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February 23, 1965
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1965 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD APPENDIX So long as the United States has vital in. terests in.4.rsb lands and the United Arab Republio has a role of influence and leader- ship, the two countries cannot escape doing business with each other. The question is whether they can be sufficiently mature, clear sighted and patient to work out g*ad Us Stand in Vietnam EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI OF WISCONSIN Recent evens is Vietnam indicate that "the war that is not a war" has reached a crossroads. Washington's policy of the past 4 years, based on the polite fiction that we were not fighting a war but merely helping the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong insur- gents within their own territory, has reached a point of no return. Compromise and consensus-perhaps ap- plicable to some of the Nation's great domes- tic problems-cannot be guideposts to for- eign policy. There must be a clear-cut and courageous decision. And though in Viet- nam we face the hard problem of risking much to gain little, the risk must be taken; we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. We must use what it takes to win. Our policy should not be "unconditional surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal of victory should be the defeat of Communist attempts to conquer South Vietnam and ex- tend their control deep into southeast Asia. The reasons we must fight for Vietnam have little to do with making Saigon safe for democracy or freedom. There has been far too much cant on this point, far too much effort devoted to trying to establish a polit- ically legitimate South Vietnamese Govern- ment after our own image. Nor does it do much good to argue the past, debating whether or not we should have become in- volved in Vietnam in the first place. The facts are that Communist expansionism in Asia has been consistent, related and pro- gressive, that the end of the Korean war, without a simultaneous settlement in Viet- nam, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh the opportunity in southeast Asia they have so well exploited. Belatedly, but nevertheless clearly, the United States became aware of the threat. Our commitments to Saigon began in the Eisenhower administration and were enor- mously amplified after the Kennedy admin- istration took power 4 years ago. Today, we are committed-fully committed-by the words of Presidents and Cabinet members, by the actions of the Government, by the deep involvement of U.S. military forces. U.S. global prestige and power is intimate- ly bound up with the outcome of the Viet- namese struggle. In Vietnam, we are at- tempting to formulate an answer to the Com- munist strategy of creeping aggression, of subversion and insurgency, of what Khrush- chev called "wars of national liberation." If the might and will of the United States cannot evolve a victorious answer to such tactics, we are undone; the map of the world will gradually become red. And if we will not fight in Vietnam, where-after the series of Communist conquests in the past 20 years -will we fight? Where will we draw the line? The psychological and political conse- N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, as I indicated in earlier remarks on the floor of the House, I am inserting in the CON- GRESSIONAL RECORD an article by Mr. Han- son W. Baldwin,. respected military com- mentator, which appeared in the Sunday New York Times Magazine for February 21, 1965. In the article, entitled "We Must Choose-(1) 'Bug Out,' (2) Negotiate, (3) Fight," Mr. Baldwin argues for a greater use of American military power in Vietnam. He believes we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. While I do not agree with Mr. Bald- win's observations and. recommendations in every instance, it is my belief that he has made a distinct contribution to the dialog on this issue. Among his suggestions which I .believe should be implemented are these, First, the United States itself must pro- vide maximum possible security for our installations in South Vietnam. Rather than rely on the South Vietnamese as we have in the past, we should use U.S. armed guards to defend against Vietcong attacks on our airplanes, helicopters, barracks, and other facilities. Second, Mr. Baldwin points out that coordination between the various U.S. agencies working in Vietnam could be further improved. This problem was evi- dent to me during my visits to Vietnam, the last in October 1963. Apparently there has been some improvement, but more could be done to streamline our op- erations, Further, he suggests that military troops in Vietnam be made responsible for holding the areas cleared of Vietcong guerrillas, a task at present being done by internal security forces. This recom- mendation.deserves careful attention. I do not agree, however, with Mr. Bald- win's belief that a commitment of U.S. combat troops under United States- South Vietnamese joint command is nec- essary at this time. Rather, I would hope to see greater efforts being made to convince our allies in Southeast Asia-especially the South Koreans, Nationalist Chinese and the Filipinos-to send forces into South Vietnam to assist in defeating Com- munist aggression there. WE MUST CHOOPV; (1) "BUG OUT,,, (2) NEGOTIAy'E, (3) P IGHT (By Hanson W. Baldwin) What should we, do-"bug out" or fight? Should we be hawkp or doves? Or is there a third choice-negotiations now? .quences of a U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a U.S. withdrawal, or a negotiated peace likely to lead to a Communist takeover, would be disastrous in much of Asia. It would under- mine Thailand (already openly threatened by Peiping), Laos (even now half conquered by communism), Malaya, the Philippines (with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma, India, Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa, and Australia. For a long time after the politically stale- mated end of the Korean war, Peiping was successfully depicting the United States to the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The defeat of the French-backed heavily by American aid-in Indochina enhanced this image of a windy, weak-willed, feeble Uncle Sam. That image has since been dispelled by V.S. actions in and around the Taiwan Straits, during the Cuban missile crisis and, recently, by President Johnson's retaliatory air attacks upon North Vietnamese objectives. ,But the portrait of flabby indecision could be easily revived if the United States loses in Strategically, South Vietnam is too im- portant to be allowed to go by default. North Vietnam badly needs the rice of the A783 South. More imporant, the area is the tra- ditional rice bowl of the continent. Geo- graphically, Vietnam is a long appendix pointing toward the rich archipelago of In- donesia and abutting strategic sea passages. Whoever dominates it will eventually control most of the Indonesian archipelago. The strategic importance of the area is similar to the so-called "rimlands," or mari- time nations, of Western Europe which repre- sent a powerful bastion against the "heart- land" of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the non- Communist strategic position vis-a-vis Red China is based upon mainland positions- Pakistan, India, southeast Asia, and the is- land bastions of the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and Japan. If the "rimlands" of Asia fall to communism, the island positions will be doomed sooner or later. Ultimately the Communists will challenge us upon what is now our unchallenged domain-the oceans. In a word, we must remain in southeast Asia for our own security needs. South Viet- nam is in itself not "vital" in the sense that the United States cannot live without it. But if lost we would be forced to commence the next chapter of the world conflict in re- treat, and at a disadvantage. Despite the admitted importance of South Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the cur- rent breed of neoisolationists and the "doves" who believe we must cut our losses and get out advance many arguments against deeper involvement and in favor of with- drawal. Most of the arguments represent the voices of defeat and despair, caution and fear. "Why not negotiate now?" Any negotiations opened now would lead from weakness, not strength. If we want to negotiate-and not to surrender-we shall have to raise our ante considerably. And "meaningful" negotiations are "meaning- ful" to the Communists only if they are faced with superior power and a position of strength. We must "arm to parley." Personally, I seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as some quarters have suggested, by neutraliz- ing the area politically and militarily; in short, by eliminating the struggle for in- fluence between Communists and non-Com- munists. Nevertheless, we need not fear negotiations if we speak from strength, by really putting up a fight for Vietnam. Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on North Vietnam would serve notice on Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow that the United States will no longer tolerate "sanctuary warfare." They might-hopefully-force Hanoi to the conference table. Indeed, such a policy would appear to be the minimum necessary to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even such a program will not "win" the war, in the South. "If the French couldn't win, how can the United States achieve victory?" The implication of this argument is two- fold: (1) we have donned the colonial mantle of the French, and (2) our power is no greater than that of Paris. Both suggestions are absurd. As some of our diplomats have found to their discomfort, South Vietnam is dis- tinctly an independent country-not, as in France's day, part of a colonial empire. In fact, the fear of Chinese Communist colonial- ism is probably greater in all of Vietnam, and in North Vietnam in particular, than the fear of United States "imperialism." As fol' a comparison between the political, eco- nomic, and military power of the United States and France, there is none. Particu- larly in the air and at sea we can mobilize power completely unavailable to France, backed up by the ultimate force which France did not possess-a nuclear arsenal. "You can't win a war against guerrillas." Not true. We have dressed up the fight- ing in Vietnam with a fancy name-"coun- terinsurgency," but some of its basic mill- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 A784 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 23 tary elements resemble the kind of war Americans have fought successfully many times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and behind the main fighting fronts during the Korean war. Other anti-Communist guer- rilla wars were won in Greece, the Philip- pines, and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to have done a pretty good job of stamping out the rebellion in Angola. Guerrillas can be defeated, but it takes careful organization, special training, and security forces that should be from 10 to 30 times larger than the guerrillas. It takes infinite determina- tion and patience. "Continued fighting or expanded U.S. in- volvement will mean higher U.B. casualties and greater risks of broadening the war." Of course. You cannot win a war without spilling blodd. We must pay the price of power. Risks are unavoidable in any for- eign policy worthy of its name. The ques- tion Is not whether there will be risks, but the degree of risk. For against the perils of action -must be weighed the perils of in- action. Political and military history clearly reveal that compromise, hesitancy or ap- peasement merely lead to ultimate disaster. In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater the price we shall have to pay for even par- tial victory (as we are now discovering), and the more restricted our choice of options. "We-have no moral right to be in Vietnam, or to attack North Vietnam." Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North Vietnam have the right to support the civil war in the South. Our involvement was a response to Communist aggression. Since the-beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied and directed the Vietcong Insurgency. We were Invited by the South Vietnamese Gov- ernment to come to Its aid. A high moral purpose Is an essential element of our foreign policy but we can be left with no purpose- moral or otherwise-if we are conquered by the doctrine that the ends justify the means. If we are inhibited from action by Hamlet- like Indecision over legalistic concepts of International law, we shall lose the world. "What's the use of further ;military in- volvement,, when the political instability of South Vietnam pulls the rug from under our feet?" Here is one of the more cogent objections to greater involvement. But In the long history of Vietnam there have always been feudfng sects and factions. Moreover, the French left behind them a people still un- equipped for self-government., Yet some- how or other the war has gone on, and some- what better in some respects recently. Great- er U.S. involvement-above all, a tangible determination to. win-may well do more for Safgon'a``political stability than any amount of diplomatic pressures. "Isn't the real danger that escalation might involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't the Chinese come in?" "This is the $64 million question. It is "quite clear that if the United States becomes more involved we must be prepared for great- er effort by the enemy. Escalation In some form would be not only possible, but likely. But we have advantages. We are fighting, as we, did in Korea, on a, peninsula when. our superior sea 'and air power can be most effective. North Vietnam's few powerplants and Industries are vulnerable to destruction. The Gulf of Tonkin is easily blockaded. And China itself, with an obsolete air force and minimal naval power, could not defend itself effectively against a determined air and sea attack. Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the United States in Vietnam may well be an- swered by an increased flow of supplies and men from North Vietnam, perhaps by an all- out attack by the North 'Vietnamese Army, and perhaps ultimately by aid from China into South Vietnam. Though the flow could be hampered and reduced by air attacks it could not be completely halted. It is quite possible that the United States might be= come involved in a new kind of Korean war. But this would not be hopeless by any means. In fact, some well-informed authorities be- lieve the United States could win a Korean type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against the best that the Chinese Communists could throw against us. "What about the specter of nuclear weap- ons? Wouldn't Russia join in, even if China didn't have enough A-bombs to do us any harm?" There is no Certain answer to these ques- tions, but a full scale nuclear war Is highly unlikely. The United States has scared itself to death by its own nuclear propaganda. The fear of a nuclear exchange-never probable, or even likely-has been the greatest single restraint upon a positive and firm U.S. diplo- macy since World War U. Presidents and public alike have been in- hibited by the nightmare of the mushroom cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis should be remembered. Is it in any way probable that the Kremlin would risk for Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba? Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would Russia invite its own destruction as a nation by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in any cause except the defense of its own soil? The questions answer themselves. We must also remember the risks of delay. If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation to- day by Peiping, how much greater will it be tomorrow when China will have accumulated a stockpile of weapons? Time is restricting our options. Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are large enough to warrant the risks of greater U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise our ante, the enemy will. The Communists are implacably determined to triumph, and the only factor that can prevent their vic- tory is superior power in all its forms. More of the same on our part will no longer serve any purpose, save slow defeat. . What should we do? First and foremost, we must recognize as a Government and as a people that we are fighting a war in Viet- nam, not merely advising how to fight one. Such a recognition would awaken a greater sense of national and military determination, inspire a Presidential and congressional enunciation of purpose, and create a more streamlined military operation in Vietnam. Second, the United States itself must pro- vide maximum possible security in Vietnam to major U.S. Installations, such as airfields, supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary McNamara's statement that it was impossible to guard against such attacks as those re- cently made by the Vietcong against U.S. airfields and barracks is no answer. Of course, 100-percent security is impossible in any war; defense against terrorism and sabo- tage is especially difficult. But there is no doubt whatsoever that we can provide better security to key installations than the South Vietnamese, who have been responsible for the job in the past. We need U.S. ground tactical units in South Vietnam to defend our installations. We need infantry battalions, military police companies, Army Engineers, and Navy Sea- bees to build aircraft revetments, dugouts, and protected barracks. Yet all this is pure- ly defensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties but it will not win the war. Another essential measure is simplifica- tion and streamlining of both the high mili- tary command and the "country team units, composed of representatives from various Government agencies, that support our aid effort in Vietnam. We must get more Americans and more Vietnamese out of the bistros of Saigon and Into the bush. The coordination between the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State De- partment, the U.B. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development is far better than it once was. But it is still far from perfect, in Saigon or in Washington. The war has shown, for instance, that South Vietnamese-United States teams have been able in many instances to carry out the military portion of the "clear and hold" prescription for victory. But AID-not the military-is responsible for police and in- ternal security forces in Vietnam, and these cadres rarely have been able to hold an area once it has been cleared of the Vietcong. Perhaps military troops should be charged with the "hold," as well as the "clear," part of the operations. Certainly internal polic- ing needs a major overhaul. A basic change in the prescription for vic- tory demands a United States-South Viet- namese unified command such as now exists in South Korea. Continuous and heavy air and sea at- tacks against staging areas, supply routes, training fields, camps and recuperation cen- ters of the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam and Laos will be necessary for any appreciable diminution in the flow of men and supplies to the Communists. The one- shot retaliatory raids have only temporary and minimum military importance; viewed as political and psychological warnings, they are likely to provoke the Vietcong and North Vietnam to a redoubled war effort. The history of airpower dictates the need for unrelenting, massive attacks. Bombing targets in North Vietnam probably would have to be broadened to include power- plants, bridges, industries, road junctions, docks and oil storage facilities. A naval blockade and naval gunfire may well supple- ment the air bombardment. To carry out effectively any such program as this, U.S. air and naval forces in the Western Pacific would require material strengthening. Meanwhile, it would take years of effort in- side South Vietnam itself to reduce the Viet- cong to manageable proportions. Much larger and better led, South Vietnamese forces would be necessary. They would have to be supplemented by MS. ground troops- perhaps In small numbers at first, but more later, particularly if North Vietnamese regu- lar forces and Chinese soldiers joined the Vietcong. How many U.S. soldiers would be needed Is uncertain-probably a minimum of three tb six divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or brigade-size units), possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy, and supporting units, perhaps 200,000 to 1 million Americans would be fighting in Viet- nam. Obviously, this would mean a Korea-type conflict, a major war, no matter what euphe- misms would be used. Nor could we wage it in the present "business as usual" economy. We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed-up military production. Many weak- nesses In our military structure would need strengthening. Even so, we could not an- ticipate quick success. The war would be long, nasty, and wearing. No one could relish such a prospect as this; the stark statistics of war explain the Presi- dent's reluctance to embark upon a path that has no turning. Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the struggle for freedom; there is no good place to die. And it Is far better to fight in Viet- nam-on China's doorsteep-than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 ? CONGRESSIONAL.,RECQRD.-.APPENDIX, A777. of useful, products for mankind. Upon his death, of January 5, 1943, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's telegram to Tuskegee In- Ititute said, "all mankind are the beneficiaries of his discoveries." Justice Felix Frankfurter EXTENSION OF REMARKS .,,.._ OF HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE OF,MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, February 8, 1965 Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, a few short years ago at the law school in Cambridge, a bust of Justice Felix Frankfurter was presented to take its place alongside four other great jurists of our century: Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Learned Hand. Now Pro- fessor Frankfurter, for he remained a teacher throughout his judicial tenure, has joined those others in answering that summons, for which no continu- ance can be granted. Professor. Frank- furter will require no extension of time to plead. His life exemplified the creed espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he spoke to the 50th anni- versary of his class in June 1911: To see so far as one may, and, to feel the great forces that are behind every detail * * * to' hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work as one can, to try to make it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised. All of this Justice Frankfurter has done, The words of his last major opin- ion filed in dissent in March 1962, in the Tennessee apportionment case sounded a warning bell that still rings true today: The Justice wrote: "The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only 5 years ago. "Such a massive repudiation of the ex- perience of our whole past in asserting de- structively novel judiciary power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our constitutional system. "Disregard of inherent limits in the effec- tive exercise of the Court's `judicial power' not only presages the futility of judicial in- tervention in the essentially political con- flict of forces. * * * it may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of `the supreme law of the land' in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce. "PUBLIC CONFIDENCE "The Court's authprity-processed neither of the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction, Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entangle- ments and by abstention frorp injecting it- self into the clash of political forces in political settlements." The struggle Justice Frankfurter went through in leaving his personal convictions behind carte through most sharply in his 1943 c ssent. in.. the flag salute case. The Court reversed a previous decision and ruled .that children of Jehovah's Witnesses could not be forced to salute the U.S. flag at school. Frankfurter, disagrgeeing, said: "One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely per- sonal attitude relevant I should whole- heartedly associate myseit with the general libertarian views in the Coirt's opinion, rep- resenting as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. "FEELING AS JUDGE ".But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. * * * As a member of this Court I am not justi- fedin writing my private notions into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard." He was with the majority in ruling that congressional committees must make clear to witnesses the pertinency of questions; in drawing a sharp distinction between sub- versive thought and action; and in striking down the State Department's restrictive passport regulations as not authorized by law. Perhaps his most bitter defeat on the Court was his last one. That was the Ten- nessee apportionment case where six Justices voted to allow lower Federal courts to hear the complaints of citizens who think un- equal voting, districts dilute their right to vote. For Justice Frankfurter, the Court's de- cision to step into what he called a political thicket was tragic. The lamps of learning he has lit shall' light the paths of countless generations yet unborn. National Lutheran Council Endorses Pres- ident Johnson's Immigration Bill EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. JOHN BRADEMAS OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, under -unanimous. consent, I insert in the REC- ORD the text of a resolution adopted by the National Lutheran Council support- ing President Johnson' proposal for re- vision of the immigration law. Although the Lutheran Church, Mis- souri Synod, does not officially partici- pate in the National Lutheran Council, it wishes to be associated with the sub- stance of this resolution. The text of the resolution follows: RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION Whereas the National Lutheran Council has consistently expressed hope that Congress will establish immigration laws, "just to all and ministering most truly to the public welfare"; and Whereas the National Lutheran Council has stated its "firm conviction that the exist- ing immigration legislation has severe short- comings, as a result of which neither tradi- tional Christian humanitarianism nor en- lightened self-interest are adequately ex- hibited," and has expressed hope that Con- gress will "seek a just and workable sub- stitute for the national origins quota system"; and Whereas the Statement "Immigration Pol- icy: Moral Issues. and the National Interest," endorsed by the National Lutheran Council at its meeting on February 4, 1960, com- mended for study and consideration the fol- lowing'flve possible objectives as the basis of a revised U.S. immigration law: 1: To supply `our permanent population with a steady proportion 'of newcomers who have chosen the United states as their new homeland and who can impart to their American neighbors an understanding of-the cultures, attitudes, and interests of other races and peoples of the world. 2. To assume the United States proper share of, international responsibility for the resettlement of refugees and of other per- sons urgently in need of the compassionate haven of a new homeland. 3. To facilitate the reuniting of families. 4. To facilitate the entry of persons pos- sessing special skills or other capacities needed by the American economy and cul- ture. 5. To admit annually a reasonable number of the persons described above on an objec- tive basis of selection which, while discrimi- nating, will not be discriminatory with re- spect to race, national origin, color, or re- ligion, testifying thereby to the U.S. recogni- tion of the interlocking and mutual interests of all nations with regard to the migration of people, the interaction of cultures and respect of universal human rights; and Whereas the proposed legislation submitted to Congress by President Johnson on Jan- uary 13, 1965, represents substantial progress toward the fulfillment of the basic hopes and objectives expressed in prior National Lu- theran Council resolutions: Therefore be it Resolved, That the he National Lutheran Council reaffirm its` concern for a fair and just immigration law, and express its hope that Congress will enact into law the prin- ciples and objectives contained in the Presi- dent's proposal now before Congress; and be it further Resolved, That the congregations of the member bodies of the National Lutheran Council be encouraged to welcome lmmi- grants into their fellowship and to assist them in continuing integration into com- munity life. NSION OF REMARKS OF HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, when the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is finally written, a great American news- paper-the New York Times-will have a special place for having lived up to the highest standard of courageous and in- cisive journalism. No newcomer to this complex issue, the New York Times pub- lished articles by Pulitzer Prize winner David Halberstram and Homer Bigart which brought to light the realities of the dictatorial Diem regime. Recently James Reston has analyzed the complex- ities of Vietnam in a number of pene- trating articles, and the New York Times has put special emphasis on Vietnam on the editorial page in a series of in-depth editorials. I commend the following three editorials to my colleagues: [From the New York Times, Feb. 19, 1965] THE WAR HAWKS A comparatively small group of Americans, at this moment predominantly political in character and predominantly Republican in Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-ROP67B00446R000300170003-8 A778 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 28 politics, is doing its best to multiply the perils and frustrations of the war in southeast Asia. This group ignores the realities of the pres- ent situation. It ignores the obvious war- weariness of the people of South Vietnam. It ignores the steady stream of desertions from the Vietnamese Army. It ignores the diffi- culty of protecting isolated American bases against the surprise attacks of guerrillas. It ignores the possibility of an invasion of South V etnam by the very considerable North Viet ese Army. It ignores the problem of how an aerial counterattack could cope successfully with a massive ground at- tack of this character. It ignores the pos- sibility of Chinese Intervention. It ignores the logistics and belittles the cost in lives lost, blood spilled and treasure wasted, of fighting a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles from the coast of California. The whole aim of this group is to expand the Vietnamese war, even if it means drawing in China and perhaps the Soviet Union as well. By its lights, President Johnson's dec- laration that the United States seeks no wider war is as much a prescription for fail- ure as any attempt at a negotiated peace. It is one thing to say, as Secretary McNamara did in his testimony yesterday, that this country has "no other alternative than con- tinuing to support South Vietnam against the Red`gUerrilla onslaught." It is quite an- other to argue that the road out of the pres- ent hazardous situation is to invite world destruction. The American people made it overwhelmingly clear in the last election that they do not want to plunge recklessly down that road. any real effectiveness. It Is more urgent than ever for President Johnson to take a new, hard look at this 'worsening morass before honorable extrication from it becomes impossible. [From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1965] THE DEBATE ON VIETNAM A great debate on the Vietnamese conflict is now raging all over the United States. It ,goes from the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon to every home, office, - factory, and farm. it is unresolved because the Gov- ernment has not yet decided on its policy or, if it has, President Johnson is not telling the American people. The debate's subject, in its simplest form, is Whether to fight a big war in Vietnam or to seek a way out through a combination of continuing de- fense and diplomatic negotiation. The case for a vastly stepped-up American military commitment-as set forth in today's Magazine by military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin-is that the "Communist strategy of creeping aggression" must be stopped in Vietnam before it swallows all of Asia and the world. Under this theory, the United States should undertake saturation bombing been that our military position is too weak to allow negotiations. Every week it has grown weaker, and the latest upheavals in the Vietnamese military and political struc- ture indicate that total collapse may be im- minent. To send hundreds of thousands of Americans into an endless jungle war or to bomb North Vietnamese ports and industrial centers on a saturation basis would be a surer road to global holocaust than to a victory arms can never win for either side. All of Idaho Welcomes 1965 Girl Scout Roundup EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. COMPTON I. WHITE, JR. OF IDAHO IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 2, 1965 Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, of North Vietnam and send as many as a under leave to extend my remarks in the million American soldiers, sailors, and fliers RECORD, I include the following editorial into a "wear to win." which appeared in the February 18 edi such an approach discards any pretense tion of the Bonners Ferry Herald and that our objective in Vietnam is to protect the Vietnamese people; it turns the conflict which expresses all of Idaho's thoughts l ino a waked ideological struggle that ignores on welcoming the 1965 Internationa all the deep cleavages recent years have Senior Girl Scout Roundup to our north- brought in both the Communist and free em panhandle: worlds. Not one of our major allies in the ALL OF IDAHO WELCOMER 1965 GIRL SCOU' West could be expected to endorse, much less ROIINDUP actively assist, an American involvement so the snow over north Idaho's Far- - massive it would amount to a military occu- Dee p lies State Park where the International of leaderless South Vietnam. Ameri- ragut ca's efforts to demonstrate the superiority Senior Girl Scout Roundup will be held next of its social system by abolishing poverty and summer. In somber silence the pines, the building a Great Society would vanish under firs, and the cedars await the coming of the necessity for pouring our youth and spring, and sleeping on the bosom of the treasure into a limitless solo adventure. earth beneath the - snowy mantle lie the On the Communist side the effect of a countless flower seeds and plants that hold large-scale American assault on North Viet- the promise of many lovely tomorrows. nam would be to resolidify the fragmented And, oh, the memories this land of forest Moscow-Peiping-Hanoi axis. Communist and field, lake and stream, and mountain China would have to send her land armies and meadow holds. to the rescue, as in North Korea, or be Last night the south wind brought its first labeled a paper tiger. Soviet Russia, now promise of the welcome spring. Soughing manifestly unhappy about anything that through the pines, the breezes seemed to be would enhance Chinese prestige or dominion, reminiscing about the days gone by. If would find it almost impossible to stand one would listen close, here's what they aloof. The end result would be an escalation might have heard the breezes say: of such dimensions that no one could be "Long, long ago," the breeze began, "only sure it would not wind up in the kind of friendly Indians came this way. Kalispelms, calamitous atomic exchange Secretary Mc- they called themselves. Friends of the Namara described so graphically in his testi- neighboring Kootenai to the north and the mony last week. Nez Perce to the south. Here they pitched There are many, of course, who contend their tepees, bore their children, and lived that the United States will eventually have their happy lives. And the Great Spirit to to fight a nuclear war with China anyway, Whom they prayed smiled on them. and that it is better to have the showdown "Came then the white men, David Thomp- now when our superiority in weapons and son, Joco Finlay and all the rest of the buck- delivery devices is so great. These are the skin-clad explorers, adventurers, and voy- same people who a decade ago were advanc- ageurs. Strange were the names they gave: ing precisely the same argument on why the Pend d'Oreille, Coeur d'Alene, Mamaloos, United States should not wait to drop the Seneacquoteen. bomb on Moscow. The notion that all Com- "Tirelessly the years rolled on, and little of munists are alike and that all must be de- importance happened here. It was as though stroyed is the road to world annihilation. Fate was saving this area for a greater pur- The struggle between East and West is pose, and it was in 1941 when the world was enormously complex, and nowhere more so engaged in its second great war that destiny than in Vietnam, a country that has been decreed that this should be the site of Far- occupied or neutral for 2,000 years and that ragut Naval Training Station. Barracks, now shows no will to fight in its own defense. fieldhouses, training schools, messhalls spring The Vietnamese, both North and South, have up in five great camps. One hundred thou- an inherited fear and dislike of the Chinese. sand sailors to man the greatest armanda the The Russians undoubtedly have at least as world has ever known were trained here. much- desire as the United States to keep From farm and city these recruits came. them' from being swallowed into Peiping's Pink checked youths they were, some sob- empire. bing out their homesick hearts in the dark- The course of sanity is to explore the initi- ness of the night, some braving their trails atives opened up by Secretary General That with fear in their hearts, some seeking excite- and General de Gaulle for negotiations to ment and adventure, all knowing that some seek a neutralization of Vietnam and all would not . return. But they were Ameri- [From the New York Times, Feb. 20, 1965] REVOLVING DOOR IN SAIGON Personal and group ambitions seem more consequential to some of South Vietnam's key military leaders than the war against the Vietcong. The world worries about the danger of a general war growing out of the U.S. effort to underwrite Vietnamese free- dom with American men, money and arms. Yet, the primary worry for many of the gen- erals and colonels who are supposed to be in direct charge of Saigon's war effort revolves around personal power. In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, at almost the time the latest coup was beginning, Secretary McNa- mara warned that without national unity,and a stable government the South `Vietnamese would not be able to make effective use either of their own armed forces or of the help the United States is giving them. His Words were apparently lost on the battling warlords in Saigon. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this newest in an endless series of internal up- heavals is how unprepared every American policymaker in Saigon or Washington seemed to be for it. The available evidence suggests that the abortive coup was hatched in the South Vietnamese Embassy In Washington, where Colonel Thao was press attache until recently and where Lieutenant General Khiem is currently ambassador. The total surprise of American officialdom indicates an abysmal failure of the Central Intelligence Agency and every branch of military intelli- gence. It is all much too' reminiscent of the days when Washington gave over-ready credence to the late Ngo Dinh Diem's glowing reports of military victories and villages :made secure. The situation in Saigon is still too obscure to permit any forecast of who will emerge as ruler for a day, a week, or a month. But there are enough puzzles about the latest insurgence to raise suspicion that the Viet- cong may have infiltrated the highest coun- cils of the Vietnamese armed forces. Cer- tainly, there is no prospect of the kind of stable government Secretary McNamara has Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 ,.Approved For Release?20,.03/10/14CIA-RDP67B00446R000360170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- APPENDIX .. .:A 1l$.LP 'V1,.: IN130VATIJ The use of term loans in foreign opera- tions is' an adaptation of techniques de- veloped in the United States for domestic lending. As 1s well known, term loans in the United 'States are generally made to finance acquisitions of plants, machinery and equipment, with repayment out of the cash flow-earnings and depreciation-expected to be generated by their use. The lender must satisfy himself that the borrower will, have funds forthcoming to meet his obliga- tions. The ,borrower can obtain terms that give flexibility in repayment schedules and permit efficient use of loan funds. Over half of the total dollar volume of business loans made by major New York City banks consist of term loans. Banks extending term loans abroad must, however, satisfy themselves that the bor- rower will not only generate adequate cash flows but also will be able to convert his local currency earnings into U.S. dol- lars. Exchange risks-including the pos- sibility, however remote, that exchange con- trols may prohibit remittances to the United States-and political risks are as much part and parcel of considerations bearing on the extension of a term loan as the general credit standing of the borrower, Other essential considerations are the balance- of-payments position of the borrower's Country, the level of its gold and foreign exchange reserves and its short-term inter- national indebtedness. Under certain cir- cumstances; a country may appear to be "borrowed up." Many of the term loans extended by U.S. commercial banks to borrowers in less-developed countries have been ar- ranged in conjunction with operations of the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the Agency for International Development and such private lenders as insurance companies. As part of policies to encourage U.S. exports, the Export-Import tank has recently devel- oped comprehensive insurance coverage for banks against political, military, and com- mercial risks. on development loans. This can be expected, as was the intention, to increase the volume of term lending, particularly to some of the less-developed countries. On a number of occasions, U.S,. com- rrierelal banks also have granted loans to foreign governments or central banks as part of packages of financial assistance extended by the International Monetary Fund, some- times in conjunction with credits from the U.S. Treasury or the Export-Import Bank. Such arrangements have often been nego- tiated with Latin American nations. Loans to Europe and Canada have been extended primarily to foreign subsidiaries of American businesses. Sometimes, U.S. firms operating abroad have also been instru-. mental in helping arrange U.S. bank financ- ing for many of the foreign customers and suppliers with whom they do business. Credits have thus been granted to finance purchases of oil tankers, freighters, air- planes, machinery, electrical equipment, etc. Because of their rapid rate of obso- lescence, airplanes have been particularly well suited to financing through bank term loans, with maturities adjusted to the funds generated through earnings and deprecia- tion allowances. Shipping firms have re- ceived substantial amounts of term credit by obtaining long-term charters from major shippers of such raw materials as oil, Iron ore, and bauxite and assigning the charter income to the lenders. Technical, innovations in industry have thus been matched by innovations in bank- ing techniques. Like advances in tech- nology, the bank term loan is spreading to meet the needs of corporate enterprise here as well as abroad. The growth of inter- national trade and multinational business organizations naturally creates demands for flexible financing on an international scale. TERM LOANS AND TIlE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS Term loans help promote U.S. exports in the period following the year when they are granted; this minimizes their impact on the balance of payments. Subsequent repay- ments of the loans with interest increase V.S. balance-of-payments receipts. . Foreigners not only borrow in the United States but also keep deposits in U.S. banks and hold bankers acceptances and other A765 short -ter mI investments. Some of these de- posits are normally connected with the loans granted them by U.S. banks. In fact, most nations hold short-term assets in U.S. banks in excess of the sums they borrow from them, The relevant data for selected countries are summed up in the table, which also shows the value of U.S. trade with the nations concerned. Among the leading net debtors is Japan; its assets in the United States are, however, large. Japan is the second largest customer of the United States. This group of coun- tries also includes several Latin American countries and Norway (because of shipping loans). U.S. banking credits to foreigners set against the background of foreigners' short-term assets in the United States and U.S. foreign trade, August 1964, [In millions of dollars] U.S. bank credits abroad Foreign short-term U S ex- U.S im Short term Long term assets in the United . . ports ? . - ports 2 States I Canada-------------------------------------------- Italy 694 270 3,065 4,572 4,060 ----------------------------------------------- United Kngdom------------------------------------ 94 277 260 72 1,057 1, 951 8825 1 384 8 503 1 115 Germany------------------------------------------- Argentina 133 133 2,361 1,217 , 1,100 ------------------------------------------ Venezuela------------------------------------------ 175 137 78 36 307 707 215 675 145 940 France--------------------------------------------- Switzerland------------------- 72 88 42 25 1,525 774 480 --------------------- Belgium-------------------------------`------------ 31 71 1,102 424 341 4606 256 4418 Sweden ------------------?----------------?---_-- Netherlands------------------- - 31 40 69 13 609 278 197 --?_--_- ------ Japan---------------------------------------------- Mexico 2,471 833 316 2,614 905 1,868 217 1,625 --------------------------------------------- Brazil ---------------------------------------------- 572 153 415 209 674 221 967 343 649 562 Colombia------------------------------------------ Philippines----------------------------------------- 250 179 56 120 .149 216 249 360 266 366 Norway-------------------------------------------- Chile 35 249 171 104 117 ----------------------------------------------- 187 23 172 164 193 I Official and private. s Year ended August 1964. S Including Trieste. 4 Including Luxembourg. NOTE.-The countries are arranged in 2 groups: those where U.S, bank credits, both short and long term, are smaller than short-term dollar assets held by them in U.S. banks and vice versa. Within each group, the countires are arranged according to the size of U.S. bank credits to them, Bank lending also appears as a compli- cating factor. In our balance of payments because of the way in which Government statisticians present their accounts. When an American citizen makes a deposit in a foreign bank or a loan to a foreigner, the transaction is recorded as a capital outflow; but when a foreigner makes a deposit in a U.S. bank or buys V.S. short-term paper, the transaction is considered as one of the means of "financing" the U.S. payments defi- cit rather than a capital inflow that helps reduce the deficit. A committee of Govern- ment-appointed experts, which, under the chairmanship of Edward M. Bernstein, has since April 1963 been examining the asym- metries and anomalies in U.S. balance-of- payments bookkeeping, is to report its find- ings this month. One thing is certain. Bank loans abroad to finance V.S. exports and other interna- tional business do not result in a loss of U.S. interntaional wealth. They help ex- pand U.S. exports and job opportunities and incomes at home. They speed up economic development abroad. The law providing for the interest equalization tax, with its im- plied threat of removing the exemption for bank term loans, should be allowed to expire on its scheduled date at the end of 1965. Even if some immediate advantage were to be gained for our balance of payments by controls over bank lending, it would be more than offset by the damage such controls would do to the standing of the dollar as A Bill To Broaden Coverage of Social Security Benefits EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. PAUL A. FINO OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, today I re- introduced my bill to broaden coverage of social security benefits to include brothers, sisters, and other dependent relatives of a deceased individual fully insured under the act. At present, a dependent brother, sister, or other relative of a deceased wage. earner is left in the cold as far as social security payments when that wage earn- er dies. Except for funeral expenses paid, all of the deceased's social secu- rity contributions are lost unless there is a surviving spouse. My proposed legislation would remedy this great injustice. Under this legis- lation, if a dependent brother, sister, or relative of an unmarried wage earner can show that he or she was receiving at least, hatV support from the R' e Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX ebruary 23 earner, that dependent would be en- titled to monthly insurance benefits. To my mind, this sort of humanization of our existing social security law is a necessity. What My Country Means to Me EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. E. ROSS ADAIR OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, it is with a great deal of pride that I call attention to the signal achievement of one of the eighth-grade students of the Whitley County, Ind., schools, Richard Redman. Richard, who is enrolled in Marshall Me- morial School-named after Indiana's onetime Vice President-recently was judged first-place winner for his essay entitled, "What My Country Means to Me." Richard's essay was in competition with 50 other entries in the eighth-grade contest in Whitley County schools. We can all take to heart the warm, pa- triotic message of this fine, young Amer- ican. After reading his essay, it is easy to understand why it was judged a first- place winner. The prize-winning essay follows: WHAT MY COUNTRY MEANS TO ME (By Richard Redmap, Columbia City, Ind.) As a good American citizen, I feel it is my solved without controls and compulsion. Yet duty to love, honor, and cherish the rights the squeeze of Presidential power was exerted and freedoms which have been guaranteed as bluntly and directly as if a collection of to me and all other Americans in the Bill Soviet provincial managers, planners, and of Rights. This "charter of liberty" guar- bureaucrats had been summoned to the antees such fundamental rights as freedom Kremlin to get their instructions about the of religion, freedom of speech and of the regulation of the Communist economy.- press, and the right of privacy and security. We have come to a fine pass in this coun- It is important for me to understand that try when free enterprise is being reduced step freedom is not the privilege of doing what I by step to an obsolete phrase and govern- want to do without regard for other people. ment calls all the signals. As one of Mr. In spite of America's great strides forward Johnson's auditors from Chicago observed, in education, individual enterprise, Indus- "Nobody asked the President anything. We try, inventions, etc., there is still work to be just sat there." done. America is not a utopia by any means. Perhaps the President's tactics will pro- There are many problems to cope with, such, vide the financial and business community as crime, poverty, unemployment, racial ten- with a new perspective on his methods. sion, foreign entangelments, and corrupt Many of its members supported him in last politics. Problems, weaknesses, and ob- November's election, and a roundup of opin- stacles in the American way of life do not ion in the current U.S. News & World Report decrease my patriotism; on the contrary, they shows that he still commands much favor. increase my loyalty and devotion to God and Many of those interviewed seem to have my country. They make me more conscious learned the catchwords of the "Great Society" of my individual responsibility as a Chris- in justification of the "new economics." For tian citizen. They challenge me and all cit- example, a merchandiser says that while red izens "to carry ahead the ideals of democ- ink in Government is always a worry, "there racy and keep the faith of our Fathers." is a question whether there is really an in- What my country means to me is sum- crease in red ink if you compare the national marized excellently in William Tyler Page's debt to the gross national product." words, written in 1917 and later officially Another executive isn't worried about deft- adopted as "The American's Creed." This city because "a business must operate within it creed reads as follows: "I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; a government whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign Nation of many sovereign States; a perfect union, one and inseparable, estab- lished upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes. "I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it; to support its Constitu- tion; to obey its laws; to respect its flag; and to defend it against all enemies." I am an American youth. Because of my age, I am not a voter, a property owner, a wage earner, or an official. Nevertheless I am a citizen. Regardless of my age-yes, even because of it-I am important to my country and my country is very important to me. What I do, say, or think at school, at home, at church, on the street, or wherever I may be is an indication of the kind of citizen that I am and want to be. Naturally, it makes me feel proud to refer to America as my country, but when I con- sider how it came to be mine, my pride is overshadowed with humility. I did not choose tihs great land to he my homeland; it was by the grace of God that I was born here and that this land of freedom and op- portunity became mine. Furthermore, as I live today in the 20th century, under the blessing of God, I am enjoying a civilization established, preserved, and extended by oth- ers; their work and sacrifices have made my country great. These facts cause me to un- derstand and appreciate my American heri- tage, and they influence site to do to the best of my ability what God and my country ex- pect me to do. Someone has said, "The difficult thing to remember about patriotism is that it is a sentiment to which is tied a bundle of obli- gations." These obligations are mine even as a youth. Now and all through my life I must live and work to preserve liberty and democ- racy. I can do this now through obeying laws, getting a good education, and being in- terested in local, national, and world affairs. Later in my life, there will come opportu- nities for voting, jury service, and perhaps military duty, to name just a few of the many privileges and responsibilities which will be mine as a worthy citizen of this country which means so much to me. The late President Kennedy beautifully summarized each citizen's obligation to- ward his country when he said, "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include the follow- ing editorial from the Chicago Tribune dated February 20, 1965: ORDERS FROM ow HIGH The presidents and chairmen of the boards of nearly all the major corporations and banks doing a large international business were called to the White House Thursday to serve as a captive audience while President Johnson gave them their orders. His com- mand was that they reduce oversee, invest- ments and loans this year in order to help correct the deficit in the international bal- ance of payments which arises largely be- cause of the administration's own policies. The banks were told to cut foreign lend- ing 75 percent and the corporations were di- rected to reduce their flow of dollars out of the country by 15 to 20 percent. The leaders of the business and banking communities were then steered respectively to the Com- merce Department and to the Federal Re- serve, where they were directed to file a flock of reports with Washington whenever they made a decision to send dollars abroad. Mr. Johnson showed the iron hand in the velvet glove by expressing the hope that the balance-of-payments problem could be its own relatively limited resources, wh e "the resources of the Federal Government are limited only by the total wealth of the country." This gentleman adds, "This phi- losophy would have made our fathers' hair stand on end, but nevertheless it is a fact. More and more conservative businessmen are coming to the view that you can't look at Government in the same way you view a business." A Wall Streeter comments, "We might as well give this fiscal innovation of deficit financing an opportunity to prove itself." A fuel supplier admits the "Great Society" will produce "continued inflation and an inflated dollar, but lots of goods will be sold under it.,, To a surprising degree, the greatest spend- er in history has been viewed up to now as a "conservative" and a "middle-of-the- roader." But we find a more dispassionate view in the dissent of one businessman: "More and more, the Government is telling you how to run your business-whom you must hire, how much you must pay, whom you cannot fire. In 20 years, if this keeps up, there will be on incentive to be a busi- nessman." Isn't this a fair description of what hap- pened at the Washington conference? Was not the President telling the 370 men in his audience how to run their businesses? And what could they do but sit and take it? TENSION OF REMARKS HON. CRAIG HOSMER OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the cur- rent issue of the American Security Council's Washington Report, dated Feb- ruary 22, contains a remarkably percep- tive essay by Frank J. Johnson, the publication's foreign editor. It reads as follows : WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW A great swirl of climactic events has fol- lowed President Johnson's order to give con- crete effect to his repeated warnings to the Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67g00446RO 300170003-8 19 65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A767 Communists to cease their aggression against South, Vietnam. The difficult but extremely necessary decisions have at last been taken, Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere of crisis is created by the outraged cries and threats of international communism. Just as inevitably, the calls for a "negotiated settlement" are redoubled on the free world side of the line. Many well-meaning people find it difficult to understand why President Johnson does not at least accompany his military action by an offer to enter into im- mediate, negotiations to end the Vietnam war. Undoubtedly, the President would like nothing better-nor would any other person of good will-if negotiation presently offered a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this pledge which we must honor if there is ever to be any hope of lasting peace in the world. But in considering negotiation the adminis- tration is faced with a series of very un- pleasant facts, which are either unknown or forgotten by the general public. ,One set of facts concerns the inherent na- ture of guerrilla wars. The military tactics and political purposes of such wars are not subject to stalemate or compromise. For ex- ample, much of the current argument for negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a "military victory" for either side is impossi- ble. This is begging the question. Since World War It, when the guerrilla war came into vogue, they have invariably been won or lost. Either the guerrillas "win" in the sense of achieving a takeover of the country or government in question, or else they are mili- tarily defeated, at least to the point where they are reduced to a harmless remnant. There have been no exceptions to this rule. The ?guerrillas triumphed completely against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the French in Algeria and Indochina (except here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather than risk U.S, intervention), against the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against Batista in Cuba. They were de- cisively defeated in Greece, the Philippines, Mal, a 'burins and-apparently=Vene- These statements might be written off as mere propaganda bargaining were they not backed up by a great deal of background in- formation coming out of Communist China, which indicate that she believes time and events are very much on her side. Since the second hypothesis for negotiations is that they must include Communist China, her attitude is obviously decisive to the outcome. Here are some of the more public facts which the President must consider: (1) Between December 21, 1964, and Jan- uary 4, 1965, the first session of the Third National People's Congress was convened in Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders of Communist China. In addition to state- ments by Marshall Ho Lung, boasting that the Chinese people's army has been con- siderably enlarged, supplied with up-to- date equipment, and is now supported by powerful naval and air force units, the Chinese published, on December 30, an ab- breviated version of Premier Chou En-lai's report on Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The speech reflected great pride and self- confidence resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the "very serious difficulties" between 1959 and 1961, resulting from the failure of the "great leap forward," and the intention of trans- forming China into a world power with the most modern industry, agriculture, tech- nology, and defense within the shortest pos- sible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou pledged support to all-and he listed each one-revolutionary movements and centers of unrest. He declared that Peiping would consider negotiation with the United States only after it had given up Taiwan and would deal with the United Nations only when it had thrown out Nationalist China. Chou further asserted that the East wind would prevail over the West wind, and that favorable conditions for such an outcome are the "storm centers of world revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The speech forces the conclusion that the Chi- nese Communists are not only conscious of another point he actually made In the inter- view. Unless he can be shaken in this con- viction there is no possible basis for negoti- ation with China. MUST STOP REDS It is easy for those without responsibility to call for "negotiation," as though this were the automatic panacea for all the world's ills. But the U.S. Government is faced with the kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as much more grim data of a secret nature, which cannot be shrugged off. This is why it has consistently rejected calls for a new Geneva Conference and why even the British have supported this stand. It is accepted as axiomatic by most policymakers that under present circumstances negotiation could lead only to an American defeat. Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not simply for reasons of foolish national pride, but because the Chinese have made it so very plain that Vietnam is only part of a much wider plan for aggrandizement and troublemaking. We are helping Vietnam because it is in the interest. of free men everywhere that the Communist challenge be halted at this point. The President is trying to create a new psychological situation in Asia. His decision to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only one which offers any hope of success. It has been long overdue and is all the more diffi- cult for that reason, but It is still not too late. Mr. Johnson should be warmly con- gratulated for his action. If we carry through our policy with resolution there is still an excellent chance that we can "win" the Vietnam war at least in the sense that the Communists are, induced to call off the war as a bad business and eiher withdraw the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease outside aid completely and leave them to their fate. Only then can there be a gen- uine basis for a negotiation which will ratify this decision. The Communists will not come willingly or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Pre- vious U.S. vacillation has led them to count the Vietnam war as already won. It will probably take time and a great deal of pun- ishment before they call off the war. But they are practical men and eventually bow to reality. What is essential now is that the President be given the time to make the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow without being continu- ally badgered to negotiate. The, calls for negotiation only make the task harder and bloodier because it encourages the Commu- nists to think that we may still falter in our purpose. It is still a Chinese article of faith that the world and domestic pressures can be mobilized to thwart any resolute ac- tion by the U.S. Government. Many past follies have confirmed them in this view- point. TURNING POINT IN HISTORY y ' zuela. Whenever negotiations" were held it their power, but are also prepared to use it was only for the purpose of' ratifying the to support "wars of liberation" wherever pos- guerrilla victory. In the majority" of cases sible in a continuing struggle against "im- this was not of a decisive military nature. perialism." The French were never beaten in Algeria and (2) As a concrete example that Chou even after Dien Bien Phu they could have meant what he said and that the "falling held on at least in, Hanoi and Saigon. The domino" theory in southeast Asia was not Dutch could have held Indonesia for some a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimu- time as could the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But either the will to resist was broken or else a reevaluation of national in- terests caused them to consider the area no longer vital. CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS lated imagination,., Peiping formally an- nounced on February 5, 1965, the formation of a "patriotic front" to overthrow the pro- Western government of Thailand and eradi- cate American influence there. For some time now, Communist agents have been in- filtrating into Thailand in order to form On the basis of all past experience, there- the nucleus for subverting that country. fore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam The Thais have instituted energetic counter- can only have the purpose either of con- measures which have so far kept.them under firming a Communist decison to abandon control, but it is foolish to believe that Thai- A great experiment is underway-the ex- the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an land would or could resist a_Communist take- , periment to see whether we can successfully American decision to admit defeat and with- over backed by China if South Vietnam is contain Communist China on the mainland draw. A cease fire would be meaningless. lost. The Chinese do not even wait until of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to It would only leave the guerrillas in place one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming our children are hideous to contemplate. and free to use the interval to run in more their plans to take over the next one. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive, reinforcements and arms until they were (3) Mao Tse-tung stated in a 'January the ambition, and the eventual potential to ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all interview with Ame;scan journalist Edgar rule the world. The days through which we Communist guerrillas behind the 17th par- Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead are now passing will mark one of the great allel, as is sometimes suggested, would be to war between China and the United States. turning points of world history. fine, but would of course be tantamount to so long as China is not invaded. He also a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. said that the war in Vietnam would last The United States has very strong trumps m President Johnson has no intelligence as yet only another year or two because the South is play in this contest. If y If North Vietnam to lead him to suppose that the Commu- Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice nists are ready for anything of the sort.. and the Americans will "lose interest " herself in a continuing effort to win South On the contrary-and this is the second While this statement greatly reduces the Vietnam, there can t one final our set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situa- likelihood of anyeliinese retaliation against o sh th h reaten China with h the tion-#i e,Cgmmunist world remains unani- our raids on North Vietnam, it gives no com- mons iii its declarations that` the only basis fort to those urgfri g negotiation. If Mao destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is really believes that the war will be won by bombardment. If forced to carry out this the complete withdrawal of American forces, the Communists ' in another year or two, threat, we would at least prevent or delay which is tantamount to a complete Ameri- then it is obvious that he looks on negoti- the looming menace of a nuclear-armed can defeat. ation only to confirm this fact, which is China. