LET US STAND IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 23, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

1965
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD APPENDIX
So long as the United States has vital in.
terests in.4.rsb lands and the United Arab
Republio has a role of influence and leader-
ship, the two countries cannot escape doing
business with each other. The question is
whether they can be sufficiently mature,
clear sighted and patient to work out g*ad
Us Stand in Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
OF WISCONSIN
Recent evens is Vietnam indicate that
"the war that is not a war" has reached a
crossroads. Washington's policy of the past
4 years, based on the polite fiction that we
were not fighting a war but merely helping
the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong insur-
gents within their own territory, has reached
a point of no return.
Compromise and consensus-perhaps ap-
plicable to some of the Nation's great domes-
tic problems-cannot be guideposts to for-
eign policy. There must be a clear-cut and
courageous decision. And though in Viet-
nam we face the hard problem of risking
much to gain little, the risk must be taken;
we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable
defeat. We must use what it takes to win.
Our policy should not be "unconditional
surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal of
victory should be the defeat of Communist
attempts to conquer South Vietnam and ex-
tend their control deep into southeast Asia.
The reasons we must fight for Vietnam
have little to do with making Saigon safe
for democracy or freedom. There has been
far too much cant on this point, far too much
effort devoted to trying to establish a polit-
ically legitimate South Vietnamese Govern-
ment after our own image. Nor does it do
much good to argue the past, debating
whether or not we should have become in-
volved in Vietnam in the first place. The
facts are that Communist expansionism in
Asia has been consistent, related and pro-
gressive, that the end of the Korean war,
without a simultaneous settlement in Viet-
nam, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho
Chi Minh the opportunity in southeast Asia
they have so well exploited.
Belatedly, but nevertheless clearly, the
United States became aware of the threat.
Our commitments to Saigon began in the
Eisenhower administration and were enor-
mously amplified after the Kennedy admin-
istration took power 4 years ago. Today, we
are committed-fully committed-by the
words of Presidents and Cabinet members,
by the actions of the Government, by the
deep involvement of U.S. military forces.
U.S. global prestige and power is intimate-
ly bound up with the outcome of the Viet-
namese struggle. In Vietnam, we are at-
tempting to formulate an answer to the Com-
munist strategy of creeping aggression, of
subversion and insurgency, of what Khrush-
chev called "wars of national liberation."
If the might and will of the United States
cannot evolve a victorious answer to such
tactics, we are undone; the map of the world
will gradually become red. And if we will
not fight in Vietnam, where-after the series
of Communist conquests in the past 20 years
-will we fight? Where will we draw the line?
The psychological and political conse-
N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, as I
indicated in earlier remarks on the floor
of the House, I am inserting in the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD an article by Mr. Han-
son W. Baldwin,. respected military com-
mentator, which appeared in the Sunday
New York Times Magazine for February
21, 1965.
In the article, entitled "We Must
Choose-(1) 'Bug Out,' (2) Negotiate,
(3) Fight," Mr. Baldwin argues for a
greater use of American military power
in Vietnam. He believes we must fight a
war to prevent an irreparable defeat.
While I do not agree with Mr. Bald-
win's observations and. recommendations
in every instance, it is my belief that he
has made a distinct contribution to the
dialog on this issue.
Among his suggestions which I .believe
should be implemented are these,
First, the United States itself must pro-
vide maximum possible security for our
installations in South Vietnam. Rather
than rely on the South Vietnamese as we
have in the past, we should use U.S.
armed guards to defend against Vietcong
attacks on our airplanes, helicopters,
barracks, and other facilities.
Second, Mr. Baldwin points out that
coordination between the various U.S.
agencies working in Vietnam could be
further improved. This problem was evi-
dent to me during my visits to Vietnam,
the last in October 1963. Apparently
there has been some improvement, but
more could be done to streamline our op-
erations,
Further, he suggests that military
troops in Vietnam be made responsible
for holding the areas cleared of Vietcong
guerrillas, a task at present being done
by internal security forces. This recom-
mendation.deserves careful attention.
I do not agree, however, with Mr. Bald-
win's belief that a commitment of U.S.
combat troops under United States-
South Vietnamese joint command is nec-
essary at this time.
Rather, I would hope to see greater
efforts being made to convince our allies
in Southeast Asia-especially the South
Koreans, Nationalist Chinese and the
Filipinos-to send forces into South
Vietnam to assist in defeating Com-
munist aggression there.
WE MUST CHOOPV; (1) "BUG OUT,,, (2)
NEGOTIAy'E, (3) P IGHT
(By Hanson W. Baldwin)
What should we, do-"bug out" or fight?
Should we be hawkp or doves? Or is there a
third choice-negotiations now?
.quences of a U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a U.S.
withdrawal, or a negotiated peace likely to
lead to a Communist takeover, would be
disastrous in much of Asia. It would under-
mine Thailand (already openly threatened by
Peiping), Laos (even now half conquered by
communism), Malaya, the Philippines
(with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma,
India, Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa,
and Australia.
For a long time after the politically stale-
mated end of the Korean war, Peiping was
successfully depicting the United States to
the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The
defeat of the French-backed heavily by
American aid-in Indochina enhanced this
image of a windy, weak-willed, feeble Uncle
Sam. That image has since been dispelled
by V.S. actions in and around the Taiwan
Straits, during the Cuban missile crisis and,
recently, by President Johnson's retaliatory
air attacks upon North Vietnamese objectives.
,But the portrait of flabby indecision could
be easily revived if the United States loses in
Strategically, South Vietnam is too im-
portant to be allowed to go by default.
North Vietnam badly needs the rice of the
A783
South. More imporant, the area is the tra-
ditional rice bowl of the continent. Geo-
graphically, Vietnam is a long appendix
pointing toward the rich archipelago of In-
donesia and abutting strategic sea passages.
Whoever dominates it will eventually control
most of the Indonesian archipelago.
The strategic importance of the area is
similar to the so-called "rimlands," or mari-
time nations, of Western Europe which repre-
sent a powerful bastion against the "heart-
land" of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the non-
Communist strategic position vis-a-vis Red
China is based upon mainland positions-
Pakistan, India, southeast Asia, and the is-
land bastions of the Philippines, Taiwan,
Okinawa and Japan. If the "rimlands" of
Asia fall to communism, the island positions
will be doomed sooner or later. Ultimately
the Communists will challenge us upon what
is now our unchallenged domain-the oceans.
In a word, we must remain in southeast
Asia for our own security needs. South Viet-
nam is in itself not "vital" in the sense that
the United States cannot live without it.
But if lost we would be forced to commence
the next chapter of the world conflict in re-
treat, and at a disadvantage.
Despite the admitted importance of South
Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the cur-
rent breed of neoisolationists and the
"doves" who believe we must cut our losses
and get out advance many arguments against
deeper involvement and in favor of with-
drawal.
Most of the arguments represent the voices
of defeat and despair, caution and fear.
"Why not negotiate now?"
Any negotiations opened now would lead
from weakness, not strength. If we want to
negotiate-and not to surrender-we shall
have to raise our ante considerably. And
"meaningful" negotiations are "meaning-
ful" to the Communists only if they are
faced with superior power and a position of
strength.
We must "arm to parley." Personally, I
seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee
peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as
some quarters have suggested, by neutraliz-
ing the area politically and militarily; in
short, by eliminating the struggle for in-
fluence between Communists and non-Com-
munists. Nevertheless, we need not fear
negotiations if we speak from strength, by
really putting up a fight for Vietnam.
Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on
North Vietnam would serve notice on Hanoi,
Peiping, and Moscow that the United States
will no longer tolerate "sanctuary warfare."
They might-hopefully-force Hanoi to the
conference table. Indeed, such a policy
would appear to be the minimum necessary
to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even
such a program will not "win" the war, in
the South.
"If the French couldn't win, how can the
United States achieve victory?"
The implication of this argument is two-
fold: (1) we have donned the colonial mantle
of the French, and (2) our power is no
greater than that of Paris. Both suggestions
are absurd.
As some of our diplomats have found
to their discomfort, South Vietnam is dis-
tinctly an independent country-not, as in
France's day, part of a colonial empire. In
fact, the fear of Chinese Communist colonial-
ism is probably greater in all of Vietnam,
and in North Vietnam in particular, than
the fear of United States "imperialism." As
fol' a comparison between the political, eco-
nomic, and military power of the United
States and France, there is none. Particu-
larly in the air and at sea we can mobilize
power completely unavailable to France,
backed up by the ultimate force which
France did not possess-a nuclear arsenal.
"You can't win a war against guerrillas."
Not true. We have dressed up the fight-
ing in Vietnam with a fancy name-"coun-
terinsurgency," but some of its basic mill-
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 A784
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 23
tary elements resemble the kind of war
Americans have fought successfully many
times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and
behind the main fighting fronts during the
Korean war. Other anti-Communist guer-
rilla wars were won in Greece, the Philip-
pines, and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to
have done a pretty good job of stamping out
the rebellion in Angola. Guerrillas can be
defeated, but it takes careful organization,
special training, and security forces that
should be from 10 to 30 times larger than
the guerrillas. It takes infinite determina-
tion and patience.
"Continued fighting or expanded U.S. in-
volvement will mean higher U.B. casualties
and greater risks of broadening the war."
Of course. You cannot win a war without
spilling blodd. We must pay the price of
power. Risks are unavoidable in any for-
eign policy worthy of its name. The ques-
tion Is not whether there will be risks, but
the degree of risk. For against the perils
of action -must be weighed the perils of in-
action. Political and military history clearly
reveal that compromise, hesitancy or ap-
peasement merely lead to ultimate disaster.
In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater
the price we shall have to pay for even par-
tial victory (as we are now discovering), and
the more restricted our choice of options.
"We-have no moral right to be in Vietnam,
or to attack North Vietnam."
Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North
Vietnam have the right to support the civil
war in the South. Our involvement was a
response to Communist aggression. Since
the-beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied
and directed the Vietcong Insurgency. We
were Invited by the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment to come to Its aid. A high moral
purpose Is an essential element of our foreign
policy but we can be left with no purpose-
moral or otherwise-if we are conquered by
the doctrine that the ends justify the means.
If we are inhibited from action by Hamlet-
like Indecision over legalistic concepts of
International law, we shall lose the world.
"What's the use of further ;military in-
volvement,, when the political instability of
South Vietnam pulls the rug from under our
feet?"
Here is one of the more cogent objections
to greater involvement. But In the long
history of Vietnam there have always been
feudfng sects and factions. Moreover, the
French left behind them a people still un-
equipped for self-government., Yet some-
how or other the war has gone on, and some-
what better in some respects recently. Great-
er U.S. involvement-above all, a tangible
determination to. win-may well do more for
Safgon'a``political stability than any amount
of diplomatic pressures.
"Isn't the real danger that escalation might
involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't the
Chinese come in?"
"This is the $64 million question. It is
"quite clear that if the United States becomes
more involved we must be prepared for great-
er effort by the enemy. Escalation In some
form would be not only possible, but likely.
But we have advantages. We are fighting,
as we, did in Korea, on a, peninsula when.
our superior sea 'and air power can be most
effective. North Vietnam's few powerplants
and Industries are vulnerable to destruction.
The Gulf of Tonkin is easily blockaded. And
China itself, with an obsolete air force and
minimal naval power, could not defend itself
effectively against a determined air and sea
attack.
Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the
United States in Vietnam may well be an-
swered by an increased flow of supplies and
men from North Vietnam, perhaps by an all-
out attack by the North 'Vietnamese Army,
and perhaps ultimately by aid from China
into South Vietnam. Though the flow could
be hampered and reduced by air attacks it
could not be completely halted. It is quite
possible that the United States might be=
come involved in a new kind of Korean war.
But this would not be hopeless by any means.
In fact, some well-informed authorities be-
lieve the United States could win a Korean
type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against
the best that the Chinese Communists could
throw against us.
"What about the specter of nuclear weap-
ons? Wouldn't Russia join in, even if
China didn't have enough A-bombs to do us
any harm?"
There is no Certain answer to these ques-
tions, but a full scale nuclear war Is highly
unlikely. The United States has scared itself
to death by its own nuclear propaganda. The
fear of a nuclear exchange-never probable,
or even likely-has been the greatest single
restraint upon a positive and firm U.S. diplo-
macy since World War U.
Presidents and public alike have been in-
hibited by the nightmare of the mushroom
cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile
crisis should be remembered. Is it in any
way probable that the Kremlin would risk for
Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba?
Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would
Russia invite its own destruction as a nation
by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in
any cause except the defense of its own soil?
The questions answer themselves.
We must also remember the risks of delay.
If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation to-
day by Peiping, how much greater will it be
tomorrow when China will have accumulated
a stockpile of weapons? Time is restricting
our options.
Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are
large enough to warrant the risks of greater
U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise
our ante, the enemy will. The Communists
are implacably determined to triumph, and
the only factor that can prevent their vic-
tory is superior power in all its forms. More
of the same on our part will no longer serve
any purpose, save slow defeat. .
What should we do? First and foremost,
we must recognize as a Government and as
a people that we are fighting a war in Viet-
nam, not merely advising how to fight one.
Such a recognition would awaken a greater
sense of national and military determination,
inspire a Presidential and congressional
enunciation of purpose, and create a more
streamlined military operation in Vietnam.
Second, the United States itself must pro-
vide maximum possible security in Vietnam
to major U.S. Installations, such as airfields,
supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary
McNamara's statement that it was impossible
to guard against such attacks as those re-
cently made by the Vietcong against U.S.
airfields and barracks is no answer. Of
course, 100-percent security is impossible in
any war; defense against terrorism and sabo-
tage is especially difficult. But there is no
doubt whatsoever that we can provide better
security to key installations than the South
Vietnamese, who have been responsible for
the job in the past.
We need U.S. ground tactical units in
South Vietnam to defend our installations.
We need infantry battalions, military police
companies, Army Engineers, and Navy Sea-
bees to build aircraft revetments, dugouts,
and protected barracks. Yet all this is pure-
ly defensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties
but it will not win the war.
Another essential measure is simplifica-
tion and streamlining of both the high mili-
tary command and the "country team
units, composed of representatives from
various Government agencies, that support
our aid effort in Vietnam. We must get
more Americans and more Vietnamese out
of the bistros of Saigon and Into the bush.
The coordination between the military, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State De-
partment, the U.B. Information Agency and
the Agency for International Development
is far better than it once was. But it is still
far from perfect, in Saigon or in Washington.
The war has shown, for instance, that South
Vietnamese-United States teams have been
able in many instances to carry out the
military portion of the "clear and hold"
prescription for victory. But AID-not the
military-is responsible for police and in-
ternal security forces in Vietnam, and these
cadres rarely have been able to hold an area
once it has been cleared of the Vietcong.
Perhaps military troops should be charged
with the "hold," as well as the "clear," part
of the operations. Certainly internal polic-
ing needs a major overhaul.
A basic change in the prescription for vic-
tory demands a United States-South Viet-
namese unified command such as now exists
in South Korea.
Continuous and heavy air and sea at-
tacks against staging areas, supply routes,
training fields, camps and recuperation cen-
ters of the Vietcong in North and South
Vietnam and Laos will be necessary for any
appreciable diminution in the flow of men
and supplies to the Communists. The one-
shot retaliatory raids have only temporary
and minimum military importance; viewed
as political and psychological warnings, they
are likely to provoke the Vietcong and North
Vietnam to a redoubled war effort.
The history of airpower dictates the need
for unrelenting, massive attacks. Bombing
targets in North Vietnam probably would
have to be broadened to include power-
plants, bridges, industries, road junctions,
docks and oil storage facilities. A naval
blockade and naval gunfire may well supple-
ment the air bombardment. To carry out
effectively any such program as this, U.S. air
and naval forces in the Western Pacific
would require material strengthening.
Meanwhile, it would take years of effort in-
side South Vietnam itself to reduce the Viet-
cong to manageable proportions. Much
larger and better led, South Vietnamese
forces would be necessary. They would have
to be supplemented by MS. ground troops-
perhaps In small numbers at first, but more
later, particularly if North Vietnamese regu-
lar forces and Chinese soldiers joined the
Vietcong.
How many U.S. soldiers would be needed Is
uncertain-probably a minimum of three tb
six divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or
brigade-size units), possibly as many as 10
or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy,
and supporting units, perhaps 200,000 to 1
million Americans would be fighting in Viet-
nam.
Obviously, this would mean a Korea-type
conflict, a major war, no matter what euphe-
misms would be used. Nor could we wage it
in the present "business as usual" economy.
We would require partial mobilization, vastly
beefed-up military production. Many weak-
nesses In our military structure would need
strengthening. Even so, we could not an-
ticipate quick success. The war would be
long, nasty, and wearing.
No one could relish such a prospect as this;
the stark statistics of war explain the Presi-
dent's reluctance to embark upon a path that
has no turning.
Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But
there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the
struggle for freedom; there is no good place
to die. And it Is far better to fight in Viet-
nam-on China's doorsteep-than fight some
years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
1965 ? CONGRESSIONAL.,RECQRD.-.APPENDIX, A777.
of useful, products for mankind. Upon his
death, of January 5, 1943, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's telegram to Tuskegee In-
Ititute said, "all mankind are the beneficiaries
of his discoveries."
Justice Felix Frankfurter
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
.,,.._ OF
HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE
OF,MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 8, 1965
Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, a few
short years ago at the law school in
Cambridge, a bust of Justice Felix
Frankfurter was presented to take its
place alongside four other great jurists
of our century: Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin
Cardozo, and Learned Hand. Now Pro-
fessor Frankfurter, for he remained a
teacher throughout his judicial tenure,
has joined those others in answering
that summons, for which no continu-
ance can be granted. Professor. Frank-
furter will require no extension of time
to plead. His life exemplified the creed
espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes when he spoke to the 50th anni-
versary of his class in June 1911:
To see so far as one may, and, to feel the
great forces that are behind every detail
* * * to' hammer out as compact and solid
a piece of work as one can, to try to make
it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised.
All of this Justice Frankfurter has
done, The words of his last major opin-
ion filed in dissent in March 1962, in the
Tennessee apportionment case sounded
a warning bell that still rings true
today:
The Justice wrote:
"The Court today reverses a uniform
course of decision established by a dozen
cases, including one by which the very claim
now sustained was unanimously rejected
only 5 years ago.
"Such a massive repudiation of the ex-
perience of our whole past in asserting de-
structively novel judiciary power demands a
detailed analysis of the role of this Court in
our constitutional system.
"Disregard of inherent limits in the effec-
tive exercise of the Court's `judicial power'
not only presages the futility of judicial in-
tervention in the essentially political con-
flict of forces. * * * it may well impair the
Court's position as the ultimate organ of `the
supreme law of the land' in that vast range
of legal problems, often strongly entangled
in popular feeling, on which this Court must
pronounce.
"PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
"The Court's authprity-processed neither
of the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests
on sustained public confidence in its moral
sanction, Such feeling must be nourished
by the Court's complete detachment, in fact
and in appearance, from political entangle-
ments and by abstention frorp injecting it-
self into the clash of political forces in
political settlements."
The struggle Justice Frankfurter went
through in leaving his personal convictions
behind carte through most sharply in his
1943 c ssent. in.. the flag salute case. The
Court reversed a previous decision and ruled
.that children of Jehovah's Witnesses could
not be forced to salute the U.S. flag at school.
Frankfurter, disagrgeeing, said:
"One who belongs to the most vilified and
persecuted minority in history is not likely
to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed
by our Constitution. Were my purely per-
sonal attitude relevant I should whole-
heartedly associate myseit with the general
libertarian views in the Coirt's opinion, rep-
resenting as they do the thought and action
of a lifetime.
"FEELING AS JUDGE
".But as judges we are neither Jew nor
Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. * * *
As a member of this Court I am not justi-
fedin writing my private notions into the
Constitution, no matter how deeply I may
cherish them or how mischievous I may deem
their disregard."
He was with the majority in ruling that
congressional committees must make clear
to witnesses the pertinency of questions; in
drawing a sharp distinction between sub-
versive thought and action; and in striking
down the State Department's restrictive
passport regulations as not authorized by
law.
Perhaps his most bitter defeat on the
Court was his last one. That was the Ten-
nessee apportionment case where six Justices
voted to allow lower Federal courts to hear
the complaints of citizens who think un-
equal voting, districts dilute their right to
vote.
For Justice Frankfurter, the Court's de-
cision to step into what he called a political
thicket was tragic.
The lamps of learning he has lit shall'
light the paths of countless generations
yet unborn.
National Lutheran Council Endorses Pres-
ident Johnson's Immigration Bill
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JOHN BRADEMAS
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, under
-unanimous. consent, I insert in the REC-
ORD the text of a resolution adopted by
the National Lutheran Council support-
ing President Johnson' proposal for re-
vision of the immigration law.
Although the Lutheran Church, Mis-
souri Synod, does not officially partici-
pate in the National Lutheran Council, it
wishes to be associated with the sub-
stance of this resolution.
The text of the resolution follows:
RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION
Whereas the National Lutheran Council
has consistently expressed hope that Congress
will establish immigration laws, "just to all
and ministering most truly to the public
welfare"; and
Whereas the National Lutheran Council
has stated its "firm conviction that the exist-
ing immigration legislation has severe short-
comings, as a result of which neither tradi-
tional Christian humanitarianism nor en-
lightened self-interest are adequately ex-
hibited," and has expressed hope that Con-
gress will "seek a just and workable sub-
stitute for the national origins quota
system"; and
Whereas the Statement "Immigration Pol-
icy: Moral Issues. and the National Interest,"
endorsed by the National Lutheran Council
at its meeting on February 4, 1960, com-
mended for study and consideration the fol-
lowing'flve possible objectives as the basis of
a revised U.S. immigration law:
1: To supply `our permanent population
with a steady proportion 'of newcomers who
have chosen the United states as their new
homeland and who can impart to their
American neighbors an understanding of-the
cultures, attitudes, and interests of other
races and peoples of the world.
2. To assume the United States proper
share of, international responsibility for the
resettlement of refugees and of other per-
sons urgently in need of the compassionate
haven of a new homeland.
3. To facilitate the reuniting of families.
4. To facilitate the entry of persons pos-
sessing special skills or other capacities
needed by the American economy and cul-
ture.
5. To admit annually a reasonable number
of the persons described above on an objec-
tive basis of selection which, while discrimi-
nating, will not be discriminatory with re-
spect to race, national origin, color, or re-
ligion, testifying thereby to the U.S. recogni-
tion of the interlocking and mutual interests
of all nations with regard to the migration
of people, the interaction of cultures and
respect of universal human rights; and
Whereas the proposed legislation submitted
to Congress by President Johnson on Jan-
uary 13, 1965, represents substantial progress
toward the fulfillment of the basic hopes and
objectives expressed in prior National Lu-
theran Council resolutions: Therefore be it
Resolved, That the he National Lutheran
Council reaffirm its` concern for a fair and
just immigration law, and express its hope
that Congress will enact into law the prin-
ciples and objectives contained in the Presi-
dent's proposal now before Congress; and be
it further
Resolved, That the congregations of the
member bodies of the National Lutheran
Council be encouraged to welcome lmmi-
grants into their fellowship and to assist
them in continuing integration into com-
munity life.
NSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, when the
history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is
finally written, a great American news-
paper-the New York Times-will have
a special place for having lived up to the
highest standard of courageous and in-
cisive journalism. No newcomer to this
complex issue, the New York Times pub-
lished articles by Pulitzer Prize winner
David Halberstram and Homer Bigart
which brought to light the realities of
the dictatorial Diem regime. Recently
James Reston has analyzed the complex-
ities of Vietnam in a number of pene-
trating articles, and the New York Times
has put special emphasis on Vietnam on
the editorial page in a series of in-depth
editorials. I commend the following
three editorials to my colleagues:
[From the New York Times, Feb. 19, 1965]
THE WAR HAWKS
A comparatively small group of Americans,
at this moment predominantly political in
character and predominantly Republican in
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-ROP67B00446R000300170003-8
 A778
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 28
politics, is doing its best to multiply the
perils and frustrations of the war in southeast
Asia.
This group ignores the realities of the pres-
ent situation. It ignores the obvious war-
weariness of the people of South Vietnam. It
ignores the steady stream of desertions from
the Vietnamese Army. It ignores the diffi-
culty of protecting isolated American bases
against the surprise attacks of guerrillas.
It ignores the possibility of an invasion
of South V etnam by the very considerable
North Viet ese Army. It ignores the
problem of how an aerial counterattack could
cope successfully with a massive ground at-
tack of this character. It ignores the pos-
sibility of Chinese Intervention. It ignores
the logistics and belittles the cost in lives
lost, blood spilled and treasure wasted, of
fighting a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles
from the coast of California.
The whole aim of this group is to expand
the Vietnamese war, even if it means drawing
in China and perhaps the Soviet Union as
well. By its lights, President Johnson's dec-
laration that the United States seeks no
wider war is as much a prescription for fail-
ure as any attempt at a negotiated peace.
It is one thing to say, as Secretary McNamara
did in his testimony yesterday, that this
country has "no other alternative than con-
tinuing to support South Vietnam against
the Red`gUerrilla onslaught." It is quite an-
other to argue that the road out of the pres-
ent hazardous situation is to invite world
destruction. The American people made it
overwhelmingly clear in the last election
that they do not want to plunge recklessly
down that road.
any real effectiveness. It Is more urgent
than ever for President Johnson to take a
new, hard look at this 'worsening morass
before honorable extrication from it becomes
impossible.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1965]
THE DEBATE ON VIETNAM
A great debate on the Vietnamese conflict
is now raging all over the United States. It
,goes from the White House, Congress, and
the Pentagon to every home, office, - factory,
and farm. it is unresolved because the Gov-
ernment has not yet decided on its policy or,
if it has, President Johnson is not telling
the American people. The debate's subject,
in its simplest form, is Whether to fight a
big war in Vietnam or to seek a way out
through a combination of continuing de-
fense and diplomatic negotiation.
The case for a vastly stepped-up American
military commitment-as set forth in today's
Magazine by military analyst Hanson W.
Baldwin-is that the "Communist strategy
of creeping aggression" must be stopped in
Vietnam before it swallows all of Asia and
the world. Under this theory, the United
States should undertake saturation bombing
been that our military position is too weak
to allow negotiations. Every week it has
grown weaker, and the latest upheavals in
the Vietnamese military and political struc-
ture indicate that total collapse may be im-
minent. To send hundreds of thousands of
Americans into an endless jungle war or to
bomb North Vietnamese ports and industrial
centers on a saturation basis would be a
surer road to global holocaust than to a
victory arms can never win for either side.
All of Idaho Welcomes 1965 Girl Scout
Roundup
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. COMPTON I. WHITE, JR.
OF IDAHO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 2, 1965
Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker,
of North Vietnam and send as many as a under leave to extend my remarks in the
million American soldiers, sailors, and fliers RECORD, I include the following editorial
into a "wear to win." which appeared in the February 18 edi
such an approach discards any pretense tion of the Bonners Ferry Herald and
that our objective in Vietnam is to protect
the Vietnamese people; it turns the conflict which expresses all of Idaho's thoughts
l
ino a waked ideological struggle that ignores on welcoming the 1965 Internationa
all the deep cleavages recent years have Senior Girl Scout Roundup to our north-
brought in both the Communist and free em panhandle:
worlds. Not one of our major allies in the ALL OF IDAHO WELCOMER 1965 GIRL SCOU'
West could be expected to endorse, much less ROIINDUP
actively assist, an American involvement so the snow over north Idaho's Far-
-
massive it would amount to a military occu- Dee
p lies State Park where the International
of leaderless South Vietnam. Ameri- ragut
ca's efforts to demonstrate the superiority Senior Girl Scout Roundup will be held next
of its social system by abolishing poverty and summer. In somber silence the pines, the
building a Great Society would vanish under firs, and the cedars await the coming of
the necessity for pouring our youth and spring, and sleeping on the bosom of the
treasure into a limitless solo adventure. earth beneath the - snowy mantle lie the
On the Communist side the effect of a countless flower seeds and plants that hold
large-scale American assault on North Viet- the promise of many lovely tomorrows.
nam would be to resolidify the fragmented And, oh, the memories this land of forest
Moscow-Peiping-Hanoi axis. Communist and field, lake and stream, and mountain
China would have to send her land armies and meadow holds.
to the rescue, as in North Korea, or be Last night the south wind brought its first
labeled a paper tiger. Soviet Russia, now promise of the welcome spring. Soughing
manifestly unhappy about anything that through the pines, the breezes seemed to be
would enhance Chinese prestige or dominion, reminiscing about the days gone by. If
would find it almost impossible to stand one would listen close, here's what they
aloof. The end result would be an escalation might have heard the breezes say:
of such dimensions that no one could be "Long, long ago," the breeze began, "only
sure it would not wind up in the kind of friendly Indians came this way. Kalispelms,
calamitous atomic exchange Secretary Mc- they called themselves. Friends of the
Namara described so graphically in his testi- neighboring Kootenai to the north and the
mony last week. Nez Perce to the south. Here they pitched
There are many, of course, who contend their tepees, bore their children, and lived
that the United States will eventually have their happy lives. And the Great Spirit to
to fight a nuclear war with China anyway, Whom they prayed smiled on them.
and that it is better to have the showdown "Came then the white men, David Thomp-
now when our superiority in weapons and son, Joco Finlay and all the rest of the buck-
delivery devices is so great. These are the skin-clad explorers, adventurers, and voy-
same people who a decade ago were advanc- ageurs. Strange were the names they gave:
ing precisely the same argument on why the Pend d'Oreille, Coeur d'Alene, Mamaloos,
United States should not wait to drop the Seneacquoteen.
bomb on Moscow. The notion that all Com- "Tirelessly the years rolled on, and little of
munists are alike and that all must be de- importance happened here. It was as though
stroyed is the road to world annihilation. Fate was saving this area for a greater pur-
The struggle between East and West is pose, and it was in 1941 when the world was
enormously complex, and nowhere more so engaged in its second great war that destiny
than in Vietnam, a country that has been decreed that this should be the site of Far-
occupied or neutral for 2,000 years and that ragut Naval Training Station. Barracks,
now shows no will to fight in its own defense. fieldhouses, training schools, messhalls spring
The Vietnamese, both North and South, have up in five great camps. One hundred thou-
an inherited fear and dislike of the Chinese. sand sailors to man the greatest armanda the
The Russians undoubtedly have at least as world has ever known were trained here.
much- desire as the United States to keep From farm and city these recruits came.
them' from being swallowed into Peiping's Pink checked youths they were, some sob-
empire. bing out their homesick hearts in the dark-
The course of sanity is to explore the initi- ness of the night, some braving their trails
atives opened up by Secretary General That with fear in their hearts, some seeking excite-
and General de Gaulle for negotiations to ment and adventure, all knowing that some
seek a neutralization of Vietnam and all would not . return. But they were Ameri-
[From the New York Times, Feb. 20, 1965]
REVOLVING DOOR IN SAIGON
Personal and group ambitions seem more
consequential to some of South Vietnam's
key military leaders than the war against
the Vietcong. The world worries about the
danger of a general war growing out of the
U.S. effort to underwrite Vietnamese free-
dom with American men, money and arms.
Yet, the primary worry for many of the gen-
erals and colonels who are supposed to be in
direct charge of Saigon's war effort revolves
around personal power.
In his testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, at almost the time the
latest coup was beginning, Secretary McNa-
mara warned that without national unity,and
a stable government the South `Vietnamese
would not be able to make effective use either
of their own armed forces or of the help the
United States is giving them. His Words
were apparently lost on the battling warlords
in Saigon.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this
newest in an endless series of internal up-
heavals is how unprepared every American
policymaker in Saigon or Washington seemed
to be for it. The available evidence suggests
that the abortive coup was hatched in the
South Vietnamese Embassy In Washington,
where Colonel Thao was press attache until
recently and where Lieutenant General
Khiem is currently ambassador. The total
surprise of American officialdom indicates
an abysmal failure of the Central Intelligence
Agency and every branch of military intelli-
gence. It is all much too' reminiscent of the
days when Washington gave over-ready
credence to the late Ngo Dinh Diem's glowing
reports of military victories and villages
:made secure.
The situation in Saigon is still too obscure
to permit any forecast of who will emerge
as ruler for a day, a week, or a month. But
there are enough puzzles about the latest
insurgence to raise suspicion that the Viet-
cong may have infiltrated the highest coun-
cils of the Vietnamese armed forces. Cer-
tainly, there is no prospect of the kind of
stable government Secretary McNamara has
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 ,.Approved For Release?20,.03/10/14CIA-RDP67B00446R000360170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- APPENDIX
.. .:A 1l$.LP 'V1,.: IN130VATIJ
The use of term loans in foreign opera-
tions is' an adaptation of techniques de-
veloped in the United States for domestic
lending. As 1s well known, term loans in
the United 'States are generally made to
finance acquisitions of plants, machinery and
equipment, with repayment out of the cash
flow-earnings and depreciation-expected
to be generated by their use. The lender
must satisfy himself that the borrower will,
have funds forthcoming to meet his obliga-
tions. The ,borrower can obtain terms that
give flexibility in repayment schedules and
permit efficient use of loan funds. Over
half of the total dollar volume of business
loans made by major New York City banks
consist of term loans.
Banks extending term loans abroad must,
however, satisfy themselves that the bor-
rower will not only generate adequate cash
flows but also will be able to convert
his local currency earnings into U.S. dol-
lars. Exchange risks-including the pos-
sibility, however remote, that exchange con-
trols may prohibit remittances to the United
States-and political risks are as much part
and parcel of considerations bearing on the
extension of a term loan as the general
credit standing of the borrower, Other
essential considerations are the balance-
of-payments position of the borrower's
Country, the level of its gold and foreign
exchange reserves and its short-term inter-
national indebtedness. Under certain cir-
cumstances; a country may appear to be
"borrowed up."
Many of the term loans extended by
U.S. commercial banks to borrowers in
less-developed countries have been ar-
ranged in conjunction with operations of the
Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the
Agency for International Development and
such private lenders as insurance companies.
As part of policies to encourage U.S. exports,
the Export-Import tank has recently devel-
oped comprehensive insurance coverage for
banks against political, military, and com-
mercial risks. on development loans. This can
be expected, as was the intention, to increase
the volume of term lending, particularly to
some of the less-developed countries.
On a number of occasions, U.S,. com-
rrierelal banks also have granted loans to
foreign governments or central banks as part
of packages of financial assistance extended
by the International Monetary Fund, some-
times in conjunction with credits from the
U.S. Treasury or the Export-Import Bank.
Such arrangements have often been nego-
tiated with Latin American nations.
Loans to Europe and Canada have been
extended primarily to foreign subsidiaries of
American businesses. Sometimes, U.S. firms
operating abroad have also been instru-.
mental in helping arrange U.S. bank financ-
ing for many of the foreign customers and
suppliers with whom they do business.
Credits have thus been granted to finance
purchases of oil tankers, freighters, air-
planes, machinery, electrical equipment,
etc. Because of their rapid rate of obso-
lescence, airplanes have been particularly
well suited to financing through bank term
loans, with maturities adjusted to the funds
generated through earnings and deprecia-
tion allowances. Shipping firms have re-
ceived substantial amounts of term credit
by obtaining long-term charters from major
shippers of such raw materials as oil, Iron
ore, and bauxite and assigning the charter
income to the lenders.
Technical, innovations in industry have
thus been matched by innovations in bank-
ing techniques. Like advances in tech-
nology, the bank term loan is spreading to
meet the needs of corporate enterprise here
as well as abroad. The growth of inter-
national trade and multinational business
organizations naturally creates demands for
flexible financing on an international scale.
TERM LOANS AND TIlE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Term loans help promote U.S. exports in
the period following the year when they are
granted; this minimizes their impact on the
balance of payments. Subsequent repay-
ments of the loans with interest increase
V.S. balance-of-payments receipts.
. Foreigners not only borrow in the United
States but also keep deposits in U.S. banks
and hold bankers acceptances and other
A765
short -ter mI investments. Some of these de-
posits are normally connected with the loans
granted them by U.S. banks. In fact, most
nations hold short-term assets in U.S. banks
in excess of the sums they borrow from them,
The relevant data for selected countries are
summed up in the table, which also shows
the value of U.S. trade with the nations
concerned.
Among the leading net debtors is Japan;
its assets in the United States are, however,
large. Japan is the second largest customer
of the United States. This group of coun-
tries also includes several Latin American
countries and Norway (because of shipping
loans).
U.S. banking credits to foreigners set against the background of foreigners' short-term assets
in the United States and U.S. foreign trade, August 1964,
[In millions of dollars]
U.S. bank credits abroad
Foreign
short-term
U
S
ex-
U.S
im
Short term
Long term
assets in
the United
.
.
ports ?
.
-
ports 2
States I
Canada--------------------------------------------
Italy
694
270
3,065
4,572
4,060
-----------------------------------------------
United Kngdom------------------------------------
94
277
260
72
1,057
1, 951
8825
1 384
8 503
1
115
Germany-------------------------------------------
Argentina
133
133
2,361
1,217
,
1,100
------------------------------------------
Venezuela------------------------------------------
175
137
78
36
307
707
215
675
145
940
France---------------------------------------------
Switzerland-------------------
72
88
42
25
1,525
774
480
---------------------
Belgium-------------------------------`------------
31
71
1,102
424
341
4606
256
4418
Sweden ------------------?----------------?---_--
Netherlands-------------------
-
31
40
69
13
609
278
197
--?_--_-
------
Japan----------------------------------------------
Mexico
2,471
833
316
2,614
905
1,868
217
1,625
---------------------------------------------
Brazil ----------------------------------------------
572
153
415
209
674
221
967
343
649
562
Colombia------------------------------------------
Philippines-----------------------------------------
250
179
56
120
.149
216
249
360
266
366
Norway--------------------------------------------
Chile
35
249
171
104
117
-----------------------------------------------
187
23
172
164
193
I Official and private.
s Year ended August 1964.
S Including Trieste.
4 Including Luxembourg.
NOTE.-The countries are arranged in 2 groups: those where U.S, bank credits, both short and long term, are
smaller than short-term dollar assets held by them in U.S. banks and vice versa. Within each group, the countires
are arranged according to the size of U.S. bank credits to them,
Bank lending also appears as a compli-
cating factor. In our balance of payments
because of the way in which Government
statisticians present their accounts. When
an American citizen makes a deposit in a
foreign bank or a loan to a foreigner, the
transaction is recorded as a capital outflow;
but when a foreigner makes a deposit in a
U.S. bank or buys V.S. short-term paper,
the transaction is considered as one of the
means of "financing" the U.S. payments defi-
cit rather than a capital inflow that helps
reduce the deficit. A committee of Govern-
ment-appointed experts, which, under the
chairmanship of Edward M. Bernstein, has
since April 1963 been examining the asym-
metries and anomalies in U.S. balance-of-
payments bookkeeping, is to report its find-
ings this month.
One thing is certain. Bank loans abroad
to finance V.S. exports and other interna-
tional business do not result in a loss of
U.S. interntaional wealth. They help ex-
pand U.S. exports and job opportunities and
incomes at home. They speed up economic
development abroad. The law providing for
the interest equalization tax, with its im-
plied threat of removing the exemption for
bank term loans, should be allowed to expire
on its scheduled date at the end of 1965.
Even if some immediate advantage were to
be gained for our balance of payments by
controls over bank lending, it would be more
than offset by the damage such controls
would do to the standing of the dollar as
A Bill To Broaden Coverage of Social
Security Benefits
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. PAUL A. FINO
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, today I re-
introduced my bill to broaden coverage
of social security benefits to include
brothers, sisters, and other dependent
relatives of a deceased individual fully
insured under the act.
At present, a dependent brother, sister,
or other relative of a deceased wage.
earner is left in the cold as far as social
security payments when that wage earn-
er dies. Except for funeral expenses
paid, all of the deceased's social secu-
rity contributions are lost unless there is
a surviving spouse.
My proposed legislation would remedy
this great injustice. Under this legis-
lation, if a dependent brother, sister, or
relative of an unmarried wage earner
can show that he or she was receiving
at least, hatV support from the R' e
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX ebruary 23
earner, that dependent would be en-
titled to monthly insurance benefits.
To my mind, this sort of humanization
of our existing social security law is a
necessity.
What My Country Means to Me
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. E. ROSS ADAIR
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, it is with a
great deal of pride that I call attention
to the signal achievement of one of the
eighth-grade students of the Whitley
County, Ind., schools, Richard Redman.
Richard, who is enrolled in Marshall Me-
morial School-named after Indiana's
onetime Vice President-recently was
judged first-place winner for his essay
entitled, "What My Country Means to
Me."
Richard's essay was in competition
with 50 other entries in the eighth-grade
contest in Whitley County schools.
We can all take to heart the warm, pa-
triotic message of this fine, young Amer-
ican. After reading his essay, it is easy
to understand why it was judged a first-
place winner.
The prize-winning essay follows:
WHAT MY COUNTRY MEANS TO ME
(By Richard Redmap, Columbia City, Ind.)
As a good American citizen, I feel it is my solved without controls and compulsion. Yet
duty to love, honor, and cherish the rights the squeeze of Presidential power was exerted
and freedoms which have been guaranteed as bluntly and directly as if a collection of
to me and all other Americans in the Bill Soviet provincial managers, planners, and
of Rights. This "charter of liberty" guar- bureaucrats had been summoned to the
antees such fundamental rights as freedom Kremlin to get their instructions about the
of religion, freedom of speech and of the regulation of the Communist economy.-
press, and the right of privacy and security. We have come to a fine pass in this coun-
It is important for me to understand that try when free enterprise is being reduced step
freedom is not the privilege of doing what I by step to an obsolete phrase and govern-
want to do without regard for other people. ment calls all the signals. As one of Mr.
In spite of America's great strides forward Johnson's auditors from Chicago observed,
in education, individual enterprise, Indus- "Nobody asked the President anything. We
try, inventions, etc., there is still work to be just sat there."
done. America is not a utopia by any means. Perhaps the President's tactics will pro-
There are many problems to cope with, such, vide the financial and business community
as crime, poverty, unemployment, racial ten- with a new perspective on his methods.
sion, foreign entangelments, and corrupt Many of its members supported him in last
politics. Problems, weaknesses, and ob- November's election, and a roundup of opin-
stacles in the American way of life do not ion in the current U.S. News & World Report
decrease my patriotism; on the contrary, they shows that he still commands much favor.
increase my loyalty and devotion to God and Many of those interviewed seem to have
my country. They make me more conscious learned the catchwords of the "Great Society"
of my individual responsibility as a Chris- in justification of the "new economics." For
tian citizen. They challenge me and all cit- example, a merchandiser says that while red
izens "to carry ahead the ideals of democ- ink in Government is always a worry, "there
racy and keep the faith of our Fathers." is a question whether there is really an in-
What my country means to me is sum- crease in red ink if you compare the national
marized excellently in William Tyler Page's debt to the gross national product."
words, written in 1917 and later officially Another executive isn't worried about deft-
adopted as "The American's Creed." This city because "a business must operate within
it
creed reads as follows:
"I believe in the United States of America
as a government of the people, by the people,
for the people; a government whose just
powers are derived from the consent of the
governed; a democracy in a republic; a
sovereign Nation of many sovereign States; a
perfect union, one and inseparable, estab-
lished upon those principles of freedom,
equality, justice, and humanity for which
American patriots sacrificed their lives and
fortunes.
"I therefore believe it is my duty to my
country to love it; to support its Constitu-
tion; to obey its laws; to respect its flag; and
to defend it against all enemies."
I am an American youth. Because of my
age, I am not a voter, a property owner,
a wage earner, or an official. Nevertheless
I am a citizen. Regardless of my age-yes,
even because of it-I am important to my
country and my country is very important
to me. What I do, say, or think at school,
at home, at church, on the street, or wherever
I may be is an indication of the kind of
citizen that I am and want to be.
Naturally, it makes me feel proud to refer
to America as my country, but when I con-
sider how it came to be mine, my pride is
overshadowed with humility. I did not
choose tihs great land to he my homeland;
it was by the grace of God that I was born
here and that this land of freedom and op-
portunity became mine. Furthermore, as I
live today in the 20th century, under the
blessing of God, I am enjoying a civilization
established, preserved, and extended by oth-
ers; their work and sacrifices have made my
country great. These facts cause me to un-
derstand and appreciate my American heri-
tage, and they influence site to do to the best
of my ability what God and my country ex-
pect me to do.
Someone has said, "The difficult thing to
remember about patriotism is that it is a
sentiment to which is tied a bundle of obli-
gations." These obligations are mine even as
a youth. Now and all through my life I must
live and work to preserve liberty and democ-
racy. I can do this now through obeying
laws, getting a good education, and being in-
terested in local, national, and world affairs.
Later in my life, there will come opportu-
nities for voting, jury service, and perhaps
military duty, to name just a few of the many
privileges and responsibilities which will be
mine as a worthy citizen of this country
which means so much to me.
The late President Kennedy beautifully
summarized each citizen's obligation to-
ward his country when he said, "Ask not
what your country can do for you, ask what
you can do for your country."
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under
unanimous consent I include the follow-
ing editorial from the Chicago Tribune
dated February 20, 1965:
ORDERS FROM ow HIGH
The presidents and chairmen of the boards
of nearly all the major corporations and
banks doing a large international business
were called to the White House Thursday to
serve as a captive audience while President
Johnson gave them their orders. His com-
mand was that they reduce oversee, invest-
ments and loans this year in order to help
correct the deficit in the international bal-
ance of payments which arises largely be-
cause of the administration's own policies.
The banks were told to cut foreign lend-
ing 75 percent and the corporations were di-
rected to reduce their flow of dollars out of
the country by 15 to 20 percent. The leaders
of the business and banking communities
were then steered respectively to the Com-
merce Department and to the Federal Re-
serve, where they were directed to file a flock
of reports with Washington whenever they
made a decision to send dollars abroad.
Mr. Johnson showed the iron hand in the
velvet glove by expressing the hope that the
balance-of-payments problem could be
its own relatively limited resources, wh e
"the resources of the Federal Government are
limited only by the total wealth of the
country." This gentleman adds, "This phi-
losophy would have made our fathers' hair
stand on end, but nevertheless it is a fact.
More and more conservative businessmen are
coming to the view that you can't look at
Government in the same way you view a
business."
A Wall Streeter comments, "We might as
well give this fiscal innovation of deficit
financing an opportunity to prove itself." A
fuel supplier admits the "Great Society" will
produce "continued inflation and an inflated
dollar, but lots of goods will be sold under
it.,,
To a surprising degree, the greatest spend-
er in history has been viewed up to now as
a "conservative" and a "middle-of-the-
roader." But we find a more dispassionate
view in the dissent of one businessman:
"More and more, the Government is telling
you how to run your business-whom you
must hire, how much you must pay, whom
you cannot fire. In 20 years, if this keeps
up, there will be on incentive to be a busi-
nessman."
Isn't this a fair description of what hap-
pened at the Washington conference? Was
not the President telling the 370 men in his
audience how to run their businesses? And
what could they do but sit and take it?
TENSION OF REMARKS
HON. CRAIG HOSMER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the cur-
rent issue of the American Security
Council's Washington Report, dated Feb-
ruary 22, contains a remarkably percep-
tive essay by Frank J. Johnson, the
publication's foreign editor. It reads as
follows :
WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW
A great swirl of climactic events has fol-
lowed President Johnson's order to give con-
crete effect to his repeated warnings to the
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67g00446RO 300170003-8
19 65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A767
Communists to cease their aggression against
South, Vietnam. The difficult but extremely
necessary decisions have at last been taken,
Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere of
crisis is created by the outraged cries and
threats of international communism. Just
as inevitably, the calls for a "negotiated
settlement" are redoubled on the free world
side of the line. Many well-meaning people
find it difficult to understand why President
Johnson does not at least accompany his
military action by an offer to enter into im-
mediate, negotiations to end the Vietnam
war.
Undoubtedly, the President would like
nothing better-nor would any other person
of good will-if negotiation presently offered
a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge
to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this
pledge which we must honor if there is ever
to be any hope of lasting peace in the world.
But in considering negotiation the adminis-
tration is faced with a series of very un-
pleasant facts, which are either unknown or
forgotten by the general public.
,One set of facts concerns the inherent na-
ture of guerrilla wars. The military tactics
and political purposes of such wars are not
subject to stalemate or compromise. For ex-
ample, much of the current argument for
negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a
"military victory" for either side is impossi-
ble. This is begging the question. Since
World War It, when the guerrilla war came
into vogue, they have invariably been won or
lost. Either the guerrillas "win" in the sense
of achieving a takeover of the country or
government in question, or else they are mili-
tarily defeated, at least to the point where
they are reduced to a harmless remnant.
There have been no exceptions to this rule.
The ?guerrillas triumphed completely
against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the
French in Algeria and Indochina (except
here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954
rather than risk U.S, intervention), against
the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and
against Batista in Cuba. They were de-
cisively defeated in Greece, the Philippines,
Mal, a 'burins and-apparently=Vene-
These statements might be written off as
mere propaganda bargaining were they not
backed up by a great deal of background in-
formation coming out of Communist China,
which indicate that she believes time and
events are very much on her side. Since the
second hypothesis for negotiations is that
they must include Communist China, her
attitude is obviously decisive to the outcome.
Here are some of the more public facts which
the President must consider:
(1) Between December 21, 1964, and Jan-
uary 4, 1965, the first session of the Third
National People's Congress was convened in
Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind
closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders
of Communist China. In addition to state-
ments by Marshall Ho Lung, boasting that
the Chinese people's army has been con-
siderably enlarged, supplied with up-to-
date equipment, and is now supported by
powerful naval and air force units, the
Chinese published, on December 30, an ab-
breviated version of Premier Chou En-lai's
report on Chinese domestic and foreign
policy.
The speech reflected great pride and self-
confidence resulting from the explosion of
the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the
"very serious difficulties" between 1959 and
1961, resulting from the failure of the "great
leap forward," and the intention of trans-
forming China into a world power with
the most modern industry, agriculture, tech-
nology, and defense within the shortest pos-
sible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou
pledged support to all-and he listed each
one-revolutionary movements and centers
of unrest. He declared that Peiping would
consider negotiation with the United States
only after it had given up Taiwan and would
deal with the United Nations only when it
had thrown out Nationalist China.
Chou further asserted that the East wind
would prevail over the West wind, and that
favorable conditions for such an outcome
are the "storm centers of world revolution
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The
speech forces the conclusion that the Chi-
nese Communists are not only conscious of
another point he actually made In the inter-
view. Unless he can be shaken in this con-
viction there is no possible basis for negoti-
ation with China.
MUST STOP REDS
It is easy for those without responsibility
to call for "negotiation," as though this were
the automatic panacea for all the world's ills.
But the U.S. Government is faced with the
kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as
much more grim data of a secret nature,
which cannot be shrugged off. This is why
it has consistently rejected calls for a new
Geneva Conference and why even the British
have supported this stand. It is accepted as
axiomatic by most policymakers that under
present circumstances negotiation could lead
only to an American defeat.
Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not
simply for reasons of foolish national pride,
but because the Chinese have made it so
very plain that Vietnam is only part of a
much wider plan for aggrandizement and
troublemaking. We are helping Vietnam
because it is in the interest. of free men
everywhere that the Communist challenge
be halted at this point.
The President is trying to create a new
psychological situation in Asia. His decision
to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only
one which offers any hope of success. It has
been long overdue and is all the more diffi-
cult for that reason, but It is still not too
late. Mr. Johnson should be warmly con-
gratulated for his action. If we carry
through our policy with resolution there is
still an excellent chance that we can "win"
the Vietnam war at least in the sense that
the Communists are, induced to call off the
war as a bad business and eiher withdraw
the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else
cease outside aid completely and leave them
to their fate. Only then can there be a gen-
uine basis for a negotiation which will ratify
this decision.
The Communists will not come willingly
or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Pre-
vious U.S. vacillation has led them to count
the Vietnam war as already won. It will
probably take time and a great deal of pun-
ishment before they call off the war. But
they are practical men and eventually bow
to reality. What is essential now is that
the President be given the time to make
the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi,
Peiping, and Moscow without being continu-
ally badgered to negotiate. The, calls for
negotiation only make the task harder and
bloodier because it encourages the Commu-
nists to think that we may still falter in our
purpose. It is still a Chinese article of
faith that the world and domestic pressures
can be mobilized to thwart any resolute ac-
tion by the U.S. Government. Many past
follies have confirmed them in this view-
point.
TURNING POINT IN HISTORY
y '
zuela. Whenever negotiations" were held it their power, but are also prepared to use it
was only for the purpose of' ratifying the to support "wars of liberation" wherever pos-
guerrilla victory. In the majority" of cases sible in a continuing struggle against "im-
this was not of a decisive military nature. perialism."
The French were never beaten in Algeria and (2) As a concrete example that Chou
even after Dien Bien Phu they could have meant what he said and that the "falling
held on at least in, Hanoi and Saigon. The domino" theory in southeast Asia was not
Dutch could have held Indonesia for some a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimu-
time as could the British in Palestine and
Cyprus. But either the will to resist was
broken or else a reevaluation of national in-
terests caused them to consider the area no
longer vital.
CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS
lated imagination,., Peiping formally an-
nounced on February 5, 1965, the formation
of a "patriotic front" to overthrow the pro-
Western government of Thailand and eradi-
cate American influence there. For some
time now, Communist agents have been in-
filtrating into Thailand in order to form
On the basis of all past experience, there- the nucleus for subverting that country.
fore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam The Thais have instituted energetic counter-
can only have the purpose either of con- measures which have so far kept.them under
firming a Communist decison to abandon control, but it is foolish to believe that Thai- A great experiment is underway-the ex-
the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an land would or could resist a_Communist take- , periment to see whether we can successfully
American decision to admit defeat and with- over backed by China if South Vietnam is contain Communist China on the mainland
draw. A cease fire would be meaningless. lost. The Chinese do not even wait until of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to
It would only leave the guerrillas in place one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming our children are hideous to contemplate.
and free to use the interval to run in more their plans to take over the next one. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive,
reinforcements and arms until they were (3) Mao Tse-tung stated in a 'January the ambition, and the eventual potential to
ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all interview with Ame;scan journalist Edgar rule the world. The days through which we
Communist guerrillas behind the 17th par- Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead are now passing will mark one of the great
allel, as is sometimes suggested, would be to war between China and the United States. turning points of world history.
fine, but would of course be tantamount to so long as China is not invaded. He also
a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. said that the war in Vietnam would last The United States has very strong trumps
m
President Johnson has no intelligence as yet only another year or two because the South is play in this contest. If y If North Vietnam
to lead him to suppose that the Commu- Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice
nists are ready for anything of the sort.. and the Americans will "lose interest " herself in a continuing effort to win South
On the contrary-and this is the second While this statement greatly reduces the Vietnam, there can t one final our
set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situa- likelihood of anyeliinese retaliation against o sh th h reaten China with h the
tion-#i e,Cgmmunist world remains unani- our raids on North Vietnam, it gives no com-
mons iii its declarations that` the only basis fort to those urgfri g negotiation. If Mao destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial
for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is really believes that the war will be won by bombardment. If forced to carry out this
the complete withdrawal of American forces, the Communists ' in another year or two, threat, we would at least prevent or delay
which is tantamount to a complete Ameri- then it is obvious that he looks on negoti- the looming menace of a nuclear-armed
can defeat. ation only to confirm this fact, which is China.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 A768
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX , February ,23
Review and Outlook
Government policy, precisely because its
cardinal principle is that no one very ser-
iously challenge what someone else proposes.
