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proved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 nary Y , 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE nder the proposal I offer today, $50 Yet, though a thorough knowledge of .ilion would be appropriated for title present and future economic trends is X. This increase is necessary both to vital to intelligent policymaking, there finance the expected projects fortheom- has been a surprisingly small amount of ing from the expansion of the act to in- public concern and no widespread debate clude racial imbalance plans, and also to thus far in this area. A few economists finance more adequately the existing au- and some business leaders have come thority to assist de jure desegregation forward with varying economic analyses programs. The Office of Education esti- and widely differing proposals, but their mates that this amount is the absolute efforts have received scant attention. realistic minimum required if a satis- Mr. President, the Constitution of the factory Federal effort is to be made. United States places the final responsi- Mr. President, I want to stress that my bility for the conduct of our foreign re- proposal contains no coercive features lations in the hands of the President. whatsoever. It does not require any So, while debate in Congress over the school board to take any action. It is conflict in Vietnam may prove healthy, simply designed to help those school may help clarify the issues at stake, and boards who have determined that a pro- may even develop workable alterna- gram to correct racial imbalance is nec- tives-still, in the final analysis-we essary and who can make good use of the cannot displace that ultimate responsi- Federal funds which my proposal would bility of the Chief Executive-that final provide. decision which is always his. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- However, the same Constitution vests sent that the bill lie on the desk for 10 in Congress the primary responsibility days for the purpose of permitting addi- for the American economy. It is we tional Senators to join as cosponsors. who must enact the laws levying taxes, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill imposing duties, appropriating moneys, will be received and appropriately re- and regulating commerce. And, if we ferred; and, without objection, the bill are to legislate in a manner that will per- will lie on the desk, as requested by the mit us to meet our international obliga- Senator from Massachusetts. tions while maintaining a growing, ex- The bill (S. 2928) to amend title IV panding domestic economy, Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order must assemble all the facts and informa- to authorize the Commissioner of Edu- tion necessary to the task. cation to provide technical assistance We must probe beneath surface ap- and grants to school boards in support of pearances and examine in detail rank- programs designed to overcome any ra- ling questions that have yet to be resolved cial imbalance in the public schools, in- to everyone's satisfaction. troduced by Mr. KENNEDY of Massachu- and referred to the Committee on Labor that the unn;ea aLates is roiiowing the and Public Welfare. only just and honorable course of policy open to us in Vietnam. THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH IN- derelict in our duty if we did not ascer- QUIRY INTO OUR FISCAL AND tain whether we can truly afford "guns MONETARY POLICIES $Y VIRTUE and butter" without endangering our in- OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT economic health; whether a sudden in- crease in military expenditures combined Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, to- with growing domestic programs will day the brooding specter of the war in generate unbearable inflationary pres- Vietnam looms large over Washington. sures; whether future tax increases may Government officials, members of the be required to keep growth steady and communications media, and the Ameri- stable; and, whether our balance-of-pay- can public in general, all realize that the ments deficits can be further reduced. single most important issue currently These are just some of the matters we facing this Nation is the conduct of our need to look into in order to discharge our policy in a small, beleagured country responsibilities. thousands of miles from our own shores. Mr. President, such an investigation is In fact, whether they uphold, or would not just desirable and timely, it is urgent have us renounce our commitment to and necessary. the people of South Vietnam, Senators, For that reason, I am today submitting columnists, businessmen, students and a resolution on behalf of the distin- all men of good will affirm that the pur- guished senior Senator from Indiana suit of peace in southeast Asia is of over- [Mr. HARTKE], the able junior Senator riding importance to the United States from Montana [Mr. METCALi'], and my- and every one of our partners in the free self whi h ld , c wou authorize the Senate world. Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, at its Committee on Finance to make a full But, concerned as we are over events and complete study of all matters relat- next printing, I ask unanimous consent in South Vietnam itself, we cannot lose ing to the fiscal and monetary position that my name be added as a cosponsor of sight of the problems related to the eco- of the Government, and their effect on of he (S. 2911) to bill Tariff Act of amend roduce 3bb y nomic strength which undergirds Amer- the state of the economy. The resolu- th the noAct of 1eo introduced L- icas' ability to meet her responsibilities the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TA there-as well as in other friendly na- tion would require the committee to re- 1v1ADGE]. tions and at home. We cannot and must port its findings-and make such recom- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without not allow the political and military ques- mendations as it deems advisable to the objection, it is so ordered. tions about the Vietnamese struggle to Senate not later than 90 days after the Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I ask obscure the implications for our economy day on which the resolution is agreed to. unanimous consent that my name may. of the increased spending required to I sincerely trust that this resolution be added as a cosponsor to S. 2797 at its sustain that struggle. will be speedily adopted. next printing. No. 26-2 2901 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The res- olution will be received and appropriately referred. The resolution (S. Res. 221) was re- ferred to the Committee on Finance, as follows: S. Ras. 221 Resolved, That the Committee on Finance, or any duly authorized subcommittee there- of, is authorized under sections 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdiction specified by rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to all matters relating to the fiscal and monetary position of the Government of the United States in view of our increas- ing commitments in Vietnam, including, but not limited to the adequacy of the revenues of the Government, the need for increasing the statutory limit on the public debt, meth- ods for further improving the United States balance-of-payments position, the problem of interest rates and other matters related to the Nation's economic welfare. SEC. 2. The committee shall report its findings upon the study and investigation authorized by this resolution, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable, to the Senate not later than the 90th day after the day on which this resolution is agreed to. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR ADDI- TIONAL COSPONSORS TO S. 2888 Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, a week ago I asked unanimous consent that S. 2888 remain at the desk for the conven- ience of those Senators who desire to co- sponsor it. I now ask unanimous consent that S. 2888 remain at the desk for an additional week for the convenience of those Sena- tors who are not present today, until February 23. This bill would give prior- ity to school lunch programs. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS Mr, BOGGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of S. 2882, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act so as to extend to June 30, 196', the period for initial enrollment in the program of sup- plementary medical insurance benefits for the aged provided under part B of such title, the names of Senator JAVrTS, of New York, Senator ALLOTT, of Colo- rado, Senator FONG, of Hawaii, and Sen- ator ScoTT, of Pennsylvania be added as cosponsors. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 16, 1966 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objec- tion, it is so ordered. NOTICE OF HEARING ON S. 2704. A 13ILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE REG- ULATION OF BANK COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS 1Vlr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I AND JOINT RESOLUTION should like to announce that the Sub- Under authority of the orders of the committee on Financial Institutions of Senate, as indicated below, the follow- the Committee on Bankin?; and Currency ing names have been added as additional will hold a hearing on S. 2703, a bill to a^osponsors for the following bills and provide for the regulation of bank collec- joint resolution:: tive investment funds. The hearing will begin on Tuesc a.y, Authority of February 1, 1966: 2855. A bill to amend chapter 207, title March 8, 1966, at 10 a.m.,, in room 5302, S. 18, United States Code, to prescribe procedure New Senate Office Building. for the return of persons who have fled, in Any persons who wish to appear and violation of the conditions of ball given in testify in connection with this bill are any State or judicial district of the United requested to notify Matthew Hale, chief States, to another state or judicial district, of staff, Senate Committee on Banking and for other purposes: Mr. BAYH, Mr. ERVIN, and Currency, room 5301), New Senate Mr. FONG, Mr. HART, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. JAVITS, :i,nd Mr. SMATHERS Office Building, Washington, D.C., tele- . S.J. Res. 133. Joint resolution designating phone 225--3921. tebruary of each year as American History Month: Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BENNETT, MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. BYRD of West Vir- alnia, Mr. CASE, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. A message from the House of Ret)re- DoMINICK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FAN- sentatives? by Mr. Hackney, one o1 its NIN, Mr. FONG, :Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARRIS, reading clerks, communicated to the Seri- Mr. HART, Mr. IIARTKE, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. ate the intelligence of the death of lion, I Mr. KENNNEDNEDY of of Massachusetts, JORDAN Mr. of KEIdaho,NNEDY Of Of f AI BERT THOMAS, late a Representative KENNEDY York, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. from the State of Texas, and transmitted MAGNUSON, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. the resolutions of the House thereon. METCALF, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. MORTON, Mr. The message announced that the Muni-Hy, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PELL, Mr. PROUTY, House had disagreed to the amendment Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3314) to I'HURMOND, Mr. 'rowER, and Mr. YOUNG of require premarital examinations in the North Dakota. District of Columbia, and for other Fur- .A 3,196: S. 2871.tA bill CtoFamend Public law 660, poses; asked a conference with the hen- 116th Congress, to establish a National Traffic ate on the disagreeing votes of the two Safety Agency to provide national leader- Houses thereon, and that Mr. WHITENER, ship to reduce traffic accident losses by means Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HORTON, and Mr. of intensive research and vigorous applica- ROUDEBUSH were appointed managers Hon of findings, and for other purposes: Mr. oil the part of the House at the ALLOTT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BIBLE, conference. Mr. CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. I The message also announced that the NOUYE, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MoN- RONEY, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. MOSS, and Mr. PELL. House had disagreed to the amendments S. 2874. A bill to provide for the strength- of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 647 to ening of American educational resources for amend the act of March 3, 1901, to per- international studies and research: Mr. nut the appointment of new trustees in CLARK, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. deeds of trust in the District of Columbia TNOUYE. Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. by agreement of the parties; asked a LONG of Missouri. Mrs. NEUDERGER, Mr. PELL, conference with the Senate on the dis- Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIBICoFF, Mr. WILLIAMS agreeing votes of the two Houses Of New Jersey, a Mr. YABROROUGH. thereon, and that Mr. MULTER, Mr. Authority of f February 4 4, , 1966 196ti: S. 2877..A bill to amend the Older Ameri- A.BERNETIIY, Mr. SMITH of Virginia, Mr. cans Act of 1965 in order to provide for a SPRINGER, and Mr. NELSEN were ap- National Community Senior Service Corps: pointed managers on the part of the Mr" CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HART, Mr. House at the conference. tIARTKE, Mrs. NEIIBEEGER, and Mr. RIDICOFF. The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amamd- ON ELEC- ments of the Senate to the bill i H.R. NOTICE, OF HEARINGS 10304) to provide for the mandatory re- TORAL COLLEGE REFORM porting by physicians and institutions Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, as chair- in the District of Columbia of certain man of the Senate Judiciary Subcommit- physical abuse of children; asked a con- tee on Constitutional Amendments, I ference with the Senate on the disa:ree- wish to announce forthcoming hear- ing votes of the two Houses thereon, and rots on electoral college reform. The that Mr. MULTER, Mr. .ABERNETHY, Mr. hearings are scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. SMITH of Virginia, Mr.. SPRINGER, and on February 28, March 1, 2, 3, and 4, Mr. NELSEN were appointed managers and March 7 through 10. They will be on the part of the House at the conducted in the auditorium, 0-308 of conference. the New Senate Office Building. The message also announced that the Any persons or organizations inter- House had disagreed to the amendments ested in presenting their views to the of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9985) to subcommittee should contact the sub- provide for the mandatory reporting by committee staff in room 419, Senate Of- physicians and hospitals or similar in- fice Building, phone extension 3018. stitutions in the District of Columbia of injuries caused by firearms or other dangerous weapons; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. MULTER, and Mr. HARSHA were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference. ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESO- LUTION SIGNED The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint res- olution: S. 9. An act to provide readjustment as- sistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period; S. 1407. An act for the relief of Frank E. Lipp; and H.J. Res. 403. Joint resolution authorizing an appropriation to enable the United States to extend an invitation to the World Health Organization to hold the 22d World Health Assembly in Boston, Mass., in 1969. FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I have been a friend and supporter of the food- for peace program ever since those days of serious agricultural surpluses back: in 1954, when we enacted the original Pub- lic Law 480 legislation. Last week the President submitted to Congress a comprehensive and expanded food for peace program. The President called it food for freedom. Personally, I regret the change in name as the name food for peace was established in our own Nation and the world. The pro- gram, as we have known it through these 11 years of operation, has been useful to us and to our foreign friends. It has re- duced our surpluses. It has opened new outlets for our fields and our farmers. It has brought increased jobs and income to our city people. It has fed millions of hungry people overseas. It has stabi- lized food prices where otherwise there would have been severe inflation. It has stimulated economic development and laid the basis for expanded private trade. It has won friends for us. It has strengthened free world relationships and has advanced the peaceful aims for which we stand. The program has done all that we originally hoped for it, and more. The fact that we propose now to change that program Is In the spirit of progress rather than dissatisfaction. Food for peace has been not only a useful tool in feeding people and expand- ing trade, but also has been a highly in- structive teacher. The lessons we have learned are the basis for the changes now proposed. We have come to have second thoughts, for example, about use of the word "sur- plus" in a world where millions are hungry or underfed. The same can be said for the "disposal." The farmers of Kansas are producing wheat on about 9 million acres of their farmland, and a substantial amount of this wheat has been moving to foreign Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 rte, Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February I, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 2911 years of broadcasting, made the decision all almost no doubt that he'll return to making of the Government. The wavelengths New& himself to resign as president of CBS documentaries and there's even less doubt that a network will hire him. to all the people of the country. by . This is a are occurrence at broadcasting Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the cIn my view, Congress should give very areful consideration to an allocation networks. Usually, if a man is fired, the of event is referred to as a "resignation." The Senator from Alaska yield at that point? ` a certain amount of time of certain wave- toughest term ever permitted is that a de- Mr. GRUENING. I am glad to yield lengths, for presentation, for discussion, parted employe's services were "terminated to the Senator from Tennessee, for examination of public issues, not by mutual consent." Mr. GORE. I commend the Senator alone by the Congress, but surely partly But Fred W. Friendly, a volatile, emotional from Alaska for his statement. As a by the Congress. man, quit after a disagreement with his new member of the Committee on Foreign boss, John A. Schneider. Schneider was pro- Mr. GRUENING. I could not agree moted last Wednesday from president of the Relations, I wish to express appreciation more with the wise and penetrating state- CBS television network to group vice presi- for the coverage which television pro- ment of the distinguished Senator from dent, broadcasting. vided for the committee hearings. I be- Tennessee. It is very much the business In the elaborate organization of CBS, Inc., lieve that the action of the Columbia of the American people. The southeast Schneider had been Friendly's equal. On Broadcasting System and the success of Asian involvement is one of the most Wednesday, Schneider moved up, second only the hearings in re hl +h , ,_ ac and to Board Chairman William Paley. The Wednesday date is important, for on Thursday came a debate between Friendly and Schneider. Friendly wanted live TV cov- erage of George F. Kennan's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Schneider decided to go with the regular schedule but added that live coverage might come this week. The official announcement, made yesterday by Dr. Stanton, said: "Friendly feels he is unable to continue in his post as a result of a decision made by * * * Schneider not to schedule live coverage of the testimony Stanton added: "Fred Friendly has been an outstanding leader of broadcast journalism. His contributions to the public, to his pro- fession and to CBS have been great indeed. My associates, his colleagues and I will miss him." Fred's emotions were shown plainly in his letter of resignation. He called it "a matter of conscience." After the decision not to broadcast Kennan's testimony, Friendly watched the four TV monitors that are in his office. While NBC telecast the hearing, Friendly said, CBS was showing "a fifth re- run of 'I Love Lucy' and an eighth rerun of 'The Real McCoys,' "I wanted to order up an announcement that said: 'Due to circumstances beyond our control the broadcast originally intended for this time will not be seen,' " Friendly wrote. His letter of resignation also said: "I am resigning because the decision not to carry the hearings makes a mockery of the Paley- Stanton CND (Columbia News Division) crusade of many years that demands broad- cast access to congressional debate." Friendly, TV's most honored producer of news documentary programs, moved to the presidency of CBS News, March 2, 1964. His success continued after he introduced the national TV "test" programs and as the Walter Cronkite news program gained ground and sometimes won higher ratings than the NBC team of Chet Huntley and David Brink- ley. One good source in New York said yester- day: "Of course, CBS hates to lose Fred. But he stood on principle and made his fight at the wrong time. The network has no choice in such a fight but to uphold its top execu- tive." Speculation began immediately about Friendly's successor. The names that cropped up immediately were those of Gordon Manning and Bill Leonard. Man- ning was executive editor of Newsweek for 3 years before Friendly selected him to be- come CBS News vice president and director of television news in December 1964. At the same time, veteran broadcaster Leonard was promoted to vice president and, director of news programing. The promotion came after Leonard had pioneered new tech- niques for covering elections. Privately, Friendly has complained, rather mildly, that the presidency of CBS News brought him smaller earnings than he had made as a documentary producer. There's People raises an interesting question. Many thoughtful Americans express ap- prehension as to the imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches of Government. The Presi- dent has frequently resorted-and prop- erly so-to every means of com- munication. The state of the Union message is not a message to Congress any more, but, over the heads of Congress, to the Amer- ican people. I do not speak critically of. this situation, because we have a people's government. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARTKE in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. GORE. I ask unanimous consent that 3 additional minutes be allowed to the Senator from Alaska. The PRESIDING OFFTC in which Congress has had no real voice. Mr. GORE. And the Government has been very profligate in allowing the wavelengths to be monopolized by com- mercial organizations. The very idea of a vast television network using the wave- lengths that belong to the whole people to advertise soap, when we should be having a critical examination of the issue of war and peace, makes it appar- ent that there should be a reexamina- tion of the whole question of licensing television. Mr. GRUENING. I hope Congress will not only examine this case, but the whole subject, which affects the right to know of the American people. objection, it is so ordered. Without OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM . Mr. GORE. If the legislative branch Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- is without the facility to communicate dent, with my responsibilities of being with the American people, how is this chairman of a committee as well as the imbalance to be corrected, I ask the assistant majority leader, I was not able Senator? to be present at the hearings of the For- Mr. GRUENING. I believe that the eign Relations Committee, but I want to remarks of the senior Senator from Ten- say that these advocates of retreat, de- nessee are extremely pertinent. I know feat, surrender, and national dishonor of no more important function in a de- have not been doing the country any mocracy, in a government of free people, good when they went before a television than that the people shall have full ac- network suggesting that this Nation was cess to all the actions of their govern- not committed to fighting aggression in ment. Very frequently that has not this area. The Senate voted for the res- been forthcoming. olution last year, and Senators voted that I believe that broadcasting by the na- this country would help that country re- tional networks by TV, the hearings of sist aggression, and specifically author- the Committee on Foreign Relations, was ized the President to take whatever steps one of the most important public serv- he felt necessary to resist further aggres- Ices for the benefit of our democratic sion. We are committed. We have system that has been rendered in our more than 200,000 men there. We have time. at stake our national honor. We are Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the hear- committed to resisting Communist ag- Ings deal with the most important issue gression. That is what this is all about. before the Nation and the world today. It has been going on for some time. I doubt that a more important commit- The Senator from Alaska voted against tee hearing has been held in the last 20 the resolution, and he was privileged to years. Fortunately, the message is do it, but once the Congress adopted that reaching the American people. Millions resolution, it had taken a firm position. of people have been able to see and hear Once Congress authorized the President the issue questioned. It has not been a to do that which he felt necessary, the side show. I believe the Senator will President was authorized to do it. it agree that it has been a thorough ex- was authorized in the resolution and dis- amination of the commitments, the is- cussed specifically during the debate on sues, and possible consequences. the floor of the Senate. He was au- If the American people are not en- thorized to send troops wherever neces- titled to the fullest information on such sary to resist aggression in the area. an issue as this, the issue of war and It is not helping our t coun ry when peace, then for what purpose should the Senators go before the Nation and ex- Government permit the use of the other press their fears on this issue that the waves? Red Chinese might come in, and the fact Let us never forget that every single that we are losing some American boys. television station operates at the license We are inflicting at least 10 to 1 damage Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0004 0 0001-5. 2912 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE e ruary 16, 1 X966 on the North Vietnam invaders com- We let those people know that we would Those whom we have sent are whip- pared to the losses suffered by our forces. help them resist aggression. We said ping the Communists. They are going to if this great nation is to be humili- we would put ships and advisers in there beat the aggressors unless the best fight- ated, Is to be defeated and run out and at that time to help those people defend Ing men in the world-the American le downgraded to a second-class power themselves against subversion and ag- soldiers-are pulled out of there. They by that little nation, then I wish Red gression. might be defeated, but they are not go- China would come in. It would be a Then, the Communists came and they ing to get whipped in Vietnam. If they great humiliation for this Nation to be attacked our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. are beaten, it will be in Washington. defeated by a small nation of 16 million That was an act of war. We shot back. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will people. If we must be defeated, it would Not only did we shoot back, but we the Senator yield? be better to lose to a large nation of bombed the bases from which those tor- Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- `100 million people. pedo boats came to attack our ships. dent, I yield. This Nation was founded because we So that there will not be any mis;m- Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President. I bad courageous men. We became a d.erstandings, at the time I was in charge wish to say in connection with the criti- great nation because the people had of debating the equalization tax here on cism of the Senator of those who have courage. They did not give up because the Senate floor, the President asked expressed publicly their dissent from an they had to fight Indians. If the men Senators on the Republican side of the undeclared war and an unconstitu- who came on the Mayflower were fright- aisle and Senators on the Democratic tional- ened to helplessness the first time they side of the aisle to come to the White Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- had to fight Indians, they would have House and talk with him. While Sena- dent, will the Senator yield? gone back to England on the Mayflower. tors were debating on the floor, the en- But they fought the Indians and won, tire matter was discussed. The Presi- Mr. GRUENING. I will finish my sen- meanwhile losing some fine Americans, dent asked for that resolution for au- tence, if I may. until this Nation became great. We are thority broad enough to authorize put- Abraham Lincoln, who was not too upholding our commitments in the ting troops in there and we understood greatly admired in the State of the Sen- proud tradition of our fathers, grand- that, if need be, the resolution said that ator from Louisiana, opposed the entry fathers, great-grandfathers, and may he was authorized to take any steps nec- of the United States in the Mexican War, other courageous Americans who fell on essary to resist aggression in that area. spoke against it in the Congress and else- the field of battle. It was explained on the floor of the where and today no one vilifies the mem- I only wish that back during the Civil Senate by the chairman of the commit- ory of Abraham Lincoln or castigates him War there had been a humorous element tee.. The resolution was broad enough for that courageous and proper attitude. in the Congress that would have ap- to put Army men. on the land mass of Those of us who oppose and continue to peared daily before a nationwide televi- Asia. oppose our entry in an undeclared war lion network and have said, "We fought Then, North Vietnam regular army and the sending of our boys to slaughter and lost a Yankee today. We lost a boy units proceeded to march on South Viet- where there was no act of aggression today let us quit." If they had spread nam, we put our troops there to resist against us, and where those people whom that propaganda, it might have spread aggression. They are the aggressors. we are supporting are not willing to fi?ht fear. Maybe the war would have gone We went in after that date. We are effectively for themselves, have no regrets the other way. 'then we would have fighting there pursuant to that,resolu- or apologies to offer. won the principles of States' rights. We tio:n. Our national honor is committed We will find that more and more Amer- would prove that we were the strong to it. ican people will come to our point of view people. Having achieved victory we I do not believe it serves the purposes that we have no business down there. could have offered to rejoin the Union of this country to have two Senators who We were not attacked, and we have no with considerable pride that our theory voted against the purpose of this Nation right or obligation to involve ourselves all of States' rights had been sustained. making a speech every week and some- over the world as policemen and sending Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will times every day against our determined our boys to their slaughter, whenever the Senator yield? national purpose to uphold our national someone scents a Communist threat. An The PRESIDING OFFICER. The honor and to keep our word and our com- examination of the record will show that time of the Senator has expired. rnitment. there was aggression on both sides and Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask unani- :[ do not believe it is helpful to go on that we too were guilty of aggression and mous consent that we may have 5 addi- national television and suggest that we violation of commitments far more sol- tional minutes. are the International criminal when we emn and binding than those that are al- The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- are, in truth, the international good leged to justify our military adventures out objection, it is so ordered. guys. We did not start this fight. They in southeast Asia. Mr. GRUENING. If the hearings con- did. We are ready to talk peace at any Mr. GORE. Mr President, I am glad tinue to be televised, the American pee- time. They are not. that the hearings of the Committee on ple may learn of the mistaken concept Our children will call us blessed and Foreign Relations have not been char- stated by our distinguished majority courageous if we stand fast and defeat acterized by intemperate and flamboyant whip, that we have a solemn commit- Communist aggression. language and arm waving. iiient. solem They will learn there was no such The PRESIDING OFFICER. The I invite the distinguished junior Sen- olemn commitment; that we were never time of the Senator has expired. ator from Louisiana to attend the hear- so committed; that our commitment was Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- ings and present the views he has here a tentative one, dealing only with eco- dent, I ask unanimous consent that I presented. I would like to suggest to nomic aid and further conditioned on may proceed for 1 additional minute. him that the issue before the committee re by ment i which the were South Vietnam Govern e The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- is not defeat, retreat, and surrender, to went whi any commitment never made. T Therhei r out objection, it is so ordered. use his words. was never ammitment to send our Mr. LONG of Louisiana. They will This issue is rather whether this war is troops public into cese fand , athey must inform be the cell us courageous because we have the to be held within bounds which we can brought t these facts, a American to stand up and resist aggres- reasonably anticipate to be manageable, re- sion in the tradition of our fathers, our whether the goal be limited and the bMr. LONG Mr. Lhome to Louisiana. American not t people. MI do not grandfathers, and great grandfathers. commitments be limited, or whether this this Nation a as being an interne- tional criminal, as the Senator from I am proud of my forebears who helped be an open end commitment for total vic- Oregon has said, and I do not regard this to give us this great Nation. tory militarily against whatever forces Nation as being an international ag- I have just come from Louisiana. I may appear in opposition in southeast gressor, as the Senator from Alaska has had an occasion to visit with these fine Asia. said. I regard the Communists as the young men who are preparing to fight in The issue is rather whether this war is aggressors. We helped organize the Vietnam. There Is not a coward in the a global war. Such an issue deserves the peaceful nation of South Vietnam. We crowd. They are courageous young men. deliberate consideration which the com- are members of the SEATO agreement. They have high morale and high spirit. mittee is giving it. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Februerr 1 fApp ed For RV &l ? Ji, % f37B0 6 0400020001-5 It is far too important to be considered with catch phrases and loosely selected slogans. I hope the committee hearings for the next 2 days will be observed by countless millions of Americans. It is for their country, and it is their sons who will die if this degenerates into a war between the United States and China, and from that who can tell what holocaust may develop. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President- Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor. Mr. GORE. I yield, but I have only a minute left. Mr. McGOVERN. It has been sug- gested here that those who share the Senator's concern about a major war in Asia are somehow lacking in patriotism and willingness to defend our country's interest. I have not been in the Senate very long. The Senator from Tennessee has. Does the Senator from Tennessee recall the warning of General MacArthur some years ago that anyone who- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator recall General MacArthur's warning some years ago that anyone who com- mitted the United States to a major war on the Asian mainland "ought to have his head examined"? Mr. GORE. I recall that and that General MacArthur gave this country the warning that if we went to the Yalu in Korea, China would not come into the war. Unfortunately he was in error. They did come in and we lost many thou- sands of men in a few days. Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator remember during the discussion of whether we should send forces into southeast Asia in 1954 that General Ridgway, who was then the Army Chief of Staff, vigorously opposed it and said that he regarded it as a harebrained idea? Mr. GORE. And we also heard from General Gavin last week. Mr. McGOVERN. It seems to me that no one would be foolish enough to sug- gest that General MacArthur and Gen- eral Ridgway and General Gavin are lacking in patriotism or in knowledge of the problems we are up against if we get into a major war in Asia. It is easy for gentlemen to talk about our chil- dren calling us blessed if we get involved in war with China. But if, that happens, there may not be any children left to call us blessed. Mr. GORE. Chauvinism is not the is- sue here. The issue is the wisest course for this country involving war and peace. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, I rather resent the suggestion that this Nation is waging illegal war. One hundred and twenty-five times in our his- tory the President has sent American troops into action, either to defend our position or to help our friends without a declaration of war or any prior au- thorization whatever. Most of our declarations of war-in fact, I suspect that perhaps all but about one-actually occurred after the fighting had begun, sometimes after it had been going on for a long time. Our boys at Pearl Harbor did not wait for Congress to declare war before shooting back at the Japanese who were attacking. Gen- eral MacArthur did not wait for Con- gress to declare war before he took ac- tion in the Philippines to attack the Japanese forces with our Air Force. The President has the authority- and I have said this both under a Re- publican President and under Demo- cratic Presidents-to send American servicemen into action to defend the position that this Nation decides to take, and he has the power to make such a decision. I might add that when we fought the war in Korea, there was no declaration of war. But hardly anyone challenged the legality of what we were doing in Korea. There was no serious challenge of that action. We thought we were acting in pursuance of a United Nations treaty commitment. In this instance, an act of aggression was committed against us. We were attacked, and we fought back. We attacked those who attacked us. Then Congress considered the matter and voted for a resolution that gave the Presi- dent the specific power to take whatever action he thought would-be necessary to resist in that area. Look at article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It specif- ically authorizes the right of individual and collective self-defense. Then what happened? The Commu- nists proceeded to march organized units from North Vietnam into South Viet- nam. When they did that, we proceeded to send units of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps into South Vietnam to hold the land that the Communists were trying to take by outright aggression, and our forces are doing a magnificent job. When I speak of my love for my great country, I am not embarrassed because now and then I become a little enthusi- astic. I swell with pride when I see Old Glory flying from the Capitol. I swell with pride when I see Old Glory flying around the Washington Monument. I swell with pride when I see it flying from the. Senate Office Building. I am proud of this country. I pray that no other flag will ever fly over it. While sometimes I may be dismayed to see that flag flying at half mast, as it is today in honor of a patriotic, coura- geous American, who'did his best to serve his country, as God gave him the light to serve it during his time here, my prayer is that there may never be a white flag of surrender up there. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield. Mr. McGOVERN. I do not believe that anyone is questioning the glory of the American flag. The question is, What is in our national interest? Does not the Senator from Louisiana believe that Members of the Senate have the right to raise questions about our policy in southeast Asia, when we con- sider that the backers of that policy have been consistently wrong about what they have told us? The Secretary of Defense, not many months ago, gave it as his assessment that the American military combat role in Vietnam would be largely over by the end of 1965 and that our boys would be on their way home. We have come to the end of 1965 and have entered 1966. Instead of bringing the American forces home, we hear from those same sources that we shall have a force of 400,000, 500,000, or 600,000 in Vietnam before the end of 1966. That is only one of the more notable predictions that have been wrong. Each time we have had a dis- appointment in our effort in southeast Asia, our policymakers have merely asked us to redouble the prescription. In view of that record, does not the Senator from Louisiana believe that Senators have some right to raise ques- tions about our policy there and about the course we are on, without being re- minded that the glory of the flag is in- volved? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Senators have the right to ask questions, but when the Nation is committed and our men are fighting in the field, we have a re- sponsibility not to do things that will divide and confuse the people and pro- long the war. The information I am getting-and it is coming from very high sources in the Government-is that one of the greatest difficulties in bringing the war to an end is that every time a Sena- tor suggests that we retreat and accept defeat or surrender, that word goes right back to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the powers at Peiping, who say, "If we will just keep after those Americans, even though they are killing 10 of our men to every 1 of theirs that is being killed that great nation will lose courage and quit." So every time a Senator makes an- other speech in fear that Red China might come in, he helps the Communist cause. If the United States had been so timid and afraid of Red China during the Ko- rean war, South Korea would be a Com- munist country today. Instead of try- ing to liberate only a part of Korea, we tried to liberate the whole country, but we did it in the interest of freedom. I am not ashamed that our troops went there. They achieved our national pur- pose, even though the Red Chinese did come in. Some of us felt that we should have fought the Red Chinese with more determination than we did. But our Nation is committed in Viet- nam. My own judgment is that we will see this action through. We will come out of it with honor worthy of all Ameri- cans who have gone before us. To those forces of doubt and defeat who advocate, "Oh, my goodness; get out; Red China might come in," I say that if Red China thought that this Na- tion was so much afraid of Red China, Red China would be in the war. But Red China knows that we are a great, big, Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16,'1.966 strong country, a first class fighting power. They know they can do us much injury, but they also know that we can do a lot more damage to them. It works both ways. Mr. McGOVERN. Did I correctly un- derstand the implication of the Senator's earlier statement to be a recommenda?- L en to extend our action to a war with China? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I did not say 1,1 fat at all, and the RECORD will not show that I did. I merely said that if Red China thought that if by sending some of her troops in the United States would turn tail and ruic, as some Senators have advocated, Red China would be in the war tomorrow. But I am of the unpres- ;ion that Red China believes that if she came into the war, she would have a first- Class modern fighting power to contend with, and she will be right. I maintain that speeches on the floor of the Senate and on television, advocat- i rig that our boys not fight for their coun- try, and that the people back off from the effort to help their country, handcuff our lighting men and to hold our country (town when the going gets tough, do clothing but encourage the Communists to continue the war. Mr. GRUENI:NG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield. M1?. GRUENING. I take issue with the Senator's statement that our boys are fighting for their country. We are lighting in another country where we gave taken sides in a civil war. The fact is that the new "white-haired boy" whom we have built up, Mr. Ky, made a state- enent in answer to a press request, "Who are your heroes?" His reply was, "I have only one, Adolph Hitler. We need four or five more Hitters in Vietnam." That is the man whom we are now supporting. Ife is the man we are entrusting with do- mestic reforms. Actually his is the kind Of corrupt government we have been supporting, of which there have been nine different specimens since Diem was "humped off." That is the kind of :,o-called freedom we are fighting for, not the real freedom of the people. ti-Ii,. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, I have never seen it fail, at any Lime when this Nation chooses to sup- port a government that is resisting com- munism, that the Communists always put forth the argument that the head of that anti--Communist government is a "bad guy"; that he is corrupt and v',- nious; and pick out a statement the man may have made--l)erhapis an ill-advised misunderstood statement-to show that perhaps he is not the kind of fellow that we should support, and that he is not our kind of guy. Alter all, Mr. President, this man is not chopping off the heads of innocent people. That is what cannot be said for the opposition, however. ,'?rir. President, for the life of me I can- flot understand when people stand and 7i?11hi; for our i'riends and keep fighting :side by side with us, in resisting; com- munism, why some persons will find so ;ouch fault with our friends and can- not even find one fault with the murder- ous assassins who want to kill us, as soon as they have disposed of our friends. Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I be- lieve that one statement made in the course of the very interesting, discussion which we have just heard should per- haps be corrected to some degree in this Lincoln's birthday period. I believe I am the only Member of Congress whose father was a Confeder- ate soldier. Many Members of Congress had. two grandfathers who were Con- federate soldiers. In my case I knew for years all three of the men whore I have mentioned, my father and my two grandfathers. 1 never :heard any of those three men speak with anything save respect, and sometimes they spoke almost with veneration, of Abraham Lincoln. They felt, as do most of the people in the part of the country ft om which I come, that perhaps the greatest national tragedy in connection with that war which split our country asunder was the assassination of Abraham Lin- coln. 'I want the RECORD to show that most of us in the southland venerate the memory of Abraham Lincoln and believe that if he had lived we would not have had the troubles that came after the conclusion of that war. V, DISCLOSURE OF TROOP MO dE- MENTS IN ON-THE-SPOT REPORT- 'ING IN VIETNAM :hMr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I re- cently received a letter from a retired chief warrant officer of the Army which I believe reflects the deep feeling and concern that parents throughout the Na- tion have for their sons who are cur- rently on the battlefront in Vietnam. The concern centers around the fact that the movement of our forces is "tele- raphed" to the enemy through on-.rie- spot reporting of the news media. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article written by Raymond L. Hughes, chief warrant officer, U.S. Army retired, of Plant City, Fla., which appeared as a letter to the editor in the Tampa Tribune of Sunday, February 6, 1966. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: .MUST :HELD TROOP MOVES IN VIETN., II PANT Cary.-We note with alarm and, on- siderable apprehension the almost total lack of security afforded our troops in South Viet- nara by every news medium; and the fact that newspapers, radio, and. television ,eem to be vying with each other to disclose in- formation 'which, by all standards of sec:a cy and commonsense, should not be disci-,ed. t'reedoin of the press is one thing but when one can pick up the morning paper, listea to the radio, or look at television and see and ho r disclosed the most minute detai';; of troop movements and deployments :ht down to platoon and squad locations and even to pinpoint where private Joe Blot': has his pup tent--and what road to take to find it, the whole aspect of freedom of the T. ress begins co be asinine and literally explosive. If I were Private Etlow-or his security off- cer--I would hiow my top, clear to the Pc: ntagon.. A recent news release from recurity 1-trn- eic%s in Washington counseled all news media to use self-censorship and discretion in dis- closing troop movements in Vietnam b.ct if this had any effect at all it has not become evident. Commanders in the area of this vicious and nasty conflict to which so many of our men have been committed, and to which many more thousands will be committed, complain that they are extremely hamnerca by the lack of intelligence concerning loca- tion and movement of the Vietcong. You may be sure that the Vietcong, Hanoi, and Red China (if any of their people can read English at all), have no trouble at all in tracing the movement and minutest opera- tion of our troops and that of our allies. 'I'o them we must indeed be stupid to bare for all to read (who have the price of a news- paper) information which should reach wily the Pentagon and then only in a top secret communication. If this were only a game of marbles and the teams were not playing for keeps, in- stead of a deadly war where your boy, or mine, could be killed next week, I would s:Iy tell where the boy's tent is pitched, or where his foxhole is-and how to reach it from Saigon; but with my 18-year-old boy likely to arrive there at any time, I would prefer to let him tell me where his squad is billeted or bivouacked rather than to read it in the paper or see it an TV. As a combat infantryman and communi- cations officer in a war where we knew who the enemy was (and how to recognize him) I shudder for our boys every time I pick up a paper and read about an enemy who sur- rounds him and creeps out of holes in the night and who is unrecognizable; and yet who is furnished the minutest detail about where to locate our GIs-even In the dark. The papers have a right to detest censor- ship but they also have a duty to make cen- sorship unnecessary Instead of aiding and abetting our enemies. This will be a long, bitter, and bloody war. Let us not show all of our cards to the enemy. RAYMOND L. HUGHES, Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, so that Senators may realize the travail which parents are now experiencing because of news reporting of many of our troop movements too soon and in too much detail I wish to read the covering letter Mr. Hughes addressed to me dated Feb- ruary 9, 1966, and reads as follows: PLANT CITY, FLA. February 9, 1966. Hon. SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. MY DEAR SENATOR: Note attached clipping from last Sunday's Tampa Tribune. Is there nothing that can be done about the flagrant disclosure of our every troop movement in Vietnam? This week every move of an attempted entrapment Of three battalions of Vietcong in a valley they had held for 10 years was announced in advance, by every news media. To no one's surprise they were gone when our troops enveloped the area. For God's salve (and our boys' sake) read this in the Senate. And put the attached clipping in the Senate RECORD. My 18-year-old son is to be in Vietnam June 1. It is nothing short of murder what the news media, is doing to our troops. Sincerely, RAYMOND L. HUGHES, C7aief Warrant Ofeer, U.S. Army, Retired. Mr. President, not being a member of the Armed Services Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee, I am not in possession of all the facts relative to our situation and the restrictions im- posed on the news media in Vietnam, and it is not my intent, here on the floor of Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 29151 the Senate to suggest any unreasonable limitation on the freedom of the press as provided in our constitution. How- ever, if, as seems to be the case, on-the- spot reporting-by newsmen accom- panying our troops-enables the enemy to establish a pattern of our operations or actions in advance, then I believe the news media should certainly impose their own censorship of information, which I am sure will be their desire if they are advised that such reporting has com- forted and aided and abetted the enemy. If such voluntary reporting is not effec- tive, then steps should be taken by the military to censor news from the battle- front. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS CON- CERNING COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, for the past 2 weeks many -Senators have been asking me about the legislative de- velopments regarding the community antenna television systems. Many of the senatorial offices have been deluged with literally thousands of letters from people who have been informed that their television service via the cable sys- tems will be curtailed because of the pending proposals by the FCC. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Com- merce Committee, I have dealt with this problem at great length and, therefore, should set forth, as clearly and precisely ,as I can, some of the history of the pres- ent situation as it involves CATV systems. First, the Subcommittee on Communi- cations, anticipating the problems that the growth of CATV systems were facing, conducted long and extensive hearings in 1958 and 1959. These hearings were held in Washington, D.C., the States of Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. Numerous witnesses repre- senting Government agencies affected, representatives of various organizations including television stations, CATV owners, association officials as well as the general public, submitted their views. It was apparent that the FCC was re- luctant and slow to take any constructive action in this field. In July 1959, in open hearing, I told the Chairman of the FCC: You have CATV people coming in and set- ting up their systems contrary to all stand- ards and no one seems to be policing it, There is no supervision on the part of any- one. We have to have rules and regulations. We have to have standards. I urged him to move-to take action. As a token effort, the Commission, finally, at the urging of our committee, sent a man out into the field to investi- gate the situation. Again, in 1960, I stated that the FCC was rather lukewarm with regard to whether they should assume responsibil- ity. It was obvious from the testimony developed by the committee that some action was necessary. If Congress did not act, a hodgepodge growth of CATV would take place with possible serious consequences to an orderly development of TV, particularly with reference to lo- cal live TV service. As a consequence, the committee drafted original legisla- tion setting forth appropriate guidelines that, in my judgment, would have per- mitted an orderly growth of both CATV and broadcasting under the umbrella of the FCC. The bill was reported favor- ably by the committee to the Senate and after many discussions and refinement of language, the representatives of the Na- tional Association of Community An- tenna Systems agreed to accept the leg- islation. However, certain CATV inter- ests at the last minute decided to vigor- ously oppose the bill and after 2 days of full debate on the floor of the Senate, the bill was recommitted by one vote. There is no question in my mind, and this will be agreed to by most of the CATV operators today, that if the legis- lation that the committee reported in the 86th Congress had been enacted, many of the questions that are now being raised, as well as the proliferation of the State and municipal regulations in the CATV field, may have been eliminated and CATV allowed to grow in an orderly fashion. In 1961, the FCC's concern with the matter of CATV and its impact on the development of local as well as nation- wide television service began to increase so that in May 1961 it asserted juris- diction over a common carrier micro- wave serving a CATV system in Wyo- ming. The CATV representatives op- posed this action of the FCC and ap- pealed the decision to the Federal courts, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be per- mitted to continue for 2 additional minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, in a landmark decision-Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. (32 FCC 459) -the Commission assertion of jurisdiction was sustained by the court-321 F. 2d 359 (C.A.D.C.) cert. den. 375 U.S. 951. The language of the court is quite interesting and very specific with reference to the FCC's responsibility. Following the Carter Mountain deci- sion, the Commission instituted further intensive studies and began accumulat- ing additional data on the overall CATV situation. In April 1965 the Commission adopted rules governing the grant of microwave authorizations being used to relay television signals to CATV sys- tems-first report and order, docket Nos. 14895 and 15233. In general, these rules require that any microwave-served CATV system, upon request, carry the signals of local stations and refrain from dupli- cating their programs from 15 days be- fore and after the local broadcast. On the same date in April 1965, the Commission also instituted a further CATV rulemaking proceeding, divided into two parts, which is presently in progress-notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rulemaking, docket No. 15971. Part I of this proceeding proposed to finalize the Commission's initial conclu- sion that it had and should also exercise jurisdiction over the CATV systems not served by microwaves and, pursuant thereto, to extend to them the same re- quirements now governing the micro- wave-served systems. In part II of the proceeding, the Commission initiated an inquiry looking toward possible rulemak- ing on broader questions posed by the trend of CATV development. These in- cluded the effects on independent UHF stations in major markets of CATV entry into those markets; possible limitations on the long-distance `extension of sta- tions' signals by CATV and on CATV pro- gram origination, together with several other matters related to CATV impact on our broadcast system. Part II also in- cluded a notice of proposed'rulemaking under which rules or other measures, interim or final, might be taken to deal effectively with some of the more press- ing problem areas. Interested parties have, of course, been provided an opportunity to submit coun- terproposals, comments, and replies on the matters raised by the Commission's proposals and inquiry. All such filings have not been completed. Final action was taken by the Com- mission on Tuesday, February 15, 1966- which was yesterday-in which they an- nounced plans for the regulation of all CATV systems. A copy of the Commis- sion's report has been made available to me, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in full at this point in my remarks. There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: FCC ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR REGULATION OF ALL CATV SYSTEMS Following meetings held February 10, 11, and 14, the Commission has reached agree- ment on a broad plan for the regulation of community antenna television systems, in- cluding a legislative program. To insure the effective integration of CATV with a fully developed television service, the new regula- tions will apply equally to all CATV systems, including those which require microwave li- censes, and those which receive their signal off the air. Excluded from these rules will be those CATV systems which serve less than 50 customers, or which serve only as an apartment house master antenna. The CATV rules concurrently in effect for micro- wave-fed systems will be revised to reflect the new rules adopted for all systems. Coupled with the new CATV rules, to be incorporated in a Report and Order shortly to be issued, the Commission will send ree- ommended legislation to Congress to codify and supplement its regulatory program in this important area. The Commission's new CATV program in- cludes eight major points: 1. Carriage of local stations: A CATV sys- tem will be required to carry without ma- terial degradation the signals of all local television stations within whose Grade B contours the CATV system is located. The carriage requirements thus made applicable to all CATV systems will be substantially the same as those applied to microwave-served systems by the Commission's first report and order in dockets Nos. 14895 and 15233, adopted in April, 1965. 2. Same day nonduplication: A CATV sys- tem will be required to avoid duplication of the programs of local television stations during the same day that such programs are broadcast by the local stations. This non- duplication protection, as under the exist- ing rules, will apply to "prime-time" net- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16; 1966 work programs only if such programs are presented by the local station entirely within what is locally considered to be "prime- -,one." It will also give the CATV sub- scribers access to network programs on the ;;irue day that they are presented on the net- :vork. Nonduplication protection will not be iiforded to programs which are carried In black and white by the local station and ore available in color from a more distant station on the CATV system. The new nonduplication rules thus embody two substantial changes from those adopted in the first report and order. First, the time period during which nonduplication protec- Lbou must be afforded has been reduced from 15 days before and after local broadcast to the single day of local broadcast. Second, a?? now exemption from the nonduplication requirement has been added as to color pro- f;e.crrus not carried in color by local stations. 3. Private agreements and ad hoc pro- c;,dures: The Commission will continue to give full effect to private agreements between CATV operators and local television stations which provide for a different type or degree rif protection for the local station than do the Commission's rules. Moreover, the Com- arission will give ad hoc consideration to petitions from local television stations seek- ing a greater degree of protection than pro- vided by the rules, or from CATV operators seeking it waiver of the rules. IT. Distant city signals-New CATV systems in the top 100 television markets: Parties who obtain State or focal franchises to operate CATV systems in the 100 highest ranked television markets (according to American Research Bureau (ARB) net weekly circula- tion figures), which propose to extend the signals of television broadcast stations be- yond their grade B contours, will be required to obtain FCC approval before CATV service to subscribers may be commenced. This aspect of the Commissions decision is effec- tive Immediately, and will be applicable to all CATV operation commenced after Feb- ruary 15, 1966. An evidentiary hearing will be held as to all such requests for FCC approval, subject, of course, to the general waiver provisions of the Commission's rules. These hearings will be concerned primarily with (a) the poten- tial effects of the proposed CATV operation on the full development of off-the-air tele- vision outlets (particularly UHF) for that market, and (b) the relationship, if any, of proposed CATV operations and the develop- ment of pay television in that market. The hearing requirement will apply to all CATV operations proposed to communities lying within the predicted grade A service contour of all existing television stations in that s-n irket. 7-iervice presently being rendered to CATV subscribers will be unaffected. However, the Commission will entertain petitions ob- jecting to the geographical extension to new areas of CATV systems already in operation in the top 100 television markets. 3. Distant city signals--New CATV systems in smaller television markets: 'lire commis- ,,ion's prior ohproval after an evidentiary hearing will not be required by rule for pro- t>osed CA'iV systems or operations in mar- kets below 10(; nn the AItB rankings. How- ever, the Commission will entertain, on an ad hoc basis, petitions from interested par- ties concerning the carriage of distrust sig- rals by CATV ry:aems located In such smaller rnarkc ts. G. i:nfonnaiiun to be filed by CATV owners: 1'rirsuant to its authority under Section 403 of the Cornr:.urrie:.tians Act, the Commis- .;lun will, within an appropriate time be prescribed, require all CATV operations to submit, theiollowing data with respect to each of their CATV systems: (a) The names, addresses, and business interests of all officers, directors, acid persons having substantial ownership Interests in each system; (b) the number of subscribers to each system; (c) the television stations carried on each sys- tem; and (d) the extent of any existing or proposed program origination by each CATV system. 7. Assertion of jurisdiction To the extent necessary to carry out the regulatory pro- gram set forth above, the Commission asserts its present jurisdiction over all CATV sys- tems, whether or not served by microwave relay. 