VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170016-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: OPEN

1965
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
The virus which has been going
around the city struck me down in the
middle of last week, thus I could not go.
I am very glad, however, that my former
administrative assistant, Mr. Merrell F.
Small, read the partial text which I had
prepared, and also spoke from notes
which were furnished to him by my office
on some of the issues which I considered
to be of interest to the newspaper profes-
sion in my State.
I ask unanimous consent that the
partial text of my comments be printed
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
PARTIAL TEXT OF REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, PRESENTED TO THE
CALIFORNIA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIA-
TION'S CONVENTION, EL DORADO HOTEL,
SACREMENTO, CALIF., FEBRUARY 4, 1965
We are confronted in Washington with a
series of messages and recommendations from
the President and from the concept of what
he has called the Great Society. No one
should cavil at the high goals which he has
set forth for us. All of us hope for better
life and learning for our youth, and for hap-
pier days for all our people, whose lifespan
Is lengthening through the marvels of medi-
cine and science. All of us agree that poverty
ought to be fought, and that disease and
illiteracy are bad, and that our free society,
and its system of free enterprise represent
the best form of society which we intend to
keep and to improve. There is a real ques-
tion of the prodigious amount of money in-
volved in all this, and at what rate, in all
the many fields the President covered, we
should seek to proceed toward their attain-
ment. A rule of reason needs to be applied
respecting levels of public expenditures, for
fiscal integrity in our Federal Government
must be attained.
I wish to point out that however good life
is, or may be, in the United States, the globe
Is not ours alone. The vagaries of mankind,
and the paths which other nations may fol-
low, bear strongly and directly upon what
kind of living may be our own lot.
The $50 billion we shall again appropriate
for the next fiscal year for our military is
not to promote the welfare of our country,
but rather to help its preservation. We in-
tend to maintain a military superiority to
deter potential aggression against us, or, if
necessary, to combat it.
The moneys our Government spends abroad
are intended for our own security, and for
advancing, if that is possible, toward a decent
and-Just peace.
But, since evil and lust for power are not
going suddenly to evaporate, the adminis-
tration has a firm and continuing duty to
exert itself in matters of defense and foreign
policy, indeed, to lead, with vigor and cour-
age, all the free nation-states against a
growing number of potential pitfalls, many
of which they themselves create, and most
of the rest of which come from the trickery
and treachery of international communism.
The other day, a prominent Paris news-
paper suggested that President Johnson's ill-
ness was faked in order to avoid meetings
with international leaders attending the
funeral for Sir Winston Chuchill in London.
That is an ugly charge, and a false one,
unworthy of a great newspaper. The Presi-
dent was ill and he should not have gone
overseas. Its falSity can best be proved by
the President and his administration exert-
ing a leadership, in American foreign policy,
through all the techniques of diplomacy and
statesmanship, among all nations who, with
us, aim to keep their freedom and integrity.
The security of America, including such
progress as we hope reasonably to make,
rests on a foreign policy which successfully
meets the flow of dangers as they emanate
from international communism and else-
where.
The fact is that this world of ours is full
Of trouble. There is considerable peril in
almost every corner of the globe, and very
little of it seems to be on the wane.
A war is being fought in the Indochinese
Peninsula and it involves the United States.
Under General Eisenhower, we responded to
a call from the Government of South Viet-
nam for "advice and assistance" and it is
generally conceded that, in the intervening
years, that phrase has been rather liberally
construed by our own Government. Reli-
gious, political, and personal differences
among the South Vietnamese people have
produced constant instability in their Gov-
ernment, which has changed hands so often
as to raise serious doubts on their capacity
to unite even in defense of their homeland.
Unity of their own leaders in the formation
of a government with some stability is an
indispensable prerequisite to the protection
and to the integrity of their homeland. The
Vietcong, from the north, abetted by the
infamous Marxist regime of Red China, yearn
for the day when all of this Asian penin-
sula will fall to the Reds. If they would
let their non-Communist neighbors live in
peace, there would be very little trouble, and
some kind of a peace could ensue in this
beleaguered area. But Marxist communism
does not work that way. Decades and gen-
erations?perhaps centuries?are of small
moment in their strategic planning. Life, to
them, is hardly an expensive commodity.
And now, the announced visit of a Soviet
delegation, led by its Premier, to North Viet-
nam adds new mystery and foreboding to
the danger.
However much Americans may wish to
debate the wisdom of our original response
to a cry for help, the fact is we did respond
and we are present?to "advise and assist'
and I can now see no honorable means for
us abruptly to abandon the South Vietnam-
ese peoples as some in the Congress and the
country now demand. I see no useful pur-
pose in now arguing whether we should have
agreed, years ago, to assist South Vietnam.
The fact is we did agree and we are there.
The sanctity of America's ward, of her re-
sponse to a plea for help, raises a question of
honor when some among us urge our Gov-
ernment to pull out. Friends who trust us
must not be disillusioned, and our enemies
and potential enemies must recognize that
America does not run away from danger.
I like what Dean Acheson said in a recent
speech at Amherst College. We have a duty
"to preserve values outside the contour of our
own skins, and at the expense of foregoing
much that is desired and pleasant, includ-
ing?it may be?our own fortunes and lives."
Of all the worries which plague us, I think
one of the most grievous is that which we
and some of our historic friends have them-
selves brought upon us. Churchill spoke
about the need for close collaboration among
the English-speaking countries. How true.
And among our historic friends and allies in
Western Europe, we, over here, have fondly
hoped that, some day, they would become
the United States of Europe. That day has
not arrived. But we have had, in the Second
World War, and in the subsequent years of
uneasy peace, a Western alliance, a collective
military interdependence of free democracies,
agreeing that an attack against one of them
would be treated as an attack against all of
us. And since the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization came into being, Red inroads in
Europe have come to a halt.
Much progress has been achieved in the
Atlantic Community. Yet, perhaps partly
because of such progress, this achievement
is now faced with great danger. Why should
this be so? The Communist danger has not
disappeared. That communism shows its
2153
greatest impact now in Asia and Africa, where
Western unity is either nonexistent or much
less in evidence than in Europe, ought to
reawaken us to the very value of that unity.
And it is also true that the rise of emerging
nations confronts the entire Western World
with common problems which we could re-
solve far better by a common effort. History
seems to disclose that trouble flows most
freely when the West is disunited.
What has happened to this great alliance?
Why is it suddenly in such disarray?
Some fainthearted critics have told us
that this alliance was forged in the days
when America was supreme and Europe lay
prostrate; but now, we are told, Europe
wants to be on her own. Hence, they say
this alliance is outdated. To many, this
appears to make sense on first impact, but
if we take the trouble to cut through the
verbiage and look at facts, not fiction, a
quite different picture emerges.
True, there is criticism here and there,
and there are various suggestions for im-
provements. Obviously, changes should be
made in an alliance created over 15 years
ago. But it is equally true that neither in
Great Britain, nor in Germany, nor in Italy,
nor in the Benelux countries nor Scandi-
navia, is ther a demand for fundamental
change or renunciation of NATO. None of
them desires the United States to be less
active in the common defense of the West,
or less of a participant in NATO, though
. they do desire a stronger voice in the com-
mon weal. We should be ready, indeed,
active, to seek ways of achieving this.
Only one country appears to seek the dis-
solution of NATO and the withdrawal of
America from Europe. That country is
France. And even there, many of France's
citizens and nearly all of the great news-
papers are opposed to the policy of their
government.
Last New Year's Eve, General de Gaulle
addressed the people of France, and spoke of
"rejecting all systems which, under the guise
of `supranational,' or of 'integration,' or else
of 'Atlanticism' systems which would actu-
ally maintain us under the hegemony of
which you know."
If these words mean what I am afraid they
mean, then our long-time friends, the gallant
French people, under de Gaulle's leadership,
may not long remain in an integrated system
of defense among the Atlantic nations.
France is an independent, sovereign coun-
try. If she were to choose to leave the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, we cannot stop
her.
But we, too are an independent, sovereign
Nation, and so are our allies. While we
cannot stop France, France cannot stop us
or those in the Western alliance who agree
with us in our wish to make lasting arrange-
ments for the common defense of like-
minded members of the Atlantic area.
The situation cries out for leadership, and
leadership will come from the United States,
or it will not come at all. Should we look
to the United Kingdom, whose government
was elected with a razor-thin majority, and
Which is beset with many problems? Will
leadership come from Germany, or from
Italy? Surely, there can be no question. It
is the Government of the United States
which will supply the leadership, if any
there be, or the disarray of NO will give
way to, disintegration and demise.
VIETNAM
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, on last
Thursday I said:
A war Is being fought in the Indochinese
Peninsula and it involves the United States.
Under General Eisenhower, we responded to
a call from the Government of South Viet-
nam for "advice and assistance" and it Is
generally conceded that, in the intervening
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2154 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA r ebru,ary 8
years, that phrase has been rather liberally
construed by our own Government. Reli-
gious, political, and personal differences
among the South Vietnamese people have
produced constant instability in their gov-
ernment, which has changed hands so often
as to raise serious doubts on their capacity
to unite even in defense of their homeland.
Unity of their own leaders in the formation
of a government with some stability is an
indispensable prerequisite to the protection
and to the integrity of their homeland.