No proposal is perfect, and without challenge.
the imperfections can only be discovered too
late.
Second, such an enshrinement of logroll-
ing tends to legitimize practically anything
some group is brazen enough to demand.
Such a faction more or lessnames its own
price for not rocking the boat. No one
bothers to object that even if a proposal is
good for someone it may be bad for all of
us. What's too easily ignored is President
Johnson's own warning, "The national inter-
est is greater than the sum of all local
interests."
Most important, this sort of consensus
seems to add up to a cementing of one of the
central philosophies of the New Deal: "Let
the Federal Government do it." With the
Government already so dominant in our
society, our era is hardly the time to do away
with debate over giving Government more
responsibility and hence more power over all
of us. Now more than ever, the warnings
need to be heard, not stifled.
In short, a politics of consensus could pro-
vide undoubted opportunities, but it runs
the considerable danger that the consensus
would be primarily an agreement for all of us
to look the other way while each of us steals
his favorite gem from the public treasure
chest.
The Rumanians will acquire the synthetic
rubber plant, nevertheless; Firestone has
agreed to build it. But at a time when Com-
munist governments are waging war against
American servicemen in Vietnam * * *
when Soviet Russia stages mob attacks on
the American embassy and roughs up U.S.
newsmen covering the attacks * * * and
when Peiping and Moscow are working to
undermine freedom in the Congo and
throughout Africa, it is heartening to know
that one major American corporation refuses
to do business with America's enemies.
Lenin once said that when the time comes
to strangle capitalism, businessmen will be
bidding for the right to sell the Communists
the rope. Perhaps so. But Goodyear has
demonstrated that it will not be among the
bidders.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 3, 1965
Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, today
we hear much about an administration
by consenus and I have not seen any-
thing that points up the dangers of such
an administration as well as an editorial
which appeared in the Wall Street Jour-
nal on February 18. The editorial
follows:
REVIEW AND OUTLOOK
PRECAUTIONS ON CONSENSUS
President Johnson offers himself as an
apostle of consensus, a concept elusive
enough as a word, let alone as policy.
Whether this notion is promising or danger-
ous depends on just what he has in mind.
He seems to mean, at a minimum,; less
heated disagreement. "Let us reject any
among us who seek to reopen old wounds
and rekindle old hatreds," he enjoined in
his inaugural address. "The time has come
to achieve progress without strife and
change without hatred: Not without differ-
ence of opinion, but without the deep and
abiding divisions which scar the Union for
generations."
In some respects, the vision is farsighted
indeed. The President is rejecting a popu-
lar brand of political leadership which con-
sists mostly of arousing the faithful to rise
up and slay the Infidel. This kind of poli-
tics sometimes has proved effective, and it
must be particularly tempting for a Presi-
dent with huge congressional majorities.
As the President seems to realize so well,
though, tough tactics have the unfortunate
result of clouding communications among
factions in our society. With their leaders
often inciting them against each other, it's
hard for opposing groups to remember that
both may possibly be saying something
worth listening to. Disagreement is resolved
by brute force, which is less likely to yield
intelligent policy than compromise borne of
honest discussion.
A politics of consensus, by promoting mod-
eration and compromise, could more nearly
establish a true give-and-take discourse on
national policy. That is unquestionably a
high ideal, and perhaps the President is
right when he says the time for it has come.
Yet there are some who are dubious about
Mr. Johnson's ideal. Part of their reaction
is simply aversion to the President's practical
politics, and part is disappointment that the
leader of the faithful professes friendship
with the infidel. But a more significant
part, we think, arises from concern over just
what kind of tactics will be used to suppress
strife and keep everyone happy.
A cynical formula for "consensus" could
read merely: Throw tax cuts and lots of flat-
tery to businessmen, the union shop and an
Under Secretary of Labor to the unions,
school aid to educators with a drop to Cath-
olics, high price supports to farmers and
transportation aid to cities. And so on.
The formula might build considerable
harmony and reduce strife, for a while any-
way. It's an ancient truism that if enough
people are getting a big enough sop, they
will hesitate to challenge the one someone
else gets. But a consensus based on no
more than this is not exactly an appealing
prospect.
For one thing, a consensus thus cynically
conceived would degrade rather than im-
prove the quality of public discussion on
Good Going, Goodyear
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN J. RHODES
OF ARIZONA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 16, 1965
Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr.
Speaker, under leave previously granted,
I would like to include in the RECORD the
following self-explanatory editorial
which appeared in the Arizona Republic
on February 14, 1965. I join the Arizona
Republic in saying, "Good Going, Good-
year." The editorial is as follows:
GOOD GOING, GOODYEAR
The U.S. State Department and Communist
Rumania had it all figured out.
The Goodyear Corp. would sell a modern
synthetic rubber plant to Rumania. Inas-
much as State had been assured by the
Rumanian Government that it wouldn't
divulge the polyisoprene secrets to other
Communist countries, it wasn't like giving
away important production secrets to every
Communist country. And, State reasoned,
sale of the plant would help bring Rumania
closer to the West.
But the State Department hadn't consid-
ered the reaction of the Goodyear Corp. And
Goodyear refused to sell the plant to
Rumania, thereby passing up an approxi-
mately $50 million transaction.
In the current company newspaper, pub-
lished in Litchfield Park, Goodyear explained
that it felt the dangers to the United States
far outweighed the possible benefits in the
proposed deal. The company believes the
Communists could, if they desired, disrupt
natural rubber markets in Malaysia. Liberia,
and other undeveloped countries, using cut-
rate prices (underwritten by the state) as
economic clubs.
Furthermore, although respecting the
State Department's belief in the Rumanians'
promise, Goodyear said it preferred not to
entrust its production secrets to the Com-
munists.
Private Capital Flows: The Balance of
Payments Whipping Boy
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, in spite
of repeated promises, the administration
has failed to eliminate the deficit in our
international balance of payments. Last
year the deficit on regular transactions
amounted to about $3 billion, compared
to $3.3 billion for 1963. Especially dis-
trubing are the figures for the fourth
quarter of 1964, which show a deficit in
the order of $1.4 billion or nearly $6 bil-
lion on an annual basis. The First Na-
tional City Bank Monthly Economic Let-
ter for February 1965, details our de-
teriorating payments position and ana-
lyzes recent administration proposals to
deal with the problem.
The two measures most recently pro-
posed as solutions to the chronic pay-
ments problem are a 2-year extension
and broadening of the interest equaliza-
tion tax, which was originally proposed
as a temporary-tax, a restriction of bank
lending abroad, and a program of so-
called voluntary restraint on direct in-
vestment. Restrictive controls over pri-
vate investment abroad in the long run
would work untold damage on our own
economy as well as to world prosperity
and economic development. Domesti-
cally, such curbs on lending would cut
U.S. exports which are intimately linked
with our oversea loans and investments.
The letter states that:
Postwar experience selective controls here
and abroad shows unmistakably that one
measure lays the groundwork and necessity
for another. This is already being demon-
strated. First we have the interest equali-
zation tax, then provision for its extension
to bank loans, and now more consideration
of direct controls over capital. The prolifera-
tion is endless and so are the complexities.
There is an additional risk in propos-
ing controls of this sort. They could be
regarded as something which has in fact
reduced the ability of U.S. dollar holders,
here and abroad, to use or transfer them
by their own choice. If the dollar is to
remain trusted and respected, it must re-
main unfettered.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1965,
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A763
Michigan's visitors traveling slowly
over these rcds.nay be treated to the
sight of a doe and her fawn, a strutting
buck, and other animals whose habitat
is within the boundaries of this forest
area. Bird lovers, too, will be well re-
paid for their visit. Not only game birds
but song birds abound. A few months
ago I called attention of my colleagues to
the efforts of the Forest Service to pro-
vide a refuge for the annual visit of
Kirkland's warblers, a rare bird, which
pays our section of the State a visit each
year. Thirty-one bald eagle nests were
spotted by forest rangers. Nine of these
were active at. time of location and 17
young were being,produced.
To insure adequate cover for wildlife
in the years ahead the Forest Service has
a carefully managed program. Last year
over 4 million trees were planted in the
Huron-Manistee Forests. In addition
two waterfowl dams were constructed
and numerous wildlife waterholes were
established..
Fishermen, hunters, nature lovers,
mushroom and berry pickers, bird watch-
ers, hikers, and all lovers of the out of
doors will find the Huron-Manistee Na-
tional Forests of interest.
Doing Business With Our Enemies
umnist, David Lawrence, advocated severing
diplomatic relations with Russia. He may
be right.
At any rate, unless the United States ceases
to play the part of the less than bright
country cousin in its deals with foreigners
whose goal is to destroy us, our Nation is
headed for more serious trouble than it has
seen in its nearly 200 years of trying to
make the world a better place to live.
The action in South Vietnam may not be
considered war, but to the men who are
daily fighting and facing death there, it is,
as real/a war as .any ever fought. To aid
their ki ers is to break faith with them.
Winning in Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL
OF ILLINOIS
N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23,1965
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under
unanimous consent I include the follow-
ing editorial from the Peoria Journal
Star dated February 19, 1965:.
WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM
Before we get too worked up about the ab-
sence of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam
"who ought to be in there and doing the job
right," and the resulting deaths of American
specialists, and the confusion over the gov-
ernment of the place and its "attitude" to-
ward the United States, etc., we had better
take a look at how the job was done before.
Before the United States made the decision
not to let the Communists run, unchecked,
over the whole of southeast Asia, the French
tried to throw them out of Vietnam.
They decided not to fool around and to do
the job right.
The French sent their own regular forces
by the tens and even hundreds of thousands,
plus thousands of veteran German soldiers
enlisted into the Foreign Legion, and went
out to clobber the Vietcong.
Instead, they were clobbered themselves.
They had 200,000 casualties and were run out
of Vietnam altogether in a short space of
time.
We stepped in to support a South Vietnam
regime to prevent the Vietcong from over-
running the whole country and with that
momentum and morale situation all the rest
of the rich subcontinent.
The experts and the press reported that
Vietnam was confused, naked, unarmed and
morale shattered and "wouldn't last 6
months."
And we didn't rush in with massive com-
bat forces to replace the French Army. We
sent arms, training experts, supply handlers,
and advisers-a mere handful.
That handful is now up to 23,000 men,
mostly doing specialist "behind the lines"
jobs, and a few serving as combat advisers.
Vietnam has resisted the Vietcong, as a re-
sult, under this system not for 6 months as
forecast, and not for a couple of years, but
for a dozen years, virtually.
Thousands have died and are dying. Thou-
sands of guerrillas have been killed and their
bodies carefully counted, and are being
killed. Somebody Is fighting the forces that
cut down 200,000 Frenchmen, somebody more
than 23,000 American fliers, mechanics, sup-
ply experts, advisers, etc.
About 300 Americans have been killed.
Would fewer Americans die if we let them
have South Vietnam? And then go after us
somewhere else, as they surely would?
De Gaulle has said from the first that we
can't possibly succeed where the brilliant
and gallant French have failed. If they
couldn't do It with strong measures and
direct war, how can we do It by carefully
avoiding the use of combat units and just
helping Vietnamese who will fight for their
own country?
The Communists and their stooges, natu-
rally, have been using every agency and de-
vice possible to propagandize the hopeless-
ness of our effort, as well.
And they have the great advantage of tying
their control over many devices of propa-
ganda with their control over guerrilla ef-
forts and "incidents"-and they are making
a major effort to convince us it is hopeless
right now, by both methods. And to scare us,
in the bargain.
The fact remains that we have, thus far,
done a far better job than the French, with
all the frustrations involved, and without
sending in an American Army, and without
suffering 200,000 casualties as they did.
The record shows that it was not a stupid
policy. It was a shrewd policy.
The record shows that we have vastly im-
proved the free world's chances over what
they were when we went in with this policy,
and vastly improved the situation left us by
the French.
The record suggests that having corrected
their major mistakes, we can correct some of
our own mistakes and do a still more suc-
cessful job-and we can win.
The biggest barrier to that is the encour-
agement the Red Chinese take and their
Communist allies from our discouragement.
The killing of some 30 Americans in terror
raids the last week was not designed for any
actual military benefit. It was designed to
horrify us, and to frighten us, and thus to
cause us to give up and get out.
They are fighting a political war and hope
to win it, not in Vietnam, but right here in
the minds and, votes of Americans in the
United States.
And if they do, they will figure they can
win anything they want by simply scaring us
"cowardly" Americans-the paper tiger. And
they will push us, and push us, and push us,
until we just can't stand to be pushed any
more.
And therein lies the real danger of a major
war.
C. L. DANCEY.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. E. Y. BERRY
OF SOUTH DAKOTA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, under
unanimous consent I insert in,the REC-
ORD an editorial from the February 17,
1965, Issue of the Buffalo, S. Dak., Times-
Herald, as follows:
DoIxa B.usmzSS WITH OUR ENEMII^
With the pledge of military aid to North
Vietnam by Soviet Russia, the United States
has again been placed in the position of
direct trading with an avowed enemy.
There has never been any doubt as to
Russia's intention to do all in her power to
destroy the United States, but our leaders
have been able to wink at these announced
intentions and ' work for establishment and
extension of trade with the Communists In
the name of better relations. The better
relations have included the stoning of the
American Embassy with the approval of the
Russian regime, and the jeopardizing of the
lives of our diplomats in Russia and other
countries under her domination.
With. American boys being killed and
wounded ' in South Vietnam, and Russian
pledges of military assistance to their killers,
there can no longer be any doubt that our
vacillating foreign policy has led us down
the street to failure in our position in the
world.
It is still not too late for the United States
to call a halt to this folly. In view of pres-
ent circumstances, any attempt to honey up
to the Communists by inviting them to the
United States "to see how we. live" makes
about as much sense as hiring a crazed
murderer to baby-sit with our children.
The United Nations have proven itself
powerless to serve as anything but a tool
of the Communists, who in turn laugh at
any moral obligations to the world debating
society. Recently, the noted political col-
Bank Loan Curb Will Cut Exports
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, February 23, 1965
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, the in-
evitable result of the application of the
interest equalization tax to bank loans
with a term of over 1 year will be to re-
duce the volume of U.S. exports. Thus a
measure designed to help bring the bal-
ance of payments into surplus will ac-
tually have an offsetting effect that will
tend to deepen the deficit.
The link between bank loans and U.S.
exports is discussed at some length in
the Monthly Economic Letter of Decem-
ber 1964, published by the First National
City Bank of New York. The article
points out how the remarkable expansion
of world trade in recent years has re-
quired growing supplies of U.S. bank
credit for financing purposes. The in-
consistancies in the administration's
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 A764
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX ebruary 23
position is evident from the fact that
while presumably attempting to increase
world trade, the administration now
seeks to restrict the financing required
to carry on that trade.
Although it is often said that term
loans of over 1 year do riot finance ex-
ports, the article makes perfectly clear
the various ways in which such term
loans do finance exports and, at the same
time, increase job opportunities and in-
comes at home.
In view of the administration's in-
creasing reliance on restrictions in the
field of international trade and pay-
ments, I ask unanimous consent that the
article from the Monthly Economic Let-
ter be included in the RECORD at this
point :
COMMERCIAL BANK TERM LOANS ABROAD
In the world today, nations are exchang-
ing goods in rapidly growing volumes. Our
own exports have expanded from $15 billion
to $25 billion in the past 10 years. Under-
standably, the remarkable expansion of world
trade has required growing supplies of credit.
Commercial banks in the United States
and other principal trading nations extend
credits to their foreign correspondents and
customers. Indeed, the resources of com-
mercial banks constitute a pool of private
international liquidity that is drawn upon
by creditworthy borrowers in creditworthy
countries throughout the world.
Along with direct investment in bricks
and mortar, commercial bank credit abroad
has greatly expanded over the past 15 years
as private U.S. capital has replaced U.S. Gov-
ernment aid to Western Europe and Japan-
aid that had been an essential ingredient
during the earlier postwar period in reinvig-
'orating world commerce. In recent years,
private financing has received further im-
petus from the restoration of meaningful
currency convertibility among the principal
.nations. These trends and developments
have in turn strengthened international com-
petition in the field of money and banking;
they have also created new opportunities.
Within a relatively short span of time, U.S.
banks have girded themselves to play a prom-
inent role in world finance. With the dollar
the leading international currency, the
United States the world's largest exporter
and importer, and U.S. money and capital
markets the single most important source
of financial resources, this has been a natural
evolution.
PATTERNS OF BANK LENDING
American commercial banks engaging in
international business extend both short-
and- long-term cedits. According to defini-
tions used by official statisticians, short-term
credits are those with a maturity up to 1
year; they are frequently renewed from year
to year. Loans beyond 1 year are called term
loans. These term loans have been custom-
ary in domestic financing in the United
States for a quarter of a century and have,
since World War II, spread to the field of
International financing.
U.S. banks have outstanding short- and
tong-term credits abroad of $9.5 billion,
U.S. exporters, importers, and industrial and
commercial firms also grant credits to their
foreign clients; these amount to $2.3 billion
at this time.
Of the short-term bank credits, about $1
billion consist of items held for collection
largely on behalf of customers. An addi-
tional $2.5 billion of the short-term bank
credits represent bankers acceptances. After
a long period of inactivity, these have grown
remarkably since 1960, with the encourage..
ment of the Federal Reserve System; most
acceptances are made under arrangements
that involve exports from the United States.
Loans to foreign banks and customers today
amount to about $5.7 billion, of which $2.2
billion are short term and $3.5 billion are
term loans.
THE ANATOMY OF TERM LOANS
There is general agreement that- short-
term loans by U.S. Banks are indispensable
as a means of financing U.S. trade and other
international business that directly benefits
the U.S. balance of payments. Sometimes,
however, the question is raised-particu-
larly by those who tend to blame the
U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on pri-
vate capital investments abroad-whether
loans in excess of 1 year serve purposes bene-
ficial to the U.S. balance of payments. To
19r5------------------------------------
19196 _----_
1957------------------------------------
1058 ------------------------------------
19.59 -----------------------------------
1960-------
106t--_-_--
--
1962-----__----- ----------_----___ --
1903------
lO i3-J an
---- - --- - ------- -----
April-June y-September _._ - _ __-- -- ------
Jul
Outstanding: uary-March ------------------
_ _ ___ _ ____ ____
October-December uary-March - -.---- - ---------
i;Ni4-Jan
-----------------------
April-June
Jul-August -------
v_ -- - -- - ----
August1304_____________
Acceptances made for account of foreigners, including varying amounts of other financing.
-'Including central banks and other official institutions.
3 Excluding credits in foreign currencies, which amounted to $689,000,000 in August 1964.
4 Excluding items reported by banks for the first time but representing certain credits extended previously. Such
items amounted to $86,000,000 in the 2d and $193,000,000 in the 4th quarter of 1963. Of the latter amount, $150,000,000
represented trade credits sold to banks by a U.S. corporation.
Source: Derived from data published in the U.S. Treasury Department Bulletin and the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The author of this amendment, Senator
ALBERT GORE of Tennessee, stated that it
seemed a "foregone conclusion" that the ex-
emption of commercial bank term loans
would be used to avoid the tax and charac-
terized it as an "Important loophole." In
his testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee last June, Secretary of the Treas-
ury Douglas Dillon pointed out that the rise
in long-term bank loans had started before
there was any thought of the tax and that,
in the light of detailed information made
available to the Treasury, any possible eva-
sion of the tax through use of bank loans
could not be "more than 5 percent of the
total bank loans."
Changes in direction of the flow of loans to
less-developed and developed countries have
been remarkably similar to the changes in
assure export financing and "normal recur-
ring international business," the administra-
tion's proposal and the House-approved bill
for an interest equalization tax, exempted
bank loans made in the ordinary course of
business as well as all obligations maturing
within 3 years. Before the tax was enacted
last September, however, a provision was
added in the Senate giving the President
standby authority to extend the tax to bank.
loans with a maturity of 1 year or more.
1 The tax and its implications have been
reviewed in the April and November 1964
issues of this letter.
Changes in U.S. short-term banking credits abroad
[In millions of dollars]
patterns of direct Investment. Until 2 or 3
years ago, the direction of the flows had
been mainly to Latin America and Canada.
In recent years, most of the term loans have
gone to Europe, particularly to Italy during
late 1963 and early 1964, and to Japan. The
shifts in the geographic distribution are
summed up in the second table.
Over the past year, changes in bank credits
abroad, short as well as long term, have been
particularly influenced by borrowings by Ja-
pan. These have grown substantially to
support the expanding volume of Japanese
trade and business activity. In recent
months, the rate of bank lending to Japan
has slowed down. As noted in these pages
last month, Japan has floated sizable
amounts of bonds in European markets.
Changes in U.S. long-term banking credits abroad
[In millions of dollars]
1955------------------------------ ---------------
1056------_------------------------------------------
1957------------------------ ----.--------------------
1958------------------------------------------------
1959-------------------------------------------------
1960-------------------------------------------------
1961--------------------------------------------------
1962 ---------------------------------- ----------------
1983 -----------_--_-------------------------------
1963--January-March---------------------------------
April-June------------------------------------
July-September--------------------------------
October-December'----------------------------
1964-January-March---------------------------------
April-June----------------- -------------------
Juty-August-----------------------------------
o utstanding: August 1964----------------------------
-21
95
164
20
-28
-1
126
86
518
27
150
82
259
155
80
49
1,385
Latin
America
240
67
116
85
131
126
17
-45
-5
-16
30
-1
-18
-15
28
1,037
-44
-27
6
4
3
3
5
50
129
2
35
30
62
62
14
8
3
22
33
28
5
-28
198
80
-29
-19
-28
10
S
-13
14
270
52
16
71
72
54
--10
6
49
--30
77
------------
2
11
31
415
I Pxclu ling the $193,000,000 item described in footnote 4 to the preceding table. Its geographical distribution is as
follows: Europe, $5,000,000; Latin America, $134,000,000; Japan, $46,000,000; and others, $8,000,000. The distribution
of the $86,000,000 item has not been published.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
Collections
Accept-
Loans
to-
Total 2
Long term
anew '
-
Banks 2
Others
24
40
94
209
230
87
137
93
94
411
108
-17
- 245
13
25
292
188
-2
-43
213
5
125
292
188.
95
-64
5
22
62
153
99
661
-35
22
099
336
14
641
224
140
1,099
336
-44
93
174
32
372
126
146
596
-171
132
703
6
22
25
90
341
-207
-94
29
24
-65
297
- -338
4178
24
74
-42
207
6
124
27
52
i5
456
121
4313
100
136
163
29
369
231
1
23
242
-101
7
15
32 3
30
130
- 956
2,840
1,326
919
6,041
- 3,440
 -Approved For Release 2003110/15 : CIA-RDP67B0b446R000300170003-8
T 965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 3319
ical lh) and su Piling Act ' (5Up le es-' co s ab y
cal li) d the e supplemental stock ie
ded by the improved, gigot at oStates, is ns no all of the States a product of practically
tablished, pursuant to section 104(b) of the may only result in complete rout now To manufacture millions of automo-
Agricultural Trade Development and As- those who are trying to contain Commu- biles you need materials in units often
sistance
704(b) . Such Act i9Gss ion may II. ade Dist expansion in southeast Asia. ordered in the tens of millions. It would
without hout regard d t o d the e provisions may of lie ma section 3 de For who, Mr. Speaker, would be will- be idle to tell the exact number of acres
wi provis
of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Ing to take the side of a "paper tiger" to of, cotton, of sheep ranches, of chemical
Piling Act: Provided, That the time and oppose the expanding military might of plants needed to produce the raw mate-
method of disposition shall be fixed with due Red China? If Vietnam goes down the rials for the many millions of yards of
regard to the protection of the United States drain, if we now withdraw our support fabrics needed merely for automobile
against avoidable loss and the protection of from the effort being waged by its peo- interiors.
producers, processors, and consumers against ple, where will we make our stand? . Similarly astounding statistics could be
SEC. 2avoidable. The Administrator Adonminis straatotheir r is rls usual
o author- Which country in the Far East would be gathered in telling the story of paint in-
ized, without regard to to the provisions of willing to put any trust in us then? gredients and their compounding, of
section 3 of the Strategic and Critical Mate- These questions are ignored by those metal mining and of fabrication of parts
rials Stock Piling Act, to make.available an who advocate immediate. negotiations- resulting, of rubber components, and of
additional fifty thousand short tons of lead or, in truth, our prompt withdrawal from all the rest.
now held in the national and supplemental Vietnam. And yet these very questions As impressive as that aspect of auto-
stockpiles for direct use by agencies of the must be faced, and answered, before we mobile manufacture is in all 50 of our
United States Government. embark upon a course which will lead us great States, it is not the equal, possibly,
The committee amendment was agreed past the point of no return not only in to the economic effect produced locally
to. southeast Asia but in the Far East and when great numbers of persons are able
The bill was ordered to be engrossed in Western Pacific as well. to enjoy the ownership of new automo-
and read a third' time, was read the third It is for this reason that I have ob- biles. The entire locality of sale soon
time, and passed. tained permission to insert in the Ap- undergoes economic invigoration.
The title was amended so as to read: pendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an To understand why this is so, it is
"A bill to authorize the disposal, without article which appeared in Sunday's New merely necessary to visualize a'gasoline
regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting York Times, by the respected military service station. This is possibly the
period, of lead from the national stock- commentator, Hanson W. Baldwin. Mr. most common sight in the land and it is
pile and the supplemental stockpile." Baldwin urges greater use of American, the outward manifestation of a great
A motion to reconsider was laid on the military power in Vietnam. He believes supplier and service industry that is even
table. we must stand firm and fight now to more diffused than the once centralized
avert. irreparable defeat. assembly of automobiles,
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days in which to extend
their remarks on the two bills. just
passed.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Mas-
sac usetts?
T ere was no objection.
LET US STAND IN VIETNAM
(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I know
you are fully aware of my deep and con-
tinuing interest in the situation in Viet-
nam.
Today I want to reaffirm my view that
this area must not be permitted to be lost
to the Communists, either by default or
by design.
Whether we like it or not, we have a
political and moral commitment to the
people of South Vietnam to assist them
against Communist insurgency from
-within, and Communist aggression from
without.
This commitment has been confirmed
by three successive Presidents of the
United States.
This commitment cannot be lightly
dismissed or negotiated away. Unpleas-
ant as it may be, our choice already has
been made. We must stand firm in Viet-
nam.
This does not mean, Mr. Speaker, that
negotiations may not ultimately help re-
solve the situation in Vietnam. But
negotiations should not, must not, be
used as a coverup for surrender. And
unless the position of the free people of
Although I do not agree in every de- Once the mind is focused on this huge
tail with Mr. Baldwin's observations and generator of economic well-being, it
recommendations, I believe that his views would be difficult indeed to think of any
deserve the careful attention of my col- part of America that would not get a
leagues. substantial local economic boost out of
increased ownership of new automobiles.
EXCSE TAX ON AUTOMOBILES A remaining question to be faced is,
SHOULD BE REMOVED Can the Nation afford the tax removal?
A better question is, Can the Nation
(Mr. FARNUM asked and was given afford not to remove this outdated and
permission to address the House for outmoded tax?
1 minute and to revise and extend his We have had considerable proof re-
remarks.) cently, and increasingly are getting more
Mr. FARNUM. Mr. Speaker, in join- of it, that over a period a tax cut may
ing with my distinguished colleague from not reduce revenue-if the cutting is well
Michigan, the Honorable MARTHA W. planned. A cut in the excise tax on
GRIFFITHS, and with other Members in automobiles may well leave the U.S.
support of a bill to remove the 10-percent Treasury in a better position, after a rea-
excise tax from automobiles, my pri- sonable time, than it held before the cut.
mary concern has been the economic I ask this honorable body to consider
well-being of the Nation rather than again the great economic activity that a
short-range interests of my district and price cut in automobiles would stir up
State. throughout the 50 States. Economic
I have explained this in detail to those activity of this kind always is reflected
who have approached me from the city of , in tax revenues from various sources and
Pontiac in my district and from other it requires little imagination to see that
great automobile manufacturing centers. cutting the excise tax on automobiles
A point I made was that unless the tax would result in increases in revenue
savings were passed on to the consumer, from a host of other sources.
the measure would have not my support There is one final thought I would
but my opposition. leave with the honorable gentlemen.
I have received assurances that a re- This is the joy a new automobile brings
duced take-home price, for automobiles to its owner. Is there a better way to
will be the result of reoval of the tax. pursue happiness, and to bring domestic
wonder if the honorable Members are tranquillity within the family circle, than
I
fully aware f the ra significance Me o rs er e in a gleamingly new automobile fresh off
fect, a substantial cut in the price of the showroom floor? I doubt it. A re-
automobiles to the people of each and duction in automobile prices, through an
every one of the 50 States? overdue cut in the excise tax, would
make meaningful the "unalienable right"
Most understand, I am sure, that when to pursue happiness for Americans from
the.automobile business is poor, the Na- Hawaii to Maine and from Alaska to
tion's entire economy tends to be poor; Texas.
when the automobile industry is hard at
work, most of America also tends to be
hard at profitable work.
Among the reasons for this is that
automobiles, wherever they may be
PEDDLERS OF HATE
(Mr. SCHWEIKER asked and was
given permission to address the House
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3320
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE ebruary 23
for 1 minute, to revise and extend his re- The ravings of that organization fell on
marks, and to include extraneous mat- fallow ground at the Penn fraternity house.
These decent, intelligent young men scorned
ter.)
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, I the barefaced appeal to join an army of
hatred the attenion of my colleagues and But t 'will other young men across the
the Nation to a vicious anti-Semitic country have the intellectual fortitude to
campaign being waged on college cam- resist this base attack, particularly where
puses in the Philadelphia area and else- religious intolerance already exists? We
where. A lunatic fringe group calling it- hope so.
self the Christian Youth Corps of St. But there's an Old saying that if you throw
Petersburg, Fla., has mailed to college enough mud on a fence, some-of it will stick.
There's
a vile anti-Semitic letter seek- s always the possibility that such
propaganda will take root in some young and
ing to raise an army of hate. The lead- impressionable minds.
ers of the group are identified in the let- The blazing emblem of this Christian
ter as a Col. Oren F. Potito and a Lt. Youth Corps is a black cross on a field of
Philip D. Le Bus. This fanatical group white and red. That's the color scheme of
talks hysterically about--and I quote- the Nazis. The impression it gives, along
"Red hordes that will soon attack the with the printed matter, is more suggestive
United States." This extremist group in of the swastika.
The Youth Corps calls the late President
Its hate letters asks, and again I quote, Franklin D. Roosevelt a tool of what it de-
"young Christian Americans of Anglo- scribes as the Jewish brain trust. They say
Saxon stock to join us In the fight to this brain trust arranged the Second World
save our beloved Nation from the Jew- War.
Communist conspiracy." This so-called The Youth Corps describes Philanthropist
Christian Youth Corps goes on at length Samuel Fels as the man who financed the
in its vicious diatribe to make the Jewish Russian revolution, and killed 21 million
religion synonymous with communism Christians. But the University of Pennsyl-
vania is proud to point to the Fels Institute
and it then urges college students to of Local and State Government on its
become "brothers-in-arms," to equip campus.
themselves for "guerrilla warfare opera- And here's a direct quote-from this so-
tions" by obtaining knives, rifles, 1,000 called Christian Youth Corps: "Today Jews
rounds of ammunition, and other war control our Government and our money sys-
supplies. Mr. Speaker, like most of my tem, and are responsible for all the racial
colleagues, I have seen a great deal of strife that is tearing the Nation apart by
the hate trash which fanatical groups organizing and financing pro-Communist
organizations such as the NAACP, CORE,
such as this "Christian Youth Corps" ACT, and the Black Muslims."
circulate throughout the Nation. But I Throughout the diatribe, the Jewish re-
have rarely seen material as vicious as ligion is made synonymous with commu-
n sYouth
this. I am alarmed, Mr. Speaker. I am nism. oFor theAngl Christian
stock
alarmed that not enough light is being Corps calls on youth
c
thrown on the activities of such crack- to we fight quote, "Jew- save Cothis mmunist country from the, and
pots. I am today asking that the House The Christian Youth Corps warns college
Committee on Un-American Activities students a Communist attack will come very
Investigate the operations of this vicious soon. It tells them they better be on the
group of hate peddlers calling itself the right side, or be destroyed with the Jews.
Christian Youth Corps. They might They urge the students to obtain a rifle and
more properly be called vigilantes of 1,000 rounds of ammunition. They urge the
hate. The committee investigation of students to join their army of 10 million
this group could properly be handled Christians, Including the Minutemen, now
with the proposed committee investiga- facing investigation by the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee.
tion of that similar group calling itself WCAU radio has pledged to expose the
the "Minutemen." I urge my colleagues activities of hate groups wherever we find
to support such an inquiry to shed light them. We are sending copies of this hate
on the outrageous activities of these propaganda to the appropriate Government
groups. agencies and officials. And we can for a
Mr. Speaker, WCAU radio in Philadel- complete investigation of this attempt to re-
phia has done a great public service by cruit a lawless army of hate in our Nation.
calling the public's attention to the hate- CHRISTIAN YOUTH CORPS
mongering Christian Youth Corps. I am Asks young Christian Americans of Anglo-
inserting WCAU's editorial. In addition, Saxon stock to join us in the fight to save
Mr. Speaker, I am inserting a copy of the our beloved Nation from the Jew-Communist
Christian Youth Corps letter because I conspiracy.
feel my colleagues and the people of this Only the Christian young men of this
Nation should have an opportunity to Nation can save it from the ever tightening
see for themselves the vile trash which Red grip that Satan's children (international
these hate peddlers are circulating: Jewry) are fastening upon us.
(WCAII radio, editorial] Prepare yourselves for this battle for
Christ, when the Christ hating Jews unleash
INVESTIGATE HATE ARMY their Red Communist hordes upon us.
Hate peddlers have launched a vicious Remember that Karl Marx was a Jew,
anti-Semitic campaign on college campuses whose real name was Moses Mordecai Levi,
in the Philadelphia area and elsewhere. the son of a rabbi. Lenin and Trotsky were
A lunatic fringe group has sent its hys- also .lews, as are all top Communists.
terical outpourings to at least one fraternity That the Russian revolution was financed
at the University of Pennsylvania. by American Jews Jacob Schiff and Felds,
Behind this attack is a recruiting cam- owner of Fels-Naphtha Soap Co. More than
paign for an army of hate. 21 million Christians have died in Red purges
The organization which is trying to cap- since.
ture the minds of college students calls itself That International Jewish bankers (the
the Christian Youth Corps. It's based in House of Rothschild) promoted World War I
St. Petersburg, Fla. and succeeded in getting Christian, to fight
against Christian until 15 million were killed,
The Jews and communism were the only
profiteers.
That U.S. entry into World War II was
conveniently arranged by the Jewish brain
trust that ran the (Rosenvelt, his Dutch Jew
name) administration, to prevent destruc-
tion of communism by Germany.
That all but one of the atomic spys who
gave our atomic secrets to Russia were Jews.
That today Jews control our Government
and our money system; and are responsible
for all the racial strife that is tearing the
Nation apart by organizing and financing
pro-Communist organizations such as the
NAACP, CORE, ACT, and Black Muslims.
Christian Anglo-Saxon young men we ask
you to join us in our battle against Judaistic
communism. Remember what our Lord and
Saviour, Jesus Christ said to the Jews, "You
are Satan's children and his works you do."
All athiestic communism it attempting to
do is take control of the world for Satan,
and international Jewry is carry out this plan
to the letter.
However, Almighty God is going to give we
Christians the final victory through his be-
loved Son when He returns. You had better
be fighting on the right side or you will be
destroyed as will be the Jews, and all other
enemies of Christ.
We are brothers-in-arms with the U.S.
rangers, the California rangers, the Minute-
men, the Texas Rangers, the Green Moun-
tain boys in New England, and many other
smaller localized organizations all of which
comprise a vast national Christian army of
over 10 million patriotic men who are ready
to defend this Nation against the Red hordes
that will soon attack the United States.
Each man needs the following basic equip-
ment for guerrilla warfare operations.
1. Any standard rifle of at least .30 caliber.
2. One good quality hunting knife, 6-inch
blade.
3. At least 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
4. Regulation canteen-holder-webbed belt.
5. Any suitable type backpack on which
can be mounted; a good quality sleeping bag;
a good quality two-man tent.
6. Three pair of camouflage fatigues of
heavy duck cloth.
7. At least one pair of insulated paratroop
type boots.
8. Seven-day supply of concentrated food
packs.
9. At least 500 water purification tablets.
10. Snake bite and first aid kit.
11. One mosquito bar.
12. One camouflaged waterproof poncho.
This is a basic equipment list that will
allow you to operate an an effective guerrilla
unit.
We shall fight from the fields, from the
plains, from the swamps, and from the
mountains; and although overwhelmingly
outnumbered in men and equipment we shall
still be victorious for we have Almighty God
on our side and at the precise moment his
heavenly armies will intervene and give us
the victory through the triumphant return
of His blessed Son.
Let us remember the words of our late
Christian president who was assassinated by
the anti-Christ Jew-Communists, "I am a
Berliner," and in the spirit of these brave
people let us prepare to defend our Christian
heritage for Almighty God, for Christ, and
the Nation.
For more Information write to: Col. Oren
F. Potito, or Lt. Philip D. Le Bus, Post Office
Box 20183, St. Petersburg, Fla.
LE Bus ANTIQUE AEROPLANE CO.,
St. Petersburg., Fla., January 31, 1965.
ATO FRATERNITY.
DEAR BROTHERS: It pleases me to tell you
that we now have a large number of brothers
in the corps ready to fight for Christ and
Nation.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 T 965 Approved For 8f,U7BgWAW0300170003-8 33101
the offer of the Japanese to mediate. I believe that is the "greatest danger in think that because peace is so wonderful
Perhaps, it we could suggest something, the dialog on this subject. I believe that and so much to be sought after we should
I. would most enthusiastically join the every Senator and others who have allow the Communists to trick us into
Senator in a plea for vigorous action by spoken have had much to add, but I negotiations, which would be used to ex-
the administration to enlist the partici- especially wish to commend the Senator ploit us for their purpose. The way to
pation of our allies. If any such vigorous from Connecticut and to associate my- get peace is to try to improve our posi-
action is in fact being taken, it is so self with his strong recommendations, tion, to be able to proceed from a stand-
quiet, so submerged, so subdued, that particularly in regard to the intensifica- point of strength, rather than from a
even we Who are extremely sensitive and tion of. political warfare in that troubled standpoint of weakness. When we reach
have many places where we can get in- sector, and the encouragement of greater that point we shall not be laying our-
formation, have heard nothing about it. collective action by other people of the selves open to helping them in their ob-
I I believe it is in this area that we Asiatic nations. jective to propagandize themselves and
should push and press. Bringing in our Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful to the alleged position that they have in
allies does not have so many of the con- the Senator from Oklahoma for his Vietnam.
notations of negotiations with the other comments. I compliment the distinguished Sena-
side-that is, with the Communists; but Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will tor on his firm position.
we really should make massive demands the Senator from Connecticut yield? Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.
and keep at it eternally to get help in Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
this situation, so that Asians may get Senator from Oklahoma. the Senator yield?
into the struggle, which is a struggle for Mr. MONRONEY. I should like to join Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator
the whole of Asia. my distinguished junior colleague in from Ohio.
Mr. DODD. I wholly agree with the complimenting the able and distinguished Mr. LAUSCHE. I am extremely de-
Senator from New York. I have said Senator from Connecticut on his stand lighted to state that my views have in
so many times years ago. and the position he has taken in regard the past coincided with the views of the
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct. to Vietnam. Senator from Connecticut and coincide
Mr. DODD. When I came back from I had the great good fortune to repre- with them today. It is my recollection
the trip which I made, I referred to it on sent the Senate in a visit to southeast that in the Korean negotiations, the pro-
the floor of the Senate. I then thought Asia between Thanksgiving and Christ- posal to negotiate was not made by -the
it was urgent and necessary. It is even mas for 3 days-to make the most of some United States, but by the North Koreans.
more urgent and necessary now. I com- 3 days by interviewing men who had Does the Senator have a recollection on
pletely agree. served in that theater. Later, I talked to that point?
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator many who have served throughout the Mr. DODD. That is my recollection.
from Connecticut. entire Far East theater of operations. I Mr. LAUSCHE. I am quite certain
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the am convinced, as the Senator from Con- that that is correct. Now it is proposed
Senator from Connecticut yield? necticut is convinced, that an attempt to that we negotiate, and those who make
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. arrange a negotiated settlement at this the proposal used the analogy of what
MusxiE in the chair). Does the Senator time would be folly in the extreme. happened in Korea. Actually there is no
from Connecticut yield to the Senator The Communists could use these so- analogy.
from Oklahoma? called negotiations merely as a stalking- I heard the discussion about terrorism
Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the horse to get their apparatus more firmly I would like to hear the Senator's view
Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS]. at work or to gain time, or to gain place, on whether the terrorism is in the main
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish or gain a position, or gain land, or gain practically and in completeness the acts
to associate myself with the remarks of in the conflict. I spent some time in of the guerrillas of North Vietnam
the Senator from Connecticut and to Korea-3 days there. The only reason against the peasants in the hamlets in
commend him for the excellent think- the Korean armistice has worked is the South Vietnam.
ing through which he has done on this fact that we have had military power Mr. DODD. I do not want to be un-
grave problem and for the presentation back of the 38th parallel, in a command- derstood as altogether absolving the
of his very important recommendations Ing position in the mountains, and have South Vietnamese from any acts of
in this critical situation. I commend got air cover behind that, and tanks be- terror. Unhappily, these things have
him particularly for the overall posi- hind the air cover to make that line occurred on both sides. However, I be-
tion that what we are doing is so much stick. lieve that the overwhelming number of
better than two or three of the other Otherwise the armistice agreement acts of terror are chargeable directly to
alternatives which are available to us, would not have been worth the paper on the Communists. There is no doubt
among which are pulling out altogether which it had been written, if we had had about that. Terror is a part of their
from South Vietnam or neutralization to depend on the Communists. Then it policy; whereas to some extent it may be
without adequate safeguards, which was the Korean Communists; this time it true of South Vietnam, it is not the
would result in the same end as with- Is the Vietnamese Communists. They stated policy.
drawal from South Vietnam and eventual are all of the same breed of cats. They Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree completely
withdrawal from southeast Asia. may differ in their ideologies, as between with the Senator from Connecticut that
I believe that a general debate on this the Chinese Reds and the Russian Reds, it is their technique to intimidate and
and all other matters of foreign policy but they are both Reds; they are both terrorize the peasants working in the
are of great benefit, and help the people Communists. In 99 percent of the cases, fields and living serenely in their homes,
of this country establish a general con- agreements are made by them for the descending upon them at night to de-
sensus, which we as public officials have very purpose of breaking them and mis- capitate their leaders and place their
the responsibility not only to discover leading and tricking their opponents, separated heads on poles, so that the
but also to lead toward. Nevertheless, it and without any hope of having them peasants will begin to fear that if they
seems to me that we must be careful that honor their written commitments in any take up the position of chieftan or leader
we do not by our statements indicate to manner, shape, or form. they Will likewise suffer the same fate.
the people of southeast Asia, or to those I am surprised that so many Members Mr.' DODD. That is why it is done.
who are our adversaries there, that this of the Senate, with good and peaceful Mr. LAUSCHE. I heard the discus-
country plans any kind of negotiation intentions, invariably are taken in by this sion between the Senator from Connecti-
which would result in our abandonment absolutely phony argument, which bears cut and the Senator from Illinois about
of the people of South Vietnam and, by the hallmark of deceit and intent at mis- drawing a lesson from what happened
any such statements, perhaps, accom- representation and the obvious purpose following the violation of treaties going
plish the same results which many fear- of deceiving. I am surprised that it back to 1939. Unless we take a look at
that is, that we"would force the admin- should fool anyone. I regret very much these incidents of appeasement we shall
istration to ever'-increasing military ef- that so many of my able and distin- miss completely the lessons that must
forts to keep those people from thinking guished colleagues in the Senate, who are be drawn from past conduct in order to
that we are going to pull out. in a position to know better, seem to guide ourselves in the future.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved Fo6 es pa /1&1 EEE P6~ 0AfflR000300170003 3,ebruacy 23
Mr. DODD. That is very true. I do
not offer these analogies because I think
think they are exact parallels. The Sen-
ator understands that, I am sure. There
are always some differences. I know
that. However, we learn from what hap-
pened in the past, certainly from what
happened in the near past, and we study
these happenings in order to learn from
them. If others made mistakes, we
should try to learn how to avoid repeat-
ing them. I drew these analogies for
that purpose. There are other examples
in history-these are not the only ones-
but the ones that I drew on are the
latest and perhaps the most pertinent.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There was the Ver-
sailles Treaty and the League of Nations
covenants, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
and the Lucarno Treaty. All of them
contained provisions which were violated
by the Japanese as early as 1922.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. By Hitler beginning
about 1932, and by Mussolini at the same
time. In instance after instance it was
thought that if we would give in, it
would be the end of it.
Mr. DODD. That is true. I referred
to Nuremberg and what we discovered
there. One of the thinks we learned was
that at the time Hitler ordered his troops
to occupy the Rhineland, he had given
instructions that if they met any op-
position at all they should immediately
retreat. How easy it would have been
for us to stop him cold then. There was
considerable dissatisfaction with Hitler
in his own military circles, and, as we
know, there was an attempt made later
to get rid of him.
We failed in that situation to take the
appropriate steps. Our failure enabled
Hitler to remain in power.
There were those who said, "Oh, no;
war would result if we tried to stop Hit-
ler now, and it would be terrible." We
did not do what we should have done,
and in that way a terrible war was
brought on.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It has been suggested
that we negotiate the future political
status of South Vietnam. What does
that mean? Does it mean that we should
negotiate a new type of government for
South Vietnam?
Mr. DODD. I do not know. I do not
believe that the Senator from New York
meant it that way. As I understood him,
he made a good point. I am sure the
Senator from Ohio shares my feeling on
that point. As I understood the Senator
from New York, we do not want to do
anything that will give the impression
that we are for unconditional surrender
and, on the other hand, we do not want
to give the impression that we will have
nothing to do with the Communists.
That is all that the Senator from New
York meant, I am sure.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There is now in exist-
ence a pact by which we have abided and
by which the South Vietnamese have
abided, but which the North Vietnamese
have violated.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the Geneva
Pact of 1954.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. In addition, to that,
a new agreement was made in 1962, in
Laos.
Mr. DODD. Yes.
Mr. LAUSCHE. There we followed the
policy of negotiation.
Mr. DODD. Yes. I believe it was in
1961.
Mr. LAUSCHE. May I ask whether
the Laotian agreement worked out as it
was anticipated it would work out by the
sponsors of it?
Mr. DODD. Not at all. It could not
have worked out worse than it did. For
the people of Laos and the people of
southeast Asia and for us it has been a
complete farce. It has been repeatedly
violated, and it is being violated every
day. It is another case of our inability
to trust those people.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I commend the Sen-
ator from Connecticut for his presenta-
tion, because I believe what he has said
and what others have said on this point
will bring home to the minds of the
America~nn people that what is involved
is not dierely wanting to be in southeast
Asia, but that our national security is
involved. In my judgment, wordsto the
contrary, are not at this time helpful to
the achievement of the common objec-
tive that we seek to achieve.
Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the Sen-
ator for his compliment, which I do not
deserve, but which I enjoy.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE
PRESIDENT
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TYDINGS in the chair). On behalf of the
Vice President, pursuant to Public Law
87-758, the Chair announces the ap-
pointment of the Senator from Vermont
[Mr. PROUTY] as a member of the Na-
tional Fisheries Center and Aquarium
Advisory Board for a 4-year term.
INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate resume to the con-
sideration of Calendar No. 64, House bill
45.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TYDINCS in the chair). The bill will be
stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
45) to amend the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank Act to authorize the
United States to participate in an in-
crease in the resources of the Fund for
Special Operations of the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Arkansas.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to make a brief statement in sup-
port-of S. 805, a bill to amend the Inter-
American Development Bank Act to au-
thorize the United States to participate
in an increase in the resources of the
Bank's Fund for Special Operations.
I say that the statement will be short.
I do so not as an indication of the
strength of my support for the meas-
ure-indeed, I thoroughly approve of
this bill-but in order to spare Senators
a complicated and wearisome recital of
factual material. A plethora of facts
and figures will be found in the printed
material on Senator's desks. As with
data on any financial institution, there
is virtually no end to the figures, charts,
and tables. Oversimplification of such
material in this case may be a service
rather than a danger.
I have said that I heartily approve of
this bill, attd I am sure that my reasons
for this position will be shared by a great
number of Senators, for this is the kind
of foreign assistance activity in which
the United States should be engaged.
The purpose of the bill is easily and fully
identifiable. The financing is of a kind
which is particularly suited to the needs
of friendly countries. We can readily
keep track of the process of lending
through ample public information on
projects and their results. Self-help and
responsibility are engendered through
the participation of the countries being
assisted. Criteria for eligibility are kept
high. And the United States does not
become embroiled in political squabbling
or become the target of resentment and
unseemly pressures.
However, before elaborating on any of
these points it is necessary to give at
least a very simplified explanation of the
purposes and effects of this proposed
legislation. We should start, I think,
with the important fact that Latin.
American countries by and large are in
a position where they find it increasingly
difficult to service loans for economic and
social development on conventional or
hard terms. In addition, many vitally
necessary projects in the so-called infra-
structure category must be undertaken
as a precursor to overall economic de-
velopment. Since these projects do not
represent an immediate or short-term
economic return, they generally cannot
be financed through ordinary banking
operations. It almost goes without say-
ing that loans for social projects such as
housing, technical training, and educa-
tion require special kinds of financing.
The need for this kind of lending ac.
tivity was recognized at the time of the
Inter-American Development Bank's es-
tablishment 5 years ago, and a Fund for
Special Operations was created as a com-
pletely separate window of the Bank to
service this requirement. At the same
time, the initial resources made available
to this special Fund were quite modest
in comparison with the amounts sub-
scribed toward the ordinary conventional
lending operations of the Bank. More-
over, it was not then recognized how
closely intertwined were the fields of eco???
nomic and social development, and the
Fund for Special Operations was not
designed as an underwriter of social
projects. To fill the resulting gap, the
United States in 1961 unilaterally con-
tributed a large sum to be administered
through yet a third window by the Inter-
American Bank; this window has been
known as the Social Progress Trust
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1965
Approved ForR~,5 :BR17BR00300170003-8
should have been made public. I do not
see much sense in classifying this mate-
rial' and concealing it. The people do
not know these facts.
Mr. DOMINICK. It is particularly
important with respect to the arguement
made by those who would like to see us
negotiate and neutralize. The South
Vietnamese villages are not with us. But
it is very difficult to have them cooperate
with us if they are under the grip of
terrorism and many people in their
areas are being murdered. Until we
give them the security they need, it is
hard for them to be able to do anything.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, one
of the things that has not been made
plain in the overall debate, I feel, is the
fact that there is a contest of willpower
in this area. There is no doubt in my
mind, from the study that I have made
of the overall situation, that the Com-
munists are using the so-called national
liberalization plan as a test mechanism
to determine how great the willpower
of the free world is. If this plan should
be successful in persuading us to nego-
tiate or neutralize, it is inevitable that
this technique will spread widely
throughout the world, through Africa,
South America, and Latin America.
It is already being used. But I be-
lieve it will be accelerated sharply. I
think the Senator brought that point
out very well. I congratulate him on
making a very useful contribution.
Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. MUNDT. I congratulate the dis-
tinguished Senator from Connecticut
for having presented a most conclusive
and comprehensive statement on this
whole Vietnamese problem. It is the
type of white paper which I hoped the
State Department would have placed be-
fore the American people long ago.
I believe it would still be well for them
to do so. In his analysis of the historic
developments of the problems" and the
consequences involved in this important
theater of the world, the Senator leaves
little doubt as to his accuracy.
While men may disagree among them-
selves as to the various processes to be
used to bring this matter to a successful
culmination, the matters that the Sena-
tor has anticipated are the type that
should emanate from the State Depart-
ment, carrying the full weight of the ad-
ministration and the Government. I am
sure that would convince many fine
American citizens, who are beginning to
doubt their own judgments in these
areas, as to what is involved.
I congratulate the Senator on a most
comprehensive study. I am happy to
note the emphasis and the importance
which the Senator places on it step-up
political warfare in this area.
The distinguished Senator from Con-
necticut has long tried to establish a
training institution in this country so
that we could prepare Americans to go
overseas, for the type of warfare-we wish
to pursue, with a stable, constituted gov-
ernment in Vietnam.
I hope that the State Department,
which has shown such a stubborn re-
luctance to provide the type training
required for this type of warfare, will
consider carefully the emphasis that the
Senator places on this particular recom-
ihendation for future activity.
The Senator talks about cadres of
trained political leaders and emissaries
from these countries who are equipped
and capable so that they could deliver
the type of . guidance and inspiration
needed by our friends in South Vietnam.
Unfortunately, this is always debated in
a vacuum in our ability to wage a cold
war.
I happen to be one of those who be-
lieve honestly that had the other body
approved in 1960 what the Senate then
did approve, legislation for the creation
of a freedom academy-following a won-
derful report written in large part by
the Senator from Connecticut, as a mem-
ber of the Committee on the Judiciary,
emphasizing the need for this adjunct
to our contest against the Communists
overseas-we would have had 5 long
years within which not only to train our-
selves, but also to provide for young gov-
ernmental officials and career people in
the government in Saigon to come here
and learn the full truth about the tech-
niques and devices employed by the Com-
munists. These officials and career peo-
ple would have learned to understand
the maneuvers and manipulations of the
Communist conspiracy, and been trained
to be better able to convince their fel-
low citizens on the free side of the Viet-
namese struggle of the dividends which
accrue to freedom, and the importance
of Communists.
There would not have been the melan-
cholic succession of quick changes in the
officialdom of South Vietnam. We
would have obtained what all hands
agree is an indispensable requirement in
bringing success to our efforts there-
the creation of a stable government in
South Vietnam which has not only the
will to win, but also the respect of the
local people, so that it in turn would sup-
port the Government and maintain its
stability in office, so that the people there
could get on with the work to be done.
Mr. DODD.. The Senator gives me
credit for the idea of the Freedom Acad-
emy. It was the idea of the Senator
from South Dakota. I was merely a
minor help in getting it through the
Senate. The Senator from South Da-
kota deserves great credit for it.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator
from Texas.
Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator
from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. The speech of the Sen-
ator from Connecticut is altogether too
provocative and he has done his home-
work altogether too well for him to be
complimented merely or. a good job. It
is a good job, however, and I should like
to join my colleagues from Texas, South
Dakota, and other States who have said
so. Any time the Senator devotes him-
self to this kind of work, it helps the
country.
The Senator from Connecticut has
done a thorough job in presenting new
ideas. This is the place for them, for
we are not inhibited by the administra-
tion or its policies, especially when a
Democrat puts forth a good idea.
One lack, as I have said before, is that
retaliation has been pictured as a policy.
It is not a policy. It is a reaction. We
support it. We close ranks behind the
President. We have common interests in
it and in the losses. The losses break
our hearts, but we try to do something
about them. However, it is not a policy.
