber of the Assembly were reduced and
those. of the popular-elected lower
Chamber were liberalized and fortified.
The peasantry were freed and placed for
the first time under the protection of the
law. Separation of the middle and lower
classes from the nobility was minimized.
The authority of the landlords over the
peasantry was reduced. Equally as im-
portant, the liberum veto whereby one
Member of the Diet could veto any meas-
ure was abolished thus assuring passage
of more legislation. This constitution
also created the first type of cabinet gov-
ernment. Perhaps one of the most im-
portant provisions was freedom of reli-
gion, conscience, and speech. Thus, Po-
land became the pioneer of democracy
in Europe by proclaiming the sovereignty
of her people.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
those weren't his exact words but they are
close enough.
So, from plot 23, Dr. William A. Albrecht,
then chairman of the Department of Soils
of the University of Missouri, carefully
shoveled up a sample of good earth which,
through all the long years dating back well
into the last century, had known no other
crop but mule forage. Many thoughts, as
they always did, rushed through Albrecht's
scientific brain as he walked back down Col-
lege Avenue with his soil sample to Mumford
Hall and the lab. There, he was a familiar
figure with crucible, test tube, or retort in
hand, always talking fast and gesturing faster
to some freshman student about how to con-
centrate on his studies, or to some doctoral
candidate on such subjects as collodial in-
vestigations.
Now, back in his lab on this August day,
1945, less important things, such as confer-
ences with professors and meetings with fer-
HON. RICHARD (DICK) ICHORD
OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 5, 1965
Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, the world
is full of surprises, to be sure, but the
report of a scientific surprise which
reached me recently is worthy of calling
to the attention of this body. For back-
ground information may I point out that
the ensuing article, entitled "Old San-
born Field," was written by one of my,
constituents, Clyde H. Duncan, asso-
ciate agricultural editor of the College
of Agriculture, University of Missouri,
The article was contained in a publics
tion, Harvest-An Anthology of Farm
Writings, by Wheeler McMillen, formerly,
editor of Farm Journal. Mr. Wheeler, it
is reported to me, decided to include Old
Sanborn. Field in his collection because
"this story about Old Sanborn Field is
priceless and must be included in my
anthology. It cannot be lost to pos-
terity."
Old Sanborn Field, located on the cam-
pus of the University of Missouri, is con-
sidered one of the most important
experimental fields, and because of the
scientific surprise the 8-acre plot has
special significance.
I commend the article to the Members.
of the House of Representatives:
OLD SANBORN FIELD
(By Clyde H. Duncan)
The little professor through the years, with
soil auger in hand and with, students follow-
ing behind him at a dogtrot, had almost
worn a path from his classrooms In Waters
and Mumford Halls to "Old Sanborn," the
small 8-acre experimental field within this.
city's (Columbia, Mo.) boundaries.
His actions were by no means unusual in
this placid community long accustomed to
professors, where education is the common
currency. If he had been carrying a blunder-
buss instead of the soil augur, it would
hardly have caused an eyebrow to raise.
Now it was 1945 and "Bill" Albrecht, as
farmers and fertilizer folks knew him and not
as "the professor," was standing in this same
old field. His sleeves were rolled up, his col-
lar wilted down under the rays of an Au-
gust sun, hot enough, he says now, to fry a
pan of catfish. He was taking one more soil
sample but now there were no students with
their staccato firing of questions. He had
more time for meditation and that's just
what the task in hand required. He was on
a special mission, one of his many very spe-
cial missions.
Presently, he came to plot 23. He stopped
suddenly, gave it a cursory survey. He could'
recite its history backwards and forwards,
every year of its existence since 1888, or since
J. W. Sanborn, the stormy, crotchety dean,
had established this land as rotation field.
During all these 57 years this plot had been
unfertilized, Albrecht knew, and had con-
stantly been cropped to timothy alone.
He had a hunch, and perhaps even a good
scientific reason, for taking a sample from
this particular area. He wanted it for a
friend who was interested in the new wonder
drug research now daily making the front
pages. This friend had written him tersely,
"Please send me a good representative sample
of Sanborn Field. I'm playing a hunch that
the old field is loaded with fungus." Maybe
tilizer executives, could all wait. He had
something more important to do. He had
this package of soil to mail, without delay,
to his oldtime colleague and former Univer-
sity of Missouri faculty friend, Dr. Benjamin
M. Duggar, the botanist.
"What has Albrecht sent me this time?"
Duggar no doubt said on receiving this bit
of Missouri crust. "He's probably outdone
himself this time."
The botanist was to find that his own
words were truly prophetic, and that Albrecht
had outdone himself and all other men up
to that time for the laboratory soon was to
reveal that the sample from plot 23, Sanborn
Field, University of Missouri, contained the
first golden mold from which aureomycin
was obtained. Thus, this was the beginning,
the starting point, of the now world-re-
nowned antibiotic similar to penicillin.
It would be awhile before all the story
of this day's events would be completely
written, if ever, Duggan and Albrecht knew.
