OUR COURSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved
For Re "g3 le( SAC EB BO"$00300170007-4
Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Speaker,'it is un-
fortunate that West Germany has bowed
to pressure from President Nasser of
Egypt and canceled armed shipments to
Israel. In taking this action, Bonn has
surrendered to Nasser's blackmail at the
expense of Israel's security.
West Germany's surrender to Nasser's
blackmail threat to recognize East Ger-
manyif Bonn did not halt aid to Israel,
can be interpreted as another victory for
Nasser and the Soviet Union. Pressured
and influenced by the Soviet, Nasser has
long demanded an end to West Ger-
many's arms shipments to Israel. He
was not successful until he seized on the
bold idea of inviting East Germany's
President Ulbricht to Egypt for a state
visit-a gamble for Nasser since his
country desperately needs new loans
from the West. Nasser stood to lose more
than the West, and yet he won.
Mr. Speaker, last week I voted against
further.aid from our country to Egypt as
long as Nasser continues to push his
aggressive policies in the Middle East. I
Let us give Nasser the opportunity to con-
vince us that he and his nation deserve our
generosity. The time has come to place upon
him the burden of proving to our satisfaction
that he is worthy of our aid.
Only a matter of a few days later,
Nasser threatens Bonn with recognition
of East Germany, and instead of halting
aid to Egypt, West Germany halts mili-
tary aid to Israel. It is additionally em-
barrassing to us that the "Prime Minister
of Egypt gloatingly first made the an-
nouncement to the world that West Ger-
many would terminate the shipments to
Israel.
Mr. Speaker, our American position in
the Middle East is weakened, Israel's
position is weakened, and West German
relations with Israel, which had im-
proved so much, have dived to a dan-
gerous level of anger and bitternessL
while the power and prestige of Nasser
and Communist East Germany are
strengthened and the Soviet Union con-
tinues arms shipments to the United
Arab Republic.
The action in the past few days proves
we cannot trust Nasser; a dictator is a
dictator no matter how we look at it, and
Nasser is an aggressive dictator. All the
appeasement in the world will not keep
under control his insatiable hunger for
more power.
ARMS SHIPMENTS TO, ISRAEL
(Mr. ADDABBO (at the request of Mr.
GILBERT) was given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I join
with my colleagues in urging the Bonn
Government, to reconsider its termina-
tion of its contract to ship helicopters
and tanks. to Israel. I do not believe
that any nation should compromise its
legal obligations and contracts because
of threats by a third nation. If the
Bonn G vernmept is to stand as a free
nation, It must show its willingness to
be bound by its legal commitments and
not waiver to a side where the greatest
force might be applied.
FRANCE WANTS U.S. GOLD; SHOULD
PAY DEBTS TO UNITED STATES
(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr.
Speaker, French Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville is visiting the United States.
While he is here the Government of
France should be firmly reminded that
it still owes the United States billions of
dollars in debts for World War I.
The terms for France's repayment of
its World War I debts to the United
States were approved by the 69th Con-
gress and enacted into law in 1929. The
debt was to be paid by June 15, 1987.
However, because France was in such fi-
nancial difficulty in the early 1930's, the
Congress allowed a period of grace for
France's payments on the war debt.
The grace period was to run from fiscal
year 1932 for a 10-year period, but of
course the end of that grace period saw
France right in the middle of World War
II, so the American people did not press
for payment of the World War I debts.
However, now that France is finan-
cially secure, General de Gaulle has an-
nounced his intention to convert U.S.
dollars to gold. He has already received
$150 million in U.S. gold, and the French
Republic now states it will continue to
demand gold as U.S. dollars flow into its
coffers.
This demand comes at a time when
the United States is showing increasing
concern over its dwindling gold reserves.
One reason for the gold outflow is the
large number of U.S. tourists which go
overseas, many of them visitingI France
and bringing prosperity in that country
as well as U.S. dollars for the French
Treasury to convert to U.S. gold.
I am today introducing a resolution
expressing the sense of the Congress
that France begin repayments on its
World War I debts. The last payment
was made June 15, 1931, and it amounted
to $40 million. ' The amount of the debts
came to over $6.5 billion, and since no
payment has. been made for 34 years
sound business practice dictates that
payment be resumed. My resolution
would request that the French debt be
paid off according to the original sched-
uled date of 1987. The United States
would accept U.S. dollars from France
in payment-or gold would do.
WEST GERMANY'S RELATIONS
WITH, ISRAEL
(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was
given permission to_ address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, yes-
terday, in the course of making a 1-
minute statement, I said that I was
shocked to learn that West Germany
had canceled its agreement to deliver
arms to Israel. I said some other un-
pleasant things about that nation be-
cause I thought there was good reason
therefor.
2823
I repeat and reiterate all the state-
ments I made which are contained in
today's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; and now
suggest that not alone has the Bonn
government been finding it difficult to
cleanse itself of the stench of Auschwitz,
but it has been thoroughly outwitted by
Nasser; and has also lost face and pres-
tige in this country and even some com-
mercial business from American busi-
ness firms. I understand several con-
tracts for the purchase from Germany
of machinery have been canceled in the
wake of the Bonn government's sever-
ing its agreement to furnish arms to
Israel.
I have said on this floor, you cannot
appease a Hitler. I venture to say
Ulbricht will go to Cairo anyway and
will be well received by Nasser which,
in effect, will amount to de facto recog-
nition. Where does this leave Germany
except in an "incredible mess" as stated
in the New York Times of yesterday.
The action by the Bonn government
in failing to honor its agreement with
Israel and in collapsing at the first sign
of trouble is a victory for Moscow
diplomacy because it weakens Israel,
strengthens East Germany, and bolsters
Egypt. Surely at this indication of
weakness on the part of the Bonn gov-
ernment Nasser will feel free to make
other threats and who ,can guarantee
that the weakening German backbone
will not again yield to what may well be
bluff and bluster.
The new Germany has been trying
to persuade the world that it has re-
formed-the present actions of the Bonn
government are not a shining example
of such reform. One wonders how far
the Nazi beliefs are actually buried.
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINIS-
TRATION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTS
Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Subcom-
mittee on Accounts of the Committee on
House Administration may be permitted
to sit during general debate today.
The SPEAKER. Is there obj ction to
the request of the gentlemi,n from
Maryland?
There was,no objection.
V
OUR COURSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(Mr. COLLIER asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, recently
we have witnessed demonstrations on
college campuses protesting our retali-
atory actions in the Vietnam conflict.
In other quarters there has been pub-
lic criticism of our policy in handling
the crisis in southeast Asia.
While I respect freedom of expression
of every American, I think these attacks
at this time are sad and regrettable-
particular,ly since they are used in propa-
ganda that aids and abets the enemy.
Any course other than the one we are
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taking under the conditions which pre-
vail would be a grave mistake.
The defense of freedom and commit-
ments alvbays involves calculated risks,
but I shudder to think of the conse-
quences if we turned our other cheek to
the arrogant Communist aggressor who
has no intention of stopping here. Per-
mitted to seize Vietnam, where would
they stop next-Thailand, Malaysia, or
who knows where?
Now is the time all Americans should
unite in support of the President's pol-
icy in the southeast Asian crisis for we
can do no less under the circumstances
which prevail in fulfilling our treaty
commitment and moral obligation to the
free world and to our own national
security.
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent to make a correction
in a statement which I inserted in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on February 15,
1965. The vote count mentioned in col-
umn 1, line 7, page A607, should read
"yeas, 165; nays, 241."
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Illi-
nois?
There was no objection.
EXCISE TAX REDUCTION
(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, while
awaiting the administration's decision
on excise tax reduction, I am studying
the excise tax section of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. It is riddled with
wartime-imposed emergency revenue-
raising methods, "temporary" taxes in
effect now for a generation. These
taxes, imposed originally to support the
war effort, have become crutches in sup-
porting bigger and bigger Federal
budgets.
Among those I feel should be elimi-
nated are excise taxes on club dues, ini-
tiation fees, and lifetime memberships.
In. legislation I am introducing today I
ask repeal of these taxes, just as I have
asked repeal of the telephone-telegraph
tax and the entertainment tax in bills in-
troduced earlier this session. Millions
of American men and women are penal-
ized for their memberships in service,
patriotic, and civic organizations which
do boundless good for their communities
and Nation. At a time when recreation
is considered important enough for the
Federal Government to subsidize costly
programs in this area, and to spend tax-
payers' money promoting national phys-
ical fitness, I see no reason why dues and
fees for country clubs and athletic clubs
should be subject to taxation.
I am hopeful that the Ways and Means
Committee will give this bill its serious
consideration when the general subject
of excise tax repeal comes before them.
AID TO NASSER
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry
that the distinguished gentleman* from
New York [Mr. CELLER7 has left the
House floor.
Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. There
he is.
Mr. GROSS. I am glad to see him
here because I was unable to ascertain
when he spoke earlier this afternoon on
the business of giving food products to
Dictator Nasser whether he regretted the
flexible vote he cast in favor of that busi-
ness.
Mr. CELLER. Does the gentleman
want me to answer?
Mr. GROSS. Yes, I would be glad to
have an answer.
Mr. CELLER. I do not regret that
vote because that first vote where I and
others indicated that no aid should be
given might be deemed very rigid notice
and very powerful notice that there
might be revision of policy. However,
after the occurrences in Vietnam I felt,
and others did likewise, that this was a
time of emergency and that we should
stand foursquare behind our President
in the formulation of foreign policy.
Mr. GROSS. Well, Mr. Speaker, be-
fore my time runs out, that sounds ex-
actly like the answer we got from the
State Department in the Committee on
Foreign Affairs this morning when we
tried to ascertain where they are going
from here with respect to Nasser. The
gentleman's answer sounds exactly the
same.
CALL OF THE HOUSE
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, I make
the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum
is not present.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a
call of the House.
A call of the House was ordered.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names :
[Roll No. 151
Abbitt
Foley
Nix
Adair
Giaimo
O'Brien
Ashley
Gonzalez
O'Neal, Ga.
Aspinall
Gray
Pelly
Baldwin
Gubser
Powell
Baring
Hagen, Calif.
Quillen
Battin
Hanna
Reid, N.Y.
Bell
Hansen, Idaho
Reinecke
Betts
Hardy
Rhodes, Ariz.
Blatnik
Harvey, Mich.
Rivers, Alaska
Bolling
Holland
Rivers, S.C.
Bolton
Hosmer
Roosevelt
Brooks
Jacobs
Rostenkowski
Brown, Calif.
Johnson, Calif.
Roudebush
Broyhill, Va.
Jones, Ala.
Sisk
Burton, Utah
Kastenmeier
Springer
Cabell
King, Calif.
Staggers
Cameron
King, N.Y.
Teague, Tex.
Cederberg
Kluczynski
Thompson, N.J.
Clawson, Del
Long, La.
Toll
Colmer
Love
Tuck
Conyers
McDowell
Tunney
Corman
McMillan
Udall
Cramer
Macdonald
Utt
Curtin
Martin, Mass.
Walker, Miss.
Derwinski
Miller
White, Idaho
Duncan, Oreg.
Moorhead
Erlenborn
Morse
Charles H.
Farnsley
Murray
Wright
The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 347
Members have answered to their names,
a quorum,
By unanimous consent, further pro-
ceedings under the call were dispensed
with.
NASSER'S NEW TURMOIL
(Mr. HALPERN asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I join
in expressing my own personal indigna-
tion and shock at the success registered
by bluster and blackmail on the inter-
national scene. Nasser has succeeded in
wringing from the West German Gov-
ernment a termination of aid to a
friendly power.
Truly these ignoble events have
plunged diplomacy to new depths of
ugliness.
Nasser is about to receive for an of-
ficial visit the most hated Communist
boss in Europe. The Hallstein doctrine,
totally unrealistic, is in substance re-
sponsible for West Germany's ill-advised
decision to abruptly terminate aid to
Israel; Nasser forced Bonn to take this
step, a hasty and irresponsible act.
There is no end to the turmoil this man
will cause unless he is faced with people
of equal will and determination. It is
lamentable that the Congress did not
finally accept a complete termination of
our aid program to Egypt.
Nasser has an obsession against the
Western democracies; he will spare no
effort to subvert their objectives and
raise havoc amongst them.
And now West Germany. The Bonn
Government has suffered a needless loss
of face, a tangible diplomatic defeat. In
sabotaging the slow and welcome prog-
ress toward a normalization of German-
Israel relations, it has received nothing
in return; and the consequences of its
irresponsibility will be felt for a long
time to come.
Nasser must be curbed. His policy is
an utter contradiction of American for-
eign policy objectives. Now he has acted
to weaken the necessary strength which
Israel must possess as a partner of peace
and democratic ideals.
I condemn the diplomatic blackmail
by this man who, by his words and deeds,
is helping to destroy that base of inter-
national morality and decency for which
this Nation strives.
HORTON BILL INCREASES SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS
(Mr. HORTON asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, I have
introduced legislation in Congress today
to give 20 million social security bene-
ficiaries a 7-percent increase in monthly
payments. The bill is based on a mea-
sure passed by both the House and Sen-
ate in the last Congress, but which died
in conference because of disagreement
over the Senate addition of a health
care benefits amendment.
The 89th Congress should here and
now redeem the wrong done last year to
retired workers, widows, orphans, and
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 1965
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 2859
H.J. RES. 327
Joint resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the United States
relating to the election of the President
and Vice President 41 Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each
House concurring therein), That the follow-
ing article is proposed as an amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, which
shall be valid to ail intents and purposes as
part of the Constitution when ratified by
the legislatures of three=fourths of the
several States within seven years from the
date of Its submission by the Congress:
"ARTICLE -
"SECTION 1. The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the United States
of America. He shall hold his office during
the term of four years, and, together with the
Vice President, be elected as follows:
"Each State shall be entitled to cast for
President and Vice President a number of
electoral votes equal to the whole number
of Senators and 'Representatives to which
such State may be entitled in the Congress.
Such electoral votes shall be cast, as provided
by section 2 of this article, upon the basis
of an election in -which. the people of such
State shall cast their votes for candidates
to the offices of President and Vice Presi-
dent. The voters in each State in any such
election shall have the qualifications
requisite for persons voting for members of
the most numerous branch of the State
legislature.
"The Congress shall determine the time of
such election. Unless otherwise determined
by the Congress, such election shall be held
on the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in November of the year preceding the year
in which the regular term of office of the
President is to begin.
"SEC. 2. In such election within any State,
the voters by a single ballot shall cast their
votes for candidates to the offices of Presi-
dent and Vice President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
State with themselves. The name of any
person maybe placed upon any ballot listing
candidates for the offices of President and
Vice President only with the consent of such
person; but no person constitutionally in-
eligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to the office of Vice President. The
electoral votes which each State is entitled
to cast shall be cast for the person who in
that State receives the greatest number of
votes for President and Vice President, re-
spectively.