8. Legislation to be recommended to Ccan- greys: The Commission will recommend, with specific proposals where appropriate, that Congress consider and enact legislation de- signed to express basic national policy in the CATV field. Such legislation would in- clude those matters over which the Comruis- sion has exercised its jurisdiction, as well as those matters which are still under con- sideration. Included in these recommendations will be the following: (a) Clarification and confirmation of FCC jurisdiction over CATV systems generally, along with. such specific provisions as are deemed appropriate. (b) Prohibition of the origination of pro- gram or other material by a CATV system with such limitations or exceptions, if any, as are deemed appropriate. (c) Consideration of whether, to whet ex- tent, and under what circumstances C"ATV systems should be required to obtain the consent of the originating broadcast st-!lion for the retransmission of the signal by the CATV system. (d) Consideration of whether CATV sys- tems should or should not be deemed public utilities. In this connection, Congress, will be asked to consider the appropriate reh tion- ship of Federal to State-local jurisdiction in the CATV field, with particular reference to initial franchising, rate regulation, and extension of service. The Commission, of course, stands re dy to discuss all of the above matters with the appropriate congressional committees at any time. STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT T. BARTLEY' I cannot agree that the Communications Act confers jurisdiction over CATV; however, I endorse legislation which would prohibit a CATV system from originating program matter. SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER KENNETH A. Cox I concur fully in those portions of the Commission's action in which it (1) asserts Jurisdiction over all CATV operations, (2) requires carriage of Ideal stations on CATV systems, (3) provides for expedited ad hoc procedures for the consideration of special relief requested either by broadcavters or CATV operators, (4) requires disclosure of information as to ownership of CA'T'V sys- tems and certain other matters, and (5) calls on Congress to give prompt consideration to the problem of integrating CATV opera- tions into our overall television system, with particular attention to the questions of pro- gram origination by CATV systems, possible extension of the principle of rebroadcast consent, and overlapping jurisdiction with the States. As to the balance of the action ,,)ken, I agree with what is done but believe it falls far short of protecting the public interest in an expanding television service. I agree that local stations should not have Vieir pro- grams duplicated, but believe that t:he pro- tection afforded them is totally inadequate. As to network programs, they should be ac- corded exclusivity-that Is, should not be duplicated-as to all programs which they propose to present in a comparable time period within 15 clays? This Commission found in the first report that, for cogent reasons, deladye nonduplication served the public interest. (See pars. IOI-127, 38 FCC at 721-.731.) But the majority now cuts back on such delayed nonduplication to a single day. This 1-day protection is patently inadequate as to network programing (see first report, par. 125, 38 FCC at 730, where it is pointed out that only 10.2 percent of local stations' delayed broadcasts are de- layed less than 1 day, with roughly 79 per- cent being delayed between I and 15 day:;). As to nonnotwork programs, the majoril:v previously pointed out that such material was not distributed on a simultaneous na- tionwide basis and that, therefore, a 15-day protection was "clearly a minimal measure of protection against the duplication of syn- dicated or feature film programs, consider- ing the extended periods-up to and exceed- ing 5 years---for which stations now bargain and obtain exclusivity in relation to such programs." As to feature film, syndicated series, and other filmed or taped programing for which they have acquired local exhibition rights, they should be assured the right of first run--- which is only one of the rights normally bargained for, but. certainly the most impor- tant one. I realize that this is more pro- tection than was proposed in this proceeding, but since I feel this would be necessary to assure the station of the most important of the program rights It has acquired as against prior exhibition by an entity which has acquired no rights at all, I certainly can- not agree with the majority's refusal to recognize any rights as to such programing. Some nonsimultaneous nonduplication is necessary to afford local stations sufficient flexibility to provide the best possible service to those viewers who do not subscribe to the cable service. Similarly, I agree that some measures are needed to curb the Indiscriminate extension of television signals by CATV systems. Sec- tion 303(h) of the Communications Act gives us clear authority to establish zones or areas of service for broadcast stations. In televi- sion, I think we have undertaken to do this by establishing a carefully designed channel allocation and by fixing maximum limits on heights and powers. While there are many situations in which deficiencies of service can and should be corrected by supplemental means such as CATV, satellites and trans- lators, I do not believe that any of these auxiliary services should be permitted to dis- rupt the basic television system that Con- gress, the Commission and the broad casters have worked so hard to establish. The majority contents itself with saying that it will carefully examine proposals to provide CATV service in the top 100 televi- sion markets, I would greatly prefer an ap- proach which would bar new systems--for a specified period-from extending a station's signal beyond its Grade B contour, except upon authorization by the Commission in certain carefully defined situations. I be- lieve this is necessary to stem the current proliferation of CATV systems in areas already receiving substantial televlsion serv- ice. Without such action, I am afraid that CATV-a supplemental and derivative serv- ice-will stunt the future growth of our free television system, and perhaps even Impair the viability of some of the service which the public is now receiving. It is all very well to study the problems posed by CATV's threatened invasion of the major markets. It is true that the moat immediate hopes for expanded UHF service are centered there, and that the risk of CATV operators' building a pay television system 1 I agree that as to network color programs the local station should not be protected unless it will present them in color. ,9nry ?? Approved For Release 2005/06/29 c'" No ftlml?WWRMIPI, I : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001 5nn'p lam' Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :-CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 1b, 1 tunity for normal debate. But when we The next day the President resumed the For one, I think it showed to the libel are living through the hours that Amer- bombing of North Vietnam and took his plea that the President means to follow th, leans historically will be living through for peace to the United Nations. line, by espousing the social revolution ii as this historic record is made I am not The fighting goes on as before. The talk South Vietnam-the aspirations of the peo- about peace goes on, but no peace negotia- pre for better health, better housing, bet- going to agree to have any limitation on tions seem to be in prospect. And in the ter land tenure and all the things they debate whatsoever. Therefore, I an- meantime the President has held a dra- fought for for so many years. nounce now that if I am on the floor I matic conference in Honolulu with the It is interesting to me that notwithstand- shall object to any limitation of time on leaders of the Saigon Government. ing the fact that this should appeal to the debate. I inform my leadership that i How much of all this represents forward liberals, and that the liberals should be for to any limitation of debate, movement, either toward peace or prosecu- the limited struggle in Vietnam, because it am opposed the Lion of the war, and how much is just motion is a struggle for freedom, the Honolulu con- and if I not have assurance from is rather hard to tell. fcrence showed up even more sharply the leadership that there will not be any It anything anywhere has changed, it is divisions within the President's own party limitation of time, I shall see that some the intensity of the domestic debate over and, interestingly enough, the real consensus Senator is present on the floor to make Vietnam. on the Republican side, which is giving him objection in my behalf. As broadcast viewers and listeners, as let- all kinds of backing. terwriters, as demonstrators and counter- Just one other point which seems to me demonstrators, the American people are en- to be clear from Honolulu. "VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CON- tering this argument more and more. The central thing now stands out to be GRESS AFTER HONOLULU"-A Let us try again today to put this coin- what are you going to do with the Viet- plex and troubling combination war and cong if there is ever going to be a peace TELEVISION PROGRAM BY CBS peace effort into some focus. conference, and I do not think there is TRULY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST Five more-Senators of differing persuasions any question about the fact that they have are with us this afternoon. Let me intro- to be a party, whether they are an inde- Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last ? duce them in alphabetical order. pendent party or a group or whatever you , in Foreign elations Committee which has been she sooner thaty have to be a party, And Sunday Columbia February 13, 1966- the Columbia Broadcasting oatie state that unequivocally, series holding public hearings this week. I think, the more chance there will be to continuation of its praiseworthy seworthy System, in g about ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, of the Gov- get to the negotiating table. of the inissues forming the involved in the American undeclared pu blic out ernment Operations Committee, who has Finally, I think it is mature consensus on been opposed to this war from its begin- the part of the people, which was contributed in Vietnam-a series ably directed by ning. to by the Senate hearings, that there is a Eric Sevareid and Fred Friendly-pres- JACOn JAVrTS, of New York, recently back way of limiting the South Vietnam conflict, ented an hour-long discussion of those from South Vietnam, for the Government and that is in the effort to consolidate and issues. Operations Committee. pacify the coastal areas and the Mekong I was honored to be invited to pahtici- STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, member Delta and area around Saigon where there of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv- are 70 to 80 percent of the people all with- pate, along with my able and disting- ices Committees, and former Air Force Sec- in ready reach of air and naval power. And guished colleagues, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. retary. that I think is the ultimate thrust of the JAVITS, Mr. SYMINGTON, and Mr. TOWER. JouN TOWER, of Texas, member of the Gavin idea and the way In which a consensus The discussion on the program-which Armed Services Committee, also just re- can be developed on that. was broadcast live-was spirited and, in turned from Vietnam. Mr. SAVAREIO. We may get back to the the short time available, sought to bring Gentlemen, I think we might try first to Gavin idea in just a moment. forth all possible points of view. deal for a little while with this Honolulu I think Senator SYMINGTON wanted to talk conference just over. I would like to know about this conference. The distinguished senior Senator from. how you read its results and what you make Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. As Commander Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] summed up the of It. Senator CHURCH. In Chief of this country, inasmuch as basic problem confronting this Nation are pros and Hcons. Only the future will tell.' CINCPAC it se seemed quitruns gicthe al for mill- when when he said: I am for getting a good policy that will On the debit side, the President has laid Commander in Chief, with the Chairman of deal more effectively with the phenonema of hands, so to speak, upon Air Marshal Ky and the Joint Chiefs, to go out and talk with Ad- revolution. We are going to live in a genera- thus has invested him with the great pres- miral Sharp and General Waters and Gen- tion of revolution throughout all of Latin tige of the American presidency. This could oral Harris, and then at the same time to America, Africa, Asia, for a long time to prove a problem in the future if a need have General Westmoreland, who wears two should develop for broadening the popular hats, one toward Hawaii and the other to come. base of the Saigon regime. the Joint Chiefs here, to be in the discus- I ask unanimous consent that the On the credit side, I am glad of the em- Sion-and also to have Ambassador Lodge transcript of that television broadcast Phasis that was given to the need for social there to give his position with respect to it. be printed in full at the conclusion of and economic, political, reform in this sit- In addition to that, I think it was prob- uation in South Vietnam. ably wise that he brought the head of the my remarks. But I recall that-I think even in the first Government out there, Ky, because General There being no objection, the broad- letter that President Eisenhower sent out Ky-because I was in Saigon last month and cast was ordered to be printed in the that committed us to the initial assistance my impression was that if we were going to RECORD, as follows: in 1954, there was mention of the need for recognize the Vietcong separately, within a VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CONGRESS AFTER reform, at that time relating to the Diem few hours that automatically meant the fall HONOLULU regime. And if I am not mistaken, Lyndon of the Government. Therefore, If General (A broadcast over the CBS Television Net- Johnson, when Vice President, went out Ky felt that way, he was probably reassured work and the CBS Radio Network, Sunday, there in 1961, again on a mission which gave by the attention that was given him. February 13, 1966) emphasis to the need for reform and secur- Finally, I would like to join my colleague, ing a broader popular base. And now Vice Senator CIIURCII, in saying that I was very Guests: Senators FRANK CHURCH, Demo- President HusrsmnrY is there for that same glad to note the emphasis that was paid in crat. of Idaho; EaNEsT GnuENINO, Democrat, purpose. And obviously, this is a problem, Hawaii to the economic and social develop- of Alaska; JACOB K. JAVITS, Republican, of a continuing problem, that we recognize, meets that are at least as important as any New York; STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat, of but a problem easier to define than to solve. other in this overall picture. Missouri; JOHN G. TowER, Republican, of Finally, one caveat. Mr. SAVAREs. Most of you so far seem to Texas. I think at Honolulu the statements of Air think there was not just a waste of effort. Moderator:. Eric Sevareid. Marshal Ky and of our own Government Senator Towrn, do you have different ideas? Producer: William J. small. indicate a definite split on the question of Senator TOWER. No. I agree that this was Director: Robert Camilord. negotiation and on the question of the dos- not a wasted effort. I think it is altogether ANNOUNCER. As part of its continuing Bible Inclusion of the Vietcong. mote and proper that the President should coverage of the Vietnam conflict, CBS News If this split is as serious as it seems, that go there and that he should meet with the presents "Vietnam Perspective: Congress a warning for the future. Vietnamese heads of state. I think it is After Honolulu," think good that we should add a little prestige and Here to lead the discussion this afternoon Mw warning flag a Any of the rest . of you stature to that Government, because appar- is CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid it is serious? A ently it is the most stable Government we Mr. SEVAREID. Good afternoon. Two weeks Senator JAVITS. Well, a word on that Hono- have had there since the Diem regime. ago today five Members of the U.S. Congress lulu Conference. I think, too, that it is good that we have sat at this table and debated the Vietnam It seemed to me that a number of things placed emphasis on the civic action programs war, its promises, its legality, its conduct, and developed and a number of things did not that we have already been engaged in over its possible outcome. develop. there. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2965 Feb r ary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Actually the idea of assisting these people Senator SYMINGTON. There is a side to that Mr. SEVAREID. Is there any man at this agriculturally, healthwise, assisting them also-and that is that the Premier Ky comes table who believes these hearings are harm- with political and social reforms is not new. from the north country and there has been ful to the national interest? We have been doing this in Vietnam. Our increasing irritation in the south, includ- ErSe nato IJAvI tell you think they are very good, servicemen, as well as fighting, have been on ing Saigon, about the dominance of peo- the constructive side, working with our ple in the north, which to some extent must PresWhat ident you really ton have for tan USAM officials over there, in conducting these have affected his control. coming to ress civic action programs, which I think are turn- For example, I was told out there that updating of the resolution of August 1964, ing out to be a great success. there might be another coup-although Am- the dog-eared one he carries in his pocket gives him They are teaching these people the rudi- bassador Lodge said-well, he was only sup- and constantly he reArmedfers which the United ments of sanitation, they are showing them posed to last 6 weeks and he has now lasted Spower to use t Forces of tates, etc. That is completely outdated. how to get pure water supply, helping them over 6 months. combat disease, infection, showing them how On the other hand, I think it is unfair And anything that leads to getting the Presi- to get the maximum utilization out of their to compare him to Hitler. We have had our dent to do that-and I think these hearings land. And, more important, teaching them own President and our own Foreign Rela- are definitely a step in that direction-is the art of self-government. The French tions Committee-recently there was some good. It is high time the whole country were failed to develop any native leadership over talk about Hitler- there. We are currently doing that now.. Senator GRUENING. No one has compared crystallized behind what is the new policy, to get the Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has been him to Hitler. Ky said the one man he ad- and the the way to so. that is personally I And listening. Would you like to speak, sir? mired most was Hitler. backing Senator GRUENING. This Honolulu Con- Senator SYMINGTON. Because if you take think that is a very serious mistake the ference was a big buildup for the Premier, something out of context about the man- President is making, in not coming back to Nguyen Ky, who is the ninth head of gov- the truth is that he has come much further the Congress for a new resolution. ernment since our first white-haired boy, in his emphasis on the importance of land Mr. SEVAREID. In other words, you think Diem, was disposed of 21/2 years ago. How reform and on the importance of a new deal the hearings are going to help him in the useful he will be in bringing freedom to than anybody else who has been in charge end, not damage his position. his people and having these reforms may be of that Government so far. And I would Senator JAvITs. They will help the people's judged by his statement when he was inter- rather take somebody who has been there a cause by crystallizing the Congress and the viewed by the London Mirror last July 4, long time, like Cabot Lodge, or like the other American people behind a policy which will when he said: people-I would rather take their word for be enough like his policy so that he ought aask for . I know that kind ofasupp rt. "People ask me who my heros are. I have the possibilities under him than I would to come ~and new reso- only one-Adolf Hitler. We need four or people who would take a long-distance ap- Mr. you five Hitlers in Vietnam." proach and have never discussed the matter lutlon torcGRUEllize it. That is the man we have built up, he is with him, which I have done myself. Senator GRUENING. I think these hearings the man whom we depend upon to bring Senator JAVITS. Well, Senator, I do not about these reforms. I have no confidence think it is necessary for us to say we are all are long overdue; they have taken these reforms will take place any more than out for Ky. This statement that he made place years ago, when we engaged what Is they have taken place in the last 12 years about Hitler is pretty rugged, very hard for called ed ta here Comm, itmeent was although I am at ommn- when we said the same thing. Eisenhower anybody in the world to take. ne such tried to do the same thing. It is not going I think the answer is that this is the Gov- ment-but if the administration thinks so, to happen-not with that man. ernment for the time being, and we have got then that kind of commitment required a back, when Mr. SEVAREID. That may be a question , er to work with indpendnt attitude otoward the we made or alleged we we Anmd that kind a a course o pretty hard to answer, except cept over hibit our of a commitment, the President then or his cof time, I would think. development of the country in economic and But let me ask you gentlemen this. social terms, successor should have gone to the Senate for Do any of you find the same objection to I think for one that Honolulu was essen- the treatymaking power. that Conference that our ex-diplomat George tial, because at the United Nations we said What right have we got to commit our- Kennan had this week in testifying before we want peace at almost any price. That is selves to defend the frontiers of another the Foreign Relations Committee? He great. Now, if the other side won't negotiate country and send our troops down there thought it wrong to have this public tieup for peace, Honolulu had to answer what do without the consent of the Senate formally with the Saigon government at the same we do. Well, we are going to launch a new sought and obtained? We have none. time that we had taken this issue to the campaign on the social revolution front, with Mr. SEVAREID. You are saying in effect the United Nations. HUMPHREY as its coordinator. We need it hearings have come about because of the Does that bother anyone? sadly-a basic coordinator. And secondly, manner we got into this war, that there Senator CHURcH? we are developing and putting forward a would have to be such hearings at some Senator TOWER. Well, I would disagree that strategy which is viable for us until there are point. the timing was bad. I think that the timing not just one, to wit, ourselves, but two to overdue, r GRUENING. Yes-that they are was very good, because I'm afraid that with talk peace. our long peace offensive, with the long mora- And so I think Honolulu was very needed Senator CHURCH. Eric, at that point let me torium on bombing, that perhaps some peo- and very constructive. say-I would like to emphasize the fact that ple in Asia had gotten the impression that Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I don't want to the Foreign Relations Committee has a con- we had no real will or determination to go too far with the Honolulu Conference. stitutional responsibility to advise and con- prevail in southeast Asia, that we were trying Our time is running on, and there are sent in the matter of foreign policy. And for to find some face-saving device to enable us some other things probably of more impor- years the committee has been tending to con- to withdraw. And therefore I think that tance. duct its business more and more behind this Conference was very timely, to show our Now, one thing is this Foreign Relations closed doors. determination to stay in South Vietnam Committee hearing this past week. They Now, when we came back to Congress this until we have achieved what the President have dealt with the issues. But these hear- year, the gravity of the situation had become said is our minimum objective, and that is ings themselves have become something of such in southeast Asia that we felt we had the guarantee of the independence of South an issue-whether they are injuring the to come out from behind closed doors, and Vietnam. morale of troops, or our negotiating position,, in the public, examine the premises that Senator CHUacH. Since you first turned or our fighting position. have led us into this situation, and take that question to me, may I say a word ar two How do you feel about this? How about stock of the situation, and try to determine about it. you, Senator SYMINGTON? You have sat what is portended for the future. And this I think that what was unfortunate was on them. business is the business of the American the statement that Air Marshal Ky him- Senator SYMINGTON. I think these hear- people, and they should be included, and self made-I agree with Senator GRUENING. ings are all right. The witnesses so far have they have been through those hearings. I think there are grounds to wonder wheth- been pretty critical of our current adminis- Mr. SEVAREID. Well, now, gentlemen, the er this man really represents the wave of trative program, just as you have illustrated, president said 2 days ago, as I recollect, that in southeast Asia. And I think Eric, with respect to Mr. Kennan's thinking he had followed these hearings, or the testi- the that future when he said in Honolulu that he in about the Commander in Chief going to mony from them, and that he could not see effect was not much interested in negotia- Hawaii. that any concrete, clear alternative policies tions, and that In any case there would be But, on the other hand, let's ventilate the had been proposed at the hearings by people no negotiating with the Vietcong, that this subject, as Mr. DIRxsEN would say-and it like General Gavin or Mr. George Kennan; did render our position more difficult for is being done. the tone of their testimony appeared to be us at the United Nations. And I should I would hope that people postpone their in opposition to what we are doing. think it renders the President's position more final opinions about it until they hear ben- Did you discover, those of you who sat difficult. I thought that was one of the- eral Taylor on next Thursday and Secretary there, any concrete alternative that struck one of the unfortunate consequences. Rusk on Friday. you as worth following? Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February -16-,; 1966 :senator SYMINGTON. Well, General Gavin's tion between ourselves and the Communist "if that would save 100,000 men, additional testimony was rather difficult to follow, be- Chinese push In Asia. Americans, being needed and drafted out of cause in the covering letter It said that he As I see it, that is in effect what they their homes into South Vietnam." wanted-did not want to resume bombing recommended, and it seems to Inc that gave And he said "Well, that is a serious ques- in North Vietnam, and that he did want to the lines of a perfectly viable position for tion. I would have to study it." withdraw to coastal enclaves. But then in the United States. Now, I think his testimony was fuzzy. I direct testimony he denied that he felt that Mr. SEVAREID. It seems rather unusual for think-that, to me, is a fuzzy answer, And way about it. And also he denied that he me that Senators would sit and l.ry to thrash I would hope that at some time we would was against the policies as advertised in an out alternative military stratel ies for this get a witness up there who would be clear advertisement in the paper which said that country, which is in a war. as to just why it is we don't go after the rnili- he was against the President's policies. Senator CHUncH. I don't thin 1:, Eric, that tary targets, and military only like power ?o I think it is fair to say, and perhaps the purpose of this hearing is to come up and petroleum, at the same time we know a little charitable to say, that his testimony with any miracle cures in Vietnam. I think that they are coming down in such heavy was fuzzy as to just exactly what he stood for. it is generally recognized that what has been quantities down the Ho Chi Minh trail and in the case of Mr. Kerman, I think that his done there cannot be suddenly undone. being used against the troops of the United position was more clear. He, in effect, as, I There are some Omelets that are not di- States and the South Vietnamese in South gathered his testimony, wanted to strictly gestible, but I don't know of any that can Vietnam. stick to a land war, if any war, in South be unscrambled. And the Pre, ident's op- Senator CHURCII. Can I just say in that re- Vietnam. tions are narrowing, spect that I don't regard Ambassador Ken- Mr. SEVAREm. To a land war. Now, lie is striving to find the rudiments nan as an authority when it comes to lbomb- Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. for a satisfactory political settlement. He is Ing, and certainly some of the questions you Mr. SEVAREID. Well, gentlemen, as I tried to striving to locate that diplomatic door which posed to him we would have no argument follow those hearings, it seemed to me that will lead to the negotiating table and he is about. But I do regard him as an authority both General Gavin and Mr. Kerman were striving to keep the war confined within with respect to the overall strategy of deal- talking about far more than just how the war manageable limits. And in all ,f these en- ing with the Communist world. should be conducted now-what the acres deavors he certainly has my ull-hearted He was the architect of the successful con- should be in Vietnam. They were looking at support. tainment policy in Europe, and his opinions it in terms. as I gathered, of our whole world I think what the committee L. looking to are entitled to a lot of respect, and I think position. We have troops in Korea, in West is to something both behind end beyond this was where on the diplomatic front, the Europe, and many places where things could Vietnam. What kind of role arc we assum- strategic front, that he really made a very happen. And that this was what one of them ing on the mainland of Asia and in the un- fine contribution, and what lie said, in effect, I think called possibly a baited trap. I SUP- derdeveloped world that led us into Vietnam was, let's not let the tail wag the dog, and pose meaning that China might come In or in the first place, and don't we have to take invest so much resource in manpower, in that we would get overcommitted there in another careful look at these premises? Do treasure, in southeast Asia that we find our- relation to our other commitments. we have the kind of policy that is well- selves at serious disadvantage elsewhere. Do any of you have a feeling that Vietnam designed to cope with the problem of guer- And the President has just said that he is Is sucking us into a position where we will be rilla warfare, of wars of so-ca1Lcd national in agreement with that, that he does not- way off balance? liberation in the ex-colonial pert of the that he does not propose the kind of an ,,c- c enator GRUENING. Well, I think that there world? And is the best means the massive celerated war that might engage us in a was no effort on the part of Mr. Kerman. intervention of American troops imported massive confrontation in Asia, whose testimony was most useful, to come tip from the opposite side of the world? Senator SYMINGTON. But he brought it up, with a solution. He was relating it to the These are the things, I think, the long, FRANK. I didn't bring it up. He said no whole situation. He was not asked for a searching questions, that we have got to more strategic bombing, so I asked him to particular solution. And I think that some grope with if we are going to fashion a policy define it. of us have ideas on the subject-but I think in Asia that will work for the United States. Senator CHURCH. Well, he is a diplomat. that would emerge from the findings of the Mr. SEVAREID. While the Senate and others He is not an airman and not a bomber, and committee. argue about overinvesting or not overinvest- I think it is in that phase of his testimony r think at the end of the hearings they lag resources, men, and money in that tip of that he made a, real contribution. will probably come up with some recoil]- Asia, the investment goes on, cuucisions by Mr. SEVAISEID. Does Senator GltueNING wish mendations. I hope so. others. to come in'? Senator JAVrrs. Well, I would say, Eric, that Is this fruitful at all- Senator .YMINGTON? Senator GRUENING. I think that. the ques- I think the testimony of both Kennan and Senator SYMINGTON. Well, first, if I may, tions that the former Secretary of the Air Gavin was extremely useful In crystallizing Eric, I would like to go back to tae question Force asked Mr. Kerman had to do with mili- a position the administration has left very of "fuzzy". I don't think the ;;dministra- tary details which were not in Mr. Kennan's fuzzy. tion's position is fuzzy today. I think it is field. P or one, it Is it fact that we do not want clear. I don't agree with all et it, but I What he hoped to bring out was that this general mobilization for Vietnam, but we think it is clear. was a great error In view of our worldwide are willing to devote to it-and I think this I explained why I thought that General commitments, and I am hoping that this fin- is a national consensus-such resources as Gavin's testimony was fuzzy. vestigation before we get through with it can be devoted without general mobilization. Now let's take Ambassador Kennan's testi- will point out how completely false the And that seems to be in the general order mony. premises are which our of magnitude of up to 400,000 troops, and justify going in there. Don't misunderstand me. I want to get I can demonstrate-there won't be time on all the other things we are doing there. into the big, broad problems than have just this program-conclusively from the very Now, what Gavin and Kennon said in ef- been. discussed by my good colh'ague from documents which are used by the adminis- feet--and you cannot hold them word for Idaho. tration to prove why we are in Vietnam-- word-is there is a strategy of consolidating But we have a problem. We a;ue killing a this one (holding up the State Department's our hold on the coastal regions, the Mekong great many American boys every week. brochure entitled "Why Vietnam.?")-.that Delta, the Saigon area, engaging in a pacifi- Ambassador Kennan-former Ambassador there was no commitment. President Eisen- cation program there, and in a sense mak- Kennan-said "I am opposed to strategic bower made no commitment to send in Ing that our stand--just as when we with- bombing." troops. He offered economic aid on a very drew from the Yalu into South Korea that I said "Well, will you defin< strategic tentative basis and we were not, as alletred, became our stand. bombing." asked in there b a friendl Now, it seems to be a accepted Y y cvKennedy generally He said, any bombing that hcsn't got a We asked ourselves in. And Jackk Kennedy proposition that even If the Communist; direct relationship with troops. never did anything more than send in Chinese come in-and you cannot tell when Well, I said "For example, woulc you con- advisers. they will come in-that is In their control-- sider strategic bombing bombing a bus that It is only under this administration that even if they do come In, the long logistical was going down the Ho Chi Minh Trail full we sent troops into combat, and those are lines which represent our stand on the coast; of ammunition and soldiers and guns?" questions which I hope the Committee on around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta. He said yes, it would be; therefore he Foreign Relations will bring out. I think: the makes our position viable. would be opposed to it unless you were sure American y public, which has been misled so Therefore, what Gavin and Kennan, as l: it was going to be used against our troops. long, is entitled to know these facts. And I :see it, were laying before the country in. Now, there have been a great many figures hope in the subsequent hearings these facts effect, was here is the way in which you can. used in executive sessions of the Armed Serv- will be thoroughly aired. It is about time take a limited position, devoting to it the Ices Committee about the number of addi- the American people were let in on what has resources which you have available and rea- tional troops that would be required--from been going on without their knowledge. sonable without jeopardizing your situation 600,000, I believe, John, to 500,000 and then Senator TOWER. The fact remains that in the rest of the world and without general 100,000 to 300,000. North Vietnam has intensified its effort in mobilizations and without a declaration of And I asked him this question. "Would South Vietnam during the course of this war, which I am against, and at the same you agree to bomb military target; in North administration, necessitating some reaction time maintain a position in the confronta- Vietnam," military targets, let me emphasize, on our part. Had we not literally sent the Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 cry 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE .airy to the rescue last summer, the Viet- oong and the North Vietnamese would have cut through the central highlands, cut their country in two. It would have probably overrun it by now. Now, certainly it is true that Vietnam, South Vietnam, taken alone has no great geographic and strategic importance. But southeast Asia does. And this is where the front is. This is where Communist aggres- sion is manifest. If we don't combat it here, aren't we going to encourage the precipita- tion of so-called wars of national liberation in other spots? Senator JAvrTs. Well, the whole idea is that you are encouraging the technique of wars of national liberation because you show an inability to deal with them, and you've got upsets right now in northern Thailand. You had it in northern India. Senator TowER. The point I was making. Senator JAVrrs. Exactly right, and you are going to face the situation in south and southeast Asia when you are facing it here, and you are getting prepared for. I did want to say a word, Eric, about this bombardment thing, which I think is very- to my mind, has been a big obsession with lots of people. The fact is that once you determine the size and character of your commitment in South Vietnam, and let's assume that the American people are getting to some con- sensus on that, then everything falls into place. If you are trying to do just so much and you have just so many people involved, then what bombardment you have to undertake, and I am not against the bombardment of the supply lines at all, re- lates to the size and character of your mili- tary decision as to exactly what you are going to commit. But I do believe that what you are going to try to do, the purpose you are going to try to accomplish, and the means you are going to try to commit to It, this is a very Important element of congressional as well as Presidential decision, and I feel very strongly that we should have our say in that, and I believe that it will come down to pretty much this pholisophy of pacifica- tion of the areas which are within reach, 30 to 50 miles of the coast, Mekong Delta, the Saigon area, where there is 70 to 80 percent of the population, the necessary men to do that, and then everything that follows to protect that position en suite, including the extent of bombardment which is required for it, and we have to be pre- pared to face that as a total strategy, a total political decision with the military consequences which ensue. Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I hate to inter- rupt at this point even for the 5 seconds necessary, but let us pause now for station identification. Mr. SEVAREIO. Gentlemen, some very funda- mental questions have been raised in the debate in the Senate and in the press re- cently and In some of the remarks of the President. In Honolulu he said something to the effect that subjugation by an armed minority in Asia is not different from the same phenomenon in Europe, that we have expended a lot of treasure and blood to reverse such things. But from our position in the world, are these two things equal? Is Germany or France, for example, equal to this little country in southeast Asia? Senator Church? SENATOR CHURCH. No, Eric. We have got to make better distinctions, I think, than that. In the first place, we went back to Europe after the Second World War because we rec- ognized that if all of Europe fell to the Russians and the Red Army In occupation of Eastern Europe was moving the Iron Curtain inexorably westward, that then the balance of power would shift from our favor to theirs, and I think we must not confuse the situa- tion in Europe with the problem that faces us in Asia. In Europe, after all, we went back and were welcomed among people with whom we had a common civilization, common culture. The great majority of these people found communism as repugnant as we found It and willingly joined in a real system of col- lective defense against it, and that was the NATO line. But the NATO line just stopped the Iron Curtain from moving further west. It didn't exterminate communism behind the Iron Curtain. And today in Europe we are not faced with the problem of guerrilla wars of na- tional liberation simply because these coun- tries with strong democratic traditions have cohesion and internal support. But the situation is quite different in Asia, and I think our basic mistake has been to assume that policies which worked in Eu- rope could be superimposed in Asia and would work there. I think the facts betray that those pol- icies designed for Europe are not suitable for Asia. Mr. SEVAREID. Well, you seem to be taking issue with really the most profound argu- ment and premise behind the whole war as often expressed by Secretary Rusk. We are told again and again that if we do not stop this aggression in South Vietnam, we are going to have to meet it somewhere else In southeast Asia. Senator GRUENING, is that necessarily true in your opinion? Senator GRUENING. I want to dissent com- pletely from the basic premise of our action down there, that we are repelling aggression. The facts are that we are just as much, if not more, the aggressors. We came in to help the French with a military mission. We did not engage in combat because Congress would not stand for it. President Eisenhower could not get the support of other powers. But we were there with a military mission. We gave them a lot of supplies and a lot of training and we stayed on there, and then we continued to escalate. We are in a foreign country. The Viet- namese are all Vietnamese, North and South. We are much more the aggressors than the others and their aggression, their infiltra- tion, did not start until long after we had escalated our participation in violation of agreements which we approved unilaterally although we did not actually sign them. I think this is the important issue and we will not have a suitable meeting at the peace table until we confess a certain amount of error on our part, and that is the basic issue. Of course, we have got to negotiate with the people who are doing the fighting. This is a civil war. President Kennedy said so. Just recently our colleague, Senator YOUNG of Odnio came back from there convinced that this is a civil war, that the overwhelming majority of the Vietcong are South Vietnamese fighting the tyrannical governments which we have sup- ported down there. This is the basic issue, and we are not going to have a solution at the peace table unless we meet that question and confess a certain amount- Mr. SEVAREm. Are you suggesting, Senator, that we go to a peace conference trying to settle this now rather big war and say that we should never have been in It in the first place? How can a great country do that? Senator GRUENING. When individuals do it, confess errors, they are praised. Nations find it more difficult to do that, but we should do it. De Gaulle did it in an analogous situation in Algeria. When he first came in he was never going to leave Algeria. Algeria was French. The French had been there for 130 years. But after a time he realized that it was wiser for him to get out. He lost no prestige. He lost no face. He is stronger than ever. We are losing face there every day. We would have far more face and we would save a great many American lives if we stopped right now and made a far greater effort to be made by admitting our errors and admit- ting that we are as much aggressors as the others. Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to com- ment on what Senator CHURCH said about Europe. I do not think today the way that the telescoping in time and space, that there is a big difference between Europe and Asia that so many people consider that are inter- ested in this subject. For example, today every country in effect is in the same county. I illustrate it in my State by presenting the fact that by time, militarily, by air, Red China is closer to St. Louis, Mo., than Kansas City is to St. Louis, Mo., by the fastest commercial jets, and therefore I completely agree with Dean Rusk when he says this is simply a question of whether we want to resist communism the world: over. We cannot pick, as I see it, the places that we want to resist. As far as-incidentally, someone mentioned that I used to be the Air Force Secretary. It was a long time ago. I have been in the Senate 14 years. But I was mighty proud of it. My only point is that Socrates said "note se ata," know your terms. What is it we are talking about? And it begins to look to me as if some of the people who are so Interested in what we are doing out there want to force us into a ground war only in Asia and not the utilization of our air power which I do not think we could ever win. Now, finally, I have a little pin here which was given me at the political action team- my good friend from New York knows a great deal about-and which is the finest thing I saw in South Vietnam. The three T letters stands for victory, love, and sincerity, and I would hope that those who think that there is a predominance of Vietcong thinking in South Vietnam would go there. It is easy to talk long distance, and see and talk in the villages. There are 700,000 South Vietnam- ese fighting today on our side in South Viet- nam and only 5 percent of them are con- scripts, and in my opinion the very fact that thousands of these young men are being trained in this program prove that the South Vietnamese, if they were given a chance with- out terrorism and without a war that is dominated by the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, that they would elect a South Viet- namese government. Senator JAvrrs. There is one sure thing and that is when you-you have got to be convinced that the North Vietnamese are in this is an organized way, without question, throughout their units, et cetera, and I think that the question, with all respect to Sen- ator GRUENING, is begged by what he says and that the main question is the one you stated, the one Senator CHURCH and Senator SYMINGTON have addressed themselves to, what is the importance of Asia to American and free world security? And I think one thing we had better never forget, World War II, as far as we were con- cerned, was started from Asia by Japan, That is an Asian country and a mighty big one, and very important one, and World War II, through Japan, was the only time that we have ever been threatened in modern times in our own Nation, on our shores. California was in a state of alert at that time. Now, what is threatened in Asia, as far as we are concerned, with its enormous pre- ponderance of population, represents the overwhelming security problem of the free world for the very reason that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the most important alliance. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February if, Why? Because that is the backing which the free world gives to the ideas for which we are fighting in South Vietnam. 'l.'he support, the backing, the structure of the great industrial nations of the Atlantic basin is what makes the struggle for freedom in the world likely to succeed, but that struggle is now being fought at its central core which is Asia, the preponderant population crass in the whole world, the change of which over to Communist aggression would make the whole difference between security and freedom for the world and a condition of such jeopardy as to make our country almost immediately a garrison state. Mr. SEVAazIm. Senator, if there is a kind of relentless general tide of advancing coma- munism or the threat of it in Asia, what do we make of such things as the complete turn- back of the Communists in Indonesia, which is the biggest country in that part of Asia? Must be assume that this is an irrevocable, remorseless, general advance? Senator JAVITS. If I may answer that, Eric. it is an excellent question, but the very change in Indonesia is attributable to the fact that Indonesia for a long enough time was shielded from the tidelike power which flows from Communist China, and that is precisely, it is exactly that kind of a break- water that we are trying to erect in all of south and southeast Asia by strengthening; in South Vietnam, in Thailand, in India, in Pakistan, and in Malaysia and in the Philip- pines and in Japan, what is the spirit which will hold on or hold back that onrushing tide. Mind you, someday we will find a way to got along with the Communist Chinese. ;f am not for atomic war and I don't think it is inevitable at all, but at some point in the process you have to show steel. That is the only thing that will-that is an answer at this moment. That doesn't mean that it is a permanent answer, and I am not for it as a permanent answer. Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH. Senator CHURCH. Well, Eric, I think that this kind of discussion begs the point a great deal. Your original question had to do with the comparison of Europe with Asia. Now, my good friends "STU" SYMINGTON says the world is much smaller. Of course it is. My good friend "JACK" JAvrrs says that Asia is very important. Of course it is. The problem that we face is whether the spread of communism which we would like to discourage in Asia represents the same kind of problem, and therefore can be dealt with with the same kind of policies that we used in Europe. Now, in Europe communism was spread by the Ilussiaca sword. In Asia communism is being spread not by the same method but by revolution. Now, unless we are prepared to say there Is no distinction between revolution and the kind of westward movement of the Red Army in Europe, then we have got to recognize that this is a problem for which we must devise new policies. I simply disagree completely with the proposition that by sending a tremendous western army into Vietnam that this some- how xs going to bring an end to the problem. of guerrilla wars. Why, we are there now with 200,000 troops. We have spent $15 or $20 billion. We will spend more before this war is-this year is over. Yet already we are being told that the war is spreading into 'L hailand right next to Vietnam. That is not because we have pulled out. And your ilustration was a very good one, The most effective work that is being done against the Communists is being done by the Indonesians themselves, not with our help: but. without it. And talk about the tide moving inexorably southward from China, why, Burma dealt with a guerrilla war without any great west- ern intervention, and that war was dealt with by a country that has over 1.500 miles of common frontier with China. Revolution must be dealt with differently and we need a policy that is better adapted to deal with it. And that is all that I am pleading for. Mr. SEVAREID. Senator TowER. Senator TowER. I think it should be pointed out that there was an internal sit- uation in Indonesia in, which Sukarno played off the military against the Communist poli- ticians. Utlimately, the Communists were a little bit precipitive in trying to hurry the process of takeover and the military reacted swiftly and have now gone about systemat- ically exterminating Communistas, And we have been treated to the spectacle of Suban- drfo having a soul-searching experience in an agonizing reappraisal. As far as-- Senator CHURCH. I am merely printing out that they are doing this on their own and U Thant said that had we come in with a massive western force at the time Burma was dealing with her problem, we might very well have-- Senator Towim. Well, Indonesia and Viet- nam are not the same. Senator CHURCH. Invested that govern- ment with the kind of front of puppetry that would have lost the support of its own people. Senator Tows. Indonesia and Vietnam are not the same. Mr'. SEVAREm. That is not a good---- Senator ToWER. The fact of the matter is that North Vietnam is actively engaged in armed aggression against South Vietnam. There are North Vietnamese troops concen- trated in regimental strength in South Viet- nam today. Senator CHURCH. Nobody is arguing that. Senator TowER. Well, all right. When the aggressor nation moves in militarily against a non-Communist country, you cannot say, well, the way to solve this is not by the in- trusion of troops. Let us go over there with specific action programs, Well, civic action programs are great, they are fine, if that is correct, but when the aggressor uses mili- tary power, then we must combat that mili- tary power. I remember a statement made by a great commentator who said, goodness without power is impotent and power itself is impotent without the willingness to use it, if necessary. Senator CHURCH. Well, now, of course, JOHN, but you are pushing an open door here. No one is suggesting that we should use--that no power should be used against power. All that I am suggesting is----- Senator SYMINGTON. You compared-- Senator CHURCH. All that I am suggesting, "STU," if I may Just finish-- Senator SYMINGTON. But let me Just finish. Senator CHURCH. All I am suggesting is this. Senator SYMINGTON. I am taking up for his side because you interrupted him. Now let Ire interrupt you. I think that you felt that every thing was the same in Asia and differently in Europe and used what had been done in Indonesia and Burma to show what could be done in North and South Vietnam. What JOHN was doing, as I understood it, was to explain why he felt that Indonesia was totallly different from anything in North and South Vietnam, and I think there is great merit. Senator JAVITS. May we add one further fact, gentlemen. Every one of us who has been there knows that if we had not moved in as we did beginning in February of 1965, South Vietnam was finished- Senator TowER. Gone. Gone. Senator JAvrrs. Through, folded up and out of business. Senator TowER. Absolutely. Senator JAVrrs. That was not true in Burma. Senator CHURCH. That is not true. I have been there and that is not the argumei... all. The argument is from the experienc, in Vietnarn and looking around at other guerrilla wars, let us try and determine what will be best adapted to discouraging the spread of Communism and recognize that revolutionary situations are different basic- ally than the situations that faced--- Senator GRUENING. Indeed. Indeed. Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has the floor. Senator GRUENING. I would. disagree wita all my colleagues to the effect that Asia is so important that it justifies the kind cf military and financial all-out action we have taken. Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, you live very close to Asia. Senator GRUENING. It has some impor- tance, but if we kept out, I am convinced we would have had in Vietnam a. reunited Vietnam which would have been independ- ent of Peiping, an analogy to which is the situation in Yugoslavia where the United States invested $2 billion in support cf Communist Tito because he was :independ- ent of the lz-remlin. That could be demon- strated if there were time. Ho Chi Minh had no use for the Chinese; the Vietnamese hate the Chinese. If we had just left the situa- tion alone. But we were observed with our fears, with our mistaken beliefs that all communism. was of the same kind. Senator JAVrrs. Well, the defect in that argument is that South Vietnamese people do not agree with Senator GRUENING. They did not want it- Senator TowER. That is right. Senator JAVITS. And they fought against it. Senator TowER. That is right. Senator JAVITS. And they are fighting against it to the tune of 700,000 right now, and that invalidates the thesis completely. Senator TowER. And too often the critics of administration policy say, well, we are not supporting a popularly based government in South Vietnam. How on earth can you de- termine what a popularly based government is? Senator GRUENING. Well, why then did we have to take over a whole war? Senator TowER. Could you have a mean- ingful election in South Vietnam today? Senator GRUENING. Why did we have to take over the whole war ourselves-- Senator TOWER. Of course you could not. Senator GRUENING. If this was such a pop- ular cause in South Vietnam? Senator SYMINGTON. Because of the North Vietnam forces. The North sent in support. Senator GRUENING. They only came in after we sent in American aid. Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would g) out there. I told you that. You would change a lot of your thoughts. I changed a lot of mime. Mr. SEVAREID. I gather the thrust of a goo,i bit of your talk a few minutes ago was to the effect that what we are really trying 0 do in a groping way is to get some kind of a balance of power in Asia comparable to the balance that was achieved and which has protected Europe these last 20 years. Is this always going to have to require American armed presence? Should we have not taken a different policy with Japa.r., then? Should not Japan be armed if this is a problem? Japan at one end and India at the other? Senator JAVrrs. Well, isn't this really- w3 may ask a question of ourselves and of the people-a transitional phase in Asia? Now, Europe is pretty well equipped to deal with its problems, whatever may be its unwillingness to venture outside of Europe. The fact is that the NATO alliance has held Europe together and now it is getting to be much more Integrated, et cetera. This is a nascent stage, a growing stage in Asia. India is getting a greater sense of Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Fi2nxary 16, 1 966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE nationhood. The accord between Pakistan standpoint of maintaining our own security and India at Tashkent, indeed, the fact that to maintain our defense perimeter as far Russia is emerging as a power itself, able from our own shores as possible, and as close to bring two parties together I think is a to the enemy's as possible. very significant aspect of world affairs. And Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH, did you I think that the United States is fitting into wish to come in? what is somewhat of a vacuum. Senator CHURCH. I just want to say I think For a time and in this terribly tortured we do ourselves an injustice by using terms world where you are seeking to hold off an that are really not accurate. We talk about atomic war, a real big holocaust, it seems the free world and the Communist world as to me that that kind of interim action is though these were two great monolithic free world which is in the best position to do that, and one must admit it, has the will to do it, and indeed I am grateful that our country does have the will and still the pio- neering spirit in which to see that far down the road so that it will itself assume a burden which must be assumed if no one else will. Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to an- swer your point about India and Japan, if I may, to some extent. India today is heavily armed by the Soviet Communists. They have the biggest air force by far in their part of the world. So far as Japan is concerned, where re- cently I spent quite a lot of time, you have a treaty, and in that treaty the Japanese do not guarantee to protect us, but we guaran- tee to protect them. And they are very peace- ful minded. Of course, they don't like to see any fight- ing out there. Unfortunately they had a sad and tragic ending to World War II, but, on the other hand, if it wasn't for the guarantee that the United States has given them, that goes through 1970 or to 1970, I am sure that they would have a totally different approach to their own defenses. I only mention this again because I think Europe, where incidentally we have heard talk of NATO-I don't think there is any greater enemy fundamentally to our future than France, which is perhaps the core of NATO, gepgraphically, anyway. I think each and every one of these cases is different and what my apprehension is, listening to these witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee, is-that they are too prone to con- tinue a phase which perhaps could be best summed up in the words "spheres of in- fluence." I believe spheres of influence, the way the world is today, when you go around it in 90 minutes, is getting to be a rather obsolete term. Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we haven't talked much about the prospects and possi- bilities of peace. There has been no hard signals from Hanoi so far as anyone knows in the direction of peace negotiations. Is there any of you at this table who think there is any chance that Hanoi is going to talk peace before there is some military change in the battlefield that makes her realize she can't win this war and will take very great losses? Senator TowER. I think that the only way Hanoi can be brought to the conference table with a reasonable attitude is for us to make the war so costly that they do not choose to pursue it any further. I think to reduce their will to wage an aggressive war against South Vietnam we must reduce their capacity to do it. We have tried It. We have tried desperately to bring them to the conference table. We have sent our peace mission all over the world and they have rebuffed us. So apparently force is the only thing that they understand, because they have not yet I think been convinced of the determination of the United States to stay and defend non-Communist governments against Communist encroachment. I think one thing that we in the United States had better resign ourselves to and understand; that is, because we are the most powerful nation in the free world, we are necessarily the free world's first line of de- fense, and it is incumbent on us from the blocs. Neither are and most of the coun- tries in the so-called free world aren't free and never have been free, and this is the reason in so much of Asia, in so much of Africa, where the people retch in poverty and suffer the yoke of ancient wrongs that revo- lutions are going to occur, and we have got to recognize that the Communists are going to try to take these revolutions over, and this is a different situation than faced us in Europe. I was -reading in the official statement of administration policy about the kind of mil- itary alliance system we have established in Europe, NATO, and then SEATO and CENTRO, around the rest of the Communist world, and the discussion of this alliance system Is a great barrier to Communist pene- tration. Well, Eric, if this is a barrier, then a sieve is a barrier to water and a plate glass window is a barrier to sunlight. These alliances are not stopping the pene- tration of communism. We stand in Viet- nam today practically alone and the only allies that we can honestly claim as military allies are South Korea, Taiwan, and Thai- land, and all together they constitute less than 8 percent of the people of Asia. Senator Gaumsiwo. Who are on our payroll. Senator CHURCH. Now, I must say we are deluding ourselves if we think this is the bulwark of a policy. It is evidenced that we lack a policy. I am for getting a good policy that will deal more effectively with the phenomena of revolution. We are going to live in a generation of revolution through- out all of Latin America, Africa, Asia, for a long time to come and we have yet to devise a policy that will deal effectively with the- Senator JAVITS. Well, the basic ingredi- ents- Senator GRUENING. I could not disagree more with Senator TOWER. We tried bomb- ing for 1 year and we have been totally ineffective. It has merely hardened resist- ance of the people, and one reason Hanoi is not interested is because our approaches, our alleged unconditional terms are very condi- tional. We have got to negotiate with the people who are doing the fighting. That is the first thing we have got to do. We are not doing it. If we were willing to negotiate with the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong; we would be realistic about it. Hanoi is not the villain in this thing. Hanoi came. in late to infiltrate when the revolution, the civil war had already gone on for some time, and this is a reality that we have refused in our administration circles to face. Senator TowER. The Vietcong cannot wage war without Hanoi. Mr. SEVAREID. We have about a minute and a half or so. Senator GRUENING. They did. Mr. SEVAREm. I wonder if any of you had time to form any opinions about Senator RIBIcoFF's ideas published today, that we have a conference right away now in Geneva, invite the Vietcong representatives and offer a partial withdrawal of our troops if Hanoi will do the same. Is there merit in this? Senator JAVITS. Well, I will tell you, the weakness of it is the very weakness of the things that Senator CHURCH and Senator GRUENING have been discussing. It is a uni- lateral effort to bring peace. We are going to sit down in Geneva and invite people to come who then will not come which will set the effort back a lot further than it is now. Senator TOWER. Further negotiation from weakness. Senator JAvrrs. I do not believe that esca- lation necessarily will do it. I think the maintenance of our position with integrity and viability on a unilateral basis, that is what we are doing in order to defend, pacify, reconstruct a viable area of South Vietnam is our best position. Let us remember that the South Vietnamese, Vietcong, could flow back to the villages just like they left them and the North Vietnamese could go home, and you would not need a peace conference at all, and that is very likely to be the result. Senator SYMINGTON. If you sit down with the Vietcong alone, then automatically you lose all the Government of South Vietnam. Senator GRUENING. That would be no loss. Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you want to turn over to the Vietcong South Vietnam which you would be doing if you sat down with the Vietcong. Mr. SEVAREID. Gentleman, I want to thank all of you for coming on this rainy Sunday afternoon. Our time has about run out. I wish we could talk for another hour, and perhaps in the future we will have occasion to have all of you back again. It looks like a long war to come. I suppose there is some danger in public debate about the validity in the conduct of a war in which thousands of Americans are already risking their lives. There is some danger of encouraging the enemy to hang on, perhaps, when he hears all this, danger I would think to the political careers of those who speak out before, this is all over, people on either side of this argument, but there are many precedents in our history for ques- tioning an American war even after it is un- derway. And this Lincoln's Birthday week- end is a good time perhaps to remember that. On January 12 of 1848 a young Congress- man, Abraham Lincoln, stood up in the House and he denounced the Mexican War as un- necessarily and unconstitutionally com- menced by President Polk, and that speech was described by many people and many papers in this country as unpatriotic, a great disservice to the fighting man. He had a thousand of them from his own district in that war. And he never got reelected to Con- gress. Well, if there are dangers over this- he became President-this present national debate on this war, I think maybe we have to remember that life in the free society is not supposed to be safe. It is supposed to be free, in the belief that only in this free conflict of ideas do you ultimately find the way to the final safety. This is Eric Sevareid in Washington. Good afternoon. ANNOUNCER. This has been "Vietnam Per- spective-Congress After Honolulu," part of CBS' News continuing coverage of the Viet- nam conflict. TONY SCHWAMM Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Tony Schwamm, postmaster of Anchorage, who only a few weeks ago was 1 of 14 postmasters in the United States visiting Washington to be given citations by Postmaster General Lawrence F. O'Brien for the able way in which they had car- ried out the President's natural beauty program by improving the appearance of their respective post offices and their surrounding grounds, died suddenly of a heart attack. His passing is a great loss not merely to the city of Anchorage but to all Alaska, throughout which he was widely known and loved. Only weeks ago, on January 18, after his award, I placed an item in the Coil- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 9 ;,6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February 16, .L GIIESSIONAL RECORD about him, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AN ALASKA POSTMASTER IS HONORED-CITA- TION OF MEsrr Is CONFERRED ox "TONY" SCI-IWAMM OF ANCHORAGE Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I am happy to record that of the 14 postmasters in the Nation who are being honored this week with a citation of merit by Postmaster General O'Brien, one is from Alaska. He is George S. '.. Cony" Schwamm, the competent postmaster of Alaska's largest city, Anchorage. The citation of merit is awarded because of the able way in which Postmaster Schwamm has carried out the President's natural beauty program by improving the appearance of the various post offices in his jurisdiction and their surrounding grounds. Postmaster Schwamm is an outstanding Alaskan, a former World War II pilot who thereafter served with great ability as the head of the territory's department of aero- nautics. In that capacity he started a most effective airport construction program and built airfields which are still in use and have stood up under the wear and tear of service. He then became the manager of the Inter- national Airport at Anchorage, which, under his direction, became the air crossways of the Northern Hemisphere. It links the three great continents of that hemisphere. "Tony" Schwamm's dynamic leadership contributed substantially to this airport development. Today, the passengers from Europe and Asia have the opportunity to stop off at Anchor- age and enjoy the outstanding scenic beau- ties of the last: frontier. It is a pleasure to salute "Tony" Schwamm for his outstanding performance in every position that he has occupied and to con- gratulate Postmaster General Larry O'Brien for making this award. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, what was so essentially true of Tony Schwamm was that he was a live, kindly, alert, dy- namic individual, who performed every task that he undertook with great zest and competence. In addition to his various personal undertakings, he was unofficially an Anchorage greeter, an assignment de- rived not merely from his innate out- giving nature but from the fact that for many years before his postmastership he was the manager of the International Airport at Anchorage, to which an ever- increasing number of visitors from abroad came. Tony had seen the begin- nings of their influx. He took a personal interest in them. It was his delight to welcome the arrivals from the Scandi- navian countries, from France, Japan, Germany and other countries, and to transmit to them the spirit of friendli- ness and warm hospitality which is characteristic of Alaskans, and which. Tony embodied to a superlative degree, A World War II aviator who was re- tired because of damage from lead poi- soning received while in the service, it might truly be said of him that he was outstanding and dedicated both in war and in peace. In his relatively short term of service as postmaster, he did a superlative job in distributing the vast volume of mail to a rapidly growing community. He will be sorely missed, but the mem?- ory of his sterling character and his out- standing contributions will be remcm-- bered and treasured as long as those who knew and loved him remain alive. MILWAUKEE MOTHER AND TEACH- ER TELLS HOWS CHILDREN NEED SCHOOL MILK Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I rise again to protest the administration's unrealistic and totally unacceptable cut- back in the special school milk program. I have spoken out daily on this sub- ject. Today I want to put into the REc- ORD the words of one who should know better than anyone else what this calam- itous proposal means. This person, Mrs. Meyer Bloom Of Milwaukee, is the mother of three children and a teacher of many more. She says, in part: I frequently have observed a marked change in attitude and responsiveness in a child after he or she has had the morning milk. Are we going to permit the adminis- tration to eliminate this? I say we can- not afford it. Nothing is more vital than the health and education of our children, our most precious asset. I ask unanimous consent to have Mrs. Bloom's letter printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DEAR SENATOR PaoxMIRE: As a teacher and a mother of three growing (fast) children I have very little time to write notes to anyone-even the milkman-but I did want to write to support your actions regarding the special milk program. for our school- children. Your February 1966 report states prob- ably the greatest truth regarding the situa- tion-"You can't teach a hungry child." I have been teaching in one of Milwaukee's so-called core schools and frequently have observed a marked change in attitude and responsiveness in a child after he or she has had the morning milk. So very many of these children come to school without break- fast (among other things, Including ade- quate sleep, etc.). I have always urged the parents I have come in contact with to send the 2 cents per half pint of milk for their child. Frequently this is the oily milk children have each day. Our school is now on a hot lunch program and the morning milk has been eliminated. It worries me to know that of the many children not purchasing the hot lunch, that is, those that bring sandwiches, a sizable proportion of them do not purchase milk. Is there same way we can work out this situation in the classroom or with the par- ents? Do you have any suggestions? I could provide you with statistics of our school's program alone if that would be of any help. Most sincere best wishes in your efforts. Mrs. MEYER BLOOM. TIMBER ALLOWABLE CUTS--II Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on Jan- uary 17 I discussed the subject of allow- able cuts of timber in the national forests in Oregon and the effort some people were making to use a 5-year-old working paper to exploit the national forests. The man who assisted in preparing this 5-year-old document was a Dr. Wil- liam A. Duerr of Syracuse, N.Y. I sent my remarks to Dr. Duerr and received a letter from him dated January 26, 1966. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the REC- SYRACUSE, N.Y.,. January 2G, 1986. Hon. WAYNE MORSE, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It was kind of you to write me on January 18 and to enclose a copy of your remarks on the floor of the Senate concerning the allowable cut of tim- ber. And I appreciate the invitation you gave me to comment in confidence. I am much relieved to have the record set straight, for over the years it had gotten pretty muddled. As you observed, I was being badly used. And yet I believed it best not to enter the squabble personally, lest I embarrass my associates. How fortunate for all of us that you came to our rescue. As you know, the allowable-cut issue con- tinues lively. My friends in the Bureau of Land Management tell me that Director Stoddard is determined to fight the recent insistent demands for an immediate upping of the cut in western Oregon. He proposes to make a basic study during 1966 of the whole policy and procedure for setting the cut, meanwhile sticking with the formula used in recent years. Such studies are essen- tial to the public Interest. The problem is technically difficult and cannot be resolved quickly. It would be a blow to Federal for- estry if the Bureau were forced by local pres-. sures to move prematurely. Again, thanks to you, and kindest regards. Most sincerely, WILLIAM A. DuFRR. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it !became quite obvious, after a careful reading of an October 27, 1965, letter sent to Dr. Duerr by a State senator from Oregon and Dr. Duerr's November 2, 1965, reply to the State senator, that those who were seeking to use Dr. Duerr in exploiting the allowable cut issue were not going to get any help in their efforts. Now Dr. Duerr himself observes that he was "being bad- ly used." In view of these developments I am pleased to insert in the RECORD Dr. Duerr's letter of January 26, 1966, ad- dressed to me so that all interested in- dividuals may have the benefit of his comments. It is my desire to have this allowable timber cut issue placed out in the open where true conservationists'-which in- clude many in the timber industry-can see it in full focus. As one who has labored as an edu- cator, I should point out that another great principle is at stake here. It goes beyond the forest issue. It involves the right and the obligation of an educator to examine into a subject freely and fuilly and the right of a researcher to look at all possible alternatives and not be used because he dares to think. It includes the precious right to think new thoughts-the obligation to test new ideas-the responsibility to challenge the accepted policy. Above all, we must never abandon the right to bring the dis- ciplines and knowledge of science, eco- nomics, and sociology to bear upon the problems that confront us-free from political ha:rrassment. For decisions on resource manage- ment to be sound, they must be based on facts. For decisions to be support- able, they must rest on logic. Any con- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, Aggroved FoE8"AW~[2WE P6~9 hftR000400020001-5 I've had comes from junior officers and en- listed men. I have always made it a practice, therefore, to listen to anyone, no matter what his rank or rate. A President I admire greatly was Teddy Roosevelt. He was a physical-fitness advo- cate. He was a man who understood the art of leadership. And he got things done. It may have been Teddy Roosevelt who coined that bit of philosophy I've long quoted: "If you need a helping hand, there it is-right on the end of your arm." Young men sometimes ask me: "Is it still possible to achieve a full and satisfying career in the U.S. Navy?" My answer goes something like this: Contrary to the prophets of doom, there will always be a U.S. Navy-and opportu- nities abound for those who take advantage of them. In spite of substitute methods of transportation, we will for many years use the surface of the sea to carry the bulk of our trade and to defend our shores. Fleets of the future may bear little resem- blance to present-day ships. But I am con- vinced that there will be naval aviation in some form, aircraft carriers, submarines, and small, fast ships for escort duty. These are all battle-tested types and least vulnerable to nuclear bombs-if such weapons of mass destruction are used in the future. To fulfill its mission; the Navy must have the finest, most dedicated officers and men it can attract. Being a part of the Navy is honorable; soul satisfying, and sufficiently remunerative to reward any active young man who loves his country and is willing to accept his responsibilities. Last November 7, I remarked to my Ma- rine Corps driver, "Today is a very special day for me because it was just 63 years ago that I entered the Naval Academy." "Well, Admiral, do you think you'll make a career of it?" he quipped. Yes, I think I shall. I'm still learning every day. I'm still trying to do my best (by Navy regulation a five-star admiral never re- tires). And I refuse to worry about things over which I have no control. If I had a chance to relive my life, I'd still follow Grandfather Nimitz' philosophy-even if it led to another court-martial for running the U.S.S. Decatur aground. (Enrros's NOTE: Reprinted through cour- tesy of Boy's Life magazine published by the Boy Scouts of America.) In speaking of the Boy Scouts, Admiral Nin itz stated: "My boyhood occurred before Scouting came to the United States, but I have long been interested in its growth, development, and principles. If I were to sum up the qualities required of a good naval officer, I would be hard put to add anything to the qualities required of a good Scout. Of the 2,500,000 men under my command at the height of the war in the Pacific, fewer than half were former Scouts. Yet this 40 percent won 60 percent out of all the medals MAINE LEGISLATURE SUPPORTS U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, on be- half of my colleague from Maine [Mr. MUSKIEI and myself I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a joint resolution adopted by the Legisla- ture of the State of Maine in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam. There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM We, your memorialists, the House of Repre- sentatives and Senate of the State of Maine No. 26-11 in special session of the 102d legislative ses- sion assembled, most respectfully present and petition your honorable body as follows: Whereas the United States of America stands committed to a policy of resisting the forces of Communist aggression which im- peril the freedom and liberty Of the people and nations of the free world; and Whereas it is of vital importance that the forces of totalitarianism recognize that the United States of America, as a nation, will utilize every means at its disposa# to honor such commitments; and Whereas the present use of American military forces in Vietnam manifests the determination of the United States of America to implement this policy whenever and wherever the freedom of the nations of the free world are threatened; and Whereas our military forces, in this great struggle, are proving a decisive factor in im- plementing American policy, not only in the defense of. Vietnam against Communist ag- gression, but as a developing arsenal of strength which will provide the means of securing a final peace: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That we, your memorialists, urge that the Congress of the United States of America, in recognition of the sacrifices and heroism of our fighting men in Vietnam, extend the profound thanks of the Congress and the people of the United States to the military forces of this country in Vietnam for their valiant efforts; and be it further Resolved, That a copy of this resolution, duly authenticated by the secretary of state, be transmitted by the secretary of state to the Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, and to the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress and to the Members of the Senate and House of- Representatives from this State. In senate chamber, read and adopted, sent down for concurrence, February 1, 1966. EDWIN H. PERT, Secretary. House of representatives, read and adopted, in concurrence, February 1, 1966. JEROME G. PLANTE, Clerk. CURTAILMENT OF REA LOAN PRO- GRAM WILL CAUSE FURTHER DEPRESSION OF RURAL AREAS Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, in his budget message last month the President proposed sharp curtailment in rural electrification loan funds. This cutback, if agreed to by Congress, will have a sharp effect in Montana. Right now there Is a large backlog of loan applications at the Rural Electrifi- cation Administration. This backlog, plus applications which will normally come in this year, amount to about three-quarters of a billion dollars. Congress authorized the loan of about $400 million to meet part of this demand. However, the budget message proposed that about one-third of the amount Con- gress appropriated be impounded, its use withheld until next year. The adminis- tration proposes an REA loan program of about a quarter of a billion dollars next year, which is several hundred mil- lion dollars short of the need. The 24 cooperatives in Montana will need about $8 million during the next year and a half. If the budget cutbacks are accepted,' several million dollars needed for expansion of rural electric service In Montana will have to be raised elsewhere, at a cost considerably above 2973 the 2-percent rate on REA loans. This will mean higher rates for consumers on farms and in small towns. I think that it is time for the Govern- ment to take a hard look at the ways it helps finance essential electric service. The Government grants special powers and privileges to all suppliers of elec- tricity, because electricity is essential and because it is most economically dis- tributed on a monopoly basis. A number of investor-owned utilities have received 2-percent REA loans on exactly the same terms granted the co- operatives. Any supplier who obtains one of those low-interest loans has to agree to serve the entire area, not just the lucrative, high-density areas. Many power companies found they could make more money by serving se- lected, populous areas with conventional financing, than by serving an entire area with construction financed at only 2 percent. The investor-owned utilities take in about 15 times as much revenue per mile of line as the rural co-ops do. If the privately owned, consumer-man- aged rural cooperatives had that kind of density and revenue they could cer- tainly finance their growth without any 2-percent loans. Another point-there has been a big shift in financing of the major segment of the power industry-the investor- owned utilities-within recent years. A substantial proportion of the cost of their expansion has been shifted from the stockholders to the customers. About half of the 10 U's-the investor- owned utilities-won't have to go to the marketplace for new money at all dur- ing the sixties. In other words, these companies will pay zero percent interest on new con- struction capital. The companies have already collected a lot of that capital, month after month, from the customers. But the customers of the Investor- owned utilities did not get any stock, or dividends. And they would not get their money back. If the REA program Is curtailed, either through increase in rates or in- adequacy of service, needed employment opportunities cannot be developed in rural areas. It will be more difficult for us in 'Montana to keep our young people in these areas. That is why I have told the President- and a number of other Senators, of both parties, have joined in the request- that the REA loan program must be restored. Beyond its enormous value in the areas it serves it has a beneficial effect in cities served by investor-owned companies, be- cause of the yardstick effect of competi- tion. The program is especially useful in: this regard in Montana, which is the only one of the States-except for Ha- waii-without a single city-owned power system. I believe the Congress will give the President better advice on REA matters than he received from his Budget Bureau. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE February 16, 1966 SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF AD- VISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-, GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the Ad- visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has submitted its seventh an-, nual report to the President of the United States, the Vice President, and the Speaker of the House of Representa- tives. Members will recall that this Commission was established by Congress in 1959, for the following basic purposes: First. To bring together representa- tives of the Federal, State, and local gov- ernments, for consideration of common problems. Second. To provide a forum for dis- cussion of the administration of Federal grant programs. Third. To give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in the 'administration of Federal grant pro- grams. Fourth. To make available technical assistance to the executive and legisla- tive branches of the Federal Govern- ment, in the review of proposed legisla- tion, to determine its overall effect on the Federal system. Fifth. To encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging pub- lic problems that are likely to require in?- tergovernmental cooperation. Sixth. To recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of government. Seventh. To recommend methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws and. administrative practices, to achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of gov- ernment and to reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers. The Advisory Commission is composed of representatives of the public and of each level of government. The senior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ExviN7, the senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], and I have served on the Commission since its establish- ment. On the House side, Representa- tive FouremIN, of North Carolina, chair- man of the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, and the original sponsor of the bill creating the Commission, and Representative DWYER, of New Jersey, are also charter members.. The other House Member is Representa- tive KEOGH, of New York. In addition to the six Members from. Congress, the Commission has three from the executive branch: the Secre-? tary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Hous-? ing and Urban Development. Other members include four Governors, four mayors, three State legislative leaders, and three elected county officials. The public is represented by three members, one of whom is the Commission's Chair- man. A year has elapsed since the submis- sion of the Commission's sixth annual report, and it is appropriate that the Senate be apprised of the Commission's activities during the past 12 months. Mr. Frank Bane, of Virginia. Chair- man of the Commission, continues to skillfully guide the Commission, while Mr. William G. Colman, its executive di- rector, provides able leadership in over- seeing the activities of the 23-member professional and clerical staff. During 1965, general meetings of the Commission were held in January, May, and October; and this year, in January. The following major reports requiring implementation were adopted during the course of the sessions: First. "Relocation: Unequal Treatment of People arid Businesses Displaced by Governments." This study explores the need to achieve consistency and equity in the treatment of those persons and businesses forced to relocate because of Federal and federally aided public im- provement programs. The Subcommittee on Intergovern- mental Relations acted swiftly to imple- ment the Commission's findings. On April 1, 1965, I introduced S. 1681. Com- panion measures to S. 1681 were intro- duced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen FouNTAiN-H.R. 7821, and 1DWYER--HR. 7970. H.R. 10212, in- troduced by Congressman SIcnr.Es, in- eludes provisions similar to S. 1681. Hearings were held by the subcommittee on June 30, July 1, 13, and 14, 1965. Final action by the Senate is expected in the near future. Second. "Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes." If our States are to remain viable partners in our Fed- eral system, their fiscal position. must be strengthened. This report looks at this problem and develops a number of useful recommendations, including a proposed Federal tax credit for State income tax payments. Third. "Metropolitan Social and Eco- nomic Disparities: Implications for In- tergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs." This report inves- tigates : Who lives in the central cities and corre- sponding suburban rings of each metropol- itan area? What are the fiscal resources in our central cities and suburbs? How do gov- ernmental expenditures differ among these jurisdictions? What changes, if any, should be made in Federal, State, and local policies regarding such social and economic dispar- ities, and what specific legislative and admin- istrative actions should be taken to imple- ment these changes? Current work projects on the Commis- sion's agenda include: First. State taxation of interstate commerce. This report considers policy issues raised in H.R. 11798--WILLIS, Democrat, of Louisiana, pertaining to State taxation of interstate commerce. Second. Intergovernmental responsi- bility for building codes and regulations. The variety of building regulations and how greater uniformity can be achieved were considered at the January meeting of the Commission. Third. Effect of tax and expenditure practices on location of industry and economic development. State laws de- signed to attract industry pose serious intergovernmental problems. This ques- tion is now being scrutinized by the Commission. Fourth. Intergovernmental relations in the poverty program. The war against poverty is running into serious obstacles and is being attacked in some quarters. The Commission is exploring ways in which more effective cooperation among levels of government can be achieved in the administration of this program. Fifth. The Advisory Commission has contracted with the Department of City Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to reassess Commission recommendations relating to urban areas and to measure their effectiveness as de- vices for relieving pressing metropolitan problems. Sixth. In October, the Commission sponsored and chaired a meeting to con- sider the need for a fullfledged confer- ence to discuss the question of urban research. The staff of the subcommit- tee participated in the conference. Of more general concern to those in- terested in intergovernmental relations is the tracing by the Commission of sig- nificant intergovernmental events in 1965. Brief descriptions of the Voting Rights Act, the Elementary and Second- ary Education Act, a grant program for the improvement of State and local 'law enforcement are included. Two major fiscal problems, State taxation of inter- state commerce and the treatment of income derived from securities of State and local governments, are also dis- cussed. The brief survey of State legislative reapportionment in 1965 will be of spe- cial interest to all Senators. The Commission's report also high- lights a number of significant develop- ments at the State level, including: increased State interest in urban prob- lems, improvements In intergovern- mental fiscal relations, new and higher State and local taxes, and greater con-- cern with revising State constitutions. A number of recent examples of, greater areawide cooperation in urban areas were cited. The Commission's report takes note of other significant intergovernmental relations developments that took place at the Federal level in 1965. The crea. tion of the Department of Urban Affairs brings into better focus Federal activi- ties as they affect our cities. The pas- sage by the Senate of S. 561, the ;Proposed Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1965, also marks a real milestone in intergovernmental relations. S. 561 will help to better coordinate Federal efforts as they influence State and local affairs. The continuing debate on the so- called Heller proposal suggests that the topic of intergovernmental finances will occupy much of our attention in the months to come. The report takes special note of joint hearings held by the House and Senate Subcommittees on Intergovernmental Relations last May on the 5-year record of the Advisory Commission. In transmitting the subcommittee's findings to the Senate Committee on Government Operations, I pointed out: The hearings revealed that the Commis- sion, in its 1i years of operation, hws achieved a high level of competence and productivity in its continuing study of problems which Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2986 l-V1VRE551UNAL KECORD7B SENATE 0400020 F1-5 ebruary V1V 4AJ ESES a growing stream of reference by finan- cial columnists and economic writers to inflationary factors in our economy. This is understandable inasmuch as prices have moved up somewhat more rapidly in 1965 than in the preceding years. After increasing at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent between 1960 and 1964, the gross national product deflator, which is the best general mea- sure of inflationary pressures in our economy, rose by 1.8 percent in 1965. Significantly, the President's Council of Economic Advisers which testified be- fore the Joint Economic Committee last Tuesday, predicts no greater rate of price increase in 1966 than in 1965. Nevertheless, with the submission of the 1966 budget there has been renewed concern about inflationary pressures. In particular, repeated references are made to the Vietnam war as a major factor in rising demand and inflationary pres- sures. Many analysts and commenta- tors have drawn a parallel between the Korean war experience which did in- volve substantial price inflation and the emerging situation in Vietnam. A closer analysis shows that the com- parison may be spurious. In the course of the current hearings, it has been brought out that military expenditures are a lower percentage of the gross na- product. Obviously, even with the ex- tional product than they were in the pansion in 1967 th Vi t e e ,- nam conflict ac 1950's. For the current fiscal year, total counts for only a tiny fraction of total outlays for the military functions of the demands on the economy, and it is highly Department of Defense amount to $56.5 misleading to attribute any serious in- billion, which is approximately 7.7 per- flationary pressures to these outlays. It cent of the gross national product. For is true that expanding military expendi- 1967, the percentage is 7.9 percent, which -tures have a multiplier effect and tend to includes $10.3 billion for the Vietnam trigger off other investments and ex- conflict. A44 In the 4-year period 1956 through 1959, when our role in Vietnam was pure- ly an advisory one and, therefore, far more limited than the present, the rela- tionship between defense and total gross national product averaged 8.85 percent- higher than the projection for the year ahead. The following table shows the percentage relationship between Depart- ment of Defense military functions and total gross national product for each fiscal year from 1939 through 1967. Nat- urally, the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 are estimated. I ask unanimous consent that the table may be printed in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Defense spending as percentage of gross national product, fiscal years 1939-67 Percent of GNP 1939-------------------------------- 1.2 1940-------------------------------- 1.6 1941-------------------------------- 5.4 1942-------------------------------- 16.8 1943-------------------------------- 35.1 1944-------------------------------- 37.4 1945-------------------------------- 36.7 1946-------------------------------- 20.7 1947-------------------------------- 6.2 pen ures, but obviously it is unreason- able to exaggerate the effect of current outlays for Vietnam or to draw close economic parallels with the Korean war period. The base of military expenditures was and is much greater now than in the Korean war period. To illustrate: Total national defense outlays in 1949 were $13.3 billion and, in 1950, $14.1 billion. From that very limited base, they jumped to $33.6 billion in 1951, $45.9 billion in 1952, $48.7 billion in 1953, and $41.3 bil- lion in 1954. Thus, in the fiscal year 1951, military expenditures were doubled and, a year later, tripled as compared with the pre-Korean war level. By contrast, our military expenditures have been running at a $50-billion level ever since 1961. The Vietnam additions come to about 20 percent of base, as con- trasted with the aforementioned dou- bling and tripling in the Korean war period. As a result, there should be none of the inflationary thrust that was caused by rapid acceleration in the early 1950's. For the same reason, it is absurd to contend as our leftwing critics often do, that this Nation is dependent on military outlays to keep its vast economy going. There would be no serious problem at all in diverting any portion of military ex- Defense spending as percentage of gross national product, fiscal years 1939-67-Con. Percent 1948 of =----------- 1949 - - - - - 1950 1951 - 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957------------ 1958 ------------- ------------------- 1969 ---------------------- 1960-------------' 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 19661 ------------------------------- 19671 Estimates. percentage relationship ranged, from a low of 1.2 percent in 1939 to a maximum of 37.4 at the height of World War II, and a postwar high of 12.1 percent in 1953 reflecting the Korean war. Turning now to the expenditures for the Vietnam conflict, the sum of $10.5 billion is identifiable in the 1967 budget as required for this purpose. This comes to 11/2 percent of gross national product. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, the $4.3 billion in cost of our Vietnam military struggle comes to about seven- GNP 4.4 4.4 4. 5 6.4 11.5 12. 1 11.1 9.4 8. 8 8. 9 8. 9 8.8 8.3 8.5 8. 7 8. 5 8.2 7. 1 7. 7 7.8 16, 1966 penditures to the needs of an expanding civilian society. The President has indi- cated, both in his state of the Union mes- sage and his annual Economic Report, that Great Society programs have been held back in order to meet our military requirements and, at the same time, avoid undue pressures on our economic output. Mr. President, it is clear from the testi- mony taken by the Joint Economic Com- mittee that the dynamic factors in our current expansion are consumer expen- ditures and domestic investment. Gross national product is estimated at $722 billion for 1966-$46.5 billion over the 196,5 figure. Rising consumer expendi- tures are expected to make up 60 percent of this increase. In the case of business investment, the annual rate of spending by business for plant and equipment in the first half of 1966 will exceed the full year 1965 level by $6 billion, and this rise is expected to continue in the second half of the year. The total of fixed in- vestment, exclusive of residential Is ex- , pected to reach 101/2 percent of gross national product. In truth, we are maintaining a very rapid rate of expansion on all fronts and it is natural that some price pressures will be generated. At the same time, it is most important that we see these pres- sures in proper perspective. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an article entitled "The 2-Per- cent War" written by J. A. Livingston. There -being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE 2-PERCENT WAR (By J. A. Livingston) Question. What makes a war economy or why is Vietnam different? Answer. Quantity. World Was II never left any doubt. Na- tional defense purchases took two-fifths of the. economic pie. The homefront served the war maw. Bacon, sugar, meat, coffee were rationed. Copper, steel, aluminum, and rubber were distributed by priority. An entire system of controls-who gets what, when-was centralized in the War Pro- duction Board in Washington. Even man- power was allocated. Behind guns, butter was an also-ran. The Korean war gave a less decisive an- swer. The economy had grown 16 percent bigger. So the Nation's manpower and equipment could handle a quantitatively greater war effort with less strain. And Korea was far smaller than World War H. A month after it began, President Truman said: "This is not the time for business as usual * * * or for complete economic mo- bilization." At the peak, national defense took a 15- percent wedge out of the pie. And Vietnam is even smaller. Quantita- tively, it is dwarfed by World War II. And it differs from Korea in both size and im- pact. Korea caught Americans-you, me, and General Motors-with our military plants down. Promptly after the surrender of Ja- pan, this Nation demobilized. National de- fense was scanted in the lunge toward peace: "Bring the boys back home." After President Truman ordered General MacArthur to the defense of South Korea, industry had to retool and the Military Establishment, then a mere skeleton, had to be beefed up. Prices rose, shortages de- veloped, Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2985 Fe 95 ebruary .16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE is now being copied in a dozen States. And grapple with gut issues, the state can serve comes. The money could be used only for from the assembly came a scheme to harness as a qualified example to its 49 sisters,. health, education, and welfare projects. the intellectual horsepower of California's There are signs that the States--frightened JAVITS, however, is a Republican;; his party "think factories." Last spring the State by the specter of further Federal encroach- is in the minority. It is unlikely that the hired four aerospace firms to find solutions rnent and mounting fiscal crisis and shaken plan will win congressional approval this soo ov- is boner or later tit Federal sGon- to problems of crime and transportation that l in g Some r: States, ,e gain- year. "But g with. regional solutions io the Washington economist. "Similar schemes Calif sito will face in the year 2000. g vitality. A visitor to Sacramento is struck by legisla- ]perimentin tors like Jerry Waldie, the trim, dark-haired, urban problems that often spill across arbi- have already been tried successfully in Aus- 40-year-old Democratic majority leader in teary boundary lines. Indiana and Illinois tralia and Canada." The economist pauses, the assembly. An intense man who cares signed a compact on air pollution last year, then grins. "If you like this idea," he says, deeply about the problems of mental retarda- and New York has joined with Pennsylvania, "you better start calling it the Johnson tion, he directed a year-long probe of the Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan. to reverse the p State's mental institutions, then pushed tide of pollution in Lake Erie. The 19?5 Gov- In an effort to disentangle themselves through sweeping reforms. Or consider ernors' conference adopted an inti rstate from a web of outmoded restrictions, at Senator Tom Rees, a lanky, informal man compact on education and set up a commis- least 25 States have established constitu- who is perhaps the only lawmaker in the Na- Sion to make recommendations to the titates. tional-revision commissions. Almost all. Lion with the intestinal courage needed to "We are coming to realize," says former North these commissions are recommending that pour a jigger of gin into a glass of scotch Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, "that edu- many previously that a ective positions e'lmade whisky and then swallow the mixture with- cation is too large and too important it sub- appointive; gove be out grimacing. 1"Es, recently elevated to ject to be left to the haphazard chance of terms and greater powers; that archaic bor-- the U.S. Congress in a special election, is unconnected State and local efforts It is rowing and taxing provisions be thrown on concerned about urban sprawl. "One third also too complex to be left to a single guid- the unkpil . "Not the si Unionnce after. Southern War," reentered of all our downtown areas are made up of tag national hand." States says Alfred Willoughby, executive dil ugly parking lots," he says, and he grins as To solve their pressing fiscal problems. the Wd been. such a National Municipal exL ecutive exa eaue- mina- he tells a visitor about an informal group he States have lately been exerting tremendous a r rhos of there the who organized "to give awards to the people efforts. Indiana, for example, faced a money who do the most to screw up our natural crisis 2 years ago. The State desperately Lion of Se constitutions. And this is only environment." needed $200 million. Its level of : ervices beginning."' As a further outgrowth of these revisions, The name of this group is Los Angeles was abysmal. Its citizens were screaming also being Gruesome (LAG) ; he hopes it will spread to about inadequate schools, high property the tteer legislative The structure number is is States hold- the Bay Area around San Francisco (BAG) taxes, and the inability of the legislature st annual sessions, for example, has risen and eventually to Sacramento itself (SAG). to rise above petty partisanship. Then the sIng par 1 in the ]loot decade. In Pennsylvania, Men like Waldie and Rees can wrestle with legislature bravely enacted a compromise sh rpy I enas and other ennsyl law- complex problems primarily because they tax plan. Republicans accepted a 2-percent Makers' salaries are being increStad. "You have provided themselves with adequate income tax; Democrats a 2-percent sates tax. wget better legislators crease by pay- tools. A legislator's basic salary is just It was stipulated. that poor families who paid won't more money," says one lifm elong by pan- $6,000, but the State provides fringe benefits sales taxes on such essentials as food could g government, "but you won't get (among them: an automobile, oil- and tele- apply for refunds on the State's income tax. of better State tegigovern unless you do." phone-company credit cards) which, in ef- All of this was highly unorthodox For a Gradually most legislatures are beginning fect, double that amount. Furthermore, while license plates blossomed with the un- the Importance ce of sresearch. each legislator has a private office and at least official legend. "Land of Taxes," and several realize ome are the ortan o sound a d resatrc legi one assistant----not only in Sacramento but legislators who voted for the plan were de- S S men e taking advantage by the tive- also in his home district. feated in the. 1964 electrons. But Vic plan exist- staffs.oundation; And many others are legislatures strengthening enen are even professional more significant is the amount of has worked. Over the past 24 months the Foundation; professional help lawmakers receive. Each. State of Indiana has not only veered away gin ateAdn egu buare even the Assembly':; 23 committees, for example, from bankruptcy; it has also impr~?Ved its paying attention t interest and those old b gabs lobbying - of control of . has a staff director and a secretary; some services substantially. York, for example, strengthened its code committees hove a dozen employees. in ad- In 31 States last year legislators mustered New ethics last session. And in Nebraska, dition, there is It "floating" central staff of sufficient courage to increase existing taxes. where lobbying esioi. were likened ka men and women who can be loaned out as Additional increases expected this spring. tartly "a semaphore operation on the the need arises. To answer general questions, 'T'here is, however, a practical and political to lawmakers :re opra a measure assemblymen call on a six-man reference bu- ceiling on the amount of money thy.' States etly oad, that approved can be fined one reau. To drat bills and get legal opinions, can collect by themselves. Realizing this, prilror into jail for 6 sts can if fined arid they rely on a legislative council of 20 at- most Governors and legislators have been th own ntempt of the legislature. torneys. And when they want to examine pinning their hopes on Federal ac+'eptance mendable. Ym improvements, any of ob corveurse, are e com- such matters as the Governor's budget re- of a modified Heller plan. Such corn-onde quests, they turn to a separate staff of 16 Before Dr. Walter Heller resigned a., Chair- Yet too few en ers wo and lisc:il analysts, man of the President's Council on Economic whether tthey're not corning. The trend of the times "We have had to develop these tools," says Advisers, he proposed a plan whereby the too late be omin g he ethe Stales. times Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh, "so we Federal Government would return a fixed seems bagainst increasingly the States. State boundaries aeotion Nation becomes will become even less mobile, wouldn't be conned all the time either by portion of income-tax funds to the States. the the executive branch or by the special-inter- 'The States could use this money in almost S Federal will programs proliferate, groups." Unruh himself has played a any way they saw fit. As Heller envisioned Sta e State programs wshrivel. As they expect major role in that development. Once, asked it, the plan would not only reduce a worri- less and less from will i State government, s they expect why California had such a progressive legis- some Federal surplus; it would also prompt even lass it. r-Citi lature, he replied, "Me." It was hardly an the States to become more active partners leans zee lo will leshow ss yalties will ocus in instead terd on Washing- overstatemen C. in the federal system. ten, o D.C. aAnd if the States are deprived o- IsasicallyUnruh is a pragmatist. Over and Organized labor howled. So did tyre liberal these loyalties, they will cease to function as over again, in a somber, bullfrog voice, he wing or the Democratic Party. If the States nireiterates his favorite theme: A legislature are handed gift packages from Washington, meaningful States units today," of government. e Pennsylvania eRoy Irvis, ",are under Pennsylvania cannot be the expressive arm of government their argument ran, the States would simply "The S until it is independent. And it cannot be lower taxes and forget about improving serv- Representative that a the are sort of evolutionary they don't pressure shape up, independent until it is adequately paid, ices. In addition, they claimed, the Heller same sort housed, and staffed. He suggests further that plan would deflate the current pressure on eaten up," government could profit greatly by the States to modernize their own archaic they'll get p' emulating the `result' orientation of prl- tax structures. President Johnson seemed Can the States, somehow, shape up? Can vote enterprise." And he envisions a corn- impressed with such reasoning. And he they recapture the loyalty of their constit- ing crag of "it new politics that, is riot re- seemed piqued, too, by what he considered uents, retain their role as active partners in stricted by conventional wisdom or ideologi- to be a premature disclosure of the plan in the Federal system and stem the tide of cal rigidity. if we cannot generate thinking the New York 'Times. So nothing was done sweeping centralization? in. State government," he adds, "then we about It. The only way in which the States can cannot survive." Last October, New York's Senat,+r JACOB erect a barrier against the extension of en- Calilornia is not the sole repository of JAV[TS introduced a modified version of the tional power, a distinguished American once political virtue in the United States, nor is plan in Congress. JAVrrs' proposal would wrote, is for the States to strength'.sn their its virtue uniform. Like other State govern- establish a trust fund of about $2.0 billion. governments. * * ? "As this cannot be done ments, California's is ever threatened by Eighty percent of this money would be dis- by any change in the Federal Constitar- human fallibility and often thwarted as it tributed on the basis of population: the re- tion * * ? it must be done by the States gropes toward a future of awesome complex- mainhrg 20 percent would be divided among themselves." ity. Yet in Its demonstrated willingness to the States with the lowest per capita in- The author was Thomas Jefferson. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 vim',IH1 too"" +'~ovpwInaadnunM~R!Iwd~ww~NwwMMww WUwnN#rllgaaw~MU:~d:~7~pga lom "wm :~nuwxrnwiA+~u~.,,mwi~wx i~~mnm wn~m+M~r niiieu"i"o il"AfloN"nilNUin weMMellIlt iI4iSIIl~iOmiipioi t1*1an ?. Fefrr ry 16, 194pproved As ??IMXT6 &~bRDg~ 6R000400020001-5 2987 Reluctantly, President Truman resorted to allocations of some materials and to price and wage controls. But he never exacted a no-strike pledge from labor. He couldn't re- press inflation. The psychological acceptance of war was never all pervasive. Business continued partially as usual. The United States had plenty of butter while producing guns and sending men overseas. Nevertheless, Korea changed the American stance. It underlined that the "ramparts we watch" are worldwide and demand in- stant and permanent readiness. Thus the Vietnam effort has been pretty much in- gested by a national defense establishment in being. At the same time the economic pie-the capacity to meet war demands- has grown. Today, military purchases amount to less than 10 percent of the gross national prod- uct and the Vietnam share of that is about one-fifth. Thus, in relation to the total economy-the aggregate production of goods and services-Vietnam absorbs about 2 per- cent. Yet this 2 percent is an add-on. It re- inforces prosperity, creates jobs, drains off manpower into the armed services and, in general, crowds an economy not too rich in leeway. Will it generate inflation? Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler thinks not. "Vast quantities of new indus- trial capacity will be coming on stream," he says enlarging the capability of the country to cope with expanding demand. That is why President Johnson puts off asking Congress for a major tax boost which would cut down purchasing power. He'd prefer self-imposed restraint by labor and management on wages and prices to curb inflation. Why permit a very small war-a 2-percent war-to reshape the Great Society? Should a sore tail wag a huge dog? RENT SUPPLEMENTS Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, since Congress adjourned last fall, the Depart- ment of Housing and Urban Development has studied carefully all aspects of the rent supplement program and has devel- oped plans for its administration. This program marks an entirely new step in providing decent housing for poor people-at rents they can afford to pay. It is designed to enlist the support and energies of private enterprise-and, I might add, the program has been given enthusiastic support by builders, realtors, lenders, private nonprofit organizations, and other private groups. Public housing and other housing pro- grams have accomplished much to im- prove housing conditions in the United States. But there are still far too many poor families and elderly persons with low incomes who are living in substand- ard housing. This is the group the rent supplement program will serve. Recently the Department of Hotysing and Urban Development released income limits for a number of cities which will govern eligibility for rent supplements. The Department has leaned over back- ward to comply with the wishes ex- pressed-by the Congress at the last ses- sion. The income ceilings are the same as public housing admission ceilings in those communities having public hous- ing authorities. In New York City, the rent supplement ceilings are lower than public housing admission limits for f am- ilies having five or more persons. In localities where there is no public hous- ing, rent supplement income limits will be established at the same level which would have existed if there were a pub- lic housing program, based on available rental information and the income limits for public housing in a nearby commu- nity having comparable cost levels. Similarly, rules have been formulated to limit assets, so that persons or fam- ilies with savings or other assets of more than $2,000 will be not be eligible for for rent supplements, except in the case of the elderly, where $5,000 will be permitted. Mortgage limits and maximum rent limits will assure that rent supplement housing will be of modest design without luxury features. The objective will be to provide sound and sanitary housing suitable to the needs of low-income people. I understand that many organizations and other potential sponsors have ex- pressed interest to FHA in the form of letters and other data. These represent a total of 424 projects and 69,750 dwelling units. Private lim- ited dividend sponsors account for 53 percent of the proposed dwelling units, which underlines my earlier statement that the rent supplement program is en- listing private enterprise to help solve the housing problems of the poor. These projects are widely scattered in practically every state, and I am sure as the program gets underway, every state will have its share of projects. President Johnson described the rent supplement program as "the most cru- cial new instrument in our effort to im- prove the American city." The widespread interest which has been expressed since the program was enacted into law last August, even though no funds have yet been appro- priated, underlines the accuracy and significance of the President's statement. THE DEATH OF DR. J. ELLIOTT SCARBOROUGH, JR. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Ga., late last month, there died one of the great men of the medical profession, a man whose death will leave a void of massive proportions in the bridge of knowledge which will eventually lead to the conquest of cancer. Ironically, can- cer is what killed R. J. Elliott Scarbor- ough, Jr., who, at 59, was acknowledged as one of the Nation's outstanding spe- cialists in that disease. Mrs. Simpson and I have had a long and enduring friendship with Elliott Scarborough. Like hundreds of others throughout the Nation, we were shocked that he could be taken at so young an age by the disease that he had given his crea- tive energy to conquer. As the Atlanta Constitution expressed it so eloquently in an editorial February 1: He was the one who gave back life to so many who were dying, or who walked gently as a father with those he could not save and, out of his unbounded strength, gave them composure. No man's passing, in the medical profes- sion of this State and region, will be more deeply mourned. Mr. President, the death of Dr. Scar- borough deprives the Nation of a great mind, a great conscience, and a great hu- manitarian. He was truly a national fig- ure whose passing is felt in and out of the medical profession. I ask, Mr. President, that various obituaries and editorials pertaining to Dr. Scarborough be printed in the RECORD with my remarks. There being no objection, the ma- terial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1, 19661 DR. J. If. SCARBOROUGH, DIES; LED FIGHT AGAINST CANCER Dr. J. Elliott Scarborough, Jr., 59, one of the Nation's outstanding cancer specialists, died Monday afternoon in Emory University Hospital. He succumbed to the disease he spent a medical lifetime fighting. Since coming here in 1937 to direct the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic, Dr. Scar- borough had been a leader in developing Emory's Medical Center and in expanding Emory University Clinic, of which he became director in 1957. He held a Rockefeller Clinic Fellowship at Memorial Hospital in New York where he was invited here to head up the tumor clinic being established in the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic, one of the first for diagnosis and treatment of cancer in this area. Under Dr. Scarborough's guidance it became nation- ally known. He believed an expanding teaching program should be an integral part of the treatment of private patients at the clinic, and that the clinic could grow in service by acting as a training center for physicians. Scores of as- sociates who once, worked under Dr. Scar- borough's direction are now practicing in many other areas. His continuing interest and influence in the clinical handling of patients referred by other doctors helped in expanding his con- cept and philosophy to other areas of medicine. In addition to his original assignment as director of the Robert Winship Clinic, Dr. Scarborough held teaching positions in the Emory Medical School, beginning as instruc- tor in surgery in 1937 and rising to professor of surgery in 1957. In the same year he be- came director of Emory University Clinic and director of professional services in Emory University Hospital. Dr. Scarborough did much to enable the general public to understand cancer, for he had the gift to speak in terms understand- able to laymen. In 1949 he was appointed to the National Advisory Cancer Council, the Government's top policymaking scientific group in cancer research. In 1955 he was named to the na- tional board of directors of the American Cancer Society and reelected in 1959. He also served as a member of the cancer com- mittee of the American College of Surgeons. In 1956 Dr. Scarborough was chosen presi- dent of the James Ewing Society, composed of doctors prominent in treatment and research of cancer and other neoplastic diseases. In the same year he received the American Cancer Society's Award for Distinguished Service in Cancer Control. He had served as chairman of the executive committee of the Georgia Division since 1952. In 1960 he was appointed a member of the Cancer Research Training Committee of the National Cancer Institute and served until 1964. Dr. Scarborough was a diplomats of the American College of Surgeons, and the Amer- ican Board of Surgery. In addition, he was a member of the American Medical Associa- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February j-(;, rS' G~i Lion, the Medical Association of Georgia, and the Fulton County Medical Society. Born July 26, 1906, in Mount Willing, Ala., he received his A.B. degree at the University of Alabama in 1926 and his M.D. degree at I3arvard Medical School in 1932. He served a surgical internship at Roosevelt Hospital in New York, then continued his training at Memorial Hospital before coming here. Ile was an elder in the First Presbyterian Church. He served as a director of the Great Southern Real Estate Trust. lle was a member of the Piedmont Driving Club, Capital City Club, and Kappa Alpha fraternity. Emory students recently chose him as an honorary member of ODK leader- ship fraternity, 1)r. and Mrs. Scarborough, the former Isa- belle Wisell, of Middlebury, Vt., were married in 1935. I'hey lived at 100 Westminster Drive NE. Their two daughters are Mrs. Nancy Cottraux, of Atlanta, and Mrs. Joseph H. Long, of Dallas, Tex. Their son, Elliott III, is a college student and another son, Evans II., attends Darlington in Rome. He is a:so survived by his mother, Mrs. Mattie Hinson Scarborough, and six grandchildren. The family request that in lieu of flowers donations be made to the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic Patient Care Fund of Emory [niversity. l From ?he Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1. 1966] i?LSOTT SCARBOROUGH, M.D. It does not seem quite possible that Dr. Fliott Scarborough is gone. Ile was the one who gave back life to so many who were dying, or who walked gently a ; a father with those he could not save and, out of his unbounded strength, gave them composure. No man :s passing, in the medical profes- Si,an of this State and region, will be mere deeply mourned. itor his field was cancer, and all who came to him asked him for miracles. He headed the Emory University Cancer Clinic and its distinguished reputation in American medi- cine brought to him the highest professional esteem. Yet to the patient who entered his dcx,r-anti h:s door was ever open--he was a warm friend, steadying counselor, calming voice, and knowing hand. No suffering hu- man being was too humble, no frigthened person ever too weak, to be outside his un- derstandirrg, his concern, and his ready help. To those who studied under him, the hippocratic oath took deeper meaning from Ins example-"I will impart this art by precept, by lecture,, and by every mode of Leaching." And so did the oath take un- forgettable meaning for those patients the Li :ca,te,d-"Whatsoever house I enter, there will I go for the benefit of the sick." be entered innumerable houses, where se will not be forgotten. For Elrott Scarborough was more than a brilliant doctor who advanced the art of medicine. rte was a gaol man. IFrom list Atlanta Journal, Feb. 1. H,661 K)r,. SCARBOROUGH In the death by cancer of Dr. J. Scarborough. Jr., Atlanta lost one of her first citizens. The world lost a man long in the forefront of the battle against cancer. Iir. Scarborough was a national leader in cancer research and education. He was a pioneer in the field of diagnosis and treat- nient, and for many years was with Emory University Hospital and Medical School. Ills work brought cures and comfort to many, but, it was his fate to die of that watch he fought. its contributed greatly to the search Into the causes of cancer and its cures, and this THE COLD WAR GI BILL :Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, the passage of the cold war GI bill of rights is a major public service to the Nation. The benefits to our service- men, to our universities, to the Nation as a whole will. be felt for marry years. For this achievement the primary credit must go to the senior Senator from Texas. The Senator from Texas has carried the burden of this fight for 7 years. Throughout that time he has sought to educate the Congress, the exec- utive branch and the public on the need for this bill and the benefit;, to be ex- pected from it. His wide knowledge of education, his perseverance, above all his dedication to Justice for thos,~ who have guarded freedom's gate around the world-these things have been indispen- sable to the passage of this bill. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to have worked with him on it during my short time in the Senate: it is an honor to vote with him for its passa'e.. THE BOXCAR SHORTAGE Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the boxcar shortage, originally just a sea- sonal matter, has become a yearlong problem of serious proportions. In re- cent weeks there have been an increas- ing number of alarming ref:: its about this shortage. On January 27 I joined wi? h 17 other Senators in urging the Interstate Com- merce Commission to take strong steps and to utilize to the fullest its existing authority to alleviate this shortage. I would like to call our letter, and Chairman Bush's reply, to the attention of the Senate. I respectfully ask unani- mous consent that the text of these let- ters be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. SENA'.' OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY 1.i:ADE:R, 1174shington, D.C., Janita.y 27, 1966. JOHN W. BusH, Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D.C. r USSR MR. CHAIRMAN: In recent weeks, there has been an increased number of ;.)arming re- ports about the shortage of boxes s. In years past, this situation has been limited gener- ally to the harvest season. However, it has now become apparent that this is a year- round problem. Reports indictl:e that de- mands for boxcars are being met only 50 per- cent of the time. Several of the major rail- roads have only 60 to 65 percent f their own boxcars operating on their lines There are two distinct problems in this situation which call for immediate attention. First of all, the railroads are nit replacing boxcars in kind as they are taken out of service. Also, there is too much delay in the expeditious return of boxcars ti, their own lines. In this latter instance, orders from INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONMMI :-r()N, Washington, D.C., Fcbraro;ii 4, loci Hon. LEE METCALF, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR METCALF: I want to give y)ll an in-depth reply to your recent letter re- flecting your deep concern over the boxcar shortage, rather than a perfunctory "were doing the best we can" type of reply. I have therefore had our director, Mr. I'fahler. acrd his staff combine the information they have available with a considerable amount of addi- tional information the Association of Am; r- ican Railroads very helpfully assembled for us. This report to you is submitted in the form of two enclosures. Sincerely, Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 is a search which some day will be success- ful. The day of discovery will come. It win be a day of thanksgiving for the human race. It will be a day of thanks to Dr. Scarborough and those like him,. who labored so long in humanity's behalf, and whose p,itient labors finally bore fruit. the Federal Government have been of little value because they are immediately tested in the courts, thus involving time-consuming delay. In addition to these two difficulties, an- other situation has arisen which will corn- plicate matters even more. The Commodity Credit Corporation has now ordered the re- location of some 85 million bushels of wheat and corn. This movement of grains from the farms to the elevators and to seaports will place heavy burdens on the railroads in the Middle West and West. This country's ef- forts to expand overseas shipment of agricul- ture commodities will continue to aggravate the situation. We knew that car service is but it small part of the activities under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but we want to stress the importance of this work and ask that each member of the Com- mission give the problem every considera- tion. Therefore, we suggest that a greater effort be made to facilitate utilization of existing boxcars. More car-service person- nel are needed to work at railroad terminals in an effort to keep the cars moving. Re- ports reaching us indicate that these person- nel are decreasing in number and that their efforts are being diverted into other areas at is time when their services are needed at the terminals. We ask that the Commission initiate con- tacts with the individual railroads discussing the need for purchasing additional boxcars and other equipment for the hauling of grain. We recognize that the railroads :ire making many improvements in their equip- ment, but there does not appear to be a suffi- cient stress on the need for replacing and increasing the number of the common, or- dinary variety of boxcar. The boxcar shortage, originally a seasonal matter, now a 12-month problem can easily develop into a traffic situation of morn- mental proportions. Movement of products by surface transportation to point:; of export is continually expanding. If we are to avoid the congestion now indicated, we will line to act now. In addition to S. 1098 c,nd S. 2816, now being actively considered by the Congress, we feel the Commission must take some initiative and utilize to the fullest existing authority. This is of grave concern to our constituents and to us as their repre- sentatives. We demand prompt action, now. With best wishes, we are, Sincerely, MIKE MANSFIELD, WARREN G. I1TAGNu SCAN, MAURINE NEUBERGER, GALE W. MCCi mu. QUENTIN BURDICK, MILTON R. YOUNG, LEN B. JORDAN, WALTER F. MONDA:.E, GEORGE MURPHY, LEE METCALF', HENRY M. JACKSON, GEORGE MCGOVEI.N, THOMAS H. KUCHEL, MILWARD L. SINiP- SON, KARL E. MUNDT, WAYNE MOR'se, FRANK CHURCH, EUGENE J. MCCAR'TF:Y. JOHN W. Ih'ssI, Cbttirrn.un. oved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, Y CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 2999 standards to be established by the Secretary." No section of this act received more exhaustive attention by the Committee on Public Works. After 4 days of hear- ings on the bill and 3 days in executive session, the committee reported an amended bill which required that the unzoned areas would be determined "in accordance with provisions established by the legislatures of the several States, which shall be consistent with the pur- poses of this section." The last proviso of the amendment was accepted in committee on my mo- tion, and I believe then, as -I believe now, that it would have given the Secretary of Commerce quite adequate authority to implement the act. As the committee report stated: The committee has given long and deliber- ate consideration to this subsection. * * The basic postulate of this provision is that outdoor advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing function and an established segment of the national econ- omy; as a legitimate business, it should therefore be allowed to operate where other industrial and commercial activities are conducted. The report continued with the obser- vation: The committee notes the qualifying clause quoted above "which shall be consistent with the purpose of this section." The purpose of this act is to preserve and develop the recreational and esthetic values of the inter- state and primary highway systems * * *. The committee is of the opinion that subsec- tions (b) and (c) provide the Secretary with adequate authority to enforce compliance with the purpose of the act. However, the argument was later ad- vanced by officials of the administration, shortly before S. 2084 was brought to the Senate floor, that in the process of clos- ing off many areas -heretofore occupied by outdoor advertising, the act would tend to enhance the value of the remain- ing sites in industrial and commercial areas. Therefore, in order to prevent consequent clutter in these areas, the administration requested an amendment which would authorize limited controls in commercial and industrial areas, whether zoned or unzoned. On September 15, 1965, the floor man- ager of the bill in the Senate [Mr. RANDOLPH] proposed the first of the ad- ministration amendments addressed to this issue. As a substitute for the com- mittee language, the amendment read as follows: (e) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, signs, displays, and devices conform- ing to criteria determined by the States sub- ject to concurrence by the Secretary concern- ing the lighting, size, number of signs, and such other requirements as may be appro- priate, may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or com- mercial under authority of State law, or which are not zoned under authority of State law but are used for industrial or commercial activities, which unzoned areas are determined by the several States subject to the approval of the Secretary. After rather lengthy debate and con- siderable opposition, the senior Senator from West Virgina requested unanimous consent temporarily to withdraw the nation of unzoned areas to be "deter- amendment, which act was later made a mined by agreement between the several permanent withdrawal. States and the Secretary." the Senate floor manager received a copy of a letter from Secretary of Commerce, John T. Connor, to Representative JOHN C. KLuczyNSKI, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Public Roads, explain- ing the purpose of the proposed amend- ment. The Secretary stated, in part: In order to prevent an unchecked prolif- eration which not only results in a public eyesore but undoubtedly impedes the effec- tiveness of billboard advertising, reasonable standards pertaining to size, spacing, and number of billboards would be devel- oped. * * * It is the intention of the administration that the regulations, insofar as they are consistent with the purposes of this act, shall be helpful to the advertising industry and that, for instance, standards of size which may be adopted would be insofar as possible consistent with standard size bill- boards in customary use. Viewed in the context of the events at that time, Mr. President it is quite evi- dent that the Senate had no intention of giving authority to the Secretary of Commerce to outlaw outdoor advertising in industrial and commercial areas, whether zoned or unzoned. In his letter to Representative KLUCZYNSKI, Secretary Connor made it equally evident that he desired no such authority and that the proposed amendment would not be so interpreted by him. With this under- standing in mind, the manager of the bill in the Senate, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] introduced on September 16 a modified version of the amendment which he had withdrawn on the preceding day. The substitute amendment, which was passed by the Senate with a vote of 44 to 40, read as follows: (e) In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of outdoor ad- vertising while remaining consistent with the purposes of this section, signs, displays and devices whose size, lighting and spacing is to be determined by agreement between the sev- eral States and the Secretary, may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State law, or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary: Pro- vided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to signs as defined in section 101(c) (2). Mr. President, there are three signifi- cant differences between the amendment finally adopted by the Senate and the earlier one which was withdrawn. And each of these changes is important in terms of the congressional intent of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 with respect to the recently announced "guidelines." First, the declaration of purpose in the amendment acknowledged the legitimacy of outdoor advertising as a business enterprise in industrial and commercial areas. Second, it deleted the catchall phrase, "and such other require- ments as may be appropriate," and limited control criteria to "size, lighting, and spacing." And, third, it required both the control criteria and the desig- I would add that this subsection was further amended by the House of Repre- sentatives, in which action the Senate concurred, to provide that the criteria of size, lighting, and spacing would be con- sistent with customary use. In present- ing the House bill to the Senate for final action, the senior Senator from West Virginia stated: Any regulations or criteria with respect to size, spacing, and lighting of outdoor adver- tising signs should, insofar as possible, be consistent with customary use in the indus- try. Therefore, I cannot perceive any valid objection to this particular language in the House-approved bill. Thus, Mr. President, it is apparent from this brief summary of the genesis of subsection (d) of title I of Public Law 89-285, that both bodies of the Congress were quite deliberate in their aim to acknowledge the right of outdoor adver- tising to operate in commercial or indus- trial areas. That is not to imply that the industry should operate free of any controls. But, as the Secretary of Com- merce indicated, and as the Congress affirmed, the purpose of controls would be primarily to prevent undue prolifera- tion of signs in commercial and indus- trial areas and to provide for any orderly development of the industry. This is a purpose supported by a majority of the Senate, including the Senator from West Virginia and myself. I shall not comment on the specifics of the proposed guidelines for outdoor advertising. The senior Senator from West Virginia made sufficient observa- tions on this point in his comments on February 4. However, it does seem to me that the proposals of the Department of Commerce are at variance with the leg- islative intent that I have summarized. For these reasons, the Secretary may wish to consider the advisability of is- suing a clarifying statement before in- stituting the hearings in the several States. ~44 l A DISPATCH FROM VIETNAM PUB- LISHED IN THE HONOLULU AD- VERTISER Mr. INOUYE. The Honolulu Adver- tiser is perhaps the only metropolitan newspaper in the 50,000 to 100,000 cir- culation class with 2 full-time staff reporters covering the battlefronts in Vietnam-Bob Jones, chief of the Adver- tiser's Vietnam bureau, and Bob Krause. Both of these men are frontline com- bat correspondents in the best Ernie Pyle tradition. On February 9, the U.S. mili- tary headquarters in Saigon reported that Bob Jones was wounded by mortar fragments during an operation against Vietcong forces. The 30-year-old re- porter suffered wounds in one leg, his back, and both hands. S. Sgt. Robert S. Andrade, 33, of Waimanalo, Hawaii, the patrol leader, was killed in the same ac- tion, as were several other members of the patrol. Despite his wounds, Bob Jones was able to get off a final story to his newspaper. I respectfully request that his account be printed in the RECORD. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE February .16, 1966 There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: I WAS BLEEDING, HE WAS DEAD (By Bob Jones) Cu CHI, V wrNAM.-The story wasn't sup- POSe to end that way. It was going to be a story of 2d Brigade men who lived while others were dying, or being shipped off to the hospital with the wounded. The patrol was almost over, and I was writing the story in my mind. It was going to be in the form of a letter to Sgt. Boyd Andrade, of the Honolulu Police Department, and Lt. Sonny Andrade, of the Kailua Fire Department, and to Mrs. Robert S. Andrade, of Waim.analo, and her five kids. "Army S. Sgt. Robert S. Andrade," the story was going in my mind, "looks to me like the kind of GI who has a sixth sense amid the confusion of battle to keep himself and his men alive." Andrade, a former lolani school football player, was a squad leader with C Company of the 1st Battalion, Wolfhounds. Between C and A Companies, there had been more than 50 casualties in 3 days of trying to flush the Vietcong out of a jungle enclave they call Taro Village. I teamed up with Andrade's squad to do a profile piece on him. He had the reputation of being one of the best in the business over here. A few days earlier, three of his men had been hit by a grenade, but he rallied his squad and took the sniper bunker. Another of his men froze on the ground in fear, and Andrade had dragged the Ivan 100 yards using an ammo sling wrapped around the man's arm. "Sure, I get scared," he told me out there in the jungle, "but mostly when we are pinned down by snipers and can't see who's -.shooting at us." I had taken about 1.5 pictures of him that (lay (Thursday) and he had pulled out his wallet and showed me pictures of his wife, and two of his kids under a Christmas tree in his two-story Walmanalo home. Well, that's the way the story should have gone. As I said, the patrol was almost over. It was 2 p.m. We were sitting waiting for the order to make the final push. Andrade had just given me a can of fruit cocktail from his C-rations, and I was making notes on how his squad had been better than. 00 percent of the units I have been with. Then there was a dull but overpowering; explosion. E'or a few seconds I lost my sight and hearing. But there was the familiar smell of powder choking out the rest of the air. I was on the ground, and bleeding from the hand, back, and leg. I crawled over to a young Army movie photographer from Fort Shatter, Hawaii. Ilse was dead. His camera lay in the settling dirt. Andrade, who had been sitting there with his knee touching mine, was on his back, and although I know nothing about medi-- cin.e, I had the feeling there was nothing I could do for him. If you have never heard the moans and the "Oh Gads" that come from the lips of the men who are dying, consider yourself lucky. You would never erase it from your mind. '].'here was a youngster who had both his legs blown. off. Another lay with his body ripped open and moaned, "Oh, my God, I'.mm dying, I'm dying." 