The Senator from Connecticut is try-
ing to work out a policy. Whether it be
a good or a bad policy, he is right
in trying to work it out, because he pro-
poses something positive, which takes us
on a road where there is a big lack. That
is what is causing doubts among the
people as to whether this country is going
to pull out of South Vietnam or go for-
ward.
Granting all that I have said, I should
like to ask the Senator some questions.
In the first place, the Senator does not
deal with something that troubles many
of us, and that is the question, "Is there
still a majority in South Vietnam who do
not want communism? Do a majority
of the people want to fight against it?"
We cannot fight a war without soldiers.
That statement goes whether the fight is
for an ideology or for freedom. That is
one question we must always determine.
We cannot put our head on other peo-
ple's shoulders and assume they are
"buddies." We may, for example, be
bitterly opposed in Albania and other
places, because the people there may
want communism. They may like it.
.That is a very gnawing question with re-
spect to South Vietnam: What is the at-
titude of the people of the country?
Only a declaration of the President of
the United States can answer. I know
that is so often said that it must sound
like a cliche, but it is the President who
has the vast reservoir of intelligence
information. I think all of us, notwith-
standing difference of party, would ac-
cept a declaration on the facts by the
President of the United States. We are
colleagues from South Dakota and Colo- talking about the Presidency; it is not
rado in commending the able and distin- the man or party we are talking about.
guished Senator from Connecticut for It is the office we are speaking of.
his comprehensive contribution to the So, first, we ought to have a declara-
dialog on southeast Asia. It must be tion and assurance, based on the whole
made clear to the American people that combination of intelligence, diplomatic,
we must take stringent action in south- and military advice, that a majority still
east Asia if we are to deter and discour- favors fighting communism in that
age further aggressive adventures by the country.
Communists. Again I thank the Sen- I wish the Senator would comment on
ator from Connecticut very much. that point.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Mr. DODD. The Senator from New
Senator yield? York was not in the Chamber when I
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3300
Approved Foe Mt ,1ilS e P67 k 000300170003-9'ebruary 23
commented on that point; but I pointed
out that, from all the information I can
get, the Vietnamese people are over-
whelmingly in favor of resisting Com-
munist aggressors.
I pointed out that the people of Viet-
nam have a long history of resistance
against oppression. I know and I have
pointed out that many people believe
that the people of South Vietnam have
no will to fight, and that communism
has an attraction for them. But the
record shows that at the several different
periods in their history, when they have
been under attack, they have demon-
strated their will to resist. It was the
people of Vietnam who successfully re-
sisted Genghis Khan. In our own time,
they threw out the French. And they
had been free for 500 years before
the French occupation. They are proud
of the fact that they threw the French
out with their army of 500,000 men. So,
I repeat that the Vietnamese people have
historically displayed the will to resist
and they are displaying the same will to-
day. They behave very well, in fact.
And the evidence is that they Are over-
whelmingly anti-Communist.
I pointed out that some people say the
Vietnamese do not know anything about
freedom, and that it is silly to talk about
freedom for the Vietnamese. There are,
however, three or four or five kinds of
freedom.
The primitive peasant in the moun-
tains knows what freedom is. Many of
-them have lived under communism, so
they also know what slavery is.
The freedom enjoyed by the Vietnam-
ese peasant I call a natural freedom.
The peasant can plant his own seed,
raise his crops and sell his produce. He
has a family life, he can guide the up-
bringing of his children, he can elect lo-
cal officials. If, in addition, the govern-
ment builds a school, and, dispensary, or
supplies him with fertilizer, he thinks he
is about as free as anybody in the world
can be.
They do not have to have democratic,
parliamentary freedom such as we have.
I do not mean to detract from parlia-
mentary democracy, but historically it
is a refined form of democracy. How-
ever, it just is not true that the Viet-
namese people do not know very much
about freedom. They do know much
about it. They have demonstrated that
again and again.
There is another kind of freedom, and
that is freedom from foreign domination.
They know the meaning of this, too. As
I said before, they defeated Genghis
Khan, and they threw out the French.
That they have the will to resist com-
munism is borne out by the fact that 1
million have fled south. Roughly 5
million of them have, atone time or an-
other, fought the Communists.
If we make allowance for wives and
children, that would make a figure of '9
or 10 out of 14 million. The percentage
may even be higher.
Again I repeat that the Vietnamese
people do have the will to resist.: All they
want from us is aid to counterbalance
the technicians and personnel, and
weapons that the Communists have been
pouring in to support the Vietcong
guerrillas.
I cannot give the Senator from New
York the declaration which he wisely
says we ought to have on Vietnam. I
cannot speak In that capacity. I can say
that, from my information-and I cited
it-I am convinced that the facts are as
I have stated them.
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator referred to
the fact that the answer to my question is
mentioned in his speech. I was not pres-
ent in the Chamber all the time he was
making his speech, but I have read it. I
would not have presumed to ask the Sen-
ator these questions had I not read it.
The purpose of my questions is more for
emphasis.
The Senator from Connecticut has al-
ready answered a collateral question in
the course of his last reply; namely,
whether the South Vietnamese want our
help.
I am pleased to hear the Senator say
that a declaration by the President on
this subject would be a good thing. It is
necessary. I am not critical, but that
does not stop us from urging what would
be good for the country and the world.
Mr. DODD. I knew the Senator was
present. I was aware of his presence
while I was speaking.
I think it is good to do anything that
would help our people understand where
they are, and what we are trying to do
in Vietnam.
Mr. JAVITS. One big point being
made is on the question of negotia-
tion. The Senator has said that the de-
mand that ewe negotiate now over
Vietnam is akin to having asked
Churchill to negotiate with the Germans
at the time of Dunkirk and President
Truman to negotiate at the time of
Pusan. I assume that also goes for Presi-
dent Kennedy with respect to Castro.
Let me ask the Senator this question,
which concerns a Presidential declara-
tion. I do not know what the answer of
the Senator will be, therefore I may be
making a mistake, because a trial lawyer
should not ask a question to which he
does not already know the -answer, but I
believe that-
Mr. DODD. That is not what Is
worrying me. I am worrying as to
whether I know the answer.
Mr. JAVITS. It is important that we
explore each 'other's minds to see
whether we agree with each other's point
of view.
As the President has stated, we are
ready to negotiate. We are ready to
negotiate if negotiations do not repre-
sent a sellout of the people of South
Vietnam or a sellout of the cause of
freedom.
I should like that formula better, be-
cause this is a big question in'the world:
"Is the United States In a mood for un-
conditional surrender?" The Senator
and every newspaper editor in the world
know precisely what I mean by that.
What are we saying here-that some-
day, somehow, as in the case of the Berlin
airlift, or other emergencies which looked
as though they would never be settled,
some way will be found out of the sit-
uation? The same thing occurred in
Korea. The day came when there was
some kind of negotiation, good, bad, or
indifferent. Therefore, would the Sen-
ator, consistent with his conscience and
his views, subscribe to the proposal that
we should assert that we are ready to
negotiate, provided it is not a sellout
negotiation and not a negotiation for
face-saving purposes because we wish to
find a good reason to pull out, but that
we are ready to negotiate honestly and
legitimately for a political settlement of
the issue, now, tomorrow, or at any other
time?
Mr. DODD. Perhaps I could answer
the Senator's question better and more
directly if he would tell me what it is
that he would suggest we negotiate.
Mr. JAVITS. I suggest that we nego-
tiate the political future of South Viet-
nam, or that we encourage South Viet-
nam to negotiate it, in or out of the
United Nations, in or out of the Geneva
conventions, so long as the conditions
which are the framework of the nego-
tiations do not show the United States
to be pulling out of South Vietnam.
Mr. DODD. What I am worried about
is the fact that we already have an
agreement. We have already negotiated
one. It has been violated. What do we
negotiate? Do we sit around a table
and say, "You have broken your agree-
ment. Stop doing it. Get back and
obey its terms." I suppose that could be
described as negotiation in a crude sense.
But it seems to me that this is all we
have to negotiate.
I do not like to use the term "negotia-
tion" when what we are really talking
about is a breach of covenant. If I have
a contract with the Senator from New
York and I should break it, I believe that
he would use stronger language than
negotiation.
I do not wish to be evasive. If it
would help to sit down and talk with the
Communists, I would be in favor of it.
But, I have serious doubt that it would
help us in this crisis. Certainly, in a
general sense, the President has stated
that we are always willing to negotiate.
If there Is anything, really, to nego-
tiate, and if it would help, I am sure the
President would do it.
I would put it a little differently. We
do not know what there is to negotiate.
We already have an agreement. We say,
"We have an agreement which you have
violated and which has caused some
trouble. All you have to do is to retire
from your aggressions, and cease attack-
ing your neighbor." If the Communists
are willing to talk about this, then I sup-
pose we should do so.
Mr. JAVITS. I have suggested the
framework for negotiations, and let me
say that the Senator has just made what
could be an excellent opening statement
by the United States in such a negoti-
ation. I believe that within that frame-
work, the Senator and I could agree.
But let me make one further com-
ment on this subject which is important;
in debate and in fortifying our own con-
science on this issue, we must not forget
that we are supposed to have allies In
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,
in mutual defense agreements, even in
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 T X65 Approved For RiL C-7B044~,Q.Q0300170003-8 327
except through some newspaper articles. Mr. ELLENDER. I want the senator 1 ~Mr. DODD. If I may int
So far as I know, no formal errupt, that
inquiry was from Connecticut to know that I have could well have been learned from the
ever made, although there have been taken part in debates in the Chamber in Senator from Illinois.
many ugly rumors. But officially, we respect to South Vietnam on many oc- Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the gen-
do not know why Diem was overthrown, casions, but I am not one to try to dic- eral elevation of attitude and the pow-
or how his death occurred. tate to the President what he ought to erful logic of the speech. This is the
That was the beginning of our trouble do. most puzzling and dangerous problem
in South Vietnam. I make this state- Mr. DODD. Neither am I. which our country has faced since Oc-
ment only for historical reference, so Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far tober 1962.
that I may put my response in better now that I do not know what the whole I agree with the Senator from Con-
perspective, We have since the death of picture is. I still contend that unless necticut that many Americans do not
Diem been plagued with the fall of one we can persuade our allies to assist us sufficiently appreciate what the loss of
government after another in South Viet- in that area, and unless we can enable South Vietnam would mean to the free
nam. There must be a stable., Govern- the South Vietnamese to build up to the world and to the anti-Communist forces.
ntent, and we cap and must try to help point where they will have a strong, sta- I am not an expert on the subject of
the South Vietnamese achieve it. ble government, there is no telling how this territory, but a study of the map in-
Mr. ELLENDER. Suppose we cannot long we shall be in that country, and dicates what is involved. The Senator is
accomplish that? there is no telling how many American completely correct in his statement that
Mr. DODD. I do not think that will lives will be lost. I doubt that there is the fall of South Vietnam, or a with-
happen. I think it can be done. any way to win there under present con- drawal from South Vietnam, unless con-
Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator has ditions. ditions change, would mean the almost
been speaking about Diem? As the Senator may recall, the late immediate fall of Cambodia and Laos
Mr. DOPD. It is an "if" question. I President Kennedy said-and I well into the Communist camp. Laos is al-
do not know that anyone can ever remember when he said it, because I dis- ready half there; Cambodia is perhaps
answer it. The Senator says "suppose." cussed it with him in person, following half there.
I could add a hundred other suppositions my last visit to South Vietnam-that if Then, If Senators will look at a map
that would malg his question of no victory were to be attained in South Viet- of the area, they will see that Thailand
moment. Suppose we were attacked by nam, the South Vietnamese would have would be half encircled. As the Senator
the Soviets tomorrow morning with nu- to achieve it. In my opinion, that can- from Connecticut has pointed out, the
clear weapons; I do not think we would not be done unless there is a stable Gov- North Vietnamese announced a few days
then be able to do much in Vietnam. ernment there that is willing, with our ago that they were setting up a commit-
But I do not believe that will happen, assistance, to fight. Does not the Sen- tee for the national liberation for Thai-
I do not think we get anywhere by such ator agree? land.
suppositions. Mr. DODD. Yes. I am much in agree- Mr. DODD. Yes.
We must strive to assist the South ment with the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. DOUGLAS. With that kind of
Vietnamese In obtaining a stable govern- I have great admiration for him. 1 know power base, with North Vietnam
push-
ment. I think that with our, help, they how hard he has worked on these sub- ing, with China behind North Vietnam,
can establish such a government; then jects and how widely he has traveled. and wih the United States out of the
we shall do better. I am grateful to him for his comment. area, would not Communist influence
Mr. ELLENDER. I should like to I shall touch on these subjects later. take over Thailand and then spread
speak about Diem, if the Senator Will Mr. President, I reiterate my earlier north into Burma and south into Ma-
permit me to do so. request that this colloquy be placed at laysia?
Mr. DODD. Certainly. the end of my speech.
Mr. ELLENDER. I was in South Viet- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Mr. DOUG. Most hen to th 650 nam within a matter of months after objection, it is so ordered. lion Mr. DOwoul added 25 million
Diem took oMce and on several occa- Mr. ELLENDER. I am deeply inter- Chinese would be would e50 the po -
sions thereafter. I remember on my ested in what the Senator is saying. If Malays. What then would be the posi
second visit there discussing with him I do not remain in the Chamber all the tion of India?
the existence in his country of two pock- time, I shall read his speech in the REC- Mr. DODD. Then it would be hope-
ets or areas, one in the delta and one ORD. I should like to have the benefit of less.
to the northwest of Saigon, that were his statistics concerning the religious as- Mr. DOUGLAS. I remember talking
infested with Communists. He knew pects of the trouble in South Vietnam. many years ago with an eminent Indian,
that. As I recall, we made efforts to Mr. DODD. Yes. I am grateful to who was not pro-Western and not pro-
encourage him to take action to satisfy the Senator from Louisiana. Communist, `-ut rather was a neutralist.
those people, but we could never get him Mr. President, I am pleased to observe I addressed this question to my Indian
to do so. Those two pockets continued in the Chamber the distinguished junior acquaintance: "How long could India be
to grow in size. They may have been Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENXNc], I kept neutral if southeast Asia were to go
dominated by Buddhists, because it is am happy that he is here, because I hope Communist?" The reply was almost im-
alleged that 90 to. 92 percent of the to receive his views as I proceed to discuss mediate. "We could not keep India
people are Buddhists. this subject. neutralist for more than a year."
Mr. DODD. No; the Senator is in er- Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will I know that the "domino" theory is
ror. This is a common mistake. Not the Senator yield? being attacked now as not being applic-
more than 30 percent of the population Mr. DODD. I am delighted to yield to able; but if these were an absence of force
are Buddhists. my distinguished friend the Senator to check the Chinese, it would seem to
Mr. ELLENDER. Thirty percent are from Illinois. many of us to be almost inevitable that
Buddhists? Mr. DOUGLAS. I had the privilege of all of Malaysia and virtually all of India
Mr. DODD. Thirty percent. I can reading overnight the very able address would go Communist. We would then
document, my belief. of the Senator from Connecticut. In face a combination of 350 million In-
Mr. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator fact I read it over no less than three dians, 250 million Malays, and 650 million
would. times. Chinese-1,250 million people. That
Mr. DODD. This is a common error. Mr. DODD. I am indeed compli- would not be merely a change of political
Such statements are made frequently. mented. government but the conquest of a doe-
There is nothing to substantiate the fig- Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the Sena- trine bent on world domination which
ure of 90 percent. tor for many features of his address. treats the United States as its basic
Mr. ELL NDER, What is the di- First, I commend the spirit which ani- enemy.
Vision? mates his speech, the refusal to indulge Mr. DODD. Oh, no.
Mr. DODD. I should like to place that in personalities, the crediting of high Mr. DOUGLAS. It would be a power-
information,in the RECORD In an orderly motives to those who differ in their pre- ful force dedicated to the defeat of the
way. I shall discuss it.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3298
Approved For CONGR SS~SNAT.15k FP6 ~R000300170003i8ebruary 23
I Mr. g QDDat the Senator made r that
observation.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator,
Perhaps certain features of his program,
such as the proposal to capture a staging
area just inside of Laos may not be the
right thing to do. But, in general, the
program sugested and in good to per is h pe hi prop ate
will be considered by the American peo-
ofethe finthat it may serve to offset some
ely motivated but incomplete
suggestions that have been made.
Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful for
the observations of the Senator.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I
congratulate the distinguished Senator
from Connecticut on making what I
think is a valuable contribution to the
national debate on what we should do
in southeast Asia.
I not only had an opportunity to read
the statement before it was delivered,
but I also had the pleasure of listening
to the delivery. There are several points
that the Senator made which I think
were publicly made for the first time.
The one that I should like to emphasize
If the Senator from Connecticut would veto and thus stymie any resolution of
permit me to do so, I should like to the U.N.
underscore some of his remarks on neix As one who has always been asup-
tralization. I suppose that if there could porter of the U.N., and who still is, I
be genuine neutralization, that would be observe many signs that the United Na-
highly desirable. tions is being weakened in the same
Mr. DODD. Of course; I should have fashion that the League of Nations
made that point. No one would be hap- weakened in the middle and late 1930's.
pier than I if genuine neutralization, as I hope that this will not happen.
the Senator puts it, could be achieved. Mr. DODD. So do I.
I was talking about neutralization in the Mr. DOUGLAS. We should try to pre-
sense in which the Communists use it. vent that from happening, but,we should
We are too inclined to believe that the not ignore reality.
Communists mean genuine neutraliza- To those who say that there is no
tion, when what they mean, in fact, is analogy between the cumulative con-
communization. quests of Hitler and Mussolini in the
Mr. DOUGLAS. If it were genuine late 1930's and the cumulative develop-
neutralization, it should certainly apply m.ents of the Chinese in Asia in the
to North Vietnam as well as to South 1960's, I should say that there is grave
Vietnam. danger that they delude themselves. It
Mr. DODD. That would be genuine would be a terrible thing if we woke up
neutralization. to find all of Asia Communist.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Even if it were ap- Mr. DODD. It would be a dreadful
plied to South Vietnam, it would not be disaster. Earlier I described it as an
effective in view of Communist philoso "unthinkable thought," borrowing my
phy and power, unless there were some words from the Senator from Arkansas.
adequate supervisory body having real Mr. DOUGLAS. It would have tre-
authority to police the agreement. mendous propaganda influence in Africa,
We have all noticed press reports, much greater than the Russians alone
which are authentic, that North Viet- could have, because the Russians, after
nam has even expelled the small in- all , are members of the white race. But
teams which, under the Geneva the members of the yellow race or the
spection
Convention of 1954, were placed both brown race can make a much greater
in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to appeal to the blacks than the white na-
see what was taking place and to report. tions can.
They are being expelled and forced out. The Senator from Connecticut has
So there will be no eyes and no voices-- performed a real public service in stress-
no eyes to detect and no voices to report ing the dangers. It should be noted also
the military preparations and movements that he cannot be accused of being a war
of North Vietnam. hawk. He does not advocate the indis-
Mr. D ODD. That is correct. criminate bombing of North Vietnam or
Mr. DOUGLAS. If there were a a bombing attack on China.
strong, effective United Nations, with a Mr. DODD. No.
mobile police force, that force could be Mr. DOUGLAS. He suggests the pos-
All the power sibility of guerrilla warfare in the north,
h
l
p
e
placed in this area to
vacuum. which would have to be done by South
Mr. DODD. There is no doubt about Vietnam, rather than by the United
that. States.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I was in Egypt and Mr. DODD. Only because of what
Israel in 1956, shortly after the Suez hos- North Vietnam is doing to South Viet-
tilities. I was greatly pleased about the nam. This seems to me a proper cor-
excellent work of the United Nations Po- rective measure only so long as North
lice force. The Senator from Connecti- Vietnam persists in its activities.
cut and I may have differed somewhat What we all hope for, I need not say
about the role of a United Nations police to the Senator, is a settlement of the dif-
force in the Congo, but to my mind it ferences between countries, so that they
represented a healthy principle. can drop their arms and get on with the
Mr. DODD. I have no difficulty with business' of improving the lives of their
the Senator from Illinois on that point. people.
I am sure the Senator would agree, that Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator proposes
we' can make mistakes. But the prin- political warfare and economic aid to be
ciple is correct: A United Nations police of real benefit to the people of South
force should be used wherever this is Vietnam; the development of SEATO;
feasible. and various other measures.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Unfortunately, I feel certain that the country will
as we all know, the Russians and, I am appreciate what the Senator from Con-
sorry to say, the French also, have vir- necticut has done. I urge that his warn-
tually stymied the creation of such a ings and his suggestions should not be
force by refusing to contribute to its sup- dismissed summarily.
port. I can remember how, in the 1930's,
Mr. DODD. Yes. after two trips to Europe, I felt that the
Mr. DOUGLAS. So it will be almost combination of Hitler and Mussolini was
impossible in the near future to finance moving to take over the free world. I
and to place a United Nations police believe that it was the duty of all who
force in the field. loved freedom to resist that movement.
Another political change is occurring There is' a similar obligation upon us to-
inside the U.N.; namely, a shift of power day to resist totalitarianism of the left,
from the Assembly to the Security Coun- as well as totalitarianism of the right.
ciI, where the Russians can interpose a One is as bad as the other.
at this point concerns some of the
strategic implications, gained by looking
at a map, of what might happen if the
Red Chinese decide to move south.
The implication is rather plain that
the Senator does not think they will do
that. I agree. Among the things that
would deter them from doing that is the
presence in Taiwan of a highly trained
air force. The Nationalist Chinese very
much want to go back to the mainland
if they have an opportunity. If the Red
Chinese forces were to be drawn to the
south, that would give them the chancc
to move, which chance they might not
have again.
The Senator presented figures on what,
the Vietcong has done in the way of
murder and terror within the country.
The Senator said that almost 500 a
month, or 6,000 a year, wits the village
hamlets have been murdered by the Viet-
cong.
Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. DOMINICK. I wonder if the Sen-
ator can tell me where the figures origi-
nate.
Mr. DODD. I hope the Senator will
be satisfied with my statement. I am
sure they are from an official source of
the administration.
Mr. DOMINICK. The reason I asked
is that figures have been given to me
which are of a very substantial nature,
but not quite that large. When I have
mentioned the figures from time to time,
in the process of meeting with groups
and talking about the terrorism that has
been inflicted, people had not heard of
this before. They had never understood
what was going on. They had no con-
cept of the problem.
Mr. DODD. I do not know whether
the Senator was in the Chamber before,
but when I obtained the figures, I said,
"Why in the world have the figures not
been made public?" I think the figures
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 For ~Wg9 A15 R W1 67 4 lf&000300170003-8
EXILES
Raising a touchy political issue, the stu-
dents also questioned the status of five gen-
erals exiled to the mountain resort of Dalat
by Premier Khanh when he seized power last
January. General Khanh charged at the time
the generals were plotting a neutralist solu-
tion for the country's war against the Viet-
cong-Communist guerrillas. He said Wednes-
day the five officers were being returned to
active duty.
The students asked whether this meant
that the generals were falsely accused or
whether General Khanh now is willing to ad-
mit high-ranking neutralists in his high
command.
The Vietcong's clandestine'Radio Libera-
tion joined the anti-U.S. chorus yesterday
with a broadcast plea to South Vietnamese
religious leaders, intellectuals, and soldiers
to help drive out the Americans.
Turning around U.S. charges that the Viet-
cong deliberately fomented interreligious
stride, the Red National Liberation Front's
top political official, Nguyen Huu Tho, said
the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" plot-
ted to separate Buddhists from Catholics
"with the aim of invading our country and
enslaving our people."
[From the Evening Star, Sept. 7, 1964]
VIETNAM ANSWERS SOUGHT
(By Marguerite Higgins)
What do the Buddhist political leaders of
Vietnam really want?
What is the objective of the drumfire of
propaganda and demonstrations against the
predominantly Buddhist government of
Vietnam that began as early as last April-a
time, unfortunately, when the American Em-
bassy and the American people had their
mind on other things?
In secret meetings in Saigon late last week
with top Buddhist leaders, Ambassador Max-
well Taylor tried urgently to find the answers
to these questions because, among other
things, he is under pressure from Washing-
ton to explain increasingly worrisome signals
as to Buddhist Intentions.
During the meeting, General Taylor ad-
dressed most of his questions to the Rever-
end Thich Tam Chau, a refugee from North
Vietnam, a genuine anti-Communist in prin-
ciple albeit something of a timid soul in
practice, and ostensibly the leader of the
United Buddhist Movement of Vietnam.
But the answers that really counted be-
longed to the Reverend Thich Tri Quang, a
one time associate of the Communist Viet-
minh, the mastermind of the anti-Diem
campaign of last summer and fall, and cur-
rently the spearhead of a deadly struggle for
power inside the Buddhist movement against
the Reverend Tam Chou. Tri Quang is ad-
ditionally the leader of a sometime open and
sometime secret drive to topple the Khanh
regime.
There are some who say that the Buddhist
Monk Tri Quang is, next to General Khanh,
the most powerful Vietnamese figure in
South Vietnam today and that tomorrow he
may be the most powerful.
It is of significance therefore that General
Taylor's telegrams on the Buddhist situation
produced so many somber faces around the
Department of State.
For the time being, at any rate, it appears
according to Ambassador Taylor's assessment
that the moderates among Vietnam's nearly
6 million Buddhists (out of.a population of
more than 14 million of which the majority
are ancestor worshippers) are being skillfully
and relentlessly outmaneuvered by the ex-
tremist wing led by the Reverend Tri Quang,
whose flamboyant oratory and calls for direct
action have far more appeal, for example,
to Vietnam's citified, riot-prone young people
than the pleas for caution issued by the Rev-
erend Tam Chau.
As to the political game being played by
the Reverend Tri Quang, a key administra-
tion official who had read General Taylor's
telegrams summed things up this way:
"A defensible case can be made for the
theory that Tri Quang will sooner or later
seek to undermine any stable anti-Commu-
nist government in Vietnam in the belief
that anarchy will drive the United States to
go home, permitting the emergence of a neu-
tralist or possibly pro-Communist state with
himself at the helm."
He continued: "If Tri Quang wants to de-
liver Vietnam to neutralism or communism
under his own leadership, it would explain
the mystery of why he raised the false issue
of persecution which is ridiculous in light of
all the concessions-indeed the favoritism-
shown the Buddhists by Khanh's regime.
"But the cry of Buddhist persecution-as
Tri Quang well knows-brings an almost
Pavlovian reaction in the outside world where
most people are too uninformed and too naive
to believe that a Buddhist monk might make
up such accusations out of whole cloth to
gain his own ends."
The issue now seems less and less whether
the Reverend Tri Quang aspires fora neu-
tralist and pro-Communist Vietnam under
his leadership.
It is focusing more and more on the fact
that his actions are pointing in that direc-
tion. The question now is whether any-
thing can be done effectively to stop him as
he operates from within the privileged psy-
chological sanctuary of being a Buddhist
monk.
[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 5, 1963]
REDS SEEK NEW COUPS OF BUDDHIST-LED
.TYPE-REPORTED TRYING To SPREAD VIET-
NAM RELIGIOUS REVOLT TO LAOS
(By Paul W. Ward)
NEW YORK, November 4.-Having seen
Buddhism spearhead a drive that toppled
Vietnam's Diem regime, Communists now
are trying to organize like offensives else-
where in southeast Asia.
So it was learned here today following an-
nouncement that a United Nations mission
sent to South Vietnam October 22 to investi-
gate charges that Buddhists were being per-
secuted there has completed its task and
will reassemble next Monday In New York.
IMMEDIATE TARGET
Laos, which lies just west of Vietnam
and also abuts Communist China, appears
the immediate target of a campaign origi-
natingin Peiping. Its aim is to set Buddhist
communities throughout Asia to filing com-
plaints against elements of Laos' coalition
Government akin to those they had been
pressing against the Diem regime at Saigon
until it fell last Friday.
The chief indication was provided in broad-
casts from Hanoi, in North Vietnam, and
Peiping reporting that the "Loatian Buddhist
Association [has issued] a statement strongly
protesting against the bombardment of a
monastery by the Phoumi Nosavan troops
and reactionaries among Kong Le's troops."
Gen. Phoumi Nosavan heads the anti-
Communist wing of a troika-form govern-
ment set up in Laos last year to carry out
an agreement to neutralize that southeast
Asian kingdom worked out at a Geneva con-
ference which included the United States,
the Soviet Union and Communist China
among Its participants.
Gen. Kong Le commands the troops of the
coalition's neutralist factions and enjoyed
avowed support by Peiping and Hanoi until
the Communists concluded several months
ago that he is sincerely neutralist and will
not help them take over Laos.
06MP2NSA'iibi DEMAIQD . .....
Since then, they not only have been de-
nouncing him but trying to win over his
subordinate officers to their side.
3295
The Laotian Communist radio station, call-
ing itself the voice of Laos, also broadcast
the statement attributed to the "Laotian
Buddhists Association," that alleged their
foes had "destroyed a [Buddhist] monastery
and acting Buddhists" at Ban Ton Nuong in
Kieng Province's back county by a bombard-
ment during the night of October 16-17.
The statement demanded "that the Phou-
mi Nosavan clique compensate the losses and
immediately stop all moves against the Bud-
dhists." Otherwise, "it would bear full re-
sponsibility for the consequences," it said,
adding:
"All Laotian monks and Buddhists are
urged to strengthen their solidarity, heighten
their vigilance, and resolutely oppose all
schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their
lackeys."
The Communists have been denouncing
the anti-Communist and neutralist factions
of Laos' coalition government as puppets of
the United States, just as they formerly de-
nounced South Vietnam's Diem regime and
are currently trying to discredit on like
grounds the military junta that displaced it
Friday.
To further what began as a Buddhist cam-
paign against the Diem regime, Communist
China also staged shortly before that regime's
fall a 3-day conference of Buddhist clergy
and laymen from 11 Asian countries.
Held in Peiping's Fayuan Monastery the
conference was devoted in large part to ora-
tions against "the United States-Ngo Dinh
Diem clique" at Saigon.
MONKS REPORTED BEHEADED
Its participants, now touring Communist
China under the aegis of Peiping atheist
regime, included:
1. The Venerable Thich Thien Hao, listed
as president of the Luc Hao Buddhist Asso-
ciation of South Vietnam, who made a long
speech about atrocities, including behead-
ings and disembowelings of Buddhist monks,
that he attributed to "the United States-
Diem. clique."
2. The Venerable Thepbouary Pramaha
Khamtank, named as president of the Bud-
dhist Association of Laos, who charged the
United States is trying to turn that coun-
try into a "colony" and demanded that Wash-
ington cease giving military aid td the Lao-
tian Government, asserting:
AUGUST DENUNCIATION
"We Asian people and Buddhists are the
masters of our own affairs. We don't need
any other masters lording it over and ruling
us.,,
Mainland China's Communist rulers, who
in August denounced as "political agents"
of Chiang Khai-shek a group of Buddhist
monks from Formosa then visiting India, also
brought together in Fayuan Xonastery Bud-
dhist monks and laymen from Cambodia,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan,
Thailand, and North Vietnam, which, like
Cambodia and Thailand, also abuts Laos.
Having produced on October 20 a formal
appeal to Buddhists everywhere to join in the
anti-Diem campaign, the conferees gave
themselves over to a series of fetes arranged
in their honor by the Peiping regime that only
a few years ago was charged before the Unit-
ed Nations Assembly here with having de-
stroyed more than 1,000 Buddhist monas-
teries in Tibet.
NORTH VIETNAM CUARGES
There was no Tibetan participation in the
Buddhist conference at Peiping.
North Vietnam's Communist regime has
sent to the International (i.e., Polish, Indian,
and Canadian) Control Commission for both
parts of Vietnam a compilation of "Bud-
dhist persecution and atrocity" charges
against the Diem regime that said in part:
11
Gen. Ton That Dinh, military governor of
Saigon, personally directed troops to martyr-
ize pupils of Vietnamese and French mid-
dle. schools". on September 7.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15': CIA-R0P67B00446R000300170003-8
 3296
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February' 23
TO HEAD NATIONAL POLICE
He currently is slated to be Interior Min-
ister (i.e., chief of police forces) in the new
regime at Saigon, having turned revolution-
ist after being refused the same post In the
Diem regime, according to reports relayed
from Saigon via Washington.
Today Moscow's radio stations continued
to denounce the military junta in Saigon
just as they previously had denounced the
Diem regime as an American puppet and
the United Nations mission to Vietnam as a
Washington invention designed to protect
and preserve the Diem regime.
Meanwhile, it was noted here that in
Burma, homeland of U Thant, United Na-
tions Secretary General, the military regime
in control at Rangoon is under attack from
the venerable U Kaythara, who, at 83, Is
the ranking Buddhist priest at Mandalay.
Addressing mass rallies asembled in defi-
ance of the regime and overtly inviting ar-
rest, he has also been predicting that Gen.
Ne Win, the regime's head, will meet the
same end as Gen. Aung Sau, Burma's na-
tional hero, who was assassinated in 1947.
In a statement relayed from Saigon and
issued here today, a spokesman for the fact-
finding mission that headed back to New
York yesterday contended its departure from
Vietnam was not occasioned by the coup
d'etat there, but was "as scheduled," al-
though in statements prior to the coup the
mission had claimed inability to estimate
when it would complete its on-the-spot in-
vestigation.
Today's statement also said the mission
"had not been able to Interview Thich Tri
Quang [a Buddhist monk] who was in
asylum at the U.S. Embassy" in Saigon. It
added that "the former government of the
republic had informed the mission that, ac-
cording to the laws of asylum, a person In
asylum was not allowed to make any con-
tacts whatsoever while in asylum."
BURMESE COMPLAINT
Meanwhile, there were these additional
developments at United Nations headquar-
ters:
1. James Barrington, Burma's chief dele-
gate here and its representative in the cur-
rently recessed disarmament conference at
Geneva, complained in one of the Assembly's
standing committees about a tendency to-
ward "bilateralism" by Washington and
Moscow and consequent bypassing of the
lesser powers, including neutralists, in dis-
armament matters.
2. Mrs. Agda Rossel, Sweden's chief dele-
gate took steps in another committee to
initiate debate on a resolution-sponsored
also by Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Uruguay,
and Venezuela-that is aimed at getting all
governments to follow the example Liechten-
stein set in 1798 by abolishing capital pun-
ishment.
During the delivery of Mr. DODD's
speech,
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. I believe that my rec-
ord on the scoreboard of the Americans
for Constitutional Action is even lower
than the record of the Senator from
Connecticut.
I share with the Senator from Con-
necticut the feeling that it only demon-
strates that we are trying in new ways
to have the government use its powers
for the people without at the same time
jeopardizing individual freedom. We
can only hope and pray that among the
makers of these arbitrary scoreboards
there could be a greater reflection of the
consensus of our own people in our own
States. Then I think the scoreboard
would be very different for the Senator
from Connecticut and myself.
Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's
making that observation. Tha Senator
is one of the great minds in this body.
He stands out particularly in the area of
which he has spoken. I am happy to
be In his company on that scoreboard.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the colloquy in which I have
just engaged with the Senator from New
York be placed at the end of my remarks
so that I may have my speech in con-
tinuity.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, am
I to understand that the Senator from
Connecticut does not wish to yield?
Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield. I
merely wish that whatever yielding I do
may appear at the end of my remarks,
unless there is some reason for it to ap-
pear elsewhere.
Mr. ELLENDER. I have been listen-
ing to what the Senator has said with
much interest, because I have visited
southeast Asia on, many occasions. I
have often described to the Senate-and
I believe my reports will so indicate-
the situation that was prevalent in south-
east Asia. I am almost certain that my
good friend will agree that were he to go
to South Vietnam now, he would find
things quite different from what they
were when he visited that country 4
years ago.
Mr. DODD. I am sure that is true.
Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt
about that. On several occasions I made
the statement on the floor of the Senate
that unless we could persuade our allies
to ass'st us in carrying this load-and I
am sure the Senator agrees that that
ought to be done-and unless a stable
government could be established in South
Vietnam, we would be in serious trouble.
Mr. DODD. Yes. I wholly agree with
those two points. I refer to a speech I
made 4 years ago, In which I made the
same point. I said I thought it was
absolutely essential that our friends and
allies in that part of the world join us in
the struggle to preserve the freedom of
the South Vietnamese. I pointed out-
and I shall touch on the issue later to-
day-that there is a basic structural
fault in the SEATO organization which
gives a veto power to any one member;
and, as the Senator knows, that power
has been exercised by France and Britain.
We must have a stable government in
South Vietnam. The Senator is a well-
informed Member of this body on these
problems. I have great respect for his
opinions.
Mr. ELLENDER. The question I
should like to ask the Senator is as
follows: Should we continue to intensify
our efforts in that area if we cannot get
our allies to assist us or if a stable gov-
ernment is not established in South
Vietnam? That is the question.
Mr. DODD. The Senator's question is
part of a larger question. There are
many things we must do. Those are two
things that we must do. I believe that
we must get our friends and allies In
that part of the world to assist us.. We
are getting them. Already Korea has
announced that it is sending men to that
area.
Mr. ELLENDER. Two thousand men.
Mr. DODD. Two thousand men. The
Philippines are sending in several thou-
sand men. All this is encouraging. They
are starting, at least. I would like to
see other nations do as much or more,
and I expect that they will. I believe
we are underway, and that this is no
time to quit, because now we have the
signs and beginnings to indicate that our
allies are starting to do what the Sen-
ator from Louisiana and I believe they
should have done long ago.
Mr. ELLENDER. I am not suggest-
ing that we quit now.
Mr. DODD. I know the Senator is not.
Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so
far into it that we may well find ourselves
in over our heads.
What I fear-and I have said so on
the floor of the Senate and have in-
cluded it in my reports-is that the sit-
uation that now exists in South Vietnam
may become similar to the one that now
exists in South Korea. The Senator
will remember that the South Korean
war was supposed to be a United Nations
affair, in which all the membership of
that great organization was to join us in
fighting in South Korea. But what
happened? We took hold of the situa-
tion there; and as I recall the figures,
96 percent of the cost of that war was
paid by the United States, and about
95 percent of the foreign men who died
in that conflict were Americans.
Mr. DODD. I accept the Senator's
statistics.
Mr. ELLENDER. That is as I remem-
ber them.
Mr. DODD. They seem to me to be
approximately correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. Today we are stuck.
as it were, in South Korea. We are
trying to maintain 18 local divisions
there. It is very costly to do that. In.
addition, we are maintaining 2 of our
own divisions there. As the Senator from.
Connecticut knows, we cannot pay the
expenses of our soldiers there with col-
lar buttons. It is necessary to have the
money and the wherewithal to do it.
What I have feared all along is that
unless we can persuade our allies to
assist us in South Vietnam, and unless
a stable government can be established.
there, a condition may develop which
will be worse than the situation that
confronts us in South Korea. That is
what has worried me.
Mr. DODD. I know the Senator from
Louisiana is worried; and so am I. It
is a proper problem to worry about.
There is no question that a stable gov-
ernment must be established in South
Vietnam.
The trouble began, in my opinion,
with the assassination of Diem. Diem
was the best thing we had going for the
free world in that area, and the tragedy
of his death still haunts us.
I hope that at some time the proper
committee will conduct a formal in-
quiry as to his overthrow and assassina.-
tion and what part, if any, officials of the
U.S. Government played in this tragedy.
We have never been told anything,
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 196"5
Approved For Y ~- 674L0003001 70003-8
of conducting antigovernment propaganda
from this sensitive vantage point.
End the custom that came into practice
during the Khanh regime where even a
proven Vietcong agent would often be re-
leased if, as became standard operational
procedure, the prisoner would state that he
was 'Buddhist" and claim-with Buddhist
backing-that his imprisonment therefore
amounted to religious persecution.
PUBLIC RECOGNITION
If it sounds a bit insane that practices
such as these have been permitted to take
place In a nation supposedly at war with
the Communist Vietcong, it can only be
replied that the new premier is the first to
have recognized publicly these insanities and
may soon lose his political head as a result.
But now that the United States privately
recognizes that Thich Tri Quang is working
at totally cross purposes in Vietnam, is
there not some. way to checkmate his design
for chaos?, Or has it already gone too far?
The fate of the new civilian regime should
provide some clues as to the answer.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1964]
POLrrio. HAMPERS VIETNAM'S WAR
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, October 17.-
Maxwell D. Taylor, the U.S. Ambassador, was
given a poignant insight into the whys of
Vietnamese politics the other day. Talking
Socially with a middle-aged politician, the
Ambassador broached the subject of present
political pressures from diverse groups on the
Saigon Government and the possibly harm-
ful effects of this agitation in the war against
the Communist Vietcong Insurgents.
"You Americans view all this In the terms
of your own country," said the politician, not
as a reproach but in an effort to let Ameri-
cans understand what is going on in
Vietnam.
You must realize that this period-these
few weeks-is the first moment in my life-
time that we Vietnamese are able to partici-
pate in the normal political interplay your
democratic countries have enjoyed for
decades.
SEEMING CONTRADICTION
"Fir,t we were under French domination,
then came the war and rule by the Japanese.
After the war we had to choose between the
French again or joining the Communists.
Those of us In the south got our independ-
ence with a non-Communist government
but Diem kept all political parties down just
as the French had.
"When Diem was overthrown it was the
army that ran everything. They let us poli-
ticians talk in the open but nothing we said
ever seemed to have any effect on the deci-
sions of the military government.
"Now at last we are able to act as real citi-
zens, not just as tools of one or another
group which, holds all the power, whether
spokesmen of the people like it or not.
There's nothing disloyal about politics.
The conversation, trivial in itself, never-
theless made an impression on Ambassador
Taylor, who now freely admits that his fre-
quent visits to Vietnam as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not prepare him for
the political complexities and struggles he
faces In the role of, Ambassador.
Gradually U.S. officials are discovering a
seeming contradiction underlying American
and Vietnamese attitudes toward the war
effort against the Vietcong. From this con-
tradiction comes American. impatience with
Vietnamese intramural quibbling over forms
of government. From it comes also Viet-
namese, suspicions about American motives
here, suspicions that are only increasing.
COLD WAR TRENCH
To Americans, Vietnam seems to be a
trench in the cold war, a chosen battlefield
for the. non-Communist world to confront
Communist expansionism.
The Vietnamese do not see their plight in
these terms at all. The upheavals of the last
2 months have made abundantly clear. To
the articulate Vietnamese, the struggle is to
build a viable nation and government, a gov-
ernment of justice truly representative of
what the leading forces of society want. For
too long they have lived under a government
and policies imposed upon them by outside
influence. Communism would be another of
these outside influences, but perhaps so now
is the American notion of winning a war at
whatever cost by whatever government.
THE COMING STORY
Resolution of this contradiction will be the
story of South Vietnam in the months to
come.
Considering the ' lack of political oppor-
tunity, the fumblings of the Vietnamese in
their quest for representative and just gov-
ernment should come as no surprise.
Nor is the accumulation of transitory po-
litical institutions-piled up in a haphazard
and seemingly self-nullifying manner-alien
to Vietnamese experience as any examination
of the postwar years under the French will
show.
At the top of the political pile now is an
ad hoc body of 17 men called the High Na-
tional Council. Appointed September 26 by
Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the chief of
state, after consultations with leading reli-
gious and social groups of the nation, the
council is designed to resemble a representa-
tive asembly, not for the purpose of govern-
ing the country but only for deciding how
the country should be governed.
The constitution it produces is supposed to
be provisional, the personnel installed in
high office only temporary, until some kind
of national elections can be held.
The 17 men are a strange mixture. Only
a few have any personal political futures or
ambitions.
So remote from immediate cross-currents
of politics does the council seem that many
Vietnamese have dubbed it the "High Na-
tional Museum." To American policymakers
and Vietnamese officials, however, the coun-
cil is the only available link between the tor-
mented past and the promised land. Seldom
has so much international stress been placed
on such a weak link.
The extent of the council's responsibilities
is unclear, the demands put upon it are
enormous and diverse. So-called civilian
government is the goal, but Premier Nguyen
Khanh has insisted that the armed forces
must have "a place of honor" in the gov-
ernment to compensate the military estab-
lishment for its sacrifices in defending the
nation on the battlefield.
The religious and political groups pressing
for civilian government have not made clear
whether they will be satisfied with civilian
ministers alone or whether they will press
further for military officers to be replaced as
chiefs of some-or even all-of the country's
45 provinces.
Once the principles of government struc-
ture are determined, who are to be the per-
sonalities to fill leading posts? Some politi-
cal groups insist that only immediate elec-
. tions can bring forth leaders truly claiming
the confidence of the people. Others recog-
nize the difficulty of holding elections in the
midst of a guerrilla war and propose instead
the naming of "acceptable" persons as yet
another interim measure.
Whether this course would solve anything
is open to question since the ideal of a popu-
larly supported government would remain
remote.
.. Yet this is the ideal ever before Vietnamese
political figures these days as they luxuriate
.try the. democratic interplay they missed for
so long.
WAR IS NOT THE ISSUE
If it all sounds remote from the war in the
countryside, it is. The campaign against a
purposeful Communist enemy is not much
3293
of an issue in the political jousting of Sai-
gon. No agitation group admits to being
neutralist; even the most intransigent of
politicians can be at same time sincerely
anti-Communist.
The political groups making the most
headway among the people outside of Sai-
gon-the Central Vietnamese Political Move-
ment led from Hue University is a prime
example-are not openly advocating a cease-
fire or a negotiated settlement with the Viet-
cong and suspicions to this effect once ex-
pressed are vehemently denied with seeming
conviction.
If the war is not an issue and all groups
wish to continue the anti-Communist strug-
gle and that is the end of the story, American
policymakers should be able to sit back and
await with equanimity the outcome of Viet-
nam's first self-conscious adventure with
democracy. But, of course, this is not the
end of the story and the Americans realize
perhaps more clearly than the Vietnamese
that the Communists are moving effectively
into the governmental vacuum, in the coun-
tryside at least.
American officials maintain they have no
ready answer to Vietnamese political striv-
ings, no ideal government structure to pro-
pose. This time they are willing to let the
Vietnamese work out their own government
just the way they want it. But what the
Americans in contact with members of High
National Council are encouraging is rapid
adjustment and conciliation toward some
common denominator-anything in fact that
would restore the central direction to the war
effort that has been lacking since Premier
Khanh stepped down as President last Au-
gust 25.
So the interplay goes on and no end is in
sight. The stable and popular government
that the Vietnamese seek and that the Amer-
icans hope will arrive from somewhere before
it is too late seems as remote as ever.
[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 19641
BUDDHIST POWER GROWS-IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THEY HAVE CREATED A STRUCTURE THAT
DRAWS THE LOYALTY OF MANY PERSONS
(By Peter Grose)
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 12.-
A Buddhist revolution is taking place in
South Vietnam. Its lines and goals are still
far from clear even to many of the Buddhists
themselves, but seasoned observers consider
it the most significant and far-reaching trend
in present-day southeast Asia. Its implica-
tions stretch far beyond the frontiers of this
country. They extend not only to nations
nearby but also, because of Buddhism's un-
clear relation to the Ideology and power of
communism, the Vietnamese experience could
alter the entire power structure the United
States has been fighting to maintain in the
southwestern Pacific.
The Buddhists seem to be gambling that
they can produce a new basis for stability.
So far what has actually happened is that
the American-supported Premier of South
Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has ac-
cepted in general and in detail an immediate
Buddhist formula for reforming his Govern-
ment along new civilian lines. This is the
outcome, now apparent, of this country's
political crisis last month.
PREMIER FIRST
That crisis was the second step in an evolu-
tion starting 16 months ago. The first step
was reached last November, when 9 years of
rule by President Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed
in a bloody coup d'etat. Both the Buddhists
and the Vietnamese Army contributed to
President Diem's downfall, but the Buddhists
were neither organized nor motivated to fill
by themselves the void left when President
Diem was removed.
Since November 1 the army has governed
South Vietnam. On January 13 there was a
change in leadership-General Khanh took
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3294
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February- 23
over where a junta had failed to get off the
ground but throughout his first 7 months
in power the army remained Premier Khanh'a
principal base of support, his only real claim
to hold power in a land torn by war and
popular dissent.
Now the Military Revolutionary Council,
the instrument of army rule, has been dis-
banded. A constitution that seemed to in-.
stftutionalize military dictatorship was with-
drawn. Premier Khanh is in the process of
easing his former military cronies out of their
Government positions. Many have already
resigned.
"I am still a general," Premier Khanli said
the other day, "but I am Premier first."
The former field commander now wears
civilian clothes. He has shaved off the little
goatee he sported throughout the military
phase of his rule. He never stated publicly
why he had grown this beard in the weeks
preceding his coup d'etat, but from the smiles
and jokes of officers around him it is clear
the goatee had a certain barrack-room sym-
bolic value to the military clique that helped
him into power. Now both the goatee and
the clique are gone.
NEW FOUNDATION
The full story of why the army gave up so
easily has yet to come out-maybe it was
only a tactical retreat to prepare for new
power plays, perhaps by a younger genera-
tion of colonels. Some elements would have
the people believe there were secret Induce-
ments-that is to say, money-that per-
suaded certain individuals to abandon their
claims to power. More likely the generals
felt an onrush of frustration and helpless-
ness from 10 unpleasant months in power,
even a feeling that they might as well get
out while the going was still good.
However It happened, the army says it has
abandoned its foray into politics and now
theoretically will return to the business of
fighting a war. Political power is forming
on a new foundation.
Spokesmen In the Buddhist hierarchy will
firmly deny any political aspirations for
themselves as persons or for Buddhism as
such. They are speaking, they say, solely In
the name of the Vietnamese people of what-
ever religion.
A coon CLAIM
In fact, Buddhist leaders have as good a
claim as anyone else, and better than many,
for presenting the views of "the people," for
Buddhism is the family religion of the vast
majority of Vietnamese. It has been so for
centuries. Premier Khanh himself has long
had a Buddhistshrine to his parents in his
house.
Figures are difficult and misleading since
there are a few criteria for claiming to be a
Buddhist. Out of a population of 14 million
an estimated total of 5 or 6 million people
are practicing Buddhists responsive to the
voice of the hierarchy. Many more who say
they are Buddhists if asked pay little more
than lipservice to any religion. Others ad-
here to Buddhist-oriented sects that never-
theless shun the central Buddhist organi-
zation.
Furthermore, there are clear geographical
distinctions of attitude among even the most
faithful of Buddhists. Until recently the
most politically active were bonzes, or monks,
from North Vietnam who had fled to the
south to escape Communist rule. They
gravitated toward Saigon, establishing their
own pagodas' separate from the pagodas of
their brothers native to South Vietnam.
Northerners are .outspoken In their opposi-
tion to communism and have supported the
military government in active prosecution of
the war against the Communist Vietcong.
The best known spokesman for the North-
ern refugees is Thich Tam Chau, who holds
the position of rector, or chairman of the
Buddhist Secular Institute. the organiza-
tional center of Buddhist political activity.
At the opposite extreme In zeal are the
Buddhists of the far south, the populous and thirties of early forties, all appointed, like
rich Mekong Delta. In this area the orthodox the Government's province chiefs, by their
hierarchy is weak, laymen have greater in- own administration in Saigon.
fluence and religion plays a lesser role in the This is the political structure the Bud-
comfortable life of the population. Here dhists were erecting during the 10 months of
also thrive many independent sects of Viet- military rule over South Vietnam.
namese Buddhists as well as a militant anti- How effective would this structure be in
Communist group of Buddhists of Cambodian , support of a government favorable to Bud-
origin who adhere to the "hinayana," or dhists? The matter has not yet been put to a
"lesser vehicle." branch of International
Buddhism. Vietnamese Buddhists is pre-
dominantly "mahayana," or "greater vehicle,"
in which the Buddha is deified.
HARDEST TO DEFINE
it Is the Buddhists of central Vietnam who
have spurred the most significant recent ad-
vances into politics. Their Intellectual cen-
ter is at Hue. These are the Buddhists hard-
est to understand or define in political terms.
They profess anticommunism and antineu-
tralism, but they also seem far from happy
with the present American policy for fighting
the war.
Their undoubted leader is Thich Trl
Quang, considered by many the mastermind
of last year's Buddhist revolt against Presi-
dent Diem. By seeking refuge in the U.S.
Embassy a year ago, he forced the U.S. Gov-
ernment to take sides with the Buddhists
against the Diem government, which was
trying to arrest Buddhist leaders.
Though Tri Quang lacks Tam Chau's pres-
tigious position as head of the Secular In-
stitute, he seems now to be the most influen-
tial single Buddhist In the country. There
are some observers who look upon his politi-
cal skills as setting the pattern for Buddhism
throughout southeast Asia.
A long-term Buddhist revolution is taking
place both within the movement and In the
country at large. Its goal is undefined. Its
purpose, according to the bonzes, is to "pro-
tect Buddhism." Neither the meaning of
this phrase nor the means to realize it have
been made clear to nonbelievers.
A basic strain within the movement is the
whole question of whether Buddhism should
deal in temporal politics. Any typical
Buddhist declaration will be couched In
terms of religion, shunning partisan involve-
ment in worldly political matters. Bonzes
such as Tri Quang will evade difficult political
gtfestions by insisting they are solely men of
religion and not competent to speak on mat-
ters of politics.
DRIVE REMOVED DOUBT
Considering their role last year and this,
it is difficult to refrain from charges of hy-
pocrisy on this point. Any doubt about the
potential political strength and interests of
at least some Buddhist leaders was removed
in their campaign against President Diem.
With the November coup their effective-
ness seemed ended for the moment, since
they had no viable organization capable of
retaining political control after 10 centuries
of relative noninvolvement. Quickly but
quietly this was changed.
Starting on January 3, when the "Vietnam
Unified Buddhist Church" came into being,
the Buddhists under Tam Chau and Tri
Quang have established a shadow govern-
ment across the country, a shadow rapidly
assuming substance. At the top there are
two "institutes," one for religious affairs,
which has nominal and honorific responsi-
bilities equivalent to those of a chief of
state, and the other for secular affairs, which,
like a premier, wields actual power over the
organization.
POLITICAL STRUCTURES
In the secular institute there are six "gen-
eral offices," resembling ministries, for clergy
affairs, Buddhist studies, cultural affairs,
construction and finance, lay peoples' affairs,
and youth. Each general office is headed by
a commissioner.
Down in the provinces there are delegates
and deputies, all bonzes, mostly In their
test-little has so far been demanded of
the Buddhist population by their leaders.
But many observers think the test will come
in the next months as long as Premier Khanh
leans more and more heavily on apparently
the one non-Communist element of the na-
tion that has not yet been brought into
active participation in the Government.
[From the New York Tribune, Sept. 11, 1964)
VIET: BUDDHIST PRESS LASHES UNITED STATES
SAIGON. South Vietnam's leading Bud-
dhist publication yesterday blamed the
United States for the political and religious
turmoil that has swept the country since
mid-August.
The publication, Hai Trieu Am, charged in-
directly that Americans are manipulating the
Saigon government to extend U.S. Influence
in South Vietnam-an accusation previously
voiced privately by some Vietnamese officials.
The paper also backed rebellious-students'
charges that Americans triggered the recent
bloody clashes between Buddhists and Ro-
man Catholics in the northern city of Da
Nang.
PROTEST
More student trouble developed yesterday
as Saigon's politically active student union
denounced the ruling military government
for not creating a promised "high national
council" quickly enough. The council is to
take steps within 2 months toward setting
up a civilian government by late next year.
Hai Trieu Am, in voicing the Buddhist
charges, said that "if one wishes to learn the
deep reasons for the anger of the people of
Da Nang, one must find them in the August
16 constitution, which certainly was not
drafted by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh."
