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March 1, 1966
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Approved For RtmimiggRicatiswiloggoppo400050008-5,, 4156 -march 1, 1966 March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of Frederick J. R. Heebee, of Louisiana, to be U.S. district judge, eastern district of Louisiana, vice Frank B. Ellis, retired. At the indicated time and place per- sons interested in the hearing may make such representations as may be perti- nent. The subcommittee consists of the Sen- ator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HirosicA], and myself, as chairman. ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI- CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX On request, and by unanimous con- sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appen- dix, as follows: By Mr. FULBRIGHT: Certificate of merit issued by the American Red Cross to Howard E. Haugerud; article published in the Washington, D.C., Daily News of February 4, 1966, entitled "Dramatic Minutes on a Bridge"; article published in the State Department Newsletter of Feb- ruary 1966, entitled "Red Cross Cites Hauge- rud for Saving Policeman's Life"; and letters from the Vice President, Representative THOMAS E. MORGAN, Senator FULBRIGHT, Sen- ator MONT/ALE, Senator McCLELLAN, Repre- sentative FRASER, and Senator MCCARTHY, all in commendation of Mr. Haugerud. Transcript of radio broadcast made by Edward P. Morgan on February 21, 1966, relating to hearings recently held by the Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the war in Vietnam. By Mr. HARTKE: Editorials entitled "Misplacing the Blame," "Let's Declare Just What We Mean in Viet- nam," and "Coincidence Underlines a Point," published in the Post-Tribune, Gary, Ind., February 3, 6, and 9, 1966, respectively. THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST DEBATE Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the To- ronto Daily Star, one of Canada's great- est papers, recently presented to its readers a discerning portrait of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee, under the heading "The Man Who Leads America's Greatest De- bate." Says the article, by Staff Writer Robert Nielsen under a Washington date- line: Questioning national dogma and offending conventional wisdom is a risky habit, es- pecially at times of stress. * * * His prestige as one of that rare species, the philosopher- statesman, is grounded in a 23-year record of reasoned and often prophetic discourses as Representative and Senator. As the article points out, Senator FUL- BRIGHT has been a prophet or a promoter of all the major constructive and mod- erating influences in world affairs, in- cluding foreign aid, coexistence, and re- straining of nuclear arms rivalry. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that this article, which is such a deserved tribute to our distinguished colleague, may be printed in the CON- GRESSIONAL RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the REC- ORD, as follows: THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST DEDATE7--FULBRIGHT GOES ON THINKING, AND SAYING THE UNTHINKABLE (By Robert Nielsen) Wsslinvorow.?The Vietnam ulcer has be- gun to perforate and inflame the American body politic. It is a fime when conventional politicians talk of "honor" or "victory" or at least "firm- ness." But Senator JAMES WILLIAM FUL- BRIGHT goes on doing what comes naturally to him?thinking unthinkable thoughts and uttering them when he believes they should be aired. He is doing it this week as his Senate Foreign Relations Committee opens what amounts to a full-dress public inquiry into U.S. policy in Vietnam. A few days ago FULBRIGHT mused aloud, in his soft Ozark drawl, on, whether the United States had been wrong to commit it- self in South Vietnam, and on whether a great nation -could admit such a mistake and draw back. Then he bored in on Secretary of State Dean Rusk with embarrassing questions about the origins of the war. Questioning national dogma and offending conventional wisdom Is a risky habit, es- pecially at times of stress, and Fur.sarcm's latest heresies have clearly earned him the displeasure of President Johnson, who shows an increasing preference for yes men. Johnson snubbed FULBRIGHT at a meeting with 20 congressional leaders before announc- ing the resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. OVEREDUCATED The Senator had just begun an exposition of American policy in Asia since World War II when the President pointedly turned to Rusk and started a conversation. FULBRIGHT has known worse rebuffs than that. President Truman once called him "an overeducated Oxford s.o.b." (FULBRIGHT was a Rhodes scholar) for suggesting that the President should resign when the opposition party captures Congress in the midterm elections---as the Republicans did in 1946. The late Senator Joe McCarthy tried to nickname him "Senator Halfbright." It never took, except among some rightwing patriots who are regurgitating their old scur- rilities into FuLnarcarr's mailbag these days. But those who have disagreed with Fur,- BRIGHT have usually found, in the end, that it is unsafe to ignore his deeply considered opinions. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee, which carries the main burden of the Senate's constitutional duty to give advice and consent to administration foreign policy, his words automatically carry weight. His prestige as one of that rare species, the philosopher-statesman, is grounded in a 23- year record of reasoned and often prophetic discourses as Representative and Senator. Although he is exceptionally mild man- nered, and almost unfailingly temperate in language, FULBRIGHT has ample inner tough- ness for the role of Great Dissenter in foreign policy matters. LAPSE When the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles was being considered in 1961, FCTL- BRIGHT did not fear to pit his detached schol- arly judgment against the optimism of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and the State Department. He wrote President Kennedy a long memo condemning the project on bah political and moral grounds. After the fiasco, the Presi- dent said to him within the hearing of others: "You are the only one here who has a right to say T told you so.'" McCarthy's fear-and-smear tactics caused one of FuLsrucirr's few lapses from moderate speech. He observed that democracy has "no apparatus to deal with the boor, the liar, the lout." At a time when President Eisenhower was trying to pussyfoot around the rampant Mc- Carthy, and when Congress was afraid of him, Pur..srucarr was the lone Senator to vote to cut off funds for McCarthy's investiga- tions. By the end of the same year (1954) his minority of one had become a majority of the Senate voting censure of McCarthy and breaking the latter's political power. Arkansas lost an educator, and the United States gained a statesman, as a result of FULBRIGHT'S having got fired, for parochial political reasons, from the presidency of the University of Arkansas. He made his mark in his first year (1943) as a freshman Representative, successfully moving a resolution favoring U.S. member- ship in a world organization with powers adequate to keep the peace. This was a forerunner to the establishment of the United Nations, and a decisive breakaway from American isolationism. Yet when the U.N. Charter was being eu- phorically hailed in 1945, FULBRIGHT rose in the Senate to voice critical reservations. The U.N. was being sold on the ground that it would not infringe national sover- eignty, he noted. But unless it developed to the point where it limited the autonomy of nations in their dealings with others, it would prove ineffective. The rule of law, backed by U.N. power to settle disputes, could not operate if the member nations retained absolute sover- eignty. PROPHET Since then FULBRIGHT has been a prophet or a promoter of nearly every major con- structive or moderating tendency in world affairs: Foreign economic aid, European union, the coexistence of capitalism and com- munism, "polycentrism" in the Communist world; restraint of the nuclear arms race. Even without that record, his fame would endure from one simple idea he had in 1945: Conversion of surplus U.S. military supplies, left overseas after the war, into exchange scholarships. At last count, more than 25,000 Americans had gone overseas on Fulbright scholarships, and 47,000 men and women had come to study in the United States. FULBRIGHT, now 60, was more noted as, an athlete and good mixer than as a scholar at Oxford University. FULBRIGHT derives his authority from his habit of standing back coolly from the chaotic flux of current events, trying to detect the significant movements and then fitting them into their historical contexts. His mind is richly stocked with political history, and he resorts frequently to the wisdom of the ancient philosophers, and of the 18th and 19th century thinkers. In a sense he is still an educator. From his Senate forum he periodically lectures the American people about their qualities, both good and bad, especially as they relate to the difficulties of conducting an intelligent for- eign policy. "We have clung too long to our youth as a nation, during which our foreign policy consisted in a series of exhilarating and suc- cessful adventures. * * * But we live now in a far more difficult and more dangerous world, a world in which we must come of age. Neither God nor nature has preordained the triumph of our free society. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 19(6 Approved FesmEettngg587/Ak8roRDPs6ETRON6R000400050008-5 Mr. President, I offer my resolution as a constructive alternative to the John- son administration's proposal. That proposal, while abolishing the electoral college and thereby preventing presiden- tial electors from flouting the popular will as expressed in the November elec- tions, would freeze into our Constitution the winner-take-all system whereby a State's entire electoral vote would go to the ticket carrying that State. A bad consequence of the winner-take-all sys- Lam is that the parties concentrate their campaigns on those States having the largest number of electoral votes to the exclusion of the other States. A ticket that can carry the major industrial States can win a majority of the elec- toral votes. My proposal would give the people a more meaningful voice in selecting their national leaders by requiring presiden- tial tickets to go after every congres- aional district or special district in order to be sure of winning a majority of the electoral votes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and ap- oropriately referred. The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 141) proposing an amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States providing for the election of the President and Vice President, introduced by Mr. SCOTT, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Ju- diciary. -y?-,-,,,, TAX ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966-- AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. 490 Mr. PROUTY (for himself and Mr. JORDAN of Idaho) submitted amend- ments, intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the bill (H.R. 12752) to pro- vide for graduated withholding of in- come tax from wages, to require declara- Lions of estimated tax with respect to self-employment income, to accelerate current payments of estimated income Lax by corporations, to postpone certain excise tax rate reductions, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed. ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL Mr. MeGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of a bill I have introduced to promote the safety of railway employees, S. 2180, the name of the junior Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] be added as a cosponsor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS COSPONSORS OP BILL Under authority of the order of the Senate of February 21, 1966, the names r)k. Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. MORTON, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. TOWER were added as additional cosponsors of the bill (S. 2956) to amend the National Labor Relations Act so as to make it an unfair labor practice for a labor organi- zation to discriminate on account of race, color, religion, or national origin, intro- duced by Mr. Domi:Nrox on February 21, 1966. ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AMENDMENT Under authority of the order of the Senate of February 18, 1966, the names of Mr. GREENING, Mr. HART, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachu- setts, Mr. KUCIIEL, Mr. :MCGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MIJSKIE, and Mr. SALTONSTALL were added as additienal cosponsors of amendment No. 485, in- tended to be proposed by Mr. BARTI.,:TT, to the bill (S. 2933) to promote inter- national trade in agricultural comnuali- ties, to combat hunger and malnutriteon, to further economic development, and for other purposes, submitted by Mr. BARTLETT (for himself and Mr. MAG:ZU- son) on February 18, 1966. PUBLIC HEARINGS ON S. 1676, A BILL TO COORDINATE AND DIS- SEMINATE BIRTH CONTROL IN- FORMATION UPON REQUEST, SCHEDULED WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, AND THURSDAY, MARCH 3, AT 10 A.M., ROOM 4200, NEW SENA TE OFFICE BUILDING Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, this week on Wedriesda,y and Thursday the eovernment Operations Subcommit tee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, of which I am chairman, will hold bearings in which it is hoped that the growing popu- lation dialog will be further expanded. These public hearings will start at 10 a.m. This week the hearings will be held in room 1200 of the New Senate Office Building. On Wednesday contributions will be made by the following witnesses: Dr. Donald M. Barrett, professor of sociology, University of Notre Dame, Norte Dame, Lid.; director of the Notre Dame Institute for Latin American Pop- ulation Research, and a member of the Papal Commisaion on Population and Birth Control. Prof. Albert P. Blaustein, professor of law and law librarian, Rutgers Univer- eity, Camden, N.J. Dr. Andre J. deBethune, author and professor of chemistry, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. Dr. Joseph D. :Beasley, obstetric an and gynecologist, Department of Child Health and Pediatrics, Tulane Univer- sity School of Medicine, New Orleans, La. The subcommittee had hoped to hear from Dr. Joseph P.. Martin of Cleveland, Ohio, but Dr. Martin is suffering from the flu. He will make his contribution at a later hearing. On Thursday contributions to these extended hearings on S. 1676. my bill to coordinate and disseminate birth control information upon request will be made by a man who is highly qualified to discuss food and housing needs?Secre- tary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman. 4155 NOTICE OF WEATHER. MODIFICA- TION HEARINGS Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate and other interested persons, I want to announce that hearings have been scheduled by the Committee on Interior and Insular Af- fairs on S. 2375, the bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a comprehensive program of scientific and engineering research, ex- periments, tests, and operations for in- creasing the yield of water from atmos- pheric sources. The hearings will start at 10 a.m., Monday, March 21, 1966, in room 3110, New Senate Office Building, and continue until all of those wishing to be heard have had an opportunity to testify. S. 2875 was introduced by our dis- tinguished colleague, Senator ANDERSON, for himself and 20 other Senators, on February 4, 1966. The purpose of the bill is to implement recommendations re- cently released by the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences. Because of the widespread interest in weather modification and its possible ef- fect on our water supply and resources, it is my intention to invite testimony from qualified scientific and engineering individuals to give the committee the benefit of their knowledge and expel 1- ence. I trust that a complete record of both past activities and the possibilities for the future can be completely ee- plored. It is time to move forward fl this field with boldness and perseverance, and S. 2875 is a step in this direction. We must continue to do all in our power to meet this Nation's water needs. NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINA- TION OF RUSSELL E. SMITH TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, DISTRICT OF MONTANA Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, cn behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hear- ing has been scheduled for Thursday, March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in mon 2300, New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of Russell E. Smith, of Mon- tana, to be U.S. district judge, district of Montana, vice William D. Murray, re- tired. At the indicated time and place pee- sons interested in the hearing may mat. e such representations as may be perti- nent. The subcommittee consists of the Sen- ator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN I, the Senator from Nebraska [Mi. Hausical , and myself, as chairman. NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINA- TION OF FREDERICK J. R. HEEBE TO BE U.S. DIS IRICT JUDGE. EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISI- ANA Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public heal - ing has been scheduled for Thursdaea Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDPUBOR44R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN TRICKS "History plays cruel tricks. It allowed us to believe that the triumphs of our past were the product of our vigor and resourcefulness alone. What we failed to perceive in our past was the presence of another element; The element of an improbable run of luck, the luck of a rich and unspoiled continent far removed from the centers of power poli- tic's and world conflicts." Although he is a hero to liberal inter- nationalists and a dirty word to the self- styled conservatives of the radical right. FULBRIGHT himself is palpably a conserva- tive. He has a conservative's respect for tradition and an aristocrat's mistrust of mass impulses. He has voted the straight Southern line against civil rights, without apologies and with inner discomforts that can only be guessed at, since he is certainly not a bigot. He is forever counseling the United States to be prudent as well as conciliatory in for- eign affairs, to beware of thinking it can police the world or remake the world in its image. MODERATION If FULBRIGHT is passionate about anything, It is moderation. But his insistent desire to see things in their true proportions can startle his coun- trymen when it collides with national myths and obsessions?as when he rated Fidel Castro "a nuisance but not a grave threat" to the United States. Now he is applying his system of measure- ment to Vietnam and if he turns out right it will not be said, as it often has been, that he was "right too soon." In fact, he swallowed this week some of the humble medicine he suggested for the coun- try, and admitted he had been wrong to en- dorse a 1964 congressional resolution au- thorizing the President to take all necessary steps to repel aggression in southeast Asia. Johnson now is waving this blank check under Congress' nose, and FULBRIGHT evidently would like to write some conditions into it. This will not restore him to the best graces of the White House, but then, FULBRIGHT has never depended on the favor of Presi- dents. Or even on the agreement of his colleagues in Congress, His constituency is scattered across the country ?and many parts of the world, in centers of learning and especially among students and practitioners of International relations. LOYAL His following is select, influential, and His own status is unique, and indicated by the fact that British Labor dissidents wired a protest to him, rather than Johnson, over the resumption of bombing. Even if the Presidential frowns should be followed by thunderbolts, FULBRIGHT might take solace at having moved Walter Lipp- mann to this hyperbole; "The role he plays in Washington is an indispensable role: There is no one else who is so powerful and also so wise." NEBRASKA'S STATEHOOD DAY AND CENTENNIAL Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, 99 years ago today, on March 1, 1867, the free State of Nebraska was recognized as the 37th State in the Union. Today we cele- brate our natal day. One year from now Nebraska will be celebrating its 100th birthday. Ground- work has been laid for ceremonies and festivities marking the anniversary of a century of pioneer heritage. A fondly remembered part of that heritage is the postal history of Nebraska as a State and territory. Nebraska's re- quest for the issuance of a Nebraska statehood centennial commemorative stamp in 1967 is presently on the agenda of the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Commit- tee to the Past Office Department. The Centennial Commission's Commemora- tive Stamp Committee has plans for re- staging the first night airmail flight from North Platte to Omaha. The Pony Ex- press run from Fairbury to Scottsbluff will be reenacted along the original route. The centennial program, according to the Nebraska Centennial Commission, has a three-part objective. The first is to honor our heritage. It is only through examination of our past and ad- herence to proven ideals and principles that we can be true to the land and con- tinue to have a heritage worthy of honor. It is remembered at this time that these sturdy pioneers made sacred the land called Nebraska by their great bravery and sacrifices. By principles based upon a strong democratic ideal and spiritual faith a heritage has been forged deserv- ing our highest respect. We are unalter- ably committed to its preservation. The second aim of our program is a celebration or commemoration begin- ning on our Statehood Day, March 1, 1967, and running through Thanksgiv- ing Day, 1967. This period of time will be filled with activities of national and local importance and interest. It is in- deed fitting that these 8 months be set aside to commemorate the work of many years which have given us such a great State today. This is the birthday party. The third objective is a rededication to the future. With renewed spirits and confidence, Nebraskans will look to the future and join their fellow countrymen in preserving the heritage and realizing the promise of our great land. The people of Nebraska extend the hand of friendship. Inscribed on our centennial seal is "Welcome to Ne- braskaland?where the West begins." In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe that through the individual effort of Nebraskans combined with the support of all the Nation, the Nebraska Centen- nial of 1967 will be a tremendous suc- cess with lasting effects on our fine State and our great Nation. WAR ON HUNGER Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the March issue of the Farm Journal strong- ly endorses President Johnson's new food-for-freedom program. The Farm Journal called rather ur- gently last October for efforts to meet the population food crisis in the world. That editorial appeared in the RECORD of January 14. In its new comment on the President's world food proposal the mag- azine suggests that the label "war on hunger" would be appropriate. It says: We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words which the President used). They have the neces- sary ring of urgency. As a past director of food for peace and author of a book entitled "War 4157 Against Want," I offer no specific label for the Nation's food program, but I would like to join Farm Journal Editor Carroll P. Streeter in his comment that there should be a "necessary ring of ur- gency" about the program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the Farm Journal editorial be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GOOD HUNGER PROGRAM President Johnson's new food-for-freedom program, with its implications for U.S. farm- ers and for the hungry of the world has Farm Journal's full support. It agrees in intent with what we have been advocating for months, particularly in our war-on- hunger statement on this page of last October. The food-for-peace label has apparently been tossed aside. The new one isn't much better. We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words which the President used). They have the necessary ring of urgency. In essence the policy calls for expanding our food shipments from here to a practi- cable degree; trying to put more of them on a long time loan basis; going into the market to buy what the hungry need, not just dump- ing surpluses we want to get rid of; sending food only to those who will show real effort to help themselves; clamping down on feed- ing unfriendly nations (does Russian belong here); and guardedly bringing back into production as fast as needed, but no faster, some of our 60 million acres of idle land. Nothing was said about charging more of this cost to something other than agricul- ture?a step we still urge. If we really hew to these lines and not just talk about them, and if we move in the direction of more "freedom" for American farmers as well as freedom from hunger (a big "if" indeed), our "hunger" campaign will be on the right track at last. Let's see now if we do as we say. FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE AS A DIET SUPPLEMENT Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, Secretary of the Interior Udall announced recently a dramatic breakthrough in the worldwide struggle against hunger when he revealed the de- velopment of a new process for produc- ing a wholesome fish protein concentrate which can be used as a diet supplement throughout the world. For many years the people of the United States have been actively engaged in an effort to provide food for the world's hungry people. The accelerat- ing pace of modern life makes the prob- lems of each country the concern of all countries, and hunger is the greatest common enemy in the world today. The statistics of world hunger do not need repeating. The President's recent mes- sage to the Congress on food for freedom clearly documented the problem. It is enough for us to realize that more than half of the world's inhabitants are either chronically hungry or consistently undernourished. The task of providing food for the world's starving millions has challenged American ingenuity, and America has re- sponded in many ways. One response? the one cited by Secretary Udall?raises the intriguing probability that the har- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1158 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1981; vest of the future can come from the sea. The bounty contained in the world's oceans has never been underestimated. Scientists and nutritional experts have long known that fish and fish products could go far toward erasing hunger in many countries of the world. The ques- tion has always been, how could this in- valuable resource he exploited, how could we actually get these fish products into the mouths of the hungry? An enormous amount of research has gone toward answering this question, and out of it has come at least one very hope- ful product. That product is called fish protein concentrate, or fish flour. It seems to offer an exciting victory in the war against hunger. Fishprotein concentrate is an utterly new concept in the food industry. For years fishermen and fish processors have used many devices to preserve fish against rapid deterioration. They have salted fish, smoked it, dried it, canned it, frozen it. And they have been success- ful in part with each of these methods. But in every case they have been trying to preserve fish in a form very closely resembling its original state, and not try- ing to extract from fish the greatest pos- sible amount of nutritional value. The process which results in fish pro- tein concentrate takes a different ap- proach. It is aimed not at preserving fish in its original state, but rather at taking advantage of the tremendous amount of protein which is concentrated in even the least valuable type of fish. '?rotein deficiency is the most promi- nent element of malnutrition in the world today_ Meat is far too expensive in most countries to provide a staple diet item for the average person. Wheat yields ample protein, but wheat is virtu- ally unknown in many lands. Vegetables of one kind or another are common everywhere, but they often supply only small amounts of a low quality protein. Fish protein concentrate is designed to meet this worldwide need for protein with a food supplement which contains a high. amount of high quality animal protein in a form which is safe, inexpen- sive, easy to transport, and palatable. The idea of developing a fish flour has been current among fishery technologists for more than a decade. But it has al- ways faced a tangle of questions: could a fish protein concentrate be developed economically? Could it be made accept- able in countries where fish is not a com- mon or recognizable part of the diet? In 1963 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the In- terior began intensive research into these questions, and the National Academy of Sciences soon joined in the project.. Work began with tests on various meth- ods of removing the water and oil from the whole fish so that it yielded a dry, white powder containing most of the pro- tein and minerals of the original raw fish. On the basis of preliminary research in the laboratory, the Bureau was able to design a model scale FPC production Plant which could manufacture 100 pounds of FPC per day. While research continued at the laboratory, construction of the scale plant was begun, and the plant was completed in the spring of 1965. This plant greatly accelerated the "FTC study. It was apparent early in the study that a protein product which would be made available to the poor of the world have to be manufactured at a very low cost. That meant using the whole fish as raw material?not a fillet, or a steak, but the whole flab,. And this introduced the problem of wholesomeness. With this and other considerations in mind, the :Bureau of Commercial Fish- eries began through exhaustive tests to narrow down the focus of its Quest. By last summer it had developed a process whereby Atlantic red hake, a cheap and plentiful fish, could be turned into a highly acceptable protein concentrate through treatment with isopropyl alco- hol. The protein content of this pow- dery substance is extremely high?about 80 percent., The estimated price is very low?somewhere between 14 and 29 cents a pound, depending on the capacity of the plant which produces it. In October of last. year an Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences pronounced the concentrate "wholesome,, highly nutritious, stable, safe, and capable of economic produc- Uon and marketing." The Committee's report further said: The product blends well with (F her forms of food. The Committee has tested it as an ingredient in beverages, noodles, gravy, bread, and cookies. In percentages high enough to be of nutritional significance, the product is scarcely detectable, and in most forms, not at all. A similar test, a flavor profile, was conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. It revealed that fish protein concentrate is not fishy in taste. FPC has been in- corporated in noodles at levels up to 10 percent, in milkshakes at levels of 20 percent, and in dry beef gravy mixes at up to 20 percent. In no case i.eas a fish flavor detected by a trained panel. FPC was ever, used in the making of tortillas, with no fish taste and no change in flavor. On October 14, 1965, the National Academy's Committee recommended that the U.S. Government arrange for the production of 3,000 tons of fish protein concentrate within 2 years. The Com- mittee recommended that an experi- mental pilot plant; be constructed and operated which could produce :0 tons of concentrate per day based on the Bu- reau of Commercial Fisheries' process. These developments, culminating in Sec- retary Udah's recent announcement, make it clear that fish protein con- centrate has been tested and proved to be a valuable, comm.ercially marketable product. The question remains, how can it best be used? Surely our first consideration should be America's foreign aid program. Presi- dent Johnson has proposed a food-for- freedom plan designed to put America's skill and abundance at the service of the worldwide fight against hunger. Fish protein concentrate should become a key commodity in American food shipments to poor nations. The Bureau (,)f Com- mercial Fisheries, working closely with the Department of State and the Agency for International Development, should distribute enormous amounts of fish pre- tien concentrate which would have a strong effect on the world's nutrition. It should also make available to the countries of the developing world the fruits of this technical breakthrough sa that each country could commence its own production. The potential of fish protein concen- trate as a worldwide nutritional supple- ment is clear. But let me point out that commercial production and distribution of fish protein concentrate could also have widespread benefits in the United States. In our own country nearly 13 percent of all households do not meet two-thirds of the food nutrient allow- ances recommended for their diets. Another important beneficiary would be the U.S. fishing industry. Full-scale production of fish protein concentrate would enable fishermen to use fish which they now catch and discard because the fish are of insufficient commercial value. Fish protein concentrate would increase the present use of fish by 7 billion pounds per year in the United States alone. Commercial use of fish protein concen- trate would also allow fishermen to work steadily the year round, catching mar- ketable species of fish when they are available and turning to species suitable for fish protein concentrate during the remainder of the year. This new process could stabilize and diversify the fish mar- ket, and increase employment in fish processing plants. But beyond the immediate advantages to the fishing industry, production of fish protein concentrate would also bene- fit other parts of our economy. A major FPC program would of course mean in- creased demands for ships and thus more work for shipbuilders. It would also open a new field of research into fish processing and the development of new processing techniques. And it could very well mean a whole new line of foods for domestic use?many major food com- panies in the United States have ex- pressed interest in the use of FPC in everyday food such as cereal, bread, pastry, and even candy. The potential contribution that fish protein concentrate can make both at home and abroad is clear, but it is essen- tial that we plan now to take advantage of its benefits. I, therefore, propose a six-point action program to insure that fish protein concentrate is put to work quickly and effectively. First. Our first objective muet be to obtain approval by the Food and Drug Administration for the commercial mar- keting of FPC. The Food and Drug Ad- ministration has so far refused approval for domestic marketing of FPC because the product uses the whole fish, including the portions which are normally die- carded. But exhaustive tests by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the Na- tional Academy of Sciences, and an inde- pendent testing firm all show that the new FPC recently developed is safe and wholesome. In order to obtain FDA approval, a group of New England Senators has twice petitioned the FDA, and a formal Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4170 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and It is so ordered. SENATOR ALLEN J. FLTENDER RE- PORTS FROM CONGRESS ON SOUTH VIETNAM Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD excerpts from reports which I have made to the people of Louisiana during the year 1965 and part of this year, 1966, on the issue of Vietnam. I also ask unanimous consent that preced- ing each excerpt, the date of my report be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [Prom the report of Feb. 27, 19651 SOUTH VIETNAM Hearings began last week on the impor- tant, $49 billion defense appropriations bill. The Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee went into execu- tive session to receive testimony and justifi- cation from Defense Secretary Robert Mc- Namara on this mammoth expenditure. As a member of the subcommittee, I questioned Mr. McNamara very closely as to our mili- tary posture and our military policies throughout the world. Like many other Senators and Congressmen, I am becoming extremely concerned about the effectiveness of these policies, particularly in Vietnam. It appears to me that we have gone in so deeply in South Vietnam, that we now find ourselves in over our heads. I am not at all sure that we can gain any victory in that God-forsaken corner of the world, and I fear we are on the verge of finding another South Korea on our hands which may be more costly. God forbid that we become engaged in a big war on the continent of Asia. I become particularly concerned when I recall the history of the French effort to hold Indochina. That war lasted from 1916 to 1954, and in its latter stages we supplied the French with approximately $1.5 billion worth of American aid. The French at one time had as many as 350,000 men in action on the Indochina peninsula, of which about 175,000 were French nationals. The administration of the Government and the entire population were under their control; yet in 8 years, the French were decisively defeated and driven out of an area they had held for 100 years. This history does not bode well for the fu- ture of the American effort. [Prom the report of Apr. 3, 19651 The news from the international scene has been dominated in the last weeks by the worsening situation in Vietnam. Personally, I have long given up hope that any good can come from our Nation's involvement in that God-forsaken corner of the world. Based on my personal knowledge and ray inspections of the Vietnam situation, I repeatedly warned and advised against the coming entangle- ment, beginning with the Eisenhower ad- ministration. My warnings were not heeded, however, and we now find ourselves hanging on the tail of an increasingly ferocious bear. As it is, I am becoming more and more concerned about the course of events. It seems to me as if we have very little to win, if, indeed, we can win, and a great deal to lose. At this point, we can do little more than hope that Red Chinese forces are not brought into the fray, for we shall then have another full-scale Korea on our hands?a condition that I have tried to head off in every way that I could. Once again we are carrying the entire burden, while our erstwhile allies sit back and give advice. It does seem to me, however, that our au- thorities could take the necessary steps to provide effective security for our facilities and installations on Vietnamese territory. I have in mind particularly the recent bombing of our American Embassy in Saigon, which did great damage and took a number of lives. It is unthinkable that with the number of forces we currently have in -that area that adequate security from such sneak attacks cannot be provided. I express the hope that strong steps will be taken to assure that such attacks do not occur in the future. [From the report of May 8, 1965] VIETNAM I was invited to the White House last week to take part in a briefing by the President on the state of our affairs in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The President an- nounced to us at that meeting that he would ask Congress to appropriate an additional $700 million to carry out our expanded ef- forts in Vietnam and to deal with the new difficulties,we have run into with the Do- minican Republic. There is no doubt that ample funds are already available to the President within the Department of Defense to carry out these purposes. It is apparent to me that the administration is actually seeking a con- gressional vote of confidence in respect to the course our foreign policy is taking. The President is seeking quick congressional ap- proval as indicative of a united front on the part of the American people. As to Vietnam, I see no other course that might now be followed with any hope of suc- cess. Personally, I went on record as far back as 1954 against the involvement of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and advised President Eisen- hower against it. Instead, he and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested that U.S. military advisers be assigned to Vietnam, and the pot soon began to boil and bubble. President Kennedy augmented our forces by a substantial amount, and now, of course, we are engaged in what comes very close to being a full-scale war. I regret that this has come about, but now there seems to be no alternative but to push ahead and attempt to settle it in the shortest time possible, and with the smallest loss of life. From all re- ports the bombing we have engaged in north of the 17th parallel is having considerable effect, and I express the hope that some solu- tion can be found without the necessity of sending larger numbers of American boys into action against the enemy. What I fear is the possibility of our becoming involved in another South Korea, or even greater in- tensity, [From the report of May 15, 1965] THE JOHNSON DoorRiNE On another front, it seems to me that the President's leadership is more open to ques- tion. I refer to his statement when he signed the special congressional resolution making more funds available for the struggle in Vietnam. At that time, he indicated that congressional passage of the resolution indi- cated that the Nation and the Congress stood ready to do "whatever must be done" to pro- tect South Vietnam from aggression. In other words, he apparently considers the con- gressional action more or less a blanket en- dorsement of whatever action he may take in the future in regard to southeast Asia. Yet, prior to this statement, many Members of both the House and Senate rose to express the feeling that their votes for the resolu- tion should not be looked upon as an en- dorsement of all future action. Although these sentiments were issued a step ahead of the President, he has chosen to ignore them. Many Senators and Members of the House are very much opposed to any action which Would draw the United States into a land war in Asia, and I share this attitude. As I have said before, however, if the Chinese Communists were to send masses of troops to Vietnam, I would favor using all the means at our command to deter the Chinese aggression and protect the lives of our American boys. In connection with the Vietnam and Dominican Republic situations, recent Presidential statements have given rise to what is coming to be known as the Johnson doctrine. In short, this doctrine seems to mean that the United States will act as the policemen of peace, as New York Times Col- umnist Arthur Krock puts it, to protect nations and peoples all over the world. This goes far beyond the so-called Truman doc- trine, which was the savior of Greece and Turkey, but which pledged only economic and finaneial aid in the worldwide flight against communism. I expect that Congress is going to have a great deal to say in the future about the new Johnson doctrine, particularly if trouble continues to flare up in the fax-off corners of the world and American troops ars dis- patched to put out the fires. I, for one, am not sure that the Nation is prepared to make the sacrifices that such a course of action will necessarily call for. Aside from that, it seems that we will be compelled to go it alone. [From the report of May 29, 1965] VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC The news from Vietnam continues to be disturbing, although apparently conditions in the Dominican Republic are settling down somewhat. In Vietnam, it appears more and more as if we are heading toward a Korean- type situation of even greater dimensions. This, of course, is the one thing that X have bent every effort to avoid, beginning with 1956, 'when I first visited that beleaguered land after the French had withdrawn their farces. We now have more than 50,000 American fighting troops stationed in South Vietnam, and we have been told that this number may be increased to 75,000 in the near future. This is the equivalent of almost three full divisions. In addition, our men are now being sent into direct offensive action, on their own, against the Vietcong, according to press reports. Reports are also being received concerning the buildup of Chi- nese men and material across the North Viet- nam border. As fax as I can see, none of this news bodes well for our Nation's hope for peace. Fortunately, we have been able to with- draw a few of our boys from the Dominican Republic, and there appears hope that the multilateral peace force of the OAS will be able to maintain order and effect a settle- ment. No political agreement has been an- nounced as yet, however, and I fear that if, as, and when agreement is reached, it is likely to prove of short duration. The Gov- ernment of the Republic has already changed hands four times?more or less violently? in the 4 years since the assassination of Rafael Trujillo. In this connection, I was not surprised to hear President Johnson promise that even more economic aid will be sent to the Dominican Republic when the fighting is settled and agreement is reached. I can only remark that the same promise was made after Trujillo was deposed, and it cost our Government $103.9 million during the years 1962 through 1964. Before that time, our Nation extended $8.8 million in aid to the Republic, some of which was mili- tary hardware for internal security. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE retirement toward boosting this growing field of industry. I wish him good luck in this endeavor and I express the hope that he will be as successful in this new activity as he has been as a newspaper editor. ask unanimous consent that edito- rials commenting on Mr. Hart's retire- ment from the Dominion-News, of Morgantown, W. Va.., and the Fairmont W. Va.) Times be printed in the REcoaa. There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the REcoao, as follows: itorom the Morgantown (W. Va.) Dominion- News, Feb. 26, 1966j it CRUSTY EDITos TAKF7S IT EASIER Bill Hart's friend and fellow columnist, )reAY Pearson, called him a "crusty editor." Stronger terms have been used by Editor VIlatter H. Hart's enemies. Others, including neighbors and friends in his native Preston, consider him, a loyal friend and a major benefactor to this part of West Vir- ginia. There.'s not much neutrality when people ialk about Bill Hart of 7,-1 fame. A crusty editor is hound to have enemies as well as Iriends with a fair amount of switching back and forth depending on different situations. Sic is of the old school of personal editors. He started as an e,ager boy reporter here 47 years ago: He advanced to editor in days when it was not uncommon for editors to use their editor's chair from which to mix per- Jona], arid inailic affairs, especially in matters. Aar. Hart is a Democrat, He used his p0- -Weal influence on many occasions to obtain major benefits for his hometown and sur- rounding area. He was unrelaxing in seek- ing WPA projects ;end had a big hand in obtaining some of the most worthwhile ones iii the country.. Through the years he has ought for aviation in general and Morgan- .,own.'s beautiful airport in the mountains Li particular. Several physical assets in this area are permanent monuments to his crusti- ess and persistence. As a crusty editor, he has often gone it alone in his crusades. Sometimes he's gone overboard. He says he should have been a Barnum. He has enlivened life hereabouts by his showmanship, especially his ability to hang Presidents, Presidents' wives, Cabinet niembers, and other celebrities to Morgan- town for such things as the Hart-promoted "Fabulous Showcase" events at the airport. A self-styled "least of these, my brethren" ccuntry boy, Bill Hart was hobnobbed with e great and near great in unabashed lash- .011. Re haa ordered candidates, including t)Te great President-to-he, to do his bidding as a campaign strategist. He's as much at le me in Washington as in Tunnelton or Morgantown. ic loves to travel and has seen much of world. When it comes to airplanes, he's stin an eager?thrilled r,nct thrilling?young reporter. rAitor Hart has a family of which he is rely proud and one of which our whole corn- minity is proud. s ',day is the last day Mr. Hart's mune appears in. the editorial page masthead as editor. He is retiring from that post to take tintiris a bit easier. All, that is, except yield- lip to that eagerness to get around, to see Ciii -1gS, and report. His inimitable column,. "it May Interest You,- will continue in this paper, often from far-away places such as Saigon, Anchorage, Saudi Arabia and Cuba, but always reflecting his pride in West Vir- ginia, most especially Preston County and Morgantown. No. t We wish Bill Hart the happiness he gets from freedom to travel and, the opportunity to take it easier, when arid if his unabated young reporter's eagerness pal-mita him, to relax. Best wishes, z-1 ancl_flight chief. [From the Tolman t19(6W6.1Va.) Times, Feb. 28, ALL OITT roe AVIATION" Relieved of the daily responsibilities of get- ting out a newepaper, Walter Lawrence hart, of the Morgantown Dominion-News is going to devote almost his full time in the future to his "second love," aviation He plans to travel extensively, and there is a possibility he will be given a Government office rrom which to opera Le. Bill's interest in aviation gocs back ti the days of the Works Administrwton., when he was a prime mover in the effort; to obtain an airport for Morganto'wn. The late U.S. Senator Matthew Mansfield Neely, to whom Hart was close, had proposed an air- port in the vicinity of Fairmont to serve this community as well as Morgantown and Cl arksburg. When local leaders gave the idea a ,old shoulder, Hart and others acted quickly to obtain WPA. assistance for a Morgantown airport. Those associated with the district office of the Federal agency here in those days recall his incessant demands for more men, more equipment, and more money?all of which he eventually got. This connection with the world of flyng expanded over the ye,ars. Han is now ac- tively associated with Drew Pearson snd :rack Alexander in a charter-freight airline whose eastern base he may get changed to Morgantown if the runways there will stand the load. He has close ties with the Federal aviation regulatory bodies and for years has practically commuted between Morgantown and Washington in pursuance of his fl- terests. A confidant of the mighty, the Morgan- town editor has taken an active role in politics. He was .-me of the first to know if Senator Neely's decision to run far Governor back in 1940. Unfortunately Bill's last polit- ical "scoop"---a prediction that Arch Moore would run for the U.S. Senate this year?did not pan out, but his average is still high. As editor, he has been the most vigorous booster of what he proudly calls the Mor- gantown Trading Territory or, more recently, Mason-Dixonland. He has been an effee- tive exponent of many community project;. BillHart's influence as an editor in Mor- gantown has been substantial. He now turns to larger fields, and the cause of aviation will gain an ardent full-time supporter. FARM LABOR'S LOT INCHES UP Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mi President, over the years, the New York Times editorial board has taken great interest in farm labor problems. Its edi- torials in this field have been factual and thought provoking. The Times' most recent obseiwation--- its February 15 editorial?urges that, Federal minimum wage legislation and other protective laws which have bene- fited American labor for the last 30 years be extended to American farmworkers. As chairman of the Senate Migratory Labor Subcommittee, I endorse the Times' editorial position and urge prompt passage of S. 1861 through S. 1868, These bills were introduced during the last session of Congress and would estab- lish a minimum wage for workers em- 1169 ployed on our Nation's larger farms, pro- hibit harmful child labor outside of school hours for some children under the age of 14, provide National Labor Relations Act coverage for farmworkers employed on our Nation's larger farms, establish a voluntary recruitment pro- gram for farmworkers administered by the Secretary of Labor to aid the farmer in finding qualified employees and the farmworker in finding employment, and establish a National Advisory Council on Migratory Labor to coordinate existing programs affecting migratory farmwork- ers and to recommend to the President and Congress such new programs as may be needed. I wholeheartedly concur with the Times' conclusion that legislation in tins field is "as fundamental as any in the war against poverty." I believe that the Senate should have the benefit of this informative editorial and, therefore, ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the REcoaa. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECO1 0. as follows: [From the New York Times, Feb. 15, 1966; :FARM LABOR'S LOT INCITES UP In the year since Congress banned the mass import of low-wage farm labor from Mexico, the man-months of work done by foreign workers on American farms has de- clined by 83 percent_ Seasonal job oppor- tunities were thus created, Secretary Wirtz estimates, for at least 100,000 more domest.c. workers. This year even tighter limits cm imported farm labor will be enforced. Throughout the year farm interests sought to kill the restrictions by warning that crops would rot and prices skyrocket. Yet critical labor shortages were few; harvests were huge and the price of most fruits and vegetables declined. Despite the wage increases offered by grow- ers to attract an adequate flow of domesti! labor, farm wages remain abysmally low by industrial standards. The Wirtz report indi cates that the farm average is $1.14 an hour and that in 11 States it is still under $1 an hour. This compares with a $2.82 average for factory workers. Farm laborers should be placed under the Federal minimum wage and the other pro- tective laws that the rest of American labor has had for 30 years. It is time for Presi- dent Johnson to push forward energetically on a front as fundamental as any in the war against poverty. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS ihi the chair). The clerk will call the roll. The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec- tion is heard. The clerk will continue to call the roll. The Chief Clerk continued the call of the roll. Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved F_...R.eLease 2n05/07112 (AJINCLKE5SWINAL'KEdaiDR-QRANAtt46R000400050008-5 4171 [From the report of June 5, 1965] In South Vietnam, the undeclared war con- tinues to go badly. The decisions of our policymakers have not borne fruit, and the casualties mount day by day. The bombing raids across the border into North Vietnam apparently have not been successful in halt- ing the aggression in the south, and I fear we are being drawn more and more deeply into a second Korean conflict, one that will be more costly than the Korean war. An- other pipeline to suck up American men and materiel is being constructed, and no one can predict when we will be able to close down the Vietnam pumping station. We now have more than 50,000 American fighting men stationed in South Vietnam, and we are told that thousands more are on the way. As one who has watched and studied southeast Asia very closely since 1954, when the French were driven from Indochina, the senior Senator from Louisiana has a right to feel bitter and frustrated. I have visited that area on many occasions over the last 10 years, and on each return trip from there I carried the same message: namely, that our Nation should not become involved, on its own, in a section of the world where we had no direct interest and which lay far outside our sphere of influence. I told the late John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State under President Eisen- hower, that preparations for war should not be encouraged by the establishment of Amer- ican military advisory groups in South Viet- nam. These military advisers do little more than keep the pot boiling. At their request, thousands of Americans were sent there to train the natives how to use our military hardware. Today we are sending thousands to do the actual fighting, while our rich allies of Western Europe gave us only their moral support. Some are critical of our actions. Despite my advice and on-the-scene experi- ence, the advisers were sent in. I advised President Kennedy to withdraw our military; instead, their number was in- creased. I suggested that steps be taken to make certain that the enormous amounts of economic aid to South Vietnam were dis- tributed fairly and equitably; that President Diem be persuaded to mollify the dissident groups in his country, and satisfy their just grievances. No firm action along these lines was taken by our representatives. In spite of all my efforts, we entered the morass of southeast Asian politics with one eye closed and the other on an idealistic vision of what we hoped might somehow and someway be brought about. Now our eyes have been opened, and we have been brought down to earth. I only hope it is not too late, and that some way can be found to avoid an all-out war on the Asiatic mainland. [From the report of July 17, 1965] SOUTH VIETNAM In such a situation as now faces our Nation In South Vietnam, where we have gone in so deeply that the quicksands of southeast Asian politica are threatening to pull us under, we have no other recourse than to close ranks and support the policies of Presi- dent Johnson and his advisers. The present and past administrations have taken a gamble and now it is too late to retreat. I for one do not believe that these so-called protest demonstrations against our foreign policy by beatniks, college students, and even teachers, do much good. They may very well do a great deal of harm, for the press and other news media play up these demonstra- tions to such an extent that foreigners are led to believe that a majority of our people are not supporting the President. In point of fact, only a very small minority is doing the demonstrating, making the noise, and "teaching in," In my estimation, it would be better if we had more "study-ins" and fewer "teach-ins." [From the report of July 24, 19651 VIETNAM To turn to a subject far removed from the District of Columbia, I was interested to hear Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's comments after his recent inspection tour of Vietnam. The situation, he said, has deteriorated "in many aspects," since his last visit of 15 months ago. These sentiments, of course, are in marked contrast to hie somewhat rosy early estimates of Our Viet- nam difficulties. On prior visits much opti- mism was expressed by him and many state- ments were issued to the effect that we had tho situation well in hand. Unfortunately, his most recent statement, more closely approximates the true condi- tions to be found in that unsettled corner of the world. Long ago, I predicted that we were embarking on a course of folly by be- coming deeply involved in the civil strife then building up in Vietnam. It was my view that the presence of our so-called military advisers would serve to keep the pot boiling and cause both North Vietnam and Red China to provide more and more aid and assistance. I also pointed out to our officials on both the Vietnam and Washington levels, as well as to the Vietnam leadership, that the administration of the tremendous amounts of economic aid we were making available left a great deal to be desired. I did not feel that our aid was being made available to all Vietnamese citi- zens on an equitable basis, and because of this, a large portion of the populace was being alienated from the Government. My advice went unheeded, and today not even a Solomon could provide satisfactory an- swers. As a corollary to Vietnam, I am informed that further tax reductions, which the ad- ministration's economic advisers had "in the works" for next year, may lave to be set aside because of increased outlays for de- fense. In testimony before a congressional committee Tuesday, Gordon Ackley, the new Chairman of the President's Council of Eco- nomic Advisers, indicated that a possible in- crease in the exemption now allowed each taxpayer and his dependents, from $600 to $1,000, was being considered by the admin- istration. In my view, and in light of the mammoth tax reductions in income and excise taxes the Congress has so recently enacted, further proposals for tax reductions should be greeted very skeptically by the Congress. Especially Is this true when rising defense expenditures are facing the Nation, as pointed out by Mr. Ackley, and when the Federal Government is headed into greatly expanded and more expensive activities in social welfare and re- lated fields. It is estimated that every $100 increase in the $600 exemption allowed for taxpayers and dependents will result in the loss of $2.5 billion in revenue for the Treasury. Thus, an increase of $400 in the exemption would bring about a Federal revenue loss of $10 billion. I doubt very much that such a tax reduction can be justified at this time, or in the near future. [From the report of July 31, 19651 THE PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM ADDRESS I listened very closely to the President's address to the Nation on the Vietnam situa- tion last Wednesday at noon. As predicted. President Johnson did not reveal much new information or startling decisions. As a mat- ter of fact, I was one of a small group of Senators summoned to the White House early Wednesday morning for an advance briefing on the President's address. He is very much worried, and as many of you know, he in- herited much of the trouble that now pre- vails in Vietnam. The main point of his remarks was that many more troops would be sent immediately to Vietnam, raising our total force there from 75,000 to 125,000 men. He stated that more may be sent later, and in answer to questions, indicated that the American peo- ple could look forward to conflict in south- east Asia for many years ahead?perhaps 6 or 7. As you may recall, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recently stated our en- gagement there may last as long as 5 or 10 years, while Ho Chi Minh, leader of North Vietnam, has been reported as predicting that American forces may be fighting in South Vietnam for as long as 20 years. To compensate for this drain of American troops, the President stated that the draft would be increased from 17,000 to 35,000 young men a month. I was pleased to hear the decision had been made not to call up the Reserves or to declare a state of emer- gency at this time, although those possibili- ties have not been ruled out for the future. Mr. Johnson said that he had instructed Secretary McNamara to request more defense funds from the Congress to support the in- creases. Further requests would be made in the budget presentation next January, he said. I was also glad to hear President Johnson assure us that he had asked General West- moreland, the commander of our forces in the area, what he needed to get the job done. The President said that the general had answered his request, and that all the needs of our fighting men would be supplied. Over the past few months, I have received cor- respondence from some of the families and friends of our men in Vietnam, which in- dicated that the equipment and supplies they were receiving left something to be desired. If we are going to fight what amounts to a full-scale war in Vietnam, it seems to me that we should make every effort to see that every possible advantage is working on our side. It appears to me that we are going to need all the odds we can get. No doubt the Congress will approve the re- quest for funds needed to support our efforts In South Vietnam. In a situation such as this, we in Congress can do little else, in all good conscience, than support our President. He is acting on far more accurate informa- tion than Congress has at its command. I only hope that the information given the President represents a true picture of the situation, which seems to grow from bad to worse with each passing day. So far, the results of plans pushed forward by our mili- tary experts in the Pentagon have not been reassuring. It strikes me that we seem to be making some of the same mistakes made by the French generals in the years before 1954, when they were defeated at Dienbienphu and driven out of Indochina. From my study of that long, drawn-out guerrilla war, it is ob- vious that one of the primary faults of the French was that they greatly underesti- mated the fighting potential of their enemy. The Vietminh defined the terms of war very differently than do the leaders of any mod- ern army. And, just as was the case 10 or 15 years ago, the Vietcong is now in a posi- tion to impose their own definitions. But make no mistake about it, I hold no brief with those in our society who seek to divide the national purpose and weaken our resolve to do what must be done in the de- fense of freedom and in opposition to com- munism. I wish only that some of our so- called allies could be persuaded to bear the burden with us. And I also hope and pray that ways and means can be found to settle this conflict by negotiation, as the President also hoped for in his remarks Wednesday. [From the report of Aug. 7, 1965] MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNAM Turning to a subject far removed from our labor legislation, President Johnson last week sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the Congress with a request for an addi- tional $1.7 billion for defense expenditures. The request, of course, is necessitated by our involvement in the Vietna;m conflict. It is Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4 172 Approved For Reiftwraosionta : CIA-RDP671300446R000400050008-5 . KESSIO.NAL RECORD ? SENATF March 1, OGG one more step in which I predict will be a long series of increased expenditures to carry on the war in Vietnam. At this point there is actually no way of telling for how long we may be heavily involved in that strife-torn section of the world. As I said last week, I am sure the Congress will approve this request without much op- position, for no other course is open to those of us who have responsibility in these mat- ters. As you may recall, several months ago the Congress was asked to approve a request li)r an additional $700 million for expendi- ture in Vietnam for economic aid and other Purposes. What I fear is that because we are now sending more and more American forces In carry on the actual fighting, the South Vietnamese will be more and more prone to let us carry the entire burden. Since there Il. no stable government in South Vietnam, do not see how it will be possible to force young Vietnamese to carry on the fight. [From the report of Sept. 24, 19651 :HOPE IN VIETNAM_ On our eastern front in Vietnam, it seems that at long last the tide of the battle may be turning. Our large commitment of U.S. men and materiel is beginning to bring more and more pressure upon the enemy, and of course, something would be seriously wrong if victories could not be entered on the ledger to at least partially balance the many defeats we have had to bear at the hands of the elusive Vietcong. Unfortunately, the end is as yet nowhere Iii sight, and I fear that a great many more lives will be sacrificed before. another Amer- ican peace can be imposed on the rice pad- dies and jungles of South Vietnam. While the news of our military victories Is good, there is other recent news that is deeply disturbing to me. Now that the American commitment to South Vietnam has been made very plain by the President's statements and by the dispatch of more than 100,000 American troops, it is no doubt very obvious to the Vietcong that they can- not expect to gain a military victory against such odds. So it will be only natural for them to seek other avenues for action. The recent, student riots and demonstra- tions which have occurred in various Viet- narnese cities against the Government seem to open up one of these avenues. The Viet- cong must know, as well as you and I do, that a stable government is absolutely essential for any Western victory. I suspect, therefore, that more and more civilian political action, such as these student riots, will be orga- nized and directed against the incumbent Government. At the present, it seems to me that a revolt of the civilian populace is by no means out of the question, and it holds dangers far more severe than any defeat of American forces. It must not be forgotten that the Vietnames people have very little feeling of national unity, and feel very lit- tle sense of allegiance to any Saigon govern- ment. I express the hope that if we manage to pull through the very dangerous monsoon period, which will end in October. we will not find ourselves out of the military frying pan only to land into the fire of civilian upheaval. From the report of Jan. 15, 1966] "UR VIETNAM CONFLICT While on my tour of the State, I also found that the Vietnam conflict was the sub- ject of much intense interest and much speculation as to the probable outcome. Upon returning to Washington, I found much, interest centering on the role the United States is playing in the attempt to bring that beleaguered nation out of its difficulties. There is much difference of opinion both within and without the Senate as to what our future course of action should be. Frankly, your senior Senator is very much concerned about thii situation in which we now find ourselves, and about the pitfalls that lie along both slate of the path we are following. There is no question that it is now vital that our Nation act decisively to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam. The prestige and power of the United States has beep laid on the line, and to withdraw under present conditions would do us untold damage not only on the Asian Continent, but all over the world. Our Nation has never run from a fight, and now that we have been drawn so deeply into this one, it seems to me that. we have no choice except to stick it out until some sort of honorable resolution can be achieved. If our adversaries will not agree to meaningful peace talks, they should be hit harder, and the industrial and political centers of North Vietnam should be bombed by our forces if necessary. As wears carrying out, a n jittery cam- paign in Vietnam, however, I frmly believe that a. second front should he opened in Western Europe. In other words. If a vic- tory or a cessation of the fighting is im- portant for the future protection of the free world, we should make it plain to our so- called allies in Western Europe that we ex- pect some meaningful assistance from them in carrying the burden. By meaningful assistance, I mean mote than the moral sup- port that has been offered until now. We should impress upon our friends that the United States cannot be expet led to bear the entre load in southeast Asia, as we are already doing in Korea, and at the same time, maintain thousands of troops en duty for their protection in Western Europe. If of- fers of meaningful aid are not ibrthcoming, advocate beginning the withdrawal of the thousands of troops we now have garrisoned across toe Atlantic. This seems to my mind to be toe commonsense approa th, and one that is long overdue. In the past, we have been ton easy going in our relations with our erstwhile allies. As you. may know, I have complained about this to ;crest and present administrations on numerous occasions, and I have recommended that a much stiffer line be taken by the negotiators in our State Department. Until now, the line has always been taken that the United States is the richest and most power- ful nation on earth, and therefore we should be willing and able to carry on alone, no matter what the cost and sacrifice. The fact that the Western European nations have also became rich and powerful during the past two decades, due in large part to our own generosity toward them, seems to be almost completely forgotten. Now, however, the shoe of his commit- ments at home and abroad is beginning to pinch Uncle Sam's foot a little bit. We are waking up to the fact, or we should be, that our Nation is simply not rich enough, or powerful enough, to act as the policeman and protector of the entire world. We need assistance from those who are directly bene- fiting from our protection. We have been holding an umbrella OT military might over Western Europe entirely too long. If we cannot obtain help when it is needed, from those we have been sheltering in the past, I say that it is time to begin folding up the umbrella. I Prom the report of Jan. 22. .19661 MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNA aT Also in connection with southeast Asia, the President has sent to the Congreas a special request for another appropriation to carry on the struggle in Vietnam. The special amount requested for this fiscal year is $12.7 billion, over and above the special appropri- ations made for that purpose last year, and above the billions of dollars provided in the regular Department of Defense appropria- tion bill. The amount of this latest request - -- $12.7 billion?provides a good measure of the in- creased role we are playing in the Vietnam conflict. Although the Congress has been informed that only about half the sum asked for is to be actually expended this year, I have no doubt that more and greater ex- penditures can be expected in the future. Of course, our boys fighting in the rice paddies and jungles must be supported in every manner conceivable, and I am certain that the Congress and the country will do everything possible to see that their needs are met. You may rest assured that I shall do everything in my power to render what- ever assistance is needed in order to bring the conflict there to a speedy end. Not, only should our servicemen be supported, but as I stated last week, if the enemy continues to refuse to enter into meaningful negotia- tions for peace, their industrial centers should be hit by our forces until there 'an be no Mistaking our intention to win an honorable peace in Vietnam.. Also included in the supplemental appro- priation request is the sum of $115 million to be spent as an addition to this year's for- eign aid program. Two hundred and ninety million dollars of that amount is earmarked for supporting assistance to southeast Asian nations. South Vietnam is to receive $275 million of this supporting assistance, while Laos and Thailand are to be the recipients of another $15 million. One hundred million dollars is also requested as an addition to the foreign aid contingnecy fund. I was surprised to see included n the see- plemental request the sum of $25 million for support to the Dominican Republic. It seems as if the President is now learning what it will cost if we continue our attempts to police, pacify, and bring prosperity to every corner of the world. Before leaving the subject of southeast Asia and Vietnam, you will recall that last week I advocated that the administration and the State Department toughen our pol- icy toward our so-called allies in Western Europe. On the question of assisting lei to carry our worldwide burdens, particularly In southeast Asia, where we hare no real economic interest, I pointed out that the struggle to protect and defend the free world Is as much their struggle as it is ours. I further stated that I could see no real rea- son why our Nation should continue to main- tain thousands of men garrisoned in West- ern Europe. The defense against aggression that these troops have provided has turned out to be an umbrella, beneath which West- ern Europe has found peace and prosperity. Also, the maintenance of these thousands of men has proved to be a substantial drain of our U.S. gold supply, and the recipients of this drain have been the coffers of our allies. Last week I did a little checking into the record, and found that as of December 31. 