But one thing they did know, as scientists,
that soon the fruits of this day's labors would
be put to work saving millions from untimely
deaths. They know, too, or strongly sus-
pected, that it would prove the arch enemy of
certain death-dealing viruses as well as both
gram-positive and gram-negative bacteria.
One now can easily visualize Dr. Duggar
looking a bit bewildered after this famous
discovery, serving as he was then as con-
sultant in mycological fungus research and
production for American Cyanamid's Lederle
Laboratories. One can almost hear him say-
ing, "Albrecht has more wizardry and magic
than Houdini. Imagine, of all the places he
might have spaded the soil for a sample, he
picks just the right one that happened to
be loaded with aureomycin."
Dr. Duggar, no doubt, was awed by this
unusual discovery. It is doubtful., though,
if it surprised the professor, who had become
accustomed to seeing Sanborn Field produce
the out-of-the-way and the unusual so much
so as to establish for it a peculiar niche in
the literature of agriculture. Rebellike, this
tiny field seemed never to stick to the script.
Dr. Albrecht, as a director of all of the
Sanborn Field research, had seen these same
acres produce face-reddening facts. For in-
stance, he knew that back when everyone
was talking and preaching crop rotations
evidence from Sanborn Field had proven
that such practices under certain conditions
could not be beneficial but actually very
harmful. This man of classroom and labor-
atory, a born teacher, knew, too, that con-
trary to early admonitions that legumes left
the soil better than they found it, wasn't
always true. Legumes, overdone could, in-
stead of leaving the soil with an abundance
of stored nitrogen, leave it as impoverished
as a sharecropper's land following a lifetime
of following a one-crop system. Sanborn
Field also had taught the research men that
fertilizers applied without rhyme or reason
could be almost as bad as no fertilizer at all.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX May 5, 1965
Albrecht knew these things, because he of gas also surprised the German general phibious assault at a high cost in American
knew Sanborn Field, those few little acres staff which originally was committed merely lives-U.S. casualties could have been kept
that the unimaginative had once tried to to the experimental use of the weapon. Be- to a minimum. It is to be presumed that
turn into a parking lot, but which were cause the gases were deadly, and because the utilization even of lethal gases may have
capable of producing more scientific sur- there was no defense, nor a capability for permitted large numbers of Japanese soldiers
prises than a clown in a circus. It was this retaliation, the Allies feared that the Ger- to survive. If nonlethal gases had been used,
knowledge which mothered a remark by him mans had achieved technological superiority. the casualty rates very well may have been
when the soil sample that had produced the In their desperation, Paris and London un- reduced drastically on both sides. The use
then newest of the wonder drugs was pre- leashed a furious propaganda campaign of nonlethal gases, therefore, was Indicated
sented in special ceremonies at the Smith- branding the employment of poison gas as for humane, and also for many solid mili-
sonian Institution on October 15, 1958. barbarous and inhuman. The American tary reasons. Unfortunately, fear of public
He declared at that time, his friends say, press took up the theme and soon the world opinion precluded utilization of the chemi-
that it was very doubtful if any other plot found itself In a paroxysm of moral protest. cal capability and caused thousanis of Amer-
of land, comparable in size on the face of the The Germans remained undeterred. But icans and Japanese to d1.e.
earth, has produced as much genuine knowl- since they had only rudimentary gas war- No one in his right mind ever has criticized
edge and wisdom for humanity's use In corn- fare capabilities and had not thought the pacifist desire to abolish war. But wars
bating physical suffering and hunger as have through their tactics. they were unable to continue to occur and the United States con-
the hallowed acres of Sanborn Field. win any decisive victories. Within a year, tinues to be involved. Furthermore, we have
ermans were In a now entered a period when it is most likely
e th
e G
st by the tim
ju position to make really effective use of the that an increasing number of so-calle3 paci-
weapon, the British and French had de- fication missions will have to be executed
d th
e s-
The Nonlethal Gas Issue veloped adequate defenses and were using in order to stop bloodshed an
chemical ammunitions of their own. From criminate slaughter of civilians. Why, in
n
nd
i
i
hi
h A
mer
ca
a
c
n w
'then on gas shells belonged in the standard any of the operations
EXTENSION OF REMARKS V arsenal. This should have ended the props- U.N. forces will be engaged, should fatalities
fi
ht
d? I
b
id
g
-
n
e avo
e
OF ganda excitement, but opposition to gas war- be inflicted which can
fare continued unabated and gradually grew Ing guerrillas American forces often will be
HUN. CRAIG HOSMER stronger. meeting enemy soldiers who are opposed to
OF CALIFORNIA Granted that there is a different psycho- communism, who are fundamentally friendly
logical reaction to gas than to lead and steel, to the democratic cause, and whose death
IN THE HOUSE OF REPI S is not at all in our interest. On the con-
Wednesday, May 5,1965 justified criticism fied because humane grou chemical ands mul was un- trayy, our tactical and political interests
objectives lowed the attainment of military tary objec ectives would be served best if those potentially
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the fol- by inflicting only a quarter of the fatalities friendly soldiers were captured and con-
lowing essay, which makes a lot of sense, that were caused by high explosive shells. verted.