INFLUENCE
The inference was that the Military Revo-
lutionary Council, which approved the con-
stitution, as well as strongman General
Khanh were influenced by the United States.
The constitution, under which General
Khanh was elevated from Premier to Presi-
dent and given sweeping powers, was re-
scinded In response to violent rioting and
Buddhist demonstrations. General Khanh.
reverted to Premier and became the domi-
nant member of the ruling military triumvi-
rate. On Wednesday he also took over the!
Defense Minister's post.
The Buddhist publication criticized Ameri-
can press reports of Buddhists' razing of the
Catholic sector of Da Nang, charging they
failed to indicate the real causes of the
rioting.
Asserting that "since the distant past until
the arrival of Americans here, Buddhists have
never destroyed or burned any houses," Hai
Trieu Am said that "the immediate reason
(for anger in Da Nang) was the shots fired
in the air by Americans."
U.S. soldiers had fired shots in the air to
disperse Buddhist demonstrators who tried
to break into the U.S. Army compound In
Da Nang.
The student union, meeting ostensibly to
debate criteria for prospective civilian states-
men's conduct, denounced former U.B. Am-
bassador Henry Cabot Lodge for allegedly
being soft on the late President Ngo Dinh
Diem. It charged that Mr. Lodge recently
told a Paris audience that Mr. Diem, who
was overthrown and slain in last November's
coup, might have survived if he had been a
better President.
The students termed this "a flagrant inter-
ference in the affairs of Vietnam."
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1965 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
to be, the problem of containing their power spected work 'Buddhism in Vietnam," writ- downfall of President Ngo
and rendering them relatively harmless ten by Dr, Mai Tho Truyen the
should not b I ,
r
n
3291
so uble. B
ea es. November of 1963. on uddhism, It is e Buddhist
The methods of doing this are hardly up to miovem ntein Vietnam has expanded tot at leaders awoulldruselthee ameatactics against
Americans to decide. The best they can do is least 4 million persons (or about 30 percent any effective anti-Communist government in
to encourage Premier Tran Van Huong to of the population of 14 million). But again Vietnam. So it is high time to stop acting
face up to the situation and take corrective according to Dr. Truyen, the overwhelming as if the significance of these men is to any
action. The worst they can do is to keep in- majority of Vietnamese Buddhists do not substantial extent religious. Whether or not
sisting that Huong find some ground for agree-and indeed disapprove-of the Com- they are actually agents of the Communists
compromise with men who are actively seek- munist-tinged extremism and violence of makes no real difference. The fact is that
Ing to overthrow his government. the Thich Tri Quang wing. their actities are estructive to
The problem of dealing with widespread Dr. Truyen, Who is additionally head of of the country and that attempts to arri6eoat
and well-organized subversive conspiracies, South Vietnam's powerful Buddhist Lay- some sort of compromise with them will very
after all, is not exactly new. Even the fact men's Association, cooperates with and sup- probably prove fatal.
that this conspiracy may command wide pub- ports Vietnam's Buddhist-dominated gov- Estimates vary on the effectiveness and
lic support does not make it all powerful. ernment led by Premier Tran Van Huong, size of the Buddhist apparatus in Vietnam.
The French, for example, faced something of Certainly the Huong government has no The more effective, however, the more es-
the same situation with the Communists in quarrel with the Buddhist but rather vice- sential it is that it be dismantled or neutral-
the late 1940's, complete with infiltration of versa.
the army, police and government, nationwide As Huon
g put It in a shed ld beug thing. The Huong government
strikes and impressive street riots. It was not question on the subject;cabled answer to my should be eting the strongest American _
necessary to annihilate the Communists to "Your refer to a quarrel. But my govern- enco Iss age t gt tong end.
contain the threat to the security of the It g not i nt any such thwit The
state: y meat has never answered attacks and ac- Huon government, in dealing with the
govern-
What gives the Buddhist conspiracy its and cusationsmyseldf Buddhist elements. ments since the overthrow of Diem have been
uniquely dangerous twist is the. pseudo- If these attacks, were halted, the quarrel inhibited, by the feeling that the Americans
religious cover of its leadership. The ma- would die automatically." more e in g jority of Buddhists in Vietnam are quite But if there is a genuine schism in the InareVietnamintthanrested they areainieffectivecgov
Certainly neither _ proneutralist nor pro- Vietnamese Buddhist movement between the ernment there. We seem to be defending
Communist. Yet the militant leaders in moderates and the extremists, and if the ex- our fuzzy liberal ideal against the army-the
Saigon naturally seek to identify themselves tremists are in the minority, how have they only real source of strength for any govern-
with, and presume to speak for, every managed to infiltrate the Vietnamese army? ment in Vietnam.
Buddhist in the world. It goes back to last summer when Gen. The sad fact of the matter is that American
Certainly they will raise the cry of religious Nguyen Khanh waf_ still fighting for his policy is still very much under the influence
persecution at the first hint of trouble. Given political life and was under the illusion that of the men who were responsible for the
the experience of the unfortunate President he could appease his most vocal tormentor- overthrow of Diem and who are still de-
Ngo Dinh Diem, it is a highly effective form the same extremist monk, Thich Tri Quang- termined to justify their action. It appar-
of defense. And every effort must be made to by giving In to his demands. One of these ently makes little difference that the highest
avoid lending credence to the charge, demands was to give Quang the right to as- officials of the administration are con-
It seems improbable, therefore, that an at- sign Buddhist chaplains to every army com- winced-and were convinced at the time-
tempt to crush the conspiracy by force pany. that this m was a traic mistake, The
will be called for. But short of this, there Three-man Buddhist chaplain teams (in same thinkingethatt p oduced the mistake is
are plenty of things that the Saigon govern- reality political cells) were soon thereafter still shaping our policies in Vietnam today.
ment could do. attached to the army and soon trouble It is time the nonsense stopped.
It could, for instance, put considerably started. A few irate Vietnamese comman-
more _
backbone in suppressing the kind of ders began to expel the chaplains when they [From 'the Christian Science Monitor, Dec.
senseless juvenile hooliganism that fills the caught them distributing tracts telling sol- 21, 1964
"daily news columns from Saigon, diers they need not obey their officers if the ]
It could screen out of the army and police felt they were acting in the interests of BUDDHISM s WIDENS less than ROLE
y force those elements which might be likely colonialist Americans or persons unfaithful With Christmas less than a week away,
to side against the government in any real to the nationalist cause. wuddhism continues ` to be active on the
showdown with the Buddhist leadership. But for the most part, individual Viet- world's newsira et
It could strengthen the hand of more con- namese army officers have been unwilling to The South Vietnamese Government has
servative (and more religious) Buddhist take upon themselves the expulsion of these been full alert, Buddhist hagainst ilt dtthe tra-
leaders who, at present, are themselves the cohorts of Thich Tri Quang, particularly so sibility . e ionbet st the cou-
targets of strong-arm tactics by their mili- long as his capacity to wrest further appease- ttry's. Tension factions some t of the n gov-
tant coreligionists, merit from the government and from the try's Buddhist factions and the Saigon It could, in short, face up to the problem Americans seemed unchecked. ernment has been increasing daily, gv
instead of shrinking from it. What is essen- In any case, the capacity of a militant the In the midst of the Vietnamese friction,
tial in Vietnam is that the power to over- minority to make trouble out of all propor- billion religion that Tsai being many as half a
throw governments-any government which tion to their true importance is winds adherents
Cots u beng buffeted
and by new
they do not control-be taken away from this part of the winds ero Communist China and soothed
handful of monks. If this is not done, and even If Quarig's landscape boast of subverting v Vietnam. And by statements from the Vatican.
soon, there will be no prospect whatever of name evens armed forces of subverting the Viet-
any stable government in South Vietnam. e armed forces is exaggerated, it is OoorERATION ASKED
surely criminal negligence not to take what- Among the past week's developments in-
[From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. g ever steps necessary to destroy his capacity volving Buddhism around the world:
19651 to spread political poisons among Vietnam's Pope Paul VI appealed for Buddhists and
BUDDHISTS BRAG OF SUByERSION fighting men. Roman Catholics to cooperate, "especially in
certain zones where the two communities
(By Marguerite Higgins) [From the Evening Star, Jan. T, 1985] live together and are confronted with the
On the bulletin board of the newest pa- THE BUDDHISTS IN VIETNAM same problems." The zone that bests fits
gods in Saigon there recently has appeared this situation is Vietnam.
a communique which the Communist- In some ways, the American Government The Chinese Communist Government
oriented wof militant Vietnamese Bud- Is its own worst enemy in Vietnam. In its stripped the Dalai Lama of Tibet of his re-
re-
or eat d wing in to have subverted at least National Arm d- Buddhist subversion and its fatuous insist- committee for the "Tibet Autonomous Re-
The is sinister Thich Tri y ence on the theme of a "broadly based gion" of China. It called him a "traitor who
Quang, Vietnam's civilian government in Saigon it is in Itself is an incorrigible running dog of imperialism
ace toppler of governments, boasts that 2,000 largely responsible for the near paralysis of and forei%n reactionaries."
officers of th' Vietnamese army would lay the regime of Premier Tran Van Huong, a The move dropped all Chinese pretense
down their arms and refuse to fight the paralysis not likely to be broken by today's that the Buddhist god-king of Tibet, now
Communists if he ordered them to do so. reported agreement to form a new coalition in exile in India, retained any further secular
How valid arethese. boasts?
It acre,tsuestion ?and an council, or spiritual authority In his conquered land.
is - appalling The threat raised by the militant Buddhist The Theravada Buddhist sect, an impor-
one. For if the Vietnamese regular army leaders is now perfectly clear. After months tant minority in Vietnam, sent a petition to
has been subverted to this extent today, of behind-the-scenes Incitement of disorder, the government asking for arms to fight the
what will happen tomorrow? the two top "venerables," Tich Tri Quan Communist Vietcong
First, it should be pointed out that there and Tich Tam Chau, are in open revolt be granted.' It is unlikely it will
appears to be a widespread misconception against the Huong regime. They are threat- REACTION WATCHED
In this country about the southeast Asian ening to overthrow it, using the same Vietnam has been badly fragmented by
Buddhist movement. According to the re- methods of mass disorder that led to the fighting religious sects before. And Thera-
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
3292 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
vada, weak as it may be in Vietnam, repre-
sents 95 percent of the population of adjoin-
ing Cambodia, a country with strong anti-
Saigon leanings,
Political observers in Saigon were watching
closely reactions of Vietnam's ranking Bud-
dhist layman, Mal The Truyen, who returned
home Friday from a World Buddhist con-
ference in India.
Mr. Truyen is a vice president of the world
body but, more importantly for Vietnamese
Buddhism, he is a member of the High Na-
tional Council, the Saigon government's
interim legislature.
Mr. Truyen has not joined the recent Bud-
dhist protests and is regarded by some as the
best hope for getting antigovernment Bud-
dhist priests together with the government
of Premier Tran Van Huong.
The Vietnamese Commissioner General for
Buddhist Youth Affairs, Thich Thien Minh,
said Vietnamese Buddhists had striven hard
to live up to "Lord Buddha's teachings of
compassion and altruism." He said the best
way for Buddhists to combat communism
was to come together in one united, cen-
tralized body to advance the Buddhist ide-
ology and eliminate social injustice.
DISSENT INDICATED
In another quote, the State Department in
Washington termed a letter written to Presi-
dent Johnson by another Saigon Buddhist
leader, Thich Tam Chau, "a propaganda de-
vice and not an appropriate means of com-
municating with the President of the United
States." The priest had written charging
Premier Huong's government with oppress-
ing Buddhism.
Meanwhile there has been evidence that
not all Buddhists follow the protesting
priests. It is known that many of the monks
in the vanguard of last year's struggle
against the Ngo Dinh Diem rule have opposed
the current anti-Huong campaign. At least
one of them, Thich Due Nghiep, has been
denounced by the North Vietnamese Gov-
ernment
Thich Due Nghiep has opposed the anti-
Huong demonstrations and urged priests to
take to the countryside to preach against the
Vietcong.
Perhaps his followers are gaining ground.
A week ago violent demonstrations. and self-
immolation by priests was predicted. But
they failed to materialize. The same pre-
dictions have been made again.
NEW AGITATION
The Government has obviously mustered
some support for its position and has suc-
cessfully clamped down an troublemakers.
Btft some sources report agitation now is
strong in the large cities of Rue and Da
Nang farther north where Saigon control Is
less effective.
Meanwhile, the Saigon government has ad-
mitted that the Buddhists are not the only
factionalists dividing South Vietnam.
It announced the formation of an Armed
Forces Council to iron out differences be-
tween the old guard officers and the "young
Turks,"
And Chief of State Phan Khuc Suu has
proposed that seven new members be added
to the High National Council. He suggested
names representing the south, central, and
north sections of the country In order to try
to overcome regional factionalism.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2,
1964]
SAIGON SCHISM: BUDDHIST STRUGGLE SAPS
FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISTS
(By Takashi Oka)
SAICoN. The struggle between Premier
Tran Van Huong and the Buddhist leadership
continues, and South Vietnam is the loser.
Neither side talks to the other except in
propagandistic appeals to the population.
Each day of political Instability at the center
makes more difficult the task of pacification
against Communist insurgents in the coun-
tryside.
Washington, engaged in intensive review
of its Indochina policy, must decide whether
or not continuation of military and economic
aid on the present scale of more than $500
million a year can bring victory against the
Communists without taking the war into
North Vietnam.
It must also decide how this aid can most
effectively be used as leverage to promote
political stability within South Vietnam.
It is the second of these two tasks that
preoccupies the American Embassy here these
days. Washington formally supports the
Tran Van Huang government, which came
into being according to provisions of the
October 20 constitution and which cannot
legally be overthrown unless the 1b-man-High
National Council votes it out.
Yet there is full recognition that Buddhism
in South Vietnam constitutes a powerful
political force, that leaders of the Buddhist
hierarchy have been dissatisfied with the
Huong government from its inception, and
that whatever legal rights and wrongs of the
situation, an all-out confrontation between
Buddhists and the government can benefit
no one but the Communists.
REGIME ATTACKED
Americans have, therefore, sought to keep
an open bridge between the government and
Buddhist leadership. But the task becomes
more difficult with each passing day.
Saturday Thich Tam Chau, one of the
Buddhist hierarchy's two most prominent
leaders, held a press conference bitterly at-
tacking the Huong government.
The following day he permitted a student-
sponsored funeral procession for a youth
killed in government-student clashes last
week to start out from Buddhist headquar-
ters, the Vien Hoa Dao or Institute for Exe-
cution of Dharma.
Buddhist sources say Vien Boa Dao will
call for popular noncooperation with the
government.
A nightly program of loudspeaker broad-
casts from within Vien Hoa Dao Is to be
launched this week. Those who gather In
streets to listen will do so at their own
risk, presumably.
BUDDHISTS ACCUSED
The government accuses the Buddhists of
mixing religion and politics by using the re-
ligious prestige of the hierarchy to promote
secular causes such as the overthrow of the
government. Thich Tam Chau responds that
"all things in the world are related."
To an observer the Buddhist hierarchy
seems to be testing its strength with the
people. Last August's events have 'already
proved that on some issues they can win
overriding popular support.
Whether this support will stay with them
on lesser issues is problematical. But the
Huong-Buddhist confrontation has had a
snowballing effect. What seemed bridgeable
and nonessential at the start has built up
into a major test of strength from which
neither now can afford to withdraw.
CAMPAIGN HINTED
[Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported
the Buddhists may again turn to suicide by
fire in an intensive campaign to overthrow
Premier Huong's government, quoting an un-
named Buddhist leader. -
[Leading monks deny there are plans for
more such suicides. But Buddhist strate-
gists generally keep their plans secret to the
last moment. -
[A Reuters dispatch said government
forces are pressing their gains against Com-
munist Vietcong guerrillas while the Bud-
dhist leaders work out a strategy for ousting
the civilian government.[ -
February 23
[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 12,
19641
PAINFVL VERDICT IN VIETNAM
(By Marguerite Higgins)
Key U.S. officials in Vietnam have come to
a painful but significant conclusion. It is
that a tiny faction of Vietnamese-too clever
to reveal their motives and too powerful for
comfort-are bent on using the cloak of re-
ligion as a cover for undeclared warfare de-
signed to prevent the emergence of a stable
government in Vietnam. In other words.
whenever any regime in Saigon shows any
sign of being able to govern the drive to
topplp it will begin.
There are some dissenters from this view
in the Embassy in Saigon. But this conclu-
sion is nonetheless held widely and strongly
enough to explain why the Embassy gave the
strongest sort of backing to the decision of
Vietnam's new premier, Tran Vail Huong,
last weekend to can out the army to repress
the Buddhist-instigated demonstrations
against his fledgling government.
WILY MONK
Thus Tran Van Huong's new regime, fcr
whom practically nobody has great hopes, is
momentarily one up on the wiliest, slickest
demagog In Vietnam, the Buddhist monk,
Thich Tri Quang, who, Americans believe,
was behind last weekend's initial attempt
to topple the latest Saigon regime, just as
he had previously mastermined the toppling
of Ngo Dinh Diem and Gen. Nguyen Khanh.
But in this matter of government toppling,
the smart money is on Thich Tri Quang, es-
pecially if his boasts of having swung some
personalities of the Catholic, Cao Dal, and
Hoa Hao faiths into his camp, are at all
true.
It has taken some time for U.S. officials
to permit themselves to face the fearsome
and indeed awesome truth about Thich Tri
Quang. Of late, Ambassador Maxwell Tay-
lor in Saigon and State Department officials
in Washington have taken to describing
Thich Tri Quang as "the_ Makarios of south-
east Asia."
There used to be brisk arguments among
Americans in Saigon and Washington as to
whether Thich Tri Quang, who once served
with the Communist Viet Minh and whose
two brothers serve Ho Chi Minh, is "still a
Communist."
It is only recently that Americans have
begun to realize that this begs the real issue
which is whether Thich Tri Quang serves
Communist ends. And the answer here is
that if the Vietcong themselves had been
writing the scenario as to how any given
Buddhist monk could play into their hands,
they could not have improved on the real
life doingsof Thich Tri Quang, including his
current attempt to topple the new civilian
government.
For if Thich Tri Quang and his followers
can, by demonstrations, riot, and propaganda
successfully keep on perpetuating the near
chaos that has prevailed from the top down
in Vietnam, it is just a matter of time 'until
the Vietcong take over the country - from
within.
The civilian regime of Tran Van Huong re-
quired great courage to proclaim the separa-
tion of politics from religion, because if this
much needed step were carried out it would
checkmate some of the antigovernment
troubles masterminded by Thich Tri Quang.
It would, as a few examples:
End the vigilante squads of Buddhists who
have taken law into their own hands in
the provinces and arrested Catholics on the
pretext that they are Diemists (it Is a pre-
text because almost all educated Vietnamese
worked for the government between 1954 and
1963 and hence were Dlemists).
End the system where triumvirates of
Buddhists are attached to Vietnamese bat-
talions with the divisive and dangerous habit
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003110/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
19-65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3289
A clear-cut Communist victory in South military, although in seniority they rank be. toward the junior officers and General
Vietnam, the domino theorists maintain, low many officers without field responsibility. Khanh. The remarks by General Khanh,
would have worldwide repercussions, The The two officer factions have been feuding he said, "might have been made In the heat
Communists in Peiping would win the argu- for months. On December 18. the junior offi- of the moment." But Mr. Rusk suggested
ment with the Communists in Moscow cers formed an organization called the that U.S. aid might be curtailed if the d!ffi-
over how to spread their ideology. Commu- Armed Forces Council, with no representa- culties In Saigon continued.
nists would expand their Chinese-style sub- tion from the senior officers. The council The latest flare-up came just as plans were
versive activities In Africa and South Amer- then drew up an order calling for mandatory shaping up for South Vietnamese air strikes
Ica, confident that the United States would retirement of all officers with at least 25 against Communist Vietcong supply bases
refuse to become involved in another expen- years' service. This would retire about 40 and infiltration staging areas in Laos near
sive guerrilla war., officers, Including Maj. Gen. Duong Van the South Vietnamese border. Gen.
LEAVE THE WEAPONS BEHIND? Minh, former Premier who is popular with Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Premier of Loss,
The domino theory is based, of course, on South Vietnam's Buddhists. visited Saigon last week, presumably to put
tpresumption that without U.S. aid South The High National Council refused to ap- the finishing touches on plans to strike at
the Vietnam presumption
collapse houtethe Commu- South prove the order. So the junior officers abol- the Communist bases.
fished the legislative group. The purge
nists. But If the United States did withdraw, THE FLAMES OF WAR
most probably American weapons and equip- commander comma,Air of the he air air force, Nguyen , and d Brig. . Gen. . These preparations were enough to alarm
ment now.stQred in that country would be Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of the 1st the Red Chinese, who threatened to plunge
left behlnfl. The South Vietnamese armed Army Corps, defended the military's right to Indochina into war if the United States
forces would. certainly not succumb to the "act as mediator" of disputes within the bombs supply lines through Laos. "The
Communist guerrillas overnight. Government. flames of war will spread to the whole of
But psychologically, South Vietnam would The officers said their move was aimed at Indochina if U.S. Imperialism succeeds in
be 'weakened. The South Vietnamese mili- eliminating political interference in the con- its criminal scheme," warned the Peiping
tary situation, after all, has steadily de- duct or the antiguerrilla war. But, although People's Daily.
teriorated despite American aid of more than they disbanded the legislative arm of the Whether the United States would go along
$11,500,000 a day and the presence of 22,000 Government, they pledged continued these plans in view of the present tur-
American advisers. Without American sup- bulence in Saigon was uncertain. For one
port, the best to Premier Tran Van Huong and his his Cabinet. support
guess is that the South Viet- The Premier has been under attack by mili- thing, it was no longer clear who actually
namese would quickly seek a political, rather tant Buddhist organizations almost since 'he held power in the country. U.S. officials
than a military, solution to the Red threat. took office October 30. The purge leaders !n- were unsure whether General Khanh had
The Communists probably would be willing dicated they believed their move would pave again assumed the role of strong man or
to negotiate a cease-fire, figuring It would be the way for reconciling the Buddhists and whether he was only acting as the mouth-
less expensive to them to subvert the Gov- the Huong government. piece of the junior officers. Nor was Premier
ernment from within. MOTIVES CALLED SINCERE Huong's position clear. Despite strong ges-
BATTLE WITH NO FRONTLINES tures of support from Washington, the Pre-
The United States, even if it pulled out of The U.S. Embassy In Saigon quickly op- mier remained in the background, tacitly, at
South Vietnam, still would remain the posed the purge. Conceding that the officers' least, giving his approvagto the purge. The
strongest military power in Asia. The 7th motives in attempting to stabilize the Gov- Buddhists, too, stayed quiet, awaiting the
now pfrom Com- ernment were sincere, Embassy officials military's next move. The' United States
Fleet
Fleet now protects said the purge would only further disrupt the alone was standing fast publicly against the
hustle i re ects Formosa o
tInvasion and quickly ckGovernment. U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. purge. And the United States suddenly
to any an could
country
ened troops
t military forces: But, the Taylor held hurried consultations with the seemed to have very few friends in South
ed Communist m un say, the 7th Fleet has junior officers, General Khanh, and Premier Vietnam.
.domino
subversion In Laos and Huon The officers refused to back down. RICHARD EGAN.
failed South to o prevrevn.ent Although Red Red the United States General Khanh's position in the maneuver-
South ing was unclear, but there were plenty of [From the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 25,
is the world's mightiest military power, they rumors. One said he had been at odds with 1964]
say, nuclear bombs, tanks, and aircraft car- the junior officers in recent weeks because of MATTER OF FACT: How NOT To Do IT
riers are of little use against a guerrilla force his refusal to pledge his support to Mr.
fighting a battle with no front lines. Huong, his successor as Premier. The junior (BY Joseph Alsop)
At a press conference last week, Secretary officers were said to have threatened Decem- HONG KONG.-The political trouble in
of State Dean Rusk ducked a question about ber 6 to jail General Khanh unless he pub- Saigon began at almost the moment when
whether the United States still subscribed to licly announced support of the Premier. It this reporter was starting home for Christ-
the domino theory. was rumored, too, that General Khanh was mas. But even on the road home, with no
He did say, however, that if South Viet- quietly conferring with Buddhist leaders, pre- opportunity to study detailed developments,
nam were lost to the Communists, "they sumably in hope of capitalizing on any Bud- it is easy to see that we are being given an-
would simply move the problem to the next dhist-provoked overthrow of the Huong gov- other demonstration of how not to do it.
country and the next and, the next. And, ernment. The Vietnamese generals have no doubt
as I say, this is not dominoes. This Is the In a radio address after a 'meeting with contributed their share to this demonstra-
kind of Marxism that comes out of Peiping." Ambassador Taylor, General Khanh accepted tion, but so have the Americans. To be sure,
Mr. Rusk asserted that South Vietnam's full responsibility for the purge. Then he the fault on the American side does not lie
"primary requirement" in the fight against swung into his attack against the United with Gen. Maxwell Taylor. The fault lies
the Communists Is national unity. "Unity," States. "We make sacrifices for the coun- with the instructions that General Taylor
he said, would be worth many, many divi- try's independence and the Vietnamese peo- was given, and even more with the ludicrously
sions, " But there was no unity in South ple's liberty, but not to carry out the policy unrealistic ideas and prejudices in which
Vietnam last week. , of any foreign country," he said. He defined those instructions partly originated.
The latest upheaval began in the same way the role of the military as "acting as an in- It has been the same old story from the
as most of the previous coups and attempted termediary to settle all disputes and differ- period when large numbers of U.S. officials,
coups-with the rumbling of trucks filled ences if they create a situation favorable to military officers and one must add, news-
with soldiers in the streets of Saigon. The the common enemies: communism and Papermen, were doing everything in their
purge was carried out speedily. Soldiers, colonialism in any form." power to undercut the beleaguered Chinese
under command of a clique of 9 junior CRITICAL OF AMBASSADOR TAYLOR Nationalist Government, down to the present
officers, arrested most of the members of the melancholy moment. Almost always, the
15-man High National Council, the country's In private interviews with American re- same two tendencies have recurrently
provisional legislature, and several dozen Porters, General Khanh was sharply critical marked-and too often fatally marred-
other political figures. of Ambassador Taylor. If he "does not act American dealings with situations like that
The officers acted, they said, because the more intelligently, the United States will lose in Vietnam.
council was dominated, by "counter-revolu- southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom," In such situations, first of all, a good many
tionary elements that were acting against said General Khanh. He charged the U.S. Americans mysteriously tend to be hyper-
the spirit of national unity." The arrested Envoy had acted "beyond imagination as far critical of precisely those allied leaders whose
council members, the officers said, had been as an ambassador is concerned." aims and purposes most closely coincide with
"conspiring" against the armed forces in In Washington, the Johnson administra- American interests. It is never enough, for
hope of furthering "their own personal tion replied with a message of support for Americans of this stripe, that our interests
ambitions." Its man in Saigon. "Ambassador Taylor," are being served.
OFFICER FACTIONS FEUD said the State Department, "has been acting Whether in China, or Korea, or today In
throughout with the full support of the Vietnam, they must always be designing
But more than the personal ambitions and U.S. Government." ideal governments; their ideal governments
rivalries of the officers seemed to be involved. Secretary Rusk, at his news conference generally exclude the local leaders whose aims
The nine officers all hold key positions in the the next day, took a more conciliatory tone coincide with American Interests. This was
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
emphatically the case in Vietnam in the years tion that permitted the Vietcong to take ments that Marxism and Buddhism were
of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in a considerable over 7 million (out of 14 million) Viet- alike, his furtive meetings with leaders of
measure, it is today. namese in 2 months, the demoralizing ef- the Vietcong National Liberation front?
The rights and wrongs of the young gen- feet of the first and second coup d'etats on Will faces turn red if we admit further
erals' renewed intervention in Vietnamese Vietnam's fledgling officer corps has changed that for many months Quang bamboozled
politics cannot be judged from this distance. the very nature of the war. . many well-meaning Americans into believ-
But from any distance, it is perfectly clear The demoralization Is such that many Viet- ing his absurd claim that his particular
that these are the men most deeply com- namese officers have become de facto hors clique of Buddhists represented "85 to 90
matted to resisting the Communist attack on de combat even though they are nominally percent" of the Vietnamese people when in
South Vietnam. It is also clear that with still attheir posts. The morale of many key point of fact Buddhists in Vietnam may just
the possible exception of Prime Minister Tran officers has been crippled because they do possibly constitute 30 percent of the people
Van I3uong, they are the most effective per- not know whom to trust. In the wake of the (see "Buddhism in Vietnam" by Dr. Mai Tho
sonalities on the scene. successive purgings of the "ins" by the "outs" Truyen, chairman of the Vietnamese Associ-
The motives for their renewed intervention during the two revolts, who can blame these ation of Buddhist Laymen) and further,
may well have been a great deal more justi- officers if they are fearful of taking respon- Quang's faction is bitterly opposed by truly
fiable than one might suppose from a brief sibility and executing orders. After all, their religious Buddhists such as those at Saigon's
perusal of the pompous pronouncements of general or other superior officer may be "in" Xa Loi Pagoda, which is not on speaking
the State Department spokesman. Just be- today "out" tomorrow. If they do their duty terms with the Buddhist center run by the
fore they acted, for example, there were today they may be punished tomorrow. Communist-tinged extremists?
strong indications that Phan Khac Suu, the And the United States is not without Embarrassing as all this may be, embar-
nice, bewildered old gentleman who is the blame for this uncertain atmosphere. If the rassment has become, and resoundingly, the
official chief of state, was about to make a American Embassy in Saigon had spoken out lesser of the evils. The moment of truth is
dangerously muddled compromise with the half as forcefully against the reign of terror at hand.
political Buddhists. perpetrated recently (mainly against Cath- The truth is vital because otherwise Amer
Moreover, you need only ask any American olics) in Vietnam as it did during the so- ican opinion is going to fall, just like that
in Saigon, whether political or military, what called Buddhist crisis, there might be a into the trap so cleverly and deviously pre-
protection we have against a neutralist gov- saner atmosphere. The phony trial of the pared by Quang-the trap of believing that
ernment finally coming to power because of Catholic Mayor Dang Sy, the war hero (seven the so-called and in fact nonexistent "Bud-
the general deterioration in South Vietnam. decorations) who was condemned for having dhist majority" of the Vietnamese people
The answer always is, "The army leaders will carried out orders of his Buddhist superiors have turned against the United States.
not permit it." In these very possible cir- in Hue last May, is but one example of this The truth is, and it needs to be repeated
cumstances, in short, we are actually count- reign of terror. And if Catholics carry signs loud and clear, that the man behind the per--
ing on the army leaders' intervention. saying "Henry Cabot Lodge Go Home" it is sons cradling the rocks that smash our Ii..
Because of American tendency No. 1, how- because they think the United States has brary is Quang as well as others who have
ever, the army leaders are now the targets stayed strangely silent in the face of what been been intriguing with the Vietcong Com-
of the State Department's righteous indigna- almost everybody on the scene in Saigon munists for a very long time, as the American
tion. As for tendency No. 2, it is symbolized considers a mockery of justice-only one intelligence record-to its credit--shows even
by Phan Khac Suu, the chief of state above among many. though the policymakers have chosen to dis-
mentioned. He has clean hands and sore In any case, the morale of many Vietna- regard the evidence.
feet. And he wonderfully illustrates the mese officers in crucial areas is shot. But if and when the majority of the Ameri-
usual results of ideal government designing. Further, this country is going to have to can people begin to believe that utterly false,
It was a fairly hair raising experience to stop trying to fight this war with its left but so carefully prepared, piece of Commu-
go straight from an audience with this ami- hand. It is not serious warfare, to give but nist-abetted propaganda to the effect that
able old man, with his white foot bandages one example, to send over military advisers the illusory Buddhist majority wants us to go
and obvious feebleness, to a long meeting for 1 year only. The advisers are the first home, then the clamor for Americans to give
with one of the ideal government designers. to say it. Said Maj. Olen O'Connor, of Ari- up and get out of Vietnam could become ir-
"Now," this American kept saying, "we've zona: "It takes about 6 to 8 months to get reversible.
got a government we can really work with- to know your Vietnamese opposite number All right, so the United States made a mis-
a government with real promise of stability." and work smoothly with him. And just as take back in the summer of 1963. We can
And he went on to talk with pious enthusi- things are really beginning to mesh, it Is now see, in retrospect, that the Vietnamese
asm about the high national council's promis- time to go home." army, the Vietnamese security police, and
lug first attempts to prepare a national elec- Further, the Communists, who convinced Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem were
tion in South Vietnam. themselves early in 1964 that the United completely right when they tried to tell us
In reality, it would be flattering to call States was about to bow out of Asia, must be from the very beginning of the Buddhist
the high national council a basket of eels. Put on notice that this country will do what- crisis that in Vietnam the Communists do
As for the notion of holding a general elec- ever is necessary to prevent a Communist not, after all, play cricket, but play dirty.
tion in Vietnam at this juncture or at any victory. This means, if necessary, the com- They play real dirty and indulge in precisely
time in the near future, this alone would mitment of American troops, sabotage and such tricks as infiltrating the Buddhist
almost excuse the dissolution of the high other dirty tricks in North Vietnam, etc. The movement, and not only that, infiltrating
national council by the young generals: Communists know that the United States also, to some degree, the Catholics, Cao Dai,
Working for sane civilian leadership by has the power to win In southeast Asia. Hon Hao, mountain tribesmen, the ancestor
W
PMinister Huong civilian one pin y And if Peking and Hanoi are convinced that worshippers, and the many other non-Bud-
men men like Prime rimiof comedy or parody the United States Is prepared-at last-to dhist sects and religions of Vietnam.
Trying to stage a
of normal, duly elected democratic govern- use it, the invocation of this power may not More recently, Premier Tran Van Huong
ment in Saigon at this stage of the war, Is be necessary. was perfectly correct in warning that ace-
quite another thing. The purpose of the 6. THE BUDDHIST MILITANTS government toppler Quang talked like a Coln-
parody Is clear, of course. It looks nice in [From the Washington Star, Jan. 23, 1965] munist, acted like a Communist, and served
the papers back home, and thus consoles IsN'T IT TIME To FACE TRUTH? Communist ends.
the large element in the U.S. Government (By Marguerite Higgins) The United States' mistakes are painful,
that always worries about appearances. but not shameful. Contrary to the Commu-
The time has come to say, however, "To The spectacle in Saigon of brown-robed nists, we have not been plotting for 25 years
the devil with appearances. What matters monks egging on delinquents, both juvenile to seize Vietnam and have not meticulously
is averting a shattering defeat." and adult, to smash the windows of our studied every village, every province, every
libraries leads to one insistent question: religion, every superstition, with the aim
[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, Isn't it time the United States told the of subverting them to our ends. If it is any
1964] American people the truth concerning the comfort, our inexperience is born of virtue---
way in which a handful of Buddhist poli- the virtue of a Johnny-come-lately desper-
ON THE SPOT: VIETNAM ERRORS OFFER VITAL ticians in Vietnam have used a religious ately seeking to save a drowning man with-
LEssoN cover to camouflage a campaign of chaos
Marguerite Higgins) that for the last 18 months has served only out time to find out much about him, let
(By alone bone up on his family tree.
NEW Yoax.--One way for the United States Communist ends? And the essential, and most salutary point
to better its present chances (perhaps 50-50) Is it embarrassing to admit that the Unit- of admitting past mistakes is that this is
of winning the war in Vietnam is to face ed States made a mistake in giving asylum the only way to stop repeating them.
coldly and honestly the consequences of its at its Saigon embassy no less than twice (3 _
past mistakes. months in 1968, 1 day in 1964) to the in- [From the Washington Evening Star,
Putting aside matters of America's image, tellectual powerhouse of the rock-throwing Jan. 8, 1965]
world opinion, and the like, the greatest, and clique, the Buddhist Monk Thich Tri Quang?
possibly disastrous, blunder of the last year Is it difficult to acknojvledge that perhaps CONTROLLING THE BUDDHISTS
was the decision to signal the overthrow of we should have checked a little further into if the militant Buddhist leaders in Saigon
the Diem regime in midbattle. Quite apart Quang's past, his two arrests by the French are recognized as subversive conspirators in-
from the resulting chaos and disorganiza- for serving with the Communists, his state- stead of the spiritual characters they pretend
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
1.465 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3287
At Bienhoa, 20 miles outside of Saigon, a
new papermill will officially begin produc-
tion today. The opening will culminate 26
months of construction work, frequently in-
terrupted by skirmishes between Vietnamese
troops and the Vietminh.
At Anhoa, 530 miles north of Saigon, work
on a giant Government industrial complex
is moving steadily ahead, despite frequent
incursions by guerrillas.
The first phase of the project, including a
coal mine, a hydroelectric plant, a nitrogen
fertilizer plant, and a calcium-carbide plant,
is` about 75 percent completed and should
be finished by early next year.
INTERNATIONAL TEAMWORK
The Cong Ty Ky Nghe Giay Vietnam pulp
and paper mill was completely built by the
Parson & Whittemore-Lyddon organiza-
tion, with a team of workers and technicians
that included Vietnamese, Americans,
Canadians, Taiwan Chinese, Frenchmen,
Germans, Indians, and Swiss.
The plant was built under difficult condi-
tions. An American executive who visited
the site said that workers were frequently
the target of snipers-particularly occidental
workers.
The mill; which will produce newsprint
and writing paper, i6--owned by the Viet-
namese Government. Foreign exchange for
the purchase of machinery was provided by
the Agency for International Development,
and Parsons & Whittemore has subscribed for
19 percent of the share capital.
The Anhoa site, less than 100 miles south
of the 17th parallel, partitioning Vietnam,
was selected for the industrial complex be-
cause of the coal deposits at nearby Nong-
son.
The Industrial project in the populous
province of Quangnam, was aided by a $1.7
million grant from the Development Agency,
$400,000 of which was used to purchase a
fleet of 14 pieces of 'construction equipment
from Allis-Chalmers International.
The Nongson coal mine is already in opera-
tion and last year produced some 200,000
tons of anthracite.
A SECOND PHASE
The second phase of the giant project,
which is also owned by the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, is scheduled for completion by
1968, This phase will include a caustic-soda
plant, a glass factory, a cement plant, a dry-
ice plant and several other producing facili-
ties.
A third phase, which will depend on
whether more coal can be found in the Nong-
son bed, will include development of nearby
magnetite, hematite, gold, copper, lead, and
other metal deposits and a factory for ore
concentration.
The French and West German Govern-
ments have also made grants to assist the
Anhoa-Nongson complex.
The project area is accessible by a rail-
road, two highways, and the Thubon River.
Because of heavy guerrilla activity, however,
military helicopter is often the only safe
way' of reaching the development.
One American technician, who recently
returned from working on the complex, said
that the first thing he was issued when he
arrived was an M-1 rifle.
Feb. 19,19641
VIETNAM
(By Robert R. Brunn)
WASHINGTON.-Communist North Viet-
nam's woes are giving sizable encouragement
to the South Vietnamese regime and the
United States
Some kind of a respite is being offered
hard-pressed American officials dealing with
the guerrilla war. They argued that now is
the time to place aggressive pressure on the
Communist forces.
Self-admitted weaknesses of the Hanoi
government of North Vietnam, some rather
surprising assumptions by the Communists,
and U.S. intelligence assessments add up in
this way:
Hanoi grimly assumes that the anguish-
provoking war will continue, without any
question through 1964 and beyond. This is
despite Washington's acknowledgement that
the next 4 months are "crucial."
Hanoi is combating the widening un-
popularity of the war in the south which
is draining off resources from a seriously de-
pressed economy. Apathy often charac-
terizes the civilian attitude.
MOSCOW REJECTION
Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was
at least 20 percent below 1962's middling
harvest. Some starvation is visible but there
is no general disaster in sight.
Moscow has flatly turned down a direct
Hanoi plea for aid to support the war. The
North Vietnamese reason that they can't af-
ford to turn their backs politically on
Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy
can give them little help in terms of food
or weapons.
Morale among the Communist Vietcong
troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing
problem for the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment. Analysis have seen absolutely no evi-
dence that the division between pro-Peiping
and pro-Moscow camps seriously hampers
the war effort, as such. The major Hanoi
decision to side openly with Peiping was
bound to leave a disappointed minority but
there have been no demotions, no dissident
voices raised.
Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for
U.S. military power and sees the superior
weapons, equipment, and manpower of the
South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle
to victory. The Communists fear an escala-
tion of the war, bringing an open U.S. inva-
sion of North Vietnam, and this has tended
up to now to keep the Communist military
effort within a limited framework.
While the Vietcong at times' has its guer-
rillas at battalion strength, they are in no
position to coordinate such units in massive
movements against the South Vietnamese.
One factor Is the lack of well-anchored sup-
ply bases for such operations.
Neutralization of North Vietnam is con-
sidered to be utterly out of the question in
the minds of the Hanoi regime.
Much of the above analysis comes out of a
careful American study of the most impor-
tant statement made by the Hanoi govern-
ment in several years.
PROTRACTED TRIALS
it was spelled out In two articles in the
January and February issues in Hanoi's prin-
cipal journal, Hoc Tan, and a third article
in the newspaper Nhan Dan.
This official line laid down by the articles
in Hoc Tan is designed to seep down through
the ranks of the faithful and be imported to
South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting
guerrillas, observers here believe.
When the articles speak of new, hard, long,
protracted trials in the war and use the word
"protracted" over and over again, the signal
is that the Hanoi Communists are not think-
ing In terms of a rapid termination of the
war or the Imminent defeat of the South
Vietnamese army,
On the contrary, the Communists expect a
mounting military initiative in South Viet-
nam and complain that often they will have
to meet modern weapons with rusty nails
and crossbows.
ECONOMIC DRAIN
Analysts emphasize there is no widespread
disaffection in North Vietnam. The farm
situation is grim but not beyond hope.
But there is little doubt there is a solid
body of opinion in the north that the never
ending war is the primary cause for the weak-
ness of their economy.
The war in South Vietnam is seen here an
basically an indigenous one, gaining in its
support from within Vietnam. It is a dirty
war and one which has its grim aspects for
the Communists who have had no spectacu-
lar victories. These magazine articles were
designed to buck up the morale of the fight-
ing men.
5. COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL OPINION
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 19651
NEGOTIATIONS
It would be a mistake to allow the world
to believe that the people of the United
States have fallen into an Irreconcilable di-
vision on the question of whether we should
or should not negotiate a settlement in
South Vietnam. There are differences of
opinion, but they do not relate to the idea of
negotiation; they concern the kind of nego-
tiation. Sentiment surely is overwhelming-
ly in favor of negotiations that would end
the fighting, set up enforceable peace terms,
preserve the rights of our friends in South
Vietnam and leave intact the honor and pres-
tige of the United States. Just as certainly,
sentiment is against negotiations that would
not do this. The choice is not "negotia-
tions" or "no negotiations." The question.
is: "What kind of negotiations?"
In 1954, the French were driven into ne-
gotiations of a kind we must avoid. Mendez
France was in desperation. He had promised
to get France out of Indochina. To do it he
had to abandon many of the people of North
Vietnam to Communist vengeance. He had
to get the Soviet Union to intervene with He
Chi Minh and by allowing the EDO treaty to
fail in the French chamber he encouraged
that collaboration. But French power was
being drained away in Indochina. The na-
tion was literally bleeding to death. History
can forgive a weak power at the end of its
resources for upsetting its allies in Europe,
for deserting its comrades in arms in Indo-
china and for closing its eyes to the conse-
quences in Asia. France had no other
choice.
The United States; however, is not a small
European power at the end of its military,
economic, and political resources. It Is a
great global power whose might is undi-
minished. It will be judged by different
standards. It cannot permit savage re-
prisals to be worked upon anti-Communist
South Vietnamese. It cannot allow them to
died by battalions in order to save the lives
and property of Americans. It cannot offer
the Soviet Union or any other intervenor po-
litical concessions at the expense of Euro-
pean allies. It cannot be Indifferent to the
extension of Chinese Communist power in
Asia.
Many feared at the time that the 1954
negotiations would not end the fighting. And
indeed they permitted It to continue on terms
advantageous to communism. They did not
provide a settlement that enforced itself or
one that permitted anyone else to enforce
it.
Can negotiations in 1965 do any better?
If the North Vietnamese and their Chinese
sponsors understand the difference between
a powerful United States and an exhausted
France they might. But they must be made
to understand that difference. If they are
convinced that this country has the power
and the will to pursue Its legitimate ends
as long as it may be necessary to do so,
negotiations might be feasible and arrange-
ments of an acceptable peace possible. Until
the posture of the United States Is under-
stood by those with whom negotiations must
be conducted, this country must look to the
practical military means of better protecting
its position in South Vietnam.
It is perfectly clear that we need greatly to
increase the effectiveness of our conduct of
the war inside the borders of South Vietnam.
Several immediate steps are self-evident to
military authority: (1) The routes by which
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
North Vietnam is maintaining replacements
and supplies for 35,000 infiltrators must be
more nearly sealed off by the use of more
troops on the border and by a tighter naval
blockade; (2) the ratio of South Vietnam to
Vietcong forces must be raised from 5 to 1
to at least the 8-to-1 level by which the Brit-
ish gained success against Communists in
Malaya; (3) points from which troops are
embarked and material shipped in North
Vietnam must not enjoy immunity from re-
prisal attack; (4) the command structure of
the South Vietnam forces must be stabilized;
(5) the South Vietnam civilian government
must be strengthened.
There is no time limit In which we must
achieve these objectives. The scale of ex-
penditures is not prohibitive. We can keep
up operations on an even greater scale, year
after year and decade after decade, if that Is
vital to our interests.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged
that nothing is possible without a primary
effort by the South Vietnam peopli them-
selves. The war against the Vietcong is
their war. And it is a war which only South
Vietnam forces can win. The struggle for
the loyalty of the people is the struggle of
Vietnamese leaders. It is conceivable that
the South Vietnamese may fail completely on
these fronts. If that happens, regretfully
and sorrowfully, it will be necessary for us
to be governed by what we can do and not
by what we would like to do or what we ought
to do.
At the same time that we proceed to the
more effective prosecution of the war and the
more efficient organization of the civilian
Government in South Vietnam, we should
continuously make known the very limited
nature of our objectives. Unlike the French
In 1954, we- have no colonial ambitions. We
wish to see an independent .South Vietnam,
safe from external aggression, free to choose
in peace the kind of - government its people
wish (even if it is a,Communist government
in the end), open to normal trade and inter-
course with North Vietnam and other Asian
neighbors with whom it surely must be
closely associated in the future. Such a
South Vietnam would not menace any Asian
neighbor or threaten any legitimate interest
of North Vietnam.
More than mere oral assurances are needed
to assure the future of such a country. There
are, however, many sorts of satisfactory per-
formance bonds that could be given by a
North Vietnam Government desiring peace
on these terms,
Surely there is not much mystery about
the conditions to settle the war in South
Vietnam. When there is it fair prospect for
arriving at these conditions, there will be
little difference among Americans as to the
wisdom or desirability of negotiating.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Feb. 15, 1965]
WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP--VXETNA:M: THE
DOMINO THEORY
(By Crosby S. Noyes)
With the way things are going in Vietnam
it is only natural that a certain amount of
thought should be given these days to the
domino theory.
It was President Eisenhower who first used
the metaphor to explain and justify our pres-
ence in Vietnam. If our position there
should topple, he thought, a whole series of
non-Communist states in southeast Asia
would almost automatically fall under Com-
munist rule.
The domino theory is a good deal less
popular in administration circles today than
it once was. As the political situation in
Vietnam deteriorates and the possibility of
Communist victory grows, serious considers-
tion is -being given to the ways and means
of limiting the extent of a possible defeat
there.
Since administration leaders tend to ques-
tion the validity of the domino theory, they
also tend to deny rather emphatically any
total withdrawal of American military power
from southeast Asia in the event of a with-
drawal from Vietnam. The argument some-
times made by Vietnam bitter-enders, that it
would mean a retreat back to Hawaii and an
end to our presence in Asia, is rejected.
It can be argued on the contrary that there
is no country in the world harder to defend
against Communist subversion than South
Vietnam. The almost Impossible task of try-
ing to create a country where none exists in
the midst of a revolution that had been in
progress for a decade before the Americans
arrived would not confront us elsewhere.
Thailand, for example, would provide in-
finitely more favorable ground for resistance
to the Chinese Communist thrust. There,
at least, there is a sense of national identity
and a tradition of government authority.
And while the history of the country is not
exactly one of heroic defense of freedom, the
That, with encouragement, have shown
themselves quite determined in opposing
Communist pressures.
These pressures, perhaps, could be ex-
pected to increase if the position in Viet-
nam were lost. But the problems of waging
a subversive war against a country as rela-
tively well organized as Thailand are enor-
mously different than in Vietnam. There
is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-tung's
guerrillas would find the waters of Thailand's
population very congenial.
Open military pressure through Laos would
involve substantial risks for the Chinese.
As a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, Thailand could call on-and
presumably receive-aid from Australia,
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Britain, and the United States.
Under the terms of this treaty. in fact,
the power of the United States is already
committed in Thailand, to the extent that
it might be needed to resist either Com-
munist subversion or outright attack. And
though there is little reason to believe that
our commitment would reach anything like
the proportions in Vietnam, there is no rea-
son whatever to suppose that it would be
withdrawn.
There are those in Washington today who
deplore this state of affairs. The advocates
of worldwide American "disengagement" are
Inclined to the theory that American power
and prestige should never have been com-
mited in Vietnam in the first place. And
from here they argue that its commitment in
any of the so-called soft areas of southeast
Asia-which, presumably, means all of it-
should be avoided at all cost.
There are also those who contend that
any substantial transfer of American power
to Thailand would simply serve to invite
increase Communist pressures there. The
converse of the domino theory is that the
only way to contain the spread of militant
communism in the area is by strict nonin-
volvement and the encouragement of neutra-
list states on the periphery of China.
The trouble with both theories is that they
are belied by the evidence. The evidence is
that strong Communist pressure already is
being brought to bear on neutral states in
southeast Asia. It may be that these pres-
sures can be resisted by reasonably well
integrated nations with a reasonable amount
of political stability and military backing.
It is not to minimize the seriousness of a
defeat in Vietnam to say that it would not
necessarily mean defeat everywhere.
It is time to face up to the fact that we
are engaged in a continuing process of con-
taining or at least limiting the thrust of
Communist China which threatens all of
southeast Asia. To pretend that this thrust
does not exist, or that it does not represent
a threat to vital American interests, or that
It can be limited by diplomacy, could well
turn defeat into disaster.
[From the National Observer, Dec. 28, 1964]
AT A CROSSROADS IN ASIA?-VIETNAM: FADING
FRIENDSHIP AND NEW Focus ON DOMINO
THEORY
The speaker was no leftist demagog, though
his attack on U.S. policy was full of words
like interference and colonialism. The speak-
er was, instead, an American ally in a war
against communism, South Vietnam's Lt.
Gen. Nguyen Khanh. And his words raised
serious questions about the very basis of
American policy in southeast Asia.
It is better, said General Khanh, "to live
poor but proud as free citizens of an inde-
pendent country rather than in ease and
shame as slaves of the foreigners and Com-
munists." South Vietnam, he added, should
be prepared to go it alone against the Com-
munist Vietcong and spurn further U.S. help.
Washington was stunned by last week's
attack from the wily ex-Premier, once re-
garded as South Vietnam's best hope of
achieving victory over Red guerrillas. And
the question, once again, was being asked
in the Nation's Capital, "What would hap-
pen if the United States pulled out?"
CURTAILMENT OF AID?
To be sure, no high administration of-
ficial went so far as to urge outright with-
drawal. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
expressing the Government's opposition to
last week's Saigon house cleaning by young
army officers, hinted at a curtailment of pro-
posed U.S. aid. "Obviously," he said, "if
there are problems of unity, there are certain
kinds of assistance that are simply not fea-
sible." And Senate Majority Leader Mnez
MANSJTSI,D revived his proposal to transfer the
question of Vietnam's future from the battle-
field to the conference table. "I don't think
neutrality Is a bad word," he said.
Indeed, the voices urging a sharp reap-
praisal of America's Asian policy received an
additional boost on Christmas Eve. A ter-
rorist bomb exploded in the garage of the
main U.S. officers' billet in Saigon, killing 2
Americans and injuring 110 persons. The
bomb apparently was smuggled into the
heavily guarded building in a U.S. jeep, an-
other indication of increasing Vietcong bold-
ness despite the intense U.S. effort In South
Vietnam.
Why doesn't the United States pull out of
Vietnam? The answer can be summed up in
three words: The domino theory.
Through the years, American officials have
argued that if South Vietnam were to fall to
the Communists, the other nations of south-
east Asia would likewise topple-like a row
of stacked dominoes.
WHAT THE REDS WOULD GOBBLE
Landlocked Laos, already two-thirds in
Communist hands, would be swiftly gobbled
up by the Reds. Thailand, which caved in to
Japanese invaders after only 5 hours of fight-
ing in December 1941, would sue for some
accommodation with Red China in hope of
preserving a semblance of its long-cherished
independence from foreign rule. Burma,
whose government already has cut most of its
ties with the West, would become little more
than a Chinese province. Cambodia, recently
professing friendship with China, would suc-
cumb quickly to Communist domination.
The domino theory extends even further.
Pessimistic proponents of the theory fear
that if the United States is forced out of
South Vietnam, either by a Communist con-
quest or by the Saigon government, all of
Asia might be opened to Chinese Communist
penetration, either through subversion or
outright invasion. At least, they argue,
strongly pro-Western nations such as Japan,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Formosa could
no longer trust the United States to fulfill any
promises to protect them. India, Pakistan,
and South Korea, too, might have second
thoughts about alining themselves too
closely with the United States.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 32$5
Significantly, it is the latter, less-alarmist
group that holds the controlling viewpoint
inside the Johnson administration.
The administration has endeavored to con-
vince congressional critics of U.S. policy in
southeast Asia that this calmer attitude is
iustifled, and that American policy, heavily
committed physically and psychologically in
Laos and South Vietnam, should continue in
its present framework.
~ To buttress that position, administration
officials said that while there has been in-
creased Communist infiltration, North Viet-
nam has by no means committed all its power
to either the Laotian or South Vietnamese
conflicts.
Perhaps more importantly, these officials
assert, the Chinese Communists, who give
the North Vietnamese moral and physical
.support, continue to demonstrate consider-
able caution about any direct involvement
with the United States.
State Department Press Officer Robert J.
McCloskey said yesterday that there have
been Indications in recent weeks of North
Vietnamese military movements into south-
ern and central Laos.
McCloskey said he could not state either
the size or objective of the infiltration, He
Said, in answer to questions, that the troop
movements might or might not be a seasonal
increase coinciding with the ending of the
rainy season, a shifting of forces, or a move-
ment designed primarily to send reinforce-
ments to South Vietnam.
Many officials here believe that the troops
are being funneled through the so-called Ho
Chi Minh network of trails In Laos, for use
in South Vietnam.
McCloskey described the situation as "a
cause for concern but not for alarm." He
said, "We're following the situation closely."
Other authqritative sources said it appears
that the thousands of South Vietnamese who
were being trained in North Vietnam for use
in the south are about used up, and that the
Communist northerners are now sending
down native-born men from the Red terri-
tory.