1960, our military had 352,000 men stationed in Western Europe, plus 9,916 U.S. employees; and 311,000 dependents. The number s tit- tioned abroad rose by 54,000 during the period of the Berlin crisis, and then dropped some- what after that. But the fact remains that as of September 30, 1965, the United States maintained 331,000 troops on guard in West- ern Europe, supported by 11,344 civilian em- ployees, together with 288,000 dependents. To my mind and in light of the current situation, this state of affairs is elmost in- excusable. Our so-called allies have benefited from the military umbrella we have been holding over them for many years. They were able to reduce their military spending and build their own economy with the ex- penditure each year of many millions of dollars by our soldiers, their dependents, and our civilian employees. Now when we go to them for assistance, we find that nobody is home. That is why I stated last week that unless we can secure scone meaningful Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved R901114C4RMSSMINUALTCOLOgREVM66446R000400050008-5 4173 assistance from them as we try to find a way out of the current conflict, we should make it plain to them that we will begin folding up the umbrella. [From the report of Jan. 29, 19661 OUR ALLIES AND VIETNAM Last week I called attention to the fact that over the last 5 years the United States has maintained a garrison of well over 300,- 000 troops on the other side of the Atlantic in Western Europe. As a matter of fact, the number of servicemen stationed in that sec- tion of the world at the end of 1960 was 352,000. By September 30 of 1965, the total had decreased by only 20,090 men under arms?to a figure of slightly less than 331,000. I also pointed out that in addition to these fighting men, we maintain a sizable con- tingent of dependents and supporting per- sonnel. For instance, as of September 30 of last year, there were almost 288,000 depend- ents of U.S. servicemen in Western Europe, in addition to over 11,000 U.S. civilian em- ployees working for the Pentagon. The idea behind these figures is simply this. The economies of the Western Europe nations?our so-called allies?have benefited tremendously from the presence of these American troops on their shores. These bene- fits have been realized in two ways. First, our troops have provided protection against possible Russian aggression, and because of this protection, our allies have been able to throw the resources at their command into the building up of their own economies. They have not been required to devote large- scale national efforts to develop and main- tain military establishments as we have done. Because they have been so successful in de- veloping their peacetime economies, with the assistance of both our massive foreign aid program and our military presence, they are today giving our American industry and businesses real competition in the market- places of the world. In the second place, and equally important to my way of thinking, the great amount of money we have been required to send abroad to support and maintain these troops, de- pendents, and civilian employees, has been spent for the direct economic benefit of the host nations. It has also been to the direct economic benefit of our own Nation. As an illustration of this fact, I have recently ob. tained figures indicating what it costs OUT Government to maintain these hundreds of thousands of troops, the supporting civilians, and their dependents. That figure amounts to approximately 2.4 billion annually. To be specific, in the last fiscal year?fiscal year 1965?the total expenditure amounted to $2,390 million. That figure includes only Western Europe, and does not include the maintenance and upkeep of the sizable garri- sons we maintain in Greece and Turkey; it does not include the cost of supplying and maintaining the 6th Fleet, which Is con- stantly on patrol in the Mediterranean and Atlantic; nor does it include the major pro- curement costs of the planes, ships, and guns with which our fighting men are equipped. I have also obtained figures concerning our balance-of-payments deficits for fiscal year 1965. By coincidence, last year's bal- ance-of-payment deficits amounted to $2.3 billion, almost exactly equal to our Western European support cost of $24 billion. Not all of our military expenditures contributed to our balance-of-payments problem, be- cause some of the dollars were returned to our shores. But our administrators readily admit that a large portion of our Western European expenditures do show up on the balance sheets to keep our international ac- counts in the red. It is estimated that during the first half of fiscal year 1966, that is, from July to De- cember 1965, our deficit in payments-amount- ed to approximately $1.3 billion. I have been assured that stringent policies are being fol- lowed by the administration, and that the situation should improve considerably in the coming months. That may or may not be the case, for rosy predictions have been made In this area before, and have turned out to be sadly wanting. That is why I advocate now, as I have in the past, that definite steps be taken to secure Western European assist- ance in the Vietnam conflict. Common- sense requires it, and our own self-interest demands it. We can no longer afford to po- lice and protect all the world, with no help other than lipservice from those we have been protecting and defending in years past. Our allies must be made to realize that the struggle for freedom is as much their strug- gle as it is ours. It is only realistic to expect them to bear a fair share of the burden. [From the report of Feb. 19, 1966] Moles FONDS FOR VIETNAM Last week the Senate laid aside the ques- tion of repealing 14(b) in this session of the Congress, and has moved on to other matters. The first important legislation to be taken up by the Senate after the Lincoln's Day holiday was the supplemental military au- thorization bill to carry on our efforts in Vietnam, This legislation would authorize additional appropriations during the last half of fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of planes and ships, and for research and testing of new devices and techniques to enable our forces to deal more effectively with guerrilla fight- ers. The bill also contains the sum of $1.2 billion for the construction of bases and fa- cilities in southeast Asia. I have been closely following the difficulties our forces have been experiencing in receiv- ing the necessary supplies and hardware shipped from the States. A large part of these difficulties has to do with the lack of adequate port facilities for the unloading of ships and the handling of vast amounts of cargo which we are pouring into Vietnam. It is my hope that the sums authorized in the bill, and which will be provided by the Con- gress in a separate appropriation measure, will do a great deal to solve this vexing prob- lem in the near future. I have on many oc- casions stated my belief that our boys who are fighting and dying in the jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam should be sup- plied with all of the weapons and armaments that are necessary. I have received reports from time to time that shortages have occurred among several items of clothing and military hardware used by our troops. I have looked into the matter through the Department of Defense, and have been assured that where such shortages do exist, they are being filled as rapidly as pos- sible. Plant production of some items, such as special jungle boots and clothing, for ex- ample, have not yet reached what our au- thorities consider an adequate level to sup- ply the need. It is my hope and expectation that this current legislation will make it possible to fill any shortages of any items which might be needed by our fighting men. As you may know, the Subcommittee on Military Pre- paredness, headed by Senator STENNIS, of Mississippi, is looking into this problem, with the view of seeing to it that any deficiencies that come to light may be immediately cor- rected. In connection with the military construc- tion authorization, I was very disappointed several weeks ago when it was announced that several items authorized and funded by the Congress for military construction in this country would be indefinitely delayed because of mounting Vietnam expenditures. Several projects scheduled for construction in Louisiana were placed in this category. I am glad to note that the supplemental military authorization bill contains the sum of $6 million for the rehabilitation and con- struction of barracks at Fort Polk. In addi- tion, the regular military construction bill for the next fiscal year contains $861,000 for the construction of living quarters at Fort Polk, plus $700,000 for the construction of troop housing and other facilities at Barks- dale Air Force Base in Bossier Parish. You may recall that when the President first sent this special spending request to the Congress earlier in the year, the total amount asked for was $12.8 billion. The bill taken up by the Senate last week dealt with only $12.3 billion of that original request. The other portion?$415 million?is in the cate- gory of economic assistance, and must be acted upon by the Foreign Relations Com- mittee of the Senate before the funds can be appropriated. Of the $415 million total requested for sup- plemental economic assistance, $275 mil- lion has been programed for Vietnam; $175 million is to be used to finance the import of various agricultural and industrial commodities into South Viet- nam. The other $100 million will go to finance the special counterinsurgency and rural construction program that is being developed. One of the most interesting items in this special appropriation request is the sum of $21 million for the importation of rice into Vietnam. It appears that under the on- slaught of war, the production of rice has been greatly curtailed, and where the Viet- namese at one time were able to export this commodity, it now must be brought into their country. It is for this reason that President John- son recently announced that he had in- structed Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to increase our rice acreage allot- ment by 10 percent this year. More and more of this staple cornmodity will no doubt be required in the weeks and months ahead. As I recently pointed out, it was not long ago that we were forced to purchase 150,000 tons of rice from Thailand for shipment to South Vietnam. As long as the requirement must continue to be met, and financed by the U.S. Treasury, I would much prefer that the ex- penditures be made on our home soil, for the benefit of our American farmers. [From the report of Feb. 26, 19661 RIGHT TO DISSENT?VIETNAM Today, the Nation is doing battle in a far corner of the world. While some of us may not agree entirely with that battle or its aims, it is nevertheless important that we present a united front to the enemy. A noisy minority speaking against our position Can- not help doing more harm than good, it seems to me. They cannot help but give comfort to the enemy. Legitimate dissent must be tolerated if we are to maintain our free society, but in many cases the bounds have been overstepped. As you no doubt know, much debate over our Vietnam policy is now taking place in the halls of Congress and its committees. My fear is that many Senators fail to under- stand that we are already in action in South Vietnam. It is no longer a question of get- ting into the fight?we are already in it. In other words, we are committed and Must now back up our commitment. I have no doubt in my own mind that many of the statements now issuing from Con- gress or from congressional commjttees will do no good to our cause in the fighting. I feel that some Congressmen and Senators-- although certainly they are not doing it wil- fully?are giving a lot of relief and a lot of propaganda material to Hanoi. In my opin- ion, this may result in postponing the end of the action?whether by military victory, a Cease fire, or negotiation. In other words, as Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4174. Approved ForRellwagiRlik iMP471314441,11100400050008-5 March ? 19 (;(; long as the pot of American public opinion Is kept stirred up and boiling, the leaders of Hanoi and Red China can continue in their hopes that the escape valve will be opened in time to let the Vietcong win the war. I be- hove that too much dissension and difference of opinion, especially on the part of those not directly responsible for making and enforc- ing the decisions, can be very misleading to the enemy. The result will be longer war, and the killing and wounding of more of our soldiers. I. for one do not want to see that. TEACHER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST SLASH IN SCHOOL MILK PROGRAM Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I have received dozens of letters from school administrators, teachers, parents and children opposing the administra- tion's plans to cut the special milk pro- aTain for schoolchildren by 80 percent. As time passes I become more and more convinced that this cut simply cannot be justified. Here is what one Wisconsin school- teacher says about the cut: E am teaching in my 29th year and I feel that one of the finest things the Government has ever done for our boys and girls is the milk program. It makes me sick to read that this is to be dropped. In the same paper you can read of large amounts being spent for recreation programs for our rich Lu enjoy. It doesn't seem fair to me to deny our children milk which they need and enjoy and then spend it for recreation. Mr. President, as one who has long fought against pork barrel public works Projects which often are justified on the grounds that they will enhance recrea- tion benefits, I say amen to this state- ment. We must allocate our resources efficiently if the taxpayer is to get the most out of his tax dollar. I know of no program of greater proven worth than the school milk program. Every penny .amnt means greater health for our Na- tion's children. We cannot forget this ttreatest of our natural resources. This Wisconsin teacher goes on to give a concrete example of what the school milk program means to her pupils. She says: 5/Ey little 6- to 8-year olds must eat before 1:30 to meet the bus. Dinner is served at 11:30 and the last ones aren't home until 4:45. The milk break at 2 pm. is exactly what they need. It is economical so every- one has it, except three Amish pupils. It is not only for low-income families whose chil- dren do not have the milk these little bodies need * *. Ti ls not only low-income fam- ilies who have parents that do not buy milk tor their children so I feel that all children need the milk. Mr. President; I would like to conclude my remarks by quoting one last sentence from this excellent letter. I think it speaks for itself: The breakfast program (proposed by Presi- (lent Johnson) may be fine but it can never do so much good to so many children for so tile money. PROCEDURES FOR THE REMOVAL, RETIREMENT, AND DISCIPLINING OF UNFIT FEDERAL JUDGES Mr. HART. Mr. President, it is ad- mitting to no weakness in our Federal court system that we seek to determine the adequacy of the procedures dealing with the removal, retirement, and disci- plining of unfit judges. Rather the junior Senator from Mary- land I Mr. Tymmsl, whose subcommit- tee is conducting hearings in this area, seeks to determine "whether the Federal judiciary has the necessary statutory tools to police its own house fairly and efficiently, and, if not, to explore the pos- sibility of enacting remedial legislation." Senator ?rYDINGS displays botli courage and energy in, opening up this admittedly sensitive subject. All of us are the better for his willingness and leadership. Fortunately, there have been only rare instances where a man of questioned ability or integrity has presided over a Federal court. But the infrequency of having such a man on the bench does not obviate the need for a solutiou to deal with the problem when it arises As SerlatOr TYDINGS points out in his opening statement at the committee hearings, many influential judtas them- selves feel that present correcti,.7e meas- ures are inadequate and that this inquiry is needed. We are well aware of the tremendous backlog of cases that confronts our Fed- eral courts today.. The delay before many are brought to trial can be as much as 3 years. The division of this workload leaves no room for one judge who is unfit. And, it goes without say- ing, that in administering justiee, there is no place for such a judge. Cettainly, I consider Senator TYruNcs' explanation of the problem and scope of the inquiry as one to which we should. direct our attention. Mr. President, at this point it my re- marks, I ask unanimous consent that Senator TYDE,tcs' February 15 opening statement at the hearings before the SubcommAtee on Improvement: in Ju- dicial Machinery be printed in the RECORD. There Leing no objection, tlia state- ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD., as follows: OPENING t.AT1a55ENT OF CHAIRIVIAN JOSEPH D. TY-DINGS AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB- COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY ON PROCEDURES FOR THE RE- MOVAL, IR ENIREMENT, AND DISCTPL, SING OF UNFIT kEDERA L JUDGES, PEBRUARY 15, 1966 Today the Subcommittee on Imprt:vements in Judicial Machinery holds its ire hal ses- sion of hearings on the availability of and need for procedures to govern the removal, retirement, and disciplining of unfit. Federal judges. An inquiry of this nature ...las been contemplated for several months aml today's session will be only the first step in a lengthy and careful examination. The purpose of these hearings is io deter- mine whether the Federal judiciary has the necessary statutory tools to police its own house fairly and efficiently, arid, if not, to explore the passibility of enacting ,temedial legislation. These hearings do not indicate any lack of confidence in the Federal bench. Indeed, the, subcommittee recognitias that our Federal judiciary, as a whole, is charac- terised by men of remarkable integrity and ability. We believe that, given the proper tools, the judiciary has the capacity to handle the problems created by the tiny handful of judges who because of physical or mental disability, senility, alcoholism, lazioess, or misfeasance, do immeasurable harm to the efficient administration of lustice. Anyone even casually familiar with the Federal courts knows that their dockets are crowded and becoming more so as the amount of judicial business increases year by year. The situation is already critical. In certain districts the average litigant may wait for more than 3 years after joinder of Issue before his case goes to trial. This is not merely a matter of administrative con- cern, for justice delayed is justice denied. To remedy this state of affairs, we in the Congress are constantly asked to provide snore judgeships for various Federal districts and circuits, and we often hear proposals to place further limitations on the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in order to halt the constant increase in caseload. But these measures cannot be enough. It makes no sense to keep adding more judges, or to deny litigants access to the Federal courts, if the backlog is caused to sly degree by inefficient or unit judges. The workload in many districts is such that the court is crippled if even a single judge does not carry his share of the burden. I think that everyone agrees Unit ideally such an unfit judge should be replaced with- out delay, but only after a careful, impartial evolution of his fitness. Yet one thing that recent events have made clear is; that. there is at present no fair and effective procedure for dealing with these cases when they arise. The subcommittee cannot ignore the chit,- rule that occurred recently in the western. district of Oklahoma. For reasons that bane not yet been made clear, the Judicial Council. of the 10th Judicial Circuit, composed of able and conscientious appellate judges, reached the conclusion that Chief Judge Stephen S. Chandler of the western district of Oklahoma was "either unwilling or un- able" to perform his judicial functions ade- quately. It therefore ordered that, Judge Chandler be assigned no more cases and take no further action in cases pending before him. It based its action on section 332 of the Judicial Code, which gives a judicial council authority to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious ad- ministration of the business of the courts within its circuit." Judge Chandler has challenged this action In a petition to the Supreme Court, and has refused to obey the order with regime l to the cases already pending before him. Just last week, more than a month after tite order was originally issued, the judicial council agreed to rescind one part of the order and to allow judge Chandler to dispose of those cases already pending before him. I do not wish to comment at this time on the legal issues involved in the disuute be- tween Judge Chandler and the judicial coun- cil. Nor can I comment on the question of Judge Chandler's actual fitness to continue on the bench, since the facts have not yet been brought out. An examination of the procedures used, however, leads me to be- lieve that, regardless of the outcome of the Chandler case, the judiciary needs better tools to deal with this sort of proble:n. The judicial council's abortive action in the Chandler case created havoc in the west- ern district of Oklahoma. Look at what happened: A judge was ordered to cease the performance of his judicial functions yet he was apparently given no notice that action was about to be taken against him, no charges were specified against him, iend he was given no opportunity to present evi- dence or argument in his defense. The judge refused to relinquish jurisdiction over cases pending before him, although he had been ordered to do so and although the other Judges of his district had divided his cases among themselves. The Chandler case is an unfortunate inci- dent. It is unfortunate in that a judge has apparently behaved in such a way that some of his colleagues are convinced he is no Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 d March 1, 1966 Approvekffig""1.-vuxur"1194"aglIMAIDNVOSTIAADBEINEK111446R000400050008-5 4175 longer fit to serve on the bench. It is un- fortunate in that the procedures used?ap- parently the only ones available to the judi- cial council?did not allow Judge Chandler to obtain a complete and fair hearing of the charges against him. It is unfortunate in that the judicial council's order and Judge Chandler's intransigence created inexcusable confusion for litigants and attorneys in the western district of Oklahoma. And finally and perhaps most important, it is unfortu- nate in that the wrangling and recrimina- tions that have occurred have _exposed our fine Federal judicial system to disrepute and even ridicule. The Chandler case has brought to the at- tention of the Nation, a situation that has troubled many observers for a long time. In October, long before the judicial council's action regarding Judge Chandler, I an- nounced that the Subcommittee on Improve- ments in Judicial Machinery would conduct a study of the problems posed by judicial unfitness. We have done a great deal of re- search on this subject, and today we hold our first session of hearings. The purpose of today's hearing is to out- line and explore the difficulties that are presently experienced in handling the in- frequent instances of unfitness in the Fed- eral judiciary. Historically the only method of actually removing a Federal judge from office, so that he is deprived of his title and his right to salary, has been impeachment. This has created several difficulties, which our witnesses will explore with us in some detail tomorrow and at later sessions. First, constitutionally, impeachment lies only for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." It is uncertain whether senility, insanity, physical disability, al- coholism or laziness?all of which are forms of unfitness that require remedial action--- are covered by the impeachment process. The second difficulty lies in the nature of the impeachment machinery. Even in the early years of the Republic the inadequacy of this process was recognized. "Experience has already shown," Jefferson said in 1819, "that the impeachment the Constitution has provided is not even a scarecrow." It is a cumbersome, archaic process which requires one House of Congress, the House of Repre- sentatives, to act as a grand jury, and the other House, the Senate, to sit in judgment as a court. The House can perhaps do its share of the work effectively through the Judiciary Committee, but what of the Sen- ate? We all know that the Members of the Senate are hard pressed to fulfill the many demands of the office. If we were re- quired to do nothing but listen to testimony in an impeachment case for several weeks, the legislative calendar would be completely disrupted. Obviously, few _Senators would be able to give so much of their time, yet I submit that an impeachment trial before an empty Senate Chamber would be little more than a farce. It would hardly comport with modern standards of justice. No conviction of a criminal defendant would be tolerated if it came after a trial at which most of the jurors were not present to hear the testimony. Impeachment is perhaps the sole method of removal of Federal judges that may be constitutionally employed by the Congress, for the principle of an independent judiciary, free from interference by the legislative or executive branches, is central to the concept of a government of separated powers. But this is not to say that impeachment is the only constitutionally permissible method of removing a Federal judge from office. It should be borne in mind that a judge is to serve "during good behavior," while impeach- ment lies only for "high crimes and misde- meanors." It may be that the framers in- tended to permit other methods of removal not inconsistent with the principle of sep- aration of powers. The scholarship on this question is disappointingly sparse, and I hope that one of the effects of our study will be to stimulate some scholarly reexamina- tion of the arguments for and against the exclusivity of impeachment as a removal procedure. Aside from impeachment and the disputed method employed by the 10th Circuit Judicial Council in the Chandler case, there is only one other provision which allows remedial action to be taken in the case of an unfit judge. This is a very limited provision which permits the judicial council of a circuit to certify the disability of a judge to the Presi- dent, in which case the President may ap- point an additional judge, in effect to take the disabled judge's place. Many people?including, let us emphasize, many influential judges themselves?feel that this array of weapons is inadequate to deal with the problem of judicial un- fitness, and that is why we are beginning this inquiry today. It is not our intention to conduct an expos?f the Federal judiciary. Such an expos?ould undoubtedly find little to expose. We intend, rather, to ascer- tain whether there are now adequate pro- cedures for dealing with those rare but dam- aging cases of judicial unfitness that do oc- cur. If, as of many of us expect, we find that existing procedures are inadequate, we shall attempt to remedy the situation. The area of judicial fitness presents many difficult questions of law and policy. I sus- pect that we shall be at this job for some time. POOL FORGE'S 250TH ANNIVERSARY Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, it is fit- ting that we take note of the 250th an- niversary this year of the founding of Pool Forge?the first iron forge in Penn- sylvania. This humble establishment was started in 1716 by Thomas Rutter on the banks of the Manatawny Creek in what is now Douglass Township, Berks County. Pool Forge was the forerunner of the many Pennsylvania forges which were so vital to early settlers and provided much of the ordnance in our struggle for inde- pendence. These early iranmasters with their charcoal burning furnaces con- tributed a great deal to our Nation's early growth. We owe much to these men of ability and courage who literally started with the ground they walked on and the forest around them. Their primitive methods are long gone, and the focus in metals has moved from iron to steel. Today Pennsylvania plays a mighty role in all parts of the metals industry. In this same county of Berks, metal products range from basic iron and steel Items to highly specialized steel alloys and beryllium alloys for use throughout the Nation. In this time of vastness and complexity, we would be wise to keep the realization that here is one small begin- ning?one small forge which is not only important as part of our history, but is a vivid reminder of the pioneer spirit we must keep with us. Courage and ability never grow old, and although we work at different tasks today, we have need of the same incentives as that which built Pool Forge. GARY?A LOGICAL CHOICE FOR A DEMONSTRATION CITY Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, a massive demonstration cities program which would "offer qualifying cities of all sizes the promise of a new life for their people" was proposed by President Johnson on January 26. In line with this recom- mendation, I was pleased to join a num- ber of e,olleaghes in cosponsoring the demonstration cities bill, S. 2842, which was introduced by the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS]. Both the President's message and the legislation proposed to achieve its goals have aroused widespread interest among 'urban dwellers, city officers, and the press. Recently the editor of the Gary Post Tribune, Mr. Dale E. Belles, Jr., wrote an editorial in the form of an open letter to the President, Secretary Weaver, Senator HARTKE, Representative MADDEN, and myself, which sets forth the reasons why Gary, Ind., would be a logical com- munity to be chosen as one of the "dem- onstration cities." Although Congress has not yet acted on this significant measure, I agree with Mr. Belles that it is not too early to begin giving consideration to the qualifications of prospective cities for this selection. Because Mr. Belles' editorial quite ac- curately reflects the spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm of civic leaders in Gary, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AS WE SEE IT?WIlY GARY IS A LOGICAL DEMONSTRATION CITY TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON; SECRE- TARY ROBERT C. WEAVER, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SENATOR BIRCH BAY1i; SENATOR VANCE HARTKE; REPRESENTATIVE RAY J. MADDEN. GENTLEMEN: We have read with interest and excitement the President's message of January 26 to the Congress on demonstration cities. We are convinced that Gary should be one of those demonstration cities. Here, in part, are the reasons: A. On the positive side- 1. Gary has shown through the combined governmental and civic launching of pro- grams for new industry, downtown revitaliza- tion, and improved educational and recrea- tion facilities that it shares the President's view that "1966 can be the year of rebirth for American cities." It was beginning to demonstrate before the Presidential program was outlined that it meets its requirements of being one of "those cities who help them- selves" and where there is "a serious commit- ment to the project on the part of local * * * authorities." 2. Gary, through its long use of federally assisted housing programs, has, as the Presi- dent said, "built a platform" from which further experimentation in development can be launched. It is preparing to launch its third urban renewal program, this one the largest undertaken here to date, having learned something of both "the strengths and weaknesses" through past experiences. 3. Gary's City Council during the past year has formally adopted a previously promul- gated metropolitan plan, sharing with the President the view that it "should be an in- strument for shaping sound urban growth? not a neglected document." 4. Gary's City Council, with urging of civic leadership, adopted last year probably the most liberal open housing ordinance of any city in the Nation, exhibiting its realization of the presidential point that "at the center of the cities' housing problem lies racial dis- crimination." Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4176 Approved For RieweriNAEL(Ri itifffinS7_130h446ATRO400050008-5., Juan* 1, 1966 E. On the opposite side, not negative ex- actly, but showing need- 1. Gary is the core of an industrial area where increasing steel and other production insures growth, but has reached the point where help is needed to make sure that "the powerful forces of urban growth" do not "overwhelm efforts to achieve orderly de- velopment." 2.. Gary is still beset with what the Presi- dent terms "crowded miles of inadequate dwellings?poorly maintained, and fre- quently overpriced" in which many of its Negroes still live. While twin attacks, through the housing ordinance and the new- est urban renewal program, have been lieunched, help will be essential. 3. Gary's mass transportation facilities are deteriorated and inadequate. Its major street system, cut up by railroads, Is unsuited to carrying the necessary load. Some plans have been drafted, but a coordinated effort, preferably with Federal help, is needed. 4. Gary's parks, once a point of civic pride, and its indoor cultural and recreational fa- cilities have been outgrown or become out- moded. Assistance is needed in pushing through plans already under consideration for meeting these needs both for the present and the anticipated population. 5. Gary's "one industry" image Is grad- ually being altered, but making it one of the major "demonstration cities" could step up the program of intended diversification which could help make it a better city for all its people in the future. It is anticipated that as the broad outlines of the President's proposals are solidified into legislation, Gary governmental and civic effort will combine to furnish detailed evi- dence of how Gary meets the specific guidelines he seeks to establish. Meanwhile, we feel it our duty to make this advance nomination of' Gary as one of the demonstration cities hoping it may be- come one of those "great urban areas" which, T1.3 the President, says, can become "the mas- terpieces of our eiviliRation." Sincerely, Duel E. BELLES, .Jr., P.WitOr. C t I EA PLR AIR TRA VEL Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, for over 30 years, in a succes- sion of increasingly responsible positions in the Federal Government, one of my fellow North Carolinians has distin- guished himself by successfully tackling difficult assignments in the public sei'v- ice. An article by Burt Schorr in the Febru- ary 28 issue of the Wall Street Journal recognizes the excellent job that Charles Li. Murphy is doing as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. I request unanimous consent that this article be printed in the body of the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, R.; follows: if ,jsP,j'sR Ant '11:TAVEL?BAB CTIA IRMA AT MUR- PHY NUDGES CARRIERS TOWARD THAT GOAT. (liy Burt Schorr) WASHINGTON. -Tr may take some months to measure the success of the Civil Aero- ninnies Board's policy statement recently ill mod at reducing air travel costs. As the Board hoped, the other domestic trunielines appear to be matching United Air Lines' proposed 25-percent excursion fere discount, But there's always the possibil- ity that these reductions won't achieve the goal of lowering fares without hurting he carriers' ability to finance their big orders rel. a ow aircraft. New air travelers may not be lured into otherwise empty seats in num- bers sufficient to compensate airlines for the revenues they stand to lose. Yet even if such an eventuality demands further fare tinkering by the CAB,- the ex- cursion plan already makes this point clear: Under its new Chairman, Charles S. Murphy, the CAB has demonstrated an ability to move carriers further along the path to lower fares than they would have ventured on their own. And in accomplishing this, the Board seems to have ruffled fewer carriers feathers than might hove seemed possible or ly a few, months a,eo. Moreover, this maintenance of cordial re- lations 'between the CAB and the airlines places the Board in a good position to seek more bargelin flying for the public when It deals with several important route assign- ments now pending, including new service between southwestern and northwestern points. Finally, the energetic attack on the fare problem-- a potentially controversial issue as airline profits soar through tae second year of the air travel boom?appeers to have quashed any congressional craiiiism that the CAB isn't performing its assigned regu- latory function. During an earlier period of carrier prosperity in the 1950'8, Capitol Mu censure caused a marked stiffening of CAB fare policies, with unpleasant conse- quences for airlines. Board watchers are inclined to credit the CAB's ado 'it fare maneuvering to the helms- inanship of Chairman Murphy, wlyi took his post last June. 1. Undoubtedly Mr. Mur- phy's effectiveness has been enhanced by Washington's knowledge that he enjoys the esteem or President Johnson. The Chief Executive's personal interest in air fares hasn't been publicized, but in fent he has followed the, subject attentively. What Mr. Johnson Leportedly was anxious to have? and what Mr. Murphy seems to be deliver- ing?is a CAB fare policy designed to reduce travel costs without crippling the airlines' ability to ray for the $4.3 billion in new air- craft they will put in service between now and 1970. ON; EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNIVILTIT (i7k a Gevernment career dating back to 1934, Mr. Murphy is considered wise in the workings of the Federal bureaucracy as it operates tinder the Democratic Perty. For 1.1 years he was assistant legislative counsel to the S( nete. (One job there: Helping draft the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which created the CAB.) From tint post, he moved to the White House, advencing in 1950 to a key job as special counsel to Presi- dent Truman. Immediately prior to his CAB ap poi n tme n t. by President Johnson, Mr. Murphy SA7 R.e. serving as Tinder Secretary of Agriculture. "Murphy knows how to get thin iT,S; done," comments one industry representetive who deals :frequently with the Board. "His back- ground in writing the Aviation Act, his Sen- ate and Waite House jobs, and the backing of the Proficient give him prestige the rest of the Board can't ignore." Mr. Murphy's Influence was evident in, for example, tOe Board's recent 3 to 2 decision endorsing Frontier Airlines' 90-dag experi- mental offer of a general 50-percent discount for standby seats on certain lightte patron- ized flights. Other carriers, including United and Western Air Lines, hied vehem intly op- posed the innovation, but the Chairman, supported by his two fellow Democrats, Robert T. Murphy and Cl. Joseph Tvlinetti, agreed witn the Denver-based locitl service airline that "the only way to test The fares is by actual experience." What wasn't made public, however, was how one of the sup- porting Democrats almost joined Republi- cans Whithey Ctillilland and John G, Adams in voting "no," then reconsidered out of a desire to "cooperate" with the new Chairman. The Chairman's hand was apparent last July, too, when the Board rejected a 3-per- cent fare increase proposed by United to off- set a bigger baggage allowance. At the time, United, Eastern Air Lines, and several other carriers were still earning well below the CAB standard for a reasonable rate of return on invested capital. Nevertheleai, guided by its new Chairman, the Board held that the "favorable earnings" of the carriers provided "an excellent opportunity for reductions in fares, or improvements in service without fare increases." The Board's fare campaign intensified in the following month with the first in a series of hold-the-line orders suspending proposed new jet fares. Here the Board broke with the long-accepted practice of al- lowing jet fares to include a surcharge that pegged them about 10-percent higher than propeller fares on the same routes. Here- after, the Board said, it would allow new jet service at propeller rates only. The airlines were dismayed at the threat- ened revenue loss?up to $200 million an- nually by one reckoning. There was much grumbling, too, that carriers fortunate enough to have already filed fares for most of their shorter-range jet service were barely affected by the surcharge ban. Summing up industry frustrations, United Chairman W. A. Patterson fumed about "a very impetuous conclusion reached very hastily." It wasn't until this month's policy state- ment that the CAB finally assured the car- riers it would be willing to allow jet sur- charges after all; United, and any other car- riers filing reductions comparable to the 25 percent excursion fare discount, eineld re- sume setting jet ticket charges higher than propeller fares. Actually, CAB insiders maintain, the Board had this in mind all along. "The sur- charge issue merely happened to be the first fare question to come along," explains one. "By issuing the suspension orders, the Board had time to think over the fare Lieue and also force carriers to come up with counter- proposals." CONVINCING THE CARRIERS It developed, though, that counterpro- posals were slciw in coming. So, in a series of speeches and private discussions with air- line executives, Mr. Murphy sought to con- vince the carriers that the Board wiisn't out to wreck them. This kept lines open be- tween Government and industry cleopite ris- ing tensions in Wall Street and aisline ex- ecutive cffices over what sort of fare policy the CAB eventually would settle on Thus, shortly before the Board's definitive statement, one Washington-based airline vice president was pleased to find Chairman Murphy demonstrating "a very enlightened and progressive attitude. Rather than aim- ing to reduce airline earnings, he and the Board say carriers should pass along to the public the benefits of improved air tech- nology ? ? When you get clown to it, the carriers have the same objectives." The recent rash of youth-fare discounts, allowing 50 percent off on stancley seats, were another sign that airlines were begin- ning to attune themselves to broad thinking. Then came January's fruitful /limiting of representatives of the 11 domestic trunklines to discuss alternatives to the surcharge ban. United first broached its plan at title Wash- ington conference. "Everybody :recognized that the Board has a problem with carrier earnings," says one executive of an extremely profitable airline who participated. "And the industry accepted the challenge of deal- ing with it." The Board's success so far contrasts mark- edly with CAB handling of the fare question back in the early 1950's, a period when the airline industry also was enjoying a boom_ Early in 1952, the domestic trunklines sought to add $1 to all one-way domestic ticket charges and eliminate a 5-percent Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67130.0446.1M00400050008,6r 4178 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA LE march 1, 1966 guideposts have serious drawbacks. First, it is not excessive profits but the visibility of these profits which the guideposts fear will lead to inflationary wage demands. And since the accumulation of profits or the failure to cut prices can never be as visible as wage demands made during controversial contract negotiations, the burden of public pressure is always on labor. Second, the wage-price guideposts are presented as though they derive from "nat- ural" and impartial economic criteria, when in fact they mask very important political judgments about the kind of society Amer- ica will be. Implicit in the guideposts is the assumption that the proportions of America's wealth enjoyed by various sectors of the population should remain constant. Since the share of the gross national product which goes to the wealthiest 20 percent of Americans is about 10 times that going to the poorest 20 percent, we cannot agree that this assumption is in accord with justice. The wage-price guideposts could be a step to a more rational, democratic system of economic planning, in which social as well as economic criteria played a part. But if they merely to become guarantees for Gen- eral Motors' prosperity, then labor's rev lt is fully justified. THE ROLE OF THE VIETCONG Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, I urged the President to openly acknowledge a central fact in the Viet- nam struggle, the political-military fact that the Vietcong should be accorded an independent status at the future peace conference. I also argued that it would be detrimental to our own purposes and to the stability and morale of the South Vietnamese if any further concessions were made to the Vietcong at this time. Specifically, I argued against giving the Vietcong a role in a coalition govern- ment before negotiations and before free elections, but only as a result of negotia- tions. Max Lerner, in two articles, sup- ports my position on this issue, and also agrees with my view that the United States must announce that it will accept the results of a genuinely free election in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD Mr. Lerner's ar- ticles of February 21 and 23 which ap- peared in the New York Post. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the New York Post, Feb. 21, 1966] VIETCONG ROLE (By Max Lerner) With the ending of the televised Fulbright hearings, the great debate on the Vietnam war has reached the end of its first phase in a dead heat. The Fulbright forces succeeded in showing that the war has moved by a succession of unanalyzed steps to unintended conse- quences. There can be little doubt that the casualty lists hurt, that the war is unpopular and is likely to get more so and that the problem is not how America shall win but how America shall extricate itself without scuttling its Vietnamese allies and abdicat- ing its national interests. The proadministration forces in turn have shown that no one knows how this can be done, least of all the Pulbright witnesses and the commentators like Lippmann on whose analysis they lean. When Gen. Max- well Taylor and Dean Rusk got their innings, they may not have triumphed, but they didn't come of second best. Rusk made the legal case he was expected to make. But he was best on the psychological and political factors, as in his discussion of the historic Oxford Pledge in its bearing on British un- preparedness in World War II, just as Taylor was best on the role of the French home- front in the French defeat in the Indochina war. When the Fulbright forces, grasping for a straw in an effort to find an alternative mili- tary strategy, plumped for the enclave theory, Taylor had little difficulty in show- ing how frail a reed it was. It is hard to advocate an outright military withdrawal from Vietnam. But it doesn't solve anything to propose a policy that will abandon the Vietnam forces and villages to the Vietcong and strip the American soldier of both his mobility and his morale. The whole enclave theory is an attempt to dress up a military withdrawal in the guise of something less inglorious. That is the point at which Senator ROBERT KENNEDY came in with his proposal to give the Vietcong a share in whatever govern- ment is set up in South Vietnam after peace negotiations. That is further than FULBRIGHT has gone, with his proposal that we recognize and deal directly with the Vietcong. The trouble with the Kennedy proposal is that it fails to distinguish between the Viet- cong role the the negotiating table and the Vietcong role in the postwar Government of Vietnam. To recognize that the Vietcong must have a role at the negotiating table is crucial. To give them a role in the Govern- ment of Vietnam would be fatal. ?The current administration refusal to deal with the Vietcong is obviously an effort to shore up the position of the Ky regime in Saigon. But Ky, whose rigid refusal to sit at any negotiating table with the Vietcong is clearly for homefront consumption, has said he is a realist and is learning to be a politician. A realist learns to accept the in- evitable. The inevitable is that the Vietcong, as a major combatant, must be at the nego- tiating table. They insist on doing sosas the only legitimate government cif South Viet- nam, which is impossible for us. America in- sists on their coming to the table, if at all, as an instrument of Hanoi?which is impossi- ble for them. Why not have them there in a third role, as representing neither Hanoi nor Saigon but only the actual territory they occupy and in fact administer? Neither Hanoi nor Peiping will agree to this straight off. Both are convinced the an- tiwar forces in America will give them the political victory they want even though the Vietoong are suffering considerable punish- ment and can have no hope for military vic- tory. But if Johnson and Rusk are willing to have the Vietcong at the negotiating table as a third party, to represent the territory they actually hold, then Washington can offer Moscow a solution the Russians in the end can back up without sacrificing their role as Hanoi's champions. But there is no reason to sign away South Vietnam now by offering to include the Viet- cong in the postwar government. The nature of the peace arrangements is something for the negotiating conference to decide. Any coalition formula which will include the Viet- cong is bound to result in a Communist gov- ernment that has excluded or liquidated its non-Communist partners. The experience of Poland and Czechoslovakia after the Yalta agreements is witness to what happens. One cannot exclude the possibility that the people of South Vietnam will want some day to vote in a Communist regime. But it ought not to be imposed on them by a peace treaty. In fairness to them, there should be a mora- torium of perhaps 2 years, during which the economy and society of South Vietnam will have a chance to rebuild themselves with aid from American and other sources. A postwar government should have a chance to strengthen the political fiber of the nation and show the people what can be accom- plished in peacetime. At the end of that period, the Vietnamese should have a chance to ratify or reject what such a regime has done and become. If at that time it chooses a coalition popular front or a straight Communist government, that will be its own concern. Neither Hanoi nor the Vietcong are today confident they would get the suffrage of the people. If they were confident, they would welcome the chance to come to the negotiating table and agree to such a solution. [From the New York Post, Feb. 23, 1966] THE KENNEDY TANGLE (By Max Lerner) The disarray surrounding Senator KEN- NEDY'S proposal on the Vietcong peace role was partly due to the clumsiness of trying to stage a debate through press conferences and TV shows on one side and press secretaries on the other; this is where the British sys- tem of straight parliamentary confrontation between the Government and its opponents would have served the Nation better. But partly also it was due to the fact that few public figures (and Senator KENNEDY is no exception) have had a chance to think their way through the touchy problems of a peace conference and what would follow it. Com- pared with this the Vietnam jungle is a grove. Too much of the general Vietnam debate thus far has been on the strategy and politics of the war, not enough on what happens when the shooting stops. Senator KENNEDY had a hectic couple of days, backing and filling, in getting his position clear, and so did Maxwell Taylor; as for HUBERT 1-117M- PHREY, his troubles may still lie ahead. A confused time was had by all, but out of it may come some unraveling of the tangle. I am not talking of the advertised agree- ment between KENNEDY and the White House, subscribed to by both sides. On the crucial issues I doubt that there is any real agreement. Examining the peacemaking process phase by phase, the first concerns the way in Which the Vietcong will be represented at the con- ference. Here KENNEDY does well to hold his ground. I agree with him that the Viet- cong, simply because of the area they con- trol, must be at the conference as "an inde- pendent entity." The next phase has to do with the Viet- cong role in a coalition government. KEN- NEDY originally talked as if the "share of power and responsibility" for the Vietcong was something for America to back, and something to emerge?however gradually? from the conference. He now talks more warily on both scores. He doesn't expect a coalition government to be shaped "auto- matically," but wants the administration not to shut the door on it. Certainly this door, like any other door, should not be shut, But it still leaves the question of whether the Americans are to put their influence behind it. To say that America should accept a solution agreed upon by the conference is to omit the patent fact that the South Viet- nam governmental delegation will oppose a coalition agreement bitterly. To get the agreement KENNEDY envisages will mean American pressure. Then there is the problem of elections. KENNEDY now seems to talk of a coalition government as including only "what they (the Vietcong) win in free elections." He also talks of a "permanent coalition" as a possibility, presumably without such elec- tions. Such a "permanent coalition" would quickly eliminate the chances that free elec- tions would ever be held. To prevent this, KENNEDY speaks of an international control authority to watch out for Communist at- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March , 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE roundtrip discount. The year of the hung proved to be the peak year for postwar traffic; return on overall domestic trunkline investment skyrocketed to 15.3 percent. (Following a later general fare investigation completed in 1980, the Board concluded that 10.5 percent was the proper average rate of return for domestic trunks, lest year, by comparison, the figure probably exceeded 12 percent, after eliminating the effect of the investment tax credit. 'Vim CAB permi fled the $1 increase to stand on an "interim" basis, but it refused 1,0 allow abandonment of the round trip dis- emint and ordered a general fare inyestiga- ion. En turn, the carriers withdrew their proposal to end the discount and urged the noard to halt the investigation. Finally, rl May 1953, despite having spent a year in. Irreliminary work on the Investigation, the CAB acceded to the airline request by a 3-2 vote. ',SODDING 'T?, 0 NE CONGREss It was this lenieney that moved the Bruise Judiciary Committee, under Representative IOWAN-CB/, GELLER, Democrat, of New York, to include the CAB in an investigation of several regulatory agencies 3 years later, By this time, however, several changes in Board reembership (a term is 6 years) had pro- duced a majority considered less friendly to carrier interests. Stung by CELLER committee complaints that the Board had. "waltzed around" the fare question and was guilty et "scandalous abdication. of responsibility," the CAB hastened to atone by ordering the prompt start of a general fare investigation. lin tact, airlines entered a lean period just as the investigation was getting underway; :o0; their clamor for fare increases was re- sisted until sagging, return on investment, which reached a low of 1.5 percent in 1961, cenfronted the Board with the prospect that airlines might not be able to pay for the 'toed of new jets they'd ordered some years earlier, and it agreed to a series of fare in- creases. Perhaps the expanded use of promotional fares like the ones the Board now is en- enraging might have filled many of the empty seats of the early 'I960's. This in turn could have reduced the need for higher fares and kept air travel available to the broadest possible segment of the population. True or not? the erincept is one airlines can expect to see tested again in future neard rulings while Mr Murphy is in charge. 51; a recent press conference the Chairman eaid of the airlines, "It seems to me they neve to go out and hustle for business." rile added the promise that "the Board will -ielp as best it can to try to see that traffic ei generated." Around the end nf this year the CAB is expected to decide the Northwest-Southwest case, the last major assignment of routes remaining on the continental United States ir map. Competing carriers would do well tr, show the Board "who is elate to do more it the public" in. the way of lower fares, one CAB source suggests, and several of the ap- pihrants are indeed taking this tack. Simi- 1.trly, route awards expected next year in the New York-Florida proceedings, as well those later in the transpacific care involv- ing service to Hawaii. otter further oppor- ix nines for reduced air charges. Chairman Murphy gets high marks from CAB staff members and airline representa- tives for his patient absorption of complex hirilies. And, those who have witnessed his talent for conciliating diverse views say it Is Impressive. Both qualities should be in great demand in the coming critical period of domestic airline growth, NO. 56--fl THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM: A HISTOR,Y Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to call attention to a recent book by Walter Johnson and Francis J. Coliigan entitled "The F'ulbright Program: A History." Walter Johnson is Preston and Eterl- frig Morton professor of history a:. the University of CE:cag-o. He has bc(:n a member of the Board of Foreign Scholar- ships since 1947 and has provided con- tinuity and leadership in promoting educational exchange programs. From 1950 to 1953, he served as chairrar2n. of the Board of Foreign Schoilnrships. Francis J. Colligan is Director of Policy P.eview and Coordination fel: the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs at the DL:partment of State. Mr. Colligan has also been associated with the exchange program since 1947 and during the years from 1948 until 1957 he was executive secretary of the program. Both Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan have done a tray remark able job in describing the postwar develop- ment of U.S. exchange programs. They have been ablo to do this because they have been active participants. At. the same time, their participation has not destroyed their critical faculties and the book which they have produced is, I be- lieve, a fair treatment of the successes and the failures of what has become known as tile Fulbright program. I am glad to note for the record that the silo- ceases have far outnumbered and out- weighed the failures. Members of the Senate I know receive many communica- tions from. then: constituents requesting information about the availability of Fulbright grants and other questi inS regarding the .orogram. This study by Messrs. Johnson and Colligan will be helpful not only to Members in answer- ing inquiries but to individuals and in- .stitutions in the United States that have been involved in the program. As author of the original legislation in this field, which was in the nature of an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, I wish to take this occasion to say that the program could never hove succeeded had Lt not been for the hued work and perseverance and support of men like Walter Johnson arid Francis Colligan, Throughout 20 years of this program, they have been aided by ma ly other people in the academic and latui- neSS community too numerous tt me ..i- tion. Any program can fail if it is not properly administered and supported lay tile American public. This program, I am glad to say, has had this support. THE PRESIDENT'S WAGE-PRICE GUIDEPOSTS Mr. HART, Mr.. President, for the past several months, considerable dis.- cussion has been devoted to the validity of the administration's wage-Price guideposts and their effectiveness as a tool of economic policy. 4177 Implicit in this debate is the reog-- nition by those--in favor and opposed to these guidelines?that sound planning is necessary to assure the steady, con- tinued growth of the Nation's economy-- without inflation. The longrun best interest of the coun- try is not served by either rising prices or wages. Both business and labor are well aware of the benefits that have accrued to them as a result of the econ- ozny's current, and unprecedented, pe- riod of prosperity?benefits in the fonn of increased profits and nearly Full employment. And, though both business and lshrr have said?albeit for different reasons-- that the present guidelines are um cal- istic, clearly each of them recognizes ,it some guarantee of a stable economy is needed. In understanding both viewpoints, an article in the February 18 issue of ?lie Commonweal should be considered as part of this discussion on economic policy. Mr. President I ask unanimous ecti- sent that the magazine article to which I refer be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECOae, as follows: LABOR'S JUST COMPLAINT The labor unions have begun to complain about the President's wage-price guidepost'.? and well they might. The best possible evi- dence for their argument has now been sup- plied by an unexpected source: General rAto- tors Corp. All General Motors did was tell the world how much money it made in lifJC:s; and labor's case was matte. The wage-price guideposts are based on the theory that wage increases must be tied to the increase in overall national productiv- ity, so that demand does not outstrip supp'y, causing price rises and inflation. But wage demands are obviously related to corporative profits; and so- the guideposts proposed that increase in profits be likewise limited by the rate of increase in national productivil y. When profits are rising faster than produe- tivity, the excess should be returned to the public in the form of price cuts, let workers have grounds for inflationary weer) demands. A few spectacular cases of pressure from the Government have generally convinced lIe public that the guideposts have been more severely enforced against business than labor. But these few cases involved industries whefe prices were being raised. Totally ignored has been the obligation of industries with rid rag profits to cut prices. The results? Through- out 19(35, labor unions were urged to limit their demands to a 3.2-percent increase in wages (in keeping with the 3.2 percent an- nual Increase in national productivity . And, in fact, labor gains did stay between 3 and 4 percent. But meanwhile corporations enjoyed a 20-percent increase in profits. Now General Motors, the Nation's largest company, reveals it has done even better. It; profits after taxes in 1065 jumped by 23 per- cent. In 1984, screams of anguish went up when the United Auto Workers obtained A contract from General Motors which went only slightly beyond the wage-price guide posts. Who's complaining now? The wage-price guideposts have merits. Their existence is an admission of the need for national economic planning. But the Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4179 tempts at seizing the government. But this would end with no effective government at all, from which only a totalitarian group could benefit, whether Communist or mili- tary. We need to clear up the question of when the elections ought to come if they are best to serve the interests of a stable and demo- cratic Vietnam. KENNEDY speaks of free elections to settle the "immediate composi- tion" of the government. That is too soon, as anyone must know who understands the political immaturity of the southeast Asia area and the chaos that war has wrought. They should come after a waiting period to give a government, whether of one party or a coalition, a chance for stability. And lest the government-in-power rig the elections, this is where an international control com- mission should function: in making sure the elections are honest, and the votes honestly counted. I am glad KENNEDY opened the floodgate on these themes. But the KENNEDY name is so important in world opinion that he would have done better to wait until he was clearly ready. SCHOOL MILIC AND LUNCH PRO- GRAMS SHOULD NOT BE CUT Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have received a large number of telegrams, calls and letters urging me to do every- thing possible to restore the proposed cuts in appropriations for the special school milk and school lunch programs. There are many places where the budget can, and should, be cut this ses- sion but these are not among them. Both of these programs have had widespread support over the years, both in Wiscon- sin and across the country. They have been built up over many years through cooperative arrangements with the States. These programs are important to the dairy industry and they are important to the health of our schoolchildren. I have received a large number of let- ters from school administrators, school- children, dairy farmers, cooperatives and others. I ask unanimous consent that a representative sample be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: AMERICAN SCHOOL FOOD SERVICE ASSOCIATION, Madison., Wis., February 18, 1966. Hon. GAYLORD NELSON, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR NELSON: I wish to thank you again for the generous time you gave to me and Mr. Langkop when we visited with you recently. We are very much concerned over the administration's budget proposals for the school lunch and special milk pro- grams for 1966-67 and were very grateful for an opportunity to visit with you concern- ing the matter. I am sending to you herewith a copy of a bulletin which I have requested the Ameri- can School Food Service Association to issue to State directors of school lunch programs, State presidents of school food service asso- ciations, and State legislative chairmen con- cerning the administration's budget pro- posals for the school lunch and special milk programs for 1966-67. I want to keep you as fully informed as I possibly can, since I am sure you will be receiving inquiries and letters from many people in Wisconsin, and It may also be helpful to you to get our side of the picture when the budget comes up for consideration in hearings and on the Senate floor. I believe the material I am sending to you is quite self-explanatory, but I should like to add some further explanation as to what the program might look like in Wisconsin if the President's budget proposals were to be- come effective. There are now only 6 school districts of grades kindergarten through 12 or 9 through 12 which do not have the school lunch pro- gram in Wisconsin. There are, of course, a number of small rural districts operating one-room or two-room schools which do not have a lunch program since building facilities would not permit. Thus you can see that the program has been quite universally ac- cepted and incorporated into the daily school activities in nearly all. of the schools of the State. There are 105 school districts involving 151 schools with an average daily attendance of 24,009 pupils which have a milk program only. In September these schools served 345,008 half pints of milk; in October, 452,- 541, and in November 379,654. The reim- bursement from Federal funds in November, for example, was $10,187. There are 467 school districts involving 2,511 schools which have both the school lunch and special milk programs. The aver- age daily attendance in these schools is 644,- 488 pupils. In September these schools served 7,660,488 half pints of milk; in Octo- ber, 8,830,621; and in November, 7,494,993. The reimbursement from Federal funds in November amounted to $276,395. In these schools the children also had the benefit of a balanced noon meal which included a half pint of milk. The figures given you above are concerned only with the extra milk which was consumed in these schools during recess, milk breaks, or additional milk with the noon lunch. In September these schools served 6,011,450 lunches with milk; in Octo- ber, 6,161,321; and in November, 5,310,818. Therefore, in November, for example, there were 12,805,811 half pints of milk consumed In these schools in addition to other dairy products which were served as a part of the meal. The point I am trying to make is that the special milk program would virtually be dead if it were limited to schools which do not have a lunch service. Although the chart shows a net reduction of $19 million in the budget for the school lunch program (approximately 10 percent of this year's appropriation) the situation is actually worse than it appears. Section 11 funds are used in granting high reimburse- ment rates to schools in especially needy areas. The funds appropriated for this sec- tion are apportioned among the States pri- marily on the basis of need for serving lunches free of charge to children who can- not afford to pay. From a national stand- point the $6.5 million budget is but a token of what would be required if the need were to be met. The city of Chicago alone would require the total appropriation. Conse- quently, the funds appropriated for the cur- rent year ($2 million) were apportioned among the States to start experimental pro- grams to determine what effect a high re- imbursement rate and a reduced price to children might have on participation, num- ber of free lunches required, etc. Wisconsin got $11,700. We were able to start four small projects beginning in February?one in West- boro; one in Pine Lake, near Rhinelander; one at Neopit and one in Keshena. Thus you can see that the $4.5 million increase in the budget for such purposes will have but little bearing on the program as a whole. Appropriated funds available for reim- bursement and section 6 commodities for the current year total $152,915,000 (not in- cluding the $45 milliop transfer from sec- tion 32 funds for this purpose). Appropri- ated funds for identical purposes next year Would be $129,115,000. Thus there is actu- ally a reduction of funds for the regular program of 15.4 percent and not 10 percent as it would appear on the surface. Along with the 15.4 percent reduction in funds, it is quite evident that surplus com- modities will not be available in the kinds and quantities we have had in the past. Several valuable items have disappeared from the surplus list. We have received only 202,173 pounds of cheese for schools this year. Last year we used 821,770 pounds. There are virtually no Government pur- chases being made for price support pur- poses. Butter has reached the same posi- tion. Section 70 of the Agricultural Act of 1965 authorizes ie Secretary of Agriculture to go out on t e market and buy butter, cheese, and powdered milk in any quantity needed to fulfill requirements of the pro- gram regardless of price or surplus situation, but he has not done so until February 10 when he announced he would buy a limited quantity of butter to meet the needs of the school lunch program. He made no offer to buy cheese, however. If the administrations proposals prevail, It will mean an increase of perhaps 5 cents per lunch in charges to children. Children attending schools where there is a lunch pro- gram would be required to pay the full cost of the milk, unless the district were to sub- sidize it somehow. There would be no milk reimbursement for such schools, excepting for the milk served to needy children who would be unable to pay. This would be an inconsequential amount, I'm sure. Schools which have a lunch program are now being reimbursed at the rate of 4 cents per half pint of extra milk served, and the schools which do not have a lunch service are paid 3 cents per half pint. All schools are paid a uniform rate of 4 cents per lunch with milk. No reimbursement is paid for lunches served without milk. This letter has grown somewhat lengthy and I apologize for it. Anything you can do In behalf of adequately funding both pro- grams in the coming fiscal year will be very much appreciated. Sincerely, GORDON W. GUNDERSON, Chairman, Legislative Committee, ASFSA. MILK INDUSTRY FOUNDATION, Washington., D.C., February 11, 1966. Senator GAYLORD NELSON, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR NELSON: We Solicit your support for continuance of the special milk program which in fiscal year 1965 was used by 92,005 schools and child care institutions where 2,966,800,000 half pints of milk were consumed. By comparison, 70,132 schools participated in the national school lunch program and used 2,876,150,103 half pints of milk in fiscal 1965. This usage of milk aggregated nearly 3 bil- lion pounds. Had this milk not been so used, there can be little doubt that it would have been acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation in the form of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese since approximately 5.7 billion pounds on a milk equivalent basis was actually acquired. The direct cost at the present support price would have been $103 million, the exact amount Congress ap- propriated for the special milk program for fiscal 1966. In addition, there would have been the cost of acquiring, handling, packag- ing, and transporting the products which would have been made from the 3 billion pounds of milk used in the school lunch and school milk programs. While commercial consumption has shown a gain during the past year and some further gain is expected this year, it now appears that Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 an estimated :3 to 4 billion pounds of milk in the form of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese will be acquired under the price sup- port program in 1966. In the light of these circumstances it makes extremely good sense to continue the apecial milk program. Nearly 22,000 more schools and child care institutions use this program than use the school lunch program. More children are benefited by having a nutritious energy-giving food in the form of milk. At a time when our Government is spend- ing millions of dollars to rehabilitate school dropouts, is enlarging the food stamp pro- gram and carrying on a war against poverty, it ,s inconsistent to curtail a program that adds to the health, energy, and vitality of children who are in school and thereby helps them to stay in school. This is especially trot, with respect to the 22,000 schools and institutions which, because of lack of facili- ties, funds or for other reasons do not have a school lunch program. We of the Milk Industry Foundation, a trade association of milk processors having mombers doing business in every State of the Nation, including, of course, your State, respectfully request your help in maintaining the Special Milk Program at a level where all schools and child institutions wishing to pacticipate may do so. Sin caret y, Roemer EL NORTH, ttery live Director. Now eecrevioNe PUBLIC SCHOOLS, NMI) Richmond, Wis., February 18, 1166. TRU'. GAYLORD NELSON, Senate Office Washington, D.C. ! WAR SENATOR NELSON: The proposal in Federal budget and in the Congress to cut back in the the appropriation for the special milk program in schools and to as- sign the administration of the fund to the Department of Health, Education, and Wel- fare instead of the Department of Agricul- ture has come to my attention. My per- sonal feeling about this proposal, and its tie-in effect with ether programs, are ex- pressed as that of a parent, a taxpayer, and a school administrator. 