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 A768 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX , February ,23 Review and Outlook Government policy, precisely because its cardinal principle is that no one very ser- iously challenge what someone else proposes. No proposal is perfect, and without challenge. the imperfections can only be discovered too late. Second, such an enshrinement of logroll- ing tends to legitimize practically anything some group is brazen enough to demand. Such a faction more or lessnames its own price for not rocking the boat. No one bothers to object that even if a proposal is good for someone it may be bad for all of us. What's too easily ignored is President Johnson's own warning, "The national inter- est is greater than the sum of all local interests." Most important, this sort of consensus seems to add up to a cementing of one of the central philosophies of the New Deal: "Let the Federal Government do it." With the Government already so dominant in our society, our era is hardly the time to do away with debate over giving Government more responsibility and hence more power over all of us. Now more than ever, the warnings need to be heard, not stifled. In short, a politics of consensus could pro- vide undoubted opportunities, but it runs the considerable danger that the consensus would be primarily an agreement for all of us to look the other way while each of us steals his favorite gem from the public treasure chest. The Rumanians will acquire the synthetic rubber plant, nevertheless; Firestone has agreed to build it. But at a time when Com- munist governments are waging war against American servicemen in Vietnam * * * when Soviet Russia stages mob attacks on the American embassy and roughs up U.S. newsmen covering the attacks * * * and when Peiping and Moscow are working to undermine freedom in the Congo and throughout Africa, it is heartening to know that one major American corporation refuses to do business with America's enemies. Lenin once said that when the time comes to strangle capitalism, businessmen will be bidding for the right to sell the Communists the rope. Perhaps so. But Goodyear has demonstrated that it will not be among the bidders. EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 3, 1965 Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, today we hear much about an administration by consenus and I have not seen any- thing that points up the dangers of such an administration as well as an editorial which appeared in the Wall Street Jour- nal on February 18. The editorial follows: REVIEW AND OUTLOOK PRECAUTIONS ON CONSENSUS President Johnson offers himself as an apostle of consensus, a concept elusive enough as a word, let alone as policy. Whether this notion is promising or danger- ous depends on just what he has in mind. He seems to mean, at a minimum,; less heated disagreement. "Let us reject any among us who seek to reopen old wounds and rekindle old hatreds," he enjoined in his inaugural address. "The time has come to achieve progress without strife and change without hatred: Not without differ- ence of opinion, but without the deep and abiding divisions which scar the Union for generations." In some respects, the vision is farsighted indeed. The President is rejecting a popu- lar brand of political leadership which con- sists mostly of arousing the faithful to rise up and slay the Infidel. This kind of poli- tics sometimes has proved effective, and it must be particularly tempting for a Presi- dent with huge congressional majorities. As the President seems to realize so well, though, tough tactics have the unfortunate result of clouding communications among factions in our society. With their leaders often inciting them against each other, it's hard for opposing groups to remember that both may possibly be saying something worth listening to. Disagreement is resolved by brute force, which is less likely to yield intelligent policy than compromise borne of honest discussion. A politics of consensus, by promoting mod- eration and compromise, could more nearly establish a true give-and-take discourse on national policy. That is unquestionably a high ideal, and perhaps the President is right when he says the time for it has come. Yet there are some who are dubious about Mr. Johnson's ideal. Part of their reaction is simply aversion to the President's practical politics, and part is disappointment that the leader of the faithful professes friendship with the infidel. But a more significant part, we think, arises from concern over just what kind of tactics will be used to suppress strife and keep everyone happy. A cynical formula for "consensus" could read merely: Throw tax cuts and lots of flat- tery to businessmen, the union shop and an Under Secretary of Labor to the unions, school aid to educators with a drop to Cath- olics, high price supports to farmers and transportation aid to cities. And so on. The formula might build considerable harmony and reduce strife, for a while any- way. It's an ancient truism that if enough people are getting a big enough sop, they will hesitate to challenge the one someone else gets. But a consensus based on no more than this is not exactly an appealing prospect. For one thing, a consensus thus cynically conceived would degrade rather than im- prove the quality of public discussion on Good Going, Goodyear EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JOHN J. RHODES OF ARIZONA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 16, 1965 Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, under leave previously granted, I would like to include in the RECORD the following self-explanatory editorial which appeared in the Arizona Republic on February 14, 1965. I join the Arizona Republic in saying, "Good Going, Good- year." The editorial is as follows: GOOD GOING, GOODYEAR The U.S. State Department and Communist Rumania had it all figured out. The Goodyear Corp. would sell a modern synthetic rubber plant to Rumania. Inas- much as State had been assured by the Rumanian Government that it wouldn't divulge the polyisoprene secrets to other Communist countries, it wasn't like giving away important production secrets to every Communist country. And, State reasoned, sale of the plant would help bring Rumania closer to the West. But the State Department hadn't consid- ered the reaction of the Goodyear Corp. And Goodyear refused to sell the plant to Rumania, thereby passing up an approxi- mately $50 million transaction. In the current company newspaper, pub- lished in Litchfield Park, Goodyear explained that it felt the dangers to the United States far outweighed the possible benefits in the proposed deal. The company believes the Communists could, if they desired, disrupt natural rubber markets in Malaysia. Liberia, and other undeveloped countries, using cut- rate prices (underwritten by the state) as economic clubs. Furthermore, although respecting the State Department's belief in the Rumanians' promise, Goodyear said it preferred not to entrust its production secrets to the Com- munists. Private Capital Flows: The Balance of Payments Whipping Boy EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, in spite of repeated promises, the administration has failed to eliminate the deficit in our international balance of payments. Last year the deficit on regular transactions amounted to about $3 billion, compared to $3.3 billion for 1963. Especially dis- trubing are the figures for the fourth quarter of 1964, which show a deficit in the order of $1.4 billion or nearly $6 bil- lion on an annual basis. The First Na- tional City Bank Monthly Economic Let- ter for February 1965, details our de- teriorating payments position and ana- lyzes recent administration proposals to deal with the problem. The two measures most recently pro- posed as solutions to the chronic pay- ments problem are a 2-year extension and broadening of the interest equaliza- tion tax, which was originally proposed as a temporary-tax, a restriction of bank lending abroad, and a program of so- called voluntary restraint on direct in- vestment. Restrictive controls over pri- vate investment abroad in the long run would work untold damage on our own economy as well as to world prosperity and economic development. Domesti- cally, such curbs on lending would cut U.S. exports which are intimately linked with our oversea loans and investments. The letter states that: Postwar experience selective controls here and abroad shows unmistakably that one measure lays the groundwork and necessity for another. This is already being demon- strated. First we have the interest equali- zation tax, then provision for its extension to bank loans, and now more consideration of direct controls over capital. The prolifera- tion is endless and so are the complexities. There is an additional risk in propos- ing controls of this sort. They could be regarded as something which has in fact reduced the ability of U.S. dollar holders, here and abroad, to use or transfer them by their own choice. If the dollar is to remain trusted and respected, it must re- main unfettered. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965, Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A763 Michigan's visitors traveling slowly over these rcds.nay be treated to the sight of a doe and her fawn, a strutting buck, and other animals whose habitat is within the boundaries of this forest area. Bird lovers, too, will be well re- paid for their visit. Not only game birds but song birds abound. A few months ago I called attention of my colleagues to the efforts of the Forest Service to pro- vide a refuge for the annual visit of Kirkland's warblers, a rare bird, which pays our section of the State a visit each year. Thirty-one bald eagle nests were spotted by forest rangers. Nine of these were active at. time of location and 17 young were being,produced. To insure adequate cover for wildlife in the years ahead the Forest Service has a carefully managed program. Last year over 4 million trees were planted in the Huron-Manistee Forests. In addition two waterfowl dams were constructed and numerous wildlife waterholes were established.. Fishermen, hunters, nature lovers, mushroom and berry pickers, bird watch- ers, hikers, and all lovers of the out of doors will find the Huron-Manistee Na- tional Forests of interest. Doing Business With Our Enemies umnist, David Lawrence, advocated severing diplomatic relations with Russia. He may be right. At any rate, unless the United States ceases to play the part of the less than bright country cousin in its deals with foreigners whose goal is to destroy us, our Nation is headed for more serious trouble than it has seen in its nearly 200 years of trying to make the world a better place to live. The action in South Vietnam may not be considered war, but to the men who are daily fighting and facing death there, it is, as real/a war as .any ever fought. To aid their ki ers is to break faith with them. Winning in Vietnam EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL OF ILLINOIS N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23,1965 Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include the follow- ing editorial from the Peoria Journal Star dated February 19, 1965:. WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM Before we get too worked up about the ab- sence of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam "who ought to be in there and doing the job right," and the resulting deaths of American specialists, and the confusion over the gov- ernment of the place and its "attitude" to- ward the United States, etc., we had better take a look at how the job was done before. Before the United States made the decision not to let the Communists run, unchecked, over the whole of southeast Asia, the French tried to throw them out of Vietnam. They decided not to fool around and to do the job right. The French sent their own regular forces by the tens and even hundreds of thousands, plus thousands of veteran German soldiers enlisted into the Foreign Legion, and went out to clobber the Vietcong. Instead, they were clobbered themselves. They had 200,000 casualties and were run out of Vietnam altogether in a short space of time. We stepped in to support a South Vietnam regime to prevent the Vietcong from over- running the whole country and with that momentum and morale situation all the rest of the rich subcontinent. The experts and the press reported that Vietnam was confused, naked, unarmed and morale shattered and "wouldn't last 6 months." And we didn't rush in with massive com- bat forces to replace the French Army. We sent arms, training experts, supply handlers, and advisers-a mere handful. That handful is now up to 23,000 men, mostly doing specialist "behind the lines" jobs, and a few serving as combat advisers. Vietnam has resisted the Vietcong, as a re- sult, under this system not for 6 months as forecast, and not for a couple of years, but for a dozen years, virtually. Thousands have died and are dying. Thou- sands of guerrillas have been killed and their bodies carefully counted, and are being killed. Somebody Is fighting the forces that cut down 200,000 Frenchmen, somebody more than 23,000 American fliers, mechanics, sup- ply experts, advisers, etc. About 300 Americans have been killed. Would fewer Americans die if we let them have South Vietnam? And then go after us somewhere else, as they surely would? De Gaulle has said from the first that we can't possibly succeed where the brilliant and gallant French have failed. If they couldn't do It with strong measures and direct war, how can we do It by carefully avoiding the use of combat units and just helping Vietnamese who will fight for their own country? The Communists and their stooges, natu- rally, have been using every agency and de- vice possible to propagandize the hopeless- ness of our effort, as well. And they have the great advantage of tying their control over many devices of propa- ganda with their control over guerrilla ef- forts and "incidents"-and they are making a major effort to convince us it is hopeless right now, by both methods. And to scare us, in the bargain. The fact remains that we have, thus far, done a far better job than the French, with all the frustrations involved, and without sending in an American Army, and without suffering 200,000 casualties as they did. The record shows that it was not a stupid policy. It was a shrewd policy. The record shows that we have vastly im- proved the free world's chances over what they were when we went in with this policy, and vastly improved the situation left us by the French. The record suggests that having corrected their major mistakes, we can correct some of our own mistakes and do a still more suc- cessful job-and we can win. The biggest barrier to that is the encour- agement the Red Chinese take and their Communist allies from our discouragement. The killing of some 30 Americans in terror raids the last week was not designed for any actual military benefit. It was designed to horrify us, and to frighten us, and thus to cause us to give up and get out. They are fighting a political war and hope to win it, not in Vietnam, but right here in the minds and, votes of Americans in the United States. And if they do, they will figure they can win anything they want by simply scaring us "cowardly" Americans-the paper tiger. And they will push us, and push us, and push us, until we just can't stand to be pushed any more. And therein lies the real danger of a major war. C. L. DANCEY. EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. E. Y. BERRY OF SOUTH DAKOTA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I insert in,the REC- ORD an editorial from the February 17, 1965, Issue of the Buffalo, S. Dak., Times- Herald, as follows: DoIxa B.usmzSS WITH OUR ENEMII^ With the pledge of military aid to North Vietnam by Soviet Russia, the United States has again been placed in the position of direct trading with an avowed enemy. There has never been any doubt as to Russia's intention to do all in her power to destroy the United States, but our leaders have been able to wink at these announced intentions and ' work for establishment and extension of trade with the Communists In the name of better relations. The better relations have included the stoning of the American Embassy with the approval of the Russian regime, and the jeopardizing of the lives of our diplomats in Russia and other countries under her domination. With. American boys being killed and wounded ' in South Vietnam, and Russian pledges of military assistance to their killers, there can no longer be any doubt that our vacillating foreign policy has led us down the street to failure in our position in the world. It is still not too late for the United States to call a halt to this folly. In view of pres- ent circumstances, any attempt to honey up to the Communists by inviting them to the United States "to see how we. live" makes about as much sense as hiring a crazed murderer to baby-sit with our children. The United Nations have proven itself powerless to serve as anything but a tool of the Communists, who in turn laugh at any moral obligations to the world debating society. Recently, the noted political col- Bank Loan Curb Will Cut Exports EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS OF MISSOURI IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 23, 1965 Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, the in- evitable result of the application of the interest equalization tax to bank loans with a term of over 1 year will be to re- duce the volume of U.S. exports. Thus a measure designed to help bring the bal- ance of payments into surplus will ac- tually have an offsetting effect that will tend to deepen the deficit. The link between bank loans and U.S. exports is discussed at some length in the Monthly Economic Letter of Decem- ber 1964, published by the First National City Bank of New York. The article points out how the remarkable expansion of world trade in recent years has re- quired growing supplies of U.S. bank credit for financing purposes. The in- consistancies in the administration's Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 A764 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX ebruary 23 position is evident from the fact that while presumably attempting to increase world trade, the administration now seeks to restrict the financing required to carry on that trade. Although it is often said that term loans of over 1 year do riot finance ex- ports, the article makes perfectly clear the various ways in which such term loans do finance exports and, at the same time, increase job opportunities and in- comes at home. In view of the administration's in- creasing reliance on restrictions in the field of international trade and pay- ments, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Monthly Economic Let- ter be included in the RECORD at this point : COMMERCIAL BANK TERM LOANS ABROAD In the world today, nations are exchang- ing goods in rapidly growing volumes. Our own exports have expanded from $15 billion to $25 billion in the past 10 years. Under- standably, the remarkable expansion of world trade has required growing supplies of credit. Commercial banks in the United States and other principal trading nations extend credits to their foreign correspondents and customers. Indeed, the resources of com- mercial banks constitute a pool of private international liquidity that is drawn upon by creditworthy borrowers in creditworthy countries throughout the world. Along with direct investment in bricks and mortar, commercial bank credit abroad has greatly expanded over the past 15 years as private U.S. capital has replaced U.S. Gov- ernment aid to Western Europe and Japan- aid that had been an essential ingredient during the earlier postwar period in reinvig- 'orating world commerce. In recent years, private financing has received further im- petus from the restoration of meaningful currency convertibility among the principal .nations. These trends and developments have in turn strengthened international com- petition in the field of money and banking; they have also created new opportunities. Within a relatively short span of time, U.S. banks have girded themselves to play a prom- inent role in world finance. With the dollar the leading international currency, the United States the world's largest exporter and importer, and U.S. money and capital markets the single most important source of financial resources, this has been a natural evolution. PATTERNS OF BANK LENDING American commercial banks engaging in international business extend both short- and- long-term cedits. According to defini- tions used by official statisticians, short-term credits are those with a maturity up to 1 year; they are frequently renewed from year to year. Loans beyond 1 year are called term loans. These term loans have been custom- ary in domestic financing in the United States for a quarter of a century and have, since World War II, spread to the field of International financing. U.S. banks have outstanding short- and tong-term credits abroad of $9.5 billion, U.S. exporters, importers, and industrial and commercial firms also grant credits to their foreign clients; these amount to $2.3 billion at this time. Of the short-term bank credits, about $1 billion consist of items held for collection largely on behalf of customers. An addi- tional $2.5 billion of the short-term bank credits represent bankers acceptances. After a long period of inactivity, these have grown remarkably since 1960, with the encourage.. ment of the Federal Reserve System; most acceptances are made under arrangements that involve exports from the United States. Loans to foreign banks and customers today amount to about $5.7 billion, of which $2.2 billion are short term and $3.5 billion are term loans. THE ANATOMY OF TERM LOANS There is general agreement that- short- term loans by U.S. Banks are indispensable as a means of financing U.S. trade and other international business that directly benefits the U.S. balance of payments. Sometimes, however, the question is raised-particu- larly by those who tend to blame the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on pri- vate capital investments abroad-whether loans in excess of 1 year serve purposes bene- ficial to the U.S. balance of payments. To 19r5------------------------------------ 19196 _----_ 1957------------------------------------ 1058 ------------------------------------ 19.59 ----------------------------------- 1960------- 106t--_-_-- -- 1962-----__----- ----------_----___ -- 1903------ lO i3-J an ---- - --- - ------- ----- April-June y-September _._ - _ __-- -- ------ Jul Outstanding: uary-March ------------------ _ _ ___ _ ____ ____ October-December uary-March - -.---- - --------- i;Ni4-Jan ----------------------- April-June Jul-August ------- v_ -- - -- - ---- August1304_____________ Acceptances made for account of foreigners, including varying amounts of other financing. -'Including central banks and other official institutions. 3 Excluding credits in foreign currencies, which amounted to $689,000,000 in August 1964. 4 Excluding items reported by banks for the first time but representing certain credits extended previously. Such items amounted to $86,000,000 in the 2d and $193,000,000 in the 4th quarter of 1963. Of the latter amount, $150,000,000 represented trade credits sold to banks by a U.S. corporation. Source: Derived from data published in the U.S. Treasury Department Bulletin and the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The author of this amendment, Senator ALBERT GORE of Tennessee, stated that it seemed a "foregone conclusion" that the ex- emption of commercial bank term loans would be used to avoid the tax and charac- terized it as an "Important loophole." In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee last June, Secretary of the Treas- ury Douglas Dillon pointed out that the rise in long-term bank loans had started before there was any thought of the tax and that, in the light of detailed information made available to the Treasury, any possible eva- sion of the tax through use of bank loans could not be "more than 5 percent of the total bank loans." Changes in direction of the flow of loans to less-developed and developed countries have been remarkably similar to the changes in assure export financing and "normal recur- ring international business," the administra- tion's proposal and the House-approved bill for an interest equalization tax, exempted bank loans made in the ordinary course of business as well as all obligations maturing within 3 years. Before the tax was enacted last September, however, a provision was added in the Senate giving the President standby authority to extend the tax to bank. loans with a maturity of 1 year or more. 1 The tax and its implications have been reviewed in the April and November 1964 issues of this letter. Changes in U.S. short-term banking credits abroad [In millions of dollars] patterns of direct Investment. Until 2 or 3 years ago, the direction of the flows had been mainly to Latin America and Canada. In recent years, most of the term loans have gone to Europe, particularly to Italy during late 1963 and early 1964, and to Japan. The shifts in the geographic distribution are summed up in the second table. Over the past year, changes in bank credits abroad, short as well as long term, have been particularly influenced by borrowings by Ja- pan. These have grown substantially to support the expanding volume of Japanese trade and business activity. In recent months, the rate of bank lending to Japan has slowed down. As noted in these pages last month, Japan has floated sizable amounts of bonds in European markets. Changes in U.S. long-term banking credits abroad [In millions of dollars] 1955------------------------------ --------------- 1056------_------------------------------------------ 1957------------------------ ----.-------------------- 1958------------------------------------------------ 1959------------------------------------------------- 1960------------------------------------------------- 1961-------------------------------------------------- 1962 ---------------------------------- ---------------- 1983 -----------_--_------------------------------- 1963--January-March--------------------------------- April-June------------------------------------ July-September-------------------------------- October-December'---------------------------- 1964-January-March--------------------------------- April-June----------------- ------------------- Juty-August----------------------------------- o utstanding: August 1964---------------------------- -21 95 164 20 -28 -1 126 86 518 27 150 82 259 155 80 49 1,385 Latin America 240 67 116 85 131 126 17 -45 -5 -16 30 -1 -18 -15 28 1,037 -44 -27 6 4 3 3 5 50 129 2 35 30 62 62 14 8 3 22 33 28 5 -28 198 80 -29 -19 -28 10 S -13 14 270 52 16 71 72 54 --10 6 49 --30 77 ------------ 2 11 31 415 I Pxclu ling the $193,000,000 item described in footnote 4 to the preceding table. Its geographical distribution is as follows: Europe, $5,000,000; Latin America, $134,000,000; Japan, $46,000,000; and others, $8,000,000. The distribution of the $86,000,000 item has not been published. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Collections Accept- Loans to- Total 2 Long term anew ' - Banks 2 Others 24 40 94 209 230 87 137 93 94 411 108 -17 - 245 13 25 292 188 -2 -43 213 5 125 292 188. 95 -64 5 22 62 153 99 661 -35 22 099 336 14 641 224 140 1,099 336 -44 93 174 32 372 126 146 596 -171 132 703 6 22 25 90 341 -207 -94 29 24 -65 297 - -338 4178 24 74 -42 207 6 124 27 52 i5 456 121 4313 100 136 163 29 369 231 1 23 242 -101 7 15 32 3 30 130 - 956 2,840 1,326 919 6,041 - 3,440 -Approved For Release 2003110/15 : CIA-RDP67B0b446R000300170003-8 T 965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 3319 ical lh) and su Piling Act ' (5Up le es-' co s ab y cal li) d the e supplemental stock ie ded by the improved, gigot at oStates, is ns no all of the States a product of practically tablished, pursuant to section 104(b) of the may only result in complete rout now To manufacture millions of automo- Agricultural Trade Development and As- those who are trying to contain Commu- biles you need materials in units often sistance 704(b) . Such Act i9Gss ion may II. ade Dist expansion in southeast Asia. ordered in the tens of millions. It would without hout regard d t o d the e provisions may of lie ma section 3 de For who, Mr. Speaker, would be will- be idle to tell the exact number of acres wi provis of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Ing to take the side of a "paper tiger" to of, cotton, of sheep ranches, of chemical Piling Act: Provided, That the time and oppose the expanding military might of plants needed to produce the raw mate- method of disposition shall be fixed with due Red China? If Vietnam goes down the rials for the many millions of yards of regard to the protection of the United States drain, if we now withdraw our support fabrics needed merely for automobile against avoidable loss and the protection of from the effort being waged by its peo- interiors. producers, processors, and consumers against ple, where will we make our stand? . Similarly astounding statistics could be SEC. 2avoidable. The Administrator Adonminis straatotheir r is rls usual o author- Which country in the Far East would be gathered in telling the story of paint in- ized, without regard to to the provisions of willing to put any trust in us then? gredients and their compounding, of section 3 of the Strategic and Critical Mate- These questions are ignored by those metal mining and of fabrication of parts rials Stock Piling Act, to make.available an who advocate immediate. negotiations- resulting, of rubber components, and of additional fifty thousand short tons of lead or, in truth, our prompt withdrawal from all the rest. now held in the national and supplemental Vietnam. And yet these very questions As impressive as that aspect of auto- stockpiles for direct use by agencies of the must be faced, and answered, before we mobile manufacture is in all 50 of our United States Government. embark upon a course which will lead us great States, it is not the equal, possibly, The committee amendment was agreed past the point of no return not only in to the economic effect produced locally to. southeast Asia but in the Far East and when great numbers of persons are able The bill was ordered to be engrossed in Western Pacific as well. to enjoy the ownership of new automo- and read a third' time, was read the third It is for this reason that I have ob- biles. The entire locality of sale soon time, and passed. tained permission to insert in the Ap- undergoes economic invigoration. The title was amended so as to read: pendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an To understand why this is so, it is "A bill to authorize the disposal, without article which appeared in Sunday's New merely necessary to visualize a'gasoline regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting York Times, by the respected military service station. This is possibly the period, of lead from the national stock- commentator, Hanson W. Baldwin. Mr. most common sight in the land and it is pile and the supplemental stockpile." Baldwin urges greater use of American, the outward manifestation of a great A motion to reconsider was laid on the military power in Vietnam. He believes supplier and service industry that is even table. we must stand firm and fight now to more diffused than the once centralized avert. irreparable defeat. assembly of automobiles, GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the two bills. just passed. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mas- sac usetts? T ere was no objection. LET US STAND IN VIETNAM (Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I know you are fully aware of my deep and con- tinuing interest in the situation in Viet- nam. Today I want to reaffirm my view that this area must not be permitted to be lost to the Communists, either by default or by design. Whether we like it or not, we have a political and moral commitment to the people of South Vietnam to assist them against Communist insurgency from -within, and Communist aggression from without. This commitment has been confirmed by three successive Presidents of the United States. This commitment cannot be lightly dismissed or negotiated away. Unpleas- ant as it may be, our choice already has been made. We must stand firm in Viet- nam. This does not mean, Mr. Speaker, that negotiations may not ultimately help re- solve the situation in Vietnam. But negotiations should not, must not, be used as a coverup for surrender. And unless the position of the free people of Although I do not agree in every de- Once the mind is focused on this huge tail with Mr. Baldwin's observations and generator of economic well-being, it recommendations, I believe that his views would be difficult indeed to think of any deserve the careful attention of my col- part of America that would not get a leagues. substantial local economic boost out of increased ownership of new automobiles. EXCSE TAX ON AUTOMOBILES A remaining question to be faced is, SHOULD BE REMOVED Can the Nation afford the tax removal? A better question is, Can the Nation (Mr. FARNUM asked and was given afford not to remove this outdated and permission to address the House for outmoded tax? 1 minute and to revise and extend his We have had considerable proof re- remarks.) cently, and increasingly are getting more Mr. FARNUM. Mr. Speaker, in join- of it, that over a period a tax cut may ing with my distinguished colleague from not reduce revenue-if the cutting is well Michigan, the Honorable MARTHA W. planned. A cut in the excise tax on GRIFFITHS, and with other Members in automobiles may well leave the U.S. support of a bill to remove the 10-percent Treasury in a better position, after a rea- excise tax from automobiles, my pri- sonable time, than it held before the cut. mary concern has been the economic I ask this honorable body to consider well-being of the Nation rather than again the great economic activity that a short-range interests of my district and price cut in automobiles would stir up State. throughout the 50 States. Economic I have explained this in detail to those activity of this kind always is reflected who have approached me from the city of , in tax revenues from various sources and Pontiac in my district and from other it requires little imagination to see that great automobile manufacturing centers. cutting the excise tax on automobiles A point I made was that unless the tax would result in increases in revenue savings were passed on to the consumer, from a host of other sources. the measure would have not my support There is one final thought I would but my opposition. leave with the honorable gentlemen. I have received assurances that a re- This is the joy a new automobile brings duced take-home price, for automobiles to its owner. Is there a better way to will be the result of reoval of the tax. pursue happiness, and to bring domestic wonder if the honorable Members are tranquillity within the family circle, than I fully aware f the ra significance Me o rs er e in a gleamingly new automobile fresh off fect, a substantial cut in the price of the showroom floor? I doubt it. A re- automobiles to the people of each and duction in automobile prices, through an every one of the 50 States? overdue cut in the excise tax, would make meaningful the "unalienable right" Most understand, I am sure, that when to pursue happiness for Americans from the.automobile business is poor, the Na- Hawaii to Maine and from Alaska to tion's entire economy tends to be poor; Texas. when the automobile industry is hard at work, most of America also tends to be hard at profitable work. Among the reasons for this is that automobiles, wherever they may be PEDDLERS OF HATE (Mr. SCHWEIKER asked and was given permission to address the House Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3320 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE ebruary 23 for 1 minute, to revise and extend his re- The ravings of that organization fell on marks, and to include extraneous mat- fallow ground at the Penn fraternity house. These decent, intelligent young men scorned ter.) Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, I the barefaced appeal to join an army of hatred the attenion of my colleagues and But t 'will other young men across the the Nation to a vicious anti-Semitic country have the intellectual fortitude to campaign being waged on college cam- resist this base attack, particularly where puses in the Philadelphia area and else- religious intolerance already exists? We where. A lunatic fringe group calling it- hope so. self the Christian Youth Corps of St. But there's an Old saying that if you throw Petersburg, Fla., has mailed to college enough mud on a fence, some-of it will stick. There's a vile anti-Semitic letter seek- s always the possibility that such propaganda will take root in some young and ing to raise an army of hate. The lead- impressionable minds. ers of the group are identified in the let- The blazing emblem of this Christian ter as a Col. Oren F. Potito and a Lt. Youth Corps is a black cross on a field of Philip D. Le Bus. This fanatical group white and red. That's the color scheme of talks hysterically about--and I quote- the Nazis. The impression it gives, along "Red hordes that will soon attack the with the printed matter, is more suggestive United States." This extremist group in of the swastika. The Youth Corps calls the late President Its hate letters asks, and again I quote, Franklin D. Roosevelt a tool of what it de- "young Christian Americans of Anglo- scribes as the Jewish brain trust. They say Saxon stock to join us In the fight to this brain trust arranged the Second World save our beloved Nation from the Jew- War. Communist conspiracy." This so-called The Youth Corps describes Philanthropist Christian Youth Corps goes on at length Samuel Fels as the man who financed the in its vicious diatribe to make the Jewish Russian revolution, and killed 21 million religion synonymous with communism Christians. But the University of Pennsyl- vania is proud to point to the Fels Institute and it then urges college students to of Local and State Government on its become "brothers-in-arms," to equip campus. themselves for "guerrilla warfare opera- And here's a direct quote-from this so- tions" by obtaining knives, rifles, 1,000 called Christian Youth Corps: "Today Jews rounds of ammunition, and other war control our Government and our money sys- supplies. Mr. Speaker, like most of my tem, and are responsible for all the racial colleagues, I have seen a great deal of strife that is tearing the Nation apart by the hate trash which fanatical groups organizing and financing pro-Communist organizations such as the NAACP, CORE, such as this "Christian Youth Corps" ACT, and the Black Muslims." circulate throughout the Nation. But I Throughout the diatribe, the Jewish re- have rarely seen material as vicious as ligion is made synonymous with commu- n sYouth this. I am alarmed, Mr. Speaker. I am nism. oFor theAngl Christian stock alarmed that not enough light is being Corps calls on youth c thrown on the activities of such crack- to we fight quote, "Jew- save Cothis mmunist country from the, and pots. I am today asking that the House The Christian Youth Corps warns college Committee on Un-American Activities students a Communist attack will come very Investigate the operations of this vicious soon. It tells them they better be on the group of hate peddlers calling itself the right side, or be destroyed with the Jews. Christian Youth Corps. They might They urge the students to obtain a rifle and more properly be called vigilantes of 1,000 rounds of ammunition. They urge the hate. The committee investigation of students to join their army of 10 million this group could properly be handled Christians, Including the Minutemen, now with the proposed committee investiga- facing investigation by the House Un-Ameri- can Activities Committee. tion of that similar group calling itself WCAU radio has pledged to expose the the "Minutemen." I urge my colleagues activities of hate groups wherever we find to support such an inquiry to shed light them. We are sending copies of this hate on the outrageous activities of these propaganda to the appropriate Government groups. agencies and officials. And we can for a Mr. Speaker, WCAU radio in Philadel- complete investigation of this attempt to re- phia has done a great public service by cruit a lawless army of hate in our Nation. calling the public's attention to the hate- CHRISTIAN YOUTH CORPS mongering Christian Youth Corps. I am Asks young Christian Americans of Anglo- inserting WCAU's editorial. In addition, Saxon stock to join us in the fight to save Mr. Speaker, I am inserting a copy of the our beloved Nation from the Jew-Communist Christian Youth Corps letter because I conspiracy. feel my colleagues and the people of this Only the Christian young men of this Nation should have an opportunity to Nation can save it from the ever tightening see for themselves the vile trash which Red grip that Satan's children (international these hate peddlers are circulating: Jewry) are fastening upon us. (WCAII radio, editorial] Prepare yourselves for this battle for Christ, when the Christ hating Jews unleash INVESTIGATE HATE ARMY their Red Communist hordes upon us. Hate peddlers have launched a vicious Remember that Karl Marx was a Jew, anti-Semitic campaign on college campuses whose real name was Moses Mordecai Levi, in the Philadelphia area and elsewhere. the son of a rabbi. Lenin and Trotsky were A lunatic fringe group has sent its hys- also .lews, as are all top Communists. terical outpourings to at least one fraternity That the Russian revolution was financed at the University of Pennsylvania. by American Jews Jacob Schiff and Felds, Behind this attack is a recruiting cam- owner of Fels-Naphtha Soap Co. More than paign for an army of hate. 21 million Christians have died in Red purges The organization which is trying to cap- since. ture the minds of college students calls itself That International Jewish bankers (the the Christian Youth Corps. It's based in House of Rothschild) promoted World War I St. Petersburg, Fla. and succeeded in getting Christian, to fight against Christian until 15 million were killed, The Jews and communism were the only profiteers. That U.S. entry into World War II was conveniently arranged by the Jewish brain trust that ran the (Rosenvelt, his Dutch Jew name) administration, to prevent destruc- tion of communism by Germany. That all but one of the atomic spys who gave our atomic secrets to Russia were Jews. That today Jews control our Government and our money system; and are responsible for all the racial strife that is tearing the Nation apart by organizing and financing pro-Communist organizations such as the NAACP, CORE, ACT, and Black Muslims. Christian Anglo-Saxon young men we ask you to join us in our battle against Judaistic communism. Remember what our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ said to the Jews, "You are Satan's children and his works you do." All athiestic communism it attempting to do is take control of the world for Satan, and international Jewry is carry out this plan to the letter. However, Almighty God is going to give we Christians the final victory through his be- loved Son when He returns. You had better be fighting on the right side or you will be destroyed as will be the Jews, and all other enemies of Christ. We are brothers-in-arms with the U.S. rangers, the California rangers, the Minute- men, the Texas Rangers, the Green Moun- tain boys in New England, and many other smaller localized organizations all of which comprise a vast national Christian army of over 10 million patriotic men who are ready to defend this Nation against the Red hordes that will soon attack the United States. Each man needs the following basic equip- ment for guerrilla warfare operations. 1. Any standard rifle of at least .30 caliber. 2. One good quality hunting knife, 6-inch blade. 3. At least 1,000 rounds of ammunition. 4. Regulation canteen-holder-webbed belt. 5. Any suitable type backpack on which can be mounted; a good quality sleeping bag; a good quality two-man tent. 6. Three pair of camouflage fatigues of heavy duck cloth. 7. At least one pair of insulated paratroop type boots. 8. Seven-day supply of concentrated food packs. 9. At least 500 water purification tablets. 10. Snake bite and first aid kit. 11. One mosquito bar. 12. One camouflaged waterproof poncho. This is a basic equipment list that will allow you to operate an an effective guerrilla unit. We shall fight from the fields, from the plains, from the swamps, and from the mountains; and although overwhelmingly outnumbered in men and equipment we shall still be victorious for we have Almighty God on our side and at the precise moment his heavenly armies will intervene and give us the victory through the triumphant return of His blessed Son. Let us remember the words of our late Christian president who was assassinated by the anti-Christ Jew-Communists, "I am a Berliner," and in the spirit of these brave people let us prepare to defend our Christian heritage for Almighty God, for Christ, and the Nation. For more Information write to: Col. Oren F. Potito, or Lt. Philip D. Le Bus, Post Office Box 20183, St. Petersburg, Fla. LE Bus ANTIQUE AEROPLANE CO., St. Petersburg., Fla., January 31, 1965. ATO FRATERNITY. DEAR BROTHERS: It pleases me to tell you that we now have a large number of brothers in the corps ready to fight for Christ and Nation. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 T 965 Approved For 8f,U7BgWAW0300170003-8 33101 the offer of the Japanese to mediate. I believe that is the "greatest danger in think that because peace is so wonderful Perhaps, it we could suggest something, the dialog on this subject. I believe that and so much to be sought after we should I. would most enthusiastically join the every Senator and others who have allow the Communists to trick us into Senator in a plea for vigorous action by spoken have had much to add, but I negotiations, which would be used to ex- the administration to enlist the partici- especially wish to commend the Senator ploit us for their purpose. The way to pation of our allies. If any such vigorous from Connecticut and to associate my- get peace is to try to improve our posi- action is in fact being taken, it is so self with his strong recommendations, tion, to be able to proceed from a stand- quiet, so submerged, so subdued, that particularly in regard to the intensifica- point of strength, rather than from a even we Who are extremely sensitive and tion of. political warfare in that troubled standpoint of weakness. When we reach have many places where we can get in- sector, and the encouragement of greater that point we shall not be laying our- formation, have heard nothing about it. collective action by other people of the selves open to helping them in their ob- I I believe it is in this area that we Asiatic nations. jective to propagandize themselves and should push and press. Bringing in our Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful to the alleged position that they have in allies does not have so many of the con- the Senator from Oklahoma for his Vietnam. notations of negotiations with the other comments. I compliment the distinguished Sena- side-that is, with the Communists; but Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will tor on his firm position. we really should make massive demands the Senator from Connecticut yield? Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator. and keep at it eternally to get help in Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will this situation, so that Asians may get Senator from Oklahoma. the Senator yield? into the struggle, which is a struggle for Mr. MONRONEY. I should like to join Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator the whole of Asia. my distinguished junior colleague in from Ohio. Mr. DODD. I wholly agree with the complimenting the able and distinguished Mr. LAUSCHE. I am extremely de- Senator from New York. I have said Senator from Connecticut on his stand lighted to state that my views have in so many times years ago. and the position he has taken in regard the past coincided with the views of the Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct. to Vietnam. Senator from Connecticut and coincide Mr. DODD. When I came back from I had the great good fortune to repre- with them today. It is my recollection the trip which I made, I referred to it on sent the Senate in a visit to southeast that in the Korean negotiations, the pro- the floor of the Senate. I then thought Asia between Thanksgiving and Christ- posal to negotiate was not made by -the it was urgent and necessary. It is even mas for 3 days-to make the most of some United States, but by the North Koreans. more urgent and necessary now. I com- 3 days by interviewing men who had Does the Senator have a recollection on pletely agree. served in that theater. Later, I talked to that point? Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator many who have served throughout the Mr. DODD. That is my recollection. from Connecticut. entire Far East theater of operations. I Mr. LAUSCHE. I am quite certain Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the am convinced, as the Senator from Con- that that is correct. Now it is proposed Senator from Connecticut yield? necticut is convinced, that an attempt to that we negotiate, and those who make The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. arrange a negotiated settlement at this the proposal used the analogy of what MusxiE in the chair). Does the Senator time would be folly in the extreme. happened in Korea. Actually there is no from Connecticut yield to the Senator The Communists could use these so- analogy. from Oklahoma? called negotiations merely as a stalking- I heard the discussion about terrorism Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the horse to get their apparatus more firmly I would like to hear the Senator's view Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS]. at work or to gain time, or to gain place, on whether the terrorism is in the main Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish or gain a position, or gain land, or gain practically and in completeness the acts to associate myself with the remarks of in the conflict. I spent some time in of the guerrillas of North Vietnam the Senator from Connecticut and to Korea-3 days there. The only reason against the peasants in the hamlets in commend him for the excellent think- the Korean armistice has worked is the South Vietnam. ing through which he has done on this fact that we have had military power Mr. DODD. I do not want to be un- grave problem and for the presentation back of the 38th parallel, in a command- derstood as altogether absolving the of his very important recommendations Ing position in the mountains, and have South Vietnamese from any acts of in this critical situation. I commend got air cover behind that, and tanks be- terror. Unhappily, these things have him particularly for the overall posi- hind the air cover to make that line occurred on both sides. However, I be- tion that what we are doing is so much stick. lieve that the overwhelming number of better than two or three of the other Otherwise the armistice agreement acts of terror are chargeable directly to alternatives which are available to us, would not have been worth the paper on the Communists. There is no doubt among which are pulling out altogether which it had been written, if we had had about that. Terror is a part of their from South Vietnam or neutralization to depend on the Communists. Then it policy; whereas to some extent it may be without adequate safeguards, which was the Korean Communists; this time it true of South Vietnam, it is not the would result in the same end as with- Is the Vietnamese Communists. They stated policy. drawal from South Vietnam and eventual are all of the same breed of cats. They Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree completely withdrawal from southeast Asia. may differ in their ideologies, as between with the Senator from Connecticut that I believe that a general debate on this the Chinese Reds and the Russian Reds, it is their technique to intimidate and and all other matters of foreign policy but they are both Reds; they are both terrorize the peasants working in the are of great benefit, and help the people Communists. In 99 percent of the cases, fields and living serenely in their homes, of this country establish a general con- agreements are made by them for the descending upon them at night to de- sensus, which we as public officials have very purpose of breaking them and mis- capitate their leaders and place their the responsibility not only to discover leading and tricking their opponents, separated heads on poles, so that the but also to lead toward. Nevertheless, it and without any hope of having them peasants will begin to fear that if they seems to me that we must be careful that honor their written commitments in any take up the position of chieftan or leader we do not by our statements indicate to manner, shape, or form. they Will likewise suffer the same fate. the people of southeast Asia, or to those I am surprised that so many Members Mr.' DODD. That is why it is done. who are our adversaries there, that this of the Senate, with good and peaceful Mr. LAUSCHE. I heard the discus- country plans any kind of negotiation intentions, invariably are taken in by this sion between the Senator from Connecti- which would result in our abandonment absolutely phony argument, which bears cut and the Senator from Illinois about of the people of South Vietnam and, by the hallmark of deceit and intent at mis- drawing a lesson from what happened any such statements, perhaps, accom- representation and the obvious purpose following the violation of treaties going plish the same results which many fear- of deceiving. I am surprised that it back to 1939. Unless we take a look at that is, that we"would force the admin- should fool anyone. I regret very much these incidents of appeasement we shall istration to ever'-increasing military ef- that so many of my able and distin- miss completely the lessons that must forts to keep those people from thinking guished colleagues in the Senate, who are be drawn from past conduct in order to that we are going to pull out. in a position to know better, seem to guide ourselves in the future. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved Fo6 es pa /1&1 EEE P6~ 0AfflR000300170003 3,ebruacy 23 Mr. DODD. That is very true. I do not offer these analogies because I think think they are exact parallels. The Sen- ator understands that, I am sure. There are always some differences. I know that. However, we learn from what hap- pened in the past, certainly from what happened in the near past, and we study these happenings in order to learn from them. If others made mistakes, we should try to learn how to avoid repeat- ing them. I drew these analogies for that purpose. There are other examples in history-these are not the only ones- but the ones that I drew on are the latest and perhaps the most pertinent. Mr. LAUSCHE. There was the Ver- sailles Treaty and the League of Nations covenants, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, and the Lucarno Treaty. All of them contained provisions which were violated by the Japanese as early as 1922. Mr. DODD. Yes. Mr. LAUSCHE. By Hitler beginning about 1932, and by Mussolini at the same time. In instance after instance it was thought that if we would give in, it would be the end of it. Mr. DODD. That is true. I referred to Nuremberg and what we discovered there. One of the thinks we learned was that at the time Hitler ordered his troops to occupy the Rhineland, he had given instructions that if they met any op- position at all they should immediately retreat. How easy it would have been for us to stop him cold then. There was considerable dissatisfaction with Hitler in his own military circles, and, as we know, there was an attempt made later to get rid of him. We failed in that situation to take the appropriate steps. Our failure enabled Hitler to remain in power. There were those who said, "Oh, no; war would result if we tried to stop Hit- ler now, and it would be terrible." We did not do what we should have done, and in that way a terrible war was brought on. Mr. LAUSCHE. It has been suggested that we negotiate the future political status of South Vietnam. What does that mean? Does it mean that we should negotiate a new type of government for South Vietnam? Mr. DODD. I do not know. I do not believe that the Senator from New York meant it that way. As I understood him, he made a good point. I am sure the Senator from Ohio shares my feeling on that point. As I understood the Senator from New York, we do not want to do anything that will give the impression that we are for unconditional surrender and, on the other hand, we do not want to give the impression that we will have nothing to do with the Communists. That is all that the Senator from New York meant, I am sure. Mr. LAUSCHE. There is now in exist- ence a pact by which we have abided and by which the South Vietnamese have abided, but which the North Vietnamese have violated. Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the Geneva Pact of 1954. Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. Mr. LAUSCHE. In addition, to that, a new agreement was made in 1962, in Laos. Mr. DODD. Yes. Mr. LAUSCHE. There we followed the policy of negotiation. Mr. DODD. Yes. I believe it was in 1961. Mr. LAUSCHE. May I ask whether the Laotian agreement worked out as it was anticipated it would work out by the sponsors of it? Mr. DODD. Not at all. It could not have worked out worse than it did. For the people of Laos and the people of southeast Asia and for us it has been a complete farce. It has been repeatedly violated, and it is being violated every day. It is another case of our inability to trust those people. Mr. LAUSCHE. I commend the Sen- ator from Connecticut for his presenta- tion, because I believe what he has said and what others have said on this point will bring home to the minds of the America~nn people that what is involved is not dierely wanting to be in southeast Asia, but that our national security is involved. In my judgment, wordsto the contrary, are not at this time helpful to the achievement of the common objec- tive that we seek to achieve. Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the Sen- ator for his compliment, which I do not deserve, but which I enjoy. Mr. President, I yield the floor. APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). On behalf of the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 87-758, the Chair announces the ap- pointment of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] as a member of the Na- tional Fisheries Center and Aquarium Advisory Board for a 4-year term. INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER- AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume to the con- sideration of Calendar No. 64, House bill 45. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINCS in the chair). The bill will be stated by title. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American De- velopment Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an in- crease in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-Amer- ican Development Bank. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas. The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement in sup- port-of S. 805, a bill to amend the Inter- American Development Bank Act to au- thorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Bank's Fund for Special Operations. I say that the statement will be short. I do so not as an indication of the strength of my support for the meas- ure-indeed, I thoroughly approve of this bill-but in order to spare Senators a complicated and wearisome recital of factual material. A plethora of facts and figures will be found in the printed material on Senator's desks. As with data on any financial institution, there is virtually no end to the figures, charts, and tables. Oversimplification of such material in this case may be a service rather than a danger. I have said that I heartily approve of this bill, attd I am sure that my reasons for this position will be shared by a great number of Senators, for this is the kind of foreign assistance activity in which the United States should be engaged. The purpose of the bill is easily and fully identifiable. The financing is of a kind which is particularly suited to the needs of friendly countries. We can readily keep track of the process of lending through ample public information on projects and their results. Self-help and responsibility are engendered through the participation of the countries being assisted. Criteria for eligibility are kept high. And the United States does not become embroiled in political squabbling or become the target of resentment and unseemly pressures. However, before elaborating on any of these points it is necessary to give at least a very simplified explanation of the purposes and effects of this proposed legislation. We should start, I think, with the important fact that Latin. American countries by and large are in a position where they find it increasingly difficult to service loans for economic and social development on conventional or hard terms. In addition, many vitally necessary projects in the so-called infra- structure category must be undertaken as a precursor to overall economic de- velopment. Since these projects do not represent an immediate or short-term economic return, they generally cannot be financed through ordinary banking operations. It almost goes without say- ing that loans for social projects such as housing, technical training, and educa- tion require special kinds of financing. The need for this kind of lending ac. tivity was recognized at the time of the Inter-American Development Bank's es- tablishment 5 years ago, and a Fund for Special Operations was created as a com- pletely separate window of the Bank to service this requirement. At the same time, the initial resources made available to this special Fund were quite modest in comparison with the amounts sub- scribed toward the ordinary conventional lending operations of the Bank. More- over, it was not then recognized how closely intertwined were the fields of eco??? nomic and social development, and the Fund for Special Operations was not designed as an underwriter of social projects. To fill the resulting gap, the United States in 1961 unilaterally con- tributed a large sum to be administered through yet a third window by the Inter- American Bank; this window has been known as the Social Progress Trust Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 Approved ForR~,5 :BR17BR00300170003-8 should have been made public. I do not see much sense in classifying this mate- rial' and concealing it. The people do not know these facts. Mr. DOMINICK. It is particularly important with respect to the arguement made by those who would like to see us negotiate and neutralize. The South Vietnamese villages are not with us. But it is very difficult to have them cooperate with us if they are under the grip of terrorism and many people in their areas are being murdered. Until we give them the security they need, it is hard for them to be able to do anything. Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, one of the things that has not been made plain in the overall debate, I feel, is the fact that there is a contest of willpower in this area. There is no doubt in my mind, from the study that I have made of the overall situation, that the Com- munists are using the so-called national liberalization plan as a test mechanism to determine how great the willpower of the free world is. If this plan should be successful in persuading us to nego- tiate or neutralize, it is inevitable that this technique will spread widely throughout the world, through Africa, South America, and Latin America. It is already being used. But I be- lieve it will be accelerated sharply. I think the Senator brought that point out very well. I congratulate him on making a very useful contribution. Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. DODD. I yield. Mr. MUNDT. I congratulate the dis- tinguished Senator from Connecticut for having presented a most conclusive and comprehensive statement on this whole Vietnamese problem. It is the type of white paper which I hoped the State Department would have placed be- fore the American people long ago. I believe it would still be well for them to do so. In his analysis of the historic developments of the problems" and the consequences involved in this important theater of the world, the Senator leaves little doubt as to his accuracy. While men may disagree among them- selves as to the various processes to be used to bring this matter to a successful culmination, the matters that the Sena- tor has anticipated are the type that should emanate from the State Depart- ment, carrying the full weight of the ad- ministration and the Government. I am sure that would convince many fine American citizens, who are beginning to doubt their own judgments in these areas, as to what is involved. I congratulate the Senator on a most comprehensive study. I am happy to note the emphasis and the importance which the Senator places on it step-up political warfare in this area. The distinguished Senator from Con- necticut has long tried to establish a training institution in this country so that we could prepare Americans to go overseas, for the type of warfare-we wish to pursue, with a stable, constituted gov- ernment in Vietnam. I hope that the State Department, which has shown such a stubborn re- luctance to provide the type training required for this type of warfare, will consider carefully the emphasis that the Senator places on this particular recom- ihendation for future activity. The Senator talks about cadres of trained political leaders and emissaries from these countries who are equipped and capable so that they could deliver the type of . guidance and inspiration needed by our friends in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, this is always debated in a vacuum in our ability to wage a cold war. I happen to be one of those who be- lieve honestly that had the other body approved in 1960 what the Senate then did approve, legislation for the creation of a freedom academy-following a won- derful report written in large part by the Senator from Connecticut, as a mem- ber of the Committee on the Judiciary, emphasizing the need for this adjunct to our contest against the Communists overseas-we would have had 5 long years within which not only to train our- selves, but also to provide for young gov- ernmental officials and career people in the government in Saigon to come here and learn the full truth about the tech- niques and devices employed by the Com- munists. These officials and career peo- ple would have learned to understand the maneuvers and manipulations of the Communist conspiracy, and been trained to be better able to convince their fel- low citizens on the free side of the Viet- namese struggle of the dividends which accrue to freedom, and the importance of Communists. There would not have been the melan- cholic succession of quick changes in the officialdom of South Vietnam. We would have obtained what all hands agree is an indispensable requirement in bringing success to our efforts there- the creation of a stable government in South Vietnam which has not only the will to win, but also the respect of the local people, so that it in turn would sup- port the Government and maintain its stability in office, so that the people there could get on with the work to be done. Mr. DODD.. The Senator gives me credit for the idea of the Freedom Acad- emy. It was the idea of the Senator from South Dakota. I was merely a minor help in getting it through the Senate. The Senator from South Da- kota deserves great credit for it. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Texas. Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from New York. Mr. JAVITS. The speech of the Sen- ator from Connecticut is altogether too provocative and he has done his home- work altogether too well for him to be complimented merely or. a good job. It is a good job, however, and I should like to join my colleagues from Texas, South Dakota, and other States who have said so. Any time the Senator devotes him- self to this kind of work, it helps the country. The Senator from Connecticut has done a thorough job in presenting new ideas. This is the place for them, for we are not inhibited by the administra- tion or its policies, especially when a Democrat puts forth a good idea. One lack, as I have said before, is that retaliation has been pictured as a policy. It is not a policy. It is a reaction. We support it. We close ranks behind the President. We have common interests in it and in the losses. The losses break our hearts, but we try to do something about them. However, it is not a policy. The Senator from Connecticut is try- ing to work out a policy. Whether it be a good or a bad policy, he is right in trying to work it out, because he pro- poses something positive, which takes us on a road where there is a big lack. That is what is causing doubts among the people as to whether this country is going to pull out of South Vietnam or go for- ward. Granting all that I have said, I should like to ask the Senator some questions. In the first place, the Senator does not deal with something that troubles many of us, and that is the question, "Is there still a majority in South Vietnam who do not want communism? Do a majority of the people want to fight against it?" We cannot fight a war without soldiers. That statement goes whether the fight is for an ideology or for freedom. That is one question we must always determine. We cannot put our head on other peo- ple's shoulders and assume they are "buddies." We may, for example, be bitterly opposed in Albania and other places, because the people there may want communism. They may like it. .That is a very gnawing question with re- spect to South Vietnam: What is the at- titude of the people of the country? Only a declaration of the President of the United States can answer. I know that is so often said that it must sound like a cliche, but it is the President who has the vast reservoir of intelligence information. I think all of us, notwith- standing difference of party, would ac- cept a declaration on the facts by the President of the United States. We are colleagues from South Dakota and Colo- talking about the Presidency; it is not rado in commending the able and distin- the man or party we are talking about. guished Senator from Connecticut for It is the office we are speaking of. his comprehensive contribution to the So, first, we ought to have a declara- dialog on southeast Asia. It must be tion and assurance, based on the whole made clear to the American people that combination of intelligence, diplomatic, we must take stringent action in south- and military advice, that a majority still east Asia if we are to deter and discour- favors fighting communism in that age further aggressive adventures by the country. Communists. Again I thank the Sen- I wish the Senator would comment on ator from Connecticut very much. that point. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Mr. DODD. The Senator from New Senator yield? York was not in the Chamber when I Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3300 Approved Foe Mt ,1ilS e P67 k 000300170003-9'ebruary 23 commented on that point; but I pointed out that, from all the information I can get, the Vietnamese people are over- whelmingly in favor of resisting Com- munist aggressors. I pointed out that the people of Viet- nam have a long history of resistance against oppression. I know and I have pointed out that many people believe that the people of South Vietnam have no will to fight, and that communism has an attraction for them. But the record shows that at the several different periods in their history, when they have been under attack, they have demon- strated their will to resist. It was the people of Vietnam who successfully re- sisted Genghis Khan. In our own time, they threw out the French. And they had been free for 500 years before the French occupation. They are proud of the fact that they threw the French out with their army of 500,000 men. So, I repeat that the Vietnamese people have historically displayed the will to resist and they are displaying the same will to- day. They behave very well, in fact. And the evidence is that they Are over- whelmingly anti-Communist. I pointed out that some people say the Vietnamese do not know anything about freedom, and that it is silly to talk about freedom for the Vietnamese. There are, however, three or four or five kinds of freedom. The primitive peasant in the moun- tains knows what freedom is. Many of -them have lived under communism, so they also know what slavery is. The freedom enjoyed by the Vietnam- ese peasant I call a natural freedom. The peasant can plant his own seed, raise his crops and sell his produce. He has a family life, he can guide the up- bringing of his children, he can elect lo- cal officials. If, in addition, the govern- ment builds a school, and, dispensary, or supplies him with fertilizer, he thinks he is about as free as anybody in the world can be. They do not have to have democratic, parliamentary freedom such as we have. I do not mean to detract from parlia- mentary democracy, but historically it is a refined form of democracy. How- ever, it just is not true that the Viet- namese people do not know very much about freedom. They do know much about it. They have demonstrated that again and again. There is another kind of freedom, and that is freedom from foreign domination. They know the meaning of this, too. As I said before, they defeated Genghis Khan, and they threw out the French. That they have the will to resist com- munism is borne out by the fact that 1 million have fled south. Roughly 5 million of them have, atone time or an- other, fought the Communists. If we make allowance for wives and children, that would make a figure of '9 or 10 out of 14 million. The percentage may even be higher. Again I repeat that the Vietnamese people do have the will to resist.: All they want from us is aid to counterbalance the technicians and personnel, and weapons that the Communists have been pouring in to support the Vietcong guerrillas. I cannot give the Senator from New York the declaration which he wisely says we ought to have on Vietnam. I cannot speak In that capacity. I can say that, from my information-and I cited it-I am convinced that the facts are as I have stated them. Mr. JAVITS. The Senator referred to the fact that the answer to my question is mentioned in his speech. I was not pres- ent in the Chamber all the time he was making his speech, but I have read it. I would not have presumed to ask the Sen- ator these questions had I not read it. The purpose of my questions is more for emphasis. The Senator from Connecticut has al- ready answered a collateral question in the course of his last reply; namely, whether the South Vietnamese want our help. I am pleased to hear the Senator say that a declaration by the President on this subject would be a good thing. It is necessary. I am not critical, but that does not stop us from urging what would be good for the country and the world. Mr. DODD. I knew the Senator was present. I was aware of his presence while I was speaking. I think it is good to do anything that would help our people understand where they are, and what we are trying to do in Vietnam. Mr. JAVITS. One big point being made is on the question of negotia- tion. The Senator has said that the de- mand that ewe negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to having asked Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk and President Truman to negotiate at the time of Pusan. I assume that also goes for Presi- dent Kennedy with respect to Castro. Let me ask the Senator this question, which concerns a Presidential declara- tion. I do not know what the answer of the Senator will be, therefore I may be making a mistake, because a trial lawyer should not ask a question to which he does not already know the -answer, but I believe that- Mr. DODD. That is not what Is worrying me. I am worrying as to whether I know the answer. Mr. JAVITS. It is important that we explore each 'other's minds to see whether we agree with each other's point of view. As the President has stated, we are ready to negotiate. We are ready to negotiate if negotiations do not repre- sent a sellout of the people of South Vietnam or a sellout of the cause of freedom. I should like that formula better, be- cause this is a big question in'the world: "Is the United States In a mood for un- conditional surrender?" The Senator and every newspaper editor in the world know precisely what I mean by that. What are we saying here-that some- day, somehow, as in the case of the Berlin airlift, or other emergencies which looked as though they would never be settled, some way will be found out of the sit- uation? The same thing occurred in Korea. The day came when there was some kind of negotiation, good, bad, or indifferent. Therefore, would the Sen- ator, consistent with his conscience and his views, subscribe to the proposal that we should assert that we are ready to negotiate, provided it is not a sellout negotiation and not a negotiation for face-saving purposes because we wish to find a good reason to pull out, but that we are ready to negotiate honestly and legitimately for a political settlement of the issue, now, tomorrow, or at any other time? Mr. DODD. Perhaps I could answer the Senator's question better and more directly if he would tell me what it is that he would suggest we negotiate. Mr. JAVITS. I suggest that we nego- tiate the political future of South Viet- nam, or that we encourage South Viet- nam to negotiate it, in or out of the United Nations, in or out of the Geneva conventions, so long as the conditions which are the framework of the nego- tiations do not show the United States to be pulling out of South Vietnam. Mr. DODD. What I am worried about is the fact that we already have an agreement. We have already negotiated one. It has been violated. What do we negotiate? Do we sit around a table and say, "You have broken your agree- ment. Stop doing it. Get back and obey its terms." I suppose that could be described as negotiation in a crude sense. But it seems to me that this is all we have to negotiate. I do not like to use the term "negotia- tion" when what we are really talking about is a breach of covenant. If I have a contract with the Senator from New York and I should break it, I believe that he would use stronger language than negotiation. I do not wish to be evasive. If it would help to sit down and talk with the Communists, I would be in favor of it. But, I have serious doubt that it would help us in this crisis. Certainly, in a general sense, the President has stated that we are always willing to negotiate. If there Is anything, really, to nego- tiate, and if it would help, I am sure the President would do it. I would put it a little differently. We do not know what there is to negotiate. We already have an agreement. We say, "We have an agreement which you have violated and which has caused some trouble. All you have to do is to retire from your aggressions, and cease attack- ing your neighbor." If the Communists are willing to talk about this, then I sup- pose we should do so. Mr. JAVITS. I have suggested the framework for negotiations, and let me say that the Senator has just made what could be an excellent opening statement by the United States in such a negoti- ation. I believe that within that frame- work, the Senator and I could agree. But let me make one further com- ment on this subject which is important; in debate and in fortifying our own con- science on this issue, we must not forget that we are supposed to have allies In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in mutual defense agreements, even in Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 T X65 Approved For RiL C-7B044~,Q.Q0300170003-8 327 except through some newspaper articles. Mr. ELLENDER. I want the senator 1 ~Mr. DODD. If I may int So far as I know, no formal errupt, that inquiry was from Connecticut to know that I have could well have been learned from the ever made, although there have been taken part in debates in the Chamber in Senator from Illinois. many ugly rumors. But officially, we respect to South Vietnam on many oc- Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the gen- do not know why Diem was overthrown, casions, but I am not one to try to dic- eral elevation of attitude and the pow- or how his death occurred. tate to the President what he ought to erful logic of the speech. This is the That was the beginning of our trouble do. most puzzling and dangerous problem in South Vietnam. I make this state- Mr. DODD. Neither am I. which our country has faced since Oc- ment only for historical reference, so Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far tober 1962. that I may put my response in better now that I do not know what the whole I agree with the Senator from Con- perspective, We have since the death of picture is. I still contend that unless necticut that many Americans do not Diem been plagued with the fall of one we can persuade our allies to assist us sufficiently appreciate what the loss of government after another in South Viet- in that area, and unless we can enable South Vietnam would mean to the free nam. There must be a stable., Govern- the South Vietnamese to build up to the world and to the anti-Communist forces. ntent, and we cap and must try to help point where they will have a strong, sta- I am not an expert on the subject of the South Vietnamese achieve it. ble government, there is no telling how this territory, but a study of the map in- Mr. ELLENDER. Suppose we cannot long we shall be in that country, and dicates what is involved. The Senator is accomplish that? there is no telling how many American completely correct in his statement that Mr. DODD. I do not think that will lives will be lost. I doubt that there is the fall of South Vietnam, or a with- happen. I think it can be done. any way to win there under present con- drawal from South Vietnam, unless con- Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator has ditions. ditions change, would mean the almost been speaking about Diem? As the Senator may recall, the late immediate fall of Cambodia and Laos Mr. DOPD. It is an "if" question. I President Kennedy said-and I well into the Communist camp. Laos is al- do not know that anyone can ever remember when he said it, because I dis- ready half there; Cambodia is perhaps answer it. The Senator says "suppose." cussed it with him in person, following half there. I could add a hundred other suppositions my last visit to South Vietnam-that if Then, If Senators will look at a map that would malg his question of no victory were to be attained in South Viet- of the area, they will see that Thailand moment. Suppose we were attacked by nam, the South Vietnamese would have would be half encircled. As the Senator the Soviets tomorrow morning with nu- to achieve it. In my opinion, that can- from Connecticut has pointed out, the clear weapons; I do not think we would not be done unless there is a stable Gov- North Vietnamese announced a few days then be able to do much in Vietnam. ernment there that is willing, with our ago that they were setting up a commit- But I do not believe that will happen, assistance, to fight. Does not the Sen- tee for the national liberation for Thai- I do not think we get anywhere by such ator agree? land. suppositions. Mr. DODD. Yes. I am much in agree- Mr. DODD. Yes. We must strive to assist the South ment with the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. DOUGLAS. With that kind of Vietnamese In obtaining a stable govern- I have great admiration for him. 1 know power base, with North Vietnam push- ment. I think that with our, help, they how hard he has worked on these sub- ing, with China behind North Vietnam, can establish such a government; then jects and how widely he has traveled. and wih the United States out of the we shall do better. I am grateful to him for his comment. area, would not Communist influence Mr. ELLENDER. I should like to I shall touch on these subjects later. take over Thailand and then spread speak about Diem, if the Senator Will Mr. President, I reiterate my earlier north into Burma and south into Ma- permit me to do so. request that this colloquy be placed at laysia? Mr. DODD. Certainly. the end of my speech. Mr. ELLENDER. I was in South Viet- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Mr. DOUG. Most hen to th 650 nam within a matter of months after objection, it is so ordered. lion Mr. DOwoul added 25 million Diem took oMce and on several occa- Mr. ELLENDER. I am deeply inter- Chinese would be would e50 the po - sions thereafter. I remember on my ested in what the Senator is saying. If Malays. What then would be the posi second visit there discussing with him I do not remain in the Chamber all the tion of India? the existence in his country of two pock- time, I shall read his speech in the REC- Mr. DODD. Then it would be hope- ets or areas, one in the delta and one ORD. I should like to have the benefit of less. to the northwest of Saigon, that were his statistics concerning the religious as- Mr. DOUGLAS. I remember talking infested with Communists. He knew pects of the trouble in South Vietnam. many years ago with an eminent Indian, that. As I recall, we made efforts to Mr. DODD. Yes. I am grateful to who was not pro-Western and not pro- encourage him to take action to satisfy the Senator from Louisiana. Communist, `-ut rather was a neutralist. those people, but we could never get him Mr. President, I am pleased to observe I addressed this question to my Indian to do so. Those two pockets continued in the Chamber the distinguished junior acquaintance: "How long could India be to grow in size. They may have been Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENXNc], I kept neutral if southeast Asia were to go dominated by Buddhists, because it is am happy that he is here, because I hope Communist?" The reply was almost im- alleged that 90 to. 92 percent of the to receive his views as I proceed to discuss mediate. "We could not keep India people are Buddhists. this subject. neutralist for more than a year." Mr. DODD. No; the Senator is in er- Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will I know that the "domino" theory is ror. This is a common mistake. Not the Senator yield? being attacked now as not being applic- more than 30 percent of the population Mr. DODD. I am delighted to yield to able; but if these were an absence of force are Buddhists. my distinguished friend the Senator to check the Chinese, it would seem to Mr. ELLENDER. Thirty percent are from Illinois. many of us to be almost inevitable that Buddhists? Mr. DOUGLAS. I had the privilege of all of Malaysia and virtually all of India Mr. DODD. Thirty percent. I can reading overnight the very able address would go Communist. We would then document, my belief. of the Senator from Connecticut. In face a combination of 350 million In- Mr. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator fact I read it over no less than three dians, 250 million Malays, and 650 million would. times. Chinese-1,250 million people. That Mr. DODD. This is a common error. Mr. DODD. I am indeed compli- would not be merely a change of political Such statements are made frequently. mented. government but the conquest of a doe- There is nothing to substantiate the fig- Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the Sena- trine bent on world domination which ure of 90 percent. tor for many features of his address. treats the United States as its basic Mr. ELL NDER, What is the di- First, I commend the spirit which ani- enemy. Vision? mates his speech, the refusal to indulge Mr. DODD. Oh, no. Mr. DODD. I should like to place that in personalities, the crediting of high Mr. DOUGLAS. It would be a power- information,in the RECORD In an orderly motives to those who differ in their pre- ful force dedicated to the defeat of the way. I shall discuss it. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3298 Approved For CONGR SS~SNAT.15k FP6 ~R000300170003i8ebruary 23 I Mr. g QDDat the Senator made r that observation. Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator, Perhaps certain features of his program, such as the proposal to capture a staging area just inside of Laos may not be the right thing to do. But, in general, the program sugested and in good to per is h pe hi prop ate will be considered by the American peo- ofethe finthat it may serve to offset some ely motivated but incomplete suggestions that have been made. Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful for the observations of the Senator. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. DODD. I yield. Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Connecticut on making what I think is a valuable contribution to the national debate on what we should do in southeast Asia. I not only had an opportunity to read the statement before it was delivered, but I also had the pleasure of listening to the delivery. There are several points that the Senator made which I think were publicly made for the first time. The one that I should like to emphasize If the Senator from Connecticut would veto and thus stymie any resolution of permit me to do so, I should like to the U.N. underscore some of his remarks on neix As one who has always been asup- tralization. I suppose that if there could porter of the U.N., and who still is, I be genuine neutralization, that would be observe many signs that the United Na- highly desirable. tions is being weakened in the same Mr. DODD. Of course; I should have fashion that the League of Nations made that point. No one would be hap- weakened in the middle and late 1930's. pier than I if genuine neutralization, as I hope that this will not happen. the Senator puts it, could be achieved. Mr. DODD. So do I. I was talking about neutralization in the Mr. DOUGLAS. We should try to pre- sense in which the Communists use it. vent that from happening, but,we should We are too inclined to believe that the not ignore reality. Communists mean genuine neutraliza- To those who say that there is no tion, when what they mean, in fact, is analogy between the cumulative con- communization. quests of Hitler and Mussolini in the Mr. DOUGLAS. If it were genuine late 1930's and the cumulative develop- neutralization, it should certainly apply m.ents of the Chinese in Asia in the to North Vietnam as well as to South 1960's, I should say that there is grave Vietnam. danger that they delude themselves. It Mr. DODD. That would be genuine would be a terrible thing if we woke up neutralization. to find all of Asia Communist. Mr. DOUGLAS. Even if it were ap- Mr. DODD. It would be a dreadful plied to South Vietnam, it would not be disaster. Earlier I described it as an effective in view of Communist philoso "unthinkable thought," borrowing my phy and power, unless there were some words from the Senator from Arkansas. adequate supervisory body having real Mr. DOUGLAS. It would have tre- authority to police the agreement. mendous propaganda influence in Africa, We have all noticed press reports, much greater than the Russians alone which are authentic, that North Viet- could have, because the Russians, after nam has even expelled the small in- all , are members of the white race. But teams which, under the Geneva the members of the yellow race or the spection Convention of 1954, were placed both brown race can make a much greater in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to appeal to the blacks than the white na- see what was taking place and to report. tions can. They are being expelled and forced out. The Senator from Connecticut has So there will be no eyes and no voices-- performed a real public service in stress- no eyes to detect and no voices to report ing the dangers. It should be noted also the military preparations and movements that he cannot be accused of being a war of North Vietnam. hawk. He does not advocate the indis- Mr. D ODD. That is correct. criminate bombing of North Vietnam or Mr. DOUGLAS. If there were a a bombing attack on China. strong, effective United Nations, with a Mr. DODD. No. mobile police force, that force could be Mr. DOUGLAS. He suggests the pos- All the power sibility of guerrilla warfare in the north, h l p e placed in this area to vacuum. which would have to be done by South Mr. DODD. There is no doubt about Vietnam, rather than by the United that. States. Mr. DOUGLAS. I was in Egypt and Mr. DODD. Only because of what Israel in 1956, shortly after the Suez hos- North Vietnam is doing to South Viet- tilities. I was greatly pleased about the nam. This seems to me a proper cor- excellent work of the United Nations Po- rective measure only so long as North lice force. The Senator from Connecti- Vietnam persists in its activities. cut and I may have differed somewhat What we all hope for, I need not say about the role of a United Nations police to the Senator, is a settlement of the dif- force in the Congo, but to my mind it ferences between countries, so that they represented a healthy principle. can drop their arms and get on with the Mr. DODD. I have no difficulty with business' of improving the lives of their the Senator from Illinois on that point. people. I am sure the Senator would agree, that Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator proposes we' can make mistakes. But the prin- political warfare and economic aid to be ciple is correct: A United Nations police of real benefit to the people of South force should be used wherever this is Vietnam; the development of SEATO; feasible. and various other measures. Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Unfortunately, I feel certain that the country will as we all know, the Russians and, I am appreciate what the Senator from Con- sorry to say, the French also, have vir- necticut has done. I urge that his warn- tually stymied the creation of such a ings and his suggestions should not be force by refusing to contribute to its sup- dismissed summarily. port. I can remember how, in the 1930's, Mr. DODD. Yes. after two trips to Europe, I felt that the Mr. DOUGLAS. So it will be almost combination of Hitler and Mussolini was impossible in the near future to finance moving to take over the free world. I and to place a United Nations police believe that it was the duty of all who force in the field. loved freedom to resist that movement. Another political change is occurring There is' a similar obligation upon us to- inside the U.N.; namely, a shift of power day to resist totalitarianism of the left, from the Assembly to the Security Coun- as well as totalitarianism of the right. ciI, where the Russians can interpose a One is as bad as the other. at this point concerns some of the strategic implications, gained by looking at a map, of what might happen if the Red Chinese decide to move south. The implication is rather plain that the Senator does not think they will do that. I agree. Among the things that would deter them from doing that is the presence in Taiwan of a highly trained air force. The Nationalist Chinese very much want to go back to the mainland if they have an opportunity. If the Red Chinese forces were to be drawn to the south, that would give them the chancc to move, which chance they might not have again. The Senator presented figures on what, the Vietcong has done in the way of murder and terror within the country. The Senator said that almost 500 a month, or 6,000 a year, wits the village hamlets have been murdered by the Viet- cong. Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. Mr. DOMINICK. I wonder if the Sen- ator can tell me where the figures origi- nate. Mr. DODD. I hope the Senator will be satisfied with my statement. I am sure they are from an official source of the administration. Mr. DOMINICK. The reason I asked is that figures have been given to me which are of a very substantial nature, but not quite that large. When I have mentioned the figures from time to time, in the process of meeting with groups and talking about the terrorism that has been inflicted, people had not heard of this before. They had never understood what was going on. They had no con- cept of the problem. Mr. DODD. I do not know whether the Senator was in the Chamber before, but when I obtained the figures, I said, "Why in the world have the figures not been made public?" I think the figures Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 For ~Wg9 A15 R W1 67 4 lf&000300170003-8 EXILES Raising a touchy political issue, the stu- dents also questioned the status of five gen- erals exiled to the mountain resort of Dalat by Premier Khanh when he seized power last January. General Khanh charged at the time the generals were plotting a neutralist solu- tion for the country's war against the Viet- cong-Communist guerrillas. He said Wednes- day the five officers were being returned to active duty. The students asked whether this meant that the generals were falsely accused or whether General Khanh now is willing to ad- mit high-ranking neutralists in his high command. The Vietcong's clandestine'Radio Libera- tion joined the anti-U.S. chorus yesterday with a broadcast plea to South Vietnamese religious leaders, intellectuals, and soldiers to help drive out the Americans. Turning around U.S. charges that the Viet- cong deliberately fomented interreligious stride, the Red National Liberation Front's top political official, Nguyen Huu Tho, said the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" plot- ted to separate Buddhists from Catholics "with the aim of invading our country and enslaving our people." [From the Evening Star, Sept. 7, 1964] VIETNAM ANSWERS SOUGHT (By Marguerite Higgins) What do the Buddhist political leaders of Vietnam really want? What is the objective of the drumfire of propaganda and demonstrations against the predominantly Buddhist government of Vietnam that began as early as last April-a time, unfortunately, when the American Em- bassy and the American people had their mind on other things? In secret meetings in Saigon late last week with top Buddhist leaders, Ambassador Max- well Taylor tried urgently to find the answers to these questions because, among other things, he is under pressure from Washing- ton to explain increasingly worrisome signals as to Buddhist Intentions. During the meeting, General Taylor ad- dressed most of his questions to the Rever- end Thich Tam Chau, a refugee from North Vietnam, a genuine anti-Communist in prin- ciple albeit something of a timid soul in practice, and ostensibly the leader of the United Buddhist Movement of Vietnam. But the answers that really counted be- longed to the Reverend Thich Tri Quang, a one time associate of the Communist Viet- minh, the mastermind of the anti-Diem campaign of last summer and fall, and cur- rently the spearhead of a deadly struggle for power inside the Buddhist movement against the Reverend Tam Chou. Tri Quang is ad- ditionally the leader of a sometime open and sometime secret drive to topple the Khanh regime. There are some who say that the Buddhist Monk Tri Quang is, next to General Khanh, the most powerful Vietnamese figure in South Vietnam today and that tomorrow he may be the most powerful. It is of significance therefore that General Taylor's telegrams on the Buddhist situation produced so many somber faces around the Department of State. For the time being, at any rate, it appears according to Ambassador Taylor's assessment that the moderates among Vietnam's nearly 6 million Buddhists (out of.a population of more than 14 million of which the majority are ancestor worshippers) are being skillfully and relentlessly outmaneuvered by the ex- tremist wing led by the Reverend Tri Quang, whose flamboyant oratory and calls for direct action have far more appeal, for example, to Vietnam's citified, riot-prone young people than the pleas for caution issued by the Rev- erend Tam Chau. As to the political game being played by the Reverend Tri Quang, a key administra- tion official who had read General Taylor's telegrams summed things up this way: "A defensible case can be made for the theory that Tri Quang will sooner or later seek to undermine any stable anti-Commu- nist government in Vietnam in the belief that anarchy will drive the United States to go home, permitting the emergence of a neu- tralist or possibly pro-Communist state with himself at the helm." He continued: "If Tri Quang wants to de- liver Vietnam to neutralism or communism under his own leadership, it would explain the mystery of why he raised the false issue of persecution which is ridiculous in light of all the concessions-indeed the favoritism- shown the Buddhists by Khanh's regime. "But the cry of Buddhist persecution-as Tri Quang well knows-brings an almost Pavlovian reaction in the outside world where most people are too uninformed and too naive to believe that a Buddhist monk might make up such accusations out of whole cloth to gain his own ends." The issue now seems less and less whether the Reverend Tri Quang aspires fora neu- tralist and pro-Communist Vietnam under his leadership. It is focusing more and more on the fact that his actions are pointing in that direc- tion. The question now is whether any- thing can be done effectively to stop him as he operates from within the privileged psy- chological sanctuary of being a Buddhist monk. [From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 5, 1963] REDS SEEK NEW COUPS OF BUDDHIST-LED .TYPE-REPORTED TRYING To SPREAD VIET- NAM RELIGIOUS REVOLT TO LAOS (By Paul W. Ward) NEW YORK, November 4.-Having seen Buddhism spearhead a drive that toppled Vietnam's Diem regime, Communists now are trying to organize like offensives else- where in southeast Asia. So it was learned here today following an- nouncement that a United Nations mission sent to South Vietnam October 22 to investi- gate charges that Buddhists were being per- secuted there has completed its task and will reassemble next Monday In New York. IMMEDIATE TARGET Laos, which lies just west of Vietnam and also abuts Communist China, appears the immediate target of a campaign origi- natingin Peiping. Its aim is to set Buddhist communities throughout Asia to filing com- plaints against elements of Laos' coalition Government akin to those they had been pressing against the Diem regime at Saigon until it fell last Friday. The chief indication was provided in broad- casts from Hanoi, in North Vietnam, and Peiping reporting that the "Loatian Buddhist Association [has issued] a statement strongly protesting against the bombardment of a monastery by the Phoumi Nosavan troops and reactionaries among Kong Le's troops." Gen. Phoumi Nosavan heads the anti- Communist wing of a troika-form govern- ment set up in Laos last year to carry out an agreement to neutralize that southeast Asian kingdom worked out at a Geneva con- ference which included the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China among Its participants. Gen. Kong Le commands the troops of the coalition's neutralist factions and enjoyed avowed support by Peiping and Hanoi until the Communists concluded several months ago that he is sincerely neutralist and will not help them take over Laos. 06MP2NSA'iibi DEMAIQD . ..... Since then, they not only have been de- nouncing him but trying to win over his subordinate officers to their side. 3295 The Laotian Communist radio station, call- ing itself the voice of Laos, also broadcast the statement attributed to the "Laotian Buddhists Association," that alleged their foes had "destroyed a [Buddhist] monastery and acting Buddhists" at Ban Ton Nuong in Kieng Province's back county by a bombard- ment during the night of October 16-17. The statement demanded "that the Phou- mi Nosavan clique compensate the losses and immediately stop all moves against the Bud- dhists." Otherwise, "it would bear full re- sponsibility for the consequences," it said, adding: "All Laotian monks and Buddhists are urged to strengthen their solidarity, heighten their vigilance, and resolutely oppose all schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys." The Communists have been denouncing the anti-Communist and neutralist factions of Laos' coalition government as puppets of the United States, just as they formerly de- nounced South Vietnam's Diem regime and are currently trying to discredit on like grounds the military junta that displaced it Friday. To further what began as a Buddhist cam- paign against the Diem regime, Communist China also staged shortly before that regime's fall a 3-day conference of Buddhist clergy and laymen from 11 Asian countries. Held in Peiping's Fayuan Monastery the conference was devoted in large part to ora- tions against "the United States-Ngo Dinh Diem clique" at Saigon. MONKS REPORTED BEHEADED Its participants, now touring Communist China under the aegis of Peiping atheist regime, included: 1. The Venerable Thich Thien Hao, listed as president of the Luc Hao Buddhist Asso- ciation of South Vietnam, who made a long speech about atrocities, including behead- ings and disembowelings of Buddhist monks, that he attributed to "the United States- Diem. clique." 2. The Venerable Thepbouary Pramaha Khamtank, named as president of the Bud- dhist Association of Laos, who charged the United States is trying to turn that coun- try into a "colony" and demanded that Wash- ington cease giving military aid td the Lao- tian Government, asserting: AUGUST DENUNCIATION "We Asian people and Buddhists are the masters of our own affairs. We don't need any other masters lording it over and ruling us.,, Mainland China's Communist rulers, who in August denounced as "political agents" of Chiang Khai-shek a group of Buddhist monks from Formosa then visiting India, also brought together in Fayuan Xonastery Bud- dhist monks and laymen from Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, and North Vietnam, which, like Cambodia and Thailand, also abuts Laos. Having produced on October 20 a formal appeal to Buddhists everywhere to join in the anti-Diem campaign, the conferees gave themselves over to a series of fetes arranged in their honor by the Peiping regime that only a few years ago was charged before the Unit- ed Nations Assembly here with having de- stroyed more than 1,000 Buddhist monas- teries in Tibet. NORTH VIETNAM CUARGES There was no Tibetan participation in the Buddhist conference at Peiping. North Vietnam's Communist regime has sent to the International (i.e., Polish, Indian, and Canadian) Control Commission for both parts of Vietnam a compilation of "Bud- dhist persecution and atrocity" charges against the Diem regime that said in part: 11 Gen. Ton That Dinh, military governor of Saigon, personally directed troops to martyr- ize pupils of Vietnamese and French mid- dle. schools". on September 7. Approved For Release 2003/10/15': CIA-R0P67B00446R000300170003-8 3296 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February' 23 TO HEAD NATIONAL POLICE He currently is slated to be Interior Min- ister (i.e., chief of police forces) in the new regime at Saigon, having turned revolution- ist after being refused the same post In the Diem regime, according to reports relayed from Saigon via Washington. Today Moscow's radio stations continued to denounce the military junta in Saigon just as they previously had denounced the Diem regime as an American puppet and the United Nations mission to Vietnam as a Washington invention designed to protect and preserve the Diem regime. Meanwhile, it was noted here that in Burma, homeland of U Thant, United Na- tions Secretary General, the military regime in control at Rangoon is under attack from the venerable U Kaythara, who, at 83, Is the ranking Buddhist priest at Mandalay. Addressing mass rallies asembled in defi- ance of the regime and overtly inviting ar- rest, he has also been predicting that Gen. Ne Win, the regime's head, will meet the same end as Gen. Aung Sau, Burma's na- tional hero, who was assassinated in 1947. In a statement relayed from Saigon and issued here today, a spokesman for the fact- finding mission that headed back to New York yesterday contended its departure from Vietnam was not occasioned by the coup d'etat there, but was "as scheduled," al- though in statements prior to the coup the mission had claimed inability to estimate when it would complete its on-the-spot in- vestigation. Today's statement also said the mission "had not been able to Interview Thich Tri Quang [a Buddhist monk] who was in asylum at the U.S. Embassy" in Saigon. It added that "the former government of the republic had informed the mission that, ac- cording to the laws of asylum, a person In asylum was not allowed to make any con- tacts whatsoever while in asylum." BURMESE COMPLAINT Meanwhile, there were these additional developments at United Nations headquar- ters: 1. James Barrington, Burma's chief dele- gate here and its representative in the cur- rently recessed disarmament conference at Geneva, complained in one of the Assembly's standing committees about a tendency to- ward "bilateralism" by Washington and Moscow and consequent bypassing of the lesser powers, including neutralists, in dis- armament matters. 2. Mrs. Agda Rossel, Sweden's chief dele- gate took steps in another committee to initiate debate on a resolution-sponsored also by Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela-that is aimed at getting all governments to follow the example Liechten- stein set in 1798 by abolishing capital pun- ishment. During the delivery of Mr. DODD's speech, Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. DODD. I yield. Mr. JAVITS. I believe that my rec- ord on the scoreboard of the Americans for Constitutional Action is even lower than the record of the Senator from Connecticut. I share with the Senator from Con- necticut the feeling that it only demon- strates that we are trying in new ways to have the government use its powers for the people without at the same time jeopardizing individual freedom. We can only hope and pray that among the makers of these arbitrary scoreboards there could be a greater reflection of the consensus of our own people in our own States. Then I think the scoreboard would be very different for the Senator from Connecticut and myself. Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's making that observation. Tha Senator is one of the great minds in this body. He stands out particularly in the area of which he has spoken. I am happy to be In his company on that scoreboard. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the colloquy in which I have just engaged with the Senator from New York be placed at the end of my remarks so that I may have my speech in con- tinuity. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, am I to understand that the Senator from Connecticut does not wish to yield? Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield. I merely wish that whatever yielding I do may appear at the end of my remarks, unless there is some reason for it to ap- pear elsewhere. Mr. ELLENDER. I have been listen- ing to what the Senator has said with much interest, because I have visited southeast Asia on, many occasions. I have often described to the Senate-and I believe my reports will so indicate- the situation that was prevalent in south- east Asia. I am almost certain that my good friend will agree that were he to go to South Vietnam now, he would find things quite different from what they were when he visited that country 4 years ago. Mr. DODD. I am sure that is true. Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt about that. On several occasions I made the statement on the floor of the Senate that unless we could persuade our allies to ass'st us in carrying this load-and I am sure the Senator agrees that that ought to be done-and unless a stable government could be established in South Vietnam, we would be in serious trouble. Mr. DODD. Yes. I wholly agree with those two points. I refer to a speech I made 4 years ago, In which I made the same point. I said I thought it was absolutely essential that our friends and allies in that part of the world join us in the struggle to preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese. I pointed out- and I shall touch on the issue later to- day-that there is a basic structural fault in the SEATO organization which gives a veto power to any one member; and, as the Senator knows, that power has been exercised by France and Britain. We must have a stable government in South Vietnam. The Senator is a well- informed Member of this body on these problems. I have great respect for his opinions. Mr. ELLENDER. The question I should like to ask the Senator is as follows: Should we continue to intensify our efforts in that area if we cannot get our allies to assist us or if a stable gov- ernment is not established in South Vietnam? That is the question. Mr. DODD. The Senator's question is part of a larger question. There are many things we must do. Those are two things that we must do. I believe that we must get our friends and allies In that part of the world to assist us.. We are getting them. Already Korea has announced that it is sending men to that area. Mr. ELLENDER. Two thousand men. Mr. DODD. Two thousand men. The Philippines are sending in several thou- sand men. All this is encouraging. They are starting, at least. I would like to see other nations do as much or more, and I expect that they will. I believe we are underway, and that this is no time to quit, because now we have the signs and beginnings to indicate that our allies are starting to do what the Sen- ator from Louisiana and I believe they should have done long ago. Mr. ELLENDER. I am not suggest- ing that we quit now. Mr. DODD. I know the Senator is not. Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far into it that we may well find ourselves in over our heads. What I fear-and I have said so on the floor of the Senate and have in- cluded it in my reports-is that the sit- uation that now exists in South Vietnam may become similar to the one that now exists in South Korea. The Senator will remember that the South Korean war was supposed to be a United Nations affair, in which all the membership of that great organization was to join us in fighting in South Korea. But what happened? We took hold of the situa- tion there; and as I recall the figures, 96 percent of the cost of that war was paid by the United States, and about 95 percent of the foreign men who died in that conflict were Americans. Mr. DODD. I accept the Senator's statistics. Mr. ELLENDER. That is as I remem- ber them. Mr. DODD. They seem to me to be approximately correct. Mr. ELLENDER. Today we are stuck. as it were, in South Korea. We are trying to maintain 18 local divisions there. It is very costly to do that. In. addition, we are maintaining 2 of our own divisions there. As the Senator from. Connecticut knows, we cannot pay the expenses of our soldiers there with col- lar buttons. It is necessary to have the money and the wherewithal to do it. What I have feared all along is that unless we can persuade our allies to assist us in South Vietnam, and unless a stable government can be established. there, a condition may develop which will be worse than the situation that confronts us in South Korea. That is what has worried me. Mr. DODD. I know the Senator from Louisiana is worried; and so am I. It is a proper problem to worry about. There is no question that a stable gov- ernment must be established in South Vietnam. The trouble began, in my opinion, with the assassination of Diem. Diem was the best thing we had going for the free world in that area, and the tragedy of his death still haunts us. I hope that at some time the proper committee will conduct a formal in- quiry as to his overthrow and assassina.- tion and what part, if any, officials of the U.S. Government played in this tragedy. We have never been told anything, Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 196"5 Approved For Y ~- 674L0003001 70003-8 of conducting antigovernment propaganda from this sensitive vantage point. End the custom that came into practice during the Khanh regime where even a proven Vietcong agent would often be re- leased if, as became standard operational procedure, the prisoner would state that he was 'Buddhist" and claim-with Buddhist backing-that his imprisonment therefore amounted to religious persecution. PUBLIC RECOGNITION If it sounds a bit insane that practices such as these have been permitted to take place In a nation supposedly at war with the Communist Vietcong, it can only be replied that the new premier is the first to have recognized publicly these insanities and may soon lose his political head as a result. But now that the United States privately recognizes that Thich Tri Quang is working at totally cross purposes in Vietnam, is there not some. way to checkmate his design for chaos?, Or has it already gone too far? The fate of the new civilian regime should provide some clues as to the answer. [From the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1964] POLrrio. HAMPERS VIETNAM'S WAR SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, October 17.- Maxwell D. Taylor, the U.S. Ambassador, was given a poignant insight into the whys of Vietnamese politics the other day. Talking Socially with a middle-aged politician, the Ambassador broached the subject of present political pressures from diverse groups on the Saigon Government and the possibly harm- ful effects of this agitation in the war against the Communist Vietcong Insurgents. "You Americans view all this In the terms of your own country," said the politician, not as a reproach but in an effort to let Ameri- cans understand what is going on in Vietnam. You must realize that this period-these few weeks-is the first moment in my life- time that we Vietnamese are able to partici- pate in the normal political interplay your democratic countries have enjoyed for decades. SEEMING CONTRADICTION "Fir,t we were under French domination, then came the war and rule by the Japanese. After the war we had to choose between the French again or joining the Communists. Those of us In the south got our independ- ence with a non-Communist government but Diem kept all political parties down just as the French had. "When Diem was overthrown it was the army that ran everything. They let us poli- ticians talk in the open but nothing we said ever seemed to have any effect on the deci- sions of the military government. "Now at last we are able to act as real citi- zens, not just as tools of one or another group which, holds all the power, whether spokesmen of the people like it or not. There's nothing disloyal about politics. The conversation, trivial in itself, never- theless made an impression on Ambassador Taylor, who now freely admits that his fre- quent visits to Vietnam as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not prepare him for the political complexities and struggles he faces In the role of, Ambassador. Gradually U.S. officials are discovering a seeming contradiction underlying American and Vietnamese attitudes toward the war effort against the Vietcong. From this con- tradiction comes American. impatience with Vietnamese intramural quibbling over forms of government. From it comes also Viet- namese, suspicions about American motives here, suspicions that are only increasing. COLD WAR TRENCH To Americans, Vietnam seems to be a trench in the cold war, a chosen battlefield for the. non-Communist world to confront Communist expansionism. The Vietnamese do not see their plight in these terms at all. The upheavals of the last 2 months have made abundantly clear. To the articulate Vietnamese, the struggle is to build a viable nation and government, a gov- ernment of justice truly representative of what the leading forces of society want. For too long they have lived under a government and policies imposed upon them by outside influence. Communism would be another of these outside influences, but perhaps so now is the American notion of winning a war at whatever cost by whatever government. THE COMING STORY Resolution of this contradiction will be the story of South Vietnam in the months to come. Considering the ' lack of political oppor- tunity, the fumblings of the Vietnamese in their quest for representative and just gov- ernment should come as no surprise. Nor is the accumulation of transitory po- litical institutions-piled up in a haphazard and seemingly self-nullifying manner-alien to Vietnamese experience as any examination of the postwar years under the French will show. At the top of the political pile now is an ad hoc body of 17 men called the High Na- tional Council. Appointed September 26 by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the chief of state, after consultations with leading reli- gious and social groups of the nation, the council is designed to resemble a representa- tive asembly, not for the purpose of govern- ing the country but only for deciding how the country should be governed. The constitution it produces is supposed to be provisional, the personnel installed in high office only temporary, until some kind of national elections can be held. The 17 men are a strange mixture. Only a few have any personal political futures or ambitions. So remote from immediate cross-currents of politics does the council seem that many Vietnamese have dubbed it the "High Na- tional Museum." To American policymakers and Vietnamese officials, however, the coun- cil is the only available link between the tor- mented past and the promised land. Seldom has so much international stress been placed on such a weak link. The extent of the council's responsibilities is unclear, the demands put upon it are enormous and diverse. So-called civilian government is the goal, but Premier Nguyen Khanh has insisted that the armed forces must have "a place of honor" in the gov- ernment to compensate the military estab- lishment for its sacrifices in defending the nation on the battlefield. The religious and political groups pressing for civilian government have not made clear whether they will be satisfied with civilian ministers alone or whether they will press further for military officers to be replaced as chiefs of some-or even all-of the country's 45 provinces. Once the principles of government struc- ture are determined, who are to be the per- sonalities to fill leading posts? Some politi- cal groups insist that only immediate elec- . tions can bring forth leaders truly claiming the confidence of the people. Others recog- nize the difficulty of holding elections in the midst of a guerrilla war and propose instead the naming of "acceptable" persons as yet another interim measure. Whether this course would solve anything is open to question since the ideal of a popu- larly supported government would remain remote. .. Yet this is the ideal ever before Vietnamese political figures these days as they luxuriate .try the. democratic interplay they missed for so long. WAR IS NOT THE ISSUE If it all sounds remote from the war in the countryside, it is. The campaign against a purposeful Communist enemy is not much 3293 of an issue in the political jousting of Sai- gon. No agitation group admits to being neutralist; even the most intransigent of politicians can be at same time sincerely anti-Communist. The political groups making the most headway among the people outside of Sai- gon-the Central Vietnamese Political Move- ment led from Hue University is a prime example-are not openly advocating a cease- fire or a negotiated settlement with the Viet- cong and suspicions to this effect once ex- pressed are vehemently denied with seeming conviction. If the war is not an issue and all groups wish to continue the anti-Communist strug- gle and that is the end of the story, American policymakers should be able to sit back and await with equanimity the outcome of Viet- nam's first self-conscious adventure with democracy. But, of course, this is not the end of the story and the Americans realize perhaps more clearly than the Vietnamese that the Communists are moving effectively into the governmental vacuum, in the coun- tryside at least. American officials maintain they have no ready answer to Vietnamese political striv- ings, no ideal government structure to pro- pose. This time they are willing to let the Vietnamese work out their own government just the way they want it. But what the Americans in contact with members of High National Council are encouraging is rapid adjustment and conciliation toward some common denominator-anything in fact that would restore the central direction to the war effort that has been lacking since Premier Khanh stepped down as President last Au- gust 25. So the interplay goes on and no end is in sight. The stable and popular government that the Vietnamese seek and that the Amer- icans hope will arrive from somewhere before it is too late seems as remote as ever. [From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 19641 BUDDHIST POWER GROWS-IN SOUTH VIETNAM THEY HAVE CREATED A STRUCTURE THAT DRAWS THE LOYALTY OF MANY PERSONS (By Peter Grose) SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 12.- A Buddhist revolution is taking place in South Vietnam. Its lines and goals are still far from clear even to many of the Buddhists themselves, but seasoned observers consider it the most significant and far-reaching trend in present-day southeast Asia. Its implica- tions stretch far beyond the frontiers of this country. They extend not only to nations nearby but also, because of Buddhism's un- clear relation to the Ideology and power of communism, the Vietnamese experience could alter the entire power structure the United States has been fighting to maintain in the southwestern Pacific. The Buddhists seem to be gambling that they can produce a new basis for stability. So far what has actually happened is that the American-supported Premier of South Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has ac- cepted in general and in detail an immediate Buddhist formula for reforming his Govern- ment along new civilian lines. This is the outcome, now apparent, of this country's political crisis last month. PREMIER FIRST That crisis was the second step in an evolu- tion starting 16 months ago. The first step was reached last November, when 9 years of rule by President Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed in a bloody coup d'etat. Both the Buddhists and the Vietnamese Army contributed to President Diem's downfall, but the Buddhists were neither organized nor motivated to fill by themselves the void left when President Diem was removed. Since November 1 the army has governed South Vietnam. On January 13 there was a change in leadership-General Khanh took Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3294 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February- 23 over where a junta had failed to get off the ground but throughout his first 7 months in power the army remained Premier Khanh'a principal base of support, his only real claim to hold power in a land torn by war and popular dissent. Now the Military Revolutionary Council, the instrument of army rule, has been dis- banded. A constitution that seemed to in-. stftutionalize military dictatorship was with- drawn. Premier Khanh is in the process of easing his former military cronies out of their Government positions. Many have already resigned. "I am still a general," Premier Khanli said the other day, "but I am Premier first." The former field commander now wears civilian clothes. He has shaved off the little goatee he sported throughout the military phase of his rule. He never stated publicly why he had grown this beard in the weeks preceding his coup d'etat, but from the smiles and jokes of officers around him it is clear the goatee had a certain barrack-room sym- bolic value to the military clique that helped him into power. Now both the goatee and the clique are gone. NEW FOUNDATION The full story of why the army gave up so easily has yet to come out-maybe it was only a tactical retreat to prepare for new power plays, perhaps by a younger genera- tion of colonels. Some elements would have the people believe there were secret Induce- ments-that is to say, money-that per- suaded certain individuals to abandon their claims to power. More likely the generals felt an onrush of frustration and helpless- ness from 10 unpleasant months in power, even a feeling that they might as well get out while the going was still good. However It happened, the army says it has abandoned its foray into politics and now theoretically will return to the business of fighting a war. Political power is forming on a new foundation. Spokesmen In the Buddhist hierarchy will firmly deny any political aspirations for themselves as persons or for Buddhism as such. They are speaking, they say, solely In the name of the Vietnamese people of what- ever religion. A coon CLAIM In fact, Buddhist leaders have as good a claim as anyone else, and better than many, for presenting the views of "the people," for Buddhism is the family religion of the vast majority of Vietnamese. It has been so for centuries. Premier Khanh himself has long had a Buddhistshrine to his parents in his house. Figures are difficult and misleading since there are a few criteria for claiming to be a Buddhist. Out of a population of 14 million an estimated total of 5 or 6 million people are practicing Buddhists responsive to the voice of the hierarchy. Many more who say they are Buddhists if asked pay little more than lipservice to any religion. Others ad- here to Buddhist-oriented sects that never- theless shun the central Buddhist organi- zation. Furthermore, there are clear geographical distinctions of attitude among even the most faithful of Buddhists. Until recently the most politically active were bonzes, or monks, from North Vietnam who had fled to the south to escape Communist rule. They gravitated toward Saigon, establishing their own pagodas' separate from the pagodas of their brothers native to South Vietnam. Northerners are .outspoken In their opposi- tion to communism and have supported the military government in active prosecution of the war against the Communist Vietcong. The best known spokesman for the North- ern refugees is Thich Tam Chau, who holds the position of rector, or chairman of the Buddhist Secular Institute. the organiza- tional center of Buddhist political activity. At the opposite extreme In zeal are the Buddhists of the far south, the populous and thirties of early forties, all appointed, like rich Mekong Delta. In this area the orthodox the Government's province chiefs, by their hierarchy is weak, laymen have greater in- own administration in Saigon. fluence and religion plays a lesser role in the This is the political structure the Bud- comfortable life of the population. Here dhists were erecting during the 10 months of also thrive many independent sects of Viet- military rule over South Vietnam. namese Buddhists as well as a militant anti- How effective would this structure be in Communist group of Buddhists of Cambodian , support of a government favorable to Bud- origin who adhere to the "hinayana," or dhists? The matter has not yet been put to a "lesser vehicle." branch of International Buddhism. Vietnamese Buddhists is pre- dominantly "mahayana," or "greater vehicle," in which the Buddha is deified. HARDEST TO DEFINE it Is the Buddhists of central Vietnam who have spurred the most significant recent ad- vances into politics. Their Intellectual cen- ter is at Hue. These are the Buddhists hard- est to understand or define in political terms. They profess anticommunism and antineu- tralism, but they also seem far from happy with the present American policy for fighting the war. Their undoubted leader is Thich Trl Quang, considered by many the mastermind of last year's Buddhist revolt against Presi- dent Diem. By seeking refuge in the U.S. Embassy a year ago, he forced the U.S. Gov- ernment to take sides with the Buddhists against the Diem government, which was trying to arrest Buddhist leaders. Though Tri Quang lacks Tam Chau's pres- tigious position as head of the Secular In- stitute, he seems now to be the most influen- tial single Buddhist In the country. There are some observers who look upon his politi- cal skills as setting the pattern for Buddhism throughout southeast Asia. A long-term Buddhist revolution is taking place both within the movement and In the country at large. Its goal is undefined. Its purpose, according to the bonzes, is to "pro- tect Buddhism." Neither the meaning of this phrase nor the means to realize it have been made clear to nonbelievers. A basic strain within the movement is the whole question of whether Buddhism should deal in temporal politics. Any typical Buddhist declaration will be couched In terms of religion, shunning partisan involve- ment in worldly political matters. Bonzes such as Tri Quang will evade difficult political gtfestions by insisting they are solely men of religion and not competent to speak on mat- ters of politics. DRIVE REMOVED DOUBT Considering their role last year and this, it is difficult to refrain from charges of hy- pocrisy on this point. Any doubt about the potential political strength and interests of at least some Buddhist leaders was removed in their campaign against President Diem. With the November coup their effective- ness seemed ended for the moment, since they had no viable organization capable of retaining political control after 10 centuries of relative noninvolvement. Quickly but quietly this was changed. Starting on January 3, when the "Vietnam Unified Buddhist Church" came into being, the Buddhists under Tam Chau and Tri Quang have established a shadow govern- ment across the country, a shadow rapidly assuming substance. At the top there are two "institutes," one for religious affairs, which has nominal and honorific responsi- bilities equivalent to those of a chief of state, and the other for secular affairs, which, like a premier, wields actual power over the organization. POLITICAL STRUCTURES In the secular institute there are six "gen- eral offices," resembling ministries, for clergy affairs, Buddhist studies, cultural affairs, construction and finance, lay peoples' affairs, and youth. Each general office is headed by a commissioner. Down in the provinces there are delegates and deputies, all bonzes, mostly In their test-little has so far been demanded of the Buddhist population by their leaders. But many observers think the test will come in the next months as long as Premier Khanh leans more and more heavily on apparently the one non-Communist element of the na- tion that has not yet been brought into active participation in the Government. [From the New York Tribune, Sept. 11, 1964) VIET: BUDDHIST PRESS LASHES UNITED STATES SAIGON. South Vietnam's leading Bud- dhist publication yesterday blamed the United States for the political and religious turmoil that has swept the country since mid-August. The publication, Hai Trieu Am, charged in- directly that Americans are manipulating the Saigon government to extend U.S. Influence in South Vietnam-an accusation previously voiced privately by some Vietnamese officials. The paper also backed rebellious-students' charges that Americans triggered the recent bloody clashes between Buddhists and Ro- man Catholics in the northern city of Da Nang. PROTEST More student trouble developed yesterday as Saigon's politically active student union denounced the ruling military government for not creating a promised "high national council" quickly enough. The council is to take steps within 2 months toward setting up a civilian government by late next year. Hai Trieu Am, in voicing the Buddhist charges, said that "if one wishes to learn the deep reasons for the anger of the people of Da Nang, one must find them in the August 16 constitution, which certainly was not drafted by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh." INFLUENCE The inference was that the Military Revo- lutionary Council, which approved the con- stitution, as well as strongman General Khanh were influenced by the United States. The constitution, under which General Khanh was elevated from Premier to Presi- dent and given sweeping powers, was re- scinded In response to violent rioting and Buddhist demonstrations. General Khanh. reverted to Premier and became the domi- nant member of the ruling military triumvi- rate. On Wednesday he also took over the! Defense Minister's post. The Buddhist publication criticized Ameri- can press reports of Buddhists' razing of the Catholic sector of Da Nang, charging they failed to indicate the real causes of the rioting. Asserting that "since the distant past until the arrival of Americans here, Buddhists have never destroyed or burned any houses," Hai Trieu Am said that "the immediate reason (for anger in Da Nang) was the shots fired in the air by Americans." U.S. soldiers had fired shots in the air to disperse Buddhist demonstrators who tried to break into the U.S. Army compound In Da Nang. The student union, meeting ostensibly to debate criteria for prospective civilian states- men's conduct, denounced former U.B. Am- bassador Henry Cabot Lodge for allegedly being soft on the late President Ngo Dinh Diem. It charged that Mr. Lodge recently told a Paris audience that Mr. Diem, who was overthrown and slain in last November's coup, might have survived if he had been a better President. The students termed this "a flagrant inter- ference in the affairs of Vietnam." Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE to be, the problem of containing their power spected work 'Buddhism in Vietnam," writ- downfall of President Ngo and rendering them relatively harmless ten by Dr, Mai Tho Truyen the should not b I , r n 3291 so uble. B ea es. November of 1963. on uddhism, It is e Buddhist The methods of doing this are hardly up to miovem ntein Vietnam has expanded tot at leaders awoulldruselthee ameatactics against Americans to decide. The best they can do is least 4 million persons (or about 30 percent any effective anti-Communist government in to encourage Premier Tran Van Huong to of the population of 14 million). But again Vietnam. So it is high time to stop acting face up to the situation and take corrective according to Dr. Truyen, the overwhelming as if the significance of these men is to any action. The worst they can do is to keep in- majority of Vietnamese Buddhists do not substantial extent religious. Whether or not sisting that Huong find some ground for agree-and indeed disapprove-of the Com- they are actually agents of the Communists compromise with men who are actively seek- munist-tinged extremism and violence of makes no real difference. The fact is that Ing to overthrow his government. the Thich Tri Quang wing. their actities are estructive to The problem of dealing with widespread Dr. Truyen, Who is additionally head of of the country and that attempts to arri6eoat and well-organized subversive conspiracies, South Vietnam's powerful Buddhist Lay- some sort of compromise with them will very after all, is not exactly new. Even the fact men's Association, cooperates with and sup- probably prove fatal. that this conspiracy may command wide pub- ports Vietnam's Buddhist-dominated gov- Estimates vary on the effectiveness and lic support does not make it all powerful. ernment led by Premier Tran Van Huong, size of the Buddhist apparatus in Vietnam. The French, for example, faced something of Certainly the Huong government has no The more effective, however, the more es- the same situation with the Communists in quarrel with the Buddhist but rather vice- sential it is that it be dismantled or neutral- the late 1940's, complete with infiltration of versa. the army, police and government, nationwide As Huon g put It in a shed ld beug thing. The Huong government strikes and impressive street riots. It was not question on the subject;cabled answer to my should be eting the strongest American _ necessary to annihilate the Communists to "Your refer to a quarrel. But my govern- enco Iss age t gt tong end. contain the threat to the security of the It g not i nt any such thwit The state: y meat has never answered attacks and ac- Huon government, in dealing with the govern- What gives the Buddhist conspiracy its and cusationsmyseldf Buddhist elements. ments since the overthrow of Diem have been uniquely dangerous twist is the. pseudo- If these attacks, were halted, the quarrel inhibited, by the feeling that the Americans religious cover of its leadership. The ma- would die automatically." more e in g jority of Buddhists in Vietnam are quite But if there is a genuine schism in the InareVietnamintthanrested they areainieffectivecgov Certainly neither _ proneutralist nor pro- Vietnamese Buddhist movement between the ernment there. We seem to be defending Communist. Yet the militant leaders in moderates and the extremists, and if the ex- our fuzzy liberal ideal against the army-the Saigon naturally seek to identify themselves tremists are in the minority, how have they only real source of strength for any govern- with, and presume to speak for, every managed to infiltrate the Vietnamese army? ment in Vietnam. Buddhist in the world. It goes back to last summer when Gen. The sad fact of the matter is that American Certainly they will raise the cry of religious Nguyen Khanh waf_ still fighting for his policy is still very much under the influence persecution at the first hint of trouble. Given political life and was under the illusion that of the men who were responsible for the the experience of the unfortunate President he could appease his most vocal tormentor- overthrow of Diem and who are still de- Ngo Dinh Diem, it is a highly effective form the same extremist monk, Thich Tri Quang- termined to justify their action. It appar- of defense. And every effort must be made to by giving In to his demands. One of these ently makes little difference that the highest avoid lending credence to the charge, demands was to give Quang the right to as- officials of the administration are con- It seems improbable, therefore, that an at- sign Buddhist chaplains to every army com- winced-and were convinced at the time- tempt to crush the conspiracy by force pany. that this m was a traic mistake, The will be called for. But short of this, there Three-man Buddhist chaplain teams (in same thinkingethatt p oduced the mistake is are plenty of things that the Saigon govern- reality political cells) were soon thereafter still shaping our policies in Vietnam today. ment could do. attached to the army and soon trouble It is time the nonsense stopped. It could, for instance, put considerably started. A few irate Vietnamese comman- more _ backbone in suppressing the kind of ders began to expel the chaplains when they [From 'the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. senseless juvenile hooliganism that fills the caught them distributing tracts telling sol- 21, 1964 "daily news columns from Saigon, diers they need not obey their officers if the ] It could screen out of the army and police felt they were acting in the interests of BUDDHISM s WIDENS less than ROLE y force those elements which might be likely colonialist Americans or persons unfaithful With Christmas less than a week away, to side against the government in any real to the nationalist cause. wuddhism continues ` to be active on the showdown with the Buddhist leadership. But for the most part, individual Viet- world's newsira et It could strengthen the hand of more con- namese army officers have been unwilling to The South Vietnamese Government has servative (and more religious) Buddhist take upon themselves the expulsion of these been full alert, Buddhist hagainst ilt dtthe tra- leaders who, at present, are themselves the cohorts of Thich Tri Quang, particularly so sibility . e ionbet st the cou- targets of strong-arm tactics by their mili- long as his capacity to wrest further appease- ttry's. Tension factions some t of the n gov- tant coreligionists, merit from the government and from the try's Buddhist factions and the Saigon It could, in short, face up to the problem Americans seemed unchecked. ernment has been increasing daily, gv instead of shrinking from it. What is essen- In any case, the capacity of a militant the In the midst of the Vietnamese friction, tial in Vietnam is that the power to over- minority to make trouble out of all propor- billion religion that Tsai being many as half a throw governments-any government which tion to their true importance is winds adherents Cots u beng buffeted and by new they do not control-be taken away from this part of the winds ero Communist China and soothed handful of monks. If this is not done, and even If Quarig's landscape boast of subverting v Vietnam. And by statements from the Vatican. soon, there will be no prospect whatever of name evens armed forces of subverting the Viet- any stable government in South Vietnam. e armed forces is exaggerated, it is OoorERATION ASKED surely criminal negligence not to take what- Among the past week's developments in- [From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. g ever steps necessary to destroy his capacity volving Buddhism around the world: 19651 to spread political poisons among Vietnam's Pope Paul VI appealed for Buddhists and BUDDHISTS BRAG OF SUByERSION fighting men. Roman Catholics to cooperate, "especially in certain zones where the two communities (By Marguerite Higgins) [From the Evening Star, Jan. T, 1985] live together and are confronted with the On the bulletin board of the newest pa- THE BUDDHISTS IN VIETNAM same problems." The zone that bests fits gods in Saigon there recently has appeared this situation is Vietnam. a communique which the Communist- In some ways, the American Government The Chinese Communist Government oriented wof militant Vietnamese Bud- Is its own worst enemy in Vietnam. In its stripped the Dalai Lama of Tibet of his re- re- or eat d wing in to have subverted at least National Arm d- Buddhist subversion and its fatuous insist- committee for the "Tibet Autonomous Re- The is sinister Thich Tri y ence on the theme of a "broadly based gion" of China. It called him a "traitor who Quang, Vietnam's civilian government in Saigon it is in Itself is an incorrigible running dog of imperialism ace toppler of governments, boasts that 2,000 largely responsible for the near paralysis of and forei%n reactionaries." officers of th' Vietnamese army would lay the regime of Premier Tran Van Huong, a The move dropped all Chinese pretense down their arms and refuse to fight the paralysis not likely to be broken by today's that the Buddhist god-king of Tibet, now Communists if he ordered them to do so. reported agreement to form a new coalition in exile in India, retained any further secular How valid arethese. boasts? It acre,tsuestion ?and an council, or spiritual authority In his conquered land. is - appalling The threat raised by the militant Buddhist The Theravada Buddhist sect, an impor- one. For if the Vietnamese regular army leaders is now perfectly clear. After months tant minority in Vietnam, sent a petition to has been subverted to this extent today, of behind-the-scenes Incitement of disorder, the government asking for arms to fight the what will happen tomorrow? the two top "venerables," Tich Tri Quan Communist Vietcong First, it should be pointed out that there and Tich Tam Chau, are in open revolt be granted.' It is unlikely it will appears to be a widespread misconception against the Huong regime. They are threat- REACTION WATCHED In this country about the southeast Asian ening to overthrow it, using the same Vietnam has been badly fragmented by Buddhist movement. According to the re- methods of mass disorder that led to the fighting religious sects before. And Thera- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3292 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE vada, weak as it may be in Vietnam, repre- sents 95 percent of the population of adjoin- ing Cambodia, a country with strong anti- Saigon leanings, Political observers in Saigon were watching closely reactions of Vietnam's ranking Bud- dhist layman, Mal The Truyen, who returned home Friday from a World Buddhist con- ference in India. Mr. Truyen is a vice president of the world body but, more importantly for Vietnamese Buddhism, he is a member of the High Na- tional Council, the Saigon government's interim legislature. Mr. Truyen has not joined the recent Bud- dhist protests and is regarded by some as the best hope for getting antigovernment Bud- dhist priests together with the government of Premier Tran Van Huong. The Vietnamese Commissioner General for Buddhist Youth Affairs, Thich Thien Minh, said Vietnamese Buddhists had striven hard to live up to "Lord Buddha's teachings of compassion and altruism." He said the best way for Buddhists to combat communism was to come together in one united, cen- tralized body to advance the Buddhist ide- ology and eliminate social injustice. DISSENT INDICATED In another quote, the State Department in Washington termed a letter written to Presi- dent Johnson by another Saigon Buddhist leader, Thich Tam Chau, "a propaganda de- vice and not an appropriate means of com- municating with the President of the United States." The priest had written charging Premier Huong's government with oppress- ing Buddhism. Meanwhile there has been evidence that not all Buddhists follow the protesting priests. It is known that many of the monks in the vanguard of last year's struggle against the Ngo Dinh Diem rule have opposed the current anti-Huong campaign. At least one of them, Thich Due Nghiep, has been denounced by the North Vietnamese Gov- ernment Thich Due Nghiep has opposed the anti- Huong demonstrations and urged priests to take to the countryside to preach against the Vietcong. Perhaps his followers are gaining ground. A week ago violent demonstrations. and self- immolation by priests was predicted. But they failed to materialize. The same pre- dictions have been made again. NEW AGITATION The Government has obviously mustered some support for its position and has suc- cessfully clamped down an troublemakers. Btft some sources report agitation now is strong in the large cities of Rue and Da Nang farther north where Saigon control Is less effective. Meanwhile, the Saigon government has ad- mitted that the Buddhists are not the only factionalists dividing South Vietnam. It announced the formation of an Armed Forces Council to iron out differences be- tween the old guard officers and the "young Turks," And Chief of State Phan Khuc Suu has proposed that seven new members be added to the High National Council. He suggested names representing the south, central, and north sections of the country In order to try to overcome regional factionalism. [From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1964] SAIGON SCHISM: BUDDHIST STRUGGLE SAPS FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISTS (By Takashi Oka) SAICoN. The struggle between Premier Tran Van Huong and the Buddhist leadership continues, and South Vietnam is the loser. Neither side talks to the other except in propagandistic appeals to the population. Each day of political Instability at the center makes more difficult the task of pacification against Communist insurgents in the coun- tryside. Washington, engaged in intensive review of its Indochina policy, must decide whether or not continuation of military and economic aid on the present scale of more than $500 million a year can bring victory against the Communists without taking the war into North Vietnam. It must also decide how this aid can most effectively be used as leverage to promote political stability within South Vietnam. It is the second of these two tasks that preoccupies the American Embassy here these days. Washington formally supports the Tran Van Huang government, which came into being according to provisions of the October 20 constitution and which cannot legally be overthrown unless the 1b-man-High National Council votes it out. Yet there is full recognition that Buddhism in South Vietnam constitutes a powerful political force, that leaders of the Buddhist hierarchy have been dissatisfied with the Huong government from its inception, and that whatever legal rights and wrongs of the situation, an all-out confrontation between Buddhists and the government can benefit no one but the Communists. REGIME ATTACKED Americans have, therefore, sought to keep an open bridge between the government and Buddhist leadership. But the task becomes more difficult with each passing day. Saturday Thich Tam Chau, one of the Buddhist hierarchy's two most prominent leaders, held a press conference bitterly at- tacking the Huong government. The following day he permitted a student- sponsored funeral procession for a youth killed in government-student clashes last week to start out from Buddhist headquar- ters, the Vien Hoa Dao or Institute for Exe- cution of Dharma. Buddhist sources say Vien Boa Dao will call for popular noncooperation with the government. A nightly program of loudspeaker broad- casts from within Vien Hoa Dao Is to be launched this week. Those who gather In streets to listen will do so at their own risk, presumably. BUDDHISTS ACCUSED The government accuses the Buddhists of mixing religion and politics by using the re- ligious prestige of the hierarchy to promote secular causes such as the overthrow of the government. Thich Tam Chau responds that "all things in the world are related." To an observer the Buddhist hierarchy seems to be testing its strength with the people. Last August's events have 'already proved that on some issues they can win overriding popular support. Whether this support will stay with them on lesser issues is problematical. But the Huong-Buddhist confrontation has had a snowballing effect. What seemed bridgeable and nonessential at the start has built up into a major test of strength from which neither now can afford to withdraw. CAMPAIGN HINTED [Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported the Buddhists may again turn to suicide by fire in an intensive campaign to overthrow Premier Huong's government, quoting an un- named Buddhist leader. - [Leading monks deny there are plans for more such suicides. But Buddhist strate- gists generally keep their plans secret to the last moment. - [A Reuters dispatch said government forces are pressing their gains against Com- munist Vietcong guerrillas while the Bud- dhist leaders work out a strategy for ousting the civilian government.[ - February 23 [From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 12, 19641 PAINFVL VERDICT IN VIETNAM (By Marguerite Higgins) Key U.S. officials in Vietnam have come to a painful but significant conclusion. It is that a tiny faction of Vietnamese-too clever to reveal their motives and too powerful for comfort-are bent on using the cloak of re- ligion as a cover for undeclared warfare de- signed to prevent the emergence of a stable government in Vietnam. In other words. whenever any regime in Saigon shows any sign of being able to govern the drive to topplp it will begin. There are some dissenters from this view in the Embassy in Saigon. But this conclu- sion is nonetheless held widely and strongly enough to explain why the Embassy gave the strongest sort of backing to the decision of Vietnam's new premier, Tran Vail Huong, last weekend to can out the army to repress the Buddhist-instigated demonstrations against his fledgling government. WILY MONK Thus Tran Van Huong's new regime, fcr whom practically nobody has great hopes, is momentarily one up on the wiliest, slickest demagog In Vietnam, the Buddhist monk, Thich Tri Quang, who, Americans believe, was behind last weekend's initial attempt to topple the latest Saigon regime, just as he had previously mastermined the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem and Gen. Nguyen Khanh. But in this matter of government toppling, the smart money is on Thich Tri Quang, es- pecially if his boasts of having swung some personalities of the Catholic, Cao Dal, and Hoa Hao faiths into his camp, are at all true. It has taken some time for U.S. officials to permit themselves to face the fearsome and indeed awesome truth about Thich Tri Quang. Of late, Ambassador Maxwell Tay- lor in Saigon and State Department officials in Washington have taken to describing Thich Tri Quang as "the_ Makarios of south- east Asia." There used to be brisk arguments among Americans in Saigon and Washington as to whether Thich Tri Quang, who once served with the Communist Viet Minh and whose two brothers serve Ho Chi Minh, is "still a Communist." It is only recently that Americans have begun to realize that this begs the real issue which is whether Thich Tri Quang serves Communist ends. And the answer here is that if the Vietcong themselves had been writing the scenario as to how any given Buddhist monk could play into their hands, they could not have improved on the real life doingsof Thich Tri Quang, including his current attempt to topple the new civilian government. For if Thich Tri Quang and his followers can, by demonstrations, riot, and propaganda successfully keep on perpetuating the near chaos that has prevailed from the top down in Vietnam, it is just a matter of time 'until the Vietcong take over the country - from within. The civilian regime of Tran Van Huong re- quired great courage to proclaim the separa- tion of politics from religion, because if this much needed step were carried out it would checkmate some of the antigovernment troubles masterminded by Thich Tri Quang. It would, as a few examples: End the vigilante squads of Buddhists who have taken law into their own hands in the provinces and arrested Catholics on the pretext that they are Diemists (it Is a pre- text because almost all educated Vietnamese worked for the government between 1954 and 1963 and hence were Dlemists). End the system where triumvirates of Buddhists are attached to Vietnamese bat- talions with the divisive and dangerous habit Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003110/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 19-65 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3289 A clear-cut Communist victory in South military, although in seniority they rank be. toward the junior officers and General Vietnam, the domino theorists maintain, low many officers without field responsibility. Khanh. The remarks by General Khanh, would have worldwide repercussions, The The two officer factions have been feuding he said, "might have been made In the heat Communists in Peiping would win the argu- for months. On December 18. the junior offi- of the moment." But Mr. Rusk suggested ment with the Communists in Moscow cers formed an organization called the that U.S. aid might be curtailed if the d!ffi- over how to spread their ideology. Commu- Armed Forces Council, with no representa- culties In Saigon continued. nists would expand their Chinese-style sub- tion from the senior officers. The council The latest flare-up came just as plans were versive activities In Africa and South Amer- then drew up an order calling for mandatory shaping up for South Vietnamese air strikes Ica, confident that the United States would retirement of all officers with at least 25 against Communist Vietcong supply bases refuse to become involved in another expen- years' service. This would retire about 40 and infiltration staging areas in Laos near sive guerrilla war., officers, Including Maj. Gen. Duong Van the South Vietnamese border. Gen. LEAVE THE WEAPONS BEHIND? Minh, former Premier who is popular with Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Premier of Loss, The domino theory is based, of course, on South Vietnam's Buddhists. visited Saigon last week, presumably to put tpresumption that without U.S. aid South The High National Council refused to ap- the finishing touches on plans to strike at the Vietnam presumption collapse houtethe Commu- South prove the order. So the junior officers abol- the Communist bases. fished the legislative group. The purge nists. But If the United States did withdraw, THE FLAMES OF WAR most probably American weapons and equip- commander comma,Air of the he air air force, Nguyen , and d Brig. . Gen. . These preparations were enough to alarm ment now.stQred in that country would be Nguyen Chanh Thi, commander of the 1st the Red Chinese, who threatened to plunge left behlnfl. The South Vietnamese armed Army Corps, defended the military's right to Indochina into war if the United States forces would. certainly not succumb to the "act as mediator" of disputes within the bombs supply lines through Laos. "The Communist guerrillas overnight. Government. flames of war will spread to the whole of But psychologically, South Vietnam would The officers said their move was aimed at Indochina if U.S. Imperialism succeeds in be 'weakened. The South Vietnamese mili- eliminating political interference in the con- its criminal scheme," warned the Peiping tary situation, after all, has steadily de- duct or the antiguerrilla war. But, although People's Daily. teriorated despite American aid of more than they disbanded the legislative arm of the Whether the United States would go along $11,500,000 a day and the presence of 22,000 Government, they pledged continued these plans in view of the present tur- American advisers. Without American sup- bulence in Saigon was uncertain. For one port, the best to Premier Tran Van Huong and his his Cabinet. support guess is that the South Viet- The Premier has been under attack by mili- thing, it was no longer clear who actually namese would quickly seek a political, rather tant Buddhist organizations almost since 'he held power in the country. U.S. officials than a military, solution to the Red threat. took office October 30. The purge leaders !n- were unsure whether General Khanh had The Communists probably would be willing dicated they believed their move would pave again assumed the role of strong man or to negotiate a cease-fire, figuring It would be the way for reconciling the Buddhists and whether he was only acting as the mouth- less expensive to them to subvert the Gov- the Huong government. piece of the junior officers. Nor was Premier ernment from within. MOTIVES CALLED SINCERE Huong's position clear. Despite strong ges- BATTLE WITH NO FRONTLINES tures of support from Washington, the Pre- The United States, even if it pulled out of The U.S. Embassy In Saigon quickly op- mier remained in the background, tacitly, at South Vietnam, still would remain the posed the purge. Conceding that the officers' least, giving his approvagto the purge. The strongest military power in Asia. The 7th motives in attempting to stabilize the Gov- Buddhists, too, stayed quiet, awaiting the now pfrom Com- ernment were sincere, Embassy officials military's next move. The' United States Fleet Fleet now protects said the purge would only further disrupt the alone was standing fast publicly against the hustle i re ects Formosa o tInvasion and quickly ckGovernment. U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. purge. And the United States suddenly to any an could country ened troops t military forces: But, the Taylor held hurried consultations with the seemed to have very few friends in South ed Communist m un say, the 7th Fleet has junior officers, General Khanh, and Premier Vietnam. .domino subversion In Laos and Huon The officers refused to back down. RICHARD EGAN. failed South to o prevrevn.ent Although Red Red the United States General Khanh's position in the maneuver- South ing was unclear, but there were plenty of [From the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 25, is the world's mightiest military power, they rumors. One said he had been at odds with 1964] say, nuclear bombs, tanks, and aircraft car- the junior officers in recent weeks because of MATTER OF FACT: How NOT To Do IT riers are of little use against a guerrilla force his refusal to pledge his support to Mr. fighting a battle with no front lines. Huong, his successor as Premier. The junior (BY Joseph Alsop) At a press conference last week, Secretary officers were said to have threatened Decem- HONG KONG.-The political trouble in of State Dean Rusk ducked a question about ber 6 to jail General Khanh unless he pub- Saigon began at almost the moment when whether the United States still subscribed to licly announced support of the Premier. It this reporter was starting home for Christ- the domino theory. was rumored, too, that General Khanh was mas. But even on the road home, with no He did say, however, that if South Viet- quietly conferring with Buddhist leaders, pre- opportunity to study detailed developments, nam were lost to the Communists, "they sumably in hope of capitalizing on any Bud- it is easy to see that we are being given an- would simply move the problem to the next dhist-provoked overthrow of the Huong gov- other demonstration of how not to do it. country and the next and, the next. And, ernment. The Vietnamese generals have no doubt as I say, this is not dominoes. This Is the In a radio address after a 'meeting with contributed their share to this demonstra- kind of Marxism that comes out of Peiping." Ambassador Taylor, General Khanh accepted tion, but so have the Americans. To be sure, Mr. Rusk asserted that South Vietnam's full responsibility for the purge. Then he the fault on the American side does not lie "primary requirement" in the fight against swung into his attack against the United with Gen. Maxwell Taylor. The fault lies the Communists Is national unity. "Unity," States. "We make sacrifices for the coun- with the instructions that General Taylor he said, would be worth many, many divi- try's independence and the Vietnamese peo- was given, and even more with the ludicrously sions, " But there was no unity in South ple's liberty, but not to carry out the policy unrealistic ideas and prejudices in which Vietnam last week. , of any foreign country," he said. He defined those instructions partly originated. The latest upheaval began in the same way the role of the military as "acting as an in- It has been the same old story from the as most of the previous coups and attempted termediary to settle all disputes and differ- period when large numbers of U.S. officials, coups-with the rumbling of trucks filled ences if they create a situation favorable to military officers and one must add, news- with soldiers in the streets of Saigon. The the common enemies: communism and Papermen, were doing everything in their purge was carried out speedily. Soldiers, colonialism in any form." power to undercut the beleaguered Chinese under command of a clique of 9 junior CRITICAL OF AMBASSADOR TAYLOR Nationalist Government, down to the present officers, arrested most of the members of the melancholy moment. Almost always, the 15-man High National Council, the country's In private interviews with American re- same two tendencies have recurrently provisional legislature, and several dozen Porters, General Khanh was sharply critical marked-and too often fatally marred- other political figures. of Ambassador Taylor. If he "does not act American dealings with situations like that The officers acted, they said, because the more intelligently, the United States will lose in Vietnam. council was dominated, by "counter-revolu- southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom," In such situations, first of all, a good many tionary elements that were acting against said General Khanh. He charged the U.S. Americans mysteriously tend to be hyper- the spirit of national unity." The arrested Envoy had acted "beyond imagination as far critical of precisely those allied leaders whose council members, the officers said, had been as an ambassador is concerned." aims and purposes most closely coincide with "conspiring" against the armed forces in In Washington, the Johnson administra- American interests. It is never enough, for hope of furthering "their own personal tion replied with a message of support for Americans of this stripe, that our interests ambitions." Its man in Saigon. "Ambassador Taylor," are being served. OFFICER FACTIONS FEUD said the State Department, "has been acting Whether in China, or Korea, or today In throughout with the full support of the Vietnam, they must always be designing But more than the personal ambitions and U.S. Government." ideal governments; their ideal governments rivalries of the officers seemed to be involved. Secretary Rusk, at his news conference generally exclude the local leaders whose aims The nine officers all hold key positions in the the next day, took a more conciliatory tone coincide with American Interests. This was Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 emphatically the case in Vietnam in the years tion that permitted the Vietcong to take ments that Marxism and Buddhism were of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in a considerable over 7 million (out of 14 million) Viet- alike, his furtive meetings with leaders of measure, it is today. namese in 2 months, the demoralizing ef- the Vietcong National Liberation front? The rights and wrongs of the young gen- feet of the first and second coup d'etats on Will faces turn red if we admit further erals' renewed intervention in Vietnamese Vietnam's fledgling officer corps has changed that for many months Quang bamboozled politics cannot be judged from this distance. the very nature of the war. . many well-meaning Americans into believ- But from any distance, it is perfectly clear The demoralization Is such that many Viet- ing his absurd claim that his particular that these are the men most deeply com- namese officers have become de facto hors clique of Buddhists represented "85 to 90 matted to resisting the Communist attack on de combat even though they are nominally percent" of the Vietnamese people when in South Vietnam. It is also clear that with still attheir posts. The morale of many key point of fact Buddhists in Vietnam may just the possible exception of Prime Minister Tran officers has been crippled because they do possibly constitute 30 percent of the people Van I3uong, they are the most effective per- not know whom to trust. In the wake of the (see "Buddhism in Vietnam" by Dr. Mai Tho sonalities on the scene. successive purgings of the "ins" by the "outs" Truyen, chairman of the Vietnamese Associ- The motives for their renewed intervention during the two revolts, who can blame these ation of Buddhist Laymen) and further, may well have been a great deal more justi- officers if they are fearful of taking respon- Quang's faction is bitterly opposed by truly fiable than one might suppose from a brief sibility and executing orders. After all, their religious Buddhists such as those at Saigon's perusal of the pompous pronouncements of general or other superior officer may be "in" Xa Loi Pagoda, which is not on speaking the State Department spokesman. Just be- today "out" tomorrow. If they do their duty terms with the Buddhist center run by the fore they acted, for example, there were today they may be punished tomorrow. Communist-tinged extremists? strong indications that Phan Khac Suu, the And the United States is not without Embarrassing as all this may be, embar- nice, bewildered old gentleman who is the blame for this uncertain atmosphere. If the rassment has become, and resoundingly, the official chief of state, was about to make a American Embassy in Saigon had spoken out lesser of the evils. The moment of truth is dangerously muddled compromise with the half as forcefully against the reign of terror at hand. political Buddhists. perpetrated recently (mainly against Cath- The truth is vital because otherwise Amer Moreover, you need only ask any American olics) in Vietnam as it did during the so- ican opinion is going to fall, just like that in Saigon, whether political or military, what called Buddhist crisis, there might be a into the trap so cleverly and deviously pre- protection we have against a neutralist gov- saner atmosphere. The phony trial of the pared by Quang-the trap of believing that ernment finally coming to power because of Catholic Mayor Dang Sy, the war hero (seven the so-called and in fact nonexistent "Bud- the general deterioration in South Vietnam. decorations) who was condemned for having dhist majority" of the Vietnamese people The answer always is, "The army leaders will carried out orders of his Buddhist superiors have turned against the United States. not permit it." In these very possible cir- in Hue last May, is but one example of this The truth is, and it needs to be repeated cumstances, in short, we are actually count- reign of terror. And if Catholics carry signs loud and clear, that the man behind the per-- ing on the army leaders' intervention. saying "Henry Cabot Lodge Go Home" it is sons cradling the rocks that smash our Ii.. Because of American tendency No. 1, how- because they think the United States has brary is Quang as well as others who have ever, the army leaders are now the targets stayed strangely silent in the face of what been been intriguing with the Vietcong Com- of the State Department's righteous indigna- almost everybody on the scene in Saigon munists for a very long time, as the American tion. As for tendency No. 2, it is symbolized considers a mockery of justice-only one intelligence record-to its credit--shows even by Phan Khac Suu, the chief of state above among many. though the policymakers have chosen to dis- mentioned. He has clean hands and sore In any case, the morale of many Vietna- regard the evidence. feet. And he wonderfully illustrates the mese officers in crucial areas is shot. But if and when the majority of the Ameri- usual results of ideal government designing. Further, this country is going to have to can people begin to believe that utterly false, It was a fairly hair raising experience to stop trying to fight this war with its left but so carefully prepared, piece of Commu- go straight from an audience with this ami- hand. It is not serious warfare, to give but nist-abetted propaganda to the effect that able old man, with his white foot bandages one example, to send over military advisers the illusory Buddhist majority wants us to go and obvious feebleness, to a long meeting for 1 year only. The advisers are the first home, then the clamor for Americans to give with one of the ideal government designers. to say it. Said Maj. Olen O'Connor, of Ari- up and get out of Vietnam could become ir- "Now," this American kept saying, "we've zona: "It takes about 6 to 8 months to get reversible. got a government we can really work with- to know your Vietnamese opposite number All right, so the United States made a mis- a government with real promise of stability." and work smoothly with him. And just as take back in the summer of 1963. We can And he went on to talk with pious enthusi- things are really beginning to mesh, it Is now see, in retrospect, that the Vietnamese asm about the high national council's promis- time to go home." army, the Vietnamese security police, and lug first attempts to prepare a national elec- Further, the Communists, who convinced Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem were tion in South Vietnam. themselves early in 1964 that the United completely right when they tried to tell us In reality, it would be flattering to call States was about to bow out of Asia, must be from the very beginning of the Buddhist the high national council a basket of eels. Put on notice that this country will do what- crisis that in Vietnam the Communists do As for the notion of holding a general elec- ever is necessary to prevent a Communist not, after all, play cricket, but play dirty. tion in Vietnam at this juncture or at any victory. This means, if necessary, the com- They play real dirty and indulge in precisely time in the near future, this alone would mitment of American troops, sabotage and such tricks as infiltrating the Buddhist almost excuse the dissolution of the high other dirty tricks in North Vietnam, etc. The movement, and not only that, infiltrating national council by the young generals: Communists know that the United States also, to some degree, the Catholics, Cao Dai, Working for sane civilian leadership by has the power to win In southeast Asia. Hon Hao, mountain tribesmen, the ancestor W PMinister Huong civilian one pin y And if Peking and Hanoi are convinced that worshippers, and the many other non-Bud- men men like Prime rimiof comedy or parody the United States Is prepared-at last-to dhist sects and religions of Vietnam. Trying to stage a of normal, duly elected democratic govern- use it, the invocation of this power may not More recently, Premier Tran Van Huong ment in Saigon at this stage of the war, Is be necessary. was perfectly correct in warning that ace- quite another thing. The purpose of the 6. THE BUDDHIST MILITANTS government toppler Quang talked like a Coln- parody Is clear, of course. It looks nice in [From the Washington Star, Jan. 23, 1965] munist, acted like a Communist, and served the papers back home, and thus consoles IsN'T IT TIME To FACE TRUTH? Communist ends. the large element in the U.S. Government (By Marguerite Higgins) The United States' mistakes are painful, that always worries about appearances. but not shameful. Contrary to the Commu- The time has come to say, however, "To The spectacle in Saigon of brown-robed nists, we have not been plotting for 25 years the devil with appearances. What matters monks egging on delinquents, both juvenile to seize Vietnam and have not meticulously is averting a shattering defeat." and adult, to smash the windows of our studied every village, every province, every libraries leads to one insistent question: religion, every superstition, with the aim [From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, Isn't it time the United States told the of subverting them to our ends. If it is any 1964] American people the truth concerning the comfort, our inexperience is born of virtue--- way in which a handful of Buddhist poli- the virtue of a Johnny-come-lately desper- ON THE SPOT: VIETNAM ERRORS OFFER VITAL ticians in Vietnam have used a religious ately seeking to save a drowning man with- LEssoN cover to camouflage a campaign of chaos Marguerite Higgins) that for the last 18 months has served only out time to find out much about him, let (By alone bone up on his family tree. NEW Yoax.--One way for the United States Communist ends? And the essential, and most salutary point to better its present chances (perhaps 50-50) Is it embarrassing to admit that the Unit- of admitting past mistakes is that this is of winning the war in Vietnam is to face ed States made a mistake in giving asylum the only way to stop repeating them. coldly and honestly the consequences of its at its Saigon embassy no less than twice (3 _ past mistakes. months in 1968, 1 day in 1964) to the in- [From the Washington Evening Star, Putting aside matters of America's image, tellectual powerhouse of the rock-throwing Jan. 8, 1965] world opinion, and the like, the greatest, and clique, the Buddhist Monk Thich Tri Quang? possibly disastrous, blunder of the last year Is it difficult to acknojvledge that perhaps CONTROLLING THE BUDDHISTS was the decision to signal the overthrow of we should have checked a little further into if the militant Buddhist leaders in Saigon the Diem regime in midbattle. Quite apart Quang's past, his two arrests by the French are recognized as subversive conspirators in- from the resulting chaos and disorganiza- for serving with the Communists, his state- stead of the spiritual characters they pretend Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1.465 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3287 At Bienhoa, 20 miles outside of Saigon, a new papermill will officially begin produc- tion today. The opening will culminate 26 months of construction work, frequently in- terrupted by skirmishes between Vietnamese troops and the Vietminh. At Anhoa, 530 miles north of Saigon, work on a giant Government industrial complex is moving steadily ahead, despite frequent incursions by guerrillas. The first phase of the project, including a coal mine, a hydroelectric plant, a nitrogen fertilizer plant, and a calcium-carbide plant, is` about 75 percent completed and should be finished by early next year. INTERNATIONAL TEAMWORK The Cong Ty Ky Nghe Giay Vietnam pulp and paper mill was completely built by the Parson & Whittemore-Lyddon organiza- tion, with a team of workers and technicians that included Vietnamese, Americans, Canadians, Taiwan Chinese, Frenchmen, Germans, Indians, and Swiss. The plant was built under difficult condi- tions. An American executive who visited the site said that workers were frequently the target of snipers-particularly occidental workers. The mill; which will produce newsprint and writing paper, i6--owned by the Viet- namese Government. Foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery was provided by the Agency for International Development, and Parsons & Whittemore has subscribed for 19 percent of the share capital. The Anhoa site, less than 100 miles south of the 17th parallel, partitioning Vietnam, was selected for the industrial complex be- cause of the coal deposits at nearby Nong- son. The Industrial project in the populous province of Quangnam, was aided by a $1.7 million grant from the Development Agency, $400,000 of which was used to purchase a fleet of 14 pieces of 'construction equipment from Allis-Chalmers International. The Nongson coal mine is already in opera- tion and last year produced some 200,000 tons of anthracite. A SECOND PHASE The second phase of the giant project, which is also owned by the Vietnamese Gov- ernment, is scheduled for completion by 1968, This phase will include a caustic-soda plant, a glass factory, a cement plant, a dry- ice plant and several other producing facili- ties. A third phase, which will depend on whether more coal can be found in the Nong- son bed, will include development of nearby magnetite, hematite, gold, copper, lead, and other metal deposits and a factory for ore concentration. The French and West German Govern- ments have also made grants to assist the Anhoa-Nongson complex. The project area is accessible by a rail- road, two highways, and the Thubon River. Because of heavy guerrilla activity, however, military helicopter is often the only safe way' of reaching the development. One American technician, who recently returned from working on the complex, said that the first thing he was issued when he arrived was an M-1 rifle. Feb. 19,19641 VIETNAM (By Robert R. Brunn) WASHINGTON.-Communist North Viet- nam's woes are giving sizable encouragement to the South Vietnamese regime and the United States Some kind of a respite is being offered hard-pressed American officials dealing with the guerrilla war. They argued that now is the time to place aggressive pressure on the Communist forces. Self-admitted weaknesses of the Hanoi government of North Vietnam, some rather surprising assumptions by the Communists, and U.S. intelligence assessments add up in this way: Hanoi grimly assumes that the anguish- provoking war will continue, without any question through 1964 and beyond. This is despite Washington's acknowledgement that the next 4 months are "crucial." Hanoi is combating the widening un- popularity of the war in the south which is draining off resources from a seriously de- pressed economy. Apathy often charac- terizes the civilian attitude. MOSCOW REJECTION Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was at least 20 percent below 1962's middling harvest. Some starvation is visible but there is no general disaster in sight. Moscow has flatly turned down a direct Hanoi plea for aid to support the war. The North Vietnamese reason that they can't af- ford to turn their backs politically on Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy can give them little help in terms of food or weapons. Morale among the Communist Vietcong troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing problem for the North Vietnamese Govern- ment. Analysis have seen absolutely no evi- dence that the division between pro-Peiping and pro-Moscow camps seriously hampers the war effort, as such. The major Hanoi decision to side openly with Peiping was bound to leave a disappointed minority but there have been no demotions, no dissident voices raised. Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for U.S. military power and sees the superior weapons, equipment, and manpower of the South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle to victory. The Communists fear an escala- tion of the war, bringing an open U.S. inva- sion of North Vietnam, and this has tended up to now to keep the Communist military effort within a limited framework. While the Vietcong at times' has its guer- rillas at battalion strength, they are in no position to coordinate such units in massive movements against the South Vietnamese. One factor Is the lack of well-anchored sup- ply bases for such operations. Neutralization of North Vietnam is con- sidered to be utterly out of the question in the minds of the Hanoi regime. Much of the above analysis comes out of a careful American study of the most impor- tant statement made by the Hanoi govern- ment in several years. PROTRACTED TRIALS it was spelled out In two articles in the January and February issues in Hanoi's prin- cipal journal, Hoc Tan, and a third article in the newspaper Nhan Dan. This official line laid down by the articles in Hoc Tan is designed to seep down through the ranks of the faithful and be imported to South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting guerrillas, observers here believe. When the articles speak of new, hard, long, protracted trials in the war and use the word "protracted" over and over again, the signal is that the Hanoi Communists are not think- ing In terms of a rapid termination of the war or the Imminent defeat of the South Vietnamese army, On the contrary, the Communists expect a mounting military initiative in South Viet- nam and complain that often they will have to meet modern weapons with rusty nails and crossbows. ECONOMIC DRAIN Analysts emphasize there is no widespread disaffection in North Vietnam. The farm situation is grim but not beyond hope. But there is little doubt there is a solid body of opinion in the north that the never ending war is the primary cause for the weak- ness of their economy. The war in South Vietnam is seen here an basically an indigenous one, gaining in its support from within Vietnam. It is a dirty war and one which has its grim aspects for the Communists who have had no spectacu- lar victories. These magazine articles were designed to buck up the morale of the fight- ing men. 5. COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL OPINION [From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 19651 NEGOTIATIONS It would be a mistake to allow the world to believe that the people of the United States have fallen into an Irreconcilable di- vision on the question of whether we should or should not negotiate a settlement in South Vietnam. There are differences of opinion, but they do not relate to the idea of negotiation; they concern the kind of nego- tiation. Sentiment surely is overwhelming- ly in favor of negotiations that would end the fighting, set up enforceable peace terms, preserve the rights of our friends in South Vietnam and leave intact the honor and pres- tige of the United States. Just as certainly, sentiment is against negotiations that would not do this. The choice is not "negotia- tions" or "no negotiations." The question. is: "What kind of negotiations?" In 1954, the French were driven into ne- gotiations of a kind we must avoid. Mendez France was in desperation. He had promised to get France out of Indochina. To do it he had to abandon many of the people of North Vietnam to Communist vengeance. He had to get the Soviet Union to intervene with He Chi Minh and by allowing the EDO treaty to fail in the French chamber he encouraged that collaboration. But French power was being drained away in Indochina. The na- tion was literally bleeding to death. History can forgive a weak power at the end of its resources for upsetting its allies in Europe, for deserting its comrades in arms in Indo- china and for closing its eyes to the conse- quences in Asia. France had no other choice. The United States; however, is not a small European power at the end of its military, economic, and political resources. It Is a great global power whose might is undi- minished. It will be judged by different standards. It cannot permit savage re- prisals to be worked upon anti-Communist South Vietnamese. It cannot allow them to died by battalions in order to save the lives and property of Americans. It cannot offer the Soviet Union or any other intervenor po- litical concessions at the expense of Euro- pean allies. It cannot be Indifferent to the extension of Chinese Communist power in Asia. Many feared at the time that the 1954 negotiations would not end the fighting. And indeed they permitted It to continue on terms advantageous to communism. They did not provide a settlement that enforced itself or one that permitted anyone else to enforce it. Can negotiations in 1965 do any better? If the North Vietnamese and their Chinese sponsors understand the difference between a powerful United States and an exhausted France they might. But they must be made to understand that difference. If they are convinced that this country has the power and the will to pursue Its legitimate ends as long as it may be necessary to do so, negotiations might be feasible and arrange- ments of an acceptable peace possible. Until the posture of the United States Is under- stood by those with whom negotiations must be conducted, this country must look to the practical military means of better protecting its position in South Vietnam. It is perfectly clear that we need greatly to increase the effectiveness of our conduct of the war inside the borders of South Vietnam. Several immediate steps are self-evident to military authority: (1) The routes by which Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 North Vietnam is maintaining replacements and supplies for 35,000 infiltrators must be more nearly sealed off by the use of more troops on the border and by a tighter naval blockade; (2) the ratio of South Vietnam to Vietcong forces must be raised from 5 to 1 to at least the 8-to-1 level by which the Brit- ish gained success against Communists in Malaya; (3) points from which troops are embarked and material shipped in North Vietnam must not enjoy immunity from re- prisal attack; (4) the command structure of the South Vietnam forces must be stabilized; (5) the South Vietnam civilian government must be strengthened. There is no time limit In which we must achieve these objectives. The scale of ex- penditures is not prohibitive. We can keep up operations on an even greater scale, year after year and decade after decade, if that Is vital to our interests. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that nothing is possible without a primary effort by the South Vietnam peopli them- selves. The war against the Vietcong is their war. And it is a war which only South Vietnam forces can win. The struggle for the loyalty of the people is the struggle of Vietnamese leaders. It is conceivable that the South Vietnamese may fail completely on these fronts. If that happens, regretfully and sorrowfully, it will be necessary for us to be governed by what we can do and not by what we would like to do or what we ought to do. At the same time that we proceed to the more effective prosecution of the war and the more efficient organization of the civilian Government in South Vietnam, we should continuously make known the very limited nature of our objectives. Unlike the French In 1954, we- have no colonial ambitions. We wish to see an independent .South Vietnam, safe from external aggression, free to choose in peace the kind of - government its people wish (even if it is a,Communist government in the end), open to normal trade and inter- course with North Vietnam and other Asian neighbors with whom it surely must be closely associated in the future. Such a South Vietnam would not menace any Asian neighbor or threaten any legitimate interest of North Vietnam. More than mere oral assurances are needed to assure the future of such a country. There are, however, many sorts of satisfactory per- formance bonds that could be given by a North Vietnam Government desiring peace on these terms, Surely there is not much mystery about the conditions to settle the war in South Vietnam. When there is it fair prospect for arriving at these conditions, there will be little difference among Americans as to the wisdom or desirability of negotiating. [From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 15, 1965] WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP--VXETNA:M: THE DOMINO THEORY (By Crosby S. Noyes) With the way things are going in Vietnam it is only natural that a certain amount of thought should be given these days to the domino theory. It was President Eisenhower who first used the metaphor to explain and justify our pres- ence in Vietnam. If our position there should topple, he thought, a whole series of non-Communist states in southeast Asia would almost automatically fall under Com- munist rule. The domino theory is a good deal less popular in administration circles today than it once was. As the political situation in Vietnam deteriorates and the possibility of Communist victory grows, serious considers- tion is -being given to the ways and means of limiting the extent of a possible defeat there. Since administration leaders tend to ques- tion the validity of the domino theory, they also tend to deny rather emphatically any total withdrawal of American military power from southeast Asia in the event of a with- drawal from Vietnam. The argument some- times made by Vietnam bitter-enders, that it would mean a retreat back to Hawaii and an end to our presence in Asia, is rejected. It can be argued on the contrary that there is no country in the world harder to defend against Communist subversion than South Vietnam. The almost Impossible task of try- ing to create a country where none exists in the midst of a revolution that had been in progress for a decade before the Americans arrived would not confront us elsewhere. Thailand, for example, would provide in- finitely more favorable ground for resistance to the Chinese Communist thrust. There, at least, there is a sense of national identity and a tradition of government authority. And while the history of the country is not exactly one of heroic defense of freedom, the That, with encouragement, have shown themselves quite determined in opposing Communist pressures. These pressures, perhaps, could be ex- pected to increase if the position in Viet- nam were lost. But the problems of waging a subversive war against a country as rela- tively well organized as Thailand are enor- mously different than in Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-tung's guerrillas would find the waters of Thailand's population very congenial. Open military pressure through Laos would involve substantial risks for the Chinese. As a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Thailand could call on-and presumably receive-aid from Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philip- pines, Britain, and the United States. Under the terms of this treaty. in fact, the power of the United States is already committed in Thailand, to the extent that it might be needed to resist either Com- munist subversion or outright attack. And though there is little reason to believe that our commitment would reach anything like the proportions in Vietnam, there is no rea- son whatever to suppose that it would be withdrawn. There are those in Washington today who deplore this state of affairs. The advocates of worldwide American "disengagement" are Inclined to the theory that American power and prestige should never have been com- mited in Vietnam in the first place. And from here they argue that its commitment in any of the so-called soft areas of southeast Asia-which, presumably, means all of it- should be avoided at all cost. There are also those who contend that any substantial transfer of American power to Thailand would simply serve to invite increase Communist pressures there. The converse of the domino theory is that the only way to contain the spread of militant communism in the area is by strict nonin- volvement and the encouragement of neutra- list states on the periphery of China. The trouble with both theories is that they are belied by the evidence. The evidence is that strong Communist pressure already is being brought to bear on neutral states in southeast Asia. It may be that these pres- sures can be resisted by reasonably well integrated nations with a reasonable amount of political stability and military backing. It is not to minimize the seriousness of a defeat in Vietnam to say that it would not necessarily mean defeat everywhere. It is time to face up to the fact that we are engaged in a continuing process of con- taining or at least limiting the thrust of Communist China which threatens all of southeast Asia. To pretend that this thrust does not exist, or that it does not represent a threat to vital American interests, or that It can be limited by diplomacy, could well turn defeat into disaster. [From the National Observer, Dec. 28, 1964] AT A CROSSROADS IN ASIA?-VIETNAM: FADING FRIENDSHIP AND NEW Focus ON DOMINO THEORY The speaker was no leftist demagog, though his attack on U.S. policy was full of words like interference and colonialism. The speak- er was, instead, an American ally in a war against communism, South Vietnam's Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. And his words raised serious questions about the very basis of American policy in southeast Asia. It is better, said General Khanh, "to live poor but proud as free citizens of an inde- pendent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Com- munists." South Vietnam, he added, should be prepared to go it alone against the Com- munist Vietcong and spurn further U.S. help. Washington was stunned by last week's attack from the wily ex-Premier, once re- garded as South Vietnam's best hope of achieving victory over Red guerrillas. And the question, once again, was being asked in the Nation's Capital, "What would hap- pen if the United States pulled out?" CURTAILMENT OF AID? To be sure, no high administration of- ficial went so far as to urge outright with- drawal. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk, expressing the Government's opposition to last week's Saigon house cleaning by young army officers, hinted at a curtailment of pro- posed U.S. aid. "Obviously," he said, "if there are problems of unity, there are certain kinds of assistance that are simply not fea- sible." And Senate Majority Leader Mnez MANSJTSI,D revived his proposal to transfer the question of Vietnam's future from the battle- field to the conference table. "I don't think neutrality Is a bad word," he said. Indeed, the voices urging a sharp reap- praisal of America's Asian policy received an additional boost on Christmas Eve. A ter- rorist bomb exploded in the garage of the main U.S. officers' billet in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and injuring 110 persons. The bomb apparently was smuggled into the heavily guarded building in a U.S. jeep, an- other indication of increasing Vietcong bold- ness despite the intense U.S. effort In South Vietnam. Why doesn't the United States pull out of Vietnam? The answer can be summed up in three words: The domino theory. Through the years, American officials have argued that if South Vietnam were to fall to the Communists, the other nations of south- east Asia would likewise topple-like a row of stacked dominoes. WHAT THE REDS WOULD GOBBLE Landlocked Laos, already two-thirds in Communist hands, would be swiftly gobbled up by the Reds. Thailand, which caved in to Japanese invaders after only 5 hours of fight- ing in December 1941, would sue for some accommodation with Red China in hope of preserving a semblance of its long-cherished independence from foreign rule. Burma, whose government already has cut most of its ties with the West, would become little more than a Chinese province. Cambodia, recently professing friendship with China, would suc- cumb quickly to Communist domination. The domino theory extends even further. Pessimistic proponents of the theory fear that if the United States is forced out of South Vietnam, either by a Communist con- quest or by the Saigon government, all of Asia might be opened to Chinese Communist penetration, either through subversion or outright invasion. At least, they argue, strongly pro-Western nations such as Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Formosa could no longer trust the United States to fulfill any promises to protect them. India, Pakistan, and South Korea, too, might have second thoughts about alining themselves too closely with the United States. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 32$5 Significantly, it is the latter, less-alarmist group that holds the controlling viewpoint inside the Johnson administration. The administration has endeavored to con- vince congressional critics of U.S. policy in southeast Asia that this calmer attitude is iustifled, and that American policy, heavily committed physically and psychologically in Laos and South Vietnam, should continue in its present framework. ~ To buttress that position, administration officials said that while there has been in- creased Communist infiltration, North Viet- nam has by no means committed all its power to either the Laotian or South Vietnamese conflicts. Perhaps more importantly, these officials assert, the Chinese Communists, who give the North Vietnamese moral and physical .support, continue to demonstrate consider- able caution about any direct involvement with the United States. State Department Press Officer Robert J. McCloskey said yesterday that there have been Indications in recent weeks of North Vietnamese military movements into south- ern and central Laos. McCloskey said he could not state either the size or objective of the infiltration, He Said, in answer to questions, that the troop movements might or might not be a seasonal increase coinciding with the ending of the rainy season, a shifting of forces, or a move- ment designed primarily to send reinforce- ments to South Vietnam. Many officials here believe that the troops are being funneled through the so-called Ho Chi Minh network of trails In Laos, for use in South Vietnam. McCloskey described the situation as "a cause for concern but not for alarm." He said, "We're following the situation closely." Other authqritative sources said it appears that the thousands of South Vietnamese who were being trained in North Vietnam for use in the south are about used up, and that the Communist northerners are now sending down native-born men from the Red terri- tory. But while there have been published re- ports that between 15,000 and 20,000 men have been filtered into South Vietnam from the north during 1964, official sources here yesterday would speak only of "several thousand" men. In addition, it was said, these numbers have been offset, by an in- creasing callup of South Vietnamese forces to fight them. In Laos, officials said that since last May, when U.S. T-28 "reconnaissance" and "es- cort" planes were sent in to help the royal Government withstand the Communist Pathet,Lao and North Vietnamese, the neu- tralist central. regimes position has improved considerably. What has helped improve it is what officials will not admit publicly-the air pounding of Communist positions by American jet fight- ers during recent months. [From the New York Times, June 26, 1964] HANOI IMPROVES SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIET- NAM-MORE TROOPS CROSS LAOS BY HO CHI MINH TRAIL-ANALYSTS FEAR LARGE FORCE MAY OPEN NEW FRONT (By Hedrick Smith) WASHINGTON, June 25.-Recent U.S. re- connaissance missions have confirmed earlier reports that Communist forces have been improving their road network in southern Laos and have considerably stepped up the pace of their supply convoys there. "Officials here report that the Communists now have stretched their road network south from Tchepone, previously the terminal point for truck traffic on the supply network known as the. Ho Chi Minh trail. Other links, of the. network are reported to have been improved. The Ho Chi Minh trail, a complex of dirt, roads tapering off into scores of jungle trails, has long been one of the principal supply routes from North Vietnam to Communist guerrillas In South Vietnam. Officials declined to give precise figures on the number of trucks recently seen operating in the Tchepone region, but intelligence esti- mates indicate that roughly 3,000 North Vietnamese troops are on more or less perma- nent duty in southeastern Laos near the South Vietnamese border. YEAR OF NEW MOVES RISES This concentration and the increases in supply convoys during the recent dry season are reported to have raised fears among U.S. officials, inficluding Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, about North Vietnamese inten- tions. Officials have been worried for fear the Communists might try to infiltrate large forces across the Laotian border into the central Vietnamese highlands while South Vietnamese Government forces were largely concentrating on fighting guerrillas south of Saigon. Other officials suspect that the activity in southern Laos may be a prelude to future offensives against Saravane and Attopeu, two rightwing strongholds in southern Laos, Hostile forces nearly surround both towns now. Since neither town is in the Mekong Val- ley, some analysts here are concerned lest the Pathet Lao assume they can be attacked without fear of American intervention. . The United States has often warned that its mantle of protection extends over the Mekong Valley bordering Thailand. The stepped-up operations in southern Laos, officials said, began last fall and have increased in tempo this spring since pro- Communist Pathet Lao units gained control of the Nakay Plateau in January. These officials consider the southern opera- tions to be unrelated to recent offensives by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops around the Plains des Jarres in north-cen- tral Laos. That fighting, which pushed the United States toward the brink of a major conflict, has now almost halted. Although the ground fighting was con- fined to the region north of Paksane, Laotian Air Force T-28 fighter-bombers, supplied by the United States, have carried out strikes this month against some Pathet Lao posi- tions in southern Laos as well. Officials here have also dropped hints that some plans held in readiness would call for the South Vietnamese Air Force to raid Com- munist supply routes in Laos and possibly in North Vietnam. So far such raids are considered a fairly distant possibility. Premier Nguyen Khanh has told U.S. officials he is opposed to carry- ing the war beyond his borders until he has developed a more stable base at home. The principal roads from North Vietnam into southern Laos are Route 8, from the city of Vinh through the Nape Pass, and Route 12 through the My Gia Pass, a bit farther South, Since last fall, intelligence reports indi- cated that the Communists were building up Route 12-A to connect Route 12 at Nhom- marath with the town of Muting Phine about 80 miles to the south on Route 9. From there, truck Loads of troops and ship- ments of ammunition, weapons, fuel, medical supplies, and other equipment were reported moving east toward Tchepone on Route 9 and also down Route 23 toward Saravane, 80 miles to the southwest, to Pathet Lao guer- rillas operating in that area. 3. MORE VIETNAMS [From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 19, 19651 DE'rzNTx HOPE DzcxrvEs UNTIED STATES, LATINS SAY (By Marguerite Higgins) SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.