But while there have been published re-
ports that between 15,000 and 20,000 men
have been filtered into South Vietnam from
the north during 1964, official sources here
yesterday would speak only of "several
thousand" men. In addition, it was said,
these numbers have been offset, by an in-
creasing callup of South Vietnamese forces
to fight them.
In Laos, officials said that since last May,
when U.S. T-28 "reconnaissance" and "es-
cort" planes were sent in to help the royal
Government withstand the Communist
Pathet,Lao and North Vietnamese, the neu-
tralist central. regimes position has improved
considerably.
What has helped improve it is what officials
will not admit publicly-the air pounding of
Communist positions by American jet fight-
ers during recent months.
[From the New York Times, June 26, 1964]
HANOI IMPROVES SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIET-
NAM-MORE TROOPS CROSS LAOS BY HO CHI
MINH TRAIL-ANALYSTS FEAR LARGE FORCE
MAY OPEN NEW FRONT
(By Hedrick Smith)
WASHINGTON, June 25.-Recent U.S. re-
connaissance missions have confirmed earlier
reports that Communist forces have been
improving their road network in southern
Laos and have considerably stepped up the
pace of their supply convoys there.
"Officials here report that the Communists
now have stretched their road network south
from Tchepone, previously the terminal
point for truck traffic on the supply network
known as the. Ho Chi Minh trail. Other
links, of the. network are reported to have
been improved.
The Ho Chi Minh trail, a complex of dirt,
roads tapering off into scores of jungle trails,
has long been one of the principal supply
routes from North Vietnam to Communist
guerrillas In South Vietnam.
Officials declined to give precise figures on
the number of trucks recently seen operating
in the Tchepone region, but intelligence esti-
mates indicate that roughly 3,000 North
Vietnamese troops are on more or less perma-
nent duty in southeastern Laos near the
South Vietnamese border.
YEAR OF NEW MOVES RISES
This concentration and the increases in
supply convoys during the recent dry season
are reported to have raised fears among
U.S. officials, inficluding Ambassador Henry
Cabot Lodge, about North Vietnamese inten-
tions.
Officials have been worried for fear the
Communists might try to infiltrate large
forces across the Laotian border into the
central Vietnamese highlands while South
Vietnamese Government forces were largely
concentrating on fighting guerrillas south of
Saigon.
Other officials suspect that the activity in
southern Laos may be a prelude to future
offensives against Saravane and Attopeu, two
rightwing strongholds in southern Laos,
Hostile forces nearly surround both towns
now.
Since neither town is in the Mekong Val-
ley, some analysts here are concerned lest the
Pathet Lao assume they can be attacked
without fear of American intervention. . The
United States has often warned that its
mantle of protection extends over the
Mekong Valley bordering Thailand.
The stepped-up operations in southern
Laos, officials said, began last fall and have
increased in tempo this spring since pro-
Communist Pathet Lao units gained control
of the Nakay Plateau in January.
These officials consider the southern opera-
tions to be unrelated to recent offensives by
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops
around the Plains des Jarres in north-cen-
tral Laos.
That fighting, which pushed the United
States toward the brink of a major conflict,
has now almost halted.
Although the ground fighting was con-
fined to the region north of Paksane, Laotian
Air Force T-28 fighter-bombers, supplied by
the United States, have carried out strikes
this month against some Pathet Lao posi-
tions in southern Laos as well.
Officials here have also dropped hints that
some plans held in readiness would call for
the South Vietnamese Air Force to raid Com-
munist supply routes in Laos and possibly in
North Vietnam.
So far such raids are considered a fairly
distant possibility. Premier Nguyen Khanh
has told U.S. officials he is opposed to carry-
ing the war beyond his borders until he has
developed a more stable base at home.
The principal roads from North Vietnam
into southern Laos are Route 8, from the city
of Vinh through the Nape Pass, and Route
12 through the My Gia Pass, a bit farther
South,
Since last fall, intelligence reports indi-
cated that the Communists were building up
Route 12-A to connect Route 12 at Nhom-
marath with the town of Muting Phine about
80 miles to the south on Route 9.
From there, truck Loads of troops and ship-
ments of ammunition, weapons, fuel, medical
supplies, and other equipment were reported
moving east toward Tchepone on Route 9
and also down Route 23 toward Saravane, 80
miles to the southwest, to Pathet Lao guer-
rillas operating in that area.
3. MORE VIETNAMS
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Feb. 19, 19651
DE'rzNTx HOPE DzcxrvEs UNTIED STATES,
LATINS SAY (By Marguerite Higgins)
SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.-It is common-
place in Central America to hear experienced
diplomats express the hope that Washington
is'getting over its hypnotism with the .idea
of a Russian-American detente and its mis-
interpretation of the Sino-Soviet split.
What hypnotism? What misinterpreta-
tion?
Said an experienced Venezuelan diplomat:
"No country in Latin America would be
happier to welcome a rapprochement be-
tween Washington and Moscow-if it were
genuine. But we fear it is not genuine so
far as Latin America is concerned. Indeed
we believe that hope of a detente has been
used by Moscow to pull the wool over Wash-
ington's eyes while the Communists down
here profit from America's nonseeing atti-
tude to intensify guerrilla activities, vio-
lence, and terrorism-or at least try to.
"As to the Sino-Soviet split, we think that
far from restraining the Soviet Union, it has
merely spurred Moscow on to greater as-
sistance to so-called wars of liberation in
Latin America-assistance designed to prove
that Moscow is not soft on the West as Peip-
ing says."
CITES ATTACKS
"Washington was apparently surprised,"
the diplomat went on, "to hear of the
Kosygin visit to North Vietnam. We were
not surprised at all. For in Cuba, Russians,
Chinese, and North Vietnamese have been
cooperating in the training and planning for
guerrilla attacks in Latin America."
According to Cuban broadcasts and to the
Cuban press, a delegation from the Viet-
namese liberation front, more commonly
known as the Vietcong, came in 1964 to
Havana where it signed a mutual aid pact
with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces.
The Venezuelan guerrillas, who halted
their attacks briefly in 1963, are once more
in the mountains, burning and killing and
blowing up things.
The fact that the overwhelming majority
of Venezuelan peasants hate the guerrillas
does not deter their terrorist leaders any
more than the fact that the Vietnamese
peasants hate the Vietcong deters Hanoi.
Intelligence reports indicate that this
weird consortium planning and plotting lib-
eration wars from Cuba includes four coun-
tries-Communist China, the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam.
Here in Puerto Rico it is very unpopular
for strangers to speak of Communist doings
or even intentions. This is understandable
perhaps in light of the tourist trade and
continuing attempts to lure American busi-
ness Investment.
MINORITIES EXPLOITED
And, of course, this is perfectly correct.
There is no Communist threat to Puerto
Rico in the sense that the Communist con-
sortium in Cuba and local extremists have
made any real inroads in this country. In-
deed, no responsible official or writer has
ever alleged that the Communists are about
to take over in Puerto Rico.
But whether Castro and his cohorts are
exploiting certain minority elements in
Puerto Rico and seeking to prepare the
ground for mischiefmaking in Puerto Rico
is another matter.
In relatively prosperous Puerto Rico there
is plenty of evidence that the ideological
divisions of the Communist camp have not
prevented their cooperation in seeking to
propagandize persons who hopefully may
one day serve their purposes.
[From the Washington Post. Feb. 6, 1965]
CHINA PICKS THAILAND AS NExT TARGET-
PLEDGES SUPPORT TO REBEL MOVEMENT
TOKYO, February 5.-Communist China
announced today that a "patriotic front"
had been formed in Thailand to overthrow
the pro-Western government and eradicate
American influence there.
It was the first time that Peiping had
openly named Thailand as the next target of
a Communist campaign in southeast Asia.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3286
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
Thailand is the stanchest U.S. ally on Action of urban guerrillas, "including those
the Asian mainland. Bangkok, the capital. formed with personnel and equipment com-
is the headquarters of the Southeast Asia ing from abroad, against industrial installa-
Treaty Organization (SEATO)-the Ameri- tions permitting a notable economic paraly-
can-led defense alliance in the Orient. sis."
(In Washington, U.S. officials expressed "Specialized action to disrupt roads and
concern but said that Peiping's announce-
ment of support for the front had been
anticipated.
"It strikes me as the logical step in
Peiping's policy of supporting subversion
wherever possible. in southeast Asia," one
official said).
(From Bangkok, Reuters reported that
Thailand bad tightened its anti-Communist
security as refugees from the fighting in
Laos continued to enter the country across
the Mekong River. Police sources said 58
Communist suspects had been arrested in
northeastern Thailand in the past few days.
Latest figures place' the number of Laotian
refugees at 15,000.1
Communist China's -designs on Thailand
were made clear in a broadcast of the New
China news agency heard here today, al-
though the "patriotic front" was first an-
nounced January 1 in a clandestine Thai-
language broadcast.
which could supply troops for combat against
our units.
"Provocations at military bases and in
cities to occupy troops which otherwise could
act against our insurgents, and guerrilla
activity to occupy enemy forces (In the
mountains)."
Some longtime students of Communist
operations here question FALN's present
capacity to execute such large-scale opera-
tions, though current military estimates
place naral guerrilla strength at 2,000 men,
including those already trained and pursuing
normal occupations while waiting orders, and
3,000 urban combatants.
According to these observers, 1964 was a
year of quiet recuperation of Communist
strength in Venezuela, despite reversals suf-
fered in the universities and failure to or-
ganize a united front of leftist groups in-
clined to support anti-Government insur-
Today's broadcast urged "all patriotic peo- gency.
ple to unite as one and launch a resolute The Communists' achievements of 1964
struggle to drive out U.S. imperialism and consisted mainly in extending the number of
realize the independence, democracy, peace, guerrilla bands In gestation or In open oper-
neutrality, and prosperity of Thailand." ation and their success in creating a climate
t f 41-A insurrec-
ja
l
f
at "overthrowing the Fascist dictatorial gov-
ernment"; withdrawing from SEATO and
'driving all imperialist troops ? ` ' out of
Thailand"; economic reforms with emphasis
on restricting foreign capital "whose aim is
to seize profits from Thailand ? * *" and
"suppressing and meting out severe punish-
ment to traitors and bureaucrats who op-
press the people."
The "reforms" followed the same revo-
textbook that the Communists
i
or amnes y or
favorab
e
tionists.
President Raul Leoni is being steadily pres-
sured by the two parties which have joined
Aocion Democratica (the Government party)
to form a coalition government Into giving
favorable consideration to the amnesty ap-
peals.
Another internal Communist document, a
report on party organization in eastern Vene-
zuela, laments the decline in party activity
In. many localities after the election.
lut
and nsteel otes considerable
onary have used in Vietnam and tried to use In. Bt the the rIron eport
producing
Malaya and the Philippines. strength
region of Bolivar state.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1965] In the past the Communists have concen-
COMMUNISTS PLAN VENEZUELAN TERROR trated their labor effort in penetrating unions
l
(By Norman Gall)
CARACAS.-The Venezuelan Communist
movement, after 13 months of relative quiet
since the December 1963 elections, is plan-
ning a "counteroffensive" aimed at conquest
of power through another cycle of terrorism
and heightened guerrilla warfare.
According to recently obtained internal
Venezuelan Communist Party documents, the
current "defensive situation" of the Armed
Forces of National Liberation (FALN) sched-
uled to last "at least 6 months" will give way
to coordinated violence in. urban and rural
areas and in infiltrated military installations.
Venezuela's Communists received a severe
setback when their call for boycott of the
presidential election was ignored despite
threats of violence.- The small party never
received widespread support, even before the
government restricted it in an effort to end
terrorist acts.
The "defensive situation" described in a
memorandum of the party's politburo cir-
culated in recent months among FALN guer-
rilla units consists of accelerated programs
of training guerrillas abroad, a campaign for
amnesty for jailed insurrectionists, offers of
a truce to the government, quiet gestation of
more guerrilla operations and deepening in
filtration of the regular armed forces.
According to this memorandum, the "gen-
eral counteroffensive plan" consists of:
"Simultaneous insurgency in military in-
stallations with occupation of strategic ob-
jectives with sufficient flexibility to estab-
lish a long struggle. In these military insur-
gencies previous arrangements should ' be by holding up travelers on the Puerto Bar-
made for distribution of arms to our cadres rioe Highway. But it appears evident now
and to the civilian population under our that the movement In receiving funds from
control." outside sources as well.
SHIPMENT OF FUNDS
There has been considerable speculation
over the reported shipment last month of
$100,000 in quetzals from a bank here to a
New York bank.
The Guatemala bank assumed the costs
of commission, insurance and the shipping at
the going rate of 1 percent for the total
transaction. There was no indication here
of the Identification of the consignee in New
York. The Guatemala Government, while
it enforces dollar control, does not ask for
details of quetzals-for-dollars transactions.
The quetzal is on a par with the dollar.
The theory prevalent here Is that the un-
derground movement is being supplied by
adherents traveling from Mexico. This
theory, vaguely defined, holds that in transac-
tions such as the quetzal-dollar exchange the
messengers for the guerrilla forces smuggle
in the funds from Mexico. The question of
finances arises from the certainty that' the
expenses of the underground movement are
mounting and that there is no way to ac-
count for Its funds except from outside
sources.
Marco Antonio Yong Sosa, called "El
Chino" because one of his parents was
Chinese, admitted in an interview with the
leftist Mexican magazine writer Victor Rico
Galan that a number of the incursions of
the guerrilla forces he leads have brought
in about $100,000. The principal contribu-
tion was $75,000 paid as ransom for Jorge
Samayoa, the kidnapped son of a Guate-
malan movie chain operator.
REVENUE FROM RAIDS
Additional revenue has come from raids
on provincial United Fruit Co. treasuries and
small banks.
Mr. Yong Sosa, in the interview published
in the leftist Mexican magazine Siempre on
October 30, 1963, conceded that his forces had
assassinated several public figures and a large
number of army officers ranging up to colonel
in rank. Most of the assassinations, he said,
were for political reasons.
The guerilla forces, even their supporters
in the capital concede, are primarily of nui-
sance value. But they have an unsettling
political effect not only in the mountains but
also in the urban centers. In the cities,
particularly in the capital, they plant small
bombs and occasionally kidnap or shoot per-
sons considered to be enemies of the move-
ment. Earlier this week they exploded about
a dozen bombs here. These explosions fol-
lowed a police search that found caches of
mortars, machineguns, small arms, and am-
munition.
There is some question whether Mr. Yong
Soso, who was trained as a guerrilla fighter
by the United States in the Canal Zone,
was himself a Communist. Ile has told at
least one Guatemalan politician that he Is
accepting assistance from Communist
sources in Mexico and Cuba.
This politician is Francisco Villagran Kra-
mer, a young lawyer who is head of the
leftist Revolutionary Democratic Union
Party. At one time Mr. Villagran Kramer
and his party contemplated a union with
the Yong Sosa organization, the lawyer said.
Representatives of the two organizations, ac-
cording to Mr. Villagran Kramer, held
a series of conferences, but these were broken
off when the Villagran Kramer party decided
to go to the polls on its own last May. This
decision, Mr. Villagran Kramer said was made
over the heated objections of the Yong Sosa
group, which maintained that a revolution-
ary overthrow of the Peralta government
was Guatemala's only political solution.
4. THE ECONOMY, NORTH AND SOUTH
[From the New York Times, Mar. 16, 1964]
VIETNAM SPEEDS GAIN IN INDUSTRY
(By Philip Shabecoff)
Amid the carnage of civil war, industrial
birth is continuing in Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
in the mining and petroeum n us es.
The dominant Communist strategy in
Venezuela, over the objection of a dissident
minority opposing continued violence, is
based upon the concept of "long war" as
developed in China, Cuba, Algeria and Viet-
nam.
A training program advocated in the party
strategy memorandum advocated "a pro-
longed period of specialization for the group
that returns to Venezuela by irregular
means. '
[From the New York Times, Dec. 20, 19641
GUATEMALA REVELS STEP UP FIGHT AGAINST
REGIME
(By Paul P. Kennedy)
GUATEMALA, December 18.-Revolutionary
forces fighting as guerrilla units in the Carib-
bean area of Guatemala are taking advantage
of the political indecisiveness here to step up
their activities against the military govern-
ment of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia.
The well-equipped, well-trained groups in
the mountain and jungle areas in the Depart-
ment of Izabal are estimated at 150 to 300.
They are said to have more than 1,000 ad-
herents in the urban areas, particularly here
in the capital.
They regularly produce the newspaper
Revolucionario Socialists, and also distribute
pamphlets throughout the Republic. Persons
caught distributing the publication face a
heavy fine and prison sentence.
The guerrilla forces get ransoms from the
families of kidnap victims and more money
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
.1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
"You have to see for yourself how deeply
the. Vietnamese people fear and hate the
Vietcong if they think they can oppose them
and not have their throats cut. My team is
working its heart out. But all this is de-
pendent, of course, on some sort of stable
strong governmental direction."
And it is precisely because so many fine
people in the countryside are working their
hearts out-and giving their lives-that a
visit to the front fines renews a sense of
fury at the intrigues in the city-intrigues
that may mean that all this devotion and
dedication here at the front will add up to
nothing.
The war will not be won in Saigon. But
Saigon can prevent it from being won.
[From the Washington Evening Star,
Dec. 9, 1964]
COURAGE AT VIETNAM OUTPOST
(By Marguerite Higgins)
PLEI ME, VIETMAN.-The morning had be-
gun with a mine disaster. Literally. It was
a "Jumping Betty" mine-one of those that
jumps out of the dirt and explodes in the
air. And so, it had cruelly mangled the
bodies of 16 of the work detail that Capt.
Ronnie Mendoza, of Los Angeles, had sent to
repair about three and a half miles of the
red dirt jungle road the Vietcong had
severed by digging great, gaping ditches
across it.
Many of the wounded were only 11 to 14
years of age, children or relatives of the
Vietnamese and Montagnard (non-Mongol
mountain people) soldiers who, along with
Captain Mendoza's 12-man team, use this
isolated outpost near the Lao border for
patrols and ambushes and other counter-
guerrilal operations, against the Vietcong.
COPTER ARRIVES
Soon the helicopter arrived at Plei Me to
lift out the wounded. The two pilots-
Capt. John Mustard, of Montesand, Wash.,
and Capt. Charlie E. Bryant, of Ocilla, Ga.-
spoke feelingly of the courage with which
the big-eyed Vietnamese and Montagnard
children tried to suppress their cries of pain.
This is high, spectacular country where
the jungle covered mountains rise, steeply,
7,000 feet high and where air currents in
the intervening valleys can be tricky. The
helicopter bumped and dipped as it fought
the turbulent currents.
From the air, Plei Me is an eyesore with
Its barbed wire outer fences, its trenches, its
mortar emplacements and sandbags, its brick
and tin barracks building. It seems an im-
probable and unexpected scar in the green
jungle.
In this part of Vietnam the jungle trails
are prowled not just by the Communist Viet-
cong but by mighty tigers that European
hunters once traveled far to shoot.
And despite the morning tragedy, Men-
doza had not been able to keep his mind
off those jungle trials because 100 men of
his special forces, including 2 American
sergeants, were out there on a week long
patrol, 3 days of which had passed. Their
mission was to try and spot possible infil-
tration routes and the supply dui ps that
the Communists always prepare in advance
at points a day's march apart.
Since his men had last checked in by radio,
a lot of sniper fire had been heard in the
next valley and Mendoza, a cool and con-
trolled sort, nonetheless was eagerly await-
ing the next radio report which would come
at 4 p.m.
The itinerary of the patrol had been
worked out by Mendoza in consultation with
his Vietnamese counterpart, Capt. Nguyen
Van Thoi who was known all over the valley
as one of the few Vietnamese who could.
command the loyalty of the Montagnards.
I asked him if the morning mine casual-
ties' might have any effect on the morale of
the soldiers.
"There has never been a desertion from
this camp and there will not be," the Viet-
namese captain said with pride.
"Were his men happy with the new regime
in Saigon?" I asked.
"Madam," said the Vietnamese captain, "I
am an officer and not even I know the name
of the leader In Saigon. My men do not
fight for Saigon. They fight for their vil-
lage. They fight because the Vietcong takes
their rice and steals their children and kills
their kinfolk. They fight because the Amer-
icans give them rice and the American doc-
tor treats their wife and children. And that
is how it is."
Finally, it was 4 o'clock and the air was
electric with good news. "Nobody hurt,"
said Mendoza after his curt quick radio ex-
change with the patrol.
When night came and it was time for mere
reporters to leave, Mendoza saw us off and
yelling against the noise of the chopper
blades said something that sounded like, "We
can take care of things up here if they can
just keep those rioters quiet in Saigon."
It was. the same high morale everywhere
at the front. And It made you so mad at the
so-called student and Buddhist rioters who
cause chaos back In the soft-living city.
2. NORTH VIETNAMESE II7TTERVENTIQN
EIGHTY TONS OF VIETCONG ARMS UNCOVERED,
BIG SHIP SUNK
(By Peter Arnett)
Tuv IIOA, VIETNAM.-By far the biggest
haul of Communist weapons for the Vietcong
was uncovered yesterday, near a remote cove
where a large mystery vessel was sighted and
sunk earlier in the week. Officials estimated
80 tons of armaments-much of it Russian
and Chinese-had fallen into government
hands.
The weapons, ammunition, and medical
supplies, including whole blood, apparently
had been shipped along the coast from Com-
munist North Vietnam to equip Red guer-
rillas fighting in the South, United States and
South Vietnamese officials said.
"We thought the supply routes were
through Laos and Cambodia, but look at
this lot," said Col. Theodore Mataxis, of
Seattle, Wash., a senior adviser. "They could
easily be arming a new division to launch
against us up here."
CAMOUFLAGED SHIP SUNK
The materiel was found in the hull of the
sunken vessel and in caches on the beaches
of a cove on Vung Ro Bay here, 240 miles
northeast of Saigon and about 50 miles south
of Nha Trang, site of a major U.S. military
installation.
A routine helicopter patrol uncovered the
cache Tuesday. Flying over the bay, the
helicopter crew sighted what looked like a
drifting island. Then, heavy fire came up
from the Island. It turned out to be a well-
camouflaged ship, about 400-feet long.
South Vietnamese fighter-bombers were
called in and sank the vessel.
Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh personally ordered
troops into the area. After heavy fighting.
they took over the cove and beach area Fri-
day, when some of the armaments were
found.
A captured Communist guerrilla said the
ship had made six trips to bays along Viet-
nam's central coast, dropping off supplies.
Then yesterday the South Vietnamese un-
covered more caches. One area, said an
official, was "literally covered with weapons,
six deep."
The haul included 1,000 Russian-made
carbines, several hundred Russian sub-
machineguns and light machineguns, and
Chinese burp guns. All had been wrapped
in waterproof cloth.
Scores of tons of ammunition were found
for these weapons, some of it made as re-
cently as last year in Chinese factories, ac-
cording to ordnance experts at the scene.
There was also a selection of sophisticated
mines and grenades, and ammunition for a
new type of rocket launcher used against
tanks.
The large supplies of captured medicines
included many cases of penicillin, anti-
malarial drugs, and whole blood produced in
Japan late last year.
ONE BIG SUPPLY FACTORY
Four caches had been found up to late
yesterday. Troops probing through the hills
under the guns of Communist snipers ex-
pected to find more.
"These hills are just one big supply. fac-
tory," said Mataxis.
The extent of the Communist supply
depots shocked U.S. advisers.
"This is just massive," one said.
The Vietcong put up a determined fight
to keep government troops from the caches.
But they had to pull back. S'e'veral govern-
ment soldiers have been killed in isolated
mortar and sniping attacks.
Government forces intend to stay in the
region as long as it is necessary to clear
it of supplies.
The commander of the 23d Division, Gen.
Luu Lan, said, "What we have found here Is
of tremendops Importance. The Communist
aggressors have been able to confuse people,
so that the truth has been hard to discover.
"But here we have discovered one link
of the massive chain of weapons introduc-
tion into South Vietnam. This is one of
the reasons why we and our American
allies have had to take the actions we have
taken," the General said.
This was a reference to retaliatory air
strikes in North Vietnam.
Members of the International Control
Commission, the organization created to
police the Geneva accords on Indochina,
were shown the arms haul by Khanh.
The commission is made up of Indian,
Canadian and Polish delegates. Included
in the Communist medical supplies were
drugs from Poland.
COMMUNIST BUILDUP
U.S. sources said the apparent buildup
of Communist arms along the coast may
coincide with reports that increased num-
bers of guerillas have been Infiltrating
from North Vietnam in the past 3 days.
The Vietcong have made determined
attempts in recent months to take over the
central Vietnamese region. They have
met with considerable success so far.
Some Americans expressed belief the
Communists will use ships more frequently
to supply the Vietcong.
U.S. jet planes have been attacking the
Communist supply routes through Com-
munist-held territory in Laos.
[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 19651
CONCEPT OF "INTERNAL REVOLT" IN SOUTH
VIETNAM PUNCTURED
(By Mark S. Watson)
WASHINGTON, February 10.-From the tor-
rent of events in southeast Asia since the
weekend one politically useful fact emerges.
That is the well-publicized radio order from
Communist Vietcong headquarters in the
north to all Vietcong agents south of the
border to redouble their activities immedi-
ately.
The promptness with which the order was
obeyed at widely separated points shows how
well organized are the Vietcong's controls.
But more important in its long-range politi-
cal effects may be this plain proof of a fact
that hitherto the Communist leaders have
denied; namely, that the whole internal re-
volt in South Vietnam is, and always has
been, skillfully engineered from Red head-
quarters far to the north.
WORLD OPINION DISCUSSED
The victim of assassination is not greatly
concerned with who kills him. But world
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0003001700b3-8
 3284
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
public opinion, which communism has tried
for years to delude with this "internal revolt"
fiction, now is in better position to know that
even while the Communist powers were
agreeing to the Geneva neutralization pact
the Communist machine in North Vietnam
was already beginning Its subversion and
assassination program in the south.
In this program of deception a large in-
fluence was the International Control Com-
mission, set up to assure that the pledges of
neutrality were kept. By 1961, reports of
1,200 offensive "incidents" by Communist
agents, ranging from one-man assassinations
to fairly large scale military actions, had been
laid before the commission. None was acted
on.
The reason given by an American White
Paper was that the Polish Communist mem-
ber of the commission refused to investigate
any charge that might embarrass the Com-
munist Vietcong, and the Indian member re-
fused to start an inquiry that would em-
barrass his Polish colleague. Opposed by
two, the one remaining member, the Cana-
dian, was powerless.
LEADERS KNOWN
For some reason, possibly the difficulty in
remembering the oriental names, the Viet-
cong leaders have, with two exceptions, re-
mained largely unknown to the American
public.
There Is no mystery about the others, for
captured or defecting Vietcong agents and
officers have divulged almost all details of the
Red machine for which they worked. Full
information about that complex and sur-
prisingly efficient mechanism and its oper-
ators at all levels now can be reported with-
out endangering security.
Of the two familiar names one Is that of
Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnam
political government and of its Lao Dong
(Workers) Party, and tirelessly active in its
all-important Central Research (Intelligence
and Operations) Agency and other working
elements. The other fairly familiar name is
that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minis-
ter, one of the world's great guerrilla leaders.
The Lao Dong Party follows the pattern of
Russia's Communist Party, and its Secretary
General, Ho Chi Minh, that of Russia's usual.
one-man-in-two-jobs, premier of the nation
and secretary general of the party. The mili-
tary is subordinate to Ho, the political chief,
and all the way down the line and into the
kindred Lao Dong of South Vietnam at all
levels the political leaders uniformly com-
mand the military. That is one way of as-
suring unity.
FRONT CREATED IN 1980
To provide a cloak of respectability and
conceal in some measure the responsibility
of the Hanoi organizers with murder and in-
surrection against Saigon, Ho Chi Minh in
1960 created the "Front for Liberation of
South Vietnam."
It is still guided wholly by Ho Chi Minh's
Central Committee, immediately directing
work in the "South Central" zone (just south
of the 17th parallel border) and in the
"Nabo" region (south and southwest, in-
clig Saigon and the Mekong Delta).
For the Central Committee, supervision is
exercised in Hanoi by a "Committee for Su-
pervision of the South," made up of Le Due
Tho, of the Politburo, Phon Hung, Vice
Premier of North Vietnam, and Brig. Gen. Ng
uney Van Vinh, chairman of the board for
reunification. Each of the two zones has its
own secretary general, a deputy and a dozen
members; each its agencies for training,
propaganda and action.
To this political leadership the military, as
remarked, is subordinate. Its principals are
OR Vinb, who is indeed a member of that
Committee of the South but pointedly a
"junior member"; Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in
charge of military work in the South-Central
zone but directly responsible to Tran Luong,
of the Lao Dong in Hanoi, and Brig. Gen. Van
Muoi, similarly responsible to Muoi Cua, a
politican.
The Central Research Agency, a prime "ac-
tion" unit for subversion, forgery, arming,
radio command, intelligence and military
command, is actively directed by Ho Chi
Minh and Giap. Its prime center for disorder
in South Vietnam was at Vinh Linh, the tar-
get of Sunday's fierce bombing attack. Other
centers handle Cambodian and overseas in-
telligence, with Gen. Hosing Dao, Col. Le Can
and Col. Van Trong as principal agents.
This is regarded as the agency chiefly re-
sponsible for conveying Ho Chi Minh's direc-
tives straight to the guerrilla pockets in
South Vietnam, and seeing that the supply
of men and weapons continues pouring over
the many branches of the so-called Ho Chi
Minh trail into South Vietnam.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1965]
AGGRESSION ADMITTED
(By Joseph Alsop)
At last, the administration's policymakers
are somewhat reluctantly admitting the im-
portance of the North Vietnamese troop
movements into South Vietnam and Laos.
Being clandestine, these Communist troop
movements were long and obstinately pooh-
poohed. Now, however, they are an officially
acknowledged fact. While the fact is ad-
mitted, its meaning is still being played
down. Even the resulting solid proof of
North Vietnamese aggression has not been
greatly stressed. As for the military implica-
tions, they have been hardly mentioned;
yet they are potentially very great indeed.
In Laos, to' begin with, the whole balance
of the war has been upset. It is a tiny war.
The non-Communist Laotians, although they
have fought very well against Laotian Com-
munist sympathizers, have always fared ill
In their rare engagements with North Viet-
namese units. Hence the appearance in Laos
of several additional North Vietnamese bat-
talions changes the whole local outlook.
Because Laos is both a subsidiary war thea-
ter and a corridor to South Vietnam, it is
not quite certain how. the additional bat-
talions are to be used. some think they are
intended for use in Laos, since they have
moved into the heart of Laos to the west of
the corridor-region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
If. this is correct, the brilliant Communist
commander, Gen. Vi Nguyen Giap, must be
planning a semifinal test of strength in Laos.
Because of the generally misty character
of every Laotian situation, a prompt Ameri-
can riposte to such a test of strength will
be extra difficult. And a major Communist
thrust in Laos will have the gravest reper-
cussions in South Vietnam, unless the Ameri-
can riposte is both prompt and massive.
It is equally possible, however, that these
new battalions spotted in Laos are eventually
destined to be moved into South Vietnam.
For a good many months, organized battal-
ions of the North Vietnamese Army have been
filtering into the South Vietnamese fight-
ing-moving by truck down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail to the Chepone region, crossing the bor-
der in small bands, and then reforming and
marching to their assigned areas of opera-
tions.
There have long been plenty of signs to
prove that the North Vietnamese had reached
the stage of sending organized battalions
into the fighting, instead of mere cadres to
lead their guerrillas. As noted, for instance,
in this reporter's recent dispatches from
Saigon, young North Vietnamese army con-
scripts are now quite often found among
prisoners of war.
The invasion of South Vietnam by two,
three, or even four new Communist bat-
talions per month may not sound like much
by the standards of modern war. But this
war in Vietnam is not very modern. An
entire province may be defended by no more
than five government battalions.
If the Communists already have seven bat-
talions, as they do in Quang Nat Province,
for instance, the addition of two more bat-
talions may cause the Dien Bien Phu-like
disaster that is General Giap's obvious aim
In this phase. That is the real meaning of
the persistent Communist troop movement
into South Vietnam.
For this very reason, Gen. Maxwell Taylor
has repeatedly recommended stronger, more
direct action against the North Vietnamese.
He wanted something much more effective
than the brief retaliatory raid after the Inci-
dent in the Gulf of Tonkin. He wanted re-
taliation after the attack on the U.S. airfield
at BienHoa. He again asked for retaliation
after a U.S. officers barracks in Saigon was
destroyed by a Communist-planted bomb.
The recommendations of General Taylor
were disapproved by President Johnson in
all three instances. As a less dangerous sort
of retaliation, the President instead author-
ized bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, first
by the Laotian air force, and then by the U.S.
fighter-bombers that recently destroyed a
key bridge at Ban Ban.
The degree of power this deployed against
the infiltrators may be gaged from the fact
that one-half the Laotian air force has just
been put out of action by a single accidental
bomb explosion in an airplane hangar. In
any case, mere air attacks on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail are wildly unlikely to produce
any solid result, even if made with 10 times
the power.
The truth is, the war in southeast Asia is
steadily going from bad to worse. The
enemy is getting bolder, and he Is steadily
reinforcing his frontline troops. The rein-
forcement is not being countered. Hence
there is no hope of any counteroffensive, un-
less President Johnson has important sur-
prises up his sleeve.
Perhaps the President has such surprises
in preparation, for he is a man of surprises.
But as of now, we are drifting toward final
defeat.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 23, 19651
RED ASIAN BUILDUP CONFIRMED
(By Murrey Marder)
U.S. officials confirmed yesterday that there
has been increased infiltration of Communist
North Vietnamese troops into Laos and South
Vietnam. But they called it a cause for
continuing concern, not sudden alarm.
The Communist buildup of forces in both
places during 1964 and continuing Into re-
cent weeks is significant in relative terms,
but not a dramatic or grave turn, officials said.
In both on-the-record and background
comments, administration officials sought to
demonstrate an attitude of skeptical calm-
ness about recently published reports that
the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula may
be approaching a stage of more massive, open
warfare.
Few hard facts or figures were disclosed in
the process. Officials said more details
should be available early next week after
consultations with the U.S. mission in Saigon,
capital of South Vietnam.
It became increasingly evident yesterday
that both in South Vietnam and in Wash-
ington there are conflicting interpertations
about the facts and the significance of the
increased Communist Infiltration.
Those officials most eager to strike more
directly at Communist bases in North Viet-
nam appear to interpret the infiltration re-
ports as evidence to justify that. This
group believes the Communists are increas-
ingly preparing to shift from guerrilla tac-
tics to direct offensives.
But the less-alarmist school of thought
rates such a shift in Communist strategy as
unlikely.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3281
We suggest that all of our military, po- sustain popular support of Vietnamese Gov-
subordinated to a massive southeast Asian
development program. A Johnson plan for
the full flowering of southeast Asian econom-
ic resources and independence will have as
much potency and promise for success in
that corner of the world as the Marshall plan
did in Europe and the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority in the United States.
The Mekong Basin is one of the world's
richest and least developed areas. In an
area of the world already food rich there is an
opportunity to harness the tributaries of the
Mekong ~ Basin toward an economic flowering
offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia,
and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam,
and offering to the people and the Govern-
ment of North Vietnam economic oppor-
tunity whica only their blindness or non-
cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malay-
sia, and even India, this would present an op-
portunity in both economic and political
terms which, especially at this moment, could
not possibly be more desirable. To the
Philippines such a program would provide
the same magnetic opportunity for participa-
tion as led them generously to create and
man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago.
It would also offer the first possibility of
really involving the wealth and energy of the
Japanese Government and people. A John-
son development plan for southeast Asia
would manifest to the entire world that the
welfare of the people 'of southeast Asia is
our only purpose.
The Mekong Basin development program
will provide for the first time a future-
oriented thrust around which a Vietnamese
resurgency program can be made vital and
toward which the efforts of Americans, Ja-
panese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos
can hopefully be attracted.
THE MISSING LINK
Within the ; last 3 years the Communist
nations have revealed their inability to meet
their own most pressing economic needs.
The shortcut to the future has suddenly
proved to be a dead end of economic failure,
recrimination, and political embarrassment.
But this has not frustrated the wars of na-
tional liberation nor prevented the Com-
munists from mounting insurrectionary war-
fare whether in Congo or Vietnam. National
governments and native peoples assaulted by
such Communist purposes have, at best,
sought to sustain their own energy through
defensive effort. Virtually unused has been
the enormous potential for hope which can
be found only in the non-Communist, world,
cooperatively employing the resources of the
United States and nations friendly to it
whether in Asia, the Pacific, or Western
Europe.
We have offered to the Vietnamese people
our assistance in their struggle for national
Independence. We have failed, however, to
harness that struggle and our assistance to
an all but miraculous future, a flowering of
man, his capabilities, his resources, his aspi-
rations, Ours indeed is~ the truly revolu-
tionary opportunity. The Johnson plan
offers to southeast Asia a genuine oppor-
tunity to harness nature, enlarge justice, ex-
tend life, eradicate the scourges of illness and
illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples
to reap the fruits of their soil and the per-
manent benefits of national independence.
Behind this large vision, men throughout the
world may be led to voluntary association in
Lincoln Brigades, Gandhi Brigades, Mag-
saysay, and Marti Brigades-an international
volunteer corps for peace and freedom.
The Johnson plan for the development of
the Mekong Basin has, in our judgment, the
following potential, essentially unavailable
in the present circumstances:
1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and po-
litically potent new purpose adequate to
2. It will infuse new energy into the Viet-
namese already risking their lives in daily
defense against the Vietcong.
3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the
cooperative involvement of neighboring
southeast Asian countries as well as a gener-
ous commitment able to sustain emotionally
an international corps of volunteers.
4. It contains an enormous incentive to
North Vietnam to turn away from its present
fratricidal course.
5. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a
pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence
to other less developed areas where Commu-
nist insurrectionary warfare presently finds
soil in which to sow the seeds of destruction.
VFW ENDORSES PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NORTH
VIETNAM ACTION
WASHINGTON, D.C., February 8, 1965. The
national commander in chief of the Veterans
of Foreign Wars of the United States, Mr.
John A. Jenkins, of Birmingham, Ala., today
informed President Johnson of the "whole-
hearted and unreserved support of the VFW"
for the President's decision to retaliate
against North Vietnamese military installa-
tions.
In his telegram to the President the VFW
commander pointed out that such military
action against North Vietnam was in full
accord with the unanimously adopted resolu-
tion of the 1964 VFW national convention,
supporting whatever action is necessary to
win in South Vietnam. The text of Com-
mander Jenkins' telegram to President John-
son follows:
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Veterans of For-
eign Wars wholeheartedly and without res-
ervation supports your decision in taking
retaliatory armed action against the Com-
munist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your
wise and bold decision in this matter will go
far toward assuring our allies throughout all
Asia that the United States stands by its
commitments and will not be intimidated by
Communist threats and aggressive action.
U.S. action against North Vietnam is en-
tirely consistent with the unanimously
passed resolution of our 1964 VFW national
convention which called for all action nec-
essary to win in South Vietnam. The VFW,
consisting of 1,300,000 overseas combat vet-
erans fully recognizes that communism has
launched a deliberate attack against all
southeast Asia and, consequently, the inter-
est of U.S. security and the cause of free-
dom can be protected, in the final analysis,
only by the judicious and willing use of
military power.
JOHN A. JENKINS,
Commander in Chief, Veterans of For-
eign Wars of the United States.
1. THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE
[From the New York Times, July 31, 1964]
"PLEASANT VALLEY": A VIETNAMESE SUCCESS
STORY SAIGON'S FORCES WREST AREA FROM
STRONG RED CONTROL-"SHOW CONFIDENCE
IN PEOPLE," MAJOR SAYS OF HIS METHOD
(By Jack Raymond)
PHOUC CHAI, SOUTH VIETNAM, July 26.-In
Vietnamese, Phouc Chai means "pretty val-
ley," and that is just what this collection
of hamlets is. It represents a success story
in South Vietnam's desperate struggle to de-
feat the Communist Insurgency.
Phouc Chai is about 45 miles west of
Tamky, in the northern part of South Viet-
nam. For more than 2 years, until 6 months
ago, this valley, with its population of about
6,000, was virtually controlled by the
Vietcong.
The insurgents grew rice here to feed the
No. 35-7
guerrillas. They "taxed" farmers. They
maintained rest stations and assembly points
for fighters who blew up bridges and ter-
rorized villages.
Two organized Vietcong battalions with a
regimental headquarters operated without
Government Interference. Then a 34-year-
old major, Hoang The, appeared with his
outfit, the 6th Regiment of the 2d Division,
Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
TRAINED IN GEORGIA
Major Tho has been an officer since 1951,
when he fought for the French against the
Communist Vietminh. He received training
at the U.S. Army's military-government
school at Fort Gordon, Ga., and at the Fort
Denning, Ga., infantry training center.
Articulate, English-speaking and self-con-
fident, Major The has evidently won the
complete confidence of his troops and of
American advisers here. He lives in Danang
with his wife and five children.
He spoke matter-of-factly about having
organized 10 defended hamlets after achiev-
ing military victories over the Vietcong.
Last February, the major recalled, he sent
patrols into the valley. They located Viet-
cong units, ambushed some and drew others
into stand-up battles of company and bat-
talion size.
REDS FOUGHT HARD
The Vietcong fought hard for the valley;
it was important as a source of food as well
as a military center for the countrywide
guerrilla campaign. Yet in a month the
6th Regiment drove the Vietcong into the
jungle.
"It was only phase 1," Major Tho said.
"Now came phase 2, the administrative and
political phase."
Major Tho stood with a pointer before
an operations map as he continued his
story.
Before evacuating the valley, the Vietcong
ordered the peasants to take 15 days' sup-
plies into the jungle. They assured the
peasants that the Government forces would
not stay and that the Communists would
soon resume control.
But the Government forces stayed. Major
Tho and his men seized 40 tons of rice
originally planted by the Vietcong. They
distributed 20 tons and destroyed the rest
because they could not handle it and did
not want the Vietcong to try to recapture it.
THE PEASANTS EMERGE
Two weeks went by, and the peasants
came out of the jungle to reclaim their homes
and farms. "We let the people come back
and keep their rice," Major Tho continued.
"We said to them, 'You see, the Vietcong took
your things, but we do not.'
The major went on:
"Many of the villagers came to us and de-
nounced their neighbors as Vietcong. Some
gave me a list of 40 men to be executed. But
I realized that many were not hard-core Viet-
cong, only forced to do the bidding and pay
allegiance to the Communists."
Major Tho weeded out those he thought
were incorrigible Vietcong members and sent
them to higher headquarters. Others, in-
cluding some who had held positions under
the Vietcong, he gave new assignments.
"I recommended no executions," Major Tho
added. "I wanted to win the confidence of
the people. I called the chief villager and
asked him how he had organized the villages,
and with a few changes I let the organization,
run the same old way for the time being.
"I wanted to show that we would protect
the people against the Vietcong, and I pro-
vided special guards for those who took tasks
as village administrators and hamlet chiefs.
Every night I discussed village problems with
the chiefs."
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
WEAPONS ARE REDISTRIBUTED
Then Major The collected weapons. He
paid for all that were turned In. Most were
rifles and carbines of varied origin. Some
were American, captured from Government
forces, and others were Russian and Chinese
brought in from North Vietnam.
After collecting all the weapons, the major
added, he redistributed them in the hamlets,
"I wanted to show confidence in the peo-
ple," the major recalled. "I said, 'Here, take
the weapons, and use them against the Viet-
cong if they bother you."'
Major Tho retained one hamlet chief who
had worked for the Vietcong, but he sent him
to higher headquarters for questioning. The
man died while traveling, and Major Tho or-
dered the body brought back for burial. He
arranged a big funeral.
GESTURE WITH A MORAL
"I make propaganda, too," Majorf Tho ex-
plained with a smile. "I wanted to show that
even those who had served with the Vietcong
could be forgiven and could take a proper
place in our community."
Now 10 Government hamlets flourish in a
valley that was once a Vietcong stronghold.
As Major The accompanied a visitor on a jeep
ride to meet the people, they greeted him
with apparent pleasure and showed off a new
school Pupils on roughhewn benches in a
big shack were writing the alphabet in note-
books.
There have been no incidents in the valley
for more than 4 months, and the Vietcong
have apparently been unable to reestablish
links with villagers who were once more than
ready to help them.
Yet all around the valley, the Vietco ng_ are
known to patrol in strength.
"They set up ambushes," the major said,
"but they do not come within 2 or 3 miles
of the valley. We have established good
morale here."
VIETNAM HAMLET REPULSES REDS-PENTAGON
RELEASES ACCOUNT or REcZNr CLASH
(By Mark S. Watson)
WASHINGTON, September 25.-Messages
from the U.B. command in South Vietnam
today permitted the Pentagon to supply in
almost unprecedented detail an account of a
well-conducted defense and counterattack
recently, with the South Vietnam Govern-
ment forces gaining a substantial success over
Vietcong guerrillas.
It was at and near Luong Phu, a little
hamlet of some 75 men, women, and children
in the swampy delta of the Mekong River,
southwest of Saigon. This is the region
where the Communist Vietcong has long
been generally in control, even before 1954
when the beaten and discouraged French
withdrew from southeast Asia.
LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT
Luong Phu, largely because it remained
loyal to the government has long been sub-
jected to Communist harassment, the dis-
patch from Saigon mentioning 50 incidents
thus far in 1964, including 16 genuine at-
tacks, of which the latest was the most
violent.
In the official account of this occasion
there were several aspects so important as
to attract attention.
1. The 40 men composing the hamlet's
own defense, only lightly armed, held off
the attack, with temporary loss of only an
ammunition bunker.
2. A group of them had the spirit to
counterattack and regain the bunker with-
out loss of its contents, but with four of the
loyal force killed.
RELIEF FORCES CALLED
3. A relief force, summoned by radio, came
within artillery range and provided quick
assistance to the defense,
4. Therelief force commander, moving in
by a U.S. landing craft (one of five in the
Mekong Delta's rivers) was warned by one
of his agents that a Vietcong force was in
ambush near the riverbank, awaiting him,
after the familiar guerrilla practice.
He opened fire on the hidden guerrillas
and broke up the ambush with large casual-
ties, his own craft taking only one serious
shot from the guerrillas' 57-millimeter rifle.
The relief of Luong Phu was completed, with
40 enemy dead around it and a larger number
in the ambush party carried away by river
boats.
It was this combination of stout resistance
at the attack point, prompt radio report to
the district command, quick advance of relief
forces, and alertness to the danger of am-
bush, with which the Saigon authorities are
obviously most pleased.
PATTERN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
This is the pattern of their counterin-
surgency training, but nobody pretends that
it is easy to accomplish that operation with
all its four phases perfectly executed. With
any of the four missing, the whole opera-
tion has small chance of success.
The landing craft and patrol boats and
motorized junks on the several rivers and
canals are-save for the helicopters-the
prime means of rapid movement of rein-
forcing troops and weapons. They make
possible a fairly rapid use of guns and heavy
mortars.
The other artillery application is by
mounts of single guns in an entrenched posi-
tion (dotted over the countryside) permit-
ting movement of the gun throughout 360?
and prompt laying of fire on any target
within range.
This method presupposes the existence of
excellent maps and prime ability to use them
effectively for fire or an unseen target. A
most encouraging aspect of the war in South
Vietnam is that the maps do exist and that
there is ineresting skill in their efficient use.
CONTINUING MYSTERY
There is one continuing mystery in Viet-
nam, namely the reason for the Vietcong
guerrillas' strange failure to take wide ad-
vantage of the South Vietnam Government's
semiparalysis as a result of the most recent
coup. It would have seemed the ideal time
for massive assaults.
A growing theory is that the guerrilla
movement has been hurt more than is gen-
erally realized, and compelled to slow down
for a time In order to regather strength for
another strong assault at widely scattered
points.
Such an assault is still thought likely, the
surprise being that it was not timed to take
advantage of governmental confusion.
[From the Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1964]
VIETNAM VILLAGERS FIGHT ON
(By Marguerite Higgins)
MEKONG DELTA, SOUTH VIETNAM.-From the
distance the boom of artillery sounded a
steady reminder that the frontlines of the
war were at hand.
A few rice paddies away there was the
authoritative crackle of small arms fire which
was, as to be expected, harassing the heli-
copter that was whirring down on the dirt
road next to the quaint and charming little
village of thatched roofs that now gave haven
to the broken bodies of two American
sergeants killed by an electrically detonated
landmine.
It was a road of bitter memories, this
muddy, tortured dirt lane surrounded by
emerald green rice paddies and a deceptively
lyrical and limpid stream in which the big-
eyed children played, not even looking up
when the angry machinegun bursts got
close and mere adults looked for cover.
In the summer of 1963 there had been a
nasty fire fight on the road, In which several
American reporters lost face but not much
else when they made a run for it. In Novem-
ber 1963 this reporter revisited the road
and its villages on the day that it claimed
the lives of two United Nations agricultural
workers. And now the death of the two ser-
geants.
FAMILIES FIGHT REDS
Yet, at the end of the road is a small
village-Van Thien-whose 150 families have
been overrun six times by the Vietcong and
who still fight back. And one reason they
fight back is because every day American
advisers and Vietnamese soldiers, American
aid teams and Vietnamese engineers defy
the danger and travel back and forth with
their guns and supplies and medicines to help
Van Thien try to stay free.
And this is the real miracle of South Viet-
nam-this fact that somehow the war is still
fought anywhere at all with devotion and
sacrifice and hope despite the selfish joust-
ings of the politicians in Saigon, the power
plays of the military, the riots of the draft-
dodging students and the political poisons
spread by a handful of power-hungry Bud-
dhist leaders whose intrigues are totally dis-
approved by the genuinely religious Bud-
dhists here in the countryside.
Indeed, here in this section of the delta,
I found the progress of the war far less de-
pressing than I had expected. Chaos, lack of
direction, arbitrary arrests, and purges have
taken their toll, of course. But in giddy,
gaudy Saigon the spoiled intellectuals and
politicians do not know the Vietcong first-
hand and can indulge their political death
wishes with a garishly gay ignorance of what
would happen to them if the Communists
took over.
VIETCONG DEPREDATIONS
But in Van Thien it is only a short mo-?
ment in time since the Vietcong disembow-
eled the wife of the district chief and kid-
naped 14 youngsters of the village. So long
as there is the sightest hope of real and
effective outside help against the Vietcong,
the people will fight to keep them out of the
Van Thiens of the delta.
Mytho is the headquarters for the 7th
Vietnamese Division, which guards four key
provinces in the delta. When I first visited
Van Thien In the summer of 1963, it had
just been liberated for the first time from a
long period of Vietcong rule. And elsewhere
in the delta, the fight against the Commu..
nists, while tough and hard, was beginning
to show results. That summer perhaps 64
percent of the population in these key four
provinces were under central Vietnamese
control.
Then came the coup d'etat of November
1963, the murder of Diem and Nhu, the dis-
Integration of the entire fabric of Vietnam-
ese governmental structure, all of which
was taken as a signal by the Vietcong to
really go on the warpath. As a consequence,
when this reporter revisited the 7th Division
provinces in late November 1963, it had been
impossible to even go near many areas that
had been clean and clear of Vietcong the
previous summer. By early 1964, the Viet-
namese controlled less than 25 percent of
these four provinces.
NEED TO START OVER
"And so," said the American colonel in
Mytho, "we had to start over. By April, we
got a new and less ambitious pacification
program. Somehow despite the tumult in
the cities the supplies kept coming. Every-
time a new coup d'etat was rumored every-
thing ground to a halt, of course.
"Slowly and painfully we have gone back
into village after village. It has been heart-
warming to see places where we began with
deserted marketplaces and burned school-
houses soon make a comeback and become
bustling again. I think we can win this wa:r
against the Vietcong. I am an optimist.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
east Asia. Such a plan, they point out,
would offer incredible promise to Laos,
Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to
South Vietnam, and it would offer equal
promise to the people of North Vietnam,
which only the continued belligerence
and noncooperation of their Government
could frustrate.
This, to me, sounds eminently sensi-
ble.
'FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY
If we decide to withdraw from Viet-
nam we can certainly find plenty of ex-
cuses to ease our path. We can blame it
on the geography; or on the topography;
or on local apathy; or on political in-
stability; or on religious strife; or even
on anti-Americanism. But that will fool
no one but ourselves. These conditions
make our success there difficult, but only
our own timidity and vacillation can
make it impossible.
It has become obvious that we cannot
go on fighting this undeclared war under
the rules laid down by our enemies. We
have reached the point where we shall
have to make a great decision, a decision
as to whether we are to take the hard
steps necessary to turn the tide in Viet-
nam or whether we are to refrain from
doing so and thus lose inevitably by de-
fault.
The ultimate outcome of the cold war
depends upon an affirmative decision to
do whatever is necessary to achieve vic-
tory in South Vietnam. The events of
recent weeks demonstrate again that the
administration is not lacking in resolve
and that it is rapidly approaching such a
decision. '
Whether that means a larger commit-
ment of forces, or continued retaliatory
strikes against the North, or carrying
guerrilla warfare to the enemy home-
land, or completely sealing off South
Vietnam from Communist aid-I say to
the administration, "Give us the plan
that will do the job, and we will support
you."
Whether our victory be near or far, can
we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn
away from the task before us, however
frustrating or burdensome it may be?
Here surely is a time for us to heed
Santayana's maxim "Those who will not
learn from the past are destined to re-
peat it."
And so I speak today not merely to urge
that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also
to urge that we meet head on the new
isolationism in its incipient stages, before
the long months and years of discontent,
frustration, and weariness that lie ahead
have swelled the chorus urging disen-
gagement and withdrawal to a deafening
roar.
Let us expound a foreign policy nur-
tured in our constantly growing strength,
not one fed by fear and disillusionment;
a policy which each year is prepared to
expend more, not less, in the cause of
preserving our country and the decencies
of man.
Let us insist upon a defense budget
based upon the dangers we face abroad,
not upon the benefits we seek at home.
Let us, embrace a doctrine that refuses
to yield to force, ever; that honors its
commitments because we know that our
good faith is the cement binding the free
world together; a doctrine that recog-
nizes in its foreign aid program not only
that the rich are morally obligated to
help the poor, but also that prosperity
cannot permanently endure surrounded
by poverty, and justice cannot conquer
until its conquest is. universal.
Let us, above all, encourage and inspire
a national spirit worthy of our history,
worthy of our burgeoning, bursting
strength, in our arms, in our agriculture,
in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit
of confidence, of optimism, of willingness
to accept new risks and exploit new op-
portunities.
And let us remember that providence
has showered upon our people greater
blessings than on any other, and that,
great though our works have been, much
greater is expected of us.
In recent days, the free world has paid
tribute to its greatest champion of our
age, Winston Churchill.
It is a curious thing that though
Churchill is acknowledged on all sides
as the preeminent figure of our time
and as the highest embodiment of West-
ern statesmanship, he was, throughout
his life, and remains today, a prophet
unheeded, a statesman whom men ven-
erate but will not emulate.
It may well be that Winston Church-
ill's greatest legacy will prove to be, not
the legacy of his immortal deeds, but
that of his example and his precepts; and
that freemen of the future will pay him
the homage denied by his contempo-
raries, the tribute of imitation and ac-
ceptance of his message.