The Vietcong, from the north, abetted by
the infamous Marxist regime of Red China,
yearn for the day when all of this Asian
Peninsula will fall to the Reds. If they
would let their non-Communist neighbors
live in peace, there would be very little trou-
ble, and some kind of a peace could ensue
in this beleaguered area. But Marxist com-
munism does not work that way. Decades
and generations?perhaps centuries?are of
small moment in their strategic planning.
Life, to them, is hardly an expensive com-
modity.
And now, the announced visit of a Soviet
delegation, led by its Premier, to North Viet-
nam adds new mystery and foreboding to
the danger.
However much Americans may wish to de-
bate the wisdom of our original response
to a cry for help, the fact is we did respond
and we are present?to "advise and as-
sist"?and I can now see no honorable means
for us abruptly to abandon the South Viet-
namese people as some in the Congress and
the country now demand. I see no useful
purpose in now arguing whether we should
have agreed, years ago, to assist South Viet-
nam, The fact is we did agree and we are
there. The sanctity of America's word, of
her response to a plea for help, raises a ques-
tion of honor when some among us urge
our Government to pull out. Friends who
trust us must not be disillusioned, and our
enemies and potenial enemies must recog-
nize that America does not run away from
danger.
I like what Dean Acheson said in a recent
speech at Amherst College. We have a duty
"to preserve values outside the contour of
our own skins, and at the expense of fore-
going much that is desired and pleasant,
including?it may be?our own fortunes and
Yesterday at the request of the wire
services, I made a statement reading as
follows:
There is yet time for communism to halt
this frightful adventure. Whether anyone
likes it or not, America is in South Vietnam
as her request, to help her preserve her in-
dependence.
It is an independence grounded on the
agreement in which the Soviet Union
itself participated.
And we are not going to be driven out nor
run away. America's purpose is clear, and
communism must not misunderstand us.
Otherwise, the Reds in Asia?maybe else-
where?could mistakingly ignite a fire to
destroy far more than they bargained for.
I completely approve our immediate response
to the new, enlarged sneak attack of the
Vietcong. Why the sneak attack was suc-
cessful at all remains to be answered.
I /limit add, as a Senator who speaks
as, an American in this Chamber, and not
as a political partisan, that the question
of why the sneak attack was successful
at all remains a problem to be answered
by the appropriate committees of the
Senate.
STOCKPILE INVESTIGATION
Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, to-
morrow the Senate will have before it
S. 28, a bill to provide for the sale,
eventually, of all surplus stockpiled ma-
terials, which had a cost price of about
about $81/2 billion.
The Subcommittee on National Stock-
pile and Naval Petroleum Reserves of
the Senate Armed Services Committee
started its stockpile investigation on
February 23, 1962 for the purpose of re-
covering unconscionable profits from
producers who contracted to sell stra-
tegic and critical materials to the Gov-
ernment.
In a press conference on June 1, 1962,
the chairman of the Subcommittee on
National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum
Reserves stated that as of that date his
subcommittee had established that the
taxpayers stand to lose $1 billion as a
result of these stockpile operations. He
further stated:
We have also established the fact that
much of this loss is because of maladmin-
istration or inefficiency in the handling of
the program.
Although I am not aware of any re-
port on the recovery of unconscionable
profits, the subcommittee of the ,Armed
Services Committee and the full commit-
tee have voted out a bill, S. 28, which
cuts across the legislative jurisdiction
of the Banking and Currency Commit-
tee, the Agricultural and Forestry Com-
mittee, and the Finance Committee.
The Banking and Currency Commit-
tee has legislative jurisdiction over the
Defense Production Act inventory of
Materials, and this inventory has been
subject to continuing review by the Joint
Committee on Defense Production. S. 28
seeks to transfer all authority over the
Defense Production Act inventory to the
Subcommittee on National Stockpile and
Naval Petroleum Reserves and to bypass
the Banking and Currency Committee,
S. 28 proposes to transfer materials
in the Defense Production Act inventory
to a new materials reserve inventory
if not required to meet current stock-
pile objectives. Also, materials here-
after acquired under the provisions of
the Defense Production Act which are
not needed to meet stockpile objectives
of the national stockpile would be placed'
in the materials reserve inventory.
The Banking and Currency Committee
would be required to relinquish its au-
thority over the Defense Production Act
inventory to the Armed Services Com-
mittee.
Notes representing the acquisition
costs of materials so transferred, to-
gether with unpaid interest thereon,
would be canceled, and the borrowing
authority under section 304(b) of the
Defense Production Act would be corre-
spondingly reduced. The waiver of in-
terest and the cancellation of notes un-
der the borrowing authority of title III
of the Defense Production Act has been
the subject of discussion in 1964, 1962,
and earlier. Approval of such waivers
and cancellation has been denied.
Materials in the Defense Production
Act inventory may not be sold at less
than the current domestic market price.
In 1962 it was proposed to eliminate the
won! "domestic" from this provision of
the Defense Production Act. However,
the proposal was not adopted. S. 28
provides for the sale of materials in the
materials reserve inventory at "fair
market value" but provides that "fair
market value" shall be construted to
mean not less than the current domestic
market price unless the President shall
determine that such a construction is in-
consistent with the purposes of the act.
There is no requirement in the Defense
Production Act for any delay in selling
materials acquired under that act. The
timing of a sale is entirely within the
discretion of the agencies administering
the act. S. 28 would impose on sales
from the new materials reserve inven-
tory, and consequently on all materials
in the Defense Production Act inventory,
a requirement of at least 60 days' delay,
and would subject them to veto by resolu-
tion of the Senate or the House.
In extending the Defense Production
Act, the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee expressly recommended continu-
ance of sections 302, 303, and 304 to con-
tinue available to the executive the
means for quick and decisive action to
meet a materials supply problem in a new
emergency. If materials acquired for
this purpose are made subject to the 60-
day waiting period imposed by section 7
of S. 28, the purpose of the program
would be frustrated.
The basic responsibility of the Armed
Services Committee, as related to mate-
rials, is to determine what is needed in
the stockpile for defense purposes. The
Banking and Currency Committee has
responsibility for economic measures,
stabilization, and controls. Surplus sup-
plies of materials which are to be offered
for sale in the civilian economy should be
under the jurisdiction of the Banking
and Currency Committee.
S. 28 appears to be similar to a pro-
posed bill which originated in the Gen-
eral Services Administration and was
circulated among Government agencies
long before the subcommittee started its
stockpiling hearings. This may explain
why the policymaking functions of the
Office of Emergency Planning are being
transferred to the housekeeping agency
of the Government, the General Services
Administration. The Office of Emer-
gency Planning, which has special skills
and knowledge as to the needs of the
military and of the civilian economy for
defense and mobilization purposes, and
the Department of Commerce, would be
entirely bypassed.
As early as January 1955, the Joint
Committee on Defense Production re-
viewed the procedures being followed in
the administration of materials con-
tracts and recommended that GSA re-
view the records of individuals within
GSA who failed to carry out assigned
duties and to properly safeguard the in-
terest of the Government. There is a
case in court at the present time involv-
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widening American bloodshet taut we
need not be taken for fools in accepting
without further explanation that this is
permitted in the name of "stability."
Stability of what? A series of cabals
and cliques that defy stability and have
no base of support in the country other
than our own military backup? If there
Is any element of American political
prestige in addition to the military it is
declining very rapidly. Stabilize the area
with what then? More mortars and guns
that eventually are turned %Mina us?
Or with more inspection tours by four
star generals thereby again leaving the
Impression that the full military might
of the United States is committed, which
Is neither true nor desirable.
There will be. from now on. more
strikes and counter strikes until the
little remaining cover is totally stripped
away and the Involvement that is euphe-
mistically known as military support
becomes a naked U.S. war that has
neither front lines nor back lines, nor
beginning or ending, nor commitment
by the very people we seek to defend.
I am not suggesting, Mr. Speaker, that
we pick up and walk out of Vietnam to-
morrow morning. Obviously such a
Petulant act, born out of anger and frus-
tration, would at this point have giant
repercussions in the chain of anti-Com-
munist defense running the loop from
India and Pakistan. to Malaysia and the
Philippines to Australia, Formosa and
Japan. The Oriental notion of "face" is
not to be taken lightly. And even our
friends who think we are fools agree that
we have got ourselves sufficiently frozen
In to be incapable of immediate
extrication.
I do suggest, however, that heads of
state display some willingness to com-
municate with each other?some ener-
getic commonsense-4n .order to Prevent
this miserable war from unnecessarily
enmeshing the entire globe in a conflict
of arms. The initiative must come from
the President of the United States, for
no one else can or will take the lead.
This initiative, Mr. Speaker, should
include a report to the Congress and the
country, by the President. defining our
policy in this area, its purpose and its
proposal for a political solution, the
means by which a halt?even tem-
porary?to military operations can be
achieved, and what measures interested
nations should be prepared to undertake
on a collective bane to guarantee the in-
dependence of the area.
meat district. The local contributions for
administrative ORIMOBOR may be in battil or
In kind, fairly evaluated. including but not
limited to space, equipment, and services;
and
(2) either directly or through arrange-
ments with appropriate public or private or-
ganizaUons, to provide funds for invettlga-
tion, research, studies, and demonstration
projects, but not for construction purposes.
which will further the purposes of this Act.