"Within forty-five days after the election,
or at such time as the Congress shall direct,
the official custodian of the election returns
of each State shall prepare, sign, certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate, a list of all persons
for whom votes were cast for President and
a separate list of all persons for whom votes
were cast for Vice President. Upon each list
there. shall be entered the number of votes
cast for each person" thereon, the total num-
ber of votes cast for all such persons, and the
name of the person for whom the electoral
"SEC. 3. The District constituting the seat
of Government of the United States shall be
entitled to cast a number of electoral votes
for President and Vice President equal to the
whole number of Senators and Represents-
-tives to which the District would be entitled
if it were a State, but in no event more than
the least populous State. Such votes shall
be in addition to those to which the States
are entitled but shall be considered, for the
purposes of the election of the President and
Vice President, to be votes cast by a State.
"The election ditl in" the District for Presi-
dent and Vice President shall be held as pro-
vided in sections 1 and 2 of this article, and
the District shall cast the electoral votes in
the manner as provided in section 2 of this
article.
"The Congress shall have the power to en-
force this section by appropriate legislation.
"SEC. 4. On the sixth day of January fol-
lowing the election, unless the Congress by
law appoints a different day not earlier than
the fourth day of January and not later than
the tenth day of January, the President of
the Senate shall, in the presence of the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives, open
all the election certificates and the electoral
votes shall then be counted. The person
having the greatest number of electoral votes
for President shall be the President, and the
person having the greatest number of elec-
toral votes for Vice President shall be Vice
President.
"If the count of the electoral votes shall
result in a tie, with any candidates to the
office of President or Vice President, respec-
tively, having an equal number of electoral
votes otherwise sufficient for election to the
office to which they are a candidate, then
from those candidates with such equal num-
ber of votes the Senate and the House of
Representatives, sitting in joint session, shall
choose immediately the person to fill such
office. The vote of each Member of each
House shall be publicly announced and re-
corded. A quorum for this purpose shall con-
sist of three-quarters of the whole number
of Senators and Representatives, and the
candidates for either such office receiving
the greatest number of votes shall be de-
clared elected.
"SEC. 5. If, at the time fixed for the count-
ing of the electoral votes as provided in sec-
tion 4 of this article, the presidential candi-
date who would have received the greatest
number of electoral votes for President shall
have died, the vice-presidential candidate
who is entitled to receive the greatest num-
ber of electoral votes for Vice President shall
become President.
"SEC. 6. The Congress may by law provide
for the case of the death of both the presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates who,
except for their death, would have been en-
titled to receive the greatest number of elec-
toral votes for President and Vice President,
respectively, and for the case of the death
of any candidates from whom the Senate
and the House of Representatives may choose
a President or a Vice President whenever
the right of choice shall have devolved upon
them.
"SEC. 7. The first, second, third, and fourth
paragraphs of section 1, article II, of the
Constitution, the twelfth article of amend-
ment to the Constitution, sections 3 and 4
of the twentieth article of amendment to
the Constitution, and the twenty-third arti-
cle of amendment to the Constitution, are
hereby repealed.
"SEC. 8. This article shall be inoperative
unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legis-
latures of three-fourths of the States within
seven ye rs from the date of its submission
to the Sates by the Congress."
TTLEMENT IN VIETNAM
Mr. ALBERT) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, the
situation in Vietnam has reached crisis
proportions, The conflict in that war-
torn area of the world has escalated dan-
gerously, while changes in the govern-
ment of South Vietnam continue with-
out any apparent sign that an end is in
sight.
The Vietnamese crisis has its roots
deep in the past, but this is not the time
to deplore what is past, but to decide
what is to be done about the present and
the future.
I think it is clear that a peaceable
setlement must be sought through inter-
national conference. I have asked Presi-
dent Johnson to immediately take the
initiative to start negotiations toward
this end.
I have also asked the President to give
the people of the United States a clear
definition of our policy in southeast
Asia, to give some precise answers to the
questions that have too long gone un-
answered, with a resulting confusion in
the public mind.
The following letter, which I sent to
President Johnson, reflects not only the
concern of my colleagues and me, but
that of all Americans and the other peo-
ples of the free world:
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., February 12, 1965.
Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I am taking the
liberty of writing to express my concern and
that of many of my constituents about the
escalation of our activities in Vietnam.
To many of us, the stand we have taken
in Vietnam appears to be at the wrong time,
at the wrong place, and for the wrong cause.
To take the ultimate risks of involvement
with China and possibly of a nuclear holo-
caust to defend people who have no desire
for our assistance and who are undergoing
an apparently internal revolution, seems
mistaken to us. While we would be per-
fectly willing to take these ultimate risks to
preserve our freedom or even more remotely
to preserve the cause of freedom in the world,
that does not seem to be the case with the
Vietnamese situation.
We are all very aware of our limitations in
advising on foreign policy matters. Just
last week I voted against restricting your au-
thority to send food to Egypt even though
my feelings are strongly against giving any
aid to the United Arab Republic at this time,
because I appreciate congressional limita-
tions on acting competently in this field.
To have the wholehearted backing of the
people, the people should be informed and
to have the wholehearted backing of Con-
gress, we too should be informed of the
underlying rational of so important a policy,
even if the details of the conduct of our
conflict cannot, for security reasons, be made-
public.
From my present knowledge, I would
strongly advise that we immediately take
the initiative to commence negotiations un-
der the auspices of the U.N. or another in-
ternational body to try to reestablish a
peaceful settlement in Vietnam. This seems
vital to avoid nuclear catastrophe. Our pres-
ent policy seems doomed to failure and daily
we increase resentment against our actions
by Asians, many of whom feel that our inter-
vention is a form of imperialism.
If such negotiations are for some reason
unfeasible, then I think we and the public
should be informed as to why they are un-
feasible.
I would urge that open public hearings be
held by the Congress at which the various
administration officials involved would ex-
plain the basis for our continued prosecution
of this conflict and our policy with respect
to it. In the alternative, you might make
this explanation yourself to the public.
Our lives, those of our children, and per-
haps even the future of the world, are at
stake with such momentous decisions in-
t
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -= HOUSE February 17
volved and still with timeto take alternative
actions, though not much time, I hope you
will give serious consideration to these
recommendations.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
RICHARD L. OTTINGER.
JOINT CIVIC COMMITTEE OF THE
ITALIAN AMERICANS IN CHICAGO,
ILL.
(Mr. ANNUNZIO (at the request of Mr.
ALBERT) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I have
for many years had the honor of being
closely associated with the Joint Civic
Committee of the Italian Americans in
Chicago, Ill.
Representing over 40 different organi-
zations, the joint civic committee serves
as both planner and coordinator of nu-
merous civic, educational, welfare, and
social action programs carried out by the
Italo-American community in the
greater Chicago area.
We in Chicago are proud of the joint
civic committee's accomplishments and
of the local, State, and National acclaim
its work has earned. Community lead-
ers across the country have acquainted
themselves with the joint civic commit-
tee and have used it as a model for sim-
ilar enterprises.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
include excerpts from the annual report
for 1964 of the Joint Civic Committee of
Italian Americans for Chicago. The
report follows:
The work of the Joint Civic Committee of
Italian Americans was broadened grid inten-
sified on a truly impressive basis during 1964
under the leadership of Anthony Paterno,
president. It is doubtful that any previous
year was so fruitful and rewarding. Not only
did the committee have a significant impact
upon our people in the Chicago metropolitan
area, but In addition, Americans of Italian
extraction in many other States became cog-
nizant of our work and accomplishments.
The Joint Civic Committee of Italian
Americans is known all over Illinois and from
New York to California President Johnson,
Governor Kerner, Mayor Daley, and many of
the U.S. Senators and Congressmen axe inti-
mately acquainted with our program and
with our goals and aspirations. We in Chi-
cago can be proud of the many activities
which are carried on by the Joint Civic Com-
mittee of Italian Americans. Without ques-
tion, the Joint Civic Committee -of Italian
Americans has blazed new trails in civic ac-
tion. The work of the joint civic committee
is carried on under the leadership of dedi-
cated volunteers working on various subcom-
mittees which will be discussed briefly in this
report.
At long last, on November 1, 1964, the joint
civic committee opened an office, employed
a full-time secretary and other personnel
so that these activities could be carried on
more effectively and efficiently and thus bet-
ter meet the needs of our people in general.
To raise the necessary funds for this ex-
panded program, the joint civic committee
will cosponsor an opera, "Aida" in conjunc-
tion with the Apollo Opera Co. at the Civic
Opera House on February 20, 1965. Cochair-
men of this event are Congressman FRANK
ANNUNZIO, Anthony Paterno, Nello Ferrara,
Dr. Mario O. Rubinelli, and Victor Failla.
Increasingly in this country we are begin-
ning to appreciate and to value all things
Italian. This appreciation, we believe, was
best expressed some years ago by an eminent
American, often quoted by Victor Arrigo. We
refer to President Nicholas Murray Butler of
Columbia University when he said, "The
place of Italy in civilization is beat shown by
trying to subtract that place from world his-
tory. Take away her scientific accomplish-
ments, her statesmanship, her leadership of
the world for many years, and what have you
left? The world looks badly decapitated.
You can subtract Italian culture from
civilization only by destroying that civiliza-
tion."
HUMAN RELATIONS
At the beginning of the year the joint
civic committee started with a determina-
tion to deal more vigorously and more ef-
fectively with human relation problems af-
fecting the Italian people. A strong policy,
adopted by the executive committee, and
implemented by the human relations com-
mittee directed by Joseph Barbera, vowed
that hereafter all incidents involving dis-
crimination or defamation of character
would be given top priority with immediate
action to be taken.
During the year the human relations com-
mittee investigated approximately six in-
cidents involving discrimination. The ma-
jor incident concerned two attorneys of
Italian extraction who were rejected for ap-
pointment as circuit court magistrates. A
thorough investigation by the human rela-
tions committee revealed clearly that the
two attorneys had no negative marks in their
record either as private citizens or attorneys.
The human relations committee will con-
tinue to be alert in the coming year to any
unfair attacks made upon persons of Italian
extraction.
COLUMBUS DAY PARADE
As we all know, one of the turning points
in history was the discovery of America by
Columbus, an Italian. Columbus, therefore,
has become our symbol, our inspiration, and
our hope for a better world. For this reason,
also we are pressing the fight to have Colum-
bus Day observed as a national legal holiday.
Under the leadership of Frank Armanetti,
general chairman, this year's parade was one
of the most colorful parades ever to march
down State Street. The 50 floats were su-
perbly designed and decorated, the bands and
marchers and other units--a total of 200-
all gave excellent performances, hailed and
praised by everyone.
Two million people saw the parade, both
on State Street and on television. Hon. An-
thony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, Governor Kerner, Mayor
Daley, Senator DOUGLAS, Senator DIRKSEN,
Congressman ANNUNZIO, and all of our Il-
linois political leaders marched in the parade
and viewed it from the special stand on
Madison and State Streets.
CULTURAL AFFAIRS
The highly successful program. "Sojourn
in Italy" sponsored by the Joint Civic Com-
mittee of Italian Americans was offered for
the third year at DePaul University, 25 East
Jackson Boulevard.
The program continued to attract hun-
dreds of persons who wish to learn the Italian
language and become better acquainted with
its history, art, literature, science, music-
in short-its whole way of life.
Under the leadership of Peter R. Scalise,
chairman of the committee, this program
costs about $10,000 a year and is largely sub-
sidized by the nominal tuition of $20 for
30 sessions and by contributions from
sponsors.
Another activity of the cultural affairs
committee was the sponsorship of a lecture
and exhibit on Galileo at the art institute
to focus attention on the 400th anniversary
of the famous Italian scientist.
Another accomplishment in cultura: affairs
was the joint civic committee's efforts in
having the Postmaster General issue a special
commemorative postage stamp on Dante.
Originally proposed by Prof. Joseph Fucilla,
of Northwestern University, this idea was
presented to Senator PAUL DOUGLAS who
secured approval for the Dante stamp. It
will be issued early In 1965.
IMMIGRATION RALLY AND LEGISLATION
The joint civic committee cosponsored a
gigantic immigration rally on December 15,
1963 in conjunction with the Chicago chap-
ter, American Committee on Italian Migra-
tion. Held at the McCormick Place and
attended by 5,000 persons, this highly suc-
cessfully rally helped to focus attention on
the need to change the formula for the
national origins quota which greatly restricts
immigration from Italy.
At a followup meeting on March 31, 1964,
at the Sherman House, delegates from over
40 organizations took responsibility for
circulating petitions to obtain names of
thousands of supporters for submission to
President Johnson and to the Senators and
Congressmen.
REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT
For a number of years the joint civic-com-
mittee has been carrying on a campaign to
have persons of Italian extraction appointed
to the various advisory boards and commis-
sions of city, country, and State governments.
Conferences were held with Mayor Daley
and Governor Kerner and they indicated an
interest and willingness to appoint persons
of Italian origin to the various boards.
ITALIAN FLOOD RELIEF
A check for $25,000 was presented on
October 30, 1964, by the Italian Flood Relief
Committee to aid the victims of last year's
Vaiont Dam disaster which killed over 2,000
persons in Longarone, Italy.
SCHOLARSHIP FUND
A scholarship fund, which began about
8 years ago, was resumed in 1964. Partic-
ipating in a benefit luncheon with the United
Chicago Police Association enabled us to
raise sufficient funds.
Known as the Rocky Martian Scholarship
Fund, the committee in 1964 made the fund
available to the Sacred Heart Seminary en-
abling two of its graduates to attend the
Maryknoll College Seminary.
CALVARY HILL "PASSION PLAY"
An "Italian night" was sponsored by the
joint civic committee at the Sacred Heart
Seminary in Stone Park on Saturday, Au-
gust 14, 1964.
The major attractionwas the Calvary Hill
"Passion Play" con4ycted by the Scalabrini
Fathers which was- attended by 7,000 peo-
ple, a record attendance for one night.
FLIGHTS TO ITALY
In order to facilitate travel to Italy at a
low cost, group basis, from Chicago to Rome,
the Joint Civic Committee of Italian-Amer-
icans in 1964 sponsored its second annual
program.