is found in the American Security Coun- Granted also that the effects of gas on human As a general principle, if a military ob-
Cil's Washington report for May 3, and skins, respiratory organs and mucous mem- jective can be attained through the employ-
was authored by Dr. Stefan Possony of branes often lingered and that some indirect ment of weapons that inflict a minimum
the Hoover Institution on War, Revolu- effects (for example on kidneys) could last rather than a maximum number of fatalities,
for decades, it was nevertheless true that it would be the preferred moral and humane
tion, and Peace: most gas casualties recovered completely, course of action to fight with the more
THE HUMANIZATION OF WAR that gas crippled only small numbers (mostly benign arms. The employment of non-
(By Stefan Possony) in the form of blindness), and that shrapnel lethal weapons would be particularly wise
The utilization in the Vietnamese war of was an immeasurably more deadly killer than if such a choice would yield desirable politi-
nonlethal gases may turd out to be a sig- gas. The fact is that the lethality of the cal byproducts.
niflcant milestone in the' history of armed gas shell was far less than that of the high The attitude of self-styled pacifists and
ritualistic critics of gas warfare is logically
conflict, According to Washington, nonlethal explosive shell. The foremost utility of gas, and mindefensible and can be ex-
gases were made available by the united therefore, was not that it inflicted casualties morally a only by the example of Pavlov's dog
States to Vietnam and were used by Viet- but that it reduced the opponent's tactical plained y y namese troops u n a decision by the Viet- flexibility and mobility and that it affected who reacts to the sound of a bell by salivat-
namese con mand Secretary Rusk stated the morale and psychology of hostile troops. ing regardless of whether food is offered or
that the nonlethal gas employed belongs to To give one concrete example of survival: not. The so-called humanitarians are react-
the class of tear gases. less authoritative Adolf Hitler was heavily gassed by the end ing to the word "gas" but not to the reality
Washington sources stated that the gas of World War I. To the disadvantage, of all which is symbolized by this abstraction.
O sin nonlethal on the rounds that
causes attacks of nausea and diarrhea last- other survivors of that conflict he was Opposing gas g
lug a few hours. This gas supposedly can promptly cured and left the hospital to start any gas is objectionable is like opposing
be bought on the open market and is nor- a political career. For another 27 years, Hit- a protective serum that produces temporary
mally employed for riot control. ler was able to operate at a high level of ef- discomfort on the grounds that it is a killing
Whatever the nature of the gas itself, it fectiveness; he died by suicide, not as a re- poison.
seems doubtful, under the circumstances, sult of poison gas. In the present concrete case, the United
that company-grade commanders were au- The eagerness with which, after World States has no particular reason to assume
thorized to order the use-of gas of any kind War I, Britain and France signed the Geneva that the North Vietnamese population is
,as they would order rifle or machinegun Convention outlawing gas warfare was due supporting the Communist regime enthusi-
fire, to the backfire of their own propaganda. If astically. The Vietcong, undoubtedly, in-
It seems, rather, that we should congratu- humanitarianism really had been used as a clude well-indoctrinated and disciplined
late President Johnson and Secretary Mc- standard of judgment, high explosive weap- Communists but it is unlikely that most
Namara on a decision which, in one way ons should have been outlawed instead of Vietcong soldiers are lastingly hostile; quite
or the other, they must have made deliber- chemical munitions. The United States, in- a few of them probably are serving against
ately and which, potentially, could be one cidentally, did not become a signatory to the their will. Under the circumstances, while
of the most humanitarian decisions of all Geneva Convention; nor did the U.S.S.R. we must make every effort to prevent the
times. I hope that they will have the cour- Whether or not it would have been ad- enemy from hurting our ally or prolonging
age of their own convictions and will not give vantageous during World War II, for one or the conflict, we have no interest whatever in
in to the anti-American and antigas propa- the other side, to resort to gas warfare re- killing North Vietnamese soldiers or civil-
ganda barrage. mains an open question. The military knew fans. Our present interest is to break up
Thus far, American leaders have handled all about the poor lethality of the weapon the Vietcong, to deprive them of their re-
the propaganda attack by declaring that the' on the battlefield. Since there were ade- sources,-to lessen their will to fight, to halt
gas would continue to be used whenever re- quate defenses at least against gases affect- the flow of their supplies, and to stop the
quired, namely in riotlilce circumstances. ing the lungs and eyes, none of the high guerrilla offensive.