As we ponder the passing of this he-
roic figure and reflect upon his career
and try to draw from it lessons which
we might apply to the aggressive on-
slaught that we face today in a hundred
ways on a hundred fronts, we might
take to heart this advice which he gave in
the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Har-
row, his old school :
Never give in. Never, never, never, never.
Never yield to force and the apparently over-
whelming might of the enemy. Never yield
in any way, great or small, large or petty,
except to convictions of honor and good
sense.
Let us resolve to nail this message to
the masthead of our ship of state in this
year of decision.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
following documents: First, a summary
of Communist violations of the Laotian
armistice prepared for me by the Library
of Congress; second, a copy of a state-
ment released yesterday by the American
Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of
"A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a
copy of a telegram to the President from
the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth,
various newspaper clippings bearing on
the situation in Vietnam.
There being no objection, the sundry
documents were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964.
To: Hon. THOMAS J. Dona.
From: Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: List of violations by the Commu-
nist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice
of 1961-62.
July 27, 1962: Laotian cease-fire committee
of the three factions (neutralists, rightists,
and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an
agreement on principles to implement a
truce: forces of each faction will remain in
their previous positions; frontline forces
and military supplies are not to be increased;
and troops of the three factions will not at-
tack each other.
August 22, 1962: Several companies of pro-
Communist Pathet Lao troops attack out-
posts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in
northeastern Laos.
November 27, 1962: U.S. C-123 cargo plane,
flying rice and other supplies to neutralist
forces, is shot down over the Plaine des
Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and
one wounded. Investigation shows that the
plane was shot down by dissident neutralist
troops tied up with Pathet Lao.
April 4, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma
announces that Pathet Lao troops have at-
tacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in
the Plaine des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S.
State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of
a serious violation of the cease-fire.
April 15, 1963: Following brief cease-fire,
fighting breaks out again on the Plaine des
Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong
Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On
April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George
Ball says that the United States does not
rule out the possibility of sending troops
Into Laos if the situation should continue to
deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and
President Kennedy on April 19.
May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two
helicopters of the International Control Com-
mission in the Plaine des Jarres, destroying
one and wounding four occupants. On May
10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses
the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and
violating the Geneva accords, and he says
that the United States will never leave Laos
standing alone "to face its enemies from
within and abroad."
May 21, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma
issues communique stating that severe fight-
ing has been going on for 2 days in the
Plains des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops
and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC
asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue
immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the
Plaine des Jarres.
June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma
charges that Pathet Lao forces are continu-
ing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against
neutralist positions near the Plains des
Jarres.
September 7, 1963: U.S. C-47 unarmed
cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in
central Laos. The government says they
carry only rice and other relief supplies.
, September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in
Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the
rightist police force under Deputy Premier
Phoumi Nosavan.
November 17, 1963: Cease-fire is broken as
fighting resumes in the Plaine des Jarres.
Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao
military leaders subsequently break down
as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the
ICC to police the cease-fire.
January 29, 1964: Neutralist military head-
quarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four
North Vietnamese battalions have launched
an attack In southern Laos, have defeated
neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and
are now heading toward the the strategic
post of Thakhek.
April 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane,
organized by rightist army officers, ousts gov-
ernment of Premier Souvanna. Coup lead-
ers give as reason for their action the pre-
mier's failure to establish peace in Laos.
May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government re-
ports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha
Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast
of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack
on the defense perimeter of Paksane is immi-
nent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew
attacks on neutralist position on the Plains
des Jarres. A State Department spokesman
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3280
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open
violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62.
DAVID E. LOCKWOOD,
Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs.
A NEw POLICY FOR VIETNAM
(Statement by the American Friends of Viet-
nam)
THE DILEMMA
If we are to identify wisely our most effec-
tive forward course in Vietnam, it is impor-
tant first to understand the exact nature of
our dilemma there. We know the inherent
generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its
neighboring countries, which has led us to
Involve our substance and our blood. We
know that but for our commitment, free Viet-
nam would long since have fallen into the
political darkness and physical despair which
oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We
know that our presence there is In response
to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese
leadership, however they differ among them-
selves on other matters. We know that our
presence there is earnestly desired by most
neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We
know that our purpose is to assist responsible
and responsive government and to enable
Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain na-
tional independence against external en-
croachment. We know that we have neither
wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Viet-
namese government nor to seek for ourselves
political, military, or economic advantage.
Our,dilemma flows in part from the fact
that this knowledge is not shared by all of
the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the
members of the Vietcong, is not believed in
parts of the less developed world still suf-
fering the scars of recent colonial experience.
Nor, in fact, is this understanding uniformly
shared by our own people.
The dilemma is sharpened further by a
spreading doubt among leadership elements
In independent southeast Asian countries
that the United States has staying power.
Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Kho-
man, recently warned members of the Over-
seas Press Club: "The Thai Government
knows much better but some people are not
sure we can depend on outside help-especial-
ly when there is so much talk of quitting and
going home. The Communists have never
spoken- that line of quitting. When they go
some place they stay there."
In part, at least, this skepticism is fos-
tered by the doubt among some Americans
that any valid purpose led to our presence
in Vietnam in the first place.
THE ALTERNATIVES
The lack of public understanding flows in
part from inadequate examination of the
alternatives confronting the United States
now. In our opinion there are six choices:
1. Continue as now, Whether or not the
Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their ef-
fectiveness there is a growing conviction in
Saigan, in the United States, and in much
of the rest of the world, that this is so.
This alone makes continuation of our present
policy undesirable. The overriding hazard
of the present policy is the undeniable fact
that it has not provided sufficient psycho-
logical and political potency to sustain a
Vietnamese Government.
2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge
not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It
would manifest throughout the world a U,S.
inability to long sustain an effort designed
to frustrate Communist intentions. The im-
plications would be read as eloquently in
Berlin or in Cuba, as they would be in Viet-
nam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no
question that this alternative would require
the Governments of the Phillippines, Thai-
land, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally
present policy and to reorient toward what
would he the dominating new facts of Asian
life.
("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not sug-
gested here for a simple reason; genuine and
reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not pos-
sible at the present time. What is most often
talked of in this connection is merely a
rhetorical euphemism designed to make
withdrawal more palatable. On the other
hand, the proposals discussed here are valu-
able to part precisely because they do hold
the promise that they may generate sufficient
free Vietnamese vitality to make true and
assured neutralization possible at some
future time.)
S. Military cordon sanitaire across Viet-
nam and Laos. An estimated military force
of up to 100,000 would be involved in mak-
ing such a cordon truly effective and enemy
penetration genuinely hazardous. Its great-
est contribution would be in providing hard
evidence of new determination to maintain
southeast Asian Integrity. Although mili-
tary effect of interdicting the Vietcong's
transport and supply may be limited, it is
nonetheless one useful alternative, espe-
cially when employed with other steps out-
lined here.
4. Extend military action to the north.
Until last week, steps taken in this di-
rection were, in our judgment, not suffi-
ciently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnam-
ese faith In our intentions or to inspire con-
fidence In other Asian countries that we are
indeed willing to accept risk as the price
of our commitment to freedom. The in-
creased external, Communist intervention in
South Vietnam has made it both reasonable
and essential that there be a vigorous anti-
Communist military response. The limited
air strikes in North Vietnam by American
and Vietnamese planes constituted such an
appropriate response.
There are many other forms of stronger
American action and involvement and they
are not mutually exclusive. They include:
(a) Formation of an open, well-publicized
North Vietnam liberation movement spon-
soring major psychological operations pro-
grams, including paramilitary action, against
the North Vietnamese- regime.
(b) Establishment of an International
Voluntary Corps dedicated to the mainte-
nance of free nations in the Mekong basin.
This corps should consist primarily of vol-
unteers from Asian countries but may also
contain a liberal admixture of Americans
with military experience. Operating nor-
mally in small units with sufficient air sup-
port, this force-under the sponsorship of
the proposed North Vietnam Liberation
Movement-would harass the enemy wher-
ever suitable targets exist, including targets
within North Vietnam.
(c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces
within South Vietnam to act as a general
reserve-a sizable firefighting force. Such
a military contingent (perhaps as many as
two brigades) should not be used for routine
combat or security duties, but as an imme-
diate-reaction fighting force intended to
engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions.
Desirably, combat elements from other na-
tions will be attached to this force.
(d) Continued bombing of selected mili-
tary targets in North Vietnam. In contrast
to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the
Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's
concern for the Vietnamese people in both
halves of the country make it undesirable for
us to conduct warfare upon cities where the
innocent will be hurt. However, those mili-
tary targets in North Vietnam which are vital
to their aggressive capability and which can
be destroyed with our assistance are, in our
view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage
destruction.
What is the risk involved in such action?
In our judgment the possibility of Chinese
involvement In South Vietnam would be only
slightly increased. The possibility of Chi-
nese help thrust upon North Vietnam would
be greater. However, this probability may be
precisely what is needed to make clear` to
even the most Communist leaders of North
Vietnam how undesirable such help is to
them in the long run. A heightened aware-
ness of this danger might, in fact, force
greater restraint upon the Government in
Hanoi than our present policy can achieve.
Frankly, however, the direct military dam-
age inflicted on the Communist regime in
North Vietnam is the lesser of our reasons
for suggesting that these steps be under-
taken. In our opinion, it is urgent that the
people of free Vietnam be assured that Presi-
dent Johnson means what he says-that we
mean to stay and help, no matter what risks
we must incur. It is equally urgent that
these Intentions be understood also in
Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia,
the rest of Asia, and the world. Stanch,
long-term American commitment-fully
communicated and understood-would pro-
vide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject
new vitality in the Vietnamese Government
and require a new assessment of the United
States among neighboring countries and
among Asian allies elsewhere.
There is one final reason we support this
painful course of action. Basic require-
ments for victory in Vietnam are not primar-
ily military. They are psychological, social,
and economic. Below we address ourselves
to instruments which can meet the nonmili-
tary-aspects of the undertaking. But neither
the economic nor political measures we pro-
pose will get off the ground without evidence
of the seriousness of our military Intention
Nor will our military commitment produce
the desired results without the companion
economic and psychological supports.
America's experience in relation to the in-
stability in postwar Europe is clearly rele-
vant. The Marshall plan did not begin to
come to life until, the physical security prom-
ised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO
by itself have been meaningful without the
human vision and economic future presented
by the Marshall plan.
5. Forging a more popular or responsive
government. It is clear that the difficulties
confronting any Vietnamese Government un-
der Communist attack are enormous. We
can but sympathize with those who carry
the burdens of government in circumstances
so frustrating and continuously demanding.
It Is possible that 20 years of civil war, co-
lonial war, and Communist insurrectionary
war, have so debilitated the structure of gov-
ernment as to preclude the immediate pos-
siblity, no matter how desirable, of absolutely
stable government. There are political per-
sonalities with nationalist backgrounds who
are deserving of our help and encourage-
ment. We must do what we can to help them
and bring them forward. At the same time,
we must help to diminish the present conflict
of personalities that has proved in past years
to be so destructive. In any event, we believe
it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the
past, on personalities, rather than on pur-
poses, ideas, and institutions.
6. Injection of new purpose. If charis-
matic leadership is unavailable, charismatic
purpose can be found. One aspect of that
purpose involves the modest extension of
military effort discussed above. It involves
the clear demonstration that the United
States means to remain committed even at
enlarged risk. And such charismatic pur-
pose must, of necessity, accept as workable
"the best available choices of Vietnamese
Government personnel"-choices made by
the Vietnamese not by us. But our object
would be to harness our military commit-
ment and the Vietnamese effort to an in-
finitely larger objective than has previously
motivated our participation. It would make
crystal clear that the objectives which unite
us with the Vietnamese people, aswith our
other allies on southeast Asia, are construc-
tive and inextricably linked to the welfare
of all southeast Asian peoples.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1 9 65
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 3277
and how much they have done to under-
mine the fight against Communists.
No stable government can be created
in Vietnam without the participation and
support of responsible Buddhist leader-
ship. But this responsible leadership
cannot be found among the handful of
monks of questionable antecedents who
have been misdirecting the militant
Buddhist movement in the cities of Viet-
nam.
It is time to speak bluntly on this issue.
THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY
Over and over again in recent months
I have heard it said that our position in
Vietnam is impossible because the
French, who knew Vietnam so much bet-
ter than we do, were compelled to admit
defeat after 8 years of war against the
Vietminh. A recent half-page adver-
tisement in the NewYork Times asked:
"How can we win in Vietnam with less
than 30,000 advisers, when the French
could not win with an army of nearly
half a million?"
.Our own position is entirely different
from the French position in Indochina.
The French were a colonial power, ex-
ploiting and imposing their will on the
Indochinese people and stubbornly deny-
ing them their freedom. The French
military effort in Indochina was doomed
because it had against it not only the
Communists but the overwhelming
majority of the Indochinese people. it
was a war fought by Frenchmen against
Indochinese,
The United States, however, does not
seek to impose its control on Vietnam or
exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial
power. We seek only to help the people
of South Vietnam defend their freedom
against an insurgency that is inspired
and directed and aided by the North Viet-
namese Communists. This is understood
by the Vietnamese people. And that is
why hundreds of thousands of Vietnam-'
ese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against
the French are today fighting for the
Saigon government against the Vietcong.
That is why the war against the Viet-
cong can be won, while the war of French
colonialism against the Indochinese inde-
pendence movement was doomed from
the outset. There is no similarity in
the two situations that has any meaning
or validity.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
I believe the war in. Vietnam can be
won without a significant increase in our
military effort. There are many things
that can be done to improve the perform-
ance of our side, and most of them lie
essentially in the nonmilitary field.
Let me set forth some of the things
that I believe can be done.
THE NEED FOR IMPROVED LIAISON
One of the most obvious and most seri-
ous weaknesses of the American position
in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison
with the leaders of the various sectors of
the Vietnamese, community.
Because of this lack of communication,
we have frequently been caught un-
awares. by developments; we have re-
mained without serious ability to influ-
ence them; and we have not been able to
effectively assist the Vietnamese in com-
municating with each other and in sta-
bilizing the political situation in Saigon.
No one person is to blame for this. It
is, rather, the system which rotates mili-
tary officers and AID officials and other
Americans in Vietnam on an annual or
2-year basis.
As one American officer pointed out in
a recent interview, "It takes about 8
months before you can really get to know
the country and the people. And, just
about the time you are beginning to
understand something, you are rotated
home and that is the end of your utility."
I believe that something can be done to
improve this situation.
I have met a number of Americans,
former soldiers and former AID officials,
who have spent 5 years or more in Viet-
nam, have built up personal friendships
with leaders of every sector of the Viet-
namese community, enjoy the confidence
of the Vietnamese because of their
understanding and dedication, and who
would jump at the opportunity to return
to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it
in this critical hour. I am told that
there may be as many as 10 or 12 such
people in this country.
I have proposed in a letter to the
President that these Americans be con-
stituted into a liaison group and that
they be dispatched to Saigon imme-
diately for the purpose of helping the
Embassy to establish the broadest and
most effective possible liaison with the
army leaders, with the Buddhists, with
the intellectual community, and with the
Vietnamese political leaders.
I know that there is always a tendency
on the part of World War II officers to
resent World War I officers, and on the
part of those who are involved in a situa-
tion today to resist the assistance of
those who preceded them. There is also
sometimes a tendency for those who were
there yesterday to believe that they
understand things better than those who
are there today.
But this is a situation in which I am
confident every American, no matter
what his rank, will seek to rise above his
personal prejudices. It is a situation that
demands the utilization of every ounce
of experience and dedication available
to us.
It is my earnest personal conviction
that the dispatch of such a liaison group
to Saigon would result in an early im-
provement in our ability to communicate
with the Vietnamese and in our ability to
assist them in achieving the political sta-
bility which is essential to the successful
prosecution of the war.
THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE
EFFORT
From many conversations with Viet-
namese and with Americans who have
served in various capacities in Vietnam,
I am convinced that another one of our
major weaknesses lies in the field of po-
litical warfare.
We have, by and large, been trying to
meet the Communist insurgency by tra-
ditional military methods or by tradi-
tional methods slightly tailored to meet
the special requirements of guerrilla war-
fare. In the field of political warfare,
where the Communists have scored their
most spectacular triumphs, our own ef-
fort has been limited, and halting, and
amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffec-
tive.
The prime goal of political warfare, as
it must be waged by freemen, is to win
men's minds. The prime goal of political
warfare, as it is waged by the Commu-
nists, is to erode and paralyze the will to
resist by means of total error.
An effective political warfare program
requires three major ingredients: First,
a handful of basic slogans which capsul-
ize popular desires and which are capable
of striking responsive chords in the
hearts of the people; second, a propa-
ganda apparatus capable of conveying
this program both to those on the Gov-
ernment side and those on the side of the
insurgents; third, specially trained cad-
res to direct the effort.
But the slogans we have are inade-
quate. Our propaganda program is dis-
mally weak compared with that of the
Communists. And according to my in-
formation, we still have not assisted the
Vietnamese to set up an intensive train-
ing program in Communist cold war
methods and how to counter them.
An article in the New York Times on
August 3, 1964, pointed out that in every
area "the basic cutting tool of the Viet-
cong is a squad of about 10 armed men
and women whose primary function is
propaganda." The article also said that
"Most of the experts in psychological
warfare and propaganda here believe the
Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the
Saigon government more damage than
even the tough Vietcong regular batta-
lions." Finally, the article made the
point that according to estimates there
were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" teams
working in the country, against 20 "in-
formation teams" for the government
side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of
16 to 1 in the field of propaganda per-
sonnel. And the edge was probably even
greater in terms of finesse and effective-
ness.
Even if we help the South Vietnamese
Government intensify its propaganda ef-
fort, there would still remain the prob-
lem of basic goals and slogans.
I have pointed out that the Vietnamese
people have a proud history and a strong
sense of national unity. All Vietnamese,
whether they live in the north or south,
would like to see a unified and peaceful
Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only
the Communists are able to hold forth
the prospect of the reunification of Viet-
nam. To date we have not given the
South Vietnamese Government the green
light to set up a "Committee for the
Liberation of North Vietnam," as coun-
terpart to the "Liberation Front" which
the Communists have set up in the south.
This places the South Vietnamese side
at a grave disadvantage.
There are any number of patriotic
North Vietnamese refugees who have
been itching for the opportunity to set
up a Liberation Committee for the North.
The establishment of such a committee
could, in my opinion, have an immediate
and profound impact on the conduct of
But above all, the situation in Vietnam
underscores the need for an effective
training program in political warfare,
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3278
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
for our own foreign service and military
personnel so that they can help to com-
municate this knowledge to nationals of
other countries who, like the South Viet-
namese, are engaged in a life-and-death
struggle for survival against the most
cunning and most ruthless practitioners
of political warfare history has ever
known.
In this connection, I wish to bring
to the attention of my colleagues the
fact that there has been pending before
Congress for some 6 years a bill calling
for the establishment of a Freedom
Academy. This would be an institu-
tion where Americans and citizens of
other free countries could receive con-
centrated training in Communist tech-
niques and operations, and in tactics and
methods designed to frustrate the Com-
munists at every operational level, from
elections for the control of trade unions
and student organizations, to street riots,
to attempted insurrections.
The Senate Judiciary Committee in
reporting this measure to the floor in
May of 1960, described the bill as "one
of the most important measures ever in-
troduced in the Congress." But, unfor-
tunately, although the bill was passed
by the Senate, the House took no action.
When the bill was reintroduced for the
third time in early 1963, it has the spon-
sorship of the following Senators:
MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DoDD, SMATHERS,
Goldwater, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKEN-
LOOPER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and
SCOTT.
The distinguished senior Senator from
South Dakota last Friday reintroduced
the measure for the fourth time, and it is
now lying on the table, so that those who
wish to add their names as cosponsors
may do so. It is my earnest hope that
the measure will have the sponsorship
of an even larger bipartisan group of
Senators than it did in 1963. It is my
hope too that there will be no further
delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this
long-overdue measure. It is time, high
time, that we recognize the imperative
need to equip ourselves and our allies
with the knowledge and the trained per-
sonnel required to meet the Communist
onslaught.
CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH
First of all, I think there is a growing
acceptance of the need for punishing the
North with hit-and-run raids. It would
be much more effective if these raids
could be carried out in the name of a
North Vietnamese Liberation Front than
in the name of the South Vietnamese
Government.
Second, I have reason for believing
that increasing consideration is being
given to the need for countering the Viet-
cong insurgency in the South with a
guerrilla warfare effort in the North.
In May of 1961, when I returned from
Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement,
which I should like to repeat today :
The best way for us to stop Communist
guerrilla action in Laos and in South Viet-
nam is to send guerrilla forces into North
Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots
already in the field; to make every Commu-
nist official fear the just retribution of an
outraged humanity; to make every Commu-
nist arsenal, government building, commu-
n1cations center and transportation facility
a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying
point for the great masses of oppressed peo-
ple who hate communism because they have
known it. Only when we give the Commu-
nists more trouble than they can handle at
home, will they cease their aggression against
the outposts of freedom.
I believe that every word I said in 1961
.is doubly valid today. It is not too late to
embark upon such a program. And if we
do give the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment the green light to embark upon it
on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again
I think it would add significantly to the
psychological impact of the entire pro-
gram if all guerrilla activities were car-
ried out in the name of the "Committee
for the Liberation of the North."
A FEW MILITARY SUGGESTIONS
I do not pretend to be a military ex-
pert. But I have discussed the situation
in Vietnam with a number of military
men of considerable experience in the
area, and I have been encouraged to be-
lieve that the several suggestions which
I have to make in this field are realistic.
I submit them for the consideration
of my colleagues, because I think they
make sense.
My-first proposition is that we cannot
regard the war in Vietnam in isolation
from the rest of southeast Asia.
The Communist Party over which Ho
Chi Minh presided for many years was
the Communist Party of Indochina. In-
deed, to this day, there is no such thing
as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho
Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are
directed toward the reunification of all
the former territories of French Indo-
china under his personal sway. This
makes it imperative for us to develop a
coordinated strategy for the entire area
if we are to cope effectively with the
Communist strategy.
Proposition No. 2 is that there are
certain dramatic military actions open
to us that do not involve the territory of
North Vietnam.
The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is
the town of Tchepone, Inside the Lao-
tian frontier, just south of the 17th par-
allel, the dividing line between North
Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through
Tchepone pour most of the reinforce-
ments and equipment from North Viet-
nam. From Tchepone the men and
equipment are infiltrated into South
Vietnam along hundreds of different
jungle trails.
I recall that when I met with Presi-
dent Diem in April of 1961, he urged that
the Americans assist him and the Laotian
Government in preemptive action to
secure three key centers in the Laotian
Panhandle-Tchepone, Saravane, and
Attopeu-in order to prevent the large-
scale infiltration which is today taking
place. I still have a copy of the marked
map which he gave me in Outlining his
project. Had Diem's advice been fol-
lowed there would have been no Ho Chi
Minh trail. But this was at the time of
the Laotian armistice and we were not
disposed to take any actions which might
provoke the Laotian Communists. So
nothing was done.
The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian
and Vietnamese forces, with American
air support would, I have been assured,
be a feasible military operation and one
that could be carried out with the means
available to us on the spot. It would
do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi
Minh trail than any amount of bombing
we could attempt. And it would have
as dramatic an impact on the situation
in Taos as on the situation in Vietnam.
Finally, there is the matter of collec-
tive action by the SEATO nations.
As late as April of 1961, the SEATO na-
tions in the Immediate area of the
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New
Zealand, and Pakistan-all favored com-
mon action against the Communist
menace in Laos. But the British and
French were opposed to such action, and
we ourselves sat on the fence; and the
result was that nothing was done.
The charter of SEATO will have to be
modified so that one nation cannot veto
collective action by all the other nations.
Britain, I am inclined to believe, would
now be disposed to support collective ac-
tion by SEATO because of the situation
in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should
be invited to leave SEATO, on the
grounds that she has no vital interests in
the area, and her entire attitude toward
Red China is one of appeasement. In
view of the fact that something has to be
done immediately, however, the sensible
course is to encourage collective action
by the free nations in the area, outside
the framework of SEATO, until SEATO
can be reorganized in a manner that
makes it effective.
In this connection, I am most encour-
aged by the news that South Korea has
decided to send a contingent of several
thousand military engineers to South
Vietnam, and the Philippines have de-
cided to do likewise. It is Infinitely bet-
ter from every standpoint to have Asian
troops supporting the Vietnamese forces
against the Vietcong on the ground, than
it is to have American troops actively in-
volved.
THE NEED FOR UNDERSCORING OUR
LONG-TERM COMMITMENT
The retaliatory strikes ordered by
President Johnson against the North
have had the effect of reiterating our
commitment in a manner that the Com-
munists understand; and this, in the
long run, is probably more important
than the damage wrought by these
strikes.
But if the Communists are to be dis-
couraged from continuing this costly
war, Ive must seek every possible means
of underscoring our determination to
stand by the people of South Vietnam,
to pay whatever cost may be necessary,
and to take whatever risk may be neces-
sary to prevent the Communists from
subjugating the Vietnamese people and
other people in the area.
It is important to reiterate our resolve
at every opportunity. And it is even
more important to translate this resolve
into hard political and military actions.
The American Friends of Vietnam
have suggested another dramatic meas-
ure. They have suggested a commit-
ment to a massive southeast Asian de-
velopment program based on the har-
nessing of the Mekong River-a kind of
Tennessee. Valley Authority for south-
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/'15: CIA-RDP67B 0300170003-8
1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - 3275
For. some strange reason, the torture And even last year, when the fortunes kangaroo courts, and executing and
of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far of war turned against the Vietnamese burying those who were sentenced.
more indignation in our country than government, the Vietnamese Army killed I also remind them of the scenes that
the assassination of scores of thousands 17,000 Vietcong against a loss of 7,000 took place when the prisoners were
of innocent civilians by the Vietcong men, and took 4,200 Communists captive brought before the, Communist interro-
Communists, including the bombing of a against 5,800 captives lost to them. gators under the procedures set up by
schoolbus in which a score of children To those who say that the Vietnamese the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
died. Army has not shown the will to resist, mission. The prisoners had to be dragged
But, if the Vietnamese people are anti- I point out that, over the 3-year period before the interrogators forcibly, their
Communist, I have been asked: Why has for which I have presented figures, this arms pinned behind their backs by In-
the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a army suffered a total death toll of 17,000 than soldiers. When the Communist in-
show? men, which is almost as high as the total terrogators spoke to them, urging that
The Vietnamese Army has been handi- American toll in South Korea. The they return to their homeland, the pris-
capped by political instability by the fre- enemy's casualties have been much heav- oners spat out their hatred with a vehe-
quent shifts of officers, by poor staff ier. But the Communists have continued mence that Western observers found
work, by its inadequate use of scouts and to attack regardless of losses. And be- frightening. So embarrassing were the
security patrols, and by the many dis- cause it has not been possible to recon- interrogations for the Communists that
advantages under which counterguer- stitute a stable government since the after a number of sessions they decided
rilla forces must always operate. But, overthrow of Diem, and, because no one to call off the whole show.
It is simply not true that the Vietnamese knows where guerrillas may strike next, In the light of this conclusion, how
Army has shown no willingness to fight. and because unlimited terror is a dread- much significance can one attach to the
They have fought bravely in thou- fully effective instrument, the Vietcong, seemingly fanatical courage displayed by
sands of engagements. They have taken over the past 15 months, have been able the Chinese and North Korean soldiers
heavy casualties and inflicted much to make most of the Vietnamese country- in attacking our positions, or to the grim
heavier casualties on the enemy. side insecure. unity of the Koje prisoners of war in
The belief that the Vietnamese people The fact that the Vietcong seem to be resisting their mar elAmerican at ccaptors?
opparently
do not have the will to resist the Com- winning and that they have been so Before munists and that the Vietnamese forces effective in resisting government count- high morale of the Vietcong forces in
have fought poorly against them, is in erattacks, has led some people to believe South Vietnam, I suggest that we recall
large measure due to the unfortunate that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of the experience of the Korean war, be-
emphasis which the press always places the justice of his cause and that this is cause the evidence is overwhelming that
on disasters and defects. why he fights more grimly. the Vietcong Communists are using ter-
It probably also springs in pert from The Communists are masters of the ror on the same scale and in the same
the traditional attitude of the American art of imposing iron discipline by means manner that it was employed on the
newspaperman that it is his duty to of unlimited terror. Korean battlefront and in the prisoner-
mercilessly expose every weakness in Senators will recall that during the of-war camps.
his city government, in his State govern- Korean war we all marveled at the dis- That the morale of the Vietcong forces
ment, in his National Government. cipline of the Chinese Communist sol- is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the
I do not complain about that. I sup- diers who kept on marching without substantial number of Vietcong prisoners
pose that is the way it has to be. -breaking step while they were being taken over the past 3 years. It is demon-
But whatever the reasons may be, the bombed and strafed by American planes, strated even more dramatically by the
emphasis in the press has been so mis- or who attacked our positions, wave upon fact that from February 1963 through
leading that even knowledgeable mem- wave, apparently oblivious to casualties. the end of 1964 there were approxi-
bers of the administration have been con- I remember people saying, "See the mately 17,000 Vietcong defections. The
fused by it. For example, a member of number of defections would be far
the administration who very recently dedication of these Chinese Communists, larger, t am certain, if a stable govern-
visited Vietnam informed me that, con See how they bear themselves against ment could establish itself in Saigon.
trary to his impressions from reading the bullets and bombs. See how fanatically It is interesting to note that, while
press he was amazed to learn that in they believe in their cause." I did not most of the defectors have been young
eight engagements of battalion size and think that was the reason, but I did not peasants who' were conscripted by the
larger which took place during the have an effective answer until after the Vietcong, their ranks also include North
month of January 1965, the Vietnamese war was over. Vietnamese officers who were told that
Army got the better of the engagement Senators will recall the terrible riots they were going south to fight the Amer-
in every single case. in the Koje prisoner-of-war camp, when icans and who broke when they dis-
I have here the comparative figures the prisoners seemed so grimly united covered that they were fighting their
for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties against us that for weeks on end Amer- own people.
for the 3-year period .1962-64, which ican soldiers could not venture into the Impatient constituents have sometimes
I have received from an official source. POW compound. Again, the common asked me why the Communists have been
I wish to read them, Mr. President, be- assumption was that the prisoners were able to plan elaborate attacks on our
cause they throw an altogether new light all fanatical Communists. airfields and other installations without
on the situation in Vietnam. I do not But then the end of the war came- advance intelligence reaching us from
know why these figures were not released and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000 members of the local population who
long ago. I hear people complaining of the Communist prisoners in our hands must have observed the Communists.
that they do not know what is going on asked for refugee status rather than The instrument of terror is also appli-
in Vietnam. The release of these figures return to North Korea or China. And cable to the control of the ciXilian popu-
would have helped them to understand. these were supposed to be the dedicated lation. Whenever the Communists take
In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400 Communists who believe so fanatically over a village or a town, they systemat-
killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong in communism. ically massacre all known anti-Commu-
killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500 Of the 5,000 who returned home, there nist leaders and those who are suspected
captives taken from the Vietcong. is reason to believe that the majority of informing. They frequently mutilate
Those are, pretty good statistics. They did so with heavy hearts, because of their bodies as an example to the people.
ought to be read and studied by persons strong family ties and not because of If we could give the Vietnamese vil-
who are saying the South Vietnamese any love for communism. lagers a feeling of greater. security, I am
have no will to fight. I remind the Senators-because these sure that more intelligence would be
Listen to these further figures: things tend to be forgotten-of the evi- forthcoming. As matters now stand, the
In 1963 the figures"were 5,700 Vietna- dencewhich emerged that the Koje pris- average Vietnamese peasant fears that
mere soldiers killed in action against oners of war had been terrorized by a the Communists are going to win the
21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or tiny minority of Communist militants war, and he knows the terrible punish-
captured against 4,000 Vietcong cap- who ran the camp with an iron hand, ment that awaits those who inform on
tured. torturing political opponents, staging the Communists. This is why our in-
. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3276
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
telligence has admittedly been inade-
quate-one of the reasons, certainly.
But this is a situation that could change
dramatically if we succeeded in convinc-
ing the Vietnamese people of our deter-
mination to help them retain their free-
dom, and if we succeeded in inflicting a
number of significant defeats on the
enemy.
THE BUDDHIST FALLACY
I now wish to discuss the Buddhist sit-
uation, about which we have heard for
several years now.
The myth of Buddhist persecution and
the parallel myth that the Buddhists are
opposed to the Government, have be-
cause of the so-called militant Buddhist
movement, become important political
factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, im-
portant that we should seek to under-
stand the nature of this movement, the
motivation of its leaders, and the real
degree of Influence it exerts over the
Vietnamese people.
It is, indeed, idle to debate the subject
of Vietnam and our policy there and not
understand the so-called Buddhist Prob-
lem. There has been much loose talk
about it, but there has thus far been little
hard, factual information.
The campaign which resulted in the
overthrow of President Diem was marked
by the charge that he had subjected the
Buddhist religion to inhuman persecu-
tion; and, in protest against this alleged
persecution, a number of Buddhist monks
went through the horrifying ritual of
self-immolation.
Week after week, month after month,
the American people and the people of
the world were inundated with stories
supporting the charge that Diem was
persecuting the Buddhist religion. There
were a number of experienced corre-
spondents of national reputation who
challenged the authenticity of these
stories. But their voices were drowned
by the torrent of charges and allegations
that appeared in some of our major news-
papers, and that were lent further
credence because of repetition of our of-
fical information agencies.
At the invitation of President Diem, the
U.N. General Assembly decided to send a
factfinding mission to South Vietnam to
look into the situation. I find this rarely
referred to in any discussion of the Bud-
dhist question, but It is a fact that the
United Nations did send a mission over
there.
While the mission was still in the coun-
try, President Diem and his brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and
assassinated.
The mission decided that the overthrow
of Diem made it unnecessary to come up
with a formal finding. I believe that
this was most regrettable. But the-sum--
mary of the testimony which it had taken
in Vietnam pointed strongly to the con-
clusion that the persecution of the
Buddhists was either nonexistent or
vastly exaggerated and that the agita-
tion was essentially political. This, in
essence, was what I was told in a per-
sonal conversation with Ambassador Per-
ma:ndo Volio Jiminez, of Costa Rica, who
had introduced the motion calling for the
setting up of the U.N. mission and who
served as a member of it.
I went to New York and saw Ambas-
sador Volio. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I
understand you were a member of the
United Nations commission which went
to Vietnam. I should like to ask you
what the facts are." Ambassador Volio
gave me the facts as I have given them to
you here.
Ambassador Pinto, of Dohomey, an-
other member of the U.N. mission, ex-
pressed himself in similar terms in
public.
The entire tragic story suggests that
the free world was made the victim of a
gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of
which the legitimate government of
President Diem was destroyed and a
chaotic situation created which has in-
evitably played into the hands of the
Communists.
If Senators have not yet had time to
read the report of the U.N. factflnding
mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so
because it throws essential light on the
current activities of the militant
Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies
mailed to every Senator, and I hope that
all Senators will read it, because they
will learn a great deal about the present
Buddhist situation from it.
The first fact which needs to be estab-
lished in evaluating the militant Buddhist
movement is that the Buddhists do not
constitute 80 or 85 percent of the popula-
tion, as was widely reported at the time
of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr.
Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest au-
thorities on Vietnam Buddhism theViet-
namese Buddhists number approxi;Yiately
4 million people, or about 30 percent of
the population.
The second point that must be made is
that the militant Buddhists constitute
only a small fraction of the total Bud-
dhist population. The millions of the
Buddhist peasants, in their great ma-
jority, do not approve of the militant
political actions and the government-
toppling intrigues of the Buddhist mili-
tants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed,
run completely counter to the pacific
traditions of the Buddhist religion.
It is questionable whether the Bud-
dhist militants have been able to mobilize
as many as 50,000 active supporters in
all the demonstrations they have staged
in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But
because political power resides in the
cities, the several tens of thousands of
Buddhist militants, by their clamor and
their persistent demonstrations and their
clever propaganda, have succeeded in
creating the impression that they speak
for the people of the cities and for the
majority of the people of Vietnam.
What do the Buddhist militants want?
Before the overthrow of President Diem,
Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Hig-
gins frankly: "We cannot get an arrange-
ment with the north until we get rid -3f
Diem and Nhu."
The evidence Is clear that Thich Tri
Quang and some of his other militants
are still bent on an agreement with the
north. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang
called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi
Minh.
If there is reason to believe that Thich
Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even
more reason for fearing that some of the
other members of the Buddhist opposi-
tion movement are openly pro-Commu-
nist or that they have become tools of
the rather substantial Communist infil-
tration which is known to exist in the
Buddhist clergy in the various countries
of Asia.
That such an infiltration should exist
is not surprising because there are no
barriers to it.
A man who wants to become a Bud-
dhist monk does not have to prepare him-
self for his ministry by engaging in
studies, nor does he have to be ordained,
nor does he take any vow.
He simply shaves his head and dons
the saffron robe and enters a monas-
tery-and overnight he becomes one of
the religious elite.
When he wishes to leave the mon-
astery, he sheds his robe and leaves it;
if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe
again and reenters. That is all there
is to it.
I do not criticize this procedure on
religious grounds.
Buddhism is one of the great religions
of mankind and much can be said for
an arrangement that enables every man
of religious disposition to spen-l at least
a portion of his life under the voluntary
monastic discipline characteristic of
Buddhism.
But, regrettably, it is a procedure that
leaves the door wide open to Communist
Infiltration.
I remember that when we were digging
into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg,
we found that Hitler had under consider-
ation a program of Infiltrating the
churches by inducing young people to
enter seminaries, so that he could have
them at his disposal.
When I first began to hear of the
Buddhist situation, it occurred to me
that more than likely there was a sim-
ilar infiltration of religion at work.
The militant Buddhists have used the
influence and prestige which accrued to
them from the overthrow of Diem for
the prime purpose of making stable gov-
ernment impossible: in this sense, what-
ever the intent of their leaders, they
have been serving the desires of the
Communist Vietcong.
They have organized demonstrations,
provoked riots, inflamed passions with
highly publicized fasts and self -Immola-
tions, and subjected the government to
a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They
overthrew the Khanh government.
Then they overthrew the Huong govern-
Unent which succeeded it. And they
seem to be intent on making things im-
possible for any government that may
come to power.
It is, of course, difficult to deal with a
political conspiracy that camouflages it-
self in religious robes. In any case, this
is a matter for the Vietnamese Govern-
ment and not for our own Government.
But it would make matters immeasur-
ably easier for the Vietnamese authori-
ties if the true facts about Buddhism
in Vietnam were given to the American
people and If they could be helped to
understand how little the Buddhist mili-
tants really represent, how nefarious
their political activities have really been,
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 19ti5 Approved For R ~$ 22QQQQ~3//1~ : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
~vRvRESSI EECORI 77 SENATE, 3273
Polish Communist, member consistently Having defeated the military sects social advances recorded anywhere in
refused t0 inves'tigate reports of North and integrated them into the Armed Asia,
Vietnamese intervention? in South Viet- Forces of the republic, Diem within a ESCALATION : FACT AND FALLACY
nam. 111, this way, this entire massive few years was able to resettle the 1 mil- There has been a good deal of talk
body, of evidence, of Hanoi's. intervention lion refugees and to create a stable uni- about the United States escalating the
in South Vietnam was muted and ren- fied state where none had previously ex- war in South Vietnam. Several Senators
dere,,d fine e. fisted. who spoke last week warned that if we
In order r to to understand the war in Viet- I could not help feeling indignant over escalate the war by means of air strikes
nam, we have to get away from tradi- an article on Vietnam which appeared against North Vietnam, the escalation
tional concepts in which ,armies with some time ago in the Washington Star. may get out of hand and wind up as a war
their own insignias cross clearly marked The author, Prof. Bernard Fall, who with Red China or perhaps even a world
national, demarcation lines after their wrote the article in ill-concealed admi- war.
governments have duly declared war. ration of what the Communists had done But it is not we who have escalated the
Communist guerrilla warfare is waged in their area of Vietnam, mentioned the war; it is the Communists. Peiping and
without any declaration of war. In the fact that the Communists had built Hanoi have been busy escalating the war
case of Vietnam, it is waged from exter- schools for the people. What he did not in South Vietnam for several years now.
nalsanctuaries which claim immunity to mention was that from 1955 to 1963 They have sent in tens of thousands of
attack because the state which harbors President Diem has doubled the number soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army;
them has not formally declared war, of students in elementary schools, while they have trained additional tens of thou-
It blends military cadres who have in- at the secondary school level the in- sands of dissident South Vietnamese;
filtrated into the country with native crease has been fivefold. they have supplied them with massive
dissidents and conscripts, in a manner The remarkable progress in the field quantities of equipment; and they have
which conceals the foreign instigation of of education was no exception. The en- stepped up the tempo of their attacks
the insurgency, and which enables the tire South Vietnamese society scored re- against the Vietnamese people.
Communists to pretend that it is merely markable advances in every field of eco- Now we are told that if we take any ac-
a civil war. .1 1 nomic and social endeavor, so that in tion against the territory of North Viet-
,It is time that, we nail the civil war 1963 South Vietnam for the first time nam, which has mounted and directed
lie for what it is. It is time that we rec- had a sizable rice surplus for export. the entire attack on South Vietnam, it
ognized it as a form of aggression as There were significant increases in all will entail the risk of world war.
intolerable as open aggression across sectors of industry and agriculture, and If the Communists are always to be
marked frontiers. a 20-percent rise in per capita income. Permitted the privilege of escalating their
Why did Ho Chi, Minh decide to launch Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things attempts to take over new countries,
the current war for the liberation of in while we shrink from retaliation for fear
South Vietnam? The answer to this were going from bad to worse. As in
question is really very simple. every other Communist country the col- of further escalation, we might as well
l
i
th
After the Geneva agreement, it had
been the expectation of the Communists
that South Vietnam would collapse in
administrative and political chaos be-
fore many months had passed, and that
it would fall into their hands like an
overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh
Diem took office as Premier after the
surrender of North Vietnam to the Com-
munists, 99 percent of the Western press
viewed the situation in South Vietnam
as hopeless and predicted an early take-
over by the Communist guerrillas.
Cut off from the mineral and indus-
trial riches of the north; swamped by
an influx of 1 million refugees; without
an adequate army or administration of
its own; with three major sects, each
with private armies, openly challenging
its authority-confronted with this com-
bination of burdens and handicaps, it
seemed that nothing could save the new
born South Vietnamese Government.
But then there took place something
that has properly come to be called the
Diem miracle; this term was used at
different times by President Kennedy and
Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's
tyo we a,re uomg now. But on
now realize was a tragic mistake. ment, I think it important to point out the ground, the fighting can most effec-
Diem first of all moved to destroy the that this war has gravely complicated tively be done by the Vietnamese armed
power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a the already serious internal difficulties forces, supported, I believe, by military
sect of river pirates who, under the of the North, so that in 1963, for exam- contingents from the other free Asian
French, were given a simultaneous mo- ple, the per capita output of rice in Com- countries.
nopoly on the n}etropolitan police force munist North Vietnam was 20 percent THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT
of Saigon and on the thousands of opium lower than in 1960. KNOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM
dens and houses of prostitution and And I also consider it important to it has been stated by the senior Sena-
gambling that flourished there, understand the significance of the fact tor from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by
So powerful was, the Binh Xyuen and that the Vietcong insurgency was di- other critics of our foreign policy in Viet-
so weak were the. Diem. forces at the rected not against a government that nam that it is pointless to talk about
time that even the American Ambassa- had failed to improve the lot of its peo- fighting for freedom In Asia because the
dor urged Diem not to attack them, ple but against a government which, Asian people historically do not know the
Diem, however, did attack them and over a short period of time, had scored meaning of freedom. It has even been
drove them our of Saigon, some of the most dramatic e
on
mi
i
l
c
c and
o
mp
ied that, becausef thi i
oergnorance
No. 35-a
ect
vization of the peasants resulted in
row in the sponge now and tell the
a dramatic reduction of food output and Communists the world is theirs for the
in chronic food shortages throughout taking.
the country. The resentment of the I find It difficult to conceive of Red
peasants was compounded by the brutal China sending in her armies in response
and indiscriminate punishment of hun- to air strikes against carefully selected
dreds of thousands of peasant farmers military targets. After all, if they did
who were hailed before so-called people's so, they would be risking retaliation
courts and charged with being bourgeois against their highly vulnerable coastal
elements or exploiting landlords. Dur- cities, where most of Red China's indus-
ing the course of 1955 peasant revolts try is concentrated. They would be risk-
broke out in several areas. There was ing setting back their economy 10 or 20
Seven a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own vil- years.
lage. And there was some evidence that Moreover, both the Chinese Commu-
the troops sent to suppress these revolts nists and the Hanoi Communists are
sometimes sympathized with the peas- aware that the ma
i
i
ss
ve
ntroduction of
ants. Shortages increased year by year. Chinese troops would create serious pop-
The people became increasingly apa- ular resentment because of the tradi-
thetic. tional Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese
The contrast between the growing imperialism.
prosperity of the South and the growing That there will be no invasion of the
misery in the North confronted the Viet- North by Vietnamese and American
namese Communists with a challenge forces can, I believe, be taken as axio-
they could not tolerate. That is why matic. Nor do I believe there will be any
they decided that they had to put an large-scale involvement of American
end to freedom in South Vietnam. troops on the Korean model. We will
While they have scored some sensational have to continue to provide the Viet-
victories in their war of subversion namese with logistical support and air
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
3274 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
of freedom and their indifference to it, southeast Asian peasant, his life is full that they resist it only halfheartedly.
communism exercises a genuine attrac- and he is prepared to fight to defend it some commentators have even sought to
tion for the peoples of Asia. against the Communists. create the impression that America is in
I am sure that most Asians would con- It is, in short, completely untrue that a position of coercing the South Viet-
sider this analysis condescending and the Vietnamese people and the other namese to fight against communism.
offensive. I myself would be disposed to peoples of Asia do not know the mean- This estimate of the attitude of the
agree with them. It is an analysis which, ing of freedom. And it is equally untrue South Vietnamese people is totally false.
in my opinion, is false on almost every that communism is acceptable to the True, Souh Vietnam is suffering from.
score. Asian peasant because of his indiffer- political instability.
We have grown accustomed to equat- ence to freedom. True, the war against the Vietcong is
ing freedom with the full range of free- Communism has never been freely ac- going badly.
doms that we in the United States today eepted by any people, anywhere, no mat- But these things by themselves do not
enjoy. But, in the world in which we ter how primitive. constitute proof that the Vietnamese
line, the word "freedom" has at least it has never been accepted for the people are indifferent to communism or
three separate and perhaps equally im- simple reason that even primitive peoples that they do not have the will to resist.
portant connotations. do not enjoy being pushed around and The people of South Vietnam are, in
First, there is national freedom, or in- brutalized and terrorized, and told what fact, one of the most anti-Communist
dependence from foreign control. to do and what not to do, and having peoples in the world. Among them are
Second, there is freedom of speech their every activity ordered and super- more than 1 million refugees who sacri-
and press and the other freedoms in- vised by political commissars. fired everything they possessed to flee
herent in parliamentary democracy, such This is why communism must govern from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
as we enjoy. by means of ruthless dictatorship wher. after the country was divided by the
And, third, there is the type of natural ever it takes power. Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is esti-
freedom that is enjoyed by primitive This is why the primitive mountain mated that there are another 300,000 in- -
peasants and tribesmen in many back- peoples of both Laos and Vietnam h a a mternal unil refugees controlled who have fled from south.
ward countries, even under political in an overwhelming majority,
autocracies. against the Communists. Among the present population of 14 mil-
It is true that most Asian governments This is why there are almost 8 mil- lion, in addition, there are several million
are autocratic; and it is. probably true lion refugees from Communist rule In peasants and workers and students who
that the Vietnamese people do not un- Asia today-people who have seen the have at one time or another borne arms
derstand or appreciate freedom in the reality of the so-called People's Democ- against the Communists, some of them
sense of parliamentary democracy. But racy, and who have given up everything in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in
they certainly understand the meaning they possessed and frequently risked village self-defense units.
of "freedom" when the word is used to their lives to escape from it. The overwhelming majority of the
mean independence from foreign rule. That is why there is barbed wire and people of South Vietnam have what corn-
They are, in fact, a people with a long iron curtains surrounding the Commu- coupl munie backs. have There ri-
and proud history and a strong sense of nist countries. The inhabitants of the enced it means indeed von their few own because
South batkcks TTher w re
national identity. Every Vietnamese Communist countries would all leave if do not have friends or relatives who have
schoolboy knows that his people fought they could,
and triumphed over the hordes of There is one final comment I would like been the victims of Communist brutality
Genghis Khan in defense of their free- to make while dealing with this sub- and terror.
dom and he also knows that his country Let me tell the story of one such act
was free for five centuries before the jest. Too often I have heard it said of Communist terror, because statistics
choose o fight- by themselves tend to be meaningless.
French occupation. Finally, he knows ing that the bthere here Vietnamese is people nothing t t are not
because
and takes pride in the fact that his peo- between communism and the kind of gov- In the village of Phu Hoa, there was a
pie drove out the French colonialists de- ernment they now have. teenage girl by the name of Giau, the
spite their army of 400,000 men. Do not To equate an authoritarian regime like pride of her parents and a born leader of
tell me that these people know nothing others. As a member of the Republican
about freedom. that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or youth Organization, she organized the
To the westernized Saigonese intellec- Thailand with the totalitarian rule of village youth and gave talks. On the
tuals, freedom of speech and freedom of communism is tantamount to losing all evening of January 15, 1962, she was ab-
the press are certainly very real issues; sense of proportion. Not only have these ducted from her village by Vietcong Bol-
and even though they may have not mas- regimes never been guilty of the massive diers. The next morning her mutilated
tered the processes, they would unques- bloodletting and total direction of per- and decapitated body-I have a photo-
tionably like to see some kind of parlia- sonal life which has characterized Com- graph of it-was discovered in the road-
mentary democracy in their country. It munist rule in every country, but, care- way outside the village with a note on
is completely understandable that they fully examined, it will turn out that these her breast captioned "Death Sentence
should have chafed over the political con- regimes are 3 mixture of natural democ- for Giau," and signed by the "People's
trols that existed under the Diem gov- racy at the bottom with political controls Front of Liberation."
ernment, and that have existed, in one of varying rigidity at the top. For a long period of time, assassina-
degree or another, under succeeding gov- Even at their worst, the political au- tions such as this were going on at the
ernments. tocracies that exist in certain free Asian rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a
But in the countryside, where the great countries are a thousand times better year. The victims were most frequently
mass of the people reside, the political than communism from the standpoint of active supporters of government, local
controls that exist in the city are mean- how they treat their own people. And administrators, village heads, and school-
ingless. The peasant is free to own his at their best, some of these autocracies teachers. The families of village mili-
own land, to dispose of his produce, to have combined control of the press and tiamen were another favorite target.
worship according to his beliefs, to guide political parties with remarkably pro- The Vietcong would entice the militia
the upbringing of his children, and to gressive social programs. away from the village-and when they
elect his local village officials. To him, But perhaps more important from our returned they would find their wives and
these freedoms that touch on his every- standpoint is that these free- autocracies, children massacred.
day life are the freedoms that really for lack of a better term, do not threaten While the facts of these mass assassi-
count, not the abstract and remote free- the peace of their neighbors or of the nations are not generally known in our
doms of constitutional and federal gov- world or threaten our own security, country,, they are known in Vietnam.
ernment. whereas world communism has now be- And this is one of the reasons why the
And, if on top of granting him these come a threat of terrifying dimensions. Vietnamese people hate the Communists,
natural freedoms, the government as- THE TALLACT THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE and why they continue to resist them
sists him by building schools and dis- HAVE'NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM despite the chronic political instability
pensaries and by providing seed and Per- We have been told that the Vietnamese in Saigon and despite the seeming hope-
tilizer, then, from the standpoint of the people are Indifferent to communism; lessness of their situation.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3271
I suggested to Senators that a train
wreck hadoccurred in which 100 persons
had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in
which 150 had lost their lives, or some
common disaster with hundreds or even
thousands of lives lost, we would react,
we would feel it. But If I suggested that
1 million murders had taken place, our
minds would not be able to grasp the
enormity of such a crime.
Perhaps that is just as well. There
must be built into our intellectual mech-
anism some kind of governor. Unfortu-
nately, while it is probably saving us from
insanity, the fact that our minds cannot
comprehend the murder of 1 million peo-
ple or 40 million people serves as a pro-
tective asset to the perpetrator of such an
evil deed. It does not make the crime
any less horrible. It simply makes our
task that much more difficult.
Even after Khrushchev's denunciation
of Stalin confirmed all the essential
charges that had been made against the
Soviet regime, men of good will in the
Western World refused to believe that
the Communist regime could be so evil.
They refused to believe, because it is dif-
ficult for them to conceive of horror and
brutality on such a mass scale.
To those who refuse to believe, I would
like to read the eloquent words penned by
Dr. Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish
leader in prewar Lithuania, one of the
scores of thousands of Lithuanians de-
ported to Soviet slave labor camps after
the Soviet occupation of his country.
When he was released after 7 years in
the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote:
Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a
position of benevolent neutrality toward the
U.S.S.R. * * * The last.7 years have made
me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet
system. I hate this system with all the
strength of my heart and all the power of
my mind. Everything I have seen there has
filled me with horror and disgust which will
last until the end of my days. I feel that
the struggle against this system of slavery,
terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there
constitutes the primary obligation of every
man in this world. Tolerance or support of
such an international shame is not permis-
sible for people who are on this side of the
Soviet border and who live under normal
conditions. * * *
Millions of men are perishing in the camps
of the Soviet Union. * * * Since they came
into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed
more people, have executed more victims,
than all the other camps-Hitler's in-
cluded-together; and this lethal engine con-
tinues to operate full blast.
And those who in reply only shrug their
shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with
vague and meaningless generalities, I con-
sider moral abetters and accomplices of ban-
ditry.
Let those who talk of getting out of
Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of
saving human lives weigh the words of
Dr. Julius Margolin-a man who, like
themselves, refused to believe that com-
munism could be so inhuman until he saw
its punitive machinery at work with his
awn eyes.
And if the administration should ever
succumb to, their pressure and negotiate
the surrender of Vietnam, and if the
Vietnamese Communists then embark on
the orgy of bloodletting which has always
accolnpanled the establishment of Com-
munist power, let those who are pressur-
ing for negotiations not be heard to say,
"but we didn't intend it this way." Be-
cause there is today no excuse for igno-
rance about communism,
(B) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITH-
DRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION
Our withdrawal from Vietnam would
immediately confront us with an agoniz-
ing choice.
If we decide to try to defend what is
left of southeast Asia against the advance
of communism, it will require far more
money, far more men, and far more.
American blood than we are today in-
vesting in the defense of Vietnam. What
is more, it would involve a far greater risk
of the major escalation which we seek
to avoid.
If, on the other hand, we decide to
abandon the whole of southeast Asia to
communism, as some of the proponents
of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it
would result in the early disintegration
of all our alliances, and in the total
eclipse of America as a great nation.
Because no nation can remain great when
its assurances are considered worthless
.even by its friends.
(C) MORE VIETNAMS
Whether we decide to abandon south-
east Asia or to try to draw another line
outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will
result in a dozen more Vietnams in dif-
ferent parts of the world. If we cannot
cope with this type of warfare in Viet-
nam, the Chinese Communists will be en-
couraged in the belief that we cannot
cope with it anywhere else
In the Congo, the Chinese Communists
have launched their first attempt at ap-
plying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa.