Five flights by Alitalia jet planes were
sponsored for members, spouses, and de-
pendents at group rates of $477. Flights
started in June and continued to Septem-
ber 1964. Each group consisted of 25 or more
pasengers and the stay in Italy ranged from
3 to 6 weeks. To be eligible persons had to
have membership in the joint civic com-
mittee or in one of its affiliated organiza-
tions which have coextensive membership in
the committee. A total of 150 persons par-
ticipated in this unique travel program
which afforded a wonderful opportunity to
visit relatives and to see firsthand the beauty
and marvels of Italy.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
In addition to the major projects described
in this report, the joint civic committee
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2791
marks of the senior Senator from Idaho
[Mr. CHURCH], I have some extended re-
marks to make on the same problem. I
should appreciate the opportunity to go
into that subject,, tonight. I hope that
helps in resolving the uncertainty in the
mind of the acting majority leader.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I had inquired, as to the possibility
of a unanimous-consent agreement.
Under the circumstances, it is not pos-
sible. It would be objected to. That
being ,the case, I have discussed the sit-
uation with the distinguished chairman
of the committee, the junior Senator
from Virginia. His judgment is that the
Senate would do better if it were to come
back tomorrow and seek to finish consid-
eration of the bill then.
Mr. ROBERTSON. I am sure that
many Senators have. engagements and
will not be here after .6::30,, and I do not
see why we should proceed if, we could
not obtain .a quorum.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Under the
circumstances I think it would be better
to resume consideration. of the bill to-
morrow and seek to, cpm plete action then.
I ? would hope that tgmorrowwe would
be able toiuisl, action On, this bill and
the other bills which have beep referred
to, but I do not believe there it too much
hope for that.
Mr. SMATHER$. Mr, President, does
the acting majority leader know how
many amendments there are?
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. There would
be a vote on two more amendments and
perhaps a vote on passage of the bill.
While my heart is with the Senator from
Florida, I believe he would find that ab-
senteeism would 'be so pronounced after
7 o'clock that it would be necessary to
come back and .complete action on the
bill tomorrow,
I hope there would be no, objection to
modifying the unanimous consent pre-
viously entered, in order that action on
the bill could be finished tomorrow.
Mr. DLRKSEIQ Mr. President, one
more inquiry. I understand an order
was obtained for the Senate to meet at
10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct, ,
HEARINGS BY. THE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND. CURRENCY ON U.S.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the
chairman of the Committee on Banking
and Currency announced that he was
starting hearings next week, or soon
thereafter, on the question of balance
of payments. In order to assist the com-
mittee and Members of this body in
studying that question, I ask unanimous
consent that there may be printed the
titles, page references, and years of issue
of some 16 studies issued by the Joint
Economic Committee. We shall be glad
to get these'publications to the chairman
of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency for such use as he may wish to
make of them. They weigh, in all, about
8 pounds; and I feel that they will help
the Committee on Banking and Currency
in the hearings that may conducted.
There being no objection, the list was The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as objection to the present consideration of
follows: the nomination
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE PUBLICATIONS ON There being no objection, the Senate
THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAr e, NTS proceeded to consider the nomination.
"International Influences on the American Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the
Economy," June 1959. committee unanimously reported favor-
"International Effects of U.B. Economic ably the confirmation of the nomination
Policy," by Edward M. Bernstein, January of Postmaster General. We are taking
1960. this unusual action since the term of the
"International Payments Imbalances and Postmaster would automatically expire
Need for Strengthening International Finan-
cial Arrangements"; hearings before Subcom-
mittee on International Exchange and Pay-
ments, May, June, 1961.
"International Payments Imbalances and
Need for Strengthening International Finan-
cial Arrangements"; report of the Subcom-
mittee on International Exchange and Pay-
ments, August 1961.
"Factors Affecting the U.S. Balance of
Payments"; studies prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on International Exchange and Pay-
ments, December 1962.
"Outlook for the U.S. Balance of Pay-
ments"; hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on International Exchange and Payments,
December 1962.
"U.s. Payments Policies Consistent with
Domestic Objectives of Maximum Employ-
ment and Growth"; report of the Subcom-
mittee on International Exchange and Pay-
ments, December 1962.
"Current Problems and Policies," July
1963; hearings on the U.S. balance of pay-
ments, part 1.
. "Outlook for the U.S. Balance. of Pay-
ments"; hearings on the U.S. balance of pay-
ments, part 2, July 1963.
"The International Monetary System:
Functioning and Possible Reform"; hearings
on the U.S. balance of payments, part 3,
November 1963.
"The U.S, Balance of Payments-Perspec-
tives and Policies," November 1963.
"The U.S. Balance of Payments: State-
ments by Economists, Bankers, and Others
an the Brookings Institution Study, 'The U.S.
Balance of Payments in 1968."' November
1963.
"A Description and Analysis of Certain
Euroepan Capital Markets," January 1964.
"The U.S. Balance of Payments," March
1964.
"Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and
the Balance of Payments"; part IV, hearings,
March 1964.
"Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and
the Balance of Payments"; hearings, part V,
appendix, September 1964.
EXECUTIVE BUSINESS
As in executive session,
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I
have conferred with the minority leader
and with the minority members of the
Committee on Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice on this request. I ask unanimous
consent, as in executive session, to report
from the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service the nomination of John A.
Gronouski, of Wisconsin, to be Postmas-
ter General, and I ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the Senate will proceed as
in executive session.
If there be no committee reports, the
nomination will be stated.
POSTMASTER GENERAL
The legislative clerk read the nomina-
tion of John A. Gronouski, of Wisconsin,
to be Postmaster General.
on Friday. In order to have continuity
of contracts and other important busi-
ness, it is necessary that we act now, so
the -confirmation can reach the White
House in time for the Postmaster Gen-
eral to be installed in office at the ex-
piration of his present term.
On behalf of the chairman of the full
Committee on Post Office and Civil Serv-
ice, the Senator from South Carolina
[Mr. JOHNSTON], I should like to read this
statement, as the Senator from South
Carolina is unable to be present:
STATEMENT BY SENATOR OLIN D. JOHNSTON ON
THE NOMINATION OF MR. JOHN A, GaoNoU-
SKI TO BE POSTMASTER GENERAL, FEBRUARY
17, 1965
I am very pleased that President Johnson
leas reappointed John Gronouski to be Post-
master General. I wish it were possible for
me to be in the Senate to vote for his con-
firmation.
He has served as Postmaster General ably
and well since his appointment in 1963, dem-
onstrating an unusual ability to attack prob-
lems head on and frequently to find solu-
tions. He has brought to his position the
talents of a scholar and the energies and
directness of an outstanding administrator.
As chairman of the Post Office and Civil
Service Committee, I have dealt for many
years with the complicated web of postal
affairs, and I feel that we are indeed for-
tunate to have a man of John Gronouski's
demonstrated abilities to seek solutions to
our postal problems. My relations with the
Postmaster General have always been marked
by great cordiality and cooperation on his
part, and I look forward to their continua-
tion.
John Gronouski has my every good wish
as his new term of office begins.
I have just read a statement by the
distinguished chairman of the commit-
tee, who is absent because of illness.
Republicans as well as Democrats spoke
glowingly of the services Mr. Gronouski
has rendered during the time he has been
Postmaster General since his appoint-
ment in 1963.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I concur in everything the Senator
from Oklahoma has said. I believe Post-
master General Gronouski is making a
magnificent record. He has performed
his tasks far beyond the call of duty. I
say this as one who has had an opportu-
nity to know the extent to which he has
gone in traveling about the country ful-
filling his responsibilities and duties. I
believe he is entitled to the highest com-
mendation we can give him. I am ex-
tremely honored to support the nomina-
tion.
Mr. MONRONEY. I appreciate what
the Senator from Louisiana has said.
During the service of. the Postmaster
General he has visited in practically all
the 50 States, where his farfiung enter-
prise is situated. He has seen many of
the men whose task it is to move the mil-
lions of pieces of mail and who comprise
the postal service.
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I ask for a vote on the nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is, Will the Senate advise and
consent to the confirmation of this
nomination?
The nomination was confirmed.
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I
ask that the President be notified ?im-
mediately of the confirmation of the
nomination.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the President will, be imme-
diately notified.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
resume the consideration of legislative
business.
There being no objection, the Senate
resuipied the consideration of legislative
OVERINVOLVEMENA IN AFRICA
AND ASIA-A CRITICAL AP-
PRAISAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN EX-COLONIAL RE-
GIONS OF THE WORLD
PART I: FROM ONE EXTREME TO ANOTHER
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, "we can
never again stand aside prideful in isola-
tion," so spoke Lyndon B. Johnson at his
inauguration.
All Americans should agree with the
President. Head-in-the-sand isolation-
ism died a generation ago. It isn't likely
to be resurrected. The ranks of those
who believe that the United States can
ever again withdraw from world affairs
have been rightly decimated.
As a. confirmed internationalist, I fa-
vor strong American support for the
United Nations. I believe in a sensible
foreign aid program to help lift depressed
living standards in the underdeveloped
world. In the Senate, I have voted con-
sistently to extend the use of our surplus
food in hungry lands, and to enlarge
the Peace Corps as living work-a-day evi-
dence of American good will.
But the pendulum of our foreign policy
can swing from one extreme to the other.
Once we thought that anything which
happened abroad was none of our busi-
ness; now we evidently think that every-
thing which happens abroad has become
our business. In the span of 30 years,
an excess of isolationism has been trans-
formed into an excess of interventionism.
Since the days of the Marshall plan,
the United States has constantly ex-
panded the scope of its commitment to
foreign governments. From Western
Europe, we have moved into Africa, the
Middle East, and the Far East, until the
dimension of our involvement has be-
come global. Our troops are now sta-
tioned in no less than 30 countries, we
are pledged to defend 42, and we are ex-
tending aid, in one form or another, to
nearly 100 nations. As a result of this
proliferation, Walter Lippmann write.,:
We have become grossly overextended in
regions where we have no primary vital in-
terest. We have scattered our assistance to
such a degree that we help everybody a little
and nobody enough.
Why have we spread ourselves so thin?
What compulsion draws us, ever deeper,
into the internal affairs of so manycoun-
tries in Africa and Asia, having so re-
mote a connection with the vital inter-
ests of the United States?
The answer, I think, stems from our
intensely ideological view of the cold war.
We have come to treat "communism,"
regardless of what form it may take in
any given country, as the enemy. We
fancy ourselves as guardian of the "free"
world, though most of it is not free, and
never has been. We seek to immunize
this world against further Communist
infection through massive injections of
American aid, and, wherever necessary,
through direct. American intervention.
Such a vast undertaking has at least two
defects: First, it exceeds our national
capability; second, among the newly
emerging nations, where the specter of
Western imperialism is dreaded more
than communism, such a policy can be
self-defeating. As a seasoned, friendly
foreign diplomat recently put it:
The United States is getting involved in
situations where no one-not even a nation
of saints-would be welcome.
This is not to say that we should write
off Africa or Asia. It Is to say that a for-
eign policy of intervention, which was
right for Western Europe, Is apt to be
wrong for those continents which have
just thrown off European rule.
To begin with, the stakes in Europe
were different. Had so rich an industrial
prize as Western Europe ever fallen into
Russian hands, the actual balance of
power in the world would have shifted
from us to the Soviet Union. We were
obliged to regard the dividing line in
Europe as though it were an American
frontier, to commit our nuclear arsenal
to its defense, and to station an army
of American troops in West Germany as
"tripwire" evidence of our determina-
tion to defend that country as though it
were our own.
No nation goes this far unless its very
survival hangs in the balance.
Even so, our intervention in Europe
would not have succeeded without a
strong mutual purpose. We were wel-
comed back to war-devastated Europe in
1945 to be a nuclear sentinel against
further Russian aggression, It was the
expansion of hostile Russian power which
summoned us, not the color of the Red
banner,' or our distaste for the way of
life inside the Soviet Union. There was
no confusion among the NATO allies as
to the identity of the enemy. As long as
the Russian threat remained imminent,
we all faced in the same direction, united
by a single will.
There was still another reason for the
success of our intervention in Europe-a
condition so obvious that it is often over-
looked, and yet so fundamental that its
absence in Africa and Asia accounts for
most of our setbacks on these continents.
In Europe, we stood among people with
whom we shared a common ancestry,
whose political and economic systems
were similar to our own, and whose tradi-
tional values derived from the same
mainstream of historical experience that
we call Western civilization. This cul-
tural bond meant that most Europeans
generally shared our aims and our point
of view.
But if the inhabitants of Western Eu-
rope tend to see the world as we do, as a
global arena in which "free" people are
arrayed against Communists, it does net
follow that Africans and Asians share
this view. They have been participants
in a different revolution, more potent and
widespread than the Communist brand--
a revolution foreshadowed two centuries
ago, by the American War for Independ-
ence, and whipped into flame by Wood-
row Wilson's ringing reaffirmation of the
right of self-determination. Neither
Marx nor Lenin fathered the revolt
against colonialism, and we need not per-
mit their successors, in Moscow or Pei-
ping, to exploit the colonial issue to
Communist advantage.
To avoid this, we must understand
that, for most Africans and Asians, our
concept of self-government and individ-
ual freedom is totally unreal, having
ne ier been experienced. In many, if not
most, of these emergent lands, it is capi-
talism, not communism, which is the ugly
word. The very term evokes images of
the old colonial plantation and white
man supremacy. Furthermore, any at-
tempt to acquaint Africa and Asia with
the miracles of modern capitalism, as
witnessed in such places as the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan, is
relatively meaningless. The under-de-
veloped world lacks the private capital
with which to industrialize. Govern-
ment is often the only source available
to underwrite development programs.
Thus, popular repugnance to capitalism
combines with economic necessity to
cause most of the new governments in
Africa and Asia to proclaim themselves
Socialist states.
Because these facts are so well known,
it puzzles me that American foreign po-
licy in Africa and Asia has not been tied
to them. We have plunged into these
former colonial regions as though we
had been designated on high to act as
trustee in bankruptcy for the broken
empires.
First of all, we strained relations by
trying to induce governments to line up
with us in the cold war, a struggle in
which few felt any real interest. For-
getting that we ourselves had insisted
upon our right to stay neutral for most
of our history, we assailed "neutralism"
as a kind of Communist trick. Later,
having painfully learned that cold war
neutrality always served as a badge of,
and sometimes even as an umbrella for,
independence, we changed tune, but,
even then, we kept on administering our
aid programs in ways designed to freeze
out the Russians and Chinese.
In regions craving aid from any source,
our freeze-out policy was bound to give
rise to cries of undue interference.
Soon, African and Asian governments
were demanding aid "without strings at-
tached," while accusing the United
States of practicing "neo-colonialism."
Worse still, sensing that we feared com-
petition from Communist sources, many
a government craftily raised the "ante"
on us, threatening to go to the Reds for
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help if we failed to meet some new de-
mand.