-It is common- place in Central America to hear experienced diplomats express the hope that Washington is'getting over its hypnotism with the .idea of a Russian-American detente and its mis- interpretation of the Sino-Soviet split. What hypnotism? What misinterpreta- tion? Said an experienced Venezuelan diplomat: "No country in Latin America would be happier to welcome a rapprochement be- tween Washington and Moscow-if it were genuine. But we fear it is not genuine so far as Latin America is concerned. Indeed we believe that hope of a detente has been used by Moscow to pull the wool over Wash- ington's eyes while the Communists down here profit from America's nonseeing atti- tude to intensify guerrilla activities, vio- lence, and terrorism-or at least try to. "As to the Sino-Soviet split, we think that far from restraining the Soviet Union, it has merely spurred Moscow on to greater as- sistance to so-called wars of liberation in Latin America-assistance designed to prove that Moscow is not soft on the West as Peip- ing says." CITES ATTACKS "Washington was apparently surprised," the diplomat went on, "to hear of the Kosygin visit to North Vietnam. We were not surprised at all. For in Cuba, Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese have been cooperating in the training and planning for guerrilla attacks in Latin America." According to Cuban broadcasts and to the Cuban press, a delegation from the Viet- namese liberation front, more commonly known as the Vietcong, came in 1964 to Havana where it signed a mutual aid pact with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces. The Venezuelan guerrillas, who halted their attacks briefly in 1963, are once more in the mountains, burning and killing and blowing up things. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Venezuelan peasants hate the guerrillas does not deter their terrorist leaders any more than the fact that the Vietnamese peasants hate the Vietcong deters Hanoi. Intelligence reports indicate that this weird consortium planning and plotting lib- eration wars from Cuba includes four coun- tries-Communist China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam. Here in Puerto Rico it is very unpopular for strangers to speak of Communist doings or even intentions. This is understandable perhaps in light of the tourist trade and continuing attempts to lure American busi- ness Investment. MINORITIES EXPLOITED And, of course, this is perfectly correct. There is no Communist threat to Puerto Rico in the sense that the Communist con- sortium in Cuba and local extremists have made any real inroads in this country. In- deed, no responsible official or writer has ever alleged that the Communists are about to take over in Puerto Rico. But whether Castro and his cohorts are exploiting certain minority elements in Puerto Rico and seeking to prepare the ground for mischiefmaking in Puerto Rico is another matter. In relatively prosperous Puerto Rico there is plenty of evidence that the ideological divisions of the Communist camp have not prevented their cooperation in seeking to propagandize persons who hopefully may one day serve their purposes. [From the Washington Post. Feb. 6, 1965] CHINA PICKS THAILAND AS NExT TARGET- PLEDGES SUPPORT TO REBEL MOVEMENT TOKYO, February 5.-Communist China announced today that a "patriotic front" had been formed in Thailand to overthrow the pro-Western government and eradicate American influence there. It was the first time that Peiping had openly named Thailand as the next target of a Communist campaign in southeast Asia. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3286 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 Thailand is the stanchest U.S. ally on Action of urban guerrillas, "including those the Asian mainland. Bangkok, the capital. formed with personnel and equipment com- is the headquarters of the Southeast Asia ing from abroad, against industrial installa- Treaty Organization (SEATO)-the Ameri- tions permitting a notable economic paraly- can-led defense alliance in the Orient. sis." (In Washington, U.S. officials expressed "Specialized action to disrupt roads and concern but said that Peiping's announce- ment of support for the front had been anticipated. "It strikes me as the logical step in Peiping's policy of supporting subversion wherever possible. in southeast Asia," one official said). (From Bangkok, Reuters reported that Thailand bad tightened its anti-Communist security as refugees from the fighting in Laos continued to enter the country across the Mekong River. Police sources said 58 Communist suspects had been arrested in northeastern Thailand in the past few days. Latest figures place' the number of Laotian refugees at 15,000.1 Communist China's -designs on Thailand were made clear in a broadcast of the New China news agency heard here today, al- though the "patriotic front" was first an- nounced January 1 in a clandestine Thai- language broadcast. which could supply troops for combat against our units. "Provocations at military bases and in cities to occupy troops which otherwise could act against our insurgents, and guerrilla activity to occupy enemy forces (In the mountains)." Some longtime students of Communist operations here question FALN's present capacity to execute such large-scale opera- tions, though current military estimates place naral guerrilla strength at 2,000 men, including those already trained and pursuing normal occupations while waiting orders, and 3,000 urban combatants. According to these observers, 1964 was a year of quiet recuperation of Communist strength in Venezuela, despite reversals suf- fered in the universities and failure to or- ganize a united front of leftist groups in- clined to support anti-Government insur- Today's broadcast urged "all patriotic peo- gency. ple to unite as one and launch a resolute The Communists' achievements of 1964 struggle to drive out U.S. imperialism and consisted mainly in extending the number of realize the independence, democracy, peace, guerrilla bands In gestation or In open oper- neutrality, and prosperity of Thailand." ation and their success in creating a climate t f 41-A insurrec- ja l f at "overthrowing the Fascist dictatorial gov- ernment"; withdrawing from SEATO and 'driving all imperialist troops ? ` ' out of Thailand"; economic reforms with emphasis on restricting foreign capital "whose aim is to seize profits from Thailand ? * *" and "suppressing and meting out severe punish- ment to traitors and bureaucrats who op- press the people." The "reforms" followed the same revo- textbook that the Communists i or amnes y or favorab e tionists. President Raul Leoni is being steadily pres- sured by the two parties which have joined Aocion Democratica (the Government party) to form a coalition government Into giving favorable consideration to the amnesty ap- peals. Another internal Communist document, a report on party organization in eastern Vene- zuela, laments the decline in party activity In. many localities after the election. lut and nsteel otes considerable onary have used in Vietnam and tried to use In. Bt the the rIron eport producing Malaya and the Philippines. strength region of Bolivar state. [From the Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1965] In the past the Communists have concen- COMMUNISTS PLAN VENEZUELAN TERROR trated their labor effort in penetrating unions l (By Norman Gall) CARACAS.-The Venezuelan Communist movement, after 13 months of relative quiet since the December 1963 elections, is plan- ning a "counteroffensive" aimed at conquest of power through another cycle of terrorism and heightened guerrilla warfare. According to recently obtained internal Venezuelan Communist Party documents, the current "defensive situation" of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) sched- uled to last "at least 6 months" will give way to coordinated violence in. urban and rural areas and in infiltrated military installations. Venezuela's Communists received a severe setback when their call for boycott of the presidential election was ignored despite threats of violence.- The small party never received widespread support, even before the government restricted it in an effort to end terrorist acts. The "defensive situation" described in a memorandum of the party's politburo cir- culated in recent months among FALN guer- rilla units consists of accelerated programs of training guerrillas abroad, a campaign for amnesty for jailed insurrectionists, offers of a truce to the government, quiet gestation of more guerrilla operations and deepening in filtration of the regular armed forces. According to this memorandum, the "gen- eral counteroffensive plan" consists of: "Simultaneous insurgency in military in- stallations with occupation of strategic ob- jectives with sufficient flexibility to estab- lish a long struggle. In these military insur- gencies previous arrangements should ' be by holding up travelers on the Puerto Bar- made for distribution of arms to our cadres rioe Highway. But it appears evident now and to the civilian population under our that the movement In receiving funds from control." outside sources as well. SHIPMENT OF FUNDS There has been considerable speculation over the reported shipment last month of $100,000 in quetzals from a bank here to a New York bank. The Guatemala bank assumed the costs of commission, insurance and the shipping at the going rate of 1 percent for the total transaction. There was no indication here of the Identification of the consignee in New York. The Guatemala Government, while it enforces dollar control, does not ask for details of quetzals-for-dollars transactions. The quetzal is on a par with the dollar. The theory prevalent here Is that the un- derground movement is being supplied by adherents traveling from Mexico. This theory, vaguely defined, holds that in transac- tions such as the quetzal-dollar exchange the messengers for the guerrilla forces smuggle in the funds from Mexico. The question of finances arises from the certainty that' the expenses of the underground movement are mounting and that there is no way to ac- count for Its funds except from outside sources. Marco Antonio Yong Sosa, called "El Chino" because one of his parents was Chinese, admitted in an interview with the leftist Mexican magazine writer Victor Rico Galan that a number of the incursions of the guerrilla forces he leads have brought in about $100,000. The principal contribu- tion was $75,000 paid as ransom for Jorge Samayoa, the kidnapped son of a Guate- malan movie chain operator. REVENUE FROM RAIDS Additional revenue has come from raids on provincial United Fruit Co. treasuries and small banks. Mr. Yong Sosa, in the interview published in the leftist Mexican magazine Siempre on October 30, 1963, conceded that his forces had assassinated several public figures and a large number of army officers ranging up to colonel in rank. Most of the assassinations, he said, were for political reasons. The guerilla forces, even their supporters in the capital concede, are primarily of nui- sance value. But they have an unsettling political effect not only in the mountains but also in the urban centers. In the cities, particularly in the capital, they plant small bombs and occasionally kidnap or shoot per- sons considered to be enemies of the move- ment. Earlier this week they exploded about a dozen bombs here. These explosions fol- lowed a police search that found caches of mortars, machineguns, small arms, and am- munition. There is some question whether Mr. Yong Soso, who was trained as a guerrilla fighter by the United States in the Canal Zone, was himself a Communist. Ile has told at least one Guatemalan politician that he Is accepting assistance from Communist sources in Mexico and Cuba. This politician is Francisco Villagran Kra- mer, a young lawyer who is head of the leftist Revolutionary Democratic Union Party. At one time Mr. Villagran Kramer and his party contemplated a union with the Yong Sosa organization, the lawyer said. Representatives of the two organizations, ac- cording to Mr. Villagran Kramer, held a series of conferences, but these were broken off when the Villagran Kramer party decided to go to the polls on its own last May. This decision, Mr. Villagran Kramer said was made over the heated objections of the Yong Sosa group, which maintained that a revolution- ary overthrow of the Peralta government was Guatemala's only political solution. 4. THE ECONOMY, NORTH AND SOUTH [From the New York Times, Mar. 16, 1964] VIETNAM SPEEDS GAIN IN INDUSTRY (By Philip Shabecoff) Amid the carnage of civil war, industrial birth is continuing in Vietnam. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 in the mining and petroeum n us es. The dominant Communist strategy in Venezuela, over the objection of a dissident minority opposing continued violence, is based upon the concept of "long war" as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria and Viet- nam. A training program advocated in the party strategy memorandum advocated "a pro- longed period of specialization for the group that returns to Venezuela by irregular means. ' [From the New York Times, Dec. 20, 19641 GUATEMALA REVELS STEP UP FIGHT AGAINST REGIME (By Paul P. Kennedy) GUATEMALA, December 18.-Revolutionary forces fighting as guerrilla units in the Carib- bean area of Guatemala are taking advantage of the political indecisiveness here to step up their activities against the military govern- ment of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia. The well-equipped, well-trained groups in the mountain and jungle areas in the Depart- ment of Izabal are estimated at 150 to 300. They are said to have more than 1,000 ad- herents in the urban areas, particularly here in the capital. They regularly produce the newspaper Revolucionario Socialists, and also distribute pamphlets throughout the Republic. Persons caught distributing the publication face a heavy fine and prison sentence. The guerrilla forces get ransoms from the families of kidnap victims and more money Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 .1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE "You have to see for yourself how deeply the. Vietnamese people fear and hate the Vietcong if they think they can oppose them and not have their throats cut. My team is working its heart out. But all this is de- pendent, of course, on some sort of stable strong governmental direction." And it is precisely because so many fine people in the countryside are working their hearts out-and giving their lives-that a visit to the front fines renews a sense of fury at the intrigues in the city-intrigues that may mean that all this devotion and dedication here at the front will add up to nothing. The war will not be won in Saigon. But Saigon can prevent it from being won. [From the Washington Evening Star, Dec. 9, 1964] COURAGE AT VIETNAM OUTPOST (By Marguerite Higgins) PLEI ME, VIETMAN.-The morning had be- gun with a mine disaster. Literally. It was a "Jumping Betty" mine-one of those that jumps out of the dirt and explodes in the air. And so, it had cruelly mangled the bodies of 16 of the work detail that Capt. Ronnie Mendoza, of Los Angeles, had sent to repair about three and a half miles of the red dirt jungle road the Vietcong had severed by digging great, gaping ditches across it. Many of the wounded were only 11 to 14 years of age, children or relatives of the Vietnamese and Montagnard (non-Mongol mountain people) soldiers who, along with Captain Mendoza's 12-man team, use this isolated outpost near the Lao border for patrols and ambushes and other counter- guerrilal operations, against the Vietcong. COPTER ARRIVES Soon the helicopter arrived at Plei Me to lift out the wounded. The two pilots- Capt. John Mustard, of Montesand, Wash., and Capt. Charlie E. Bryant, of Ocilla, Ga.- spoke feelingly of the courage with which the big-eyed Vietnamese and Montagnard children tried to suppress their cries of pain. This is high, spectacular country where the jungle covered mountains rise, steeply, 7,000 feet high and where air currents in the intervening valleys can be tricky. The helicopter bumped and dipped as it fought the turbulent currents. From the air, Plei Me is an eyesore with Its barbed wire outer fences, its trenches, its mortar emplacements and sandbags, its brick and tin barracks building. It seems an im- probable and unexpected scar in the green jungle. In this part of Vietnam the jungle trails are prowled not just by the Communist Viet- cong but by mighty tigers that European hunters once traveled far to shoot. And despite the morning tragedy, Men- doza had not been able to keep his mind off those jungle trials because 100 men of his special forces, including 2 American sergeants, were out there on a week long patrol, 3 days of which had passed. Their mission was to try and spot possible infil- tration routes and the supply dui ps that the Communists always prepare in advance at points a day's march apart. Since his men had last checked in by radio, a lot of sniper fire had been heard in the next valley and Mendoza, a cool and con- trolled sort, nonetheless was eagerly await- ing the next radio report which would come at 4 p.m. The itinerary of the patrol had been worked out by Mendoza in consultation with his Vietnamese counterpart, Capt. Nguyen Van Thoi who was known all over the valley as one of the few Vietnamese who could. command the loyalty of the Montagnards. I asked him if the morning mine casual- ties' might have any effect on the morale of the soldiers. "There has never been a desertion from this camp and there will not be," the Viet- namese captain said with pride. "Were his men happy with the new regime in Saigon?" I asked. "Madam," said the Vietnamese captain, "I am an officer and not even I know the name of the leader In Saigon. My men do not fight for Saigon. They fight for their vil- lage. They fight because the Vietcong takes their rice and steals their children and kills their kinfolk. They fight because the Amer- icans give them rice and the American doc- tor treats their wife and children. And that is how it is." Finally, it was 4 o'clock and the air was electric with good news. "Nobody hurt," said Mendoza after his curt quick radio ex- change with the patrol. When night came and it was time for mere reporters to leave, Mendoza saw us off and yelling against the noise of the chopper blades said something that sounded like, "We can take care of things up here if they can just keep those rioters quiet in Saigon." It was. the same high morale everywhere at the front. And It made you so mad at the so-called student and Buddhist rioters who cause chaos back In the soft-living city. 2. NORTH VIETNAMESE II7TTERVENTIQN EIGHTY TONS OF VIETCONG ARMS UNCOVERED, BIG SHIP SUNK (By Peter Arnett) Tuv IIOA, VIETNAM.-By far the biggest haul of Communist weapons for the Vietcong was uncovered yesterday, near a remote cove where a large mystery vessel was sighted and sunk earlier in the week. Officials estimated 80 tons of armaments-much of it Russian and Chinese-had fallen into government hands. The weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies, including whole blood, apparently had been shipped along the coast from Com- munist North Vietnam to equip Red guer- rillas fighting in the South, United States and South Vietnamese officials said. "We thought the supply routes were through Laos and Cambodia, but look at this lot," said Col. Theodore Mataxis, of Seattle, Wash., a senior adviser. "They could easily be arming a new division to launch against us up here." CAMOUFLAGED SHIP SUNK The materiel was found in the hull of the sunken vessel and in caches on the beaches of a cove on Vung Ro Bay here, 240 miles northeast of Saigon and about 50 miles south of Nha Trang, site of a major U.S. military installation. A routine helicopter patrol uncovered the cache Tuesday. Flying over the bay, the helicopter crew sighted what looked like a drifting island. Then, heavy fire came up from the Island. It turned out to be a well- camouflaged ship, about 400-feet long. South Vietnamese fighter-bombers were called in and sank the vessel. Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh personally ordered troops into the area. After heavy fighting. they took over the cove and beach area Fri- day, when some of the armaments were found. A captured Communist guerrilla said the ship had made six trips to bays along Viet- nam's central coast, dropping off supplies. Then yesterday the South Vietnamese un- covered more caches. One area, said an official, was "literally covered with weapons, six deep." The haul included 1,000 Russian-made carbines, several hundred Russian sub- machineguns and light machineguns, and Chinese burp guns. All had been wrapped in waterproof cloth. Scores of tons of ammunition were found for these weapons, some of it made as re- cently as last year in Chinese factories, ac- cording to ordnance experts at the scene. There was also a selection of sophisticated mines and grenades, and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks. The large supplies of captured medicines included many cases of penicillin, anti- malarial drugs, and whole blood produced in Japan late last year. ONE BIG SUPPLY FACTORY Four caches had been found up to late yesterday. Troops probing through the hills under the guns of Communist snipers ex- pected to find more. "These hills are just one big supply. fac- tory," said Mataxis. The extent of the Communist supply depots shocked U.S. advisers. "This is just massive," one said. The Vietcong put up a determined fight to keep government troops from the caches. But they had to pull back. S'e'veral govern- ment soldiers have been killed in isolated mortar and sniping attacks. Government forces intend to stay in the region as long as it is necessary to clear it of supplies. The commander of the 23d Division, Gen. Luu Lan, said, "What we have found here Is of tremendops Importance. The Communist aggressors have been able to confuse people, so that the truth has been hard to discover. "But here we have discovered one link of the massive chain of weapons introduc- tion into South Vietnam. This is one of the reasons why we and our American allies have had to take the actions we have taken," the General said. This was a reference to retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam. Members of the International Control Commission, the organization created to police the Geneva accords on Indochina, were shown the arms haul by Khanh. The commission is made up of Indian, Canadian and Polish delegates. Included in the Communist medical supplies were drugs from Poland. COMMUNIST BUILDUP U.S. sources said the apparent buildup of Communist arms along the coast may coincide with reports that increased num- bers of guerillas have been Infiltrating from North Vietnam in the past 3 days. The Vietcong have made determined attempts in recent months to take over the central Vietnamese region. They have met with considerable success so far. Some Americans expressed belief the Communists will use ships more frequently to supply the Vietcong. U.S. jet planes have been attacking the Communist supply routes through Com- munist-held territory in Laos. [From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 19651 CONCEPT OF "INTERNAL REVOLT" IN SOUTH VIETNAM PUNCTURED (By Mark S. Watson) WASHINGTON, February 10.-From the tor- rent of events in southeast Asia since the weekend one politically useful fact emerges. That is the well-publicized radio order from Communist Vietcong headquarters in the north to all Vietcong agents south of the border to redouble their activities immedi- ately. The promptness with which the order was obeyed at widely separated points shows how well organized are the Vietcong's controls. But more important in its long-range politi- cal effects may be this plain proof of a fact that hitherto the Communist leaders have denied; namely, that the whole internal re- volt in South Vietnam is, and always has been, skillfully engineered from Red head- quarters far to the north. WORLD OPINION DISCUSSED The victim of assassination is not greatly concerned with who kills him. But world Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0003001700b3-8 3284 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 public opinion, which communism has tried for years to delude with this "internal revolt" fiction, now is in better position to know that even while the Communist powers were agreeing to the Geneva neutralization pact the Communist machine in North Vietnam was already beginning Its subversion and assassination program in the south. In this program of deception a large in- fluence was the International Control Com- mission, set up to assure that the pledges of neutrality were kept. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive "incidents" by Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to fairly large scale military actions, had been laid before the commission. None was acted on. The reason given by an American White Paper was that the Polish Communist mem- ber of the commission refused to investigate any charge that might embarrass the Com- munist Vietcong, and the Indian member re- fused to start an inquiry that would em- barrass his Polish colleague. Opposed by two, the one remaining member, the Cana- dian, was powerless. LEADERS KNOWN For some reason, possibly the difficulty in remembering the oriental names, the Viet- cong leaders have, with two exceptions, re- mained largely unknown to the American public. There Is no mystery about the others, for captured or defecting Vietcong agents and officers have divulged almost all details of the Red machine for which they worked. Full information about that complex and sur- prisingly efficient mechanism and its oper- ators at all levels now can be reported with- out endangering security. Of the two familiar names one Is that of Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnam political government and of its Lao Dong (Workers) Party, and tirelessly active in its all-important Central Research (Intelligence and Operations) Agency and other working elements. The other fairly familiar name is that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minis- ter, one of the world's great guerrilla leaders. The Lao Dong Party follows the pattern of Russia's Communist Party, and its Secretary General, Ho Chi Minh, that of Russia's usual. one-man-in-two-jobs, premier of the nation and secretary general of the party. The mili- tary is subordinate to Ho, the political chief, and all the way down the line and into the kindred Lao Dong of South Vietnam at all levels the political leaders uniformly com- mand the military. That is one way of as- suring unity. FRONT CREATED IN 1980 To provide a cloak of respectability and conceal in some measure the responsibility of the Hanoi organizers with murder and in- surrection against Saigon, Ho Chi Minh in 1960 created the "Front for Liberation of South Vietnam." It is still guided wholly by Ho Chi Minh's Central Committee, immediately directing work in the "South Central" zone (just south of the 17th parallel border) and in the "Nabo" region (south and southwest, in- clig Saigon and the Mekong Delta). For the Central Committee, supervision is exercised in Hanoi by a "Committee for Su- pervision of the South," made up of Le Due Tho, of the Politburo, Phon Hung, Vice Premier of North Vietnam, and Brig. Gen. Ng uney Van Vinh, chairman of the board for reunification. Each of the two zones has its own secretary general, a deputy and a dozen members; each its agencies for training, propaganda and action. To this political leadership the military, as remarked, is subordinate. Its principals are OR Vinb, who is indeed a member of that Committee of the South but pointedly a "junior member"; Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in charge of military work in the South-Central zone but directly responsible to Tran Luong, of the Lao Dong in Hanoi, and Brig. Gen. Van Muoi, similarly responsible to Muoi Cua, a politican. The Central Research Agency, a prime "ac- tion" unit for subversion, forgery, arming, radio command, intelligence and military command, is actively directed by Ho Chi Minh and Giap. Its prime center for disorder in South Vietnam was at Vinh Linh, the tar- get of Sunday's fierce bombing attack. Other centers handle Cambodian and overseas in- telligence, with Gen. Hosing Dao, Col. Le Can and Col. Van Trong as principal agents. This is regarded as the agency chiefly re- sponsible for conveying Ho Chi Minh's direc- tives straight to the guerrilla pockets in South Vietnam, and seeing that the supply of men and weapons continues pouring over the many branches of the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. [From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1965] AGGRESSION ADMITTED (By Joseph Alsop) At last, the administration's policymakers are somewhat reluctantly admitting the im- portance of the North Vietnamese troop movements into South Vietnam and Laos. Being clandestine, these Communist troop movements were long and obstinately pooh- poohed. Now, however, they are an officially acknowledged fact. While the fact is ad- mitted, its meaning is still being played down. Even the resulting solid proof of North Vietnamese aggression has not been greatly stressed. As for the military implica- tions, they have been hardly mentioned; yet they are potentially very great indeed. In Laos, to' begin with, the whole balance of the war has been upset. It is a tiny war. The non-Communist Laotians, although they have fought very well against Laotian Com- munist sympathizers, have always fared ill In their rare engagements with North Viet- namese units. Hence the appearance in Laos of several additional North Vietnamese bat- talions changes the whole local outlook. Because Laos is both a subsidiary war thea- ter and a corridor to South Vietnam, it is not quite certain how. the additional bat- talions are to be used. some think they are intended for use in Laos, since they have moved into the heart of Laos to the west of the corridor-region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If. this is correct, the brilliant Communist commander, Gen. Vi Nguyen Giap, must be planning a semifinal test of strength in Laos. Because of the generally misty character of every Laotian situation, a prompt Ameri- can riposte to such a test of strength will be extra difficult. And a major Communist thrust in Laos will have the gravest reper- cussions in South Vietnam, unless the Ameri- can riposte is both prompt and massive. It is equally possible, however, that these new battalions spotted in Laos are eventually destined to be moved into South Vietnam. For a good many months, organized battal- ions of the North Vietnamese Army have been filtering into the South Vietnamese fight- ing-moving by truck down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Chepone region, crossing the bor- der in small bands, and then reforming and marching to their assigned areas of opera- tions. There have long been plenty of signs to prove that the North Vietnamese had reached the stage of sending organized battalions into the fighting, instead of mere cadres to lead their guerrillas. As noted, for instance, in this reporter's recent dispatches from Saigon, young North Vietnamese army con- scripts are now quite often found among prisoners of war. The invasion of South Vietnam by two, three, or even four new Communist bat- talions per month may not sound like much by the standards of modern war. But this war in Vietnam is not very modern. An entire province may be defended by no more than five government battalions. If the Communists already have seven bat- talions, as they do in Quang Nat Province, for instance, the addition of two more bat- talions may cause the Dien Bien Phu-like disaster that is General Giap's obvious aim In this phase. That is the real meaning of the persistent Communist troop movement into South Vietnam. For this very reason, Gen. Maxwell Taylor has repeatedly recommended stronger, more direct action against the North Vietnamese. He wanted something much more effective than the brief retaliatory raid after the Inci- dent in the Gulf of Tonkin. He wanted re- taliation after the attack on the U.S. airfield at BienHoa. He again asked for retaliation after a U.S. officers barracks in Saigon was destroyed by a Communist-planted bomb. The recommendations of General Taylor were disapproved by President Johnson in all three instances. As a less dangerous sort of retaliation, the President instead author- ized bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, first by the Laotian air force, and then by the U.S. fighter-bombers that recently destroyed a key bridge at Ban Ban. The degree of power this deployed against the infiltrators may be gaged from the fact that one-half the Laotian air force has just been put out of action by a single accidental bomb explosion in an airplane hangar. In any case, mere air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail are wildly unlikely to produce any solid result, even if made with 10 times the power. The truth is, the war in southeast Asia is steadily going from bad to worse. The enemy is getting bolder, and he Is steadily reinforcing his frontline troops. The rein- forcement is not being countered. Hence there is no hope of any counteroffensive, un- less President Johnson has important sur- prises up his sleeve. Perhaps the President has such surprises in preparation, for he is a man of surprises. But as of now, we are drifting toward final defeat. [From the Washington Post, Jan. 23, 19651 RED ASIAN BUILDUP CONFIRMED (By Murrey Marder) U.S. officials confirmed yesterday that there has been increased infiltration of Communist North Vietnamese troops into Laos and South Vietnam. But they called it a cause for continuing concern, not sudden alarm. The Communist buildup of forces in both places during 1964 and continuing Into re- cent weeks is significant in relative terms, but not a dramatic or grave turn, officials said. In both on-the-record and background comments, administration officials sought to demonstrate an attitude of skeptical calm- ness about recently published reports that the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula may be approaching a stage of more massive, open warfare. Few hard facts or figures were disclosed in the process. Officials said more details should be available early next week after consultations with the U.S. mission in Saigon, capital of South Vietnam. It became increasingly evident yesterday that both in South Vietnam and in Wash- ington there are conflicting interpertations about the facts and the significance of the increased Communist Infiltration. Those officials most eager to strike more directly at Communist bases in North Viet- nam appear to interpret the infiltration re- ports as evidence to justify that. This group believes the Communists are increas- ingly preparing to shift from guerrilla tac- tics to direct offensives. But the less-alarmist school of thought rates such a shift in Communist strategy as unlikely. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3281 We suggest that all of our military, po- sustain popular support of Vietnamese Gov- subordinated to a massive southeast Asian development program. A Johnson plan for the full flowering of southeast Asian econom- ic resources and independence will have as much potency and promise for success in that corner of the world as the Marshall plan did in Europe and the Tennessee Valley Au- thority in the United States. The Mekong Basin is one of the world's richest and least developed areas. In an area of the world already food rich there is an opportunity to harness the tributaries of the Mekong ~ Basin toward an economic flowering offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and offering to the people and the Govern- ment of North Vietnam economic oppor- tunity whica only their blindness or non- cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malay- sia, and even India, this would present an op- portunity in both economic and political terms which, especially at this moment, could not possibly be more desirable. To the Philippines such a program would provide the same magnetic opportunity for participa- tion as led them generously to create and man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago. It would also offer the first possibility of really involving the wealth and energy of the Japanese Government and people. A John- son development plan for southeast Asia would manifest to the entire world that the welfare of the people 'of southeast Asia is our only purpose. The Mekong Basin development program will provide for the first time a future- oriented thrust around which a Vietnamese resurgency program can be made vital and toward which the efforts of Americans, Ja- panese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos can hopefully be attracted. THE MISSING LINK Within the ; last 3 years the Communist nations have revealed their inability to meet their own most pressing economic needs. The shortcut to the future has suddenly proved to be a dead end of economic failure, recrimination, and political embarrassment. But this has not frustrated the wars of na- tional liberation nor prevented the Com- munists from mounting insurrectionary war- fare whether in Congo or Vietnam. National governments and native peoples assaulted by such Communist purposes have, at best, sought to sustain their own energy through defensive effort. Virtually unused has been the enormous potential for hope which can be found only in the non-Communist, world, cooperatively employing the resources of the United States and nations friendly to it whether in Asia, the Pacific, or Western Europe. We have offered to the Vietnamese people our assistance in their struggle for national Independence. We have failed, however, to harness that struggle and our assistance to an all but miraculous future, a flowering of man, his capabilities, his resources, his aspi- rations, Ours indeed is~ the truly revolu- tionary opportunity. The Johnson plan offers to southeast Asia a genuine oppor- tunity to harness nature, enlarge justice, ex- tend life, eradicate the scourges of illness and illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples to reap the fruits of their soil and the per- manent benefits of national independence. Behind this large vision, men throughout the world may be led to voluntary association in Lincoln Brigades, Gandhi Brigades, Mag- saysay, and Marti Brigades-an international volunteer corps for peace and freedom. The Johnson plan for the development of the Mekong Basin has, in our judgment, the following potential, essentially unavailable in the present circumstances: 1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and po- litically potent new purpose adequate to 2. It will infuse new energy into the Viet- namese already risking their lives in daily defense against the Vietcong. 3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the cooperative involvement of neighboring southeast Asian countries as well as a gener- ous commitment able to sustain emotionally an international corps of volunteers. 4. It contains an enormous incentive to North Vietnam to turn away from its present fratricidal course. 5. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence to other less developed areas where Commu- nist insurrectionary warfare presently finds soil in which to sow the seeds of destruction. VFW ENDORSES PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NORTH VIETNAM ACTION WASHINGTON, D.C., February 8, 1965. The national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, of Birmingham, Ala., today informed President Johnson of the "whole- hearted and unreserved support of the VFW" for the President's decision to retaliate against North Vietnamese military installa- tions. In his telegram to the President the VFW commander pointed out that such military action against North Vietnam was in full accord with the unanimously adopted resolu- tion of the 1964 VFW national convention, supporting whatever action is necessary to win in South Vietnam. The text of Com- mander Jenkins' telegram to President John- son follows: THE PRESIDENT, The White House, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Veterans of For- eign Wars wholeheartedly and without res- ervation supports your decision in taking retaliatory armed action against the Com- munist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your wise and bold decision in this matter will go far toward assuring our allies throughout all Asia that the United States stands by its commitments and will not be intimidated by Communist threats and aggressive action. U.S. action against North Vietnam is en- tirely consistent with the unanimously passed resolution of our 1964 VFW national convention which called for all action nec- essary to win in South Vietnam. The VFW, consisting of 1,300,000 overseas combat vet- erans fully recognizes that communism has launched a deliberate attack against all southeast Asia and, consequently, the inter- est of U.S. security and the cause of free- dom can be protected, in the final analysis, only by the judicious and willing use of military power. JOHN A. JENKINS, Commander in Chief, Veterans of For- eign Wars of the United States. 1. THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE [From the New York Times, July 31, 1964] "PLEASANT VALLEY": A VIETNAMESE SUCCESS STORY SAIGON'S FORCES WREST AREA FROM STRONG RED CONTROL-"SHOW CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE," MAJOR SAYS OF HIS METHOD (By Jack Raymond) PHOUC CHAI, SOUTH VIETNAM, July 26.-In Vietnamese, Phouc Chai means "pretty val- ley," and that is just what this collection of hamlets is. It represents a success story in South Vietnam's desperate struggle to de- feat the Communist Insurgency. Phouc Chai is about 45 miles west of Tamky, in the northern part of South Viet- nam. For more than 2 years, until 6 months ago, this valley, with its population of about 6,000, was virtually controlled by the Vietcong. The insurgents grew rice here to feed the No. 35-7 guerrillas. They "taxed" farmers. They maintained rest stations and assembly points for fighters who blew up bridges and ter- rorized villages. Two organized Vietcong battalions with a regimental headquarters operated without Government Interference. Then a 34-year- old major, Hoang The, appeared with his outfit, the 6th Regiment of the 2d Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam. TRAINED IN GEORGIA Major Tho has been an officer since 1951, when he fought for the French against the Communist Vietminh. He received training at the U.S. Army's military-government school at Fort Gordon, Ga., and at the Fort Denning, Ga., infantry training center. Articulate, English-speaking and self-con- fident, Major The has evidently won the complete confidence of his troops and of American advisers here. He lives in Danang with his wife and five children. He spoke matter-of-factly about having organized 10 defended hamlets after achiev- ing military victories over the Vietcong. Last February, the major recalled, he sent patrols into the valley. They located Viet- cong units, ambushed some and drew others into stand-up battles of company and bat- talion size. REDS FOUGHT HARD The Vietcong fought hard for the valley; it was important as a source of food as well as a military center for the countrywide guerrilla campaign. Yet in a month the 6th Regiment drove the Vietcong into the jungle. "It was only phase 1," Major Tho said. "Now came phase 2, the administrative and political phase." Major Tho stood with a pointer before an operations map as he continued his story. Before evacuating the valley, the Vietcong ordered the peasants to take 15 days' sup- plies into the jungle. They assured the peasants that the Government forces would not stay and that the Communists would soon resume control. But the Government forces stayed. Major Tho and his men seized 40 tons of rice originally planted by the Vietcong. They distributed 20 tons and destroyed the rest because they could not handle it and did not want the Vietcong to try to recapture it. THE PEASANTS EMERGE Two weeks went by, and the peasants came out of the jungle to reclaim their homes and farms. "We let the people come back and keep their rice," Major Tho continued. "We said to them, 'You see, the Vietcong took your things, but we do not.' The major went on: "Many of the villagers came to us and de- nounced their neighbors as Vietcong. Some gave me a list of 40 men to be executed. But I realized that many were not hard-core Viet- cong, only forced to do the bidding and pay allegiance to the Communists." Major Tho weeded out those he thought were incorrigible Vietcong members and sent them to higher headquarters. Others, in- cluding some who had held positions under the Vietcong, he gave new assignments. "I recommended no executions," Major Tho added. "I wanted to win the confidence of the people. I called the chief villager and asked him how he had organized the villages, and with a few changes I let the organization, run the same old way for the time being. "I wanted to show that we would protect the people against the Vietcong, and I pro- vided special guards for those who took tasks as village administrators and hamlet chiefs. Every night I discussed village problems with the chiefs." Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 WEAPONS ARE REDISTRIBUTED Then Major The collected weapons. He paid for all that were turned In. Most were rifles and carbines of varied origin. Some were American, captured from Government forces, and others were Russian and Chinese brought in from North Vietnam. After collecting all the weapons, the major added, he redistributed them in the hamlets, "I wanted to show confidence in the peo- ple," the major recalled. "I said, 'Here, take the weapons, and use them against the Viet- cong if they bother you."' Major Tho retained one hamlet chief who had worked for the Vietcong, but he sent him to higher headquarters for questioning. The man died while traveling, and Major Tho or- dered the body brought back for burial. He arranged a big funeral. GESTURE WITH A MORAL "I make propaganda, too," Majorf Tho ex- plained with a smile. "I wanted to show that even those who had served with the Vietcong could be forgiven and could take a proper place in our community." Now 10 Government hamlets flourish in a valley that was once a Vietcong stronghold. As Major The accompanied a visitor on a jeep ride to meet the people, they greeted him with apparent pleasure and showed off a new school Pupils on roughhewn benches in a big shack were writing the alphabet in note- books. There have been no incidents in the valley for more than 4 months, and the Vietcong have apparently been unable to reestablish links with villagers who were once more than ready to help them. Yet all around the valley, the Vietco ng_ are known to patrol in strength. "They set up ambushes," the major said, "but they do not come within 2 or 3 miles of the valley. We have established good morale here." VIETNAM HAMLET REPULSES REDS-PENTAGON RELEASES ACCOUNT or REcZNr CLASH (By Mark S. Watson) WASHINGTON, September 25.-Messages from the U.B. command in South Vietnam today permitted the Pentagon to supply in almost unprecedented detail an account of a well-conducted defense and counterattack recently, with the South Vietnam Govern- ment forces gaining a substantial success over Vietcong guerrillas. It was at and near Luong Phu, a little hamlet of some 75 men, women, and children in the swampy delta of the Mekong River, southwest of Saigon. This is the region where the Communist Vietcong has long been generally in control, even before 1954 when the beaten and discouraged French withdrew from southeast Asia. LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT Luong Phu, largely because it remained loyal to the government has long been sub- jected to Communist harassment, the dis- patch from Saigon mentioning 50 incidents thus far in 1964, including 16 genuine at- tacks, of which the latest was the most violent. In the official account of this occasion there were several aspects so important as to attract attention. 1. The 40 men composing the hamlet's own defense, only lightly armed, held off the attack, with temporary loss of only an ammunition bunker. 2. A group of them had the spirit to counterattack and regain the bunker with- out loss of its contents, but with four of the loyal force killed. RELIEF FORCES CALLED 3. A relief force, summoned by radio, came within artillery range and provided quick assistance to the defense, 4. Therelief force commander, moving in by a U.S. landing craft (one of five in the Mekong Delta's rivers) was warned by one of his agents that a Vietcong force was in ambush near the riverbank, awaiting him, after the familiar guerrilla practice. He opened fire on the hidden guerrillas and broke up the ambush with large casual- ties, his own craft taking only one serious shot from the guerrillas' 57-millimeter rifle. The relief of Luong Phu was completed, with 40 enemy dead around it and a larger number in the ambush party carried away by river boats. It was this combination of stout resistance at the attack point, prompt radio report to the district command, quick advance of relief forces, and alertness to the danger of am- bush, with which the Saigon authorities are obviously most pleased. PATTERN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY This is the pattern of their counterin- surgency training, but nobody pretends that it is easy to accomplish that operation with all its four phases perfectly executed. With any of the four missing, the whole opera- tion has small chance of success. The landing craft and patrol boats and motorized junks on the several rivers and canals are-save for the helicopters-the prime means of rapid movement of rein- forcing troops and weapons. They make possible a fairly rapid use of guns and heavy mortars. The other artillery application is by mounts of single guns in an entrenched posi- tion (dotted over the countryside) permit- ting movement of the gun throughout 360? and prompt laying of fire on any target within range. This method presupposes the existence of excellent maps and prime ability to use them effectively for fire or an unseen target. A most encouraging aspect of the war in South Vietnam is that the maps do exist and that there is ineresting skill in their efficient use. CONTINUING MYSTERY There is one continuing mystery in Viet- nam, namely the reason for the Vietcong guerrillas' strange failure to take wide ad- vantage of the South Vietnam Government's semiparalysis as a result of the most recent coup. It would have seemed the ideal time for massive assaults. A growing theory is that the guerrilla movement has been hurt more than is gen- erally realized, and compelled to slow down for a time In order to regather strength for another strong assault at widely scattered points. Such an assault is still thought likely, the surprise being that it was not timed to take advantage of governmental confusion. [From the Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1964] VIETNAM VILLAGERS FIGHT ON (By Marguerite Higgins) MEKONG DELTA, SOUTH VIETNAM.-From the distance the boom of artillery sounded a steady reminder that the frontlines of the war were at hand. A few rice paddies away there was the authoritative crackle of small arms fire which was, as to be expected, harassing the heli- copter that was whirring down on the dirt road next to the quaint and charming little village of thatched roofs that now gave haven to the broken bodies of two American sergeants killed by an electrically detonated landmine. It was a road of bitter memories, this muddy, tortured dirt lane surrounded by emerald green rice paddies and a deceptively lyrical and limpid stream in which the big- eyed children played, not even looking up when the angry machinegun bursts got close and mere adults looked for cover. In the summer of 1963 there had been a nasty fire fight on the road, In which several American reporters lost face but not much else when they made a run for it. In Novem- ber 1963 this reporter revisited the road and its villages on the day that it claimed the lives of two United Nations agricultural workers. And now the death of the two ser- geants. FAMILIES FIGHT REDS Yet, at the end of the road is a small village-Van Thien-whose 150 families have been overrun six times by the Vietcong and who still fight back. And one reason they fight back is because every day American advisers and Vietnamese soldiers, American aid teams and Vietnamese engineers defy the danger and travel back and forth with their guns and supplies and medicines to help Van Thien try to stay free. And this is the real miracle of South Viet- nam-this fact that somehow the war is still fought anywhere at all with devotion and sacrifice and hope despite the selfish joust- ings of the politicians in Saigon, the power plays of the military, the riots of the draft- dodging students and the political poisons spread by a handful of power-hungry Bud- dhist leaders whose intrigues are totally dis- approved by the genuinely religious Bud- dhists here in the countryside. Indeed, here in this section of the delta, I found the progress of the war far less de- pressing than I had expected. Chaos, lack of direction, arbitrary arrests, and purges have taken their toll, of course. But in giddy, gaudy Saigon the spoiled intellectuals and politicians do not know the Vietcong first- hand and can indulge their political death wishes with a garishly gay ignorance of what would happen to them if the Communists took over. VIETCONG DEPREDATIONS But in Van Thien it is only a short mo-? ment in time since the Vietcong disembow- eled the wife of the district chief and kid- naped 14 youngsters of the village. So long as there is the sightest hope of real and effective outside help against the Vietcong, the people will fight to keep them out of the Van Thiens of the delta. Mytho is the headquarters for the 7th Vietnamese Division, which guards four key provinces in the delta. When I first visited Van Thien In the summer of 1963, it had just been liberated for the first time from a long period of Vietcong rule. And elsewhere in the delta, the fight against the Commu.. nists, while tough and hard, was beginning to show results. That summer perhaps 64 percent of the population in these key four provinces were under central Vietnamese control. Then came the coup d'etat of November 1963, the murder of Diem and Nhu, the dis- Integration of the entire fabric of Vietnam- ese governmental structure, all of which was taken as a signal by the Vietcong to really go on the warpath. As a consequence, when this reporter revisited the 7th Division provinces in late November 1963, it had been impossible to even go near many areas that had been clean and clear of Vietcong the previous summer. By early 1964, the Viet- namese controlled less than 25 percent of these four provinces. NEED TO START OVER "And so," said the American colonel in Mytho, "we had to start over. By April, we got a new and less ambitious pacification program. Somehow despite the tumult in the cities the supplies kept coming. Every- time a new coup d'etat was rumored every- thing ground to a halt, of course. "Slowly and painfully we have gone back into village after village. It has been heart- warming to see places where we began with deserted marketplaces and burned school- houses soon make a comeback and become bustling again. I think we can win this wa:r against the Vietcong. I am an optimist. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE east Asia. Such a plan, they point out, would offer incredible promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and it would offer equal promise to the people of North Vietnam, which only the continued belligerence and noncooperation of their Government could frustrate. This, to me, sounds eminently sensi- ble. 'FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY If we decide to withdraw from Viet- nam we can certainly find plenty of ex- cuses to ease our path. We can blame it on the geography; or on the topography; or on local apathy; or on political in- stability; or on religious strife; or even on anti-Americanism. But that will fool no one but ourselves. These conditions make our success there difficult, but only our own timidity and vacillation can make it impossible. It has become obvious that we cannot go on fighting this undeclared war under the rules laid down by our enemies. We have reached the point where we shall have to make a great decision, a decision as to whether we are to take the hard steps necessary to turn the tide in Viet- nam or whether we are to refrain from doing so and thus lose inevitably by de- fault. The ultimate outcome of the cold war depends upon an affirmative decision to do whatever is necessary to achieve vic- tory in South Vietnam. The events of recent weeks demonstrate again that the administration is not lacking in resolve and that it is rapidly approaching such a decision. ' Whether that means a larger commit- ment of forces, or continued retaliatory strikes against the North, or carrying guerrilla warfare to the enemy home- land, or completely sealing off South Vietnam from Communist aid-I say to the administration, "Give us the plan that will do the job, and we will support you." Whether our victory be near or far, can we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn away from the task before us, however frustrating or burdensome it may be? Here surely is a time for us to heed Santayana's maxim "Those who will not learn from the past are destined to re- peat it." And so I speak today not merely to urge that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also to urge that we meet head on the new isolationism in its incipient stages, before the long months and years of discontent, frustration, and weariness that lie ahead have swelled the chorus urging disen- gagement and withdrawal to a deafening roar. Let us expound a foreign policy nur- tured in our constantly growing strength, not one fed by fear and disillusionment; a policy which each year is prepared to expend more, not less, in the cause of preserving our country and the decencies of man. Let us insist upon a defense budget based upon the dangers we face abroad, not upon the benefits we seek at home. Let us, embrace a doctrine that refuses to yield to force, ever; that honors its commitments because we know that our good faith is the cement binding the free world together; a doctrine that recog- nizes in its foreign aid program not only that the rich are morally obligated to help the poor, but also that prosperity cannot permanently endure surrounded by poverty, and justice cannot conquer until its conquest is. universal. Let us, above all, encourage and inspire a national spirit worthy of our history, worthy of our burgeoning, bursting strength, in our arms, in our agriculture, in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit of confidence, of optimism, of willingness to accept new risks and exploit new op- portunities. And let us remember that providence has showered upon our people greater blessings than on any other, and that, great though our works have been, much greater is expected of us. In recent days, the free world has paid tribute to its greatest champion of our age, Winston Churchill. It is a curious thing that though Churchill is acknowledged on all sides as the preeminent figure of our time and as the highest embodiment of West- ern statesmanship, he was, throughout his life, and remains today, a prophet unheeded, a statesman whom men ven- erate but will not emulate. It may well be that Winston Church- ill's greatest legacy will prove to be, not the legacy of his immortal deeds, but that of his example and his precepts; and that freemen of the future will pay him the homage denied by his contempo- raries, the tribute of imitation and ac- ceptance of his message. As we ponder the passing of this he- roic figure and reflect upon his career and try to draw from it lessons which we might apply to the aggressive on- slaught that we face today in a hundred ways on a hundred fronts, we might take to heart this advice which he gave in the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Har- row, his old school : Never give in. Never, never, never, never. Never yield to force and the apparently over- whelming might of the enemy. Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honor and good sense. Let us resolve to nail this message to the masthead of our ship of state in this year of decision. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD the following documents: First, a summary of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress; second, a copy of a state- ment released yesterday by the American Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of "A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a copy of a telegram to the President from the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth, various newspaper clippings bearing on the situation in Vietnam. There being no objection, the sundry documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964. To: Hon. THOMAS J. Dona. From: Foreign Affairs Division. Subject: List of violations by the Commu- nist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice of 1961-62. July 27, 1962: Laotian cease-fire committee of the three factions (neutralists, rightists, and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an agreement on principles to implement a truce: forces of each faction will remain in their previous positions; frontline forces and military supplies are not to be increased; and troops of the three factions will not at- tack each other. August 22, 1962: Several companies of pro- Communist Pathet Lao troops attack out- posts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in northeastern Laos. November 27, 1962: U.S. C-123 cargo plane, flying rice and other supplies to neutralist forces, is shot down over the Plaine des Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and one wounded. Investigation shows that the plane was shot down by dissident neutralist troops tied up with Pathet Lao. April 4, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that Pathet Lao troops have at- tacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S. State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of a serious violation of the cease-fire. April 15, 1963: Following brief cease-fire, fighting breaks out again on the Plaine des Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball says that the United States does not rule out the possibility of sending troops Into Laos if the situation should continue to deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Sec- retary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and President Kennedy on April 19. May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two helicopters of the International Control Com- mission in the Plaine des Jarres, destroying one and wounding four occupants. On May 10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and violating the Geneva accords, and he says that the United States will never leave Laos standing alone "to face its enemies from within and abroad." May 21, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma issues communique stating that severe fight- ing has been going on for 2 days in the Plains des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres. June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma charges that Pathet Lao forces are continu- ing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against neutralist positions near the Plains des Jarres. September 7, 1963: U.S. C-47 unarmed cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in central Laos. The government says they carry only rice and other relief supplies. , September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the rightist police force under Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan. November 17, 1963: Cease-fire is broken as fighting resumes in the Plaine des Jarres. Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao military leaders subsequently break down as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the ICC to police the cease-fire. January 29, 1964: Neutralist military head- quarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four North Vietnamese battalions have launched an attack In southern Laos, have defeated neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and are now heading toward the the strategic post of Thakhek. April 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane, organized by rightist army officers, ousts gov- ernment of Premier Souvanna. Coup lead- ers give as reason for their action the pre- mier's failure to establish peace in Laos. May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government re- ports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack on the defense perimeter of Paksane is immi- nent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew attacks on neutralist position on the Plains des Jarres. A State Department spokesman Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3280 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62. DAVID E. LOCKWOOD, Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs. A NEw POLICY FOR VIETNAM (Statement by the American Friends of Viet- nam) THE DILEMMA If we are to identify wisely our most effec- tive forward course in Vietnam, it is impor- tant first to understand the exact nature of our dilemma there. We know the inherent generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its neighboring countries, which has led us to Involve our substance and our blood. We know that but for our commitment, free Viet- nam would long since have fallen into the political darkness and physical despair which oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We know that our presence there is In response to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese leadership, however they differ among them- selves on other matters. We know that our presence there is earnestly desired by most neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We know that our purpose is to assist responsible and responsive government and to enable Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain na- tional independence against external en- croachment. We know that we have neither wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Viet- namese government nor to seek for ourselves political, military, or economic advantage. Our,dilemma flows in part from the fact that this knowledge is not shared by all of the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the members of the Vietcong, is not believed in parts of the less developed world still suf- fering the scars of recent colonial experience. Nor, in fact, is this understanding uniformly shared by our own people. The dilemma is sharpened further by a spreading doubt among leadership elements In independent southeast Asian countries that the United States has staying power. Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Kho- man, recently warned members of the Over- seas Press Club: "The Thai Government knows much better but some people are not sure we can depend on outside help-especial- ly when there is so much talk of quitting and going home. The Communists have never spoken- that line of quitting. When they go some place they stay there." In part, at least, this skepticism is fos- tered by the doubt among some Americans that any valid purpose led to our presence in Vietnam in the first place. THE ALTERNATIVES The lack of public understanding flows in part from inadequate examination of the alternatives confronting the United States now. In our opinion there are six choices: 1. Continue as now, Whether or not the Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their ef- fectiveness there is a growing conviction in Saigan, in the United States, and in much of the rest of the world, that this is so. This alone makes continuation of our present policy undesirable. The overriding hazard of the present policy is the undeniable fact that it has not provided sufficient psycho- logical and political potency to sustain a Vietnamese Government. 2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It would manifest throughout the world a U,S. inability to long sustain an effort designed to frustrate Communist intentions. The im- plications would be read as eloquently in Berlin or in Cuba, as they would be in Viet- nam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no question that this alternative would require the Governments of the Phillippines, Thai- land, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally present policy and to reorient toward what would he the dominating new facts of Asian life. ("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not sug- gested here for a simple reason; genuine and reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not pos- sible at the present time. What is most often talked of in this connection is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to make withdrawal more palatable. On the other hand, the proposals discussed here are valu- able to part precisely because they do hold the promise that they may generate sufficient free Vietnamese vitality to make true and assured neutralization possible at some future time.) S. Military cordon sanitaire across Viet- nam and Laos. An estimated military force of up to 100,000 would be involved in mak- ing such a cordon truly effective and enemy penetration genuinely hazardous. Its great- est contribution would be in providing hard evidence of new determination to maintain southeast Asian Integrity. Although mili- tary effect of interdicting the Vietcong's transport and supply may be limited, it is nonetheless one useful alternative, espe- cially when employed with other steps out- lined here. 4. Extend military action to the north. Until last week, steps taken in this di- rection were, in our judgment, not suffi- ciently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnam- ese faith In our intentions or to inspire con- fidence In other Asian countries that we are indeed willing to accept risk as the price of our commitment to freedom. The in- creased external, Communist intervention in South Vietnam has made it both reasonable and essential that there be a vigorous anti- Communist military response. The limited air strikes in North Vietnam by American and Vietnamese planes constituted such an appropriate response. There are many other forms of stronger American action and involvement and they are not mutually exclusive. They include: (a) Formation of an open, well-publicized North Vietnam liberation movement spon- soring major psychological operations pro- grams, including paramilitary action, against the North Vietnamese- regime. (b) Establishment of an International Voluntary Corps dedicated to the mainte- nance of free nations in the Mekong basin. This corps should consist primarily of vol- unteers from Asian countries but may also contain a liberal admixture of Americans with military experience. Operating nor- mally in small units with sufficient air sup- port, this force-under the sponsorship of the proposed North Vietnam Liberation Movement-would harass the enemy wher- ever suitable targets exist, including targets within North Vietnam. (c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces within South Vietnam to act as a general reserve-a sizable firefighting force. Such a military contingent (perhaps as many as two brigades) should not be used for routine combat or security duties, but as an imme- diate-reaction fighting force intended to engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions. Desirably, combat elements from other na- tions will be attached to this force. (d) Continued bombing of selected mili- tary targets in North Vietnam. In contrast to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's concern for the Vietnamese people in both halves of the country make it undesirable for us to conduct warfare upon cities where the innocent will be hurt. However, those mili- tary targets in North Vietnam which are vital to their aggressive capability and which can be destroyed with our assistance are, in our view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage destruction. What is the risk involved in such action? In our judgment the possibility of Chinese involvement In South Vietnam would be only slightly increased. The possibility of Chi- nese help thrust upon North Vietnam would be greater. However, this probability may be precisely what is needed to make clear` to even the most Communist leaders of North Vietnam how undesirable such help is to them in the long run. A heightened aware- ness of this danger might, in fact, force greater restraint upon the Government in Hanoi than our present policy can achieve. Frankly, however, the direct military dam- age inflicted on the Communist regime in North Vietnam is the lesser of our reasons for suggesting that these steps be under- taken. In our opinion, it is urgent that the people of free Vietnam be assured that Presi- dent Johnson means what he says-that we mean to stay and help, no matter what risks we must incur. It is equally urgent that these Intentions be understood also in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, the rest of Asia, and the world. Stanch, long-term American commitment-fully communicated and understood-would pro- vide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject new vitality in the Vietnamese Government and require a new assessment of the United States among neighboring countries and among Asian allies elsewhere. There is one final reason we support this painful course of action. Basic require- ments for victory in Vietnam are not primar- ily military. They are psychological, social, and economic. Below we address ourselves to instruments which can meet the nonmili- tary-aspects of the undertaking. But neither the economic nor political measures we pro- pose will get off the ground without evidence of the seriousness of our military Intention Nor will our military commitment produce the desired results without the companion economic and psychological supports. America's experience in relation to the in- stability in postwar Europe is clearly rele- vant. The Marshall plan did not begin to come to life until, the physical security prom- ised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO by itself have been meaningful without the human vision and economic future presented by the Marshall plan. 5. Forging a more popular or responsive government. It is clear that the difficulties confronting any Vietnamese Government un- der Communist attack are enormous. We can but sympathize with those who carry the burdens of government in circumstances so frustrating and continuously demanding. It Is possible that 20 years of civil war, co- lonial war, and Communist insurrectionary war, have so debilitated the structure of gov- ernment as to preclude the immediate pos- siblity, no matter how desirable, of absolutely stable government. There are political per- sonalities with nationalist backgrounds who are deserving of our help and encourage- ment. We must do what we can to help them and bring them forward. At the same time, we must help to diminish the present conflict of personalities that has proved in past years to be so destructive. In any event, we believe it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the past, on personalities, rather than on pur- poses, ideas, and institutions. 6. Injection of new purpose. If charis- matic leadership is unavailable, charismatic purpose can be found. One aspect of that purpose involves the modest extension of military effort discussed above. It involves the clear demonstration that the United States means to remain committed even at enlarged risk. And such charismatic pur- pose must, of necessity, accept as workable "the best available choices of Vietnamese Government personnel"-choices made by the Vietnamese not by us. But our object would be to harness our military commit- ment and the Vietnamese effort to an in- finitely larger objective than has previously motivated our participation. It would make crystal clear that the objectives which unite us with the Vietnamese people, aswith our other allies on southeast Asia, are construc- tive and inextricably linked to the welfare of all southeast Asian peoples. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1 9 65 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 3277 and how much they have done to under- mine the fight against Communists. No stable government can be created in Vietnam without the participation and support of responsible Buddhist leader- ship. But this responsible leadership cannot be found among the handful of monks of questionable antecedents who have been misdirecting the militant Buddhist movement in the cities of Viet- nam. It is time to speak bluntly on this issue. THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY Over and over again in recent months I have heard it said that our position in Vietnam is impossible because the French, who knew Vietnam so much bet- ter than we do, were compelled to admit defeat after 8 years of war against the Vietminh. A recent half-page adver- tisement in the NewYork Times asked: "How can we win in Vietnam with less than 30,000 advisers, when the French could not win with an army of nearly half a million?" .Our own position is entirely different from the French position in Indochina. The French were a colonial power, ex- ploiting and imposing their will on the Indochinese people and stubbornly deny- ing them their freedom. The French military effort in Indochina was doomed because it had against it not only the Communists but the overwhelming majority of the Indochinese people. it was a war fought by Frenchmen against Indochinese, The United States, however, does not seek to impose its control on Vietnam or exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial power. We seek only to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom against an insurgency that is inspired and directed and aided by the North Viet- namese Communists. This is understood by the Vietnamese people. And that is why hundreds of thousands of Vietnam-' ese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against the French are today fighting for the Saigon government against the Vietcong. That is why the war against the Viet- cong can be won, while the war of French colonialism against the Indochinese inde- pendence movement was doomed from the outset. There is no similarity in the two situations that has any meaning or validity. WHAT CAN BE DONE? I believe the war in. Vietnam can be won without a significant increase in our military effort. There are many things that can be done to improve the perform- ance of our side, and most of them lie essentially in the nonmilitary field. Let me set forth some of the things that I believe can be done. THE NEED FOR IMPROVED LIAISON One of the most obvious and most seri- ous weaknesses of the American position in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison with the leaders of the various sectors of the Vietnamese, community. Because of this lack of communication, we have frequently been caught un- awares. by developments; we have re- mained without serious ability to influ- ence them; and we have not been able to effectively assist the Vietnamese in com- municating with each other and in sta- bilizing the political situation in Saigon. No one person is to blame for this. It is, rather, the system which rotates mili- tary officers and AID officials and other Americans in Vietnam on an annual or 2-year basis. As one American officer pointed out in a recent interview, "It takes about 8 months before you can really get to know the country and the people. And, just about the time you are beginning to understand something, you are rotated home and that is the end of your utility." I believe that something can be done to improve this situation. I have met a number of Americans, former soldiers and former AID officials, who have spent 5 years or more in Viet- nam, have built up personal friendships with leaders of every sector of the Viet- namese community, enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese because of their understanding and dedication, and who would jump at the opportunity to return to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it in this critical hour. I am told that there may be as many as 10 or 12 such people in this country. I have proposed in a letter to the President that these Americans be con- stituted into a liaison group and that they be dispatched to Saigon imme- diately for the purpose of helping the Embassy to establish the broadest and most effective possible liaison with the army leaders, with the Buddhists, with the intellectual community, and with the Vietnamese political leaders. I know that there is always a tendency on the part of World War II officers to resent World War I officers, and on the part of those who are involved in a situa- tion today to resist the assistance of those who preceded them. There is also sometimes a tendency for those who were there yesterday to believe that they understand things better than those who are there today. But this is a situation in which I am confident every American, no matter what his rank, will seek to rise above his personal prejudices. It is a situation that demands the utilization of every ounce of experience and dedication available to us. It is my earnest personal conviction that the dispatch of such a liaison group to Saigon would result in an early im- provement in our ability to communicate with the Vietnamese and in our ability to assist them in achieving the political sta- bility which is essential to the successful prosecution of the war. THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE EFFORT From many conversations with Viet- namese and with Americans who have served in various capacities in Vietnam, I am convinced that another one of our major weaknesses lies in the field of po- litical warfare. We have, by and large, been trying to meet the Communist insurgency by tra- ditional military methods or by tradi- tional methods slightly tailored to meet the special requirements of guerrilla war- fare. In the field of political warfare, where the Communists have scored their most spectacular triumphs, our own ef- fort has been limited, and halting, and amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffec- tive. The prime goal of political warfare, as it must be waged by freemen, is to win men's minds. The prime goal of political warfare, as it is waged by the Commu- nists, is to erode and paralyze the will to resist by means of total error. An effective political warfare program requires three major ingredients: First, a handful of basic slogans which capsul- ize popular desires and which are capable of striking responsive chords in the hearts of the people; second, a propa- ganda apparatus capable of conveying this program both to those on the Gov- ernment side and those on the side of the insurgents; third, specially trained cad- res to direct the effort. But the slogans we have are inade- quate. Our propaganda program is dis- mally weak compared with that of the Communists. And according to my in- formation, we still have not assisted the Vietnamese to set up an intensive train- ing program in Communist cold war methods and how to counter them. An article in the New York Times on August 3, 1964, pointed out that in every area "the basic cutting tool of the Viet- cong is a squad of about 10 armed men and women whose primary function is propaganda." The article also said that "Most of the experts in psychological warfare and propaganda here believe the Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the Saigon government more damage than even the tough Vietcong regular batta- lions." Finally, the article made the point that according to estimates there were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" teams working in the country, against 20 "in- formation teams" for the government side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of 16 to 1 in the field of propaganda per- sonnel. And the edge was probably even greater in terms of finesse and effective- ness. Even if we help the South Vietnamese Government intensify its propaganda ef- fort, there would still remain the prob- lem of basic goals and slogans. I have pointed out that the Vietnamese people have a proud history and a strong sense of national unity. All Vietnamese, whether they live in the north or south, would like to see a unified and peaceful Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only the Communists are able to hold forth the prospect of the reunification of Viet- nam. To date we have not given the South Vietnamese Government the green light to set up a "Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam," as coun- terpart to the "Liberation Front" which the Communists have set up in the south. This places the South Vietnamese side at a grave disadvantage. There are any number of patriotic North Vietnamese refugees who have been itching for the opportunity to set up a Liberation Committee for the North. The establishment of such a committee could, in my opinion, have an immediate and profound impact on the conduct of But above all, the situation in Vietnam underscores the need for an effective training program in political warfare, Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3278 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 for our own foreign service and military personnel so that they can help to com- municate this knowledge to nationals of other countries who, like the South Viet- namese, are engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival against the most cunning and most ruthless practitioners of political warfare history has ever known. In this connection, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that there has been pending before Congress for some 6 years a bill calling for the establishment of a Freedom Academy. This would be an institu- tion where Americans and citizens of other free countries could receive con- centrated training in Communist tech- niques and operations, and in tactics and methods designed to frustrate the Com- munists at every operational level, from elections for the control of trade unions and student organizations, to street riots, to attempted insurrections. The Senate Judiciary Committee in reporting this measure to the floor in May of 1960, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever in- troduced in the Congress." But, unfor- tunately, although the bill was passed by the Senate, the House took no action. When the bill was reintroduced for the third time in early 1963, it has the spon- sorship of the following Senators: MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DoDD, SMATHERS, Goldwater, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKEN- LOOPER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and SCOTT. The distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota last Friday reintroduced the measure for the fourth time, and it is now lying on the table, so that those who wish to add their names as cosponsors may do so. It is my earnest hope that the measure will have the sponsorship of an even larger bipartisan group of Senators than it did in 1963. It is my hope too that there will be no further delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this long-overdue measure. It is time, high time, that we recognize the imperative need to equip ourselves and our allies with the knowledge and the trained per- sonnel required to meet the Communist onslaught. CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH First of all, I think there is a growing acceptance of the need for punishing the North with hit-and-run raids. It would be much more effective if these raids could be carried out in the name of a North Vietnamese Liberation Front than in the name of the South Vietnamese Government. Second, I have reason for believing that increasing consideration is being given to the need for countering the Viet- cong insurgency in the South with a guerrilla warfare effort in the North. In May of 1961, when I returned from Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement, which I should like to repeat today : The best way for us to stop Communist guerrilla action in Laos and in South Viet- nam is to send guerrilla forces into North Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots already in the field; to make every Commu- nist official fear the just retribution of an outraged humanity; to make every Commu- nist arsenal, government building, commu- n1cations center and transportation facility a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying point for the great masses of oppressed peo- ple who hate communism because they have known it. Only when we give the Commu- nists more trouble than they can handle at home, will they cease their aggression against the outposts of freedom. I believe that every word I said in 1961 .is doubly valid today. It is not too late to embark upon such a program. And if we do give the South Vietnamese Govern- ment the green light to embark upon it on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again I think it would add significantly to the psychological impact of the entire pro- gram if all guerrilla activities were car- ried out in the name of the "Committee for the Liberation of the North." A FEW MILITARY SUGGESTIONS I do not pretend to be a military ex- pert. But I have discussed the situation in Vietnam with a number of military men of considerable experience in the area, and I have been encouraged to be- lieve that the several suggestions which I have to make in this field are realistic. I submit them for the consideration of my colleagues, because I think they make sense. My-first proposition is that we cannot regard the war in Vietnam in isolation from the rest of southeast Asia. The Communist Party over which Ho Chi Minh presided for many years was the Communist Party of Indochina. In- deed, to this day, there is no such thing as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are directed toward the reunification of all the former territories of French Indo- china under his personal sway. This makes it imperative for us to develop a coordinated strategy for the entire area if we are to cope effectively with the Communist strategy. Proposition No. 2 is that there are certain dramatic military actions open to us that do not involve the territory of North Vietnam. The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is the town of Tchepone, Inside the Lao- tian frontier, just south of the 17th par- allel, the dividing line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through Tchepone pour most of the reinforce- ments and equipment from North Viet- nam. From Tchepone the men and equipment are infiltrated into South Vietnam along hundreds of different jungle trails. I recall that when I met with Presi- dent Diem in April of 1961, he urged that the Americans assist him and the Laotian Government in preemptive action to secure three key centers in the Laotian Panhandle-Tchepone, Saravane, and Attopeu-in order to prevent the large- scale infiltration which is today taking place. I still have a copy of the marked map which he gave me in Outlining his project. Had Diem's advice been fol- lowed there would have been no Ho Chi Minh trail. But this was at the time of the Laotian armistice and we were not disposed to take any actions which might provoke the Laotian Communists. So nothing was done. The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian and Vietnamese forces, with American air support would, I have been assured, be a feasible military operation and one that could be carried out with the means available to us on the spot. It would do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi Minh trail than any amount of bombing we could attempt. And it would have as dramatic an impact on the situation in Taos as on the situation in Vietnam. Finally, there is the matter of collec- tive action by the SEATO nations. As late as April of 1961, the SEATO na- tions in the Immediate area of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan-all favored com- mon action against the Communist menace in Laos. But the British and French were opposed to such action, and we ourselves sat on the fence; and the result was that nothing was done. The charter of SEATO will have to be modified so that one nation cannot veto collective action by all the other nations. Britain, I am inclined to believe, would now be disposed to support collective ac- tion by SEATO because of the situation in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should be invited to leave SEATO, on the grounds that she has no vital interests in the area, and her entire attitude toward Red China is one of appeasement. In view of the fact that something has to be done immediately, however, the sensible course is to encourage collective action by the free nations in the area, outside the framework of SEATO, until SEATO can be reorganized in a manner that makes it effective. In this connection, I am most encour- aged by the news that South Korea has decided to send a contingent of several thousand military engineers to South Vietnam, and the Philippines have de- cided to do likewise. It is Infinitely bet- ter from every standpoint to have Asian troops supporting the Vietnamese forces against the Vietcong on the ground, than it is to have American troops actively in- volved. THE NEED FOR UNDERSCORING OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT The retaliatory strikes ordered by President Johnson against the North have had the effect of reiterating our commitment in a manner that the Com- munists understand; and this, in the long run, is probably more important than the damage wrought by these strikes. But if the Communists are to be dis- couraged from continuing this costly war, Ive must seek every possible means of underscoring our determination to stand by the people of South Vietnam, to pay whatever cost may be necessary, and to take whatever risk may be neces- sary to prevent the Communists from subjugating the Vietnamese people and other people in the area. It is important to reiterate our resolve at every opportunity. And it is even more important to translate this resolve into hard political and military actions. The American Friends of Vietnam have suggested another dramatic meas- ure. They have suggested a commit- ment to a massive southeast Asian de- velopment program based on the har- nessing of the Mekong River-a kind of Tennessee. Valley Authority for south- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/'15: CIA-RDP67B 0300170003-8 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - 3275 For. some strange reason, the torture And even last year, when the fortunes kangaroo courts, and executing and of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far of war turned against the Vietnamese burying those who were sentenced. more indignation in our country than government, the Vietnamese Army killed I also remind them of the scenes that the assassination of scores of thousands 17,000 Vietcong against a loss of 7,000 took place when the prisoners were of innocent civilians by the Vietcong men, and took 4,200 Communists captive brought before the, Communist interro- Communists, including the bombing of a against 5,800 captives lost to them. gators under the procedures set up by schoolbus in which a score of children To those who say that the Vietnamese the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com- died. Army has not shown the will to resist, mission. The prisoners had to be dragged But, if the Vietnamese people are anti- I point out that, over the 3-year period before the interrogators forcibly, their Communist, I have been asked: Why has for which I have presented figures, this arms pinned behind their backs by In- the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a army suffered a total death toll of 17,000 than soldiers. When the Communist in- show? men, which is almost as high as the total terrogators spoke to them, urging that The Vietnamese Army has been handi- American toll in South Korea. The they return to their homeland, the pris- capped by political instability by the fre- enemy's casualties have been much heav- oners spat out their hatred with a vehe- quent shifts of officers, by poor staff ier. But the Communists have continued mence that Western observers found work, by its inadequate use of scouts and to attack regardless of losses. And be- frightening. So embarrassing were the security patrols, and by the many dis- cause it has not been possible to recon- interrogations for the Communists that advantages under which counterguer- stitute a stable government since the after a number of sessions they decided rilla forces must always operate. But, overthrow of Diem, and, because no one to call off the whole show. It is simply not true that the Vietnamese knows where guerrillas may strike next, In the light of this conclusion, how Army has shown no willingness to fight. and because unlimited terror is a dread- much significance can one attach to the They have fought bravely in thou- fully effective instrument, the Vietcong, seemingly fanatical courage displayed by sands of engagements. They have taken over the past 15 months, have been able the Chinese and North Korean soldiers heavy casualties and inflicted much to make most of the Vietnamese country- in attacking our positions, or to the grim heavier casualties on the enemy. side insecure. unity of the Koje prisoners of war in The belief that the Vietnamese people The fact that the Vietcong seem to be resisting their mar elAmerican at ccaptors? opparently do not have the will to resist the Com- winning and that they have been so Before munists and that the Vietnamese forces effective in resisting government count- high morale of the Vietcong forces in have fought poorly against them, is in erattacks, has led some people to believe South Vietnam, I suggest that we recall large measure due to the unfortunate that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of the experience of the Korean war, be- emphasis which the press always places the justice of his cause and that this is cause the evidence is overwhelming that on disasters and defects. why he fights more grimly. the Vietcong Communists are using ter- It probably also springs in pert from The Communists are masters of the ror on the same scale and in the same the traditional attitude of the American art of imposing iron discipline by means manner that it was employed on the newspaperman that it is his duty to of unlimited terror. Korean battlefront and in the prisoner- mercilessly expose every weakness in Senators will recall that during the of-war camps. his city government, in his State govern- Korean war we all marveled at the dis- That the morale of the Vietcong forces ment, in his National Government. cipline of the Chinese Communist sol- is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the I do not complain about that. I sup- diers who kept on marching without substantial number of Vietcong prisoners pose that is the way it has to be. -breaking step while they were being taken over the past 3 years. It is demon- But whatever the reasons may be, the bombed and strafed by American planes, strated even more dramatically by the emphasis in the press has been so mis- or who attacked our positions, wave upon fact that from February 1963 through leading that even knowledgeable mem- wave, apparently oblivious to casualties. the end of 1964 there were approxi- bers of the administration have been con- I remember people saying, "See the mately 17,000 Vietcong defections. The fused by it. For example, a member of number of defections would be far the administration who very recently dedication of these Chinese Communists, larger, t am certain, if a stable govern- visited Vietnam informed me that, con See how they bear themselves against ment could establish itself in Saigon. trary to his impressions from reading the bullets and bombs. See how fanatically It is interesting to note that, while press he was amazed to learn that in they believe in their cause." I did not most of the defectors have been young eight engagements of battalion size and think that was the reason, but I did not peasants who' were conscripted by the larger which took place during the have an effective answer until after the Vietcong, their ranks also include North month of January 1965, the Vietnamese war was over. Vietnamese officers who were told that Army got the better of the engagement Senators will recall the terrible riots they were going south to fight the Amer- in every single case. in the Koje prisoner-of-war camp, when icans and who broke when they dis- I have here the comparative figures the prisoners seemed so grimly united covered that they were fighting their for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties against us that for weeks on end Amer- own people. for the 3-year period .1962-64, which ican soldiers could not venture into the Impatient constituents have sometimes I have received from an official source. POW compound. Again, the common asked me why the Communists have been I wish to read them, Mr. President, be- assumption was that the prisoners were able to plan elaborate attacks on our cause they throw an altogether new light all fanatical Communists. airfields and other installations without on the situation in Vietnam. I do not But then the end of the war came- advance intelligence reaching us from know why these figures were not released and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000 members of the local population who long ago. I hear people complaining of the Communist prisoners in our hands must have observed the Communists. that they do not know what is going on asked for refugee status rather than The instrument of terror is also appli- in Vietnam. The release of these figures return to North Korea or China. And cable to the control of the ciXilian popu- would have helped them to understand. these were supposed to be the dedicated lation. Whenever the Communists take In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400 Communists who believe so fanatically over a village or a town, they systemat- killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong in communism. ically massacre all known anti-Commu- killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500 Of the 5,000 who returned home, there nist leaders and those who are suspected captives taken from the Vietcong. is reason to believe that the majority of informing. They frequently mutilate Those are, pretty good statistics. They did so with heavy hearts, because of their bodies as an example to the people. ought to be read and studied by persons strong family ties and not because of If we could give the Vietnamese vil- who are saying the South Vietnamese any love for communism. lagers a feeling of greater. security, I am have no will to fight. I remind the Senators-because these sure that more intelligence would be Listen to these further figures: things tend to be forgotten-of the evi- forthcoming. As matters now stand, the In 1963 the figures"were 5,700 Vietna- dencewhich emerged that the Koje pris- average Vietnamese peasant fears that mere soldiers killed in action against oners of war had been terrorized by a the Communists are going to win the 21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or tiny minority of Communist militants war, and he knows the terrible punish- captured against 4,000 Vietcong cap- who ran the camp with an iron hand, ment that awaits those who inform on tured. torturing political opponents, staging the Communists. This is why our in- . Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3276 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 telligence has admittedly been inade- quate-one of the reasons, certainly. But this is a situation that could change dramatically if we succeeded in convinc- ing the Vietnamese people of our deter- mination to help them retain their free- dom, and if we succeeded in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the enemy. THE BUDDHIST FALLACY I now wish to discuss the Buddhist sit- uation, about which we have heard for several years now. The myth of Buddhist persecution and the parallel myth that the Buddhists are opposed to the Government, have be- cause of the so-called militant Buddhist movement, become important political factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, im- portant that we should seek to under- stand the nature of this movement, the motivation of its leaders, and the real degree of Influence it exerts over the Vietnamese people. It is, indeed, idle to debate the subject of Vietnam and our policy there and not understand the so-called Buddhist Prob- lem. There has been much loose talk about it, but there has thus far been little hard, factual information. The campaign which resulted in the overthrow of President Diem was marked by the charge that he had subjected the Buddhist religion to inhuman persecu- tion; and, in protest against this alleged persecution, a number of Buddhist monks went through the horrifying ritual of self-immolation. Week after week, month after month, the American people and the people of the world were inundated with stories supporting the charge that Diem was persecuting the Buddhist religion. There were a number of experienced corre- spondents of national reputation who challenged the authenticity of these stories. But their voices were drowned by the torrent of charges and allegations that appeared in some of our major news- papers, and that were lent further credence because of repetition of our of- fical information agencies. At the invitation of President Diem, the U.N. General Assembly decided to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to look into the situation. I find this rarely referred to in any discussion of the Bud- dhist question, but It is a fact that the United Nations did send a mission over there. While the mission was still in the coun- try, President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and assassinated. The mission decided that the overthrow of Diem made it unnecessary to come up with a formal finding. I believe that this was most regrettable. But the-sum-- mary of the testimony which it had taken in Vietnam pointed strongly to the con- clusion that the persecution of the Buddhists was either nonexistent or vastly exaggerated and that the agita- tion was essentially political. This, in essence, was what I was told in a per- sonal conversation with Ambassador Per- ma:ndo Volio Jiminez, of Costa Rica, who had introduced the motion calling for the setting up of the U.N. mission and who served as a member of it. I went to New York and saw Ambas- sador Volio. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I understand you were a member of the United Nations commission which went to Vietnam. I should like to ask you what the facts are." Ambassador Volio gave me the facts as I have given them to you here. Ambassador Pinto, of Dohomey, an- other member of the U.N. mission, ex- pressed himself in similar terms in public. The entire tragic story suggests that the free world was made the victim of a gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of which the legitimate government of President Diem was destroyed and a chaotic situation created which has in- evitably played into the hands of the Communists. If Senators have not yet had time to read the report of the U.N. factflnding mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so because it throws essential light on the current activities of the militant Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies mailed to every Senator, and I hope that all Senators will read it, because they will learn a great deal about the present Buddhist situation from it. The first fact which needs to be estab- lished in evaluating the militant Buddhist movement is that the Buddhists do not constitute 80 or 85 percent of the popula- tion, as was widely reported at the time of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest au- thorities on Vietnam Buddhism theViet- namese Buddhists number approxi;Yiately 4 million people, or about 30 percent of the population. The second point that must be made is that the militant Buddhists constitute only a small fraction of the total Bud- dhist population. The millions of the Buddhist peasants, in their great ma- jority, do not approve of the militant political actions and the government- toppling intrigues of the Buddhist mili- tants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed, run completely counter to the pacific traditions of the Buddhist religion. It is questionable whether the Bud- dhist militants have been able to mobilize as many as 50,000 active supporters in all the demonstrations they have staged in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But because political power resides in the cities, the several tens of thousands of Buddhist militants, by their clamor and their persistent demonstrations and their clever propaganda, have succeeded in creating the impression that they speak for the people of the cities and for the majority of the people of Vietnam. What do the Buddhist militants want? Before the overthrow of President Diem, Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Hig- gins frankly: "We cannot get an arrange- ment with the north until we get rid -3f Diem and Nhu." The evidence Is clear that Thich Tri Quang and some of his other militants are still bent on an agreement with the north. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. If there is reason to believe that Thich Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even more reason for fearing that some of the other members of the Buddhist opposi- tion movement are openly pro-Commu- nist or that they have become tools of the rather substantial Communist infil- tration which is known to exist in the Buddhist clergy in the various countries of Asia. That such an infiltration should exist is not surprising because there are no barriers to it. A man who wants to become a Bud- dhist monk does not have to prepare him- self for his ministry by engaging in studies, nor does he have to be ordained, nor does he take any vow. He simply shaves his head and dons the saffron robe and enters a monas- tery-and overnight he becomes one of the religious elite. When he wishes to leave the mon- astery, he sheds his robe and leaves it; if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe again and reenters. That is all there is to it. I do not criticize this procedure on religious grounds. Buddhism is one of the great religions of mankind and much can be said for an arrangement that enables every man of religious disposition to spen-l at least a portion of his life under the voluntary monastic discipline characteristic of Buddhism. But, regrettably, it is a procedure that leaves the door wide open to Communist Infiltration. I remember that when we were digging into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg, we found that Hitler had under consider- ation a program of Infiltrating the churches by inducing young people to enter seminaries, so that he could have them at his disposal. When I first began to hear of the Buddhist situation, it occurred to me that more than likely there was a sim- ilar infiltration of religion at work. The militant Buddhists have used the influence and prestige which accrued to them from the overthrow of Diem for the prime purpose of making stable gov- ernment impossible: in this sense, what- ever the intent of their leaders, they have been serving the desires of the Communist Vietcong. They have organized demonstrations, provoked riots, inflamed passions with highly publicized fasts and self -Immola- tions, and subjected the government to a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They overthrew the Khanh government. Then they overthrew the Huong govern- Unent which succeeded it. And they seem to be intent on making things im- possible for any government that may come to power. It is, of course, difficult to deal with a political conspiracy that camouflages it- self in religious robes. In any case, this is a matter for the Vietnamese Govern- ment and not for our own Government. But it would make matters immeasur- ably easier for the Vietnamese authori- ties if the true facts about Buddhism in Vietnam were given to the American people and If they could be helped to understand how little the Buddhist mili- tants really represent, how nefarious their political activities have really been, Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 19ti5 Approved For R ~$ 22QQQQ~3//1~ : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 ~vRvRESSI EECORI 77 SENATE, 3273 Polish Communist, member consistently Having defeated the military sects social advances recorded anywhere in refused t0 inves'tigate reports of North and integrated them into the Armed Asia, Vietnamese intervention? in South Viet- Forces of the republic, Diem within a ESCALATION : FACT AND FALLACY nam. 111, this way, this entire massive few years was able to resettle the 1 mil- There has been a good deal of talk body, of evidence, of Hanoi's. intervention lion refugees and to create a stable uni- about the United States escalating the in South Vietnam was muted and ren- fied state where none had previously ex- war in South Vietnam. Several Senators dere,,d fine e. fisted. who spoke last week warned that if we In order r to to understand the war in Viet- I could not help feeling indignant over escalate the war by means of air strikes nam, we have to get away from tradi- an article on Vietnam which appeared against North Vietnam, the escalation tional concepts in which ,armies with some time ago in the Washington Star. may get out of hand and wind up as a war their own insignias cross clearly marked The author, Prof. Bernard Fall, who with Red China or perhaps even a world national, demarcation lines after their wrote the article in ill-concealed admi- war. governments have duly declared war. ration of what the Communists had done But it is not we who have escalated the Communist guerrilla warfare is waged in their area of Vietnam, mentioned the war; it is the Communists. Peiping and without any declaration of war. In the fact that the Communists had built Hanoi have been busy escalating the war case of Vietnam, it is waged from exter- schools for the people. What he did not in South Vietnam for several years now. nalsanctuaries which claim immunity to mention was that from 1955 to 1963 They have sent in tens of thousands of attack because the state which harbors President Diem has doubled the number soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army; them has not formally declared war, of students in elementary schools, while they have trained additional tens of thou- It blends military cadres who have in- at the secondary school level the in- sands of dissident South Vietnamese; filtrated into the country with native crease has been fivefold. they have supplied them with massive dissidents and conscripts, in a manner The remarkable progress in the field quantities of equipment; and they have which conceals the foreign instigation of of education was no exception. The en- stepped up the tempo of their attacks the insurgency, and which enables the tire South Vietnamese society scored re- against the Vietnamese people. Communists to pretend that it is merely markable advances in every field of eco- Now we are told that if we take any ac- a civil war. .1 1 nomic and social endeavor, so that in tion against the territory of North Viet- ,It is time that, we nail the civil war 1963 South Vietnam for the first time nam, which has mounted and directed lie for what it is. It is time that we rec- had a sizable rice surplus for export. the entire attack on South Vietnam, it ognized it as a form of aggression as There were significant increases in all will entail the risk of world war. intolerable as open aggression across sectors of industry and agriculture, and If the Communists are always to be marked frontiers. a 20-percent rise in per capita income. Permitted the privilege of escalating their Why did Ho Chi, Minh decide to launch Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things attempts to take over new countries, the current war for the liberation of in while we shrink from retaliation for fear South Vietnam? The answer to this were going from bad to worse. As in question is really very simple. every other Communist country the col- of further escalation, we might as well l i th After the Geneva agreement, it had been the expectation of the Communists that South Vietnam would collapse in administrative and political chaos be- fore many months had passed, and that it would fall into their hands like an overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh Diem took office as Premier after the surrender of North Vietnam to the Com- munists, 99 percent of the Western press viewed the situation in South Vietnam as hopeless and predicted an early take- over by the Communist guerrillas. Cut off from the mineral and indus- trial riches of the north; swamped by an influx of 1 million refugees; without an adequate army or administration of its own; with three major sects, each with private armies, openly challenging its authority-confronted with this com- bination of burdens and handicaps, it seemed that nothing could save the new born South Vietnamese Government. But then there took place something that has properly come to be called the Diem miracle; this term was used at different times by President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's tyo we a,re uomg now. But on now realize was a tragic mistake. ment, I think it important to point out the ground, the fighting can most effec- Diem first of all moved to destroy the that this war has gravely complicated tively be done by the Vietnamese armed power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a the already serious internal difficulties forces, supported, I believe, by military sect of river pirates who, under the of the North, so that in 1963, for exam- contingents from the other free Asian French, were given a simultaneous mo- ple, the per capita output of rice in Com- countries. nopoly on the n}etropolitan police force munist North Vietnam was 20 percent THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT of Saigon and on the thousands of opium lower than in 1960. KNOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM dens and houses of prostitution and And I also consider it important to it has been stated by the senior Sena- gambling that flourished there, understand the significance of the fact tor from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by So powerful was, the Binh Xyuen and that the Vietcong insurgency was di- other critics of our foreign policy in Viet- so weak were the. Diem. forces at the rected not against a government that nam that it is pointless to talk about time that even the American Ambassa- had failed to improve the lot of its peo- fighting for freedom In Asia because the dor urged Diem not to attack them, ple but against a government which, Asian people historically do not know the Diem, however, did attack them and over a short period of time, had scored meaning of freedom. It has even been drove them our of Saigon, some of the most dramatic e on mi i l c c and o mp ied that, becausef thi i oergnorance No. 35-a ect vization of the peasants resulted in row in the sponge now and tell the a dramatic reduction of food output and Communists the world is theirs for the in chronic food shortages throughout taking. the country. The resentment of the I find It difficult to conceive of Red peasants was compounded by the brutal China sending in her armies in response and indiscriminate punishment of hun- to air strikes against carefully selected dreds of thousands of peasant farmers military targets. After all, if they did who were hailed before so-called people's so, they would be risking retaliation courts and charged with being bourgeois against their highly vulnerable coastal elements or exploiting landlords. Dur- cities, where most of Red China's indus- ing the course of 1955 peasant revolts try is concentrated. They would be risk- broke out in several areas. There was ing setting back their economy 10 or 20 Seven a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own vil- years. lage. And there was some evidence that Moreover, both the Chinese Commu- the troops sent to suppress these revolts nists and the Hanoi Communists are sometimes sympathized with the peas- aware that the ma i i ss ve ntroduction of ants. Shortages increased year by year. Chinese troops would create serious pop- The people became increasingly apa- ular resentment because of the tradi- thetic. tional Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese The contrast between the growing imperialism. prosperity of the South and the growing That there will be no invasion of the misery in the North confronted the Viet- North by Vietnamese and American namese Communists with a challenge forces can, I believe, be taken as axio- they could not tolerate. That is why matic. Nor do I believe there will be any they decided that they had to put an large-scale involvement of American end to freedom in South Vietnam. troops on the Korean model. We will While they have scored some sensational have to continue to provide the Viet- victories in their war of subversion namese with logistical support and air Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3274 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 of freedom and their indifference to it, southeast Asian peasant, his life is full that they resist it only halfheartedly. communism exercises a genuine attrac- and he is prepared to fight to defend it some commentators have even sought to tion for the peoples of Asia. against the Communists. create the impression that America is in I am sure that most Asians would con- It is, in short, completely untrue that a position of coercing the South Viet- sider this analysis condescending and the Vietnamese people and the other namese to fight against communism. offensive. I myself would be disposed to peoples of Asia do not know the mean- This estimate of the attitude of the agree with them. It is an analysis which, ing of freedom. And it is equally untrue South Vietnamese people is totally false. in my opinion, is false on almost every that communism is acceptable to the True, Souh Vietnam is suffering from. score. Asian peasant because of his indiffer- political instability. We have grown accustomed to equat- ence to freedom. True, the war against the Vietcong is ing freedom with the full range of free- Communism has never been freely ac- going badly. doms that we in the United States today eepted by any people, anywhere, no mat- But these things by themselves do not enjoy. But, in the world in which we ter how primitive. constitute proof that the Vietnamese line, the word "freedom" has at least it has never been accepted for the people are indifferent to communism or three separate and perhaps equally im- simple reason that even primitive peoples that they do not have the will to resist. portant connotations. do not enjoy being pushed around and The people of South Vietnam are, in First, there is national freedom, or in- brutalized and terrorized, and told what fact, one of the most anti-Communist dependence from foreign control. to do and what not to do, and having peoples in the world. Among them are Second, there is freedom of speech their every activity ordered and super- more than 1 million refugees who sacri- and press and the other freedoms in- vised by political commissars. fired everything they possessed to flee herent in parliamentary democracy, such This is why communism must govern from North Vietnam to South Vietnam as we enjoy. by means of ruthless dictatorship wher. after the country was divided by the And, third, there is the type of natural ever it takes power. Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is esti- freedom that is enjoyed by primitive This is why the primitive mountain mated that there are another 300,000 in- - peasants and tribesmen in many back- peoples of both Laos and Vietnam h a a mternal unil refugees controlled who have fled from south. ward countries, even under political in an overwhelming majority, autocracies. against the Communists. Among the present population of 14 mil- It is true that most Asian governments This is why there are almost 8 mil- lion, in addition, there are several million are autocratic; and it is. probably true lion refugees from Communist rule In peasants and workers and students who that the Vietnamese people do not un- Asia today-people who have seen the have at one time or another borne arms derstand or appreciate freedom in the reality of the so-called People's Democ- against the Communists, some of them sense of parliamentary democracy. But racy, and who have given up everything in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in they certainly understand the meaning they possessed and frequently risked village self-defense units. of "freedom" when the word is used to their lives to escape from it. The overwhelming majority of the mean independence from foreign rule. That is why there is barbed wire and people of South Vietnam have what corn- They are, in fact, a people with a long iron curtains surrounding the Commu- coupl munie backs. have There ri- and proud history and a strong sense of nist countries. The inhabitants of the enced it means indeed von their few own because South batkcks TTher w re national identity. Every Vietnamese Communist countries would all leave if do not have friends or relatives who have schoolboy knows that his people fought they could, and triumphed over the hordes of There is one final comment I would like been the victims of Communist brutality Genghis Khan in defense of their free- to make while dealing with this sub- and terror. dom and he also knows that his country Let me tell the story of one such act was free for five centuries before the jest. Too often I have heard it said of Communist terror, because statistics choose o fight- by themselves tend to be meaningless. French occupation. Finally, he knows ing that the bthere here Vietnamese is people nothing t t are not because and takes pride in the fact that his peo- between communism and the kind of gov- In the village of Phu Hoa, there was a pie drove out the French colonialists de- ernment they now have. teenage girl by the name of Giau, the spite their army of 400,000 men. Do not To equate an authoritarian regime like pride of her parents and a born leader of tell me that these people know nothing others. As a member of the Republican about freedom. that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or youth Organization, she organized the To the westernized Saigonese intellec- Thailand with the totalitarian rule of village youth and gave talks. On the tuals, freedom of speech and freedom of communism is tantamount to losing all evening of January 15, 1962, she was ab- the press are certainly very real issues; sense of proportion. Not only have these ducted from her village by Vietcong Bol- and even though they may have not mas- regimes never been guilty of the massive diers. The next morning her mutilated tered the processes, they would unques- bloodletting and total direction of per- and decapitated body-I have a photo- tionably like to see some kind of parlia- sonal life which has characterized Com- graph of it-was discovered in the road- mentary democracy in their country. It munist rule in every country, but, care- way outside the village with a note on is completely understandable that they fully examined, it will turn out that these her breast captioned "Death Sentence should have chafed over the political con- regimes are 3 mixture of natural democ- for Giau," and signed by the "People's trols that existed under the Diem gov- racy at the bottom with political controls Front of Liberation." ernment, and that have existed, in one of varying rigidity at the top. For a long period of time, assassina- degree or another, under succeeding gov- Even at their worst, the political au- tions such as this were going on at the ernments. tocracies that exist in certain free Asian rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a But in the countryside, where the great countries are a thousand times better year. The victims were most frequently mass of the people reside, the political than communism from the standpoint of active supporters of government, local controls that exist in the city are mean- how they treat their own people. And administrators, village heads, and school- ingless. The peasant is free to own his at their best, some of these autocracies teachers. The families of village mili- own land, to dispose of his produce, to have combined control of the press and tiamen were another favorite target. worship according to his beliefs, to guide political parties with remarkably pro- The Vietcong would entice the militia the upbringing of his children, and to gressive social programs. away from the village-and when they elect his local village officials. To him, But perhaps more important from our returned they would find their wives and these freedoms that touch on his every- standpoint is that these free- autocracies, children massacred. day life are the freedoms that really for lack of a better term, do not threaten While the facts of these mass assassi- count, not the abstract and remote free- the peace of their neighbors or of the nations are not generally known in our doms of constitutional and federal gov- world or threaten our own security, country,, they are known in Vietnam. ernment. whereas world communism has now be- And this is one of the reasons why the And, if on top of granting him these come a threat of terrifying dimensions. Vietnamese people hate the Communists, natural freedoms, the government as- THE TALLACT THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE and why they continue to resist them sists him by building schools and dis- HAVE'NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM despite the chronic political instability pensaries and by providing seed and Per- We have been told that the Vietnamese in Saigon and despite the seeming hope- tilizer, then, from the standpoint of the people are Indifferent to communism; lessness of their situation. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 3271 I suggested to Senators that a train wreck hadoccurred in which 100 persons had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in which 150 had lost their lives, or some common disaster with hundreds or even thousands of lives lost, we would react, we would feel it. But If I suggested that 1 million murders had taken place, our minds would not be able to grasp the enormity of such a crime. Perhaps that is just as well. There must be built into our intellectual mech- anism some kind of governor. Unfortu- nately, while it is probably saving us from insanity, the fact that our minds cannot comprehend the murder of 1 million peo- ple or 40 million people serves as a pro- tective asset to the perpetrator of such an evil deed. It does not make the crime any less horrible. It simply makes our task that much more difficult. Even after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin confirmed all the essential charges that had been made against the Soviet regime, men of good will in the Western World refused to believe that the Communist regime could be so evil. They refused to believe, because it is dif- ficult for them to conceive of horror and brutality on such a mass scale. To those who refuse to believe, I would like to read the eloquent words penned by Dr. Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish leader in prewar Lithuania, one of the scores of thousands of Lithuanians de- ported to Soviet slave labor camps after the Soviet occupation of his country. When he was released after 7 years in the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote: Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward the U.S.S.R. * * * The last.7 years have made me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet system. I hate this system with all the strength of my heart and all the power of my mind. Everything I have seen there has filled me with horror and disgust which will last until the end of my days. I feel that the struggle against this system of slavery, terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there constitutes the primary obligation of every man in this world. Tolerance or support of such an international shame is not permis- sible for people who are on this side of the Soviet border and who live under normal conditions. * * * Millions of men are perishing in the camps of the Soviet Union. * * * Since they came into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed more people, have executed more victims, than all the other camps-Hitler's in- cluded-together; and this lethal engine con- tinues to operate full blast. And those who in reply only shrug their shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with vague and meaningless generalities, I con- sider moral abetters and accomplices of ban- ditry. Let those who talk of getting out of Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of saving human lives weigh the words of Dr. Julius Margolin-a man who, like themselves, refused to believe that com- munism could be so inhuman until he saw its punitive machinery at work with his awn eyes. And if the administration should ever succumb to, their pressure and negotiate the surrender of Vietnam, and if the Vietnamese Communists then embark on the orgy of bloodletting which has always accolnpanled the establishment of Com- munist power, let those who are pressur- ing for negotiations not be heard to say, "but we didn't intend it this way." Be- cause there is today no excuse for igno- rance about communism, (B) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITH- DRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION Our withdrawal from Vietnam would immediately confront us with an agoniz- ing choice. If we decide to try to defend what is left of southeast Asia against the advance of communism, it will require far more money, far more men, and far more. American blood than we are today in- vesting in the defense of Vietnam. What is more, it would involve a far greater risk of the major escalation which we seek to avoid. If, on the other hand, we decide to abandon the whole of southeast Asia to communism, as some of the proponents of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it would result in the early disintegration of all our alliances, and in the total eclipse of America as a great nation. Because no nation can remain great when its assurances are considered worthless .even by its friends. (C) MORE VIETNAMS Whether we decide to abandon south- east Asia or to try to draw another line outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will result in a dozen more Vietnams in dif- ferent parts of the world. If we cannot cope with this type of warfare in Viet- nam, the Chinese Communists will be en- couraged in the belief that we cannot cope with it anywhere else In the Congo, the Chinese Communists have launched their first attempt at ap- plying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa. In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas, after being decisively defeated in the early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic comeback. According to the New York Times, the Huks are now active again in considerable strength, control large areas of central Luzon, and are assassinating scores of village heads and local admin- istrators on the Vietcong pattern. In Thailand, Red China has already announced the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the Government and eradicate American influence. This al- most certainly presages the early launch- ing of a Thai Communist insurrection, also patterned after the Vietcong. An article in the Washington Post on January 16, pointed out that the Vene- zuelan Communists now have 5,000 men under arms in the cities and in the countryside, and that the Venezuelan Communist Party is openly committed to "the strategy of a long war, as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam." And there are at least half a dozen other Latin American countries where the Communists are fielding guerrilla forces, which may be small today, but which would be encouraged by a Com- munistvictory in Vietnam to believe that the West has no defense against the long war. It is interesting to note in this con- nection that, according to Cuban re- ports, a Vietcong delegation which came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mu- tual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guer- rilla forces. In ac]dtion, Marguerite Higgins, the distinguished correspondent for the Washington Star and other papers, points out that Vietcong experts have teamed up with experts from Com- munist China and the Soviet Union in training Latin Americans for guerrilla operations in the several schools main- tained by Fidel Castro. (D) WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE? It has been suggested that if we aban- don southeast Asia, our seapower would make it possible for us to fall back on Japan and the Philippines and the oth- er Pacific islands, and constitute a more realistic defense line there. This is non- sense. American seapower and.Ameri- can nuclear power have thus far proved impotent to cope with Communist politi- cal warfare. Cuba is the best proof of this. If we abandon southeast Asia, the Philippines may prove impossible to hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk insurgency. Japan, even if it remains non-Commu- nist, would probably, by force of circum- stances, be compelled to come to terms with Red China, adding the enormous strength of its economy to Communist strategic resources. Okinawa, where our political position is already difficult, would become politi- cally impossible to hold. If we ~ fail to draw the line in Viet- nam, in short, we may find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacific. (E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE To all those who agree that we must carefully weigh the consequences of withdrawal before we commit ourselves to withdrawal, I would refer the recent words of the well-known Filipino politi- cal commentator, Vincente Villamin. The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr. Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish on America's honor. It would reduce America in the estimation of mankind to a dismal third-rate power, despite her wealth, her culture and her nuclear ar- senal. It would make every American ashamed of his Government and would make every individual American dis- trusted everywhere on earth." This is strong language. But from conversations with a number of Asians, I know that it is an attitude shared by many of our best friends in Asia. VIETNAM AND MUNICH The situation in Vietnam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich. Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill wanted peace. Churchill said that if the free world failed to draw the line against Hitler at an early stage, it would be compelled to draw the line under much more difficult circumstances at a later date. Chamberlain held that a confronta- tion with Hitler might result in war, and that the interests of peace demanded some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslo- vakia, he said, was a faraway land about which we knew very little. Chamberlain held that a durable agreement could be negotiated with Hit- Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23. ler that would guarantee "peace in our time." How I remember those words. Churchill held that the appeasement of a compulsive aggressor simply whet- ted his a{ petite for further expansion and made war more likely. Chamberlain's policy won out, because nobody wanted war. When he came back from Munich, he was hailed not only by the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the Labor Party people, including leftwing- ers like James Maxton and Fenner Brockway. Churchill remained a voice crying in the wilderness. But who was right-Churchill or Chamberlain? Who was the true man of peace? In Vietnam today, we are again deal- inl; with a faraway land, about which we know very little. In Vietnam today, we are again con- fronted by an incorrigible aggressor, fanatically committed to the destruc- tion of the free world, whose agree- ments are as worthless as Hitler's. In- deed, even while the Communist propa- ganda apparatus is pulling out all the stops to pressure us into a diplomatic surrender in Vietnam, the Chinese Com- munists are openly encouraging a new Huk insurgency in the Philippines and have taken the first step in opening a Vietcong type insurgency in Thailand through the creation of their quisling Thai patriotic front. In signing the Munich agreement, it was not Chamberlain's intention to sur- render the whole of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The agreement was limited to the transfer of the German-speaking Sudetenland to German sovereignty. And no one was more indignant than Chamberlain when Hitler, having de- prived Czechoslovakia of her mountain defenses, proceeded to take over the entire country. While there are some proponents of a diplomatic solution who are willing to face up to the fact that negotiations at this juncture mean surrender, there are others who apparently quite hon- estly believe that we can arrive at a settlement that will both end the war and preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. If such negotia- tions should ever come to pass, I am certain that the story of Czechoslovakia would be repeated. Having deprived South Vietnam of the political and mil- itary capability to resist, the North Viet- namese Communists would not tarry long before they completely communized the country. And, before very long, those who urge a diplomatic solution for the sake of preventing war, may find themselves compelled to fight the very war that they were seeking to avoid, on a bigger and bloodier scale, and from a much more difficult line of defense. I take Itfor granted that no one in this Chamber and no loyal American citizen believes that we should stand by indifferently while communism takes over the rest of the world. I take it for granted that every in- telligent person realizes that America could not long survive as a free nation I take it for granted that everyone agrees that somewhere, somehow, we must drRw the line against further Communist expansion. The question that separates us, there- fore, is not whether such a line should be drawn, but where such a line should be drawn. I believe that we have been right in drawing the line in Vietnam and that President Johnson is right in trying to hold the line in Vietnam, despite the setbacks we have suffered over the past year. Because, if this line falls, let us have no illusions about the difficulty of drawing a realistic line of defense any- where in the western Pacific. NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION We have been told in many statements and articles that the only alternative to withdrawal from Vietnam, with or with- out negotiations, is a dramatic escala- tion of the war against the North. And we have been warned that such an esca- lation might bring in both Red China and the Soviet Union and might bring about the thermonuclear holocaust that no one wants. These are supposed to be the choices before. us. It is my belief, however, that the tide of war in Vietnam can be reversed and that this war can ultimately be won without an invasion of the North and without a significant intensification of our military effort. It is my belief that there are many measures we can take, primarily in the nonmilitary, field, to strengthen our posture and the posture of South Vietnamese forces in the fight against the Vietcong insurgency. Before outlining some of the measures which I believe can and must be taken, I wish to deal with a number of widely accepted fallacies and misconceptions about the situation in Vietnam, because one cannot intelligently approach the problem -of what to do about Vietnam without first establishing the essential facts about the present situation in that country. THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A CIVIL WAR The belief that the Vietnamese war is a civil war is one of the most widespread misconceptions about Vietnam. This is frequently associated with the charge that it is the United States, and not North Vietnam or Red China, which is inteyvening in South Vietnam. The war in South Vietnam is not a civil war. It was instigated in the first place by the North Vietnamese Commu- nists, with the material and moral sup- port of both Peiping and Moscow. There is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has provided the leadership for the Vietcong insurrection, that it has supplied them massively, and that it has served as the real command headquarters for the Viet- cong. - The present insurrection in South Vietnam goes back to the third Commu- nist Party Congress in Hanoi in Septem- ber of 1960. At this Congress it was decided "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independ- ence." The Congress also called for the creation of a broad national front in South Vietnam directed against the United States-Diem clique. Several months later the formation of the front for the liberation of the south was an- nounced. I understand that there Is an official report, according to which, the U.S. mili- tary assistants command in Vietnam is in possession of reliable evidence indi- cating that probably as many as 34,000 Vietcong infiltratorshave entered South Vietnam from the north between Jan- uary 1959 and August 1964. The report indicates that the majority of hard-core Vietcong officers and the bulk of specialized personnel such as communications and heavy weapons spe- cialists have been provided through in- filtration. Infiltrators, moreover, appar- ently make up the major part of Vietcong regulars in the northern half of South Vietnam. The infiltration from the north sup- plies the Vietcong with much of its leadership, specialist personnel, key sup- plies such as heavy ordnance and com- munications equipment, and, in some cases, elite troops. This information is derived from the interrogation of many thousands of Viet- cong captives and defectors and from captured documents. It is this hard core that has come down from the north that has provided the leadership cadres In all major in- surgent actions, including the series of sensational attacks on American Instal- lations. The scale on which Hanoi has been supplying the Vietcong insurgency was dramatically illustrated this weekend when an attack by an American helicop- ter on a ship off the coast of South Viet- nam resulted in the discovery of an enor- mous arms cache-almost enough, in the words of one American officer, to equip an entire division. The haul included a thousand Russian-made carbines, hun- dreds of Russian submachine guns, and light machine guns, and Chinese burp guns, and scores of tons of ammunition. There were also a variety of sophisticated land mines and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks. A Communist guerrilla who was captured In the action said that the ship which delivered the weapons had made six trips to bases along the South Viet- namcoast, dropping off supplies. Finally, we would do well to consider the fact that the general offensive launched by the Communist forces in Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an open call by Hanoi radio for assaults throughout the country on Vietnamese and American positions. The public confusion on the nature of the Vietnamese war stems in large meas- ure from the sabotage of the Communist member of the three-man International Control Commission set up to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva agree- ment. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive incidents of Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to large- scale military actions, had been pre- sented to the Commission. The Commis- sion, however, took no action because the Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 vvi~vi~iiJJ1V1~1-IL LU 01 lJ - SENATE 3269 A debate has been joined which is Mao Tse-tung remained confident that, ence and freedom of 240 million people worthy of the best traditions of the if he persevered, ultimately his enemies in southeast Asia and the future of free- Senate. would crack and he would emerge as dam throughout the western Pacific. I hope that the remarks I make today China's undisputed ruler. These are the reasons why we are in will contribute at least in some measure, There is no more cruel test of courage Vietnam. There is nothing new about to the further unfolding of this debate. and staying power than "the long war" them and nothing very complex. They Out of this debate, let us hope, will ulti- as it is waged by the Communists. Five have never been obscure. They have mately emerge the kind of assistance and years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing never been concealed. I cannot, for the guidance that every President must have to them. And if they detect any sign life of me, see why people fail to under- In dealing with vital issues of our for- that those opposed to them are flagging, stand them. eign policy. that their patience is growing thin or IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OP A NEGOTIATED What we say here may help to guide that their will to resist has weakened, the SETTLEMENT? the President. But in the final analysis Communists can be relied upon to re- The senior Senator from Idaho, and the terrible responsibility of decision is double their efforts, in the belief that vie- several other Senators who spoke last his and his alone. He must listen to the tory is within their grasp. exchanges which take place in this I disagree strongly with my colleagues Wednesday, repeated the proposal that Chamber. He must endure a hundred who have spoken up to urge negotiations. pose should of ould miseek atingiatthe ions bloodshed puin conflicting pressures from public sources, But if there is any way in which my Vietnam ten of avoiding din enlarge- seeking to push him in this direction voice could reach to Peiping and to Mos- Vie he r aWire an by some or. that. He must also endure the im- cow, I would warn the Communist lead- People inept of th that the ego. We are eoth by way f patience of those who demand answers ers that they should not construe the plo negotiations if ns reject the way of to complex questions today, and who debate that is now taking place in diplomacy and that if we reject jectiag now, we are in effect rejecting accuse him of not having made the Chamber as a sign of weakness it is, diplomacy. American position clear when he has in on the contrary, a testimony to our diplomacy. fact made our position abundantly clear strength. The proposal that we negotiate now on repeated occasions. Nor should they believe that those who overlooks the fact that there does exist And finally, when all the voices have speak up in favor of negotiations are the a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, ap- been heard, when he has examined all forerunners of a larger host of Ameri- Conference ethe participants of the Geneva the facts, when he has discussed all as- cans who are prepared to accept sur- o this g e4. The final think tion poets of the situation with his most render. Because there is no one here it is w this agreement or t I think trusted advisers, the President must alone who believes in surrender or believes in it worth while reading it for the REC- decide-for all Americans and for the capitulation. i believe the senior Sena- oaD and for our own recollection: entire free world-what to do about tor from Idaho made this abundantly Each member ? * undertakes to respect Vietnam. clear in his own presentation, in which the sovereignty, the Independence, the unity, No President has ever inherited a more he underscored his complete support for and the territorial integrity of the above-from difficult situation on coming to office, the retaliatory air strikes against North nterferences ntetheirdinternalaaffairs. any No President has ever been called upon Vietnam. to make a decision of greater moment. WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM? Since there is no point to negotiating At stake may be the survival of freedom. I have been amazed by a number of if it simply means reiterating the Gene-agreement, I cannot help wondering At stake may be the peace of the world. letters I have received asking the ques- whether those who urge negotiations en- I believe the United States can count tion, "Why are we in Vietnam?" or visage rewriting the agreement so that itself fortunate that it has found a Presi- < dent of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have it does not "guarantee the territorial in- to meet this crisis in its history. I also que qes stions even more t amazed me o met by have the same tegrity of the above-mentioned states." believe that, whatever differences we in u put b sophisticated this Chamber may have on the question members of the press. The history of negotiated agreements of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are To me the reasons for our presence in with the Communists underscores the with th fact that their promises are worthless the President el the ordeal of deci- Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find with through which he is now passing. it difficult to comprehend the confusion and that only those agreements have I have ugh that I have been dismayed which now appears to exist on this sub- validity which are self-enforcing or said by the rising clamor for a negotiaited ject. which we have the power to enforce. A settlement. In the yp of wag whch We are in Vietnam because our own report issued by the Senate Subcommit- tee the Communists are now waging against security and the security of the entire have on the Intnor t s e ve- et e-on which I the Communists although now wags who urge free world demands that a firm line be have t Union h has since i n es that us, I that, tho the first urge drawn against the further advance of the Soviet Union has since Ire tiesptind negotiation ne gotfe fear be e among mong the at- Communist imperialism-in Asia, in agree violated more than 1,000 treaties may outright would ould not be capitulation, tpos an s have and ued in this way Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe. agreements. The Communists have re- by the Communists.. We are in Vietnam because it is our rean armistice, t violated of the Geneva agreement The Vietnamese war, in the Commu- national interest to assist every nation, on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armis- nist lexicon, is described as. a "war of large and small, which is seeking to de- tice. national liberation." Its strategy is fend itself against Communist subver- based on the concept of what the Com- sion, infiltration, and aggression. There Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator [Mr munists call "the long This Is nothing new about this policy; it is a end. from He Idehohad hd h. o ped to pep to CHURCH] would here. peie s o s egy is premised upon the belief that the policy, in fact, to which every admin- tied on another matter, but hopes s to free world lacks the patience, the istration has adhered since the procla- stamina, the fanatical determination to motion of the Truman doctrine. get here later. persist, which inspires the adherents of We are in Vietnam because our as_ the The tiantar from Idaho has held of communism. It is based on the convic- sistance was invited by the legitimate a rational agreement as an example of tion that if the Communists keep on at- government of that country, a ratonal agreement our Cts, He nists tacking and attacking and attacking in We are in Vietnam because, as the dis- could that has served our interests. He any given situation, they will ultimately tinguished majority leader, the Senator illustration for. his ar gument picked a worse be able to destroy the morale and the will from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], pointed I can think of no more dramatic proof to resist of those who oppose them in the out in his 1963 report, Chinese Comrnu- than the Laotian armistice that agree- name of freedom. Dist hostility to the United States gents with the Communists are worth- China affords the classic example of threatens "the whole structure of our less, and that every time we try to escape the long war. It took 20 years for Mao own security in the Pacific." from today's unpleasantness by entering Tse-tung to prevail. There were several We are in Vietnam not merely to help into a new covenant with an implacable times during this period when his entire the 14 million South Vietnamese defend aggressor, we are always confronted on movement seemed on the verge of col- themselves against communism, but be- the morrow by unpleasantness com- lapse. But, even In his blackest days, cause what is at stake is the independ- pounded 10 times over. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE I traveled through southeast Asia just before the conclusion of the Laotian armistice. I talked to many people at that time. It is true that the armistice was favored by our Ambassador in Laos, and it ob- viously must have had the support of important members of the State Depart- ment hierarchy. But the personnel of our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok did not conceal from me their grave ap- prehensions over the consequences of such an armistice for Vietnam and southeast Asia. All of this I reported on confidentially upon my return. At that time, the Saigon government still controlled the situation throughout most of the countryside, although the 15,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it increasing difficulty. Our Embassy per- sonnel in Saigon expressed the fear that the conclusion of the Laotian armistice would enable the Communists to infil- trate men and material on a much larger scale and would result at an early date in a marked intensification of the Viet- cong insurgency. Needless to say, the apprehensions which they expressed to me have been completely borne out by subsequent developments. The Laotian armistice has served Laos itself as poorly-?6s it has served the cause of freedom in Vietnam. The Commu- nists have continued to nibble away at what is left of free Laos, in one aggres- sive act after another, so that by now they firmly control more than half the country, while their infiltress and guer- rillas are gnawing relentlessly at govern- ment authority in the rest of the country. In mid-1964, I asked the Library of Congress to prepare for me a study of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice agreement. The study which they submitted to me listed 14 specific violations up until that time. That was last year. There have been many more since then. Mr. President, I plan to insert into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a copy of the survey of Communist vio- lations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress. I earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho will take the time to study this before he once again holds up the Loatian armi- stice as a model for Vietnam. I should also like to quote from a statement made on March 30, 1963, by Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military commander who, as is common knowl- edge, had favored the conclusion of the Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement is significant because it illustrates how Communists will deal tomorrow with non-Communist elements that they are prepared to accept into coalition gov- ernments today. Referring to certain Communist stooges, Gen. Itong Le said: bespite their continual defeats, however, these people learned their lessons from their Communist bosses. * * * When the Prime Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to destroy the neutralist forces. They used tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to overthrow Colonel Ketsana. When these did not succeed, on February 12 they used an as- sassin to murder Ketsana. They also savage- ly killed or arrested all neutralist party members, and their bloody hands caused the death of many people. This was the statement of Gen. Kong Le, one of those who had pressed the hardest for the Laotian armistice when he saw what the armistice did to his country. Finally, I do not believe that the Lao- tian armistice has served the Interests of the other peoples of southeast Asia. I have in my possession a map of north- ern Laos showing areas where the Chi- nese Communists have been building roads that would give China direct ac- cess to the borders of Burma and Thai- land. The construction of these roads bodes ill for the future peace of south- east Asia. That they are intended for future military use is taken for granted by everyone in the area. So much for the example of the Lao- tian armistice. All this does not mean to say that we must not under any circumstances enter into negotiations with the Communists. I do not suggest that at all. It simply means that when we do so, we must do so with our eyes open and with a clear understanding of the ingredients re- quired to enforce compliance with the agreement about to be entered into. That is all I have ever urged. Moreover, there is a time to negotiate and a time not to negotiate. The demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to negotiate with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either case, the free world could have negoti- ated nothing but total capitulation. The situation in Vietnam is probably not as desperate and certainly no more desperate, than Britain's plight at the time of Dunkirk or our own plight at the time of Pusan. If we are of good heart, if we refuse to listen to the coun- sels of despair, if we again resolve that "we will never give in"-as Churchill put it-there Is every reason to be con- fident that a time will arrive when we can negotiate with honor and for a more acceptable objective than a diplomatic surrender. There are those who say that the whole of southeast Asia will, whether we like it or not, go Communist. These people are at least consistent in urging negotiations now. But anyone who be- lieves that we can negotiate now and not lose Vietnam to communism is de- luding himself in the worst possible way. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN VIETNAM it is human to oppose the cost of stay- ing on in Vietnam when American boys are dying in a faraway land about which we understand very little. I am conscious of this. I am sensitive to it. I share the troubled minds of all Sena- tors. But I am convinced that the great majority of those who advocate that we abandon Vietnam` to communism, either by pulling out or by "negotiating" a set- tlement, have not taken the time to weigh the consequences of defeat. In my opinion, the consequences of an American defeat in Vietnam would be February 23 so catastrophic that we simply cannot permit ourselves to think of it. This is truly an "unthinkable thought," to use an expression coined by the Senator from Arkansas. He was not applying it to this problem, I point out, but I find the words particularly apt in reference to Vietnam. GENOCIDE For the Vietnamese people, the first consequence would be a bloodletting on a genocidal scale. In the Soviet Union and in Red China, tens of millions of "class enemies" were eliminated by the victorious Communists. While it is true that there are some slightly more moderate Communist re- gimes in certain countries, Vietnamese communism Is characterized by utter disregard for human life of Stalinism and Maoism. What will happen to the more than 1-million refugees from North Vietnam? What will happen to the mil- lions of peasants who resisted or bore arms against the Vietcong. I shudder to think of it. The massacre of inno- cents in Vietnam will be repeated in every southeast Asian country that falls to communism in its wake, in a gigantic bloodletting that will dwarf the agony and suffering of the war in Vietnam. Those who urge our withdrawal from Vietnam in the name of saving human lives have the duty to consider the rec- ord of Communist terror in every country that has fallen under the sway of this merciless ideology, with its total disre- gard for human life. The total number of victims of commu- nism will probably never be known. Stu- dents who - have followed the Chinese Communist press closely claim that it can be demonstrated that Chinese commu- nism has cost the lives of at least 25 million and more, probably 50 million people, while students of Soviet commu- nism put the overall figure for the So- viet Union at approximately the same level. They point out that, entirely apart from the purges and mass killings, at periodic intervals and the forced star- vation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers, the reported death rate In the Soviet forced labor camps ran approximately 25 percent per annum In bad years, and 15 to 20 percent in good years. If one accepts the average population of the slave labor camps as 10 million over the 20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule, this would mean that approximately 2 million slave laborers died annually in Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20- year period. According to the Polish Government in exile, in London, the Soviets deported 11/2 million Poles to Siberia after they had occupied eastern Poland in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approxi- mately 150,000 were returned through Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Rus- sia. Another 300,000 drifted back after the war. More than i million never came back. Such was the mortality in the Soviet slave labor camps. All of this seems incredible to the Western mind. I remember, when I was in Nurembur, that when I first read the terrible sta- tistics about the mass killings by the Nazis, I could not comprehend them. If Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 14165 Approved For Release 2003110/15: CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE 3267 The greatest problem, as I have indicated before, of morale, is lack of mail,, or letters that come,. reading of depression, despond- ency, of problems or difficulties in the home that tend to lower .morale more than any other factor. Then, too, especially I would say a Word as chaplain here: I have seen many men-friends of mine that I closely felt a deep affection for-I have, seen them go down; I have conducted, memorial services for them,, Many times a question comes, "Is this vain or is this, waste?". , I have over and over evidence, that relatives often write and wonder if .this isn't a ridiculous world we're In. And I would say to you at home, as I have said to.our .men here, and as I believe they feel deeply, the men who have given their lives here have not given their lives in vain. The real price of life is always the price death to fine dedication. Our nation was built by men who loved their, principles-the truth for which they lived by much more than they loved life it- self, Our nation was built and shall only exist by our standing for the truth that we hold dear, and as we are here in this land, we are not only working and laboring and dying here for Vietnam but for America, for the world. bur world is a very small tiny village to- day, and we cannot have our neighborhood wars. We can only have a peace that can be a peace for all of us. I would say, let us dedicate ourselves, and you, to the task of liberty, and freedom, and human dignity for all people, and let us be proud of the men here, whether they are special forces out in the field; whether they be pilots-navigators in the sky; whoever, they might be. Most will come home-some will not-but let us be proud of them and let us remember them and dedicate ourselves to this task of The 1'I ESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morn- ing business is closed. INCREASE OF FUND FQR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER- AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK The PRESIDING OFFICER., Without objection, the Chair lays before the Sen- ate the unfinished business, which is S. 805. The-Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 8.05) to amend tlie.Inter- American Development Bank Act to au- thorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the ISOLATIONISM THE NEW ISOLATIONISM Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there has been developing in this country in recent years a brand of thinking about foreign affairs which, I believe, can aptly be de- scribed as "the new. isolationism," This internal phenomenon is, in my opinion, potentially more-?disastrous in terms of its consequence than the major external problems that confront us. .Its.background is a,growing national weariness with cold war burdens we have been so long carrying, a rising frustra- tion with situations that are going against us in many places, a long-sim- mering indignation over thg fact that our generosity and sacrifice have too often been met abroad, not just with indiffer- ence and ingratitude, but even with hos- tility and contempt. Its political base seems to be to the left of center, although it forms as yet a dis- tinct minority there. Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure- all is "neutralization." Its prophets include some of my col- leagues in the Congress, influential spokesmen in the press, and leading fig- ures in the academic world. Some are new volunteers in this cause of retrench- ment; they regard themselves as prag- matists. Others are old hands at Polly- anna-ism, those unshakable romantics who were disillusioned by Moscow at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillu- sioned by Mao when they discovered that he was not really an agrarian reformer, disillusioned by Castro when they learned that he was not a cross between Thomas Jefferson and Robin Hood-and who, having again dusted themselves off, now look for new vistas of adventure. If I may digress, let me say that I have always admired their durability. The manner in which they have survived, un- chastened, a whole series of intellectual Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to man's invincible confidence in himself; and their adeptness in avoiding discredi- tation, in the face of repeated catas- trophes and evacuations, must be ac- knowledged as one of the marvels of modern history-a triumph of self -recti- tude over reason. The basic premise of the new isola- tionism is that. the United States is over- extended in itsattei ptto resist Com- munist aggression around the world, overcommitted to the defense.of distant outposts, and overinvolved in the murky and unintelligible affairs of remote areas. The corollaries of the new isolationism are many. It is contended that we should deemphasize the cold war, and reverse our national priorities in favor of domestic improvements; that we should withdraw from South Vietnam; that we should cease involvement in the, Congo; that we should, relax the so-called .ri- gidity of our Berlin policy; that for- eign aid has outlived its usefulness and should be severely cut back; that our Military Establishment and our CIA, organizations that seem particu- larly suspect because they are symbols of worldwide involvement, should be hum- bled and "cut down to size" and stripped of their influence in foreign policy questions. In my judgment all of these proposi- t.lons have one thing in common. Each of them would strike at the heart of our national effort to preserve our freedom and our security; and collectively they add up to a policy which I can describe by no other name than "appeasement," subtle appeasement, unintentional ap- peasement, to be sure, but appeasement nonetheless. My purpose, this afternoon then, is to oppose these propositions and to enlist Senators' opposition against them-for the new isolationism is as bankrupt as the old. First of.all-totc -the main-preen- ise-I reject the assumption that the United States is overextended, or over- committed, or overinvolved. We are enjoying a spectacular growth in every index of national strength. Our population, our wealth, our indus- trial capacity, our scientific potential, our agricultural output, all are enjoying great upward surges. We were informed that our gross national product was again up in January, and the trend seems ever upward. Far from overextending ourselves in the cold war, we are actually in a period of declining defense budgets, of steadily lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced foreign aid, of one tax cut after another. Let me emphasize this: In every basic resource, we have greater capacity today than during the past 5 years; by every military or economic standard, we are stronger; and by every physical measure- ment, the percentage of our resources going into the cold war is lower. Why then should we talk of weariness or over- commitment? We are not even straining ourselves. We are actually pursuing today a policy not only of both guns and butter, but of less guns and more butter. So far as our resources go, we are Capable of indefinite continuation and even intensification of our present ef- forts, if need be. It is only our mental, and perhaps our moral, resources which seem to be feeling the strain. We would, of course, prefer to live in a world in which it were possible for us to have no commitments, a world in which we could devote all of our energies to the task of perfecting our society at home and enriching the lives of our peo- ple. But we must face the world as it is. And the basic fact of our world is that Western civilization, itself terribly rent and divided, both politically and philo- sophically, has been forced into a twi- light war of survival by a relentless and remorseless enemy. It is incontestable, in terms of peoples enslaved and nations gobbled up over the past 20 years, that we have not been holding our own. And each year, the world Communist movement is com- mitting more and more of its resources to the task of subjugating our allies, all around the perimeter of freedom. Against this background it is prepos- terous to maintain that we should reduce our effort and lessen our commitment to the great struggle of our century. Yet, according to Time magazine, it is the widespread sentiment of the aca- demic world that we have overreached ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter Lippmann, the well-known columnist, for whom I have great respect, says that "the American tide will have to recede." It has been argued that we would be in a "precarious situation" if we were at- tacked on several fronts. Of course we would, but does anyone believe that we can -solve the problem by abandoning our. commitments and defensive alli- ances? Would the loss of these coun- tries be any the less disastrous because they were given up undefended? .On the contrary, if we are not strong enough to honor our commitments to- day, then we should solve the problem, Approved For Release 2003/10/1? : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3268 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 2.3 not be reducing our commitments, but by becoming stronger, and by aiding our allies to become stronger. The defense of the free world rests on a very delicate balance. The key ele- ments in that balance are American power and American determination. If we lack the power to maintain that bal- ance then certainly all is lost. If we reveal that we lack the determination, if we, for Instance, allow ourselves to be pushed out of Vietnam, such a humilia- tion may indeed be the second shot heard around the world; and a dozen nations might soon throw in the sponge and make whatever accommodation they could with an enemy that would then seem assured of victory. Fortunately, at the present time we do not lack the power to carry on the de- fense of freedom. Our power is at its peak and we have the capacity to in- crease it vastly if necessary. It is our spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up. Four years ago, after a visit to south- east Asia, I said on the floor of the Senate: If the United States, with its unrivaled might, with its unparalleled wealth, with its dominion over sea and air, with its heritage as the champion of freedom-if this United States and its free-world allies have so di- minished In spirit that they can be laid in the dust by a few thousand primitive guer- rillas, then we are far down the road from which there is no return. In right and in might, we are able to work our will on this question. Southeast Asia cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost; it cannot be saved unless we will it to be saved. This problem, seemingly so remote and distant, will in fact be resolved here in the United States, in the Congress, in the ad- ministration, and in the minds and hearts of the American people. The passage of 4 years has not dimin- ished my belief in this course. If the main premise of the new isola- tionism is erroneous, then surely the lesser premises are fraught with terrible danger. It is argued that we should de- emphasize the cold war and turn more of our resources to domestic welfare. The annual congressional revolt against the foreign aid bill grows more violent and successful .each year, and the ' administration, forced to yield, now sends foreign aid requests 40 percent below what it solemnly declared 2 years ago to be the minimum figure tolerable for free world survival. And a small but growing band of Senators have begun offering each year amendments making across-the-board percentage cuts in our defense budget, cuts not directed to any specific econ- omy, but rather to a principle-the prin- ciple that we should be spending less on defense and more on welfare. Here, in my judgment, are sure- fire formulas for defeat. Where are the victories in the cold war that would justify such a reversal of priorities? in what global trouble spots are there lessened tensions or im- proved postures that would make this plausible? I can see a lot of cold war areas where things are looking worse- but very few where things are getting better. . More effort, more sacrifice-not less- is the need of our time. And I speak as one who doesnot disparage the need or the importance of domestic improve- ments. As a credential of this I recom- mend to Senators my scorecard, com- piled last year by the ultraconservative Americans for Constitutional Action, which asserts that I voted right only 13 percent of the time-one of the worst records, alas, In the Congress. But I say to you that if our foreign affairs are going badly, no aspect of Internal welfare is secure or stable. And if we cope successfully with the great problem, the cold war, no internal prob- lem can long defy solution. Our first national priority is and must ever be the survival of our country and our freedom-and if the 20th century has taught men anything, it is that sur- vival and freedom cannot be purchased on the cheap, in a discount store or a bargain basement. But our situation is such that we can meet our needs both at home and abroad-not as handsomely as we would prefer, but well enough. This I take to be the objective of the Johnson adminis- tration. The war on poverty and the struggle against tyranny can go hand in hand, if our vision be broad. Twenty-five years ago, our country, comparatively new and untried among the great nations of the earth, through passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described by Winston Churchill as "the most un- sordid act of recorded history," em- barked irrevocably upon the path that has brought us to our present posture in history. Through that act, we affirmed the preservation and expansion of liber- ty as our highest goal; we acknowledged that freedom was insecure everywhere so long as tyranny existed anywhere; and we assumed the burden, and the glory, of being the champion and defender of man's highest aspirations. Since that embattled hour, when the light of freedom was but a flicker in the dark, our journey across the pages of his- tory has been fantastic and unprece- dented : tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes and naivities, but heroic in its innova- tions and commitments, prodigious In its energy and power, gigantic in its gen- erosity and good will,, noble in its re- straint and patience, and sublime in its purpose and in its historic role. We have not realized the high goals we set for ourselves in World War II. But we have preserved freedom and national independence in more than half the earth; we have prevented the nu- clear holocaust; we have restored West- ern Europe; we have helped friend and foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and stability; we have launched a world peace organization and have kept it alive; we have offered the hand of friendship and help to the impoverished and backward peoples of the world if they will but take it. It may be said of our country today, as of no other in history, that wherever people are willing to stand up in defense of their liberty. Americans stand with them. We cannot know at this hour whether our journey has just begun or is nearing its climax; whether the task ahead is the work of a generation, or of a century. President Kennedy said, in his Inaugural Address, that the conflict would not be resolved in our lifetime. The Chief of Staff of the Army recently told the Congress that it might well take 10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam - alone. And Vietnam is only one symp- tom of the disease, the epidemic, we are resisting. Against this somber background, how foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of abandoning the Congo to Communist Intrigue, of slashing the defense budget by 10 percent, or of any of the other ir- responsibilities of the new isolationism. VIETNAM It is against this background that I take up today the question of Vietnam, which has been the favorite target of those who urge withdrawal and re- trenchment. Over the past several months, a num- ber of my most respected colleagues have taken the floor to urge that we get out of Vietnam or that we enter into negotia- tions over Vietnam. The propriety of our presence in Viet- nam and the validity of our position has been challenged. It has even been sug- gested that we are the real aggressors in Vietnam. The war has been called "Mc- Namara's War." It has been suggested that we more or less ignore Asia and Africa and concentrate on Europe and the Americas. I have listened with growing dismay to these presentations-and with all the more dismay because of the respect and affection I have for the Senators who made them. If I have not risen to reply to my colleagues before now, it was not be- cause Vietnam was a new subject to me, but because I felt that their arguments required the most carefully considered and most painstakingly prepared reply. I had visited most of the countries of southeast Asia In early 1961, and I have spoken a number of times on the floor of the Senate on the subject of Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since my return. I have endeavored to keep up with the situation in that part of the world as best one can do by reading the press and official publications. But I realized that there were important gaps in my information because the press cov- erage of Vietnam was, with a few out- standing exceptions, weak and in some cases completely misleading. I have, therefore, sought to fill these gaps by correspondence with friends in Vietnam, both Vietnamese and American, and by conversations with Americans who have served in Vietnam in various capacities- some of them for long periods of time. The senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE] and the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] on the one side, and the distinguished minority leader, the junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. Dn uSEN] and the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] have already spoken eloquently on the need for standing fast in Vietnam. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965. Approved For 1 : - 7B 0300170003-8 _6 4253 Improvement of classroom instruction. We believe it would weaken the exercise owned farms are the very backbone of rural These devices and materials have been shown of local leadership and the functioning of America. They operate most of the land to cur subcommittee in its hearings on the self-government in resource conservation and are the first custodians of most of our Elementary and Secondary Education Im- and development. Further, the proposal water. provement Act. creates the prospect that soil and water con- The proposal also invites serious questions Of particular interest, I believe, will be servation district governing bodies may be about certain Commitments of the Secre- the 45-minute presentation by a master asked to function as collection agents for tary of Agriculture. In long-term contracts teacher working for the first time with a the Federal Government, with farmers and ranchers in special pro- fifth-grade class from the District of Colum- If adopted, this proposal would, in our grams, such as the Great Plains conservation bia school system using a variety of the new judgment, break faith with State and local program the pilot cropland conversion pro- materials and equipment to strengthen the governments. State legislatures and county gram, the Secretary has contract commit- e' fectiveness of his,own teaching. governments over a quarter of a century ments under long-term agreements to fur- Cordially, have been steadily building up their finan- nish technical assistance for applying con- WAYNE MORSE, cial contributions to the total soil and water servation practices set forth in the agreed Chairman, Education Subcornmitee, conservation. effort on privately owned lands, plan of operations. With the understanding that the local- Adoption of the Budget Bureau proposal CONSERVATION RESOLUTIONS State-Federal team effort would be main- would jeopardize the morale of Soil Con- LUTIONS tamed as a team effort for the universal servation Service employees. It would con- Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on good of the Nation and all its people. stitute a vote of diminishing belief in the February 18 I called the attention of Adoption of the revolving fund proposal importance and purpose of the agency. The would treat American landowners unfairly. Soil Conservation Service today is recognized my colleagues to the fact that a conser- It would charge American landowners for as the finest scientific agency of its kind in vation battle is underway in our land. technical assistance which the Federal Gov- the world for supplying technical assistance The soil and water conservation dis- eynment now provides free of charge to the for complete natural resource planning and tricts ,(Jfr.. America have organized a people of many foreign nations. development, acre by acre, farm by farm, nationwide effort through their national Under this proposal, farmers would assume property by property on individual land- association to counteract the adminis- still more of the town and city responsibility holdings, watersheds, and whole communi- tration's proposal that Congress enact for soil and water conservation. Soil con- ties. This standard of excellence could be servation, flood control, and water develop- lost. legislation to authorize a, revolving fund ment contribute to the well-being of all the A revolving fund would increase total through which soil conservation dis- people because they depend on our limited conservation costs. A collection system out- tricte, farmers, ranchers, and other land- supplies of soil and water for their daily re- side the accepted tax collection structure owners would pay the Federal Govern- quirements of food, water, and a productive would have to be devised. Thousands of ment $20 million in 1966 to help finance countryside. farmers would need more financial assistance a part of the cost of technical assistance We believe adoption of this proposal would to pay for technical aid-or else give up the from the Soil Conservation. Service. severely retard water conservation and de- oportunity of taking part in soundly de- velopment work in America. Problems of veloped conservation programs. I announced then that I have joined water shortage, floods, pollution, and sedi- We believe future generations would suffer the soil conservation districts in opposi- mentation must be met first within the con- most if the soil and water conservation effort tion to the proposed revolving fund, fines of each local watershed. Water comes of the Nation is slowed down and dissipated. because it would not be in the public from rain and snow which falls primarily on To recover from a slowdown begun in our interest. Some of my colleagues have land surfaces. The farmers and ranchers time, another generation would be forced to asked me for more details regarding this who control our farms, range, and woodlands take 11th-hour extreme actions which would also are in a position to control the move- be costly in terms of money damaging in proposition. ' ment and protect the quality of the water terms of our basic institutions, and nsatis- Such details were set forth in resolu- falling on their lands. factory in terms of the resources themselves. tions adopted by the National Associa- If adopted, the revolving fund proposal Further, we resist the prospect that the tion of Soil, and Water Conservation would slow down the effort to reduce water leadership of the Nation in the 1960's should Districts at their ,annual convention. In pollution. The conservation needs inventory be marked as the one which turned its back Portland, Oreg., on February 9. I think of the Department of Agriculture showed that on the national soil conservation program so my colleagues will find them of great erosion is still the dominant soil problem on constructively undertaken by Franklin D. interest. I ask for unanimous consent two-thirds of the Nation's land area. Soil Roosevelt and the leaders of the 1930's, eroded from watershed areas pollutes rivers For these several preceding reasons, the to have the NACD resolutions printed and streams, and clogs harbors and bay areas National Association of Soil and Water Con- at this point in the RECORD. with sediment, servation Districts will: There being no objection, the resolu- Moreover, adoption of this proposal would I. Lead a nationwide effort, and assist the tions were ordered to be printed in the slow down work that is contributing to the Nation's 3,000 local soil and water conserva- RECORD, as follows: good appearance and beauty of the American tion districts, to defeat the proposed revoly- RESOLUTION 1 countryside. Green valleys, clear waters, ing fund; and contoured fields, well-managed forest, lush 2. Request the Administrator of the Soil PROPOSED REVOLVING FUND pastures, and developed watersheds are basic Conservation Service to undertake promptly The Bureau of the Budget has proposed to the beauty of the countryside. Gullied a nationwide study-district-by-district and that Congress enact legislation to authorize fields and muddy streams detract from the State-by-State-to evaluate the impact of a revolving fund through which soil conser- beauty of America as much as auto grave- the Budget Bureau proposal on the conser- vation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other yards. vation and resource development work on landowners would pay the Federal Govern- If this proposal were to be, adopted, we the privately owned lands of the Nation, and merit a part of the cost of technical assist- believe It would act as a major drag on the the ensuing effect on the well-being of the ance from the Soil Conservation Service of development of recreational facilities on pri- American people. the Department of Agriculture used in plan- vate lands. The Soil Conservation Service ning and applying soil and water conserva- type of technical assistance for recreational RESOLUTroN 2 tion practices on the land. development, on rural lands is not available SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS If adopted, this proposal would seriously anywhere else, even for hire. The workload in soil and water conserve- Slow down the soil, and water conservation Without question, establishment of the tion districts involving the planning and effort on the privately owned lands of the revolving fund would slow down needed ad- applying of soil and water conservation prac- Nation. We believe it would result in an justments in land use. In 1964, technical tices continues to increase each year. Dis- estimated decrease of 40 to 50 percent in the assistance guided more than 1 million soil tricts are being requested to supply increased annual application of conservation practices and water conservation district cooperators soil survey information to farmers, agricul- and would reduce the quality of the prac- in converting 2,500,000 acres from crop use tural workers, land appraisers, planning com- tices applied, to less intensive uses such as grass and tree missions, credit agencies, educators, econo- This proposal, if adopted, would reverse production. mists, and other public officials. Districts are a policy of 30 years standing. In 1935, Con- In addition, we should recognize clearly also assuming new responsibilities in pro- gress began a policy of providing technical that adoption of this proposal would hit grams for conservation, resource develop- assistance from the Soil Conservation Service hardest in economically depressed areas. ment, Land-use adjustments, and economic Without charge to farmers, ranchers, and Much of what can be done to alleviate pov- development in rural America. other private landowners willing to cooperate erty in rural areas is bound up in the im- These new district responsibilities are in scientific, farmwide conservation pro- proved use of soil and water resources. Soil based to a very large extent on farm conserva- grams on their properties. and water conservation is basic to economic tion plans which farmers develop in coopera- We believe adoption of this proposal would development and family farm stability in tion with local soil and water conservation serve to undermine landowners' confidence rural areas, districts, or on plans. developed by organized in the Federal Government's consrvation We believe adoption of this proposal would groups of landowners. purpose and its desire for an effective conser- penalize most the small farmer and the poor Meanwhile, the cost of technical assistance vation partnership with landowners, farmer who can least afford to pay. Family- has continued to increase as the national Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved Fo l es ~a /1AQ~11 ~ ~P6~ Afff R0003001700031ebruary 23 economy has grown. Federal funds appro- priated to the Soil Consevation Service have been inadequate to furnish sufficient techni- cal assistance to meet the growing obliga- tions in districts. The National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts therefore requests the Congress to appropriate additional funds to the Soil Conservation Service to provide needed technical assistance, watershed plan- ning, watershed protection, and service to the Great Plains conservation program during fiscal year 1966. More specifically, we ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate $115,040,000 for the conservation operations in fiscal year 1966. We urge the Congress to kill the proposed revolving fund through which soil conserva- tion districts and farmers and ranchers would make $20 million of payments to the Soil Conservation Service for technical assistance. We ask that $750,000 of new funds be ap- propriated to provide technical assistance staff to 25 new soil and water conservation districts expected to be organized during fis- cal year 1966. We further ask that an additional $10,- 187,000 of conservation operations funds be appropriated to meet the current backlog in staffing needs of 1,518 man-years of technical assistance in soil conservation districts. Watershed planning: We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate $10 million for watershed planning in fiscal year 1966. This $41/4 million increase over the budget estimate is needed to permit a step-up in the rate of watershed planning because nearly 1,200 communities are on the wait- ing list for planning assistance. Watershed protection: We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate $85 million for watershed pro- tection in fiscal year 1966. This would permit beginning construction on approximately 100 new watershed project starts instead of only 70 new starts as pro- posed in the budget estimates. Flood prevention: We ask the Congress to appropriate at the budget estimate level of $25,417,000 for flood prevention in fiscal year 1966. This has been a current and adequate level of flood prevention operations for several years. Great Plains conservation program: We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate $20 million for the Great Plains conservation program in fiscal year 1966. The increase over the budget estimate is needed to help meet the backlog of nearly 5,000 farmers who have made application for help but are still waiting for assistance. Resource conservation and development: We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate at the budget estimate level of $4,303,000 for resource conservation and development in fiscal year 1966. This would permit the continuation of operations in the 10 pilot R.C. & D. projects now underway and would permit the author- ization of planning on 10 more pilot R.C. & D. projects in 1966. We urge soil and water conservation dis- trict supervisors and watershed directors to inform their Senators and Representatives of these needs and request support for such appropriations. RESOLUTION 3 AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM FONDS All citizens of the Nation benefit from ac- tions taken to conserve and develop natural resources, including the basic resources of soil and water. We recognize that the economy of agri- culture is such that farmers cannot finance, wholly, all the costs of planning and apply- Ing the conservation practices that are needed. The agricultural conservation program of the USDA encourages, assists, and gives in- dividual farmers an incentive, through shar- ing the cost of applying conservation meas- ures, to proceed withthe work of conserving natural resources. The NACD, therefore, opposes the pro- posed $100 million budget reduction in the advance atuhorization for the agricultural conservation program in 1966. We ask the Congress to maintain the authorization at the 1965 level in order to maintain progress toward the conservation of natural resources. RESOLUTION 4 CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS IN WATERSHED PROJECTS Under provisions of the Great Plains con- servation program, landowners may enter into long-term contracts with USDA where- by they adopt a conservation plan for their entire unit and agree to make land- use changes, apply conservation practices, and establish desirable cropping and use systems, all according to an agreed upon time schedule. The USDA, for its part, agrees to provide technical assistance and cost-sharing to further adoption of this farmwide conservation plan according to the time schedule. We urge an amendment to the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act author- izing the use of similar contract arrange- ments within approved watersheds. We reconnend a time schedule of from 3 to 10 ye rs for completion of essential con- servati n measures on whole farms covered by s ch watershed contracts. PETITIONS BY CORNELL UNIVER- SITY STUDENTS ON U.S. POLICY ON VIETNAM Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last night I lectured at Cornell University. At the conclusion of the lecture, a group of students handed me some petitions in opposition to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the RECORD at this point with the i_ames. There being no objection, the petition and names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: We, the undersigned- members of the Cor- nell University community, strongly protest the bombing and strafing attacks on North Vietnam by the U.S. Government on February 7 and 8, 1965. In spite of official statements to the contrary, we believe that such actions can lead only to the escalation of a war that the United States should not be fight- ing In the first place; especially since we are supporting regimes disliked by and detri- mental to the Vietnamese people. We hereby join with the growing num- ber of citizens who have voiced their opposi- tion to the United States presence in Viet- nam. We demand that the U.S. Government withdraw from Vietnam now. Larry Faulkner, Fred Rosen, Mark Som- mer, Douglas Hainline, Lincoln Berg- man, Daniel Morrison, Charles F. Nagel, Janet A. Schleicher, Stephen R. Kellert, Bruce Bridgman, Martha Grin- nell, Mr. and Mrs. Christopher S. Kinder, William E. Schleicher, Joyce Stark, Jill Ann Borkey, Michael Astor. Mark Leider, Carol Newman, Tim Hallt, Dan Segrim, Steve Fankuchen, George M. Alexis, Richard Englesteen, Thomas D. Hill, Ralph Schwartz, Abby Can- field, Ronald A. Schneider, James P. Snyder, Bruce E. Kapl#n, Site J. Estey, Murray Cohen, Les Jacobs, Serina Weaver, Fred Weaver, Brenda Milder, Eugene C. Holman III, Mary Dolores Nichols, John Canfield, George R. Price, Sander Helihsby, David Kirkwood, Stanley Perlo. Gary If. Deissman, Helen Chuckrow, Michael Dossily, Ruth Goldwarren, R. Stewart Jonas, Kenneth G. Rhuess, H. Carol Woodcock, Philip L. Gilman, Martha E. Trae, Nancy Sorkin, Adam J. Sorkin, Richard Peiser, Richard Bren- blatt, Hal S. Kibley, Joe H. Griffith, Nypar Feldner, Peter Long, Stephen LeRoy Doreen Brenner, Robert Gech- feld, Eric Lee Geytman, Katherine Porter,-- David Leseohier, William, Schecter, , Dainoz Fineman, Lawrence Jones, Jonothan Sabin, Robye Cooper, Henry Balsen, Judith S. Kessel, Rich- ard Unger, James W. Boghosian. Ann Suitow, Richard Epond, Helene Brosuis, Natalie Kent, Steven Gel- ber, Marie Gould, Peter SalweSteven Faigelman, Walter J. Wilie, James R. Willcox, Mike Smith, Susan Higgins, Jo Hailperin, N. E. Dukin, G. Epoty, Claire Eisenhandler, Gail Boesel, Thomas C. Barnt, Tatman Walter, Jerry Sobel, Paul Epstein, William Duell, Bruce Bennett. Michael Rudetsky, Peter L. Gale, Na- thaniel W. Pierce, Mark L. Klein, Paul Seidel, David Rader, Steve M. Hand- schu, Christy Reppert, Helen Jones, Peter Dormont, Malcolm Campbell, Judy Russell, Martha N. Simon, Joe H. Griffith, John N. Vournakis, Karen Vournakis, Jeanne Duell, Carol V. Kaske, and Henry Daniel. PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENTS FOR GI BILLS Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, this year the cold war GI bill, S. 9, is re- ceiving the greatest support that it has ever had from the Members of this body. In addition to having 40 cosponsors, the high caliber and earnestness of testimony by several Senators before the Subcom- mittee on Veterans' Affairs demonstrates that opposing forces will have a harder time blocking the consideration of this bill than they have ever had before. I would like to remind my colleagues that the late President John F. Kennedy was an earnest supporter of readjust- ment assistance for our veterans. In Senate Document No. 79 of the 88th Con- gress, a compendium of speeches and statements made by John F. Kennedy during his service in Congress, there are two statements concerning readjustment assistance. The first of these is in sup- port of the Korean GI bill, and the sec- ond recommends raising the allowances paid under the then existing GI bill. I ask unanimous consent that these two statements be inserted at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the state- ments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE KOREAN GI BILL, H.R. 7658, JUNE 5, 1952 Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to be recorded as supporting fully and vigorously the Korean GI bill, H.R. 7656, now under consideration. Close to a million Americans have par- ticipated in the Korean struggle. They are justly deserving of the same consideration that the veterans of World War II were accorded. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 1965 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 3257 wedge in the establishment of compulsory Government medicine for all, with its attend- ant bureaucracy, redtape, and tendency to promgte mass-production, assembly-line pro- cedures in which quantity takes precedence over quality and both suffer. The State chamber believes in a realistic, practical social security system, enlarged and strengthened as the Nation can afford it. There should be continuing study of the many still-unsolved problems involved so that any further legislation in this field may be based upon careful appraisal of experience with the actual operation of the program. Prominent among these unsolved problems are that (1) no consistent relationship ex- ists between amounts of tax contributions of individuals and the amounts of benefits they ultimately may receive;. (2) the pro- gram is one of sharply rising costs for the next several decades and a major portion of costs of pension rights being earned now is being postponed for future generations to bear, and (3) the cost-deferment character- istic hides from public consciousness the fu- ture cost impact of obligations being incur- red currently. There is need for basic decisions correcting OASI financing weaknesses. In any event, future law changes increasing OASI costs should be accompanied by commensurate tax increases in order to create a clear public understanding of the cost impact. Every effort eds to be made to find and put into efecttlthe best possible solutions VIETNAM Mr. IYOMINICK. Mr. President, I have recently had the pleasure of reading the February 22 issue of the Washington Report issued by the American Security Council, containing an article entitled "Why We Can't Negotiate Now." This article deals very clearly with the situation facing us in South Vietnam, and refutes one argument after another sug- gesting negotiation in Vietnam. It points out very logically and clearly the reason why we must stand firm in that area. The axtIcle is of real value be- cause it answers some points which have been made. One of the cries we hear constantly, in Congress and outside, is that we cannot win militarily. One of the points made in the article is that every guerrilla war engaged in between World War II and now has been either lost or won, not just stalemated. Dependent on the issue of whether it has been won or lost has been the whole course of freedom in those areas. The writers of tl_e article come to the conclusion that this war can be won, that the President's policy should be firmly supported, and they go further with respect to possible support from Red China and the Vietcong. I do not want to indicate that I am necessarily in favor of or in opposition to the last paragraph of the report, but the entire article points out so many factors with which we have been dealing that I ask unanimous consent that the entire report-which is only four pages-- be included at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, as follows : WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW A great swirl of climactic events has fol- lowed President Johnson's order to give con- Crete effect to his repeated warnings to the Communists to cease their aggression against South Vietnam. The difficult but extremely necessary decisions haveat last been taken. Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere. of crisis is created by the outraged cries and threats of international communism. Just as inevitably, the calls for a negotiated set- tlement are redoubled on the free world side of the line. Many well meaning people find it difficult to understand why President Johnson does not at least accompany his military action by an offer to enter into im- mediate negotiations to end the Vietnam war. Undoubtedly, the President would like nothing better-nor would any other person of good will-if negotiation presently offered a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this pledge which we must honor if there is ever to be any hope of lasting peace in the world. But in considering negotiation the Admin- istration is faced with a series of very un- pleasant facts, which are either unknown or forgotten by the general public. One set of facts concerns the inherent nature of guerrilla wars. The military tac- tics and political purposes of such wars are not subject to stalemate or compromise. For example, much of the current argu- ment for negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a military victory for either side is im- possible. This is begging the question. Since World War II, when the guerrilla war came into vogue, they have invariably been won or lost. Either the guerrilas win in the sense of achieving a take-over of the country or government in question, or else they are militarily defeated, at least to the point where they are reduced to a harmless rem- nant. There have been no exceptions to this rule. The guerrillas triumphed completely against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the French in Algeria and Indochina (except here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather than risk U.S. Intervention), against the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against Batista in Cuba. They were decisively de- feated In Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and-apparently-Venezuela. When- ever negotiations were held it was only for" the purpose of ratifying the guerrilla vic- tory. In the majority of cases this was not of a decisive military nature. The French were never beaten in Algeria and even after Dien Bien Phu they could have held on at least in Hanoi and Saigon. The Dutch could have held Indonesia for some time as could the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But either the will to resist was broken or else a reevaluation of national interests caused them to consider the area no longer vital. CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS On the basis of all past experience, there- fore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam can only have the purpose either of confirming a Communist decision to abandon the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an American decision to admit defeat and withdraw. A cease fire would be meaningless. It would only leave the guerrillas In place and free to use the interval to run in more rein- forcements and arms until they were ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all Com- munist guerrillas behind the 17th parallel, as is sometimes suggested, woud be fine, but would of course be tantamount to a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. President Johnson has no Intelligence as yet to lead him to suppose that the Communists are ready for anything of the sort, On the contrary-and this is the second set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situa- tion-the Communist world remains unani- mous in its declarations that the only basis for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is the complete withdrawal of American forces, which is tantamount to a complete American defeat. These statements might be written off as mere propaganda bargaining were they not backed up by a great deal of background information coming out of Communist China, which indicate that she believes time and events are very much on her side. Since the second hypothesis for negotiations is that they must include Communist China, her attitude is obviously decisive to the out- come. Here are some of the more public facts which the President must consider: 1. Between December 21, 1964, and January 4, 1965, the first sesison of the Third Na- tional People's Congress was convened in Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders of Communist China. In addition to state- ments by Marshal Ho Lung boasting that the Chinese people's army has been con- siderably enlarged, supplied with up-to-date equipment, and is now supported by power- ful naval and air force units, the Chinese published on December 30 an abbreviated version of Premier Chou En-Iai's report on Chinese domestic and foreign policy. The speech reflected great pride and self- confidence resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the very serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, resulting from the failure of the great leap forward, and the intention of trans- forming China into a world power with the most modern industry, agriculture, tech- nology, and defense within the shortest pos- sible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou pledged support to all-and he listed each one-revolutionary movements and centers of unrest. He declared that Peiping would consider negotiation with the United States only after it had given up Taiwan and would deal with the United Nations only when it had thrown out Nationalist China. Chou further asserted that the east wind would prevail over the west wind, and that favorable conditions for such an outcome are the storm centers of world revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The speech forces the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are not only conscious of their power, but are also prepared to use it to support wars of liberation wherever possible in a continuing struggle against imperialism. 2. As a concrete example that Chou meant what he said and that the "falling domino" theory in southeast Asia was not a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimulated imagi- nation, Peiping formally announced on Feb- ruary 5, 1965, the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the pro-Western Gov- ernment of Thailand and eradicate American influence there. For some time now, Com- munist agents have been infiltrating into Thailand in order to form the nucleus for subverting that country. The Thais have instituted energetic countermeasures which have so far kept them under control, but it is foolish to believe that Thailand would or could resist a Communist takeover backed by China if South Vietnam is lost. The Chinese do not even wait until one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming their plans to take over the next one. 3. Mao Tse-tung stated in a January in- terview with American journalist Edgar Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead to war between China and the United States so long as China is not invaded. He also said that the war in Vietnam would last only another year or two because the South Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers and the Americans will lose interest. While this statement greatly reduces the likelihood of any Chinese retaliation againt our raids on North Vietnam. It gives no comfort to those urging negotiation. If Mao really be- lieves that the war will be won by the Com- munists in another year or two, then it is Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3258 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 23 obvious that he looks on negotiation only to confirm this fact, which is another point he actually made in the Interview. Unless he can be shaken in this conviction there is no possible basis fdr negotiation with China. MUST STOP REDS It is easy for those without responsibility to call for negotiation, as though this were the automatic panacea for all the world's ills. But the U.S. Government is faced with the kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as much more grim data of a secret nature, which cannot be shrugged off, This is why it has consistently rejected calls for a new Geneva Conference and why even the British have supported this stand. It is accepted as axiomatic by most policy- makers that under present circumstances negotiation could lead only to an American defeat. Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not sim- ply for reasons of foolish national pride, but because the Chinese have made it so very plain that Vietnam is only part of a much wider plan for aggrandizement and trouble making. We are helping Vietnam because It is in the interest of freemen everywhere that the Communist challenge be halted at this point. The President Is trying to create a new psychological situation in Asia. His decision to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only one which offers any hope of success. It has-been long overdue and is all the more difficult for that reason, but it is still not too late. W. Johnson should be warmly con- gratulated for his action. If we carry through our policy with resolution there is still an excellent chance that we can win the Vietnam war at least in the sense that the Communists are induced to call off the war as a bad business and either withdraw the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease outside aid completely and leave them to their fate. Only then can there be a genuine basis for a negotiation which will ratify this decision. The Communists will not come willingly or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Pre- vious U.S. vacillation has led them to count the Vietnam war as already won. It will probably take time and a great deal of pun- ishment before they call off the war. But they are practical men and eventually bow to reality. What Is essential now is that the President be given the time to make the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow without being continually badg- ered to negotiate. The calls for negotiation only make the task harder and bloodier be- cause it encourages the Communists to think that we may still falter in our purpose. It is still a Chinese article of faith that world and domestic pressures can be mobilized to thwart any resolute action by the U.S. Gov- ernment. Many past follies have confirmed them in this viewpoint. TURNING POINT IN HISTORY A great experiment Is underway-the ex- periment to see whether we can successfully contain Communist China on the mainland of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to our children are hideous to contemplate. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive, the ambition, and the eventual 15otential to rule the world. The days through which we are now passing will mark one of the great turning points of world history. The United States has very strong trumps to play In this contest. If North Vietnam is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice herself in a continuing effort to win South Vietnam, there is yet one final arrow in our quiver. We can threaten China with the one punishment she would most fear: The destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial bombardment. If forced to carry out this threat, we would at least prevent or delay the looming menace of a nuclear-armed China. FRANH J. JOHNSON, Foreign Editor. Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MON- TOYA in the chair). The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION DOM- ICILIARY AT THOMASVILLE, GA. Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there was published in the February 7 edition of the Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union an excellent article concerning the op- eration of the Veterans' Administration domiciliary at Thomasville, Ga., one of the facilities which it was announced Is scheduled to be closed. This article clearly shows the domicili- ary's value, both to the veterans it serves and to the community in which it is lo- cated. It is my hope that the operation of this facility will not be discontinued, and that the Veterans' Administration will reconsider its plans. It is indeed regrettable to me that our veterans should suffer because of a pur- ported economy move by the administra- tion, although it must be kept in mind that our disabled veterans must be dom- iciled and provided home and medical care, and that if this facility is closed, they will have to be moved and cared for at some other location. I fail to see any economy in such a move. As pointed out in the article, there are both human and economic factors to be considered, and I hope they will not be disregarded by the Veterans' Administra- tion. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have this article printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: HUMAN, ECONOMIC ELEMENTS HINGE ON VETERANS' UNIT (By Carey Cameron) THOMASVILLE, GA., February B.-Both the human and the economic elements are of concern to those who will be affected if the Veterans' Administration domiciliary here Is closed. Thomasville and Thomas County residents and businessmen are concerned about the economic element. Counting payroll, other expenditures and non-VA jobs affected by the VA payroll, the area may lose about $6 million annually, says chamber of commerce Executive Vice President Lloyd Eckberg. The members who live at domiciliary (they are called members, not patients, stresses J. W. Legg, assistant domiciliary director), their few relatives and the American Legion are concerned with the human element-- the displacement of 765 residents of the home, 26 percent of which are indigent. It is possible that everything will turn up roses on both accounts. Lockheed of Georgia, a corporation that does 98 percent of its business with the Government, will submit a bid February 16 for the right to operate an Urban Job Corps Training Center under the Office of Economic Opportunity programs. W. A. Pulver, president of the corporation, has told the Thomasville-Thomas Chamber of Commerce that the school will be located at the domiciliary site if Lockheed gets the contract. Revenue here from the school could reach $7 million annually, Lockheed estimates. Plans are being worked out to transfer domiciliary members to various combination hospital-domicilary centers in other loca- tions. But Lockheed may not get the train- ing center contract and Donald E. Johnson, national American Legion commander, has charged that there Is no assurance, new homes will be found for the veterans. On January 12 the VA announced plans to close 11 hospitals, 16 regional offices, and 4 domiciliaries. This plan would eliminate 3,201 domiciliary beds. Although medical care is offered in clinic and infirmary-type departments, domiciliaries are not hospitals. "They are domiciles (homes) for veteran; who have disabilities preventing them from earning a livelihood," Legg explained. Wher. a domiciliary members needs hospital care he is taken to a veterans hospital. Veterans at the Thomasville facility are usually sent to Lake City, Fla. In return, patients recovered enough to no longer need hospital care are sent back to domiciliaries to make way for new patients:. The other three domiciliaries to be closed are at Clinton, Iowa, in Commander Johnson's home State: White City, Oreg., and Bath, N.Y. The Bath home is a VA center, offer- ing both hospital and domiciliary care, Legg explained. At Thomasville, the domiciliary has an. an- nual budget of $1,800,000. Members' income from social security, pensions and other com- pensation totals $1.5 million. The capitr:l assets are about $3.5 million, Legg said. An evacuation plan, subject to approval by the central VA office in Washington, calls for all members to be moved out by March 31. The staff of 161 employees would be gore and the operation closed by June 30. Members not discharged or transferred to hospitals by March 31 would be moved o centers at Biloxi, Miss., Bay Pines, Fla., Dub- lin, Ga., and Mountain Home, Tenn. On January 13 admissions to all receiving domiciliaries were frozen. The Thomasville facility has 800 beds but operates on a planned average member load of 760, leaving a margin of up to 50 beds. On January 14 it had 765 members of which 193 were Flor- ida residents and 263 were Georgia residents. World War II veterans, a group whose need for domiciliary care is growing now that tb.eir average age has reached 45, comprised 56.84 percent of'the residents while World War I veterans made up 33.28 percent. There ware lesser numbers of Korean and peacetime vet- erans, Six residents are Spanish-American War veterans. Other facilities also have a margin between total beds and caseload and it is figured t'aat this margin plus natural turnover will make room for those being moved from the clos- ing facilities, Legg explained. The Thomasville domiciliary was built during World War II as Finney General Ifos- pital. Like most military facilities of ;hat day its exterior appearance is crude but in- teriors are comfortable. About 50 percent of the rooms are private or semiprivate and a main dining room ac- commodates 408 men who are fed in 2 shifts. Light recreation, such as shuffle- board, is available for those able to take part. Some can play the game but others are in wheelchairs. After the war, the old general hospital was used for 1 year as a VA hospital before the domiciliary was opened officially December 1, 1948. Legg, who works under Administrator E. C. McDaniel, has been here since 1948. When news of the closing was announced, Thomasville Mayor Roy Lilly and Frank Neel, immediate past chamber president, went to Washington to see what could be done but were given assurance the order would not be revoked. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3316 Approved For Relea@Op V,41(j W-?Re 044 R J00170003-8 February of which Is own ~d b P y lttsburgh Plate Glass Mr. ASPINALL, Mr. Speaker, reserv- authorizing 150,000 tons' of lead and Co. and 20 percent by British Titan Products ing the right to object-and I shall not 150,000 tons of zinc to be fed into the CO, Ltd To be located near the site of the world's object-I think I speak for all of us who market at this time-just when they are largest proven reserve of rutile, the new re are Interested in the welfare of the lead- beginning to feel the benefits of the im- finery will be in full operation and is. expected zinc industry when I say that we appre- proved market position that lead and to end a worldwide shortage of the important Mate and co mm d h en t mineral by latenest year. e distinguished zinc have enjoyed recently-the industry chairman of the full committee, the gen- leaders have, in my opinion, taken a very From the refined rutile, other firms will tleman from South Carolina, the Honor- constructive titanium oxides widel e produce sd t i u o approach a id, in the over whiteness and opacity m- able L. MsrrnEL Rrvzas, and the able gen- all national Interest, agreed, and Per- part p sty paints and tleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Part- suaded others to also used in the manufacture of paper, rub- ber. and floor coverings. SIN], who is now handling the legislation the 150,000 tons each of lead and zinc Titanium metal, whose strength-to-weight on the floor, for their action in schedul- that is provided for in H.R. 1496 and ratio is nearly twice that of alloy steels, is Ing prompt hearings on legislation de- H,R. 1658. also highly temperature resistant and is an signed to make limited amounts of lead In the circumstances, we should be important construction material In aircraft and zinc available from the stockpile in hesitant to cloud the Issue at this time and space vehicles. order to fill our current domestic re- giving a Current world production of rutile is only quirements for these vital materials, and by additional consideration amounts o of the release c, some 170,600 to 180,000 tons per year.. The bringing the bills before this body so ex- In any this s connection, lt m of lead point and out that zinc. new refinery will have initial productin of let n tens per year. ped ti usly. s o , in my opinion, Materials end equipment for the plant will As know Mr. S it makes no difference, I have a whether the additional amounts that come from various areas of the United states, dual interest In the welfare of the lead- with th might be authorized for release would e bulk coming to Modern storage, zinc Industry: Lead and zinc are pro-or by Inc., which operates a 1,20,000-square-foot duced In various areas of Colorado in- be authorized for sale t for use of k-eral warehouse at Dundalk Marine Terminal un- eluding the district which I represent; in agencies, because the, use oP stock- der lease from the Maryland Port Authority. addition,the Committee on Interior and Piled material by a Federal agency dis- Among the Baltimore share of the move- places a like amount of material that melmt will be five 60-ton diesel engines, in- Insular Affairs, of which I have the honor would otherwise come through normal cluding three to generate electricity at the to be chairman, has jurisdiction over market channels and therefore consti- plant and two to operate pumps on a by- mining interests generally. We, there- tutes an inroad on the normal sources draulic dredge used to mine the mineral. fore, are deeply concerned to assure a of supply. At the same time, I do not vIlle A dry mill will be shipped from Jackson- continuing supply of all minerals and think that It makes any p - erecmaterials for a. 40-home village to be metals while, at the same time, providing Ter articular diP erected at the plant site are m ing throu h n g e ce whether the material to be' re - g other and for maximum development of domestic leased comes from one inventory or the Port Everglades and the dredge marine equipment will be floated down the Sources, th O er and if, as consuming Miasi/+ ippi a_ River and and towed weIn the support such circumstances of lead and zinc _4i-74- -- _.some of the to Africa: stances existing today, Industries have indicated, there is a pos given permission to address the House for disruption or adverse effect on the do- pile, rather than in the national stock- ___r mining it seems only appropriate to provide 1rrlinute and to revise and extend his re- _ g industry. My colleagues STOC piles Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr, Speaker, I to ascertain the quantity of a material needs a to assure that these consumer am not prone always to agree with the that Is required at a particular moment needs are e met satisfactorily. Mr. Speaker, I understand that the Washington Post, but I found a very pro- and the quantity that can be brought General Services Administration, under vocative editorial in this morning's into the market artificially and still not the leadership of Mr. Maurice J. Con. Washington Post with regard to the sit- have an adverse effect on our own mar- s have from she outset backed the ef- hazing that the stockpile was not Created 1U? segmments or the lead-zinc industry, forts of the President of the United States for the purpose of providing reserves for developed disposal plans that are ac- ch is ra- normal domestic consumption and tha+. ceptable to the industries: Tha- in stestepping up the activity whi - the activi In s c d - c ilo aaa cor iaui ingly, any release from the stock- ' " and see no a - d at and zinc ?rrerings or a portion reason to withdraw that support from pile becomes an artificial means of sup- bereleased and zi under nc the legi the legl 1ationthat beeffore him at the present time, plying market demand as contrasted slaore Some controversy has existed between with the normal channels, which consist you, to be followed by further consulta- Members of this body and Members of of a combination of domestic production tion by General Services Administration the other body, as well as among Mem- and imports from foreign sources. with other affected Federal agencies as bers of this body, as to who supports the Parenthetically, let me call to the at- well as with segments of the industri es President in his action in Vietnam and tention of my colleagues the fact that 32 before disposing of the balance of the who does not, I wish to make it clear Members of the House have joined me tonnages that are made available for once again that I support the action of in sponsoring legislation that is now be- disposal, the President in Vietnam; and he is de-, fore the Ways and Means Committee for Not only do I want to compliment Mr. serving of the, unanimous support of the the purpose of establishing flexible quotas Connell for his performance in the de- d t i an un zuau in this country and at por ty to comment! him for the co- AUTHORIZING THE DISPOSAL OF the same time assure a continuing do- operation . he has exhibited with our ZINC FROM THE NATIONAL mestic supply of these metals during pe- committee and with industry In general STOCKPILE riods of industrial expansion as well as in connection with the various disposals Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask for our national security in times of of metals and minerals that have been unanimous consent for the immediate emergency, accomplished by the GSA. considera n the bill the 1496) to Releases from the stockpile are, there- The Committee on Interior and In- onsid ire the sale, without regard t6 the fore, temporary measures and should not sular Affairs has, as I indicated a mo- authorize the sal period prescribed, of be treated as affording any long-range merit ago, been concerned with these 6-proposed in be eriodsed of solutions or stability. Those of us in matters over a long period of time. We the posed zinc to pursuant Congress who have responsibilities for have been continually following the Stock PStra Fag o cti. and posedal mining Industries have viewed the legis- specific questions involved In connectiion The Clerk read the title of the bill. lction before you today In this context. with lead and zinc, including mine pro-' The producing industries have likewise duction as well as the level of producers The SPEAKER. Is there objection to studied the le i l ti i g s a on n this context. and consumers stocks. the request of the gentleman from Mas D t sachusetts? Approved For Relea ;d - @"4116RU d01 00OWactors and existing eon t Oris. urge favorable c n id o s er ,pital attendants had arrived with an emer- turned as active and productive members of - Gross had still not heard from the Amster- ambulance. our society if they could be given proper dam Welfare Center. gency Despite her objections (she asked to go to rehabilitation, and the social guidance that This did not happen last week or the week Roosevelt Hospital, a private hospital she is part of scientific rehabilitation work. The before-when the department of welfare was had stayed at 4 years before when she costs involved are immense but what we terribly undermanned because of its strike of underwent minor stomach surgery), she was could save, both socially and economically, 7,000 workers. be -when operating apart- taken to Knickerbocker Hospital, a private by doing what we should for our senior eiti- mT ti hwas appened last tofall hospital in Harlem. tens, is also immense." After a preliminary examination, doctors Mayor Wagner made this statement in strength. learned that she had suffered a stroke and October of 1962. Yet today, more than 2 Telephone calls by the hospital worker and severe dehydration brought on by diabetes. years later, the problems of New York's aged by her relatives invariably found the Welfare p They then told her relatives--a grandson and aging remain critical. and no closer to ouCenter's sdid mhanage es busy. Ann d, fin all it was whenata and two cousins-that Knickerbocker, the solution, to go tugh, , hospital she had been brought to, did not Medical care is perhaps the greatest prob- f)rst impossible to locate the application or have any ward space to accommodate her. lem for the aged of New York City but hous- the worker assigned to handle it. At this point, her grandson telephoned ing is not far behind. Despite the construe-' While she waited, Mrs. Gross was moved Roosevelt Hospital and was told by some- tion of 2,866 apartments designed and priced half a dozen times from one room in a ward one in emergency admissions that there was for the elderly (another 6,897 are either un- to another, at one point spending several room there and an ambulance would be sent der construction or In planning), more than nights in the hallways. to Knickerbocker to pick her up. 50,000 elderly single New Yorkers still live The longer she stayed-and the longer she After a second ambulance ride and a see- in substandard dwellings with no place to waited-the more she felt she was being ig- ond examination at Roosevelt (which pro- go, no one to turn to, and little hope for the nored by the hospital's doctors and nurses. duced the same details as the earlier one), future. Whether right or wrong, she was convinced she was told that her grandson had been mis- What is it like to be old, poor, and dis- that, as one of the few white, English-speak- informed-and that Roosevelt also did not abled in New York City? ing patients in the ward, she was being have any ward space available. WHERE TO GO-NURSING HOMES INADEQUATE discriminated against. While she waited alone and unattended in 's take a closer look at Anna Gross, a Yet, to an outsider, a visitor to the wards a small room off the emergency entrance for Let New Yorker for all but the first 10 of her 84 of Metropolitan Hospital, discrimination, nearly 2 hours, one doctor finally got around the death of her son in 1951, even if it does exist, is only a minor prob- to trying to find a bed for her somewhere. years. Since lam facing the hospital's patients. For many Because there is no daily master list of avail- the widow had lived off his insurance and savings in a small apartment on West 62d of the patients-white, Negro, or Puerto able bed space in New York's hospitals, the Street, between Columbus and Amsterdam Rican-the attitude and caliber of the staff doctor had to call each hospital individually. creates a far more considerable hardship. Though city records later showed that Avenues. Unable to collect social security because SICK PATIENTS-IGNORED SY NURSES there were more than 3,000 unused beds in of a technicality (unaware that the law had Typical was one afternoon last fall. New unableYork sofi find itals that day, the dcwas been amended in 1959, making her eligible, Despite six buzzer calls from six different unable a bed for the pged w woo man she had failed to file in time), she had re- patients all seeking assistance in the same until his seventh call-to Metropolitan Hos- lied on a series of elderly boarders. ward, two registered nurses and five lesser pittl. Despite her Increasing age, she had re- female employees continued talking in their .m., than Its sine until d been 7 p picked mup by teh- mained in good health, physically sound and room at the entrance to the ward. When a hour singe she lisp been pick the 84-year- mentally alert. And, despite one grandson visitor told them that one patient had vom- first , o d emergency ambuly set that in hand several cousins who lived outside the ited all over herself and needed assistance, and man was finally settled in a hospital city, she had remained totally self-sufficient the head nurse said it would be taken beded woman b received 84eyement. and self-sustaining, spending her leisure care of. (an In just l day, become a 84-year-old of Anna the Gross city-and ours socializing with her aging neighbors Fifteen minutes later, though five of the wias) had makes s iso a victim could and watching television. women including the nurse in charge re- have ed to much aend is that it disabled New ew This was her life until last July. it will mained in the room talking, not one of the Yrhappened t any old d and with limited resources. In fact, it had never be the same again. six patients had been attended to. Re- Yorker already happened to thousands of aging Within 6 weeks after her admission to minded by the visitor, the head nurse New Yorkers before her. Metropolitan Hospital, her diabetes was fully snapped, "We heard you the first time, Mister. It is rarely easy to be old and it is never under control and, despite paralysis of one We'll take care of it when we have time." easy to be poor in any city. But, for those arm and leg due to the stroke, she was con- It was another 10 minutes before the six both old and poor, life in New York City sidered mentally alert enough and physically patients were attended to. today has become a nightmare-where, for- able enough for discharge. "I don't mind dying of old age but I don't gotten by their families, the aged find them- The problem, however, was where could want to be killed," Mrs. Gross told her rela- selves increasingly ignored by the city. she go. She could not return to her apart- tives. "Please get me out of here." TOO LITTLE FOR TOO FEW, TOO LATE ment because she no longer could take care Her fears and her complaints are by no of herself. She could not afford a nurse means unique. Other patients at Metropoli- In the last census, 813,827 New Yorkers- because her savings had dwindled to nearly tan and the other city hospitals have suf- more than the total population of San $1,000. And she could not move in with fered for years because of the city's failure Francisco or Washington, D.C.-reported her relatives because they did not have suf- to attract and satisfy top personnel. they were 65 or older, with 229,663 above 75. ficient room for her. This does not mean, however, that all city This represents an increase of 749 percent Obviously, she needed to be discharged hospitals and all city hospital employees are since the turn of the century compared to a into. a nursing home, but in New York City, Inferior. That is clearly untrue. It does 126-percent increase for the city's total pop- when a patient's savings are limited and she mean, however, that many patients and the ulation. Today, 1 in every 10 New Yorkers is unable to care for herself, this is no longer city, which is paying for most of them, fre- is 65 or older and, by 1970, more than 1.5 an easy matter. quently are not getting their money's worth. million residents are expected to fall into Oddly enough, the majority of nursing Though a welfare investigator finally did this age group. homes in this city, both public and private, get around to checking out Mrs. Gross' case, What makes the aged problem so critical are not equipped to take care of patients she was able to leave Metropolitan Hospital is that this group's income and opportuni- who need 24-hour medical attention or who only when a relative found a vacancy for ties have not kept pace with its increased are unable to take care of themselves. And her in the Kingsbridge Heights Nursing longevity. Of New York's aged families, some of the others-particularly the private Home in the upper Bronx. Yet-even in her 102,712 had incomes of less than $3,000 in homes supported by charitable organiza- transfer-the aged woman was to receive a 1960. And, of the 144,127 living alone or tions-lose interest when they learn a patient further example of a city hospital in action. with nonrelatives, 70 percent earned less or his relatives are unable to make a con- One morning, a few days before she left than $2,000 a year. tribution at the time of admission, the hospital, someone (no one seems to re- . Despite an annual city outlay of more It is not at all unusual for a patient to be member exactly who it was) moved her from $300 m than ed, he Con for institutional care for accepted (which means he is acceptable but one room to another. During the moving, the aged, the he Cs Committee ou Aging, then must wait on a waiting list of indefinite the woman's dentures, which had been in a a branch of the Community Council of length) while, at the same time, a relative glass next to her bed, disappeared. Though Greater b Yorke, axpayer that unfoeru- is told by an official of the charity home that, she repeatedly asked for them during the th nately is amounts both 'tt too axpay little er for or too the few, elderly, too because of his income, he should contribute next few days, she received neither the this amounts to a specified amount to the home. teeth, nor an explanation. date.' " "We all know that there are many aged What happens If he doesn't is always left A STATISTIC-CITY WOULD LIKE TO FORGET and aging persons who need some kind of unsaid. Finally, after a relative wrote the hospital care including preventive care, who are not Two months after she was ready for dis- supervisor demanding an explanation, the now getting it," said Mayor Robert Wagner. charge and nearly 5 weeks after a hospital hospital replied in a letter several weeks later "There are many who could remain or be re- social caseworker had filed for welfare, Mrs. that the dentures apparently had been lost. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For g? Mt5A ]RBP67 iR000300170003- ,ebruary 2$ The hospital was extremely sorry for the in- because of his inability to speak or under- convenience and added that, if the patient stand Spanish, he has even greater difficulty wanted to file a claim, she should do it with In understanding their answers. Yet even the department of hospitals. when he has been able to communicate with The letter did not bother to say what the his patients, he has learned that It is almost woman was supposed to do until she re- impossible to help them. ceived funds from the city (which could drag Unfortunately, this tragic lack of under- out endlessly) to replace the dentures. Mrs. Gross remained at the home In the upper Bronx for 5 weeks sharing a small room in a private home with four other aged women. For $95 a week, which she paid out of her remaining savings, she received her room and her board (because she had no teeth she could eat only a bland diet). The weekly doctor's visits and medication were extra. She liked the home but, when an opening came up in a larger home with medical treatment included, she decided to move. Now, in another home in the Bronx, she has turned over all but $120 of her savings (which the city welfare people have per- mitted her to keep for burial expenses). She had been assured by administrators of the home that she now has nothing to worry about. They have told her that when her funds run out the department of welfare will continue to pay for her upkeep at the home. Her relatives have told her that they will not contribute to her upkeep and now, be- cause of the welfare strike and the an- nouncement that only emergency new cases will be accepted until it is settled, she doesn't know what will happen to her. Like a great many other older New Yorkers, Anna Gross has given up. In just 7 months, she has learned that the city and the people who work for it have little time and less interest in her problems and what becomes of her. To her relatives, who cannot afford to sup- port her and don't have room enough to take her in, she has become something of a burden. To the people who run the home she now lives in, she has become little more than a means of obtaining welfare funds from the city. And to the city Itself, she has become a statistic, a number the administration would like to forget. To New York, a city which has failed to provide adequate services and a good life for its young and middle-aged citizens, the problems of the aged may seem secondary. But to a city in which the aged population has increased sharply and will continue to increase in the next decade, it Is a problem that no longer can be ignored. ,NEW YORK CITY IN CaIsxs-CITY HOSPITALS: A PRODUCT Or BUREAUCRACY (By Claude Lewis and Barry Gottehrer) Isaiah Lee is a 30-year-old Formosan who can speak and understand Chinese, Japanese, French and English. He cannot, however, speak or understand Spanish. For most New Yorkers, this linguistic limi- tation would present no special problem. But Isaiah Lee is an exception. He is a social caseworker, employed by the department of hospitals, at Manhattan's Metropolitan Hos- pital where the majority of the patients are Puerto Ricans who speak and understand only Spanish. It is his job to obtain detailed biographical and financial information from each of 150 patients assigned to him, make applications for welfare and then help the patients pre- pare for care after discharge. EXPEDIENCY The fact that he is bright (he holds a master's degree from the University of Ne- braska) and dedicated hasn't made it any easier for him or his patients In the 7 months he has worked at the hospital. standing and communication Is not limited to Isaiah Lee and his patients at Metropoli- tan Hospital. Today, it permeates almost every level of life in New York City where the government has consistently failed its workers and has Increasingly forgotten about its citizens. Metropolitan Hospital, located on the out- skirts of Spanish Harlem at 97th Street and First Avenue, is certainly not the worst of the 21 city hospitals. It is not the best either. Yet 1 month there-as a worker or as a patient-is enough to convince anyone that the city, despite a talented and diligent com- missioner of hospitals, is clearly not keeping pace with its problems. According to the department of hospitals' personnel section, the only requirement for Mr. Lee's position as social caseworker is a master's degree in social casework from an accredited college. NO TEST REQUIRED No test, no language proficiency and no depth interview are required, according to a department spokesman. Since the job pays $6,290 a year to start and reaches a maxi- mum of only $7,490 after approximately 6 years, the city cannot afford to be particu- larly selective,in its hiring. Top personnel, if they accept a lower-rung city job, rarely stay long before moving elsewhere, generally into private industry. Seated in a narrow fifth-floor office within walking distance of the four wards he must cover daily, Isaiah Lee is surrounded by paperwork and buried by bureaucracy. Dozens of applications for welfare are piled neatly in one corner of the desk, many or them still unanswered though he had for- warded them to one of the city's welfare cen- ters weeks and even months before. Mr. Lee no longer is surprised by the wait- ing. Since there is no master list showing exactly which nursing home might have a vacancy. Mr. Lee is faced with three choices: He can telephone each of the city's more than 50 public and private pursing homes each day (which he simply doesn't have time to do). He can rely on relatives and friends (if they are willing) to find a home for the patient. Or, overwhelmed by the workload, frus- trated by the redtape, and distressed by the lack of progress, he can simply give up. Like a great many other people working for the city, secure in their jobs regardless of their performance, he can become immune to any- one's problems but his own. Isaiah Lee has not yet given up but it is not because he did not have considerable reason. "We have many people here who are too old and senile to do much for," he said. "It's the others who are still alert, who don't belong in a hospital any more but have no place to go. You want to help them and you try to help them. But things move very slowly, very very slowly. You want to do more but you can't," It is not that the supervisors at Metropoli- tan Hospital are unaware of these problems. They are. But, for them, the problems and frustrations are so far ranging that they stagger the imagination. Once located on Welfare Island, Metropoli- tan Hospital moved to its present location in 1967 and today, with 1,000 beds (the same Because of his heavy accent, most of his people living and working in an area that patients (even English-speaking ones) have stretches from river to river and from 42d difficulty understanding his questions. And, to 116th Streets. "Our No. 1 problem is overcrowding," says Dr. Ferdinand Piazza, administrator of the hospital. "On occasion, we have to treat pa- tients in an outpatient clinic when they should be in the hospital. It's what we call a calculated risk. There just isn't any place to put all of the people who should be in bed in a hospital with proper nursing, quiet, fa- cilities required to bring them back to a healthy state. We could use another 1,000 beds here in order to function at a good and proper level to meet the needs of our com- munity." NURSE SHORTAGE In 1964, Metropolitan Hospital treated 505,995 people, an average of nearly 1,400 a day, in its outpatient clinic with a staff of only 68, including only 36 nurses. To take care of more than 24,000 inpatients each year (only Bellevue and Kings County have more), Mrs. Ruth Rose, senior super- visor of nursing at the hospital, says she needs 297 registered nurses. Right now, Met- ropolitan has only 74 registerednurses on its staff. "I would rather have 297 registered nurses than $1 million," says Mrs. Rose, who has been forced to hire 219 practical nurses (less educated, less experienced, and not permitted to perform many duties a registered nurse can) to try and make up for the shortage. "It's hard to get people to work nights, be- cause of attacks by men in this area. It's not safe to walk the streets here at night. We complain and get some relief, but we need more police in the area." Because of the limited pay scale, the over- crowded, understaffed conditions, the diffi- culty in accomplishing anything, and the lo- cations (many are in or nearby slum areas), the city hospitals have been forced to settle for second best in personnel. Yet the prob- lems at Metropolitan and other city hospitals are by no means limited to the quantity and quality of its personnel. Typical is Metropolitan's request for a gen- erator. Several years ago, when the city suf- fered a massive power failure, the city gov- ernment decided that each of its hospitals must have generators just in case the city's power should ever fail again. Today, nearly 4 years since the major city power failure, Metropolitan still Is without its generators. The reason for the delay? Redtape. A HOPE "We expect them soon," said Dr. Piazza, and smiled. Despite its $15 million budget (only Belle- vue and Kings County are larger), there is still a daily shortage of towels, sheets, and more vital equipment. "Sometimes it takes a full year to get a piece of equipment you really need," says Dr. Piazza. Though the hospital personnel and admin- istrators are frustrated and disillusioned by the city's inability and indifference to their problems, it Is the patient who inevitably must pay, with his health and occasionally with his life. (Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to ex- tend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous mat- ter.) [Mr. MULTER'S remarks will. appear OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT (Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to ex- tend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 Approved For ReW BS$IaM& IC IRDR 7BAQ4 p0300170003-8 . Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, all of us today are concerned about the situa- tion in Vietnam. The President is being criticized from all sides. I believe, pow- ever, that there is 'far more widespread support for the President's approach to the problem than appears from the pub- lic media. I have developed this thought in an open letter to the President, which I am sending him today. It reads as follows: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If one were to judge from the public media, one might suppose that the general line you have been follow- ing in Vietnam has little support in this .country. Most speeches, articles or ads at- tack you for being either too hard or too soft. On the one hand, we have the Goldwaters, the Nixons, and the Joe Alsops, calling for full-scale war against North Vietnam and -maybe Communist China. On the other hand, we have all kinds of people, including especiallly many liberals, who are either urg- ing a pullout from Vietnam or who keep telling you to negotiate, negotiate, negotiate. While they may not be so outspoken, the Majority of the American people refuse as you 'do to accept an oversimplified either/or position. While they are miserably unhappy about the situation (as I am sure you are) and while they may wish that a cease-fire were in effect and negotiations for a viable settlement .weere going on (as I am sure you do also) , they do not want you to let the Communists have their way in Vietnam and they do not want you to widen the war. Hanson Baldwin's article in time mag- azine for February 21, which I take to be a statement of the views of many Pentagon military men, is a brilliant exposition of a policy the American people in my view simply will not support. Mr. Baldwin calls for a korean-type war in Vietnam, fully rec- ognizing the likelihood that Red China would probably be drawn in. Pointing to the Cuban precedent, he predicts that the So- viet Union would not respond with nuclear attacks, and he may be right, but to bomb North Vietnam's vitals, would the American people be prepared to accept the risks they were prepared to accept to get Soviet missiles, aimed at our vitals, out of Cuba? I doubt it. The threat in Vietnam to our security is too indirect, too remote, and the benefits to be reaped are too tenuous and uncertain. Stand fast against the "hawks," Mr. Pres- ident. The American people are with you. At the same time, as the polls show, ma- jority sentiment in this country is not for a pullout from Vietnam. There is wide rec- ognition of what such a decision would do to the morale of our friends around the world who are resisting communism-in Thailand, in the Philippines, in West Berlin, in Venezuela-and to their confidence in us. (I found last summer, even in countries such as Burma and India, people hoping that the United States will not withdraw and leave southeast Asia completely unprotected against the Chinese Communists.) But what about these more and more fre- quent appeals to you to negotiate? Do these perhaps reflect American public opinion? After all, Americans are great believers in the conference table. Here again, I suspect that your position is more widely understood than the flood of published comment might indicate. The question surely is not as simple as many of the appeals imply. It is not whether to ne- gotiate, but under what circumstances, with whom, with what end in view, and with what prospects of success. As traders, Americans can understand that. They might understand it better if you could spell it out for them, but they know you can't lay all your cards on the table. It may well be, for example, that you have concluded that any settlement in Vietnam, in order to be viable, must be part of a package involving the settlement of many broader issues affecting the future of the Far East, but that you do not feel in a position today to indicate your thinking as to the outlines of such a broader settlement. To those of my fellow liberals who keep urging a cease-fire and negotiations, I should like to suggest a few questions worth ponder- ing: Why should Peiping be interested in serious negotiations over Vietnam now (except for our virtual surrender) ? If North Vietnam might have greater reason to call off the fighting, what can we do to widen this po- tential area of disagreement between Hanoi and Peiping? Can we work with the Soviet Union in this area? What steps can we take to strengthen the position of the South Viet- namese Government among the people of South Vietnam? If a neutralization of all Vietnam could be achieved, as suggested by De Gaulle, what guarantees could be provided against a Laos-type erosion of the agree- ment? In light of the absence from the U.N. of both Vietnams and mainland China, and in light of the permanent members' veto power in the Security Council, what else can the U.N. realistically do beyond providing a peacekeepers presence if an agreement is reached? What is the necessary relation- ship, if any, between a cease-fire and nego- tiations (remembering that in Korea we ne- gotiated for many months while the fighting continued)? You, Mr. President, are well aware of these questions. They represent just a few of the complexities involved, complexities which too often seem ignored by the simple pleas to negotiate. Last fall Senator Goldwater was rightly accused of oversimplifying interna- tional problems. Some of your liberal friends who today are criticizing you, Mr. President, might do well to consider whether they are not oversimplifying from the other end of the political spectrum. I hope and believe, Mr. President, that you agree with the view that in the long run military measures alone cannot solve the problems of Vietnam and that a new political settlement must be our objective. I hope and believe that you and your ad- visers are giving great thought to the pos- sible nature of such a settlement and to the possible means for achieving it. What you can tell us about all this would be welcome and, I am sure, reassuring. But, whether you can tell us or not, the world knows that you are no jingoist and that you desperately want to preserve the peace. (The general reaction overseas to our recent retaliatory bombings confirms the widespread trust of the United States and its motives.) The world also knows that, remembering Munich and the Sudetenland, you realize that ap- peasement is not the way to preserve the peace. There is nothing easier in this complex world of ours than to frame false either or imperatives. More often than not, such ex- pressions represent a kind of immature im- patience. A measure of our maturity, as we perforce carry the responsibilities of the most powerful nation on earth, may well be the degree to which we are willing to accept the burdens of long-term sacrifices and re- sist the false appeal of quick solutions that may well represent disaster. That you, Mr. President, will meet this test is the convic- tion of this Congressman and, I believe, of the majority of the Congress and the Ameri- can people. Respectfully yours, JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, Member of Congress. APPORTIONMENT QF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mr. ICHORD (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend 3333, his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, article V of the U.S. Constitution reads in part as follows : The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the sev- eral States, or by conventions In three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Con- gress. Last December I met in Chicago with leaders of the Council' of State Govern- ments and it was later decided that the council would urge the legislatures of the various States to petition the Con- gress to either call a convention or sub- mit an amendment to the Constitution for ratification. Last week the Missouri Legislature finally passed the resolution proposed by the council and is one of the 16 States to have done so. It should be noted that the wording of the resolution is identical to House Joint Resolution 64 which I have introduced. Those of us who have introduced resolutions on this very important constitutional issue are determined that the Congress should have the opportunity to vote on a con- stitutional amendment in the very near future. To this end we have formed a steering committee to press for imme- diate consideration. As a member of the steering committee I intend to take all action available to us under the rules to reach a vote as early as possible. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the body of the RECORD and include a copy of House Concurrent Resolution No. 2, as passed by the Missouri General Assembly by a vote of 109 to 45 in the House of Representatives and 21 to 11 in the Mis- souri Senate: HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2 Be it resolved by the house of representat- tives (the senate concurring), That this legis- lature respectfully applies to the Congress of the United States to call a convention for the purpose of proposing the following article as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States: "ARTICLE -- "SECTION 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit any State which shall have a bicameral legislature from apportioning the membership of one house of such legislature on factors other than population, provided that the plan if such apportionment shall have been submitted to and approved by a vote of the electorate of that State; "SEC. 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall restrict or limit a State in its determination of how membership governing bodies of its subordinate units shall be apportioned. "SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legis- latures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its sub- mission to the States by the Congress; be it further "Resolved, That if Congress shall have proposed an amendment to the Constitution identical with that contained in this reso- lution prior to June 1, 1965, this applica- tion for a convention shall no longer be of any force or effect: be it further Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8 3334 Approved Foe &f4&441 1 JtE P6T $*6R000300170003 bruary "Resolved, That a duly attested copy of this resolution be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate of the United States, the Clerk of the House of Representa- tives of the United States, and to each Mem- ber of the Congress from this State." THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROG- RESS (Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous. matter.) Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the charter that emerged from the meeting of the American Republics at Punta del Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961, is destined to be remembered as one of the most comprehensive and significant documents of the 20th century. This charter, which established the Alliance for Progress, is only 31/2 years old. It is widely known but not widely understood. For I believe that in the years to come, when the Charter of Punta del Este, has had the chance to be sufficiently used and tested to achieve the purposes for which it was designed, it will earn its place alongside the Magna Carta, our own Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the Constitution of Mexico, and the other great instruments of freedom and social justice. One of the noteworthy achievements of the charter is its recognition of the role that organized labor must play in any national program of social and eco- nomic development. The preamble to the charter states: We, the American Republics, hereby pro- claim our decision to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated eco- nomic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty. The charter itself expands upon this lofty goal and sets out the basic require- ments for economic and social develop- ment. According to chapter II of title II: 1. Participating Latin American countries agree to introduce or strengthen systems for the preparation, execution, and periodic re- vision of national programs for economic and social development consistent with the prin- ciples, objectives, and requirements contained in this document. Participating Latin American countries should formulate long- term development programs. Such national development programs are supposed to incorporate self-help ef- forts directed toward "improvement of human resources and widening of op- portunities by providing adequate re- muneration for work performed, encour- aging the talents of managers, entre- preneurs, and wage earners; providing more productive employment for under- employed manpower; establishing effec- tive systems of labor relations, and pro- cedures for consultation and collabora- tion among public authorities, employer associations, and labor organizations." Labor participates in the Alliance pri- marily through the American Institute for Free Labor Development-AIFLD- a nonprofit organization supported joint- ly by unions, employers, and govern- ment. It has operated as a school to train Latin American labor leaders and as an arm for the planning and con- struction of social projects in Latin America. The fact that the Alliance has helped build 200,000 new houses is a partial tribute to the success of this phase of the program. In the February 1965 issue of the Boilermakers-Blacksmiths Record, the publication of the International Brother- hood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Build- ers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, is an article entitled "The Alliance for Progress." This well written and illu- minating article, by Lester L. Zosel, tells the story of labor's role in the Alliance. It is succinct and well worth reading for the understanding of our interna- tional partnership with the countries of Latin America which it furthers. With unanimous consent I am inserting the article by Lester L. Zosel in the RECORD: THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS-SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE AMERICAS OR POVERTY, CHAOS, AND CONTINUED OPPRES- SION? (By Lester L. Zosel) On March 13, 1961, the late President Ken- nedy announced that he was calling upon all of the people of this hemisphere to join in an "Alliance for Progress ? " " a vast coopera- tive effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools." He unveiled this sweeping new program to a group of Latin American leaders attending a White House reception. The next day, March 14, he sent his program to Congress with a request for the necessary funds to give it life. In August 1961 the charter for the Alliance was signed by representatives of 20 nations at a conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The signers were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domin- ican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate- mala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Naturally, the newspapers and other com- munications media gave publicity to the Al- liance when it was announced, as is the case with Presidential proclamations. There also was reporting on the Punta del Este con- ference. But what have you read or heard about it since? Chances are, the answer is "very little." The chances are greater still that you have read nothing in the daily press regarding the role being played by United States and Latin American labor in this worthy project. Such participation by labor is designed to insure that assistance reaches those for whom it is intended. For the most part the continuing story of the Alliance has been shamefully ignored by most of our Nation's newspapers, magazines, radio, and television-this despite the fact that the Alliance is a program involving money, plans, and far-reaching objectives to dwarf anything of its kind in past history. Unfortunately, this article, limited as it must be, cannot begin to fill the news gap on the Alliance. Instead, my modest de- sign is to bring you an appreciation of the program's importance and its staggering di- mension, and to describe labor's role in help- ing to advance its nobility of purpose. The sweep of the Alliance is best illus- trated by its charter, wherein signatories are pledged to achieving a long list of imposing objectives-economic and social develop- ment, land and tax reforms, improved wages and working conditions, better housing, a greatly reduced rate of illiteracy, stabilized prices, improved health and sanitation, stim- ulated private enterprise, and stronger demo- cratic institutions. Notable advancement toward these goals is expected to require at least $100 billion over the next 10 years. Latin American nations will provide some $80 billion of that amount. The United States has pledged a major share of the remaining $20 billion. However, some funds also are coming from other nations, international organizations, and private enterprise. The task of implementing U.S. participa- tion in the Alliance falls to the Agency for International Development, a State Depart- ment Agency which administers foreign aid programs. U.S. funds for the Alliance come out of the annual foreign aid authoriza- tions by Congress. AID's Administrator has the authority and responsibility for carrying out Alliance projects. The Alliance, unlike too many foreign aid programs in the past, has prerequisites for those who are to receive its assistance- individuals, communities, or governments. Recipients must prove they also are trying to help themselves, plans are required to have some long-range characteristics and Latin American governments are committed to make long-overdue reforms. While these prerequisites still are not be- ing met as rapidly as hoped for, the Alliance has brought reforms, to varying degrees, in Latin America. Sixteen countries have improved thci.? tax programs within the past year. A number of these have tightened up collections on previously wealthy families. Tax revenues in some countries are up as much as 30 per- cent. Land reform has been undertaken in 12 countries since 1960. What are Alliance's accomplishments in 3 years of existence? That's a big question- far too big to be fully answered here. How will anyone be able to tabulate, at any given time, the results of a "peaceful revolution" that is to stretch through a 7,000-mile-long continent inhabited by more than 200 mil- lion people living in jungles, mountains and massive cities? Even so, AID Administrator David E. Bell has assembled some impressive statistics. He reported that by the end of June the Alliance will have helped to build 220,000 new houses, constructed more than 23,000 classrooms, trained 20,000 new teachers and printed 6 million books. Over 550 mobile health units, hospitals and health centers will have been established. More than 200,000 agricultural loans have been made. Nearly 15 million people in more than 1,000 towns and villages now get clean water from Alliance-built supply sys- tems. Millions of dollars in loans are sup- porting industrial development; electric powerllnes are going up; roads are being built; community development programs are clearing slums, fighting disease, and improv- ing diets. Credit unions and cooperatives have blossomed forth in more than a dozen countries. Not only does the Alliance charter call for labor's participation in its great endeavor, but it also lists establishing of effective labor relations as an important "self help" to be initiated in developing a project. This firm recognition of labor's importance has brought strong support for the Alliance from. free unions throughout the Western Hemi- sphere. The American Institute for Free Labor De- velopment is the key instrument for labor's participation. Begun in 1960, it is a non- profit organization supported jointly by unions, employers, and government. AFL-- CIO President George Meany is its president. Its executive director is Serafino Romualdi, a man of wide experience in labor's inter- American affairs. The Brotherhood of Rail- way Clerks chief executive officer, George M. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170003-8