In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas,
after being decisively defeated in the
early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic
comeback. According to the New York
Times, the Huks are now active again in
considerable strength, control large areas
of central Luzon, and are assassinating
scores of village heads and local admin-
istrators on the Vietcong pattern.
In Thailand, Red China has already
announced the formation of a patriotic
front to overthrow the Government and
eradicate American influence. This al-
most certainly presages the early launch-
ing of a Thai Communist insurrection,
also patterned after the Vietcong.
An article in the Washington Post on
January 16, pointed out that the Vene-
zuelan Communists now have 5,000 men
under arms in the cities and in the
countryside, and that the Venezuelan
Communist Party is openly committed to
"the strategy of a long war, as developed
in China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam."
And there are at least half a dozen
other Latin American countries where
the Communists are fielding guerrilla
forces, which may be small today, but
which would be encouraged by a Com-
munistvictory in Vietnam to believe that
the West has no defense against the
long war.
It is interesting to note in this con-
nection that, according to Cuban re-
ports, a Vietcong delegation which
came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mu-
tual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guer-
rilla forces. In ac]dtion, Marguerite
Higgins, the distinguished correspondent
for the Washington Star and other
papers, points out that Vietcong experts
have teamed up with experts from Com-
munist China and the Soviet Union in
training Latin Americans for guerrilla
operations in the several schools main-
tained by Fidel Castro.
(D) WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE?
It has been suggested that if we aban-
don southeast Asia, our seapower would
make it possible for us to fall back on
Japan and the Philippines and the oth-
er Pacific islands, and constitute a more
realistic defense line there. This is non-
sense. American seapower and.Ameri-
can nuclear power have thus far proved
impotent to cope with Communist politi-
cal warfare. Cuba is the best proof of
this.
If we abandon southeast Asia, the
Philippines may prove impossible to
hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk
insurgency.
Japan, even if it remains non-Commu-
nist, would probably, by force of circum-
stances, be compelled to come to terms
with Red China, adding the enormous
strength of its economy to Communist
strategic resources.
Okinawa, where our political position
is already difficult, would become politi-
cally impossible to hold.
If we ~ fail to draw the line in Viet-
nam, in short, we may find ourselves
compelled to draw a defense line as far
back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii
as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacific.
(E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE
To all those who agree that we must
carefully weigh the consequences of
withdrawal before we commit ourselves
to withdrawal, I would refer the recent
words of the well-known Filipino politi-
cal commentator, Vincente Villamin.
The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr.
Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish
on America's honor. It would reduce
America in the estimation of mankind
to a dismal third-rate power, despite her
wealth, her culture and her nuclear ar-
senal. It would make every American
ashamed of his Government and would
make every individual American dis-
trusted everywhere on earth."
This is strong language. But from
conversations with a number of Asians, I
know that it is an attitude shared by
many of our best friends in Asia.
VIETNAM AND MUNICH
The situation in Vietnam today bears
many resemblances to the situation just
before Munich.
Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill
wanted peace.
Churchill said that if the free world
failed to draw the line against Hitler at
an early stage, it would be compelled to
draw the line under much more difficult
circumstances at a later date.
Chamberlain held that a confronta-
tion with Hitler might result in war, and
that the interests of peace demanded
some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslo-
vakia, he said, was a faraway land about
which we knew very little.
Chamberlain held that a durable
agreement could be negotiated with Hit-
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23.
ler that would guarantee "peace in our
time."
How I remember those words.
Churchill held that the appeasement
of a compulsive aggressor simply whet-
ted his a{ petite for further expansion
and made war more likely.
Chamberlain's policy won out, because
nobody wanted war. When he came back
from Munich, he was hailed not only by
the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the
Labor Party people, including leftwing-
ers like James Maxton and Fenner
Brockway.
Churchill remained a voice crying in
the wilderness.
But who was right-Churchill or
Chamberlain?
Who was the true man of peace?
In Vietnam today, we are again deal-
inl; with a faraway land, about which
we know very little.
In Vietnam today, we are again con-
fronted by an incorrigible aggressor,
fanatically committed to the destruc-
tion of the free world, whose agree-
ments are as worthless as Hitler's. In-
deed, even while the Communist propa-
ganda apparatus is pulling out all the
stops to pressure us into a diplomatic
surrender in Vietnam, the Chinese Com-
munists are openly encouraging a new
Huk insurgency in the Philippines and
have taken the first step in opening a
Vietcong type insurgency in Thailand
through the creation of their quisling
Thai patriotic front.
In signing the Munich agreement, it
was not Chamberlain's intention to sur-
render the whole of Czechoslovakia to
Hitler. The agreement was limited to
the transfer of the German-speaking
Sudetenland to German sovereignty.
And no one was more indignant than
Chamberlain when Hitler, having de-
prived Czechoslovakia of her mountain
defenses, proceeded to take over the
entire country.
While there are some proponents of
a diplomatic solution who are willing
to face up to the fact that negotiations
at this juncture mean surrender, there
are others who apparently quite hon-
estly believe that we can arrive at a
settlement that will both end the war
and preserve the freedom of the South
Vietnamese people. If such negotia-
tions should ever come to pass, I am
certain that the story of Czechoslovakia
would be repeated. Having deprived
South Vietnam of the political and mil-
itary capability to resist, the North Viet-
namese Communists would not tarry
long before they completely communized
the country.
And, before very long, those who urge
a diplomatic solution for the sake of
preventing war, may find themselves
compelled to fight the very war that
they were seeking to avoid, on a bigger
and bloodier scale, and from a much
more difficult line of defense.
I take Itfor granted that no one in
this Chamber and no loyal American
citizen believes that we should stand by
indifferently while communism takes
over the rest of the world.
I take it for granted that every in-
telligent person realizes that America
could not long survive as a free nation
I take it for granted that everyone
agrees that somewhere, somehow, we
must drRw the line against further
Communist expansion.
The question that separates us, there-
fore, is not whether such a line should
be drawn, but where such a line should
be drawn.
I believe that we have been right in
drawing the line in Vietnam and that
President Johnson is right in trying to
hold the line in Vietnam, despite the
setbacks we have suffered over the past
year. Because, if this line falls, let us
have no illusions about the difficulty of
drawing a realistic line of defense any-
where in the western Pacific.
NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION
We have been told in many statements
and articles that the only alternative to
withdrawal from Vietnam, with or with-
out negotiations, is a dramatic escala-
tion of the war against the North. And
we have been warned that such an esca-
lation might bring in both Red China
and the Soviet Union and might bring
about the thermonuclear holocaust that
no one wants.
These are supposed to be the choices
before. us.
It is my belief, however, that the tide
of war in Vietnam can be reversed and
that this war can ultimately be won
without an invasion of the North and
without a significant intensification of
our military effort. It is my belief that
there are many measures we can take,
primarily in the nonmilitary, field, to
strengthen our posture and the posture
of South Vietnamese forces in the fight
against the Vietcong insurgency.
Before outlining some of the measures
which I believe can and must be taken,
I wish to deal with a number of widely
accepted fallacies and misconceptions
about the situation in Vietnam, because
one cannot intelligently approach the
problem -of what to do about Vietnam
without first establishing the essential
facts about the present situation in that
country.
THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A
CIVIL WAR
The belief that the Vietnamese war is
a civil war is one of the most widespread
misconceptions about Vietnam. This is
frequently associated with the charge
that it is the United States, and not
North Vietnam or Red China, which is
inteyvening in South Vietnam.
The war in South Vietnam is not a
civil war. It was instigated in the first
place by the North Vietnamese Commu-
nists, with the material and moral sup-
port of both Peiping and Moscow. There
is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has
provided the leadership for the Vietcong
insurrection, that it has supplied them
massively, and that it has served as the
real command headquarters for the Viet-
cong. -
The present insurrection in South
Vietnam goes back to the third Commu-
nist Party Congress in Hanoi in Septem-
ber of 1960. At this Congress it was
decided "to liberate South Vietnam from
the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists
and their henchmen in order to achieve
national unity and complete independ-
ence." The Congress also called for the
creation of a broad national front in
South Vietnam directed against the
United States-Diem clique. Several
months later the formation of the front
for the liberation of the south was an-
nounced.
I understand that there Is an official
report, according to which, the U.S. mili-
tary assistants command in Vietnam is
in possession of reliable evidence indi-
cating that probably as many as 34,000
Vietcong infiltratorshave entered South
Vietnam from the north between Jan-
uary 1959 and August 1964.
The report indicates that the majority
of hard-core Vietcong officers and the
bulk of specialized personnel such as
communications and heavy weapons spe-
cialists have been provided through in-
filtration. Infiltrators, moreover, appar-
ently make up the major part of Vietcong
regulars in the northern half of South
Vietnam.
The infiltration from the north sup-
plies the Vietcong with much of its
leadership, specialist personnel, key sup-
plies such as heavy ordnance and com-
munications equipment, and, in some
cases, elite troops.
This information is derived from the
interrogation of many thousands of Viet-
cong captives and defectors and from
captured documents.
It is this hard core that has come
down from the north that has provided
the leadership cadres In all major in-
surgent actions, including the series of
sensational attacks on American Instal-
lations.
The scale on which Hanoi has been
supplying the Vietcong insurgency was
dramatically illustrated this weekend
when an attack by an American helicop-
ter on a ship off the coast of South Viet-
nam resulted in the discovery of an enor-
mous arms cache-almost enough, in the
words of one American officer, to equip
an entire division. The haul included a
thousand Russian-made carbines, hun-
dreds of Russian submachine guns, and
light machine guns, and Chinese burp
guns, and scores of tons of ammunition.
There were also a variety of sophisticated
land mines and ammunition for a new
type of rocket launcher used against
tanks. A Communist guerrilla who was
captured In the action said that the ship
which delivered the weapons had made
six trips to bases along the South Viet-
namcoast, dropping off supplies.
Finally, we would do well to consider
the fact that the general offensive
launched by the Communist forces in
Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an
open call by Hanoi radio for assaults
throughout the country on Vietnamese
and American positions.
The public confusion on the nature of
the Vietnamese war stems in large meas-
ure from the sabotage of the Communist
member of the three-man International
Control Commission set up to supervise
the carrying out of the Geneva agree-
ment. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive
incidents of Communist agents, ranging
from one-man assassinations to large-
scale military actions, had been pre-
sented to the Commission. The Commis-
sion, however, took no action because the
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 vvi~vi~iiJJ1V1~1-IL LU 01 lJ - SENATE 3269
A debate has been joined which is Mao Tse-tung remained confident that, ence and freedom of 240 million people
worthy of the best traditions of the if he persevered, ultimately his enemies in southeast Asia and the future of free-
Senate. would crack and he would emerge as dam throughout the western Pacific.
I hope that the remarks I make today China's undisputed ruler. These are the reasons why we are in
will contribute at least in some measure, There is no more cruel test of courage Vietnam. There is nothing new about
to the further unfolding of this debate. and staying power than "the long war" them and nothing very complex. They
Out of this debate, let us hope, will ulti- as it is waged by the Communists. Five have never been obscure. They have
mately emerge the kind of assistance and years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing never been concealed. I cannot, for the
guidance that every President must have to them. And if they detect any sign life of me, see why people fail to under-
In dealing with vital issues of our for- that those opposed to them are flagging, stand them.
eign policy. that their patience is growing thin or IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OP A NEGOTIATED
What we say here may help to guide that their will to resist has weakened, the SETTLEMENT?
the President. But in the final analysis Communists can be relied upon to re- The senior Senator from Idaho, and
the terrible responsibility of decision is double their efforts, in the belief that vie- several other Senators who spoke last
his and his alone. He must listen to the tory is within their grasp.
exchanges which take place in this I disagree strongly with my colleagues Wednesday, repeated the proposal that
Chamber. He must endure a hundred who have spoken up to urge negotiations. pose should
of ould miseek atingiatthe ions bloodshed puin
conflicting pressures from public sources, But if there is any way in which my Vietnam ten of avoiding din enlarge-
seeking to push him in this direction voice could reach to Peiping and to Mos- Vie he r aWire an by some
or. that. He must also endure the im- cow, I would warn the Communist lead- People inept of th that the ego. We are eoth by way f
patience of those who demand answers ers that they should not construe the plo negotiations
if ns reject the way of
to complex questions today, and who debate that is now taking place in diplomacy and that if we reject jectiag
now, we are in effect rejecting
accuse him of not having made the Chamber as a sign of weakness it is, diplomacy.
American position clear when he has in on the contrary, a testimony to our diplomacy.
fact made our position abundantly clear strength. The proposal that we negotiate now
on repeated occasions. Nor should they believe that those who overlooks the fact that there does exist
And finally, when all the voices have speak up in favor of negotiations are the a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, ap-
been heard, when he has examined all forerunners of a larger host of Ameri- Conference ethe participants of the Geneva
the facts, when he has discussed all as- cans who are prepared to accept sur- o this g e4. The final think tion poets of the situation with his most render. Because there is no one here it is w this agreement or t I think
trusted advisers, the President must alone who believes in surrender or believes in it worth while reading it for the REC-
decide-for all Americans and for the capitulation. i believe the senior Sena- oaD and for our own recollection:
entire free world-what to do about tor from Idaho made this abundantly Each member ? * undertakes to respect
Vietnam. clear in his own presentation, in which the sovereignty, the Independence, the unity,
No President has ever inherited a more he underscored his complete support for and the territorial integrity of the above-from difficult situation on coming to office, the retaliatory air strikes against North nterferences ntetheirdinternalaaffairs. any
No President has ever been called upon Vietnam.
to make a decision of greater moment. WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM? Since there is no point to negotiating
At stake may be the survival of freedom. I have been amazed by a number of if it simply means reiterating the Gene-agreement, I
cannot help wondering
At stake may be the peace of the world. letters I have received asking the ques- whether those who urge negotiations en-
I believe the United States can count tion, "Why are we in Vietnam?" or visage rewriting the agreement so that
itself fortunate that it has found a Presi- <
dent of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have it does not "guarantee the territorial in-
to meet this crisis in its history. I also que qes stions even more t amazed me o met by have the same tegrity of the above-mentioned states."
believe that, whatever differences we in u put b sophisticated
this Chamber may have on the question members of the press. The history of negotiated agreements
of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are To me the reasons for our presence in with the Communists underscores the
with th fact that their promises are worthless
the President el the ordeal of deci- Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find
with through which he is now passing. it difficult to comprehend the confusion and that only those agreements have
I have ugh that I have been dismayed which now appears to exist on this sub- validity which are self-enforcing or said by the rising clamor for a negotiaited ject. which we have the power to enforce. A
settlement. In the yp of wag whch We are in Vietnam because our own report issued by the Senate Subcommit-
tee
the Communists are now waging against security and the security of the entire have on the Intnor t s e ve- et e-on which I
the Communists although now wags who urge free world demands that a firm line be have
t Union h has since i n es that
us, I that, tho the first urge drawn against the further advance of the Soviet Union has since Ire tiesptind
negotiation
ne gotfe fear
be e among mong the
at- Communist imperialism-in Asia, in agree violated more than 1,000 treaties
may outright would ould not be capitulation,
tpos an
s have and
ued in this way Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe. agreements. The Communists have re-
by the Communists.. We are in Vietnam because it is our rean armistice, t violated of the Geneva agreement
The Vietnamese war, in the Commu- national interest to assist every nation, on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armis-
nist lexicon, is described as. a "war of large and small, which is seeking to de- tice.
national liberation." Its strategy is fend itself against Communist subver-
based on the concept of what the Com- sion, infiltration, and aggression. There Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator
[Mr
munists call "the long This Is nothing new about this policy; it is a end. from He Idehohad
hd h. o ped to pep to CHURCH] would here. peie s
o
s
egy is premised upon the belief that the policy, in fact, to which every admin- tied on another matter, but hopes s to
free world lacks the patience, the istration has adhered since the procla-
stamina, the fanatical determination to motion of the Truman doctrine. get here later.
persist, which inspires the adherents of We are in Vietnam because our as_ the The tiantar from Idaho has held of
communism. It is based on the convic- sistance was invited by the legitimate a rational agreement as an example of
tion that if the Communists keep on at- government of that country, a ratonal agreement our Cts, He nists tacking and attacking and attacking in We are in Vietnam because, as the dis- could that has served our interests. He
any given situation, they will ultimately tinguished majority leader, the Senator illustration for. his ar gument picked a worse
be able to destroy the morale and the will from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], pointed I can think of no more dramatic proof
to resist of those who oppose them in the out in his 1963 report, Chinese Comrnu- than the Laotian armistice that agree-
name of freedom. Dist hostility to the United States gents with the Communists are worth-
China affords the classic example of threatens "the whole structure of our less, and that every time we try to escape
the long war. It took 20 years for Mao own security in the Pacific." from today's unpleasantness by entering
Tse-tung to prevail. There were several We are in Vietnam not merely to help into a new covenant with an implacable
times during this period when his entire the 14 million South Vietnamese defend aggressor, we are always confronted on
movement seemed on the verge of col- themselves against communism, but be- the morrow by unpleasantness com-
lapse. But, even In his blackest days, cause what is at stake is the independ- pounded 10 times over.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
3270
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
I traveled through southeast Asia just
before the conclusion of the Laotian
armistice.
I talked to many people at that time.
It is true that the armistice was favored
by our Ambassador in Laos, and it ob-
viously must have had the support of
important members of the State Depart-
ment hierarchy. But the personnel of
our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok
did not conceal from me their grave ap-
prehensions over the consequences of
such an armistice for Vietnam and
southeast Asia.
All of this I reported on confidentially
upon my return.
At that time, the Saigon government
still controlled the situation throughout
most of the countryside, although the
15,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it
increasing difficulty. Our Embassy per-
sonnel in Saigon expressed the fear that
the conclusion of the Laotian armistice
would enable the Communists to infil-
trate men and material on a much larger
scale and would result at an early date
in a marked intensification of the Viet-
cong insurgency. Needless to say, the
apprehensions which they expressed to
me have been completely borne out by
subsequent developments.
The Laotian armistice has served Laos
itself as poorly-?6s it has served the cause
of freedom in Vietnam. The Commu-
nists have continued to nibble away at
what is left of free Laos, in one aggres-
sive act after another, so that by now
they firmly control more than half the
country, while their infiltress and guer-
rillas are gnawing relentlessly at govern-
ment authority in the rest of the
country.
In mid-1964, I asked the Library of
Congress to prepare for me a study of
Communist violations of the Laotian
armistice agreement. The study which
they submitted to me listed 14 specific
violations up until that time.
That was last year. There have been
many more since then.
Mr. President, I plan to insert into the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks
a copy of the survey of Communist vio-
lations of the Laotian armistice prepared
for me by the Library of Congress. I
earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho
will take the time to study this before
he once again holds up the Loatian armi-
stice as a model for Vietnam.
I should also like to quote from a
statement made on March 30, 1963, by
Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military
commander who, as is common knowl-
edge, had favored the conclusion of the
Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement
is significant because it illustrates how
Communists will deal tomorrow with
non-Communist elements that they are
prepared to accept into coalition gov-
ernments today.
Referring to certain Communist
stooges, Gen. Itong Le said:
bespite their continual defeats, however,
these people learned their lessons from their
Communist bosses. * * * When the Prime
Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to
destroy the neutralist forces. They used
tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to
overthrow Colonel Ketsana. When these did
not succeed, on February 12 they used an as-
sassin to murder Ketsana. They also savage-
ly killed or arrested all neutralist party
members, and their bloody hands caused the
death of many people.
This was the statement of Gen.
Kong Le, one of those who had pressed
the hardest for the Laotian armistice
when he saw what the armistice did to
his country.
Finally, I do not believe that the Lao-
tian armistice has served the Interests
of the other peoples of southeast Asia.
I have in my possession a map of north-
ern Laos showing areas where the Chi-
nese Communists have been building
roads that would give China direct ac-
cess to the borders of Burma and Thai-
land. The construction of these roads
bodes ill for the future peace of south-
east Asia. That they are intended for
future military use is taken for granted
by everyone in the area.
So much for the example of the Lao-
tian armistice.
All this does not mean to say that we
must not under any circumstances enter
into negotiations with the Communists.
I do not suggest that at all. It simply
means that when we do so, we must do
so with our eyes open and with a clear
understanding of the ingredients re-
quired to enforce compliance with the
agreement about to be entered into.
That is all I have ever urged.
Moreover, there is a time to negotiate
and a time not to negotiate.
The demand that we negotiate now
over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill
to negotiate with the Germans at the
time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to
negotiate with the Communists when
we stood with our backs to the sea in the
Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either
case, the free world could have negoti-
ated nothing but total capitulation.
The situation in Vietnam is probably
not as desperate and certainly no more
desperate, than Britain's plight at the
time of Dunkirk or our own plight at
the time of Pusan. If we are of good
heart, if we refuse to listen to the coun-
sels of despair, if we again resolve that
"we will never give in"-as Churchill
put it-there Is every reason to be con-
fident that a time will arrive when we
can negotiate with honor and for a more
acceptable objective than a diplomatic
surrender.
There are those who say that the
whole of southeast Asia will, whether
we like it or not, go Communist. These
people are at least consistent in urging
negotiations now. But anyone who be-
lieves that we can negotiate now and
not lose Vietnam to communism is de-
luding himself in the worst possible way.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN VIETNAM
it is human to oppose the cost of stay-
ing on in Vietnam when American boys
are dying in a faraway land about
which we understand very little. I am
conscious of this. I am sensitive to it.
I share the troubled minds of all Sena-
tors. But I am convinced that the great
majority of those who advocate that we
abandon Vietnam` to communism, either
by pulling out or by "negotiating" a set-
tlement, have not taken the time to
weigh the consequences of defeat.
In my opinion, the consequences of an
American defeat in Vietnam would be
February 23
so catastrophic that we simply cannot
permit ourselves to think of it. This is
truly an "unthinkable thought," to use
an expression coined by the Senator
from Arkansas. He was not applying it
to this problem, I point out, but I find
the words particularly apt in reference
to Vietnam.
GENOCIDE
For the Vietnamese people, the first
consequence would be a bloodletting on
a genocidal scale.
In the Soviet Union and in Red China,
tens of millions of "class enemies" were
eliminated by the victorious Communists.
While it is true that there are some
slightly more moderate Communist re-
gimes in certain countries, Vietnamese
communism Is characterized by utter
disregard for human life of Stalinism
and Maoism. What will happen to the
more than 1-million refugees from North
Vietnam? What will happen to the mil-
lions of peasants who resisted or bore
arms against the Vietcong. I shudder
to think of it. The massacre of inno-
cents in Vietnam will be repeated in every
southeast Asian country that falls to
communism in its wake, in a gigantic
bloodletting that will dwarf the agony
and suffering of the war in Vietnam.
Those who urge our withdrawal from
Vietnam in the name of saving human
lives have the duty to consider the rec-
ord of Communist terror in every country
that has fallen under the sway of this
merciless ideology, with its total disre-
gard for human life.
The total number of victims of commu-
nism will probably never be known. Stu-
dents who - have followed the Chinese
Communist press closely claim that it can
be demonstrated that Chinese commu-
nism has cost the lives of at least 25
million and more, probably 50 million
people, while students of Soviet commu-
nism put the overall figure for the So-
viet Union at approximately the same
level. They point out that, entirely
apart from the purges and mass killings,
at periodic intervals and the forced star-
vation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers,
the reported death rate In the Soviet
forced labor camps ran approximately
25 percent per annum In bad years, and
15 to 20 percent in good years. If one
accepts the average population of the
slave labor camps as 10 million over the
20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule,
this would mean that approximately 2
million slave laborers died annually in
Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20-
year period.
According to the Polish Government
in exile, in London, the Soviets deported
11/2 million Poles to Siberia after they
had occupied eastern Poland in the wake
of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approxi-
mately 150,000 were returned through
Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Rus-
sia. Another 300,000 drifted back after
the war. More than i million never
came back. Such was the mortality in
the Soviet slave labor camps.
All of this seems incredible to the
Western mind.
I remember, when I was in Nurembur,
that when I first read the terrible sta-
tistics about the mass killings by the
Nazis, I could not comprehend them. If
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 14165
Approved For Release 2003110/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 3267
The greatest problem, as I have indicated
before, of morale, is lack of mail,, or letters
that come,. reading of depression, despond-
ency, of problems or difficulties in the home
that tend to lower .morale more than any
other factor. Then, too, especially I would
say a Word as chaplain here: I have seen
many men-friends of mine that I closely
felt a deep affection for-I have, seen them
go down; I have conducted, memorial services
for them,, Many times a question comes, "Is
this vain or is this, waste?". , I have over
and over evidence, that relatives often write
and wonder if .this isn't a ridiculous world
we're In.
And I would say to you at home, as I have
said to.our .men here, and as I believe they
feel deeply, the men who have given their
lives here have not given their lives in vain.
The real price of life is always the price death
to fine dedication.
Our nation was built by men who loved
their, principles-the truth for which they
lived by much more than they loved life it-
self, Our nation was built and shall only
exist by our standing for the truth that we
hold dear, and as we are here in this land,
we are not only working and laboring and
dying here for Vietnam but for America, for
the world.
bur world is a very small tiny village to-
day, and we cannot have our neighborhood
wars. We can only have a peace that can
be a peace for all of us. I would say, let us
dedicate ourselves, and you, to the task of
liberty, and freedom, and human dignity for
all people, and let us be proud of the men
here, whether they are special forces out in
the field; whether they be pilots-navigators
in the sky; whoever, they might be.
Most will come home-some will not-but
let us be proud of them and let us remember
them and dedicate ourselves to this task of
The 1'I ESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
INCREASE OF FUND FQR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
The PRESIDING OFFICER., Without
objection, the Chair lays before the Sen-
ate the unfinished business, which is S.
805.
The-Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 8.05) to amend tlie.Inter-
American Development Bank Act to au-
thorize the United States to participate
in an increase in the resources of the
ISOLATIONISM
THE NEW ISOLATIONISM
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there has
been developing in this country in recent
years a brand of thinking about foreign
affairs which, I believe, can aptly be de-
scribed as "the new. isolationism," This
internal phenomenon is, in my opinion,
potentially more-?disastrous in terms of
its consequence than the major external
problems that confront us.
.Its.background is a,growing national
weariness with cold war burdens we have
been so long carrying, a rising frustra-
tion with situations that are going
against us in many places, a long-sim-
mering indignation over thg fact that our
generosity and sacrifice have too often
been met abroad, not just with indiffer-
ence and ingratitude, but even with hos-
tility and contempt.
Its political base seems to be to the left
of center, although it forms as yet a dis-
tinct minority there.
Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure-
all is "neutralization."
Its prophets include some of my col-
leagues in the Congress, influential
spokesmen in the press, and leading fig-
ures in the academic world. Some are
new volunteers in this cause of retrench-
ment; they regard themselves as prag-
matists. Others are old hands at Polly-
anna-ism, those unshakable romantics
who were disillusioned by Moscow at the
time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillu-
sioned by Mao when they discovered that
he was not really an agrarian reformer,
disillusioned by Castro when they learned
that he was not a cross between Thomas
Jefferson and Robin Hood-and who,
having again dusted themselves off, now
look for new vistas of adventure.
If I may digress, let me say that I have
always admired their durability. The
manner in which they have survived, un-
chastened, a whole series of intellectual
Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to
man's invincible confidence in himself;
and their adeptness in avoiding discredi-
tation, in the face of repeated catas-
trophes and evacuations, must be ac-
knowledged as one of the marvels of
modern history-a triumph of self -recti-
tude over reason.
The basic premise of the new isola-
tionism is that. the United States is over-
extended in itsattei ptto resist Com-
munist aggression around the world,
overcommitted to the defense.of distant
outposts, and overinvolved in the murky
and unintelligible affairs of remote areas.
The corollaries of the new isolationism
are many. It is contended that we
should deemphasize the cold war, and
reverse our national priorities in favor of
domestic improvements; that we should
withdraw from South Vietnam; that we
should cease involvement in the, Congo;
that we should, relax the so-called .ri-
gidity of our Berlin policy; that for-
eign aid has outlived its usefulness
and should be severely cut back;
that our Military Establishment and our
CIA, organizations that seem particu-
larly suspect because they are symbols of
worldwide involvement, should be hum-
bled and "cut down to size" and stripped
of their influence in foreign policy
questions.
In my judgment all of these proposi-
t.lons have one thing in common. Each
of them would strike at the heart of our
national effort to preserve our freedom
and our security; and collectively they
add up to a policy which I can describe
by no other name than "appeasement,"
subtle appeasement, unintentional ap-
peasement, to be sure, but appeasement
nonetheless.
My purpose, this afternoon then, is to
oppose these propositions and to enlist
Senators' opposition against them-for
the new isolationism is as bankrupt as
the old.
First of.all-totc -the main-preen-
ise-I reject the assumption that the
United States is overextended, or over-
committed, or overinvolved.
We are enjoying a spectacular growth
in every index of national strength.
Our population, our wealth, our indus-
trial capacity, our scientific potential,
our agricultural output, all are enjoying
great upward surges. We were informed
that our gross national product was
again up in January, and the trend seems
ever upward.
Far from overextending ourselves in
the cold war, we are actually in a period
of declining defense budgets, of steadily
lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced
foreign aid, of one tax cut after another.
Let me emphasize this: In every basic
resource, we have greater capacity today
than during the past 5 years; by every
military or economic standard, we are
stronger; and by every physical measure-
ment, the percentage of our resources
going into the cold war is lower. Why
then should we talk of weariness or over-
commitment?
We are not even straining ourselves.
We are actually pursuing today a policy
not only of both guns and butter, but of
less guns and more butter.
So far as our resources go, we are
Capable of indefinite continuation and
even intensification of our present ef-
forts, if need be. It is only our mental,
and perhaps our moral, resources which
seem to be feeling the strain.
We would, of course, prefer to live in a
world in which it were possible for us to
have no commitments, a world in which
we could devote all of our energies to
the task of perfecting our society at
home and enriching the lives of our peo-
ple.
But we must face the world as it is.
And the basic fact of our world is that
Western civilization, itself terribly rent
and divided, both politically and philo-
sophically, has been forced into a twi-
light war of survival by a relentless and
remorseless enemy.
It is incontestable, in terms of peoples
enslaved and nations gobbled up over
the past 20 years, that we have not been
holding our own. And each year, the
world Communist movement is com-
mitting more and more of its resources
to the task of subjugating our allies, all
around the perimeter of freedom.
Against this background it is prepos-
terous to maintain that we should reduce
our effort and lessen our commitment to
the great struggle of our century.
Yet, according to Time magazine, it
is the widespread sentiment of the aca-
demic world that we have overreached
ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter
Lippmann, the well-known columnist,
for whom I have great respect, says that
"the American tide will have to recede."
It has been argued that we would be in
a "precarious situation" if we were at-
tacked on several fronts. Of course we
would, but does anyone believe that we
can -solve the problem by abandoning
our. commitments and defensive alli-
ances? Would the loss of these coun-
tries be any the less disastrous because
they were given up undefended?
.On the contrary, if we are not strong
enough to honor our commitments to-
day, then we should solve the problem,
Approved For Release 2003/10/1? : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3268
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 -
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 2.3
not be reducing our commitments, but
by becoming stronger, and by aiding our
allies to become stronger.
The defense of the free world rests on
a very delicate balance. The key ele-
ments in that balance are American
power and American determination. If
we lack the power to maintain that bal-
ance then certainly all is lost. If we
reveal that we lack the determination, if
we, for Instance, allow ourselves to be
pushed out of Vietnam, such a humilia-
tion may indeed be the second shot heard
around the world; and a dozen nations
might soon throw in the sponge and
make whatever accommodation they
could with an enemy that would then
seem assured of victory.
Fortunately, at the present time we do
not lack the power to carry on the de-
fense of freedom. Our power is at its
peak and we have the capacity to in-
crease it vastly if necessary. It is our
spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up.
Four years ago, after a visit to south-
east Asia, I said on the floor of the
Senate:
If the United States, with its unrivaled
might, with its unparalleled wealth, with its
dominion over sea and air, with its heritage
as the champion of freedom-if this United
States and its free-world allies have so di-
minished In spirit that they can be laid in
the dust by a few thousand primitive guer-
rillas, then we are far down the road from
which there is no return.
In right and in might, we are able to work
our will on this question. Southeast Asia
cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost;
it cannot be saved unless we will it to be
saved.
This problem, seemingly so remote and
distant, will in fact be resolved here in the
United States, in the Congress, in the ad-
ministration, and in the minds and hearts
of the American people.
The passage of 4 years has not dimin-
ished my belief in this course.
If the main premise of the new isola-
tionism is erroneous, then surely the
lesser premises are fraught with terrible
danger.
It is argued that we should de-
emphasize the cold war and turn more
of our resources to domestic welfare.
The annual congressional revolt
against the foreign aid bill grows more
violent and successful .each year, and the
' administration, forced to yield, now
sends foreign aid requests 40 percent
below what it solemnly declared 2 years
ago to be the minimum figure tolerable
for free world survival.
And a small but growing band of
Senators have begun offering each year
amendments making across-the-board
percentage cuts in our defense budget,
cuts not directed to any specific econ-
omy, but rather to a principle-the prin-
ciple that we should be spending less on
defense and more on welfare.
Here, in my judgment, are sure-
fire formulas for defeat.
Where are the victories in the cold
war that would justify such a reversal
of priorities? in what global trouble
spots are there lessened tensions or im-
proved postures that would make this
plausible? I can see a lot of cold war
areas where things are looking worse-
but very few where things are getting
better.
. More effort, more sacrifice-not less-
is the need of our time. And I speak as
one who doesnot disparage the need or
the importance of domestic improve-
ments. As a credential of this I recom-
mend to Senators my scorecard, com-
piled last year by the ultraconservative
Americans for Constitutional Action,
which asserts that I voted right only 13
percent of the time-one of the worst
records, alas, In the Congress.
But I say to you that if our foreign
affairs are going badly, no aspect of
Internal welfare is secure or stable. And
if we cope successfully with the great
problem, the cold war, no internal prob-
lem can long defy solution.
Our first national priority is and must
ever be the survival of our country and
our freedom-and if the 20th century
has taught men anything, it is that sur-
vival and freedom cannot be purchased
on the cheap, in a discount store or a
bargain basement.
But our situation is such that we can
meet our needs both at home and
abroad-not as handsomely as we would
prefer, but well enough. This I take to
be the objective of the Johnson adminis-
tration. The war on poverty and the
struggle against tyranny can go hand in
hand, if our vision be broad.
Twenty-five years ago, our country,
comparatively new and untried among
the great nations of the earth, through
passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described
by Winston Churchill as "the most un-
sordid act of recorded history," em-
barked irrevocably upon the path that
has brought us to our present posture in
history. Through that act, we affirmed
the preservation and expansion of liber-
ty as our highest goal; we acknowledged
that freedom was insecure everywhere so
long as tyranny existed anywhere; and
we assumed the burden, and the glory,
of being the champion and defender of
man's highest aspirations.
Since that embattled hour, when the
light of freedom was but a flicker in the
dark, our journey across the pages of his-
tory has been fantastic and unprece-
dented : tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes
and naivities, but heroic in its innova-
tions and commitments, prodigious In its
energy and power, gigantic in its gen-
erosity and good will,, noble in its re-
straint and patience, and sublime in its
purpose and in its historic role.
We have not realized the high goals
we set for ourselves in World War II.
But we have preserved freedom and
national independence in more than half
the earth; we have prevented the nu-
clear holocaust; we have restored West-
ern Europe; we have helped friend and
foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and
stability; we have launched a world peace
organization and have kept it alive; we
have offered the hand of friendship and
help to the impoverished and backward
peoples of the world if they will but
take it.
It may be said of our country today,
as of no other in history, that wherever
people are willing to stand up in defense
of their liberty. Americans stand with
them.
We cannot know at this hour whether
our journey has just begun or is nearing
its climax; whether the task ahead is the
work of a generation, or of a century.
President Kennedy said, in his Inaugural
Address, that the conflict would not be
resolved in our lifetime.
The Chief of Staff of the Army recently
told the Congress that it might well take
10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam -
alone. And Vietnam is only one symp-
tom of the disease, the epidemic, we are
resisting.
Against this somber background, how
foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the
cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of
abandoning the Congo to Communist
Intrigue, of slashing the defense budget
by 10 percent, or of any of the other ir-
responsibilities of the new isolationism.
VIETNAM
It is against this background that I
take up today the question of Vietnam,
which has been the favorite target of
those who urge withdrawal and re-
trenchment.
Over the past several months, a num-
ber of my most respected colleagues have
taken the floor to urge that we get out of
Vietnam or that we enter into negotia-
tions over Vietnam.
The propriety of our presence in Viet-
nam and the validity of our position has
been challenged. It has even been sug-
gested that we are the real aggressors in
Vietnam. The war has been called "Mc-
Namara's War." It has been suggested
that we more or less ignore Asia and
Africa and concentrate on Europe and
the Americas.
I have listened with growing dismay
to these presentations-and with all the
more dismay because of the respect and
affection I have for the Senators who
made them.
If I have not risen to reply to my
colleagues before now, it was not be-
cause Vietnam was a new subject to me,
but because I felt that their arguments
required the most carefully considered
and most painstakingly prepared reply.
I had visited most of the countries
of southeast Asia In early 1961, and I
have spoken a number of times on the
floor of the Senate on the subject of
Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since
my return. I have endeavored to keep
up with the situation in that part of the
world as best one can do by reading
the press and official publications. But
I realized that there were important gaps
in my information because the press cov-
erage of Vietnam was, with a few out-
standing exceptions, weak and in some
cases completely misleading. I have,
therefore, sought to fill these gaps by
correspondence with friends in Vietnam,
both Vietnamese and American, and by
conversations with Americans who have
served in Vietnam in various capacities-
some of them for long periods of time.
The senior Senator from Wyoming
[Mr. MCGEE] and the senior Senator
from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] on the
one side, and the distinguished minority
leader, the junior Senator from Illinois
[Mr. Dn uSEN] and the senior Senator
from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL]
have already spoken eloquently on the
need for standing fast in Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1965. Approved For 1 : - 7B 0300170003-8
_6 4253
Improvement of classroom instruction. We believe it would weaken the exercise owned farms are the very backbone of rural
These devices and materials have been shown of local leadership and the functioning of America. They operate most of the land
to cur subcommittee in its hearings on the self-government in resource conservation and are the first custodians of most of our
Elementary and Secondary Education Im- and development. Further, the proposal water.
provement Act. creates the prospect that soil and water con- The proposal also invites serious questions
Of particular interest, I believe, will be servation district governing bodies may be about certain Commitments of the Secre-
the 45-minute presentation by a master asked to function as collection agents for tary of Agriculture. In long-term contracts
teacher working for the first time with a the Federal Government, with farmers and ranchers in special pro-
fifth-grade class from the District of Colum- If adopted, this proposal would, in our grams, such as the Great Plains conservation
bia school system using a variety of the new judgment, break faith with State and local program the pilot cropland conversion pro-
materials and equipment to strengthen the governments. State legislatures and county gram, the Secretary has contract commit-
e' fectiveness of his,own teaching. governments over a quarter of a century ments under long-term agreements to fur-
Cordially, have been steadily building up their finan- nish technical assistance for applying con-
WAYNE MORSE, cial contributions to the total soil and water servation practices set forth in the agreed
Chairman, Education Subcornmitee, conservation. effort on privately owned lands, plan of operations.
With the understanding that the local- Adoption of the Budget Bureau proposal
CONSERVATION RESOLUTIONS State-Federal team effort would be main- would jeopardize the morale of Soil Con-
LUTIONS tamed as a team effort for the universal servation Service employees. It would con-
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on good of the Nation and all its people. stitute a vote of diminishing belief in the
February 18 I called the attention of Adoption of the revolving fund proposal importance and purpose of the agency. The
would treat American landowners unfairly. Soil Conservation Service today is recognized
my colleagues to the fact that a conser- It would charge American landowners for as the finest scientific agency of its kind in
vation battle is underway in our land. technical assistance which the Federal Gov- the world for supplying technical assistance
The soil and water conservation dis- eynment now provides free of charge to the for complete natural resource planning and
tricts ,(Jfr.. America have organized a people of many foreign nations. development, acre by acre, farm by farm,
nationwide effort through their national Under this proposal, farmers would assume property by property on individual land-
association to counteract the adminis- still more of the town and city responsibility holdings, watersheds, and whole communi-
tration's proposal that Congress enact for soil and water conservation. Soil con- ties. This standard of excellence could be
servation, flood control, and water develop- lost.
legislation to authorize a, revolving fund ment contribute to the well-being of all the A revolving fund would increase total
through which soil conservation dis- people because they depend on our limited conservation costs. A collection system out-
tricte, farmers, ranchers, and other land- supplies of soil and water for their daily re- side the accepted tax collection structure
owners would pay the Federal Govern- quirements of food, water, and a productive would have to be devised. Thousands of
ment $20 million in 1966 to help finance countryside. farmers would need more financial assistance
a part of the cost of technical assistance We believe adoption of this proposal would to pay for technical aid-or else give up the
from the Soil Conservation. Service. severely retard water conservation and de- oportunity of taking part in soundly de-
velopment work in America. Problems of veloped conservation programs.
I announced then that I have joined water shortage, floods, pollution, and sedi- We believe future generations would suffer
the soil conservation districts in opposi- mentation must be met first within the con- most if the soil and water conservation effort
tion to the proposed revolving fund, fines of each local watershed. Water comes of the Nation is slowed down and dissipated.
because it would not be in the public from rain and snow which falls primarily on To recover from a slowdown begun in our
interest. Some of my colleagues have land surfaces. The farmers and ranchers time, another generation would be forced to
asked me for more details regarding this who control our farms, range, and woodlands take 11th-hour extreme actions which would
also are in a position to control the move- be costly in terms of money damaging in
proposition. ' ment and protect the quality of the water terms of our basic institutions, and nsatis-
Such details were set forth in resolu- falling on their lands. factory in terms of the resources themselves.
tions adopted by the National Associa- If adopted, the revolving fund proposal Further, we resist the prospect that the
tion of Soil, and Water Conservation would slow down the effort to reduce water leadership of the Nation in the 1960's should
Districts at their ,annual convention. In pollution. The conservation needs inventory be marked as the one which turned its back
Portland, Oreg., on February 9. I think of the Department of Agriculture showed that on the national soil conservation program so
my colleagues will find them of great erosion is still the dominant soil problem on constructively undertaken by Franklin D.
interest. I ask for unanimous consent two-thirds of the Nation's land area. Soil Roosevelt and the leaders of the 1930's,
eroded from watershed areas pollutes rivers For these several preceding reasons, the
to have the NACD resolutions printed and streams, and clogs harbors and bay areas National Association of Soil and Water Con-
at this point in the RECORD. with sediment, servation Districts will:
There being no objection, the resolu- Moreover, adoption of this proposal would I. Lead a nationwide effort, and assist the
tions were ordered to be printed in the slow down work that is contributing to the Nation's 3,000 local soil and water conserva-
RECORD, as follows: good appearance and beauty of the American tion districts, to defeat the proposed revoly-
RESOLUTION 1 countryside. Green valleys, clear waters, ing fund; and
contoured fields, well-managed forest, lush 2. Request the Administrator of the Soil
PROPOSED REVOLVING FUND pastures, and developed watersheds are basic Conservation Service to undertake promptly
The Bureau of the Budget has proposed to the beauty of the countryside. Gullied a nationwide study-district-by-district and
that Congress enact legislation to authorize fields and muddy streams detract from the State-by-State-to evaluate the impact of
a revolving fund through which soil conser- beauty of America as much as auto grave- the Budget Bureau proposal on the conser-
vation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other yards. vation and resource development work on
landowners would pay the Federal Govern- If this proposal were to be, adopted, we the privately owned lands of the Nation, and
merit a part of the cost of technical assist- believe It would act as a major drag on the the ensuing effect on the well-being of the
ance from the Soil Conservation Service of development of recreational facilities on pri- American people.
the Department of Agriculture used in plan- vate lands. The Soil Conservation Service
ning and applying soil and water conserva- type of technical assistance for recreational RESOLUTroN 2
tion practices on the land. development, on rural lands is not available SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS
If adopted, this proposal would seriously anywhere else, even for hire. The workload in soil and water conserve-
Slow down the soil, and water conservation Without question, establishment of the tion districts involving the planning and
effort on the privately owned lands of the revolving fund would slow down needed ad- applying of soil and water conservation prac-
Nation. We believe it would result in an justments in land use. In 1964, technical tices continues to increase each year. Dis-
estimated decrease of 40 to 50 percent in the assistance guided more than 1 million soil tricts are being requested to supply increased
annual application of conservation practices and water conservation district cooperators soil survey information to farmers, agricul-
and would reduce the quality of the prac- in converting 2,500,000 acres from crop use tural workers, land appraisers, planning com-
tices applied, to less intensive uses such as grass and tree missions, credit agencies, educators, econo-
This proposal, if adopted, would reverse production. mists, and other public officials. Districts are
a policy of 30 years standing. In 1935, Con- In addition, we should recognize clearly also assuming new responsibilities in pro-
gress began a policy of providing technical that adoption of this proposal would hit grams for conservation, resource develop-
assistance from the Soil Conservation Service hardest in economically depressed areas. ment, Land-use adjustments, and economic
Without charge to farmers, ranchers, and Much of what can be done to alleviate pov- development in rural America.
other private landowners willing to cooperate erty in rural areas is bound up in the im- These new district responsibilities are
in scientific, farmwide conservation pro- proved use of soil and water resources. Soil based to a very large extent on farm conserva-
grams on their properties. and water conservation is basic to economic tion plans which farmers develop in coopera-
We believe adoption of this proposal would development and family farm stability in tion with local soil and water conservation
serve to undermine landowners' confidence rural areas, districts, or on plans. developed by organized
in the Federal Government's consrvation We believe adoption of this proposal would groups of landowners.
purpose and its desire for an effective conser- penalize most the small farmer and the poor Meanwhile, the cost of technical assistance
vation partnership with landowners, farmer who can least afford to pay. Family- has continued to increase as the national
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved Fo l es ~a /1AQ~11 ~ ~P6~
Afff R0003001700031ebruary 23
economy has grown. Federal funds appro-
priated to the Soil Consevation Service have
been inadequate to furnish sufficient techni-
cal assistance to meet the growing obliga-
tions in districts.
The National Association of Soil and Water
Conservation Districts therefore requests the
Congress to appropriate additional funds to
the Soil Conservation Service to provide
needed technical assistance, watershed plan-
ning, watershed protection, and service to the
Great Plains conservation program during
fiscal year 1966.
More specifically, we ask the Congress of
the United States to appropriate $115,040,000
for the conservation operations in fiscal year
1966.
We urge the Congress to kill the proposed
revolving fund through which soil conserva-
tion districts and farmers and ranchers
would make $20 million of payments to the
Soil Conservation Service for technical
assistance.
We ask that $750,000 of new funds be ap-
propriated to provide technical assistance
staff to 25 new soil and water conservation
districts expected to be organized during fis-
cal year 1966.
We further ask that an additional $10,-
187,000 of conservation operations funds be
appropriated to meet the current backlog in
staffing needs of 1,518 man-years of technical
assistance in soil conservation districts.
Watershed planning:
We ask the Congress of the United States
to appropriate $10 million for watershed
planning in fiscal year 1966.
This $41/4 million increase over the budget
estimate is needed to permit a step-up in
the rate of watershed planning because
nearly 1,200 communities are on the wait-
ing list for planning assistance.
Watershed protection:
We ask the Congress of the United States
to appropriate $85 million for watershed pro-
tection in fiscal year 1966.
This would permit beginning construction
on approximately 100 new watershed project
starts instead of only 70 new starts as pro-
posed in the budget estimates.
Flood prevention:
We ask the Congress to appropriate at the
budget estimate level of $25,417,000 for flood
prevention in fiscal year 1966.
This has been a current and adequate level
of flood prevention operations for several
years.
Great Plains conservation program:
We ask the Congress of the United States
to appropriate $20 million for the Great
Plains conservation program in fiscal year
1966.
The increase over the budget estimate is
needed to help meet the backlog of nearly
5,000 farmers who have made application
for help but are still waiting for assistance.
Resource conservation and development:
We ask the Congress of the United States
to appropriate at the budget estimate level
of $4,303,000 for resource conservation and
development in fiscal year 1966.
This would permit the continuation of
operations in the 10 pilot R.C. & D. projects
now underway and would permit the author-
ization of planning on 10 more pilot R.C. &
D. projects in 1966.
We urge soil and water conservation dis-
trict supervisors and watershed directors to
inform their Senators and Representatives
of these needs and request support for such
appropriations.
RESOLUTION 3
AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM FONDS
All citizens of the Nation benefit from ac-
tions taken to conserve and develop natural
resources, including the basic resources of
soil and water.
We recognize that the economy of agri-
culture is such that farmers cannot finance,
wholly, all the costs of planning and apply-
Ing the conservation practices that are
needed.
The agricultural conservation program of
the USDA encourages, assists, and gives in-
dividual farmers an incentive, through shar-
ing the cost of applying conservation meas-
ures, to proceed withthe work of conserving
natural resources.
The NACD, therefore, opposes the pro-
posed $100 million budget reduction in the
advance atuhorization for the agricultural
conservation program in 1966. We ask the
Congress to maintain the authorization at
the 1965 level in order to maintain progress
toward the conservation of natural resources.
RESOLUTION 4
CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS IN WATERSHED
PROJECTS
Under provisions of the Great Plains con-
servation program, landowners may enter
into long-term contracts with USDA where-
by they adopt a conservation plan for
their entire unit and agree to make land-
use changes, apply conservation practices,
and establish desirable cropping and use
systems, all according to an agreed upon
time schedule. The USDA, for its part,
agrees to provide technical assistance and
cost-sharing to further adoption of this
farmwide conservation plan according to
the time schedule.
We urge an amendment to the Watershed
Protection and Flood Prevention Act author-
izing the use of similar contract arrange-
ments within approved watersheds. We
reconnend a time schedule of from 3 to
10 ye rs for completion of essential con-
servati n measures on whole farms covered
by s ch watershed contracts.
PETITIONS BY CORNELL UNIVER-
SITY STUDENTS ON U.S. POLICY
ON VIETNAM
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last
night I lectured at Cornell University.
At the conclusion of the lecture, a group
of students handed me some petitions
in opposition to U.S. policy in South
Vietnam.
I ask unanimous consent to have them
printed in the RECORD at this point with
the i_ames.
There being no objection, the petition
and names were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
We, the undersigned- members of the Cor-
nell University community, strongly protest
the bombing and strafing attacks on North
Vietnam by the U.S. Government on February
7 and 8, 1965. In spite of official statements
to the contrary, we believe that such actions
can lead only to the escalation of a war
that the United States should not be fight-
ing In the first place; especially since we are
supporting regimes disliked by and detri-
mental to the Vietnamese people.
We hereby join with the growing num-
ber of citizens who have voiced their opposi-
tion to the United States presence in Viet-
nam.
We demand that the U.S. Government
withdraw from Vietnam now.
Larry Faulkner, Fred Rosen, Mark Som-
mer, Douglas Hainline, Lincoln Berg-
man, Daniel Morrison, Charles F.
Nagel, Janet A. Schleicher, Stephen R.
Kellert, Bruce Bridgman, Martha Grin-
nell, Mr. and Mrs. Christopher S.
Kinder, William E. Schleicher, Joyce
Stark, Jill Ann Borkey, Michael Astor.
Mark Leider, Carol Newman, Tim Hallt,
Dan Segrim, Steve Fankuchen, George
M. Alexis, Richard Englesteen, Thomas
D. Hill, Ralph Schwartz, Abby Can-
field, Ronald A. Schneider, James P.
Snyder, Bruce E. Kapl#n, Site J. Estey,
Murray Cohen, Les Jacobs, Serina
Weaver, Fred Weaver, Brenda Milder,
Eugene C. Holman III, Mary Dolores
Nichols, John Canfield, George R. Price,
Sander Helihsby, David Kirkwood,
Stanley Perlo.
Gary If. Deissman, Helen Chuckrow,
Michael Dossily, Ruth Goldwarren,
R. Stewart Jonas, Kenneth G. Rhuess,
H. Carol Woodcock, Philip L. Gilman,
Martha E. Trae, Nancy Sorkin, Adam J.
Sorkin, Richard Peiser, Richard Bren-
blatt, Hal S. Kibley, Joe H. Griffith,
Nypar Feldner, Peter Long, Stephen
LeRoy Doreen Brenner, Robert Gech-
feld, Eric Lee Geytman, Katherine
Porter,-- David Leseohier, William,
Schecter, , Dainoz Fineman, Lawrence
Jones, Jonothan Sabin, Robye Cooper,
Henry Balsen, Judith S. Kessel, Rich-
ard Unger, James W. Boghosian.
Ann Suitow, Richard Epond, Helene
Brosuis, Natalie Kent, Steven Gel-
ber, Marie Gould, Peter SalweSteven
Faigelman, Walter J. Wilie, James R.
Willcox, Mike Smith, Susan Higgins,
Jo Hailperin, N. E. Dukin, G. Epoty,
Claire Eisenhandler, Gail Boesel,
Thomas C. Barnt, Tatman Walter,
Jerry Sobel, Paul Epstein, William
Duell, Bruce Bennett.
Michael Rudetsky, Peter L. Gale, Na-
thaniel W. Pierce, Mark L. Klein, Paul
Seidel, David Rader, Steve M. Hand-
schu, Christy Reppert, Helen Jones,
Peter Dormont, Malcolm Campbell,
Judy Russell, Martha N. Simon, Joe H.
Griffith, John N. Vournakis, Karen
Vournakis, Jeanne Duell, Carol V.
Kaske, and Henry Daniel.
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
STATEMENTS FOR GI BILLS
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
this year the cold war GI bill, S. 9, is re-
ceiving the greatest support that it has
ever had from the Members of this body.
In addition to having 40 cosponsors, the
high caliber and earnestness of testimony
by several Senators before the Subcom-
mittee on Veterans' Affairs demonstrates
that opposing forces will have a harder
time blocking the consideration of this
bill than they have ever had before.
I would like to remind my colleagues
that the late President John F. Kennedy
was an earnest supporter of readjust-
ment assistance for our veterans. In
Senate Document No. 79 of the 88th Con-
gress, a compendium of speeches and
statements made by John F. Kennedy
during his service in Congress, there are
two statements concerning readjustment
assistance. The first of these is in sup-
port of the Korean GI bill, and the sec-
ond recommends raising the allowances
paid under the then existing GI bill. I
ask unanimous consent that these two
statements be inserted at this point in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
THE KOREAN GI BILL, H.R. 7658, JUNE 5, 1952
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Speaker, I want to take
this opportunity to be recorded as supporting
fully and vigorously the Korean GI bill, H.R.
7656, now under consideration.
Close to a million Americans have par-
ticipated in the Korean struggle. They are
justly deserving of the same consideration
that the veterans of World War II were
accorded.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 1965
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 3257
wedge in the establishment of compulsory
Government medicine for all, with its attend-
ant bureaucracy, redtape, and tendency to
promgte mass-production, assembly-line pro-
cedures in which quantity takes precedence
over quality and both suffer.
The State chamber believes in a realistic,
practical social security system, enlarged and
strengthened as the Nation can afford it.
There should be continuing study of the
many still-unsolved problems involved so
that any further legislation in this field may
be based upon careful appraisal of experience
with the actual operation of the program.