'bhere weren't enough medics or bandages to go around. A lieutenant who was the mortar forward observer came up and said it apparently was a short round from our own 2d Brigade that hit us. (The 25th Division public informa- tion office at Schofield yesterday said that the lieutenant was wrong and that Sergeant Andrade wag killed "by hostile small-arms fire." The PIO said that the round of mortar fire may have been American made, but that it definitely was fired by the Vietcong.) They covered up four bodies with rubber ponchoes there in the jungle. Those still alive crawled, or were dragged to a clearing. A medical evacuation helicopter and ar- mored personnel carriers came in to get us out. The doctors In Saigon said I took seven pieces of shrapnel in the back and legs, and one fragment had fractured a finger. I consider myself the luckiest guy on earth. Just before I went into the operating room, they told me Sergeant Andrade had died on his way to the hospital. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOOD-FOR- FREEDOM PROGRAM Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Preside nt, I be- lieve that President Johnson's recent call for a 5-year war on world hunger can be- come the most important single initia- tive of his administration. The President has previously chal- lenged us to eradicate poverty in our own society. Now he calls upon Amer- icans to join with the people of other countries to eradicate the most serious enemy of mankind--human hunger. An excellent summary of the Presi- dent's challenge was carried by the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Associa- tion radio broadcast on Friday, February 11. M. W. Thatcher, general manager of GTA, has long been in the forefront of efforts to make greater use abroad of our agricultural abundance and know-how. Mr. Thatcher believes that the adminis- tration has "come up with the one thing that can lead the world along the short- est road to peace-food to feed the hungry." Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the text of the GTA broadcast referred to be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. There being no objection, the text of the broadcast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GTA DAILY RADIO RouNnns As you know by now, President Johnson has asked Congress to approve an American 5-year world war on hunger. Congress may give the President all that he ask_,--or more -or less. This is clear: The United State;. of Amer- ica will offer its open hand bearing bread to help the young nations and the troubled nations of the world conquer hunger. Long years of effort by dedicated national leaders In this country are bearing fruit. This is what Senator McGovERN has sought and Vice President HUMPIiREY and Senator MONDALE, just to name some of the origin- ators and strongest advocates of food for peace. On the farm front your own M. W. Thatcher, general manager of GTA, is one of the great leaders of the policy of abun- dance for peace from. the good earth. Food for freedom, a program begun by Mr. That- cher in the fall of 1942, was the first of its kind. Arid today Mr. Thatcher said: "This is a great program, a truly magnificent contri- bution to peace and prosperity. I know our farmers will answer the challenge to produce more food. I know that the President and Mr. HUMPHREY and our other top officials in Washington are troubled by many immense problems in the world today, but here they have come up with the one thing that can lead the world along the shortest road to peace-food to feed the hungry." Now, just what does the President's war on hunger program include? First, he called for more food production by U.S. farmers-not all-out production, but a regulated increase. Already programs for 1966 have been adjusted to get more wheat, soybeans, rice, and malting barley. Second, it looks like the Nation will final- ly get a stabilized food reserve. Third, food aid will not be limited to merely surplus products. Commodity Credit Corporation would be authorized to buy what is needled in the open market. Fourth, the nations that receive food aid would also be helped to increase their own food production. They will be aided and urged to help themselves. Fifth, voluntary relief agencies, churches, and charities will continue to receive farm products for their programs. The President said that he wants this Nation to return to production as many re- serve acres as may be needed in the critical race between food and people, "but not to produce unwanted surpluses and not to sup- plant the efforts of other nations to develop their own agricultural economies." Well, that's a short and fast summary of a big program, but it is the essence of what President Johnson recommended to Con- gress. At the same time that President Johnson made his announcement, USDA made its move to get more soybean production. Farmers will. be able this year to plant all of their feed. grain base to soybeans if they so desire, but must maintain their conserv- ing base and minimum diversion of 20 per- cent. For example, the corn farmer who signs up and elects to substitute soybeans for corn will still get the loan plus pay- ment (30 cents a bushel) on projected corr, yield on one-half of his base, even though. he grows beans instead of corn. These changes are coming almost too fast: to keep up with, so once again sharpen your pencils, figure the best program for your farm, and be sure you check out with your county ASCS office. UPI REPORT SHOWS U.S. AID FAILS TO REACH MOST PEASANTS Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President last Thursday I spoke at length on the floo,' of the Senate in support of a stepped-up program of school and farm aid and land reform for South Vietnam. I contended that the facts show elo- quently that we are talking a good fight in this regard but that we are doing pathetically little. I also contended that if we are to win our way to peaceful ne- gotiations that will permit an independ- ent decision by the people of South Viet- nam that we must do more--far more. Recently Michael Malloy, writing from Saigon for the United Press Interna- tional, documented the point I made last Thursday in an excellent article that ap- peared in the Milwaukee Journal. I as'i unanimous consent that this article be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. AID FAILS To REACH MOST PEASANTS IN VIETNAM (By Michael T. Malloy) SAIGON, VIETNAM.-The American aid pre- gram to South Vietnam is the biggest and most expensive in the world. But there .s little evidence to show that this has done Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 A proved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February.. 16, 1P6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE much to win the peasantry away from the Vietcong. There is much to be proud of in the Amer- ican efforts. And politicians from both America and South Vietnam have insisted for years that the war for the hearts and minds of the people is just as important as the war to kill Vietcong. This was reaffirmed again in the Declara- tion of Honolulu, just adopted by President Johnson and the military rulers of South Vietnam. But compared to the mountain of re- sources applied to killing the Vietcong, only a molehill of men and money goes into the silent war for the hearts and minds of the peasants. THREE MILLION PIGS GROWING And the resources of doctors, schoolrooms, and fatter pigs are barely enough to keep the Vietnamese standard of living from go- ing backward under the pressures of an ex- panding war. Carl Van Haeften, of Santa Cruz, Calif., is proud of the fact that about 3 million York- shire pigs are growing fat on Vietnamese farms, thanks to the aid mission's agricul- ture division, which he heads. But the fat, new pigs cannot get to mar- ket over the mined roads and blasted bridges, so South Vietnam is importing ship- loads of pigs for the first time in many years. There is a sad repetition of these para- doxes in other fields. Carl Winer, of Albion, N.Y., is proud of the schools he builds and the teachers he trains as the head of the aid mission's education division. But sometimes the war destroys as Winer builds. The worst example was the year of 1963, when the aid mission built 1,320 classrooms and trained 1,260 teachers. The education ministry checked the next year and found it had fewer schools and teachers than it did in 1963. The United States and its allies have sent teams of skilled surgeons into provinces where most of the peasants have never seen a doctor before. But surgeons like Dr. George Love, of Ogden, Utah, reports that up to 90 percent of their patients are victims of land mines, hand grenades, mortars, and bombs. Dr. Lowe's experience is a miniature of the problem which faces the whole aid program. Most of its efforts must go to repairing the ravages of war, rather than improving the life of the people. To begin with, the 627 American aid offi- cials are overwhelmed by the presence of 197,000 American fighting men. The sol- diers of the shooting war outnumber them by 300 to 1. Their artillery, bombs, and napalm join with Vietcong terrorists to make life miserable and dangerous in much of the countryside. The military machine gobbles up so much money and manpower that most of the aid program is simply an attempt to catch up with inflation and food shortages brought on by the war effort. BULK FOR IMPORTS Out of $326.6 million spent on economic aid in the last fiscal year, for instance, only $103.8 million actually went to development programs like health and agriculture. The bulk of the money was used to import grain and goods to make up for war- caused infla- tion and food shortages. Military expenditures and demand for la- bor have created boom conditions in the cities. Prices have shot up more than 50 percent but wages have not kept pace. Urban unemployment has been wiped out and the imported goods make the city folk more prosperous than ever before. America sends cheap rice to keep food prices stable, But three-quarters or South Vietnam's people are peasants, and only a fraction of these peasants actually get any benefit out of the American aid program. All they see of their Government is its mailed fist: Bombs, artillery, napalm, and "search and destroy" campaigns. The contrast between the suffering farm- ers and the booming cities is partly inten- tional. Although officials do not like to talk about it publicly, American strategy is pres- ently intended to force the peasants to take sides or suffer the consequences. "They can come to the Government or they can go join the Vietcong, but they can't re- main neutral and indifferent," a high rank- ing American spokesman explained. The Province of Long An, for instance, has 585 hamlets. American aid goes only to the 76 hamlets which are considered paci- fied and the rest of the countryside is written off as enemy territory. Police con- fiscate rice, salt, sugar, and medicine bound for these villages. This kind of economic warfare is intended to keep food and supplies away from the Vietcong. But it also means that life is going from bad to worse for at least half of the population of South Vietnam. The benefits of American aid go first to the city people, who have always been pro- government, and second to the secure vil- lages, which have never been pro-Vietcong. The peasants in the insecure areas are un- touched by the battle for their hearts and minds. LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ROUTINE Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I wish to reemphasize my strong support for the Teacher Corps and urge speedy pas- sage of the appropriation bill to finance it. The local school boards of this Nation are now finishing up plans for the 1966- 67 school year. They will complete their budgets-that is, allocate money for sup- plies, equipment, personnel-by early spring. By late spring the school boards will be taking the 1966-67 plans to their local citizens. Unless the school districts know-on a district-by-district, person-by-person basic-just what the National Teacher Corps is all about, its purpose, its plans, its potentialities, and in fact where on earth to write for more information- there's little chance that local school dis- tricts will be asking for the teachers they so desperately need for the 1966-67 school opening. Prompt action on this appropriation, therefore, is urgent. INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, an out- standing example of the increasing at- tention which is being given to the prob- lem of industrial air pollution control and abatement appeared in the October 1965 issue of Factory magazine. In a very thoughtful and most comprehensive article entitled "Industrial Air Pollu- tion," Factory has examined four facets of the air pollution problem: First. What is being done about it in terms of Federal, State, and local legis- lation and in terms of private initiative? Second. What constitutes an indus- trial air pollutant, where it comes from, and what its harmful effects are? Third. The various methods, processes, and equipment which different indus- tries have used to clean the air. Fourth. How industry may choose the right air pollution control system and what it will cost. In this study Factory reaches some in- teresting conclusions which seem well worth pondering. It recommends re- search to improve control equipment with an eye to lowering costs, to dispos- ing of collected solids, and to developing useful byproducts. Factory also sug- gests tougher penalties for _ persistent violators of pollution codes, increased fi- nancial assistance for small plants, and practical local codes for small communi- ties as well as for big cities. Mr. President, I would like to com- mend the staff of Factory magazine for its constructive approach to educating industry about the problems of and so- lutions to industrial air pollution. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial which accompanies this fine article be inserted in the RECORD at this point. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: CAN INDUSTRY AFFORD NOT To BE A PUBLIC NUISANCE? Smoke. Smell. Slop. Dust. Noise. Eye- sores. This is the face that 6 out of 10 man- ufacturing plants show to the public. And the public is slowly building up to a big burn about it. Rightly so, we think. In this age of engineering advance, irritating or un- sightly plant effluent seems technically in- excusable. Only an economic argument de- serves the public ear. But industry in gen- eral hasn't been talking very persuasively. All too often industry evades the issue. Typically, it has replied to public criticism with such banal and arrogant comments as: "That's a million-dollar smell," or "when that smoke clears up, you'll have a depres- sion," or "if you don't like it, we'll take our payroll elsewhere." Official denials to the contrary, a plant knows when it is becoming a public nuisance. But it also knows that the cost of curtailment is, more often than not, downright prohibitive. And, regardless of what the plant might like to do, it simply can't afford to reform if others don't. The high cost of nuisance abatement, like any other cost, is ultimately paid by the consumer. This is one fact that industry must hammer home. But in the meantime, such costs are siphoned off from a company's current profits. To expect a plant in one community to add significantly to its cost while other similar plants elsewhere do not, would create economic anarchy. On the other hand, widespread or impulsive legis- lation would knock many marginal com- panies out of the market entirely. The rich and wise companies would persevere. The poor and struggling plants would fail. This is another fact the public must be made aware of. The ultimate solution to nuisance abate- ment, we believe, lies in four related meas- ures: 1. Education of the public as to the price it must pay-directly or indirectly-for elim- ination of these industrial nuisances. 2. A national planning program jointly supported by industry and by Federal and State Governments. 3. Federal legislation based upon this plan- ning and characterized by progressive in- tensification of restrictions. 4. Vigorous development by industry of less costly and more effective equipment for preventing or containing these nuisances. L. R. BrrrsE, Editor in Chief. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---SENATE February 16, 1966 PAINTINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, Mr. President, recently the Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., in cooperation with the White House, produced a color film entitled "Paintings in the White House." This program which has been shown on some television stations throughout the country describes our Nation's history through the art now exhibited in the Executive Mansion. It is a movie which has receive highly favorable comments for its artistic merit and is devoid of commercialism. A copy of the film is being loaned to ,he Senate and I have made arrange- merits for two screenings, one at 12 noon and one at 1 p.m. on Friday, February 18, 1966, in the auditorium of the new Senate Office Building. in behalf of the Committee on Rules and Administration, an invitation is ex- tended to all Senators and their stalls and other Senate employees whose schedule permits to attend one of the scheduled showings of this beautiful film. 19i;:fi(ll NO KA 01 Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, resi- dents of the island of Maui have a say- inig, "Maui No Ka Oi," which means Maui. is the best, tire best of all the lovely islands in the Hawaiian chain. The mayor of Maui. County, which also includes the islands of Lanai and Molo- kai, and two unpopulated islands, is Mr. Eddie Tam, one of Hawaii's greatest am- bassadors of goodwill, 16 years mayor of Maul County and 22 years in public office. '].'his record is unmatched in the State of Hawaii. The Malayan Times recently pub- lished a story about Mayor Eddie Tam, a man who has carried Hawaii's mes- sage of aloha and goodwill to many na- tions. May I respectfully request that the article be printed in the RECORD? There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DYNAMIC EDDIE 'L'AM GOVERNS FIVE HAWAIIAN ISLES With his neck outstretched to see over the :;leering wheel of his limousine, Maui Coun- '.y's ChineseAmerican Mayor Eddie Tam drove up to his personal covered parking :;tall at the County Building, Walluku, Maui, county seat of live Hawaiian islands. Ile didn't so much as glance at the mynah birds chirping on the lawn, or the green-clad crags of the lowering West Maui mountains, as he walked from his car to his carpeted, air-conditioned office. It was Friday, and amen was on his mind. Two Fridays a month Mayor ram calls to order the eigiit members of the Maui County. Board of Supervisors. Three members are of Japanese ancestry, one Korean. one Puerto Rican, one Filipino, one Hawaiian-German. and one Puerto Rican-Caucasian. 'three of the county's islands are popu- lated: Maui, the Valley Isle, 36,487; Molokai, the Friendly Isle, 5,825, and Lanai, the Pine- apple Island, 3,037. Maui County occupies 1,159 square miles. For more than 22 consecutive years "Friendly Eddie" has been in public office, 16 of them as mayor. "I have learned and followed somewhat of unique philosophy," Mayor Tam said. a "What a man does for himself dies wi?,h him; what a man does for his community lives forever. FARMER The five-foot, five-inch, 152-pound mayor was born in November 25, 1899, at Islakawao. Maui, the son of Tam Hong and Jeng Kiu, who emigrated to Maui in the late 1800's from Sam Chau village in China. Mayor Tam's father worked as a blacksmith, carpenter, and farmer in Makawao. His 96-year-old mother now lives in Kula Sanatorium, Maui. Mayor Tam is the eldest of three children. His brother, William K. Tam, is assistant manager of a Honolulu branch of tiie First National Bark of Hawaii., acid he has ;a sister. Iie married Lily Hisae Morimoto in Wailu- ku on December 31, 19413, shortly after being elected to his first 2-year term as mayor. On November 4, 1964, he was rclected to his ninth consecutive term. Mayor Tani received his early edua';ation at Mak.awao and Wailuku elementary schools. Upon graduation from St. Anthony Boys' School, Wailuku, in 19.1.6, the fora sr Maui tennis champion began his career with the Baldwin Bank in Kahului, Maui. For 10 years he served in various capacities, :a5 clerk, collector, bookkeeper, and secretary RESTAIIRANr Leaving the bank in 1927, Mayor l'am was employed as office manager, bookkeeper, and secretary to a Maui State senator. in addi- tion, he was agent for a Honolulu brokerage firm. From 1945 to :1948 he op:'rated a restaurant on Maui. In 1942 he entered the political arena for the first time, and was elected to the board of supervisors as a Republican. He was re- elected as a Democrat in 1944, and continued to serve on that body until elected mayor. The mayor played a major role in estab- lishing and expanding tourism as a major industry on Maui. Three luxury hotels and the championship Kaanapail Golf Course, scene of the 1964 Canada Cup and International Golf matches now attract tourists. The hotels are lib- erally spaced to comply' w!th a rigid master plan designed to preserve the esthetic beauty of the area. The mayor of Maui was among those in- strumental in attracting the Canada Cup matches to Maui. HARMONY "It is only fitting that golfers frorra all parts of the world come to compete in friendship on Maui, where several races work and play together in harmony," Mayor Tam said. Mayor Tam's enthusiasms draw . ttention wherever he goes. Wayne Tanaka., sports editor of the Maul News, described Mayor Tam on the golf course, the day before the Canada Cup tournament: "'Friendly Eddie' Tam, who got the big- gest applause at the 'meet the teams din- ner,' drew as many raves as Pa,ner and Nicklaus on the course. You couldn't miss him in his red and yellow Outfit. His back- lash swing and backhanded puttin;r, were as talked about as the booming drives of the 'big boys.'" During the summer of 1964 the mayor was invited to represent the State of Hawaii at the annual Kelowna Regatta in British Col- umbia. "We in Maui County have mo b to be proud of," Mayor Tana said. "We have the largest dormant volcano, the largest sugar plantation, the most and best beaches, and the only roadways in the, world where you can drive from sea level to 10,000-fcx;t eleva- tion by traversing a distance of 40 miles. "And that's not all," Mayor Tam continued. "We have the largest stand of eucalyptus trees in the Nation, the first capital of the Sandwich Islands, and the clearest astrophy- sical 'window' in the world at Science City atop Haleakala. `RANCHES "But it doesn't end there. We have one of the finest golf courses in the world, the largest banyan tree in the Nation, probably the tallest hardwood tree. Haleakala Na- tional Park, one of the largest ranches and the principal base for the deep-sea drilling Project Mohole which will enhance our sci- ence industry. "I may be prejudiced, but I think. v have the most efficient county government in trim United States, the most beautiful tropical valley in the world at Iao, the most, idea climate and variety of climate in the world, and the friendliest and most hospitable peo- ple in the world. "But what we are more proud of than anything else Is the ability of all our differ- ent races to work and live together in har- mony. Here in Maui County, 'aloha' is more than just a word; it's a way of life." RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR U.S. FOREST SERVICE RETIRES Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, retirement has caught up with one of our Nation's most able and dedi- cated public servants. After 38 years of devoted public service, Dr. V. L. Harper has left his position as Deputy Chief of the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. Dr. Harper began his career with the Forest Service in 1927 in the piney woods of north Florida. His personal interest and work on gum naval stores and on the growing and producing of southern pines is reflected in the improved econ- omy of the southern pine country. Dr. Harper has held a number of posi- tions in the South, in the Northeast, and here in Washington, each increasingly complex and demanding. He served, with great distinction, as director of the Northern Forest Experiment Station at Upper Darby, Pa., during 1945-51.- Since 1951, Dr. Harper has been Dep- uty Chief in Charge of Research for the Forest Service. During his years in this post, until his recent retirement, many of us brushed shoulders with this fine scien- tist and gentleman. Dr. Harper always demonstrated rare foresight and vision in the programs he planned and developed. His testimony before Senate committees was always outstanding in its depth and clarity; his knowledge of technical de- tails of the Nation's forestry problems, and the Forest Service proposals to solve these problems, was always remarkable, in my opinion. His honesty, sincerity, and integrity were above reproach. The impact which this learned and devoted main has had upon our Nation and its natural resources has been very great. Naturally, I am most intimately acquainted with accomplishments of the Forest Service research program in my own State of West Virginia. Dr. Harper early saw the need-and brought it to the attention of the Congress--to find ways to improve our Appalachian, moun- tain timber and water resources. He played a key role in developing a labora- tory and assembling a team of topnotch scientists at Princeton, W. Va., to study these problems. He visualized the need for utilization and marketing research for our valuable mountain hardwoods, and diligently sought the will of the Congress in constructing the necessary Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 ;.sr- ary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE sacrifice to responsible citizenship. It de- clined with surprising swiftness, but was enormously influential almost because it was so readily secularized. Its "secularizability." in fact, is an important clue to the move- ment's long-term civic significance. Know- ing this, we can share the poignant historical observation of George W. Pierson: "Just as with the philosophy of the Greeks, or the laws laid down by the Romans, the moral attitudes of New England culture persist though the people who gave them birth have long since passed away" The disappearance of classic Puritanism did not end Its influence however. The great awakening of the 18th century kept alive some dimensions of the Puritan Im- pulse. The revolutionary generation reno- vated and enlivened the old sense of the country's mission in a way that was by no means utterly secular (see the several de- vices on our national seal on any dollar bill). And the great evangelical revivals beginning after 1790 made the entire 19th century a time of evangelical resurgence in which Puritan and enlightened notions of the national purpose were blended. Throughout this process, moreover, the idea of civic responsibility as a Christian virtue was a corollary of the American's confidence in his country's political and religious destiny and his refusal as a practical matter to sepa- rate church and state. On this subject, too, Francis Grund offered a valuable observa- tion: "It is with the solemnities of religion that the Declaration of Independence is yet an- nually read to the people from the pulpit or that Americans celebrate the anniversaries of the most important events in their history. s * * The Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political liberty; and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of the affection which they cherish for the institutions of their country. In other countries, where religion has become the instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of the liberal party to diminish its influence; but in America its promotion is essential to the Constitution." Americans are not now faultless paragons of dutiful citizenship and responsible gov- ernance. Sober analysts, indeed, are speak- ing of a moral crisis. Violence and irre- sponsibility in our public life have shocked the world and scarred a generation of Amer- icans. Yet the tradition as a whole has also been a beacon-even a marvel-to the world; and there is in it profound occasion for gratitude. A portion of this gratitude, moreover, is due to the Puritan's total view of man's state under God's rules, to his ex- plicit concern for law, duty, public spirit, and the commonweal, and to the fact that he framed his counsels in such a way that their efficacy continued long after the move- ment's flourishing time. In the grounds for and the fruits of that concern lies the chief political legacy of Puritanism. NEW TREND IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE M1'. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the noted columnist, Richard Wilson, has written a stimulating piece, entitled, "Chance for a New Era in Farm Poli- cies," which appeared' in the Sunday Washington Star, February 13, 1966. Mr. Wilson points out that the mount- ing world food crisis and the response of the Johnson administration to that crisis will call for greater production by America's farmers. He Quotes a distin- guished constituent of mine, Mr. Robert C. Liebenow, president of the Corn In- dustries Research Foundation and for- mer president of the Chicago Board of Trade, who is calling for an increase of acreage in 1967 to meet the growing de- mands for U.S. food abroad. I have fre- quently consulted with Mr. Liebenow on farm policy and have found him to be a forward-looking, practical-minded thinker in this field. I ask,unanimous consent to insert Mr. Wilson's column at this point in the RECORD; There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: CHANCE FOR A NEW ERA IN FARM POLICIES (By Richard Wilson) President Johnson calls on Congress for an act of intelligent generosity in the new food- for-freedom program to avert in relatively small degree the world's growing hunger. But it is more than that. The program unlocks the door for the release of American food producers from the restrictions they have hated, but accepted, for 30 years. This can be the beginning of the end of regi- mented agriculture. The proof will be in how this beginning is handled. If the farm politicians insist on clinging to their security blankets with both pudgy fists there will be a small relaxation of farm controls without a truly constructive advance. We will then have more of the same-billions for worldwide food distribu- tion with America's farmers still under Wash- ington's thumb, and the whole thing costing more than ever. But if the minds in Washington are big enough they will see in the world hunger problem the golden opportunity to serve the highest American interests while restor- ing freedom of action and choice to a large sector of the population. The continuance of the heavy Federal subsidy to American farmers, which by now runs far past the $50 billion mark, will be harder and harder to justify. What the President has done in essence is this: He has proposed expanding world- wide food distribution by about $500 million on condition that countries receiving this food aid work out really effective programs of self-help. Then, foreseeing bigger de- mands, controls have been relaxed, and will be relaxed further on wheat production. In addition, the President wishes to create a permanent food reserve for emergencies and to be used in stabilizing prices. Several m1I- lion acres previously taken out of production are in the process of being brought back in production of wheat, soybeans, and rice. What the future holds in the biggest food commodity of all, corn, is yet to be seen. Corn, and other feed grains, make possible the huge meat supply which America and now the whole world, wishes to consume. Several critical things can be said about this. The expansion of acreage isn't very great yet. Most of the Nation's farm acreage will still be subject to control. Calling sur- pluses a reserve is to use only another name. Money will still pour out in farm subsidies. The cotton surplus remains a huge unsolved problem, and there is yet too much corn. But when all this is said it still can be seen that agriculture is entering a new era which should be welcomed with open arms. some kind of light is beginning to appear at the end of the tunnel for that great heart- land of America so rich in the American tradition. Small towns which have lan- guished in the industrial age can take heart. Rural life, already a rich reward for the re- sourceful, can be better for all. 3005 Robert C. Liebenow, president of the Corn Industries Research Foundation, Inc., with the help of a team of economists, is calling for an increase of 20 million acres of crops in 1967. He forecasts that it is entirely possible exports within a few years will increase by 50 percent. In the North Central area of the Nation alone that might increase farmers cash re- ceipts by $2 billion and send a stream of fresh economic lifeblood through the Mid- west which could revivify the elm-lined streets of many a delightful small town. In the largest sense, food for freedom as now projected is only beginning. The world is racing at increasing speed into a food crisis. Half the world's population already suffers chronically from lack of food. The U.N. estimates that by 1975 food supplies will have to be increased by 35 percent merely to sustain the present level of a world half in hunger. The Aswan Dam in Egypt aptly illustrated the problem. In the 10 years which will be taken to create the dam's irrigation canals and bring in 2 million additional acres of cropland, Egypt's population will have so increased to absorb more than the produc- tion of those 2 million acres. Egypt is not running fast enough to keep up with itself. The plain fact, as President Johnson points out, is that even the American cornucopia cannot be made to overflow enough to meet the food needs of the developing nations. So the challenge is here and now. The transition to the new stage from the older era of unmanageable surpluses will have to be managed carefully. But it will be a welcome change from the old days of killing little pigs, and the gentle rain of Government checks. Congress now has an opportunity to act promptly, and even more imaginatively, on the President's Initiative. WAR ON TWO FRONTS Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, President Johnson's trip to Hawaii gave new emphasis to the administration policy to hold the line against Commu- nist aggression while at the same time building up the economic and social conditions of Vietnam. Speaking of this policy, the Portland Oregonian in a recent editorial said that: The President's statement that the United States is pledged not only to defend the freedom of South Vietnam but "to build a decent society" there will be carried out in specific programs of economic aid and in support of Premier Ky's civic action program. The editorial adds that: What can be done under war conditions will be done. But, of course, the imperative is to suppress the Vietcong by military action. When aggression is defeated, the main work of rehabilitation can begin. There is much deep thought to an issue which concerns us all at this time, and because of its lucid analysis I ask that the editorial be included as a part of the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP President Johnson's trip to Honolulu to confer with United States and South Viet- namese diplomats and generals from the frontlines gives new emphasis to admin- istration policy. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 3006 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD That policy is to defeat Communist ag- gression in South Vietnam, to uphold the caretaker military government in Saigon until conditions permit popular elections, to throw U.S. resources into rebuilding and strengthening the economy of South Viet- nam. To accomplish these objectives, the deci- sions unquestionably have been made to step up the airstrikes against military targets in North Vietnam and to increase American military power in South Vietnam to at least 400,000 troops-double those now supporting South Vietnamese troops in the mounting attacks on Vietcong strongholds and North Vietnamese regiments. The limited and responsible employment of American power is calculated to achieve the objectives without encouraging Red China or the Soviet Union to enter the war- as one or both might do should the Ameri- can methods be changed to accomplish aerial destruction of North Vietnam's industries, cities and Red River Delta farmlands. At the same time, the bombing of North Viet- nam's military targets establishes the policy of denying a sanctuary to the Communist aggressor, a warning to Red China, particu- larly, not to send in its troops as it did in Korea. The 37-day suspension of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam, while the President sought aggressively but fruitlessly for an indication from. Hanoi of willingness to ne- gotiate a ceasetire and peace terms, was a setback to what public confidence there may be in South Vietnam in its military govern- ment. The President's conference with Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Can Ky will enhance their prestige by affirming American confidence in them and unaltered intention to defend South Vietnam. The President's statement that the United States is pledged not only to defend the free- dom of South Vietnam but "to build a decent society" there will be carried out in specific programs of economic aid and in support of Premier Ky's civic action program. What can be done under war conditions will be done. But, of course, the imperative is to suppress the Vietcong by military action. When aggression is defeated, the main work of rehabilitation can begin. ORDER OF BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morn- ing business is closed. SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966 Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay down the unfinished business from the previous day. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The un- finished business will be stated by title. The LEe:ISLATTVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, de- velopment, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces. and for other purposes. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that - SENATE February 16, i further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. 'Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. l Ir. Pres- ident, last August, when the President announced a series of actions that had been decided upon in an attempt. to help the people of South Vietnam preserve their privilege of self-determination, the Congress was asked to approve a sup- plemental appropriation of $1.7, billion. This appropriation was unanimously approved in the Senate, by a vote of 89 to 0. This action followed thy' earlier approval of the appropriation of $700 million, which had been earmarked for this same purpose. During the hearings on the $1.7 bil- lion appropriation, forthright testimony clearly indicated that the amount then sought was in the nature of a downpay- ment for the additional military steps then ordered and that when the total bill could be calculated the necessary authorizations and appropriations would be requested. The rest of the check requested for this fiscal year is $12,345,719,000. The sum of $3,417,700,000 of the addi- tional appropriations- now requested has never been authorized for appropria- tion. In exercising their rulemaking powers, both Houses of the Congress have adopted requirements that only appropriations authorized by law are in order. The bill before the Senate would make later enactment of the entire 1966 defense supplemental appropriation in order. Of the appropriations that this bill would authorize, $3,417,700,000 would be used to buy aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles; $151,650,000 would be used for research and develop- ment; and $1,238,400,000 is intended to fund military construction. I do not wish to make a dish Tenuous argument, but I think it important that the Senate and the Nation clearly recog- nize this bill for what it is: an authori- zation of defense appropriations. It could not properly be considered as de- termining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endors- ing new commitments. That ours is a Government of three equal and coordinate branches and that there are checks and balances in this sys- tem are concepts we all learn in elemen- tary civics. Under the Constitu ion, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. By approvin; or dis- approving a bill of this type, Congress can neither enlarge nor diminish the President's power to command these forces; it merely can influence how many members of the Armed Forces the :Presi- dent has to command, and determine the nature of the equipment witl. which they will be provided,, and how they will be cared for and protected. Of course, I would not suggest that Congress does not have a role in the for- mulation of foreign policy. Under the division of legislative 'Labor that Congress has prescribed for itself, the Senate Com- mittee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are the instrumentalities specializint, in for- eign relations. Accordingly, I think it is important to emphasize that it would be inappropriate for this authorization to be used as a poll of congressional opinion on whether our foreign policy is sound. In my opinion, such action would tend to oust the jurisdiction of the committees charged with primary responsibility for such consideration. Instead, I prefer to think of this authorization as facilitating the arming and equipping of persons in the Armed Forces with the most effective weapons to assure their survival when they are carrying out the orders of their Commander in Chief. For those ;persons who would like to re- scind the support the Senate gave at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, I wish to point out that the resolution adopted then provides by its own terms that it may be terminated by concurrent resolution of the Congress. As we all know, a concurrent resolution requires action only by Congress and does not ire- quire Presidential participation or ap- proval. There is, then, a readily avail- able means for securing a test of congressional opinion, and that is to con- sider a resolution rescinding the Gulf of Tonkin one. I understand that a reso- lution to do just this has been submitted and is pending in the Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia permit a question? Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Am I not cor- rect in sayiing that the Senator from Georgia, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services at that time, offered an amendment to the concurrent resolu- tion to provide that Congress would have an opportunity to exercise its respon- sibility. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. To my dis- tinguished colleague from Massachu- setts, who is the ranking minority mem- ber of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, I may say that, as I recall, that sug- gestion was made at the conference we first held with Secretary Rusk and Sec- retary McNamara. I made the sugges- tion, and they agreed that it should be embraced and embodied in the resolution that was proposed, and that was done. Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Georgia took that action as chair- man of the committee, did he not? Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I did, so as to preserve the prerogatives of Congress and to make the resolution comparable to the one that had been adopted in 1957, relating to the Middle East. That reso- lution granted broad powers i:o the Pre;,i- dent and contained a provision that these powers could be terminated at any time by a majority of Congress, without participation by the President. Mr. President, an attempt to brush aside the misgivings and :reservations that many Senators and members of the public hold about events in southeast: Asia would be futile. This is not my purpose. I, too, am extremely unhappy and concerned about the gravity of the situation there and what our commit- ment portends. But, like many of my colleagues, I have had an opportunity to suggest alternative courses of action, Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 . ^y T 6, 1 roved F &~e NRT2A - C%B[ P6~7 (~ R000400020001-5 and I have been unable to suggest one likely to lead to an honorable termina- tion of the conflict there other than the course now being followed by the President. In the Senate last year, the junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] recalled, in his remarks on the floor of the Senate, that he had visited me when he was a member of the executive branch to inform me of President Eisenhower's decision to begin assisting the South Vietnamese people and my comment that I feared this course would be costly in blood and treasure, but that when the President had made his decision and had committed the flag, I had no alternative but to support the flag. I mention this not to engage "in self praise as a prophet but because it still summarizes my view. For any Members of the Senate who may be initially disposed to oppose this authorization because they have reserva- tions and misgivings about whether the policies being applied in southeast Asia are wise, I strongly urge them to stay their opposition and to find some other manner in which to register it, other than by doing it in a way that will work injury to our fellow Americans who are in southeast Asia. Incidentally, there are 300,000 there instead of the 200,000 we hear about when we include all those who are in Thailand and in the waters off the coast of Vietnam. Members of the Armed Forces are in southeast Asia under orders. From all reports, they are giving a splendid ac- count of themselves. I am proud of them. Although many have volunteered for this duty, others are there not by choice. They nonetheless are doing their best. An unreasonable delay in approv- ing this bill or a close vote on it is hardly the way to demonstrate appreciation for their sacrifices in our behalf. If we try to view our position on this bill through their eyes, I hope the Senate will not let itself be misunderstood. Mr. President, I say that without im- plying that I wish to deny to any Sen- ator the right to express himself on this measure and what is involved herein. In recent weeks there have been many references to the possibility of a credi- bility gap. If the Senate shilly-shallies with this supplemental, it will be much harder to convince those opposing us of our determination to see this commit- ment through and our adversaries are much more likely to be intransigent and contemptuous toward our efforts to find peace. I must say that I think some observers and critics have not given the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense the credit they deserve for the earnest- ness, the soul searching, and the vigor with which they have considered alter- native courses of action, and particularly for the efforts they have put forth in an attempt to find a solution leading to Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will 3007 tained on the books for the fiscal year could benefit our efforts in South Viet- ending Juhe 30, 1966, 41/2. months from nam. I will not enumerate them all. now, so that the appropriation which will follow will use this authorization, together with the remaining amount on the book, to obtain the supplies that are needed at once by our fighting men in southeast Asia. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena- tor is correct. That does not mean that it must all be spent in 1966. It is to be added to the appropriations for 1966 to take sure that there is no shortage of vital supplies for the 300,000 American boys who are in the so-called danger zone. Those supplies include every- thing from rations to bombs and shells. Mr. HOLLAND. I think that that one fact speaks like an angel's trumpet tones for the early passage of this measure. I believe that more good can be accom- plished by this bill if we pass it quickly as something that is needed now for funds to be shortly appropriated and committed or spent during the re- mainder of the fiscal year. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No appro- priation can be made without this au- thorization. It will be necessary for additional legislation to follow this leg- islation to appropriate the money. We all know that even if the require- ment is not spelled out in the Constitu- tion, the position of the House makes it necessary for appropriations to originate there. I understand that the committee in the House has already held hearings on the appropriation-all items of it-and is only awaiting the authorization to send the measure here. Further, there was testimony in the hearings before the Committee on Armed Services that it is important that this appropriation be passed by the latter part of February. It will be exceedingly difficult to do that under the very best of conditions, because the authorization must be obtained before the appropria- tion can be considered. Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding. I hope that we shall all make it clear in dis- cussing the bill that this is for an au- thorization to be followed immediately by an appropriation in a like amount and that this amount would be included with authorizations already on the book for the purpose of providing for what is actually needed to be spent or com- mitted between now and the end of the fiscal year They include such things as better drugs to combat an unusual type of malaria, from which hundreds of our boys are suffering there at this hour, better pro- tection for our helicopters, better medi-' cal facilities, improvements in electronic warfare equipment, weapons and ord- nance of the type needed in nonnuclear warfare, and modification of aircraft to adapt them to the kinds of missions needed in southeast Asia. The military construction that would be authorized stretches all the way from some bases in the 'United States through intermediate staging areas to South Viet- nam. The kinds of things that will be built include new hospitals, storage fa- cilities, runways, and port facilities to facilitate the unloading of supplies. It was really disturbing to hear some of the. difficulties encountered in unload- ing and landing essential supplies in South Vietman because of the lack of harbor facilities. That condition is be- ing remedied now as rapidly as it is pos- sible to do. The committee report gives more de- tailed information on the weapons. to be procured, the research and development, to be undertaken, and the construction that would be accomplished and I shall not repeat them here. I should point out, however, that title IV of the bill could serve as a basis for provisions in the appropriations act that would permit the funding of our support for South Vietnam and the forces of free countries associated with us in her defense from appropriations available to the Department of Defense. In ordinary circumstances, when a na- tion is not enduring hostilities on its own soil, the military assistance given to that country is authorized and appro- priated and accounted for separately from the appropriations for our own Armed Forces. When combat is taking place, the maintenance of records of the supplies and equipment and assist- ance furnished becomes most difficult and relatively irrelevant. In Korea, support for the South Korean forces and for the forces of other nations who participated with us there was included in the appropriations made to the Department of Defense and provided from those funds. The arrangement proposed for South Vietnam by this legislation is similar to that. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- The intent is that the military support Mratar. RUSSELL for South Vietnamese forces and for the Mr. President, I desire to comment forces of Allied countries there will be added to the requirements of the U.S. more particularly for a few moments on forces and that support will be provided what the authorization in this bill is for. in the field as determined by our com- In the aircraft field, it would fund more manders without separate computation helicopters and more aircraft of the type and bookkeeping for the part furnished used by our Armed Forces, whether or non-U.S. forces. not we were participating in the defense As is indicated in the committee of South Vietnam. The same can be report, the committee has modified the said f ?L......J l tl_ _ i_.._ _,__ _. _ ____ o ssi es and thi t v~ s p ocuremen tightening up on what could have been the Senator yield? is intended to replace losses already in- considered a new transfer authority and Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield. curred and those that may be incurred by requiring quarterly reports of esti- Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, it is if hostilities continue. mates of the amount of support furnished true that this authorization is to com- In research and development, the effort each nation participating with us in plete the total authorizations now con- is concentrated on those projects that South Vietnam. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R00040002000 -5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Fe ruary 1 , This limited merger of support for our associates in South Vietnam with the requirements for our own Armed Forces would be authorized only during the rest of fiscal year 1966 and for fiscal year 1967., The limited duration of this authority will. permit the Congress to reconsider whether it should be continued. But I am sure that I voice the sentiments of every Member of this body when I say that we all hope and pray that an honorable termination of hostilities can be accomplished and that there will be no need to continue the authority. Mr. President, in closing, I wish to leave the thought that I think every Member of the Senate, without regard to his views on the policy involved in Viet- nam, can conscientiously support this assistance, this means of providing arms in self-defense to U.S. citizens, without compromising any convictions he may have about what further action should be taken to restore peace in South Vie' - tiam. I urge approval of the bill and :I :;hall be glad to try to answer questions about it. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Sena- tor from Massachusetts. Mr. SAL'I'ONSTALL. Mr. President, as one who joined the chairman of our Armed Services Committee in presenting this bill to the Senate, I wholeheartedly endorse what the chairman has stated as to the purposes of the bill. As we proceed with the consideration of this legislation, I think that it is im- perative that we all remember what this legislation does and what it does not d.o. Senate bill 2791 provides authorizations for appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles for various Army, Navy, and Air Force research, development, test and evalua- tion programs, and for the construction of military installations. These authori- zations total $4,807,750,000-the amount requested by the Department of Defense. These authorizations provide the re- quired authority for the necessary appro- priations to support military operations in southeast Asia.. The recommended authorizations totaling $4.8 billion are for the following purposes: 1. In thousands I Procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles ---------- $3,417,700 Research, development, test, and evaluation programs ----------- 151, 700 Military construction projects__ 1, 238, 400 Shortly we will be considering the De- partment of Defense supplemental ap- propriation bill which will involve some $1.2.3 billion. I ask unanimous consent to have included at this point in the RECORD a tabulation of the appropria- tions requested in the proposed supple- mental appropriation bill and the required authorizations. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINCS in the chair). Without objec- tion, it is so ordered. The tabulation ordered to be printed in the RECORD is as follows: Department of Defense supplemental, south- east Asia, fiscal 1966 Fin millions of dollars] Ivlalitaay per;mmel: . Military personnel, Array_ Military personnel, Navy.. Military personnel, Marine Corps - Military personnel, Air Forcc_1 Reserve personnel, Arnry_ i Reserve personnel, Marine Corps----------------------- ,r Force__ Reserve personnel, A, National Guard personnel, Array- _ National Guard personne.l, Air Fcroe---------- supply, . mental reque 2,4e. 0 (601 ) 219 6 (22 9) (%.;. 3) (671 :1; (82:1.:1) 764. 5 60-. 5 51ti.6 (1 c. 4) (2;, 5) O lrration and mama n n ,_ Ar nny._- operatSonandmainitrs c+, Navy Olrcratiotiand maintenan, o, Marino Corps_ Operation and mainenaoce, Air Force-__-- Operation aridruaincenance, defense agoneiCS__ - ___. _ - Operation andmains.enanee, Array National (marl _ Opcration raid mabu],enance, j Air National Guard___-. Tolad, operation and 2,3h 3 Procurement.: Procurement of e luipnent and missiles, Army---- -__ Aircraft-------- __---- --- Air"raft. spares and repair parts----------------- ---- Missiles------------- Missiles spares and repair inns........................ `1'rocked combat; vehicles_._ Ammunition--- Other-------------------- Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy----------___. Other procurement, Navy -____ Procurement, Marine Corps-__ Tracked combat. vehicles-- Missiles --____--_?--- .- Aircraft. procurement, Air 1,'orcc------------- ------------ Missile procurement, Air Force --------------- Other procureinent, AirForce_ Total, procurement. --- _ _ _ _ _ Research, development, test, and evaluation: R.D.1'. & ]E., Arrn.'___-_-__-_ R.T.D. & I,., Navy _____----. l.t.D.T, & E., Air Force -----__ Total, R.D.T. & f____..._-__ Military construction: Military construction, Army_.. Military construction, Navy-- Military construction, Air Force. - ----------- ------ --_.. Military consi!ructlon, defense agencies__________________ Total, military construe- tiun -------------------- Total, regular military programs--------- Request to reimburse 1) OD for stocks advanced to military assistance program during fiscal years 1966 and 1966__.__-__.._____ 6:1.7 1, 0!' 4 z>, I) 0 .6 71. 1 7- SO Sr. 7 214. 6 1, 21N. 4 12,34i.. 7 Authori- zation required American fighting men now engaged in military operations in southeast Asia. The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee discussed the intent of this legislation with the Secre- tary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff during the hearing . I think this colloquy will help to keep this matter in the proper perspective durin 4 our consideration: The mere fact that a Member of the Senate might heartily disapprove of everything that. is going on in Vietnam wouldn't necessarily if he felt it his duty as a u.S. 5arrasor io provide for those who may serve in the awned services of this country. Secretary McNamara replied. "It would not." General Wheeler replied, "I a;rree you, Mr. Chairman." Mr. President, section 401 of the bill provides that funds for the support of the South Vietnamese armed forces and other free world forces fighting in South Vietnam shall be derived from the regul-, r appropriations for the support of our own military forces. In recent years funds for this purpose have been carried in the military assistance program. However, during the Korean war funds :lppropi' - ated for the support of U.S. Forces was $96.5.4 (604.7) 764.5 ----- 38.4 (10.9) (27.6) used to support the Korean forces and other allied forces engaged in that con- flict. The reason for this change in fundin simply stated, is to make it easier for our military commanders in southeast Asia to fight the war. Under the present sys- tem of funding, South Vietnamese troops cannot be supplied with rifles purchased with funds appropriated for the Army procurement program, nor can U.S. forces use ammunition purchased with military assistance funds. :I think we can all agree that this is not a reasonable restriction to place on our military com- manders who have the responsibility of fighting this war. During the balance of 3,417.7 :_3 ,41'-' year 1966 it is estimated that about 28.0 62.6 71.1 509.7 254. 6 Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this bill does not involve an endorsement of our present policies in southeast Asia. Neither is It a repudiation of those poli- cies. This bill authorizes the appropria- tion of funds to back up over 200,000 $200 million will be required for the sup- port of the South Vietnamese and other free world forces, and for fiscal year 1967 the estimate is $600 million. I call attention to subsection (b) of section 401, which provides that the Sec- retary of :Defense shall render to the ap- propriate committees of the Congress quarterly reports on the estimated value of support furnished to other forces from the appropriations made for the support of U.S. forces. That is to keep us in- formed, during this period, of these corn- bined funds that are used specifically for the South Vietnamese. I want to make it absolutely clear that section 401 does not expand the authority available to the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds between appropriations. We tightened that up in the committee, and. I believe, now, it is clear. And, Mr. President, it does not enlarge the powers of the De- partment of Defense to reprogram vari- ous appropriations that the Congress has made. Mr. President, this legislation should be supported by every Member of the Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 1 6, roved Ford AjgW J?91ECIORD P67E NATE 000400020001-5 Senate and I so urge. I shall join the chairman of the Armed Services Com- mittee in opposing any amendments to the bill that are designed to. constitute an endorsement or repudiation of our present policies in southeast Asia. As I have stated, that is not the purpose of this legislation. The purpose is, to provide the neces- sary funds for our forces and the South Vietnamese who are fighting in that country at the present time. It does not concern whether we are right or wrong in our policies in so fighting. We are supporting our boys, and that is the purpose of this authorization bill which will lead to appropriations. Mr. Presi- dent, I support our chairman whole- heartedly. The committee was unani- mous in making this report to the Sen- ate at this time. I thank the chairman of the com- mittee. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. Mr. President, I am now pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMiNCTON], who, before his service in the Senate and on the Committee on Armed Services, had a distinguished career in the executive branch, including service as the first Secretary of the Air Force. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able senior Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee for many years, and the authority in this body on military matters, for yielding to me. First, I commend the Senator for this fine analysis summarizing the bill before us this afternoon. I also congratulate the distinguished ac - senior Senator from Massachusetts, ities, no food, ammunition, no shells, and who, during his superb career, has al- no fuel for the airplanes and helicopters ways put his country above party, and now in that area. who has so thoroughly endorsed the ob- I cannot conceive of the Senate's servations and conclusions of the distin- tolerating such a condition for a moment, guished Senator from Georgia. without regard to the views of any Sen- Mr. President, I would nail down again ator on the wisdom of the policy which the statements made by the chairman of put our boys in South Vietnam. our committee by asking two questions. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able First, as I understand it, the Senator's Senator from Georgia for yielding to conviction is that regardless of how one me. And I assure him of my support, feels about this matter of Vietnam, what- without reservations of his position with ever opinion one may have on that par- respect to the proposed legislation. ticular subject, this bill has nothing to Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the do with agreement or disagreement with distinguished Senator from Missouri for respect to our foreign policy. Rather, it his comments. is a question of whether we do or do not Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will wish to support young Americans, men the Senator from Georgia yield? and some women, aver there in the com- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am now bat zones of South Vietnam, happy to yield to the Senator from Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- Washington [Mr. JACKSON], who has ator from Missouri has correctly stated been on the Committee on Armed my position and that of the entire Com- Services for many years. mittee on Armed Services. This bill Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as cannot possibly be construed as either should be evident by now to everyone, we an endorsement of or as an attack upon are engaged in Vietnam in a limited con- national policy. It involves more the flict with the limited aim to help South throwing of a rope to a man in the water. Vietnam preserve its independence. The We may have cause to question how he adversary can have peace as soon as he got there, but he is there, he is a human gives up his efforts to impose his will on being, he is our friend and a member of the south by force and terror. our family and, therefore, if we have a I support the administration's bill, S. rope and do not throw it to him to en- 2791, unanimously reported by our Sen- able him to assist himself out of the ate Armed Services Committee, which water, this would be a callous and heart- authorizes supplemental fiscal 1966 less attitude for us to take. Defense appropriations of $4.8 billion. Our committee is not a policy com- mittee in the field of international rela- tions, but we do have a direct respon- sibility to bring to the Senate legislation to provide for those who are in the Armed Forces of the United States wherever they may be stationed throughout the world as a result of policy. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen- ator. My second and final question is based upon a recent trip I made in the past month to South Vietnam. After noticing the heavy build up which re- sulted from the decision to move our troops in force there during 1964 some logistical shortages were noted-as there always will be in peace, in Industry, and in war; and I found at least one case in which shortages resulted in additional casualties, something which was frankly recognized and every effort was made by the Department of Defense to correct the situation. Would not the able chairman agree, however, that if we do not supply the funds he is requesting in support of this bill, and which is supported so con- vincingly by the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALLI, addi- tional casualties over a period of time are bound to occur in the fighting zones be- cause of shortages? Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course, if a hopeless impasse were to result be- tween the Commander in Chief who or- dered these men into Vietnam, and Con- gress, if it refused to provide for them there, it would mean that all of them would perish eventually, either through sickness, or from the bullets of the Viet- cong and the North Vietnamese. In a short while, they would be perfectly help- less. They would have no medical f il 3009 This was the sum requested by the ad- ministration to meet additional costs in helping the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom. I should like to comment briefly on our military effort in the Vietnamese conflict. First. The main military effort in the future, as. in the past, must be in the south. There is much to be said for in- creasing that effort rapidly, to confront Hanoi quickly with a buildup in the south they cannot match, and to give our side the initiative in keeping the adversary moving and off balance. The principle involved is clear: Hanoi and Peiping are less likely to think it worthwhile to in- crease their efforts in relation to the war if our side steps up its efforts rapidly, than if we drag out the buildup, little bit by little bit. I am well aware that it is extremely difficult, for logistical reasons, to increase the American contribution quickly. Ex- isting ports and airfields have limited capacities. To train, properly equip, and deploy combat-ready forces takes time. But the evidence that we are actually preparing as promptly as possible to mount a substantially larger effort would itself, I believe, have an impressive effect on the adversary. Second. We should persuade our allies in the Pacific area to increase their con- tributions to the defense of South Viet- nam. The Republic of Korea has sent 20,000 troops. This could be doubled to 40,000. Australia has sent 1,500 combat forces, and, at a minimum, this could in- crease to 5,000. New Zealand has sent small forces that could be increased. These allied forces have performed in first-rate fashion and have been a sub- stantial asset. We can hope that certain other countries-realizing that their vital interests are also involved in the successful defense of South Vietnam- will follow the example of New Zealand , Australia, and the Republic of Korea. Third. I believe we are not making the most effective use of our airpower in the Vietnamese conflict. As I see it-based on the advice and counsel we have received over a long pe- riod of time in the deliberations of the Armed Services and Appropriations Comn,jttees, as well as directly from the professionals on the ground out in Viet- nam-we are unduly and unwisely tying our hands by limiting ourselves to only tactical targets in North Vietnam. I agree that we should avoid, for the fore- seeable future, targeting the cities in North Vietnam, and we should take great pains to avoid hitting civilians. But there is every good political and military reason to make a careful selection of strategic targets-like oil refineries and ports-which are not only of major eco- nomic importance to the Hanoi regime but also have a direct and important bearing on its ability to move men and material into South Vietnam. The careful choice of such strategic targets-which would be struck only from time to time at the President's per- sonal direction-would contribute in a major way to raising the cost of in- filtration from North to South Vietnam and to slowing and reducing the move- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 3010 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R00040002 0 1-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 1 e wry 16, lent of supplies and forces into the Today, I received the following tele- materiel that we already have there, that South. This new strategy would also de- gram from the majority leader: are on the way, or that are expected to ter the replenishment of North Viet- February 15, 1966. be sent there. namese stocks of arms and supplies via Hon. VVAYNE MORSE, This bill merely presents the question shipping into the northern ports. If U .S. Senate, Washington, D.C.: of supporting our men. We have already coupled with a certain reduction in Reurtel. Senate has already laid down S. put them out front in the battleline. 