(b) Not to exceed $11,000,000 of this Act,
authorized in secUon 16 of this Act shah be
available to carry out this section.
ANNVAL REPORT
Sec. 17. Not later than six months after
the close of each fiscal year. each Secretary
of an executive department administering
any program under this Act shall prepare
and submit to the Governor of each State
and to the President. for transmittal to the
Congress, a report on the activities carried
out under this Act during such year.
AUTHORIZATION OP APPROPRIATIONS
Sec. 18. In addition to the appropriations
authorized in section 3 for the economic de-
velopment highways, there Is hereby author-
ized to be appropriated for the period end-
ing June 30, 1967, to be available untll ex-
pended, not to exceed $195.000,000 to carry
out this Act.
APPLICABLE LABOR STANDARDS
Sec. 19. MI laborers and mechanics em-
ployed by contractors or subcontractors in
the construction, alteration, or repair, in-
cluding painting and decorating, of projects,
buildingte and works which are financially
assisted through the Federal funds author-
ized under this Act. shell be paid wages at
rates not lees than those prevailing on simi-
lar construction in the locality as deter-
mined by the Secretary of Labor in accord-
ance with the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended
(40 U.S.C. 276a-276a-4). The Secretary of
Labor shall have with respect to such labor
standards, the authority and functions set
forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of
1050 (15 P.R. 3176, 64 Stat, 1267, 5 U.S.C.
133-133z-15), and section 2 of the Act of
June 13, 1934. as amended (48 Stat. 948, as
amended; 40 U.S.C. 276(c)).
perm:nom or XLIGLOLE AREA
Sec. 20. As used in this Act, the term "eli-
gible area" aball have the same meaning as
Is given It in section 3(a) of the Public/
Works Aoceleretion Act (76 Stat. 541).
SPIVERASILITT
SEC. 21. If any provision of this Act, or
the applicability thereof to any person or cir-
cumstance. Is held Invalid, the remainder of
this Act, and the application of such pro-
vision to other persons or circumstances,
shall not be affected thereby.
TERMINATION
SEC. 22. This Act shall cease to be in effect
on July 1.1971.
THE NEED FOR A U.S. FOREIGN POL-
ICY IN VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. LINDSAY) is
recognized for 1 hour.
(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
Permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LINDSAY. Mr. Speaker, the
President must define our policy in Viet-
neat. It is still apparent that we have
no clear policy except an aimless patch-
work of scotch tape and bailing wire that
becomes more confused every day. It
should not be necessary. I suppose, to
express our shock and dismay over the
VOTING RIGHTS BILL OF 1965
Mr. LINDSAY. Now, Mr. Speaker,
wish to change to an entirely different
subject on domestic policy and speak for
just a moment on the problem of voting
rights in the United States and civil
rights legislation in that regard. A group
of Republican Members of the House
have joined me this afternoon in intro-
ducing a comprehensive bill designed to
fill in the gaps that have been demon-
strated to exist in legislation that is now
part of the United States Code and
which relates to the responsibility that
the Federal Government has in the area
of voting rights.
Members will recall that it was during
the Eisenhower administration that key
legislation was developed, submitted to
the Congress and Passed ender which
the right to vote is guaranteed, and that
right is implemented.
In 1960 the Congress passed a Civil
Rights Act affecting voting right* which
established a procedure under which tbis
Attorney General and the Deneatnient
of Justice may apply to a U.S. court for
a finding of a pattern or practice of vot-
ing denials in any area. The court then,
under existing law, listens to the argu-
ment on both sides between the U.S. Gots.
ernment and local registrars of voting
and makes a decision. All due proms
Is met. In the event that the court sitettIti' ,
find that a pattern or practice of voting
denial exists, the court is empowered Un-
der existing law to appoint referees, or
himself to order registered Person*
denied registration by the local registrar.
This was good and sound legislation. It
was adjusted slightly In the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 through voting provisions
that had been suggested, / may saY, by
many of us on the minority side of the
Judiciary Committee. It is demonstrated
now, however, that in the United States
It Is still too difficult for qualified per-
sons to gain the right to vote where they
have not had it before. No one can deny
the facts that have been stated and re-
stated to the effect that there are too
many areas in the United States where
no Negro citizens are registered to vote
at all.
I would like to add that this problem
is one that is not confined necessarily
to any one particular part of the country
and it should not be regarded as a sec-
tional issue. It is a U.S. issue and one
that all U.S. Coneressnlen SS ILS. Con.-"
gressznen have the duty to pay some
attention to.
This bill that is submitted today by
several of us. including at least two
Members on the minority aide of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, is a
proposal which is sound, carefully
worked out, feasible, practical, bar,
reasonable, and which I think will
work. What it does in effect is to give
the executive branch of the U.S. Govern-
ment the power to take the Initiative
In setting in motion the procedure for
registering persons who allege that they
have been denied the right to vote in
any case where a Federal court is aletv
to act or negligent in the conduct of its
responsibilities.
What the bill does in effect is, or will
be, to force a court to take is positicgt.
Where a court finds that 50 or more
qualified citizens in a voting district have
been denied the right to vote, the teid-
eral court must find a pattern or Inneo.
tiee of discrimination. If it finds such
pattern or practice. the court ALM
point one or more Federal registrars, to
register citizens similarly situated whiling
the area who have been denied the rid*
to vote. If the court fails to make the
finding or fails to appoint regisla'ars
within 40 days. the President shall do
so if he receives certified statement*
under oath from 50 qualified citizens
in the area that they have been denied
the right to vote.
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1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORp = SENATE 217
The other srpulation that makes S.
500 an outstanding bill is the clause that
permits unused quota numbers in one
classification to be transferred for use in
the next lower classification. Again we
see a provision that will eliminate the
waste of quota numbers that exists un-
der our present laws and makes the struc-
ture of the quota regulations far more
flexible.
In summation, the administration bill
will make it far more possible for highly
qualified foreign citizens to immigrate
to the United States, do away with our
present discriminatory practices, and as-
sure the fullest use of the quota numbers
available. In addition, the refugee re-
form provisions in the bill will make it
easier for people' who are fleeing from
tyranny to be welcomed to the United
States as refugees.
All of us in the Senate have sponsored
private bills for individuals wishing to
immigrate to the United States and are
fully aware of the great inequities of our
present immigration laws. We are fully
cognizant of the heartache and dashed
hopes that surround most immigration
cases_with which we must deal. With full
knowledge of the present inadequacies, I
say the time has come to act.
The bill introduced by the Senator
from Michigan [Mr. HART] will help to
eliminate the hypocrisy of our position
and let the world know that the United
States is a country settled by immigrants,
brought to greatness by immigrants, and
is still a country that welcomes immi-
grants regardless of their national origin.
Let us again say with pride, "all men are
created equal."
Mr. President, as a cosponsor of S.
500, I urge every Member of this body to
give the bill his most careful considera-
tion and join me in helping to pass this
urgently needed legislation.
communications and the use of communica-
tions satellites;
(8) Federal power matters;
(9) civil aeronautics;
(10) fisheries and wildlife;
(11) marine sciences; and
(12) Weather Bureau operations and plan-
ning, including the use of weather satellites.
SEC. 2. For the purposes of this resolution
the committee, from February 1, 1965, to
January 31, 1966, inclusive, is authorized (1)
to make such expenditures as it deems ad-
visable; (2) to employ, upon a temporary
basis, technical, clerical, and other assist-
ants and consultants: Provided, That the
Minority is authorized to select one person
for appointment, and the person so selected
shall be appointed and his compensation
than be so Axed that his gross rate shall not
be less by more than $2,100 than the highest
gross rate paid to any other employee; and
(8) with the prior consent of the heads of
the departments or agencies concerned, and
the Committee on Rules and Adininistration,
to utilize the reimbursable services, infor-
mation, facilities, and personnel of any of
the departments or agencies of the Govern-
ment.
,qEC. 3. The committee shall report its
findings, together with its recommendations
for legislation as it deems advisable, to the
Senate at the earliest practicable date, but
not later than January 31, 1966.
SEc. 4. Expenses of the committee, under
this resolution, which shall not exceed $442,-
700, shall be paid from the contingent fund
of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the
chairman of the committee.
IMMIGRATION REFORM NEEDED
NOW
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, the second sentence of the
Declaration of Independence contains
the following words, "All men are
created equal."
These five words say more about the
principles behind the founding and
growth of this great country of ours
than any other five in the English lan-
guage. These few words explain our
insistence on justice for all; these few
words are in the definition of freedom.
Because of these words, great people
from the world over have come to the
United States and helped to make our
greatness a lasting thing. Through
wars, both civil and foreign, through
peace, both firm and shaky, these few
wards have endured as our guiding light.
For the past 44 years, we have told
people in many nations that we no long-
er practice what we preach; that we
no longer believe in the words of our
Declaration a Independence; that we
have, in fact, betrayed the principles
that have made this country the great-
est in the world. We have been saying,
in effect, that if we were born in north-
ern and western Europe we are more
equal than someone born in southern
and eastern Europe; but if we were
born in southeastern Europe we are,
nevertheless, more equal than those
born in Asia or Africa. This could not
be further from the truth, and I be-
lieve that the time has come to recon-
cile our actions with our beliefs. It is
time we take a serious look at our im-
migration policies and once and for all
put an end to the discriminatory Prac-
tices we have employed since 1921.