Yet, it would be jar better if the United commands thought it worthwhile to press The employment of nonlethal gases imposes
States were to decide to employ nonlethal the point. Toward the end of the war, the upon us the duty to devote sophisticated at-
gas systematically and on a large scale as one Germans invented the so-called nerve gases tention to the psychological aspects of our
of our primary means of bringing the Viet- which are believed to be far more deadly strategy. The unfortunate fact is that, as so
namese war to aclose. than earlier types; but by then they had no often before, we have once again demonstrat-
What is the background for opposition to suitable means of delivery and the allies ed that our technological capabilities exceed
chemical weapons'.+ possessed more than adequate means of re- our psychological talents. Did we again fol-
In-1815, the Germans who were unable to taliation. Thus, there was no obvious over- low our routine of forgetting about propa-
break the British and French lines by the riding advantage to gas warfare in the Eu- ganda? Or did we entrust the planning and
traditional means of artillery, infantry, and ropean theater. execution of psychological operations to un-
cavalry, resorted to gas attacks. The them- By contrast, if chemical weapons had been qualified -personnel? Or did the advice of
teal weapon came as a Complete surprise to used in the Pacific against Japanese held is- qualified personnel go unheeded? On the
the Allies. Actually, the initial effectiveness lands---which had to be seized through am- basis of considerable personal experience, I
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ay 5, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD A VPENDIX
can assure our defense officials that psycho-
logical operations can be. highly cost effective
by themselves and are well suited to enhance
the cost effectiveness of all hardware weapons.
Instead of being apologetic about our use
of temporary incapacitators, the United
States should adopt the policy of employing
nonlethal weapons of all kinds whenever this
is militarily opportune. We must insure that
this American policy will be understood by
our enemies. The time has come when the
United States should take long delayed ini-
tiatives to enlarge our capability of waging
war with a whole spectrum of nonlethal
weapons. Washington should commit itself
to develop modern technology for the in-
creasing humanization of armed conflict and
for. the downward escalation of violence.
Let those who oppose nonlethal weapons
state unequivocally that they prefer to kill
people instead of keeping them alive. And
let the United States make the case for non-
lethal warfare honestly, clearly, and openly
before the entire world. We could hardly
have it better case.
"Jibaro" With a Fresh Approach
EXTENSION OF..REMARKS
A21S5
days of a new President are highly signs l_ become ,the keystone of l'oLANCo's policy as
cant. During this brief period, the Chief Resident Commissioner and perhaps the most
Executive supposedly proposes his prograxtx, crucial aspect of United States-Puerto Rican
learns who his friends and enemies in Con- relations for the next decade. "
gress are, and stamps his personality on his As a practical matter, when he completes
administration forevermore. his trip to California and Washington States
The first 100 days of a freshmen Membgr later this summer he will have traveled some-
of the House of Representatives are unlikely 8,000 miles on behalf of a,mission of awe-
to be as earthshaking. Chances are they pass some difficulty. From a political point of
quickly in a confusion of endless marble halt- view, the "mission" is no less,than establish-
ways, instructions from party chiefs and ing for Puerto Rico an importance in "domes-
wrong telephone numbers before the Men}- tic" U.S. affairs equal to its well-known role
ber sinks into legislative limbo as the lowe$t in "foreign policy." Logic insists the two are
ranking member on a committee he didn't inseparable. But logic has never been a.die-
want anyway. tator In Washington,
Such was not the fate of a self-styles POLANCO's burden was thrust upon him by
jibaro from Puerto Rico, however. Whe;ti the kind of ironic situation only Puerto Rico
SANTAGO PoLANco-ABaEu's first 100 days seems able to produce. Basking for nearly
ended on April 14, Puerto Rico's new Resi- a decade in the warmth of mainland public
dent Commissioner was acting more like a relations too successful in chanting the
President than a junior lawmaker. Already, "miracle" of Commonwealth progress, "boot-
the impeccably dressed man with the fir4l strappery," and showcase" imagery, Puerto
handshake and the warm smile of the prat- Rico committed the most unpardonable sin
ticed politician has been adding new dimen;- in Washington politics. It became a bore.
sions to an .office which has languished in The biggest bore of all was Its preoccupa-
the shadows for 20 years. tion with "status." The infinite legalisms,
Close friends_corlfide the 44-year-old at- the "culture" and "identity" debates cause
torney was less than overjoyed when the the mind to boggle and the eye to go glassy.
Popular Democratic Party, reportedly actin As one member of the House Interior and
at, the, urging of dofia Inks, de Mufioz Merin, Insular Affairs Committee once put it:
Aped POLANCO to succeed retiring Resident "You're eating regularly, aren't you? So
Commissioner Dr. Antonio Fern's-Isern_
earnea the powerful post of Commonwealth a.+vw LLIUU eac-
HON. MORRIS K. UDALL House speaker foligwing the death of Er- ing regularly is only one facet of the Puerto
nesto Ramos Antonini, Former Gov, Lui Rican condition. But first a common ground
of A1uz6NA - - - s for discussion must be found. Puerto
IN THE Hob-SE OFR EPRhSENTATIVE9S . Meral Marfn's decision to step aside left Ricans are so far ahead of Americanos in
several inviting vacuums of power in both their thinking on socioeconomic problems of
Wednesday, May 5, 1965 party and government. POLANCO, a trusted status, they don't even inhabit the same
troubleshooter for Munoz in the Dominican planet.
Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, one of the crisis of 1963, was also identified with the It is this search for a common denominator
brightest, most hopeful and Sparkling rising young expansionist wing of the Pop- that has led POLANCO to transform the office
personalities in the freshman, corps of ular Democratic Party. In short, Puerto of Resident Commissioner into what is a
the 89th Congress is our colleague, Rico was a warm and friendly place. Wash- center for a communication program. A
SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU, the new Resi- ington was cold and remote, and the com,
plexities of the Federal establishment a lit- part a the effort showed recently in a re pre-
dent Commissioner of Puerto Rico. In press conferences with newsmen
the brief span of the first 100 days of the ifeyourpay him $30,000 11 a year. senting jibaro even offered g various regional papers. They were
were
new Congress, the gentleman from The very things, however, that made life State by Stafe statistics on the jobs
Puerto Rico [Mr, POLANCO-ABREU] has in Puero Rico so Inviting were today becom- various a by d U.S. Puerto t this is only in
made the acquaintane.e of Most of his in g o r markets. But this is only a a part
g important determinants in shaping Po- of f the the effort.
fellow Members, and I. can say that lie LANCO's position. As POLANCO himself oncei
has impressed Us with his vigor and abil- observed to a newsman, the job of a non- Far more important is s office desire
honest
sty. Although he is young in age, he has voting Resident Commissioner, powerless as' broker f for or all himself and hi on Puerto
already achieved the wisdom and ability it seems, is anything the incumbent wantsRinestions. This s. political persuasions hin l d rust-
Rican question has ntoemainla d
of a statesman, and I predict that there to make it. Under Munoz' highly centralized Ing himself
are administration the scope was severely lim- his maiden statement into mainland
great things in store for our col- ited. Munoz was his own Governor, Am- House, In his maiden tatemene to the
league, whom we have come we know as bassador, Resident Commissioner, and pollt- education bill, which came during debate on
the
"CHAGU>,N ." ical plumber rolled into one. With the de- would out POLANCO
on national made clear "i
When I was in Puerto Rico recently, centralization of power which Mufioz him- Wlspeak out on nat que questions. "I
there appeared in the April 18 issue of self ordered, the Resident Commissioner's am not," hk later ado not `simply going to
the San Juan Star-the only English- job has assumed a new place in the politf`cal talk and tw every They do nwant to hear the
firmament. While POLANCO would be the same fellow eday.
language newspaper in the island-a
Sunday feature reviewing our colleague's last to admit it, he is building the office into "My basic aim is to interest Members of
a steppingstone to the Governorship. This Congress in Puerto Rico; to create a climate
first 100 days in Congress. It was en- would be true whether he liked the idea or in which they will have confidence in my
titled "A `Jibaro' With a Fresh Ap- not. The Popular Democratic Party today opinion about Puerto Rico; to let them know
proach." I learned, that a "jibaro" in lacks the manpower in its younger echelons the importance of the special political rela-
Puerto Rico is a person from the rural who combine the insight into Federal and tions between Puerto Rico and the United
countryside. The article is, I think, a fine Commonwealth affairs of a Munoz. In 4 or States in relation to the entire hemisphere.
league, and I am sure that our fellow
Members will be interested in reading it.
Mr. Speaker, without objection, the
article follows:
Few of these hindsight observations were
running through the minds of newsmen
POLANCO'S FIRST 100 DAYS-A JIBAROWITH A
FRESH APPROACH
(By Walter S. Priest)
("As POLANCO himself once observed to
a newsman, the job of nonvoting Resident
Commissioner, powerless as it seems, is any-
thing the incumbent wants to make it. With
the decentralization of power which Mufioz
himself ordered, the Resident Commis-
sioner's job has assumed a new place in the
political firmament.")
WASRINCTON.-For reasons long lost to
American political mythology, the first 100
the Status Study Commission makes its
report."
To the effort he calls openin
th
do
g
e
or
chat over cocktails at Washington's Madison ' psychologicallyPoLsrco applies his talents
Hotel early last January. For both sides it as a listener and politician's intuitive grasp
was' a chance to measure One another's char- of the possible. Like himself, he finds, the
acter. As the evening wore on, it became average Congressman must concentrate on
plain POLANCO was interviewing the news- his district almost to the exclusion of every
men. It was equally clear to them that here thing else.
was a Resident Commissioner who enjoyed If this tends to insulate the average law-
the undefinable essence of politics whether maker's mind, the alternative is even more
practiced in Washington or San Juan, a man unprofitable. Defeat at the polls. There-
who enjoyed debate, new concepts and ap- fore PoLANCO takes Puerto Rico's case to the
proaches. If during the discussion veterans lawmaker, scheduling at least 5 meetings
of the Puerto Rican beat were prone to smile a week with various Members, 200 during
a bit at his insistence he would stump the the session, and traveling with them if they
country to acquaint Americanos with Puerto invite him to their districts.
Rico, they erred badly. They were hearing Although he has some personal doubt the
the first tentative expressions of what has Resident Commissioner should sit automat-
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A2186 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---APPENDIX
ically on the' House Interior, Agriculture, radical departure from his predecessor. But
and Armed Services Committees to the ex- it must have caught on. For the fir t time
elusion of others,' he attends meetings regu- in anyone's memory Luis Mufioz- larly. The fact they may have no legislation staying in the Resident Commissioner's quar-
involving Puerto Rico does not' matter. He ters and apparently enjoying it despite the
gOes, flying plaster. To POLANCO's delight he can
"If you're Interested in my problems, I'll now talk politics on into the night with a
be interested in your?," POLANCO observes. man he greatly admires.