2791 authorizing military procurement and As the Senator from Massachusetts bombing operations against less impor- I announced last Thursday that this bill has stated, this bill is neither affirmative tart tactical targets, this strategy could would be pending at the return of Senate nor negative with reference to policy lessen the costs to us in risks to Ameri- from Lincoln Day recess. In circumstances can pilots, and in the loss of planes over I feel that I am bound by this announcement matters. the north---which is already well over of program which the Senate was given to Mr. AIKEN. It could not be inter- 200. understand would be the situation on re- preted as indicating approval of Con- I hope the administration will review convening. I personally have no objections gress for future involvement? this matter again. It should be appar- to final vote coming after Wasaington's Mr. STENNIS. No. If we did not Birthday, but date of vote is something which support the men, we would have to bring ent that the strategy I am suggesting Senate in its collective interests and judg- would have to tuck ta.ii would. constitute a restrained but Sig- ments must and will decide. It is my under- them and run, so home. . W We speak. nificant contribution to the military standing that several amendments will be pressure we must maintain on Hanoi if offered to S. 2791. Discussion of these Mr. AIKEN. I think it is important we expect to persuade the adversary to amendments and of the bill itself will un- to have this statement so that the act of give up its efforts to impose its will orl doubtedly take some time. I would hope Congress on this proposal may not be so the South by force and terror. that Senate can go ahead in view of an- badly misinterpreted or misconstrued as in closing, I wish to commend my dis- nouncement already made placing Members was the resolution of August 1964. on notice as to the progr.:m on reconvening Mr. STENNIS. That i the constr'ruc- tinguished colleague the Senator from and to the end that S. 2791 will receive full Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] for his intelli-? discussion and, every consideration. At same tion our committee put on it. It is also gent and responsible handling of this time Foreign Relations Committee might what Secretary McNamara and General supplemental authorization which Is hear what witnesses it has scheduled and any Wheeler pointed out in the hearings. I needed in support of the American effort others it decides upon. would say, with the Senator from to help block Communist subjugation of With warm regards. Massachusetts, that this neither affirms MIKE of Vietnam. Majority MIKE Leader, , U.S S SehSenate nor denies the policy contained in the . Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank resolution of last year, because the bill the Senator from Washington. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield to before us is an authorization bill for Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, may I the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. appropriation for military supplies and. also express my appreciation to the sell- STENNIS]. equipment, some of which has already for Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator been used. SALTONSTALL.I for his dedicated support. for yielding. Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator for Mr. GOl:E. Mr. President- I wish to underscore one of the points making it clear that our action. on this; Mr. MORtsE. Mr. President, will the made by the Senator from Georgia with bill can have no effect on our southeast Senator from Tennessee yield to me for reference to the figures in this bill, which Asian policies. 2 minutes in order that I may read a he expressed so plainly. This is really a Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator telegram which I sent to the majority continuation of an appropriation of last from Vermont for his remarks; $1,2011 leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. year, an item in the general appropria- million in this is for military constluc- MANSFIELD 1, and the reply he sent to me. tion bill for these identical purposes. tion which is to be used in direct support I believe that this courtesy to the major- In that appropriation we made the down- of our military effort already in exist- ity leader should be given to him at this payment on the necessary military hard- ence in southeast Asia. It pertains to time. ware. Now we must meet the second equipment for the men, includes hospit- Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield to and third payments, in order to complete alizatian, and supply depots, all to take the Senator from Oregon. the order. care of what we have there. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, yester-- Supplementing what; the Senator said I thank the Senator for yielding to me. day I sent the following telegram to the on this point, in the procurement figure Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I am Senator from Montana l Mr. MANSFIELD], in this bill of $3,004 million, which is for grateful for the statesmanlike presenta- which was delivered to the Senator's the procurement of military hardware tion of this bill by the distinguished office: articles I have already mentioned, this senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. Rus- ltespectfully recommend that debate and sum is merely a continuation of the ap- SELL I. He, and also, just now, the able vote on sui,,plexnental military procurement propriation made last year, in order to junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. and construction authorization bill, fiscal make the second, third, and however STENNIS], have made it perfectly clear year 1966, now the pending business of the many more payments are required with that one can support the pending bill E1.,cnate, be postponed until after February 22. reference to the entire purchases. The without having it interpreted, unless I consider it important that Senate and Nation have benefit of testimony given at due date for the debt for which we ap- someone desires to make a misinterpre- Voreign Relations Committee hearing by propriated last year is here. I urged tation, as an approval of the policies Taylor and Rusk, and I hope also by then that we appropriate mon funds. I that have been followed or may here- McNamara and Wheeler, before Senate votes knew that much more would bra required. after be followed in southeast Asia. on this war appropriation bill. I thought we should take a bigier bite on I shall support the pending bill. I vleNamara?s testimony before Armed the necessary fund in 1965. shall do so because, whether wisely or Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the unwisely, as has been said here, our services committee is no substitute for his discussing overall issues of U.S. policy Senator yield? troops are committed to battle there. in Asia at public hearings before For- Mr. STENNIS. I yield, with the in- They are there on orders, not of their eign. Relations committee. Contrary to inn dulgence of the Senator from Tennessee. choosing, but on orders of the Com- pression administration has tried to create mander osin in Chief. with American people, neither McNamara nor Mr. GORE. I yield. Wheeler would be asked at Foreign Relations Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator from American troops in an area of hostili- Conxmittee hearings any question that wou..d Mississippi interpret the approval of this ties must be supplied the equipment and involve security matters. If any such ques- request for supplemental appropriations the materials necessary to enable them tion were asked, the administration knows to accomplish the mission assigned them Lim-, all its witnesses need do is to suggest as either approving or disapproving our by their superiors with maximum effec- and with with uch. questions be laid aside until they policy in South Vietnam? by their minimum danger can such' can be answered in executive session. Mr. STENNIS. Frankly, I think it is themselves. I can assure you that I am far from alone neither approval nor disapproval of our in tlxe Senate in my recommendation to you policy. We are already committed. We The Secretary of Defense and Joint that this military authorization bill be voted have already gone in. We have already Chiefs of Staff have stated that addi- on. after February 22. put the men on the ground. They must tional funds are required for this pur- With best wishes for a speedy recovery. $1.2 Retards, have support; $1.2 billion of the funds Pose. WAYNE MoasE, in the bill is for military construction in my view it is incumbent upon the U.S. senator. items. it is to take care of the men and Congress to provide funds for their sup- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 MMIIi~iM%M~MMMMRIIInMIi AM%~!MIMMMN ? o IAAIA~Iq,MMM4M~liMN!?MVMNY xii1X VIMMin,X X MFA.:'MIM119140I"AMNMIiOMNNOH M% III Yi.IM4~BMA A11 AlA1plr~ni, IAMMIIR ~ M~~n1~'nunl nNXMMWAn mil en,x,mu nM.Y i. _ try 16, ,roved Ford, a $~J/j9R - P67 1 000400020001-5 3011 port. This I will do, but I wish to make change mission. One of them listened it emphatically clear, however, that sup- to the Committee on Foreign Relations. port of similar measures in the past and In the evening thereafter he made a sig- support of the pending measure now has nificant remark to me. He said, "This not and does not reflect approval on my could occur only in a great and free part of the policies and decisions that society." have led to our involvement in Vietnam Mr. President, I am pleased for the in its current proportions. On the con- Communist world to know. I am pleased trary, it is my view that commitment of for those behind the Iron Curtain who U.S. combat forces to Vietnam was a se- may not be pleased with their lot to rious mistake, and will prove to be, in my know that there is one place in the view, a historic mistake, that has in- world where the most critical issues can creased rather than diminished the dan- be the subject of free debate. Yes; this ger of a major war. is necessary in our democratic society. Support of our troops in battle is one it is in the interest of public under- thing; approval of national policies and standing of the issues that the Senate decisions which put them there is quite Foreign Relations Committee is now another. Some may regard this as a holding, public hearings on the overall narrow, legalistic distinction. I do not; questions of policy involved in Vietnam. and I am pleased the Armed Services In my view, both these hearings and this Committee has unanimously determined debate are in the national interest. that it should not be so interpreted. I wish to advert to the question that What has been done has been done. approval of the pending bill is not tanta- I will not support an amendment to mount to approval of the policies in repeal the resolution of 1964. We can no southeast Asia. I do so to call attention more repeal what has been done than we to the fact that when Secretary Rusk can turn the sun back in its course. I was last before the Committee on For- will not support an amendment to oppose eign Relations testifying in support of sending draftees to Vietnam. Draftees the foreign aid. authorization request, he are already there. Such an amendment was asked, I believe by the chairman of to prevent the sending of replacements the committee, if a vote for that bill would, in my view, be unfair to the men could be or would be regarded as ap- already serving there. proval of the policies in southeast Asia. Let it be understood that I support The Secretary demurred and said he and support strongly the pending meas- would not like to answer that question ure. We cannot be niggardly in supply- "just now." I am not attempting to ing the materiel that our forces need to quote him exactly, but at any rate he accomplish their mission and to do so deferred his answer. with minimum danger to themselves. So it is pertinent to make the point I voice my deep concern at this time, and to make it clear. From the RECORD not with any idea that the calendar can it is now abundantly clear that a Senator be reversed, not for the purpose of ex- can vote for this measure, and have it pressing criticism, but in the hope that understood that he is voting for a specific a review of the past and a searching pub- bill and only that. lic analysis and debate of the present From the beginning I have had seri- may possibly be of some help In shaping ous reservations about our policy In Viet- the momentous decisions in the days and nam. The publicly stated objective of months ahead. The responsibility of a our policy as being designed to secure U.S. Senator and the dictates of con- to the people of South Vietnam the right science impel me to participate in this to determine their own destiny without discussion and to express these views. outside interference is, of course, fully Public discussion is essential in a free desirable, if possible and feasible, but I society. have not and do not believe that the Statements have been made here policies and programs followed offered or earlier today to the effect that this de- offer a reasonable opportunity for achiev- bate would be an aid to the enemy. I ing this objective at bearable cost and recall that when the previous authoriza- without posing potentially disastrous tion bill was before the Senate last Au- consequences for ourselves and for the gust, the junior Senator from Mississippi, free world. It is easy to coin or repeat the chairman of the Preparedness In- slogans like "victory" and "standing up vestigating Subcommittee, and also a to the Communists." member of the Committee on Appropri- One can enjoy wrapping the flag about ations, invited debate. Unfortunately, himself and enjoy a chauvinistic exer- in my view, the Senate did not respond cise, but it is much more difficult to de- to his invitation. I fault myself in that vise and Implement programs for ap- regard. plication to the conditions. existing in Debate is necessary for our democratic Vietnam which offer realistic hopes of processes. A government conducted converting such slogans into a workable under such a system must be conducted, policy that is fully consistent with our in the main, in public. Democracy may national interest. have its weaknesses. I believe it was the I have repeatedly voiced my reserva- late, great Winston Churchill who said tions about the course of events in Viet- that democracy is the worst form of gov- nam. When President Eisenhower un- ernment except any other kind. That dertook our initial commitment I coun- may not be an accurate quotation. This seled against it. is a hazard that democracies always face. The junior Senator from Mississippi An interesting observation was made did likewise, and I joined him in debate to me in this regard last week when the in 1954, as the RECORD will show. delegation was here from the Mexican I strongly advised President Kennedy Congress on an interparliamentary ex- against broadening and deepening that commitment. I have frequently urged President Johnson and his Cabinet mem- bers to avoid a wider war. Until late 1964, I confined my state- ments to direct communication and to sessions of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee in the main. I say now that I should have been speaking out publicly more than I did. I feel a share of responsibility in that regard. I fol- lowed this course In deference to the constitutional responsibility of the Pres- ident and to a feeling that strident pub- lic opposition and dissent to policies al- ready publicly proclaimed might in some degree lessen whatever chance there was for effectiveness of such policies. Upon reflection, I have concluded that this was a mistake and I am sorry I did not speak out publicly more often and sooner than I did. Legislative support of what must be done to meet national commitments neither implies approval of unwise pol- icies nor negates my responsibility to voice apprehension about present policy. An analysis of the present situation and a consideration of the future require a review of the past. Our direct Involvement in Vietnam may be said to have started with the fall of Dienbienphu in 1954. Of course we were involved before then, but our role theretofore was In support of the French to whom we gave massive economic and materiel support. As I recall, our sup- port of the French in their efforts in Vietnam amounted to some $2 billion. After 7 years of war to which they committed hundreds of thousands of troops, and despite our logistic support, the French suffered a costly defeat. The French learned, or at least were com- pelled to admit, that massive military op- erations conducted thousands of miles from their shores in the jungles and rice paddies of southeast Asia are not the answer to a problem that was and still is to a large degree political, ideological, cultural, economic, religious, and racial in nature. Much is said about the necessity of meeting our national commitments, up- holding our national honor, and protect- ing vital national interests. Of course, we must do these things, Mr. President. But having said so, we must define and understand the commitments that na- tional honor requires us to meet, from both a legal and moral standpoint. And in determining our vital national inter- ests we must do so in context with our many worldwide responsibilities; we must avoid becoming mesmerized by slogans and by commitments that do not exist; and we must achieve a balanced posture that recognizes our limitations as well as our strength. Mr. President, let us examine the na- ture of our legal commitment in Viet- nam. Following the Geneva accords of 1954, to which we did not subscribe but which we agreed to recognize and support, the Eisenhower administration made' the crucial decision to pick up the pieces dropped by the defeated, withdrawing French and to shoulder the responsibility for promoting economic and political sta- bility and preserving order In this iso- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R00040002g0Q1-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE F eobruary 16, lated area of the world which was teem- ing with turmoil. That was our first big mistake. How foolish we were to undertake a burden which the French, who were far more knowledgeable of this area than we, had, after 7 years of war, with an army of 400,000 men, found an almost impossible undertaking. And so, in October 1954, in a letter from President Eisenhower to the Presi- dent of the Council of Ministers of Viet- nam, the Government of the United States made what, along with the obliga- tions we undertook under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, consti- tutes our formal commitment to Viet- nam. President Eisenhower offered U.S. aid "to assist the Government of Viet- nam in developing and maintaining a ,strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion through military means." In this letter, President Eisenhower made it clear that such aid would be conditional upon assurances by the Gov- ernment of South Vietnam "as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied." He added, significantly: "the Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by per- formance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed re- forms." In addition to the unilateral commit- ment contained in President Eisen- bower's letter, the United States incurred certain obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Pro- tocol which was negotiated in September 1.954, and which went into effect in Feb- ruary 1955. Article IV of the SEATO Treaty provides as follows: 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of aimed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unan- imous agreeemnt may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to nisei the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. 2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the ter.. ritory or the sovereignty or political inde- pendence o1 any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which raignt endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall. consult immediately In order loo :vgree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense. 3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unani- mous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government con- cerned. If is to be noted that the parties to the treaty pledge action in accordance with. their respective constitutional procedures to meet "egression by means of armed. attack" against any of the parties or cer- tain other States in the treaty area-in- cluding South Vietnam. The Parties agree--to do what?-to consult immedi- that because of his own feeling about ately to determine such measures as the problems of the Commander in Chief should. be taken to meet any threat other and the administration, it was the better than by armed attack. part of discretion not to speak out until Pursuant to the Presidential letter of near the end of 1964. I think that re- 1954, the United States proceeded to ex- fleets the course of action that many tend aid to South Vietnam. This aid Members of the Senate have been taking. consisted of economic aid and military The fact that other Senators have not supplies and equipment together with yet spoken out on this issue is no rea- funds to support the Vietnamese mili- son to conclude that they do not have tary establishment. U.S. military per- deep apprehensions and misgivings about. sonne], were limited to small numbers the course that the United States is fol- whose mission was to assist in training lowing. the Vietnamese army and directing ad- Before the Senator leaves that part ministration of the aid program. of his speech- This arrangement continued for sev- Mr. GORE. If I may Interrupt, I eral years. From time to time, optimis- should like to comment on that point tic statements were issued about the briefly. solid progress being made in development Although I hold myself culpable for of the economy and development of the reluctance to speak out, I do not wish Vietnam army. For example, in May to criticize other Senators in that regard, 1957, a joint statement issued from the In extenuation, however, I should like White House on the occasion of visit by to suggest--- President Diem noted that: Mr. McGOVERN. I do not want to In less than 3 years a choatic situation imply any criticism either. resulting from years of war hid been Mr. GORE. I suggest that it is the changed into one of progress and stability. imminent threat of a third world war, Concerned was expressed over the buildup of as I interpret events, which has dis- military forces in North Vietnam and it was turbed me; and, I dare say, it is the im- agreed that agression or subversion threat- ening the political independence of the Re- minence of this threat which is causing public of Vietnam would be cone tiered as more and more Senators to express their endangering peace and stability. views publicly. Unless the threat of such a catastrophe That is as fax as this joint s ..;cement bestirs men to action, and unless men*.,; went. souls are aroused by these events, what During this period which, by compari- on earth could arouse them to action son, now appears to have been one of and impel them to take a position which relative calm, however, it appeared nec- for the morrient may be unpopular with a essary to continue to provide more and great many people? more in the -way of aid to maintain the Mr. McGOVERN. I thoroughly agree Diem regime. Statements about prog- with the Senator's observation. Ile has ress proved to be illusory. And by 1959 been speaking about the critical period it was obvious that the situation was get- after 1954, when the French effort in this ting worse instead of better. same area ended in failure. In .April 1959, in an address at Gettys- The Senator will recall that in 'the burg College, President Eisenhower re- spring of 1954, when the French collapse viewed the then current situation and appeared imminent, the late Secretary of concluded that South Vietnam was in- State, Mr. Dulles, felt that perhaps we capable of meeting unaided the threat ought to send American forces into that of aggression and subversion. He re- area to see if we could turn back Ho Chi iterated the domino theory and Justified Minh`s forces and resolve the military the extension of military as well as eco- decision on the side of the French nomic assistance as in our own national against the Communist forces. interests. Aid was continued and in- President Eisenhower believed that creased. should not be done unless we could ob- But despite increased aid, the Gov- tain the cooperation of the British, who ernment of South Vietnam became less were then headed by Prime Minister stable, its economy weaker. Subversion Churchill. became more widespread, with the Viet- Frequently we hear people argue that cong holding and openly contro'ling sub- we are in southeast Asia lest we repeat stantial segments of the country. Thus the errors that were made at Munich was the situation upon the change in when the Western Powers failed to stand administrations in January 1961. up to Hitler. The voice that sounded Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will most clearly in 1938, at the time of the the Senator from "Tennessee yield? Munich crisis, in a call for firm actior. Mr. GORE. I yield to the Senator from against Hitler waq the voice of Winston South Dakota. Churchill. Yet, it was Prime Minister Mn McGOVERN. First, may I ask the Churchill who counseled against Ames- Senator whether he would prefer not to ican intervention in French I1ldocL.i1.aL be interrupted? If so, I shall wait until in 1954. he has concluded his speech. Anthony Eden writes of this period Mr. GORE. I have no preference: I that Winston Churchill firmly believed am happy to accommodate the Senator that the British would be doing the from South Dakota. Americans a great injustice if they gave Mr. McGOVERN. I have had the op- any encouragement whatever to the portunity to read quickly most of the sending of American troops into that Senator's address. I believe he ismak- part of the world. Ing an extremely important statement Does the Senator not think it signifi- today, one which reflects the sentiment cant that the one man who stands out of many other Members of the Senate. in our mind as having been right at Among other things, he has pointed out the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 did Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 ,,,,,,,may 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE not see any parallel between that situa- economic aid inherited from the Eisen- tion and the sending of American troops hower administration. Secretary Rusk into French Indochina in 1954? announced increased military assistance Mr. GORE. Mr. President, Mr. on May 4, 1961. On the next day then Churchill was very knowledgeable of Vice President Johnson went to Vietnam conditions in both Europe and southeast and on May 13 a joint statement issued Asia. Those conditions are in contrast, in Saigon announced additional meas- in many respects-political conditions, ures "to extend and build upon existing governmental structures, social organi- zation, terrain, divergence in economics, in industrialization, and political sophis- tication. Indeed, there has never been a nation of Vietnam. I shall not get into a description of Vietnam in reply to the Senator. Mr. Churchill was showing his usual perspicacity when he drew a distinction rather than a parallel. Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, it seems to me that one of the things that may have led us astray in southeast Asia is that we have drawn the wrong lessons and interpretations from pre- vious historical situations. It is argued by some who most ardently defend our present position in southeast Asia that we are trying to contain the threat of Chinese communism in that part of the world in the same way that we were con- taining Russian Communist belligerents in Western Europe after World War II. I believe the two situations are vastly different. Mr. GORE. Some have become so ob- sessed and pleased with the success of the Marshall plan in the containment of communism in Western Europe that they seek to apply that remedy world- wide, when European conditions do not prevail in southeast Asia. Mr. McGOVERN. Is it not correct that, if we were to follow in southeast Asia the same course that we pursued in checking the spread of Soviet Russian power in Western Europe 20 years ago, it would involve the active support of the countries of Western Europe, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Scan- dinavian countries, plus the principal countries of Asia, India, Japan, Paki- stan, and others? This would parallel the collective security arrangements to check the possible threat of Chinese Communist power in that area in the same manner -in which we had an air- tight collective security arrangement thrown around the Soviet Union in 1945? Is it not true that we have moved into southeast Asia largely on a unilateral basis, and that we are following a policy that has very little support, either in Asia or in Western Europe, and, in fact, has the active opposition or, at least, the grave doubt of other great countries in Asia and in Western Europe? Mr. GORE. I agree with the Senator. As I said on the floor of the Senate a few days ago, a basic and grievous error in our policy is that, in a unilateral man- ner, we violate the collective security principle which we endorsed in the United Nations Charter. Mr. President, I return now to a brief history of our commitments to South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration embraced and expanded the policy of military and Upon his return, Vice President Johnson appeared before the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee and explained that no commitment had been made to send U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam. Now, upon the return of Vice Presi- dent HUMPHREY, I shall suggest to the committee that he be invited to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We should know what com- mitments he has made-what public commitments have been made, what pri- vate commitments, if any, have been made, and the authority by which he made them. I do not speak critically in this sense. I assume that whatever commitments he has made have been upon authorization of President Johnson. But in line with my deeply held feeling that the Ameri- can people are entitled to know the facts regarding this all-important question of war or peace, Vice President HUMPHREY should appear promptly upon his return. In October 1961, a visit by Gen. Max- well Taylor resulted in a decision to bolster still further the military strength of Vietnam. In December 1961, in an exchange of letters with President Diem, President Kennedy pledged to "promptly increase our assistance to your defense efforts." Please note, Mr. President, that this was an increase of our assistance to the defense efforts of the Vietnamese them- selves. Increased military and economic aid failed to halt the slippage. A "strategic hamlet" program for local pacification was very costly but ineffective. When I was in Vietnam, I visited some of these strategic villages. I came back and re- ported to my Government my assess- ment that this was a costly program that was doomed to failure. It failed misera- bly; but it cost heavily. It became obvious that the Diem gov- ernment did not enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese people and that only the U.S. presence and support kept It in of- fice at all. Religious controversy and riots brought crisis nearer and nearer. The conditions contained in President Eisenhower's letter of 1954 had clearly not been met. Reforms had not been accomplished. President Kennedy was moved to com- ment on this aspect of the situation on a television interview of September 2, 1963. He stated: I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones.who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equip- ment, we can send our men out there as ad- visers, but they have to win it-the people of Vietnam-against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won un- 3013 less the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Gov- ernment has gotton out of touch with the people. It should be noted that in this and a subsequent TV interview filmed on Sep- tember 9, 1963, President Kennedy en- dorsed the so-called domino theory and made clear his view that we could not afford to withdraw from Vietnam, but he also made it clear that stability and order by the Vietnamese themselves were a prerequisite to victory. Now, Mr. President, I should like to address a few remarks to the "domino theory." I recall that when the Communist apparatus was being fastened upon Cuba, many statements were made on the floor of the Senate, on television and radio, in the press, and on the public platforms, to the effect that if Cuba fell under communism, one after another, the countries of Latin America might have the Iron Curtain folded about them. I entertained such concern my- self, though I never made such state- ments. I wondered if it might follow. Many of us felt uncertain about it. But what do. we find now? The mis- ery, the suffering and the want, the suppression which communism has brought to Cuba is building resistance to communism in other Latin American countries. The domino theory did not work. The subsequent overthrow and assas- sination of Diem did not produce either reform or stability. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. McGEE. I should like to pursue a little further the Senator's analogy of the domino theory in Cuba, as he would draw an analogy to the domino theory in southeast Asia. Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I was attempting to draw an analogy. Mr. McGEE. The parallel; would that be better? Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I even intended that. I had previously referred to the fact that former Presi- dent Eisenhower had seemed to endorse the domino theory, and then I had re- fered to it again, and it came to my mind that there were instances in which the domino theory had not worked. Cuba came immediately to mind. I am not sure that it is an analogy, but I am willing to discuss it in that context. Mr. McGEE. To begin with, the dominoes would become a little wet. Starting with Cuba, we were able, with naval patrol and firmer economic policies on our own part, and the firming up of the backbones of some of our friends in the OAS, I think, to make it considerably more difficult for Mr. Castro to spread - his doctrine. It - was not a matter of merely abandoning the - situation, leaving it alone, or letting the rest of the people do it themselves. The reason I raise the point with the Senator from Tennessee is that there is a good bit of the same element present in Vietnam. if there is someone there Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 .3014 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Februar'u 1 , s; who is In the position to take the lead, we shall find the same firming up of the willingness and the disposition not to knuckle under, not to surrender, not to roll over and play dead, under the pressures that may be coming in from the north. 1hrrther, I think Cuba would be a better illustration of the importance of not let- ting this sort of disease, this falling of the first domino, knock over the rest of the elements on the board. !Ur. GORE. First, let it be understood, I believe it would be regrettable for the first domino to fall. I do not believe that communism in South Vietnam would be a disaster for the United States, but it would be most undesirable. So I join the Senator in opposition to the Com- munist apparatus fixing its grip on South Vietnam. But there again, as the Seri-- ator has said of the domino in Cuba, it might get a little wet tumbling to Indo- nesia or to the Philippines. It seems to me that we become a little mesmerized with these terms, and that they may not always be applicable. That is perhaps one reason why I was reluctant to say I was drawing an analogy. Mr. McGEE. I appreciate the Sena- tor's point. If I may return to south- east Asia, however, and the domino theory, perhaps we need to think up it new name for it. "Domino theory" has become a dirty word, or an expression open to criticism. But whatever we may call it, small countries being forced to accommodate their positions and policies to an overwhelming giant near their borders, because their neighbors collapse, is what is about to happen in southeast Asia. If we want to call it the domino theory, let us deal with it as the domino theory, and then we can discuss the domino theory as applying to southeast Asia. Mr. GORE. It might be equally, though perhaps inaccurately, described by another term with which so many people have become fascinated, namely "sphere of influence." Mr. McGEE. I do not happen to bun the sphere of influence theory either, but I believe that there is much concern over abandoning this area because of the disproportionate capabilities in sheer power between the small independent countries in southeast Asia on the one hand and China alone on the other. It is quite unlike Cuba, in the Caribbean, where an overwhelming force still remains, that of the United States. The issue there is a comparable force which would not permit Russia, through Cuba, or China, through Cuba, to move very far on whatever theory we may wish to consider it. liut, in southeast Asia, there is no force commensurate with the great land mass potential of China. For that reason, I believe that we have to weigh the prospect that faces Cambodia, Thailand, Burma-acrd Indonesia. Indonesia be- comes an interesting case in point, be- cause it was a case of the Chinese Com- munists really overreaching many of their own dimensions too fast and too soon. We should go slow in dismissing; the concept that the fall of one nation only delays momentarily the fall of the next, the next, and then the next in this part of the world. This has historically been the pattern of power politics in this area of southeast Asia. Mr. GORE. I wonder whether the Senator from Wyoming would mind if I addressed some remarks to the Indonesian situation to which he made reference? Mr. McGEE. No. I believe it would contribute to this dialog. Mr. GORE. More or less pu?antheti- cally, I believe it is important to keep in mind that. as the Senator indicated, the upheaval in. Indonesia may have been in consequence of the Communists over- reaching themselves. That in my view, partly correct.. But, there was another factor. The United States continued aid to Indonesia under the most difficult and trying cir- cumstances.. One of the most difficult speeches I have been called upon to make was on the floor of the Senate in sup- port. of continuation of aid to Indonesia after Mr. Sukarno had publicly told the United States to take its aid and go to hell.. But., I was advised, as other mem- bers of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were advised, that iri the view of our Government, a confrontation be- tween the local Communists in Indo- nesia-called. I believe, the PKI-and the military was inevitable, that al- though the military leaders were not particularly aligned with the United States, they were anti-Communist and, therefore. it was in our national interest to maintain liaison through aid and otherwise. Congress, fortunately, supported the administration in that policy. When the confrontation came, it came in an awk- ward way. The Senator has aptly de- scribed it as an overreaching; by the Corrimunists. The Communists intended to assassi- nate all the military leaders. They did succeed in assassinating several, but they missed some. Out of this upheaval has come the emergence of the military lead- ers, many of whom :received th. it educa- tion in the United States, They are not aligned with the United States. They are, however, asserting an Indonesian in- dependence and the kind of government suited to their own people and i heir pur- poses. But they are anti-Communist. What more can we ask? 'We ask no more. When I am asked, as I am fre- quently and critically, why I support and have supported foreign aid programs for Indonesia, I am pleased to cit, this ex- ample, in which I believe our aid has been. fully justified. I hope the Senator will pardon me for this parenthetical reference to a matter to which he had alluded. Mr. McGEE. Not at all. Tire fact is that I, too, stanchly supported all of our programs in Indonesia. We cannot afford to change our foreign policy be- cause we are angry at some individual who is the head of a country. And our foreign policy must therefore be prem- ised on that basis. He will not always be there. But the people will be. I be- lieve there was some static raised on the floor of the Senate in respect to helping a country headed. by someone like Sukarno, but I believe we see now that there is substantial evidence of making one policy and continuing that policy, and recognizing that heads of state are mortals, and will eventually pass on, but the people as a whole will still be there. I believe that Indonesia becomes another case in point in terms of our support for the kind of stance which will make it possible for the independence of In- donesia, of Vietnam, of Cambodia, of Malaysia, to take firm root. Much as I am unhappy with the fact that there is a heavy military complexion in some of these countries, we cannot but wish to give them the opportunity to win their independence and develop along paths of their own chosing. That is what is at stake now. That is the rea- son why 1: cannot understand the :mis- givings which are being expressed on the floor of the Senate from time to time concerning America's position in Viet- nam. Any casual glance at the vast sub- continent of Asia, it seems to me, tells its own story in history and is a contem- porary fact of our time. We do not need to argue that some of the critics else- where and. in the Senate do not read the history books. They need only to read the newspapers to see what has happened in our time. Here we have a great land mass donii.- nated overwhelmingly by one major power. I believe that the Senator from Tennessee shares this position because my first baptism in that part of the world was with him, and I sat at his feet, he was my professor in 1959 when we first visited India, Thailand, and. Vietnam when Diem was still alive--but many of us have been hoping for many years that India would be the great "makewait" for China. Nehru, as he made it clear the day we visited him, was not of that mind, but a "squeegee" effect was beginning. We thought that Japan might have checked China, or that Japan might have been a balancing force for China. But we have not trusted Japan. What are we confronted with now in the wake of these great, vast, deeply moving changes in the wake of World War 11 in the small countries such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and those which stretch on out into the South Pacific? They really are at the mercy of an unbalanced, predominantly main- land Chinese continent. India is in no position, however, to move south, to try to maintain the balance, even though Nehru in his last years was beginning to talk in terms of India being like the United States in its earlier history, except as relates to aggression. Whether he should have reconstructed his thoughts in terms of some kind of balance of power in Asia, I do not follow the critics who say we have no business there, that we must get out of there, that we must have some kind of orderly withdrawal plan. What will happen to the little countries there? Does the Senator argue that they do not wish to be inde- pendent? Does the Senator argue that they would rather be under the wing of mainland China? What is the case that can be :made for pulling out of that part of the world., after we, as the victors in World War II-really the victors, Mr- President? Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Fe ~. T 6, 19f Rproved FLo )%WM?8 5/~OL6/J$C DPff%0~Lf6R000400020001-5 3015 were the only ones left, by the circum- stances of a devastating war, with suffi- cient policing power, to try to put the pieces back together again? France and England pulled out. The Dutch pulled out. Even the old forces that had existed there and had con- tributed to the stabilization of some of the elements out there, were gone. Only we were in a position to do something. We tried to carry on with a stabiliza- tion of that line. We gave India our backing when she was put to a show- down in the crisis with China. The Chinese pulled back. What is the article on which one can base the argument that if we were to pull out everything will settle down, when in the face of all the evidence there has been a concerted move outward, to dis- turb the balance of Asia, if we may use that unfortunate expression? Mr. GORE. The distinguished Sena- tor has given a very able treatise on geo- politics in a vast portion of the world. He has referred to numerous situations in his eloquent statement. He will recall the evening when he and I, in the company of our wives, were with Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi. I wonder if he recalls that during the course of that evening, the able and great Prime Minister on three occasions made the remark: "When China is strong, China is aggressive." Does the Senator recall that statement by the Prime Minister? Mr. McGEE. Yes; I recall it. Mr. GORE. The emergence of China as a world power is one of the significant events of all time. The threat of China to world peace, to world stability, is felt in all quarters of the world. Indeed, I know of no nation more aware of it or which, in my opinion, is more apprehen- sive about it, than the Soviet Union her- self. The acquisition of nuclear wea- pons by China is another event of monumental proportions. The degree to which the Communist apparatus is able to regiment the people is a factor in this equation. The degree to which they are able to engender hate of America in this surging mass of one-fourth of the world's humanity is something to which all thoughtful men must give apprehensive concern. It seems to me that we must consider our obligations, our commitments, our performance, our actions, wherever the situs may be, in the context of our to- tal global obligations, our responsibility as a world leader, and first, foremost and last, in the context of our own national security. These must be interpreted in the light of our capacity, as well as the dangers, in the light of first priority, and de- grees of priority. I consider communism in Cuba most detestable and undesirable. But it has not been disastrous to the United States. I detest communism in its every concept. It is oppressive. It is stultifying. I op- pose it wherever it shows itself, south- east Asia Included. But we must not permit our anti- communism to so blind us that we fol- low a policy that may bring eventual disaster for our country. It is easy to beat one's breast and say, "I am stand- ing up to communism." This will bring applause. But how do we stand up to communism? We found a successful procedure in collective security, NATO, the United Nations. Here we have in Vietnam an area of secondary importance. Please note, I did not say an area that is not im- portant. All peoples are important. All countries are important, even Vietnam and Cuba. But certainly one could .not, in my view, say that either Cuba or Vietnam's being out from behind the Iron Curtain, or behind it, effects a major shift in the balance of power. During World War II, I was closely associated with one of the wisest men I have ever known, the late Bernard M. Baruch. I was author, as a young Mem- ber of Congress, of a bill to bring about wage and price controls early in that war. The late President Roosevelt was not ready to accept it. He was well aware that what I was advocating and what Mr. Baruch was advocating was paving the way for what was bound to come. Anyway, near the end of the war, as the attacks upon Japan were reaching a crescendo, and victory, though months away, was already in sight, Mr. Baruch and I were having dinner together. He said to me, in a paternal sort of way, "Young man, after this war, which has been such a world of convulsion, there will be many upheavals in many parts of the world, in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But keep your eye on Western Europe, because here, with her indus- trialization, with her traditions, her po- litical influence and structure, lies the balance of power between the Commu- nists and the free world." I have remembered that admonition, and I relate it only to illustrate that as between Western Europe and Vietnam, there is a vast difference in priority of commitment, in essentiality and vitality, a difference in American interests. I agree with Mr. Kennan, who said that Vietnam was a matter of national interest to us, but not a matter of vital national interest. That is one part of my answer. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, would the Senator prefer to complete his state- ment? Mr. GORE. Let me complete it. Mr. McGEE. Very well. Mr. GORE. I would treat Vietnam as a matter of importance, but of secondary importance, not as a matter of first pri- ority. The difficulty with our policy is that we have become mesmerized with it. We are tending to put all our eggs in this frail basket, thus endangering our com- mitments on a broader scale to other areas where our national interest is more vitally concerned. An answer to all the questions which the Senator has posed would require a full afternoon of discussion. I would like to go a bit further, however, and then I shall yield again. I have been deeply convinced -from the beginning-and the records of the executive sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, if the Senator will read them, will so disclose-that the most important thing involved in southeast Asia was not Vietnam, north or south, or north and south, but rather it has been and is the equation between the three world powers, the United States, Russia, and China. Shall we follow a course that is cal- culated to heal the breach which we have been developing between China and Rus- sia, thus splitting the monolithic unity of the Communist world? That is a pos- sible consequence of a war between the United States and China. The able junior Senator from Missis- sippi has expressed the view that a war between the United States and China might involve nuclear weapons. I join him in that estimate because I doubt that public opinion in this country would permit her sons to be pitted man for man against the masses of China with- out giving to them every weapon in our arsenal. Once the nuclear weapon is used, the holocaust may have begun. If the United States uses it first, for the second time the white man will have used nuclear weapons against the yel- low race. This has portents for the fu- ture which none of us can foresee and the end of which no one could predict. It is not certain that Russia would come to the aid of China in a war with a capitalist state. True, she has a firm treaty commitment to do so, but I do not know that we could rush to the con- clusion that she would keep that treaty commitment. She might act otherwise should the United States become bogged down in an Asiatic war in this Asiatic morass. The Soviets might rub their hands and look about themselves and start working their machinations in Latin America and in Africa. They might raise trouble in Berlin again, or move into Manchuria. What would we do then committed to a war with one-fourth of the human race, halfway around the world, under circum- stances most disadvantageous to our- selves logistically, politically, and mili- tarily? Hitler learned, or should have learned, that it was unwise to have a war on both his fronts. I believe Russia has been looking over her left shoulder. Her apprehension of China may well increase her desire for rapprochement with the West. Indeed, the more China has emerged as a world power the more inclination Russia has shown to improve her relations with the West. Berlin has not been flaming with action for many months, but once we are bogged down it may be inflamed quickly. So I conclude a partial answer to the question which the Senator has raised by saying that in my view these factors must be weighed. Vietnam must be viewed in perspective and considered in perspec- tive not as the end and the center of the earth. It is neither. It is an area in which we have demonstrated already in a costly way our deep concern for peo- ple who wish to resist communism. I do not believe that in order to dem- onstrate our sincerity in this regard we are required to leap over the precipice into an abyss that threatens a third Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Rep ~~?~~C BOYPHR04000200r0ruary ;6 world war and a possible nuclear holo- caust. am sorry to have taken so long. I could have taken longer. V1r. McGEE. The Senator need not apologize to the Senator from Wyoming for taking so long, because the Senator always approaches these questions on which we differ at such a high level that it contributes to the dialog and the better understanding of these questions. 1 wish to attempt to respond in those areas where we have a basic difference on the remarks the Senator has just shared with us. Mr. GORE. I welcome the exchange with the able Senator. I consider him to be one of the brightest lights that has come to the Senate for a long time. We are personal friends. I enjoy his con.- tributions and welcome them. Mr. McGEE. I thank my colleague from Tennessee for his very generous observations. f should like to go back to two or three of the real essentials and discuss those hypotheses or fundamentals with him. Mr. GORE. First, let me ask the Sen- ator from. Wyoming whether the type of discussion in which the Senate is en- gaged today is an aid to the enemy, or whether it serves the cause of democracy? Mr. McGEE. I believe the honest art- swer is yes. Mr. GORE. Which? Mr. McGEE. Both. I believe that under our system of government and the kind of society we are trying to perpetu- ate, this is one of the calculated risks that we must take. We do not want to have a society of closed ideas, a society of one truth. That is one of the risks we must take. In that respect, it gives aid and comfort; to the enemy. Mr. GORE. We cannot abort our own democratic processes In order to keep certain information from our enemies. Mr. M.cGEE. If we must give up a free society in order to be doing some- thing else, what is the purpose of doing the something else? Mr. GORE. Then we are agreed. Let us now turn to something else. Mr. McGEE. I should like to proceed to something else. There are some es- sential issues which the Senator has raised, and it is those issues to which I should like to turn. They have to do with priorities. The senator reminds us that we should keep these things in perspective. I believe that if we put these things in historic perspective, the priorities be- come obvious. It is as though someone had said In 1941, "Let us see what our priority :is. Is it Hitler or is it Japan?" We would have had a debate then. We cannot do both, obviously. Many people were say- ing that. Mr. President, we are living in a dif- ferent world, in the wake of a war from which we emerged as one of two powers capable of shaping the form of new balances In the world in the wake of World War II. Mr. GORE. Now there are three such powers. Mr. McGEE. We are now discussing another fundamental hypothesis. We can no longer replan the world In Western Europe alone. There is an emerging concern from Eastern Asia, that would compete with Western Eu- rope as an essential basic area of national interest and of the concern of the re- mainder of the world. What would be the use of :rebalancing Western Europe, which the Senator from Tena;cssee and I agree we have done, notably and largely because of our presence there at the end of the war, and then lo:r,ing it all through Eastern Asia? The world is round, and World War 11 did more to shrink the globe than anything else in our time. With the great scientific breakthroughs, and the like, we can no longer talk about Western Eur< pe, about Versailles, or about; the Congress of Vi- enna, and then believe we are pulling back into some kind of tenuous balance of the powers of the world, because we discovered in 1941 that what roes on in Asia as genuinely can jeopardize the se- curiity of the people of America, and, indeed, of the world, as wh: t goes on along the Rhine River in Western Europe. So it is no longer possible t > pick and choose. It is no longer possible to say, "This is our first priority, this is our sec- ond priority." Unless and until the whole globe is brought back into some semblence of balance, we have no reason to hope for a constructive opportunity to contribute to a different world, to help to contribute to a world that would be a little better than the world thr t preceded World War II. So I take issue with the Senator from Tennessee in terms of priorities. We have to take the world as it comes. We did it successfully in Europe: we did it successfully in Iran in 1946; in Turkey and Greece in 1947; in Italy in. 1949; and there has been a difference. We met the test in Korea; we are meet- ing the test now in Vietnam. I submit to the Senator that these tests are all cut from the same cloth. It is a many- colored cloth, but it has been put togeth- er in strange new ways, because the repe- titions of history are not precise and accurate. Because it, happened one way in Western Europe and happened in an- other in the East does not mean there is no reason why we cannot learn from the one and apply to the other. Likewise it is fundamental that in terms of monopoly of power in one place, what inhibits the right of independence of smaller neigh- bors is as Irrevocable in Asia as it is in Europe. The lessons we should have learned from Mr. Hitler are just as strong as the lessons we can now put into practice be- fore the time becomes later. The Senator from Tennessee talks about the prospect of a great nuclear war, an atomic war on the mainland of Asia. I do not know whether that will happen. God help us if it does. But I submit that if we follow the Senator's policy with respect to Vietnam, the necessity of re- sorting to some extreme of that sort may become more horrendous and probably more likely in the long run. We said exactly thesame things about the Soviet Union. The people who op- posed our going into Berlin, the people who opposed our taking the great chance. who were afraid of what would happen if there were a blockade of Berlin, said that it would lead to a big war with Russia. Who knows? Only Moscow could answer that question. But some- body had to put the issue face up, be- cause what happened in Berlin made a difference.. As the great Winston Churchill once said, because of the A:me -- ican willingness to take a chance, even the chance of a big war related to Berlin, Russia is not on the Atlantic coast >f Europe today. I disagree with the Senator from 'Ten- nessee about Cuba. Cuba, with only Castro and whatever his little party has there, is no great make-wait on the bal- ance of power in the world. But with Russia and her missiles in Cuba, the bal- ance of power in the world was read- justed, and that was where we risked a showdown in 1962: We risked war with Russia. Who can say that we did .rot risk nuclear war with Russia? That de- pends on the decisions that were made in Moscow. But somewhere it was neces- sary to draw the line. I submit that drawing the line fails upon our shoulders more than it does on the shoulders of anyone else, because we emerged from World War II with the capabilities of doing something about it. Let me turn now to the priority of Vietnam, if I may- Mr. GORE. Let me reply to the four points the Senator from Wyoming has made. Then we can come to, the next one. If I do not reply now, I shall forget what the able Senator has said, I did not take clown his remarks in shorthand. Mr. McGEE. I have some basic: dif- ferences with the Senator's very learned remarks. Following our interesting ex- change, I had hoped I might go to his second priority. Mr. GORE. Will the Senator contain himself for a moment until we deal with the first one? Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Ten- nessee has the floor; he has done me the courtesy of yielding. Mr. GORE. I am delighted to do so, but the colloquy might be more mean- ingful to those who may read it, and I shall be better able, I think, to engage in It, if I deal with the points as they are made. The able Senator has said a good many things. For one, he said that we must draw the line somewhere. He said we must determine where that is. But then, it seemed to me, he met himself coin- ing back when he said it is no longer possible for us to pick and choose where to stand. Mr. McGEE. As between Europe and Asia. Mr. GORE. The Senator did not say that. Mr. McGEE. Let me interpolate that now. That was obvious from the con- text. Mr. GORE. To quote the Senator further, he said, "we must take them where they come." There, indeed., Is a fundamental difference in our points of view. I believe we must pick and choose. We must put things in perspective. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 F proved F / / DP 6R000400020001-5 16, 19fg ~~SG~Ig ~] 3017 a- The Senator from Wyoming says that there are no degrees of priority; that "we must take them where they come." Mr. McGEE. If the Senator from Tennessee will yield, the Senator from Wyoming did not say any such thing as that. He said as between Western Europe, which was the area about which the Senator was speaking, and the Soviet Union, and the Far East, where we are talking about Vietnam. The Senator from Wyoming said we cannot pick and choose; they are cut from the same cloth. I was not talking about the whale globe. I am talking about the centers of power, where the real clash of power emerges, where the confrontation needs to be met. That is far different from saying there are no priorities. Mr. GORE. What did the Senator from Wyoming mean when he said, "It is no longer possible to pick,and choose; we must take them where they come"? Mr. McGEE. That we cannot settle our differences in Western Europe. We must recognize that the world is round, and that the great forces of potential power that both the Senator from Ten- nessee and I have been discussing are no longer concentrated along the Rhine or at the Congress of Vienna; they happen to have moved into Eastern Asia, as well. It is no longer Moscow and the United States. Peiping has come into the pic- ture. Many of us had hoped that India would have checked Peiping. We had hoped that Japan might do so, too, but Japan appears not to be willing. We cannot separate the restoration of the remainder of Asia from the rest of Western Europe. It is no longer "either, or," as it was not even-in 1941. Mr. GORE. I am glad to have the Senator's explanation. That was not exactly what I understood him to say. Mr. McGEE. The Senator has to know what I mean rather than what I say; I am not so articulate as he is. Mr. GORE. I am always glad to know what the Senator from Wyoming means, because he means well. The difference between us emerges rather clearly. Not only Vietnam, but all areas in which we are interested, as well, must be viewed in their relationship to our own vital na- tional interest. They must be viewed in relationship to our global responsibilities. If, indeed, we have lost the capacity to pick and choose; if, indeed, we are stripped of the power of discretion, of the option to put things in perspective, and if we consider every area as all-im- portant to our national interest, then, indeed, we are the victim of events; we are no longer the masters of our fate. If this be true, we have become prison- ers of an anti-Communist dogma and the initiative rests in the hands of our enemy who can bring us to a battlefield not of our choosing, but of his choosing. Indeed, in this context, if we are in this sad plight, it might well be that some of our military men are correct in their analysis that Vietnam is a baited trap. I have not been so convinced. I had thought it had a degree of "happen- stance' about it. But, if indeed the situation is as bad as the Senator de- scribes it, I shall have to think about it again. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I did not allude to it as a baited trap. Mr. GORE. The Senator draws an analogy between our enemies in World War II, Germany and Japan, and our adversaries in this Vietnam war. There is a vast difference. The United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor. This attack was described by the late President Roosevelt as a day of infamy. To a man, to a woman, to a child, with one voice, with one accord, we arose. We had a cause for which practically all men were ready and will- ing to fight. That is not true in this situation. The United States is involved, and it has become involved step by step. We have inched into this Asiatic morass through three administrations. Three Presidents have assured the American people that combat forces would not be sent to Vietnam. Upon many occasions it was said that the steps being taken were not to be followed by subsequent events which some of us foresaw. The war did not begin with an attack upon the United States which would have given the American people 'a clear cause for which to fight and for which they would be willing to send their sons over- seas. Even the enemy is not clearly iden- tifiable. Although we speak of bringing Hanoi to the peace table and we identify North Vietnam as the adversary-and I believe that they are the directing genius of the guerrilla war-yet a majority of the forces that have been plotting terror and brutality, with which forces we are presently fighting in South Vietnam, are South Vietnamese. I am not prepared to dismiss this as a civil war, as an indigenous revolution. I think those elements are present. Un- questionably there is religious strife. There is ancient racial animosity between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese. The Senator and I visited together Mon- tagnard villages. We sipped some bitter liquid through straws from a deep wine keg in a native village. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, let the RECORD show that it was liquid rice. Mr. GORE. Religious animosities ex- ist there. France never permitted the country to become a nation. It pitted prince against prince, duke against duke, and divided in order to exploit. There is little doubt as to just who the enemy really is. We heard it said on the floor of the Senate today that the real enemy is the Chinese. Is it the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, or the Vietcong? Perhaps it is all three. In any event, the situation is fraught with confusion. It is military, but it is equally political, economic, social, reli- gious, racial, and anticolonialism. We have the legacy of 100 years of French exploitation with which we must cope. I do not believe that the analogy between Germany and Japan as the enemy in World War II and the confu- sion which exists in Vietnam is an ac- curate one. It is contrast rather than comparison. The Senator draws another analogy with which I disagree. He draws an analogy between South Vietnam on the one hand and Russian missiles in Cuba and the Communist conquest of Berlin on the other. I completely disagree with that. In Berlin and in the 1962 Cuban crisis, priorities were clear. Yet the Senator says we cannot draw priorities, that we must take them as they come, that no longer can we pick and choose. Mr. President, in Cuba the Russians were attempting atomic blackmail. They were attempting to seize and reverse the balance of power. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, if they had succeeded in Cuba, would they have upset the balance of power? Mr. GORE. The Senator is correct. Had they succeeded in placing numerous missiles with atomic warheads in Cuba, they would have achieved a great victory. They would have altered the military situation in the world. I am not prepared to say that that would have shifted the balance of power, but we would have been under the gun. Mr. McGEE. Then the Senator agrees with me. That is what I just got through saying. Mr. GORE. We would have been un- der the gun, the trigger cocked, with a pistol at our temple, so to speak. This would surely have seriously altered the situation. Indeed, although I am not prepared to assert this, it was stated to the Committee on Foreign Relations in executive session that if the Russians should succeed in Cuba, it would shift the balance of power. Now, with respect to Berlin, Germany is the strongest industrial and military force in Western Europe. The seizure of Berlin by the Communists would have seriously altered the military situation and the balance of forces, political, eco- nomic, and military, in Europe. It would have extinguished the ambition of all Germans, East or West, for ultimate reunification of their country. It would have placed the largest city in central Europe under Communist domination. Mr. President, much as I regret to dis- agree with the able Senator, to consider Vietnam, on one hand, as having the same priority and importance to the United States as Russian atomic mis- siles in Cuba or Russian seizure of Berlin, is totally in error. Now, to come to the fourth and last point-and then I shall yield again-the Senator treats Vietnam as one of the- Mr. McGEE. Critical areas of the world. Mr. GORE. Critical areas, where the Communists attempt to make a gain; is that correct? Mr. McGEE. Correct. Mr. GORE. But he says we must treat them all alike; they all have the same priority. I think the point is important. I wish to resist this conclusion. I think a Ho Chi Minh government of South Vietnam would be most undesirable; but I do not think that possible eventuality should be considered as a matter of top priority concern to the vital interests of the United States. I simply do not think it holds that relative importance to us. Now I yield. - Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Red(~R8 figgffiaj - % p~7BOQ 6 APfR0400020$9e165 uary 1 ;6 Mr. McGEE. I thank my fellow Sen- ator for yielding again. I address myself, first of all, to the rela- tive roles of Japan, the Pacific, and West.