We are very fortunate to have before
us a bill that will help to do exactly
that. The bill, S. 500, was introduced
by the distinguished ? Senator from
Michigan [Mr. HART]. It is similar to
the legislation urged by the late Presi-
dent Kennedy and given priority by
President Johnson. In general, this
piece of proposed legislation will do
away with discrimination against ap-
plications for immigration visas on the
grounds of national origin.
While the bill does not open the gates
to all aliens applying for immigration, it
does so drastically modify the present
immigration regulations so as to do away
with the injustice and waste created by
our present regulations. While the
present national quota on immigration
of 158,361 will only be increased by less
than 7,000, far more people will enter
the United States, new citizens who can
be of great service to the country.
The bill will take the total number of
quota numbers and divide them into
three classifications. The first classifi-
cation will consist of 50 percent of the
numbers. Persons falling into this
classification will be those who in the
opinion of the Attorney General of the
United States will be "especially advan-
tageous" to the country.
The second classification will be 30
percent of the total quota numbers and
will be issued to unmarried sons and
daughters of U.S. citizens who are not
eligible for nonquota preference because
they are over 21 years of age.
The third classification will consist of
the remaining 20 percent of the quota
numbers, with preference issued to
spouses and unmarried sons and daugh-
ters of aliens admitted to this country
for permanent residence; and, finally, to
other miscellaneous applications for
Immigration.
There are two good aspects of the bill
that are definitely worthy of mention.
Under the proposed reforms, every
country is limited to 10 percent of the
quota numbers in each classification.
If, after 10 months of the year, it is ap-
parent that all the numbers in a given
classification will not be used in the year,
the 10-percent ban can be lifted to allow
the full use of the quotas allocated.
There is a great deal of wisdom in such
a proposal. All too often, the quota
numbers given an individual country
under the present system are unused, but
the visa applications in another country
may far outnumber the, quota numbers
available. Under the proposed system,
surplus quota numbers can be shifted to
another country to meet particular de-
mands, thus making it possible for de-
serving individuals to immigrate to the
United States when otherwise they
would be unable to do so. The 10-per-
cent ban also prevents one country from
znonopolizing the quota numbers to the
exclusion of other countries.
Under the proposed system, citizens
from all countries would have equal op-
portunity to immigrate to this country
regardless of the geographical location
of their country. It seems to me that this
system is only fair and right and is in
keeping with the American tradition.
MATERIALS RESERVE AND STOCK-
PILE ACT OF 1965
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate proceed to the con-
sideration of Senate bill 28, which was
reported today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated for the information of the
Senate.
The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (S. 28) to
insure the availability of certain critical
materials during a war or national
emergency by providing for a reserve of
such materials, and for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no
action will be taken on this bill today,
but it will be the. pending business as
soon as the morning hour is completed
tomorrow.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate concludes its business today, it
adjourn to meet at 12 o'clock noon to-
morrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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THE MESS IN VIETNAM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the
tragic events in Vietnam over the week-
end should give all Americans reason to
pause and call for a reassessment of our
position in South Vietnam.
It is, of course, difficult to have such
reassessment until all the facts concern-
ing the latest events have been made
known. Hopefully they will, although
judging by past experience on the man-
ner in which the news from South Viet-
nam has been managed, it is doubtful
whether the American public will be
made privy to the full details of what is
actually transpiring in Vietnam.
The past management of the news
from Vietnam is well set out in a very
comprehensive article by James A.
Wechsler in the Progressive for February
1965 entitled "Vietnam: A Study in De-
ception."
Mr. Wechsler's judgment is:
But whatever place the Vietnam involve-
ment may occupy in our military annals,
It has already become a classic case history
in the uses?and misuses?of Government
deception to sustain a course that deserved
the fullest national awareness and debate.
I ask unaninious consent that Mr.
Wechsler's excellent article be printed in
full in the RECORD at the conclusion of
my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
- (See exhibit No. 1.)
Mr. GRLTENING. Mr. President,
much of the news thus far released from
South Vietnam, the Pentagon, and the
White House raises many more questions
than it answers.
The reasons for the tragic loss of
American men killed and wounded in the
Vietcong attack on Pleiku cannot be
glossed over by Secretary McNamara
saying:
The fact is that the attack was carried out
in the dead of night; it was a sneak attack.
It's typical of guerrilla operations. It's the
kind of attack that it's almost impossible to
provide effective security against. I think
It's the type of attack we must expect more
of in this type of war.
The facts as published to date indicate
a deplorable lack of effective security
precautions. We are engaged in a war
in South Vietnam?an undeclared war,
to be sure?but a war in any event. The
rules of war do not limit the fighting to
the daylight hours between the hours of
9 to 5. Nor do the rules of the
war require that the enemy give us a
certain number of hours advance notice
before attacking. That is true whether
It is a conventional war or a guerrilla
war. Secretary McNamara cannot gloss
over the lack of security at Pleiku by at-
tributing our losses to a "sneak" attack
which we must expect because we are
fighting a guerrilla war. Indeed Secre-
tary McNamara's "sneak attack" char-
acterization may well deserve the award
of the silliest statement of the year, if not
in the whole history of statements from
the Pentagon. The warriors there will
know that surprise is an essential con-
comitant of military action in war.
Apparently we have learned little about
security since the destructive attack on
the Bien Boa airbase 2 months ago.
The time is long past due for a full
scale inquiry into security precautions
and the lack of them in South Vietnam.
The people of the United States have a
right to know why security precautions
have been so lax as to permit hostile
troops to come right into our compound
and destroy our airplanes and kill and
wound our men.
Another point deserving explanation is
the oversimplification of the problem by
Secretary McNamara in his news con-
ference yesterday. The distinct impres-
sion was given that a group of North
Vietnamese soldiers crept down the Ho
Chi Minh trail in the dead of night, went
through our defenses, killed and wounded
our men, destroyed our airplanes, and re-
turned to North Vietnam unscathed.
With such a simple explanation, it then
becomes easy to say that, tit for tat, we
attacked North Vietnamese bases in
southern North Vietnam. But things are
not quite that simple, judging from later
reports. Was this entirely a North Viet-
namese raid?where were the Vietcong,
whose supposedly friendly villages were
used as the staging area for the attack?
Was this entirely a North Vietnamese
raid or was it the usual Vietcong raid,
as at Bien Hoa, which again caught us
with our britches down?
The basic fact remains that we have no
business in South Vietnam. We cannot
"advise" a war weary people such as the
South Vietnamese how to fight when
they have no desire to fight.
Let us suppose that we do escalate the
war in South Vietnam by destroying all
of North Vietnam and subjugating its
people. We would still be left with South
Vietnam where a civil war would still
continue to rage. If then we militarily
subjugated all of South Vietnam, where
would the United States be? We would
have two colonies, ruled by military
might far into the future, with the hatred
of the peoples of both colonies against
the United States growing stronger by
the day?and a ghastly necrology of
young American lives lost and a stagger-
ing financial cost which will totally undo
all of President Johnson's economy ef-
forts.
We cannot instill love and respect and
support in the people of South Vietnam
for their government in Saigon by brute,
military force.
I have said before and I say again: the
war in South Vietnam should be brought
to the conference table and the sooner
that is done the better will be the U.S.
stature not only in South Vietnam but in
the entire free world.
The New York Times, this morning,
said in its lead editorial:
Each incident like Pleiku, each political
crisis, each month that passes, increases the
danger to us to southeast Asia and to the
world. The strike at North Vietnam was
understandable and justifiable as a tactical
response in a war situation. It was not a
substitute for a policy. There was an ex-
change of blows which left the Vietnamese
situation in status quo. What the Johnson
administration now has to explain is where
we go from here.
The observations in the New York
Times editorial were most cogent and I
ask unanimous consent that the entire
editorial from today's New York limes
be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
at the conclusion of my remarks.
. There is also an interesting article in
the New York Times this morning by
Charles Mohr entitled "Questions on Air
Strike?Explanations of Events Behind
Action Leave a Number of Points Unre-
solved." Mr. Mohr raises questions about
what happened in South Vietnam which
the American people have a right to have
answered. I ask unanimous consent that
Mr. Mohr's article also be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit No. 2.)
EXHIBIT 1
[From the Progressive, February 1965]
VIETNAM: A STUDY IN DECEPTION
(By James A. Wechsler)
Diplomats and historians will one day
offer their considered assessment of the
war in Vietnam and the role of the United
States in that conflict. The verdict, like so
many postmortems, will hinge in large
measure on how the story ends, and in the
early days of January 1965, when these lines
are written, the fog of uncertainty remains
thick. If, for example, the conflict should
terminate with the beginning of broad nego-
tiations for an Asian detente and the initia-
tion of meaningful discourse between Wash-
ington and Peiping, the American policy-
makers may emerge with larger distinction
than now seems likely; it may well be argued
In retrospect that only prolongation of the
long, desperate stalemate paved the way for
such an outcome. Other, far more ominous
alternatives still confront us, including, of
course, the most awesome peril that we will
stumble into large-scale collision with Red
China on this bleak terrain?surely the most
intolerable example of "the wrong war in the
wrong place at the wrong time."