Neither AID nor the State Department
will acknowledge submitting to this sort
of diplomatic blackmail in the handling
of our foreign aid program. But I have
no doubt about it. Too often I have
questioned an American Ambassador
about a misfit project in some forlorn
little country, only to be told: "If we
hadn't done it, the Russians would have
been asked." Knuckling under to such
crude pressures has caused our prestige
to go down, even as our costs have gone
up.
Worst of all, we have permitted our-
selves to be drawn into the internal
political affairs of so many African and
Asian countries that anti-American feel-
ing is rising at an alarming rate. Our
embassies are being subjected to increas-
ingly frequent attacks, our information
libraries are being sacked, and dema-
gogs from Cairo to Djakarta court
popular favor by rebuking us. Afro-
Asian delegates at the U.N. castigate us
with words of extraordinary violence.
Clearly, the policy of intervening too
much in the volatile ex-colonial regions
of Africa and Asia, is backfiring on the
PART II: MISTAKES IN AFRICA
Much of this could have been avoided.
I visited Africa in 1960, immediately aft-
er John F, Kennedy's election, in com-
pany with two of my colleagues and the
President's youngest brother, Ted.
Wherever our presence became known,
eager crowds would gather to shout,
"Kennedy, Kennedy." The, word had
spread through Africa that the newly-
elected President of the United States
had, as a Senator in 1957, spoken up for
Algeria in her war for independence
against France. For the first time, our
country was being identified, by Arab
and Black alike, with legitimate African
aspirations. Opportunity was beckon-
ing our way.
If we had continued to champion
African" nationalism, the cause that
counts with the people; if we had de-
clared ourselves strongly in favor of
rightful independence for the Portuguese
Territories, the flaming issue in Africa
today; if we had held ourselves at arms
length from the shifting factional fights
for power within the seething young
African countries, regardless of the labels
chosen to solicit outside support, I have
no doubt that our influence in Africa
would have kept on growing.
But we have not yet managed to
harness our zeal. Rational restraints
give way to emotional involvement,
which, in turn, leads to more interven-
tion. Fortunately, the Russians have
made the same mistake in Africa, and
now the Chinese seem eager to repeat
it. Here are 'two examples, one Russian,
one American, which constitute, in my
judgment, showcase illustrations of how
not to conduct a winning foreign policy
Six years ago, Nikita Khrushchev
scurried to the rescue of Sekou Toure,
strong man of Guinea, after this little
west African country had been` stripped
bare by the departing French. It seemed
a perfect marriage, since the Guinean
leaders, raised in the radical tradition of
the French labor movement, were Marx-
ists anyway, and anxious to establish a
model Marxist state.
When I arrived in Conakry, the coun-
try's capital, in December of 1960,
Guinea had taken on all the appear-
ances of a satellite. The government had
been persuaded to abandon the franc
in order to impede further trade with
the West, and the entire economy seemed
welded into the Red bloc. Communist
advisors sat beside every Government
minister. Numerous Red-donated proj-
ects were under construction, including
a big printing plant, and the place
swarmed with communist technicians,
transplanted from countries behind the
Iron Curtain. Guinea had plainly been
taken over.
Into this captured country, President
Kennedy sent a young Ambassador, Bill
Atwood. His instructions were to play it
cool. He was not to lecture the Guinean
dictator on the virtues of democracy, or
belabor his commissars with the glories
of free enterprise. He was to say it was
their business, not ours, to choose the
system they preferred; that we were in-
terested only in helping them, in a mod-
est way, with some of their problems of
human suffering. Kennedy felt, if we did
not press too hard, that Guinea would
soon discover the Russians were not 9
feet tall.
And so it happened. It wasn't long be-
fore Guinea began to resent the heavy-
handed interference of the Russians.
Relations became so strained that the
Soviet Ambassador was declared persona
non grata, and ordered to leave the
country. Meanwhile, Guinea began to
reassume control over her own course.
Today, her attitude toward the United
States is much improved, and her ties
with the West are growing again.
The mistake of too much intervention,
which the Russians made in Guinea, we
seem- determined to duplicate in the
Congo. Africans wonder why the United
States, having no historic, economic, or
security interests in the Congo, should
so involve itself in that country's civil
war. I also wonder why.
I know, of course, that the State De-
partment regards the Congo rebels as a
Communist front, though their source of
supply-Algerian and Egyptian-would
seem African enough. Our own envoy in
Stanleyville, whose" long agony with the
rebels was climaxed when they forced
him to eat an American flag, declared,
after his rescue, that he believed the re-
bellion to be.purely" African, not Com-
munist, in character. His statement met
a response of stony silence from the
American press.
For the fact is that our embrace with
Moise Tshombe is popular in the United
States. We see him as a vociferous anti-
Communist. What matters, however, is
how the Africans see him. And African
animosity toward Tshombe is so intense
that he is even barred from associating
with other African leaders, having been
physically excluded from their meetings.
To them, he is the African equivalent
of an "Uncle Tom," a puppet" of the
imperialists who uses white mercenaries
to subdue his own countrymen. I doubt
that Tshombe will ever win African ac-
ceptance. Our involvement with him
serves only to turn the tide of African
opinion increasingly against us.
PART III. THE LESSON OF PAKISTAN
Regrettably, we are creating similar
problems for ourselves in Asia by the
same excess of interventionism. Paki-
stan is a classic example. At fantastic
cost, we undertook to enlarge and mod-
ernize the armed forces of Pakistan. Our
theory was that this assistance would
bolster the country's defenses against
Russia, but it was India, contesting with
Pakistan over Kashmir, which felt
threatened.
Still, we persisted. After all, was not
Ayub Khan, that strapping, Sandhurst-
educated army man, a ruddy good chap?
He had appeared before a joint session
of, the Congress, and addressed us in
the reassuring accents of a British coun-
try squire. On the Communist issue, the
Indians seemed much too conciliatory,
but we felt sure Ayub Khan could be de-
pended upon, come what may. He him-
self said so. To the Congress, he intoned:
Let me tell you, that if there is real
trouble, there is no other country in Asia on
whom you will be able to count. The only
people who will stand by you are the people
of Pakistan.
That is past history now. Having used
us for his purpose, Ayub Khan was the
first to flirt with Red China, when India
was attacked. The fervent courtship
of Pakistan only lost us favor there. In
the recent elections, the main issue be-
tween the two presidential candidates
was who was the most anti-American;
Ayub Khan won.
PART IV: OUR DILEMMA IN VIETNAM
To the case against excessive American
intervention in Africa and Asia, the State
Department has a stock answer: The
Communists will not let us quit. South
Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of
our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong
to overthrow the Saigon Government,
then the gates are open, so the argument
goes, to successful Communist subver-
sion of all the other governments in
southeast Asia.
But the hard fact is that there are
limits to what we can do in helping any
Government surmount a Communist up-
rising. If the people themselves will not
support the Government in power, we
cannot save it. We can give arms,
money, food, and supplies, but the out-
come will depend, in the final analysis,
upon the character of the Government
helped, and the extent to which the peo-
ple are willing to rally behind it.
The Saigon Government is losing its
war, not for lack of equipment, but for
lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong
grow stronger, not because they are bet-
ter supplied than Saigon, but because
they are united in their will to fight.
This spirit cannot be imported; it must
come from within. It is nothing that we
Americans can supply from our side of
the Pacific. The weakness in South Viet-
nam emanates from Saigon itself, where
we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite
the spoiling factions. A family feud is
never settled by outsiders. Only the
Vietnamese themselves can furnish the
solution.
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As to the other governments in south-
east Asia, t$ey are not so many dominoes
in a row. They differ, one from another,
in popular support, and in capacity to
resist Communist subversion. The Ma-
layans, with British help, because of their
own determined resistance to commu-
nism, successfully put down a long and
bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars-
even when nourished- from without-can
be won by sitting governments, but only
in countries where shelter for the enemy
is not furnished by the people themselves.
Our reason for being in the Orient is
not that of fashioning Asian govern-
ments. It is not communism, as such,
which accounts for our presence in the
Far East, but rather the containment of
Peiping. This can be best accomplished
if China is ringed with stable, independ-
ent governments, which refuse to be the
pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugo-
slavia has proved in Europe vis-a-vis
Russia, even a Communist government
can play such a role.
Due to the degree of our involvement
in the internal affairs of southeast Asia,
an area where China has been feared and
resisted for centuries, the Peiping gov-
ernmentis now able to pose as champion
of Asia for the Asians, defying the United
States in the name of opposing the re-
vival of Western imperialism.
Chou En-lai had reason to rub his
hands with glee when he said recently
to a foreign visitor :
Once we worried about southeast Asia. We
don't anymore. The Americans are rapidly
solving our problems for us,
It would be to our national advantage,
then, to seek an international agreement
for the neutralization of the whole great
region that used to be French Indochina.
The transitional phase of such a settle-
ment might be policed by the United Na-
tions, or by a special high commission
set up to preside over a cease-fire in
South Vietnam, to supervise the witll-
drawal of all foreign troops from both
sides, and to maintain order, while an in-
dependent and unalined new govern-
ment is formed by the Vietnamese them-
selves.
The neutrality of the whole region
could be guaranteed by the signatories
to the international agreement. Thus,
the military might of the United States
would remain available as a deterrent
against Chinese aggression from the
north, which is-or ought to be-our
governing national objective in south-
east Asia anyway.
In like manner, we may find It in our
national interest to pledge our armed
might behind the defense of India,
Thailand, or some other Asian govern-
ment, against any future Chinese attack,
that these governments might avoid the
need for developing nuclear shields of
their own, while we avoid the dangers of
further proliferation of nuclear arsenals.
This kind of guarantee, which would be a
real deterrent to Chinese military ag-
gression, lies within our capability, and
would preclude a power vacuum in Asia,
so feared by the architects of our present
policy. If this kind of defense commit-
ment is sufficient to prevent an overt
Chinese attack upon, say, India or
Thailand, it ought to suffice for therest
of southeast Asia as well.
To those who protest that such a
policy will fail to protect against growing
Chin a influence over such countries as
Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam,
brought on through intensified Com-
munist subversion from within these
countries, I submit that the scoreboard
on our present policy of direct interven-
tion in southeast Asia shows that we are
now losing , this contest. Burma and
Cambodia, though both non-Communist
Governments, have been moving steadily
closer to China. Laos is in limbo, after
an American involvement, at heavy cost,
in that country's internal affairs, turned
sour. The war in Vietnam, despite
Saigon's preponderant military advan-
tage, is going from bad to worse.
This somber truth is underlined in the
events of the past fortnight-the
stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon Amer-
ican bases in South Vietnam, and the
consequent loss of more American lives.
We must hope that our retaliatory bomb-
ings of military installations in North
Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the
strength of our will and purpose, may
persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the
United States is not, and never has been,
a paper tiger. Having made a solemn
commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep
It. The military might we can bring to
bear upon North Vietnam is formidable
indeed, and so it would behoove the
Communists to explore with us the way
to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.
As the beat of the war drums intensi-
fies, and passions rise on both sides, I
recognize that negotiation becomes more
difficult. Already cries of "appeasement"
are being directed at anyone who speaks
up for a negotiated settlement of this
escalating war. So soon the country
seems to have forgotten the wise words
of John F. Kennedy, that we should nev-
er negotiate out of fear, but never fear
to negotiate.
All of us recognize the heavy burden
of decision which our President bears.
And we would do well'to remember that
the seal of his office is an American eagle,
clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw
and an olive branch in the other. The
judicious use of both the arrows and the
olive branch represents our best hope for
avoiding a widening war in Asia.
Those who would use the arrows alone
are actually calling for war. The sys-
tematic and sustained bombing of North
Vietnam, unattended by any proffered
recourse to the bargaining table, can
only lead us into war. North Vietnam,
lacking air and sea power, must answer
on the ground. Her response, in the
form of added military pressures against
the south, Saigon can hardly be ex-
pected to withstand. As a consequence,
the next step will be to send American
land forces Into battle, thus converting
the struggle into an American war on
the Asian mainland. That China will,
sooner or later, enter such a war, I have
no doubt.
Let those who urge this course upon
us answer for its consequences. A
spreading war on the Asian mainland,
pitting American troops against Asian
troops, is a war we cannot finish. In
the end, after a tragic trail of casualties
out of all proportion to our real national
interest, we will have to negotiate a set-
tlement with the Communists, even as
such a truce was finally negotiated in
Korea. The question really is not
whether we should negotiate, but when.
To those who say that we must not
parley now, because we would bargain
from a position of weakness, I reply that
they take too restricted a view of our
strategic position in southeast Asia.
They look only to the plight of the war
in South Vietnam, forgetting that Amer-
ican power in southeast Asia rests not
upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon
the strength of our own possession of the
sea and air. Our recent retaliatory
blows should make it clear to Hanoi and
Peiping that we will not quit under fire,
nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist
coercion. We can strike back with rela-
tive impunity, from floating bases which
are beyond Communist reach, and in-
flict heavy punishment upon them. Ours
is not a position of weakness from which
to deal.
So I would hope that the President of
the United States will undertake to use,
not only his arrows, but his olive branch
as well. Willingness to parley is not a
sign of weakness, but the symbol of
strength, nor should it destroy what re.-
mains of the fighting morale of the
South Vietnamese. Negotiations pre-
ceded the end of the fighting in Korea
by nearly 2 years. In South Vietnam,
the active bargaining for a peaceful solu-
tion could even lift morale by offering
some hope to the people that there might
come an end to their ordeal. Moreover,
an attempt to reach a peaceful settle-
ment would not be incompatible with the
keeping of our pledge to give military aid
and advice to the Saigon Government.
PART V : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Although it is natural for our atten-
tion to be fixed upon the gathering crisis
in Vietnam, I nonetheless commenced
this address with the purpose of under-
taking a general review of American for-
eign policy throughout the whole of the
ex-colonial world. My tiiesis has been
that we have allowed ourselves to become
overinvolved in both Africa and Asia.
In saying this, I fully recognize that the
United States cannot withdraw to seek
refuge within some happy hunting
ground of our own choosing.
But it is mandatory, in these former
colonial areas, that we establish foreign
policy goals which are not beyond our
reach; that we observe priorities which
correspond with our real national in-
terests; that we concern ourselves less
with other peoples' ideologies, and that
we adopt techniques which are sensitive
to, and compatible with, the prevailing
sentiment of the people in each great
region of the world. Measured by these
criteria, we are too deeply involved in
the internal affairs of the emerging na-
tions in Africa and Asia.
I believe that President Johnson in-
tends, in a prudent and responsible way,
,to redress the balance. His emphasis on
attending to the neglected problems at
home in sensible. The longrun influ-
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ences we exert abroad will hinge, in large
measure, upon the kind of society we
build in our own land.