- ern Europe in our stake in Asia and Eu- rope simultaneously, rather than to the convenience of selecting priorities as be- tween the two. Of course, the attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor galvanized us all. Of course, we were united. Because we had not been willing to learn in Manchuria in 1931 the lesson I trust we learned then, we paid with a gigantic war in the Pacific. That is the reason why we would like to avoid that kind of exigency, that kind of confrontation again. That is the whole point. The Senator could not have more eloquently made the point I wish to get across: that we cannot afford to wait another time, because of nuclear capabilities, for war tension to get as far along as it had when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, or when Germany at- tacked Poland. I trust we have learned our lessons. For the language that is universal, both in Berlin and in Tokyo, both in London and in Washington, in Saigon, in Ja- karta, in Canberra, is the lesson that we should have learned by now about when to stop an aggressor. if we had only learned that lesson, or been willing to act upon it, in 1931 in Manchuria, in 1935 In the Rhineland, in 1936 in Ethiopia, who knows what the prospects might have been for a differ- ent kind of confrontation of the aggres- sors? It would have been in different dimensional form than we have known since in history. We cannot say with certainty, because we do not have that kind of omniscience, but we do know what the price was for doing it the way we did it before, trying to appease a dictator, whetting his appetite by giv- ing him somebody else's real estate. It does not work. So I would answer the Senator, who says that there is no necessary priority connection between the Pacific and Western Europe, in response to my as- sertion that there is, that there is in- deed; they are cut from the same cloth, they are swept by the same threat, and they are put out of balance by the Same disproportionate forces that character- ized the imbalance of Europe at the end of World War II. What has happened in Asia is as much our doing or undoing as it is the next fellow's. We fought a war in Asia, simul- taneously with the war it was said we could not fight in Western Europe. Many sober voices warned us against a two-front war. But in spite of the un- fortunate experience of Mr. Hitler on that score, both with Russia and West- ern Europe, we did rather well. We dis- covered what we had to do, and with the great resources God has blessed us with, and the leadership we were able to com- mand, we succeeded. But I say to my friend from Tennessee that we are going to have to do it over the old way if we do not watch out, and that the time to stop aggression is at the beginning. I call to his mind a bit of warning and finger-wagging Lord Palmerston did 100 years ago in the British Parliament. He was speaking of the Russians-they were not Commu- nists then, but they had great power. He said that anyone can predict the policy of an expansionist state if he reads a history book. He said that what they seek to do is press outward along their periphery; and wherever they are not stopped, they will break through and take another piece of geography, but whenever they are stopped, they go else- where to seek softness. The parallel Palmerston referred to 100 years ago obtains at the present time, whether one applies it to Moscow of Peiping. The willingness to risk the use of force, or in certain instances to actually command that force, makes the difference. Those on the other side have gambled all along that we were inhibited about using force-that somehow the Ameri- cans, because we had a different stand- ard, and because one human life makes a difference to us-would be very reluc- tant to resort to the use of force. Hitler knew our minds better than did some of the American people themselves, and he gambled. He was net a great power, as we know them today. Eng- land, France, the United States and Rus- sia were all more powerful titan Hitler on paper. But Hitler was willing to risk his power, and he capitalized on the inhibitions of the "have" nations not to risk what they had. That is how he got by with literal murder for as long as he did, until it took the h' locaust of a gigantic World War II to bring him down. That is exactly the reason for the petition I would submit to tae Senate today. I say that we have a lesson to learn, and that lesson, which was writ- ten in Europe, is equally applicable in Asia. Look at the prize at stake in Asia. Look at the prize, I say to my friend from Tennessee. Southeast Asia: 300 million people, and more. Most of the rice of the world. Oil, tin, bauxite and rubber. These would be sparkling diamonds in the resources of great powers, and par- ticularly of a power that is only now beginning to expand its quest for new industrial capabilities. This is an area that historically has been a .great power factor. It was one of the prizes on the scales of the old- fashioned balances of the 19t.h century. This is one of the strategic waterways of the earth. The trade from East to West primarily goes this way, acro,,s south- east Asia. Likewise, the area itself `tanks the mainland. Here India is ou:.clanked to the East. It thrusts, almost a; a dagger, directly toward the Philippines, Austra- lia, and New Zealand. This is indeed a prize to covet. If we tend to think otherwise. I believe it would serve us well to go back and read our history again. Japan did not attack Pearl Harbor, in order to get Hawaii. Japan started World War II in order to obtain a great empire. in south- east Asia. The Japanese had read the history books. They were cognizant of the sources of great power. And I say that it behooves us, in our national self- interest, to see that we do not permit, through our own folly or indifference, this area to fall into the hands of a great power that can use it in a hostile way. That would only raise the cost of redressing the balance. Finally, let me say to my friend that there is another great issue at stake here that was in truth at stake :in Berlin. If I may draw the parallel-- Mr. GORE. Let me respond to some of the Senator's points before he makes others. Mr. McGEE. If I am speaking to sev- eral points, only because I am attempting to answer the many points the Senator from Tennessee raised. Mr. GORE. Very well; I yield further. Mr. McGEE. Each time I respond to half of the Senator's points, lie injects another dozen, and I am having difficulty keeping up. So I would appreciate it if I could finish the context of his sugges- tions just made. The question of the uncertainties of the people in southeast Asia, it seems to me, is a very large question. In Western Europe, at the time of the Berlin crisis, we were friends of the English, the French, and many others. They knew what we stood for. But they were not sure that the great power that we were left with at the end of the war would be used to try to protect a balance in Eu- rope. They, too, read a history book. At the end of the first great war, we went home, and Europe was taken over by the dictators. It was forfeited. The English, the French, the Dutch, the Bel- gians, and the rest of them had to have the answer to that big question: Would the Americans, this time, stay as they had promised when they went to war? They did not know for sure. Would they accommodate with the Russians? Or could they afford to remain outside of this orbit, and remain free? It took :Berlin to answer that, inciden- tally, to resolve that question in the mind, well as they knew us. What it represented was more the breaking of the blockade. It represented the American will to risk a war in behalf of freedom and an opportunity for a better kind of peace, if that were to be our lot in our time. That is the great questiomnark which hangs today over some of the small nations in southeast Asia. Of course they are different from us. They are different because their institutions are sometimes in opposition to our own. But the one thing that they have, that we have, the one thing they can. talk about that we can talk about in the same language is the dignity of independence; namely their national identity. It is that identity which makes the difference. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I must in- terrupt the Senator there. Despite the statement of the able Senator from Wyoming, the Vietnamese people do not have, never have had, and never have known the dignity of individualism, the freedom, the sense of independence which the American people have. They have never even been a nation. They have never been independent. I do not know how the Senator arrives at that conclusion. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 F ~ 'y 16, 19ffproved F4?o es?.89 6/i&&DeCZ #6R000400020001-5 %ftw Mr. McGEE. May I respond to that? Mr. GORE. Certainly. Mr. McGEE. One of the great prizes we won in Asia for the American role there during the war was the prize of winning the complete disintegration of the old colonial empires. They had been there too long. Mr. GORE. But they had been there 100 years. Mr. McGEE. After the colonial em- pires pulled out, those people were sparked by the new and often underesti- mated drive for national independence, for their own identity as areas, even though those areas sometimes resulted in awkward geographic configurations im- posed by colonial powers, and even though it did not always represent a basic ethnic nationalism. The point remains, typical of most of Asia, as well as Africa and Latin Amer- ica: The explosion of the nearly inde- pendent countries in a drive to further their own independence again. This is true of southeast Asia. It is that spirit of historic craving for independence to which I am referring when I draw that analogy. All I am saying is that these countries need to know where we stand. Are they going to have to live beneath the shadow of the great giant to the north, not knowing from one day to the next what the future of their own in- dependence may be? Are they going to have to accommodate themselves in some way, economically and politically-as we have seen through the National Libera- tion Front movement-to the regimes in the north? They do not know. It makes a difference to them, because they would like very much to survive some way. They need to know whether it will be a shield or a wall behind which, as was the case in Western Europe, they would have a reasonable opportunity to strug- gle, in some tortuous way, up the scale of economic, social and political growth. God knows, they have a long way to go. That is another reason, it seems to me, why this question mark hangs over us, the same kind of question mark that poses the same fundamental question which was posed in a far more mature way, and in a far more elevated scale of living, in the politics of Western Europe, but it is, nonetheless, the kind of spirit that causes their hearts to beat a little faster. I am sure that they are as proud of their na- tionalism as we are of ours. That is why we are there. That is why we have to take over and be there. That is why we have to follow through this responsibility as well. Let me say in conclusion to my friend the Senator from Tennessee, in response to the particular issue which has been raised- Mr. GORE. I must interrupt the Senator. I do not believe that is the reason we are there at all. We are not in Vietnam because of the nationalism of the Vietnamese people. Mr. McGEE. There the Senator goes again, lifting my words out of context. Mr. GORE. The Senator just stat- ed- Mr. McGEE. I have been speaking for a great many minutes with the Sen- ator. I have stressed the balance of power in southeast Asia. I have stressed the lessons learned in fighting aggres- sion. I have stressed the element of the nationalistic ambitions of the people. Therefore, if the Senator would be will- ing to keep what I hava said in its total context when he refers to my explana- tion of independence and our presence in South Vietnam, it would be appreciated. Mr. GORE. I shall be happy to deal with the total context of the able Sen- ator's very eloquent interjection. It is true that there are lessons to learn from history. It is true that we can draw some wisdom from the events of the past; but I, as a limited historian, have not noticed history repeating itself very often. It is much less likely to do so in the nuclear age. Never before have we had the balance of power, the means of communication, and the power of almost total destruction in the hands of a few powers as it exists today. Mr. McGEE. Did the Senator say "never before"? Mr. GORE. Will the Senator kindly let me proceed, please? Mr. McGEE. Of course. Mr. GORE. The Senator very ably cites many incidents of the past and many tragic historic occurrences. Then he makes what I believe is a grievous error in drawing an analogy between every one of those occurrences and Vietnam. They are simply not analogies. True, we have made errors. True, we have succeeded in containing communism in the Mediterranean basin to some ex- tent, although we have not exterminated it. The largest political party in Italy Is still the Communist Party. Once again, I suggest, that is a situa- tion which is not analogous. But, to hasten on to my address, and to make summary comment, the Senator has again referred to Berlin and to Russian nuclear missiles on Cuba. As one Senator, I was fully prepared to accept the risk of a third world war- a nuclear war-when the Russians at- tempted to put their atomic missiles in Cuba. This was a risk which I thought we should take. It happened that I was a delegate to the United Nations at the time. There, I saw the secret communi- cation between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. Never in all my life have I been so proud of an American President as I was during that dramatic episode. I shall not undertake to quote the communication except to say in es- sence that the President told Mr. Khru- shchev that the missiles must be re- moved from Cuba and quickly, that if he did not take them off, we would. This was a risk which we had to take because the stakes were high. The vital interests of America were at stake. I am not sure that the balance of power in the world was not also at stake. At least, our freedom of action would clearly have been compromise had we allowed Russian missiles to remain in Cuba. I was prepared, in my own mind, to support the risk of war over Berlin, be- cause there, too, I thought the balance of power was at stake. But I am. not willing to go over the brink of the abyss toward a third world war over Viet- nam. Let me repeat, it is important, but it does not, in my opinion, involve our vital interests. Communism there would be disagreeable and undesirable, but surely no more disastrous to the United States in Vietnam than it is in Cuba. Mr. McGEE. The Senator does not really believe that, does he? Mr. GORE. Indeed I do. I do not know why the Senator asked the ques- tion in that way. Mr. McGEE. Will the Senator yield- Mr. GORE. Not for the moment. In- deed, I believe it. I have been trying for the last hour to convince the Sen- ator of the error of his way when he un- dertakes to draw an analogy, to estab- lish a comparable priority, between Viet- nam and Western Europe, between any- thing and everything in the world. He says, we can no longer pick and choose; we have to take them where they are. Mr. McGEE. Between Western Eu- rope and Asia. The Senator is running a little loose on this analogy. It is be- tween Western Europe and Asia. Mr. GORE. If I am running a little loose it is only because I am quoting the Senator. Mr. McGEE. The Senator withdrew a statement earlier. I assume he wants to withdraw this. Mr. GORE. No, I do not withdraw it. The Senator has made a second ex- planation, but he has arrived at the same conclusion he previously stated. If I may, I would like to get back to the historical development of our esca- lation- Mr. McGEE. Is the Senator terminat- ing the colloquy? I asked him to yield a moment ago. Mr. GORE. If the Senator wishes me to yield, I do so. Mr. McGEE. I understood the Sena- tor was responding to my comments that I have been making for an hour or so. Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield fur- ther, as much as the Senator desires. Mr. McGEE. May I say that my friend and I disagree over- Mr. GORE. We have disagreed. Let us go to another point. Mr. McGEE. My friend and I disa- gree. The central point is whether Viet- nam by right is of such importance as for us to assume whatever risk may be involved in our presence there. These are risks we cannot foresee. We have to make educated guesses. I said this risk is of a high priority, in the national inter- est and that of the world, because I feel that what we do or fail to do in south- east Asia can well write the real future of eastern Asia in terms of the various potentials of power that are loose in that area. Therefore, our fundamental dis- agreement rests, if I understand the Sen- ator correctly, upon the issue that Viet- nam is only another small country, in which there may or may not be com- munism. If we leave the word "com- munism" out of the debate, we can see the issue a little more clearly. I think it is a matter of aggression. It is a matter of power that jeopardizes the balance in this critical area, where the power cal- Approved For Release 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Rt!M't1 X C 87B09fflNP04000209Pee ruary culations, by offsetting the balances, bring about stability. it is awful to talk about "balance of power." I know that. But balance of power is still the only substitute which man, in all his foolishness, has been able to find for war. That is a sorry com- mentary on the human race. Mr. GORE. And does the Senator say that Communist control of Vietnam would bring about a shift of that bal- ance of power? Mr. MCGEE. I suggest that, in the same hour to which the Senator has al- luded, I have been trying to make that point. Mr. GORE. The Senator thinks that is so? Mr-. MCGEE. I do. I believe the bal- ance of power in Asia depends on our presence there. Mr, GORE. The Senator mentioned the numerous minerals In that area. Can the Senator nam" one strategic product in South Vietnam? Mr. MCGEE. I think rice itself would be a considerable inducement- Mr.. GORE. That is the first time :l have heard rice described as a strategic material. I thought it was a bit starchy. Mr. McGEE. People have happened to become a basic indispensable resource in the modern sinews of power. Rice hap- pens to be a part of what is necessary for those people to survive. Mr. GORE. Will the Senator name me a strategic mineral exported from South Vietnam? Mr. McGEE. I think that is irrelE:-- vant. The Senator, with his skillful do-? bating, is .getting by the point. Mr. GORE. No; I am trying to get the Senator on the point. Mr. McGEE. Vietnam lies astride a vast area--- Mr. GORE. The Senator is talking about strategic materials. That is a, geographic point. Mr. McGEE. It is astride a vast area of 300 million people, and rice is neces- sary to them. There are bauxite, tier, rubber, oil-- Mr. GOlE. The point I am trying to make is that, with respect to Vietnam, there is nothing but confusion. Mr. McGEE. Vietnam is a symbol. Mr. GORE. Now the Senator talks about a symbol. Mr. McGEE. It is a symbol of the whole area, and that is at stake just as much as Manchuria, even with its re- moteness, was deemed to be unrelated to the rise of Japan. Mr. GORE. The Senator is drawing an analogy- Mr. MCGEE. Whenever the Senator finds an uncomfortable analogy, he downgrades the analogy. We can learn from the pages of the history books. Let us not, do it this time. The only way not to do it is on the side of not ignoring aggression in the hope that no more will take place. Mr. GORE. I do not find the anal.-- o:;; uncomfortable. I find it abstruse. Mr. McGEE. The pattern worldwide, it seems to me, is whether we should seek to confront aggression, which had something to do with the beginning of World War II, and has something to do with the aftermath following that same conflict; that we would be mis- taken In trying to confine our analysis to a single incident; and that the tactics and strategy are the same. Even though the strategy may remain the same, the tactics may differ. The fact is that the tactics of Russia in Iran were not the same tactics she took in Greece, in Turkey, or in Berlin or Korea. Mr. GORE. The Senator is now gen- er aliizing, Mr. MCGEE. I am trying to put it in perspective, as the Senator has . uggested. Mr. GORE. The Senator ha; said that Vietnam would affect the balance of power. He has talked about the rich strategic minerals and products and the people of Vietnam. I have asked him to name one of those strategic materials. He has named rice. Mr. MCGEE. I wish the Senator would not--- Mr. GORE. Does the Senator from Arkansas I:Mr. FULBRIGxTI fee] the need of more rice? Mr. MCGEE. The Senator r'duces the power concept to a ridiculous concept. He knows what the sinews of power are. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. In Arkansas we are great producers of rice. A 10-per- cent increase in acreage has just been announced. Vietnam ought to be pro- ducing its own rice. Formerly it did. Will the Senator yield to ire for a question? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. FULBBRIGHT. Unfortunately, I did not hear the analogies which the Senator from Wyoming mentioned. Who is the aggressor? Did the Senator indicate who he thought was tl ie aggres- sor in South Vietnam? Mr. GORE. I would rather yield to the Senator from Wyoming on that point. Mr. LAUSCHE. What is the question? Mr. McGEE. As I understand, the question is whether we had attempted to name the aggressor. Mr. GORE. Whether the Senator from Wyoming had named the aggressor? Mr. McGEE. I believe the record is rather replete with evidence that the ag- gressor that we are concerned about at this particular point is the aggression across the 17th parallel from the north, through the National Liberation Front, and through regular units which have come down. Mr. GORE. Is that a sufficient answer for the Senator from Arkansas? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought that paw t of the discussion indicated that it was China which was the ag??.ressor. I was not clear who the Senator thought was the aggressor. Mr. MCGEE. We were discussing China as being a major source of power. Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator from Arkansas claim that the United States is the aggressor? Mr. GORE. I yielded to the Senator from Arkansas. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not hear the beginning of the colloquy with the Sen- ator from Wyoming. He was drawing art analogy of various other places. Can the Senator remember when the United States ever before stepped into the shoes of a former colonial power, as we have done in South Vietnam, in which we support a colonial power in trying to retain its power, as we did in the case c f France? Is it not true that in nearly every case that I can think of our sympathies and support have been on the side of the colony seeking freedom from the colonial master? Mr. GORE. The statement of the Senator is certainly true, and this is con- sistent with our national origin. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. Mr. GORE. We came into being through a revolution, through insur- gency. This country has sympathetically responded to moves of independence and I do not now recall any other in- stance- Mr. President, may I ask for order? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Mr. GORE. I do not recall any other instance in history when the United States has gone to the aid of a country to retain its colonial empire. Mr. FUL.BRIGHT. It is the only one that I know of. Mr. GORE. And we went heavily. I believe the cost was about $2 billion. The Vietnamese people did not wish France to continue her exploitation. They resisted. They fought victoriously at Dienbi'.enphu. They fought vi- ciously and won. We made the very great and grave mistake of undertaking this burden after the French, after fighting 7 years with an army of up to 400.000 men, with our almost unlimited aid, had failed. I cite that as an answer to the Sen- ator. Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is what I thought. This situation is not cornpa- rable, it seems to me, to Berlin or hardly any other case that has been mentioned in the course of the colloquy in the re- cent exchange. There are many differ- ences in this case from many of the other analogies referred to. Most important is that Vietnam was seeking to recover her independence, which was taken from her by force in 1784 or 1785. Normally, in our tradi- tional way, we would have favored that. Instead of that, in this case, for rea- sons unrelated to Vietnam, we took the side of the French and did our best to retain their colonial control. This has led to many unfortunate results. I though that should be clear for the RECORD. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. GORE. No; I do not now yield. I wish first to respond to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relation.;. I know of no valid analogy that can be drawn between the predicament in Viet- nam and any other instance in which we have been engaged. It is quite unique. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 T bruary 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Mr. FULBRIGHT. I feel that way. There are no similar analogies any- where in the world. Mr. GORE. The question on which the distinguished Senator from Wyoming and I have been engaged in extended de- bate turns on this point. The able Senator equates Vietnam with World War II, with Munich, with missiles in Cuba, with Berlin, and with just about every instance that he has thus far recalled in history. I do not believe they are on all fours. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe they are relevant. Mr. GORE. There may be a certain relevancy, but in my view they are cer- tainly not analogous. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator if I understood him to say that Vietnam, per se-and leaving for later discussion the influence of China-is not vital to the security of the United States. Mr. GORE. Does the Senator agree with me that Vietnam does not consti- tute sti- tute the balance of power between the major powers of the world? Mr. FULBRIGHT. - I do agree with the Senator. It is a weak and poor country, with no industrialization to speak of. It formerly had almost a large surplus of rice. It is now importing rice due to the destruction as a result of this war. For the foreseeable future it is a very poor country that will need a great deal of assistance for its problems. Will the Senator not agree that appar- ently behind the concern about Vietnam is really a concern about China in the minds of those who exaggerate, in my view, or emphasize the significance of Vietnam? Mr. GORE. I believe in all fairness and candor that I should say that this is behind my concern also, but from a different point of view. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is from mine, too. This is a matter one must consider; and we in the Senate should try to un- derstand what is the significance of China, what role she has played in the past, and what she may be playing in the present. I do not believe that it is at all clear at the moment. Mr. GORE. I agree. I wish now to take the opportunity to express my appreciation to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations for having taken the initiative to promote a better examination of the issues herein involved. I was in my home State over the week- end, and I heard many expressions of appreciation for the committee hearings. People considered them enlightening and educational. "For the first time," they said, "we begin to understand the issues involved." Mr. President, this is a democracy. We can follow the course of wisdom only to the extent that our people are en- lightened and informed. It is only from information and enlightenment that a wise decision can be reached. I thank the chairman. Expressions have been made here to the effect that we are aiding com- munism by holding these hearings, or by engaging in the kind of debate that has been held on the floor of the Senate today. I reject that argument. I believe that our democratic processes must operate. We lose the most precious element we have if we forego that. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to express my appreciation for what the Senator has said about the hearings. I understand that earlier today, before we had completed our hearings on the Asia Bank, there were some rather harsh words said about the hearings. I ap- preciate the Senator's comments. He has played a very important role in the hearings. - Speaking for myself, I agree that the hearings are most essential. I apologize to the Senate, and I regret that I did not initiate them and that the committee did not initiate them long ago. I can only say that I did not realize earlier how se- rious this commitment in southeast Asia was. At the time of the 1964 resolution I really had no realization of what we were about to get into, or how it was about to escalate, or certainly I would have held hearings then. I- regret that we did not do this earlier. However, it is better to have the hearings now than not at all. If the Senator and his committee col- leagues are agreeable, I hope we shall be able to continue to have some hearings for the education and enlightenment of the people of this country and of the Senate. Mr. McGEE. I am sure the Senator from Tennessee recalls my earlier com- ments on that point. Mr. GORE. I am pleased to say that the senior Senator from Wyoming said that although the Communists are our enemies, and might draw some encour- agement and some glee from the debate, nevertheless, on balance, in his view, the debate is an essential part of the work- ing of our democratic process. The able Senator from Wyoming and I have had some difficulty agreeing on numerous points, but we agreed on that one. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to hear that. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, following a very knowledgeable, although I fear too lengthy colloquy with my colleagues, I shall return to the history of our in- volvement in Vietnam. I shall resume with the assassination of President Diem. I had said that the subsequent overthrow and assassination of Diem did not produce either reform or stability. Since 1963, a succession of govern- ments, some military and some civilian, have operated one step removed from utter chaos. The pace of deterioration became more rapid. As our aid was further increased and our military ad- visers became more numerous, the Vietcong increased its control over the 3021 countryside both in terms of geography and people. But we continued to main- tain the fiction that our role was that of providing assistance to the sovereign Government of South Vietnam in its struggle for freedom. On June 2, 1964, President Johnson, referring to the Oc- tober 1954 letter from President Eisen- hower, stated: We will keep this commitment. In the case of Vietnam, our commitment today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President Diem in 1954-a commitment to help these people help themselves. Events took a significant turn on Au- gust 2 and 4 of 1964, when North Viet- namese gunboats attacked U.S. Navy ships in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson ordered immediate retaliatory action against gunboat bases in North Vietnam. His action was strongly supported by the overwhelmingly majority of Congress and the American people. This in- cluded the senior Senator from Tennes- see. As I recall, the President described the retaliatory action as a limited re- sponse to the attack on our ships on the high seas. Shortly thereafter, as the President's request, the Congress over- whelmingly passed a resolution support- ing the determination of the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent fur-' ther aggression." The resolution has been interpreted by some as giving the President carte blanche authority to wage undeclared war. I shall not enter into a discussion of this issue except to say that I did not so regard it. But raising legalistic ques- tions will not solve our current problems. We must deal with the situation as it exists, whatever may be the theoretical legal arguments about how it was created. It has been suggested that Con- gress can rescind that action. But of what benefit would that be? What has been done cannot be repealed. We must start from where we are. Since August of 1964 we have witnessed steady escalation of the scope of U.S. participation in the conflict. Our military forces on the scene have been drastically increased in numbers and are now committed to combat. Begin- ning a year ago, planes have carried the war to North Vietnam with bombing raids almost on an around-the-clock basis. We have engaged in saturation bombing of the jungles with our B-52 bombers. All of this has been done with- out visible measurable progress in bring- ing the situation under control. The flow of supplies and recruits from the North has continued, but the strength and manpower of the Vietcong is still predominantly indigenous to South Vietnam. If I correctly understand the situa- tion, the brutalities, the atrocities, and the horrible bestiality that are practiced upon the people in the villages of Viet- nam are committed by the South Viet- namese Vietcong adherents. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield for a statement: on that point? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. LAUSCHE. I reject vigorously and vehemently the statement that the South Vietnamese are the perpetrators of torture and bestiality. The truth is that the Communists and the North Viet.- naanese are the ones that are perpetrat- inr: it. rle. GOIh . Mr. President-- Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from 'Tennessee permit m e to comment on that statement? Mr. GORE. In just a moment. I am willing to have the Senator from Ohio make his statement, but I do not believe that the facts support his statement. The overwhelming preponderance of the forces of the Vietcong and the Corl?- lnunist forces that have been in South Vietnam are indigenous to South Viet- nam. It is true that many of them have been trained in North Vietnam; that they are supplied by the North Viet- namese; and that to a large extent they are directed by the Communist Party and. officio Is in Hanoi. B:.'t the fact is that perhaps as much as 80 percent of the forces that we face there as enemies are South Vietnamese Com.-- munists or Vietcong forces that are augmented, supplied, directed, or abetted by the North Vietnamese. I be-- licve that the testimony before our corn-- mittee clearly supports this statement. if the Senator from Ohio draws a dis-- tinetion between the South Vietnamese, on the one hand, and Communists on the other, there might be a basis for his statement. But, as I understand, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong fight; side by side and perpetrate horrible crimes together. But it has been my im.-- prrssion that the Vietcong constituted the vast majority of those forces and therefore perpetrated the greater ma-- jor?ity of the wrongs. i/tr. 1.,ALISCHE. With that modifica-- hon, there is some good reason for the Senator from Tennessee to make his statement. Mr. GO'ZE. In other words, we per- haps misunderstood each other. N4,% LAUSCHE. The implication con- tamed in the original statement was that the Communists are free from guilt of torture and atrocities, and that all the blame lies with the anti-Communists. Mr_. GORE. I am sorry that the Son-? a .tor from Ohio so interpreted my state- ment; I surely did not so mean it. Mr. ILAUSCHE. The records are re-, plete with statements that the Commu-. nists have practiced the most violent; atrocities imaginable. Mr. GORE. I agree. r,3r. LAUSCHE. The lives of the chiefs, the mayor.;, and the other friends of the West have a duration of about 4 months.. Wi.hin 4 months, their heads are re- 5 eavcd from their bodies and are placed. l,i pikes for the observation of the in-? n e ent South Vietnamese citizens. (t)I:Ls:. Mr. President, I agree with the hhenator. Many of the victims have been the innocent teachers of little children. If the inference first drawn by the Senator from Ohio could be read CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 16, 1966 from my statement, I wish it made ex- plicit that I did not so intend. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I point out that very obviously there have been atrocities on both sides This is the kind of war that produces atrocities. I am fully aware of the consistent atrocities practiced by the Vietcong. As the Senator points out, there have been executions--murders-of villa;ze leaders, teachers, and others. There have been atrocities by both parties in the civil war. These people are not fighting under the kind of Marquis de Queensbury rules which we should like to see app lied. One atrocity breeds another. While the atrocity of planting bombs in buses and restaurants is horrible, I think there is not a vast distinction to be drawn between dropping bombs from the air, supposedly on strategic targets- which bombs kill many innocent peo- ple--and any other kind of bombing. It is a matter of record that in the bombing of South Vietnam, with :napalm and other high explosives, our bombs have killed many innocent peasants. It is a part of the whole atrocit v of that war itself. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, f. know of no war in history that better illustrates the accuracy of the old statement that war is hell than this war in Vietnam. The atrocities committed by the Com- munists in this war are really unbeliev- able in their viciousness. Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Presi. bent, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Presid. rnt, I do not believe that we can justifiably and in fairness to our country place the atroci- ties admittedly proved to be committed by the Communists on an eeual basis with our action and say that our country is following a similar course. We are not doing that. Mr. GORE. The Senator di, l not un- derstand me to say that;. Mr. LAIJSCHE. The Sonata r did not say that. However, the fact is that we have been most charitable. We have been enduring the brutality of the Com- munists. It is not true that when the people of the United States are told that, with our entire ethnical ba.ckgrrnrnd, our acts parallel the acts of the Communists. Mr. GORE. I know of no on,. who has said that. And if anyone doer, say it, I shall. join the Senator in denour cing him. Mr. President, last summer, with fur- ther rapid deterioration in South Viet- nam, President Johnson and his advisers undertook a full-scale review of our mili- tary commitments and our military op- erations. There was much pubic specu- lation about; a major escalation of the war. It was widely reported that the military leaders had reconimei,ded that some 400,000 troops be committed to Vietnam. When the President announced his de- cision after much public si eculation about what that decision would be-in a July 28, 1965 statement, however, it appeared that he had resisted the mas- sive escalation that :has been urged upon him. It was announced that 50,000 ad- ditional troops would be sent to Vietnam. In commenting on the President's state- ment, I said on the floor of the Senate: I took some heart and found some encour- agement in President Johnson's statement today for the following reasons: First, the President has apparently resisted the far greater degree of escalation that has been urged upon him. Second, the President stopped short of ac- cepting, or treating this as an American war. He showed an awareness of the fact that; our policy has been, and, I think should be, to assist the Vietnamese to win their own war. I believe the President showed a keen aware- ness of the danger of permitting the struggle to become an American war, a wl;ite man's war against Asia. According to the distinguished chair- man of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices in a statement earlier today, our troop strength in that area is now in the neighborhood of 300,000--and our "highest military authorities" are talk- ing of 600,000 men being sent there. I was heartened by references in the July 28, 1965, pronouncement to the possibility that the good offices of the United Nations might be utilized in. an effort to find a solution. I read from my July 28, 1965, remarks in the Senate: Third, by his increased emphasis upon the United Nations through his letter de- livered today by Ambassador. Goldberg to Mr. U Thant, the President demonstrated, it seemed to me, an awareness of the danger of isolating the United States in a land war in Asia and the danger of unifying the Com- munist world into monolithic unity by the landing of a major American expeditionary force in Asia. Should this happen it might well be that we would not be permitted the luxury of concentrating most of our forces in Vietnam. I had earlier applauded the President's Johns Hopkins University speech in which he announced clearly our willing- ness to negotiate with interested nation:; without preconditions. More recently, the pause in the bombing of North Viet- nam and the widely publicized peace offensive conducted by President John- son have served to improve our posture in the eyes of world opinion. The President is to be commended fee having made this effort, and again I commend him. But the fact remains that this effort did not succeed in bringing the contro- versy to the bargaining table. More- over, the further effort to utilize the. United Nations which was begun when bombing of North Vietnam was resumed has thus far not been particularly fruit- ful. And so, Mr. President, all our orior ac- tions having failed to resolve the contra-- versy, or even to have brought a solution nearer, another major escalation ha:; been under consideration. There are important differences, _f think, between our situation now and what it was last summer. Another esca- lation must be considered in the light ei' the fact that our military effort has al- ready been substantially escalated over what it was last summer. Each time our policy has been reviewed over the years, the result has been that our involvement has been deepened and the level of our military effort has been escalated. Al; Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE each step we have become more heavily committed, the problem has become more complex, solutions have become more elusive, and the potential conse- quences of any course of action have be- come more serious. Thus has our commitment evolved, step by step until what many now regard as our obligation in Vietnam bears no resemblance to the obligation we ac- tually incurred under the Eisenhower letter of 1954 and the SEATO Treaty. The pattern of step-by-step escalation of our commitment, accompanied with repeated assurances that we seek no wider war, concerns me greatly and I am apprehensive that this pattern may be continued. And that Is the purpose of this speech. We have been told repeatedly that we are in Vietnam only to help the Viet- namese help themselves. This was not to become an American war. But we have gone by successive stages from the extension of economic aid, to military aid, to military "advisers" and techni- cians, to troops to protect vital Ameri- can installations, and finally to full-scale offensive commitment of U.S. ground forces and the bombing of North Viet- nam. It has become an American war. If we had insisted upon the terms and conditions contained in President Eisen- hower's 1954 letter, we would have long since had to terminate any assistance at all in Vietnam. But we did not insist. From a review of the record it seems clear to me that we have no binding legal commitment that requires us to expend the effort we have undertaken in Vietnam. What commitment we have, we have managed to create for ourselves. It is as if, by saying over and over pub- licly that we are committed to restore order and tranquillity in South Vietnam, we have somehow convinced ourselves that we are legally bound to do so, what- ever the cost. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, will the Senator yield? Mr. GORE. I yield. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have be- fore me the SEATO Treaty. Article 4 of that treaty reads: ARTICLE IV 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unani- mous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will In that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be im- mediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. 2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the ter- ritory or the sovereignty or political inde- pendence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is af- fected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult Immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense. 3. It is understood action on the territory of any State designated by unani- mous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned. This is the protocol, which provides: The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collec- tive Defense Treaty unanimously designate for tl}e purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam. Mr. President, I interpret that as a commitment to help these people defend and hold their territorial sovereignty and integrity, and that that is a binding agreement that we made. If, in our judgment, this agreement for the benefit of a third party means we are going to help them maintain the "in- violability and integrity of their terri- tory or the sovereignty or political inde- pendence of any party in the treaty area" when threatened by any means, whether by armed attack or by means other than armed attack, it seems to me that we have a treaty which compels us to act to help these people maintain their own territorial integrity and sover- eignty against Communist enslavement. Mr. GORE. I appreciate the Sena- tor's reference to the SEATO treaty. For his information, I have previously dealt with that and have given reasons why I think this treaty does not amount to a binding commitment to do what we are doing or what is contemplated in Vietnam. I should be glad to discuss it again, but I have already done so. Does the Senator from South Dakota wish me to yield? Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I wish to make a brief observation. I know the Senator has been on his feet for a long time, but I was particularly grateful for the point he has made, that we must beware of the danger of making this an American velar. I think the Senator is absolutely correct; this Is a struggle which, in the last anal- ysis, must be decided primarily by the people of 'Vietnam themselves. Frequently, people draw the wrong parallels with other situations. We are in South Vietnam with over 200,000 American forces and billions of dollars in American aid. The govern- ment there has not been able to put to- gether an indigenous army capable of providing the kind of resistance and suc- cessful effort that we saw, for instance, in Greece at the end of World War II. Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator very much. As I see it, the Communists have us committed to war in an area where we-face the greatest possible disadvan- tages. Second, they have us committed there all alone. Third, If what some of my colleagues have said today be true, we must treat this commitment with the same degree of priority that we should treat an attempt to enslave Western Europe, or to put Russian nuclear missiles on Cuba. I do not believe the situation is quite that bad, but I appreciate the relevancy of the Senator's remarks. I recognize that, in addition to what- ever formal legal commitment we have In Vietnam, there is also what Is called our moral commitment to assist a people In quest of freedom. I do not subscribe to the view that the Vietcong movement is simply, a popular indigenous uprising against the remnants of despotic colo- nialism. Evidence of Vietcong terror- ism, of direction and support from Hanoi is clear. The Vietcong, if they could do so, would in my opinion doubtless estab- lish a repressive Communist regime. But, Mr. President, there are many other communist regimes, including the one in Cuba. Our moral commitment to liberate Cuba should be at least equally strong. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that we should launch a major military effort to overthrow Castro. These indefinite "moral commitments" have their limitations. They must be measured by our national interest. In reality, our present commitment in Vietnam has evolved from the fact of our presence. Each time we have in- creased our presence we have enlarged our commitment. Each time we have escalated our presence and effort our dilemma has become magnified. The distinguished former Ambassa- dor, Mr. George F. Kennan, in his recent forceful testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, stated as follows: The first point I would like to make is that If we were not already involved as we are today in Vietnam, I would know of no rea- son why we should wish to become so in- volved, and I can think of several reasons why we should wish not to. In this statement I concur completely. In the final analysis we should be guided by our own vital national inter- ests. It is my view that our national interests are not served by a major mili- tary operation in southeast Asia. First, even if we accept the inevita- bility of military solutions to cold war problems-which I do not necessarily do-it is difficult to Imagine more disad- vantageous conditions under which to wage war than those which prevail in South Vietnam. Second, we stand virtually alone in the struggle. We have received only token support from a few of our allies. Other free world nations do not even agree with what we are doing in this un- happy area. They find It difficult to understand why we are there. It is not that our Government has failed to ex- plain our position. It is simply that they do not believe that either their interests or ours are served by the conflict. On the contrary, they think the free world's position is endangered. In going it alone we violate the principle of collec- tive security to which we committed our- selves when we subscribed to the United Nations Charter. We cannot, standing alone, remake the world, and it does not serve our national interests to try on the scale and under the conditions which prevail in Vietnam. Third, we must, as I stated earlier, be guided by our position and our posture on a global basis, with recognition of the fact that our strength, though greater than that ever enjoyed by any nation, is not limitless. We have responsibilities around the world. We must meet our commitments in NATO. We still have two divisions in Korea. We have prob- lems and responsibilities within our own hemisphere. Our military and eco- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE T'ebntauif 16, 1 ri Distribution, USDA Chicago. CIIICAGO, ILL. CARL HOLT, Director, School Lunch Section, State Department of Education, St. Paul, Minn.: In accordance with instructions from the Bureau of Budget to hold expenditures under the special milk program to $1 billion in- elusive of administrative costs for this fiscal year you are hereby advised that the current deduction of 5 percent will be increased to 10 percent beginning with claims for the month of February. Schools and child care institutions should. be notified as promptly as possible. As provided in section 215.7(E) of the special milk regulations no deductions will be made in reimbursements to needy schools. DENNIS M. DOYLE, Director, Midwest Area, U.S. Department of Agriculture. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, CONSUMER AND MARKETING SERVICE, Chicago, Ill., December 28, 1965. Mr. C. E. HOLY, Director, School Lunch Section, State De- partment of Education, St. Paul, Minn. DEAR MR. HOLT: This will supplement my wire of December 23 on the special milk pro- gram fund situation for the remainder of the fiscal year. As you know, Congress appropriated $103 million for the special milk program this year. Based on preliminary estimates of expenditures for the year, however, we would need at least $102 million obligating au- thority in fiscal year 1966 If the present 5 percent reduction is continued through the full year. In order to hold expenditures to $100 million as instructed by the Bureau or the Budget, it has become necessary to re- duce obligations for the last half of the year by $2 million. Because the school year generally hegira In September, about 40 percent of program obligations occur from February 1 to the end of the fiscal year. Thus, in order to reduce obligations by $2 million during the remain- Ing 40 percent of the year, an additional S percent reduction in claims is necessary be- ginning with claims for the month of February.. No restoration of funds which may be saved by the percentage reduction method will be made after the end of the fiscal year. Although the wording of section 215.7(el of the special milk program regulations, ef- fective December 1, 1965, is not spelled out as thoroughly as it was in the former section 215.8(e) of the prior regulations, the intent is the same. No percentage reduction of re- imbursement shall be applied to any part of claims submitted by needy schools approved for special assistance under the special milk program. We hope the overall impact of this action will not adversely affect program operations. Sincerely yours, DENNIS M. DOYLE, Director, Midwest Apea. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 ae xry 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE "'awm They were primarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malle- able and, perhaps, decisive turn in the war- His column of February 14 said. Drummond reported that the Hono- lulu decisions centered on "how to help Saigon show the Vietnamese peasant that it is his own government, not the Communists', which can and will pro- tect him, help him, and secure him bet- ter against the worst hardships of the fighting." The problem-and the opportunity- is to get people who are now either will- ingly or unwillingly living in Vietcong- controlled-areas to seek the shelter of the Government. The end of the war, Drummond be- lieves, "will come when the Vietnamese peasants make this choice." This column spells out the challenge before us and our allies in Vietnam, and in the belief that others may find the column illuminating, I offer it to ? the RECORD for publication: (From the New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 14, 1966] DECISIVE TURN IN VIET? WINNING A PEOPLE'S WAR-VITAL STEPS AT HONOLULU (By Roscoe Drummond) WAsuxwoTow.-General Giap, the supreme commander of the Communist forces in North Vietnam, has labeled it a "people's war." He's right. This is why the decisions taken at Hono- lulu by President Johnson and Premier Ky go to the heart of winning. They were pri- marily social, economic, and political de- cisions. They come at a malleable and, per- haps, decisive turn in 'the war. For a long time the larger part of the 16 million South Vietnamese people, mostly peasant farmers, has tried hard to stay neu- tral in the seesaw conflict between the Viet- cong and the government troops. They did so not because they wanted to be ruled by the Communists; there is ample proof they don't. But for one main reason: neither side could give them security. Neu- trality seemed the only way to survive. The situation is now being radically altered. The mounting South Vietnamese and U.S. forces, the steady B-52 raids against VC strongholds keeping the Communists ever on the move with fewer places to hide, the now ability to take the battle to where the enemy Is and not let him rest-these are the new factors which are changing the face of the conflict. They are making it impossible for the peasant farmers to avoid much longer hav- ing to choose sides and either help the gov- ernment to-win or to cast their lot and lives with the Communists. Before the escalation of fighting and the search-and-destroy strategy of the expanded Vietnamese and U.S. forces, It was under- standable that the peasant should feel he could best avoid trouble by not choosing sides. Now the moment of-decision is at hand when the farmers and villagers will have to decide whether: To stay on their farms or in their ham- lets and take risks of noncombatants in war. To move to areas under government con- trol where the Vietcong is not drawing the fire of defending forces. To put their fate and future Into the hands of the Vietcong. The Honolulu decisions centered on this very matter: How to help Saigon show the Vietnamese peasant that it is his own gov- ernment, not the Communists', which can and will protect him, help him and secure him better against the worst hardships of the fighting. Saigon has given the peasant food when the Vietcong have taken it away from him. It has given him medicine, helped him repair the village schools and employed him to re- pair roads, whereas the Vietcong have forced the peasants to dig their trenches. But after a decade of fighting, the Saigon government cannot alone meet this problem which will soon become more acute. More Is needed and the United States proposes to provide it. One of the wisest young generals in the Pentagon, Brig. Gen. Edwin F. Black, who has just returned from a special mission in Vietnam, puts the problem-and the oppor- tunity-in these words: "This new combination, of relentless pres- sure on the ground and ceaseless attack from the air, Is making the Vietcong and their supporters steadily more miserable * * sooner or later these pressures will probably Cause many more of the people, who are now either willingly or unwillingly living in Viet- cong controlled areas, to seek the shelter of the government." The end of what General Giap calls the "people's war" will come when the Vietna- mese peasants make this choice. It .is a WTOP EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM POLICY EXPOUNDS SOME MUCH NEEDED COMMONSENSE ON- A COMPLEX ISSUE (Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks at this point in the REcoRD and to include extraneous material.) Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, those of us who have followed the progress of the fighting in Vietnam, and of the de- velopments of our policy in connection with that conflict, as we have been privileged to follow them in the Commit- tee on Armed Services, are well aware that the facts and issues in the Vietnam conflict are highly complex. Because of this complexity it is not always possible': to make a contribution to a thorough' understanding of what is involved in Vietnam simply by resort to easy slogans. or passing headlines or hastily con- ceived proposals. For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, especially encouraging to run across. now and then a comment on the matter of our Nation's policy in Vietnam that has been carefully thought out, that demonstrates a full awareness of the complexity of the issues involved, and that is marked with a high measure of sound commonsense. Two such comments I am happy to say, have recently appeared on WTOP radio and television in editorials prepared and presented by Jack Jurey of WTOP. Be- cause of their soundness and common- sense I commend these two editorials to my colleagues and to the American people. The editorials follows: VIETNAM-I (This editorial was broadcast on February 14 and 15, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Tele- vision.) This Is a WTOP editorial. The hardest work that men ever do is to think; to define their terms; to sit down and, putting aside preconceptions as much as pos- 3071 sable, try to arrive at a rational definition of a problem and a rational approach to its solution. In the case of Vietnam, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has now heard from two men with exceptional credentials: Gen. James Gavin and former Ambassador George Kennan. In prolonged testimony, they ap- peared to say much the same thing. Both men, and Professor Kennan in particular, criticize the policy decisions of the last dozen years which led to the present warfare, both are extremely apprehensive of the perils of continued escalation; both consider our Vietnam commitment to be a distortion of American foreign policy objectives; both warn that the United States cannot be all things to all men throughout the world. But when it comes to the situation as it Is, Professor Kennan and General Gavin agree that continued resistance is necessary. Ken- nan made this statement: "I think it should be our Government's aim to liquidate this involvement just as soon as this can be done without inordinate damage to our own pres- tige or to the stability of conditions in that area." The involvement, he said, "is today a fact * * * a precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present cir- by saying that he can see little difference be- tween what Kennan and Gavin recommend and what the Government is doing. Neither can we. If all the people who are concerned about Vietnam will stick to the relevant issues-which is how the present problem can be dealt with-a good part of the fog ought to lift. It is vital to debate strategy not in retrospect but in terms of the im- mediate crisis. Provided this Is done, it could very well turn out that there Is not nearly so much disagreement about Vietnam as appears in the headlines. This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP. VIETNAM-II (This editorial was broadcast on February 15 and 16, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Televi- sion) This Is a WTOP editorial, the second In a series on Vietnam,. At the root of much of the discord and dissent about Vietnam is the fear of con- tinuing escalation the fear that if American military power is applied in ever-greater measure we will drift into conflict with Com- munist China and, perhaps, the Soviet Union. This is not an unreasonable anxiety. But if we are trying to deal with the Vietnam problem rationally-which seems to be the principal need of the moment-escalation can be controlled and kept within rational limits. Military power is not an end in itself, it is an instrument of policy; which means that the escalation of such power can be severely limited to the achievement of policy objec- tives, These include, first and foremost, persuad- ing the other side to come to the conference table to negotiate what would be-for us and them-an acceptable formula for ending the fighting. - We do not seek to harm Red China, al- though one of our purposes is to contain an extension of Chinese power In southeast Asia. We do not seek to destroy North Viet- nam. And we probably are prepared to con- cede the existence of the National Liberation Front-the Vietcong-and deal with it as a political entity in one way or another. These limited objectives imply a limit to escalation. They argue against the bomb- ing of Hanoi. They argue against a vastly greater commitment of American troops. Our aim is to establish an unshakable Amer- ican military presence in South Vietnam, but Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Februaiy 11~, not to undertake an unending build-up of The full story began a long time ago, men and material. but a convenient beginning point for In other words, in terms of escalation, we my narrative is October 25, 1963, when east control the situation-not let the sit- the FDA released a progress report on nation controi us. Here again we suggest the , ,'resident and his critics are closer to agree- its v a.mpaign Against Nutritional anent than the headlines indicate. Because Quackery" in connection with the See- we can see iwLhing significant in the record and National Congress on Medical to indicate that Mr. Johnson is not fully Quackery held in Washington, D.C., un- aware of the need for restraint and caution der joint sponsorship of the FDA and in. South Vietnam. This was a WTOP .editorial, .-,peaking for W'1'O11. DECEPTION BY VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES (Mr. KING of Utah asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I am alarmed at the lack of cooperation. and the secretiveness, even the willful. deception that is currently practiced by various Federal agencies. It is conceded, I believe, that one of the most cirective bulwarks of freedom in the United States has been our his?- toric resistance to government in secret. Yet there is evidence, today, that secre- tiveness has become in some instances an Instrument of departmental policy. No one questions that our national. security requires certain critical infor- mation to remain classified. There are official documents whose general circu.-? lation is not in the national interest. There are important decisions, we all agree, which must be made behind closed doors. In order to preserve the freedom of our intellectual marketplace, however, the number of kerns designated to be with- held should be kept at an absolute niini- murn. The tendency is for departments of government to classify everything which might prove to be embarrassing to anyone within that department. Loy- alty to the establishment rather than the dissemination of truth, becomes the Important factor in determining wheth- er governmental information should be released to the public, or kept under lock and key. Secrecy is to be deplored, and should be justified only in situations where national security is clearly at stake. Now that the Government is spending billions of dollars in basic research- which amount represents over 60 per- cent of all basic research conducted in this country-it is mandatory that this information be made freely available to the pub4c. People are entitled to this dearly paid for information, not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of rig tit, subject only to the considerations of na- tional security. Errors In judging, Incompetence, ne- glect, and maladministration should be exposed. The concealment of truth,, or, worse yet, the dissemination of error, should be repudiated as an instrument of governmental policy. Over the past 8 months I have had a most frustrating experience with the Food and Drug Administration. Per- sonnel in that agency have followed a policy of official deafness and calculated obtuseness that defies credibility. the American Medical Association. Among other things, this report warned against what the FDA still calls the soil depletion myth. One state- ment in the report seemed to me and to many of my well-informed friends to be difficult to defend: The facts are that research has demon- strated that the nutritional value's of our crops are not significantly affected by the soil or the kind of fertiliser used. Only the yield is affected. Lack of iodine in soil or water, of course, has been shown to cause goiter, but this is the only disease definitely associated with soil deficiency. May I say, in passing, that any proven relationship between soil composition and the nutritional value of food be- comes a matter of great significance. The food industry, considered collec- tively, is the largest single industry in the United States. Grass annual food sales are approximately $65 billion. That industry has done an excellent job of making America the best-fed Nation in the world, but the question has been seriously asked, by experts, whether this industry may not have spent a dispro- portionate amount of time and effort in improving eye-appeal, convenience, stor- ability, and packaging, at the expense of effort which might have been spent in improving the nutritional quality of food. We are not splitting hairs, or magnifying molehills. We arc raising a question which might determine the di- rection in which the largest industry in this Nation will travel for generations to come. The FDA, by use of the above and other similar language, has indi- cated one clear course for the food in- dustry to follow. The facts which I am about to discuss raise the serious ques- tiori whether the FDA, in so doing, has acted with complete candor. I willingly concede that there is a sharp divergence of opinion among the experts on the question whether depleted or contaminated soils may produce food deficient in nutritional value. In my discussion, I do not take sides in that controversy. I assert, only that the para- mount importance of the aubject re- quires that all persons concerned act with complete candor. The public in- terest requires nothing less. In an attempt to resolve this conflict, I sought a conference with the FDA per- sonnel when I returned to C< ngress last year to discuss the aforesaid statement. On May 5, 1965, Dr. Phillip L. Harris, Director of the Division of Nutrition of the Food and Drug Administration, along with Dr. Homer Hopkins of the division staff, joined the members of my staff, and me, in a conference. Dr. Harris and Dr. Hopkins, both of whom are distin- guished men In the field of nutrition, listened respectfully and sympathetically to my objections to the categorical nature of the aforesaid FDA statement. With- out making any commitment, they agreed to review the problem to see if the FDA might reconsider its official view of the matter. I was later told, unofficially, that on or about June 11, 1965, D1'. Hopkins, at the request of Dr. Harris, had prepared an interoffice scientific memorandum, which held that the FDA position could not be defended. I was also told that an official report would be sent to me within a few days. A few days became a few weeks; and on July 9, I wrote to Dr. Harris asking for informtaion about the progress of their review of the interrelationship be- tween soil quality and nutritive value of food. Another month of silence elapsed. Finally on August 12, I wrote and asked when I might expect a reply to my letter of July 9. When I still received no acknowledgment, I instructed one of my staff to call the Assistant C'ommis- sioner's office on the telephone. The Assistant Commissioner said that a reply by Dr. Harris to my July 9 letter had been sent on July 28. I had never received that letter in my office, so I. asked for another copy. When it ar- rived, I was disappointed to find it devoic of substance. In it, Dr. Harris said We in the Division of Nutrition are retivel:, reviewing and evaluating literature, much of it very recent, on this subject. We hope to complete the rview shortly and will be glad to lot you hear further from its at, that time. I confess that I was taken aback bg the fact that over 3 months had elapsed since my conference with Dr. Harris and Dr. Hopkins, and over 2 months since Dr. Hopkins had drafted an interoffice memo covering the subject in question. When one of my staff questioned the delay by phone on August 18, the Assist- ant Commissioner assured him that a definite decision on the subject could be expected within about 10 days after then, that is, by August 28. When I had re- ceived no word from anyone by Septem- ber 8, I wrote again, this time to the Assistant Commissioner. A copy of my letter follows: S~EPTEM71tl:a 8. 1.