But whatever place the Vietnam involve-
ment may occupy in our military annals, it
has already become a classic case-history in
the uses?and misuses?of Government de-
ception to sustain a course that deserved the
fullest national awareness and debate. In
fact, from Saigon to Washington, there has
been a war within a war?a conflict between
a small, gallant band of journalists who con-
ceived it their first function to tell the coun-
try the truth, and certain elder statesmen
of the press who had voluntarily assumed the
role of advance men for influential voices in
the Pentagon and the State Department.
If much of the country has suffered a sense
of bewilderment and frustration over the
Vietnam deadlock, it is not merely because
our "illusion of omnipotence" has been shat-
tered anew. It is because we have been
subjected to an almost unsurpassed com-
pound of misinformation and wishful think-
ing. This was not always the product of
diabolical deceit; there have no doubt been
many moments when some of the sources
of befuddlement were merely articulating
their own confusion or ignorance.
But the total effect has been scandalous.
I do not happen to be one of those who light-
ly raise the cry of "managed news"; 2 years
ago, in this magazine, I defended President
Kennedy's resort to concealment in certain
crucial hours preceding the Cuban con-
frontation. At the same time I also wrote
that much of the press too often achieved
maximum indignation over marginal issues
and that it had been singularly lacking in
outrage over the fashion in which the more
diligent U.S. correspondents were being
pushed around in South Vietnam. There
has been mounting documentation of that
story in the ensuing period; it is part of a
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1965 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
larger saga of suppression and distortion in
which eminent Americans have been no less
guilty than Mme. Nhu and the minor
Machiavellis who succeded her.
Reference to a mostrecent episode may be
a proper prelude. On December 28, at a mo-
ment of new turmoil in the Saigon regime,
two large New York newspapers (and no
doubt many others throughout the Nation)
carried almost identical headlines: "Great
Victory in South Vietnam." The phrase
"great victory" was exactly the one jointly
employed by United States and Vietnamese
officials in describing the capture of a Viet-
cong headquarters and the killing of some 90
of the Communist troops. The ordinary cit-
izen, unless he had been rendered cynical by
a surfeit of similar great victories prema-
turely heralded, was clearly being invited to
believe that the tide had turned dramati-
cally.
Exactly 1 week after this inflated depic-
tion Of a inmall success came the dismal anti-
Climax. From Burgh Gia the United Press
international reported that "a major defeat
for the South Vietnamese Goverarnent'S
forces became apparent today as fighting
subsided here after 6 days." 'Twas indeed
a famous victory that preceded this debacle.
Yet on the same day that this gloomy
acknowledgment arrived, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk ?blandly announced on television
that he remained serenely confident of the
,Ultimate victory of the Vietnamese without
any expansion of the conflict.
Meanwhile, President Johnson has on at
least two occasions during this recent period
of agonized paralysis chided the press for
"speculation" about the possibility of ex-
panding the war. I am entirely convinced
that Mr. Johnson has resisted such pro-
posals; but any newspaperman over 21 knows
these stories were planted by men within his
own administration?in the Pentagon and
elsewhere?who have been pressing for such
action, and who believed the publication of
such dispatches might somehow force the
President's hand. The existence of such a
',cabal should hardly be suppressed, or dis-
missed as journalistic fantasy.
In miniature these episodes were, one,
, might say, the story of the war as it has been
officially presented to the Nation: small tri-
umphs, sharp reversals, and, most of all,
sugary reassurances.
Thus, on April 6, 1962, Gen. Paul D. Har-
kins, chief of the U.S. military command in
Saigon, was cheerfully observing that "Pre-
mier Ngo Dinh Diem has adopted two con-
cepts of major importance in the struggle
against the Communist guerrillas." The gen-
eral said "the Vietnamese forces have seized
the initiative" and that the Vietcong, hav-
ing been rebuffed in "large attacks," had
reverted to small units.
Early in July of the same year an Asso-
ciated Press dispatch from Fort Leavenworth,
Kans., based on interviews with US. officers
recently returned from Vietnam, said they
found military operations in South Vietnam
"confused and ineffective."
This somber report evoked instant counter-
fire. Gen. George H. Decker, U.S. Army Chief
of Staff, said such opinion did not "accu-
rately reflect,. the opinions of responsible
Army authorities in Washington or in the
field." Simultaneously, according to an Asso-
ciated Press dispatch from Washington,
"Dean Rusk, in a TV interview, also denied
that the Vietnam war was going badly."
On July 24, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, returning from a Pacific confer-
ence, said he was "encouraged over the prog-
ress of affairs in South Vietnam" but con-,
ceded that the struggle there might last "4
years." He said ,the South Vietnamese are
"beginning to hit the Vietcong where it hurts
most?in winning the people to the side of
No. 25 23
the Government," and added: "Our mili-
tary assistance to Vietnam is paying off."
Now we arrive at May 1963. The Vietcong
legions have stepped up their attacks. Sen-
ators Barry Goldwater and STUART- SYMING-
TON have joined in a call for U.S. air strikes
against North Vietnam. Senator MIKE
MANSFIELD (who has remained steadfastly
sober throughout the Vietnam madness, and
was one of the first to urge efforts to achiekre
a negotiated settlement) warns that such
action would invite a larger version of Korea
"paid for primarily with American lives."
Meanwhile, according to a dispatch to the
New York Herald Tribune, "experts at the
State and Defense Departments said the Viet-
cong were engaged in a desperate effort to
recapture the initiative * * *."
In September occiiired the painful Sylves-
ter affair. Arthur Sylvester, formerly an able
Washington correspondent and now Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense in charge of pub-
lic relations, had accompanied McNamara
and Gen. Maxwell Taylor on a tour of inspec-
tion to Saigon. Within 24 hours of their
arrival, Sylvester told correspondents that
the war was "going well" and that the mo-
ment was "rapidly approaching where goals
set will be reached relatively shortly." But
not many days earlier President Kennedy had
voiced concern that the war was being un-
dermined by internal strife in the Diem re-
gime. Moreover, correspondents on the
scene presented statistics to Sylvester which
disclosed that during the first half of 1963
there had been a decline in guerrilla casual-
ties and loss of weapons and a corresponding
increase in Government casualties.
Sylvester, a conscientious, thoughtful man
who has had the unenviable mission of try-
ing to speak coherently amid all the conflict-
ing clamor, finally conceded that his previ-
ously optimistic briefings might have "tended
to throw things out of focus." He said they
were apparently viewed as "tending to sug-
gest I was trying to plaster things over with
a pretty look." In fact, he declared, he had
merely been reporting what General Harkins
had told McNamara.
By autumn of 1963 it became clear that all
the effort inlested in saving the face Of the
Diem regime had been a futile endeavor.
Madame Nhu's frenetic attack on "U.S.
junior officers" helped to hasten the day of
the Diems' overthrow. By November, the
coup d'etat?plainly promoted by Washing-
ton?had occurred.
In the aftermath of the coup, Max
Frankel reported in the New York Times
that the administration anticipated "greater
progress in the war against the Communist
guerrillas." He added:
"Administration leaders are confident that
a new civilian government could quickly re-
store order in Saigon and turn its attentions
back to the war effort. They believe the
ouster of President Ngo Dinh Diem, of his
brother and principal political adviser, Ngo
Dinh Nhu, and of only a few of their princi-
pal adherents will bring an end to internal
repression and recurrent political turmoil."
Gen. Dvong Van Minh, the new military
ruler of South Vietnam, exuded positive
thinking.
"We made this coup to win the war," he
proclaimed in an interview. "We realize that
the Diem regime had lost the confidence of
the population, and you cannot win a war
without the support of the population."
New songs of hope officially emanated from
Saigon and Washington. In this as in other
matters, there was essential continuity be-
tween the Kennedy and the Johnson admin-
istrations.
As 1963 drew to an end, General Harkins
was reiterating his confidence that, by the
end of 1965, the United States would be able
to pull out most of its own forces and per-
mit the Vietnamese to finish the mop-up
2219
operation. Defense Secretary McNamara had
been persuaded to embrace Harkins' wistful
forecast.
As usual there were contradictory sounds.
Even as Harkins was reaffirming his prophesy,
a Washington dispatch to the New York
Times reported that "officials at the State
Department are less inclined than in the
past to place optimistic interpretations on
day-by-day combat reports."
One year later, at the close of 1964, the
cycle was sadly completed. After another
year of feverish fluctuation in the state-
ments of public officials and Vietnamese gen-
erals, a new coup had in effect taken place;
the military had wiped out any semblance
of constitutional rule and the United States
found itself in the awkward position of im-
ploring a restoration of the fragile status
quo.
This bare outline of history is recited be-
cause is provides the essential background
against which the journalistic war must be
weighed.
The truth is that, almost from the moment
of the U.S. commitment to defend South
Vietnam, dedicated, responsible netvspaper-
men began striving to break through the
curtain of oversimplification. Those who
did so quickly became the targets of Madame
Nhu and her entourage; they also found
themselves embroiled with U.S. officialdom
and, in some cases, with their home offices
and some of the pillars of the fourth estate.