PoLANCO'sability to mix With the Wash- POLANCO frankly confesses the intense so-
ingtonwhirl c tf:7c? obscures the deeply intro- cial life of official Washington "is just too
spective side of his nature. 'In any moment much for me." Work days, which include
his face can change from that of the con-- Saturdays, find him up at 7:15 a.m., reading
vivial politician to a man tortured by self- the Washington Post and New York Times.
doubt. The frown that follows connotes After a quick breakfast he descends to his
great spiritual struggles in progress in this first-floor office and works until 9 a.m., when
lawyer's neatly compartmented mind. His he leaves for his cramped congressional quar-
tendency is to worry a 'problem into sub- ters in the Old House Office Building. If
mission; if one approach seems wrong, try meetings of his committees are scheduled
another. for the morning he usually attends and then
Although he spans two generations in walks over to the House chamber to hear
Commonwealth politics, POLANCO hates to the debates. Afternoons, starting at 3 p.m.,
However he does are devoted to callers and conferences. At
ll
y.
be classified ideologica
subscribe to the "dynamic" concept of Coln- around 6 p.m., when most offices close, he
monwealth. "You have to consider the his- starts dictating letters and reading up on
-torical moment of 1940 and 24 years later. the next day's work until around 7 p.m.
Puerto Rico is different because, after all, Chances are the unavoidable social entan-
the world is different too." glement presents itself about that time and
"This special relationship, it should have that means home for dinner again around
a dynamic of its own. The best Way to clas- 8.30 p.m. About Washington social life, Mrs.
sify me is that I want a more perfect co-- polanco has little to say except that it's part
pact to insure a more perfect union with the of the business.
United States." Shortly after his arrival, POLANCO boldly
Once a Stacom report is in, he thinks announced plans for redecorating his quar-
Puerto Ricans will go to a plebiscite but ters included hanging a genuine Puerto
doubts Congress would bind itself in ad- Rican hammock in a shaded nook.
vance to any particular commission finding. "it will look like I'm sleeping but I'll really
What would be valuable, he believes, is for be thinking," he quipped. He could have
the commission to issue "a profound intel- saved the defensive distinctions and even
lectual statement that relations are legiti- the trouble of hanging his hammock. By
mate from the constitutional point of view. the look of his appointment book he won't
That would be a good step now." use it until next year anyway. Such is life
'Eris introspective side has led him into ex- for a man with a "mission."
tensive private research on the history of
political institutions, including Con-
gress, which he now admits he understands
better than he did as Commonwealth house Calls for an End of U.S. Policy
speaker, The results show in the speeches Sweeney
rattling out of his office since early Febru- of Appeasing Nasser
He possesses the talent of targeting his
,audiences to perfection. For the highbrow
staff of the Brookings Institution or Insti-
tute of Puerto Rico in New York, which
voted him its citizen-of-the-Year Award, he
talks about "cultural pluralism. " For the
.Society for International Development (SID)
,or the Pan American Liaison Committee of
Women's Organizations, he stresses economic
issues,
Be has lectured New York's Puerto Ricans
over the radio on the administration's civil
rights bill and encouraged a group of 150
Puerto Rico-bound youths in Wooster, Ohio,
to unbridle their imaginations and "see for
themselves."
In every case listeners are led to break
new intellectual ground without casting
completely loose from their familiar thought
patterns or encountering confusing or radi-
cal ideas. _ The adroit interweaving of fact
and concept has already won editorial praise
in several areas and in Congress.
At the same time, POLANCO will not duck
a fight for diiplomacy's sake. When' Colum-
nist Marguerite Biggins penned a series of
acid columns on "communism" in Puerto
Rico, POLANCO fired back promptly. Editors
of nearly every paper publishing the articles
yeceived a polite but firm letter setting the
- record straight.
Transformation in the Resident Commis-
eioner',applicies is reflected in the trappings
of office as ; well. Last week, painters and
saricierg di ect?d_by POLANCO's charming wife,
i4la pnini, were stripping the gloomy mag-
_nificence from his quarters above the office
Of l iierto Rico at 2210 R Street. Pearl white
waifs and varnished natural wood floors now
sparkle in the living room. POLANCO'S inten-
tion is to turn his home into a center for
Puerto Rican Iife , in Washingtf n, a truly
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT E. SWEENEY
or OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 5, 1965
May 5, 1965
time for the U.S. Department of State to
engage in a pact with Israel to conclude
a mutual security pact declaring Israel as
our sole, true friend and responsible and
reliable ally in the Middle East. We
should supply Israel with defense weap-
ons she needs to meet the aggression of
Saudi Arabia and Nasser's anti-Israel
allies.
Successful Economic Policy:
Way Partnership Between
Labor, and Government
A Three-
Business,
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. W. PAT' JENNINGS
OF VIRGINIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 5, 1965
Mr. JENNINGS. Mr. Speaker, Secre-
tary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler, in
his first major speech as Secretary, re-
cently addressed the annual convention
of the American Society of Newspaper
Editors. Secretary Fowler cited the un-
paralleled economic growth and pros-
perity experienced by this country dur-
ing the past 4 years. He points out
realistic fiscal policies. And he cites the
spirit of cooperation between business, la-
bor, and Government, which has pre-
vailed during the Kennedy administra-
tion and the administration of President
Johnson as being responsible for our
success.