[lt3 Mr. WINTON B. RANKIN, Assistant Commissioner for Planking, Food and Drug Administration, Washington, D.C. DEAR Mn. RANKIN: As I understand it, 'Jr. Homer Hopkins, staff assistant to Dr. Phillip Harris, Director of the Division of Nutrition of the Food and Drug Administration, pre- pared a report on or about June 1 relating to the subject of the influence of soil upon the nutritional quality of food. As I further understand it, this report pur- ported to conflict with a previous statement of the Food and Drug Administn,iton to the effect that the quality of soil affected the quantity but not the quality of food grown thereon. As a result of this apparent conflict, the Food and Drug Administration decided to review Its statement of policy, in the Lght of the aforesaid report of Dr. Hopkins.. On August 18, you were kind enough to discuss this matter with my administrative assistant, Mr. Frank Mensel, at which lime you indicated to him that a report would be forthcoming within 10 days. It Is possible that the report has already issued, without my being aware of it. This letter is to indicate to you my great interest Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, f9pgoved For ' 67 8 000400020001-5 NATIONAL SENIOR SERVICE CORPS (Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, in 1900,. life expectancy in the United States at time of birth was 47 years. Today it is a little over 70 years. In 1900 there were approximately 3 million Americans over 65 years of age. Today there are over 16 million in that age group, and by 1970 there will be about 20 million. In earlier times, the pattern of life was that people worked until they died, but today retirement comes at 70, 65, 62, or 60, and there are several years remain- ing before death. The transition from active life to re- tired status is satisfactorily met by some, but for many it is a traumatic experience that is most difficult to overcome. To be suddenly faced with enforced idle- ness, to have to break with past associ- ations involving the isolation from friends of long standing without new friends to fill the vacuum, especially to be overtaken by a feeling of uselessness- these are conditions which we must do everything possible to avoid. It is one thing for the pace of activity to be slowed down; it is quite another thing for activity to come to a sudden halt. Many elderly persons desire to be of service to their community, but there are too few means by which their serv- ices can be rendered. By the Older Americans Act of 1965, a fine beginning was made toward the ob- jective of a better life for our senior citi- zens, and I am particularly happy that the State of Maryland Commission on the Aging has been successful in obtaining one of the first grants under title III of the act for the purpose of helping to maintain the Metropolitan Senior Center in Baltimore City. I have recently re- ceived a letter from the Maryland Com- mission on the Aging which indicates how important the Older Americans Act is to the State of Maryland, and I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the RECORD at this point. STATE OF MARYLAND, COMMISSION ON THE AGING, Baltimore, Md., January 26, 1966. Hon. CARLTON R. SICKLES, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR CARLTON: I am delighted to inform you that on January 20, the State Commis- sion of the Aging acted favorably on the first project under the Older Americans Act in Maryland. Indeed, if not the first, among the first in the Nation. Under this project a grant of $10,000 for the first year will go to the Metropolitan Senior Center in Baltimore City. This cen- ter has become increasingly effective in the city and has previously depended largely on private financing plus some additional appropriation from the city itself. There was a possibility that without this grant, their activities for the coming year would have been much restricted or even aban- doned at the very time when it was be- coming most useful to the older citizens of the city. This project represents the first "bite" into the $67,000 Maryland may use during this fiscal year for grants on a matching basis of 75 percent Federal, 25 percent lo- cal money, under title III of the act. I know you will share our own sense of accomplishment that we were able so speed- ily to assist such a meaningful operation on behalf of the enrichment of the lives of so many older citizens. Sincerely, MARGARET C. SCHWEINHAUT, Chairman. Such centers as the senior center in Baltimore City are of great importance in providing informational, counseling, referral, and similar services. I believe we must go further, however, by the establishment of a National Senior Serv- ice Corps to enable senior citizens to work in their own communities up to 20 hours per week for compensation not to exceed $125 per month. Such a Senior Service Corps should be administered on a cooperative Federal-State basis. The details regarding the proposed Senior Service Corps are contained in a bill I introduce today to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965. I wish to em- phasize that the bill provides that mem- bers of the Senior Service Corps would be used in programs that would contribute to an undertaking or service in the pub- lic interest that would not otherwise be provided, and that such programs will not result in the displacement of em- ployed workers or impair existing con- tracts for services. I hope this bill will receive favorable consideration by the Congress, Mr. Speaker. It will help to bring the elderly back into the community in the twilight of their years, allow the com- munity to profit from the time and talent and wisdom. of our senior citizens, and enable all of us to see that the retired life is one that is well worth living. LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call my colleague's attention to a statement on the subject of legislative reapportionment which was adopted by the national board of the League of Women Voters of the United States, and which has been approved by the League of Women Voters of Frederick County, Md. The statement was as follows: STATEMENT OF POSITION ON APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES As ANNOUNCED BY THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TIIE UNITED STATES, JAN- VARY 12, 1966 The members of the League of Women Voters of the United States believe that both houses of State legislatures should be ap- portioned substantially on population. The league is convinced that this standard, estab- lished by recent apportionment decisions of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and that the U.S. Constitution should not be amended to allow for consideration of fac- tors other than population in apportioning either or both houses of State legislatures. Of overriding importance to the league in coming to this decision is the conviction that a population standard is the fairest and most equitable way of assuring that each man's vote is of equal value in a democratic and representative system of government. Other considerations influencing league decisions are that the U.S. Constitution should not be amended hastily or without due considera- tion because of an unpopular Court decision, and that individual rights now protected by the Constitution should not be weakened or abridged. Against the background of its longstand- ing interest in State government, the league also hopes that by maintaining a population standard State government may be strength- ened by insuring that State legislatures are more representative of people wherever they live. Finally, the league feels certain that the term "substantially" used in Supreme Court decisions allows adequate leeway for districting to provide for any necessary local diversities. DECLINE IN UNEMPLOYMENT (Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. FALLON. Mr. Speaker, the de- cline in the Nation's unemployment rate has been hailed editorially by the Balti- more Sun-and other newspapers-as "an economic milestone." Referring to the report from the Labor Department that the Nation's unemploy- ment rate declined to just under 4 per- cent in January, the newspaper recalled that this was "a goal set by President Kennedy in 1962 and reaffirmed by President Johnson." Stating that this does not mean that a condition of literal full employment has been reached, because many unskilled workers do not have jobs, "it does mean that the country is close to a condition of statistical full employment," the paper states. I offer this editorial, on a subject of general interest to us all, for the RECORD with the request that it be reprinted there. [From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1966] FOUR PERCENT The report from the Labor Department in Washington that the Nation's unemploy- ment rate declined to just under 4 percent in January is an economic milestone. It was a goal set by President Kennedy in 1962 and reaffirmed by President Johnson. It obviously does not mean that a condition of literal full employment has been reached, because we know that many unskilled work- ers do not have jobs, but it does mean that the country is close to a condition of statisti- cal full employment. We can understand this when we note that, while there still is unemployment among the unskilled, there are labor short- ages in many of the skilled categories. Labor Secretary Wirtz predicted that the unem- ployment figure will go down to 3.5 percent or lower this year. The figure for December was 4.1 percent. As we have said before, the declining unemployment total, together with the scarcity of qualified jobseekers in many fields, points up the importance of training programs to develop skills for the jobs avail- able. Declining unemployment also points up the importance of restraints on wages and prices to check the inflationary effect of nearly full employment. (Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.) [Mr. FALLON'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.] Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For D-lease N-GROM 9 RC1 67 8 0004000 ry 16, 1966 W&W THE BOEING 727 SHOULD BE GROUNDED (Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to ex- Lend his remarks at this point in the REC- ORD and to include extraneous matter.) Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the Boeing 727 jet should be ordered ground- ed pending it full investigation into its airworthiness and crashworthiness. Last week on the floor of this House I spoke on the subject of aerial garbage and aviation safety. That speech mainly concerned near-collisions. Today I want to talk. about real collisions. There have been four crashes of Boeing 727 jet airliners in the past 6 months A United Air Lines 727 crashed in Chicago on August 16, 1965, killing 35 persons. An American Air Lines 727 crashed in Cincinnati on November 8, 1965, killing 59 persons. Another United Air Lines 727 crashed 3 days later in Salt Lake City, killing 42 persons. And most re- cently, a Japanese 727 crashed into Tokyo Bay killing 133 persons. A total of 264 persons were killed in these 4 crashes. These facts alone, in my opinion should have moved the Federal Government to order all 727's grounded pending a com- plete investigation. The additional fact that each of the four fatal crashes oc- curred under similar circumstances, as the planes were preparing to land, makes it even more imperative that the Govern- ment act immediately before additional lives have been lost. Problems of construction have already been found in the Boeing 727. A study recently completed by the FAA disclosed it number of deficiencies in the materials presently being installed in the interiors of the planes. Further, the CAB has pointed out that the manner in which the fuel line is installed could have had something to do with the Salt Lake City crash. Each of the four crashes are cur- rently under investigation by the CAB. A CAB team has even been dispatched to Japan to act as technical adviser to the Japanese Government in its investiga- tion of the Tokyo crash. But these in- vestigations consume a great deal of time. Ordinarily, CAB investigations of major accidents take as much as a year, sometimes longer. Meanwhile, more than 220 727's are in service with 17 airlines in 7 nations and. whether 1 of them is getting ready to crash the next time it prepares to land. because of some structural defect or other deficiency is something we may not, know for many months. Mr. Speaker, this is really an intoler- able situation. The Government is on notice that something may be wrong with the way the 727's are put together. There have been 4 crashes in the past 6 months in which 264 persons met hor- rible and undeserved deaths. Each crash occurred under similar circumstances. Yet they continue to fly. There is no excuse for this. Surely, the great com?- mercial air lines would be willing to en- dure the temporary inconvenience of utilizing the planes that were in service before the 727's for a few months while the CAB completed its investigations. I fail to see why the Government has not yet acted. An editorial at the New Republic. February 19, 1966, discusses this problem. I invite my colleagues' attention to this article? With unanimous consent I am inserting it at this point in the RECORD. SAFETY IN THE AIR The crash early this month in Tokyo Bay of yet another Boeing 727 jet-the fourth in 6 months-has still not moved the Civil Aero- nautics Board to recommend grounding the planes. All four crashes occurred as the planes were preparing to land, but the CAB has seen no pattern in the accidents to sug- gest that the 727 is unsafe. The CAB has yet to complete any investigation of the domes- tic 727 crashes; it has yet to hold a hearing on any of them. It takes a distressingly long time for the Board to investigate accidents-often as long as a year-and once it has made a finding more time may elapse before corrective ac- tion is taken. The limited recommendations the CAB has already made to improve the crashworthiness of the Boeing plane will take time to implement. Meanwhile nearly 200 727's are flying. Last November 11, 43 persons died in the crash landing of a United Air Lines Boeing 727 in Salt Lake City (hearings on that crash open this week). According to a preliminary report by the CAB, the interior furnishings of the plane helped spread the fire that broke out on impact and gave off a heavy black smoke which "contributed to the fatalities." The Federal Aviation Agency has just com- pleted a study, says the CAB, which "dis- closed a number of deficiencies in the ma- terials presently being installed in aircraft interiors. Materials are available," the re- port continued, "which would be far superior to those being used today." But no planes have been grounded as a result of that find- ing, and so far the FAA has not ordered the airlines or manufacturer to refit plane in- teriors. Until the FAA completes its flamma- bility studies and hands down new stand- ards, a repeat of the Salt Lake City disaster is possible at any time. (FAA spokesmen don't know yet whether new standards will apply just to planes coming off the assembly line or to planes now in service as well.) Of- ficials mysteriously distinguish between "air- worthiness" and "crashworthiness"; they see no reason to ground a plane simply because it doesn't crash well (43 persons died in Salt Lake because the plane was not crash- worthy) . The CAB has identified other problems with the Boeing 727. Its fuel line passes through the fuselage of the plane and runs close to generator wires which can spark a fire in a belly landing. In the Salt Lake crash the "ignition of spilled fuel could have been caused by sparks from runway contact or by a broken and shorted generator lead or both."' It would help, the CAB noted, to move the wires away from the fuel line and strengthen insulating and tubing materials to withstand the shock of a crash landing. This,Boeing plans to do-in 4 months. THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE (Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. :REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous mat- ter.) Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the San Antonio Light, February 11, carried an editorial. on the much-discussed Honolulu Conference. In this editorial the Light quotes from the statement of the South Vietnam leaders that to win the military war "we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social. revo- lution." In order to share this editorial with my colleagues, I include it in the RECORD : DECISION AT HAWAII In the "Declaration of Honolulu" the United States and South Vietnamese Gov- ernments have effectively dispelled any doubts that may have been entertained about allied resolve in pursuing the Vietnam war to victory. Victory in Vietnam means, of course, suc- cess in both the political and military spheres and it was on this double aspect of the con- flict that the declaration placed its greatest emphasis. The mission of Vice President HuMrsneEv to Saigon, moreover, is added evidence of this emphasis. As the leaders of South Vietnam stated, the struggle is "a military war, a war for the hearts of the people. We cannot win one without the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution." President Johnson could not have demon- strated his awareness of this better than by his inclusion in the U.S. conference delega- tion of his Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and his Secretary of Agriculture. In other words, the conference placed an appropriately equal emphasis on the future as it did on the present. A "DECLARATION OF FREEDOM" ADOPTED BY 1,500 CUBAN EXILES (Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to ex- tend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous mat- ter.) Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, on Janu- ary 23, 1966, 1,500 Cubans, living in exile, adopted a "declaration of freedom" at a rally held in Key West, Fla. This established another date to be placed in the history and in the hearts of all freedom-loving Cubans. It is altogether fitting that this was done at the San Carlos Club from the same balcony where in 1898 the great Cuban patriot, Jose Marti, turned the course of history by proclaming the ideological basic of a free Cuba from Spanish colonialism. Mr. Speaker, this "declaration of free- dom" is submitted for the attention of my colleagues and should be read by all freedom-loving people throughout the world : DECLARATION OF FREEDOM In the city of Key West, Monroe County, State of Florida, United States of America, we, the Cuban exiles in the United States, in the name of God Almighty, and speak- ing both for ourselves and the oppressed peo- ple in Cuba, the martyr island, do say: That on January 1, 1959, the slavery yoke that came from Europe and was extinguished in Cuba at the end of the 19th century, was resumed. That those responsible for this high trea- son to our fatherland and to our people are just a score of traitors who, usurpating the government of the country have been acting as mercenary agents for the Sino-Soviet im- perialism, and have surrendered to that im- perialism our freedom and our dignity, al:;o betraying the American hemisphere. That as a consequence of this high treason, those who are usurpating the power in Cuba (as they were never elected by the people) . Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, 14plyroved F kM]Ro sAMPfA( 6/ %cl?DPA%]MR000400020001-5 soon became the center of Polish emigra- tion. - The Polish insurgents invited General Kosciuszko to head the rebellion against Russia and offered him command of the Polish national armies. With the news of the insurrection and Russian de- termination to crush it, he hastened to Cracow, where he summoned his people to arm and proclaimed new decrees in favor of the peasants. The Polish patriots led by Kosciuszko defeated the Russians at Raclawice and ably defended Warsaw but were at last overcome by the superior numbers of the enemy. On October 10, 1794, the gal- lant Polish force of 7,000 was almost annihilated by a Russian force over twice as large. General Kosciuszko's valor and heroism in this battle were unsurpassed. Three horses were killed under him as he rode again and again into the thickest of the battle. Finally, seriously wounded and insensible, the heroic general was taken prisoner. As the poet, Campbell, has written, "Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell." Freed by the Russians 2 years later, the Polish patriot traveled to the United States for a brief period and then re- turned to Europe where until his death in 1817 he continued his unceasing efforts for the liberation of Poland. Mr. Speaker, Americans and Poles alike revere the memory of General Kosciuszko for his service to the inde- pendence of our countries. His name is synonymous with one of the noblest causes of all-freedom. His heroism transcends dimensions of time and man- made national boundaries. He is the universal patriot, and to him we pay tribute and from him we gain Inspira- tion-and strength for our own hard fight EXTENSION OF REMARKS of HON. MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS OF MICHIGAN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Speaker, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg stated the case succinctly when he said: The United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is responsible. Commenting on this, the Detroit News said : Ambassador Goldberg laid the blame where it should lie. His temperate and reasoned justification for the indictment won't satisfy the scattered spectrum -of vociferous critics, particularly at home, because hard facts will never satisfy them. In his efforts for peace, the editorial points out President Johnson "halted the bombing >unconditionally, sent 6 special envoys to 34 capitals, contacted more than 115 governments, even directly ap- proached the aggressor, North Viet- nam." It adds: The Reds were asked to show only an inkling of willingness for a negotiated settle- ment so that the guns could be silenced at least temporarily in Asia. For anyone who wishes the facts, he may read this editorial and get them. Because?I thought it a lucid examination A761 what is discussed there can be on commu- nism's terms alone. It appears that if the United Nations is to be blackballed and the conference table denied us and our allies, we shall now have to answer aggression in the only language it permits. of this matter which so vitally concerns The U.S. Tax System and International us all, I offer it to the RECORD for publi- cation. GOLDBERG TAKES U.S. CASE TO U.N., BUT HANOI SPURNS PEACE BID "The United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is responsible." Thus succinctly U.S. Ambassador Arthur H. Goldberg, appearing before the U.N. Se- curity Council, laid the blame where it should lie. His temperate and reasoned justifica- tion for the indictment won't satisfy the scattered spectrum of vociferous critics, par- ticularly at home, because hard facts will never satisfy them. In their dream world they bleat or whine about the United States being an "interna- tional outlaw with blood on its hands"-to quote Senator WAYNE MORSE of Oregon-and they protest it is wicked to pursue peace and at the same time, in the event that the pur- suit fails, to use military power to protect those willing to resist aggression. These oddly assorted critics were given their chance by President Johnson. He tried it their way. He halted the bombing uncon- ditionally, sent 6 special envoys to 34 capi- tals, contacted more than 115 governments, even directly approached the aggressor, North Vietnam. Here was communism's opportunity to prove Mr. Johnson's critics were on sound ground. The Reds were asked to show only an inkling of willingness for a negotiated settlement so that the guns could be silenced at least temporarily in Asia. But what was the outcome? As Goldberg said: "No letup in war activi- ties on the Communist side. No reduction in infiltration into South Vietnam. No re- duction in terror. No reduction in the sup- ply of men or arms during the bombing pause. No willingness to negotiate or even to talk quietly through diplomatic channels with a view to negotiations * * *,absolutely nothing." Goldberg explained how even before the bomb pause was 1 week old, this Nation di- rectly informed Hanoi of the suspension and advised that if Hanoi reciprocated by making a serious contribution toward peace it would have a favorable effect on further extension of the pause. For 30 days after that we waited, to no avail. So, back to the bomb racks we had to go. It was not, however, the end of our pursuit for peace, as Goldberg explained, Recourse to the United Nations opened up "a new di- mension" in that drive, with an offer to both North and South Vietnam to come before the world's only established peacemaking forum and plead their differing causes. But that hope apparently has died, too, Hanoi rejecting as invalid any Security Coun- cil action to settle the war. More, it wouldn't even agree the United Nations should dis- cuss the matter. And on this stand it was backed in the Security Council by the Soviet Relationships EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. AL ULLMAN OF OREGON IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think it is a matter of utmost importance that the United States diligently pursue the possibilities of resolving the many prob- lems of international relationships in the area of taxation. Significant progress has been made in recent years in the number of agreements effected with other nations and in our tax regulations treating income of U.S. for- eign investments and the investments of foreign nationals in this country. Former Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon deserves great credit for initiating many important steps, as does his suc cessor, Henry Fowler, and Assistant Sec- retary Stanley S. Surrey. Mr. Surrey made a significant contribution to better understanding of this complicated prob- lem in a recent symposium of the Tax In- stitute of America. Under unanimous consent I insert his remarks in the RECORD: THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1965-66 (Remarks by Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assist- ant Secretary- of the Treasury, at the Tax Institute of America Symposium, the New York Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y? Thursday, December 2, 1985) About a year ago in a paper presented at Montreal before the Tax Executives Institute, I discussed the U.S. Tax System and Interna- tional Tax Relationships. Since then two in- come tax protocols, with Belgium and Ger- many, were signed and have been ratified by the Senate; three treaties with less developed countries, the Philippines, Thailand, and Israel, have been signed and are pending in the Senate; tentative agreements have been reached with the Netherlands and India; and negotiations are actively being pursued with a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Honduras, Trini- dad, and Tobago, and Taiwan. Since then important regulations and rulings affecting the international alloca- tion of income have been issued and more are in preparation. A comprehensive bill re- vising our statutory income tax treatment of Union and that sour apple of the Western A consideration of these current develop- alliance, De Gaulle's France. ments is now appropriate. I shall divide this The short answer to all this is that North consideration into three parts-income tax Vietnam, the Vietcong, and Red China, that treaties, both, with developed anti less de- giant skulking in the background, don't veloped countries, the administration of mant to talk peace because they don't want peace. Trapped by their own fanaticism U.S. statutory or unilateral treatment of about power in the barrel of a gun being the foreign income, and U.S. statutory or final and only arbiter, they say that if the unilateral treatment of foreigners. Because issue is to be discussed at all, it must be dis- of the length of this paper, I have prepared cussed by the 1954 Geneva accord powers and a summary which precedes the paper. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For ftt" Q5N19 R ~YJP _67FA9q 400020P ii 5ary 16, 190, SUMMARY Income tax treaties 'i'he United States is engaged in an exten.-- sive revision of its Income tax treaties with, developed countries, prompted by the recent changes in the corporated tax systems of the European countries and the adoption in 1963 by the OECD of a model income tax conven.-- Lion. The protocol with Germany ratified recently by the Senate and the tentative pro-- i.ocol with the Netherlands shortly to be :signed illustrate much of the pattern than this revision is taking. This pattern provides a, widened flexibility to international trade and investment activities between the United totes and Europe. The scope of export ac- LiviLies in a treaty country can now be en- larged, for instance, by displays and ware-- houses for the storage or delivery of goods, without subjecting the exporter to a tax in that country. Also, in cases where a firm maintains con- s;iderable commercial or industrial activity in is treaty country and therefore is taxable there on that activity at regular corporate rates, it can at the same time make investments In that country, or establish licensing relation- ships, that will remain subject to the lower rates of tax which treaties provide for invest- ment; and royalty income. Investors, more- over, will generally be free from tax on capi- tal gains arising in a treaty country. In the important matter of withholding rates on dividends paid to parent companies in one treaty country by their subsidiaries in an- other treaty country, the United States is In favor of the low OECD model rate of 5 per- cent, and likewise favors the 15 percent rate on portfolio investment. It also favors the principles that the withholding rates should be nondiscriminatory-in that a country should be willing to offer the same rates to all its treaty partners-and reciprbcai-La that a country should not claim higher treaty rates than the rates it desires us to adopt 1.11 the treaty. 'i' tese concepts cover ground that has been considerably explored in recent years. But the new corporate tax systems present prob- iems less fully mapped. Some of these sys- tems involve integration of the corporate tax with the individual shareholders' taxes on distributed dividends, through credits to these shareholders for the corporate tax. Their structure, by limiting these credits to domestic shareholders in domestic corpor?: Lions, discriminates against both their domes- tic shareholders who invest abroad and the shareholders from abroad who invest in the'.r domestic corporations. The OECD conver..- Lion does not fully meet these problems, and therefore in analytic framework for their ssoltition is needed. Such a framework should be rested, as far as possible, on two basic concepts: (irsi, the concept of long-range neutrality in a country's tax system between those of its investors who invest at home and those who invest abroad: and second, the concept of nondiscrimination in a country's tax system between its investors at home and Investors from abroad. 'T'hese treaties, under the pressure of nego- Linting problems and inevitable differences :among countries and negotiators, will not always exhibit uniformity in phrasing and a.rrangemciat. apart from substantive differ- ences. 'T'here is therefore clearly a need i o clarify the disuniformity-to state through regulations or otherwise when and to what extent different phrases and different ap- proaches in various treaties, or even the same treaty, really embody differences in end re- sult and are so intended. The United States intends to improve its regulations in re- i.ponse to this need. The United States is also engaged in an extensive program of negotiations to obtain is network of treaties with less developed countries. We believe that such treaties significantly improve the trade, investments, and cultural relationships between. the United States and these countries. Many of the European nations are also engaged in similar efforts. While these new less devel- oped country treaties in many provisions fol- low those with developed countries, there are quite significant differences arising from the fact that the investment and trade flows from the United States to these countries is generally much larger than the reperse flows. As a. consequence, and also in the light of the revenue problems of these countries, the re- ductions in withholding rates on .:vestment income and royalties in these tree ies do not always match those in the develop' cl country treaties. There also is pressure ti, widen the def,nition of permanent establis:merit and thus contract the area if tradin; activities free from tax in these countries In addi- tion, since the restrictions on fixation by the source country that do emerac in. these treaties bear in a revenue sense m,.re heavily on the less developed countries, ::?.ich coun- tries seek some provisions on the t)art of the developed countries that can be regarded as an encouragement to investment In them. The European nations have responded through provisions reducing the burden of their taxes on income flowing 'nook from these investments, either through en exemp- tion or adoption of tax-sparing credits. The United States, emphasizing instc:.d the en- couragement to the investment itself at the time that it is being considered by the U.S. taxpayer. is responding through extending to :investment In less developed treaty countries the 7-percent credit now in our law for investment at home. This 7-percent treaty credit extends to investments of cash and tangible property. A complementary provision offers encouragement to the in- vestment of technical assistance, through deferring tax in both countries where in- tangible assets, such as patents. processes or know-how, are exchanged by a U.S. in- vestor for stock in a corporation in the less developed country. We believe that extension of '.lie invest- ment credit is appropriate only where the other country is receptive to our investment and where its tax system, taken as a whole rind in the light of any modificr,Lions made in the treaty, does not involve measures that can be regarded as significantly working at cross-purposes with this investment. This negotiating approach on our part, has met with an affirmative response by the less de- veloped countries. The Subcommittee of the Sena'.e Commit- tee on Foreign Relations has performed a useful public service in holding foil hearings on. one of these new treaties, the Thailand Treaty. The published hearing:- contain a complete technical explanation o[ the treaty and a description of factors affecting nego- tiations with less developed countries. Necessarily, as experience is gained, the present pattern that has so far evolved in our negotiations with less developed coun- tries can be improved. The progress of these negotiations is encouraging, for it indicates that the United States and these countries can reach a, treaty arrangement that each regards as fair and conducive t-u improved investment, trade, and cultural relation- chips. This attitude and the promise it holds for a growing network of i;ax treaties represent a major step in our political and economic relationships with these countries. Administration of U.S. statutory taxation of foreign income-Allocation of income and section 487 The Importance of developing a sound administration of the U.S. statutory taxation of foreign income is matched by t,tie formida- ble nature of the task: The field is relatively new as tax matters go, and the needed ex- perience, analysis of detail, and ;ynthesis of concepts are still In a formative stage; the international business activities to which the rules relate are rapidly expanding in Impor- tance and number, and thus the variety of transactions and business relationships in- volved steadily increases; the tax rules more- over are constantly being buffeted by the shifting exigencies of balance-of-payment; problems. But all of this merely under- scores the challenge of the task, and th Treasury is seeking to respond in a fitting manner. The Treasury regards as the matter pres- ently having major priority the establish- ment of a satisfactory framework for thu administration of the rules governing trans- actions between the domestic and foreign units of our business companies. .In our tax parlance, this centers on the application of section 482 of our code, au- thorising the Commissioner to allocate in- come, deductions, and credits between re- lated units of an enterprise so as to prevent evasion or clearly reflect the income of the various units. The variety and number of transactions in the foreign area that lie within the reach of the section have over- strained the level of technical development that had been achieved in the earlier domes- tic application of the section. The situation thus calls for a many-faceted implementa- tion of the section so that it may carry the new burden placed on it. Several steps have already been token. The first, in revenue procedure 6.1- 54, achieved an orderly treatment of controver- sies that had arisen for years prior to 19133 by permitting taxpayers to offset--against any increase in U.S. taxes occasioned by an adjustment under this section allocating additional income to the U.S. unit of the enterprise--the foreign taxes paid on the in- come involved and thus to avoid double taxation. In addition, the revenue proce- dure stated that the Internal Revenue Serv- ice would not pursue for those years adjust- ments based on applications of section 482 not clearly required by its previous technical development. Through Its achievement of an orderly treatment of the pre-1963 ears and the consequent very marked reduction in number and dollar amount of deficiencies under the section for those years, this rev- enue procedure has permitted the ncecieci technical development of the section to pro- ceed in an atmosphere free of acrimonious disputes that would otherwise have existed. The second step, in revenue procedure 6:1- 17, provides rules governing the transfer of income between foreign subsidiary and U.4. parent intended to reflect an adjustment correcting an understatement of the parent's income, as where it charged too low a price for goods sold to the subsidiary or rendered services to it for an inadequate fee. The principal impact of these rules is to permit broad flexibility in fitting the section 4112 adjustment into a proper position within the flow of funds from the foreign subsidiary and its dividend pattern. This removes inn- pediments to the orderly repatriation of funds from. the subsidary and makes it possi- ble for the taxpayer to accept the adjustment without increasing the transfer of income from subsidiary to parent more than it con- siders desirable. These procedural steps set the stage for the development of appropriate guidelines for the substantive application of section 482. To this end the Treasury has already issued detailed proposed regulations covering transactions where assets or services of a U.S. parent are made available to its foreign subsidiary--where money Is lent, where man- agement or other services are rendered, where machinery and other tangible assets are made available. Essentially the approach is to offer taxpayers a safe conduct pass through section 482 through guidelines, based on the costs incurred by the parent and an alloca- tion of those costs to the subsidiary in a manner that follows accepted accounting precedents outside the tax field. The second set of proposed regulations, now in prepa- ration and far more difficult to develop, will Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 78 Approved F? (0 599 2*ZEV_6A H0 0 k ebr2WrJ 16, 1966 The effectiveness of this treaty led to the years. But they have been fast disappearing Vietnam Discussion development of a similar agreement with as Burkburnett, spurred by its women citi- Mexico, concluded in 1936. zens, presses on with the library and other EXTENSION OF REMARKS projects. The population is rising. In the past de- or cade, Burkburnett has doubled its ppula- HON. LESTER L. WOLFF enrollm ent. Your Town May Just Need Stirring Up tion tripled g, and business from Sh pp d OF NEW YORK Air Force Base give stability to the economy. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EXTENSION OF REMARKS It was spring in January the day I landed of at the Wichita Falls Airport. On the 15-mile Wednesday, February 16, 1966 drive to Burkburnett, I heard about some of Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, during this HON. GRAHAM PURCELL its accomplishments. OF TEXAS There was a cleanup week (November 8- period of discussion on the whole range 15) with Joe Salter, chairman of the civic of problems associated with the Vietnam IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES improvement committee and vice president conflict some very excellent appraisals of Wednesday, February 16, 1966 of the Community Service Council, in charge. the situation have been made. I respect- On November 11, schoolchildren were given fully include in the RECORD the following Mr. PURCELL. Mr. Speaker, every a half holiday and furnished litter bags with editorial from the Long Island Press person who has the opportunity to visit which they cleared the streets. High school about the views of former Ambassador Burkburnett, Tex., is impressed by the students worked by classes on assigned George Kennan, and commend it to the aggressiveness and activity in that areas; the seniors won the student council attention of this distinguished body: community. award for the best job. Burkburnett offers ample evidence of Members of the ministerial alliance man- NEITHER DOVE NOR HAWK ned tractors to mow vacant lots. Members George Kennan, our former Ambassador to the old rule that "communities that pull of the men's clubs cleared downtown streets Moscow and one-time chairman of State De- together get things done." and alleys. partment policy planning, did the Nation a Recently the Christian Science Mont- As we swung into town through an under- great service last week in his testimony at tor told the story of Burkburnett'S proj- pass, one of my hostesses apologized for beer a Senate airing of Vietnam policy. He made ects which are being entered in the 1964- cans and other roadside litter. Burkburnett the point, too often lost in the passion of 65 community improvement program itself is dry by local option, she said, but this debate, that we have to be neither doves, beer is available in nearby towns. Boy Scouts hightailing it away from danger, nor hawks, ored by of Wom omen's s Clubs the and and the eal Sears, Roebuck Federation pebuck are trying to cope with the nuisance and do swooping down on the enemy. We can be W the clearing-up, but soon the police will step wise old owls-or better yet, reasonable, Foundation. In, realistic human beings. To those interested in learning what At the home of Mayor James E. Frye, some Surrender? Of course not, said Kennan. an outstanding community can do to of the clubwomen talked of their projects 'Precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could make itself a better place to live, I com- while Mrs. Frye, the steering-committee represent in our present circumstances a mend the following article: chairman, served hot-mulled cranberry and disservice to our own interests and even to [From the Christian Science Monitor, pineapple juice and sandwiches. world peace greater than any that might LIBRARY PUSHED have been involved in our failure to engage Jan. 26, 1968 ] ourselves in the first place: ' YOUR TOWN MAY JUST NEED STIRRING UP "The most important thing for us," said On the other hand, he doubted that even BURKBURNETT, TEx.-When high school Mrs. Frye, "is to have a real cross section the most formidable military successes would of our town in this, said we have. No one bring about "the complete disappearance of of students must travel 15 miles to the nearest group or individual is doing it." the recalcitrants with which we are faced, library to study for exams, your town's in a Membership in the Community Service adversaries our formmilal and the c submission by y the realization es bad way. Council extends to two rural home-demon- the Facing such a dilemma, citizens of Burk- stration clubs and the nearby Clara-Fair- our present stated political aims." mlete Burnett decided library was first among view organized rural community. Claude If we have such difficulty in tiny Vietnam, a many town needs. The Council of Feder- ated Study Clubs, of which Mrs. F. M. Mc- Adams, Clara-Fairview president, is chair- just think of the formidable task in impos- Murtry is president, saw those needs, entered man of board. the Burkburnett library committee jing our will on 700 million Chinese. To "dig in and wait" for a political solu- last community improvement program (CIP) "I've lived here all my life," said Mrs. tion to emerge, as Mr. Kennan suggested, is last February, and called a communitywlde meeting at the town hall. Philip Carpenter, first and only woman on the Burkburnett City Council, "and we've essentially what we are doing in Asia. And we have followed Eheop are d policy we 1945, a followed High school students as well as their elders never had a library-always had to go 15 it Is essentially the were on hand for the meeting. miles to Wichita Falls." successfully himself. icy are e b by rop Mr. Kennan degree, not in himself. "We will make enough patrons to justify The library committee did research on largely differences lshaped the library," said the students. They were the choice of a site, funds available, and r !Mr. Kennan's inlsubs inc articulate. They still are and they take standards. They visited other libraries and whether it be rGavin's . Ken enclaves or Lyndon active part in Burkburnett's community consulted with the Texas State librarian in wJohnson's James more aggressive, yet es or Lyndon projects. The student council is among the Austin. kind of s mor limited, war. . 40 organizations represented on the Com- "Many of our first ideas had to be re- We can profit from the long experience of munity Service Council. vised," the women told me. "Our park cold war confrontation in Europe and apply The Community Service Council was orga- would not be an ideal site. The library some of its lessons to the hotter war in nized by the steering committee appointed couldn't be successfully Operated by vol- Asia. The hawks and the doves were busy at the initial meeting. Having no pattern unteers. We knew that what we got we'd in Europe, too, with one side urging us to for the new council, Burkburnett cut its have to live with a long time. If we were destroy the other to embrace the Soviets. own. Mrs. Marjorie Kauer wrote the consti- going to have a library we'd have to think But the Russian bear dies hard, as Hitler tution and bylaws. big." discovered even before atom bombs; and his Like many another community, Burk- At this point things happened. Mr. and embrace can be a fatal hug, as hundreds of burnett's big need was for citizens to pull Mrs. Walter Bohner gave a lot opposite 4thousands in East Europe well know. together. That they had not done so until Town Hall with a frame building, their We took-and still take-neither course. recently might perhaps be explained in part former family home. They also gave $1,000. Instead, we built up our allies in West by the town's history. Many other donations have since come in. Europe and drew lines beyond which we When Burkburnett was incorporated in The old house will be removed to an ad- made it clear Russia must not tread-in 1907, there was an oil well in every back joining lot. Meanwhile, architect's plans Greece, in Iran, in Turkey, in Berlin and in yard, and water sold for more than oil. A have been approved for an $84,000 library Cuba. We dug in and we waited and now decade later came World War i and an oil building. The city will vote on a $42,000 each day, the prospect of war in Europe boom. Remember the movie "Boom Town"? bond issue to be matched by State funds. grows less and less likely. Burkburnett was that town. Its population "A bunch Of little people trying to do big A millenium? Utopia? Detente, even? soared to 30,000 but slumped back to 5,000 things," some people said at first. But now Of course not. We will have profound differ- when peace came and ended the boom. that they see things shaping up they've ences with Russia and will for years to come. POPULATION CLIMBING changed their Opinions. Everybody is be- There can be, as Mr. Kennan said of Vietnam, Old shacks and store buildings remained hind the project. "no happy way out of this conflict." What co- as shabby reminders of the vanished pros- "People's attitude is wonderful," said exwe have ist nee,hndthncin1945 is a s de facto nor perity. A few of them survived over the Mr. Adams. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 1+'ebritary 1 E;, x~g~roved F(~NG ~SI~) VAL RECORD D A PPElNDIX 00400020001-5 sifted by the Department of Agriculture as Government-financed programs, the $1.669 billion rises to $2.605 billion. This will leave $3.599 billion as truly commer- cial competitive exports of agricultural products in the 1964-65 fiscal year in- stead of $4.426 billion-,see table 3, page 15, of the above cited Department of Ag- riculture Publication. Migratory Bird Treaty Stamp." Requests must be postmarked not later than March 16. Migratory Bird Treaty BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 50TH An aivFR- SARY OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA By 1910 it was apparent that the effects of year-round hunting of migratory birds with improved firearms for both s HON. JOHN D. DINGELL OI' MICHIGAN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATI VhS pur . and This leaves a considerably less brilliant Wednesday, February 16. 1966 commerce. coupled with the vagaries of accomplishment. No doubt we could ex- Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant uealtlher and the demands of an expanded port well above $6 billion in agricultural to populace w were daracteriz tithe rr n- per111ission granted I insert into the the abundance which characterized the frnn products if we first, sold more for foreign Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD tier era. currencies under title I, Public Law 480; a release from the 31st North American It was also evident to the leading eon- second, moved more exports under fam- Wildlife & Natural Resources Conference servationists of the time that this was a ine and emergency relief under title II to be held in the Hilton Hotel, Pitts- matter of national concern which would not. of Public Law 480; third, increased for- burgh, Pa., March 14-16, 1.966, at which be met by individual actions of the several eign donations under section 416, Agri- time an announcement will be made of States. culture Act of 1.949 and section 302, Pub- the establishment of a Migratory Bird on August 16, 1916, the Convention Ile- tic Law 480; and fourth, and offered more Treaty Stamp to celebrate the 50th an- tween the United States and Great Bri rain for the ;hipmerfts under barter programs-CCC niversary of the signing of the Migratory United StProtecon of ates and Canadadwas gr ed ill The the Charter Act: section 303, Public Law 480; Bird Treaty between the United States, treaty was ratified later that year and pro- and so so forth. Great Britain, and Canada. claimed by President Wilson on December But if we did so we would not advance This was one of the great milesiones 8, 1916. It remains a unique action among by one iota the competitive capacity of of American conservation and wildlife nations In dealing with wildlife protection this country in foreign markets. This history and it is highly appropriate that and preservation, It was an extrawrdi:nary t is a matter of production costs, and giv- treaty ne sovereign nations when i the announcement be made at that line. Was signed ween d and remains so after 50 years. cogu a away agricultural plonuc does not Also inserted into the RECORD is back- This treaty afforded international pro-of produ ends reduce costs because of tn. It hight er tax ground information on the 50th anni- tection for the first time to named migra- aise them of the Migratory Bird Treaty tory game and nongame birds common to burden created. with Great Britain and Canada made both Canada and the United States and Mr. Speaker, the false impression ere- available by the Wildlife Management made each nation responsible for enacting ated by the inclusion of subsidized farm Institute, one of the outstanding wildlife its own laws to implement the treaty provi- products in our exports and shipments and conservation organizations in the sions. under Public Law 480, and so forth, is United States. Nine families of migratory game bird:, and matched b an th y o er statistical practice that is equally pernicious in its effects. I refer to what has been called the f.o.b.- c.i.f. distortion. All the other leading trading nation,,; report their imports on the c.i.f. basis. This merely means that they record the true cost of the goods im- Ported by adding to the foreign price, the cost of shipping; and insurance incident to bringing the goods to their ports of entry. What is our practice? We leave off these charges and record the value of our imports at their foreign price, point of export. If anyone believes this to be a minor matter he should compare the Price of an automobile at Its f.o.b. De- troit level and what the cost would be if he took delivery several thousand miles away. Prom calculations made on the basis of actual import and export statistics of this country in its trade with England and Japan, it seems safe to say that our imports from these countries are under- valued from 20 to 25 percent for the rea- sson just set forth. This represents a se- lious distortion, and we should review all our import statistics with this distortion in mind. Surely we cannot base our trade noli- 'T'he material follows: .aa iauuues 01 Insectivorous and other non- game species are under its protection. Mi- M1.:,RATORY BIRD TREATY STAMP To Be I:,;t;ED gratory waterfowl, and the recreation these AT WILDLIFE. CONFERENCE birds afford have particularly benefited A new 5-cent postage stamp comrnem, ~rat_ from the treaty. tog the 50th anniversary of the signing of The direct and indirect effects of the treaty the Mi t B r and the resulting national legislation to im- plement it have been much broader than those envisioned by the proponents of the treaty. This international agreement has affected legislation and regulations of nut of the States. More than 230 waterfowl refuges and over 45 general migratory bird refuges comprising over 2 million acres have been acquired or set aside by the U.S. Government in addi- tion to nearly 100 'waterfowl production areas comprising over 100,000 acres. A broad pro- gram of migratory bird research costing over $1,800,000 anually has developed in the De- partment of the Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. An International Bird Banding Center at Laurel, Md., is the focal point of a single system of bird banding on the continent. Here records are :maintained on automatic data processing systems which support studies of migratory birds by both grotes- sionals and amateurs. g ~aory ire Treaty that provides uni- form protection for migratory birds in the United States and Canada will be issued on March 16 at Pittsburgh, Pa. The staamp- is,aiance ceremony will be held in conjauic- tiol with the 31st North American. Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, winch will be held at the Pittsburgh Hilton B,.>tel, March 14-16, under the sponsorship of the W:lldlife Management Institute. Described as a starkly modern artwork, the horizontal stamp features two birds in white outline, one flying north, the other south, at the Canadian border. Canada Is red; the United States blue; the Great Lakes a lighter blue. At the top in a white panel appears An International. Migratory Bird Commit- tee, consisting of an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and an Assistant Secretary of kilt, Interior for the United States, and the t'a- nadian Director of Agriculture and Canad: 'a Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and N;:- in black capitals "Migratory Bird Treaty/ 1916 United States-Canada 1966." The words "U.S. Postage Five Cents" appear in back in a white panel at the bottom. The Migratory Bird Treaty was signer; in Washington, D.C., by Sir Cecil Arthur Spring and Secretary of State Robert Lansing on August 16. 11916. President Woodrow WiLoia, after receiving the advice and consent of the Senate, proclaimed the treaty Deeembe: 8, 1916. Tae treaty observed that "ninny sneeie': or iutlat we have been doing. Lions traverse certain parts of the United tional Resources, was formed in 1961 to give Dominion m rnai._ It has been estimated that in place of a any of and these the are of great Canada; luc that as agement of migratory birdsontineutal ;5.2 billion surplus in our exports over a source of food or in destroying insects which Four flyway councils, consisting of Slate imports for 1965 as reported recently by are injurious to forests and forage plants and Provincial officials, give continuing at- the Department Of Commerce we actu- * as well as to agricultural crops * ` " tention to the welfare of migratory water - .Llly ran a deficit of about $2 billion, when but are nevertheless in danger of exterr.ii- fowl. Cooperation among these councils, the Life figures are corrected by the guides nation through lack of adequate protection Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, aria I have set forth above. during the nesting season or while on their the Canadian Wildlife Service provide for the way to and from their breeding grounds ' most comprehensive annual surveys and cor:- I am very anxious to see this statistical Collectors desiring first day canceilati,,ns tinned studies of migratory birds in the practice corrected as soon as possible and may send addressed envelopes, together with world. ^.nl introducing appropriate legislation to remittance to cover the cost of the stani'pa The Canadian Government carries out. re- Ghat end. I urge all who are concerned to be affixed, to the Postmaster, Pittsburgh, search, establishes hunting regulations, aund about a sound foreign, trade policy to Pa., 15219, Send money order or certified provides law enforcement in Its implement;, take an interest In this matter and to check only. The envelope to the Postmaster tion of the treaty. Canada also is embark- ;support the legislation. shotld be endorsed. "First Day covers 5-edit log on a wetlands preservation program. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, _I9~i~ved Fo2~Qg/6L2EF&-WP67~11fT0400020001-5 impossible victory, but the difficult and painful sharing of a crowded planet with disagreeable neighbors. This is what we seem to be up to in Asia. Just last Friday Peiping screamed that the Soviets have joined the United States, India, and Japan in forming a "ring of encircle- ment" around Red China-not de facto co- existence but de facto containment. We do not, however, share Mr. Kennan's misgivings over the Honolulu Conference. There are many ways-none without risk- to wage limited war. Honolulu was basically an extension of how Lyndon Johnson chooses to do it. Instead of just digging in, we are trying to pressure the enemy to the peace table. And, at the same time we are trying, sad to say, belatedly to improve the political and social climate so that we can put to work the gains of the battlefield. It is a difficult and dubious path. But this is a difficult and dubious world that seldom offers perfect, absolute answers. School Milk Program EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I wish to serve notice that I am very much opposed to the administration plans to slash funds for the school milk program. During the last fiscal year this program benefited more than 90,000 schools and child care institutions. The amount appropriated for the special milk program during the current fiscal year was $103 million. According to the Milk Industry Foundation, the school milk program and the national school lunch program accounted for the usage of nearly 3 billion pounds of milk. If the milk had not been used it would probably have been acquired by the Com- modity Credit Corporation where at pres- ent support prices it would have cost the taxpayers exactly the same amount of money as was required to finance this program which is so highly beneficial to the nourishment and health of American schoolchildren. Mr. Speaker, it makes very little sense to fund new expenditures and untried programs which cost many millions of dollars more and then penalize a tried and true program like the special milk program or the school lunch program. I am amazed that an administration which professes to be so interested in fighting the war against poverty and in doing something about school dropouts is so shortsighted in its approach to these problems. Furthermore, as a Rep- resentative from an area where dairying constitutes an important part of the farmers' cash income, I am distressed that the Government's false economy will result in a curtailment of the con- sumption of milk. There are so many other areas in which savings could be accomplished without sacrificing the health and welfare of the schoolchildren of America. Connecticut's Highway Commissioner Ives EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. WILLIAM L. ST. ONCE OF CONNECTICUT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. ST. ONGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to insert into the RECORD the- text of an article published in the Hartford Courant, in the issue of February 7, 1966, about Connecticut's highway commissioner, Howard S. Ives. . Commissioner Ives, who resides at North Stonington, Conn., in my district, has devoted a lifetime of service to the State highway department dating back to 1917. He started as a rodman and was appointed commissioner in 1959 by the then Gov. Abraham A. Ribicoff. Com- missioner Ives has been nationally Honored for his work on highway beauti- fication and is regarded as one of our most safety-minded road engineers and experts. The article about Commissioner Ives not only tells us about the man and his accomplishments over the years, but also his views and outlook on life, his char- acter and his fine qualities. I am de- lighted to count him among my friends. The article reads as follows: HOWARD S. IVES: MAN IN MIDDLE OF THE ROADS (By James J. Devaney) State Highway Commissioner Howard S. Ives is the man in the middle. Everyone agrees the State needs roads, but no one wants the road to go through his house. Ives has been nationally honored for his work on highway beautification-and his name arouses ire among lovers of Bushnell and East Rock Parks. He is noted as one of the most safety- minded engineers ever to head the depart- ment-and is criticized for allegedly danger- ous crossovers on 1-91 in Hartford. CONSCIOUS OF COMPLAINTS Ives is acutely conscious of the complaints, but he points out, "I'm charged with running a department, carrying out the mandate of the legislature-to build facilities with the funds made available. "We're not a bunch of firebreathers, but we have to keep our minds on the goal-to put these facilities where they will do the most good for the most people, and we can't deviate from that." He feels many critics would remain silent "if people would only realize the extremes we go to to insure safe, economical and engineeringwise sound roads. "What people don't realize," he continues, "is you can pick up a newspaper in Provi- dence, or Talahassee, or just about anywhere else and find the same complaints. But these roads are the work of the best engi- neering minds in the country." But Ives has a real concern for people af- fected by new highways. One of his aids said "I've seen him leave meetings and take off to some little town in a far corner of the State to investigate some complaint per- sonally." Ives comments "One of the most painful things in the department is the displace- ment of people. It tears us apart, but we do A779 what we have to do under the law, as fairly and humanely as possible." Discussing the charge that highways de- stroy natural beauty spots Ives says "People think of ruthless destruction as they see the bulldozers, earthmovers, and trucks. But this ruthlessness-these earthmovers-are to the engineer a sign of progress. CITES GOALS "This ugliness is temporary. The goal is a highway. Two roads divided by a median. Something planned and executed very care- fully. "The landscape engineer is active in every phase of construction. We try to design a highway so it looks as if it belongs there. "When we put a road through woodland or countryside, conservationists complain. But we've enabled thousands of people to enjoy that area who never had a chance to do so before. "As a conservationist, I look at a tree, and know how long it took to grow it and that it is a beautiful thing. As a safety man, I hate trees-those near the pavement-be- cause people can run off the road and kill themselves." Much of the superhighway activity in the State since Ives took office July 1, 1959, has been concentrated in the Hartford area. "We talk about the population explosion, and it's a real thing," Ives said. 1-91 was de- signed several years ago with the 1970 popu- lation in mind. Now we're designing for 1990 and 2000." Ives continues "The Hartford highway complex isn't complete. It won't really work until 1-291 is complete." 1-291 is the link between 1-91 and 1-84 which will give Hart- ford a belt highway system. Discussing criticism of 1-91 and its link to the city and over the bridges of the city Ives says "There isn't anything that has been done that can't be corrected-and will be corrected; only minor changes are needed. "The fact that we've made some changes in signs and movement is not a sign of bad design. We know that one of the worst troubles is that people drive too darn fast. "No one in the department will make ex- cuses for anything we do. If we make mis- takes, we say so, and correct them. We don't make the same mistake twice." LOVES BRIBGES He sums up: "All I'm trying to do is run the highway department. And when some- one says 'Ives, go home,' I'll go home, but I want to leave a heritage of highways. "Outside of my family and my country, this has been my life." Born in New Haven, July 31, 1900, Ives grew up in Norwich, where he attended lo- cal schools and planned his future. And he knew what he wanted to do. "I can't remember when I didn't want to build bridges. I read every book on bridges I could get my hands on, starting when I was about 10 years old. "If there's anything I love to do it is to build bridges. A bridge is something alive and beautiful. If I could do what I want to do. I'd be building bridges, not sitting here." Ives started his career with the highway department as a rodman with a survey crew in the summer of 1917. One of his cherished possessions now is a plaque which reads "From rodman to commissioner." "That's the story of my life," he says. He worked for the department until 1922, and after various engineering positions and his qualifications as a professional engineer in 1925, he returned to the department in 1927, and started his rise through the ranks. And he helped build bridges-the Middle- town-Portland Bridge,.the Housatonic River Bridge connecting the Merritt and Wilbur Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R00040002Q0 1-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX , e b ruary 16, 1 k Cross Parkways between Milford and Strat- lord; the Charter Oak Bridge; Gold Star Memorial Bridge over the Thames between New London and Groton, and the Raymond is'. Baldwin Bridge over the Connecticut be- tween Old Saybrook and Old Lyme. CITES FAVORITE His favorite was the Arrigoni Bridge in Middletown. "It was the first big bridge on which I was project engineer, and the first high level bridge in Connecticut. Fortu- nately, everything came together right, or I'd be living in Mexico." Ives was appointed deputy highway com- missioner in July 1955, and concentrated on organizing the department for the comple- tion of the Connecticut Turnpike, and the development of a division of research and development within the department. He resigned in 1956 to become general manager of the Edward Balf Co. of Hartford, but returned to the department when he was appointed State highway commissioner by Gov. ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF in 1959. Between the time he took office July 1, 1959 and June 30, 1965, the Department spent more than $600 million for about 223 miles of new highways. In addition to his career as an engineer, Ives managed an active military career. He enlisted as a private in the Connecticut Army National Guard in 1938. when he was 38 years old. "I went for a year's active training, and it stretched to more than 5 years," he said. "I like it, but I didn't care too much for the spit and polish." Eves served as an engineer officer both in the Pacific and In Europe during World War It. He was recalled to active duty during the Korean war, but to his chagrin, instead of being sent to Korea, he wound up com- manding the antiaircraft defenses of Balti- more, Md. "Tt bothers me that I had to retire a few years ago, and I cant' get into this one," he comments. Ives retired in 1957 as a brigadier general. ?i::RIES OFBOATS Tves and his wife, the former Caroline Wallen of Norwich. live at Long Pond, North ,3 ton, in a former summerhouse they Stoning converted to year-round as a family project after World War If. Ile lists his hobbies as his eight grandchil- dren and boating. His boat the "Kitty Hig- ,ins VI," is a cruiser rigged for sport fishing. Ives explains "Kitty Higgins" was a nick- name he first gave his wife--it was the name of a comic strip character. Ives has had five boats--"Kitty Higgins II" was his jeep in Europe during World Wax II. Tve:; is acutely aware that his position is a hot spot. "People ask me 'Why do you stick to it?' I don't know. Every 3 months or so I say 'I'd better go home.' But I don't, and I don't want to. I just hope I know enough to go home when finally I should." OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in behalf of the Lithuanian people, who 48 years ago, at Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, pro- claimed their independence after over a century of Russian rule and went for- ward as a free nation, achieving a high level of economic and social prosperity. Tragically, this taste of freedom was brief. It was only a little over two dec- ades after the establishment of inde- pendence that Lithuania once more be- came the victim of her overpowering neighbor. The totalitarian might of the Soviet Union has since been used to ex- terminate any sense of Lithuanian na- tionhood. Despite oppression, the :Lith- uania.n people continue to resist tyran- ny and attempt to preserve their heritage of freedom. Today, our prayer and hope is that this proud nation of people dedicated to the cause of liberty throughout their his- tory will once again join the family of free nations. We honor these people on this 48th anniversary of their independ- ence and join with all Americans of Lithuanian descent in renewing our de- votion to the cause of freedom and jus- tice. OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, success in fulfilling our commitments in Viet- nam is now within reach. The following column by Roscoe Drummond, which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of February 9, 1966, gives a, realistic estimate of the war situ- ation and I commend it to the attention of our colleagues: CONG FORCES WANINGS: A VIETNAM PEFORT- WE'RE ON WINNING TRACK (By Roscoe Drummond) WASHINGTON.-What is the most reliable and realistic estimate of how the war is go- ing in Vietnam? Are we losing? Are we just holding on? Are we hopelessly stale- mated? Are we making solid headway to- ward victory? It is the purpose of this column to re- port the overall trend of the fighting in Vietnam--arid to cite the evidence. It is based on information and judgment of peo- ple, some only just returned from Saigon, whom I consider trustworthy and objective. Here are the essential elements: 1. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are being hurt-and hurt badly. The extent to which the enemy is hurting is only how becoming evident. 7,. Hanoi's whole timetable and Strategy of conquest is out of gear. Vietcong "vic- tories" during the monsoons last year were to enable the Vietcong to take the offensive. Captured North Vietnamese prisoners say they were told they were being sent south just "to wrap it up." It isn't happening that way. Vietcong morale is deteriorating and Hanoi radio is bracing its troops for a "long, bard war." 3. There is absolutely no defeatism among the highest U.S. officials (military, political, and economic) who are on the scene in Viet- nam. They are confident that the independ- ence of South Vietnam can and will be se- cured. 