In any reappraisal of American foreign
policy in the underdeveloped world, so
recently freed from colonial bondage, we
would do well to recall the wise words of
President Kennedy, spoken in November
of 1961:
We must face the fact that the United
States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient,
that we cannot always impose our will on
the other 94 percent of mankind, that we
cannot right every wrong or reverse every
adversity, and that therefore, there cannot
be an American solution to every world
problem.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to, have printed in the RECORD the
following articles: Two excellent col-
umns written by James Reston and pub-
lished in the February 12 and February
14 issues of the New York Times, respec-
tively; and an article written by Mr.
Roscoe Drummond, captioned "Missing
Ingredient in Our Vietnam Policy," and
published in the Washington Post this
morning, February 17.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Feb. 12, 1965]
WASHINGTON: WHAT ARE OUR AIMS IN
VIETNAM?
(By James Reston)
WASHINGTON, February 11.-The first casu-
alty in every shooting war is commonsense,
and the second is free and open discussion.
An extraordinary situation now exists in
Vietnam. A conscripted American armed
force is now engaged in increasingly severe
air raids in North Vietnam without even a
speech by the President in explanation of his
present thinking on the crisis.
The big black limousines arrive and de-
part from the White House. Brief state-
ments are issued by press officers on the latest
military operations and casualties. Influen-
tial legislators express'the gravest apprehen-
sion in private about the trend of events, but
most of them remain silent on the floor of
Congress.
Meanwhile, the propaganda machine is be-
ginning to turn over, the the front pages are
filling up with pictures of the American
wounded and those almost meaningless
aerial photographs of villages burning in the
jungle.
THE AMBIGUITIES
This is no time to be dogmatic about what
should be done in Vietnam. Nobody but the
President and his most intimate advisers has
enough information about the situation in
Saigon, Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow to pass
judgment, and his advisers are deeply di-
vided on the best course of action.
But the least the President can do is to go
before the country and explain his objectives.
"There can be and there must be," he said
in a campaign speech on Vietnam last August
5-which is about the only speech he has
made on the subject-"no doubt about the
policy and no doubt about the purpose."
But there is doubt all over Washington to-
night about both America's policy and pur-
pose.
At various times we have been told that
our purpose was merely (I) to help the South
Vietnamese Government - help itself; and
then, again, it was (2) to defend the "vital
security interests" of the United States; (3)
to stop the Communist infiltration blow the
17th parallel; (4) to prevent the conquest
of all of southeast Asia from Chinese Com-
munist domination, and (5) to win a victory
over the aggressors.
SLOWDOWN OR SHOWDOWN?
Sometimes one of these quite different
aims has been given, sometimes another, and
in absence of an up-to-date explanation by
the President of where he is going now, there
is a babble of influential voices in Washing-
ton, some of them concerned to, avoid risk
of war with China and some insisting that
it is better to have a showdown with China
now than later when'she will be stronger.
There is widespread support here for a
policy of making clear to the Communists
that the United States cannot be attacked
with impunity and that the cost of a Com-
munist victory in South Vietnam would cost
the Communists more than it is worth.
It is also generally recognized in the capital
that the chaos in the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment was leading to a political collapse,
that that trend had to be reversed, and that
failure to punish the Communist aggressors
for hitting our bases would have been inter-
preted all over the world as a weakness that
would have demoralized the South Viet-
namese.
Accordingly, very few people here would
deny that the United States, as a result of
its limited policy of retaliation against bases
in the south of North Vietnam, has placed it-
self in a stronger position to negotiate a set-
tlement, but is this the President's purpose?
THE CHINA BORDER
Before long there will be few bases to bomb
in the south of Communist Vietnam. The
farther north we bomb, the closer we will
come to the Red China border and the great-
er will be the danger of a Communist Chi-
nese response, maybe in Vietnam, but also
maybe in Korea, where China's manpower
would be more effective.
"The Chinese people cannot stand idly
by," said Peiping 10 days after the American
Army crossed the 38th parallel in Korea in
1950, and we brushed it off in a mood very
similar to the mood here now. "The 650
million Chinese people," said Peiping again
this week, "will definitely not stand idly by
and are well prepared in this respect."
DON'T THINK: ACT
Despite the similarity of the two state-
ments, the risk of Chinese intervention is not
rated very high here, so long as the bombing
does not get close to the China border, but
as things now stand events are increasingly
deciding what we do, and the longer this
elaborate game of "chicken" goes on, the
farther north we are likely to go.
Even if we forget the Communist Chinese,
we are having a bad enough time with the
North Vietnamese guerrillas-a highly
trained but comparatively small force-but
what do we do if our bombings provoke the
regular North Vietnamese Army of a quarter
of a million men into an invasion of South
Vietnam against 23,000 "advisers"?
In such a situation it is easier to act than
think, and the satisfaction of acting is prob-
ably greater. A policy of retaliation to nego-
tiate from a position of strength and equali-
ty would be widely supported here, but we do
not know whether this is what the President
has in mind, and we do know that some of
his aids want far, far more.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 14, 1965]
WASHINGTON:. THE UNDECLARED AND
UNEXPLAINED WAR
(By James Reston)
WASHINGTON, February 13.-The time has
come to call a spade a bloody shovel. This
country is in an undeclared and unexplained
war in Vietnam. Our masters have a lot of
long and fancy names for it, like escalation
and retaliation, but it is war just the same.
The cause of the war Is plain enough. The
North Vietnamese Communists, with the aid
of Red China and to a lesser extent the So-
viet Union, have sent their guerrillas into
South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 and
2795
1962 Geneva agreements, for the express pur-
pose of taking over the Government and ter-
ritory of South Vietnam.
AMERICA'S RESPONSE
The course of the war is equally plain. We
were getting licked in South Vietnam. The
Communists were steadily defeating the
South Vietnamese armed forces, terrorizing a
war-weary and indifferent population, and
taking advantage of a divided and quarrel-
some South Vietnamese Government.
More than that, the Communists were
stepping up their attacks on the bases and
barracks which serve the 23,000 American
troops in South Vietnam, and it was in re-
sponse to this that President Johnson ordered
the bombing attacks on the Communist mili-
tary Installations in the south of North Viet-
namese territory.
Very few people here question the neces-
sity for a limited expansion of the war by
U.S. bombers into Communist territory. The
American and South Vietnamese position was
crumbling fast, and the political and strate-
gic consequences of defeat would have been
serious for the free world all over Asia.
There is a point, however, where this exer-
cise will become critical. As the military tar-
gets in the southern part of Communist Viet-
nam are knocked out, and our bombers move
northward, they will soon come within the
range of the North Vietnamese and Red
Chinese MIG fighters, and if we get into that
situation, the presure for attacks on the air
bases in North Vietnam and South China
will steeply increase.
The immediate problem, therefore, is how
to put enough pressure on the North Viet-
namese to bring them into negotiations for
a settlement of the war, without provoking
a mass Communist counterattack we are in
no position to meet.
This is a delicate and highly dangerous
situation. The United States has the air and
naval power to wipe out North Vietnam and
the Chinese Air Force, if it comes into the
battle. But the North Vietnamese have a
quarter of a million men under arms who
have never been committed to the battle at
all, and few observers in Washington believe
this force could be stopped without the in-
tervention of a very large American Army
on the ground.
THE SILENT WHITE HOUSE
Nobody has made all this clear to the
American people. President Johnson has not
made a major speech on the details of this
war since he entered the White House.
Neither did President Kennedy. We have
had one long speech on the subject by Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara on March 26 of
last year, and a lot of statements here and
in Saigon, many of them highly optimistic
and misleading. But the fact Is that we are
in a war that is not only undeclared and un-
explained, but that has not even been widely
debated in the Congress or the country.
The whole history of this century testifies
to the difficulty of predicting the conse-
quences of war. We imposed a policy of un-
conditional surrender on the Kaiser only to
find that the two greater menaces of commu-
nism and nazism took his place. One of the
main objectives of the two World Wars was
the freedom of Eastern Europe, which ended
up with less freedom under the Communists
than it had before.
LIMITING THE WAR
Few people here question that President
Johnson wants to limit the war in Vietnam
and avoid a ground war on the continent of
Asia, but the future is not wholly in his con-
trol. He may be bombing merely to force
a negotiated settlement, but the Chinese and
the North Vietnamese don't know that. In
fact, neither do the American people, whose
airmen are carrying out the President's
orders.
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Nor, for that matter, do the allies, who are
treaty bound to support us if we get into a
larger war in southeast Asia: They will un-
doubtedly support a policy of limited re-
taliation in North Vietnam if it is for the
purpose of negotiating a settlement, but they
will not support us for long unless we define
and limit our aims.
The implications of this war, then, extend
far beyond Vietnam. President Johnson's
hopes of building a strong alliance with
Japan and the other free nations of Asia
are not likely to be promoted by replaying
the old script of American planes once more
bombing Asians.
He has started on a massive program of
reconstruction and development at home, but
he can forget about his Great Society if he
gets bogged down in a major land war in
Asia on territory favorable to the enemy.
Freedom expands in peace and authoritarian
government in war, and this is precisely the
danger now, for the Communists have the
manpower to cause us an almost unmanage-
able situation not only in 'Vietnam but in
Korea, and force us into a war that could
divert our energies from the larger construc-
tive purposes of the Nation,.
In this situation it is difficult to under-
stand why the problem is not discussed more
openly by the President, why the terms of
an honorable settlement are not defined, and
why the negotiating efforts of the Secretary
General of the United Nations and other
world statesmen are so blithely brushed
aside.
It is true that the instability, weakness
and sensitivities of the South Vietnamese
Government have to be kept in mind but
nobody is suggesting a sellout at their ex-
pense. The talk here is not about a Munich
agreement but a Korean agreement in which
South Vietnam, like South Korea, would be
in. a better position to order its own life.
This would not be ideal, but it would be
better for the South Vietnamese and for the
United States than what we have now, and
it would be better for North Vietnam and
China than a larger war.
CHINA'S DANGER
For if this dangerous game gets out of
hand, it is not likely that China's new
industries, including her atomic installa-
tions at Takiamakan Desert in Central Sin-
kiang, will be spared. What her manpower
can grab beyond her borders would be worth
far less than what she would lose at home.
Somebody, however, has to make a move to
reverse the trend and stop the present
crooked course. For the moment, we seem
to be standing mute in Washington, para-
lyzed before a great issue, and merely dig-
ging our thought deeper into the accustomed
military rut.
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1965]
VIETNAM POLICY-THE MISSING INGREDIENT
(By Roscoe Drummond)
There is a missing ingredient in American
policy in Vietnam.
From everything which has been said-
and left unsaid-by the White House, the
evidence is that President Johnson:
Intends to step up the retaliation enough
to persuade North Vietnam that the aggres-
sion will be too costly to continue.
Wants to avoid intensifying it to the de-
gree that it will lead to all-out war.
In a word, if I read correctly Mr. John-
son's words and actions, they mean that the
United States alms to expand the war for a
limited purpose and to avoid expanding the
war beyond that purpose.
The purpose: to bring North Vietnam to
accept a settlement that would insure the
independence of South Vietnam, to which
Hanoi pledged itself in 1954 and again in
1962.
Has this riskful and delicate operation got
any fair chance of success?
It may have, but only if the missing in-
gredient is forthcoming at the right time.
The missing ingredient, which it seems
to me, must accompany new air thrusts
against North Vietnam, is a major U.B. peace
offensive, to make it clear that we seek only
an end to the aggression, that we have no
desire to inflict unnecessary blows, that our
sole objective is a settlement mutually toler-
able to both sides-whenever Hanoi will cease
and desist.
I am not talking about an appeasement
peace. There is no reason to believe the
White House has any such thing In mind.
But I am suggesting that, if the Johnson
aim of a controlled expansion of the fighting
as an essential persuader to Hanoi is to suc-
ceed, there must simultaneously be a peace
offensive to convince Hanoi that it has a
reasonable acceptable alternative to all-out
war.
More military action by itself could well
bring unlimited expansion of the war.
A peace offensive by itself could only bring
an intolerable appeasement.
Tpgether they make sense-and could
make headway toward the President's goal.
It is not likely that He Chi Minh and the
Vietcong would be persuaded by either war
action or peace action alone. The reason
Is that Hanoi and Peiping have long been
convinced that the United States would not
have the will and the patience to hang on,
that the South Vietnamese Government was
getting weaker, and that it would be foolish-
for them-to give away at the conference
table what they felt sure they were winning
on the battlefield.
No wonder Ho Chi Minh has shown no in-
terest In negotiation. For months we have
talked stronger than we have acted. We
have warned-and done little. We have con-
ferred with ourselves-and done little. Now
we are beginning to act more meaningfully.
But to bring North Vietnam to the con-
ference table will take more than the few
retaliations we have lately made. It will
undoubtedly take persistent and heavy mili-
tary pressure from the air and naval re-
sources we have mobilized in the area. If
Ho Chi Minh is to be persuaded to accept
anybody's invitation to the conference table,
it will have to be made clear that the only
practical choice is between ending the war
or suffering widespread devastation.
It is profoundly riskful to think we can
expand the war in Vietnam and control its
expansion at the same time. We -must do
it with our eyes open.
The only way this can be done with the
least risk is to mount a peace offensive which
would make our purpose clear and credible
to allies and enemies alike.
My assumption is that such plans are well
advanced within the Johnson administra-
tion and that the President is waiting for
the proper time.
Mr. McGOVERN obtained the floor.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from South Dakota yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield, without los-
ing my right to the floor.
Mr. DIRKSEN. I wish to say to the
distinguished Senator from Idaho that
I had hoped to address some remarks to
the Senate sometime today in response
to his address. I doubt whether, within
the compass of time and the duties still
before me, I shall have the opportunity
to do so. However, I trust that there
may be an opportunity tomorrow to re-
spond to some portions of the Senator's
address.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
from Illinois for his comment. I shall
look forward with interest to whatever
he may say on the subject tomorrow.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I com-
mend the Senator from Idaho on his
statement. I say to the distinguished
minority leader, for whatever it is worth,
that, not on the high level he occupies,
but on the very low level of my own
status here, I hope to respond yet this
evening to this very excellent discussion
of policy, with which I take some issue,
and that I shall await with eagerness the
comments of the Senator from Illinois
tomorrow, because his comments are
often of great guidance to us who indulge
in discussions of this type.
Mr. DIRKSEN. My friend from Wyo-
ming must never demean his position or
prestige, because, in my judgment, he
occupies a high plateau and a place of
high confidence in these great halls. I
am always prepared to listen to him with
the greatest of circumspection and hu-
mility.