I deem the remarks of Secretary
Fowler, a native Virginian and a highly
experienced Government administrator,
to be of great importance to all Ameri-
cans and of special interest to the Con-
gress. I, therefore, include the full text
of Secretary Fowler's speech:
REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY H. FOW-
LER, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, BEFORE
THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
I am particularly happy to make this, my
first fullfledged speech as Secretary of the
Treasury before a group that plays so vital
a role in informing the American public
about the complex and critical issues that
confront our Nation.
As I do so I am conscious that I observe a
precedent set 4 years ago when any distin-
guished predecessor and good friend, Douglas
Dillon, made his maiden economic address
Mr.'SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, as Con-
gressman at Large from the State of
Ohio, I today call upon the U.S. Depart-
ment of State to end a policy of appeas-
ing Nasser and the Arab States in their
continuing efforts to rob the Republic of
Israel by diverting the headwaters of the
Jordan River.
The world has stood in admiration of
achievements since her conception. Cen- In that address, he set forth a twofold pro-
turies of neglect and waste resulted in the gram to bring us closer to our economic
vast creation of desert lands; and, when goals: First, a complete overhaul of our tax
Israel came into being, she made these system to augment incentives, initiative, and
effort in the private sector of our economy,
lands begin t bloom again by the wise and second, an overall monetary approach to
use of her water resources. assure the ample availability of long-term
The Arabs, now, are attempting to dry credit; so essential to domestic growth while
out Israel and turn the land back to maintaining short-term rates at levels high
desert. No American foreign policy ex- enough to prevent any excessive outflow of
pert should support this Nasser-con- dollars abroad. These policies, he declared,
ceived plot to destroy this thriving would lead us--and ii quote, "to a period of
civilization, from which humanity de- growth and prosperity during the sixties'
rives so much benefit. such as this Nation has never known."
I predict violence will flair up at any Next month, the economic expansion that
time concerning the Nasser move to de- began in February of 1961 will become the
longest in the entire history of our Nation-
prive Israel of water. except for the expansion that included World
As an American legislator, I cannot War II. There could be no better testimony
remain silent in the face of Arab prov- to the success of our economic policies over
ocation endangering peace. Now is the the past 4 years.
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May 5, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.-.SENATE
subject matter. If the conciliation group the problem which confronts us as we
cannot reach agreement at the same session see the United Nations failing to measure
of the Conference or Board, it reports to the up the hopes which we all had for it
whichever covssionmees s the first. Conference or Board back in 1945. This contribution is pal;-
w
If the conciliation group has reached ticularly pertinent in view of the pubic
agreement, the agreed resolution can be hearings which will. shortly be held o$i
voted. If it has not, a decision can be taken, Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, co-
continuing conciliation for a further period, sponsored by 26 Senators. The hearings
or the original proposal, or some variant will begin on May 11 before the, mmit-
thereof, can be voted in the normal way. tee on Foreign Relations. ~
In the event that a vote is taken after un- . ,
successful conciliation, the resolution will
cite the report of the conciliation group
(which may contain minority as well as
majority views), and the records of the
United Nations will show how the members
voted on the resolution. ,
These procedures offer important benefits
to all U.N. members:
For the minority of developed countries,
they provide some safeguard against the vot-
ing of unacceptable resolutions by automatic
majorities, and a "cooling off" period of 6
months or more during which efforts at com-
promise can be sought through quiet
diplomacy.
For the majority of less-developed coun-
tries, they afford a means of engaging the
developed countries in a sustained debate
during which the developed countries ex-
plain the reasons for their opposition to
proposals of the majority.
It is too early to see just how the con-
ciliation procedure will work in practice,
but we may hazard one prediction: The
main yalue of the new procedures may be
less in their actual use than in the subtle
way in which their mere existence influences
member governments in the direction of
compromise rather than voting on disagreed
proposals.
This catalog of procedures for coping with
the "international apportionment problem"
should serve to indicate four things:
First, that the United States and other
countries are very much aware of the need
to adapt U.N. procedures to take account of
power realities.
Second, that a wide variety of alternative
procedures can be developed to come to grips
with the problem.
Third, that the most practical of these
procedures can be put into effect without
amendment of the U.N. Charter or of the
constitutions of other U.N. agencies.
Fourth, that a great process of procedural
adaptation and innovation is already under-
way throughout the U.N. system.
of course, procedures in and of themselves
are only part of the problem. What is really
required is widespread recognition of the
common interest in, basing U.N. decisions on
an, adequate consensus-a consensus which
includes the support of most of the countries
bearing the principal responsibilities for
action.
Will such a recognition be forthcoming?
The cynic may ask why the majority of small
countries should accept any restraint on the
use of their voting power. The answer is
clear enough.