4. No easy or early victory is expected. Hard fighting, perhaps harder than we have thus feu' experienced, may lie ahead. There is no basis for airy, blue-sky optimism. But success is within reach. Here are some pertinent facts. Troop strength: During 1965, U.S. military manpower rose from 23,000 to 181,000 and will expand further. South Vietnamese armed forces increased from 560,000 to 679,- 000. Enemy military strength rose from 103,000 to 230,000. Losses in battle: Enemy troops killed in battle in 1965 totaled 34,000, with 6,000 cap- tured-a 100-percent increase in losses over 1964. U.S. losses were slightly more than 1,300 in 1965, South Vietnamese losses were 11,000. Where Vietcong is hurting. In-depth interviews with several hundred Vietcong prisoners and defectors, carried out by ex- perts independent of any government agency, reveal: That Vietcong forces are thrown badly off balance because B-52 bombers constantly keep them on the run, preventing them from resting and regrouping. They complain: "There is no longer any place to hide." That the Vietcong is increasingly losing the support of the villagers and peasant., who have hid them in the past. They are losing it through terror and taxes. The vil- lagers mostly blame the Vietcong for the air attacks which their presence brings. The Vietcong are so short of manpower they are impressing 15-year-olds and young women into armed service. The Vietcong prisoners complain of heavy losses in combat, and North Vietnamese pris- oners admit they were misled by Hanoi, which had assured them that U.S. soldiers would be soft and couldn't fight against guerrillas. The great majority of prisoners say that most have now come to believe the Vietcong can't win the war. It is clear that there is a feeling among quite a few Americans in the United States that we can't win. I am convinced that the evidence is on the side that we can win, are winning, and will win. The confidence and stamina of our men on the battlefront deserves to be matched by confidence and stamina on the homefront. Operation Trading Stamps: Community Service EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. RICHARD L. OTTINGER OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call our colleague's atten- tion to the wonderful community service which has been performed by one of my constituents, Mr. Al Reid, of Yonkers. N.Y. Mr. Reid is the publisher of the Illus- trated News, a weekly newspaper in Yonkers and. for more than 2 years he has collected over 400,000 trading stamps. He has redeemed these stamps and has distributed more than 2,000 toys, games, and other comforting items to hospitals, convalescent centers, chil- dren's homes, homes for the aged and other deserving institutions. Recently the Peoples Savings Bank of Yonkers contributed 10,000 trading stamps to Mr. Reid's project. These stamps, in turn. were translated into a dozen toys and games which were presented to the chil- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Feltr^ ary 16, 10Proved Wle RQPhf PP @2000400020001-5 A781 dren's ward at St. John's Riverside Hos- pital it is with great pleasure that I join with Al Reid's friends and neighbors in honoring his outstanding service to the community. Metropolitan Dade County's Pioneering Traffic Court EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL OF FLORIDA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, since July 1, 1959, Dade County, Fla., has had a new and effective traffic court. This court has done an outstanding job in helping Greater Miami deal with the problems caused by a steadily increasing number of cars and trucks on our high- ways. It has had a marked effect on safety and, in the 61/2 years of its oper- ation, has proved to be one of the finest and most effective courts in the Nation. I wish to call the attention of our col- leagues to a most informative article. concerning the court in this month's is- sue of American County Government, by the distinguished mayor of Metropolitan Dade County, Charles Hall. The article follows: FEWER ACCIDENTS AIM OF A PIONEERING TRAFFIC COURT (By Mayor Charles Hall) The metropolitan court of Dade County, Fla., has been recognized as the best in its field nationally. Winner of 10 national awards since it was established in 1957, the court received 5 from the American Bar Association for establishment of a model court and its continued progress. Metro court jurisdiction includes all cases arising under county ordinances adopted by the metro commission. It may punish for contempt; impose fines not exceeding $1,000; commit offenders to the county jail; and issue bench warrants. If the offense is pun- ishable by a fine exceeding $500 or imprison- ment of more than 60 days, the accused can demand a jury trial. The court, which tries all traffic offenses in Dade County, is based on the underlying con- cepts of traffic safety through driver educa- tion and uniform laws and treatment. The objectives of metro court are to in- crease respect for traffic laws and to con- tribute to the total community effort re- quired to reduce traffic accidents. The main tool in this all-out campaign is not the fear of having to pay a heavy fine but the educa- tion of the violator. After bing in metro court, many motorists say they hadn't realized the importance of traffic laws or the dignity in which the court conducts itself, Such statements are a pleas- ant contrast to those charging that many traffic courts are mere fine-collecting agencies with no concern for justice or correction. Before metro court was established, the quality of justice ranged from excellent to terrible in the 27 municipal traffic courts. Small cities were unable to afford proper fa- cilities or full-time judges. Twenty-seven different sets of regulations made knowledge of the driving laws almost impossible. Result? A deterioration of the driving pub- lic's attitude toward the law and law en- forcement that was seriously reflected in the county's soaring death, injury and accident rate. Metro court had to overcome many hur- dles-mainly legal suits-before its present position. In one 1958 decision, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that metro traffic ordinance 57-12 expressly nullified and superseded the ordinances of all Dade Coun- ty municipalities and that traffic offenses arising under county ordinances should be tried only In the metro court. After initial legal obstacles were overcome, the board of county commissioners approved a three-phase proposal of the American Bar Association to render traffic court services to Dade County, setting up the present court system. The court went into effect on July 1, 1959, with seven court locations (another was added latter). In addition to all 27 munic- ipalities, the Dade County Sheriff's Depart- ment and the Florida Highway Patrol also file traffic cases in the metro court. Except for violations of inspection regu- lations, equipment requirements, pedestrian and parking laws, all moving violations are scheduled for a court hearing on first of- fenses. COURT APPEARANCE Without extentuating circumstances, all persons must appear personally before the judge. This follows a national recommend- ation of the Conference of State Supreme Court Chief Justices. The arresting police- men are assigned specific court dates-twice a month. The courtroom for the case de- pends on where the citation was issued. Personal appearance of violators affords the judges the opportunity to review the per- son's prior driving record, to observe any mental or physical deficiencies, and to give enough individual attention to educate and correct the individual violators rather than to punish them. In his opening remarks, the judge talks about local problems and current accident statistics. Tourists and nonresidents may advance the trial date by arrangement with either the individual police officer at the time a ticket is issued or the clerk's office, where the of- fender posts a nominal bond equal to the fine for the offense. This privilege is extended to local residents when circumstances war- rant it. Dade. County residents or property owners may be released without bail upon a written promise to appear in court, except for hazardous moving violations which require booking and bail. Noncounty residents may be released on cash bail except where the officer is required to book the person. The officer may also release sick persons from cus- tody if a valid driver's license is surrendered or when he is willing to accept a written promise to appear. All parking, standing, and nonmoving violations may be paid by mail upon signing a waiver of appearance and a guilty plea. This privilege is entended to certain moving offenses when no court appearance is re- quired. traffic complaints has been incorporated into the clerical and financial processing to elim- inate ticket fixing. Police officers' voided, spoiled or lost complaints are processed in open court. In 1964, 289,000 cases were handled. By November, the 1965 load had surpassed the 300,000 mark. The cases are handled by 175 employees. A traffic school originally was maintained by the Miami Police Academy, but was as- signed to the metro court, which updated and expanded it in 1961 in conjunction with the Dade County Board of Public Instruc- tion. The school has paid dividends. Many mo- torists who made dangerous errors through ignorance, inexperience or faulty judgment are not fined but sent to the school. In the drive for traffic safety, the court promotes vehicle and pedestrian safety in English and Spanish on radio, TV, news- papers, billboards, photo and literature dis- plays, waste cans and postmarks on metro mail. The court sponsors the ABA program, "Go to Traffic Court as a Visitor, Not as a Viola- ter," and hosts groups such as the Boy Scouts and civic organizations. Realizing that Dade County has a large number of Spanish speaking people, a Latin American safety education program was launched in 1960. Some 1,800 Latin Ameri- cans attended classes taught in Spanish and learned all phases of driving regulations and the Florida financial responsibility law. Five years ago the metro court's student traffic safety council, recently cited as the most outstanding such countywide group In 13 Southeastern States, was organized. The council has representatives from 32 county high schools. The judges send stu- dent defendants to the council for driving education punishment. Another court project is the distribution of a printed monthly report of its activities with complete accident analysis, including conviction rate by type of violation. Metro judges are chosen in accordance with the so-called Missouri plan, approved by Dade County voters. Candidates for the 13 judgeships are screened by a committee consisting of attorneys, laymen, and the pre- siding senior judge of the circuit court. The county commission appoints one or three selected by the committee to serve until the next primary. At that time, the candidate runs unopposed for the approval of the electorate. If he wins a majority, he receives a full term. The top seven in the balloting serve for 6 years; the others, 4 years. Hope Is Seen EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL OF MARYLAND IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, Presi- dent Johnson's quest for peace in Viet- nam has at last received a glimmer of en- couragement. This comes from the fact that the Vietnam issue has been moved to the corridors of the United Nations. I was one of the Members of the House who communicated with President Johnson last month to request that he formally request the United Nations to seek an effective cease-fire and that we pledge our support and our resources to such an effort. Certainly, the decision of the U.N. Security Council to place the Vietnam issue on its agenda marks a clear victory for this administration. It could prove the necessary step in moving the prob- lem from the battlefield to the confer- ence table. Commenting on this, the Baltimore Sun said the fact that the issue now is Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67BO0446R000400020001-5 Approved Forcl w?9ffQW19R $P67ARPg, N13QX 40002 r ebruary 16,.49G( A782 before the United Nations Security Coun- cil "means that another door is being held open while another possible route to a Geneva conference is being ex-- amined." The editorial suggests that "words like hawks, doves, and aggression, for ex-? ample, could well be dispensed with for the time being while calm, dispassionate efforts are made to discover the basis for a rational peace settlement." Here is a calm, dispassionate ap- praisal of a subject of vital concern to us all, and place the editorial in the RECORD : lI'rom the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 4, 19661 u THE UNITED NATIONS As Arnbantador Goldberg keeps saying, what the United States is trying to do is to have the Vietnam war brought to the con- ference table. Our objective, our belief, our hope is to have it settled there rather than on the field of battle. The fact that the Issue now is before the United Nations Secu- rity Council, after procedural preliminaries which tended to obscure the modest nature of the United States proposal, means that another door is being held open while an- other possible route to a Geneva Conference is being examined. To this extent the involvement of the Security Council, limited as it is, may be helpful. Communist China and North Viet- nam, which pour vituperation on the United States and scorn the United Nations, may talk more candidly with some of the small nonalined states. Diplomatic conversations thus could be more useful than a public debate in the Security Council over a formal resolution, especially if a debate should end ina Soviet veto. Public debate is useful, of course, at the proper time, when it promotes understand- ing by sifting the grains of facts from the chaff of speculation and emotion. Words like hawks, doves and aggression, for example, could well. be dispensed with for the time being while calm, dispassionate efforts are made to discover the basis for a rational peace settlement. This applies to the Sen- ate committee's inquiry as well as to the United Nations. Ad Hoc Congressional Conference on Vietnam i:XTENSION OF REMARKS Or HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL +5 NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. ROS:E:NTHAL. Mr. Speaker, un- der leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I am inserting below the report of an ad hoc congressional conference on Vietnam, held in Washington on Jan- uary 21 and 22. The conference was sponsored by eight Members of Congress, listed in the report. The report represents the views of a group of experts particularly qualified to discuss American diplomacy. The con- clusions were reached by that group, rather than by the congressional spon- sors. The sponsors believe the report merits careful consideration by their col- leagues, the executive branch, and the American people. The report. follows- REPORT OF TIIE AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CON- FERENCE ON VIETNAM, HELD IN WASHING- Tow, D.C., JANUARY 21 AND 22, 1966 CONGRESSONAL SPONSORS BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, Democrat, of New York, chairman. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR., Democrat. of Michi- gan. Doer EDWARDS, Democrat, of California. LEONARD FARBSTEIN, Democrat, of New York. DONALD M. FRASER, Democrat, of Minnesota. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Democrat, of Wisconsin. HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin. WILLIAM F. RYAN, Democrat, of New York. Foreword On January 21 and 22, 1966. a group of experts and scholars met in Washington at the invitation of eight Members of the House of Representatives to analyze the current situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic proposals to help end the war and lacilitate a negotiated settlement. The sponsoring Congressmen have felt un- satisfied with the recent role of Congress in foreign affairs. They believe their office requires a more fundamental examination of foreign policy than that allowed by even the most careful consideration o1 specific legislation. The sponsors are convinced that the level of congressional analyse can be raised through greater intimacy be;:weer the legislative branch and the intellectual and university community. It was with this in mind that they invited to Washington a group of experts particularly qualified to dis- cuss with them Vietnam and its implications for American diplomacy. Some of the participants have spent con- siderable time in Vietnam, and have obtained intimate association with conditions there. Others offered the important perspectives of experience in negotiation, study of econom- ics, diplomacy or international law, or ex- pert knowledge of relevant geographical areas. Participants were requested not to dwell on epi.sodes or errors of the past. Instead, they were asked to discuss present policies and possible alternatives to them; to analyze the problems involved in reaching and en- forcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to pro- ject the outlines of a creative American pol- icy toward Asia. Certain conclusions and recommendations by the participants emerged in the discus- sions and these are stated explicitly at the beginning of the report. The subsequent summary of the discussions also includes some individual points which contributed to the analysis, although they were not unan- imously endorsed. The sponsors regard the proposals made by the conference as important contributions to their own thinking about Vietnam and the formulation of American foreign policy. They feel the report deserves the attention of their congressional colleagues, members of the executive branch, and the American people. Finally, they view the conference as having set an important precedent for future congressional initiatives in foreign af- fairs. CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS Dr. Arthur Larson, chairman, director, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke Univer- sity; former director of the U.S. Information Agency, and Special Assistant to President Eisenhower. Mr. Richard Barnet, codirector, institute for Policy Studies; former Deputy Director, Office of Political Research, U.S. Anus Con- trol and Disarmament Agency. Prof. Robert Browne, professor of wonom- ics, Fairleigh-Dickinson University: former A.I.D. official in Vietnam. Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, former counsellor to the Department of State. Prof. Richard Falk, associate professor of international law, Princeton University; edi- tor, American Journal of International Law. Prof. Bernard Fall, professor of inter-- tional relations, Howard University; author of "The Two Vietnams." Mr. Arnold Fraleigh, lecturer in politico; science, George Washington University; former Foreign Service officer. Dean Edmund Gullion, dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; former Coun- sellor of American Legation in Saigon; former Ambassador to the Congo. Prof. George McT. Kahin, director, south- east Asia program, Cornell University. Prof. John Lewis, professor of government, Cornell University. Prof. John Lewis, professor of government.. Cornell University. Mr. Robert Nathan, economic consultant. Mr. Marcus Raskin, codirector, Institute for Policy Studies; former member of the special staff of the National Security Coun- cil. Prof. Louis Sohn, Bemis Professor of In- ternational Law, Harvard Law School. Mr. James Warburg, writer on foreign policy. Betty Goetz Lall, Rapporteur, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell Uni- versity. Paul T. Gorman, executive assistant. Mr. Nathan attended that part of the conference dealing with economic aid but did not participate in the preparation of the report. Dean Gullion is not in agreement with a majority of the findings and recommenda- tions. CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS The conference reached the .recommenda- tions and conclusions set out below. A sum- mary of the discussions from which they were developed follows: Present strategies There are diplomatic alternatives, not yet fully explored, to continued military escala- tion of the war in Vietnam. Continued bombing of North Vietnam is not in the American interest either in shortening the war or in improving prospects for a negotiated settlement. There should be no further escalation of American troop commitment. There are serious risks of inviting greater North Viet- namese and Chinese activity. Unilateral withdrawal of all American troops prior to a cease fire or peace con- ference is not in our national interest. New policy initiatives The most productive course for the future is a deescalation of military activity and commitment. The National Liberation Front must be recognized as a principal belligerent in the war, and as a necessary party to any peace conference and settlement. To improve the likelihood of negotiations. the Saigon government should be broadened to include representatives less hostile to negotiations. The United States must help promote greater contact between all South Viet- namese factions-representatives of the Na- tional Liberation Front, the Saigon govern- ment, and influential private citizens. Negotiations and the convening of a conference The differences between the several negotiating positions are not insurmoul:.t.- able. The United States might agree to Hanoi's four points, treating them as one interpretation of the 1954 agreement and thus an appropriate basis for negotiations. The controversial point 3 of the Hanoi program would then be a subject for sub- sequent discussion rather than prior approval. The 1954 Geneva Conference should be reconvened with all parties to the hostilities represented. A procedure for reconvening the Geneva Conference would be to have the three na- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Feb,-.wary. 16; gigpgoved FQ.r tggMNQL/2-RE 8ABOMEM0400020001-5 A783 wins on the International Control Commis- sion (Canada, India, Poland) request a con- ference to receive new instructions on enforcement of the 1954 agreements. The inability of the United Nations thus far to use its good offices to help end the Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of in- cluding China as a full member of that in- stitution. Despite the difficulties of involv- ing the United Nations in a settlement of the war, all parties should seek opportuni- ties to utilize the United Nations in appro- priate ways. Terms of a settlement A cease-fire must be secured. Given the dispersed nature of the conflict, such a cease-fire might be more easily reached at a conference, though the possibility of a prior cessation of hostilities should be explored carefully. Agreements must be reached on a provi- sional government in South Vietnam and procedures for the holding of elections to form a constituent assembly. A provisional government might be established on the basis of geographical areas controlled, with contested areas to be administered tempo- rarily by the International Control Commis- sion. Alternatively', decisions regarding such a government could be reached by prior negotiations between all parties in the south. All parties must firmly adhere to the re- sults of free elections. Amnesty must be granted for all parties in the conflict. Guarantees of the cease-fire, the provi- sional government, free elections, troop withdrawals, amnesty, and neutralization must be enforced by an effective Interna- tional Control Commission. The Interna- tional Control Commission must therefore be significantly strengthened. United Na- tions participation in this process might re- duce administrative difficulties and set precedent for future United Nations partici- pation in the solution of other civil conflicts threatening world peace. A settlement should assure the neutrali- zation of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Arms control agreements must be reached applying to other nations of the area, prescribing their nonparticipa- tion in military alliances, the freedom of their territory for foreign military bases, and their protection from outside arms, mate- rial, and armed personnel infiltration, CONFERENCE SUMMARY 1. The current situation in Vietnam In discussing the present situation in Vietnam, the Conference concentrated on two major issues: the status and relations of the several Vietnamese parties in conflict and the political effect of. various military tactics and strategies. The Vietnamese Antagonists There is little information about the Na- tional Liberation Front and its military arm, the Vietcong. Their top leaders are not easily contacted; below the top leadership few of their personnel have been adequately identified by Americans. Many of the par- ticipants felt this lack of knowedge itself obstructed needed initiatives in the diplo- matic sphere. Several participants ac- quainted with politics in South Vietnam reminded the Conference that the Vietcong had grown out of the resistance movement when all of Vietnam was struggling against the French. The National Liberation Front is clearly dominated by the Communists, al- though several experts pointed out that the Front does consist of various factions, some of them more natidnalist than Communist. It was felt that attempts must be made to learn more about the structure of the Front, constituting as it does, such a- significant force in the south. There were varying viewpoints regarding the strength of the South Vietnamese Gov- ernment, and the Conference was aware of the extreme mutability of circumstances in Saigon. Some participants believed there was no organic non-Communist political structure left in South Vietnam, and that the military government was simply an ex- tension of the American presence. Others argued that there was considerable structure intact. The Conference agreed that the sta- bility and prestige of the Government was largely a function of the degree of American support. Many participants were deeply disturbed by the Ky government's insistence that talk of negotiations jeopardizes its life and threatens to dissolve its army's will to fight. All agreed that this position should not be allowed to prevail. In fact, it was felt that a broadening of the South Vietnamese Gov- ernment would be a prerequisite for moves toward a negotiated settlement. Relations Between Saigon and the National Liberation Front Given the above evaluation, the partici- pants were deeply convinced that steps must be taken to promote greater contact between the National Liberation Front, members of the Saigon Government, and influential South Vietnamese citizens. American policy, in its insistence that the war is a simple case of external aggression, may be under- cutting this goal. While many noted the intransigence of Saigon on stimulating con- tacts, several of the participants pointed out that some South Vietnamese officials, Buddhists, independent political figures, and non-Communist intellectuals are undoubt- edly acquainted with the National Liberation Front agents and officials. The United States, through local aid and intelligence officials, should actively seek to promote these relations. The participants thought that the United States must persuade the Ky government not to obstruct this process and inflict punishment on citizens engaged in promoting contact between presently hos- tile groups. If, as all parties to the conflict agree, a future South Vietnam must be au- tonomous and free from foreign interfer- ence, then attempts at reconciliation within the country must be made. Relations Between the National Liberation Front and Hanoi Many in the group believed there are dif- ferences between the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese Govern- ment regarding the conduct of the war. Some argued that those fighting in the south are likely to feel less inclined to compromise for a settlement. An example of this differ- ence was the variation in interpretation given by the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam to the statement first issued by the Front on March 17, 1965. The North Vietnamese version, broadcast 3 days after the National Liberation Front account, was much toned down. The difference in outlook between the Front and North Vietnam was cited as an- other reason why the United States should encourage the Government in South Vietnam to make contact with the National Liberation Front. We could be committing serious er- rors if we assumed that Hanoi had such com- plete authority over the National Liberation Front that it could speak for it on all issues of stopping the war and negotiating a set- tlement. We do not know definitely that the National Liberation Front would accept Han- oi's terms for a settlement. In fact, it, was felt that one of the reasons why reunifica- tion of North and South Vietnam is no longer an issue of priority was the recognition by Hanoi that even with a Vietcong victory, re- unification would involve a complicated process of bargaining between Hanoi and whoever formed a South Vietnamese Govern- ment. The Political Effects of Military Tactics: . Bombings in the North The Conference participants were in agree- ment that the bombings in the north were o) little military value, while the diplomatic disadvantages were very serious. It was_ agreed that the bombings had helped bolster South Vietnamese morale; but it was believed this factor did not outweigh harmful diplo- matic effects. Further escalation of the bombings, it was felt, could not be expected to improve the situation. The Political Effects of Military Tactics: Operations in the South The Conference expressed extreme anxiety over the prospect of increased American troop commitments in the south. Echoing the conclusion of the recent Mansfield re- port, the participants argued that an escala- tion of troop commitment would likely re- sult in stalemates on yet higher levels of engagement. There was profound aware- ness of the risks of provoking greater North Vietnamese and possible Chinese ground par- ticipation. No member of the group be- lieved the United States should withdraw all its forces from Vietnam prior to a settlement. But the group agreed that the most desirable future course would be a deescalation of military activity and involvement. Many held that American initiatives on staged withdrawals would be more in the U.S. inter- est than, a continued enlargement of our involvemnt. The Conference also noted that bombings in the south and ground clear-and-hold op- erations were creating a serious refugee prob- lem. The number of refugees, estimated at 1 million in 1965, was growing beyond the capacity of pacification programs to absorb them. The problem was thought to be of increasing importance to the stability of the South Vietnamese Government. Throughout the discussion there was con- cern expressed that the more the United States makes the war our war, the less chance we have of building attitudes congenial to a settlement. With respect to U.S. economic efforts, for example, it was argued that with- out the willingness of the South Vietnamese Government to commit itself to improving conditions in the countryside, large increases of U.S. economic aid and personnel are not likely to achieve intended political results. 11. Negotiations and a peace conference The conference discussed in some detail the present bargaining positions of the parties in conflict. From here, it turned to an examination of the problems involved in initiating negotiations and convening a peace conference. Current Negotiating Positions On the surface it appears that both sides in the war are agreed on what should con- stitute the basis for negotiations and a peace conference. The United States and North Vietnam have said that the 1954 Geneva Agreement should form the foundation of a settlement; the United States has pre- sented 14 points as representing its own position. The North Vietnamese position is represented by the four points announced on April 8, 1965. Of these, point three has been the principal obstacle to agreement. This point reads: "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accord- ance with the program of the NFLSV (the South Vietnam National Liberation Front) without any foreign interference." The United States has indicated that all points, 4 or 14, could be dealt with in negotiation. Yet there is still considerable controversy regarding the true nature of Hanoi's point three. One view was that point three.meant that Hanoi would settle for nothing less than Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 A784 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX February 16,'1966 a settlement based entirely on the program of the front. Many, however, disputed this interpretation, arguing that the four points ;ire but an elaboration of Hanoi's under- standing of the 1954 agreement. Cited as documenting this contention were the preamble and postscript to the four points. The preamble states that it is the intention of the North Vietnamese Government "to ;;trictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the follow- ing four points": A significant number of participants felt that the negotiating positions of the parties were not so irreconcilable. It was then pro- posed that the United States should accept ,he four point, of Hanoi. treating them as one interpretation of the Geneva accords, .end thus an appropriate basis for negotia- tinns. The controversial point three would then become a subject for discussion at a conference rather than prior to it. This American diplomatic initative would give fianoi less reason to oppose negotiations. ' 1.'lhere was some belief that Hanoi was not disposed, to negotiate now since it felt that the United States could be worn down psychologically. tf, however, the above view is not entirely the case, and if the positions of the several parties are not so opposed, what then is holding tip the convening of negotiations and a conference? There appears to be the lack of conviction on each side that the ether side does in fact accept the conditions proclaimed for a settlement. There may also lie conviction that military success Is still possible. And clearly there is ambiguity regardng the role of the National Liberation ti'ront, in addition to other procedural dif- iiculties regarding the convening of a conference. scaling with .he National Liberation Front t main stumbling block to negotiations leas been the refusal of the United States to accept the presence of the National Lib- eration Front as one of the necessary parties t:o the negotiations and settlement. The U.S. position has been, in the words of the President: "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being: represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmount- :chle problem." This has appeared to be in.- ecifTicient recognition to satisfy the Front and North Vietnam. And Hanoi has some- licnes seemed to take the extreme view that the Front is the only group from South Viet- tc;.m that should be dealt with. The group felt strongly that the United :;fates should he clearer about its willingness to deal with the Front at the negotiating able. While the United States should con- ,kilt folly with the South Vietnamese Gov- c'rnment on its view, the Ky government not be permitted to exercise a veto over U.S. policy in this respect. One ap- proach to dealing with the Front might be an American decision to grant the Front bel- ligerent status. ieconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference The reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Con- ference is almost; a certain prerequisite to negotiating art end to the war. There is, however, a procedural problem as to which Government or body should request the re- convening of this conference. While there .ere considerable uncertainties regarding future developments, the partici- pants thought it important to discuss likely alternative procedures for convening a con- f erence. The cochairmen of the 1954 conference- the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union? are unlikely to issue a conference call be- cause the Soviet Union might not wish to expose itself to further denunciations by Elections There was unanimity that elections should be held for the purpose of creating a gov- ernment of South Vietnam and that the United States and all other parties to a nego- tiated settlement should be absolutely firm in their willingness to accept the results of them. The United States, among its 14 points for a settlement, includes the "sup- port of free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice." Most of the group felt that the U.S. Government would honor this commitment. Fnding acceptable means by which elec- tions can be held will be a difficult task. The International Control Commission was commissioned at Geneva to supervise elec- tions for the reunification of the two zones of Vietnam, The group assumed that the International Control Commission could also be given the ditty of supervising elections for the formation of a constituent assembly among whose responsibilities would be the formation of a government. Amnesty The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided that the representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam "must not permit any individual or collec- tive reprisals against persons who have col- laborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families." This amnesty will need to be reinforced in a peace settlement. If necessary, the ICC must be given special authority to see that amnesty is being ob- served, and to consider reports of violations and recommend action in their event. Unification With North Vietnam The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided that elections would be held in July 1955. for Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 China or complicate its good relations with North Vietnam. So this avenue war: there- fore considered unpromising. Another possibility is that the United Nations might request the reconvening of the conference. The principal problem here is that neither North nor South Vietnam or China are members of the United Nations; and North Vietnam and China may continue to regard any United Nations action as likely to be partisan and therefore unacceptable. A third possibility, now unlikely, is to act on a former (1964) Cambodian reouest to reconvene the conference to guarantee its neutrality and borders, which Cambodia charged. were threatened by the Vietnam war. This conference might then be used by the parties to discuss a settlement of the war in South Vietnam. There is a fourth possibility, as vet un- tried, which might be most acceptable to all parties. The three countries of the Inter- national Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) could request that the Geneva Conference be reconvened in order that they receive further instructions on the imple- mentation of the 1954 agreement. At this conference, the terms of a settlement to the present war could be considered. In requesting such a conference, the Inter- national Control Commission members might propose that representation be determined along the lines of the 1961-62 Laos Confer- ence, which allowed each. of the warring fac- tions to participate in discussion. One of the major functions of that conference was to provide a channel through which leaders of the three groups met and eventually agreed on the formation of a government. The Laos accord was then intended to be a guar- antor of the settlement, III. Terms of a settlement Cease-Fire A cease-fire will have to be a precondition for elections to form a government for South Vietnam. Yet given the dispersed na- ture of the conflict, there would have to be prior negotiations. The U.S. position is that it will accept a cease-fire before a conference or will agree to a cease-fire as the subject of a conference. The group agreed that either sequence could be tried. But given the complexities of such matters, a cease-fire would probably have to be worked out at preconference or confer- ence negotiations. The United States is accepting sonic risk in being willing to have a cease-fire before a conference. It is one thing to call upon major military forces to stop fighting, and quite another to rely on the observance of a cease-fire by guerrilla forces. Yet, the United States side would gain politically as it result of a cease-fire. Participants noted that there are many recent examples where nego- tiations were convened while fighting con- tinued. This was the case in Indonesia, Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, and, in 1954, Indo- china. What is desirable is that the bel- ligerents agree, at least tacitly, that they will engage in a maximum amount of deescala- tion so as to permit a conference to meet in the most relaxed possible atmosphere . Provisional Government One of the most difficult question; for a reconvened peace conference to settle is the nature of any provisional government, pend- ing the holding of elections. Some believed that this question is so difficult for outside parties to decide that elections to t'orm a constituent assembly for South Vietnam should take enlace as soon as they could be organized. Others thought that elections immediately following a cease-fire would present serious problems.. Two principal ways of forming a provi- sional government pending elections were discussed. At the national level, anal] South Vietnamese Government would be composed of representatives drawn from geographical areas. Although many details would have to be worked out in conference, the essential functions of government would be divided among the major South Vietnamese groups and the International Control Commission. At the local level the Saigon government would continue to exercise authority over areas controlled by it, and the same would be true for the National Liberation Front as well as such largely autonomous groups as the Cao Dal, Hoa Hao, and some of the Montagnard groups. As to those geographi- cal areas which are contested, the Interna- tional Control Commission would need to ex- ercise temporary control. (It was noted that. there is some precedent for this in the agree- ment which gave the United Nations tem- porary administrative control in West Irian. i In this connection, members of the group again stressed the importance of promoting closer contacts by the different groups In South Vietnam. A second way of forming a provisional government is the more traditional one of having the parties decide on a cabinets where portfolios would be divided among them. Within this context the I.C.C. could be given special responsibilities. Some expressed anxiety that this form of provisional govern- ment has provided Communists with a means of staging a coup d'etat. It was pointed out by others that whether such a provisional government can function until elections are held depends in large measure on the political orientation of the population. In such countries as France and Italy, Communists were included in the cabinet of the inimed:s- ate post-World War II governments with no subsequent Communist takeover. In the Laos Agreement of 1961-62, a coalition gov- ernment that was formed at the time sub- sequently broke down when the Communist faction withdrew its support and refused to participate, leaving the centrist and right- wing groups to run that part of the country they controlled. i. i Alpproved F_&W.&.eTMl/p6 9C RDP (000400020001-5 the purpose of reunifying the northern and southern zones of Vietnam. Among the members of the group who have had close contacts in Vietnam there was agreement that North Vietnam would not demand early reunification of the country. Since the United States is on record as supporting any free decision of the people of Vietnam on re- unification, this issue no longer appears to be among those causing great controversy. A constituent assembly could be given respon- sibility for achieving reunification. On this point it was noted that in January 1957, 6 months after the failure to hold elections in Vietnam for reunification, the Soviet Union proposed that North and South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations as separate states. The United States rejected the pro- posal at the time. Neutralization of North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia The Geneva Agreement of 1954, by provid- ing that North and South Vietnam could not accept foreign military personnel and bases or participate in military alliances, set the stage for a military neutralization of the four areas comprising. Indochina. It was recognized by the group that such neutrali- zation does not preclude governments in these countries headed or controlled by Com- munists, but that insofar as military mat- ters are concerned, Communist or non- Communist governments could not be alined with other countries. It was the conviction of the group that neutralization of North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would not jeopardize the security interests of America or the non-Communist states of Asia. Withdrawal of Troops Informally and unofficially, many Commu- nist spokesmen have stated that it would not be necessary for the United States to with- draw its troops in advance of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. There is, however, some uncertainty whether Hanoi and the Front are in accord on this point. The U.S. position is that we "want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia," and that "we do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Viet- nam after peace is assured." Assuming flexi- bility on the part of both sides on this issue, the group did not think that the withdrawal of troops per se would constitute a major issue in the negotiations. The exact staging of the withdrawal of troops on the part of both the United States and North Vietnam, of course, would need to be the subject of rather detailed discussions. Enforcement Provisions of a Settlement The International Control Commission, under the terms of the 19541 Geneva Agree- ment, is made responsible for implementing the terms of the agreement. However, in the 1954 agreements it was expected that the French Army would provide the necessary logistic support and that financial support would be given by the French Government. When the French withdrew from South Viet- nam in August 1956, the Commission was left without any means of support. The need for a reinforced ICC, therefore, was strongly felt by all members of the group. If the ICC is to perform the tasks assigned to it in 1954, plus any additional ones designated by a new 'peace conference, there must be agreement on a new financing formula. The Laos Agreement of 1961-62 bolstered the ICC in its operations in that country; this included a financing formula whereby the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom each agreed to pay 17.6 percent of the costs. The other parties agreed to pay lesser percentages. Some of the group felt that the ICC by itself did not have the kind of administrative structure needed to perform its duties. It was therefore suggested that the United Na- tions could provide administrative support to strengthen the implementation of a settle- A785 ment. Whether the Chinese would agree to American response to Communist agita- such administrative support was not known, tion for conflict in developing areas must but some participants thought that a United not be to react unilaterally with military Nations decision to support strict observance forces. U.S. aid to certain governments with of the Geneva Agreement would be evidence anti-democratic features appears to have to the Chinese of the United Nations impar- pressed the Soviet Union into incerasing its tiality regarding a settlement. agitation for disorder. Yet Soviet and Chi- IV. Related aspects of a Vietnamese nese exhortations to developing countries settlement have met with little success. Those nations which are in their post-colonial stage are China anxious for periods of sustained economic At a number of points in the conference growth which increased revolution and vio- China was discussed. These discussions lence would only disturb. There are still covered China's view of the Vietnamese con- some nations, nevertheless, in which revo- flict, and the relation of its domestic affairs lution is, or may soon be ripe. This must to foreign policy. Thought to be particu- larly important were the problems of pro- viding sufficient food for its expanding popu- lation, the succession question, and the adaptation of the army to political rather than professional military purposes. Chi- nese food needs cannot be met by extending control over small states in the area. Only in the loess region of North China can total food production be substantially raised, something in the order of 40 percent. As to the question of succession, the older leader- ship has attempted-with only only mod- erate success-to instill revolutionary and anti-American attitudes in those younger men likely to replace them. American poli- cies, however, can affect the degree of suc- cess the older leadership has with this indoctrination process. It was also noted that the Maoist leader- ship fears that the United States may at- tack the mainland soon and that China must be prepared to meet this attack by various forms of defense encompassing guerrilla-type operations. There are signs, however, that army leaders may be seriously resisting the role assigned them by the party in the defense of China. On Chinese foreign policy, the specialists in:the group noted the gross misinterpreta- tion given by many to the September 1965 statement of the Chinese Defense Minister, Lin Piao. This statement, contrary to pop- ular and some official beliefs, advocated scaling-down of overt Chinese action and those militant policies which increased the risk to China Itself. The Chinese espoused the view that revolutions and wars of libera- tion could not be imported, and that con- ditions within a country had to be ripe in order for such revolutions to succeed. This did not mean that China would not send out agents and propaganda to foment revolu- tion. Yet such tactics should be differenti- ated from the likelihood of repeated large- scale Chinese aggression and the sending of Chinese troops and arms to local Commu- nist groups in the developing areas of the world. Notable too in the Lin statement was the absence of threats to the United States in Vietnam, even though China had issued many such threats in the earlier months of 1965. Thus in Vietnam, China has exercised caution. Yet in assessing future Chinese in- tentions it was stressed that there undoubt- edly was a threshold for China's active parti- cipation in the war. At some point in a con- tinued U.S. escalation the Chinese would doubtless feel compelled to enter. Many believed that since 1963 Chinese for- eign policy had suffered a series of signifi- cant setbacks in the developing areas pri- marily because of the hostile reactions of indigenous populations and leaders. Wars of Liberation The group considered the above evalua- tion as having particular relevance to Com- munist policy on wars of liberation. Given Chinese inability or reluctance to commit military force to support wars of liberation, and what some felt was a growing uneasiness on the part of the Soviet Union unilaterally to promote these conflicts, the participants felt it important that the United States revise its conception of Communist aggres- sion. be anticipated by the United States. It was felt that our own particular revolutionary tradition was not appropriate to guiding these revolutions. But our interests are most likely to be served by a sympathetic rather than a hostile response when these events finally occur. In discussion of possible responses to rev- olutions in the developing nations, the con- ference emphasized the need for discover- ing new roles for international organiza- tions. Likewise, the participants thought the United States should seek to explore new avenues of cooperation with the Soviet Union within the United Nations. In discussing the role of major powers in local conflicts of the future, many favored stress on developing procedure within in- ternational law rather than emphasis on se- curing agreement on general principles. There was some discussion of whether Communist-inspired violence was likely to break out in Thailand. The topic was con- sidered to be highly speculative, though sev- eral experts expressed the view that a major outbreak of hostility was unlikely. Local tension and increased terror, on, the other hand, were thought to be a distinct possibil- ity. Some thought was given, therefore, to the possibility of multilateral action to anticipate strife and prevent a crisis analogous to that in Vietnam. The group also noted the need for arms control agreements in Thailand and possibly other areas. Such agreements might pro- hibit the import of arms or armed personnel, the establishment of foreign military bases, and the joining of military alliances. These steps could be incorporated into a general conference on Vietnam, or as an adjunct to a Vietnamese settlement. Our greatest in- terest, finally, should lie in insulating these conflicts from outside interference. On the relationship of Vietnam to other countries in southeast Asia, including Thailand, it was pointed out that Vietnam was the only case in southeast Asia where the Communists effectively identified them- selves with the country's nationalists. Else- where in southeast Asia, nationalism has not been forced into fusion with communism. Indeed, the failure of Communist insurrec- tions in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines testifies to the positive contribu- tion of Asian nationalism. In each of these cases, the inability of Communist insurgents to secure nationalist backing defeated their ultimate goals. "Not To Doubt,"tby Richard Chaput-A Saga of Spiritual Conquest EXTENSION OF REMARKS of HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND OF NEW HAMPSHIRE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, on January, 12, I paid tribute in the CON- Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 A786 Approved For " ~ /A?L9 ! ORD 67 004468 APPENDIX February 16,- 06(; CRESSIONAL RECORD-page A62-to Mr. has not been an independent country. Richard R Ch t f . apu o Nashua, N.H., who was named 1 of 10 outstanding young men in America by the National Junior Chamber of Commerce. On January 20, I paid further tribute to Mr. Chaput and inserted a wonderful. editorial from his hometown paper the Nashua Telegraph-CONGRESSIONAL REC- ORD, page A 260. Mr. Chaput achieved his distinctions in spite of the fact that he is nearly to- tally paralyzed as the result of child- hood polio. His accomplishments in- ciude the authorship of his autobio- graphy "Not to Doubt," which contains at foreword by Richard Cardinal Cushing. Since my remarks appear in the REC?- onD, a number of my colleagues have in.? quired about the book and I am taking this opportunity to repeat the name of it nd to recommend it as an honest, grip- ping, moving story of a man's conquest over pain, fear, depression, loss of faith, and frustration at what apepared to be a hopeless life. I have sent a copy to the President; in the belief he would find the story of a man whom trouble could not conquer inspiring in this time of our country's troubles. I wish it were possible for me to send a copy to each of my colleagues in the Congress, who also bear great burdens in these days of strife and un- certainty. Again, I am pleased to recommend "Not to Doubt", an. Inspiring story of spiritual conquest by a brave man. Lithuania: A Captive Nation IEXTENS1ON OF REMARKS of HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER OF ILLINOIS TN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, nations like individuals, wish to be free to order their affairs as they see fit. How tragic it thus is when a nation is deprived of its independence through no fault of its own. Certain great states were deprived of their freedom for a few years recently because they had shown complete dis- regard for the rights of other peoples. But when a, nation is subjugated to the will of a foreign power simply because it was too small and weak to resist the brute force of its neighbors, then we are faced with a situation which is wrong ...nd which assaults all the instincts for fairplay and decency which we profess. Lithuania is one such case of a nation held captive by a stronger, rapacious neighbor. The Lithuanian people have an identifiable history dating back to the Dark Ages. They have a proud history as one of the great nations of Eastern Europe. They have a culture and lan- guage which has set them apart from their neighbors. They certainly have as much right to an independent national r'xistence as any people. Yet, this is not today the case. Since 1940 Lithuania White it is right that our Government has not recognized the destruction of the Lithuanian state and still has diplomatic relations with representatives of inde- pendent Lithuania, the unpleasant fact is that more than 2g,2 million people live under the yoke of Soviet Russian domination in their own homeland. The last two and a half decades have been especially hard years for the people of Lithuania. Their country was a bat- tleground in one of the most merciless of conflicts-the Eastern . Front of the Second World War. After the Soviet armies returned in 1944 the infamous methods of Stalinist repression increased the suffering of the people. Opposition was quickly blotted out. Sovietization of all forms of living was imposed. The population declined. Russian immi- grants appeared to fill the places left empty by the deaths and deportation of tens of thousands of the native populace. But what is especially terrible about these events is that they began by the destruction of the independent Lithu- anian. nation. When the Soviets reim- posed. the rule of Russian czars, they ended 22 years of Lithuanian freedom. Lithuania had become independent on February 16, 1918. In the years which followed, a great deal of progress was made., especially in social matters, which indicated that Lithuania would be a peaceful, developing nation. It is par- ticularly sad that this renaissance was so viciously ended and the freedom and progress of Lithuania transformed into the sterile slavery of a Communist sa- trapy.. Mr. Speaker, I feel that it is thus especially appropriate that we take note of the 48th anniversary of the declara- tion of independence of Lithuaria. Let me extend to the people of captive Lith- uania my deepest wishes that the great hope for the future embodied in the an- niversary of their independence iii ay soon be fulfilled. People to People MOD- - honor by the Korean Ambassador a nd Madam Kim. The Government of the Republic of Korea honored Frank Per- per on this occasion in appreciation for his arduous support of the Korean Cul- tural and Freedom Foundation. His of - forts are in the highest tradition of our country's "people-to-people" program and we can all be proud of Frank's Con- tributions to international understand- ing and good will. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous con- sent I insert at this point in the RECORD a letter from the Korean Ambassador at large concerning the tour of the "Little Angels" and the letter of appreciation to Frank Perpe:r: THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, INC., Washington, D.C., January 21, 1965. DEAR FRIENDS: The Little Angels' 1965 tour of the United States was a cultural triumph. Audiences responded to performances by these 26 young ladies and 1 boy from Korea with ovations. Critics used such words as "charming," "magnificent," "su- perb" to describe their skillful and enter- taining Korean folk dances, accompanied by ancient oriental music. In these critical days in Asia, of course, the Little Angels' performances do more than bring Americans a better understanding of the centuries-old Korean culture. They also honor those Americans who have fought and died to preserve the independence of the Republic of Korea and emphasize that Free Korea Is one of America's stanchest alLies in the defense of freedom in Asia. The Little Angels would like to return to the United States this year as part of a world tour planned[ by the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. All funds raised by the tour will assist the greater cause and objectives of the Foundation, which include the education of underprivileged children in Korea. Whether or not the 1966 tour will be pos- sible depends in large part upon the people like you who have an abiding Interest in culture and in people-to-people exchanges as a means of increasing world understand- ing. With warm personal regards. Sincerely, YOU CHAN YANG, Executive Vice President and Arnba.s- sador at Large of Korea. EXTENSION OF REMARKS MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL OF MARYLAND IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 19613 Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, in these troubled times when international un- derstanding and good will are so im- portant, it is heartening to note the in- dividual acts of brotherhood performed by some dedicated citizens. One fine example of such action is well demonstrated by the work of my good friend, Mr. Frank M. Perper, of Arling- ton, Va. This businessman, who is pres- ident of the Motel Management Corp. of America, Inc., has made many un- selfish contributions of his time and energy, as well as his resources, to help further friendship between the people of Korea and the United States. Therefore, I was particularly pleased to attend a recent reception held in his REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Seoul, Korea, November 1, 1965. This letter of appreciation is presented to Mr. Frank M. Perper, the Motel Management Corp. of America, Inc., Arlington, Va., in recognition and gratitude of his unselfish contributions which helped to further the friendship between the peoples of Korea and the United States. As an arduous supporter of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation he has made tangible aid available In assisting the recent tour of the Little Angels, Korean chil- dren's musica:[ and dancing group. He also cooperated cordially in providing facilities and services for official and cere- monial occasions in Washington, D.C., area, and has shown warm humanity by assisting many Korean students in the United States to become self-supporting in continuing their education. The generosity of Mr. Perper will long and affectionately be remembered by the Korean people, and Is hereby recognized and com- mended. HONG JONG CHUL. Minister, Ministry of Public Informa- tion, Republic of Korea. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5 February 16, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A789 they have only seen the beginning. The British have promised to invoke an even wider range of sanctions and are expected to announce the next round shortly. There is no question in our minds about the determination of the British to see this program through. I might point out that at the Lagos Conference of January 11-12, the British appear to have convinced all other Commonwealth members who attend- ed that there were sufficient reasons to be- lieve that these sanctions can be successful. This led to a decision to wait until July before the Commonwealth will reexamine the effectiveness of this attempt to bring down the Smith regime. We are sure that the British will use that time to good ad- vantage. - Before and after the illegal rebellion, the British position has been that they would not use force in the Southern Rhodesia rebellion, except to restore law and order. Shortly after the rebellion took place, the British gave an indication that they were willing to send troops into neighboring Zam- bia, although agreement could not be reached with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda on a mandate for such troops. In the meantime, when the possibility that the Smith regime would cut off Zambia's power from the Kariba Dam became a spec- ter on the horizon, British Prima Minister Harold Wilson publicly stated that the Unit- ed Kingdom could not stand idly by and allow that to happen. Zambia's entire cop- per-based economy depends on Kariba pow- er. Late last week, too, a British military mission arrived in Zambia for talks with the Zambian Government.. The United States and the United King- dom are united in their determination that Zambia shall not be made to bear the brunt of the Southern Rhodesia crisis, As a result of their common colonial past, the economies of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia are rather intricately intertwined. All of Zambia's oil, for example, has been received from the re- finery at Umtali. Thus, the announcement of the British oil embargo caught Zambia with less than 2 weeks' supply of petroleum products, although measures were already underway tomeet Zambia's petroleum re- quirements by alternate overland methods. These, of course, take time to function fully. NEIGHBORS HELP ZAMBIA The help given to Zambia by its African neighbors has been vital to the success of the supply operation, Kenya and Tanzania have cooperated magnificently in making avail- able their port, railroad, and airport facilities for the British segment of the airlift. Tan- zania has greatly facilitated the overland flow of petroleum by helping to organize truck convoys. The Congo has met every request of the United States and Canadian Governments to make a success of the airlift we have mounted from Leopoldville. Two great American overseas airlines, Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines, deserve a hearty "well done" for their assistance with this airlift. Together, they are carrying a minimum of 180 tons of diesel fuel a day to Zambia. By the first of March, the petroleum sit- uation within Zambia should be sufficiently normal again for that aspect of the airlift to be discontinued, but we are prepared to con- tinue the airlift for other vitally needed supplies. President Mobutu made a large gilt of oil from his Government's own stocks to help tide Zambia over the most critical period of the oil shortage. The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola and the South African Government have shown a correct attitude. They have respected the British oil embargo and show every sign of continuing to practice their neutrality in what they see as a domestic British prob- lem. Let me close with a comment on 'the claim of the Smith regime that it is a bulwark against communism in Africa. We disagree. We believe the regime's policies and actions are designed to perpetuate minority rule. If those are left unchallenged and un- checked, they would create exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their Influence in Southern Rhodesia and which would encourage the Communists to renew their efforts elsewhere in Africa. We have had some experience in helping responsible African governments resist Com- munist encroachments-far more experience, I might add, than the Southern Rhodesian regime. We believe the policies of govern- ments in other African countries-policies looking toward social advancement, respon- sible majority rule, and political stability- are far more effective weapons against com- munism than any of the methods the Smith regime might devise. We know of no Communist threat to Southern Rhodesia at present, but we fear one may well develop if the colony continues on its present course. We do not consider our support of British efforts to return Southern Rhodesia, to legal, constitutional government inconsistent with our policy of resisting the Communist threat to genuine independence in Africa. On the contrary, we look on our opposition to the rebel. regime as additional evidence of our determination to resist that threat. [Front the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune, Jan. 29, 19661 , "AFRICA LAUDS PEACE STEPS" MENNEN WIL- LIAMS TELLS OF TALKS WITII LEADERS Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, who carried President Johnson's Vietnam "peace - offensive" to Africa, said here Friday night that the African part of the peace effort was successful, Williams, former six-term Governor of Michigan and now African affairs assistant in the State Department, spoke at a dinner meeting of the International Relations Coun- cil of St. Joseph County in the Morris Inn. The "peace offensive" was well received by African leaders, said Williams, who traveled the length of Africa, visiting 14 heads of state in 7 days, to explain this Nation's Viet- namese policy. Williams said African leaders were pleased to be consulted and praised the United States for efforts to open Vietnam peace ne- gotiations. PROMISE ACTION Many of those to whom he talked prom- ised to approach the Communist world and urge negotiations, Williams said. "Even If the North Vietnamese refuse to negotiate," Williams added, "I am positive that we have convinced the leaders of black Africa of the sincerity of our Intentions." During a question period following his speech, Williams also said communism has lost its early impact on Africa and has set- tled into a status more like imperialism. "Ideologically, communism hasn't made any headway in Africa," Williams said. "The number of card-carrying Communists in Af- rica is very small." He said the only really successful effort by Red China and Russia has been Brazzaville, the Congo. The main topic of Williams' speech was the Southern Rhodesian crisis resulting from the effort of the Ian Smith regime to obtain independence from the British Government and extend a white supremacy ruled. PRAISES EFFORT Williams praised the efforts of Britain to bring down the Smith regime. He said the efforts of Britain to use controls on trade rather than armed conflict In the Southern Rhodesian matter are proving successful, "American reaction to the illegal seizure of power by the Smith regime was immediate and positive," Williams said. He praised American businessmen for voluntary coop- eration in helping to, make the trade controls successful. Williams scoffed at the claim by Smith that the minority-rule government in South- ern Rhodesia would be a bulwark against communism. On the contrary, Williams said, Smith policies to perpetuate minority rule and hold down the advancement of the Negro majority creates "exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their influence in Southern Rhodesia" and encourages Communists efforts elsewhere in Africa. Communism and Crisis in Italy EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. EDNA F. KELLY OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 16, 1966 Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to place in the RECORD and to commend to the attention of the membership of this body, an editorial entitled "Communism and Crisis in Italy," which appeared in the February 14, 1966, edition of the New York Times. For many years I have spoken in this House about developments in Italy, ex- pressing my growing concern about the influence of the Communist Party in the governmental affairs of this country. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and as a great admirer of the Italian people, their contributions to our culture, and their positive and im- portant role in the NATO structure, I have viewed with dismay the progress which the Communist Party of Italy has made over the years In various local, ad- ministrative; and national elections. The current government crisis in Italy is in part attributable to those developments. Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the current situation in Italy-a situation which may provide the opportunity for the increase in power of the Communist Party of that country-will be resolved in such a manner so as to prevent, any diminution of Italy's important role in the affairs of the free world. The editorial follows: 'COMMUNISM AND CRISIS IN ITALY The failure of Aldo Moro, leader of the Christian Democrats, to form a government on his first try in the present Italian political crisis is bad news for everyone but the Com- munists. The possibilities now are a long crisis, a caretaker government, or a general election. The four-party coalition is dis- playing lack of unity just at the moment that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has reorganized and unified its leadership. The PCI, largest Communist Party in the West, Is likely to continue on the relatively moderate line set for it years ago by the late Palmiro Togliatti. In its esoteric terminol- ogy, polycentrism-or autonomy from Mos- cow and Peiping-is the party's policy in international affairs. In internal affairs, it is democratic centralism, which calm for cen- tralized strategy but, diversity and even lib- eralism in tactics. Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400020001-5