The first clear portent was the ouster of
Francois Sully of Newsweek. A veteran
southeast Asia observer, he was guilty of lack
of reverence for Mme. Nhu. Soon there-
after came the exiling of James Robinson of
the National Broadcasting Co., for com-
parable heresy. Both episodes stirred far too
little notice in the country.
They were not isolated incidents; they
were symptomatic of an underlying tension
between inquisitive newsmen and the Saigon
? Establishment (Vietnamese and American) .
David Halberstam, of the New York Times,
writing recently in the magazine Commen-
tary, summed it up this way:
"The job of reporters in Vietnam was to
report the news, whether or not the news was
good for America.
"To the ambassadors and generals, on the
other hand, it was crucial that the news be
good, and they regarded any other interpre-
tation as defeatist and irresponsible."
Halberstam himself soon became a "con-
troversial figure." He was one of the younger
journalists who refused to accept the official
versions; he was dismayed by the stream of
military and political dignitaries who jun-
keted to the area, went on conducted tours,
and returned to the United States proclaim-
ing that victory was on the horizon. Cor-
respondents would read such stuff under
Washington datelines, Halberstam noted, and
then return to the field and "see- the same
tired old government tactics, the same hack
political commanders in charge, the same
waste of human resources."
To other troublemakers were Charles
Mohr and Mort Perry of Time magazine.
They, too, found little substance for the good
news periodically being sponsored by those
who were the makers or mouthpieces of offi-
cial policy. But back in their home office
there were men who professed to be able to
see things more clearly. Time's press sec-
tion carried a harsh diatribe (reportedly
dictated by the managing editor) against
Saigon reports who engaged in cru-
sading?meaning that they tried to write
what they saw, rather than what Saigon and
Washington preferred to see in print.
Finally, Mohr and his colleague, in 1963,
filed a comprehensive report which began:
"The war in Vietnam is being lost.." As re-
drafted in New York, it became a highly
favorable estimate of the grand fighting
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2220 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Febmary
spirit of the Vietnamese troops. They
resigned.
Halberstam's experience with the New York
Times was exactly the reverse; it is also a
painful episode in the chronicles of the Ken-
nedy administration. When Arthur Ochs
Sulzburger, then the new publisher of the
Times, paid a courtesy call on President Ken-
nedy in the fall of 1963, the President asked
whether there was any prospect of Halber-
stam's early transfer. He suggested that this
able young man might have become "too
involved" in the Saigon story. Sulzburger
replied that the Times was entirely satisfied
with his coverage, and canceled Halberstam's
Imminent vacation lest it be construed as a
capitulation. The incident was not one of
Mr. Kennedy's better moments; but it ex-
pressed a state of mind not confined to the
White House.
. At many moments of setback On the Viet-
namese front, there has been a persistent
tendency to make skeptical journalists the
villains of the drama. Homer Bigart, who
preceded Halberstam, suffered similar
reproach.
Sadly enough, some of the most articulate
spokesmen of this attack were themselves
journalists who intermittently visited
Saigon?Joseph Alsop, Frank Conniff, and
Marguerite Higgins. At various intervals
they reported that certain Idealistic but un-
tutored young men were offering a "defeat-
ist" view of the war that was somehow in-
fecting the atmosphere.
On the surface the theory seemed some-
what implausible since the circulation of
the New, York Times among the masses of
Vietnamese peasants is limited. Perhaps the
more serious contention was that the ca-
pricious, tender-spirited rulers of the land
could be induced to larger effort if we main-
tained the pretense that they were giving
their all and that their deeds were being
crowned with daily success. Plainly this was
the judgment of some U.S. emissaries there,
but it should hardly have been used as a
yardstick of journalistic virtue.
Regardless of how the story ends, events
have abundantly and repeatedly vindicated
the gloomy crusaders. Neither Diem nor the
military claque that succeeded him has
shown any capacity for effective popular
leadership or for carrying out those reforms
that might give the populace some sense that
it had a true stake in the war.
Indeed, those who had led us to believe
in 1963 that Halberstam and his associates
were being unduly pessimistic were tacitly
conceding, by the end of 1964, how right he
had been. Led by Joseph Alsop, they were
clamoring for large-scale 'U.S. intervention
to rescue Saigon's chaotic regime. (The al-
ternative, wrote Alsop, is "the most humiliat-
ing defeat" in our national history.) Surely
that desperate predicament could not be at-
tributed to any underestimation of Viet-
namese strength voiced by the heretic corre-
spondents.
It seems to me that the clearest clue to
the agony of South Vietnam--and the point
that the harassed journalists have been
steadily trying to make?was contained in a
dispatch from Robert Keatly, the Wall Street
Journal's man in Saigon, published on June
15, 1964, which began;
"Long An province, just southwest of Sai-
gon, is potentially a rich area. Its fertile
land produces quantities of rice and fruit,
and large numbers of the white Peking 'ducks
so highly favored in Vietnamese cuisine are
raised locally.
But prosperity hasn't touched most of the
province's 300,000 inhabitants. Many live
on small plots of rented land and pay 50
:)ercent or 75 percent of their crops to land-
lords. Most do without electricity and run-
ning water.
"A hired fieldhand earns 70 cents a day if
he can work. Two young girls spend a long
day weaving three fiber mats on a crude hand
loom, dividing wages of only 50 cents be-
tween them."
Most American observers in South Viet-
nam, Keatly added, agreed the Saigon regime
could wage effective military action against
the Communists only if it wins the loyalty
and confidence of the people of the Viet-
namese countryside; it could do so only by
providing dramatic improvements in drab,
substandard living conditions. So far, he
said, there was no sign of a new day; many
decades of bungling, graft, and indifference
in high places had created a profound skep-
ticism about vigorous new programs such
as those proclaimed by the new regime of
General Khanh.
And time, he warned, was running out.
"If these programs don't show measurable
progress this year," a MB official was quoted
as saying, "the whole war effort could be
washed out from beneath us."
That was June 1964.
Certainly there has been an honorable
American attempt, under both Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson, to convey the warn-
ings to Saigon's elite. But the message has
never been truly heard. Perhaps it might
have been more audible if less time had been
spent in seeking, between the intermittent
moments of truth, to blur the hard facts
of life.
I have never doubted President Johnson's
(or Kennedy's) earnest desire to end this
war on honorable terms, and to avoid reck-
less "escalation." Some of the mischievous
propaganda circulated in various U.S. organs
of the new pro-Chinese left is as unjust and
as unrelated to reality as the monolithic
mystique of the Muscovites of the 1930's.
But neither do I believe there can be any
sane solution if we are ourselves unwilling
to confront unpleasant truth and to recog-
nize that the game, as we have played it
so far in Vietnam, may be nearly up. Beyond
that, the lesson of these matters is that all
of our psychological warfare, geared to pro-
moting the notion that things are usually
better than they seem, has singularly failed
to deceive the enemy; it has merely aug-
mented our own confusion, and delayed too
long the airing of our real dilemma. Our
bargaining position might have been far
better 2 years ago if we had recognized what
Halberstam and others attempted to tell us.
It may be even worse a year from now if
we continue the process of self-delusion and
perpetuate the legend that time and provi-
dence are necessarily on our side.
EXHIB/T 2
[From the New York Times, Feb. 8, 1965]
TIT FOR TAT IN VIETNAM
The American position in the strike
against North Vietnam has been stated
clearly by President Johnson, Secretary Mc-
Namara, and Under Secretary Ball. It is that
the Vietcong attack on Pleiku, with its bloody
toll in American dead and wounded, repre-
sented a test of American political will and
purpose, to which "we could not fail to
respond." Washington emphasizes that the
United States "does not strive to expand the
war."
The difficulty is that Hanoi may now adopt
exactly the same logic and treat the Ameri-
can strike as a challenge to its will and
purpose. Peiping and Moscow, whose Pre-
mier Kosygin was in North Vietnam's capi-
tal at the time, may also take it as a provoca-
tion directed at them. Perhaps the very fact
of Mr. Kosygin's presence was why Hanoi
chose to make its raid. Yet, the retalia-
tion that raid has brought makes it a matter
of prestige for the Russians to help Hanoi.
To that extent it tends to bring Russia and
China into tactical partnership.
In Vietnam the United States is engaged
In a war. In any war, attacks are made
and men are killed and wounded. The other
side is impelled to strike back even harder,
and so try to discourage further attacks.
The process, inescapably, is one of escalation.
As such a war continues, it becomes bigger,
costlier, more dangerous. Vietnam Is prov-
ing no exception. ,
The average American will not question
that if the Vietcong hits the Americans, our
forces must hit back. But many will won-
der why we are fighting a war on the other
side of the globe for a people who permit our
soldiers to be killed without lifting a warn-
ing voice. As in the attack at Bien Hos. air-
base 2 months ago when so many American
planes were destroyed, the Vietnamese vil-
lagers either collaborated with the Vietcong
or refused to help the Americans and the
Saigon Government.