I often sit at his feet to listen, know-
ing, of course, that he has occupied high
places on a university faculty and has
given much time during his life to a
study of historic trends. So I am con-
fident that I can listen and learn.
Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator from
Illinois for his comments. Probably I
should quit while I am ahead. However,
for the RECORD, I wanted to have an un-
derstanding. Do I correctly understand
that the Senator from South Dakota in-
tends to project his thoughts, roughly
along the same line, and that it might
be to the advantage of the discussion If
I were to withhold my questions and
my comments until, perhaps, his remarks
were also a part of the RECORD?
Mr. McGOVERN. I plan to speak for
12 or 15 minutes. If the Senator from
Wyoming wishes to make his remarks
first, I shall be glad to defer to him.
Mr. McGEE. In the interest of being
orderly and talking about the same sub-
ject, so that we shall not have to switch
back and forth, as if we were watching
a tennis match, it might be better if
both speeches were in the RECORD.
Mr. CHURCH. I am advised by the
senior Senator from Missouri that he
wishes to ask a question or two. Then I
shall be happy to yield the floor, unless
the Senator wishes to propound ques-
tions to the distinguished Senator from
South Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair has recognized the Senator from
South Dakota.
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield to the
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator
from South Dakota.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Idaho yield for a
question?
Mr. CHURCH. I shall be happy to
yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. First, although it
has not been possible. for me to be in the
Chamber during all of the Senator's re-
marks, I am pleased to have had the
opportunity to read his thought-provok-
ing address. I hope that every Member
of the Senate will also read it.
The question I should like to ask is one
to which I am sure the distinguished
Senator has given much attention in con-
structing the philosophy that he has so
ably presented this evening; that is,
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 !965
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exactly what does he think we can do
'rom the standpoint of relative disen-
;agement in South Vietnam as against
maintaining the status quo or moving
more definitely to the north?
Mr. CHURCH. First, I should say
that I have not advocated withdrawal
from South Vietnam or any repudiation
of the pledges we have made to the
Saigon government. In every instance
that I have spoken on this subject, I have
tried, at least, to make it clear that this
country keeps its commitments, and that
the United States, under mounting Com-
munist pressure, ought not to withdraw
from South Vietnam.
I have also spoken up on several oc-
casions in support of the action that
President Johnson has taken in order-
ing bombings in retaliation for the in-
creased attacks upon American per-
sonnel.
As a prelude to the response that I
shall make to the Senator, let me again
say that I support the President in what
he has done thus far.
When the President ordered these
bombings, clearly his action was intended
to demonstrate the strength of Amer-
ican will and purpose. It was intended
to show Hanoi and Peiping that the
United States is not a paper tiger, and
that we will not be forced out of South
Vietnam by stepped-up Communist
coercion.
The necessary correlate to this posi-
tion, it seems to me, is a willingness to
make clear to the world the conditions
for peace in southeast Asia. We should
define with clarity and precision what
our objectives are in being there. I sub-
mit, with all deference to the State De-
partment, that there has not yet been
a consistent, clear-cut definition of the
American purpose. The confusion has
been compounded by conflicting state-
ments as to our purpose.
If our objective is to immunize south-
east Asia from Chinese interest or activ-
ity, to dam off this part of the world from
what has traditionally been a sphere of
influence for China, then I say that our
goal is unrealistic and foredoomed to
failure, in the long course of events.
China is the biggest power in Asia. It
is a dominant force. China desires to
reestablish a sphere of influence in
southeast Asia like that she maintained
under the Chinese emperors.
able to determine what the character of
these governments will be. I do not be-
lieve that this matters so much as the
independence of those governments.
Therefore, I should think that it would
be in the interest of the United States
to begin to do in Asia what we have long
been doing in Europe-recognizing that
the satellite countries are restless, that
they are not all alike, not dominated by
the Kremlin to the same degree. We
are watching each one working its way
out from under the Kremlin's grip, rec-
ognizing that Tito's Yugoslavia is, in
fact, largely independent from the direc-
tion and control of Russia.
I cannot see why, in the face of what
has happened to the Communist satel-
lites in Europe, the same experience will
not also occur in Asia. Therefore, I
should like, in answer to the question of
the senior Senator from Missouri, to
state that the struggle in southeast Asia
is one which eventually must find a polit-
ical, rather than a military, settlement.
In a widened military involvement, we
can lose many men. We lost 157,000,
dead and wounded, in Korea. The fight-
ing cost us $18 billion. But, in the end,
we had to go to the conference table.
There had to be a political settlement.
So it is with southeast Asia.
So, I should hope that our Government
would make clear that a peaceful settle-
ment is our objective in southeast Asia;
that we are willing to consider-either
through the intervention of the United
Nations, or through another Geneva
Conference-the prospects for a political
solution in southeast Asia which would
neutralize the area and provide for the
orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops.
We could guarantee the integrity of that
neutrality with the full strength of
American might. This would be using
American military power in a way that
as a deterrent to Chi-
effective
ld b
,
cou
e
nese encroachment upon her neighbors. army that refused to fight. The war in
I submit that our present policy, on Laos was going against us. In another
the scoreboard, is not one to give us 60 days, the country would have fallen
reassurance, for Chinese hegemony grows into the lap of the Communists. Presi-
in southeast Asia every day. dent Kennedy took us to the Geneva
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will conference table. Today, there is no
the Senator yield? one, including our Ambassador in Saigon,
Mr. CHURCH. I yield. who does not say that the situation in
Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the Laos, after the neutralization worked out
lucid presentation of the senior Senator at the Geneva conference table, is better
from Idaho on the subject. I mentioned than it what can be done Kist is an indica-
before that I think he has made a mag- tiations.
niflcent address. Mr. SYMINGTON. The only reason I
I am looking for some practical ap-
plications of his concept. For example, am asking the question is that I am very
I would like to see more trade and less much impressed with the statement of
aid as an American policy. I mentioned my friend and colleague on the Foreign
earlier today that when I asked the for- Relations Committee. Would the Sena-
mer Secretary of Commerce, Mr. tor think of starting with a conference
Hodges, and the present Secretary of the at Geneva; and if so, who should be at
Treasury, Mr. Dillon, if they knew of the bargaining table?
any highly developed country in the free Mr. CHURCH. These are matters
world, that was not doing its best to get which should be left to the President,
as much trade as possible from behind of necessity. We entered f failurei when
If we were to say that it is American
policy-if it were in fact our purpose-
to immunize southeast Asia from Chinese
influence, this is a policy which will not
succeed. It runs contrary to the physi-
cal power relationships in Asia. It would
be as though the Chinese were to say to
us, "Quit trying to assert a dominant
American Interest in Mexico." I do not
believe this is the policy. Rather, our
purpose in Asia, is the containment of
We went back to Western Eu-
China.
rope to prevent further Russian expan-
rope
sion. Our presence in Asia is related to
,
sa
Now, the best way to contain the power South I
m ate But what
of Peiping is to ring China with hnde- other reasons, was not trying to improve wou ti have the President Vietnam
pendent, stable governments. I do not its trade position.
think that, in the long run, we shall be I also mentioned that I felt trade was the prerequisites might be for going to
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the Iron Curtain, both in exports to those over Laos at the pom
countries and imports from them. They continuation of the war would have
that our country was the meant a Communist seizure of the coun-
both
id no
'mila.r
perhaps the best way in which to obtain
a better understanding between nations,
and the normal relationship between
businessmen who are looking forward to
an arrangement that both sides consider
satisfactory.
It is a little ridiculous for us to keep
nearly a million military people, counting
their dependents, living in Germany, as
we have for so many years. We should,
in the interest of our balance-of-pay-
ments problem, withdraw a large number
of those people. I am confident that
would not affect anything from the
standpoint of our commitments.
But what I would like to ask my able
friend from Idaho is, What does he think
would be the best specific course that we
could take at this time in South Viet-
nam? If I have any disagreement with
him, it is over the statement that the
President should emphasize his desire
for peace. I am sure the Senator agrees
that the President has emphasized his
desire for peace in that part of the world,
as well as all other parts of the world.
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is cor-
rect. My point is that we should ac-
company the stepped-up military moves
with a peace initiative, making clear
what we regard the essential prerequi-
sites to be for an acceptable political
settlement that will bring peace to
southeast Asia and provide for an inde-
pendent and unalined Vietnam.
The Senator knows it is not possible
for any Member of the Senate to specify
the exact form that our proposal might
take or what we might finally agree to
at the conference table.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The question I
wish to ask the distinguished Senator is
what bargaining table he has in mind,
and where.
Mr. CHURCH. I cite the fact that we
went to Geneva over Laos. We had
spent $325 million to build a Laotian
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 1;
the bargaining table. I am not in a ready to fight now if the Russians in- trouble with his statement that I have
position to specify these conditions on tended to try to move into those areas. with statements made by the state De-
the Senate floor, which only the Presi- We made it unalterably clear that that partment on the situation in southeast
dent and the, Secretary of state could was our position. The consequence was Asia. There were very good reasons for
properly undertake to do, but I am sure that the Russians backed off. the success of our containment policy
they would do it in a manner safe- Two years earlier, we did the same in Europe. I believe it is important to
guarding American interests. thing in Greece where, it is true, the draw a sharp distinction between Europe
We have had several opportunities. Government did not have the support of and southeast Asia, and not to paint the
Mr. U Thant has urged using the good the people. For the most part, Greece picture in broad-brush strokes, as
offices of the United Nations in seeking was in the throes of a civil war, on a though there were no difference between
a solution of the Vietnam issue. Presi- considerably higher level than the one Western Europe and Russian expan-?
dent de Gaulle has made suggestions, now going on in Vietnam, but civil war, sionism after World War II, and the
I am sure other opportunities will arise, nonetheless, kind of problem we are facing in the
because neither side can win a clean The question that took first priority jungles of Vietnam today.
victory in southeast Asia, and neither was the encroachment from the north I suggest that the difference is as great
side really wants war. Korea was a les- of Communist forces across the border. as that between Western Europe and
son for all. There was no victory for We had to back not the good guys but southeast Asia in terms of the people.
us in Korea. Neither would there be the bad guys in Greece-to put It simply of values, of governmental systems, and
from widening the war in southeast Asia, in the vernacular. We did not back the of outlook. Therefore, to say that this
In a situation where both sides stand to people. We backed the monarchy; we is all one big problem, and that the
lose so much in a war which neither backed those who happened to be in the same policy of containment that worked
wants, it seems to me the opportunity driver's seat at that moment. We took 15 years ago in Europe is going to work
is ripe to reach a political settlement, a chance on Greece raising its level of in southeast Asia today is, to me, a
to use the olive branch of the Presi- economy and in improving the quality fundamental error.
dential Seal, even as we use the arrows, of its own government. It was a case The reason why our policy has failed
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sena- of putting first things first. As a result to produce the desired results In so many
tor for his kindness in listening to my of the strong position which we made parts of Asia and Africa is that there Is
questions. clear was ours in Greece, the Russians so different an attitude in Africa and
Mr. CHURCH. I thank the senator backed off. Asia toward the Western World.
for asking them. I submit that the analogy Is now These continents have just emerged
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the valid in Vietnam. It has been valid all from centuries of colonial bondage. I
Senator yield on that point? along. It was valid when we went in, served in Burma, in India, and in China
Mr. CHURCH. I yield. immediately after 1954. To complete during the war. The only common link
Mr. McGEE. First, I would make a the point in Vietnam, what worked among the people I encountered was their
matter of public record the fact that the under the Communist pressure from great resentment of the white man.
Senator from Idaho and I learned many Moscow in 1946, 1947, and 1948, has to These factors, which count for so much
of these lessons together, side by side, work in different terms, but still work in Asia, were not present in Europe.
in the countries that seem to be having now-that is we must make it clear There, we Americans were, more or less,
so much trouble. that in Vietnam, much as we would like of the same family. We were part of the
Mr. CHURCH. In connection with an to see a different government and even same mainspring of Western civilization.
article of mine that was published ffi a democratic government for them, the We had cultural values, economic and
the New York Times Magazine on Sun- first thing we insist upon is that there
political day, there is a picture In which the Sena- be no additional encroachment by forces we shared systems ,
a co m a com repugnan sufficiently ance a so coa om-mon tor from Wyoming appears with the from the north. me a not believe t
, or
Senator from Idaho, taken in Vietnam. I believe that the moment we try to lop Afr riiccannr. I As antians f feel thl the It follows
I do not want that picture to implicate the whole area into the category of a see communism As light same way, o
the Senator from Wyoming in the article discussion, we then are daring to negoti- do. I bellieviev that the e same actor that we
or in the views I am expressing this af- ate the status of the line that really was fu e these factors are n
ternoon. a sacred line in Germany, in Berlin, and fundamental that they must be taken
Mr. McGEE. Basically, it comes as a in Greece. Policy Into to account be if an formulated for intelligent American
Mr. of compliment to the Senator There should be the same sacred line a par par of world so different
from Wyoming in view of the high level In Vietnam. Even though we went to The Senator e .
of the remarks submitted by the Senator the conference table, after the fighting the line in South states that Vietnam we the mesa draw
the
I
from Idaho. Our experiences together in Korea, we drew a line that was con- was drawn in Europe. way if
in Africa, Asia, and Saigon in particular, sistent with our purpose-respecting the had a waas better idea a of exactly I say that if
have deeply affected the thinking of both agreement that had already been jective southeast Asia, I woe our ave
of us. reached there; and we stabilized the a better r basis for ea is in ior evaluating Asia, would have
our policy.
picture even though it involved the So would the Senator or from Wyoming
The real point of my interruption is to So address myself to the excellent state- presence of American troops. But a di- [Mr. McGEE], so would the Senator from
ment the Senator has made in regard vided Korea, two Berlins, two Germanys, South Dakota [Mr. McGovERN], and so
to why we are in Vietnam. Why are we two Chinas, and two Vietnams seem to would the people of the United States
there as compared to the situation in be our starting place, and not our negoti- who will have to fight, should it come to
Western Europe, when, after the war, we able area.
were all eager to go home? We were de- For that reason, I suggest that the that.
termined to contain the Russians. We Senator's wise drawing of the issue in fronted d with that in Vietnam we are con .
had the courage to prevent the Russians Europe and in stopping Russian com- Everyone wi who a writes different about kind it, , problem.
from moving ahead. The Senator munism pertains equally in the drawing agrees to
Pointed out that there is a difference be- of the line in southeast Asia. this.
tween Vietnam and Western Europe, the Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in re- there. the moment not the ome down are not
difference being in the sophistication of sponse to the very able statement of theirThey have come down with
their armies. They have not dropped
the people. Those people are capable of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. the Bamboo Curtain on southeast Asia
a correct assessment of the situation. McGEE], let me say, first of all, that
But what I think he suggests is that I fear it illustrates the danger of argu- and backed it up with Chinese divisions.
when the chips were down in Western ment by analogies which really are not North The war in Vietnam and Vietnam has South V been
nietnaatweeo
we did not say: "This is a matter based upon the same underlying facts. m, to
of interest to us. We are ready to flight, It also tends to point up the need for determine
and under nd hus nfar, the what kind kind of will v-
but let us sit down and talk about it." a more precise reunited, the cgm-
Instead, we served notice on Moscow objectives Inutheast Asia. of American batants is have T been South most of t Vietnamese.
that starting in Western Europe, with I say with all deference to the Sena- The Pro-Communist South Vietnamese,
West Germany and in Berlin, we were tor from Wyoming that I have the same called the Vietcong, and the anti-Com-
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 1965-
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munist South Vietnamese, rallied-if
that is not too strong a word--around
whatever government is sitting in Saigon.