If United Nations procedures : cannot be
adapted to take account of power realities,
the large and middle powers will increas-
ingly pursue their national interests outside
the U.N. system.
If, on the other hand, the necessary proce.
dural adjustments can be carried out, the
United Nations and its agencies will be able
to assume increasing responsibilities for ac-
tion in both peacekeeping and development.
This is the fundamental reason why the
important procedural adjustments now un-
derway in the United Nations serve the en-
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there may be
printed in the RECORD at this point a
column entitled "The Hidden Issue" writ-
ten by Walter Lippmann and published
recently in the Washington Post.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE HIDDEN IssuE
(By Walter Lippmann)
In his press conference on Tuesday, thg
President said that "as long as aggression
continues, and as long as they bomb in Soutll
Vietnam, and as long as they bomb our
sports arenas, and our theaters, and our em-
bassies, and kill our women and children, and
the Vietnamese soldiers * * * we think that
we are justified in trying to slow down that
operation and make them realize that it is
very costly, and that their aggression should
cease. * * * The moment that this aggress
sion ceases, the destruction of their bridges
and their radar stations and the ammuni-
tion that .they use on our bodies will cease.','
If this were a full definition of our policy,
the obvious proposal to make would be an
unconditional cease-fire. Under a cease-fire,
all the fighting would stop, including the
bombing in the south and in the north, and
could be resumed only if the other side vio-,
lated the truce.
There must then be a compelling reason
why the President has not proposed a cease-
fire, even though it fits exactly the purpose
he declared at the press conference on Tues-
day. There is a compelling reason why the
administration has rejected the proposal of
a cease-fire and has substituted for it a pro-
posal for "unconditional discussions." The
compelling reason is that a cease-fire today
would leave the Vietcong with the upper
hand in the eventual negotiations with Sai-
gon and Washington. It might even precip-
itate a deal in South Vietnam between the.
Vietcong and the peace party.
The truth is that the President's advisers.
have a bigger purpose than the one defined.
in his press conference. Their aim is to re-
verse the existing balance of power in South'
Vietnam before the negotiations for the',
eventual settlement begin.
This is the crux of the situation today,
and it has to be understood in order to.
understand why there is no present prospect
of bringing the war to an end or even of,
preventing It from becoming a wider war.!
The Vietcong and Hanoi, who have the;
upper hand in South Vietnam, will not nego
9133
whole controversy at home and abroad about
stopping or interrupting unilaterally the
American bombing raids.
Before we make up our minds about pro-
posing a cease-fire now, we have to weigh
the consequences. The fundamental choice
is whether or not we must and can redress
the balance of power in South Vietnam be-
fore we cease fighting. If we do not re-
dress the balance of power in South Vietnam,
the Hanoi government is likely to have a
dominant influence on the settlement.
The division of responsible opinion in this
country today is between those, on the one
hand, who think that with more bombing
and with more American troops the pre-
dominance of the Vietcong and of Hanoi can
be overturned-and those, on the other hand,
who think that if this can be done at all,
it can be done only at a price which, meas-
ured by the American interests at stake, is
exorbitant.
There are those who resent, almost apoplec-
tically, the idea that we are not omnipotent
everywhere on the globe. But the sober ma-
jority of our people, the President first among
them, have no appetite for unending and
unlimited war in the pursuit of the mirage
of victory. They want a decent and honor-
able end to the war, decent in that the kill-
ing and burning stop, honorable in that we
do not abandon our clients and friends to
the vengeance of their enemies.
Since we cannot win the war and keep it
won, there are, I believe, two great forces
which we must and can rely on when even-
tually we bargain out the terms of our leav-
ing Saigon. They will help us preserve the
independence of Vietnam against Chinese
conquest. One of these forces is our own
unchallenged supremacy at sea and in the
air in the Pacific and in the Indian Oceans.
The other force is Vietnamese nationalism
which, whether Communist or not, is deeply,
and it would appear permanently, resistant
to Chinese imperialism.
Mr. Lippmann points out:
But the sober majority of our people, the
President first among them, have no appetite
for unending and unlimited war in the pur-
suit of the mirage of victory. They want a
decent and honorable end to the war, decent
in that the killing and burning stop, honor-
able in that we do not abandon our clients
and friends to the vengeance of our enemies.
These comments of Mr. Lippmann
quite accurately state my own views in
this regard.
A DECENT HOME FOR EVERY
AMERICAN
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, on April
9, 1965, the Senator from New York [Mr.
KENNEDY], and I testified on the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965 be-
fore the Housing Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency on behalf of Senators BAYH, HART,
KENNEDY of Massachusetts, MCNAMARA,
MORSE, PELL, and TYDINGS, as well as our-
selves.
edged-perhaps by a willingness on our part States represented by these nine Sena-
to deal with the National Liberation Front, tors total nearly one-fifth of the Ameri-
which is the political arm of the Vietcong. can people. In our statement we en-
And our real aim is to fight on until our mili dorsed the recommendations of the
tary position, is as good or a little better than Johnson administration and carried
that of our adversaries. . them still further in proposals of our own.
So we must ask ourselves this question: I ask unanimous consent that there be
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