Prominent among these unsolved problems
are that (1) no consistent relationship ex-
ists between amounts of tax contributions
of individuals and the amounts of benefits
they ultimately may receive;. (2) the pro-
gram is one of sharply rising costs for the
next several decades and a major portion of
costs of pension rights being earned now is
being postponed for future generations to
bear, and (3) the cost-deferment character-
istic hides from public consciousness the fu-
ture cost impact of obligations being incur-
red currently.
There is need for basic decisions correcting
OASI financing weaknesses. In any event,
future law changes increasing OASI costs
should be accompanied by commensurate tax
increases in order to create a clear public
understanding of the cost impact.
Every effort eds to be made to find and
put into efecttlthe best possible solutions
VIETNAM
Mr. IYOMINICK. Mr. President, I
have recently had the pleasure of reading
the February 22 issue of the Washington
Report issued by the American Security
Council, containing an article entitled
"Why We Can't Negotiate Now."
This article deals very clearly with the
situation facing us in South Vietnam, and
refutes one argument after another sug-
gesting negotiation in Vietnam. It
points out very logically and clearly the
reason why we must stand firm in that
area. The axtIcle is of real value be-
cause it answers some points which have
been made. One of the cries we hear
constantly, in Congress and outside, is
that we cannot win militarily.
One of the points made in the article
is that every guerrilla war engaged in
between World War II and now has been
either lost or won, not just stalemated.
Dependent on the issue of whether it has
been won or lost has been the whole
course of freedom in those areas.
The writers of tl_e article come to the
conclusion that this war can be won,
that the President's policy should be
firmly supported, and they go further
with respect to possible support from Red
China and the Vietcong.
I do not want to indicate that I am
necessarily in favor of or in opposition
to the last paragraph of the report, but
the entire article points out so many
factors with which we have been dealing
that I ask unanimous consent that the
entire report-which is only four pages--
be included at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows :
WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW
A great swirl of climactic events has fol-
lowed President Johnson's order to give con-
Crete effect to his repeated warnings to the
Communists to cease their aggression against
South Vietnam. The difficult but extremely
necessary decisions haveat last been taken.
Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere. of
crisis is created by the outraged cries and
threats of international communism. Just
as inevitably, the calls for a negotiated set-
tlement are redoubled on the free world side
of the line. Many well meaning people find
it difficult to understand why President
Johnson does not at least accompany his
military action by an offer to enter into im-
mediate negotiations to end the Vietnam
war.
Undoubtedly, the President would like
nothing better-nor would any other person
of good will-if negotiation presently offered
a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge
to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this
pledge which we must honor if there is ever
to be any hope of lasting peace in the world.
But in considering negotiation the Admin-
istration is faced with a series of very un-
pleasant facts, which are either unknown or
forgotten by the general public.
One set of facts concerns the inherent
nature of guerrilla wars. The military tac-
tics and political purposes of such wars are
not subject to stalemate or compromise.
For example, much of the current argu-
ment for negotiation rests on the hypothesis
that a military victory for either side is im-
possible. This is begging the question.
Since World War II, when the guerrilla war
came into vogue, they have invariably been
won or lost. Either the guerrilas win in the
sense of achieving a take-over of the country
or government in question, or else they are
militarily defeated, at least to the point
where they are reduced to a harmless rem-
nant. There have been no exceptions to this
rule.
The guerrillas triumphed completely
against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the
French in Algeria and Indochina (except here
they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather
than risk U.S. Intervention), against the
British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against
Batista in Cuba. They were decisively de-
feated In Greece, the Philippines, Malaya,
Burma, and-apparently-Venezuela. When-
ever negotiations were held it was only for"
the purpose of ratifying the guerrilla vic-
tory. In the majority of cases this was not
of a decisive military nature. The French
were never beaten in Algeria and even after
Dien Bien Phu they could have held on at
least in Hanoi and Saigon. The Dutch could
have held Indonesia for some time as could
the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But
either the will to resist was broken or else
a reevaluation of national interests caused
them to consider the area no longer vital.
CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS
On the basis of all past experience, there-
fore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam can
only have the purpose either of confirming
a Communist decision to abandon the drive
for control of Vietnam, or else an American
decision to admit defeat and withdraw. A
cease fire would be meaningless. It would
only leave the guerrillas In place and free
to use the interval to run in more rein-
forcements and arms until they were ready
for the next push. Withdrawal of all Com-
munist guerrillas behind the 17th parallel,
as is sometimes suggested, woud be fine,
but would of course be tantamount to a total
Communist defeat in Vietnam. President
Johnson has no Intelligence as yet to lead
him to suppose that the Communists are
ready for anything of the sort,
On the contrary-and this is the second
set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situa-
tion-the Communist world remains unani-
mous in its declarations that the only basis
for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is
the complete withdrawal of American forces,
which is tantamount to a complete American
defeat.
These statements might be written off as
mere propaganda bargaining were they not
backed up by a great deal of background
information coming out of Communist
China, which indicate that she believes time
and events are very much on her side. Since
the second hypothesis for negotiations is
that they must include Communist China,
her attitude is obviously decisive to the out-
come. Here are some of the more public
facts which the President must consider:
1. Between December 21, 1964, and January
4, 1965, the first sesison of the Third Na-
tional People's Congress was convened in
Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind
closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders
of Communist China. In addition to state-
ments by Marshal Ho Lung boasting that
the Chinese people's army has been con-
siderably enlarged, supplied with up-to-date
equipment, and is now supported by power-
ful naval and air force units, the Chinese
published on December 30 an abbreviated
version of Premier Chou En-Iai's report on
Chinese domestic and foreign policy.
The speech reflected great pride and self-
confidence resulting from the explosion of
the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the
very serious difficulties between 1959 and
1961, resulting from the failure of the great
leap forward, and the intention of trans-
forming China into a world power with the
most modern industry, agriculture, tech-
nology, and defense within the shortest pos-
sible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou
pledged support to all-and he listed each
one-revolutionary movements and centers
of unrest. He declared that Peiping would
consider negotiation with the United States
only after it had given up Taiwan and would
deal with the United Nations only when it
had thrown out Nationalist China.
Chou further asserted that the east wind
would prevail over the west wind, and that
favorable conditions for such an outcome
are the storm centers of world revolution
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The
speech forces the conclusion that the Chinese
Communists are not only conscious of their
power, but are also prepared to use it to
support wars of liberation wherever possible
in a continuing struggle against imperialism.
2. As a concrete example that Chou meant
what he said and that the "falling domino"
theory in southeast Asia was not a figment
of John Foster Dulles' overstimulated imagi-
nation, Peiping formally announced on Feb-
ruary 5, 1965, the formation of a patriotic
front to overthrow the pro-Western Gov-
ernment of Thailand and eradicate American
influence there. For some time now, Com-
munist agents have been infiltrating into
Thailand in order to form the nucleus for
subverting that country. The Thais have
instituted energetic countermeasures which
have so far kept them under control, but it is
foolish to believe that Thailand would or
could resist a Communist takeover backed
by China if South Vietnam is lost. The
Chinese do not even wait until one victim
is gobbled up before proclaiming their plans
to take over the next one.
3. Mao Tse-tung stated in a January in-
terview with American journalist Edgar
Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not
lead to war between China and the United
States so long as China is not invaded. He
also said that the war in Vietnam would last
only another year or two because the South
Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers
and the Americans will lose interest. While
this statement greatly reduces the likelihood
of any Chinese retaliation againt our raids
on North Vietnam. It gives no comfort to
those urging negotiation. If Mao really be-
lieves that the war will be won by the Com-
munists in another year or two, then it is
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3258
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23
obvious that he looks on negotiation only
to confirm this fact, which is another point
he actually made in the Interview. Unless
he can be shaken in this conviction there is
no possible basis fdr negotiation with China.
MUST STOP REDS
It is easy for those without responsibility
to call for negotiation, as though this were
the automatic panacea for all the world's
ills. But the U.S. Government is faced
with the kinds of facts mentioned above,
as well as much more grim data of a secret
nature, which cannot be shrugged off, This
is why it has consistently rejected calls for
a new Geneva Conference and why even
the British have supported this stand. It
is accepted as axiomatic by most policy-
makers that under present circumstances
negotiation could lead only to an American
defeat.
Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not sim-
ply for reasons of foolish national pride, but
because the Chinese have made it so very
plain that Vietnam is only part of a much
wider plan for aggrandizement and trouble
making. We are helping Vietnam because It
is in the interest of freemen everywhere
that the Communist challenge be halted at
this point.
The President Is trying to create a new
psychological situation in Asia. His decision
to retaliate against North Vietnam is the
only one which offers any hope of success. It
has-been long overdue and is all the more
difficult for that reason, but it is still not too
late. W. Johnson should be warmly con-
gratulated for his action. If we carry
through our policy with resolution there is
still an excellent chance that we can win the
Vietnam war at least in the sense that the
Communists are induced to call off the war as
a bad business and either withdraw the
guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease
outside aid completely and leave them to
their fate. Only then can there be a genuine
basis for a negotiation which will ratify this
decision.
The Communists will not come willingly
or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Pre-
vious U.S. vacillation has led them to count
the Vietnam war as already won. It will
probably take time and a great deal of pun-
ishment before they call off the war. But
they are practical men and eventually bow
to reality. What Is essential now is that the
President be given the time to make the full
effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peiping,
and Moscow without being continually badg-
ered to negotiate. The calls for negotiation
only make the task harder and bloodier be-
cause it encourages the Communists to think
that we may still falter in our purpose. It
is still a Chinese article of faith that world
and domestic pressures can be mobilized to
thwart any resolute action by the U.S. Gov-
ernment. Many past follies have confirmed
them in this viewpoint.
TURNING POINT IN HISTORY
A great experiment Is underway-the ex-
periment to see whether we can successfully
contain Communist China on the mainland
of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to
our children are hideous to contemplate.
The Chinese have the numbers, the drive,
the ambition, and the eventual 15otential to
rule the world. The days through which we
are now passing will mark one of the great
turning points of world history.
The United States has very strong trumps
to play In this contest. If North Vietnam
is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice
herself in a continuing effort to win South
Vietnam, there is yet one final arrow in our
quiver. We can threaten China with the
one punishment she would most fear: The
destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial
bombardment. If forced to carry out this
threat, we would at least prevent or delay the
looming menace of a nuclear-armed China.
FRANH J. JOHNSON,
Foreign Editor.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MON-
TOYA in the chair). The clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION DOM-
ICILIARY AT THOMASVILLE, GA.
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there
was published in the February 7 edition
of the Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union
an excellent article concerning the op-
eration of the Veterans' Administration
domiciliary at Thomasville, Ga., one of
the facilities which it was announced Is
scheduled to be closed.
This article clearly shows the domicili-
ary's value, both to the veterans it serves
and to the community in which it is lo-
cated. It is my hope that the operation
of this facility will not be discontinued,
and that the Veterans' Administration
will reconsider its plans.
It is indeed regrettable to me that our
veterans should suffer because of a pur-
ported economy move by the administra-
tion, although it must be kept in mind
that our disabled veterans must be dom-
iciled and provided home and medical
care, and that if this facility is closed,
they will have to be moved and cared
for at some other location. I fail to see
any economy in such a move.
As pointed out in the article, there are
both human and economic factors to be
considered, and I hope they will not be
disregarded by the Veterans' Administra-
tion.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have this article printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
HUMAN, ECONOMIC ELEMENTS HINGE ON
VETERANS' UNIT
(By Carey Cameron)
THOMASVILLE, GA., February B.-Both the
human and the economic elements are of
concern to those who will be affected if the
Veterans' Administration domiciliary here Is
closed.
Thomasville and Thomas County residents
and businessmen are concerned about the
economic element. Counting payroll, other
expenditures and non-VA jobs affected by
the VA payroll, the area may lose about $6
million annually, says chamber of commerce
Executive Vice President Lloyd Eckberg.
The members who live at domiciliary (they
are called members, not patients, stresses
J. W. Legg, assistant domiciliary director),
their few relatives and the American Legion
are concerned with the human element--
the displacement of 765 residents of the
home, 26 percent of which are indigent.
It is possible that everything will turn
up roses on both accounts. Lockheed of
Georgia, a corporation that does 98 percent
of its business with the Government, will
submit a bid February 16 for the right to
operate an Urban Job Corps Training Center
under the Office of Economic Opportunity
programs.
W. A. Pulver, president of the corporation,
has told the Thomasville-Thomas Chamber
of Commerce that the school will be located
at the domiciliary site if Lockheed gets the
contract. Revenue here from the school
could reach $7 million annually, Lockheed
estimates.
Plans are being worked out to transfer
domiciliary members to various combination
hospital-domicilary centers in other loca-
tions. But Lockheed may not get the train-
ing center contract and Donald E. Johnson,
national American Legion commander, has
charged that there Is no assurance, new
homes will be found for the veterans.
On January 12 the VA announced plans
to close 11 hospitals, 16 regional offices, and
4 domiciliaries. This plan would eliminate
3,201 domiciliary beds. Although medical
care is offered in clinic and infirmary-type
departments, domiciliaries are not hospitals.
"They are domiciles (homes) for veteran;
who have disabilities preventing them from
earning a livelihood," Legg explained. Wher.
a domiciliary members needs hospital care
he is taken to a veterans hospital. Veterans
at the Thomasville facility are usually sent
to Lake City, Fla.
In return, patients recovered enough to no
longer need hospital care are sent back to
domiciliaries to make way for new patients:.
The other three domiciliaries to be closed are
at Clinton, Iowa, in Commander Johnson's
home State: White City, Oreg., and Bath,
N.Y. The Bath home is a VA center, offer-
ing both hospital and domiciliary care, Legg
explained.
At Thomasville, the domiciliary has an. an-
nual budget of $1,800,000. Members' income
from social security, pensions and other com-
pensation totals $1.5 million. The capitr:l
assets are about $3.5 million, Legg said.
An evacuation plan, subject to approval by
the central VA office in Washington, calls for
all members to be moved out by March 31.
The staff of 161 employees would be gore
and the operation closed by June 30.
Members not discharged or transferred to
hospitals by March 31 would be moved o
centers at Biloxi, Miss., Bay Pines, Fla., Dub-
lin, Ga., and Mountain Home, Tenn.
On January 13 admissions to all receiving
domiciliaries were frozen. The Thomasville
facility has 800 beds but operates on a
planned average member load of 760, leaving
a margin of up to 50 beds. On January 14
it had 765 members of which 193 were Flor-
ida residents and 263 were Georgia residents.
World War II veterans, a group whose need
for domiciliary care is growing now that tb.eir
average age has reached 45, comprised 56.84
percent of'the residents while World War I
veterans made up 33.28 percent. There ware
lesser numbers of Korean and peacetime vet-
erans, Six residents are Spanish-American
War veterans.
Other facilities also have a margin between
total beds and caseload and it is figured t'aat
this margin plus natural turnover will make
room for those being moved from the clos-
ing facilities, Legg explained.
The Thomasville domiciliary was built
during World War II as Finney General Ifos-
pital. Like most military facilities of ;hat
day its exterior appearance is crude but in-
teriors are comfortable.
About 50 percent of the rooms are private
or semiprivate and a main dining room ac-
commodates 408 men who are fed in 2
shifts. Light recreation, such as shuffle-
board, is available for those able to take
part. Some can play the game but others
are in wheelchairs.
After the war, the old general hospital was
used for 1 year as a VA hospital before the
domiciliary was opened officially December 1,
1948. Legg, who works under Administrator
E. C. McDaniel, has been here since 1948.
When news of the closing was announced,
Thomasville Mayor Roy Lilly and Frank Neel,
immediate past chamber president, went to
Washington to see what could be done but
were given assurance the order would not be
revoked.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3316 Approved For Relea@Op V,41(j W-?Re 044 R J00170003-8
February
of which Is own ~d b P
y lttsburgh Plate Glass Mr. ASPINALL, Mr. Speaker, reserv- authorizing 150,000 tons' of lead and
Co. and 20 percent by British Titan Products ing the right to object-and I shall not 150,000 tons of zinc to be fed into the
CO, Ltd To be located near the site of the world's object-I think I speak for all of us who market at this time-just when they are
largest proven reserve of rutile, the new re are Interested in the welfare of the lead- beginning to feel the benefits of the im-
finery will be in full operation and is. expected zinc industry when I say that we appre- proved market position that lead and
to end a worldwide shortage of the important Mate and co
mm
d
h
en
t
mineral by latenest year.
e distinguished zinc have enjoyed recently-the industry
chairman of the full committee, the gen- leaders have, in my opinion, taken a very
From the refined rutile, other firms will tleman from South Carolina, the Honor- constructive
titanium
oxides
widel
e
produce
sd t
i
u
o
approach a id, in the over
whiteness
and
opacity
m- able L. MsrrnEL Rrvzas, and the able gen- all national Interest, agreed, and Per-
part p sty paints and tleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Part- suaded others to also used in the manufacture of paper, rub-
ber. and floor coverings. SIN], who is now handling the legislation the 150,000 tons each of lead and zinc
Titanium metal, whose strength-to-weight on the floor, for their action in schedul- that is provided for in H.R. 1496 and
ratio is nearly twice that of alloy steels, is Ing prompt hearings on legislation de- H,R. 1658.
also highly temperature resistant and is an signed to make limited amounts of lead In the circumstances, we should be
important construction material In aircraft and zinc available from the stockpile in hesitant to cloud the Issue at this time
and space vehicles. order to fill our current domestic re- giving a
Current world production of rutile is only quirements for these vital materials, and by additional consideration
amounts o of the release c,
some 170,600 to 180,000 tons per year.. The bringing the bills before this body so ex- In any this s connection, lt m of lead point and out that
zinc.
new refinery will have initial productin of
let
n tens per year. ped
ti
usly.
s
o
, in my opinion,
Materials end equipment for the plant will As know Mr. S it makes no difference, I have a whether the additional amounts that
come from various areas of the United states, dual interest In the welfare of the lead-
with th
might be authorized for release would
e bulk coming to Modern storage, zinc Industry: Lead and zinc are pro-or by Inc., which operates a 1,20,000-square-foot duced In various areas of Colorado in- be authorized for sale t for use of k-eral warehouse at Dundalk Marine Terminal un- eluding the district which I represent; in agencies, because the, use oP stock-
der lease from the Maryland Port Authority. addition,the Committee on Interior and Piled material by a Federal agency dis-
Among the Baltimore share of the move- places a like amount of material that
melmt will be five 60-ton diesel engines, in- Insular Affairs, of which I have the honor would otherwise come through normal
cluding three to generate electricity at the to be chairman, has jurisdiction over market channels and therefore consti-
plant and two to operate pumps on a by- mining interests generally. We, there- tutes an inroad on the normal sources
draulic dredge used to mine the mineral. fore, are deeply concerned to assure a of supply. At the same time, I do not
vIlle A dry mill will be shipped from Jackson- continuing supply of all minerals and think that It makes any p -
erecmaterials for a. 40-home village to be metals while, at the same time, providing Ter
articular
diP
erected at the plant site are m
ing
throu
h
n
g
e
ce whether the material to
be' re
-
g other
and
for maximum development of domestic leased comes from one inventory or the
Port Everglades and the dredge marine equipment will be floated down the Sources,
th
O
er and if, as consuming
Miasi/+ ippi a_ River and and towed weIn the support such circumstances of lead and zinc _4i-74- -- _.some of the
to Africa: stances existing today, Industries have indicated, there is a pos
given permission to address the House for disruption or adverse effect on the do- pile, rather than in the national stock-
___r mining it seems only appropriate to provide
1rrlinute and to revise and extend his re- _ g industry. My colleagues
STOC piles
Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr, Speaker, I to ascertain the quantity of a material needs a to assure that these consumer
am not prone always to agree with the that Is required at a particular moment needs are e met satisfactorily.
Mr. Speaker, I understand that the
Washington Post, but I found a very pro- and the quantity that can be brought
General Services Administration, under
vocative editorial in this morning's into the market artificially and still not the leadership of Mr. Maurice J. Con.
Washington Post with regard to the sit- have an adverse effect on our own mar-
s have from she outset backed the ef- hazing that the stockpile was not Created 1U? segmments or the lead-zinc industry,
forts of the President of the United States for the purpose of providing reserves for developed disposal plans that are ac-
ch is ra- normal domestic consumption and tha+. ceptable to the industries: Tha-
in stestepping up the activity whi
-
the activi
In
s
c
d
-
c
ilo
aaa
cor
iaui
ingly, any release from the stock- ' "
and see no a
- d at and zinc ?rrerings or a portion
reason to withdraw that support from pile becomes an artificial means of sup- bereleased and zi under nc the legi the legl 1ationthat beeffore
him at the present time, plying market demand as contrasted slaore
Some controversy has existed between with the normal channels, which consist you, to be followed by further consulta-
Members of this body and Members of of a combination of domestic production tion by General Services Administration
the other body, as well as among Mem- and imports from foreign sources. with other affected Federal agencies as
bers of this body, as to who supports the Parenthetically, let me call to the at- well as with segments of the industri
es
President in his action in Vietnam and tention of my colleagues the fact that 32 before disposing of the balance of the
who does not, I wish to make it clear Members of the House have joined me tonnages that are made available for
once again that I support the action of in sponsoring legislation that is now be- disposal,
the President in Vietnam; and he is de-, fore the Ways and Means Committee for Not only do I want to compliment Mr.
serving of the, unanimous support of the the purpose of establishing flexible quotas Connell for his performance in the de-
d
t
i
an
un
zuau in this country and at por
ty to comment! him for the co-
AUTHORIZING THE DISPOSAL OF the same time assure a continuing do- operation . he has exhibited with our
ZINC FROM THE NATIONAL mestic supply of these metals during pe- committee and with industry In general
STOCKPILE riods of industrial expansion as well as in connection with the various disposals
Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask for our national security in times of of metals and minerals that have been
unanimous consent for the immediate emergency, accomplished by the GSA.
considera n the bill the 1496) to Releases from the stockpile are, there- The Committee on Interior and In-
onsid ire the sale, without regard t6 the fore, temporary measures and should not sular Affairs has, as I indicated a mo-
authorize the sal period prescribed, of be treated as affording any long-range merit ago, been concerned with these
6-proposed in be eriodsed of solutions or stability. Those of us in matters over a long period of time. We
the posed
zinc to pursuant Congress who have responsibilities for have been continually following the
Stock PStra Fag o cti. and posedal mining Industries have viewed the legis- specific questions involved In connectiion
The Clerk read the title of the bill. lction before you today In this context. with lead and zinc, including mine pro-'
The producing industries have likewise duction as well as the level of producers
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to studied the le
i
l
ti
i
g
s
a
on
n this context. and consumers stocks.
the request of the gentleman from Mas D t
sachusetts? Approved For Relea ;d - @"4116RU d01 00OWactors and existing
eon t Oris. urge favorable c
n
id
o
s
er
 ,pital attendants had arrived with an emer- turned as active and productive members of - Gross had still not heard from the Amster-
ambulance. our society if they could be given proper dam Welfare Center.
gency
Despite her objections (she asked to go to rehabilitation, and the social guidance that This did not happen last week or the week
Roosevelt Hospital, a private hospital she is part of scientific rehabilitation work. The before-when the department of welfare was
had stayed at 4 years before when she costs involved are immense but what we terribly undermanned because of its strike of
underwent minor stomach surgery), she was could save, both socially and economically, 7,000 workers.
be -when operating apart-
taken to Knickerbocker Hospital, a private by doing what we should for our senior eiti- mT ti hwas appened last tofall
hospital in Harlem. tens, is also immense."
After a preliminary examination, doctors Mayor Wagner made this statement in strength.
learned that she had suffered a stroke and October of 1962. Yet today, more than 2 Telephone calls by the hospital worker and
severe dehydration brought on by diabetes. years later, the problems of New York's aged by her relatives invariably found the Welfare p They then told her relatives--a grandson and aging remain critical. and no closer to ouCenter's sdid mhanage es busy. Ann d, fin all it was whenata
and two cousins-that Knickerbocker, the solution, to go tugh, ,
hospital she had been brought to, did not Medical care is perhaps the greatest prob- f)rst impossible to locate the application or
have any ward space to accommodate her. lem for the aged of New York City but hous- the worker assigned to handle it.
At this point, her grandson telephoned ing is not far behind. Despite the construe-' While she waited, Mrs. Gross was moved
Roosevelt Hospital and was told by some- tion of 2,866 apartments designed and priced half a dozen times from one room in a ward
one in emergency admissions that there was for the elderly (another 6,897 are either un- to another, at one point spending several
room there and an ambulance would be sent der construction or In planning), more than nights in the hallways.
to Knickerbocker to pick her up. 50,000 elderly single New Yorkers still live The longer she stayed-and the longer she
After a second ambulance ride and a see- in substandard dwellings with no place to waited-the more she felt she was being ig-
ond examination at Roosevelt (which pro- go, no one to turn to, and little hope for the nored by the hospital's doctors and nurses.
duced the same details as the earlier one), future. Whether right or wrong, she was convinced
she was told that her grandson had been mis- What is it like to be old, poor, and dis- that, as one of the few white, English-speak-
informed-and that Roosevelt also did not abled in New York City? ing patients in the ward, she was being
have any ward space available. WHERE TO GO-NURSING HOMES INADEQUATE discriminated against.
While she waited alone and unattended in 's take a closer look at Anna Gross, a Yet, to an outsider, a visitor to the wards
a small room off the emergency entrance for Let New Yorker for all but the first 10 of her 84 of Metropolitan Hospital, discrimination,
nearly 2 hours, one doctor finally got around the death of her son in 1951, even if it does exist, is only a minor prob-
to trying to find a bed for her somewhere. years. Since lam facing the hospital's patients. For many
Because there is no daily master list of avail- the widow had lived off his insurance and
savings in a small apartment on West 62d of the patients-white, Negro, or Puerto able bed space in New York's hospitals, the Street, between Columbus and Amsterdam Rican-the attitude and caliber of the staff
doctor had to call each hospital individually. creates a far more considerable hardship.
Though city records later showed that Avenues.
Unable to collect social security because SICK PATIENTS-IGNORED SY NURSES
there were more than 3,000 unused beds in of a technicality (unaware that the law had Typical was one afternoon last fall.
New unableYork sofi find itals that day, the dcwas been amended in 1959, making her eligible, Despite six buzzer calls from six different
unable a bed for the pged w woo man she had failed to file in time), she had re- patients all seeking assistance in the same
until his seventh call-to Metropolitan Hos- lied on a series of elderly boarders. ward, two registered nurses and five lesser
pittl. Despite her Increasing age, she had re- female employees continued talking in their
.m., than Its sine until d been 7 p picked mup by teh- mained in good health, physically sound and room at the entrance to the ward. When a
hour singe she lisp been pick the 84-year- mentally alert. And, despite one grandson visitor told them that one patient had vom-
first , o d emergency ambuly set that in hand several cousins who lived outside the ited all over herself and needed assistance,
and man was finally settled in a hospital city, she had remained totally self-sufficient the head nurse said it would be taken
beded woman
b received 84eyement. and self-sustaining, spending her leisure care of. (an In just l day, become a 84-year-old of Anna the Gross city-and ours socializing with her aging neighbors Fifteen minutes later, though five of the
wias) had makes s iso a victim could and watching television. women including the nurse in charge re-
have ed to much aend is that it disabled New ew This was her life until last July. it will mained in the room talking, not one of the
Yrhappened t any old d and
with limited resources. In fact, it had never be the same again. six patients had been attended to. Re-
Yorker
already happened to thousands of aging Within 6 weeks after her admission to minded by the visitor, the head nurse
New Yorkers before her. Metropolitan Hospital, her diabetes was fully snapped, "We heard you the first time, Mister.
It is rarely easy to be old and it is never under control and, despite paralysis of one We'll take care of it when we have time."
easy to be poor in any city. But, for those arm and leg due to the stroke, she was con- It was another 10 minutes before the six
both old and poor, life in New York City sidered mentally alert enough and physically patients were attended to.
today has become a nightmare-where, for- able enough for discharge. "I don't mind dying of old age but I don't
gotten by their families, the aged find them- The problem, however, was where could want to be killed," Mrs. Gross told her rela-
selves increasingly ignored by the city. she go. She could not return to her apart- tives. "Please get me out of here."
TOO LITTLE FOR TOO FEW, TOO LATE ment because she no longer could take care Her fears and her complaints are by no
of herself. She could not afford a nurse means unique. Other patients at Metropoli-
In the last census, 813,827 New Yorkers- because her savings had dwindled to nearly tan and the other city hospitals have suf-
more than the total population of San $1,000. And she could not move in with fered for years because of the city's failure
Francisco or Washington, D.C.-reported her relatives because they did not have suf- to attract and satisfy top personnel.
they were 65 or older, with 229,663 above 75. ficient room for her. This does not mean, however, that all city
This represents an increase of 749 percent Obviously, she needed to be discharged hospitals and all city hospital employees are
since the turn of the century compared to a into. a nursing home, but in New York City, Inferior. That is clearly untrue. It does
126-percent increase for the city's total pop- when a patient's savings are limited and she mean, however, that many patients and the
ulation. Today, 1 in every 10 New Yorkers is unable to care for herself, this is no longer city, which is paying for most of them, fre-
is 65 or older and, by 1970, more than 1.5 an easy matter. quently are not getting their money's worth.
million residents are expected to fall into Oddly enough, the majority of nursing Though a welfare investigator finally did
this age group. homes in this city, both public and private, get around to checking out Mrs. Gross' case,
What makes the aged problem so critical are not equipped to take care of patients she was able to leave Metropolitan Hospital
is that this group's income and opportuni- who need 24-hour medical attention or who only when a relative found a vacancy for
ties have not kept pace with its increased are unable to take care of themselves. And her in the Kingsbridge Heights Nursing
longevity. Of New York's aged families, some of the others-particularly the private Home in the upper Bronx. Yet-even in her
102,712 had incomes of less than $3,000 in homes supported by charitable organiza- transfer-the aged woman was to receive a
1960. And, of the 144,127 living alone or tions-lose interest when they learn a patient further example of a city hospital in action.
with nonrelatives, 70 percent earned less or his relatives are unable to make a con- One morning, a few days before she left
than $2,000 a year. tribution at the time of admission, the hospital, someone (no one seems to re-
. Despite an annual city outlay of more It is not at all unusual for a patient to be member exactly who it was) moved her from
$300 m than ed, he Con for institutional care for accepted (which means he is acceptable but one room to another. During the moving,
the aged, the he Cs Committee ou Aging, then must wait on a waiting list of indefinite the woman's dentures, which had been in a
a branch of the Community Council of length) while, at the same time, a relative glass next to her bed, disappeared. Though
Greater b Yorke, axpayer that unfoeru- is told by an official of the charity home that, she repeatedly asked for them during the
th
nately is amounts both 'tt too axpay little er for or too the few, elderly, too because of his income, he should contribute next few days, she received neither the
this amounts to a specified amount to the home. teeth, nor an explanation.
date.' "
"We all know that there are many aged What happens If he doesn't is always left A STATISTIC-CITY WOULD LIKE TO FORGET
and aging persons who need some kind of unsaid. Finally, after a relative wrote the hospital
care including preventive care, who are not Two months after she was ready for dis- supervisor demanding an explanation, the
now getting it," said Mayor Robert Wagner. charge and nearly 5 weeks after a hospital hospital replied in a letter several weeks later
"There are many who could remain or be re- social caseworker had filed for welfare, Mrs. that the dentures apparently had been lost.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For g? Mt5A ]RBP67 iR000300170003- ,ebruary 2$
The hospital was extremely sorry for the in- because of his inability to speak or under-
convenience and added that, if the patient stand Spanish, he has even greater difficulty
wanted to file a claim, she should do it with In understanding their answers. Yet even
the department of hospitals. when he has been able to communicate with
The letter did not bother to say what the his patients, he has learned that It is almost
woman was supposed to do until she re- impossible to help them.
ceived funds from the city (which could drag Unfortunately, this tragic lack of under-
out endlessly) to replace the dentures.
Mrs. Gross remained at the home In the
upper Bronx for 5 weeks sharing a small
room in a private home with four other aged
women. For $95 a week, which she paid out
of her remaining savings, she received her
room and her board (because she had no
teeth she could eat only a bland diet). The
weekly doctor's visits and medication were
extra.
She liked the home but, when an opening
came up in a larger home with medical
treatment included, she decided to move.
Now, in another home in the Bronx, she
has turned over all but $120 of her savings
(which the city welfare people have per-
mitted her to keep for burial expenses).
She had been assured by administrators of
the home that she now has nothing to worry
about. They have told her that when her
funds run out the department of welfare will
continue to pay for her upkeep at the home.
Her relatives have told her that they will
not contribute to her upkeep and now, be-
cause of the welfare strike and the an-
nouncement that only emergency new cases
will be accepted until it is settled, she doesn't
know what will happen to her.
Like a great many other older New Yorkers,
Anna Gross has given up. In just 7 months,
she has learned that the city and the people
who work for it have little time and less
interest in her problems and what becomes
of her.
To her relatives, who cannot afford to sup-
port her and don't have room enough to
take her in, she has become something of
a burden.
To the people who run the home she now
lives in, she has become little more than a
means of obtaining welfare funds from the
city.
And to the city Itself, she has become a
statistic, a number the administration would
like to forget.
To New York, a city which has failed to
provide adequate services and a good life for
its young and middle-aged citizens, the
problems of the aged may seem secondary.
But to a city in which the aged population
has increased sharply and will continue to
increase in the next decade, it Is a problem
that no longer can be ignored.
,NEW YORK CITY IN CaIsxs-CITY HOSPITALS:
A PRODUCT Or BUREAUCRACY
(By Claude Lewis and Barry Gottehrer)
Isaiah Lee is a 30-year-old Formosan who
can speak and understand Chinese, Japanese,
French and English. He cannot, however,
speak or understand Spanish.
For most New Yorkers, this linguistic limi-
tation would present no special problem. But
Isaiah Lee is an exception. He is a social
caseworker, employed by the department of
hospitals, at Manhattan's Metropolitan Hos-
pital where the majority of the patients are
Puerto Ricans who speak and understand
only Spanish.
It is his job to obtain detailed biographical
and financial information from each of 150
patients assigned to him, make applications
for welfare and then help the patients pre-
pare for care after discharge.
EXPEDIENCY
The fact that he is bright (he holds a
master's degree from the University of Ne-
braska) and dedicated hasn't made it any
easier for him or his patients In the 7 months
he has worked at the hospital.
standing and communication Is not limited
to Isaiah Lee and his patients at Metropoli-
tan Hospital. Today, it permeates almost
every level of life in New York City where
the government has consistently failed its
workers and has Increasingly forgotten about
its citizens.
Metropolitan Hospital, located on the out-
skirts of Spanish Harlem at 97th Street and
First Avenue, is certainly not the worst of
the 21 city hospitals. It is not the best
either.
Yet 1 month there-as a worker or as a
patient-is enough to convince anyone that
the city, despite a talented and diligent com-
missioner of hospitals, is clearly not keeping
pace with its problems.
According to the department of hospitals'
personnel section, the only requirement for
Mr. Lee's position as social caseworker is a
master's degree in social casework from an
accredited college.
NO TEST REQUIRED
No test, no language proficiency and no
depth interview are required, according to a
department spokesman. Since the job pays
$6,290 a year to start and reaches a maxi-
mum of only $7,490 after approximately 6
years, the city cannot afford to be particu-
larly selective,in its hiring. Top personnel,
if they accept a lower-rung city job, rarely
stay long before moving elsewhere, generally
into private industry.
Seated in a narrow fifth-floor office within
walking distance of the four wards he must
cover daily, Isaiah Lee is surrounded by
paperwork and buried by bureaucracy.
Dozens of applications for welfare are piled
neatly in one corner of the desk, many or
them still unanswered though he had for-
warded them to one of the city's welfare cen-
ters weeks and even months before.
Mr. Lee no longer is surprised by the wait-
ing. Since there is no master list showing
exactly which nursing home might have a
vacancy. Mr. Lee is faced with three
choices:
He can telephone each of the city's more
than 50 public and private pursing homes
each day (which he simply doesn't have time
to do).
He can rely on relatives and friends (if
they are willing) to find a home for the
patient.
Or, overwhelmed by the workload, frus-
trated by the redtape, and distressed by the
lack of progress, he can simply give up. Like
a great many other people working for the
city, secure in their jobs regardless of their
performance, he can become immune to any-
one's problems but his own.
Isaiah Lee has not yet given up but it is
not because he did not have considerable
reason.
"We have many people here who are too
old and senile to do much for," he said.
"It's the others who are still alert, who don't
belong in a hospital any more but have no
place to go. You want to help them and
you try to help them. But things move
very slowly, very very slowly. You want to
do more but you can't,"
It is not that the supervisors at Metropoli-
tan Hospital are unaware of these problems.
They are. But, for them, the problems and
frustrations are so far ranging that they
stagger the imagination.
Once located on Welfare Island, Metropoli-
tan Hospital moved to its present location in
1967 and today, with 1,000 beds (the same
Because of his heavy accent, most of his people living and working in an area that
patients (even English-speaking ones) have stretches from river to river and from 42d
difficulty understanding his questions. And, to 116th Streets.
"Our No. 1 problem is overcrowding," says
Dr. Ferdinand Piazza, administrator of the
hospital. "On occasion, we have to treat pa-
tients in an outpatient clinic when they
should be in the hospital. It's what we call
a calculated risk. There just isn't any place
to put all of the people who should be in bed
in a hospital with proper nursing, quiet, fa-
cilities required to bring them back to a
healthy state. We could use another 1,000
beds here in order to function at a good and
proper level to meet the needs of our com-
munity."
NURSE SHORTAGE
In 1964, Metropolitan Hospital treated
505,995 people, an average of nearly 1,400 a
day, in its outpatient clinic with a staff of
only 68, including only 36 nurses.
To take care of more than 24,000 inpatients
each year (only Bellevue and Kings County
have more), Mrs. Ruth Rose, senior super-
visor of nursing at the hospital, says she
needs 297 registered nurses. Right now, Met-
ropolitan has only 74 registerednurses on its
staff.
"I would rather have 297 registered nurses
than $1 million," says Mrs. Rose, who has
been forced to hire 219 practical nurses (less
educated, less experienced, and not permitted
to perform many duties a registered nurse
can) to try and make up for the shortage.
"It's hard to get people to work nights, be-
cause of attacks by men in this area. It's
not safe to walk the streets here at night.
We complain and get some relief, but we
need more police in the area."
Because of the limited pay scale, the over-
crowded, understaffed conditions, the diffi-
culty in accomplishing anything, and the lo-
cations (many are in or nearby slum areas),
the city hospitals have been forced to settle
for second best in personnel. Yet the prob-
lems at Metropolitan and other city hospitals
are by no means limited to the quantity and
quality of its personnel.
Typical is Metropolitan's request for a gen-
erator. Several years ago, when the city suf-
fered a massive power failure, the city gov-
ernment decided that each of its hospitals
must have generators just in case the city's
power should ever fail again. Today, nearly
4 years since the major city power failure,
Metropolitan still Is without its generators.
The reason for the delay? Redtape.
A HOPE
"We expect them soon," said Dr. Piazza,
and smiled.
Despite its $15 million budget (only Belle-
vue and Kings County are larger), there is
still a daily shortage of towels, sheets, and
more vital equipment.
"Sometimes it takes a full year to get a
piece of equipment you really need," says
Dr. Piazza.
Though the hospital personnel and admin-
istrators are frustrated and disillusioned by
the city's inability and indifference to their
problems, it Is the patient who inevitably
must pay, with his health and occasionally
with his life.
(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr.
Dow) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will. appear
OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr.
Dow) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 Approved For ReW BS$IaM& IC IRDR 7BAQ4 p0300170003-8
. Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, all of
us today are concerned about the situa-
tion in Vietnam. The President is being
criticized from all sides. I believe, pow-
ever, that there is 'far more widespread
support for the President's approach to
the problem than appears from the pub-
lic media.
I have developed this thought in an
open letter to the President, which I am
sending him today. It reads as follows:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If one were to judge
from the public media, one might suppose
that the general line you have been follow-
ing in Vietnam has little support in this
.country. Most speeches, articles or ads at-
tack you for being either too hard or too soft.
On the one hand, we have the Goldwaters,
the Nixons, and the Joe Alsops, calling for
full-scale war against North Vietnam and
-maybe Communist China. On the other
hand, we have all kinds of people, including
especiallly many liberals, who are either urg-
ing a pullout from Vietnam or who keep
telling you to negotiate, negotiate, negotiate.
While they may not be so outspoken, the
Majority of the American people refuse as
you 'do to accept an oversimplified either/or
position. While they are miserably unhappy
about the situation (as I am sure you are)
and while they may wish that a cease-fire
were in effect and negotiations for a viable
settlement .weere going on (as I am sure you
do also) , they do not want you to let the
Communists have their way in Vietnam and
they do not want you to widen the war.
Hanson Baldwin's article in time mag-
azine for February 21, which I take to be a
statement of the views of many Pentagon
military men, is a brilliant exposition of a
policy the American people in my view
simply will not support. Mr. Baldwin calls
for a korean-type war in Vietnam, fully rec-
ognizing the likelihood that Red China would
probably be drawn in. Pointing to the
Cuban precedent, he predicts that the So-
viet Union would not respond with nuclear
attacks, and he may be right, but to bomb
North Vietnam's vitals, would the American
people be prepared to accept the risks they
were prepared to accept to get Soviet missiles,
aimed at our vitals, out of Cuba? I doubt it.
The threat in Vietnam to our security is too
indirect, too remote, and the benefits to be
reaped are too tenuous and uncertain.
Stand fast against the "hawks," Mr. Pres-
ident. The American people are with you.
At the same time, as the polls show, ma-
jority sentiment in this country is not for
a pullout from Vietnam. There is wide rec-
ognition of what such a decision would do
to the morale of our friends around the
world who are resisting communism-in
Thailand, in the Philippines, in West Berlin,
in Venezuela-and to their confidence in us.
(I found last summer, even in countries such
as Burma and India, people hoping that the
United States will not withdraw and leave
southeast Asia completely unprotected
against the Chinese Communists.)
But what about these more and more fre-
quent appeals to you to negotiate? Do these
perhaps reflect American public opinion?
After all, Americans are great believers in the
conference table.
Here again, I suspect that your position is
more widely understood than the flood of
published comment might indicate. The
question surely is not as simple as many of
the appeals imply. It is not whether to ne-
gotiate, but under what circumstances, with
whom, with what end in view, and with what
prospects of success.
As traders, Americans can understand that.
They might understand it better if you
could spell it out for them, but they know
you can't lay all your cards on the table.
It may well be, for example, that you have
concluded that any settlement in Vietnam,
in order to be viable, must be part of a
package involving the settlement of many
broader issues affecting the future of the Far
East, but that you do not feel in a position
today to indicate your thinking as to the
outlines of such a broader settlement.
To those of my fellow liberals who keep
urging a cease-fire and negotiations, I should
like to suggest a few questions worth ponder-
ing:
Why should Peiping be interested in serious
negotiations over Vietnam now (except for
our virtual surrender) ? If North Vietnam
might have greater reason to call off the
fighting, what can we do to widen this po-
tential area of disagreement between Hanoi
and Peiping? Can we work with the Soviet
Union in this area? What steps can we take
to strengthen the position of the South Viet-
namese Government among the people of
South Vietnam? If a neutralization of all
Vietnam could be achieved, as suggested by
De Gaulle, what guarantees could be provided
against a Laos-type erosion of the agree-
ment? In light of the absence from the U.N.
of both Vietnams and mainland China, and
in light of the permanent members' veto
power in the Security Council, what else can
the U.N. realistically do beyond providing a
peacekeepers presence if an agreement is
reached? What is the necessary relation-
ship, if any, between a cease-fire and nego-
tiations (remembering that in Korea we ne-
gotiated for many months while the fighting
continued)?
You, Mr. President, are well aware of these
questions. They represent just a few of the
complexities involved, complexities which too
often seem ignored by the simple pleas to
negotiate. Last fall Senator Goldwater was
rightly accused of oversimplifying interna-
tional problems. Some of your liberal
friends who today are criticizing you, Mr.
President, might do well to consider whether
they are not oversimplifying from the other
end of the political spectrum.
I hope and believe, Mr. President, that
you agree with the view that in the long
run military measures alone cannot solve
the problems of Vietnam and that a new
political settlement must be our objective.
I hope and believe that you and your ad-
visers are giving great thought to the pos-
sible nature of such a settlement and to the
possible means for achieving it. What you
can tell us about all this would be welcome
and, I am sure, reassuring. But, whether
you can tell us or not, the world knows that
you are no jingoist and that you desperately
want to preserve the peace. (The general
reaction overseas to our recent retaliatory
bombings confirms the widespread trust of
the United States and its motives.) The
world also knows that, remembering Munich
and the Sudetenland, you realize that ap-
peasement is not the way to preserve the
peace.
There is nothing easier in this complex
world of ours than to frame false either or
imperatives. More often than not, such ex-
pressions represent a kind of immature im-
patience. A measure of our maturity, as we
perforce carry the responsibilities of the
most powerful nation on earth, may well be
the degree to which we are willing to accept
the burdens of long-term sacrifices and re-
sist the false appeal of quick solutions that
may well represent disaster. That you, Mr.
President, will meet this test is the convic-
tion of this Congressman and, I believe, of
the majority of the Congress and the Ameri-
can people.
Respectfully yours,
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM,
Member of Congress.
APPORTIONMENT QF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Mr. ICHORD (at the request of Mr.
Dow) was granted permission to extend
3333,
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, article V
of the U.S. Constitution reads in part as
follows :
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both
Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
application of legislatures of two-thirds of
the several States, shall call a convention for
proposing amendments, which in either case,
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by
the legislatures of three-fourths of the sev-
eral States, or by conventions In three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of
ratification may be proposed by the Con-
gress.
Last December I met in Chicago with
leaders of the Council' of State Govern-
ments and it was later decided that the
council would urge the legislatures of
the various States to petition the Con-
gress to either call a convention or sub-
mit an amendment to the Constitution
for ratification. Last week the Missouri
Legislature finally passed the resolution
proposed by the council and is one of the
16 States to have done so. It should be
noted that the wording of the resolution
is identical to House Joint Resolution 64
which I have introduced. Those of us
who have introduced resolutions on this
very important constitutional issue are
determined that the Congress should
have the opportunity to vote on a con-
stitutional amendment in the very near
future. To this end we have formed a
steering committee to press for imme-
diate consideration. As a member of the
steering committee I intend to take all
action available to us under the rules to
reach a vote as early as possible.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
to revise and extend my remarks in the
body of the RECORD and include a copy of
House Concurrent Resolution No. 2, as
passed by the Missouri General Assembly
by a vote of 109 to 45 in the House of
Representatives and 21 to 11 in the Mis-
souri Senate:
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2
Be it resolved by the house of representat-
tives (the senate concurring), That this legis-
lature respectfully applies to the Congress of
the United States to call a convention for
the purpose of proposing the following article
as an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States:
"ARTICLE --
"SECTION 1. Nothing in this Constitution
shall prohibit any State which shall have a
bicameral legislature from apportioning the
membership of one house of such legislature
on factors other than population, provided
that the plan if such apportionment shall
have been submitted to and approved by a
vote of the electorate of that State;
"SEC. 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall
restrict or limit a State in its determination
of how membership governing bodies of its
subordinate units shall be apportioned.
"SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative
unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legis-
latures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its sub-
mission to the States by the Congress; be it
further
"Resolved, That if Congress shall have
proposed an amendment to the Constitution
identical with that contained in this reso-
lution prior to June 1, 1965, this applica-
tion for a convention shall no longer be of
any force or effect: be it further
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8
 3334
Approved Foe &f4&441 1 JtE P6T $*6R000300170003 bruary
"Resolved, That a duly attested copy of
this resolution be immediately transmitted
to the Secretary of the Senate of the United
States, the Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives of the United States, and to each Mem-
ber of the Congress from this State."
THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR
IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROG-
RESS
(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr.
Dow) was granted permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD
and to include extraneous. matter.)
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the
charter that emerged from the meeting
of the American Republics at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961,
is destined to be remembered as one of
the most comprehensive and significant
documents of the 20th century. This
charter, which established the Alliance
for Progress, is only 31/2 years old. It is
widely known but not widely understood.
For I believe that in the years to come,
when the Charter of Punta del Este, has
had the chance to be sufficiently used
and tested to achieve the purposes for
which it was designed, it will earn its
place alongside the Magna Carta, our
own Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution, the Constitution of
Mexico, and the other great instruments
of freedom and social justice.
One of the noteworthy achievements
of the charter is its recognition of the
role that organized labor must play in
any national program of social and eco-
nomic development. The preamble to
the charter states:
We, the American Republics, hereby pro-
claim our decision to unite in a common
effort to bring our people accelerated eco-
nomic progress and broader social justice
within the framework of personal dignity
and political liberty.
The charter itself expands upon this
lofty goal and sets out the basic require-
ments for economic and social develop-
ment. According to chapter II of title II:
1. Participating Latin American countries
agree to introduce or strengthen systems for
the preparation, execution, and periodic re-
vision of national programs for economic and
social development consistent with the prin-
ciples, objectives, and requirements contained
in this document. Participating Latin
American countries should formulate long-
term development programs.
Such national development programs
are supposed to incorporate self-help ef-
forts directed toward "improvement of
human resources and widening of op-
portunities by providing adequate re-
muneration for work performed, encour-
aging the talents of managers, entre-
preneurs, and wage earners; providing
more productive employment for under-
employed manpower; establishing effec-
tive systems of labor relations, and pro-
cedures for consultation and collabora-
tion among public authorities, employer
associations, and labor organizations."
Labor participates in the Alliance pri-
marily through the American Institute
for Free Labor Development-AIFLD-
a nonprofit organization supported joint-
ly by unions, employers, and govern-
ment. It has operated as a school to
train Latin American labor leaders and
as an arm for the planning and con-
struction of social projects in Latin
America. The fact that the Alliance
has helped build 200,000 new houses is
a partial tribute to the success of this
phase of the program.
In the February 1965 issue of the
Boilermakers-Blacksmiths Record, the
publication of the International Brother-
hood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Build-
ers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers,
is an article entitled "The Alliance for
Progress." This well written and illu-
minating article, by Lester L. Zosel, tells
the story of labor's role in the Alliance.
It is succinct and well worth reading
for the understanding of our interna-
tional partnership with the countries of
Latin America which it furthers. With
unanimous consent I am inserting the
article by Lester L. Zosel in the RECORD:
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS-SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE AMERICAS OR
POVERTY, CHAOS, AND CONTINUED OPPRES-
SION?
(By Lester L. Zosel)
On March 13, 1961, the late President Ken-
nedy announced that he was calling upon all
of the people of this hemisphere to join in
an "Alliance for Progress ? " " a vast coopera-
tive effort, unparalleled in magnitude and
nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs
of the American people for homes, work and
land, health and schools."
He unveiled this sweeping new program to
a group of Latin American leaders attending
a White House reception. The next day,
March 14, he sent his program to Congress
with a request for the necessary funds to
give it life. In August 1961 the charter for
the Alliance was signed by representatives
of 20 nations at a conference in Punta del
Este, Uruguay.
The signers were: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domin-
ican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
Naturally, the newspapers and other com-
munications media gave publicity to the Al-
liance when it was announced, as is the case
with Presidential proclamations. There also
was reporting on the Punta del Este con-
ference. But what have you read or heard
about it since? Chances are, the answer is
"very little."
The chances are greater still that you have
read nothing in the daily press regarding the
role being played by United States and Latin
American labor in this worthy project. Such
participation by labor is designed to insure
that assistance reaches those for whom it is
intended.
For the most part the continuing story of
the Alliance has been shamefully ignored by
most of our Nation's newspapers, magazines,
radio, and television-this despite the fact
that the Alliance is a program involving
money, plans, and far-reaching objectives to
dwarf anything of its kind in past history.
Unfortunately, this article, limited as it
must be, cannot begin to fill the news gap
on the Alliance. Instead, my modest de-
sign is to bring you an appreciation of the
program's importance and its staggering di-
mension, and to describe labor's role in help-
ing to advance its nobility of purpose.
The sweep of the Alliance is best illus-
trated by its charter, wherein signatories are
pledged to achieving a long list of imposing
objectives-economic and social develop-
ment, land and tax reforms, improved wages
and working conditions, better housing, a
greatly reduced rate of illiteracy, stabilized
prices, improved health and sanitation, stim-
ulated private enterprise, and stronger demo-
cratic institutions.
Notable advancement toward these goals
is expected to require at least $100 billion
over the next 10 years. Latin American
nations will provide some $80 billion of that
amount. The United States has pledged a
major share of the remaining $20 billion.
However, some funds also are coming from
other nations, international organizations,
and private enterprise.
The task of implementing U.S. participa-
tion in the Alliance falls to the Agency for
International Development, a State Depart-
ment Agency which administers foreign aid
programs. U.S. funds for the Alliance come
out of the annual foreign aid authoriza-
tions by Congress. AID's Administrator has
the authority and responsibility for carrying
out Alliance projects.
The Alliance, unlike too many foreign aid
programs in the past, has prerequisites for
those who are to receive its assistance-
individuals, communities, or governments.
Recipients must prove they also are trying to
help themselves, plans are required to have
some long-range characteristics and Latin
American governments are committed to
make long-overdue reforms.
While these prerequisites still are not be-
ing met as rapidly as hoped for, the Alliance
has brought reforms, to varying degrees, in
Latin America.
Sixteen countries have improved thci.? tax
programs within the past year. A number
of these have tightened up collections on
previously wealthy families. Tax revenues
in some countries are up as much as 30 per-
cent. Land reform has been undertaken in
12 countries since 1960.
What are Alliance's accomplishments in 3
years of existence? That's a big question-
far too big to be fully answered here. How
will anyone be able to tabulate, at any given
time, the results of a "peaceful revolution"
that is to stretch through a 7,000-mile-long
continent inhabited by more than 200 mil-
lion people living in jungles, mountains and
massive cities?
Even so, AID Administrator David E. Bell
has assembled some impressive statistics.
He reported that by the end of June the
Alliance will have helped to build 220,000
new houses, constructed more than 23,000
classrooms, trained 20,000 new teachers and
printed 6 million books. Over 550 mobile
health units, hospitals and health centers
will have been established.
More than 200,000 agricultural loans have
been made. Nearly 15 million people in
more than 1,000 towns and villages now get
clean water from Alliance-built supply sys-
tems. Millions of dollars in loans are sup-
porting industrial development; electric
powerllnes are going up; roads are being
built; community development programs are
clearing slums, fighting disease, and improv-
ing diets. Credit unions and cooperatives
have blossomed forth in more than a dozen
countries.
Not only does the Alliance charter call
for labor's participation in its great endeavor,
but it also lists establishing of effective
labor relations as an important "self help"
to be initiated in developing a project. This
firm recognition of labor's importance has
brought strong support for the Alliance from.
free unions throughout the Western Hemi-
sphere.
The American Institute for Free Labor De-
velopment is the key instrument for labor's
participation. Begun in 1960, it is a non-
profit organization supported jointly by
unions, employers, and government. AFL--
CIO President George Meany is its president.
Its executive director is Serafino Romualdi,
a man of wide experience in labor's inter-
American affairs. The Brotherhood of Rail-
way Clerks chief executive officer, George M.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8