It has been essentially a civil war, even
though aided and abetted from the north.
What north are we talking about?
We are talking about Hanoi. The most
significant help Peiping has given, thus
far, is some Mig fighters, sent down re-
cently. Most of the Chinese participa-
tion, so far, has been verbal service to
the cause. There has been some instruc-
tion on the art of guerrilla warfare, but
the Chinese are not there in any physical
sense, certainly not to the same degree
that we are there in a physical sense.
This is essentially a war among the Viet-
namese.
I submit to the Senator from Wyoming
that the Chinese doubtlessly desire the
communization of Vietnam, but the
method is insurrection, and the people
involved in that subversive effort are
Vietnamese:
If we believe that a white Western na-
tion can intervene and take over this
kind of war, convert it into an American
war, and then settle it in any durable
way, I simply disagree.
There are limits to what we can do in
assisting a country which is gripped in
insurrection involving brother against
brother. .,
Since there 'are limitations, let us rec-
ognize them. Let us define our goals.
Let us decide what we are really out to
do. Then let us see if that can be done
through the processes of negotiation.
I have tried to make it clear that, in
gaining this objective, American power
must be brought to bear. I have en-
dorsed what the President has done in
his use of American power. I believe a
'widening war may be averted through
the judicious use of power, and with a
policy that clearly undertakes to mark
the course to the bargaining table, where
we can ascertain whether or not our ob-
jectives can be attained.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield further?
Mr..CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. NfcGEE.. The Senator from Idaho
this
is, so eloquent and well informed on
question that I am reluctant even to Before we can talk or negotiate, we South Dakota waiting, which has not
press the matter further. I believe he must make certain that there is no equiv- been fair to him, I should like to yield
makes an excellent point when. he says ocation about where we stand and about to him now so that he can deliver his
that communism in Asia and in Africa is where we have drawn the line. speech. Then I shall be happy to re-
a far different thing to these people than President Kennedy said that we can main to discuss these questions further
it was to the residents of Western Eu- always negotiate freely, but we must not with the Senator from Wyoming after
rope. I believe we would all get closer to negotiate freedom. the Senator from South Dakota has con-
the nub of the real problem that faces us I believe, this must be the issue laid eluded.
now in Asia if we would not talk so much down on the firming of the line on this The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
about communism and talk more about the last segment of a power vacuum in Senator from South Dakota is recog-
power politics. the world. Then we shall be in a posi- nized.
Mr. CHURCH. I agree with the tion to start talking about the kind of Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the
Senator. world we want. Senator from South Dakota yield to me
Mr. McGEE. Herein we find the ex- Mr. CHURCH. In response to for 1 minute?
planations not only for the American Mr. McGEE. May I finish? As we Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield
presence, but ' the goal that should' draw that line, we are only completing to the Senator from Wyoming.
epitomize the American past the sequence of the policy bases and the Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Idaho
In the wake of World War II, if I may power commitments for the benefit of a has given a great deal of thought to the
submit the historical parallel, the nations balance in the world that-was begun back subject, as I have also. I shall have
of the world fell into the throes of the in 1946. I believe the price we have al- some additional suggestions to make for
same, historic conflict that followed in ready paid for this opportunity ought to discussion purposes which I believe will
the wake of nearly every one of the great give us pause about slowing down-until meet the kind of objections that he has
wars of history, and that is to put back we have fully reconstituted the balance raised, or answer the serious questions
together again the pieces and to recon- in the world. that he has posed and which bother him
4titute some kind of accepted balance of I believe that the condition of the at the present time. I wish only to ex-
power as mans' only substitute for con- Vietnamese people, and the direction in press the hope that no one will leave out
tinuing war up to this time. which their future may be going, are of any calculation the idea what we are
World War II was especially harsh on
the conventional balance of power. Not
only had three nations gone down to de-
feat; namely, Italy, Germany, Japan,
but even two of the victorious powers
were so strapped by the war that they
could not continue their historic rela-
tionships. I speak, of course, of our al-
lies, France and England.
Nonetheless it behooves us to do what
we can, as one of the allies, one of the
victors, to try to reconstitute a balance
that will be as favorable to our common
cause as possible. That is what has been
taking place since 1945. That is what
happened in Berlin, in West Germany, in
Greece, and around the globe, to such
an extent that it is possible to draw a
firm line all the way from Finland, down
across Eastern Europe, across Greece and
Turkey, Iraq and Iran, Pakistan and
India, all the way to the China Sea, ex-
cept for the embarrassing fluid gap that
still exists. Neither side has been able
to firm up conditions in southeast Asia.
What I am saying to the Senator is not
that I disagree with the imperativeness
of negotiation; but I believe in negotia-
tion at the right time, and that now is
not that time.
We must close the last remaining gap.
Although conditions in Vietnam are en-
tirely different in many ways than they
were in Europe or than they are in Latin
America or anywhere else, the one thing
that is present that was present in
Europe and is present in the other areas
around the fringe of either Soviet im-
perialistic design or of the Chinese is.
sheer political calculation.
It should have been spelled out before
this time, for in my judgment, if we,
through a policy of hesitation, or a policy
of premature negotiation, make it pos-
sible for the Chinese, as a case in point,
to move into southeast Asia, however
surreptitiously, we jeopardize the politi-
cal balance in the world.
That empire in southeast Asia is the
last large resource area outside the con-
trol of any one of the major powers on
the globe. In the hands of one it be-
comes a power calculation that can up-
2799
at this stage secondary, not primary. I
believe that is where we become con-
fused. We must keep first things first,
as we did in Greece in the civil war there.
Mr. CHURCH. The Senator intends
to speak later in further extension of
his thoughts. I merely wish to restate
briefly what I have said. I understand
the Senator from South Dakota [Mr.
McGovERN] has been waiting patiently
to make his speech; and other Senators
may wish to speak also.
China is not now in Vietnam-either
In North Vietnon or in South Vietnam.
We are now demonstrating the strength
of the American position in southeast
Asia stemming from our domination of
the air and the sea. . Therefore, I do
not believe that we would negotiate from
weakness.
The danger of using our military
strength alone and extending the bomb-
ing northward, unaccompanied by any
preferred recourse to the bargaining
table, can lead only to a worsening
situation.
Once the bombing goes further north,
the danger increase- that North Vietnam
must respond; and the only means she
has is on the ground. Saigon is obviously
too weak to withstand such further
pressures. So the demand will follow
for American ground troops. The last
time we had a similar experience, this
led to Chinese involvement. We can go
down that road again, with all the at-
tendant pain, cost, and tragedy. But,
in the end, we shall come back to the
conference table, as we did in Korea,
with China as well as North Vietnam to
contend with; and large parts of south-
east Asia in Chinese occupation.
That kind of situation would not auger
well for a satisfactory settlement. I
disagree with the Senator from Wyoming
when he' says that we should wait until
some time later, until after the military
situation has changed. It seems to me
that, given a spreading war, the military
situation will only worsen. So, I think
we should combine our military effort
in South Vietnam with an indicated will-
ingness to negotiate.
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D - SENATE February 1-/
talking about is Hanoi, and that the in the final analysis, it is their war. They are the wider war that has been American policy
Chinese mainland and Government are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We and interest to avoid. As we retaliate
not specifically involved. We know that can help them, we can give them equipment, against stronger Vietcong activity in South
China has not joined its armies with the we can send our men out there as advisers, Vietnam with heavier and deeper aerial at-
Vietcong yet. but they have to win it-the people of Viet- tacks upon North Vietnam, we extend an
Mr. CHURCH. China is indeed the na n--against the Communists. We are pre- ever more pressing invitation for the Chin-
reason for Or pared to continue to assist them, but I don't ese Communists to intervene forcibly. To
presence in southeast think that the war can be won unless the say that they will not do so is to forget that
Asia. I have expressed doubts as to people support the effort. this country made just such a misjudg-
whether our policy is properly directed And on August 12, 1965, President ment in Korea.
toward the effective containment of Johnson described the primer _ The problem is not that we couldn't win
Peiping. The Chinese involvement in y pattern a war against China. We have the power to
southeast Asia could become a great deal of our effort over the last 10 years: in it. But for what purpose? It would
worse than it is today. First, that the South Vietnamese have the involve us massively in a remote area of
I yield than the odnator~from Wyoming. basic responsibility for the defense of their the world where our national interest and
own freedom. security are not involved in any paramount;
Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator degree. It would risk the danger of nuclear
from South Dakota for his indulgence. When we first agreed to help South war-for the Soviet Union, whatever its dif-.
Mr. McGOVERN. It has been a great Vietnam, French armies had just suf- ferences with China, could not long stand by
educational experience on the part of fered a disastrous defeat at Dienbienphu. without at least material aid to the Com-?
the Senator from South Dakota. Before After spending an estimated $8.5 billion, munist side.
I begin my remarks, I should like to yield after committing more than 400,000 first- The dangers are too great and the goals
briefly to the Senator from Wisconsin. rate soldiers, and after suffering 240,000 too unimportant for us to push on into full.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I com- casualties, the French learned it is al- strong scale warwill . It and is not erm if we had allies of
mend the Senator from Idaho for an ex- most impossible to win a jungle war in TSouth th Vietnamese as a at our side.
The
in whole do not.
ceptionally fine speech. This is a most Asia, except at incredible cost. As the have their hearts rts in this a this enterprise. Our
thoughtful presentation by a practical, Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRICHTI, European allies do not believe that we be-
hardheaded Internationalist. The Sen- chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- long in southeast Asia.
ator from Idaho vigorously supports our mittee, recently told the Senate, most We are like a musclebound giant being
position in the world as the defender of responsible American officials realize besieged by gnats. We have overwhelming
freedom. He speaks as one who seeks that "it would be very unwise under any power but no way or reason to use it. The
to strengthen our role and improve our circumstances to put a large land army war is realy a grueling ground action in the
position in international affairs. on the Asian Continent." j uHens and rice paddies.
His words are a refreshing and Our national policy has been to help Vietnam, argues thatoretaliation ~against
thoughtful contribution to the dialog with advice and material, but not to sub- North Vietnam is proper when we are at-
on our role in Vietnam. stitute our forces for those of the South tacked but it cannot win the war. He thinks
I shall not attempt to elaborate on Vietnamese Government, nor to join it is impossible to seal the borders of South
the thoughts expressed by him. He cov- with them in a land war, nor to fight Vietnam. He told U.S. News & World Re-
eved that ground thoroughly enough. their war for them. Our military per- port that "even if you had a 100-percent
in 't
u could bombing win supply lines I stnl don th
However, one aspect of this continuing sonnel in Vietnam number only 24,000. think yo
and ever-changing dialog on our role in Based on our experience of 10 years in Vietnam on this struggle in south
by just doing that."
Vietnam is worthy of attention. That Vietnam it clearly would be folly to ex- Where do we go from here? Logically to
aspect is: What is the Conception of our pand our mission or the original concept a negotiated settlement. Lodge sees little
presence in South Vietnam? and, should of our involvement. When we became possibility of this, but this country certainly
we change it? engaged there in 1954 I do not think any- should not be reluctant to say that it is
Increasingly, in recent months, we one expected we would still be there in ready to seek a settlement at the conference
have heard the voices of many who 1965. Certainly we do not intend to stay table. Nothing could be lost by recalling
seem to have the view that the war there there until 1975. At some stage we must the Geneva pact powers for negotiation. Pr de
is in fact our war and that we should and make a decision on whether it is possible that tisout ea s Gaulle Asia ais
shou ld ld right when he says
tha neutral zone
must make the necessary investment of to achieve our original objective. The and that hat steps should be taken now to that
men and material to win at whatever the accumulated evidence indicates we can- end.
cost. not. If this is correct it is in our national Certainly Russia wants no war. In all
If that is our mission there, as some self-interest to seek ways and means of probability China doesn't, and North Viet-
seem to believe, the rules of the game negotiating a constructive settlement. nam certainly doesn't want Chinese soldiers
have been rather dramatically changed. The President, of course, is in the best in its territory. A negotiated peace is vital.
I do not think our mission has been position to make the necessary tactical It is the only alternative now to expanding
changed and I do not think it should be. judgments to accomplish this end. war. And peace must remain our goal.
From the very beginning of our in- Whatever the final result in South Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator
volvement it has been clear that our Vietnam I think it is a necessary part of from South Dakota.
mission is a very limited one. Three the educational process for us as Ameri- Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
Presidents have clearly stated the propo- cans to recognize that in our relatively Senate and the entire Nation is indebted
sition that our role is simply to give aid new role as leader of the free world we to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH]
and technical advice with the objective will be continually engaged in difficult for the high level foreign policy debate
of helping establish an independent, risks and gambles In remote spots all that he has introduced in the Senate to-
viable regime that is capable of manag- over the globe. We will in the future as day. The Senate has a constitutional
ing its own affairs. we have in the past take many risks in responsibility for the conduct of foreign
On October 23, 1954, when President which the chances of success are much policy and in a dialog with the Presi.