1. Since the milk purchased by the re- duced appropriation is to be distributed to needy children, there is an obvious tie-in with programing under the Education Act of 1965. 'e School lunch and special mik programs have stood for years as evidence that a fed- erally aided program can do an effective job with a minirnum of Government interfer- ence. I. The Education Act of 1965 is becoming a monument of regulation, detail, restriction iind administrative putter work. What was promoted as a first time opportunity for education innovation on a national scale has become restrictive to a point that pro- graming is going to evolve into a number of ricatly wrapped educational packages. In- novation, as I understand the implication of the term, will not happen. .1. Any remote tie-in of the milk or lunch program to the restrictiveness of Public Law 89-10 will tend to render that program In- c! let:teal. O. To spend billions in an emotion- packed great-experiment program and at the same time cut back in a program that has proved itself nutritionally, educationally, and economically sound for years, would be difficult to defend, I'm sure. Your serious effort to restore the fund- ing for the milk program to its original strength, and retain the administration of the program to the Department of Agricul- ture, will, I'm sure, receive the enthusiastic support and imdorsement of your constitu- ents. Sincerely yours, SHERMAN H. GROVES, Superintendent. MILE. PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC., KENOSHA, Wis., February 16, 1966. Senator GAYLORD Nrazoe, Senate Office Building, Room 404: Washingt on?O.C. DEAR SENATOR NELSON: The Wisconsin Council of Agricultural Cooperatives strongly protests the proposed unprecedented 1967 budget out of $82 million for the special milk program for schoolchildren. We urge that the special milk program budgets be restored to $H03 million, the current appro- priation; preferably funds for this program should be authorized at $115 millern. The proposed reduction of $19 million in the school lunch program should also be restored by Congress. A reduction of the size proposed is tanta- mount to complete elimination of the special milk program. Complete elimination would divert about 1.5 billion pounds of milk now consumed as fluid milk into manufactured dairy products. USDA reports indicate the price for milk eligible for fluid consumption was $4.63 per hundredweight in 1965, compared to $3.33 for milk used for manufacturing. The dif- ference in the two prices is $1,30 per hun- dredweight. The 1.5 billion pounds of milk times $1 30 per hundredweight would mean a loss of $19.5 million Li dairy farmers' pur- chasing power. The special milk program is one of our moss effective vehicles for insuring good eat- ing habis and at the same time improving diets of all children. Certainly this impor- tant aspect of the program should not be based on ability to pay. Does the administration realize how much milk consumption in schools will decline if the cost per half pint is increased? A study in Chicago schools revealed that an increase of 1 cent per half pint on white milk and chocolate milk reduced consump- tion by 10 percent,. This fact alone should give cause for serious reconsideration of the proposed action. We urgently request that you do your utmost to combat efforts to reduce the spe- cial milk program appropriations. The pro- gram, as we know it, has the support of not only dairy farmers but the general public es well. Our younger generation would be dealt a disservice by the U.S. Congress if ap- propriations for this program are dropped below the current level. Sincerely yours, MILK PRODUCERS CO-Os, INC., E. Maciar, Sales Manager. AUTO SAFETY Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, :I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a brief on auto safety prepared by the Honorable Howard Grafftey, Member of Parliament of Canada, Mr. C.. Alexander Brown, and Mr. Rheal Casavant, also of Canada, for consideration by the Federal Government of Canada. This brief concerns the rising accident and death toll resulting :from auto crashes in Canada. Although we usually think of auto safety in the American con- text, Canadians also use many cars de- signed in the United States. It is only natural for Canadians to be concerned with the safety of American automobiles. I call to the attention of my associates the material prepared by Messrs. Graff- tey, Brown, and Casavant. It is perti- nent to our problems with auto safety. There being no objection, the brief was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Fut'. TEXT OF BRIEF ON" TRAFFIC ACCIDENT DEATHS AND INJURIES IN CAN ADA INTRODUCTION Significant new developments in the un- derstanding of the complex casualty of motor vehicle fatalities and injuries have prompted us to set dOwn our knowledge and understanding of this problem, together with three recommendations for remedial action that could be taken at the federal level, for presentation to the Prime Minister of Can- ada, the Minister of National Health isod Welfare, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and Moister of Industry. This brief has been endorsed by: C. E. Dionne, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa. Stanley Knowles, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa. Guy Marcoux, Member of Parliament, M.D., House of Commons, Ottawa. John Matheson, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa. Wilson Southern, television producer, Champlain Towers, Ottawa. This brief has been prepared and presented by: Howard Grafftey, Member of Parliament. House of Commons, Ottawa. C. Alexander Brown, writer, 135 Wood- ridge Crescent, Ottawa 14, Ontario. it Casa,vant, television executive, 195 Fontaine Street, Hull, Quebec. BRIEF ON AUTOMOBILE SAFE'.'Y In the past 10 years 35,031 people have been killed in automobile accidents in Can- ada, and 948,850 injured. It is estimated that by the end of 1965, 4,800 more will die and 150,000 will be injured. If the present trend continues between the beginning of 1966 and the end of 1970, 26,000 more Ca- nadians will die on our roads and more than 1 million more will be injured. Accidents are now one of the leading causes of death and injury in this, as in many other countries. It is estimated that about half of all cars in North America between the time they are first driven and the time they are scrapped become involved in at least one injury-producing accident. To the present time nearly all efforts to correct this situation have been directed at drivers. In spite of this, the toll of death and injury, continues to increase and there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that to continue to expend most of our efforts in educating, cajoling, and penalizing the driver will yield adequate results. The prob- lem of highway death and injury must be attached in other areas. In modern times, the techniques of epidemiology have been successfully "extended from its original re- striction to the communicable diseases to a broad application of mass diseases of man; to cancer, diabetes, congenital anomalies and many others. It is not so generally appre- ciated that injuries, as distinguished from diseases, are equally susceptible to this ap- proach, and that accidents as a health prob- lem of populations conform to the same biological laws as do disease processes and regularly evidence comparable behavior." Epidemiological approach Applying the terminology of epidemiology to automobile accidents, the roads are the environment, the driver is the host, and au- tomobiles are the agents. Drivers (the host in our terms) are susceptible to human er- ror. Therefore, there will always be acci- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved Effmrpggimp7ityd6a111:21gRAI146R000400050008-5 4187 March 1, 1966 on insurance regulation in 1964 while insur- ance companies paid the States $737.6 million. DISTRICT SIXTH HIGHEST The States that spent the least, in relation to their income from the insurance industry, were in order, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Missouri, Idaho, Michigan, Connecticut and Minnesota. None budgeted more than 2.15 cents of the insurance tax dollar for insur- ance regulation. The District of Columbia, which budgeted 6.24 cents, ranked sixth highest. Maryland and Virginia, which spent about 3 cents each, ranked 33d and 34th, respectively. States without any examiners at all, ac- cording to the subcommittee's survey, were Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Yet Arizona and Mississippi alone had the prime responsibility for checking on the financial stability of 404 insurance com- panies chartered in their States. New Hampshire and Vermont had only one examiner each; Maine and Montana, two; Oregon and Wyoming, three. NINE EXAMINERS HERE The District of Columbia, with 50 com- panies chartered here and another 630 doing business, had 9 examiners. Virginia had 10 examiners for 846 companies, 95 of them homegrown. Maryland, with 57 companies chartered in the State and another 752 in business there, had 12 examiners. New York had 342 examiners for 736 com- panies. "No State insurance department, none of the 50 States, is going to be any stronger than the weakest examiner they have on their payroll," one witness testified before the subcommittee. In some of the States that have no insur- ance examiners of their own, private ac- counting firms are hired to make the checks. DODD said he had no illusions about getting a perfect system of insurance regulation. But, he said, "what we are getting now is not even within shouting distance of this ideal." [From the Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 19661 THREAT OF NEW FEDERAL CONTROLS Is RAISED?SENATOR DODD URGES STATES To ACT IMMEDIATELY (By Alexander Picone) A short while back we allowed as how the substandard risk automobile insurance mar- ket, a relatively insignificant segment of the business, could turn out to be the "Achilles heel" of State regulation, unless the com- panies and the State regulatory authorities pay more attention than has been given to date to the cleansing of this obviously un- pleasant fringe of the business. It is a full- blown threat as of now. Since 1960, some 58 high-risk auto Insur- ance companies went under leaving over a million persons without insurance. This, plus other developments, has provided am- munition for those who would prefer stronger Federal supervision of the business, if not complete takeover by repeal of the McCarran Act. STRONG EFFORT It is useless to go on carping and edito- rializing, but sincere executives must make every effort?and do it now?to prevent even the smallest black mark from spotting the Image of effective State regulation. Perhaps, there are some insurance execu- tives among us who do not want State regu- lation to continue. If this view is widely shared by people within the industry then efforts should be started to determine where such defections exist. The Senate Judiciary Antitrust Subcom- mittee, of which Senator THOMAS J. Dom), Democrat, of Connecticut, is chairman, has the continuing responsibility of studying the effectiveness of the system of State regulation of insurance. In a speech last reek on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Mr. DODD, who has been called the congressional watchdog of the insurance business, revealed that nearly 1 of every 10 high-risk auto insurance companies had failed in the last 2 years, leaving more than half a million persons without protection. He said the situation was appalling and added that it may be time for the Federal Govern- ment to pass legislation unless the States take immediate and sufficient action. The words "immediate" and "sufficient" should be underlined. And, any action taken on a State level would be futile unless the com- panies cooperated fully and wholeheartedly. POINT STRESSED The Senator from Connecticut also stressed a point which should, by now, be im- printed on the minds of all insurance people. ,It is this: "The legislative history of the McCarran Act clearly indicates that 'Congress was making only a conditional delegation of authority to the States, to be reconsidered if the States should demonstrate an in- ability to properly serve the public interest." The Senator was kind enough to stress the excellent record of some State insurance de- partments and to assert his personal support of State regulation as best suited for supervi- sion of the insurance industry "because it is at the level most aware of the local and regional needs of the consumer." The Sena- tor, like most public figures, is subject to a multitude of pressures, political and other- wise, and he may be forced to take steps that are contrary to his personal convictions. The bald fact, as the Senator sees it is that State regulation, in toto, is not adequately protecting the consumer, and at all costs, he must be protected. Mr. DODD, in his speech before the Senate, raised these questions, questions which every responsible person in the Insurance industry should be prepared to answer: "Can a form of regulation be adequate which allows virtually 9 percent of the high- risk automobile insurance companies in the Nation to fail over a 2-year period, leaving considerably more than half a million per- sons without insurance?" "Can a form of regulation be adequate which generally doesn't maintain examiners sufficient in number to carefully analyze the financial standing of thousands of insurance companies?" "Can a form of regulation be adequate in which at least six of the States have three or less examiners and at least nine States have no examiners at all?" "Can a form of regulation be adequate which is operated on a marginal budget of usually less than 4 percent of the premium taxes and fees collected from insurance com- panies by the States?" FEDERAL CONTAOL Although no system of supervision can hope to achieve perfection, Senator DODD said. "we know that no type of Federal con- trol would tolerate a failure rate of the mag- nitude of that presently occurring in high- risk automobile insurance." Complete Federal regulation of insurance may be undesirable, Senator DODD said, "but we have a critical problem in the high-risk automobile insurance area today, one which needs serious attention. If the States do not immediately and sufficiently respond, the Federal Government will be left with no alternative but to itself respond. "There are alternatives not amounting to outright Federal control which would pro- tect the public from these many insolvencies. An approach similar to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in banking or a Federal Guaranty Fund are possibilities which have merit. "The time may be at hand to begin ex- ploring the feasibility of these and other possible legislative solutions to this very seri- ous problem before the American public suf- fers any further Injustices," the Senator said. As we said earlier, the time for carping has passed, indeed editorializing is of little help. What must be so evident is the fact that the insurance commissioners should appoint a competent all-industry committee and staff to cooperate with the State regulatory au- thorities and solve the high risk problem and other problems affecting the private In- surance concept and State regulation of in- surance. The integrity of the private in- surance business is on trial and we must have faith that both the commissioners and the companies will cooperate and come through with needful solutions. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, is there further morning business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morn- usiness is closed. EMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the un- finished business be laid before the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the un- finished business. The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appro- priations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evalua- tion for the armed forces, and for other purposes. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is my judgment that the Senate is about to start a session of the Senate which will result in a series of votes, probably before the day is over, which may be as impor- tant to the future of this Republic as any series of votes ever cast in the history of the Senate. Mr. President, I believe that at least, irrespective of how we feel about the issue, the American people are entitled to have the attendance of their elected rep- resentatives in the Senate on this very critical occasion and, therefore, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum and ask for a live quorum. The PRESIDING OFFIQER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names: Aiken Bass Bayh Bible Boggs Burdick Clark Cotton Dodd Ellender Fannin [No. 40 Leg.] Pulbright Inouye Jackson Javits Kennedy, Mass. Long, Mo. Mansfield McIntyre Mondale Monroney Morse Pastore Prouty Russell, S.C. Russell, Ga. Saltonstall Smith Talmadge Tydings Williams, N.J. Young, Ohio Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] is absent on official business. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4 188 Approved For ReedgleGR3Rigli3ALCAAE-ljpoft'g_BOI:SIVII4M0400050008-5 March 1)6 I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LauseuEl are necessarily absent. The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quo- rum is not present. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island. The motion was agreed to. 'the PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate. After a little delay, the following Sen- ators entered the Chamber and answered to their names: Allott Anderson Bartlett Bennett Byrd, Va. Byrd, W. Va. Cannon Carlson case Cooper Curtis Dirksen Dominick Douglas Illastland Pong Gore Gruelling Harris Hart Hartke Hayden Hickenlooper Hill Holland Hruska Jordan, N.C. Jordan, Idaho Kennedy, N.Y. Kuchel Long. La. Magnuson McCarthy McClellan McGee McGovern McNamara Metcalf Miller Montoya Morton -MOM Mundt Murphy Muskie Nelson. Neuberger Pearson Pell Proxmire Randolph Ribleoff Robertson Scott Simpson Smath ers Sparkman Stennis Symington hurrnond Tower Williams, Del. Yarborough Young, N. Dak. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). A quorum is present. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall speak briefly in support of my amend- ment, which I shall offer at the end of the statement. I may at a later hour offer a second amendment. Mr. President, the major thesis of my case against the pending business of the Senate is that the bill goes far beyond what its proponents claim for it. The pending bill is a policy bill. The pend- ing bill greatly enlarges American for- eign policy in Asia. The pending bill is pregnant with a policy that will lead to the escalation of the war in Asia. The pending bill, in my opinion, greatly endangers the development of world war three. Therefore I think that the pol- icies inherent in the bill should not be adopted by the Senate without restric- tions being placed upon the bill. It is my view, as I expressed in some depth last Friday, that this bill greatly weakens our system of checks and bal- ances. ii iS a bill that would greatly enlarge the discretionary power of the President. It is a bill that would_ give determination by way of the exercise of what I consider to be, for the fiscal year 1966-67, almost unlimited discretionary power on the part of the Secretary of Defense. There- lore, I think that the bill should be de- feated. When we finally come to the rollcall on the bill, I shall vote against the bill, and when I vote against the bill, I :hall not be voting to let down Amer- ican boys in southeast Asia. But I shall be voting to try to save the lives of many who, in my judgment, will be sent into Asia as a result of the passage of this bill. It is, of course, to be understood that I expressed in some detail last Friday my answer to the oft-repeated?but un- founded--charge that those of us who oppose the President's policies in south- east Asia have no substitute plan. We have a substitute plan, it plan that we have expressed in great detail. Mr. President, let me say that I sup- port the position of General Gavin. I support the enclave approach which would afford an opportunity for other nations to come in and live up to their obligations under the United Nations Charter to enforce the peace in south- east Asia. Mr. President, with those preliminary remarks, I now proceed with my formal statement in support of my .00sition in opposition to the bill. What is printed in the hearings is enough to destroy the claim that there is little difference between the Gavin- Kennan proposal for Vietnam and the administration objective. The adminis- tration objective in South Vietnam, which l.l quite different from any alleged commitment, is one of clearing the country for them cf the Vietcong, and restoring Genera] Ky to full control over the people and territory of South Viet- nam. Only then will we be prepared for any eleetions. That is what was in the President's Honolulu speech, and here is the military funding that will be needed o carry it mit. We are going to go to elections when we destroy large numbers of Vietcong. We are going to go to elections when we have "pacified" the country and put Ky in power. We are going to go to elec- tions when we can be sure that Ky is going to win the election. However, if we had elections controlled by Commu- nists, then we would have much to say and to deprecate. Much of the talk of the leaders of our Government about elections in South Vietnam spells out the word "hypocrisy." I think we are highly hypocritical in regard to our allegation that we seek elections. I think we also seek con- trolled elections in Vietnam, in that we only want them when we control the country. I pont to Secretary MeNamara's statement on page 105 of the hearings in response to a question by Senator SMITH, for this colloquy shovu the preg- nancy of this bill with new foreign policy. read from the hearings: Senator SMITH. Mr. SeCretarY are there any plans to escalate .a.r.d step u the offen- sive in Vietnam? Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, thele are prep- arations being made, and they are reflected in this Local :1066 supplement, for substan- tially increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units there. Whether or not we will carry out such higher rates of aiiiivities and actually deploy all of those addh..onal forces is a decision that only the Pr: sident can make, and no such cleaision his yet been made. His instruction to us is to be pre- pared to meet such higher deployments and such higher rates of activity shott,c1 the need for them arise. Senator SmrrH. If there aren't any am- munition shortages in the Vietnam fighting and if there aren't any plans to etcalate and step up the fighting in Vietnam, then why have you recently opened a halt dozen or more ammunition plants directed to start operations on increased ammunitions? Secretary McNAmARA. To be prepared to support higher deployments and higher rates of activity. We have laid out over the period of the next 13 months?through ,J me 1937? possible levels of deployment, and possible rates of activity which are higher than pres- ent levels of deployment and rates of activity. and in order to be prepared to support them, we are requesting funds to procure the am- munition for such higher deployments and higher rates of activity. Elsewhere, Secretary McNamara was pressed by Senator McCLELtax to de- scribe and define our military strategy and tactics in Vietnam. The Senator's question appears on page 112 of tile hearing record and it was: Are we going to continue fighting what appears to be a holding action? I read further from the hearings: Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that we would characterize our preseict military strategy or present tactics as holding actions. On the contrary, we are taking Lilo offensive, seeking to find and destroy the enemy bases and forces, and we propose to emtinini to follow that strategy and tactic, using what- ever forces are required to accomplish it in order to convince the Vietcong ad particu- larly the North Vietnamese who are directing their operations, that they cannot win in the south, and therefore, must cease their at- tempt to subvert and destroy the political institutions of the south. Senator MCCLELLAN. That is Nvily it oc- curs to me that it is primarily a holding action. We are just going to hold on and show them they can't win. May I have order, Mr. President? The PRESIDING OFFIC ER. The Chair has attempted to secure the co- operation of Senators. The Senate will be in order. Mr. MORSE. I continue to read: Secretary MCNAMARA. No sir. As I have said, our military strategy which is associated with the political objective of preserving the right of the South Vietnamese to deter- mine their own destiny is to find and destroy the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces operating in South Vietnam. A few sentences later, the Secretary added: If the circumstances change, if the North Vietnamese add greater force, if the military risk associated with our present policy in- creases beyond the limits we presently see, It might be desirable or necessary in the future to modify that strategy (deletic1). This, of course, is quite in keeping with the Honolulu speech of the Presi- dent at the Honolulu airport on Febru- ary 6, when he said: We will leave here determined nut only lo achieve victory over aggression, but to win victory over hunger, disease, and decpair. Today's press informs us once again that General Ky intends to reu lily both North and South under his command. Dennite his many statements to tint effect, they have never been rejected by the American Government. We finance and support Ky; we maintain him and his coterie of ruling generals in com- mand in South Vietnam. They are our responsibility. When Ky declares it to Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13,. CIA-RDP671300446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE be the policy of his government to "go North" he is reiterating what President Diem declared the policy of his govern- ment to be in 1955, a policy for which he claimed American support. Mr. President, in the Washington Post this morning, on page A-13, we have a story under the headline "Ky Says Saigon's Task Is To 'Liberate' North." The article reads: South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky believes his country has the "noble and supreme task" of "liberating the North and reunifying the fatherland." Ky made the statement in a speech on February 21 during a public seminar in Saigon, but word of it became available In Washington only yesterday. In calling for reunification of the North, Ky said "we cannot betray the 4,000 years of our history, and " * we cannot betray the sacrifices in bones and blood made by our ancestors and our sons and brothers, and * * * we cannot let the millions of the North Vietnamese people continue to endure these sufferings under the yoke of Chi- nese colonialists and their North Vietnamese puppet administration's lackeys." Ky has made similar statements in the past, but this appeared to be the first of its kind since his Honolulu meeting last month with President Johnson. Ky'd talk of "liber- ating" the North is directly at odds with the Johnson policy. Mr. Johnson has repeatedly said that the United States is not threatening the exist- ence of the North Vietnamese regime and is not attempting to alter its Communist form of government. BILL AUTHORIZES COMBINED WAR FORCE FUNDED DEFENSE DEPARTMENT The bill provides for the increased scope of the war in three ways. First, It provides for the funding of all military forces serving in South Vietnam out of U.S. Defense Department appropriations. Second, it authorizes the construction of new military bases throughout south- east Asia at the discretion of the Secre- tary of State. And third, it provides for an increase of nearly half a million men in the armed services of the United States. The first of these?the funding of all military activities in Vietnam out of our Defense budget?contemplates a total and direct reversal of the policy of the United States as set forth at the time the Southeast Asia Collective Defense treaty was presented and ratified. I read section 401(a) : Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in connection with support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. The bill provides a blank check on American defense spending for expand- ing this war into Laos and Thailand, and when we get through paying and equipping the armed forces of South Korea and the Philippines I think we will see the war spread to those coun- tries, too. Under this bill, and in this title, we are making the Vietnam war an Ameri- can war. No longer is there any pretense that military aid to the forces of South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand is aid to separate and independent mili- tary identities. Their forces are to be funded out of our American military defense spending, and I predict that this provision, which is totally unlimited as to amount and as to countries, will serve to further destroy the integrity of such neighboring countries as Thailand and any other country that is included in it. ASIAN DEFENSE FORCE UNDER SEATO REJECTED As I recited to the Senate on Friday, this kind of organization was specifically rejected in 1954 and 1955 when Secretary of State Dulles presented the treaty to the Senate, and when it was ratified by this body. He told the Foreign Relations Com- mittee that he did not like to use the word "SEATO" in connection with the treaty, because the "0" stood for "Orga- nization" and no organization was in- tended or contemplated. He said: We are trying to get away from the word because it implies a southeast Asia treaty or- ganization comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That organization is designed in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty to build up a defensive force on the continent of Europe which itself would be sufficient to resist attack by the Red armies. As I point out, that is not now the purpose under this treaty. We do not intend to dedi- cate any major elements of the U.S. Military Establishment to form an army of defense in this area. We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power. That we made clear to our associate in the treaty, and that is our policy. So that we do not intend, Mr. Chairman, to have under this treaty any such local com- bined forces as have been created in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty, and which goes by the name of NATO. It was on that basis, and with those as- surances, that the treaty was ratified by the Senate. In this bill, we not only reverse that policy by creating a local combined force, including major ele- ments of the American Military Estab- lishment, but we are going to pay the en- tire cost for all the countries that con- tribute to it. I know that so far, we are told that Ausrtalia and New Zealand are paying their own way, but there is no reason to expect they will continue to do so, once the U.S. Defense Department pays for everyone else. Mr. President, when Secretary of State Dulles presented the treaty to the Sen- ate, he told the Foreign Relations Com- mittee that he dici not like to use the word "SEATO" in connection with the treaty, because the "0," as he said, stands for "organization," and no orga- nization was intended. That is very critical in this debate, Mr. President. That is why I said last Fri- day, and will not review it in detail, in my judgment the Secretary of State is quite mistaken in his now contention that SEATO is a justification for a course of action. But of course the Secretary of State, when he testified before our committee, forgot what he told the Foreign Relations Committee in both 1962 and 1964 and in executive session in regard to SEATO. He seemed then to have been aware of what Secretary Dul- les had said. 4189 EXPANSION OF BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The second way in which the bill au- thorizes the expansion of the war is in the authority it gives the Secretary of Defense to penetrate further into that area of the world. Look at the language of section 302. The bill authorizes certain construction in support of military activities in south- east Asia, and for other purposes. Sec- tion 302 reads: The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States, and in connection therewith to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, Including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities and equipment in the total amount of $200 million. Do not tell the American people again, I say to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Presi- dent, that the United States seeks no military bases in South Vietnam or in southeast Asia. Mr. President, stark realism ought to warn us: "We spend these huge sums of money for the building of American bases in southeast Asia, and we will be there for a long time." In fact, at the present time, as I pointed out in my speech last night here on the floor of the Senate, we are finding ourselves becoming more and more in- volved in political controversy with Japan for we are maintaining huge bases in Okinawa, and we are maintaining our naval bases in Japan. Even the majority party in Japan is split over our course of action. Even the majority party of Japan wishes more favorable negotiations for our use of those bases to the economic advantage of Japan. There are many in the ma- jority party who believe that we should get out now, and of course the other parties in Japan campaign on that con- troversy as one of their major issues in opposition to the Government of Japan. When we spend these huge sums of money for the building of American bases abroad, the tendency is to post- pone and postpone and postpone getting out. In my judgment, in view of what is going to develop in southeast Asia, it Is my great concern and my fear that the construction of these bases, contrary to the enclave theory of a General Gavin, will result in America's presence in southeast Asia for many years to come. I believe that now is the time to reject that policy. I believe that now is the time to reject a bill which has that policy included in it, and also, to reject a bill which, in my judgment, gives to the Secretary of Defense and to the President of the United States the dis- cretionary power which this bill would give them. For, as section 5 provides: The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States. As Senators know, I am always con- cerned about giving broad discretionary power to any administrator of the Gov- ernment because that always increases Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4i90 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March , 191;6 the danger of going further and further down the road?a road on which we have already traveled too far?of government by executive supremacy. a deplore the extent to Which Con- gress has already delegated what I con- sider to be entirely too much discretion- ary power to the executive branch. Therefore, I say that it is a great mis- take to approve the policy of building these installations in southeast Asia. That is why I say that the Secretary of ,Aate. the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States should no larger repeat what they have been say- ing so freouently, that we seek no mili- tary bases in southeast Asia. this see bin refers to installations and .i'acilities 'vital to the security of the United States," Who is to say what is vital to the security of the country? W1'AT IS VITAL IN ASIA? Why not the Congress rather than, as in the provisions of this bill, the Secre- tary of Defense. It is he who is author- ized by this bill to establish the outposts of American military command that will thence have to be defended by all the resources of this Nation that may be re- quired to defend them. And these so- called vital interests are not in the West- ern Hemisphere, for the short title of the bill explains that it refers to military activities in southeast Asia. Mr. President, one of the great differ- ences between sincere men in this debate From its inception, which started two and a half years run, is that the Senator from Alaska and I have stated time and again on the floor of the Senate in our speeches that, in our judgment, South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. repeat that assertion today. To my judgment, we cannot justify the slaughtering of a single American boy in South Vietnam. I am perfectly willing to let history be the judge. To those who are talking about protecting our boys over there by enacting this bill, let me say in rebuttal that we who are urging defeat of the bill, are urging its defeat so that it will force upon the administra- tion a change of policy which will pre- vent the killing of American boys in South Vietnam. Mr. President, that is one of the pre- cious checks which the Constitution gives to Congress; namely, the check on the purse strings. All this talk that if we exercise this check we will be endanger' big the lives of American boys is entirely unreal. If we exercise the check, we will have to change the policy. We will have to return to such a program as General Gavin has been advocating. We will have to fall back on a program which prevents escalating the war and sending our forces farther and farther into South Vietnam, eventually into North Vielnam?and, in my opinion, ultimately into China, where they will be killed by the hundreds of thousands. That is the issue at stake here. Let the American people understand that that is the issue. Let the American people answer Congress on that issue as we go forward across the Nation in the months ahead in this historic debate at the grassroots of America over our for- eign policy. As long as we remain free, the Ameri- can people have the ultimate check upon Congress. in my judgment, we have reached the point now so that American foreign policy can be changed only by the American people. I am satisfied that it is not going to be changed by Congress. T do not accept the premise f the op- position that we have vital it Lerests in southeast Asia which call for .milateral American military action. The world has sona vital issues in Asia. The world has some obligation vis-a-vis sonth.eatt Asia. When I speak of the world. I mean those nations which have pledved them- selves, caier their own signaturis, to pre- serve the peace?but not the United States unilaterally. Every sigaatory to the United Nations Charter hit o an obli- gation to preserve the peace of the world. Do we not see the great difference? One of the great differener's which exist between us as sincere min is the honest difference of opirdoll as to whether we have any right, legally or morally, to set ourselves UP as the police- men of the world, to carry out what we consider to be the policy that v,?-e believe the world should adopt. That is why we are having so much difficulty, in so many places around the world, in get- ting more than token support, More than lip service to our foreign policy in Asia. As the war escalates. and more human beings on both sides of the war are slaughter ed, we will find rising opposi- tion and resentment to our country's policy. That is why I have been pleading that we should come to grips with the great moral issue involved, toe, in con- nection with the war. For, in my judg- ment:, our policies cannot be reconciled with the glorious, historic record of our Republic in support of histmOc ideals. For I consider that we have walked out on those ideals. Since when, and in. what act of Con- gress, is southeast Asia defined as vital to the security of the United States, justifying any unilateral action that may be needed on our part to defend it? The most that can be cited is the SEATO treaty, which., however, does not define the area as vital but refers to a -common danger" to all SEATO members that has never been seen by our SEATO partners. The resolution of August 1964 cites southeast Asia as an area where the United States regards the maintenance of international peace and security" as vital to our interests. The continued in- trusion of large-scale American military forces, bases, and navies into this area, as provided by the bill, will destroy what little international peace and security is left to the people of Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, and eventually Burma and Cambodia, for the war that is lapping at their shares will engulf them, no, if it is allowed to proceed on its present course. According to Secretary Mer.,a,mara's testimony on pages 52 and 52 of the hearings, about $975 million of existing and new military construction money is to be spent in South Vietnam, the re- maining $666 million elsewhere in the general area. Senators cannot authorize a Defense Department to exercise this kind of discretion and then not see it exercised. This is how the war has been enlarged and under this provision it will continue to be enlarged. On the basis of my observations in my many years in the Senate, if the military is given the funds it seeks, it always finds ways to spend those funds. If mere men----I care not who they are?with all the human frailties that characterize each one of us, gets this kind of power, the danger is that they became drunk with power. The best way to stop in- toxication is to keep liquor away from the potential intoxicant. The best way to avoid the growing danger in this coun- try that leaders of this country will be- come more drunk with power is to deny them the authorization for the exercise of the power. That is the policy involved in the bill. Sometimes it is said that the resolu- tion of August 1964 justifies this course of action. The resolution of August 1964 cites southeast Asia as an area where the United States regards "the mainte- nance of international peace and se- curity" as vital to our interests. The continued intrusion of large-scale Ameri- can military forces, bases, and navies into this area is what I am concerned about, for they bring an enlargement of the war, not peace or security. We ought to reject the policy of this bill that Permits another enlargement of the war at the discretion of the President. NEW MANPOWER INCREASES PROVIDED IN BILL The third way in which the bill au- thorizes an escalation in the war is in the manpower increases for American Armed Forces it provides. I call the attention of Senators to the tables furnished by the Secretary of De- fense which appear on pages 14, 15, and 16 of the hearings. There we see that the plans of the Defense Department call for increases in active duty military per- sonnel by a net total?these are in- creases?of 452,843 men to be financed by this measure. That increase is planned to be realized by the end of fiscal year 1967. Three hundred and forty-seven thousand of these men are expected to be added by June of 1966. Surely Senators who continue to de- lude themselves that this pending meas- ure merely finances what has already been done and what is now being done have simply not read the hearings. Tile purpose of the new authorisation is sub- stantially to increase our ground and air operations in southeast Asia and to pro- vide both the manpower and the ma- terial to do it. Our immediate objective is to eliminate the Vietcong forces from South Vietnam and to establish General Ky as the unchallenged authority throughout South Vietnam. It seems to be well understood that General Westmoreland wants at least an- other 200,000 men in South Vietnam to step up the work of seeking out Vietcong forces and destroying them. Assuming that we can do that without North Viet- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP671300446R000400050008-5 Approved Fo6SAmegpamik? (-1A- R000400050008-5 4191 March 1, 1966 EC'01P-E).6N11491414P nam raising the ante on its side, those 400,000 troops will have to remain in South Vietnam as occupation forces for the indefinite future. In fact, I think with the adoption of this bill the American people ought to understand that we are going to have large numbers of American soldiers in southeast Asia for a long, long time to come. I only raise the caveat that, in my judgment, when the American people fully come to understand that that is inherent in our policy in southeast Asia, they will repudiate any administration that sponsors such a plan, and they should. RESPONSE FROM OTHER SIDE UNKNOWN The most amazing thing about this bill is the ease with which Congress has ac- cepted its authorization for a larger war without even asking what we expect the other side to do in response. There is not a word in the hearings of what the administration expects the Vietcong, North Vietnam, China, or Russia to do in response to our projected buildup. Our leaders are, in effect, whistling in the dark. They are engaging in wishful thinking that China will not come in, or that Russia will not come in, or that North Vietnam will not commit her army. But they have been so wrong so many times in regard to what was going to happen in Asia that I think time will prove them wrong again. I do not think the people of the United States or any other Western nation will be permitted to maintain a foothold in Asia. No mat- ter how many years it will take to throw us out, we will be thrown out, but at the cost of a shocking holocaust. Is it assumed that North Vietnam, that Russia and China, will do nothing? If that is the assumption, on what is it based? Or is there evidence that North Viet- nam will increase its own military strength in the south? Or will the So- viet Union pour more equipment into North Vietnam to be used in the south? We are preparing another escalation in the war, I say to my colleagues, and we are doing it in this bill without so much as a hint as to what the response of the opposition may be. I have quoted Secretary McNamara's statement on page 115, wherein he said that if the North Vietnamese add greater force, if the military risk associated with our present policy increases beyond the limits we presently see, it might be de- sirable to change our strategy of not seeking to destroy the Government of North Vietnam. But as to the possibil- ities and expectations of the adminis- tration as to what the response of North Vietnam will be, I find nothing in the hearings. Nor are we given any hints about possible reactions and responses from the two great Communist powers, China and Russia. We have already been through the ex- perience of the failure of the bombing of the north to force Hanoi to the bargain- ing table. We were all assured a year ago that air raids on North Vietnam would quickly demonstrate to her the po- tential destruction the U.S. Air Force and Navy could visit upon her and bring her to the sensible conclusion that in the face of such overwhelming power she should seek the best peace she could get at the negotiating table. We listened to testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan. We heard the general point out that Hanoi and Saigon are, in fact, two hostage cities, and that an attack on one will mean, in all probability, an attack on the other. I most respectfully express the view that I am at a loss to understand how my colleagues who support this bill think that we can go forward with a new pol- icy that is authorized under the bill and not have it result in a great escalation of the war on both sides, by the United States and by North Vietnam, and I think eventually by China, too, with Russia not for long standing on the sidelines as a noncombatant. Mr. President, I am very much of the opinion that there is no hope of our reaching a peace table. We may event- ually reach a surrender table, only to have the war continue in a different form. But there is no hope for a peace table under the policies in this bill. I repeat that we were all assured a year ago that air raids on North Vietnam would quickly demonstrate to her the potential destruction the U.S. Air Force and Navy could visit upon her and bring her to the sensible conclusion that in the face of such overwhelming power she should seek the best peace she could get at the negotiating table. The Vice President is now abroad in the country trying to sell that policy. He is going to be answered, although it is interesting that he does not want to come before a public meeting of the For- eign Relations Committee or apparently even an executive meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee to try to defend the action he took on the trip that took him into southeast Asia. But, Mr. President, come or not come, policies that he is now advocating, think- ing that people can be bombed to a peace table, must be answered and will be answered, because he has drawn the is- sue. We will meet him on the issue be- cause in my judgment he, too, must be repudiated. The Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] has brought out with crystal clearness the alternative that ought to be followed in recognizing that we must not take the position that we are going to dictate the terms, who will be in- vited to the negotiating table, and as to who will comprise that interim gov- ernment that is going to be necessary for that period of years until at long last the people of North and South Viet- nam will be in a position where they can really exercise the precious privilege of self-determination. All of the proposals for bombing the enemy to a negotiating table have thus far failed, in my judgment, and will con- tinue to fail, if we are talking about a peace table. That expectation proved false. The reaction of Hanoi was just the opposite. The Defense Department and Secretary Rusk contend now that she has increased her support to the Vietcong. What does Secretary McNamara or Rusk think will be the response of Hanoi to the increased deployment of troops and increased air activities provided for in this bill? Senators do not know. If the administration has any opinion, it has not revealed it. I cannot vote for these continued ex- pansions of the war that jeopardize, and do not conserve, more of our Armed Forces than are already there. This bill does not support the men in Vietnam. It calls for the sending of hun- dreds of thousands more, for military objectives that are well beyond the ca- pacity of our existing Vietnamese force to achieve. For these reasons and the reasons I have already expressed in the series of speeches I have made in opposition to this bill heretofore in the Senate, when the roll is called on the bill itself, I shall vote against it. HANDWRINGING IS NOT ENOUGH Mr. President, I have one closing com- ment with regard to what we are reading In the newspapers today, the wire re- ports, about, may I say respectfully, the handwringers who conclude that the bill is not a proper vehicle for any limiting language. They should be asked what is the proper vehicle. The only measure on this subject is the foreign aid supplemental and subsequent to that, the appropriation. Will they take the position that maybe those bills, after they have authorized this policy, are the proper vehicle for placing some restriction on this administration? Or are we always going to hear from them that the proper vehicle has not come along while the whole world slides deeper into war? Now is the time to place the restric- tion on this administration. Now is the time for Senators who voted for the res- olution in August 1964, to go on record as to the degree they want it modified because this is the first opportunity they have had to pass upon any policy in re- gard to America's program in southeast Asia. I will say to them that they will never have a better chance, never a more ap- propriate chance to take a stand on whether or not they reaffirm the position that they took in August 1964, or now believe that that resolution should be restricted. Therefore, it is with sadness in my heart that I say that I am keenly dis- appointed that Members of this body who have been making so many speeches in so many places expressing the view that they did not agree when they voted on the resolution of August 1964, to all the things that this administration has done in southeast Asia under it. Apparently they are willing today to vote without any restriction to a whole line of expanded policy in southeast Asia. In my opinion they do a great injury by following that course of action without voting restrictions now. As I announced last night, I would have offered my amendment yesterday had I not said that I would accommo- date a group of Senators on two occa- sions to see if they could reach an agree- ment on a possible modification of the resolution of August 1964. Therefore I withheld offering the amendment. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1192 CONGRESS I[ONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 offer the amendment now. I send it to the desk. It is the amendment which proposes to add a new section, at the end of the bill, as follows: 402. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the mainte- nance of international peace and security in southeast Asia", approved August 10, 3964 UM Alit. 384) , is hereby repealed. I say to the Senate that I have checked in regard to the applicability of this amendment as an appropriate amend- inent to the pending measure and I have been advised that it is in order. President, I ask that the amend- merit be read. The PRESIDING Oriel.CER (Mr. Nm-. SON in the chair). The amendment will be stated, The legislative clerk read as follows: nag. 402. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the mainte- winee of international peace and security in southeast Asia", approved August 10. 1964 ((8 Stat. 384 ) , is hereby repeated. Mr. *RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres- ident, I am somewhat in a dilemma with respect to the amendment proposed by Ihe Senator from Oregon. It had been my intention to offer as a substitute an amendment, that would reaffirm all of the original powers and tel of the original purposes of the joint resolution. of August 10, 1964. Tnere is no doubt in my mind that a substantial majority of the Senate would support men an amendment. It is evident that there would be so much explanation, and hemming and 'lawny?: on the part of those who have de- layed action on this authorization for so many days, that this debate would be prolonged for several more days if not weeks. have concluded, after careful con- sideration, that the defeat of the pro-, posal of the Senator from Oregon by the Members of the Senate would have the same effect as the adoption of the sub- stitute proposal that I envisioned. I say that, Mr. President, because when his amendment has been defeated, this will leave the original joint resolution of Au- 7, 1964, commonly called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, unimpaired, in full strength and vigor, and with Congress, except for two Members of the Senate, who voted against the 1964 resolution, solemnly and solidly behind the President in the steps that he has taken in south-. east Asia. Whatever we may call it, no matter how much those who hesitate to take a Formal position in this matter may obfuscate the issue, when we defeat the amendment of the Senator from. Oregon--and I can understand why he deplores the positions of some of those who have been associated with him in thai light?the effect will be a reaffirma- Lion of the President's power. F stated when I brought the bill to the neer that I did not regard this author- ization for weapons, medicine, and facil- ities?including port facilities--as being either an affirmation or a rejection of our policies in Vietnam and that the bill did not get policy in the slightest degree.. I have done my best to keep policy deter- ininations out of the bill, because I thought it was more orderly to have them considered in some other way. But the question of policy has been injected into the debate now, and I wish to make it perfectly clear that so far as tne senior Senator from Georgia is concerned?and I hope the President will take the same view?the vote on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon will be, in effect, a reaffirmation of the joint resolution passed in August 1964. I have not reached my cteiclusion hastily. I opposed the original pro- posal to send American military ad- visers or a training mission, together with a quantity of military equipment and materiel, to South Vietnam. as vig- orously as I could. I am not now in favor of intervention througl Kart the entire world. By instinct and inclina- tion, I must confess that I am tn isola- tionist. I do not believe that tee might and Power of the United States can bring about the millennium. I do net believe that any number of treaties, however solemnly drafted, however well-inten- tioned, will absolutely clear up all the strife among the peoples of the world, of different nationalities, different races, and different creeds. There is nothing in all history to suggest that they will. But I am in favor of striving for peace, because this is indeed a laudable aim to work for. Nevertheless, as a realist, I am not in favor of contributing Ameri- can money and American blood in un- limited quantities for a goal that I do not believe is attainable. When the joint resolution of August 1964 was brought forward, I sti,w how broad it was in its terms. I cannot plead ignorance. I understand theit some Senators say that they did not know exactly what they were voting nor when they voted for that joint resolution. I knew how broad it was. For tliat rea- son, I suggested that Congress reserve its power in this matter by a provision that the resolution could be terminated by a concurrent resolution, in which the executive branch of the Government does not participate. That provision, was written into the joint resolution, I think that the Sena- tor from Oregon would have been better advised if he had tried to secure adop- tion of a concurrent resolution instead of offering an amendment to this bill for supplies md equipment. I am a congressional man.. I have stood here for more than 30 yam and deplored?almost wept over?the slow erosion of congressional power that has placed this body in a position inferior to the other branches of the Government. The whole genius of our Government was to provide three coequal branches?legis- lative, executive, and judicial. But, Mr, President, I cannot ig- norance. I knew that the joint resolu- tion conferred a vast grant of power upon the President. It is writteen in terms that are not capable of misinterpretation, and about which it is difficult to become confused. I read one or two sentences: Cons,onaut with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obliga- tions under the Southeast Asia Collective De- fense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determine;, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective De- fense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom, The language could not have been drawn more clearly. :Personally, I would be ashamed to say that I did not realize what I was voting for when I voted for that joint resolution. It is only one page in length; it is clear; it is explicit. It contains a very great grant of power. I would be the last to deny it. I stand here today supporting the pending measure with all the power of my being, not because I believe that the United States should be the policeman of the world, but because we are con- fronted with a condition. We are not discussing possibilities and theories and contingencies. We are confronted with a condition where more than 300,000 of the flower of the young manhood of this Nation are 9,000 miles away from home, on foreign soil and waters. I have just enough of the old clan spirit of the Scotch-Irish?indeed, of the Riropean people?to come to the defense If those of my own blood when they are in dan- ger anywhere throughout the world. As I see this matter in its simplest terms, I am not going to quibble over how those men got there. I am not going to involve abstract constitutional arguments. :I intend to try to help them. I regard this situation as being similar to one in which a man has become in- volved in quicksand. He has slowly sunk until only his eyes can be seen. Along comes his brother with a rope under his arm. The unfortunate man says, "Brother, please help me out of the quicksand." The brother asks, "How did you get in the quicksand? What did you want to walk over there for? You ought to have had more sense. When are you going to get out of the quicksand?" Mr. President, I am not going to go through all of that. I am going to throw the rope. I intend to do all within my power without splitting hairs, without legalisms, and without theorizing to sup- port these men who are there in Vietnam, not of their own volition. They did not order themselves there. But they are there because they were ordered by authority established under our form of government. I am not afraid of the constitutional issue that is involved here. There is no question in my mind about the consti- tutionality of all that has been done. I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of some of it, but there is no question what- ever as to the constitutionality of it. There have been over 125 instances in which American men have been ordered to take action or maintain positions abroad through pure Presidential order without the support of the kind that was afforded to the President of the United States in the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Wilson sent the marines into Vera Cruz to satisfy American honor. As I recall it, Buchanan sent troops into for- eign lands. He sent them to attack and charge and carry the forts at Canton in China because of an insult to the U.S. flag. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, .1966 Approved Feb?rdpefses*WW/hVcqiht3DP?ERMI6R000400050008-5 4193 There was a day when the American People cheered when Theodore Roosevelt said: "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead." That was in the days when we were not so completely international. That was in the days when people were proud to be American citizens. That was in the days when an American citizen felt that he had a right to look to his country to pro- tect him. That was before we got all of this infection that is today making this county quiver and hesitate and raise a fictitious issue. There should be no question as to the constitutionality of this situation. There is nothing mandatory in the Constitution about declaring war. In an effort to separate governmental powers and establish a system of checks and balances, the Constitution of the United States provides that the power to declare war is in the Congress. How- ever, that same Constitution, in enumer- ating the powers of the President of the United States, provides that he is Com- mander in Chief of all the Armed Forces of the United States. Every person knows that the Commander in Chief has a right to order the forces wherever he may will. Congress then, to shift back to the system of checks and balances, has ways of exercising its responsibility. One way is the power of the purse. It can deny the President the funds. But I hope that we never have another in- stance in which an attempt is made to deny funds in the middle of an under- taking that has been approved by Con- gress. That can only mean hardship to the young men serving in our Armed Forces. It would not really punish those whose actually ordered them there. The Constitution grants the Congress a great many powers that it does not exercise. One is that Congress has the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations. A substantial argument could be made that we are undertaking to punish of- fenses against the law of nations in the fight in Vietnam. We have waged war without a declara- tion of war time and again. Not only has the Commander in Chief waged war without any formal declaration of war, but Congress has also done so. I have a very errant and varied ap- petite in reading. I suppose that I have accumulated more useless information from books than has any other living person. I spend hours each day in read- ing. However, one sometimes comes up with something that is helpful. When this question of constitutionality was raised a few months ago, I remem- bered that I read an old book that was entitled "Our Naval War With France." I sent to the Congressional Library for the book. If ever there were a case in which Con- gress waged a war for 3 years, it was in the naval war with France. In propor- tion to our strength in that period we put more of our resources and men into that war than we have put into this war in South Vietnam. I am not going to read at length from this book. It is fascinating to me, but No. 36-7 It would be very boring to most people to read about the battle between the privateer Bette and the man-of-war Ex- calibur, and how one boarded the other. I get a vicarious pleasure from that type of reading. As recounted in this book, when our representative to France had been in- sulted, the President sent a message to Congress and said: I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the rep- resentative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation. Our people had much more confidence in themselves when we had about 31/2 million people scattered along the Atlan- tic seaboard from Canada to Florida than we have today when we are unquestion- ably the greatest power on earth. I continue to read: Congress had already begun to act, and during the spring and summer of 1798, adopted a number of warlike measures. The first of these was an act, passed April 27, to provide additional armament for the pro- tection of American trade; and on the 30th, another, organizing the Navy Department. We had no Department of the Navy until 1798. It had been in the Depart- ment of the Army. I continue to read: Acts soon followed directing the construc- tion and purchase of more vessels, authoriz- ing the capture of French vessels, suspending intercourse with France, establishing the Marine Corps, and making other necessary provisions for hostilities. Inasmuch as under the Constitution of the United States treaties are the supreme law of the land, these meas- ures of defense, being in conflict wth exist- ing treaties with France? That refers to the treaties? were deemed unlawful. Therefore, to avoid this difficulty, as well as to get rid of trouble- some obligations, the treaties were abrogated by the act of July 7, on the ground that they had already been violated by France. Here Congress was abrogating treaties of immunity and friendship with France. In that case, we walked right up to a declaration of war. It will be recalled that our Government summoned George Washington from his well-earned retirement to Mount Vernon, and said: We are about to fight these French. We want you to come and take command of the armies. What George Washington said should cause some people to be ashamed of themselves. He said: I must not conceal from you my earnest wish that the choice had fallen upon a man less declined in years and better qualified to encounter the usual vicissitudes of war. Feeling how incumbent it is upon every per- son, of every description, to contribute at all times to his country's welfare, and especially In a moment like the present, when every- thing we hold dear and sacred is threatened, I have finally determined to accept the com- mission of Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States. Mr. President, the book continues about how they established the Marine Corps. I could read the reports of 100 naval engagements. We sent American frigates to the Bay of Biscay; we sent them into the Mediterranean; we sent parties into the harbors at Martinique and Guadalupe and Cap-Haitien in Haiti, where the French were then stationed, and cut out their ships and attacked their forts; and we had a good many people killed and we killed many French- men over a period of 3 years. But no- body declared war and nobody urged that we declare war. I remind you, Mr. President, that there were men in ?that Congress who had served in the Constitutional Convention. They had some idea of what was intended by that document, the Constitution of the United States. Oh, I realize it is considered as out- moded, in some quarters. Some persons think tile Constitution has no place in today's Acheme of things. But as long as I am in the Senate, I shall refer to the Constitution as a guide for my actions. I have taken an oath to do so, and I make no pretense to great piety, but I shall not welsh. Here is another paragraph: To supplement the activity of the Navy in the defense of the country, private enter- prise was stimulated by issuing letters of marque. The act of June 25, 1798? That was an act of Congress, my fel- low Senators, not an act of the President of the United States? The act of June 25, 1798, ordered that mer- chant vessels might "repel by force any as- sault" committed upon them by French cruisers or privateers, capture the aggres- sors and recapture American vessels which had been taken by the French. It goes on to say: The act of July 9 authorized the President to grant the owners of private armed ships * * * special commissions * * * and such private armed vessels, when duly commis- sioned, shall have the same license and au- thority for subduing, seizing, and capturing any French armed vessels * * as the pub- lic armed vessels might by law have. That law was passed by the Congress of the United States. This was no quick, overnight affair. It lasted for over 3 years. I do not wish to bore Sen- ators, but there are many references to many acts of Congress while the United States was waging war for 3 years without any formal declaration. I do not favor any declaration of war in this case. Whom would we declare war against? If we can only declare it against the Vietcong, it would have been just as sensible in other eras to have said, "We declare war against Francisco Villa, or we declare war against Sandino"?I believe that was the bandit down in Nicaragua we fought for some time. It just does not make sense to declare war against the Vietcong. Should we declare war against the North Vietnamese? We do not recognize North Vietnam. They are not in the United Nations. And we do not know what effect such a declaration of war would have. A declaration of war against North Vietnam might bring into play mutual defense treaties between and among North Vietnam, Communist China, and Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4194 Approved For RVtlyAtitClgpjf1.1.LCARBIN_BOI:44$1R,In0400050008-5 March, J966 the. Soviet, Union. So I am not in favor of declaring war. I see nothing to be gained by it, and I perceive that we might Lose a great deal. It would be a vary, very foolish step to take. President, the issue of constitu- tionalism comes with a hollow sound from anybody except the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Alaska. They voted against the Tonkin Ba,y resolution; and therefore they can certainly offer or urge any argument they wish against this matter free of any criticism. We gave the President of the United States power in that resolution. If we want to take it back, the best way i.s through a concurrent resolution. But I knew what I was doing. I did It with some qualms, but I am not here today to plead ignorance and say I did not know what I was doing, or that I did not know the power would go so far, when the -resolution said he could use any steps?any steraa?that might be necessary to protect our vital interests in the main tenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. So we may criticize the President, but With the exception of 2 Members of this Congress-535 Members?we are absolutely changing face when we do it, because we voted him even greater powers than he has employed. do not, discount the possibility that Red China and even the Soviet Union might be brought into this war. I had that in mind when I was originally urging that we not become involved in. any way. I appreciate the fact that the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. 