Each incident like Pleiku, each political
crisis, each month that passes, increases the
danger to us, to southeast Asia, and to the
world. The strike at North Vietnam was
understandable and justifiable as a tactical
response in a war situation. It was not a
substitute for a policy. There was an ex-
change of blows which left the Vietnamese
situation in status quo. What the Johnson
administration now has to explain is where
we go from here.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 8, 1965]
QUESTIONS ON AIR STRIKE?EXPLANATIONS OF
- EVENTS BEHIND ACTION LEAVE A NUMBER OF
Pcawrs UNRESOLVED
(By Charles Molar)
WASHINGTON, February 7.?The official ex-
planations of the events surrounding the
American air strike on North Vietnam have
left a number of important questions un-
answered.
The United States attacked in retaliation
for the costly night raid on American troops
and helicopters at Pleiku in central Vietnam
by Communist guerrilla forces.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
expressed today the general opinion of the
Johnson administration when he said of the
attack on Pleiku that it was "quite clear this
was a test of the will and challenge of pur-
pose" of the United States and South Viet-
namGovernment sources privy to the discus-
sions that led to the U.S. attack say it was
felt that North Vietnam had clearly directed
and "made possible" the raid on Pleiku.
THE WEAPONS FACTOR
One question involves the weapons used
by the attacking Vietcong unit. The heaviest
were American-made 81-millimeter mortars.
American military advisers in Vietnam
have long conceded that the majority of
Vietcong weapons are American-made ones
captured in battle from South Vietnamese
forces.
The question is, therefore, that if the Viet-
cong unit at Pleiku was?as is so often the
case?using captured weapons, would this
sustain the argument that North Vietnam
made possible this particular attack?
Administration sources also contend that
the size and intensity of the attack indicated
that it was a major blow carefully timed by
Hanoi. Yet reports from the field indicate
that a company?or less?of Vietcong troops
took part in the bloody but brief encounter.
This is not a large Vietcong assault. Many
are much larger, involving hundreds of at-
tacking guerrillas.
There were American casualties, but the
attack was not especially intense. On a num-
ber of occasions whole South Vietnamese in-
fantry units up to company size have been
wiped out by the Vietcong in night assaults.
Another factor advanced by Government
sources is a belief that attacks launched the
same night at Thy Hoa and a group of vil-
lages near Nhatrang indicated, by the num-
ber and coordination of assaults in a single
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19S5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATh
-
night, a pattern of overall direction, probably
from Hanoi.
Since larger numbers of Vietcong attacks
have taken place throughout South Vietnam
on other nights, it is asked, Why would this
be?
Secretary McNamara was asked at his news
conference whether the perimeter defense
of the installations at Pleiku had been defi-
cient in view of the enemy success.
He said he did not believe "it would ever
be possible to protect our forces against a
sneak attack of that kind" and added that
the mortars had been fired from a consid-
erable distance and that clumps of foliage
on the generally open plateau had offered
cover.
Reports from Pleiku, however, later estab-
lished that the Vietcong attackers had been
able to crawl right onto the U.S. helicopter
base to place explosive charges against bar-
racks' walls and on the airstrip.
A question raised was whether South Viet-
namese security troops were ignoring long-,
standing American advice to increase night
patrolling.
Still another question puzzling to some in
Washington is why all ' three attack carriers
of the U.S. 7th Fleet were in the South China
Sea near the Vietnamese coast at the same
time.
The usual pattern is one of dispersal, with
each carrier forming the nucleus of an attack
force operating off different parts of east
Asia.
ErsEcr Is QUERIED
A further question was whether the air
attacks on North Vietnam would weaken the
Vietcong guerrillas tactically or strategically
and prevent further Vietcong successes
against American installations.
The administration contention clearly is
that North Vietnam made possible the attack
on Pleiku. But the questions about the in-
cident grow out of the apparent fact that a
small Vietcong unit, armed with captured
weapons and protected by a lack of field in-
telligence on the part of the South Viet-
namese Army, succeeded in creeping onto
the American base and dealing a bloody
blow.
Thus, the final question is how much of
the responsibility for Pleiku can be held not
just to Hanoi but to a failure to prosecute
the anttiguerrilla war in South Vietnam it-
self in a more vigorous and successful way.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is
the will of the Senate?
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the 'roll.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
I should like to reply?or rather to ex-
press myself briefly?with relation to
what the Senator from Alaska [Mr.
GRUENING], I am told, has said about our
situation in South Vietnam. Certainly,
no one regrets the present situation more
than I do. But It is very true and fun-
damental, in my opinion, that the pres-
tige of the United States, the whole se-
curity of our country, and the whole fu-
ture of our situation in the Far East de-
pends upon our retaliating quickly and
speedily when a U.S. compound is at-
tacked and our men and our airplanes
are destroyed. If we take that action
lying down, our future in that whole
area of the world will be affected ad-
versely.
Without going into any lengthy dis-
cussion at the present time, I wish to say
that I intend to support the President
and the Secretary of Defense in any re-
sponsible decisions?and I say they all
will be responsible decisions?to retali-
ate when situations like the present one
arise.
What the final determination will be
we cannot say at this time. I for one
know only what the Secretary of De-
fense has said, and what I have read in
the newspapers. It seems to me funda-
mental to state that we are in Vietnam,
and must maintain our prestige and the
strength of our forces there in order to
preserve what we stand for. We cannot
take an attack lying down and have men
in the uniform of our country killed and
wounded without letting our enemies
know that anyone responsible for such
action will meet with swift retaliation.
That is what we have done in the present
instance. I hope that we shall always
retaliate and not allow our boys in uni-
form to be killed, and take it lying down.
That is all I care to say at the present
moment.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield to the
Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CLARK. I commend the Senator
from Massachusetts for rising in support
of the Johnson administration in his
usual broadminded and bipartisan way
when a serious question of foreign pol-
icy arises.
I suppose I am as discontented with
the present situation in Vietnam as is
the Senator from Massachusetts. I
know perhaps less about the situation
than does he as a member of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services. But I believe
that this is no time to attack the present
adminisration on the floor of the Sen-
ate before we have far more information
about the background of the raids over
the weekend and the retaliation which
the President, in his capacity as the Com-
mander in Chief of our Armed Forces,
has ordered. I for one am prepared to
give the administration the benefit of
the doubt until I know far more about
the situation than I know at the present
time.
As the acting majority leader, I again
thank the Senator from Massachusetts,
for his patriotic comments in support of
What our President has done.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
I appreciate what the distinguished Sen-
aotr from Pennsylvania has said. It
seems to me fundamental that it is the
only position we can honorably take at
the present time.
CUBAN CRISIS COMPARED 'WITH
VIETNAM
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in this
morning's edition of the Washington
Post appears an article by the distin-
guished columnist, Mr. Joseph Alsop, en-
titled "'We Can' Versus 'We Can't',"
2221
which I believe merits the attention of
readers of the RECORD. I have a great
respect for Mr. Alsop's opinions, particu-
larly when they relate to the Far East.
However, in the course of his article
Mr. Alsop refers to a ratio or a percent-
ago of risk, that we may have weighed in
the balance during the Cuban missile
crisis.
My comment on this point is not "the
rear view" to which he refers in his arti-
cle, but rather is a comment I made at
the very time of the Cuban missile crisis.
I stated that I thought that President
Kennedy was making the right decision,
but I did not think that the possibility of
a nuclear war, much less an all-out nu-
clear war, was very great.
The reason I made that statement then
and the reason I repeat it now, is that
I did not think Mr. Khrushchev was any-
where near committing suicide. It is un-
fortunate that Mr. Alsop's otherwise very
splendid article should be possibly re-
duced in its value by an argument over
the responsibilities. Nevertheless, I
think that the possibilities should be
discussed.
I do not agree with Mr. Alsop's view
on this particular point, although I do
agree with some of his other views.
In connection with this point, there is
also an article in the February issue of -
the Reader's Digest entitled "We Must
Stop Red China Now," containing a
question-and-answer series involving Dr.
William E. Griffith, an outstanding au-
thority on communism. I believe that
a reading of that article, coupled with
Mr. Alsop's article, might do much to
clear the air with respect to where we
ought to be going in South Vietnam. I
ask unanimous consent that the two ar-
ticles to which I have referred be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 8, 19651
"WE CAN" VERSUS "WE CAN'T"
(By Joseph Alsop)
Not long after the Cuban missile crisis in
October 1962, President Kennedy was remi-
niscing about this supreme event of his
administration.
It all seemed easy enough, he remarked,
after the Soviet bluff had been successfully
called, but the trouble was no one could
be sure, at the outset, that the Soviets really
- were bluffing.
He was asked what he had thought the
odds were, at the outset, that the Soviets were
not bluffing. He replied that he had thought
the chance that the Soviets meant to go
through to the end was somewhere between
1 in 3 and even odds.
It was a chilling thing to hear. For if
the Soviets had not been bluffing, the Cuban
missile crisis would almost certainly have
ended in what the military theorists sweetly
call a thermonuclear exchange. And the
current Pentagon estimate of the cost to this
country of a H-bomb attack is 110 million
dead Americans.
In short, President Kennedy very sharply
changed the course of history by consciously
risking the destruction of 60 percent of the
population of the United States when the
risk was at least as high as 1 in 3 in his
sober, carefully considered opinion. He was
helped, no doubt, because he was also con-
scious that if he submitted to the threat
of Soviet Missiles in Cuba, most of the people
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE rebrmtry .8
whom he led and loved would never forgive
such a surrender.