Eisenhower first offered aid to Vietnam, less than 50-50. The fact that we gamble dent of the United States. We violate
]le stated: in behalf of freedom some place and lose not only our constitutional responsibil-
The purpose of this offer is to assist the does not mean we should not have tried. ity; but, beyond that, we jeopardize the
Government of Vietnam in developing and If we never take any risks for fear of national interest when we remain silent
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable losing, we will never lose anything except at a time of great significance to the
of resisting attempted subversion or aggres- our leadership of the free world. Nation in terms of our relations with
sion through military means, The Govern- Mr. President, I have in my hand a very other countries.
ment of the United states expects that this thoughtful editorial published in the Mil- I cannot think of any time in recent
aid will be met by performance on the part waukee Journal. I ask unanimous con- years when we have been confronted
of the Government of Vietnam in undertak- sent that it be printed in the RECORD.
ing needed reforms. There bei with more
icy thlwe changes in the field very
ng no objection, the editorial On September 2, 1963, President Ken- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, hour. oolicy than are at this very
nedy reaffirmed this policy: as follows: could hurrender The greatest
to o the disservice Senator
tho,
e President of as ; . '
I don't think that unless a greater effort NEGOTIATE Now IN VIETNAM United States and to the country aS
is made by the Government to win popular There is no future in what has been hap- whole would be to remain silent at a time-.
support that the war can be won out there. pening the last few days in Vietnam except when we have an especially urgent re-
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sponsibility to share'our views and our
convictions on important issues that
might affect the future of our country
and the peace of the world. So every
citizen of our country is indebted to the
Senator from Idaho, a thoughtful and
realistic member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, for giving us the ben-
efit of his views today on important sub-
jects affecting not only the continents
of Africa and Asia, but also our own
security. I commend him for that, and
for many other helpful initiatives that
he has taken in the field of foreign
policy.
I say the same thing to the Senator
from Wyoming, who has helped to con-
duct the debate and the dialog today
in a constructive manner. We all look
forward to his further remarks, as well
as to the dissenting views that have been
promised by the distinguished minority
leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr.
DIRSSEN], tomorrow. These differences
of opinion and their expression on the
floor of the Senate are helpful not only
in clarifying our own views, but also in
broadening the area of operations of our
President at this very difficult time.
I wish to make it very clear that my
position with regard to negotiation in
South Vietnam is exactly the same, as I
understand it, as the position of the Sen-
ator from Idaho. It has been interesting
that this week the American people have
indicated in a Gallup poll that by a mar-
gin of more than 60 percent they support
the retaliatory air strikes ordered by the
President. But those same people, less
than 3 weeks ago, indicated by an amaz-
ing percentage of 81 percent that they
also favor an initiative by the President
of the United States in arranging a con-
ference of southeast Asia, China, and
other interested powers to see if some
includes the government of mainland side support. The guerrilla strength is
China. strongest a thousand miles away from
In the Gallup poll of January 31, the the North Vietnam border. If the guer-
people were asked: rillas do not always enjoy the cooperation
Do you favor efforts by President Johnson of the general populace in South Viet-
to arrange a conference with leaders of nam, neither do they seem to encounter
southeast Asia, Including China, to see if a much grassroots resistance.
peace agreement can be worked out? This is basically a political fight, as
It is interesting to me to observe that
81 percent of the American people said
that that was what they favored. Eleven
percent dissented. Eight percent had no
opinion. I cannot recall any controver-
sial foreign policy in recent years in
which 81 percent of the people lined up
on either side.
Public opinion expression ought to be
considered carefully by our policymakers
in the State Department and elsewhere
throughout the Government.
President Johnson has consistently
acted with restraint in Vietnam. He
ordered retaliatory air strikes against
North Vietnam only after careful con-
sideration of all the factors involved in
this complex crisis. The American peo-
ple have demonstrated their support of
the President's action.
But doubtless no one recognizes more
clearly than the President that bombing
attacks in the north will not solve the
guerrilla struggle in the south. I hope
that such tactics are aimed at increasing
pressure on the North Vietnam Govern-
ment and perhaps on the Chinese for
negotiation rather than following the
false hope that military victory is pos-
sible for either side.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to
yield.
Mr. CHURCH. I commend,the Sen-
ator from South Dakota for the state-
ment he is making. I associate myself
kind of a peace settlement can be worked with the remarks he has made with the jungles of Indochina without at least a
out. Both those views reflect my own respect to the restraint that the President remote prospect of victory would be danger-
thinking, and they are not contradictory. has shown in dealing with this danger- ously futile and self-destructive. Of course,
It is perfectly possible to uphold the Pres- ous, vexatious problem. All of us know all discussion of "united action" assumes the
ident's hand at a time when he is order- that the problem has been long in the inevitability of such victory, but such as-
Ing selective air strikes in retaliation making. All of us understand the diffi- sumptions are not unlike similar predic-
against attacks upon American forces, culty of the President's situation. But i tions of confidence which have lulled the
and at the same time to urge our Presi- am confident that the President is earn- American people for many years and which,
if continued, would present an improper
dent to use that high office in arranging estly attempting to avoid a widening war basis for determining the extent of American
a conference in which the possibilities of in Asia. He remembers, as we all do, the participation.
negotiation can be explored. experience in Korea. He remembers the Then then Senator Kennedy con-
It is on that basis that I should like to statement of Gen. Douglas MacAr- tinued:
take my stand today, as I did on the Sen- thur afterward, warning against the end- Moreover, without political independence
ate floor a month ago and at the time of less attrition of sending American troops for the associated states-
Obviously, Gulf of Tonkin crisis last summer. into battle on the Asian mainland.
Obviously, there is nothing contradictory Therefore, I believe the President is en- Meaning the states of Indochina-
about favoring decisive military action in deavoring to find a way to reach a satis-. the other Asian nations have made it clear
Vietnam today at the same time that we factory settlement in southeast Asia that that they regard this as a war of colonialism
hold open the door and in fact seek ini- will not lead us into another Korean war. and the "united action" which is said to be
tiatives to bring about a conference to I wish to be associated with the re- so desperately needed for victory in that
explore the possibilities of negotiation. marks the Senator has made with respect area is likely to end up as unilateral action
to the prudent restraint the President has by our own country.
As the Senator from Idaho [Mr.
CHuxox] said, we cannot run out unilat- attempted to use as he deals with this That is exactly what has happened.
erally on our commitment to the govern- difficult problem. We are getting precious little help from
ment of Saigon, to which we have Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator any other country in the long, expensive,
pledged our continued support in that from Idaho for his comments. bloody struggle in southeast Asia.
area, I could not agree with certain This is the kind of struggle that is not Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
proposals that have been made, that we affected much, if at all, by bombings a Senator from South Dakota yield?
!merely withdraw with no notice to the thousand miles away from the fighting. Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield.
government of Saigon or to our allies. The guerrillas are largely equipped with Mr. CHURCH. It would be well to
These are matters that have to be ne- American equipment that has been cap- contrast the situation that existed at
gotiated and discussed not only with the tured from the South Vietnamese, whom the time of the Korean trouble with
government of Saigon, but with other we have equipped. The guerrillas have the nature of our involvement in South
great powers that have an interest in this demonstrated that they are capable of Vietnam today. In Korea, the invasion
part of the world, and, of course, that living off the countryside, with little out- of the south by the north constituted
the Senator from Idaho has said, that in
the long run will have to be settled by the
Vietnamese people rather than by out-
siders.
Unfortunately, our deepening mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam, however
well meaning-and our intentions were
good when we became involved in this
struggle some 11 years ago-has drawn
to us much of the resentment which the
Vietnamese developed over the years
against France, Japan, and other inter-
vening powers. Our military embrace
of the South Vietnam rulers may actu-
ally have opened the way for Commu-
nist gains in southeast Asia and de-
layed the development of responsible
government.
So however unfair it may seem to us,
many of the same political factors that
brought the French forces into disre-
pute and eventual defeat in southeast
Asia are now operating against us.
Those factors could not be controlled in
the 1950's, even by an enormous invest-
ment of French military power, including
400,000 French soldiers.
The late beloved President Kennedy
has been quoted several times on the
floor of the Senate this afternoon. It
is interesting, but perhaps somewhat
ironical, that on April 6, 1954-almost 11
years ago-the then junior Senator from
Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, took
the floor of the Senate, at a time when
the French had been fighting in the same
area for some 8 years, and said.:
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COeSSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February ' 17
a, clear violation of the peace system that
the United Nations was established to
maintain. The United Nations re-
sponded. The United States undertook
to defend South Korea in the name of
the United Nations, with the full sup-
port of world.opinion and, indeed, with
token forces contributed by a number of
other nations.
True, the physical burden was largely
ours; but the action was carried under
the aegis of the world community. To-
day, owing to the different character of
the war in South Vietnam, the world
community does not look upon it as we
d.o. Otherwise, we would probably be in
South Vietnam today under the flag of
the United Nations, with the active col-
laboration and support of other coun-
tries, and with the full approbation of
world opinion.
The very difference in the situation
bears out the position taken by the Sen-
ator from South Dakota in the excellent
address that he is making on the floor of
the Senate today.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
point of the Senator with reference to
the Korean conflict and the contrast
there is well taken. There is one fur-
ther contrast to which he alluded in his
remarks today. That is that whereas in
Korea we had the support of our U.N.
colleagues for our military involvement
in this instance not only is such support
absent, but we also have the leading of-
ficer of the United Nations, Secretary
General U.. Thant, urging the two sides
of the Vietnamese conflict to get to-
gether and try to work out some kind of
negotiated settlement.
There is one other lesson that we
should remember about the Korean con-
flict. There are those who are willing
to risk escalation on the theory that any
amount of acceleration of the war on our
part presents us with no real danger as
far as Red China is concerned. These
individuals glibly predict that a show of
force on our,part presents us with no
threat of increasing Chinese involve-
ment. They predict that somehow the
Chinese will wander away if we just com-
mit enough military power.
The lesson of Korea is that, if pushed
far enough, we can indeed provoke
hordes of Chinese soldiers to enter the
conflict. The Chinese soldiers swarmed
into Korea 1 million strong in 1951-52,
which is the same kind of threat that is
always present with reference to the
very dangerous situation in southeast
Asia. That is a lesson we ought not to
forget.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield further?
Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.
Mr. CHURCH. In the event that the
war should continue in Vietnam without
any recourse to the bargaining table, so
that both sides would have to respond in
terms of an ever higher level of mili-
tary involvement, in addition to the pros-
pect of a,,massive Chinese movement into
southeast Asia, do we not also need to
consider the increasing likelihood that
China and the Soviet Union, under the
pressure of this mounting war, would
tend to be welded back together, so that
the Communist world could present a
united front against the United States?
This is a factor of enormous impor-
tance to the future of our relationship
with the Soviet Union which needs to be
weighed carefully in the balance as we
decide how to proceed in Vietnam.
Mr. McQOVERN. Mr. President, the
Senator has touched on one of the most
fundamental questions in this whole
crisis area. It would be the saddest of
misfortunes if, at a time when the Com-
munist world appears to be in disarray
and the monolithic Communist bloc
which once confronted us has been shat-
tered, we were to provide through our
actions the vehicle that united these
very Communist governments. I can see
that very thing happening in the event
of an all-out war in southeast Asia. It
would cause our Communist rivals to
close ranks as nothing else could. Be-
yond that, we would have set back the
cause of a detente of peaceful relation-
ship of the kind that we hope has been
developing between Red China and the
Soviet Union.
I continue with two or three additional
sentences from the speech delivered by
Senator John F. Kennedy 11 years ago.
Referring to the possibility of American
intervention in southeast Asia, he said:
Such intervention, without participation
by the armed forces of the other nations of
Asia, without the support of the great masses
of the peoples of the associated states, with
increasing reluctance and discouragement
on the part of the French-and, I might add,
with hordes of Chinese communist troops
poised just across the border in anticipation
of our unilateral entry into their kind of
battleground-such intervention would be
virtually impossible in the type of military
situation which prevails.
I shall read one final statement-and
this is a most prophetic statement. It
reads:
Every year we are given three sets of as-
surances: first, that the independence of the
associated states is now complete; second,
that the independence of the associated
states will soon be completed under steps
now being undertaken; and, third, that
military victory for the French Union forces
In Indochina is assured, or is just around
the corner, or lies 2 years off. But the
stringent limitations upon the statusof the
associated states as sovereign states remain;
and that the fact that military victory has
not yet been achieved is largely the result
of these prophecies has, however, in no way
diminished the frequency of their reitera-
tion, and they have caused this Nation to
delay definite action until now the oppor-
tunity for any desirable solution may well be
past.
Mr. President, it may very well be, 11
years later, that the opportune time for
negotiations has been passed. But I do
not believe so. The difference of opin-
ion that the senior Senator from Idaho
and I have with the Senator from Wyo-
ming is that we think the time for the
United States to explore the possibility
of a negotiated settlement is now, before
the forces are out of control and before
a trend is started that might lead to
world war III,
A month after the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts delivered that speech, with
predictions of victory reverberating
from the French, Dienbienphu took
place. The French resistance collapsed,
and the stage was set for a forced with-
drawal of the French forces in Indochina.
How ironical it is that more than a dec-
ade later, the same advice that we were
giving the French in 1954 Is now being
given to us by President de Gaulle-that
we cannot win a military victory, given
the political conditions that exist in
southeast Asia, that we cannot win when
there is not a responsible political force
in control in that part of the world, that
guerrilla tactics of this kind do not lend
themselves to a continued military -solu-
tion, and that what is needed is a polit-
ical settlement. Apparently the fight in
southeast Asia has swung full cycle.
It is doubtful that our continued mili-
tary involvement in the sixties will prove
to be any more successful than the mili-
tary involvement of the French was in
1954. We have already sacrificed over
300 American lives and $4 billion in the
Vietnamese war. Perhaps that would
not be too big a price to pay if we had
been able to stabilize the political and
military situation with that investment.
But the facts are that both the political
and military situations have worsened
as we have become steadily more in-
volved.
Far from losing face, I say that if we
were to take the initiative in ending the
fighting in southeast Asia now, it would
reaffirm the fundamental desire of the
American people for world peace. There
is not any thought in the minds of the
people around the world that is any more
precious than the hope for peace. There
is not any nation that would win any
more prestige and support throughout
the world than the nation that cham-
pions constructive steps in the cause of
peace.
It is not appeasement to recognize
that the problem of southeast Asia does
not lend itself to a military solution. It
is not appeasement for the mightiest
military power in the history of the
world to recognize the limits of that
power ari`d` to commit it reasonably and
wisely. Postitive steps toward peace will
do more than retaliatory air strikes to
replenish the reservoir of good will which
is America's greatest source of strength
in Asia and throughout the world.
It seems evident that neither we nor
the other side can score a decisive vic-
tory in the kind of political guerilla war
that has cursed Vietnam since the end
of World War II.
The statement that we cannot score a
decisive victory is balanced by the state-
ment that neither can they have a deci-
sive victory. The North Vietnamese and
the Chinese have enormous land armies
capable of holding out in the jungles for
decades if they should ever be drawn on
a large scale into the conflict in south-
east Asia. U.S. military strength in the
Far East, on the other hand, is largely
naval and air power which does not lend
itself to an Asiatic land war. We could
pulverize the great cities of China and
North Vietnam and still not end the
guerilla warfare, or encourage the estab-
lishment of effective local government.
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