Every thinking person is grateful, today,
for the dead President's willingness to run
this fearful risk. Many are perhaps unaware
of the Pentagon price tag above quoted.
Many may believe, with the easy wisdom of
the rear view, that the risk was not really
"1 in 3."
But no thinking person can suppose there
was no risk at all that the Kremlin would
refuse to back down in October 1962. And
no thinking person can suppose that the
thing risked?an H-bomb attack?would
have been anything but unimaginably awful.
All the same, there is unanimity that Mr.
Kennedy did right.
These facts provide the context in which
to judge the sharp turn that events have
taken in the last 48 hours. As these words
are written, it is not known whether the
President has merely ordered another demon-
stration, like the one after the trouble in
the Gulf of Tonkin; or whether he has at
last decided to do whatever may be needed
to avert defeat in South Vietnam.
It is not known, in other words, whether
he has finally decided to act upon the advice
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Ambas-
sador in Saigon, Gen. Maxwell Taylor. But
whether this is another fruitless one-shot
stunt, or whether the President now means
business at last, it is worth fitting the reason
for his long indecision into the context al-
ready provided above.
Previously he has rejected the Joint Chiefs'
advice and has done less than Maxwell Taylor
wanted done, even at the time of the Gulf
of Tonkin, for a basically simple reason.
When each successive plan for sterner action
against the North Vietnamese aggressors has
been presented to the President, he has asked
for absolute guarantees that such action
would not lead to "another Korea." And the
guarantees have not been given, because they
could not be given with honesty.
The memory of the proudest episode in
this country's proud postwar history as
burden-bearer of the free world has in fact
paralyzed our highest councils instead of
inspiring them.
The practical political reasons why this
has happened?the narrow murmurings of
Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, the President's
own memories of the opposition's squalid
post-Korea behavior, and so On and on?
hardly need emphasis.
What needs emphasis is the bizarre lunacy
of the people who insist we an quite prop-
erly do what we did in October 1962 whereas
we cannot again do what we did in Korea.
The figures speak for themselves. In Oc-
tober 1962 President Kennedy took a sub-
stantial risk of 110 million casualties in this
country. The Korean war was hard and
cruel as well as proud, but it cost us, in
dead and wounded, only 137,000 casualties.
Those men fell to defend all that had been
defended and gained for their country by
those who fell at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Guadal-
canal, and Saipan?who also numbered less
than 300,000. Where then is our common-
sense, that we shrink and fall back, and
shrink and fall back until the lives of millions
must again be risked?
We have waited overlong. With Kosygin
at Hanoi, the danger is far greater than it
was not so very long ago. But the choice is
the same, and the figures are the same, and
the price of failure is the same.
[From the Reader's Digest, February 19651
WE MUST STOP RED CHINA NOW
An apprehensive shudder traveled through
the free world last fall when Red China ex-
ploded its first nuclear device. Since then,
the Chinese have become increasingly bellig-
erent in sensitive areas around the globe.
liotv should the United States and its allies
respond to this new and menacing offensive?
In this interview, conducted by the editors
of The Reader's Digest, Dr. William E. Grif-
fith, an outstanding authority on commu-
nism, offers a series of specific proposals de-
signed to contain the strengthened Chinese
influence. Dr. Griffith is director of the In-
ternational Communism Project at the MIT
Center for International Studies. He is also
professor of Soviet diplomacy in the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts Uni-
versity, and author of "The Sino-Soviet
Rift.")
Question. Dr. Griffith, what is the signifi-
cance of Red Chinas explosion of a nuclear
device?
Answer. To the Chinese people, and to
many others throughout the world, the de-
vice is proof that Red China now has the
essential element of becoming an independ-
ent power?atomic capacity. The political
effect of this is already apparent. More and
more people, even in India and Japan, are
beginning to think that the wave of the
future, at least in areas like southeast Asia,
is not red, white and blue, but yellow.
China is the first underdeveloped country
the first Asian country and the first colored
country that has produced an atomic bomb.
There is no question that the Chinese are
highly proud of this achievement and now
realize that all the privations have not been
in vain. If they don't have butter, at least
they do have a very big gun.
From our point of view, the most alarming
aspect is the type of device that was ex-
ploded. The official statement of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission indicates that
the Chinese used uranium 235, very likely
produced in a gaseous-diffusion plant. This
is an enormously expensive operation, in-
volving tremendous amounts of electric pow-
er, and it indicates that Chinese technology
and engineering may be much more ad-
vanced than we had thought. Moreover, the
fact that the Chinese have uranium 235 in-
dicates that they will be able to get an H-
bomb much more rapidly than had been
thought?probably within 2 or 3 years.
For the present at least, one should think
fundamentally of the Chinese nuclear de-
vice as a political advantage, rather than
a military gain. Red China still lacks an
effective delivery system for the A-bomb.
There is no reason, however, to suppose that
the Chinese cannot eventually develop one.
Question. Apart from the bomb, have the
Chinese been doing well in extending their
influence?
Answer. The Chinese are dizzy with suc-
cess. They were the greatest winners from
the fall of Khrushchev. In Asia the Chinese
now have primary influence over the North
Vietnamese. By supporting the North
Koreans in the Korean war, they have won
primary influence over North Korea, and
the Russians have lost it. They have drawn
Cambodia and Burma into their orbit. They
defeated the Indians humiliatingly and
disastrously in November 1962. They have
isolated the Indians from all the other south-
east Asian powers, which are now so fright-
ened by Red China that they are in the
process of trying to come to terms with
Peiping. The Chinese have tremendous sway
over the Indonesians. And Chinese influ-
ence even extends into Europe, for Albania
is virtually a Chinese satellite.
Question. What do these successes mean
in terms of China's role in world affairs?
Answer. The rise of Red China presents
an entirely new situation in the world bal-
ance of power. China is a revolutionary
power with global ambitions. It is deter-
mined to replace Moscow at the head of
what the Chinese would consider a com-
pletely purified and revolutionary world
Communist movement.
The Chinese think that the wave of victory
which they are riding will engulf the under-
developed countries, particularly those in
the Southern Hemisphere, where people who
are both poor and colored resent the wealthy
white countries, including Russia. China
counts on the frustrations, the weakness, and
the fear of the colored peoples of the world
to drive them into Peiping's control. That
is why they are working so hard?and effec-
tively?in Africa and Latin America.
Question. How, exactly, do the Chinese
operate in these areas?
Answer. They have various weapons.
Their first weapon is money?they are spend-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars a year on
their worldwide operations. In Latin Amer-
ica the Chinese have encouraged Castro to
support the guerrillas in Venezuela. They
have allied with him in a struggle to win
supremacy over Latin American communism
and, in the process, to depose the pro-Soviet
heads of the big Latin American Commu-
nist Parties?in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
They do not have diplomatic missions in
Latin America, but they frequently use their
news agency offices?the New China News
Agency?as their base for subversion and
bribery.
The Chinese carry on an immense propa-
ganda operation, not only with very exten-
sive broadcasts, but also with an immense
amount of literature. They publish their
magazines and articles in about 15 languages
and spread them around the world with no
thought of cost. These things are very well
done, and there is no question that they have
some influence. At the University of Ca-
racas in Venezuela, for example, you don't
see Russian literature, you don't see Ameri-
can literature?you see Chinese literature, in
impeccable Spanish. It is tallormade for the
young, the radical, the violent, the dis-
satisfied, the frustrated.
In Africa, the Chinese think they have
great chances, because they feel the future
there holds more turmoil, more tribal and
ethnic warfare, and more anarchy and
chaos?the kind of violence which they have
only to urge on. For this reason they have
aided the revolutionaries in Zanzibar, the
rebels in the Congo. They are trying to buy
up, tp influence and to give training and
political and ideological direction to the dis-
datisfied, frustrated radicals in all countries
of black Africa.
Question. China is doing all this, and yet,
internally, it is a weak country?
Answer. Yes. This is the most remark-
able aspect of its achievements. Not only is
it a weak country with an enormous popu-
lation growth, but it has probably become
weaker in the last 5 years. China was hard
hit when the Russians took back all their
technical experts and stopped all economic
aid in 1960. The stagnation of Chinese in-
dustry in the last 5 years is almost unparal-
leled in any Communist country. Further-
more, the Chinese ran into a series of very bad
harvests. They've been buying the wheat
surpluses of Canada and Australia for some
years now; only in this way have they been
able to keep going in the food sector.
One must remember, however, that
throughout history China has always had
immense problems arising from its tremen-
dous population, from recurrent bad har-
vests and floods of its great rivers. The Com-
munist Government, if nothing else, has pro-
duced a degree of discipline which prevents
wholesale catastrophe; even at the worst of
the economic crisis in 1960-61, there was no
mass starvation in China.
The Chinese seem for the present to be
concentrating primarily on agriculture.
Given their population problems, they prob-
ably can do little else. The population of
China is estimated to be somewhere around
660 to 700 million, and estimates of the rate
of population increase have ranged as high
as 25 million a year. This explains their
Interest in southeast Asia, which is tradi-
tionally a great rice-producing area.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R0003001700164