1Mr. MORTON I , who was then Assistant Secretary of State--I had forgotten all about the incident until last summer, when I returned from my illness, he mentioned it here on the floor?was sent down to Georgia to tell me a mission had been sent to South Vietnam, and that we were going to send. material. I told him then, "I think you. have made a mistake, but the Commander in Chief can commit our flag, and I will support he flag, even though I think it is going to be a long struggle and costly in blood and treasure." -OTI that way today. I think the sooner we come to some decision there, the better off everybody will be. I do not favor all this timidity, whether it is in the executive branch of the Gov- ernment or in the Congress. If we are going to keep men there, I am not in favor of having them picked off by handfuls here and there. in order to keep down the casualty lists, when we know over a period of years it, is going to amount to massive numbers_ If it is our policy to keep them there?and it is our avowed policy?I say, "Visit such punishment on the North Vietnamese as will bring about a conference, and let, us come to some determination of this issue. Let them. have an election in South Vietnam_ If they want a Com- munist government and can vote for it without intimidation, I think they have a right to have it, under our doctrine of self -determin ation." However, self-determination is some- what like the Constitution; it becomes less deserved in our system as we go along, because it seems that we support authoritarian regimes and republics alike, if we happen to be allied with them by treaty. Mr. President, I must say that I was more than mildly surprised and per- plexed by the timing of this assault, par- ticularly the vehicle which was selected for it. This is an authorization bill, and I have tried to point out that it did not specifically involve policy, although I concede that money is going to be spent hi Vietnam. If Senators wish to punish the Presi- dent by starving 300,000 American boys and leaving them in Vietnam, they should not only vote for the resolution of the Senator from Oregon but should also vote against the authorization. Senators have this power. But, I have an idea, if they do, that they will hear something from the American people. Every State in the Union has men in Vietnam. The people hack in the "boon- docks" and in our towns, and those liv- ing in the fords of the creeks., have a high value of life. It is a matter of grief when one of those coffins, with the Amer- ican flag draped over it, comes back home to a small town. It is not a matter of higgling and haggling about policy or Presidential power. It is a matter which strikes right into the homes of a whole community. We have been placed on notice that this authorization would be sought. Last August there was brought before the Senate and clearly explained a $1.7 billion supplemental appropria Lion for the same purposes involved here. It passed by an 89-to-0 vote. At that time, it was declared on the floor of the Senate that the $1.7 billion would be just the downpayment. that additional authorizations; and appropriations would be required early this year. Now we run into difficulties?right in the middle of the war?with a maze of technicalities, legalisms, surmises, false premises, more than I have ever seen hurled at one bill, much less a relatively modest authoriza- tion of this kind. Mr. President, it has been stated on the floor of the Senate:, in flights of hy- perbole, that this measure is an open- ended invitation to war. I suppose this could be said about every annual appro- priation bill enacted for the Defense Department from year to year, if it could be said, with accuracy, of the pending bill. If this is an open-ended invitation to war, then every appropriation bill for the maintenance of our Armed Forces is also an open-ended invitation to war. I, for one, am not willing to go about curbing the President's power by punish- ing American boys in Vietnam. Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss this matter at further length, although I am full with it, because I have been torn by conflicting emotions, as I am sure most Senators have, concerning this is- sue. But I am not badly torn when it comes to the issue of supporting Ameri- can soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen, because I have some familiarity with the lives they must live and their obliga- tions. I know that they do not control their own comings and goings, that it is impossible to do so in any military estab- lishment. I cannot conceive of a higher duty on the part of Congress than to support those who have been brought into the Armed Forces, who have been taken out of their businesses, taken away from civilian pursuits, paid a minimum salary, and then there is haggling over whether we are going to support them or not. To me, it is utterly incomprehensible. I cannot understand it. We have taken a calculated risk in Vietnam. We took it when the first man landed. We had it when a contingent, landed there yesterday. We took a cal- culated risk when we operated our air- power in the south. We took a calcu- lated risk when we operated our airpower in the north. I hope that we will take a calculated risk in undertaking to put a "stopper in the bottle" at the port at Haiphong and cut off their supplies to those trying to conquer South Vietnam. I do not believe that we are ever going to bring this war to a termination until that is done. Mr. President, sometimes I believe that the American people do not realize the tremendous might and strength of our military organization. Howevir, our enemies know it. There was no doubt about it in the mind of Mr. Khrushchev when he received that letter on Cuba, He knew more about the strength of this country, and respected it more, thou those who may tremble now at the thought of a confrontation. It did not take Mr. Khrushchev long to send an answer, although I am not satisfied with the termination of that episode. I believe that in our exultation and celebration of that victory, we gave the victory away. We are now in the position of babysitting for Castro. when we should have destroyed him when we found the long-range missiles there. That is my own view. As an individual I can express it, although I realize that it is not a majority view, either of Con- gress or the American people; but I just do not know when we will ever have an- other reason for doing it. Congress had passed a resolution shortly before, declaring that the intro- duction of any offensive weapon into Cuba was an act of aggression against the United States. But now we arc baby- sitting for Castro, who is 90 miles away from our shores, while fighting other communism 9,000 miles away. The hu- man and logistical costs are staggering to contemplate. There is no doubt, in my mind that if we had wiped out Castro. there would not be any similar probing;; along the perimeter of the Iron Curtain for the next 8 to 10 years. There will be. even if we bring the Vietnamese situa- tion under control?as we will, eventu- ally. There will be further probings on the part of communism in their quest for world domination, because they axe not going to stop. But firm action against Cuba would have stopped them for a Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4195 long time. It would certainly have slowed down the Communists. Mr. President, if there ever were a time when Congress should have at least an appearance of unity?whether we have any unity or not?it is today. Upon the unity of the American people in this Vietnam war depend the hopes of bring- ing it to an early conclusion. I do not doubt that Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow know what is going on. With every little sign of dissent, every criticism, every at- tack on American foreign policy, they will say, "Well, we are catching hell out there in Vietnam, but look what is going on back in the United States. We will hold on for a while longer. They will tire, and they will withdraw. Thus we will gain a victory." So I say, Mr. President, it is time for an appearance of unity. And I hope that this issue will not be brought up recur- ringly on every bill that comes along. It should have been fought out when the Tonkin Gulf resolution was before the Senate. If an issue were to be made of the situation, it should have been made then. Mr. President, generally I do not ap- prove of appeals to emotion, because I do not believe they serve any useful purpose; but I should like to tell the Senate of a letter I received from a Georgia widow, with a son who is a corporal in the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines. He had served his hitch in Vietnam and was re- turned to the United States in December 1964, but was shipped back to Vietnam in August of 1965. She wrote me to ask if it were right for a person who had finished one tour of duty there to be sent back so quickly. She informed him she had writ- ten to me, and she sent me his answer. This is from a man who had already served one hitch in Vietnam and had been sent back. This is the reply to her letter she received from him: DEAR IVIorxxs: I can't approve of what you did; I could not come home any way but the right way, and that is when my time is up, or else I'm wounded or dead, and I believe it will be because my time is up. He had faith in himself. I do not know whether he is still alive and serving there. The letter continues: The other two ways I don't like. I'd love to be home, but there are times a man can't do what he would like to do, but has to do his part, and I believe this is my part. I hope you understand it isn't because I don't want to see you, but rather it's because I have a duty to do here. Come October I'll be home. There may be a finer or higher sense of duty than that, but it has not been reflected here in this body. ? Robert E. Lee is one of my heroes. I say that unashamedly. He was a great man, though he was the head of the rebel armies. He said that "Duty" is the most sublime word in the English language. The spirit of that American fighting in Vietnam is the most sublime spirit. Would to God it could permeate some of those in this Chamber, because we can- not win by haggling over an authoriza- tion bill at this time. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, we have listened to a very eloquent plea by the Senator from Georgia for action on the bill. I know we are going to do it very shortly. The Senator from Georgia, who made his plea, has pointed out the authority involved under the Constitu- tion, and our duty in the Senate. He expressed himself very fully on this sub- ject. He and I spoke on the floor over 2 weeks ago, when we brought the bill out of the Senate Armed Forces Com- mittee by a unanimous vote. We believe there should be prompt action because the boys in Vietnam should be supported, and they need this authorization and the appropriation to support them. I am opposed to the amendment of the senior Senator from Oregon for two rea- sons. First, I do not think it is in order in connection with the bill presently before us, and second, I oppose it on its merits. This is no time to pull the rug out from under the President. S. 2791, which authorizes $4.8 billion in supplemental fiscal 1966 defense ap- propriations, provides necessary funds so that our men in Vietnam will have the equipment, food, and clothing they need to carry out their assigned tasks in the best possible way. It was reported out of the Armed Services Committee by a unanimous vote, even though some committee members may not entirely agree with our Vietnam policy. Whether that policy is right or wrong was not considered central to considera- tion of this bill. It is a separate issue which, as I stated at the time the bill was reported, should be considered separately. Of course there should be free and open discussion of our role in Vietnam. Certainly no one denies the right of an individual to raise questions regarding the wisdom of our policies there; we know there are important differences within this body on the issue. But S. 2791 is not the proper place to debate the funda- mental question raised by the Senator from Oregon. We must be aware that the issue pre- sented by the Senator from Oregon is not a matter of withholding from the President some new authority he has re- quested. It is a question of withdrawing from him authority which the Senate, with but two dissenting votes, freely gave to him in August of 1964, and withdraw- ing it at a most awkward time. The implications of such an action are there- fore very serious, and the consequences could be far reaching and lasting. The legal basis for our participation in the Vietnam conflict has been ques- tioned here and elsewhere. I find it significant and gratifying that recently the house of delegates of the American Bar Association by a unanimous vote of 279 to 0 upheld the legality of our in- volvement and said it was consistent with the United Nations Charter. There are different opinions in this body regarding Vietnam, but I think we all applaud the recent statement of Presi- dent Johnson as he received the National Freedom Award in New York: We stand for self-determination?for free elections?and we will honor the result. His statement of our purpose is worth repeating: Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is riot domination. Our men in Vietnam are there to keep a promise made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised?as Secretary John Poster Dulles said for the United States?"that an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed, that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain." But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Vietnam. We keep the faith for freedom. None of us likes the situation in which we find ourselves in Vietnam. Everyone is troubled by it. We know that an in- creasing number of Americans is being exposed to danger and that some of our boys are being wounded or killed. We all want peace in that troubled area, but we must face the facts. We are in Viet- nam?we are there because of our belief that people everywhere should be free to determine their own way of life, free to make the basic decisions regarding their government. We know there is no easy way out. As George Kennan, in analyz- ing our policy, said recently in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: A precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present circumstances a disservice to our own interests and even to world peace greater than any that might have been involved in our failure to engage ourselves there in the first place. Given the situation and the responsi- bilities of the President as Commander in Chief and the chief agent of our for- eign policy to exercise leadership in this crisis, can we shoot down his authority, restrict his actions, and indeed in effect repudiate the earnest efforts he has made to bring peace to that troubled area? I think we cannot, and I think we should not. Whether or not one has misgivings about our policy in Vietnam, it seems to me inappropriate at this time to take the action recommended by the senior Sena- tor from Oregon. What would be the consequences of such an action? What would be its effect on the morale of those serving us there? What would be the effect on our allies and on the Govern- ment of South Vietnam? How would Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and other neighboring countries react? Such an action would bring satisfaction to our enemies, consternation to those countries who, like us, are dedicated to the preservation of freedom, and would strike a crippling blow at the morale of our fighting men presently in Vietnam. This is a time to show the world that individual differences over particular ac- tions do not prevent us from presenting a united front, from supporting our Com- mander in Chief. Senators and other Americans ought to continue to discuss the situation in Vietnam, to raise questions about poli- cies, and offer constructive suggestions. That is one thing, but to shoot from un- der the President at this time his au- thority which we almost unanimously gave him in 1964 is, to me, unthinkable. Of course, we expect the President to use sound judgment and to confer and consult with his advisers and the Con- gress as he goes about the difficult task Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4196 Approved For ReletaffaMadliiveg000moiroo5o008-5 March 1, 1966 of ending this conflict. He has kept us informed so far and has asked our views and I see no reason to think he will stop doing so. I am confident that when the vote is taken on the Morse amendment it will be defeated by an overwhelming margin. That will reveal our unity of purpose, that will give hope to our servicemen and to the people of South Vietnam, and will dismay our enemies who may have been deluded into thinking discussion meant fundamental disagreement. It will remind the world of our concern for our fellow man as he :fights to remain free and to live in peace and rebuild his economy and the social and political life of his country. At this difficult time we cannot repudiate our President or imply that we have no confidence in his future actions. Passage of the Morse amend- ment would be misunderstood around the world with irreparable damage to our prestige and that of our President. I shall vote against it, and hope that it will be overwhelmingly defeated. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for I minute? Mr. SALTONSTALL? I yield. Mr. STENNIS. I wish to say to the Senate and to the people of this Nation that I do not believe the solidarity and unity of this Chamber has ever been better represented in a time of peril than it has by the two spokesmen we have just heard, the Senator from Georgia I Mr. RUSSELL!, who is the chairman of the committee, and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL I, who is the ranking Republican member of the committee. I salute them and commend them. T would like to be associated with every point that they made. I would like to be especially associated with the point that the Senator from Georgia made when he said every dissent, every divi- sion, every expression of doubt, every ex- pression of uncertainty is encouragement to our adversaries. They are looking for that kind of encouragement. They know that, they cannot beat us on the field of battle, but they are looking here for en- couragement to carry on their activities. hope that we get an overwhelming vote. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I will only state what I said some time ago when I said I hoped that this amendment would be offered, because T. wanted to speak against- it and vote against it. Senators have complained in some in- stances that they have 'not had an op- portunity to express themselves. If anyone does not have confidence in the President, if he wants to withdraw from the President as our Commander in Chief under the Constitution, the au- thority given the President to take what.. eversteps he finds necessary to resist aggression, then that Senator should vote for the amendment. If th.e motion te table is made, he should vote against the motion to table. As far as T am concerned, I am voting on the merits of this matter. I under- sWorl the merits of the matter when I voted in August of 1964. I understand very well that we cannot fight a war by having 535 commanders in chief. There must be one Commander in Chief. We must unite behind that Commander in Chief and have faith and confidence in :him, just as we have in the men that we send there to defend our national honor and the freedom of the world. I will vote against the amendment and I hope that anyone who lacks faith and confidence in the President will vote against the motion -to table in the event it be made. Mr. President, I have an editorial here that I wish to put in the RECORD from WTOP in Washington. It is a very fine statement making clear the fact that those who wish to urge a policy of weak- ness and urge that we should not be firm and strong in our commitments, and those who wish to further erode the strength of our position, should seek to address themselves to the President in- dividually and personally rather than through the press and the CONGRESSIONAL R,ECORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the WTOP editorial be printed in the REcoaa as a part of my remarks. There being no objection, the edi- torial wa,s ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [Editorial broadcast on Feb. 23 ;.nd 24, 1966, over WTOP radio and telev ision] PRENEGOTIATIC)N STRATD (Or Perhaps the wisest thing that has been said in the most recent flap about Vietnam came from U.N. Ambassador Arthur Gold- burg following a White House conference. The Ambassador was asked about Senator KENNEDY'S statement, to the effect that the Communists might be allowed to participate in a coalition South Vietnamese government. His response was that enough h,ei been said on the subject already. There has been a gre;t; to-ing and fro-ing here in Washington the last couple of days about Senator KENNEDY'S argument that it might be necessary to admit dissident groups?meaning the Vietcong, mostly?into "a share of power arid resporsibility" In Saigon. There have been any number of attempts at clarification, with the result that Senator KENNEDY appears to be edging ct)ser to the White House view on how the Communists might become entitled to share power in South Vietnam. But in the mids;, of all the declarations on the subject, a fat emerges which needs attention. IL is that the United lAates cannot decide publicly before negotiations start just what our final bargaining po.:itions wilt be. The situation allows a considerable number of options, depending on a number of circum- stances when and if the C.iommun sts decide to talk to as. We have offered unconditiona negotia- tions. We have agreed to have the Vietcong represented, in fact if not in tame, We have said?before Senator HENS I Olt raised the issue?that we will accept tie conse- quences of self-determination alDeng the people of South Vietnam, whetho r we like those consequences or not. Sures y this is as much as we ought to concede in advance of talks a'oout the terms of a peace agree- men t. This was a WTOP editorial, 3::ck Jurey speaking for WTOP. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I feel moved to speak because I think there is a point of view which has not been expressed. Those of us, like myself, who 'viii vote against the Morse amendment and want to table it, and who will vote for the bill to give the President additional funds, are not again writing a blank check. I do not, and I cannot accept the vote against the Morse amendment as being a reaffirmation. Reaffirmation is the word used by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. He made a most moving speech, with which I agree in substance, as well as the speech of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL1. I cannot accept the fact that this will be a reaffirmation of the resolution of Au- gust 1964. The fact is that as the Presi- dent has handled this situation he leaves us no other alternative. He has left no alternative for those who disagree with his policies except to vote against an au- thorization on another occasion. As I agree with his policies ?to date, I shall vote for this authorization. But if to- morrow I disagree with his policies the President leaves us no alternative but to vote against an authorization, and I shall do so. Why is that so? It is a fact that the President has, in my Judgment, the con- stitutional authority?as the house of delegates of the association of the bar found, as the Senator from Massachu- setts [Mr. SALTON5TALL] said, as Com- mander in Chief and the official charged with foreign policy of the Nation?to in- tercede in Vietnam or any place with the Armed Forces of the United States where the interests of the United States are in such imminent danger. He can come to the Congress for the necessary authority which is, generally speaking a declara- tion of war. I thoroughly agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL 1 that a dec- laration of war would be most inadvis- able at this time and I have said so in debate on the floor of the Senate. The President was not satisfied with that. He not only ordered U.S. troops to Vietnam under aforementioned Presi- dential authority but he came to the Congress for a resolution and asked us to join in the policy. That resolution was not juridically necessary and it has no juridicial force. But in terms of pol- icy it is critically important. It com- mitted us to Presidential policy as of that time. That is what the Gulf of Tonkin reso- lution meant. Having associated our- selves with this policy then, we now have a right to be consulted once again. The Senator from Oregon told us the only logical thing he could do, consider- ing his point of view, was to give us the opportunity to repudiate the policy the President set, and lie is right,. If we voted for the amendment of the Senator from Oregon., and the other body did, as it is also required to act, we would no longer be the President's partners in a policy sense. It is a fact, whether we like it or riot, that by virtue of having acted on the resolution of August 1964, we are a party to present policy. But we are a party that should be consulted now as well. We must be given an opportunity at the Initiative of the President, to reaffirm our support for a new situation and also to set limits to his commitments of U.S. power. Our August 1964 resolution is Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4197 analogous, in my mind, to a power of at- torney that one gives to a lawyer or someone else for a particular purpose: buying a house, a withdrawal of money from a bank account, and so forth, which power is also on very general terms. I agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RussELLl that we are not engaged in legal tautologies. I understood per- fectly that? the President would get a grant of enormous authority. I said so. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] said so. The Senator from Georgia, I am sure, understood that very clearly. I know that he is an excellent lawyer; of course he did. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres- ident, will the Senator from New York yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena- tor knows that we were approving the use of the President's constitutional power. Mr. JAVITS. Exactly. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We put Congress behind the President. We put the imprimatur of congressional power on a power that he could have exercised anyway. The late Senator Borah an- swered an argument that the Congress could make the President bring home certain troops then stationed in Europe: We could not make the President do it. He is Commander In Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States; and if in the discharge of his duty he wants to assign them there, I do not know of any power that we can exert to compel him to bring them home. We may refuse to create an army, but when it is cre- ated he is the commander. ? Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is exactly correct. The logical sequel to that is that if the President has abused his power to commit our forces, Congress still has a remedy. That remedy is to deny him the money. Then he can no longer exercise the power, and he must withdraw our forces. That is exactly what the Senator from Oregon is telling us. The Gulf of Tonkin action has no role with reference to the action subse- quently taken. At that time we were reacting to an attack upon American per- sonnel and equipment. Our ships were In the Gulf of Tonkin. Since that time, and specifically from February to June of 1965, we have been engaged in com- bat operations. We are no longer ad- vising; we are in direct combat opera- tions in South Vietnam with organized American forces. I respectfully submit that this is an entirely different policy decision from the decision which au- thored the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Therefore, I am speaking today to ex- plain why I back the actions of the Pres- ident to date and to give notice why I may refuse to back him tomorrow. Incidentally, I think there is a rather broad feeling pretty much along this line throughout the country. That is why the President has been making all the statements he has made?and quite properly?about his willingness to nego- tiate without conditions and about the limited purpose and the limited means he proposes to use to attain that pur- pose. But it is extremely important that the President should at no time mask his purposes. Consistent with the national security and with the way this matter is being handled, the President has a duty to the country and to Congress to at no time mask his purposes. We ought to know at all times exactly what his pur- pose is, if we are called upon to support that purpose. I think the President would do well to associate himself with Congress. Personally, I believe he is making a great mistake in not again coming to Congress and asking for a resolution of support. By coming to Congress again with a resolution, he would thereby give us an opportunity to support his present policy in a formal and direct way, and not force us to ex- press approval or disapproval through other legislative means. Therefore, when I vote in favor of this authorization bill, I am not reaffirming the joint resolution of August 1964 nor rejecting it. New policy support should necessitate a new resolution. Without such a resolution, I am left with no al- ternative but to protest against future Presidential actions in Vietnam through the authorization and appropriations process, that is, through the back door. And on behalf of the people of my State, I shall protest should any policy go be- yond limited military means and objec- tives. The final question, then, is, why do I support the President as far as he has gone? I do support him, and I shall vote that way, and shall know what I am voting for when I vote. The President has expressed a willingness to negotiate unconditionally. I believe, as I have said in a previous speech, that if we ac- tually get a chance for peace talks, the President will, as Averell L. Harriman indicated, recognize the National Libera- tion Front of the Vietcong as a party to the negotiations. I am against the idea that they should be included in a coali- tion government before negotiations. A second element of the President's policy, as I understand it, is that he is applying limited means to a limited pur- pose. In other words, he is not asking Congress for general mobilization. He assures us that he is not prejudicially draining down the forces of the United States that are charged with responsi- bilities around the world; but that he is utilizing forces which are available to the United States for this purpose, and that the purpose is solely to bring about sufficient pacification of major popula- tion concentrations in South Vietnam to enable that country to proceed to free elections and self-determination. I think this is a very exciting day. It indicates the complete maturity of our country when not only the President, but also Senators like the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], can say that if In free elections, after a reasonable pac- ification period insuring the elections will really be free, the Vietnamese decide they want a Communist government, that is what they will have. We cer- tainly will not stand in the way of free elections. This is an extremely impor- tant and most mature declaration of pol- icy on the part of very important people in our country. There is one ambiguous point in the President's declaration to date. The dif- ficulty is that the President seems con- tent to carry around in his pocket a worn copy of the August 1964 joint resolution. The President may further wrongly as- sume that a vote for this authorization bill is an endorsement of any future actions. Perhaps that is the real essence of the argument of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Moasa], and of the previous argu- ments which I have heard him make? and he knows that I have the highest re- spect for his judgment in the matter. I have debated as an administration de- fender in this particular matter. I speak in the role of a liberal, although the gen- eral liberal community is considered to be unafavorable to what the Government is doing in Vietnam. I do not agree with that because it seems to me to be anoma- lous that the liberal community of the United States should not recognize a struggle for freedom, as this one is, in my judgment, within the conditions I have described. Nonetheless, that is so. So I have engaged in these debates. And I recognize the problem of escala- tion. We are always faced with the problem that if we put in another 100,000 men, the other side will put in another 100,000; then it will be increased 100,000 beyond that. Then we shall move into Cambodia, into North Vietnam, and into Laos; or *e may take some other overt action against Communist Chinese in- stallations, and the fat will then be in the fire. But I do not conceive of that at all within the authority which I would be voting the President by supporting the bill to authorize $4.7 billion in additional appropriations. I do not believe, from everything that he has shown to date, that the President will construe our ac- tion in that way. I believe we are mak- ing a pact with him based exactly on what he has said. I make the urgent plea in terms of penalty, of being a grievous, deep offense in this country, that if the President wishes to espouse another policy which goes beyond the present deployment of our forces, the President, because he has now opened the door by the joint resolution of August 1964, should again come back to Congress for a new declaration of policy. If there is any escalation beyond that point, then all of the arguments which have been made with reference to the escalation become relevant and pertinent. I believe I have stated the situation thoroughly. It is my judgment that if the President sticks to his peace offensive, If he sticks to the limited purpose which he has described to us, and the means which he has described to us, those mis- sions will accomplish that purpose. This particular appropriation, it seems to me, has as its base the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, found at page 55 of the hearings. I believe that to be so important that-I hope my colleagues will indulge me as I read it into the RECORD. Senator ELLENDER asked: Now, you have asked, for an increase in the number of personnel generally, in the amount Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4198 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 of 510,521 as appears on page 12 of your state- ment, that is your exhibit appearing at page l2 Now many of those will be directly con- nected with our operations in South Viet- nam? This was Secretary McNamara's an- swer: ileeretary MCNAMARA. PlTSt, Senator EL- LENDER, we haven't asked for 510,521 to be added to the original 1966 program, but, rather, that amount less the military jobs transferred to civilian jobs, plus another adjustment, with the result that the net Increase we are asking above the original total is 452,843. Senator ELLE/V-1)Pa. Well, they are Amer- icans who are going to be employed either in the Army, or the Navy, or the Air Force as well as personnel to take care of the ad- ministrative portion of our operations. Secretary MCNAMARA. The net total is 453?- 000, not 510,000. Senator ET.1.ENDER. At the bottom of your exhibit, you have a total of 510,521, you deduct 74,300 and add 16,620 to give you the figure-- Scorer:Iry NiciNAmeatA. That is correct, sir. It is 453,000_ Senator ELLENDER. Well, of that 453,000, how many of those will be used in South Vietnam? Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, these are ad- ditions to the total LT.S. military force and It is not possible to say that any of those in particular will be used In South. Vietnam, but, In the net, all of them are being added because of the South Vietnam conflict. Mr. President, we have a right to as- sume that the order of magnitude we are talking about in this supplementary ap- propriation is approximately 450,000 personnel. The exact number is not material. T am satisfied, as one Senator, that this kind of deployment in South Viet- nam is enough, and that we will .not have to go in for a general mobilization. We should not prejudicially drain the per- eonnel available for our responsibilities around the world; We can do the limited job in South Vietnam described by the President with the presently projected force level. With my eyes wide open, I am pre- pared to support that kind of effort. My reason is twofold: First, we must show that wars of national liberation, so- called euphemistically by the Com- munists, do not work. Even if they were to work, T do not believe in the domino theory. It will not be Malaya, Burma, or Thailand tomorrow, but it may very well be S or 10 Latin American countries, or 4 or 5 African countries, or 3 or 4 countries in the Middle East. The Communists will try this ap - preach wherever they can because it will he a formula that worki. We shall have ehowit our inability to deal with it. In terms of averting World War III, it is so critically important that we show our ability to deal with these guerrilla wars, that I believe that every American boy who falls in Vietnam is as much a hero as any boy who fought the Kaiser in World War I or Hitler in World War Before I conclude, I shall read a letter which made my hair stand up. I believe that it will have the same effect on everyone else. My second point is that in our great struggle with communism, the difference between the Soviet, Union and Com- munist China is that the Communist Chinese think that in order to prevail, they most exterminate a good part of mankind. The Soviet Union believes, and I think this is fairly clear from their policy, that they can outcompete the free world. We very much prefer the latter kind of policy and welcome the competition on these grounds. We are ardent rooters for the latter because we think we can do mighty well ourselves. However, the Soviet Union is now engaged in this struggle in Vietnam up to its neck. Why? Because it is still placing its leadership of the Communist world on a higher priority than it places the effort to ar- rive at a detente or coexistence with the United States and the rest of the world. I want to change that priority. The only way to avoid world war III and to change that priority is to show the Com- munist Chinese that the Soviet Union scheme of peaceful competition is better than the risks of war. I consider that what has been done in South Vietnam, regardless of whether I would have gone there in the first place, or whether it is the best place for the confrontation?and there will be a lot of argument about that?is now a fact. The situation is there. It makes little some to rehash past mistakes. I believe that we must ultimately find a way to gel; along with Communist China. The alternative is ever-increasing risks of war through miscalculation. The co- existence idea must prevail, rather than the extermination idea which prevails presently among the Communist bloc. It is for those reasons that I shall sup- port the request for the appropriation now, without any assurance that I would do so tomorrow. Mr. President, it is also for Haase rea- sons that 71 shall oppose the amendment of the senior Senator from Oregon. I think ii is most unfortunate that, be- cause of the disputes and the differences and the unhappiness in many quarters, especially ,n very articulate quatters, in the newspapers, the press, the radio, and television, there is some feeling that the boys who are fighting in Vietnam are not quite earning the kind of gratitude, un- derstanding, and appreciation frem the American people as did those who fought in World Wars I and H. This is a very unhappy and most unfortunate situa- tion. I hope very much that whatew sr may be our view upon this situation?and I certainly have frankly expressed nine? that we will give recognition to those who are encountering the terrible dangers in- volved in this struggle. We have ex- tended such recognition from our hearts for the patriotism of Sc many others around the world. Mr. President, I should like te close by reading a very brief note. I sent a letter of condolence to this family which lost a son, a lieutenant, in the action in Vietnam. The family wrote me as follows, the letter being signed by the members of the family: DEAR MR. AND MRS. JAVITLn Thank you for your letter of comfort in this tragic time. We have lost our only child, a woniierful, loving, devoted, dedicated. son. Be has left us with beautiful memories. Our hope is that all involved in the struggle for the freedom for which Joseph sacrificed his life will be channeled in the right direction be- cause that sacrifice must not have been in vain. The letter is signed, "Sincerely, Joe and Pat De Gennaro." Mr. President, if I can help as a Sena- tor, as a human being, I shall do every- thing that I can. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, it is my intention, at an appropriate time, to move to table the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE I. While the Senator's amendment is in order, of course, under the Senate rules, I feel that it is inap- propriate and inadvisable in coiniection with this bill at this time. S. 2791, the pending business, la a mili- tary "nut and bolts" measure. The ques- tions involved in it are clear and tangi- ble. Regardless of the Tonkin Bay reso- lution we will have to dispose of this measure sooner or later. It is a bill which should stand alone and, in my judgment, should be considered on its own merit. I do not believe that any Member of the Senate wishes to delay the bill, as such, unduly. Difficulty has arisen here pri- marily because S. 2791 has been given in the minds of some a significance which it does not possess. There arc many views, for example, on the precise mean- ing of the Tonkin Bay resolution which the distinguished Senator from Oregon seeks to rescind by his amendment. They cannot be resolved, in my judg- ment, through the vehicle of S. 2791 and so I shall move to table. If the Senator's amendment is tabled, it will have the effect of keeping in force the Tonkin Gulf resolution as passed by the Senate on a rollcall vote of 88 to 2 in 1964. The prevailing constitutional situation will be unchanged. The significance of the Tonkin Gulf resolution will remain unchanged. It will still be as it is now, for each Senator in his own conscience to decide. The President believes that this resolution gives him some additional assurance, some authority in addition to that embodied in his constitutional posi- tion as Commander in Chief. Obviously that is the case or he would not have asked for the resolution in the first place. But among Senators, I know, there has been a wide divergence of view as to what, if any, constitutional significance attaches to a resolution of this kind. Those divergencies will remain. Indeed, that has been the case with all these so- called hand-upholding resolutions begin- ning with the Eisenhower administra- tion. Insofar as the leadership is concerned, however, a vote to table is most of all a vote to get on with the main business of S. 2791. It is also a vote to keep the Tonkin Gulf resolution in effect with whatever constitutional force it may have, even as a vote against tabling, as the distinguished Senator from Oregon has indicated, will result in its rescinding provided that the other House also agrees. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4199 To that extent, the issue is clear even though this is not the appropriate way, in my opinion, to consider this matter. As long as it has come before the Senate, however, a choice will have to be made. We are in too deep now. The situation is one of the utmost delicacy and the risk of misinterpretation is very great. It is, in short, a situation which each Senator will have to face up to on the basis of his own convictions. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH in the chair). The Senator from Washington is recognized. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen- ator from Washington. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished lead- er, is it his interpretation that his mo- tion to table shall have the effect of reaf- firming the Tonkin Gulf resolution? Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator was on the floor, he will recall that I said, in the course of my brief remarks, it meant that the Tonkin Gulf resolution would still be in effect. Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, my only concern is that I think, after this long debate on the floor, it would be un- fortunate if we came out of our delibera- tions with muted decisions. While a bill of this sort is not necessarily the place to offer this kind of amendment, I think the country is entitled to know the posi- tion of the Senate on Vietnam. I am very pleased that the majority leader makes that interpretation in offering his motion to table. Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Washing- ton, and again call to his attention what I previously said: Insofar as the leadership is concerned, however, a vote to table is roost of all a vote to get on with the main business of S. 2791. It is also a vote to keep the Tonkin Gulf resolution in effect with whatever constitu- tional force it may have, even as a vote against tabling, as the distinguished Senator from Oregon has indicated, could well result in its rescinding, provided that the other House also agrees. I yield to the distinguished minority leader. Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, this entire matter had long discussion be- fore the majority leader came in and his question as to whether or not there would be a vote directly on the Morse amend- ment or on the motion to table came up. There was some apprehension that a vote on the motion to table might leave some misapprenhension or misimpression abroad. In all kindliness, I say to my distin- guished friend the Senator from Oregon that I wish to make clear that the posi- tion of the minority?and I think I speak for most of them?is that we com- pletely separate ourselves from the views expressed by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, both in committee and on the floor, and that if those views are something of a symbol in southeast Asia, we wish to do what we can to destroy that symbol as a reflection of the views of the American people. So when we vote for the motion to table?and the majority leader informed me this morning that he intended to make that motion?I wish to say for my part, to my fellow Senators and to all the wide world, that what we are trying to do is get on with the serious business, the undramatic business of this struggle in Vietnam and wind up as quickly as pos- sible, and to supply the American troops with whatever is necessary to do a com- plete and final job. Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I am happy that the majority leader has moved to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I will move. Mr. McGEE. Will move to table it. I, too, however, express concern over how the vote on that matter will be inter- preted. People sometimes have difficulty, I think, understanding a parliamentary move on the floor of the Senate. As a matter of fact, if I may say so, there is sometimes some disagreement among Senators as to what their votes mean. It is no wonder that beyond our shores, there is occasionally confusion as to the meaning of an action taken by the U.S. Senate. For that reason, I think we should be under no illusions about what will be said about a Senate vote this afternoon to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. If that motion is indeed agreed to, as I am sure it will be, I trust that it will be understood that this is in no sense a diminution of the Tonkin resolu- tion, that this is in no sense a back- handed slap at an existing policy posi- tion. I think we should make it unal- terably clear, especially to the aggres- sors, that this has no significance for them that could be equated with a re- traction or withdrawal or some other form of weakness. I think it is impor- tant that we make that clear because there are those who press against their restraints as they seek a sign of weak- ness, as they probe for soft spots of which they can make the maximum psycho- logical use. I personally believed that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was very clear at the time it was passed. I did not think I was confused about it, and do not think I am now, but I do respect those who are raising questions, and I think as we vote on the motion which will be made by the majority leader to table the rescind- ing proposal of the Senator from Oregon, that we still should make clear on the Memo) that we are taking two actions. Those who believe with him that we should rescind the August 1964 resolu- tion should stand up and be counted. I think that is their free right to expres- sion, and I think it is a part of our sys- tem. I think it is a part of the risk that we have to afford in our kind of society. But for the others, I desperately hope than an overwhelming vote to table will mean exactly what it says, that there is no intention on the part of the Members of the Senate to in any way detract, by that vote, from the President's position in southeast Asia. I think that must be made unequivocally clear, that no ag- gressors should take comfort in it, that no psychological warriors may seek to exploit it beyond its real meaning. If we take those precautions, I think we will be, in a sense, sustaining, in effect strengthening and reaffirming the role of the President himself as Com- mander in Chief. This is a technique used many, many times in our history by our Commander in Chief. I only hope that the parlia- mentary maneuver does not lend itself to a negative interpretation, or to a weakened response. Let the aggressors, I say, stand on notice that the Senate is, indeed, with the President on the ques- tion of aggression. I wish to thank the majority leader for yielding to me at this time. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I wish to make a few brief remarks about the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon which I shall oppose because it has no current relevance. I have taken no time on the bill, and do not intend to do so. However, first I should like to take this opportunity to commend the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and the Committee on Foreign Relations, for the great contributon he and the committee have made to the dialog concerning the issue which now con- fronts the country. Far too little credit has been given to the chairman of that committee, and to the committee itself, for the great con- tribution to the public education they have made. I have had occasion twice to be back in my own State. I have no notion, no judgment, and no guess as to whether it changed the viewpoints of the people in the country on balance; but I do know that It was the first time in the history of our involvement in South Vietnam that the people of this country have had an opportunity to hear the experts rep- resenting diverse viewpoints intelligently discuss the subject on television in their homes. I read a number of columnists who de- clared that no one learned anything as a result of the hearings. Well, Mr. Presi- dent, of course Mr. McNamara did not learn anything. He did not pick up any new facts, and neither did the chairman of the committee nor those in the Con- gress and of the press who have made it their business to study the issue. But the general public learned a great deal. Tragically, Congress has permitted al- most 2 years to pass by without adequate- ly discussing what is involved in south- east Asia. In my opinion the lack of debate and discussion is what has caused the confusion and misunderstanding in this country. The contribution to this debate of the hearings in the Foreign Relations Com- mittee has been of great value and sig- nificance, and I wish to commend the chairman and the committee. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield just briefly? Mr. NELSON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Arkansas. Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. First, I appreciate what the Senator said. I have already said publicly that I believe one of the Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4200 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 most serious mistakes I have made as chairman was in not accepting or urging the Senate to accept the amendment of- fered by the Senator from Wisconsin in August 1964. I do not believe it is proper, and do not wish to take the time to ex- plain the circumstances of that particu- lar moment, but, nevertheless, I believe it was a mistake and I commend the Sen- ator from Wisconsin for having more foresight than I had at that time, and think many other Senators, as to the possible significance of that resolution. He did offer a very sensible, limiting amendment to that resolution, and I re- 'ret that we did not have the kind of discussion of it in public at that time that we have had recently. But I do commend the Senator from Wisconsin for his foresightedness and regret that I did not have as much. Mr. NELSON. I believe that the Sen- ator advised me at that time that his interpretation of the resolution was the same as the purpose of my amendment, and that therefore the amendment was unnecessary. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought it was. Mr, NELSON, I also wish to commend those who have participated in this de- bate on both sides of the aisle. Although very frequently I do not agree with the Senator from Oregon, I should like to say that he has made a most valuable contribution to this dis- cussion?and he will continue to do so. One thing, however, that disturbs me very much is the argument I have heard advanced in the press, by columnists, by distinguished Members of Congress, and people in the executive branch, that we should not be debating this issue because what we say here, in our free country, will be misunderstood by some Communists in. some other country, Communists who do not know what free speech is all about and never will. Mr. President, this is the greatest par- liamentary body in the world. It is the oldest parliamentary body in the world. Its function and purpose is constructive debate. The strength of this Nation is measured by its capacity for intelligent debate, not by its ability to goosestep. hope we do not undermine that source of our power. I have heard it implied here and elsewhere lately that free speech and dissent should stop because it may be misunderstood in Communist countries. This is a dangerous parallel to the theory that was recently used by the Russian court in sentencing two writers to jail, not because of what they said in Russia but because they pub- lished books in this country which the Russians thought would be misunder- stood in America and damage Russia. On that theory the Russian court sen- tenced the writers to jail. Over here, we have people saying that we should stop debate because someone else who cannot understand the debate might misunderstand our resolve and damage America. Mr. President, freedom is what democ- racy is all about. If some foreign dicta- tor does not understand it, that is too bad. I have no intention of giving up my freedom of speech because some Commu- nist does not understand what free speech is all about--and never will. Regarding the Tonkin Bay resolution, let me comment briefly. It has been re- peatedly stated by those who unquali- fiedly support the Tonkin Bay resolu- tion that there were only two Senators who had any reservations about it. Mr. President, I had reservations about that resolution and I made them clear. I was in the Chamber on August 6, August 7, and August 8, and partici- pated in the dialog concerning the reso- lution, as did several other Senators, who also expressed grave reservations about the resolution. Their remarks were in- tended to interpret that resoletion and demonstrate congressional intent. I discussed the subject on three dif- ferent days with the chairme o of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I am a little weary of having my vete inter- preted as an unqualified endmaement of escalation. The record will show it was not such an endorsement. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was in the Chamber?the Senator from. Arkansas (Mr. Pm .sinstrrl , as th.e spokesman for the administra- tion As a U.S. Senator, I was entitled to accept his advice, counsel, and inter- pretation of that resolution as an ex- pression of the intent of the adminis- tration. Mr. President, I shall not i sad the whole dialog, but I will read a Fart of it from the REcoin of August 6 anti 7, 1964, as follows. Addressing myself to the chairman of the Foreign Relatio.o; Com- mittee: But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to te:il the executive bra ach and the public that we would endorse a iiomplete change in our mission. That would concern me. Mr,. Purinsiduir. I do not iaterpret ,ihe joint resolution in that way at all. It str ikes me, as I understand it, that the joint riesolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what ,ae have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years. Skipping some of it, 1 addrea;ed the chairman once more, as follows: in view of the differine interpratations which have been put upon the joint resolu- tion with respect to what the sense ..,if Con- gress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is hat we in Congress could give th.e impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and iiubstantiAlly ex- pand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the RECORD: "On page 2, line 3, alter the word, "Mat' insert '(a) '. "On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following: " '(b) The Congress also approves mid sup- ports the efforts of the President-- This was the amendment to the Ton- kin Bay resolution? to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States,, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is "limited and fitting". Our continuing policy is to limit our role? Listen to these words? to the provision of aid, training eseistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to at- tempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict'." This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitu- tional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment? Mr. FULDRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Sena- tors have stated. ? I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay flatters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are in- volved in this kind of legislative aiition. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy. I would think that ought to be a suffi- cient answer to those who have repeat- edly insisted that the Tonkin resolution was a blank check. It was not. I had reservations. So did others. I was as- sured that we were not changing our role in southeast Asia. We have changed it. Obviously we cannot turn back the clock. But I trust that, for the cake of the historical record this may correct those gross misinterpretations of the record which have been so frequently uttered on the floor and elsewhere in recent months. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed extracts of the statement to which I previously referred. There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the Recons, as follows: But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive bramh and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me. Mr. FULDRIGIIT. I do not interpret the joint resolution in that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years. (August 7, 1964) INTERPRETATION Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have reed the RECORD. There was some colloquy on the floor yesterday. I noticed that every Senator who spoke had his own personal Interpreta- tion of what the joint resolution means. One Senator yesterday stated for the REC- ORD that he understands the resolution to mean that there will be no more privileged sanctuaries, Another Senator interprets the resolution to mean that it would authorize the Chief Executive to eliminate any aggression, I ature and present. Some Senators interpret this language to mean aggression against South Vietnam; others interpret it to mean aggres- sion directly against our military forces, Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 ApprovedEor RaleaS0,200510V1-3-147-M-Pn March 1, 1966 (11NtlittZ310.1NAL- -rtmAnzia .,-,-4tAIVP446R000400050008-5 4201 Another Senator interpreted the joint res- olution to mean that it is the sense of Con- gress that no change is suggested by Con- gress in the present mission in South Vietnam?the mission that has been ours for 10 years, which is to supply advisers, tech- nical advice, and materiel, for the purpose of attempting to encourage the establishment of an independent, viable regime, so that we can withdraw our forces; and that it has not been our mission in the past 10 years to sub- stitute our military forces for the South Vietnamese forces, nor to join with them in a land war, nor to fight their battle for them, nor to substitute our Government for theirs. This 10-year-old limited mission can, be legitimately defended as a responsibility of ours to assist free and independent nations; and it can be legitimately questioned, too, be- cause of the geographic location of that mis- sion. In any event, I am most disturbed to see that there is no agreement in the Senate on what the joint resolution means. I would like to see it clarified. NELSON'S AMENDMENT Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing in- terpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially ex- pand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the RECORD: "On page 2, line 3, after the word 'That' insert (a) '. "On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following: "(b) The Congress also approves and sup- ports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provoca- tion in a manner that is 'limited and fitting'. Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to at- tempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict,'" This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitu- tional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment? Mr. FULDRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my under- standing was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be ap- propriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism. The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjection- able. However, I cannot accept the amend- ment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this re,so- No. 36-8 lution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters. I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay mat- ters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all dis- agree with the amendment as a general statement of policy. Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in that connection, I certainly agree with what the Senator from Wisconsin has said. He is right to have made it. I have stated that I understood, from the information that was given to us, a spe- cific incident was presented as the reason for that resolution. It was that a direct attack had been made on our ships on the high seas?this is what we were told?where they had a right to be. We were told it was an unprovoked attack. In other words, we had not done anything that properly could be consid- ered as provocation. These facts are difficult for a committee or any of us to check. I think we were told things happened at night and things were mov- ing rapidly, and so on. I had no reason to doubt the factual situation. On the other hand, it is ex- tremely difficult to prove what happened. In any event, the Senator from Wis- consin has certainly stated very clearly what the situation was. We all know the President has, without any resolution, the right to respond to an immediate attack. He has the right to take actions of a temporary nature, one might say, to protect our interests. Then at some' point, if hostilities continue, if the Con- stitution means anything, a declaration of war should be sought. I will leave it to Senators, the manager of the bill, the administration, whether or not we are now at war. This bill and other events would indicate we are. I have discussed this matter with some of those who have responsibility in this area. They are reluctant to do what I have suggested. I am not at all sure, if we continue along the course we are fol- lowing, it will not be necessary to impose powers and disciplines and controls upon our economy sooner or later. We cannot carry on this kind of conflict and call it a skirmish. So this is a matter I think the administration should be giving thought to. I have a few remarks to make gener- ally about the situation, in addition to the pending measure, but I want to join the Senator from Wisconsin in paying tribute to the Senator from Oregon for the analysis he presented to the Senate last Friday, particularly with regard to the legal basis for our involvement in Vietnam. I think he did the finest job of research, of putting together and pull- ing together the various aspects concern- ing Vietnam, particularly the shifting basis upon which the administration has presented its case. First they said that action was not based on SEATO, then that it was, and so on. I shall not take the time to elaborate; I only recommend a reading of the Senator's speech by anyone who is interested in following the origin and legal basis of the Vietnam situation. It is difficult for people who do not make it their business to follow these matters to understand the issue. I think this fact lies at the root of much of the confusion in the country as to why we are involved, how we got in that war. To them I recommend a reading of the analysis made by the Senator from Ore- gon. I wish to say a few words generally about the southeast Asia situation and a few words about the pending measure. In a book written in 1898 called "The Mysterious Stranger," Mark Twain, one of our greatest writers, for whom all Members here have admiration; I do not know of anyone who does not?who had a genius for understanding human nature and presenting it in printed form, wrote the following on war. I read a paragraph: There has never been a just one, never an honorable one?on the part of the instigator of the war. I can see a million years ahead and this rule will never change in so many as half a dozen instances. The loud 'little handful?as usual?will shout for the war. The pulpit will?warily and cautiously? object?at first; the great, big, dull bulk of the Nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war and will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is unjust and dishonorable and there is no necessity for it." Then the handful will shout louder. A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded, but it will not last long; those others will outshout them, and presently the antiwar audiences will thin out and lose popularity. Before long you will see this curious thing: the speakers stoned from the platform, and free speech strangled by hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with those stoned speakers?as earlier?but do not dare to say so. And now the whole Nation? pulpit and all?will take up the warcry and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth, and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing fantasies and will dili- gently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them, and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self- deception. (Mark Twain, "The Mysterious Stranger," 1898.) Past experience provides little basis for confidence that reason can prevail in an atmosphere of mounting war fever. In a contest between a hawk and dove the hawk has a great advantage, not because it is a better bird but because it is a bigger bird with lethal talons and a highly developed will to use them. In China this is the year of the horse; in America it appears to be the year of the hawk. Without illusions as to the prospect of success, we must try nonetheless to bring reason and restraint into the emotionally Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1202 CONGRESSIONAL RECOE D ? SENATE March 1, i; charged atmosphere in which the Viet- namese war is now being discussed. In- stead of trading epithets about the legit- imacy of debate and about who is and is not giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy, we would do well to focus calmly and deliberately on the issue itself, rec- ognizing that all of us make mistakes and that mistakes can only be corrected if they are acknowledged and discussed, and recognizing further that war is not its own justification, that it can and must be discussed unless we are prepared to sacrifice our traditional democratic, proc- esses to a false image of national unanimity. That is largely what these hearings the Senator from Wisconsin referred to were all about. The issue underlying our vote on the military supplemental authorization now before the Senate is not whether, but how, to bring about an early and honor- able end to the war in Vietnam. I em- phasize "underlying" because later I shall state clearly that this particular bill should not be interpreted as a policy statement. I know that it may be and the Senator from Oregon stated it will be, but I shall refer to the statements of the chairman of the committee who in- troduced it. Since I have properly been held re- sponsible for some things that I said in regard to the 1964 resolution, I think we are entitled to rely on the statement made by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee as to the effect of this bill. Thoreau'. vigorous differences of opin- ion as to whether an early and honorable peace is more likely to be gained by intensifying the war or by reducing its scale, but no responsible participants in the debate have advocated either expand- ing the conflict into a general war with China or an unconditional and disorderly withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. nivided though we are, there- fore, with respect to means, there re- mains a powerful consensus in support of the objective of an early and honor- able peace. The Harris survey contained in the Washington Post on February 28 reports a growing consensus for peace along with a cowing division as to how to achieve it and a mounting uneasiness as to the continuation of the war. The lanais survey reports that the American people "are becoming split between those who favor an all-out military effort to shorten the war and those who prefer negotiation to the risk of escalation." The survey reports that no more than 10 percent of the American people favor immediate withdrawal arid only about 16 percent favor an all-out war against North Vietnam, leaving the great ma- jority of our people in between, hopeful, that is, of an early and honorable end of the war but divided as to how it can be achieved. According to the Harris survey, this great majority who agree on the goal of peace are almost evenly divided as to how to attain it, with 33 per- cent favoring an increased military effort and 34 percent favoring an accelerated effort to bring about negotiations. Discounting extreme points of view, as I think we can and must, the practical choice before us is between a policy of accelerated war confined to Vietnam but nonetheless aiming at total victory with- in South Vietnam and a policy of de- escalation. aimed at neogtiation and an accommodation among the parties to the South Vietnamese civil war. My own view is that the second course Is the wiser by far. I am in agreement with Mr. :Kerman, General Gavin, and General Ridgway, all of whore have indi- cated that they favor a military policy of "making do with what we have" in South Vietnam until an honorable peace settlement can be negotiated. I might say that General Ridgway did net appear. He had been ill, but he wrote me a letter which I made public. shall put it in the REcoRn. It endorses in full the statements and 1 lie theories of General Gavin. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a suggestion Mr. I.FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator obtain the letter and put it in the REcoari? I think it is important to put it in the RECORD, Mn, FUILBRIGHT. I sha; I. I over- looked bringing it with me. ask unanimous consent that the let- ter from General Ridgway may be printer', in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFIClqn With- out objection, it is ac ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. FULBRIGHT. That letter was from General Ridgway, who was the Chief of Staff under General ,:lIlisenhower at the time of the 1954 tragedy shall try to explain why I believe that a policy of accommodation is preferable to a policy aimed at military victory, even a military victory confined within the limits of South Vietnam. I shall try also to suggest what seems to me to be the central requirement for an accom- modation in southeast Asia. Hi story seldom if ever tells us exactly what we must do in specific situations, but it does provide guidance as to the kinds of policies that are likely to suc- ceed and the kinds that are likely to fail. The experience of nations in the last 150 Years leaves one in no doubt that gen- erally policies of accommode lion make for m( ire durable peace :.ettlements whereas policies of total victory make for renewed conflict, usually ':,:enerating greater problems than they sol I com- mend to the attention of my colleagues the following examples: In 1815, the great powers of Europe, led by the great conservatives. Lord Cas- tlereagh of England and Prirwe Metter- nich of Austria, granted terns of peace to a defeated and helpless France which can only be described by 20th-century standards as astonishingly generous. They did so despite the fact that France had conquered most of Europe and kept it in turmoil for a quarter of a century. Under the terms of peace, the French lost no territory at all that had been theirs before the Great RevolLtion, were subjected to a limited occupation of only 3 years. and we:re compelled to make limited reparations and then were given assistance in paying them, with the re- sult that France's financial obligations were liquidated within 4 years of the end of hostilities. Three years after the end of the Na- poleonic Wars, France was brought into the concert of Europe as a full and equal great power. The conservative states- men who made this generous peace did not do so out of love for a revolutionary and aggressive France but out of respect for the power and dynamism of the French nation. Wanting above all things peace and stability, Castlereagh and Metternich gave France a peace that she could endure. Castlereagh said that he had come to Vienna not to col- lect trophies but "to bring the world back to peaceful habits." He was ad- mirably successful. Not only was France reconciled with the nations that defeated her but never again after 1815 did France engage in major aggression and never again did she pose a major threat to the peace of Europe. Another example of a highly success- ful peace based on accommodation came out of our own War of 1812. The Amer- icans won a great victory over the Brit- ish at New Orleans, but the victory did not win the war because the Treaty of Ghent which ended the war had already been signed when the battle was fought. England at the time was at the peak of her power. Napoleon had already been defeated, the British fleet was unchal- lenged on the seas, and undoubtedly, had they wished to do so, the British could have defeated the young American Na- tion militarily and might even have brought it back into the British Empire. They had the generosity?and the wis- dom?not to do so. Had the British tried to use their overwhelming power to re- conquer America, they would probably have encountered fierce national resist- ance by an aroused American people fighting for their own homes, their own towns, and their own farms. The Brit- ish themselves had supported the Spanish in their successful guerrilla war against Napoleon and, powerful as they were, the British knew how hopeless it would be to try to subjugate a patriotic people determined to defend their in- dependence. The Treaty of Ghent simply restored the status quo between America and England as it had existed before the war. There were no victor and no vanquished, and the issues that had set America against England remained unsolved. But what diplomacy did not resolve history did. Never again did England and America go to war; and in the 20th cen- tury, confronted with new circumstances and new dangers, they have become each other's closest allies. It all began with the unpromising Treaty of Ghent. By contrast with the conflicts of the 19th century, 20th century warfare has been marked by total victories and total defeats. The total victories of 1918 and 1945 both generated more problems than they solved, sowing the seeds of new, unforeseen, and greater conflicts. These conflicts were generated by the totality of things?by the totality of violence in two Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 ApprovedemittmcmoWOM-RDANW:10A46R000400050008-5 4203 March 1, 1966 world wars and the totality of the vic- tories that ended them. The harshness of the treaty of Ver- sailles was more in its implementation than in its provisions. For many and complex reasons, the vindictive provi- sions of the treaty, those pertaining to reparations and the occupation of Ger- many, rather than the promising parts of the treaty, those pertaining to dis- armament and the League of Nations, were most vigorously implemented in the 1920's. The failure of the belligerents of World War I to reconcile in the 1920's was the most important single factor behind the rise of Hitler in the thirties. In short, the vindictiveness of World War I became the major cause of World War The cold war of the last 20 years was spawned by the total victory of 1945. The total destruction of German and Japanese power created a vacuum which was soon enough filled, quickly and eag- erly by Russia and belatedly and reluc- tantly by America. Had the generals who tried to kill Hitler in 1944 been suc- cessful at that time or earlier, a nego- tiated peace might conceivably have saved Germany from partition. It was the total defeat of Germany that re- sulted in her division, and that division, the product of a total victory, became the paramount issue in a new, great, and still unresolved conflict, a conflict which could rise up, indeed, and cause us trou- ble now. As we consider now whether we wish to bid for victory or accommodation in southeast Asia, we would do well to con- sider the wisdom of a tragically prophetic letter written by Lord Lansdowne to the Daily Telegraph of London on November 29, 1917. He wrote: We are going to win the war, * * * but its prolongation will spell the ruin of the civil- ized world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the bless- ings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them??Lord Newton, "Lord Lansdowne: A Biography" (London: Mac- millan, 1929), page 467. The debate between those who would accelerate the war in Vietnam and those who would reduce its scale is as fateful and significant as any we had in the last two decades. There is a deceptive appeal about proposals for expanded military action; they are simple and clean cut and they seem to promise quick and easy solutions to difficult and pain- ful problems. Proposals for accommo- dation, on the other hand, as the Sen- ator from New York has discovered, are complex, ambiguous and easily misun- derstood. History, however, suggests that the military solution that seems so promising today is likely to result in dis- aster tomorrow, whereas the course of accommodation, which always seems so difficult, is the only course with demon- strated promise of being able to bring about a lasting and honorable peace. The essential principle of an accom- modation in southeast Asia is that it must apply not just to Vietnam but to all of southeast Asia. Vietnam, after all, is only one of many small and weak nations on the periphery of a powerful China and, as has been pointed out in- numerable times, what happens in one such country may well happen in an- other. This premise underlies the domino theory, which holds that if one country falls to the Communists so must an- other and then another. The inference we have drawn from this is that we must fight in one country in order to avoid having to fight in another, although we could with equal logic have inferred that it is useless to fight in one country when the same conditions of conflict are present in another, that the failure of subversion in one country might simply result in the transfer of subversion to another. Some of us can really see no reason why there should be considera- tion of only one aspect of the so-called domino theory. History and logic and commonsense suggest that a viable settlement in Viet- nam must be part of a general settle- ment in southeast Asia. Unless we are prepared to fight a general war W elimi- nate the effects of Chinese power in all of southeast Asia, we have no alterna- tive but to seek a general accommoda- tion. This is what really causes un- easiness among most of us. The central issue is the contest between Chinese and American power; and the prospect for a lasting peace depends far more upon the resolution of that issue than it does on the matter of who is to participate in a South Vietnamese Government and by what means it shall be formed. If the issue between Chinese and American power in southeast Asia can be resolved, the future of Vietnam should not be too difficult to arrange, although it would involve some difficulty, of course; but if the issue of Chinese and American power is left unresolved, even a total victory in South Vietnam is unlikely to solve very much. As long as China and America are competitors for predomi- nance?particularly military predomi- nance?in southeast Asia, there can be no lasting peace or stability in that part of the world. Just as history suggests the advisabil- ity of accommodation, it also offers guid- ance as to the kind of accommodiation which might make for lasting peace in southeast Asia. In the past when great powers have competed for predominance over smaller and weaker nations, the one workable alternative to the victory of one or the other has been neutralization. In such arrangements, it is the fact of neu- tralization rather than the political or Ideological complexion of the small coun- tries concerned that has made for stabil- ity and peace. Neutralization is not a foolproof method of resolving great power conflicts, but it is a demonstrably more successful one than total victory. Switzerland is an example. The Swiss Federation was established by the Con- gress of Vienna in 1815 as a perpetually neutral state. To this day, despite the fact that she is surrounded by great powers, Switzerland remains both neu- tral and at peace. Belgium was established as a perpetu- ally neutral state under the guarantee of the great powers by a treaty signed in 1839. The treaty was violated in 1914, but the more astonishing fact is that for 75 years Belgium remained both neutral and at peace despite the ambitions of the great powers and despite her strategic location .between France and Germany, the latter baying been one of the most powerful nations in that area. Belgium might well have been the victim of great power ambitions, but neutralization made her instead the beneficiary of great power rivalry and also served as the means of regulating that rivalry. The solution lay quite simply in the fact that, hopeful as was each great power for its own hegemony, it was no less fearful of the hegemony of the other and neu- tralization was judged to be the accept- able price of its prevention. Austria is the outstanding contempo- rary example of accommodation by neu- tralization. Ten years after World War II Austria was divided and occupied by the great powers. The State Treaty of 1955 laid the basis for the independent and prosperous national existence that Austria now enjoys and at the same time resolved a major issue between Rus- sia and the West without upsetting the European balance of power. Applying historical experience, it seems to me that the crisis in southeast Asia can only be resolved on a lasting basis by the neutralization of the entire region as between China and the United States. China is profoundly fearful of American bases on her periphery; she demonstrat- ed that by intervening in the Korean war in 1950 only when American troops ap- proached her Manchurian frontier. Fearful as she is of American military power in southeast Asia, China might well be willing to purchase its removal by the exclusion of her own. It would seem to me highly advisable that, by one means or another, we indicate to the Chinese that we are prepared to remove American military power not only from Vietnam but from all of southeast Asia in return for a similar prohibition on her part. A general neutralization agreement for southeast Asia could be enforced in two ways. First, a degree of automatic en- forcement would arise from the prospect that the reintroduction of Chinese mili- tary power would be followed by the re- introduction of American power. Sec- ondly, a neutralization agreement could and should be placed under the guaran- tee of the major powers with interests in the southeast Asia, notably the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, India, and Japan. It is quite likely that the Chinese are not at present prepared to enter a neu- tralization agreement. As long as the United States is expending more and more lives and more and more money in an ever widening but inconclusive war In Indochina, the Chinese can logically hope that the American people will soon- er or later find the effort intolerable and force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from southeast Asia. As a matter of fact, that is what in effect happened in the Korean war. The American people got tired of the Korean war. The policy of growing in- volvement that the United States is now Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4204 Approved For ReleaseZEIRMlipa7[90044M0E400050008-5 March. 1, 966 following in the apparent belief that it will persuade the Chinese of our deter- mination to remain in southeast Asia may in fact have the opposite effect: it may persuade them, however wrongly, that the American people and their Gov- ernment will sooner or later withdraw itheir support from an insupportable commitment and abandon southeast Asia to the unchallenged hegemony of China. Mr. Charles Taylor, a correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, one of the few Westerners who have been al- lowed to report from Peiping?and who was here in Washington at a meeting a few days ago?recently wrote of the Chinese: ft is a matter of faith with them that the Milted States can never win a land war in Asia and that for all its awesome power, the United States lacks the resources to light several revolutionary wars at the same time and will eventually be engulfed with- out direct Chinese intervention. Mr. Taylor quotes the Peiping Review as saying: If South Vietnam alone is enough to keep the U.S. aggressor forces tied clown so hope- lessly, one can easily visualize what is in store for Yankee imperialism once it gets tzelf entangled in other parts of Asia. What then can we do to induce China to pay the price of a neutralization agreement? What we can do, it seems to me, is to confront her with the per- fectly credible prospect of being con- fronted with that which she most fears, Which is to say, with permanent Ameri- can military bases on her periphery. We can make the threat of permanent bases credible by reducing the cost of sustaining them to a level which the Chinese will know we can sustain indefi- nitely. This, I think, is the implication of views put forth by such eminent in- dividuals as George Kerman, Walter Lippmann, and Generals Gavin and Ridgway, each of whom has suggested that we confine our military efforts in Vietnam to "making do with what we have," or holding easily defensible forti- fied bases somewhat like Guantanamo or Gibraltar, which has been held for some 200 years, I believe, by the British. If we were to entrench ourselves in Powerful. bases on the coast of Vietnam or inland where appropriate, bases which could be held with minimal loss of life and at moderate cost, the Chinese would be confronted with a perfectly credible threat of permanent American bases on their periphery. Knowing that we could remain in these bases indefinitely, they would have a powerful inducement to seek an agreement for the neutralization of all of southeast Asia. At the very least, such a policy would convert a situ- ation in which our enemies believe them- seives to be wearing us down to one in which we, at supportable cost, would be wearing them down. The present policy of gradually ex- panding warfare is costing the United States a tragic toll in lives, large and growing sums of money, and a world- wide loss of prestige, including mounting disaffection on the part of those very allies to whom we are supposed to be proving our high determination. In ad- dition, according to late information, the present policy seems to be costing our Goveinment the confidence of growing numbers of the American people. I think that is reflected in the polls that I mentioned earlier. A policy of holding impregnable bases, on the other hand, aimed at a general solution based on the neutralization of southeast Asia, would reverse the Ameri- can position in all of these respects, cre- ating the long-term prospect of a stable peace and the short-term prospect of nothing more than drastically reduced military engagements. Mr. President, I want to say a few words more directly about the pending hill. Although I think the pending bill has a significance a?s to our overall policy, it authorizes money to carry on the war, arid is not a policy statement. I am dubious of this legislation because pass- age of the measure may be viewed as an endorsement of the present policy in Vietnam for the reasons that I have just offered--which policy I do not endorse. state again, as I did yesterday, that I accept wholly the statement made by the able and distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services when, in presenting this bill to the Senate, he said that nothin.g in this legislation can properly be construed as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments. I think that we are entitled to rely upon that statement from the Senator. We have had this debate about policy. I hereby state that I do not meaa by voting for this bill that I endorse the military or political policies that are being fol- lowed, as understand, at the present time in escalating the war in Vietnam. Mr. MORSE. Mr. Presideet, will the Senator yield for an observation? Mr. ELM:BRIGHT. I yield. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this is an appropeiate place to make the observa- tion that the principle that the Senator from Arkansas seems to be relying upon is that when there is ambiaoity as to what the policy of the bill is, then legis- lative history is made by turning to the statements of the Senator in charge of the bill. That, of course, completely falls when the administration itself states what its policy is in the heari 558 on the bill and in the bill itself. In my judgment, there is no question as to the policy of this administration in the bill. Therefore, there is not anything that the Senator from Georgia can say to change that policy. The policy is set out with complete clarity in the bill itself and in the statements of the, witnesses of the administration. Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I recognize, as I have said in discussing the matter with the Senator privately, as all of us have, that this is a very difficult situation in which we have an authoriza- tion for an appropriation. An appro- priation is normally not inclined to be considered as a statement of policy. It is normal that legislation, according to our rules, should not be included in an appropriation bill. say that we are faced with an ex- tremely difficult situation. I am very reluctant to vote for this measure for the reasons the Senator has stated. The alternative proposed by the Senator from Oregon would result in a situation which would force a decision on the floor as to whether the Senate should reaffirm policies which I do not wish to reaffirm, speaking for myself. We are merely de- laying the decision to a better day so we can make the decision under more favor- able circumstances and determine what our policy should be. I think it is unfortunate that in the beginning of this session these questions have arisen in connection with an au- thorization for the armed services. This gives at least some color to the pleas that we are interfering with the supplies of our soldiers. This opens up opportunities for all kinds of irrelevant and very damaging debate, irrelevant, I think, to the real essence of policy. What I am trying to say is that insofar as this bill is concerned, I accept that statement in the same way the Senator from Wisconsin said he relied upon the statement of the Senator from Arkansas. I thought I was telling him, as far as I knew at the time, the truth of the matter I was trying to interpret what the ad- ministration told US in presenting that 1964 resolution. So as a matter of legislative history, for whatever it is worth--and I must say in many cases it is not worth much? that is the limit of our power. I know we do not have the votes to change the existing resolution which has been under discussion; and, therefore, I think it is the better part of wisdom to follow the course upon which I suggest. It is not a happy choice. It is very seldom, any more, that one has a good choice between what he likes and what he does not like. The choice always seems between the lesser of two evils. At least about 99 percent of the time, that is the kind of choice we have here Mr. CLARK. Mr. President., will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I yield. Mr. CLARK. I should like the RECORD to show my complete agreement with the position taken by the Senator from Arkansas. I shall vote against the Morse amendment and I shall vote in favor of the bill. I do both with a heavy heart, most reluctantly, as the least unacceptable of all available choices. But I wish to make it very clear indeed that my votes, both against the Morse amendment and for the bill, do not indicate an endorsement of the policy which I fear the adminis- tration is following. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has expressed very well what I feel. We are holding it in abeyance for a better day, a better opportunity, where the matter of our involvement in Vietnam as a mat- ter of national policy can be discussed as freely as possible and without being entwined into our flag, which flies over the Capitol. Nobody wants a white flag on the Capi- tol, and I do not like this kind of dis- cussion in connection with it. It makes it very difficult, really, for us to discuss Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Mad oh 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4205 a matter of high policy under these circumstances. That is why I think it is the better part of wisdom, in effect, to defer to a better day a full-fledged discussion, and I hope a proper decision on this matter of policy. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. MORSE. I understand the argu- ment of the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Pennsylvania. Where they lose me is when they assume they are going to be in a better position to discuss policy when they get 450,000 more American boys over there. That is the policy they are approving in this bill. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator knows very well that I do not approve of 450,000 more men over there, or even 450,000. As I understood General Gavin's state- ment?and I have tried to associate my- self with it here today?he said we should make do with what we have there. He did not develop, as far as I have at- tempted to develop today, the next steps. As I see it, this is implicit in what he did say on how to go about treating a state of mind on the part of the Chinese so they will negotiate. This is the first step. All of the discussion of what the final solution will be is for the future. It is all right to speculate about it, but the No, 1 problem now is how we get them in a mood even to have a discussion. It is obvious now that this constant escalation from 20,000 to 200,000 has by no means brought them along closer to negotiation. If anything, I think the Chinese reason that we are foolish enough to expend our manpower and our treasure and our material at such a furious rate that we will grow tired of the effort. As large as we are, because of our many other commitments, we will reach the point where we cannot afford it, and that is the way we will sooner or later give up the ghost. ? That is in effect what both General Gavin and Mr. Kennan said: We should look at this more in perspective with re- gard to our overall commitments, and not concentrate so much upon just Vietnam. Mr. CLARK. The Senator said, I suspect inadvertently, "to bring the Chinese to negotiate." Did he not mean "to bring the Vietcong to negotiate"? Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean the Chinese. I think the Chinese are in- volved in this. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania will agree that the great concern that underlies much of what has been said is the possibility or even the probability that the course we are pur- suing will lead to a conflict with the Chinese. We also know that much moral sup- port and external physical support to the Vietcong in the way of equipment, and so forth, comes from the Chinese; and the proximity of this area to China?it is as close as Cuba is to the United States. Of course, North Vietnam adjoins China. The Senator will remember what con- sternation arose in this country when we discovered Russia's presence in Cuba. Why would it not be somewhat similar, when we are so close to China? Mr. CLARK. The Senator is probably correct. _It is my view, however, that the end of this war is going to come first through some arrangement with the Vietcong that Hanoi is prepared to sup- port; whereas China is, I believe, just sitting back watching American boys get killed while they do not have a single soldier involved. I would question whether the Senator would be able to force Hanoi to continue to fight if they did not wish to do so. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I should be happy to settle it with the Vietcong if we could, if they are so disposed. There is another matter about the Vietcong. The Vietcong have been deceived twice, as the Senator knows: By the French in 1946 and I guess you might say all of us in 1956, after failing to go through with the Geneva accords. I do not know whether they will be disposed to make a settlement or not. I think the Chinese could have great in- fluence upon them. One thing which leads me to approach it this way for pur- poses of discussion is that we constantly hear, as an excuse for this bill, about the buildup in Thailand. We have heard that discussed at nearly every meeting of the committee: "You know, the Chinese have already given orders and subversive organizations are being start- ed in northeast Thailand, and that is the next one on the course." That is part of the justification for this bill. It is assumed that even if we wipe out the Vietcong, next we are going to be over there in Thailand. It is that domino theory in this connection. So that is what has led pie to believe and to think along the lines that If we settle South Vietnam, we will not have settled very much, because we have Cambodia, Laos, Thailand. All right, they are all very weak. We should try to begin looking at the problem on a broader basis, in order to get some kind of a settlement that might be useful. I do not wish to have a succession of these conflicts, and I know nobody else does. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. Mr. GORE. Could it not easily be reasoned that the spread of insurgency to other areas in southeast Asia is the result of the buildup of an American expeditionary force? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Sena- tor is quite correct. Implicit in what I am saying, if I did not make it clear, is that the thing that would be of great ? value as an incentive to the Chinese and the North Vietnamese in leading to a settlement would be a withdrawal of our military. To put It another way, our presence itself is the principal reason for much of the activity, the insurgency, the en- ergy, and the willingness of the enemy to sacrifice. I often think of what con- sternation struck us as we realized that Russia had a real presence In Cuba. This country was ready to do anything. We would not have hesitated if the President had ordered an invasion. As the Senators know, we would have ap- proved it, and everyone would have ap- plauded. President Kennedy picked a better method, a much wiser method that had never occurred to most of us, as a mat- ter of fact, a very ingenious method, which in my view was a form of accom- modation. He allowed Russia to save her face and to get out without humilia- tion. And what has happened? The Cubans are Communists, but with the Russians gone, we do not hear any more speeches on the floor of the Senate about Cuba. Very few. Senators will remember at what white heat everyone's tempers were around here, and the great speeches that were made denouncing Castro, and so on. I have hardly heard Castro mentioned in recent years; only incidentally, when we receive these circulars from some orga- nized group of emigres, and we feel sad about them and all that. But the country is not concerned about Cuba at present. It has simmered down, and that is what George Kennan says this country ought to do, simmer down about Vietnam and look for some form of solution. I think the Senator is quite right: As long as we are there, to them it is like the presence of the French. As long as the French were there, there was bound to be agitation to get them out. I know this may not sit well with my fellow Americans, to be compared with the French. I know we are there under the best of motives. I do not question the motives; all I question is the wisdom. I do not believe that our motives are bad. Our motives are of the best. We wish to help them. But that has no effect upon the wisdom of what we are doing, or whether what we are doing is designed to achieve our purpose, or whether the purpose we set out with is achievable. I applaud the efforts concerning paci- fication and improving the life of these people. It is possible that they think we are like the French, that our administra- tion looks the same as that of any for- eigners. We look like the French. Of course we do not talk like them, but we have similar characteristics. It reminds me of the article I read, which was placed in the RECORD the other day, that we are sleeping in the same beds as the French but dreaming different dreams. We look too much like colonialists from a western country, perhaps. I do not believe that our motives are bad. I be- lieve that our motives are high. I be- lieve it is a question of wisdom as to policy, particularly when we believe it is within our power to accomplish what we say is our objective. Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. YARBOROUGH, and Mr. GRUENING addressed the Chair. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen- ator from South Dakota first, and then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Alaska. Mr. McGOVERN. When the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RussELL1 presented the bill on February 16, he had this to say about it: Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4206 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 This bill cannot possibly be construed as either an endorsement of or as an attack upon national policy. It involves more the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he got there, but he is there, he Is a human being, hi is our friend and a member of our family and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not throw it to him to enable him to assist him- self out of the water this would be a callous and heartless attitude for us to take. As 1: interpret that statement by the Senator in charge of the bill, it is open to question whether we were right in getting so deeply involved in this struggle but that, nevertheless, because of those policies which may be open to question, we have our troops in there, over their heads?as he states?in the water, and we have no other reasonable or accept- able course other than to throw a rope to them in the form of needed equip- ment. Is that the Senator's understand- ing-of what we are doing with regard to this bill? Mr, FULBRIGHT. Yes, Our forces are there, and I believe that as I have Already said to the Senator from Oregon?I do not know whether the Senator from South Dakota was in the Chamber?there is a distinction between the necessity to authorize an appro- priation for the Army and a statement of policy or endorsement of policy. I read another part of the same Senator's speech that this was not interpreted to be a statement of policy, but the Senator from Oregon has made the point that it is impossible to insulate these two. If we totally reject what is-going on, one of the ways to stop it is to cutoff the money; but this is a drastic thing to do and, furthermore, the Senator has to admit it is utterly unrealistic to think that we can, I notice that the Senator from Oregon has a quizzical look, on his face, so let me assure Idin that I mean he does not have the votes?and the Senator knows that he does not have them. Therefore? we are faced with the facts in this case. I like to argue theory in other forums, but in the Senate we have to recognize the facts and vote accordingly on an issue which could if pressed have the effect of reaffirming a policy I do not wish to reaffirm. This may not be a very gallant or straightforward way in ordinary business, but in politics, I be- lieve it is perfectly logical and necessary, certainly in this instance, Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield? Mr, GRUEN-MG. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield? Mr. FULI3RIGHT, I have only one more page to read, but I yield at this time to the Senator from Texas. Mr. YARBOROUGH. I desire to ask this question of the Senator from Arkan- sas. Does the Senator know the ap- proximate speed of our bombers which were used over North Vietnam before the Pause? How fast were they going?how many miles per hour? Mr. FULBRIGHT. These are the best we have?supersonic, I believe-1,200 to 1,400-- Mr. YARBOROUGH. One thousand five hundred mile,s per hour? Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that neighbor- hood; yes. These are the best we have. Mr. YARBOROUGH. How close were they bombing to the Chinese border? approximately 30 miles? Mr. FTILBRIGHT? Somewhere around that fig ure, I believe. Mr. YAP. BOROUGH. So that with a speed of 1,500 miles an hour and the border 30 miles away, we were dropping bombs only 1 minute from Red China; is that not correct? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Less than 1 minute-- Mr. 'YARBOROUGH. Less than a minute-- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Much less than a minute I believe, is it not? Mr. YARBOROUGH. In the opinion of the Senator from Arkansas, as chair- man of the Foreign Relations Committee, and having studied this resolution, when we bomb within less than 1 minute of the Chinese border, could not the neutral nations of the world believe, in the Sena- tor's thinking, that we are tweaking the tiger's tail and trying to lure him into a war? Mr. FULBRIGHT. It certainly could be interpreted as such. This is one of the explanations which I have been curi- ous about. I do not like ever to challenge anyone's veracity without having any- thing to base it on and, therefore, I can- not do it; but I have often wondered what were our ships doing up there, so close to that seacoast? It has been stated that we were approaching them on the radar at night, so I do not know, but I certainly believe that is subject to some kind of interpretation. Let me ask the Senator, did he say tweaking whose tail? Mr, YARBOROUGH. I asked whether the neutral. nations of the world might not think we were kind of stomping the tiger's Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator must mean the dragon's tail, in this case. Dragon's tail, is it not? The Senator must he thinking of a "tiger in your tank." [Laughter. 'I Mr. YARBOROUGH. I invite the at- tention of the Senator from Arkansas to page 35 of the February 21 issue of U.S. News & World Report, on page 35, under the subhead of "U.S. Goals in Vietnam." The article states, under a Honolulu dateline, that there are 12,000 villages and hamlets in Vietnam, that the Gov- ernment holds a thousand and that the other 11,000 are held by the Vietcong. The article states that our aim this year is to recapture and pacify 900 out of South Vietnam's 11?000 hamlets held by the Communists-900 of the 11,000 this year, 1,500 in 1967, and, hopefully, to ac- celerate the rate in future years. My question for the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Com- mittee is: As a result of the recent hear- ings, how do we intend to pacify these villages and hamlets? Do we intend to burn these villages down and destroy them? Or how can we pacify them? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I stated a moment ago that I believe the objectives which have been announced are, for all prac- tical purposes, practically impossible for foreigners to achieve. This is one of the things I have in mind. As the Senator stated, if we burn these villages down, that would be a difficult way to pacify them, naturally. We would have to re- build them. But even if we did rebuild them after burning them down, that would not necessarily create a viable structure for these people who differ from us in so many ways. They could not help regarding us as anything but similar to their former colonial masters. When we have poured in 200,000 troops with all the services that go ith it, we are completely disrupting their economy. We all read about the same things in the newspapers, that the whole economy of Vietnam is being thrown into chaos by the infusion of so much money, so rapidly, by our troops and by our con- struction there. It is creating an almost intolerable situation. So we do, more and more, have to take control of this country. We have to do that, to try to keep them in there. The bill before the Foreign Relations Committee for eco- nomic aid is to try to control inflation. I am not sure whether it will control or enhance it. It is questionable. This is a very, very difficult thing. I cannot think of anything quite comparable in our experience. We can think of the Philippines, if we like, at least it is some- what near there, but we did not do the Job there. Magsaysay did it with very little economic aid. We did not do it ourselves. I do not believe that we could have done it. But, he did it. Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas for his comments. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, the article pub- lished in the U.S. News & World Report on page 35, in the issue of February 21, 1966, entitled "U.S. Goals in Vietnam." There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. GOALS IN VIETNAM 110N0LULU,?liere's what the United States and South Vietnam are hoping to accomplish in this year's lighting: Recapture and pacify 900 out (A South Vietnam's 12,000 hamlets held by Commu- nists. Consolidate control of 1,000 Government- held hamlets?making a total of 1,900 ham- lets firmly under Government control. Build 2,050 new classrooms. Construct 500 miles of road, 148 bridges, 57 dams, and 120 miles of canals. In 1967, the aim is to pacify 1,500 more hamlets. After 1967, it is hoped, the rate of pacification will snowball?with the iiountry brought entirely under control of the Gov- ernment within 5 to 7 years. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen- ator from Alaska. Mr. GRUENING. I first would like to say I find myself in complete accord with the fears, doubts, and questions which the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has expressed. I may not take the same position on the bill as he has, but I real- ize the dilemma which faces us. I wish to comment briefly on the collo- quy had between the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Oregon, Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved EaR,Relaano?aaogial7as A wiv-K.T.n.-Ezzrurrtm?AmCalielfRETM4901416R000400050008-5 4207 and the fact that we have a certain amount of comfort in accepting the as- surance by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that voting for the bill is no compliance with or acceptance of the present foreign policy or future policy. That may be true. As the Senator from Oregon pointed out, no Member of the Senate, not even the chairman in charge of the bill, can make a commitment that the President makes. We find that commitment in the very letter of transmittal, in which it is stated: In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of authorization and appropriation, the Con- gress has provided continuing support for our national decision "to prevent further aggression" in southeast Asia. The quoted words come from the joint resolution of Congress?Public Law 88-408?approved on August 10,1964. That was the basis for the resolution. Of course, that resolution was drafted in the White House. So there we have it in black and white. If we vote for the bill, we are approv- ing the policy which the Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Alaska, the Senator from Oregon, and other Sena- tors do not approve of. There it is in black and white. One may find comfort in the words of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee [Mr. Rus- SELL], but there it is. If we pass this bill, the administration has served no- tice that we approve the policy. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not agree with that. I do not accept that. Mr. GRUENING. It is there. Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is there, yes; this business of our relations with the executive has been a difficult one. No government of any importance that I know of, a country as big as this one, has the same relationship between the legis- lative and executive. In England and in all other large parliamentary bodies the executive is a part of the legislative, and they work problems out between them- selves, and they have their own method of resolving their differences. They have the very important power that when they disagree with the executive they can change him. We cannot do it. We have to accommodate to it. In many ways our President has much greater power, regardless of the Legislature, than is true of the executive in other countries. Peo- ple do not recognize that fact. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. I have about concluded my statement. Mr. MORSE. This is the last time I shall interrupt. I would like to go back to the time of what happened at the Tonkin Bay inci- dent. I judge, from the way the Senator from Arkansas has expressed himself, that he is not too sure just exactly what happened at Tonkin Bay. The Senator from Oregon is not, either. There is one thing we ought to make very clear in the RECORD. It is that the administration told us that our ships were 70 or 75 miles away. I was one who pressed them on this, because I had been informed in advice from the Pentagon building that our ships were a much, much shorter distance away than 75 miles. We learned subsequently that the ships were only 13 or 14 miles away from the place where bombing took place by the South Vietnamese ships, which we had completely equipped. The testimony also brought out that our officials in Saigon had constant information as to what they were doing. History has already recorded that our ships were sufficiently close in proximity to those South Vietnamese vessels that were bombing islands three or four miles off the mainland of North Vietnam that we were in fact giving coverage. At least, our destroyers were close enough to come to the assistance of those ships if they got into trouble. The Senator will recall that in the For- eign Relations Committee?and the record will show it?I said to the ad- ministration witnesses, "What do you suppose we would have done if Russia had had destroyers 75 miles from Key West and started bombing Key West?" We know what we would have done. We would have sunk those Russian ships. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator for- gets that we are "good guys." It makes a lot of difference. I have about concluded. I should like to make another comment about the House committee report with regard to the urgency of the bill. I do not think there is any reason at all to apologize for the discussion that has taken place, since the House report states that there is no urgency for the bill. I have stated that and placed it in the RECORD, and I shall not do so again. Fur- thermore, the House is only acting on the bill today. According to the House Committee on Armed Services, which, as we know, is composed of gentlemen who can hardly be considered unsympathetic to the ma- terial needs of the armed services, there is no urgency about this supplemental authorization. In the words of the re- port of the House Armed Services Com- mittee: If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items in- volved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction, may simply have been moved from the reg- ular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military ad- vantages would be gained by such a book- keeping situation. Testimony on this sub- ject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient defini- tive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization. The accusations which have been leveled at us have been perfectly un- justifiable. There has been direct ref- erence to the debate which has gone on about this question, as well as the hear- ings. I do not take with very good grace the criticism that has been leveled at members of the Foreign Relations Corn- tmittee or any other Members who have taken part in the debate. Some strong words were used on the floor of the Sen- ate in an attempt to try to show that the delay in passing this bill was injuring our Armed Forces, which is nonsense. There are shortages of certain mate- rials in Vietnam, but no evidence has been offered to show that this is due to a present lack of money. Whatever shortages there may be are due to con- gestion in the ports, to the lack of ware- housing or transportation, or to poor planning, but not to lack of money. If I understand the situation correctly, this money might just as well be carried in the regular Defense Department au- thorization which will soon be before us and which will, of course, require well over half of the total taxes paid by the 190 million people of the richest Nation in the world. I intend, with great reluctance, to vote for this bill. I hope I have made it clear that my vote will not indicate support of present military policies. I shall vote for the bill because, althOugh available evidence, including the stated reserva- tion of the House Armed Services Com- mittee, indicates that this supplemental authorization is not necessary to meet the present material needs of our Armed Forces in Vietnam, the merest possibil- ity that a delay in funds might conceiv- ably handicap our fighting men obliges me to support it. However unwise the policy that put them there, our men are In Vietnam and fighting, and one cannot take the chance?even a very remote one?of denying them anything they may need. The only item mentioned in which there might be a delay in issuing contracts is for helicopters. I am un- willing to vote against this bill because? and only because?of the dim and re- mote possibility that it may actually serve some useful purpose for our fight- ing men. EXHIBIT 1 FEBRUARY 11, 1966. Gen. MATTHEW RIDGWAY, U.S. Army (Retired), Mellon Institute, Pitts- burgh., Pa. DEAR GENERAL RIDGWAY: I regret that you do not feel in a position to testify before the committee concerning the situation in Vietnam. many of the members of the com- mittee, and I particularly, had hoped that you would give us the benefit of your vast experience and knowledge in military af- fairs. I can certainly understand your desire to restrict your activities in the next few weeks and I hope that you will be fully recovered from your illness soon. You have no doubt read press accounts of General Gavin's testimony before the com- mittee on Tuesday. His testimony was ex- tremely well presented and his comments will, I am sure, be very helpful to the mem- bers of this committee and the public gen- erally in gaining a better understanding of the issues facing us in Vietnam. If you have any comments on his testimony or on Vietnam generally, the committee would be glad to have them, either for publication or for the information of the members only. If you do not care to make any comments, I will certainly understand. With kind regards, I am, Sincerely yours, 3. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4208 Approved For ReilitiM/fgfai,C0-59A7B004411,20400050008-5march 1, 19 66 PITTSBURGH, PA., February 19, 1966. [Ion. J. WmfrAivt PULBRIGIIT, U.S. Senate, Washington .1) C. DEAR SENATOR PTITBRIGHT: Your gracious letter is deeply appreciated. While it is dated February 11, it was only delivered to no here on the 18th. welcome the opportunity you kindly of- fer me to comment on General Gavin's testi- mony, and I have no restrictions to request BS to the disposition you may wish to make of my comments. If, in your judgment, they merit distribution among the members of your committee, or inclusion in the ro::- ords of the hearings. I shall be happy. On December 13 last, General Gavin wrote me, enclosing a copy of a draft of a letter he had written for publication in Harper's magazine, saying that since I was men- tioned in it, he "thought it appropriate for me to see its" even though "you may not be in agreement with the sentiments expressed in it." On December 17, I replied that I thought "the letter-swill have a substantial impact on al.l thoughtful persons who read it and on those in official circles in Washington-- executive and legislative?concerned with the problems with which it deals." At the same time I wrote Harper's magazine that my own views accord completely" with those of General Gavin, as stated in the draft sent me. f added that I was. then consider- ing publishing an article on the Vietnam situation. Actually I had been working on the draft of one prior to receipt of General OILVUI'S letter, and for some time now that draft has been undergoing review by a pros- pective publisher. When General Gavin's letter was pub- lished, I was disturbed to see the distortions which it had been subjected, and which had read into his statements thoughts I as- sume he had never entertained. I tele- phoned him verifying the correctness of my assumption, and was gratified to have him state his intention of making all this clear in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Deletions Committee the following day. watched all of General Gavin's testimony before your nommittee. I thought it re- worded great depth and breadth of view, and I was deeply gratified, not only by his com- plete candor in responding to all questions and the temperate language in which his tinswers were couched, but equally so by the clarity of his presentation. I thought it dis- sipated the cloud of misinterpretation and misrepresentation by which others had ?b- emired the meaning he had intended. Again I found myself in basic agreement with his staled views. In conclusion, having sat before the TV screen throughout all of the hearings, may 1 state, sir, my respectful opinion that you conducted them in the finest traditions of the Senate, and that you and your colleagues performed a signal service to our people. Out of these hearings I hope will accrue in- creasingly strong support for the middle course which I believe the President to be following, in rejecting the counsel of ex- tremists in either direction, while continuing to seek an honorable solution which will put ;LB end to hostilities without prejudice either in our vital interests, or to the fulfillment of our pledges. With my highest respect, I am, Sincerely. Ms 13. hireew AY, ;e!Ur!r(11, U.S. Army, Retired. Me. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I si tall necessarily be brief because, regret- tably, the condition of my throat is such that I cannot speak for as long as I should like. However, I am happy to have an opportunity to make a, few remarks, I think I express the views of the ma- jority of the Members of the U.S. Senate when I say I am. relieved and pleased that the Senate is finally going to have an opportunity to vote on the amend- ment which has been offered by the dis- tinguished Senator from Oregon to re- peal the Southeast Asia Resolution of 1964. While I do not agree with the distin- guished senior Senator from Oregon and his conclusions with respect to most matters having to do with Vietnam, nevertheless I recognize him.. as does every other Senator, as a man of great courage and a man of great forthright- ness. Be has presented to us the real problem with which we are all con- cerned, and now we have a chance to vote up or down the real issue fJ, stake. I have listened with interest to the re- marks made by a man for whom I have great respect, the chairman of the For- eign Relations Committee I Cdr. Fut.- saicuTl, with respect to the fact that he did not think this was necessarily going to be a vote on the key issues of what we are doing in Vietnam, whether we should be there or not, or whether we are giving support to the resolution as passed in 1964. I quote from the CoNctiEssiomm. REC- aim of August 6, 1964. The distinguished Senator from Arkansas said: It should be made equally clear to these reg Imes? Meaning the Comm:mists? if it is mit yet sufficiently clear, that their aggressive and expansionist ambitions, wher- ever advanced, will meet. precisely that de- gree of American opposition which is neces- sary to frustrate them. That it. what the distinguished Sena- tor said that day. When one reads what the President said .when he sent to Congress the pres- ent request for supplemental funds, it is in almost precisely the same language. I quote from the first page of the mes- sage: We are currently engaged in a mojor effort to open ii road to a peaceful settlement. Whether the present effort is suceessful or not, our purpose of peace will be constant; we will continue to press on every loor. 13ilt, until there is a response?and until the aggression ends--we must do ell that is necessary to support our .allies and our own fighting forces in Vietnam. 'Phis is the purpose of the piee;ent re- quest. It has been made so that we can meet whatever force they apply against us and meet whatever force they apply against South Vietnam. That is what I understand the distin- guished Senator from Arkansas said the Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant when he led the debate for it in 1964. At this point in my remarks, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the ree,ord the full text of Public Law 88- 49a of the 88th Congress approved Au- gust ill, 1964--the joint resolution and to promote the maintenance of interna- tional peace and security in southeast Asia together with the :President's mes- sage to the Congress dated August 5, 1964. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the REcoso, as follows: [Public Law 88-408, 88th Cong.] H.J. RES, 1145 Joint resolution to promote the mainte- nance of international peace and security in southeast Asia Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the prin- ciples of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attacks are part of a de- liberate and systematic campaign of aggres- sion that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neigh- bors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should lie left in peace to work out their own deetinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and HOUSe of Rep- resentatives of the United States America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. SEC. 2, The United States regards as vital to its national interest and -to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United Slates and the Charter of the United Nation.; and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all accessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of tile Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re- questing assistance in defense of its freedom. SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concur- rent resolution of the Congress. Approved August 10, 1964. To the Congress of the United States Last night I announced to the P merican people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in inter- national waters, and that I had therefore di- rected air action against gunboats end sup- porting facilities used in these hostile op- erations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action. After consultation with the leaden. of both parties in the Congress, I further enuounced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolu- tion expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia. These latest actions of the North Viet- namese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by Preeiden 1, Eisen- hower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Troaty ap- proved by the Senate in February 1955. This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other mem- bers to act in accordance with their con- stitutional processes to meet Communist ag- gression against any of the parties or protocol states. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved EorwiNta,Ranrzlaas.A3k7rTrixingiu March 1, 1966 iti4ACOMERDRAIM4316R000400050008-5 4209 Our policy in southeast Asia has been con- sistent and unchanged since 1954. I sum- marized it on June 2 in four simple proposi- tions: 1. America keeps her word. Here as else- where, we must and shall honor our commit- ments. 2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us. 3. Our purpose is peace. We have no mili- tary, political or territorial ambitions in the area. 4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of hu- man activity. Our military and economic as- sistance to South Vietnam and Laos in par- ticular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. The threat to the free nations of south- east Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese terri- tory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat opera- tions?all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962. In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the In- ternational Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I re- sponded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attacks on Armed Forces of the United States. As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Con- gress, on its part, to join in affirming the na- tional determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their free- dom. As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determina- tion to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreement signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos. I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary ac- tion to protect our Armed Forces and to as- sist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effec- tively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion arid the preservation of the in- dependence of the nations of the area. The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past?to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for No. 36-9 action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give con- vincing evidence to the aggressive Commu- nist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward?and that the peace and se- curity of the area will be preserved. The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional res- olution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaign- ing. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will con- tinue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us. LYNDON B. JOHNSON. THE WHITE HOUSE, August 5, 1964. Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, let us recall that we had a united Congress and a united nation. The resolution was adopted by the House of Representa- tives by a vote of 414 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 88 yeas to 2 nays. I am confident that we have that support to- day and that the Congress will over- whelmingly defeat the Morse amend- ment. Let us also be very clear on this issue: Public Law 88-408 previously referred to declares that the United States re- gards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. I am confident that the Congress ap- proves and supports the determinations of our President, as Commander in Chief to take all necessary steps to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States, to prevent further aggres- sion, and that the United States is pre- pared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocal state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting as- sistance in defense of its freedom. I might point out that South Vietnam is a protocal state and did request our assistance. Now is the time to again demonstrate our support for administrative policy and get on with the business at hand to let our fighting men know that their country is united in its efforts and their efforts for the cause of freedom. The time for action is now. The time to show a unified nation to the free world is now. The time to stand up against Commu- nist agression is now. The time to give full support to our fighting men abroad is now. The time to give full support to our President in the interest of our own na- tional security as well as promoting the cause of freedom is now. Whether Senators agree with the dis- tinguished Senator from Arkansas or the distinguished Senator from Alaska on this point, of course, what we are doing Is carrying out the spirit of the resolu- tion. I would hate to think that anybody was going to delude or kid himself into believing that when we vote to table this amendment which has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Ore- gon that we are not in fact voting to keep on the books the resolution which we passed in August 1964, which we did, as the distinguished chairman of the For- eign Relations Committee said, to let us meet every aggressive act with precisely the correct response so that we can pre- serve freedom in South Vietnam. I would not want the people deluding themselves over the fact any more than I would want members of the Finance Committee to say that when we reduce taxes from 50 to 40 percent, "I really mean that I voted for 45 percent." When the 50 percent is eliminated, there is left standing the result. There is no middle ground. The act will speak for itself. It will be a law on the books. I have only spoken on the floor one time this year with respect to the entire question of our policies in southeast Asia. But I believe that the discussions which were held and the debates which have developed have been very useful. Certainly they have been legal. Cer- tainly they have been lawful in every sense. But I do think this kind of de- bate can be carried on so long that it begins to hurt. I think there is no doubt that it has now begun to hurt, not only in the United States but elsewhere. There was an article in the Washington Post on February 27, by Mr. Ward Just, of the Washington Post Foreign Service, which I would like to read in part: SAIGON, February 26.?Senior U.S. officials here are dismayed and angered by congres- sional criticism of the war in Vietnam. This view is shared, it is understood, by virtually every top official in the U.S. civilian and mili- tary command. These officials believe that what one senior diplomat called "organized congressional criticism" of the U.S. position here has damaged morale in the Armed Forces, sowed doubt in the minds of Vietnamese leaders, and encouraged the enemy to believe that the United States cannot stay the course. He goes on to say: An American delegation which journeyed to Ankhe, headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division, earlier this week was told that the criticism of the war effort "cannot help but hurt morale" among American soldiers. I do not want to go so far as to bring in personal matters, but I wish to relate from personal knowledge and personal experience that I know these continued criticisms directed against the policies we are following in Vietnam have greatly disturbed and dismayed some of our own servicemen out there. Obviously, there is no question that some some of our allies have been worried about what our course of action is going to be. Certainly the South Vietnamese want to know whether we really mean what we say, whether we will stand by our commitments, whether we are going to stay and help them defeat communism or put our tail between our legs and get out because it has become difficult and hard and is costing us materiel and men. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4210 Approved For ReMmipp A (3?C I AlrTB004?n00400050008-5 4ALaa_sitiE March 1, 1966 Mr. CLARK, Mr. President, will the Senator yield? SMATHERS. I would like to finish my discussion and then I will be happy to yield. I think that by a- vote here today the vast majority of the Senate can prove and establish beyond the hint of a doubt the fact that we uphold the hand of the President. Certainly we do not like to be out there. wish that my two sons were home and I wish that the sons of other parents were home. Nobody wants to be tied down there. When our President took over, there were approximately 25,000 men there. When the preceding President took over there were about 1,000 men there. Do we put our tail between our legs arid run, and say we signed a treaty but it does not amount to anything? I do not think we can do that. We have had to meet aggression with aggression. The President has said over and over again that this is a limited war with limited objectives. We have riot struck Red China. We have not 31;ruck some of the strategic targets in Vietnam. This is the course we are en- deavoring to follow, hoping we can some- how bring these people to the negotia- tion table. I would like to read an article by Max e'reedman, a fine liberal columnist with svhom I do not always agree. I do re- spect, him, and I do think that he is one of the greatest columnists of all time. In wrote an article last night in. which I thought he put his finger right on the nubbin of the problem. He said: ) 11 tit North Vietnam is ready to accept the f:Let, that she cannot impose her will by mili- tary force and organized subversion on South vietnam, the road to peace will remain closed. The war, rather than diplomacy, holds the key to peace. For, in the judgment of highly placed officials in Washington, it will be im- possible to persuade Hanoi that the Presi- dent's promises and assurances will be ful- Idled while they are regarded, as they now ore, as no more than a skillful effort to weaken and divide the Conununist military r!Ill paign. Mr. President, I never in my life have known of anyone getting into a fist fight when he was a young man or a little boy who was able, while losing, to say "Let us stop now; let; us negotiate; let us sit down and show how reasonable we can be." The only time you can get a man to negotiate is when you are beginning to hurt him a little; when he is beginning Li) suffer a little. Then you can say to him, "Let us negotiate," and he will listen. ii you. He will not listen to you when. lie feels he is winning. This is the situa- tion, expanded many times, that we find. kids y in Vietnam. Until the Communists know that we intend to stay there, until they know that we mean business, until we show that we are united, until we show that we are not ening to be driven out, and until we show that we will live up to our commitments, we are not going to get them to negotiate. 0:very time someone gets up and talks about the tide changing and people los- ing heart, it encourages the enemy. That iII bow the Vietnamese Communists won before. As General Maxwell Taylor said before the Foreign Relations Committee, that is how they won in 1954. He said the Communists won in Paris, not out in Indochina. That was so because the French people had lost heart, because they were divided, and because they gave up. Certainly, this is not the intention or the desire of the American people. Cer- tainly, t is not the intention or desire of anyone in Congress. I do not believe that we ought to give that impression, or that we are even considering such a thing. I do not really believe that we are. However, some of the debate in this Chamber is being interpreted in that way. ',et, us have no illusions abom this par- ticular vote. While I disagree with the conclusions of the Senator from Oregon, I believe he is absolutely cormI in stat- ing that when we vote, there will be no mental gymnastics which we can follow. No one can say that what we co will not in effect be a reaffirmation of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which was passed in August 1964. If any Senator does not like that, he ought to vote for the amendasmt of the distinguished Senator from Or:Ton. By our vote to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon, we shall be voting to reaffirm the decision we mad' when we passed the joint resolution of August 10, 1964. When I vote, I want to reaffirm it, and I believe the great majority of Senators have the same feeline Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. SMATHERS. I am happy to yield. Mr. CLARK. I have listened with growing amazement to the comments of my good friend from Florida, comments which, to my way of thinking, impose a dilemma on those of us who in many ways obj act to the acts of our Govern- ment in Vietnam, although not necessar- ily, yet, to the policy as enunciated by the President. I should merely like to state for the record that I have not the slightest in- tention of having my vote on this ques- tion interpreted as the Senator from Florida would, like to have it interpreted. I do not believe for a moment that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution added as much as one inch to the powers of the Presi- dent. H?r had all those powers without adding another. They were his right as Commander in Chief. I do not intend to vote in favar of the Morse amendment, and I do no intend, no matter what the Senator from Flor- ida may say, to have my vote interpreted in any other way but the way I stated it a few moments ago in a colloquy with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fursamml. am opposed to a policy which would escalate this war. I shall vote against the Morse amendment. I shall vote for the bill. Nothing that the Senaor from Florida can say will change my own in- terpretation or the interpretation of the people of Pennsylvania of the way I shall vote. Mr. SMATHERS. All I say is that the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, Is in simple, understandable English. It is on the books. There it is. It will stand as the law of the land, it seems to me, until it is removed. If any Senator wishes to challenge it, he can offer a pro- posal to change it, as the Senator from Oregon has done. The Senator from Oregon does not like the joint resolution; he wants a change. I have not seen any other amendments or proposals to change the joint resolution of 1964. So when we vote on the motion to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon, it seems to me that we can arrive at only one conclusion: that we are affirming the resolution 01 1964. I shall vote to table the amendment. I want to reaffirm the position we took in August, 1964. I want to uphold the hand of the Commander in Chief. I want to uphold the hand of the President. I want to uphold our boys in the fight they are making, because I believe it is right to do so. I do not believe we should quit. We should not run away. We will not run away. I do not believe we should cut and run merely because the struggle is getting difficult, and no others want to make the sacrifice we are making. The Senator from Illinois, I think, wishes to comment. Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. SMATHERS. I yield. Mr. DIRKSEN. It occurs to me that now and then we should refresh our- selves a little on the power of the Com- mander in Chief. The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief, and that is a reflection of the experience that George Washington had with divided authority under the Conti- nental Congress. The closest that the Constitutional Convention ever came to putting a limit on the powers of the President was when they toyed with the idea of a limitation to the effect that the President could not take command of an army in the field. But that pro- posal was dropped in the Convention, at) there is no limit whatsoever. In the joint resolution of 1994, Con- gress was only affirming the power that the Commander in Chief had to use the Armed Forces of this country. Every time we support or approve action by the President, we are in effect supporting his capacity as Commander in Chief under a constitutional power that cannot be modified, unless the Constitution is changed. So we ride along with the joint resolu- tion of 1964. I see no reason why it should be modified or changed, or why we should be Indian givers and pull it back, now that we are in the thick of things. We gave the President the power with our eyes open. We knew is we were doing. Now to smash it up, to im- pair it, or to diminish it in any respect would be about as foolhardy an act as Congress could undertake. Mr. SMATHERS. I totally agree with the Senator from Illinois. I should like to have his comments concerning who I, would be the reaction around the world should we now withdraw our endorse- ment. What would be the reaction around the world were we at this par- ticular moment to say to the President Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FeblkulemsfRAIZ/131-zedtirPORAFR000400050008-5 4211 that we now rescind the endorsement which we gave him in August, 1964? Mr DIRICSEN. I doubt whether that reaction could be measured. /t would be almost fantastic in its dimensions. I said to the Senator from Oregon earlier today?and I said it with the ut- most of candidness?that as I listen to the international radio monitors and hear his name mentioned and his speeches quoted from time to time, and reported by short wave from Peiping, and out of Hanoi, I believe he has become something of a symbol. He may laugh about this, but I have read pages and pages in the international monitors, and the Senator from Oregon has become a symbol. I said today that, in my judgment, we shall have to destFoy that symbolism, if we are to indicate to the world that we mean business?and we do mean busi- ness. Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. SMATHERS. I yield. Mr. MORSE. I do not propose to let any despicable Communist or group of Communists anywhere in the world de- ' termine whether the senior Senator from Oregon will carry out what he con- siders to be his trust in the Senate and to say whatever he thinks needs to be said in trying to bring about a policy that he believes will be in the best in- terests of his country. Mr, DIRKSEN. Oh, surely; I would be the last to impeach the motives of the Senator from Oregon. I am only stating what I think is a fact. - The name of the senior Senator from Oregon has become a symbol, and they have tied this viewpoint to his name. That does not represent, in my judg- ment, the feeling of the Senate or the feeling of the people of this country. We must destroy that symbolism. Otherwise, they will go on with the idea that if they stay at it long enough we will throw our hand in and withdraw. Of all the things that we could not countenance for one single moment, that would be it. Mr. MATHER& Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader for his contribution. I totally agree with him. Mr. President, I should like to make a very brief reference to the comments of the distinguished Senator from Ar- kansas [Mr. FuLsruatirl with respect to the new Harris poll, by which he con- cluded that the people were in effect leaving the position taken by the Presi- dent of the United States. - I do not think that anyone who reads that poll can accurately arrive at that conclusion. I submit that if one reads the second column in which It states the basic stand on U.S. policies he will see that it states: "Disagree. Carry war more to the north." In January, 12 per- cent wanted to do that. In February, when the poll was taken, 16 percent wan,ted to do that. . , What is happening is that the Presi- dent i? losing some of the people who were supporting him in his limited war with limited objectives, and they want to go further. The next question asked was: "Agree, but increase the military effort." Thirty- three percent were in this category in January and 33 percent were in the same category in February. In the next category, "Agree, but do more to negotiate," 39 percent of those interviewed in January thought we should do more to negotiate. However, after the President has made such great efforts to negotiate, the percentage is now 34. This is not disagreement. This Is an understanding and appreciation that we have explored every possible avenue open to us with respect to nego- tiating this matter. We are still trying to negotiate the matter. As we read the poll, it appears that the middle group is beginning to move into the "hawk" group, and that is where the President loses the percentage. As I stated at the outset, I firmly be- lieve that the vast majority of the people of the United States, as well as the vast Majority of Senators and Representa- tives, totally and completely support and endorse the program of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. They uphold his hand. They support and approve the manner in which General Westmoreland is conducting our efforts out there. They applaud the sac- rifice being made by our young men. When we have an opportunity today to vote on this particular measure and vote resoundingly to table, there is no other conclusion that can be reached than that we are voting to affirm that resolution which we agreed to in 1964 concerning the course of action in which the Presi- dent is leading us. I yield the floor. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President. Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Oregon wanted the floor. The Chair notes that so many Senators wish to express themselves on this important piece of legislation that it is extremely difficult for the Chair to observe the order in which the floor has been sought, par- ticularly when a Senator seeks the floor and then yields temporarily. The Chair will try to Make note of this in the future. The Senator from Oregon had previously asked for the floor. I was going to recognize the Senator from Kentucky, but then thought of the com- mitment that had been made to the Senator from Oregon. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ap- preciate the difficulties that you are hav- ing. My remarks will not be long. I recognize after this long debate the limitation of adding very much to it. I did want to speak now because I spoke on this matter at the time the joint reso- lution was agreed to in August 1964, and I took notice of the effect that the 1964 resolution could have. In questions I directed to the chair- man of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions, I asked if the 1964 Bay of Tonkin resolution would ultimately be used to approve any action that the President might take, including the bombing of cities and ports in North Vietnam, and to undertaking a course of action which could lead to a war that might involve China and become world war III. I cannot say that I was not conscious of the implications of the resolution when I raised those questions that day, August 6, on the floor of the Senate. However, in voting for the resolution I expressed my concern at the time that because we were approving great powers to the President of the United States, he had the duty to immediately and assid- uously search out the possibility of nego- tiations, and, if necessary, refer the question to the Geneva powers or, indeed, to the United Nations for settlement. I spoke in the Senate again in March 1965, and pointed out that I believed the President had placed preconditions upon our willingness to negotiate. I asked him to assert clearly that the United States would negotiate without pre- conditions. Mr. GORE. Mr. President, before the Senator leaves that matter, will he yield? Mr. COOPER. I yield. Mr. GORE. Of course, the resolution and its contents and the context in which we agreed to the resolution is not the important thing. The important thing is what we do from here. Mr. COOPER. That is the point that I was going to make. Mr. GORE. Since so much emphasis has been placed upon that, I should like to read a portion of some material. Mr. COOPER. I do not want to speak so much on the 1964 resolution. I have already said that I understood its impli- cations at the time we agreed to it. I wanted to speak with reference to the present day, and what can be done look- ing to the future. Mr. GORE. I shall be brief, if the Senator will yield further. Mr. COOPER. I yield. Mr. GORE. The Senator will recall that on the night before the resolution came to Congress, at the time that our forces were responding to the attack, President Johnson spoke by radio and television to the American people. I should like to read a portion of the speech of the President. I shall not take the time to read that entire address. However, this is it, in part: But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain sup- port facilities of North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations. I call this specifically to the attention of the Senate and the country in order to indicate the atmosphere in which the Senate acted. I read further from the speech: Yet our response for the present will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risk of spreading conflict. We seek no wider war. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries, and, indeed, to all. , In the message t,o Congress the next day, there appeared this sentence in the message of the President: As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 212 Approved For RVelmalggiaqii, RfRatt7B0s0A6ARIOR0400050008- marult __t ,u?? 1, -/00 Then days after this resolution was reed to, to indicate, I think, that the resident did not then interpret this Solution as being tantamount to a edaration of war, he said in a public eeth to the American people: eome others are eager,to enlarge the con- let. They call upon us to supply American ys to do the job that Asian boys should do. ey ask us to take reckless action which ight risk the lives of millions, and engulf Uch of Asia, and certainly threaten the eace of the entire world. Moreover, such a tIon would offer no solution at all to the ^ at problem in Vietnam. 1 thank the Senator for yielding. I I; lied to read these statements of the resident or the United States, both ef ore the resolaition was passed and 2 ? as after it was passed, to indicate that t e legislative intent was not then, in my inion, what it has since been inter- reted to be. Mr. COOPER. I agree that circum- s ances have changed. But they have c anged because Of the continued in- c 'ease In forces, which has been matched ?y the other side. I said I did not wish to spend too much t me discussing the resolution of August , , except to say that it could have put t e Senate upon notice that the progres- s eovc enud rietd, fhevents entd atlhwr Presidenteah which dcyh although haveapossess,ny occurredauwthweauthority dtuyi could dd ti ahgnphalt ? e Ixtrve such action as he might take in tie future, as I saw it, according to the , s ond paragraph of the resolution. But that is past, and we come now to t is day, and another legal question is ^ ised?a stale question, perhaps, by ow?in which we are asking, "If we take tion today, and pass the bill are we f rther approving the policy of the Pres- i ent of the 'United States?" Many say, "1 am not," and of course at is their view and their opinion and ate of mind. I do not think the action we take to- y will affect the President's powers in v way. Even if we should rescind the ugust 1064 resolution, we are now en- ged In a war, and have been engaged s nee we passed the resolution. About 3 ,000 troops were fighting in Vietnam t en. Even if we rescind this resolu- t on today, it could not reduce the pow- e s Of the President, as Commander In [et to carry on a war in which we are eseritly engaged. As I see it, the only constitutional pOwer Congress has to stop the Presi- ' rit's action is to deny him funds. The other things we can do are merely ex- pressions of approval or disapproval. But I am bound to say that the ac- ton we take here in approving this au- t crization bill, will in my view, at least be a measure of approval. It is a way o saying to the President, "To this point, a least, we do give a kind of approval your course of action." That is my derstanding of it. Others, of course, ve their own positions. , hi But now I should like to go further, e are all trying, as we can, to give the resident advice in some way. This de- bate is the best evidence that we are speaking because we are concerned. a ? Otherwise, there would be no debate on the matter. The bill would have been passed two weeks ago. While the de- bate is an indication of concern about the policy in Vietnam, it is also an indi- cation of concern about Vietnam's con- Seciuences We cannot withdraw honorably, we cannot surrender, and we cannot afford to deny the young men who did not choose that battlefield, this measure of support. So I would say at this point the most Important thing that we can accomplish In this debate is to try to look ahead, and advise the President as to what our views are in the hope that they will in- fluence a restrained course of action. I followed the debate in the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was a very effective debate. I have followed the debate on the floor. The debate has indicated our concern with policy, and I believe it grows out of the fear that the war is going to be moved up, step by step, until finally we may find ourselves in a major war with China, unlimited in area and unlimited in weapons and forces. No one can say that will happen, but it is a concern. I noted in the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, that the chairman of the committee and others?including my friend, the able Senator from Ten- nessee [Mr. GORE I, whose questions were so incisive?the fear there were no limits which were being placed by our country upon the expansion of the war. I re- member the chairman said that he could see no limits except surrender by one side or the other. I would agree that if North Vietnam and China intervened and intervened and intervened, there might be no limit. But I wish to say today I think there is a limit which is within the control of the United States and its President? one which is within our control for trial. I think that the administration must decide whether or not it can maintain a situation where negotiations are Pos- sible. Because if one thing was made clear by the debate in the Senate and in the Foreign Relations Committee? and I am not a member of the commit- tee?it is the firm opinion that this war should be settled by negotiation and not by a total war. Then the question is, "How can we maintain such a situation where nego- tiations may be possible?" If force is met by force, there will be escalation, until finally there is likely to come such an engagement of forces, both on our side and on the other side, when there will be no possibility of deci- sion except for war and surrender. I do not think that it would be the United States which would surrender and I do not want to see the enlarge- ment of the war. The President has the power to limit the situation so negotia- tions will still be possible. This means that the battlefield must be kept at its narrowest scope consistent with the actual security of our forces. I was one of those who believed that bombing should not be resumed, but that is now past: So I would urge today, that the battlefield ought to be confined to South Vietnam. If we move north, and extend bomb- ing north, and extend it north again, we may reach that point where our troops are wholly committed and engaged and settlement would not be possible, except as war determines. And, at some point, China may consider that it must make its decision about entering the war. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield? Mr. COOPER. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Rhode Island. Mr. PASTORE. I am very much in agreement with what the Senator from Kentucky has said, but what disturbs me is that we seem to have two schools of thought in the Senate, as we seem to have two schools of thought in the coun- try. We have characterized the situ- ation as the "dove" concept and the "hawk" concept. There are those ready to blockade Haiphong, to bomb Hanoi, to go the full distance if we are in war. Their logic is let us try for all-out vic- tory. Then there are some who feel that possibly we should accept the enclave theory. Mr. President, I listened carefully to General Gavin and I believe that by the time he finished testifying it was rather uncertain exactly what he meant by "enclave." So much so that I believe a Senator asked him the question categor- ically whether he was in agreement with the administration policy, and I believe that he answered in the affirmative. The Senator from Kentucky has stated that we should make sure it is within the power of the President. Indeed, it is within the power of the President to keep this conflict within reasonable lim- its, if that is at all possible, consonant with the security of our boys. But, Mr. President, would it be to the interest of this Nation to announce publicly what the limits are? Is that not exactly the question? Mr. COOPER. I have not said that we should. I am talking about actual lim- itations on the battlefield, not announced limitations. Mr. PASTORE. I know the Senator has not said that. Mr. COOPER. I have said, though, that the Senate should make known? by our own statements and our advice? what our position is, with the hope that it would influence the decisions of the President of the United States. Mr. PASTORE. Well now, if the Sen- ator will indulge me for another moment, I believe this issue preoccupies every American, particularly Members of Con- gress, we have responsibility in this prem- ise for this conflict in Vietnani, and I believe it overrides every other matter and every other issue that can come be- fore Congress in this session. We have 205,000 American souls committed in that part of the world?and they had no de- cision, no choice, in going there. They were commanded to go, and out of a sense of duty to their country, and their patriotism, they are there now. What disturbs me is this: I have lis- tened to many briefings. We have been Invited to briefings in the White House. We have faithfully attended these brief- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP671500446R000400050008-5 March 1,9AO, 13, roved Foreaft*ALLIK7E-kiebliDP67B0044i1000400050008-5 e6-113 -3.EIN A Ing. We have been briefed by the Sec- retary of Defense the Secretary of State, arid Many other officials, including the President of the United -States. Only a short while ago, the Vice Pres- ident came back from' tour tour of that area - and he briefed us as well. The one thing that comforts Me?if anyone can gain any comfort at all frorri this very confusing and complex situa- tion?is the tqct that from all the con- - versations I-have heard from men, in high places irilhe GrOverrunent who have the power of decision, they have talked in a restrained Manner. They have talked 4n terms which are restrained. ? -I attended one meeting where certain Senators were pushing for greater ef- forts. The Secretary of Defense then ? made it abundantly clear?and this has been reiterated time and again by the Secretary of State?that we have no desire to overthrow, the government of Hanoi. Further, we have no desire to bomb the industrial complex of North Vietnam, because we feel that whatever ammunition and arms are coming in, now being supplied by North Vietnam,' are coming in from other places. The only bombing we can engage in is that bombing which has to do with trans- portation of men and materiel?lines of communication, and the defeat of the forces of the Vietcong and the North -Vietnamese who are hi South Vietnam. Mr. President, I do not know how more clearly the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State can tell Congress and the American people that all that we have in Vietnam is a limited political objective, and that our whole push is a restrained offensive. , I know that there are many people who say that we should never have gone twice in the first place. A long time ago, In 1954, in 1961, in 1962, and in 1963, with the fall of Diem, that may have been a debatable question; but the fact remains that we are there riQw. I have never heard a responsible per- sOn say that we should get out. It was ? refreshing to hear my distinguished col- league, the Senator from Oregon IMr. Moan), state today that he adopts the \ Gavin theory. That is going a long way, for the Senator from Oregon. I do' not say that facetiously, because the Senator has been consistent. If any man in the Senate has been consistent, it has been the Senator from Oregon [Mr. /yroasEl, I have not agreed with him, but he has been consistent. When he goes so far as to say that, he would be willing to ac- cept the Gavin philosophy, then, in fact, he is saying that we cannot get out. We Cannot get out, but let us be careful how far we go. - I believe that that idea palpitates in the hearts of every Member of the Sen- ate, every Member of Congress, and every eF1cAn....11,9 one wiShes to see ,a mas- jengagerffent with Red, China. No One wishes to se a nuclear or a thermo- nuclear horilb_used again by America in Asia, hope that never happens, under anY circumstances. woUld hope that this Government, out of all Of.tbese debates,. out of all of the confusing and divergent points of view, at some point will sbow and indi- cate to the mothers of America, whose sons are in Vietnam, that there is some sense of unanimity in America, at least in Congress?on this issue. All I am saying is that the man who is calling the "shots" is the President of the United states. He is the man who has the responsibility to make the de- cision. I do not believe that he is going to change overnight. I do not believe that he is going to change overnight, be- cause he has stayed awake long into every night trying to figure out what his next step should be. We cannot go on debating and delay- ing forever. I do not care what the Senator from Oregon says, I do not care what the Senator from Arkansas or the distinguished chairman of the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations says, the fact is, we cannot change or take away from the authority of the President, whether we vote for this resolution or not, or amend it. We are pommitted. We are committed, and we are going to vote this money for our boys in Vietnam. These men who met yesterday talked it out, but they knew in their hearts that there was nothing they could do?even though they disagreed with the policy?to im- pede the passage of this proposed legis- lation. We have been told time and again by our American military leaders that this money is necessary and that this equip- ment must be sent to our boys. There- fore, let us not delude ourselves about that. We are going to vote for this money, with or without an amendment. All I am saying to my colleagues is this: There is the situation. It is there. We are committed. We are committed heavily. No matter how much we talk, the President of the United States has the responsibility of making that deci- sion, and he will make it today, he will make it tomorrow, or he will make it next week. I say only this, that I pray to God that some light from on high will illu- mine the President's mind to make a decision which will be good for the Amer- ican people and good for peace in the world. I thank the Senator from Kentucky. Mr. COOPER. I also thank the Sen- ator from Rhode Island for a fine speech, but I did not answer his question. Mr. PASTORE. Well?sufficiently? I usually ask a question as a reason to make a speech. Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am going to close my remarks in a few min- utes. Let me point out again that I am not questioning the authority of the President. I believe that nothing we do in the Senate in the way of a resolution or amendment can take away his au- thority as Commander in Chief, except to deny him the funds and thus nullify or vitiate his authority. But, we can advise, and that is what we are talking about, and should do. The President has stated again and again that our objectives in the war are limited. I do not doubt his sincerity in making this statement, which he has made many times. However, there is a vast difference between the pronounce- 4213 ment of limitations, honest as they are, and a course or policy which could lead to their nullification. What I have been pointing out is that if while we admit our objective is limi- tation we still take steps which ex- tend the conflict?then we will reach that point where there can be no settle- ment possible except by the outcome of war. There is the possibility now of limiting the war to South Vietnam. I am not talking about enclaves, but I am talking about limiting the war to the territory of South Vietnam. I belive with this limitation, and with the development of the strength of our forces and our sup- ply system?which is much better than the supply system from the north?it would be much more difficult for the north than for us if the north introduced more troops. So the war could be limited to its narrowest scope, to South Vietnam. The limitation would avoid escalation in forces and weapons, and help avoid pos- sible internvention of China as we ap- proach her borders, either physically or by bombing. I think this is a power which is in the hands of the administration. That is my reason for speaking today. Mr, MORSE. Mr. President, I shall take but a few moments to make a few replies to some of the arguments which have been made today on the other side of the issue. In fairness to my record, I think I owe it to myself to make these replies. Before replying to some of the argu- ments of the opposition, I wish to have the attention of the Senator from Arkansas for a moment. There is no substitute for scholarship in meeting issues and in presenting to the Senate information and data in sup- port of a position taken by a Senator. When we go back to reflect on the debate of today, we shall recognize that the Senator from Arkansas, as is typical of him, being the great student that he is, made a speech today that is characterized by scholarship. The eloquent remarks of the Senator from Arkansas took us back to the his- tory of some of the wars of mankind and the policies that were followed in the ultimate solution of those wars. He pointed out that when the solution was one of surrender, there was never a peace which lasted very long; and when there was, as he used the term, a solution of accommodation, and there were long periods in which at least the combatants In such wars lived in peace. That is a lesson to learn in the con- test in which we are now involved. That is why I find myself, and have right along, holding to the position which the Senator from Arkansas so eloquently ex- pressed today?that we must find an ac- commodation. My great concern with the course of action we are following is that it is a course of action which seeks surrender. Surrender will never give us peace. The course of action we are following is based primarily upon a unilateral approach by the United States in the situation in southeast Asia which is not gging to give Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5 Approved FordttefttORM/Aftiot9p17414994,4fe000400050008p6 -march 1, 1966 us pace, either. That is why it is im- Port nt that we work out an accommoda- tion , That will make it possible for others to cdrre in and settle the war for, us. cannot settle the war, and we will Settle the war successfully, if we oing to measure success in terms of I have said so many times, I have not ny doubt that we can bring about sue devastation in Asia by our military mig t, fighting an enemy at the present tint which has no navy, no air force, no hea equipment. I have been heard to say 0 many times in the last few years that we can continue to shoot fish in a bar 1?and that is what we are doing. We Can bring about great human de- stru ton by our military might. What males us think that will lead to peace? Wb 4t makes us think that will lead to the typ of accommodation the Senator from Ark rises talked about today? T at is going to lead us to a world whi h for decades to come will be in tur- mei , and the primary responsibility for tha turmoil will be the unilateral course of a tion we are following, for the most par. 0 great chairman of the Foreign Rel dons Committee made one of the gr test contributions in recent weeks tow d the offering of an intelligent solu- tion of a great crisis that any Senator in my arty Years in the Senate has made in a critical situation. r. FULBRICTIIT. Mr. President, will he maw' yid d ? r. MORSE. I yield. r. VULBRIGHT. I wish to express my appreciation to the Senator. His great contribution has stimulated us to thirk about this problem in a way that we otherwise would not have. I am ple cd indeed he feels that way. My po- sit! n is implicit in other statements I hay made, and I have only tried to carry on fortify them. I am pleased that he app oyes of it. r. MORSE. What the Senator has is typical of the generosity of the 8 tor from Arkansas. I appreciate his ?ernarks, but I want him to know I app eciate something much more, and tha is his friendship. r. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sen- to from Oregon. r. MORSE Let me now say that I do ot question in the slightest the sin- eer y, the high Motivations, the dedica- tio to our country, and the loyalty to Our country of all my colleagues in the Se ie, whether or not they hold views con r ary to mine. e have had great differences of opin- ion in the last 2i/2 years over the matter of ?reign policy, and those differences wil continue. The vote is not going to set le them today. The vote will tern- por ily in this body stop discussion, but it ill settle nothing in this great con- tes which is reaching the grassroots of thi country. The American people are goi g to make clear to our Government, as he French people made clear to the Fr eh Government, that our continued p tioijaation in this war wilt not con- tin e to have public support._ e vote today will not more settle an thing than did the vote on the Ton- kin Lay resolution. Only time will be the judge of what I have said. But so far as this Senator is concerned, short of a declaration a war I am going to continue to oppose our foreign policy in respect to this war. That foreign policy must change. Xs FREE DEBATE UNPATRIOTIC? I turn to the first point that was made against me this afternoon. I say "against me" because it certainly was an argument to which I hold the opposite point of view. I do not question the sincerity of those any more than I question the sincerity of the Senator from Illinois who made the statements that the Senator from Oregon is quoted in Peiping, Hanoi, Mos- cow, and quoted in other Communist areas of the world. I do not intend to let a bunch of Com- munists silence my lips. If I can be in- fluential in changing the foreign policy of my country in the interest of preserv- ing freedom and giving a greater assur- ance of a legacy of freedom to be handed down to future generations of American boys and girls, no Communists in Hanoi or Peiping are going to stop me. These issues are fundamental and basic and our differences are honest and sin- cere. The argument that those of us who are trying to get changes in this bill are letting down our boys in southeast Asia loses me completely. I say respectfully that in my judgment we do not protect those by waving the flag into tatters. Those of us who try to follow the program so brilliantly and elo- quently outlined by the Senator from Arkansas this afternoon, and which, in my humble and inadequate way, I have been urging on the floor of the Senate for a long, long time past, are not letting down these boys in Asia. We are trying to stop increased kill- ing of our men which, in my judgment, we are going to become guilty of as a nation if we follow our present policy and if we authorize the new policy that is inherent in this bill. Mr. President, if the stamp of approval is put on this policy this afternoon, in my judgment, we are on our way to a further escalation and expansion of this war that is going to call for many more thousands of men in southeast Asia. I pointed out on Friday, I pointed out last night, and I pointed out earlier to- day in my speech that this administra- tion, in its own statement of policy through its Secretary of Defense, in his testimony before our committee, admits that this bill will authorize an additional 452,843 military personnel within this period of 1966-67. There is already talk of 800,000 additional men, if we find there is an escalated speedup in South Vietnam because of what may happen on the part of the program of our enemies. My good friend from Arkansas and I disagree on how to implement this mat- ter. I will come to that later. I wish to point out that when those of us trying to follow the program of the Senator from Arkansas do so, we are trying to create a situation where this country will not have to be sending, in round num- bers, 500,000 additional men over there. We cannot send 500,000 additional men over there without enlarging the war and increasing the killing of larger num- bers of them. Those of us who oppose this war feel we have no business there there on that scale. The Senator from Rhode Island is cor- rect. The Senator from Oregon from the beginning has taken the position that we had no business getting involved there and creating the situation we created. We cannot pull stake and get out. I have said over and over, and I am sure ad nauseam to some Senators, that if we just pulled stakes and got out, mankind would then probably be con- fronted with the greatest human mas- sacre ever known because through whichever side is stronger over there, it would be a blood bath. That is why there has to be a position taken where there is power to stop the blood bath. But we have the defensive position where other nations, noncombatant na- tions, can come in to enforce a peace. That is what is needed and that is what the enclave theory is going to provide for. What was one of the main points of the arguments of General Gavin, as the Senator from Arkansas has said? We have to make use of what we have. We should not follow a program of expand- ing. We should take these positions that will protect the Vietnamese and our soldiers. That does not mean, as he pointed out, that we are going to retreat. When asked in the hearing he made clear he is advocating no retreat, but a holding operation. He is not going to permit the Vietcong to advance. Of course, this strategy will help pro- vide for the accommodation that the Senator from Arkansas is pleading for because it brings to an end the exten- sion of the war and this bill will extend it further and in an alarming degree as I shall point out in just a moment. Then, it provides an opportunity for other nations that are not combatants to take advantage of what is their clear obligation to come in with peacekeeping approaches, including peacekeeping forces, if necessary; separate the com- batants, stop the warmaking. Then, the interesting thing is that if it gets into that situation where people start coming to their senses and the na- tions start coming to their senses, there will be the beginning of negotiations. Of course, General Gavin pointed out that if we follow the course of action we are now following, with more and more bombing into North Vietnam, it will be only a matter of time before we shall be bombing urban centers. Urban centers, he said. Once we begin the bombing of urban centers, the situation cannot be controlled. Once we get into the situ- ation of bombing cities, let us face it: we cannot bomb Hanoi today, without bombing a large number of Russians, for there are many Russians in Hanoi. They are there giving technical assist- ance and advisory assistance for the de- fense of Hanoi and other defense centers of North Vietnam. Then the great danger will be that when we begin to bomb urban centers in North Vietnam, as was pointed out by the Senator from Texas [Mr. Yint- Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1'966 Approved FewatEmegwrik~DpwomoR000400050008-5 4215 sortovonl, we shall be only seconds away from the Chinese border. When we be- gin to drop bombs within 30 miles of China proper?and we have already done so?think of what a miscalculation can do, what a mistake can do, what the dropping of a bomb on China can do. There are no risks of an escalated war? There are no risks of a war with China? It is beyond my power of com- prehension to assume that there is no danger of war with China. We are liv- ing 24 hours of the day and night under the danger of a war with China, which can be caused even by a miscalculation. So many of us are urging that the program of a great military strategist of our country, General Gavin, be fol- lowed. It was not so long ago, when he was in uniform, that we recognized how fortunate we were to have such a bril- liant mind exercise strong influence in the development of American military strategy. His being out of uniform in no way, so far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned, diminishes his intellectual ability. I shall continue to heed him. We find General Gavin's views but- tressed by those of former Ambassador George Kennan, who in effect said the same thing?that we ought to make use of what we have; we ought to take a holding position; we ought to take a de- fensive position, where the Vietcong can- not advance, but where we will not ad- vance and carry on the war at an ex- panded rate. He is a witness whom we ought to heed. As my chairman knows, I think we have just started to listen to the wit- nesses we ought to hear. As he knows, I have submitted to the committee a list of witnesses who I think ought to be called in a public hearing, for the Amer- ican people are entitled to have their foreign policy discussed in public hear- ings of the Committee on Foreign Re- lations. We have yet to hear our first China expert. We have yet to hear our first constitutional law authority. We have yet to hear our first international law authority. But I am not going to be deterred from urging the type of approach that the distinguished Senator from Arkan- sas [Mr. Furinacirr], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has urged in his eloquent, brilliant, and scholarly speech this afternoon, when he said we ought to make an approach to accommodation, if we want peace. If we want to annihilate the enemy, let us stop talking about accommodation; but also just forget about peace, because that course of action will result in a heritage of intense Asiatic hatred to- ward future generations of American boys and girls. All we are doing is con- demning our future generations to mas- sive burdens and possible destruction? if that does not occur even while we are still alive, in our generation. What makes us think that the United States will be allowed to maintain a foot- hold of domination anywhere in Asia? The Asiatics will throw us out, if it takes 50 or 100 years to do it. We ought to be thinking further into the future. I re- spectfully say that, in my opinion, not very much thought is being given to it at the present time by very many. CONGRESSIONAL CHECK THROUGH PURSE STRINGS The second argument that was ad- vanced against me this afternoon, re- lated to the constitutional check of Con- gress through the purse strings. My good friend from Georgia [Mr. Rus- SELL] said he recognized that we have the control of the purse strings. That is a check. I am merely asking, "Why don't you use it in this bill?" The Sen- ate has before it an authorization bill for more than $4 billion. It will move on to an appropriation. It will be passed; and as I said earlier this afternoon, merely provide the military with the money, and the military will spend it. They will find ways to spend it. What I seek to do as of now, until we can try to work out a program of accommodation such as the Senator from Arkansas has spoken about, is to stop increasing the money we give the military. But it is said that we will be letting down the boys. Of course not. The purpose of the check is to force the President to change his foreign policy. The regular Defense Department funds are not affected. But this bill is for an increase, and that is what should be checked. That is what I am pleading for. I am saying that we should not give the Presi- dent this additional authority and money. We have this checking author- ity; in my judgment, we should use it. Deny the President the money. That will not be letting down the boys; it will be saving the lives of thousands of them, because we will change the President's policy, and he will be forced to move into a defensive position which will not in any way weaken the security of our country. So I am a little at a loss to understand how in one breath my opposition can talk about the purse strings being a check, and then with the next breath say, "Of course, we should not exercise this check against the President, became, after all, he is the Commander in Chief. He is in charge; therefore, we should give him what he wants." I have been arguing that the time has come to stop giving the President what he wants. In my judgment, the Presi- dent is leading us into the increasing danger of massive war that can lead to world war III. The checking principle of the Consti- tution means exactly what it says. The responsibility of Congress is to exercise the check. Go ahead and give the Presi- dent everything he wants. If we con- tinue to do so, then stop talking to me about using the purse strings as a check. Here and now, in this bill, are the time and place to exercise that check. If we are ever going to exercise the check of the purse string, now is the time. Do not forget what the Secretary of Defense has said. I have quoted it before; I shall do so briefly again. If there is any ques- tion as to the policy contained in this bill, so far as the authority to extend the war in southeast Asia is concerned, the Secretary of Defense gave his answer when Senator SMITH asked the question: Mr. Secretary, are there plans to escalate and step up the offensive in Vietnam? Secretary McNamara replied: Well, there are preparations being made, and they are reflected in this fiscal 1966 sup- plement, for substantially increasing our de- ployments. What does that mean? It means our manpower. Secretary McNamara later in the hearings stated: The figure I have given in round num- bers? Four hundred and fifty thousand men? increasing our deployments to South Viet- nam and raising the rate of activity of our air units. That means obtaining the money so that we can expand the policy and the air battles and the airpower. That is the policy. I am merely asking that we check the President and not give him that authorization. As to all the talk about not going to supply the material for these boys, I simply say that me must not expand the operations. As the Senator from Ar- kansas pointed out in his comment, we already have too much of a backlog and delivery problem to even take care of the manpower that we presently have over there. It will take many months to build the installations called for in the bill in order to accommodate the ships and the delivery of materiel. Mr. President, we are not going to be letting any boys down unless we continue to expand this war while they are in a situation in which we cannot even de- liver to them all of the supplies as rap- idly as we want to deliever them at the present time. We have already overextended our- selves. We have already gone too far both in sending manpower and in the rate of the hostilities that we are con- ducting. HOW BIG A WAR CAN WE WAGE WITIIOUT DECLARING WAR? I come very briefly to the constitutional argument. We again hear about the res- olution of the house of delegates of the American Bar Association. - It is only a resolution. The Com- mittee on Foreign Relations wired the American Bar Association and asked for a memorandum in support of the reso- lution. The committee asked for a doc- umentation that would support the con- clusion. No documentation has been re- ceived. However, I have been advised as to what happened. The house of delegates of the American Bar Association is char- acterized by a good many characteristics of a political institution. I have been advised by one who sat there during the meetings that there were emotional and political speeches. I repeat that, in my judgment, this war is an unconstitutional war and it has been from the very beginning. Mr. President, on last Friday I set forth at some great length in the RECORD the material discussing the constitu- tional debates on article I, section 8, of the Constitution, when the declaration of war section was written into the Con- Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For R691-4grORRNR41113L: RIft1M-97_InKIM00400050008-5 31:arch, 1. 1966 siltation, and when the debates were I ad as to whether there should be a declaration of war and power to make war. Will TY! found that I quoted from -Hamilton. 1 rotated from the Federalist Pagers. I quoted from the Constitu- tional Fathers, which quotations made it perfectly clear that what they were :inciting to do was to prevent the Presi- dent of the United States from having the power of the King of England to make war. They sought to vest that -:-)0IV Cr in the Congress of the United ;a Lams. There In is not been one word uttered this debate that changes what the Constitutional Fathers said and ob- viihisly intended. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- son( that that material from ray speech 01 to,st Midas/ be printed at this point iii noe REcorai. Moore being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD? 101.10WS : Ti "The Federalist" Hamilton wrote: "The President is to be Commander in. cijile? of the Army and Navy of the united ill-AU:es, tn. this respect his authority will be. min:Eu.9.1i), the rame with that of the King of iizent Britain, lint in substance much in- rtirioe to it. It will amount, to nothing more !luta the supreme command and direction of the mill taly and naval forces, as first gencrial and admiral of the Confederacy, while that cif the British King extends to the declaring ot war and to the raising and roF,r- .1r, of fleets and. armies?all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature." Me. MORS3E. Mr. President, I have nom time to time quoted one eonstitu- al authority after another in regard La ibis matter. I quoted great American emiters such as Professor Commager, of .nonlairat University, who talked to me length the other morning on the long- distance telephone. He told me?and I :say this with immodesty, I know?that I we s correct in the many statements that r have :made on the history of article I, eaction 8 of the Constitution, and as to al at hannened in the Constitutional convention. ffe told me how right I nave been in the position I have taken tnat, gilder the Constitution, a declara- tutl war is necessary if we are going ind Ameriean boys constitutionally is tie Tao argument was made this morning hy fly good friend, the senior Senator Csion ?eorgi.a., that on a number of or'- 'so is a President alone had sent men iota battle. That does not make it, con- etlint i.011 i3OIero-. Line thing is that we can add D 11 of Om mistakes and all of the wrongs, one on another, and never end w: in a summation of right. 'u'' nod of practices that have no constitutional basis does not make the practices constitutional. Let; us not '..orttet that, as a result of some of the ,'cam ales that, were cited of sending the Marines to certain places, we are still "tying the price. We are still paying the terrible twice, the loss of confidence its, and the loss of prestige because we misused I,ne Marines at the times a l'resident sent, them in. In Latin America, this has been re- ferred to as an example of shocking American military intervention. T do not want to see my country con- tinue that. I want to see my country get back inside of the Constitution. How- ever, Mr. President, I have discussed my views with regard to the international aspects of tins matter with a recognized international lawyer such as Ben Cohen, who has, because of his Millianey in the field of international law, represented the United States in a consideraine num- ber of international conferences. Mr. President, over year am), I had printed in the Rricona that great trea- tise of Ben Cohen in respset to the in- ternational law aspects of this problem, using him as my authority. I called him on yesterday and talked to him about it again. He again veri- fied the position I have been taking in regard to the international law aspects of this problem. I have used the win-Clogs of the great Edward Corwin on our Constitution and on the power of the Presidency, sustain- ing my position. I have used the writings of Prof. Roger Fisher, of Harvard. Mr. President, as I have said now for 2y2 years, in my judgment, we have been following an illegal course of action in southeast Asia in respect to our Consti- tution. There is no doubt about our frequent violations of the United Na- tions Charter. Mr. President, as an old law leacher, I know the importance of dm:union- tat ion. On last Friday I had printed in the RECORD a memorandum of law, prepared by a group of American lawyers, which holds a view different from thar of the American Bar Association, together with a letter of transmittal from that group, submitting the memorandum to the President of the United States under date cif January 25, 1963. I do not en- dorse every proposition is it; but It, poses the issues that are still unsettled and unsolved. I ask unanimous consent that, at the close of my remarks, this material be printed in the REcona. it appear ii in the CONGRESSION.AL RECORD of Febru afar 25, 1966, at pages 3996 to 4904. The PRESIDING OF.ACFR, Without objection, it, is SO ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, come now to the Tonkin Bay resolution. I CIO say to my friend, the Senator from Alaska, that I shall alwa?ys be proud, Us I am sure he will be proud, to have our grandchildren read that we did not vote for the resolution in August 1164. I would not vote for a renewal of tne reso- Intion becaitse, in my judgment, it, sought to recognize a power tha ; a President of the United States does not have. There was some talk earlier today by the Senator from Georgia Mr. RlissEiml who talked?about the Lebanon resolu- tion, and about the Cuban resolution, and also, I think, about the Formosa resolution. Mr. President, the Cuban resolution? let me say it again?the Cuban resolu- tion differs from all the other resolu- tions, because it did not give the Pres- ident any power to make war. The majority leader knows why it did not. I will refresh his memory by re- minding him that the Senate accepted the proposal I made to modify the Cuban resolution. It would not contain any language giving war power to the Pres- ident as did the Formosa resolution and the Labonon resolution. That; is not in the Cuban resolution. The Senator from Oregon was responsible for its being taken out. And only because it was taken out, the Senator from Oregon voted for that resolution. I voted aga,nist the Formosa resolution; I voted against the Lebanon resolution. I have voted against every resolution that has been presented in the Senate which seeks to /nye the President the power to make war, be- cause, in my judgment, we cannot give him that power. Congress must declare war. MAJOR MILITARY EFFORTS HAVE :FOLLOWED WAR. MESSAGES, NOT PRECEDED THEM. Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk here today about the power of the President as Commander in Chief. The President, as Commander in Chief, does not have the power to make a war. The President, as Commander in Chief, has the power to respond immediately to the self-defense needs of our Nation. The President had the power, as Commander in Chief, to respond immediately to any attack that was made upon us on the high seas in Tonkin Bay. The then President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had the power to re- spond immediately after Pearl Harbor to the self-defense needs of this Repub- lic. But he recognized that he also had the obligation to ask Congress for a dec- laration of war. Last Friday, I put in the RECORD the war message of Franklin Roosevelt fol- lowing Pearl Harbor and the war mes- sage of Woodrow Wilson on April 2, 1917, before a joint session of Congress, when he gave his reasons as to why he thought the Congress, under article I, seetion a of the Constitution, should declare war the German imperial Govern- ' wish to take a moment, if Uri Sen- ators will bear with me, to find that declaration, because once again, I wish to read the first paragraph of tlan great war message of Woodrow Wilson. I do not have to refresh the memorY of the Senators as to the understanding of that great American historian. Prior to entering politics, he was one of the great historians of the time. He was more than a historian; he was one of the great scholars of American political sci- ence, one of the great profesioni at, Princeton University. I read the first paragraph frosa the message of Woodrow Wilson on that his- toric night in April 1917: I have called the Congress into cxtaitordi- nary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissiblo that I should assume the responsibility of mak- ing. He knew his constitutional history. He knew his constitutional law. He knew Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 205/07/13 ? r-IA-RDIAWV6R000400050008-5 4217 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIoN A L RECORD that as President of the United States, he was without constitutional authority to make war against the German Im- perial Government without a declaration of war by the Congress. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to rest my case on this issue with Woodrow Wilson. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Alaska. Mr. GRUENING. I should like to say, in connection with the allusion of the Senator from Oregon to the Tonkin Gulf resolution, that it is difficult to un- derstand why it was not clear at the time when that resolution was drafted at the White House, sent to Congress, and approved by a great majority, that it, itself, was a violation of the very kind to which the Senator is addressing him- self. The Tonkin Bay resolution, in its op- ening paragraph, spoke of the attacks on naval vessels, and said they "have thereby created a serious threat to in- ternational peace." "A serious threat to international peace." But article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to which we are a sig- natory, said that, "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"?those very same words?"shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation," and it names eight alternatives: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means. That resolution was a violation of the United Nations Charter and its purpose. We were as violative of that charter as we have charged the other people of being. Mr. MORSE. As the Senator from Alaska knows, I completely agree with him. I am just not going to give into the United Nations aspects of this tonight, because if I started, in justice to the sub- ject, it would take a long time. But as the Senator knows, I have argued here for two and a half years that we have violated at least 13 articles of the United Nations Charter in our course of conduct in southeast Asia, and we have violated section after section of the Geneva ac- cords. It is no alibi to say that we did not sign them, and then at the same time say we are in there, in part, because the North Vietnamese are violating them. We cannot have it both ways, Mr. President. Mr. GRUENING. If the Senator will yield further, of course we gave uni- lateral approval, and, through Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, said we would adhere to 12 of the 13 articles. Mr. MORSE. I agree with the Sena- tor. I made my case on that last Fri- day, as I have made it many times here- tofore. I only wish to say now, Mr. President, that from the beginning, when we took this little Vietnamese exile by the name of Diem out of Washington, D.C., and No. 36-10 out of Paris, who had never fought the French, militarized him, and set him up as our first puppet President of South Vietnam, we violated the Geneva accords. The Geneva accords? do not provide for two governments in Vietnam. The 17th parallel was nothing but a line of de- marcation separating the military forces of the Vietminh and the French. That is what that 17th parallel was for. The accords then provided for 2 years to work out, under the direction and jurisdiction of an International Control Commission represented by India, Can- ada, and Poland, arrangements for an election in July 1956, that would estab- lish a government and a reunification of all Vietnam. That is what the Geneva accord called for. Who divided Vietnam? The United States. That is our record. Of course, we are going to hear about that when we get into the councils of the world. There does not seem to be much enthusiasm for getting into an open world debate on Vietnam in the Security Council; but I am still hoping it will come, and if it does not come, then I wish to repeat very quickly here, my President ought to get before the Gen- eral Assembly of the United Nations and make a plea to the world for that Gen- eral Assembly to take over its peacekeep- ing functions in South Vietnam, and stop the danger of this war escalating into a holocaust. FLOOR MANAGER DOES NOT CONTROL POLICY Then, Mr. President, there is another point on which my good friend, the Sena- tor from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and I may not see eye to eye, although I fully understand his point of view. I believe that the situation of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], is quite different on this bill from the situation of the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the Tonkin Bay resolution. There is no am- biguity in this bill, to justify any legis- lative history, as there was in the Tonkin Bay resolution. For the Senator from Georgia from Georgia to say that it does not involve policy does not erase the record of the administration as to what the policy of the bill is. It contains new authority which makes it possible to escalate the war. The Secretary of Defense says so, that it is a decision for further escalation, to be made by the President. He has not made it yet, but we are going to give him all the materiel, all the manpower, and all the money for the escalation of the war. Mr. President, that is what I am pro- testing. It is that policy which should be stopped. Now is the time to check the President. He must not be placed in a position that he can exercise his discretion to escalate the war and send increasing numbers of American boys to their deaths in southeast Asia. As I stated earlier, in my judgment, southeast Asia is not worth the life of a single one of our boys. It is not our uni- lateral responsibility. It is the responsi- bility of the nations of the world, who have committed themselves to keep the peace, to start living up to their obliga- tions. Therefore, I dismiss the point by saying that nothing which the Senator from Georgia has said can make legislative history for the simple reason that unless a bill is ambiguous, then anything the Senator in charge of the bill states is superfluous. We know what the intent is. It is that intent which I am pro- testing. That is why I do not believe that the statements of the Senator from Georgia help my friend the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], one iota in regard to the policy which is spelled out in the bill. Mr. President, first, a vote for my amendment would be a vote to make clear to the President that those who vote for the amendment disapprove of the con- tinuation of the exercise of the power he has been exercising under the Tonkin Bay resolution. A vote against the bill would constitute a check on the purse strings, in order to deny to the President the authoriy that the bill would give him to expand the war. For it is an expansion of the war which I believe is so dangerous. It is an expansion of the war which I fear would lead us to a war with China and eventually with Russia. Mr. President, it is a risk we should not take. That is why I say that we should take the General Gavin program, the so-called holding operation, and then use that time period in order to urge other nations to come in and enforce the peace. I make this plea to the chairman of my committee: A vote for the authoriza- tion bill will be a vote which will not strengthen those in the American popu- lation who, in my judgment, in increas- ing millions, wish the United States to follow a course of action whereby the war will not be escalated. A vote against the bill, in my opinion, would strengthen those within American public opinion who, in increasing num- bers, are urging a change in our course of action in the operation of our foreign policy in southeast Asia. A vote for this bill on the part of any Senator who has great reservations about the Tonkin Bay resolution, who has great reservations which many have expressed, In terms of fear as to what may happen in Vietnam, even by miscalculation, or direct planning on the part of the ad- ministration to expand the war, would be a vote to weaken those in American pub- lic opinion who, in increasing numbers, in my judgment, are insisting that our foreign policy in southeast Asia be changed. The only alternative left the Amer- ican people, if Congress will not carry out, in this instance, its power of check through the purse strings, would be for them to take the issue to the polls. I shall be one who will urge them to take to the polls, because I believe that every procedure available to the American people, under our constitutional system, Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1218 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966 should be exercised with them to check the expansion of this war, to increase thereby the possibility of finding a peaceful solution or, as the Senator from Arkansas has said, an accommodation which will lead to peace. Mr. President, I wish to put into the 1.,!,ceose the conclusion of that great re- port of my majority leader which sets forth, for those who will read it, the warning signs of where we may be going in southeast Asia if we follow the au- thorization of this bill, if we give to the administration the authority to ex- pand the war, which this authority would give to the administration, de- Pendent only upon the decision of the President of the United States. Mr. President, speaking most respect- fully of my President, and I make no personal comment. I will not vote to give to this President, or to any President, the kind of discretionary power which the bill would give to him. As the Sec- retary of Defense states, the President gave instructions to submit this bill to provide for all these authorities which will result, if they are exercised, in an escalation of the war, all dependent upon the discretionary decision of the Presi- dent of the United States. Mr. President, we should not give it to any man--no man; and if we give it to any mere man, with all the frailties that every man possesses, we will weaken our system of constitutional checks, and we will enhance the growing danger in this country of a government by men and not of law. We would also increase the danger of a government by executive supremacy, instead of a government which would preserve the precious sys- tem of three coordinate and coequal branches of government. Mr, President, I rest my case. ,Exinerr il'A'I'ERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN :emicy TOWARD VIETNAM, Nen York, N.Y., January 25, 1966. i,VINDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States, Washington, Mr. PRESIDENT ! Following the issuance by ihe Department of State in March 1965 of a memorandum captioned "Legal Basis for U.S. Actions Against North Vietnam," our com- mittee, in consultation with leading author- itief; in the fields of international law and constitutional law, undertook to research the legal issues, culminating in the memorandum of law (here enclosed). Our committee's memorandum of law has been endorsed, among others, by Profs. Quincy Wright, of the University of Virginia; Wolfgang Friedmann, of Columbia Univer- sity; Thomas T. Emerson, of Yale; Richard A. Falk, of Princeton; Norman Malcolm, of Cor- nell; D. F? Fleming, of Vanderbilt; David Haber, of Rutgers; Roy M. Mersky, of the University of 'I'exas; William G. Rice, of the University of Wisconsin; Chancellor Robert M. tVlacIver, of the New School for Social Research; Profs. Robert C. Stevenson, of Idaho State University; Alexander W. Rud- zineki, of Columbia; Darrell Randell, of the American University in Washington, D.C.: :fed Profs, Wallace McClure and William W. Van Alstyne, both from Duke University and the World Rule of Law Center. For the reasons documented in our memo- rancium our committee has reached the re- grettable but inescapable conclusion that the actions of the United States in Vietnam con- travene the essential provisions if the United Nations Charter, to which we are bound by treaty; violate the Geneva accords which we pledged to observe; are not sanctioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; and violate our own Constitu- tion and the system of checks end balances which is the heart of it, by the prosecution of the war in Vietnam without; a congres- sional declaration of war. The principal argument adva need in the State Department's memorandum is that our Government's action in Vietnam is justi- fied under article 51 of the United Nations Charter sanctioning "individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." However, South Vietnam is indisputably Apt a mem- ber of the tmited Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva accords of 1954, is merely a tem- porary zone. Moreover, since the Geneva accords recognized all of Vietnam as a single state, the conflict in Vietnam is -civil strife" and foreign intervention is forbidden. We do well to recall that President Lincoln, in the course of our Civil War to preserve the union of the North, and the South, vigorously op- posed British and French threats to inter- vene in hehalf of the independance of the Confederacy. In addition, the right of collective self- defense under article 51 is limit(xl to those nations which are within a regional com- munity which history and geography have developed into a regional collective defense system. The United States?a country sep- arated by oceans and thousands of miles from southeast Asia and lackin4 historical or ethnic connections with the peoples of that area--cannot qualify as a bona fide member of a regional collective defense sys- tem for southeast Asia. The State Department's memorandum also contends that the actions of the United States "being defensive in characer and de- signed to resist armed aggression, are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the caarter and specifically with article 2, paragraph 4." Yet article 2, paragraph 4, declares in clear and unambiguous language that "all members shall refrain in their in- ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The State Department's memonnidum also attempts to justify our Govermnent's ac- tions in Vietnam on the ground that the "North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva accords." But this state- ment ignores our Government's antecedent violations of the pledges we made On July 21, 1954, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith in a declaration confirmed by President Eisenhower, pledged that. our Gov- ernment would not "disturb" the Geneva accords and would "not join in all arrange- ment which would hinder" the rights of peoples "to determine their own future." However, the United States departed from these pledges when, on July 16, 1955, the Diem regime announced with American back- ing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, thus violating the central condition which had made the Geneva accords acceptable to the Vietminh. And the United States also chose to ignore the ban on the introduction of troops, mili- tary personnel, arms, and munitions into Vietnam, and the prohibition against the establishment of new military bases in Viet- nam territory?provisions set out in the Ge- neva accords. It is an historical fact that the refusal to hold the elections prescribed by the Geneva accords, coupled with the reign of terror and suppression instituted by the Diem regime, precipitated the civil war. In the light of the foregoing, more fully detailed and documented in the enclosed memorandum, we submit, Mr. President, that the State Department has incorrectly advised you as to the legality of U.S. actions against Vietnam. We further submit, Mr. President, that the frequent citation of the pledges given by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam. President Eisenhower has stated that his administra- tion had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever." President Kennedy insisted that the war in Vietnam was "their war" and promised only equipment and military advisers. Hence the historical facts fail to support the point advanced. Beyond this, these Presidential pledges do not even have the status of treaties, not having been ratified by the Senate. Manifestly, the obli- gations assumed by our Government under the United Nations Charter, with the advice and consent of the Senate, transcend any Presidential pledge undertaken vis-a-vis the South Vietnamese regime. Our Government has often urged that our presence in South Vietnam is solely to pre- serve freedom for its people and to uphold the democratic process. Yet the series of regimes supported by the United States in South Vietnam have been authoritarian in character, quite without populer support and largely indifferent to the welfare of the local population. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 30, 1964, commenting on the consequences of massive Americau involve- ment in Vietnam, stated, "Well, that means we become a colonial power and I think it's been pretty well established that colonialism is over. I believe that if you start doing that you will get all kinds of unfortunate results: you'll stir up antiforeign feeling; there'll be a tendency to lay back and let the Americans do it and all that. I can't think that it's a good thing to do. As we have stated, our committee has also come to the painful conclusion that our Government's action in Vietnam violates the clear provision of our Constitution which vests in Congress exclusively the power to declare war--a power not constitutionally granted to the President. The debates in the Constitutional Convention at Philadel- phia make explicitly clear that wan-making was to be a purely legislative prerogative and the President was not to have the power to wage a war or "commit" our Nation to the waging of a war, although the Executive was intended to have the power to repel sudden attacks. In pointing out that the President lacks constitutional power to make war, our com- mittee does not imply that a declaration of war by the Congress is desirable. Rather, we mean to point out that the failure to abide and conform to the provisions of our Con- stitution inevitably lead to tragic situations. In alerting the American people to the unconstitutionality of the war being waged in Vietnam, we are following the example followed by Abraham Lincoln who, in a speech made on January 12, 1848, before the House of Representatives opposing the war undertaken by President Polk, set out the reasons which impelled him to vote for a resolution which declared that "the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitu- tionally commenced by the President." Our committee conducted its research be- cause of a deep sense of responsibility as members of the bar and because of our dedi- cation to the principle of world peace through law. It was the American lawyers who conceived and nurtured this principle, and after holding conferences on four con- tinents (San Jose, Costa Rica; Tokyo, Japan; Lagos, Nigeria; Rome, Italy), finally con- vened the First World Conference on World Peace Through Law at Athens, Greece, in July 1963. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Releil.sgsf8Ki0e/WcWpfgffflti6R000400050008-5 4219 March 1, 1966 CONixtur. In the proclamation of Athens, the decla- ration of general principles for a world rule of law, among other things, declared that "all obligations under international law must be fulfilled and all rights thereunder must be exercised in good faith." Mr. President, we submit that our Govern- ment's intervention in Vietnam falls far short of the declaration of principles at Athens, Greece, in July 1963, and is in viola- tion of international agreements. The rule of law is the essential foundation of stability and order, both between societies and in international relations. When we violate the law ourselves, we cannot expect respect for the rule of law by others. Our present uni- lateral intervention is an offense, we submit, against the spirit of American institutions. As lawyers, we feel that the national inter- est is best served-indeed it can only be served-by (a) a commitment that our Gov- ernment will be bound by and implement the principles of the Geneva accords of 1954, and that the main provisions thereof be the basis for the establishment of an independ- ent, unified neutral Vietnam; (b) an invoca- tion of the provisions of the United Nations Charter to assure peace in southeast Asia; and (c) a declaration that there will be no further bombing of Vietnam, that we will agree to a cease-fire, and publicly declare that the United States is willing to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front- a point endorsed by leading Senators and Secretary General Thant and mandated by article 33 of the United Nations Charter re- quiring that the "parties to any dispute S * * shall first of all, seek a solution by negotia- tion * * * or other peaceful means of their own choice," and that all elements of the South Vietnamese people should be repre- sented in that country's postwar govern- ment. Respectfully yours, ROBERT W. KENNY, Honorary Chairman. WILLIAM L. STANDARD, Chairman. AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, IN LIGHT OF OUR CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE 1954 GENEVA AC- CORDS, AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Prepared by Lawyers Committee on Ameri- can Policy Toward Vietnam, Hon. Robert K. Kenny, Honorary Chairman) Executive committee William L. Standard, Chairman; Carey Mc- Williams, Vice Chairman; Joseph H. Crown, Secretary, Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, 38 Park Row, New York, N.Y. AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM The justification of American involvement* in Vietnam has troubled lawyers in the light of the literal language of our Consti- tution and the United Nations Charter. Though the United States initially entered South Vietnam only to advise, American troops, now numbering 125,000,1 have moved *For a historical background, see Robert Scheer, "How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam" (A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Post Office Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif., 93103) ; sam- ple copy free. President Johnson, in his news confer- ence of July 29, 1965, stated: "I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." (Presiden- tial Documents, vol. 1, No. I, p. 15, Aug. 2, 1965.) from a passive to an active combat role. American forces have mounted repeated air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Is such action, raising the threat of large-scale war, consonant with our Constitution, our obligations under the United Nations Char- ter, the provisions of the southeast Asia col- lective defense treaty? Observance of the rule of law is a basic tenet of American democracy. Hence it is fitting that American lawyers examine the action pursued by our Government to deter- mine whether our Government's conduct is justified under the rule of law mandated by the United Nations Charter, a charter adopted to banish from the earth the scourge of war. We shall explore and assess the grounds advanced to justify the course of conduct pursued by our Government vis-a-vis Viet- nam. In section I, we examine American policy in the light of the United Nations; in section II, in the light of the Geneva accords and the southeast Asia collective defense treaty; and in sections III-IV in the light of our Constitution. Mindful of the grave im- portance of the issues, we have exercised the maximum diligence in the preparation of this memorandum which is fully docu- mented. I-THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER The Charter of the United Nations was signed on behalf of the United States on June 26, 1945, by the President of the United States, and was ratified on July 28, 1945, by the Senate., Thus, the United States became a signatory to the Charter, along with 55 other nations (there are now 114), obligat- ing itself to outlaw war, to refrain from the unilateral use of force against other nations, and to abide by the procedures embodied in the Charter for the settlement of differences between states. In essence, the obligations assumed by member nations under the United Nations Charter represent the princi- ples of international law which govern the conduct of members of the United Nations and their legal relations. The Charter of the United Nations is a presently effective treaty binding upon the Government of the United States because it is the "supreme law of the land.", In- deed, the Charter constitutes the cornerstone of a world system of nations which recognizes that peaceful relations, devoid any use of force or threats of force, are the fundamental legal relations between nations. The follow- ing provisions of the Charter are relevant: (a) "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur- poses of the United Nations" (ch. I, art. II(4) ) . 2 See Historical Note under title 22, United States Code, sec. 287. By the act of Dec. 20, 1945, c. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (22 U.S.C. 287- 287e) , Congress enacted "The United Nations Participation Act of 1945," empowering the President to appoint representatives to the United Nations and to render various forms of assistance to the United Nations and the Security Council under specified terms and conditions. a The treaties to which the United States is a signatory are a part of the fundamental law, binding upon all officials and all govern- mental institutions. Art. I, sec. 2, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution confers power upon the President to make treaties with the concur- rence of two-thirds of the Senate. Art. VI, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides that treaties so made, together With the Constitution and the laws of the United States made pursuant thereto, are "the Supreme Law of the Land." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-434; Hines v Davidowitz, 312 'U.S. 52, 62-63; United States V. Pink, 316 U.S. 203, 230-231; Cleric v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503-508. (b) "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations or shall decide what measures shall be taken * * * to main- tain or restore international peace and se- curity." (Ch. VII, 39.) It is thus plain that signatory members of the United Nations Charter are barred from resorting to force unilaterally and that only the Security Council is authorized to deter- mine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace (apart from the question as to whether or not the Gen- eral Assembly has any residual authority by virtue of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution for this purpose when the Security Council is unable to meet its responsibilities 4), It may be recalled that in 1956, Israel justified its attack on the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula "as security measures to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen 'Com- mando' bases in the Sinai Peninsula from which raids had been launched across the Israeli frontier." Starke, "Introduction to International Law," fourth edition, London, 1958, at page 83 et seq. When Great Britain and France introduced their troops into the Sinai Peninsula, under claim of a threat to their vital interests, the "preponderant reaction of the rest of the world was to condemn this action as inter alia, a breach of the United Nations Char- ter." Starke, "Introduction to International Law," fourth edition, London, 1958, at pages 85-88. When the Soviet Union suggested a joint military operation with the United States to restore the peace in the Middle East, Secre- tary of State John Foster Dulles rejected this proposal as "unthinkable" (New York Times, November 6, 1956). Dulles declared: "Any intervention by the United States and/or Russia, or any other action, except by a duly constituted United Nations peace force would be counter to everything the General Assembly and the Secretary General of the United Nations were charged by the charter to do in order to secure a United Nations police cease-fire." At a news conference on November 8, 1956, President Eisenhower, answering an an- nouncement of the Soviet Union at that time, declared that the United States would oppose the dispatch of Russian "volunteers" to aid Egypt, saying that it would be the duty of all United Nations members, including the United States, under the clear mandate of the United Nations Charter to counter any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. The President said: "The United Nations is alone charged with the responsibility of securing the peace in the Middle East and throughout the world." United Nations Action in the Suez Crisis. Tulane Studies in Political Science, volume IV entitled "International Law in the Middle East Crisis." To the fundamental, substantive and pro- cedural requirements and conditions vesting sole authority in the United Nations to authorize utilization of force, there are only two exceptions set forth in the charter. The first exception is found in article 51 of chap- ter 7: "Nothing in the present charter shall im- pair the inherent right of individual or col- lective self-defense if an armed attack oc- curs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken meas- ures -to maintain international peace and security." Article 51 of the charter marked a serious restriction on the traditional right of self- defense. As was stated by Prof. Philip C. Jessup in his work, "A Modern Law of Na- tions," published in 1947 (at pp. 165-166) : 4 The constitutional validity of the "Unit- ing for Peace" resolution adopted in 1950, is disputed. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4220 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE March 1, .195'6 'Article 51 of the charter suggests a fur- ther limitation on the right of self-defense: it may be exercised only 'if an armed at- tack occurs.' * * * This restriction in article al very definitely narrows the freedom of as ion which states had under traditional Law. A cane could be made out for self- defense under the traditional law where the injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place. Under the charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state wonld -justify a resort to the Security Coun- cil, but would not justify resort to anticipa- tory force by the state which believed itself three tened." 'lie traditional right of self-defense, even prior to the adoption of the United Nations charter, was limited. As stated by Secretary of Sitate Daniel Webster in the Caroline ease," and as adopted In the Neurenberg :lodgment in 1045, any resort to armed force in self-defense must, be confined to cases in which "I:he necessity of that self-defense is instant, oyerwehlming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of delibera- iion." Li expressly ill-tilting independent military action to instances of armed attack, the founding nations explicitly and implicitly rejected the right to the use of force based on the familiar claim of "anticipatory self- defense." or "intervention by subversion," or iiprif-enaptive armed attack to forestall threatened aggression," and similar rationale. iaticiti concepts were well known to the rounding nations if only because most of the wars of history had been fought under iiiinners carrying or suggesting these slogans. More importantly for our purposes here, however, the United States was aware of these precepts before the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter and consciously ac- quiesced in their rejection as a basis for in- dependent maned intervention." ft has been. authoritatively said that the exceptional circumstances stipulated in Cr- Inde iii are "clear, objective, easy to prove sod difficult) to misinterpret or to fabricate".." The wording was deliberately and carefully I' 101 Renee article 51 can under no circum- souices afford at justification for U.S. inter- vention in Vietnam, since the Saigon regime is indisputably not a member of the United Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva Ac- In support of his views, Erofessor Jessup not (ii: "The documentary record of the discus-- cots at San Francisco does not afford con- clusive evidence that the suggested inter- pret:Ai:on or the words 'armed attack' in ertiele 51 is correct, but the general tenor of Lile discussions, as well as the careful choice of words throughout chapters VI and VII of title charter relative to various stages of ag- ipetvetion of (-fingers to the peace, support die view stated." (Jessup, "A Modern Law mi Nations," p. 166.) Hee, Louis tiankin. (professor of law and iiiternational law and diplomacy, Colurnbin, uniiiirsity), 57 "American Society of Inter-- national Law Proceedings," 1963, at p. 152.. Moore's "Digest of International Law." vol. p 412. hid . faiarings on U.N. Charter, Committee on linrcern Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., I. Isess., July 9-13, 1945, at p. 210. thinkin, ibid. 1.1 the conference itself, every ward, every sentence, every paragraph of the el :sneer's text was examined and reconsid- elf ci by the representatives of 50 nations and much of it reworked." (Report to the Presi- dent en the results of the San Francisco Con- 'tense by the Chairman of the U.S. Dele- ga lion, i.e., the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945 hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee in Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 70th Cong., 1st sees., at p. 41.) cords of 1954, South Vietnam is merely a temporary zone not even qualifying politi- cally as a state (See Section II infra), even if it be assumed that an "armed attack," within the meaning of article 51, has oc- curred against South Vietnam. For, as has been shown, article 51 is operative only in the event. of "an armed attack against a member of the United Nations." Hence, neither the right of individual self-defense nor the. right of collective h self-defense can become operative. It has been claimed that United States in- terventimi in Vietnam is sanctioned under article 5 on the ground (1) that South Vietnam in an independent state. (2) that South Vietnam had been the victim of an armed attack from North Vietnam and (3) that the United States, with the consent of South Vietnam, was engaging in "colletcive self-defense" of that country, as islaimed by the United States in a communication to the United Nations Security Council in March 1905 (U.S. Chronicle, vol. 2, p. 22). To sus- tain this claim, all three elemenis must be satisfied. This CB ins As untenable, however, on sev- eral grounds. First, South Vietnam was not recognized as an independent state at the 1951 Geneva Conference (see sec. II, infra). Even if it had become 1 de facto state in the course of events since 1951, the infiltration from North Vietnam cannot be deemed to constitute .en "armed attack" within the purview of article 51. Since the Geneva Accords recognized all oi Vietnam as a single state, the conflict whether of the Vietcong or Ho Chi Minh against South Vietnam is "civil strife', and foreign intervention is forbidden, because civil strife is a domestic question--a posi- tion insisted upon by the United States in its civil war of 1861. Ho Chi Minh can com- pare his position in demanding union of Vietnam viith that of Lincoln., when Britain and Franc were threatening to intervene to assure the independence of the Confeder- acy (and with the added point that the national elections mandated for 1056 in the Geneva Accords were frustrated by South Vietnam with apparent support of the United States; see sec. II, infra). Nor should it be overlooked that Lincoln had very little support from the people of the S. into, who generally supported the Confederitcy, while Ho Chi Minh has a great deal of support from the people in South Vietnam organized in the National Liberation Front whose mili- tary arm is the Vie :Leong. There is, there- fore, a basic issue whether the hostilities in Vietnam constitute external aggression (by North Vietnam) or "civil strife." Here it should be noted that the United Nations is authorized to intervene where civil strife threatens international peace, as the United Nations did in the Congo, in accord with article 39 of the charter?but individual states are not permitted to inter', cue The third element .retraisite for the invoca- tion of the right of collective self-defense under Art ale 51 presupposes that: the na- tions invoking such right are properly mem- bers of a regional collective system within the mirview of the United Nations Charter. The point: here involved is: Can the United States validly be a genuine member of a re- gional systsm covering southeast Asia. Arti- cle 51 and Article 53, dealing with regional systems, were interrelated amendatory pro- visions intended primarily to integrate the inter-American system with the United Na- tions organization (see fn. 8, 13, 15). The concept that the United States?a country separated by oceans and thousands of miles from southeast Asia and bereft of any his- torical or ethnic connection with the peoples of southeast Asia?could validly be con- sidered a member of a regional system im- planted in southeast; Asia, is utterly alien to the regional systems envisaged in the charter. The "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty' ?connecting the United States with southeast Asia, architectured by Secretary of State Dulles, is a legalistic ar- tificial formulation to circumvent the funda- mental limitations placed by the United Nations Charter on unilateral actions by individual members. However ingenuous ordisingenuous?the Dulles approach, SEATO is a caricature of the genuine regional systems envisaged by the U.N. Char- ter. A buffalo cannot be transformed into a giraffe however elongated its neck may be stretched. The Dulles approach to collec- tive defense treaties employed legal artifice to circumvent the exclusive authority vested in the United Nations to deal with breaches in the peace. Articles 51 and 53 were in- tended to make a bona fide integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security--but these envisaged regional systems Which his- torically and geographically developed into a regional community?not contemplating a regional system which fused a region like southeast Asia with a country on the North American Continent. SEATO is not a re- gional agency within the letter or spirit, of the U.N. Charter as to authorize the United States to claim the right of collective self- defense even if there had been tin armed attack on a member of the United Nations geographically located in southeast Asia. If artifices like SEATO were sanctioned, the path would be open for the emasculation of the United Nations organization and the world system of international security as- siduously developed to prevent the scourge of war. Hence article 51 cannot be properly in- voked for (1) South Vietnam does not have the political status of a state; (21 even if South Vietnam were deemed a de facto state, the infiltrations do not constitute an "armed attack" within the purvie,w of article 51; and (3) the United States cannot claim the right of "collective self-defense" in respect of a regional system involving southeast Asia. Apart from ,article 51 (inapplicable to the situation here), the only other exception to the renunciation of the "threat or use of force" by member states is found in chapter VIII of the charter dealing with regional arrangements. Article 53 of -said chapter contains two paragraphs of particular sig- nificance: (a) "The Security Council shalt, where appropriate, utilize such regional iirrange- ments or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrange- ments or by regional agencies without the authofization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this article." (Ch. VII, art. 55(1).) Paragraph two of that article psosides: (b) "The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter." With respect to regional arrangementa therefore, it is clear that no enforcement action may be undertaken without the au- thorization of tlie Security Ciiiinen of the United Nations, save and except in iinly one instance; against any state which. during World War II, was an enemy of :111V of the charter," to wit, Germany, Italy and ./ap,an. The reason for this exception appeti rt; clear. When the charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, peace treaties had not yet been finally signed by the allied nations with each of the enemy states. Rep- arations, sanctions, territorial changes, bed not then been finalized. And so, in order to permit necessary flexibility in these respects, this sharply limited exception, permit ting ac- tion against an enemy state in World War II by an allied government, was spelled out. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 4221 Approved FieblAteffAmiopa?cBliep_PgD49{446R000400050008-5 Since Vietnam was manifestly not an "enemy state" within the purview of article 53(b), enforcement action under SEATO is unau- thorized and cannot be justified in view of the express restrictions set out under article 53(a) of the United Nations Charter. In summary, the United Nations Charter obligates all of its signatory members to re- frain from the threat or use of force, and only the Security Council (apart from the residual authority (see footnote 4) granted the General Assembly under the "uniting for peace" resolution) is authorized to deter- mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and 'o determine the measures to be taken to .naintain or restore international peace. To these salient provisions, there are only two exceptions: the first, the right to self-de- fense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations; and, the second, the right of nations to enter into appropriate "regional arrangements," sub- ject, however, to the provision that no en- forcement action shall be taken under such arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, the only exception to the latter requirement being with respect to measures against an enemy state, as defined in the charter. We have shown that none of the afore- stated exceptions can be invoked by the U.S. Government with respect to its conduct in Vietnam. It follows therefore that the fundamental requirements of ?the United Nations Charter with respect to the renun- ciation of force and the threat of force are directly applicable to the actions of the United States. One other noteworthy charter provision is article 103 which subordinates all regional and treaty compacts to the United Nations Charter. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the pres- ent charter shall prevail." (Ch. XVI, art. 103.) This supremacy clause was drafted to meet the predictable reassertion of dominance by the great powers within their respective geographic zones or hemispheres. Because of the unhappy history of a world frag- mented by such "spheres of influence," the supremacy clause and the restrictions on the use of force under regional agreements emerge as limitations upon the superpowers even within their awn geographic zones. It is significant that the United States not only accepted these limitations, but actively supported their incorporation within the charter.13 " Hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Senate, 79th Cong. 1st sees., supra, n. 6, at p. 306. On May 15, 1945, Secretary of State Stet- tinius issued a statement at the San Fran- cisco Conference regarding the Act of Cha- pultpec vis-a-vis the United Nations Or- ganization which declared (so far as here pertinent), hearings on U.N. Charter, op. cit., p. 306; "As a result of discussions with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the charter the relation- ship of regional agencies and collective ar- rangements to the world organization. "These proposals will? "1. Recognize the paramount authority of the world organization in all enforcement action. "2. Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, remains unimpaired in case the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Any meas- ures of self-defense shall immediately be Article 103 makes clear that the obligations of the United Nations Charter prevail vie-a- vis the obligations of the SEATO treaty. Indeed, article VI of the SEATO expressly recognizes the supremacy of the United Na- tions Charter (see sec. II infra). Moreover the frequent citation by President Johnson of the pledges given by Presidents Eisen- hower, Kennedy, and himself to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. inter- vention in Vietnam.14 In the first place, these pledges or commitments do not even have the status of treaties, for these Presi- dential pledges have not been ratified by the Senate. And even if these Presidential pledges had been solemnly ratified by the Senate, any obligations thereunder must yield to the obligations imposed under the United Nations Charter by virtue of the supremacy clause embodied in article 103. Nor would the illegality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam be altered by the circumstance that the Saigon regime may have invited the United States to assume its role in the Vietnam con- flict. The supremacy clause of the charter reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsi- bility of the Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore interna- tional peace and security. "3. Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means." The first point is already dealt with by the provision of the Dumbarton Oaks pro- posals (ch. VIII, sec. C, par. 2) which pro- vides that no enforcement action will be taken by regional agencies without the au- thorization of the Security Council. It is not proposed to change this language. The second point will be dealt with by an addition to chapter VIII of a new section substantially as follows: "Nothing in this chapter impairs the in- herent right of self-defense, either individ- ual or collective, in the event that the Secu- rity Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." The third point would be dealt with by inclusion of a specific reference to regional agencies or arrangements in chapter VIII, sec. A, par. 3, describing the methods where- by parties to a dispute should, first of all, seek a peaceful solution by means of their own choice. The U.S. delegation believes that pro- posals as above outlined if adopted by the Conference would, with the other relevant provisions of the projected charter, make possible a useful and effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security. This applies with particular significance to the long-established inter-American sys- tem. " President Johnson, in his news confer- ence of July 28, 1965, declared: "Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents?President Eisen- hower, President Kennedy, and your present President?over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help de- fend this small and valiant nation" (Presi- dential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15). President Eisenhower has stated that his administration had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever" (the New York Times, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 1). manifestly prevails and cannot be annulled by mutual agreement of third parties. It is by virtue of the supremacy clause that the Secretary General of the United Nations has called the world's attention to the emasculation of the authority of the United Nations resulting from actions taken by regional agencies without reference to the Security Council. We believe that any fair study of the United Nations Charter will affirm the obser- vations of Prof. Lewis Henkin, of Columbia University, when he speaks "of the law of the charter": "So far as it purports to prescribe for the conduct of nations, it consists, basically, of one principle: Except in self-defense against armed attack, members must refrain from the threat or use of force against other states * * * the rule of the charter against unilat- eral force in international relations is the essence of any meaningful concept of law be- tween nations and the foundation on which rests all other attempts to regulate interna- tional behavior. It is a rule which all nations have accepted and which all have a common interest essential to law." 15 It appears difficult to escape the conclusion therefore, in the light of the aforesaid, that the action of the U.S. Government in Vietnam contravenes essential provisions of the United Nations Charter. The U.S. Govern- ment has decided for itself to use armed forces in South Vietnam and to bomb North Vietnam without authorization of the Secu- rity Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. The failure of the United States to honor its obligations under the United Nations Charter is a regrettable but inescapable conclusion which we as lawyers have been compelled to reach. We, as law- yers, urge our President to accept the obliga- tions for international behavior placed upon us by our signature of the United Nations Charter. II?THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS AND THE SEATO TREATY Officials of the U.S. Government have nev- ertheless asserted, on different occasions, that the actions of the United States in Vietnam are consistent with the U.S. duties and obli- gations under the United Nations Charter and sanctioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) .10 The conduct of the U.S. Govern- ment has been justified as support of a legiti- mate government defending itself against in- surrection from within and aggression from without. We have demonstrated above that even if this latter position were accepted on its face, unilateral conclusions and actions taken by the Government of the United States upon the basis of such conclusions are violative of the firm obligations under the 10 Henkin, in 57 "American Society of In- ternational Law Proceedings," 1963, supra, n. 6, at p. 148. See also in further explication of Professor Henkin's succinct conclusion: Statements of Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State, the testimony of Senator minikin, and the testimony of Mr. Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in hearings on U.N. Charter, Com- mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., supra, ii. 8, at pp. 34-147, 210, 95-100 and 304-307; Jessup, "A Modern Law of Nations" (1947); Proclamation of Athens and Declaration of General Princi- ples for a World Rule of Law, adopted by the First World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 6, 1963; Francis T. P. Plimpton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, State Department Bulletin, vol. XLIX, No. 1278, Dec. 23, 1963, pp. 978-979. 16 Geneva Conf. Doc. No. IC/42/Rev. 2, in 1 "American Foreign Policy"; 1950-55 Basic Documents 750; New York Times, July 24, 1954, p.4. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 ,!222 Approved ForRel8a\weR2r00s5/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 IONAI It 1 CORP ? SENATE Uarch I. i9(11 United Nations; Charter. However, we do not let the matter rest with this assertion, but proceed to an examination of the validity of the claims made by the U.S. Government in support of its conduct in Vietnam. The Geneva, agreement, under which the war between Vietnam and the French was terminated, effected the division of Vietnam into north and south, at the 17th parallel. The said "agreement on the cessation of hos- tilities in Vietnam," entered into in Geneva oci July 20, 1954, provided that, the division of Vietnam at, the 1.71h parallel was only "a cirovisional military demarcation line," on ei ;hr side of which the opposing forces imuld be "reprouped"?"the forces of the C'copies Army of Vietnam to the north of the lane ;And the forces of the French Union to the eolith" (ch. I. art. 'the Geneva agreement makes plain that nn or the 17th parallel was to be temporary and a step in the preparation for a, general entetion. to elect a government for a -waned nation. Pending such election, adminstration in each regrouping acme 1was to1 he in the hands of the party whocie forces are to be regrouped there" lart 1.4(a) I. The day after the aforesaid cease-fire agreement was entered, into, representatives ot Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Vtetminh), Laos, France, the Peo- ples Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingalinn affirmed The Final Declara- tion of the Geneva Conference on the Prob- lems of :Restoring Peace in Indochina, July 21, 1954.)g The declaration emphasized that the north-south division MIRA solely a means or ending the military conflict and not the creation of any oohitical or territorial bound- ary. Article 9 or the declaration stated: "Tie Conference recognizes that the es- sential purpose of the agreement relating to Vicitnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and shall not in coy way be interpreted as con- eti tuting a political or territorial boundary." This reinstitutes a recognition of the fact that Vietnam is a single nation, Maided into two zones only temporarily for administrative purposes pending an election. This being so, the action of the North Viet- cennese in aiding the South Vietnamese, to the extent that it has taken place, neither r- It is relevant to note that at the time One provision was agreed upon, the Viet- minh occupied all hut a few "islands" of ter- ritory to the north of the 171 h parallel as well as approximately two-thirds; of the ter- ritory smith of that line. See map showing areas or South Vietnam under Vietminh con- trol at end of May 1953 in Henri Navarre, "Agonie de L'Indo-Chine" (1953-54) (Paris, 1.956) , p. 37. Thus, by the cease-fire. agree- ment he Vietminh gave up substantial areas or territory in what, is now called South Viet- no 01. Au . article in the New Republic, May 2.2, 1965, p. 29, by the Honorable Henry W. Edger- ton, senior (*amid!. judge of the U.S. Court or Appeals for the District of Columbia, brit- delineates the provisional character or tin) ''Cretvern ent," of south visariane and easta doubt on 1.11e el aim to the existence of that, Government. n See ".Further Documents Relating to the lescussion of Tildochina at the Geneva tionterence" June 19 July 21, 1954 (London) (der Niajesty's Stationery Office, Cmd 9239), 1954. (referred fa) as "Geneva Accords"). Tint French-sponsored Bao Dal regime, which was not endowed as yet with ally real politi- sithstance, did not sign the Geneva Ac. cold' not until 1956 did France relin.quish eamtrol over South Vietnam; the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on Oct. 26, 1955, bat French troops were not completely evac- licitert from the country until Nov. 1, 1956. affect the character of the war as a civil war nor constitutes foreign intervcaition. It cannot bc considered an armed attack by one naticin on ancither. The United States is in fact a foreign na- tion vis-a-vis Vietnam.; North \Cietnam is not. The latter by the Geneva Agreement was to participate in an election ant to de- terinine vinether North and Soutli Vietnam should be united, hut to select a government of the nation of Vietnam, constitc;;Ing all of Vietnam? north, south, east, and west. It was the refusal on the part. of the Diem regime and the subtieqiernt "gown tunents" of the re inth, supported by tic e United States, to participate in such eleciiiions that opened the door to the present cot diet. It wes veto stated in the declaretion that the clear objective of settling political prob- lems and anifying the tuition was to be by means of free general elections. Article 7 of the declaration provided: "The Conference declares that io far as Vietnam ,,s concerned, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shell permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the funda- mental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established ae, a reset; of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progres.) in the restoration of peace has been nade, and that all the necessary conditions indain for free expression of the national will. national elections snail be held in July under the supervision of an Internatiohal Com- mission." The reference to "national elections" re- inforces the evidence of the historic :id status of Vietnam as a single nation. To present the picture, as the United States repeatedly has done, as though North Vietnam were an interloper having no organic relationship to South Vietnam is to ignore both the ap- plicable leg ed principles .and treaties and the facts of his iory. Although the United States par' icipated in the discussion leading up to the Geneva accords, it end not sign the final det ioration. Instead, the U.S. Government, thr ;ugh its Under Secretary of State, Waltee Bedell Smith, made its own unilateral declara- tion" on July 21, 1954. In this deelaration, the United Slates took note of the Geneva agreements and declared that the United States would "refrain from threat or the use of force te disturb them, in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the ()litigation of members to refrain in their international relation.s from the threat or use of firree." Referring to free elections in Viett am, the United States declaration stated: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve :nifty through elections' super- vised by the United Nations to insicre that they are conducted fairly." "i Note tint article 7 s;dpulates tnat the elections we to be antecedent to and a neceasary ccadition for the "fundamental freedoms. guaranteed by democratic institu- tions" and that the electione were to be held "in order to insure . that all thi . neces- sary conditions obtain for free expression of -the natio :cal will." This particular por- tion of the Geneva Accord has frequently been quoted out of context, with Hie key phrases in reverse order, in order to justify the refusal to hold elections on the ;irounds that the neccissary conditions did no!, exist. "See "Extracts From Verbatim. Heat irds of Eighth Session,- Geneva Accords. ',Nowhere in its own declaration did the United States recognize the political parti- tion of Vietnam; insofar as it referred to the country, it designated it as "Vietnam." not "South Vietnitm" and "North Vietnam" Thus the United States recognized Lila fact that Vietnam was a single nation. Nevertheless the justification of United States policy today ignores this admitted fact. The United States persists in de denial that it is intervening in a civil war. It seek.; to justify the bombing of North 'Vietnam by the United States on the basis that North Vietnam is a foreign aggressor iu South Vietn am. Nor is this all. The United States further pledged "that it will not join in any ar- rangement which will hinder" the reunifica- tion of Vietnam, and concluded with the hope that: "The agreement will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in Dill independence and sovereignty in the peaceful community of nations, and will cm' ible the people: of the area to determine their own fature." No election was ever held pursuant to the Cleneva Accords, although both tile Interna- tional Control Commission (composed of India, Poland, and Canada) and the United Nations announced readiness to Supervise such elections. South Vietnam announced that it did not regard itself obliged to take part in the elections because the participa- tion of North Vietnam would rencier sucti. elections not free, a position apparently sup- ported by the State Department.*c' In 1955, following the Geneva Accords, then Prime Minister of State Diem repudiated thr Geneva Agreements and refused to held the elections. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his Memoirs, suggests a further reason for Diem's refusal to hold elections pursuant to the Geneva Accords: "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Lido Chiciese af- fairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting possibly 80 percent of the population weatld have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh at; their leader rather than. Chief of State Bao DM." The consequences of the repudiation of the Geneva Accords were delineated by Sen- ator ERNEST GRUENING in a speech to the Senate on April 9, 1965: "That civil war began?let me repeat, be- cause this is crucial to the issue?wlien tint Diem regime?at our urging---refused to carry out the provision contained in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 to hold elections for the reunification of Vietnam. That was one of the underlying conditions of the "See, Question No. 7, "Questions ;hid An- swers on Vietnam," Department of State publication No. 7724, August 1991, p. Ii. See also footnote 19, George MeT. Kahn]. acid John W. Lewis, professors of government an, Cornell University, in their article. "The United States in Vietnam," which appeared in the June 1965 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, note (op. cit. p. 31) : "When on July 16, 1955, the Diem govern- ment announced, with American led:king, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central con- dition which had made the Geneva Accorda acceptable to the Vietminh. Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demon- strate otherwise, in encouraging this move. the United States departed from the posi- tion taken in its own unilateral declaration. And France in acquiescing abandoned the responsibility which she had uneqinf;ocally accepted a year earlier." (Citing--Allan B. Cole. ed., Condiet In Indo-China and International Repercus- sions," a documentary history, 1941, 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.) 1956, pp. 226-228; and Donald Lancaster, "The Emancipation of French Indo-China" (Oxford, 1961), pp. 370--372.) cit Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953 1956" (London, 1963) , p.372. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FT-M6ftiONARE1RECAtEjaRGAEM4MR000400050008-5 4223 Geneva agreement. The civil war began and has continued with intensified fury ever since * *. For over 800 years, before the conquest by France, Vietnam was a united country. After defeating the French in 1954, the Vietnamese went to the conference table at Geneva, agreeing to a settlement only on condition that reunification elections be held. Yet, nowhere in President John- son's speech of April 7, 1965, at Johns Hop- kins University is there held out a hope of ultimate reunification of Vietnam. He con- ditioned the ultimate peace 'upon an inde- pendent South Vietnam instead'." In view of all of the aforesaid, the assump- tions and justifications for our governmental policy in Vietnam do not appear to have sup- port, either in law or in fact. The conduct of the U.S. Government in Vietnam appears plainly to violate the terms of the Geneva Accords and to repudiate solemn pledges to "refrain from the threat or the use of force" to disturb the Geneva Accords. Moreover, nothing in the provisions of the southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty would appear to justify the conduct of the U.S. Government in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty was signed in Manila some 7 weeks after the signing of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty became effective,in Feb- ruary 1955, following the treaty ratification by eight member states-the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zea- land, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippine Islands. By the preamble and by article I of the SEATO Treaty, the parties acceded to the principles and supremacy of the United Na- tions Charter in accordance with article 103 thereof, which it will be recalled, provides as follows: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter arid their obli6ations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the pres- ent charter shall prevail." The supremacy of this provision was ex- pressly reiterated by the eight SEATO na- tions under article VI of said treaty, in which each solemnly agreed that the SEATO Treaty: "" * * does not affect the rights and ob- ligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or the re- sponsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and se- curity." The key provisions of the SEATO Treaty are to be found in article IV. Paragraph 1 thereof permits the use of force by one or more member states only in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack." But where the integrity or inviolability of any territory covered by the treaty is threat- ened "by other than armed attack" or "by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area," then, paragraph 2 of article IV requires, as a prerequisite to inter- vention, that "the parties shall consult im- mediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken. * * The consent of all eight SEATO nations was originally required before any military action under article IV could be undertaken by any of them (New York Times, May 28, 1962). Later, this rule was modified so that action could be undertaken if there was no dissenting vote-i.e., an abstention would not count as a veto (New York Times, April 19, 1964). At the last two annual meetings of the Ministerial Council of SEATO, France has refused to support a communique pledg- ing SEATO backing for South Vietnam against the Vietcong (New York Times, April 15-16, 1964; May 3-6, 1965; see also, Los Angeles Times, May 3-4, 1965). It would appear that with the threat of a French veto a formal SEATO commitment in Viet- nam has not been sought by the United States. However, even if there had been unanimity among the SEATO nations, the provisions of article 53 of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter will still prevail: "But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. * * Manifestly, no such authorization has ever been conferred, either by the Security Coun- cil of the United Nations or by the General Assembly, from which it follows that Ameri- can action in Vietnam clearly cannot be sup- ported by reference to SEATO. So long as the United States remains a member of the United Nations, our right to intervene is circumscribed by the provisions of the United Nations Charter. As members of SEATO, our right to intervene is limited, both by the requirement for unanimity among all of the eight treaty nations and, In addition, by the superseding requirement of article 53 of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, prohibiting any enforce- ment action under a regional arrangement without the authority of the Security Coun- cil. Our justification for acting contrary to our solemn obligations under the United Nations Charter appears tenuous and in- substantial, The fact of the matter is that the U.S. Government has simply acted as its own judge of its own interests in patent dis- regard of the fundamental law embodied in the United Nations Charter. III-CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM This disregard of the rules of the charter, inherent in U.S. intervention in Vietnam, is compounded by the fact that such inter- vention is also violative of our own Consti- tution. Whatever doubts may have existed prior to the President's "Report to the Nation Following a Review of U.S. Policy in Viet- nam" 2' (set out at his news conference on July 28, 1965) , as to whether U.S. action in Vietnam constituted the conduct of a war, the President in that report made it ex- plicitly clear that "this IS really war," noting that "our fighting strength" was being raised from 75,000 to 125,000 "almost immediately" and that "additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." Can the President's conduct be squared with our Constitution (apart from the obligations imposed upon member states by the United Nations Charter)? It is the genius of our constitutional sys- tem that ours is a government of checks and balances. A dangerous concentration of pow- er is avoided by the separation-in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution-of the leg- islative, executive, and judicial powers. The doctrine of "separation of powers" is funda- mental to, and is one of the "great structural principles of the American constitutional system." 25 The Supreme Court has recently characterized this "separation of powers" as "a bulwark against tyranny," United States v. Brown- U.S.-, 33 Law Week 4603 (June 7, 1965). The Supreme Court had earlier said: "The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the Pres- ident. Both powers imply many subordi- nate powers. Each includes all authority essential to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Con- gress, nor Congress upon the proper author- 28 Presidential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1 (Aug. 2, 1965), pp. 15-19. See also State De- partment bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 606; State Department bulletin, May 24, 1965, pas- sim; State Department bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 838, Krock, "By Any Other Name, It's Still War," New York Times, June 10, 1965. 25 Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" (New York, 1957), p. 9. ity of the President." Ex parte Milligan, 1 Wall 2, 139 (1866) Classically stated by Blackstone 26 and de- rived from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montes- quieu," this constitutional separation of powers was deliberately carried over by the Framers into the conduct of foreign affairs, For, contrary to widely held assumptions, the power to make and conduct foreign policy is not vested exclusively in the President, but is divided between him and Congress, with each endowed with complementary, but sepa- rate 28 powers and responsibilities." Thus, in making and carrying out general foreign policy, Article II, Section 2 requires the President to have the "Advice and Con- sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro- vided two-thirds of the Senators present con- cur." And the President also requires the advice and consent of the Senate to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." When statecraft fails and the question be- comes the ultimate one of war or peace, the Constitution imposes a tight rein upon the President. His participation ends at the threshold of the decision whether or not to declare war. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, that power is confided exclusively to the Congress.") There is no mention of the President in connection with the power to "declare war." Under the Constitution, Congress alone must make this decision. The Clause does not read "on recommenda- tion of the President," nor that the "Pres- ident with advice and consent of Congress may declare war." As former Assistant Sec- retary of State James Grafton Rogers has observed: "The omission is significant. There was to be no war unless Congress took the initiative." Rogers, "World Policing and The Constitution," p. 21 (Boston, 1945) . "Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of war is entrusted only to Congress." Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.). That the President lacks constitutional power to make war is underscored by the historic statement made by President Wood- row Wilson on the night of April 2, 1917, when he addressed the Congress in a joint session: "I have called the Congress into extraor- dinary session because there are serious, "Blackstone, "Commentaries on the Law of England," 146 (7th ed. 1775). 27 Cf., Sharp, The Classical American Doc- trine of "Separation of Powers," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935). 28 "One of the most striking facts in the institutional philosophic history of the United States (is) that the legislative-execu- tive quarrels during the colonial period con- vinced the colonists of the desirability of a separation of powers rather than a union of powers." Wright "Con,senstis and Con- tinuity," p. 17 (Boston, 1958). "The doctrine of separated powers is im- plemented by a number of constitutional previsions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is not to be performed by a given branch." United States v. Brown, supra-U.S., 33 Law Week, at p. 4605. 28 Story, "Commentaries on the Constitu- tion" (Boston, 1833) , passim, Dahl, "Congress and Foreign Policy" (New Haven, Conn., 1950); Robinson, "Congress and Foreign Pol- icy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative" (Ill. 1962). 2? Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Con- stitution reads: "The Congress shall have the power: "1. To declare war, grant letters of mar- que and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water." Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1221 Approved For RelwARRIBR1A3f: WRtPE9Tinivigip0400050008-5 March 1. 1966 eery serious choices of poliey to be made, ancl made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of mak- ing." St- President Franklin Roosevelt also heeded his constitutional responsibilities and was :ilso mindful and sensitive of the consti- tutional limitations applicable to the Presi- dent when, before a joint session of the Con- gress on December 7, 1941, he requested the Congress for a declaration of war following 'Pearl Harbor. The decision to place the responsibility for declaring war exclusively in Congress as the direct representative of the people, and not even to provide for the President's partici- pation in that decision was a most deliber- ate one by the Framers. '1' mc Constitutional Convention had been urged to rest the power to declare war, the "last resort of sovereigns, ultima ratio regum," in the executive, or, alternatively. in the Senate. :3 Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution." par. 1166. The arguments were made that "large bodies necessarily move slowly" and "despatch, secrecy, and vigor are often indispensable, and always usel ul toward success." Story, ibid. When the issue was debated at the Con- vention, Mr. Gerry stated that he "never ex- pected to hear in a republic a motion to em- power the Executive alone to declare war." Madison and Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Ex- ecutive the power to repel sudden attacks." The motion carried. Farrand ed., "Records of the Federal Convention" (New Haven, I).lii IL pp. 318-319.. Nowhere in the debates is there support for he view that the President can wage a war or "commit" our Nation to the waging of a war. On the contrary, warm.aking was Lu be a purely legislation prerogative. The wily use of force without a declaration of ,fl President', Wilson went on to say: "With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am tak- ing and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty. I ad- vise that the Congress declare the recent course of the imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against 1lie Government and people of the United :States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been, thrust upon and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Gov- ernment of toe German Empire to terms and end the war." .t The Flamers concluded and provided osat "the power of declaring war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative; but that IL is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the nation. War, in its best ,tstfate, never fails to impose upon the people the most burdensome taxes, and. personal ,t.tilerings. It is always injurious and some- time of the great commercial, t,1;,,ntifacturing. and agricultural interests.. Nay, it always involves the prosperity, and. not infrequent:iv the existence of a nation., Ti, is :sometimes fatal to public liberty itself.. by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, wherever a succes- eive commander will lead; and in a republic whose institutions are essentially founded on the basis of peace, there is infinite danger that war will find it both imbecile in de- and eager for contest. Indeed, the his- tory of republics has but too fatally proved, that they are too ambitious of military fame 1,isti conquest, and too easily devoted to the war that was contemplated as the debates clearly show, was "to repel sudden ottacks." " These constitutional provisions that only Congress shall have the power to declare war and that Congress has the sole responsibility to raise and support the armies, to provide for a navy, and to impose the taxes to provide the funds to carry on a war, reflected a pro- found distrust of executive autlacelty and a corresponding reliance upon the tegislature as the instrument for the decisionmaking in this vital area. Bemis,. "The Diplomacy of the American Revolution" (New Yak, 1935), These provisions reflected thing:- painfully learned during the early colonitl period, when every major European vier had its counterpart on the American fron.ers. The Colonies were therefore determined to end the imperial authority to decide for them what wars they should enter and what the outcome of those wars should be. Savelle, "The American Balance of Power, and the European Diplomacy 171:3-78," in Morris ed., "The Era of the American Revolution" (New York, 1939), pp. 140-169. The Convention was not only (determined to deny warmaking power to the President, but was also unwilllng to entrust it to the Senate alone. To assure the fullest consid- eration, the Framers therefore proeided that the House of Representatives, larger and more representative than the Senate, should also be brought in to decide this vital ques- tion. Thc action and decision of the whole Congress were therefore constitutionally made necessary to this fateful undertaking. "The Constitution says,. therefore, in effect, 'Our country shall not be committed formally to a trial of force with another nation, our people generally summoned to the effort and all the legal consequences to people, rights and property incurred until the House, Sen- ate and the President agree.'" Rogers, "World Policing and the Constitution" (Bos- ton, .I1945), p. 35. -Concededly there have been many in- stances, when the President has sent U.S. Armed Forces abroad without a declaration of war by Congress.3' These have ranged from engagements between pirates and American ships on the high seas to the dis- patch of our Armed Forces to Latin Ameri- can countries. These precedents cannc.t justify the pres- ent actions without bringing to mind Swift's comment on "precedents" in ''Crulliver's Travels": "It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, rosy legally be done again; and therefore they take spe- cial care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the gen- eral reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as au- thorities to justify the most iniquitous opin- ions; and the judges never fail to directing accordingly." Here it is important to distineuish our country's involvement in the Korean war. views of cierna fogs, who flatter their pride and betray their interests. It should there- fore be difficult, in a republic to cited:fro war; but not to make peace." Story op. cit., sec. 1166. Manifestly the residuary power eft to the President --"th repel sudden attack" con- templated attacks on the countty's geo- graphical territory?not "sudden at tacks" in far-off lands, such as southeast Asia. Cf. Tonkin Bey joint resolution. of Aug. 6-7, 1964, discussed in sec. IV, infra. "See U.S. Senate Committee or. Foreign Relations and Committee ,on Armed Services, hearing, "Situation in Cuba," 87th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 17, 1962 (Washington. G.P.O., 1962), pp. 82-87; Rogers,. op. cit., -specially pp. 93-123. For the United States fought wider the aegis of the United Nations pursuant to a definitive resolution of the Security Council authorizing and directing the employment of Armed Forces of member states, so that the United States was thus perfoeming its solemn obligations undertaken in iecorning a signatory of the United Nations Charter, a treaty which is the "Supreme Lew of the Land." But in the Vietnamese situation, there has been no authorization by the Se- curity Council; indeed the Security Council has not even been seized of the metter, has not been requested to entertain jurisdiction of the present conflict. It is therefore unfortunately vitally neces- sary, although trite, to recall that "the Gov- ernment of the United States has been em- phatically termed a government of !aws, and not of men." Marbury v. MarliNc,n, 1 Cr. 137 (1803). Under a government 17l. laws. the President is not free from the ,.hacks of the Constitution of the United States; the President is not free to assume the pow- ers entrusted solely to the Congress. Ours is not a government of executive su- premacy.. Here it is fitting to recall that on May 6, 1954, at a time when the fall of Lien Bien Phu was imminent, then Senator Lyndon. Johnson, as Democratic leader of the Senate, at a Jefferson-Jackson dinner, critieized the Eisenhower administration in these terms: "We will insist upon clear explanations of the policies in which we are asked to co- operate. We will insist that we and the American people be treated as adults?that we have the facts without sugar coating. "The function of Congress is nut simply to appropriate money and leave the problem of national security at that."3" A New York Times survey (June 1.1, 1965) reports widespread "uneasiness" over the President's foreign policies; that tie .Arner- lean academic world "is intellectually and emotionally alienated from the President, to whom it gave such strong support in the election"; that there is "increasing?and mutual--hostility between the President and many segments of the press"; that many' Democratic Members of Congress are "restive and unhappy * * * over what tiny regard as [the President's] high-handed manner of making and carrying out deeielons on foreign affairs"; that many friendly govern- ments abroad "are apprehensive ali)out Mr. Johnson's use of national power"; that among these views are expressions of "dis- may," the unreliability of CIA and FBI reports which the President accepted, the lack of clear policy, the disregard of "prie- eiples, support or advice." It is therefore imperative that Congress guard zealously against any executi ye usur- pation of its exclusive power to declare, or to decline to declare war. President Johnson has not been. aninind- ful of the damaging consequences inherent in the violation of the separation 01 powers. As recently as August 21, 1965 the President vetoed a $1.7 billion military construction bill, calling it "repugnant to the Conistitti- tion." In a stern message to Congress, the. President described certain section:: of the bill as clear violations of the "separation of powers"; warned Congress to stop meddling Si "With all its defects, delays, eit 1 incon- veniences, men have discovered no la elinione for long preserving free government except that the executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary de- liberations," Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, supra, 343 U.S. at 655 (1952). 3? Jackson, "Role and Problems of itaneress with Reference to Atomic War," May 17, 1954, publication No. L 54-135, Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved EwRalease,200&07h12, March 1, 1966 LuivoluzmuiNFAL? akr,CoratfiDRSINA.01446R000400050008-5 4225 in the prerogatives of the executive branch (New York Times, August 21, 1966, p. 1). Yet the President has not hesitated to in- trude upon the exclusive power vested in Congress to declare war. TV?CONGRESS HAS NOT DECLARED WAR IN VIET- NAM; ITS JOINT RESOLUTIONS ARE NEITHER A SUBSTITUTE FOR A DECLARATION OF WAR NOR DO THEY MAKE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR- MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL Congress has not declare war in Vietnam and the President does not claim that any declaration of war supports his actions in Vietnam. In fact, the President is reported to be extremely reluctant to ask Congress directly to declare war.,7 Instead, the Presi- dent is reported (New York Times, June 19, 1965, p. 10) to believe that authority for his actions may be inferred or extracted from the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution of August 6-7, 1964 (H.J. Res. 1145; Public Law 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, 88th Cong., 2d sess.) and the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1965 (H.J. Res. 417; Public Law 89-18; 79 Stat. 109, 89th Cong., 1st sess.) making a supplemental ap- propriation to the Defense Department for the Vietnam operations. The Tonkin Bay resolution is not a decla- ration of war. At most, it is an ultimatum? if that. It "approves and supports the de- termination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It goes on to express the view that "the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia 'is vital' to the national interests of the United States" and declares he readiness of the United States to take all necessary steps, in- cluding the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol SEATO state to de- fend its freedom. The resolution, however, provides that all such steps shall be "con- sonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Na- tions and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty." It is clear that Congressmen who voted for the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution were not voting a declaration of war in Vietnam. The resolution does not mention North Vietnam nor China; indeed it does not even mention Vietnam. It was "passed in the fever of in- dignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. fleet units in Tonkin Bay." CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 9, 1965, p. 12528. There is no evidence that Congress thought or under- stood that it was declaring war. It took no contemporaneous action which would have implemented a declaration of war. And the remarks of several Members of the House and Senate during and since the debate on the resolution reinforce the conclusion that the Tonkin Bay Resolution was not regarded as a declaration of war. Congress manifestly cannot delegate to the President its exclusive, power to declare war; and even under the specific terms of the Tonkin Bay Resolution, the President's actions neither conform nor are consonant with the Constitution?and, as we have seen in the earlier analysis, the President's actions are not consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, nor with the SEATO Treaty. In passing the May 7, 1965, resolution, au- thorizing a supplemental appropriation for the Vietnam operations, Congress was con- fronted with a fait accompli which se- verely circumscribed its action. Its constitu- tional check on the will or errors of the Executive was by the President's message, re- duced to its power of the purse. Such a cir- cumscription will not necessarily prevent un- 3, Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965, "The United States May Become More Candid on Rising Land-War Involvement," pp. 1, 16, No. 36---11 wise or unpopular decisions or allow for the exercise of the full discretion which the Constitution intended Congress to have, and for it alone to exercise. Nevertheless, a reso- lution authorizing an appropriation does not constitute a declaration of war, nor can it constitutionally authorize the President to wage an undeclared war. The presidential assumption of powers vested exclusively in the Congress concern arrogations of power which convert republi- can institutions, framed for the purpose of guarding and securing the liberties of the citizen, into a government of executive su- premacy. If the Constitution has such elas- tic, evanescent character the provisions for its amendment are entirely useless; presi- dentially-determined expediency would be- come then the standard of constitutional construction. Under the rule of law, compliance with the forms and procedures of the law are as Imperative as compliance with the substance of the law. A lynching is a totally inade- quate substitute for a trial, regardless of the guilt of the victim. What Mr. Justice Frank- furter wrote in another context is equally applicable here: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, (1947). Under our system, constitutional powers must be exercised in a constitutional man- ner by constitutionally established institu- tions. Disregard of fundamentals in an area concerning the highest sovereign prerogative affecting the very lives and fortunes of its citizens in the interest of a short term ex- pediency undermines" 'constitutional moral- ity' to such an extent that the maintenance of the order itself is endangered." Fried- rich, "The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective," p. 216 (Chicago, 1963). Finally, it cannot be over emphasized that even a declaration of war by the Congress would not negate the violations of our ob- ligations assumed under the United Nations Charter or negate the violations of interna- tional law inherent in United States inter- vention in Vietnam. Conclusion A learned authority in international af- fairs has stated: "Bluntly, all the rules about intervention. are meaningless if every nation can decide for itself which governments are legitimate and how to characterize particular limited conflict. Unless we are prepared to continue a situation in which the legality of inter- vention will often depend upon which side of the fence you are on, and in which, there- fore, our policy becomes one of countering force with force, we must be willing to refer questions of recognition (i.e., legitimacy of the government involved) and characteri- zation of a disorder (i.e., whether an armed attack from abroad or a civil war) to some authority other than ourselves. The United Nations is the most likely candidate for the role." " The United States has not observed the letter or spirit of its treaty obligations with respect to the action taken in Vietnam. World order and peace depend on the will- ingness of nations to respect international law and the rights of other nations. The United Nations is a symbol of the rejection of fatal policies which led to World War It, and an acceptance by the peoples of the world of the principles of collective security, and the avoidance of war and the use of armed forces in the settlement of differences between nations. The United Nations was 28 Roger Fisher, professor of law at Harvard University, "Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and Law" found in Essays on Inter- vention, a publication of the Marshon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University Press, pp. 19-20. intended to insure the preservation of inter- national peace, security, and justice, through rules of law, binding upon all member na- tions. The fundamental condition for the effective functioning of the United Nations is the observance on the part of all signatory nations of the obligations assumed under the charter. Only in this way can the awe- some potential of a third world war be prevented. We have concluded that the U.S. Govern- ment is in violation of its treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter. We urge upon the Government that all steps be immediately taken to undo this illegality by an immedi- ate return to an observance of the letter and spirit of the provision of the U.N. Charter. This is a solemn hour in history. We have a moral obligation to history to return to the high purposes and principles of the United Nations?to honor the pledges we solemnly assumed?to settle international disputes by peaceful means?to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force. At this fateful hour, we do well to recall the prophetic dream of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the architect of the United Na- tions, who upon his return from the Yalta Conference in his last address to the Con- gress in March 1945, said: "The Crimea Conference * * ? ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries?and have always failed. We pro- pose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving na- tions will finally have a chance to join." Should we not, 20 years after President Roosevelt's hopeful dream-20 years after the advent of the nuclear age with the awe- some potentiality of incineration of our planet and the annihilation of our civiliza- tion and the culture of millenia?should we not "spell the end of the system of unilateral action * * * that has been tried for cen- turies?and has always failed"? Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the meas- ure before the Senate would authorize the appropriation of supplemental de- fense funds required by our forces in Vietnam. I shall vote for the measure for what it is?an authorization to fund urgent military requirements. And I shall vote to table the amendment to re- peal the so-called Tonkin Gulf resolu- tion of 1964. Much has been said in recent days about the implications of our votes for or against this or that proposition bear- ing upon the foreign policy of the United States. We have been reminded that the Senate approved ratification of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1, and adopted the Tonkin Gull resolution by a vote of 88 to 2. And it has been suggested that, by these acts, the Senate conferred upon the President complete discretion to deal with southeast Asia as he may see fit. I do not so regard my votes for the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf reso- lution. Nor do I feel that, by now voting against repeal of the resolution and for this authorization bill, I am abdicating my responsibility as a Member of the Senate and of the Committee on Foreign Relations to maintain a vigilant watch over the course of this Nation's, policies in southeast Asia in the months ahead. Eighteen months ago, when we adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution, we were giving a vote of confidence to the President in his handling of a particu- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4226 Approved For moRtiniftwiCita9n713_000 S0050008-5 March 1, 11j66 lar situation. To repeal that resolution today would make no sense unless one feels, as some of my colleagues may feel, that it is time for a vote of no confidence in the President. That is not my view, and that is why I shall vote to table the amendment. I am satisfied that the administration is sincere in its purpose to avoid an esca- lation that would lead to a general war in the Far East and in its conviction that our objectives can be attained without that happening. At the same time, I believe that we have a continuing and continuous re- sponsibility to satisfy ourselves that our policies make sense and should be sup- ported. And I believe that the President has a similar responsibility to Congress and to the people to keep us fully in- formed at all times. :Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send to the desk a motion and ask that it be read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mo- tion will be read for the information of the Senate. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] pro- poses as follows: I hereby move to table the pending amend.- tnent of the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE! to the pending bill, 5.2791, a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of air- craft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, Lest, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER,. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered: and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BaswsTsa 1 is absent on official business. I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from Ohio I Mr. LAUSCHE] are necessarily absent. I further. announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Maryland I Mr. BREWSTER I and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LauscHE I would each vote "yea." The result was announced?yeas 92, nays 5, as follows: [No. 41 Leg.] SAS--92 Aiken. Cotton lull Allot t curtis Holland Anderson Dirksen Hrudsa tartriett Dodd 'Inouye it;ESS Dominick Jackson I iayh Douglas Javits itennett Eastland Jordan, N.C. Bible Ellender Jordan, Idaho Boggs Ervin Kennedy, Mass? Burdick Fannin Kennedy, N.Y. Byrd, Va. Fong K fiche' yrd, W. Va. Gore bong, Mo. Cannon Harris Long, La. Carlson Hart Magnuson Case Iliartke Mansfield Clark Hayden McClellan :ociper Hickenlooper McGee McGovern McIntyre McNamara Metcalf Miller Mondale Monroney Montoya Morton Moss Mundt Murphy Muskie Nelson Neuberger Srnsthers Pastore Smith Pearson Sparkman Pell Stennis Prouty Symington Proxmire Tal,nadge Randolph Thurmond Ribieoff Tower Robertson Tydings Russell, S.C. tams, N.J. Russell, Ga. WiPiams, Del. Saltonstall Yo.riterough Scott Yon n g, N. Dak. Simpson NAYS-5 Fulbright McCarthy Yoang, Ohio Crucini rig Morse .NOT VOTING--3 Brewster Church Lau -che So Mr. .MansFmn's motion to lay on the table Mr. MORSE'S amendment was agreed to. APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT The VICE PRESIDENT. he Chair wishes to announce the f olle wing ap- pointments: BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE AIR FOR( E ACADEMY Pursuant to Section 9355 of title 10, United States Code, the Chair appoints Senators MeGEG, Moss, and ALLOTT as members of the Board of Visitors to the Air Force Academy. BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE COM T GUARD ACADEMY Pursuant to Public Law 207 of the 81st Congress, the Chair appoints the Sen- ator from Connecticut [Mr. Donal as a member of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen- ators ELLENima, ROBERTSON, and MURPHY as members of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Military Academy. BOARD, OF WITETTORS TO THE MERCHAN MARINE ACADEM Y Pursuant to Public Law 301 of the 78th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen- ator ROBERT F. KENNEDY of New York, to the Board of Visitors of the Merchant Marine Academy. BOARD OP VISITORS TO THE NAVAL ACADEMY Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen- ators HOLLAND, BIBLE, and BOGGS as members of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Naval Academy. JOINT COMMITTEE ON SEDUCTION OF NON- ESSE NTIAE FEDERAL EXEENDITI LIES Pursuant to Public Law 250 of the 77th Congress. the Chair appoints Senator CLINTON ANTI ERSON as a member of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non- essential Federal Expenditures to fill the vacancy created by the retirement from the Senate of Senator Harry P. Byrd. INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Pursuant to Public Law 170 of the 74th Congress, the Chair appoints the fol- lowing Senators to attend the Inter- parliamentary Union, Canberra, Aus- tralia? April 11-16, 1966; Senators TAL- MADGS, YARBOROUGH, LONG Of MiSS01111, SCOTT, HRUSKA, and SIMPSON. PLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966 The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorise appro- priations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evalu- ation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. GIwSNING1 is about to propose an amendment. I understand that he does not intend to speak on it very long. I understand that the distinguished chairman of the com- mittee may have a few words in answer. It will be my intention then to move to table the amendment of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I would anticipate there will be a yea-and-nay vote. I can guarantee that there will be. I suggest that all Members sl,ay close to the floor as possible. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Alaska is recognized. Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 481 to S. 2791, and ask that it be read. The VICE PRESIDENT. The amend- ment will be stated for the infermation of the Senate. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 3, after line 8, add the following new section: "SEc. 302. During any period iihat any armed force of the United States it engaged in armed conflict or hostilities in iiouthcit sr. Asia, no person who is a member of tint u armed force serving on active duty by virtue of involuntary induction under the Univer- sal Military Training and Service Act shall be assigned to perform duty in such area. unless (1) such person volunteers for service in such area, or (2) the Congress hereafter authorizes by law the assignment to duty in southeast Asia of persons involuntarily in- ducted into such armed forces." Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the proposed amendment would merely pro- vide that draftees should not be sent to southeast Asia to combat without the consent of the Congress. It does not provide, as some columnists have mistakenly reported, that they shall not go. It provides that Congress must approve. There are two objectives. C'ongress should be further included in our pro- ceedings. There has been much discus- sion in the last few days and months on the degree of participation of the Con- gress in some important measures. This would be one way for Congress to partici- pate and stand up and be couned. The history of the proposed amend- ment is that last August when I was visiting in the White House with Presi- dent Johnson, who had invited me to come there and express my views or opposition to our policy in southeast Asia, I told him that I was planning that afternoon to introduce this amend- atory legislation. The President asked me very insist- ently not to do it. Then he said "If we Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved Fi::?fralAtitygsfal5E/laabyp_P?REMIA6R000400050008-5 4231 my vote reflects my conviction that we must protect men we have sent into bat- tle no matter how mistaken the policy may be that sent them to that battlefield. I accept the words of Senator RUSSELL, chairman of the Armed Services Com- mittee, when he said in presenting this bill to the Senate: It could not properly be considered as de- termining foreign policy, as ratifying deci- sions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments. I agree with these further observations of Senator RUSSELL: Mr. President, an attempt to brush aside the misgivings and reservations that many Senators and members of the public hold about events in southeast Asia would be futile. This is not my purpose. I, too, am extremely unhappy and concerned about the gravity of the situation there and what our commitment portends. This bill cannot possibly be construed as either an endorsement of or as an attack upon national policy. It involves more the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and a member of our family and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not throw it to him to enable him to assist him- self out of the water, this would be a cal- lous and heartless attitude for us to take. I think the debate over the past few weeks and the Senate Foreign Relations hearings have been most helpful in clarifying some of the problems we face in Asia. I only wish more Senators had been involved in the debate of our south- east Asia policy a year ago. I hope now that we will do everything in our power to avoid an all-out war in Asia. Such a war would claim the lives of vast num- bers of American men and in the end create conditions of disorder that would open the way for the very tyranny we fear. I hope the debate will continue on all aspects of our Asia policy. It is only through such free and open discussion that we can find the way to an effective policy. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BEING MISLED INTO AN UNNECESSARY HOLOCAUST IN VIETNAM Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yes- terday, in discussing S. 2791, I stated that, in my opinion, the American people are being misled into an unnecessary holocaust. S. 2791, the supplemental procurement and construction authorization bill, now before the Senate, will plunge the United States into an unlimited war in Asia. It is a blank check for unlimited esca- lation. I use the word "misled" advisedly be- cause the true facts are not made avail- able to the Amercan public and we are asked to legislate under a cloak of secrecy. Just as when we were asked to pass the Bay of Tonkin resolution in August of 1964 and to pass an unneeded $700 million appropriation in May of 1965, we are now asked to pass?in a hurry?a $4.8 billion military authorization which is far more than it seems, and takes us one more step down the road to a major war which, while now confined to south- east Asia, could easily spread to the rest of the world. The President was clear when he re- quested this supplemental authorization. He said in his message of January 19, 1966: In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of au- thorization and appropriation, the Congress has provided continuing support for our na- tional decision "to prevent further aggres- sion" in southast Asia. The quoted words come from the joint resolution of the Con- gress?Public Law 88-408?approved on Au- gust 10, 1964. It is in the letter and the spirit of the resolution that I request this supplementary appropriation. While that resolution remains in force, and until its ob- ligations are discharged, we must persevere. I believe the resolution is right, and I believe the course we follow is necessary. I intend that those who must face danger and death as we follow that course shall be supported. I am confident that the Congress will agree. In the clear and enequivocal words of the President, the supplemental is re- quested within "the letter and spirit" of the Tonkin Bay resolution. We are being urged to pass this sup- plemental as an urgent matter. Yet, as the able and distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. FULERIGIIT, pointed out on February 28, 1966: The Armed Services Committee of the House stated that there was no particular urgency and that this bill is a kind of leg- erdemain affecting next year's budget. It was handled in this way so that there would not be as big a deficit as would have been the case otherwise. Therefore, these au- thorizations were shifted into this bill. As far as the material being needed now, the House stated that the testimony on that point was not persuasive. The report of the Armed Services Committee of the House states: The essential purpose of, and underlying cause for, the proposed legislation is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters, ships, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles are all being utilized at a rate greater than it was pos- sible to anticipate when the 1966 authoriza- tion for those items was passed. This leg- islation was approved by the committee solely in order to achieve more rapid pro- curement of replacements of articles con- sumed, and to provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time. If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items in- volved, in all three categories of procure- ment, research and development, and con- struction, may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supple- mental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definite data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legisla- tion which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authori- zation. We realize the difficulty of determining exact future needs in any wartime frame- work, however, and to the extent of the pro- posed legislation we are accepting in good faith the assurances of the services and the Department of Defense that this authority is needed for these purposes at this time. We assure the Members of the House that the performance of the Department of De- fense and of the services in living up to these assurances will be closely followed. As I have said, we are called upon to- day to legislate under a cloak of secrecy. And it is not easy for an individual Senator to obtain the necessary informa- tion on which to determine whether the broad grants of power to the President and the Secretary of Defense which would be made by this bill are really necessary. In the 367-page printed Volume of the Senate hearings on S. 2791 there are not fewer than 958 deletions?. close to 3 deletions per page. The 374-page printed volume of the House hearings on a companion bill contains the same abundant deletions. Even if an individual Senator should obtain unanimous consent from the Sen- ate Committee on the Armed Services to read the original hearing record contain- ing all the testimony, including the por- tions deleted for security reasons, the individual Senator would be better in- formed, presumably, but could in no event share that additional information with the American people. Thus, if in the course of the original hearings, it should be disclosed that sub- stantial escalation is provided for in this bill?as Secretary of Defense McNamara did testify to publicly?the individual Senator could not reveal the factual background to the American people if those facts are based on the classified material he read. There are five basic policy decisions which the Senate is being called upon to decide in voting on S. 2791. In the first place, it is being called upon to authorize unlimited escalation as the President may decide. As Secretary of Defense McNamara stated before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: The budget will provide forces and equip- ment sufficient to fight the war at substan- tially increased scope and intensity, should that become necessary and desirable. In the second place, S. 2791 would au- thorize the Secretary of each military department to build military installa- tions and facilities any place in south- east Asia they may decide. This is con- trary to established precedent under which military installations and facilities are authorized on a line item basis. In the third place, S. 2791 would au- thorize the Secretary of Defense to build such permanent military bases anywhere in the world. This again violates estab- lished precedent for line item authoriza- tions by the Congress for each such base. The House hearings clearly reveal that the Department of Defense, in sub- mitting its budget request for these military bases, could not justify its re- quest on the basis of specific items, again pointing to the fact that there is no urgency for the authorization of such bases because the military planners do not now know what they will need. And finally, S. 2791 would change the method of funding the support of Allied forces in southeast Asia from the military assistance program?coming within the purview of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations?to the regular au- thorizations for the support of the Department of Defense?coming within Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For ReJease 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4232 (.1 )NGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 1, 1966 the purview of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. This is a vital change in policy since, to all intents and pur- poses, this represents a downgrading of civilian influence in South Vietnam as represented by our Ambassador there to the benefit of our military commander there. There are thus five policy decisions involved in S. 2791: First. A reaffirmation of the Bay of Tonkin resolution; Second. Delegation to the President of the power of unlimited military osculation in southeast Asia; Third. A change in long established precedents for Congress to authorize the establishment, of each military base and. the delegation of such authorization authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the-Army, the Air Force, and the Navy: and, finally, Fourth. A change in financing the support of the allied forces in South Vietnam from the military assistance program to the regular authorizations to the Department of Defense. 8. 2791 is therefore not a simple military supply bill. It is a bill making sweeping changes in 'U.S. policy. If this were just another military authorization bill to supply needed ma- terial for our fighting men in Vietnam, there would be no question of my support for it. But S. 2791 is not just another military authorization bill. S. 2791 is nothing more than another device like the premise was to commit the Congress to administration policy. It is designed to obtain blanket con- gressional approval of what has been done militarily in Vietnam and of what may be done militarily in the future how- ever great the escalation and into what- ever part of southeast Asia this military adventure may lead our forces. - I have in the past and will in the fu- ture support military authorization and appropriation needs but only where such .needs are real and where the bill is not iaeing used as a coverup device for se- curing enormous delegations of power from the Congress to the executive branch or for securing congressional ap- proval for future policies, the nature of which is not disclosed to the Congress. It has been alleged and will be again that this bill is needed to support our boys at the front. On the contrary, the enactment of this bill will spell the death of thousands more. I want to see that wanton scarifice of the flower of our youth stopped. I have voiced again and again on the floor of the Senate my con- viction that all South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. We have already lost over 2000, of them, and under this bill the casualties will steadily increase. I cannot in good conscience lend my vote to this needless and unjustifiable slaughter. I shall vote against this bill. Mr.. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays entered on Saturday, February 26, 1966, on the com- mittee amendment in the nature of a substitute, be rescinded, and that the bill proceed to a third reading, and then I shall ask for the yeas and nays on passage. The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob- jection to the request of the Senator from Georgia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The question is on agreeing to the com- mittee amendment. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to, as follows: TITLE I?PROCUREMENT SEC. 101. In addition to the ftu.ds author- ised to be appropriated under Public LA,w 89-37 there is hereby authorized 1.), be appro- priated during the fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval ves- sels, and tracked combat vehicles ii amounts as follows : A irci'aFt For aircraft: for the Army, $E25,600,000; for the Navy and the Marine Ccirps, $738,- 300,000; for the Air Force, $1,585,700,000. /if iss71,:s For missiles: for the Army, $64,000,000; for the Navy, $263200,000; for the Marine Corps, $27,500,000; for the Air Force, $63,700,000. Tracked combat vehicles For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $75,800,000; for the Marine Corps, $10,900,000. TITLE II? RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVAL CATION Sac. 201 In addition to the funds author- ized to be appropriated under Pablic Law 89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appro- priated during fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United ).itates for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows: For the Army, 8271195,000; For the Navy (including the Mari) le Corps), $52,570,000; For the Air Force, $71,08.7,000. TITLE II I?MILITARY CONSTRUE': ION SEC. 301. The Secretary of each military department may establish or develop military installations and facilities by acquiring, con- structing, converting, rehabilitating, or in- stalling permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site pre- paration, appurtenances, utilities aid equip- ment, which are necessary in connection with military activities in southeast Asia, or in support of such activities, in the total amount as follows: Department of the Army, $509,7C0,000; Department of the Navy. $254,6C0,000; Department of the Air Force, $2'71,100,000. SEC. 302. The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facili- ties which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States, and in connec- tion therewith to acquire, constrict, con- vert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, including tand ac- quisition, :).ite preparation, appurtenances, utilities and equipment in the total amount of $200,000,000. SEC. 303. The Secretary of each military department may proceed to establish or de- velop installations and facilities ur. der this Act without regard to section 3646 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.).C. 529) and sections 4774(d) and 9774(d) of title 10, United States Code. The authority to place permanent or temporary imporvements on land includes authority for surveys, admin- istration, overhead, planning, and .):upervi- sion incident to construction. That author- ity may be exercised before title to the land is approved under section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and even though the land is held temporarily. The authority to acquire real estate or land Includes authority to make surveys and to acquire land, and interests in land (including temporary use), by gift, purchase. exchange of Government-owned land, or otherwise. SEC. 304. Whenever-- (1) the President determines that compli- ance with section 2313(b) of title LO, United States Code, for contracts made under this Act for the establishment or development of military installations and facilities in foreign countries would interfere with the carrying out of this Act; and (2) the Secretary of Defense told Comp- troller General have agreed upon alternative methods of adequately auditing those con- tracts; the President may exempt those contracts from the requirements of that section. SEC. 305. There are authorized 10 be ap- propriated such sums as may be necessary for the purposes of this title, but the appro- priations for public works authorized by sections 301 and 302 shall not exceed---- (1) for section 301: Department of the Army, $509,700,000; Department of the Navy. $254,600,000; Department of the Air Force. $274,100,000, or a total of $1,038,400,000. (2) for section 302: a total of $200,000,000. TITLE IV?GENERAL PROV/SIO SEC. 401. (a) Funds authorized for appro- priation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in connection with sup- port of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine. (b) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report with respect to the estimated value by country of support furnished from appropriations authorized to be made under this subsection. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr Presi- dent, I ask for the yeas and nays on passage of the bill. The yeas and nays were ordered. The VICE PRESIDENT. The bal hav- ing been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, mud the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER I , and the Senator from Maine [Mr. MusHrE] are absent on offi- cial business. I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LA uscia] are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if presei it and voting, the Senator from Maryland I Mr. BREWSTER , the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MusHiE], and the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER] would each vote "yea." Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 d March 1, 1966 Approvee&I?WitIaSAWAV7ititcPtti-RDRAYNIN9#46R000400050008-5 4233 The result was announced?yeas 93, nays 2, as follows: [No. 43 Leg.] YEAS-03 Aiken Hart Moss Allott Hartke Mundt Anderson Hayden Murphy Bartlett Hickenlooper Nelson Bass Hill Pastore Bayh Holland Pearson Bennett Hruska Pell Bible Inouye Prouty Boggs Jackson Proxmire Burdick Javits Randolph Byrd, Va. Jordan, N.C. Ribicoff Byrd, W. Va. Jordan, Idaho Robertson Cannon Kennedy, Mass. Russell, S.C. Carlson Kennedy, N.Y. Russell, Ga. Case Kuchel Saltonstall Clark Long, Mo. Scott Cooper Long, La. Simpson Cotton Magnuson Smathers Curtis Mansfield Smith Dirksen McCarthy Sparkman Dodd McClellan Stennis Dominick McGee Symington Douglas McGovern Talmadge Eastland McIntyre Thurmond Ellender McNamara Tower Ervin Metcalf Tydings Fannin Miller Williams, N.J. Fong Mondale Williams, Del. Fulbright r Monroney Yarborough Gore Montoya Young, N. Dalt. Harris Morton Young, Ohio NAYS.-2 Gruelling Morse NOT VOTING-5 Brewster Lausche Neuberger Church Muskie So the bill (S. 2791) was passed. The title was amended, so as to read: "A bill to authorize appropriations dur- ing the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, devel- opment, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes." Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the bill was passed be reconsidered. Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is always a great honor and a distinct privilege to congratulate the distin- guished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. Today is no exception. The able and skillful chairman of the Armed Services Committee has again earned the highest respect of the Senate with the near-unanimous passage of the supplemental authorizations for our Armed Forces. Characteristically, his resolute and highly capable handling of this measure, more than anything t,7.-_?2, was responsible for this great success. He was eloquent. He was articulate. The credit is his and it is richly deserved. The Senate's action today represents just one of many brilliant achievements in support of our servicemen brought about by the tireless efforts of the great Georgia Senator. Through the years he has keenly appreciated and anticipated consistently the needs of our servicemen. That is extremely important. But even more, he, like no others, has devoted his unexcelled determination and undaunted No. 36-12 capacities to assuring the fulfillment of those needs?all to make our troops un- matched on the face of the earth. So again today he has successfully repre- sented those men with his usual incom- parable advocacy, or, as he put it him- self?with all the power of his being. We are grateful. All America is grateful. We are grateful, too, for the splendid efforts of the junior Senator from Mis- sissippi [Mr. STENNIS]. As chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcom- mittee, he is always a tireless and de- voted worker for the men in our armed services. Today's success is his to share. And to the distinguished senior Sena- tor from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTON- STALL] goes high commendation and sincere appreciation for his unsurpassed cooperative leadership. As always, his unfailing efforts helped immensely to bring about the passage of this most important authorization. Finally, I personally am deeply grate- ful to those Members of this body who so ably and properly presented their own views concerning our efforts in Vietnam, but who nonetheless joined today in giv- ing our fighting men the decisive sup- port which they deserve so much. I am referring particularly to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas?that astute and eloquent chairman of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee. I also refer to the senior Senators from Indiana [Mr. HART- KE] , Idaho [Mr. Oilmen], Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] , and Tennessee [Mr. GORE], to the junior Senators from Ohio [Mr. YouNc] , and South Dakota [Mr. McGov- ERN] , and to all other Senators who, while examining and analyzing our southeast Asia policy and the nature of our commitments there?which is truly their privilege in the best traditions of this body, today stood behind our troops to meet the vital needs of those brave men who risk their lives daily. Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- dent, the senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] Was not available to vote today. The RECORD will reflect that had he been here he would have voted for the bill that was passed as he said in his speeches on the floor of the Senate. He would have voted to table the amend- ments that were offered. The senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BizewsTzs] was appointed as a congressional adviser to the American delegation to the GATT Trade Center meetings in Geneva, Switerzerland. He is serving as the personal representative of the Senate Commerce Committee at the trade meetings. The GATT meeting which opened on Monday has been specifically called to consider ways and means of promoting increased trade with underdeveloped nations. Senator BsEwsTER will be in Geneva for a week as a member of the American delegation. He regarded the mission as extremely important to the United States, and of particular interest to the port of Baltimore, one of the foremost trading centers in the United States. We assured the Senator that we would make every effort to see that he had a pair; and in the event that that was not possibl", if it appeared his vote would be required, we would seek to have him return. We did not think that that was necesary and the RECORD will so show. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, informed the Senate that, pursuant to the provisions of 42 United States Code 2251, the Speaker had ap- pointed Mr. YOUNG of Texas as a mem- ber of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to fill an existing vacancy there- on, on the part of the House. The message announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fis- cal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other pur- pbses, in which it requested the concur- rence of the Senate. SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966 Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 12889. The PRESIDING 0101010ER (Mr. HAR- RIS in the chair). The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations dur- ing the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construc- tion for the Armed Forces, and for other Purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (HR. 12889), Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I move to strike out all after the enacting clause of H.R. 12889 and sub- stitute therefor the language of S. 2791 as it just passed the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Georgia. The motion was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill. The amendment was ordered to be en- grossed, and the bill to be read a third time. The bill was read the third time. The PRESIDING Ors'ICER. The question is on passage of the bill, as amended. The bill (H.R. 12889) was passed. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi- dent, I move that the Senate insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes there- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4234 Approved For ReletnaffiN5114AEIMINEJBOOgifflen400050008-5 March 1, 1966 on, and that the Chair appoint conferees on the part of the Senate. The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. RUSSEL/. of Georgia, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. SALTONSTALL, and Mrs. SMITH C011- forces on the part of the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the Senate bill (S. 2791) is in- definitely postponed. PERSONAL STATEMENT Mr. MeCARTHY, Mr. President, I had intended to make these remarks be- fore the motion to table was acted on, but when the motion was presented, I thought it would be presented as an amendment rather than a motion. Since I felt; my remarks would have little effect on the outcome of the vote, I withheld them until this time. It was my hope that we would have a straight vote on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. The matter of the Tonkin Gulf resolution has been dis- cussed for sometime, and it was indicated that there would probably be a vote on the question of rescinding it, which had been suggested by some officials high in the administration. There was a later indication that, fol- lowing the vote on that, or perhaps as a substitute, we would have a vote on the reaffirmation of the Tonkin Gulf reso- lution. I had intended to vote against the Morse proposal to rescind the Tonkin Gulf resolution, but also to vote against the amendment which would have reaf- firmed that resolution. It is my judgment, by virtue of the various interpretations that have been placed on the Tonkin Gulf resolution since it was first approved in August 1964, that the resolution, in the minds of some persons, has taken on a meaning and a significance which had not been attributed to it at the time it was before the Senate and was passed on August 10, 1964. It is my opinion, in view of the con- tinuing discussion of the resolution, that the Senate will be somewhat slow in the future about adopting resolutions of this kind. The fact is that I made a statement, which was affirmed by some Members of the Senate--and the position I took was reaffirmed by the President in his press conference?that this resolution did not give to the President any power he did not have before we passed the resolu- tion, and that if we had rescinded it we would not have taken away any powers he possessed under the Constitution and any powers which have been confirmed by the history of this country and by precedents. think the question must be asked: What purpose do resolutions of this kind serve? Acknowledging that the resoluti.on gives the President no power which he does not already possess, there are, then, two purposes. One, it may be reassuring to the Presi- dent in the way of congressional or pub- lic support. Second, there is the possi- bility that passing such resolutions will prevent second-guessing and improper criticisms. Those of us who served either in the House or in the Senate following the ac- tion of President Truman in the Korean war will remember the conversations in the cloakroom to the effect that it would have been wise if President Tru- man had had a resolution passed to pre- -vent criticism on the part of Members who had given their vote in support of a resolution for that action in Korea. I think President Truman acted quite properly, and took the responsibility which the President has, without in any way seeking to take authority or power which he did not properly possess and carry it out on his own accord. Various interpretations have been placed on the resolution by Members of the Senate. The minority leader said we should not rescind the resolution be- cause we would be taking away powers the President was given. I submit we could not take way any power by rescind- ing the resolution because we did not give the President any power by passage of the resolution. It was suggested in debate?not so much an the floor, but outside this Chamber, in statements made by some people high in the administration?that because Congress passed the resolution, Congress should not be critical of new policies or new applications. I submit this is a dangerous interpretation of the resolution. :In view of the experience we have had over the last 6 months in the interpre- tation and application of the resolution, I think we ought to be most careful in the future with regard to similar resolu- tions, not just because of the political implications but because what is in- volved is a fundamental change of the constitutional power of the Presidency. If we are to allow this practice to grow and establish precedents whereby reso- lutions of this kind begin to take on strength of their own, the only logical conclusion is that, first, the constitu- tional powers which Presidents have ex- ercised since the country was founded are being challenged, and perhaps even undermined. Second. There is danger in this kind of resolution that there may be a growth of tradition and the establishment of precedents of power in the Congress which it does not possess and which is not provided for under the Constitution. Third. There is danger that in the passage of resolutions of this kind it may lead to challenges on the part of Con- gress as to the power of the President. Whether the attempt would be success- ful or not is an open question, but if we are concerned about protecting the con- stitutional powers of the President, if we are concerned with not making the Sen- ate into a kind of garden club which passes resolutions with reference to Presidential powers, and if we are con- cerned perhaps with the freedom of this body to carry out its own constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, resolutions of this kind should not be approved in the future. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. MANSFIELD. I am about to lay down the pending business. Mr. MORSE. I invite the attention of the majority leader and the minority leader to the fact that this is a day of precedents in the Senate: a very im- portant precedent, I believe, was estab- lished and the policy reaffirmed. The minority leader will recall that a few days ago on the floor of the Senate, we were discussing how to dispose of the bill, timewise, and I urged that the Sen- ate go ahead without a unanimous-con- sent agreement and the probabilities would be that we might finish the bill by Tuesday night. I invite attention to the fart that this Tuesday night, the time is now 6:15, and a vital precedent has been established. In fact, as an old common law lawyer, and a believer in sound precedent. I should like my majority leader to know that that precedent is going to stand. Accordingly, we can forget about unanimous-consent agreements on major legislation from now on, because we save time without having them. Mr. DIRKSEN. The distinguished Senator from Oregon is truly generous. He is extremely tolerant. He possesses an infinite amount of wisdom with re- spect to human nature, and I congratu- late him. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, that is a great compliment and I thank the Sena- tor from Illinois. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to join the minority leader and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE I in saying that I, too, believe that the Senate has had one of its finest days of debate. It has resulted in the exercise of self - discipline which the Senate has shown sow 1 ? he Chamber today. ORDER FOR .ADJOURNMENT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it adjourn until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar No. 982, HR. 12563, be laid down and made the pending business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the informa- tion of the Senate. The LEGISLATIVE CLERIC. A bill, H.R. 12563, to provide for the participation of the United States in the Asian De- velopment Bank. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President? no action will be taken on the Asian de- velopment bill tonight. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For 4250 Rana:MR.1AI: R&BW7B996ft11000400050008,5- march 1, 1966 States, credit shall be given for amounts for which liability is relieved by this section. SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed, to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to the said Lieutenant Charles W. Pittman, Junior, an amount equal to the aggregate of the amounts paid by him, or withheld from sums otherwise due him, on account of the liability to the United States referred to in the first section of this Act. No part of the amount appropriated in this section in excess of 10 per .centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000. With the following committee amend- ments: Page 1, line 5, strike "$3,493.71" and insert "$3,358.70". Page 2, lines 10 and 11, strike "in excess of 10 per centum thereof". The committee amendments were agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to recon- sider was laid on the table. The SPEAKER. This concludes the call of the Private Calendar CALL OF THE HOUSE Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present. The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present. Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House. A call of the House was ordered. The Clerk called the roll, and the fol- lowing Members failed to answer to their names: [Roll No. 251 Gubser Hagan, Ga. Irwin Jones, Mo. Keith Leggett Matthews Miller Morgan Annunzio Baldwin Baring Berry Bolling Dawson Dingell Dowdy Downing Dyal Morton Edwards, Calif. Mosher Fisher Olson, Minn. Fuqua Powell Griffin Purcell Rostenkowski Saylor Scott Springer Steed Todd Toll White, Idaho Willis Wilson, Charles H. Wright The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 394 Members have answered to their names, a quorum. By unanimous consent, further pro- ceedings under the call were dispensed with. PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 12322, COTTON RESEARCH AND PROMOTION ACT Mr. SISK, from the Committee on 'Rules, reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 750, Rept. No. 1302) which was referred to the House Calen- dar and ordered to be printed. H. RES. 760 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12322) to enable cottongrowers to establish, finance, and carry out a coordinated program of re- search and promotion to improve the com- petitive position of, and to expand markets for, cotton, After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall con- tinue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Com- mittee on Agriculture, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments th reto to final passage without intervenlrsg dion except one motion to recommit. AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1966 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, RE- SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, EVALUATION, AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 743 and ask for its im- mediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution, as follows: H. RES. 743 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself ihto the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, mis- siles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, and all points of or- der against said bill are hereby waived. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed three hours, to be equally divided and con- trolled by the chairman and ranking mi- nority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amend- ment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amend- ments as may have been adopted and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit. The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California is recognized for 1 hour. Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Califor- nia [Mr. Swam], and, pending that, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 743 provides an open rule, waiving points of order, with 3 hours of general debate for consideration of HR. 12889, a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. The essential purpose of, and under- lying cause for, H.R. 12889 is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters, ships, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles are all being uti- lized at a rate greater than it was possible to anticipate when the 1966 authorization for those items was passed. It is hoped that the legislation will achieve more rapid procurement of replacements of articles consumed, and will provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time. The bill authorizes $3,417,700,000 for procurement; $151,650,000 for research, development, test, and evaluation; and $1,288,100,000 for military construction. Mr. Speaker, there have been ques- tions raised, and we have heard a great deal of discussion in the past few days respecting this particular piece of legislation. It seems to me that the issue is very clear cut and the interpretation to be placed upon a vote for and in support of this legislation is very simple. We simply desire to make certain that our men in uniform will have ample equip- ment and weapons to meet our commit- ments there and to make certain that we carry out the aims and the programs of our Government in South Vietnam and in other areas of the world where such commitments exist. Through the proper and timely and, yes, the escalated carrying out of those commitments we will that much sooner bring the enemy to the point of being willing to discuss peace with reference to these problems. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gen- tleman yield? Mr. SISK. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from California yielding to me, and I would like to associate my- self with his statement as far as the vote on HR. 12889 is concerned. My question, in the interests of consistency, inasmuch as last week I raised similar doubts re waiving all points of order on the rule making in order debate on the supple- mental foreign aid bill authorization, is one on the rule. As the member of the distinguished Committee on Rules of this House who is bringing this legislation to the floor, will the gentleman kindly ad- /vise me why line 9 is inserted therein eliminating all points of order? This was a bill which was brought from the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs recently. It was stated then that there was no reason within the bill itself for this, and that it had simply been inserted on recommen- dation of the Parliamentarian without a request by the chairman of the commit- tee or without the desire of the Com- mittee on Rules. Is this the same situation today? Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, if I may com- ment, I would like to call the gentleman's attention to page 5 of this legislation, the bill H.R. 12889, and specifically to call his attention to line 8 of page 5, Title IV: General Provisions, section 401(a) . If the gentleman will read that, he will find that this bill provides for certain trans- fers of funds. Therefore, that would be subject to a point of order, since it does amount to a transfer of funds. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentle- man will yield further, I have read that in detail. I know that the committee of which I am a member, the House Com- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---- HOUSE 4249 Library 'i 'ewes and Construction Act Amendments of 19116?Continued Est trim ated [Mai Fisleral annelids 1 Title I, seri, ices E2timated ncitching funds 2 Estimated Federal amomits ?disis 2'62, 701 $33, 106 $17. 101 Puerto Pico _ _ 800, 431 387, 244 190., 489 V irgin Islands 53, 477 28, 025 14, 901 Title TI, construction Estim ited Federal amoutits $29, 008 413, 10(1 552 Estimated total of basic and additiona Federal amen As. 2 Estimated total of basic and additional matching expenditure,: from Ohl .0 and local sources. EXCERPT FROM PROPOSED LEGISLATION ,,AUCATION have proposed a total Federal investment in education and training during the com- ing year in excess of $10 billion?a threefold increase, since 1961. Our education programs must be admin- isitered wisely and well. Shortly after pas- !ewe of the Elementary and Secondary Edu- eation Act of 1965, I directed that the Office iff Education be reorganized to carry out its expanded responsibilities more effectively and efficiently. This reorganization has now been completed. hi addition, we established the new post at Assistant Secretary for Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Wel- fare to strengthen program coordination throughout the Government. The Congress has already put this Nation on the path toward the achievement of goals to- 1..81x tend special educational help to 12 illion disadvantaged and handicapped children; 2. Eliminate illiteracy within a decade; 2. Bring public library services to 15 mil- lion more Americans; 4. Reduce by half the rate of high school filaments over the next 5 years; 5. Guarantee the opportunity for educa- tion beyond high school on the basis of abil- ity: to learn, rather than ability to pay; Provide college building and facilities to meet the needs of 9 million students ex- pected by 1975, intl educational opportunity for every cit- izen requires that we build on the beginnings we have aireigly made, I recommend measures to expand the Headstart program for preschool children; to strengthen the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965; to expand Federal assistance to higher education; and to improve the Nation's libraries, expand the Headstart program or pre- oot children ,ocw programs have had the visible suc- cess of Operation Headstart. The disadvan- taged children who have benefited from this program are already entering first grade-- with new confidence in themselves and eagerness to learn. 1: have requested funds almost double the Headstart program during the corning year La insure full year programs for 210,000 chil- dren; summer programs for 500,000 children. This marks a significant step in providing greatly expanded preschool assistance for 5-year-olds from disadvantaged homes, and tiummer nursery programs for 3- and 4-year- cis. TT erengthen the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1065 Though funded only 4 months ago, the 1.ilementary and Secondary Education Act of effin has already begun to bring its benefits te Hie Nation: -ipeci al help is being provided the dis- advantaged?remedial teaching, health and Food services, augmented teaching and coun- seling staffs. No. 36 Est i mated reciching funds 2 515, 201 212,855 12, 648 More books--interesting and up-to-date? have begun to appear on school library abelvea. New approaches to old problems axe being tried; instructions for the student extends beyond the classroom to museums, hos- pitals, factories. Regional education laboratories are- being developed to stimulate new technicues of teaching and lea7ning in our schools. State educational agencies are strength- ening their m toffs and assuming greeter re- eponsibtlities. Educational deprivation cannot be over- come in a year. And quality cannot be achieved ovcenight. I propose that the Elementary and Sec- ondary Education Act be extended for 4 years. My budget includes increased funds for each title of the act. In addition, I propose that coverage of the act be enlarged to raise from $2,000 te $3,000 the family income formula for allocating aid for educatioo of the disadvantaged com- mencing: in fiscal 1968; to earmark additional funds for children of American Indiens and migrant workers. Careful study of the incentive grant pro- vision of title I shows that payments would be made to many districts unrelated to need. I therefore recommend repeal of ihe in- centive grant provision of title I in ceder to focus Federal aid on basic grants to more than 20,000 local school districts. Too many schools in urban and rural slums are ancient and in disrepair. Chsolete schools aggravate the problem of eliminating de facto segregation in our northerim com- munities, thus depriving -children of full educational opportunities. There is a pressing need for long-range, community-wide planning to bring innova- tion and imiOnation in school construction. I propose that 85 million be added to title TIT to help communities in. planning school construction to encourage innovation and to deal with obsolescence, overcrowding, and special problems such as de. facto segrega- tion. A recently completed study of the fed- erally impacted area program, requested by Congress, has concluded that certain provi- sions should Oe revised. I recommend revision of the existinsr law? To require school districts to abeorb a uniform and fair share of the burden of edu- cating children in federally affected districts; To base pcyme:ffts on school expenditures in local districts :rather than on natl.- mal or State average per pupil cost; To eliminate eligibility for Federal im- paced area assistance in those cases where Government property is leased to private en- terprises that pay local taxes. JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the pro- visions of title 42, United States Code, section 2251, the Chair appoints as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy the gentleman from Texas Mr. YouNcl to fill an existing vacancy thereon. PRIVATE CALENDAR The SPEAKER. This is Private Cal- endar day. The Clerk will call thr first individual bill on the Private Calendar. ENZO (ENZIO) PEROTTI The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 4926) for the relief of Enzo (Enzio) Perotti. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? Mr. TALCOTT and Mr. GROSS ob- jected, and, under the rule, the bill was recommitted to the Committee en the Judiciary. OSMUNTDO CABIGAS The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 'i838) for the relief of Osmundo Cabigas. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be passed over without prejudice. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Cali- fornia? There was no objection. RONALD WHELAN The Clerk called the bill (H.R. ';141) for the relief of Ronald Welan. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice. The SPEAKER,. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection. RONALD POIRIER, A MINOR The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 8865) for the relief of Ronald Poirier, a minor. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan- imous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri? There was no objection. LT. CHARLES W. PITTMAN, JR U.S. NAVY The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9302) for the relief of Lt. Charles W. Pittman, Jr., U.S. Navy. There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows: H.R. 9302 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Stat,,s of America in Congress assembled, That Lieu- tenant Charles W. Pittman, Junior, United States Navy, of Columbia, South Carol)na, is relieved of liability to the United Steies in the amount of $3,493.71, representing the total amount of overpayments of comeensa- tion made to him by the Department of the Navy during the period June 6, 1960, through June 30, 1964, as a result of the use of an erro.neous pay entry base date. In the audit and settlement of the accounts of any certifying or disbursing officer of the United Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FoEtNecarns2?19Mil :Leciorti9EITM4g1fi R000400050008-5 4251 mittee on Armed Services, in its wisdom, inserted this there for this stated pur- pose. If in fact this does eliminate the question of the transferability between operation and maintenance funds, and pay of the Army or personnel funds for all the military services, then why is it necessary to have a waiver of all points of order, which I believe the gentleman will agree with me eliminates the pow- ers of the individual Members as to ger- maneness and as to other functions in an authorization bill which is coming from a legislative committee to be considered in debate on the floor of the House? It is getting to be a habit rather than a neces- sity for simply inserting the waiver in all rather than an appropriation bill or a Ways and Means Committee bill. I won- der if the elected Members, the people's personal representatives in this Con- gress, realize that they are waiving away by operating under such rules their power of objection and even compound- ing it because of the fact that it is not necessary? Mr. SISK. Let me say to my good friend from Missouri that I well .appre- ciate the statements he is making. I want to assure the gentleman that the Committee on Rules does not take light- ly this idea of waiving points of order. We only do this when we feel it is essen- tial in order to expedite the legislation as well as in order to be completely fair to all Members of the House. Accord- ing to legal advice which we had in the committee that this particular transfer would be subject to a point of order, which means that one individual could bring about the elimination of transfers, we sincerely feel that this would be in the best interests of the legislation. I want to say to my good friend that I do not think you will find the committee feels lightly about this whole question of waiving points of order. We are con- cerned, I think, to try to see every Mem- ber's rights are protected and that legis- lation is brought to the floor where it may be considered from the widest pos- sible standpoint, with an open rule, with the right of amendment and the right of every Member to make his position known. However, as the gentleman very well knows, from time to time, on these transfers which are subject to points of order, it is simply felt that it is In the best interests of the expeditious handling of the legislation to waive points of order in such a case. I hope the gentleman will accept that state- ment, that it was done in all good faith. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I do accept that, and I am delighted with the state- ment of the gentleman from the Com- mittee on Rules, which is thus made a matter of record, but if you will refer to page 2 of the report of the committee where it discusses section 401, it plainly sets forth that in the original Depart- ment of Defense language there was this "transferability," but that the commit- tee added the words "for their [the serv- ices] stated purposes." And then there is the last sentence in that paragraph, discussing section 401 (a) wherein there appears the state- ment: There is no intent to authorize additional appropriation transfer authority for the pur- poses of this section. Mr. Speaker, I also want to get that in the RECORD. Then there is the question which sim- ply comes back to the statement of whether, if there is no intent and if it was not requested?it has not been re- quested over the past 19 years based upon my available research and knowl- edge, by the Committee on Armed Serv- ices that any points of order be waived, why is it suddenly injected here so that debate thereon can be eliminated? Mr. Speaker, I believe we are treading on dangerous ground. Mr. SISK. I well appreciate the gen- tleman's position, but our advice was that that language was subject to a point of order. I understand the explanation of the report and I gather that that possi- bly was not the intent. I well understand the gentleman's feel- ings, and I want to assure the gentleman that the committee is going to look close- ly at all requests for waiving points of order and we shall not do so unless such requests are made. Mr. HALL. I appreciate that. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reserva- tion. I have done this in order to em- phasize the point that I made in the House last week when we were consider- ing the rule on the bill which came to us from the Committee on Foreign Af- fairs, and I shall continue to object to the inclusion of such points of order. Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman yield? Mr. SISK. I yield to the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives. Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I wish to congratulate the chairman and members of the Committee on Armed Services for the very fine hearings which the committee held on thi,; bill, and for the manner in which they expedited the consideration of the bill in the commit- tee. I also wish to congratulate the chair- man and the members of the House Committee on Rules for their prompt action so that this bill could be brought up at this time, which is the earliest con- sideration of the bill that could possibly be accomplished. Mr. Speaker, these two actions repre- sent leadership on the part of the Com- mittee on Armed Services and on the part of the Committee on Rules. Mr. Speaker, this bill is a very im- portant one. As stated in the commit- tee report, it is directed toward the sup- port of our forces in Vietnam. All of us understand the purpose of this bill. When we are voting on this bill every Member will appreciate the fact that he or she is voting to give our boys who are fighting in South Vietnam and carrying out the word of our country and the obli- gation of our country, and to act in ac- cordance with the national interest of our country, the means and the facili- ties?the military means and facilities? to accomplish the purposes that we have in mind?to stop aggression and to bring about as early as possible peace in this area, and in the world. Mr. Speaker, in connection with this legislation there is the resolution of August 10, 1964, which completely covers the entire situation. In that resolution we said, in unity with the Chief Execu- tive, and to show the world the unity between the Chief Executive and the legislative branch, that the United States?and I quote: The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re- questing assistance in defense of its freedom. Now, Mr. Speaker, the President has the power and has had the power under the reserved powers of the President as Commander in Chief, but this resolution was adopted at the time in order to show the world the unity that existed be- tween the executive branch and the legis- lative branch of the Government of the United States. Mr. Speaker, we took the same course of action in the Formosan resolution when President Eisenhower was the Chief Executive of our country. We took the same course of action in the Middle East resolution when President Eisenhower was our Chief Executive. Both of the resolutions are still the law of our land, just the same as the resolution of August 10, 1964, is the law of the land today. So, Mr. Speaker, the firmness of Presi- dent Johnson in performing his duties as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, following in consonance with this resolution, is the finest example of leadership that could be evidenced by any man. If we had firm leadership in the thirties when Hitler was around, the probabilities are that World War II never would have taken place. If we had that firm leadership as exemplified by the late Sir Winston Churchill, I believe Hitler would never have been permitted to go in and take over Austria. Those who felt that Hitler would be satisfied were living in a dreamworld of hope. Hitler was not satisfied. Then followed the taking over of the Sudeten- land?the forcing of the Czech Govern- ment to cede the Sudetenland, an impor- tant part of Ccezhoslovakia, to the Ger- man Reich. They hoped Hitler would be satisfied. But Hitler was not satisfied. Later Hitler without opposition took over the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Then came the rape of Poland and then the war. We were dealing with a militant ag- gressor in those years and we are dealing with a militant aggressor today. There is the calculated risk of action?yes. But there is the calculated risk of in- action. And the calculated risk of in- action was evidenced in the thirties when Hitler was permitted to go ahead?and to Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 1:252 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966 go ahead?and to go ahead?finally bringing about the great catastrophe known as World War II. So this bill is up today to enable our boys and those of our allies to fight for freedom and to fight against militant; aggression. It is as important today that we have firm leadership as it was im- oortant in the thirties when firm, strong leadership was lacking. Sc' in voting for this bill today. I am voting not only for the bill but I am also voting again for the resolution that we adopted on August 10, 1964, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of both branches of the Congress. Thus, we will convey to the actual and potential anemy and also the rest of the world that America, is united. They will understand that message. They will understand that action. They will ; understand that language. Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of he Committee on Rules, I express my appreciation to the distinguished Speaker of the House for his comments with reference to our committee. I join with him in his commendation of the Com- mittee on Armed Services for their ex- peditious handling of this bill. nuther, Mr. Speaker, I join with our distinguished Speaker in the very eloquent way in which he has expressed the position of the House of Representa- tives, and join fully and wholeheartedly with him in the hope that our vote will be unanimous. I join with him, too, in feeling that we will again be expressing our support for the resolution which was adopted in 1964. Mr, Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. (Mr. SISK asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speak- er, I yield myself such time as I may use. (Mr. SMITH of California asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend his remarks.) Mr, SMITH of California. Mr. Speak- er, House Resolution 743 will provide for hours' debate, an open rule so far as amendments are concerned, waiving points of order for the consideration of H.R. 12889, to authorize additional ap- propriations for fiscal 1966 for procure- ment, of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, devel- opment, test, evaluation, and military construction. Points of order are waived because of section 401(a) which appar- ently provides additional leeway for the use of funds previously appropriated. The purpose of the bill is to authorize additional appropriations in fiscal 1966 in the areas of weapon procurement, re- search and development, and military construction. These additional funds are required because of the accelerating situ- ation in Vietnam. The authorization is broken down as follows: $3,417.700,000 for procurement, $151,650,000 for research and develop- ment, $1,288,100,000 for military con- struction, and $4,857,450,000 for total au- t horization. All services share in the authorization, and in all parts of it. The Marines are included with the Navy. The committee has tightened up the language submitted by the Department of Defense in section 401 to insure that funds appropriated for one purpose will not be shifted to another, according to the report. However, the requested rule asks that points of order be waived, be- cause of this very point. The language in question is the last phrase of section 401, lines 14 and 15 on page 5 of the bill. The committee also added an amend- ment to insure that it would receive in- formation prior to contract letting on intended military construction. In the same field, the committee added author- izations to the bill for the Navy to con- struct additional facilities at Okinawa and Subic Bay. The Joint Chiefs ap- proved the addition. This authorization is not to be merely a speeding up of fiscal 1967 actions, but is to be in addition thereto. While testi- mony on this subject and solid facts are indecisive as to how much an increase will be achieved, the committee has the assurances of the Department of De- fense and will keep a close watch on the situation to see that an actual increase is achieved. Pages 5 through 21 of the report detail the various construction projects, re- search programs, and weapons covered by the bill. Three billion one hundred forty-nine million six hundred thousand dollars alone is for aircraft, planes, and helicopters. Also included are tracked vehicles, missiles and missile ground support equipment. Construction proj- ects run the gamut from troop housing to airfields and supply depots. Finally, section 302 includes a $200 million authorization to provide the Sec- retary of Defense with authority to pro- ceed with any construction he finds vital to U.S. security, wherever needed, to sup- port our troops. There is no minority report. As stated by the distinguished chair- man of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, Mr. RIVERS: Our men are in South Vietnam. They need weapons. This bill is an essential step in providing t.Aose weapons. Mr. Speaker, I know of no objection to the rule, and urge its adoption. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin Mr. LAIRD]. Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the pending legislation, which is authorized by this rule. I hope that the House will take prompt action on the appropriation authorization. Our De- fense Appropriations Committee has had hearings on all items included in this authorization bill and is ready to report as soon as the authorization becomes law. The funds authorized in this bill are needed now because our Defense Estab- lishment is spread dangerously thin from one end of this world to the other if we are to meet all of the worldwide commit- ments outlined by the Secretary of De- fense iin his Senate testimony within the past 2 weeks. Not to pass this legislation would place reserve stocks for American fighting men in a dangerous position in some sections of the world. We have Reserves and National Guard troops that have recently enlisted in the Reserve and National Guard that have gone as long as 3 and 4 months without fatigues in which to train. That fact came out in the testimony before our committee. Funds are needed and are necessary to carry on worldwide commit- ments of this Nation. I hope that the House will move forward and act promptly on this legislation. Mr. Speaker, for the past, 10 clays our Nation has witnessed confusion within the administration on the U.S. peace terms and future form of government in Vietnam. This spectacle has produced so much official fog that it can only be harmful to the war effort. It is time, indeed it is past time, for the party in power to face its responsi- bilities and offer clear, consistent leader- ship with regard to our goals in Vietnam. Instead, we see a continuing wrangle that disputes whether we should be in Viet- nam at all, what our aims are there, and whether the right means are being used to achieve these aims. These divisions were brought to a head when a prominent Democratic Sen- ator proposed settling the problem of Vietnam as the problems of Poland, of Rumania, of Bulgaria, of Czechoslovakia were settled after World War II?by admitting the Communists to a share of responsibility and power in government. This proposal has triggered an outpour- ing of contradictory statements and doubletalk from administration spokes- men. Some spokesmen denounced the idea. Vice President HUMPHREY declared: Such a plan would be like putting a fox in a chicken coop * * * an arsonist ii a lire department. Under Secretary of State George Bell termed the Senator's suggestion "ab- surd." McGeorge Bundy said the United States is "not going to deliver the South Vietnamese people to the ad- ministrations of a Communist regime, because that is what this war is all about." But, almost simultaneously, other of- ficial spokesmen began to talk in differ- ent terms. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, one of the President's chief advisers on Viet- nam, said the Senator's call for Com- munist participation in the government was "very, very close" to his own view. However, just 2 days before, General Tay- lor had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he did not see how "the freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese could be compromised." At the time this was generally understood to mean that General Taylor opposed any politi- cal role in South Vietnam for the Com- munists. The next day, February 23, the Senator in turn seemed to back off from his original proposal by saying that he was not proposing that the Vietcong should automatically have a share of power in an interim preelection govern- ment but was merely saying that they should not be "automatically excluded" from having it,. Mr. Speaker, at almost the same time, Bill D. Moyers, the White House press secretary, said there was no disagree- ment between the administration and the Senator "if Senator KENNEDY did not propose a coalition government. with Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1960Proved For ItemehiggWVAi : 1%906-7?B06W ?0400050008-5 4253 Communist participation before elections are held." But then Moyers, when asked what kind of government the ad- ministration envisioned in the interim Period between negotiations and elec- tions, said this "should be left to the negotiating parties." Mr. Speaker, the same day the Presi- dent in a speech attempted to answer the question: Who has a right to rule in South Vietnam? Unfortunately, he con- fined himself to broad philosophy, rather than addressing himself to the questions raised by the Senator. The President said: The people must have this right?the South Vietnamese people?and no one else. Washington will not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. We shall insist for ourselves on what we require from Hanoi; respect for the principle of government by the consent of the governed. We stand for self-deter- mination?for free elections?and we will honor their results. At a news conference on February 26, the President avoided the opportunity to make the administration view clear. He was asked: Mr. President, to clear up some confu- sion * * * about the role of the American military in Vietnam could you set the rec- ord straight on whether the American troops in Vietnam are fighting to stabilize and maintain a democratic, non-Communist gov- ernment or whether their goal is to get free elections in which the Communists might emerge as a part of a coalition government? The President replied: Well, I would have to refer you to the detailed statements of Secretary Rusk " *. If they're not satisfactory, I would refer you to the statements of the Prime Minister in Honolulu. Since Secretary Rusk and Prime Min- ister Ky have not been in complete agreement, this answer given by the President is anything but helpful. Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu have both said they would never deal with the Vietcong or the National Liberation Front. Sec- retary Rusk has said there is no insuper- able obstacle to representation of the Vietcong at a peace conference and that the administration would accept any government in Vietnam provided that the elections were free. On February 27, the debate within the party in power reached new heights. The Senator insisted that the adminis- tration would be prepared to see Com- munist elements in the government. The Senator cited Mr. Moyers eight times as support for his views although he agreed that the administration had on some oc- casions made conflicting statements. The Senator pointedly said: Statements that are made that we will never deal with assassins and we will never deal with murderers makes it difficult for them to believe they are being asked to come to the negotiating table other than to sur- render. The Senator also moved back to his original position, saying that in return for certain concessions, "we"?note he does not say the South Vietnamese peo- ple but "we"?"would see that they played a role in the processes of the gov- ernment, whether it is in the interim period of time or in the final period of time." Vice President Hummarv, that same afternoon, reminded the Senator that the Vietcong was "not an Asian version of Americans for Democratic Action" and that he is "not going to be any part of suggesting to the people of South Viet- nam or any other government, that you should reward the kind of banditry and murder which has characterized the Vietcong by giving it legitimacy in a gov- ernment. I just do not believe in it. There is no legitimacy to the National Liberation Front. It is exactly what it says it is, a front and we do not intend to recognize it as a sovereign entity." The Vice President also pointed out the dangers in coalition governments when he cited the situation in Laos to- day. He described Laos as "a country in turmoil; the Pathet Lao attacking, backed by thousands of North Viet- namese troops and moving in on the Mekong River which if the Communist attack is successful, would destroy the hopes of the development of that vast area." Mr. Speaker, is it any wonder that a member of the administration admitted that "the credibility of our Government has been assailed. We have a great problem here maintaining our credibil- ity with our own people." This remark was made last December. I call upon President Johnson to end the confusion. Perhaps he is unable to be as forthright as his Vice President, but he should make unmistakably clear whether he is supporting the suggestion that the Vietcong be given a share of power and responsibility in an interim government and in a government estab- lished after elections or whether he is supporting his Vice President. The American people have a right to know exactly what it is their young men are fighting for in Vietnam, and they have the right to know it now. Several Democratic Members of the other body have endorsed the proposal that the Communists be admitted to a share of power and responsibility in the Government of South Vietnam. The longer uncertainty continues about the attitude of the President to- ward a settlement that would, in the Vice President's words, "put the fox in the chicken coop," the more difficult it will be to maintain the morale of Amer- ican fighting forces and the people of South Vietnam. And the more difficult it will be to justify American casualties in a war that is presumably fought to prevent Communists from forcing them- selves into positions of power and re- sponsibility. Let there be no misunderstanding about the issue. The question before the President is not the ultimate gov- ernment of South Vietnam after a free election. The question is what is the attitude of the United States toward in- clusion of Communists in a government that would rule until elections are held and would determine the form of the elections?a government that would de- termine whether the elections would be truly free. Unless the United States is prepared to oppose a coalition interim govern- ment at a peace conference, South Viet- nam will go the way of the satellite na- tions of Eastern Europe and of Laos. Mr. Speaker, if a coalition government including Communist representation is acceptable to the President?as it is to many influential members of his party, all the fighting in South Vietnam?all the sacrifices?all the bloodshed?make no sense, and they should not be further prolonged. Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. REID of New York, Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman a ques- tion and make a statement before I ask the question. I intend to support the rule and to back strongly the President's supplemental authorization of $4.8 bil- lion to fully back our men in the field, but I do think it is unfortunate, given the importance and implications of the legislation, that the House today is lim- iting debate to merely 3 hours. Mr. LAIRD. Debate and full consid- eration of this request as well as the U.S. commitment in this area of the world is absolutely vital. I agree with the gentle- man from New York and hope we proceed in that fashion here in the House of Representatives. Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. ABBITT] such time as he may consume. Mr. ABBITT. Mr. Speaker, I support the rule and the bill, H.R. 12889, the supplemental defense authorization bill, commonly known as the Vietnam mili- tary bill. This legislation is of vital im- portance, not only to our military men fighting in Vietnam but to all Ameri- cans. Our boys, through no choice of their own, are in Vietnam where they are be- ing shot at, many of whom are being wounded, mutilated and killed. It is in- herent upon us to furnish them with all necessary military material that is at our command so that they will not be lack- ing one whit to protect themselves and to achieve the goals for which they have been sent. We either must furnish every needed article of offense and defense or else it is our duty to pull them out. We must support them wholeheartedly and fully or else bring our boys back home. It is not fair to them and it is not fair to America to do less. This is not the time to argue whether we should be in Vietnam or whether we should have gone. , We are there and our boys are being killed by the Com- munists daily. It is inherent upon us to put up or get out and I call upon this administration to do everything neces- sary by way of supplying our men with the needed munitions of war immedi- ately and constantly and I, therefore, wholeheartedly support this bill and hope it will be passed unanimously. (Mr. ABBITT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 min- utes to the gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN]. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP671300446R000400050008,75 ? 4254 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE march I, 1966 (Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and of the bill which is to follow. I appreciate very much the gentleman from California giving me this time, which I have asked for in order to present the following statement in behalf of 78 Members of the House of Representatives, and I un- derstand there may be a few more com- ing in before the day is over. I understand that several of the 78 Members who signed this statement will make additional remarks. But as one who has just returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam and who served for 6 years on the Armed Services Committee, I believe this statement stands by itself as a timely and impor- tant contribution to the discussion and understanding of a critical issue: We agree with President Johnson's state- ment that "we will strive to limit conflict, or we wish neither increased destruction nor increased danger." We therefore reject any eon tention that approval of this legislation will constitute a mandate for unrestrained or indiscriminate enlargement of the mili- tary effort, and we strongly support con- tinued efforts to initiate negotiations for a settlement of the conflict. We, in particular, wish to express our con- currence with the President's statement of last week in which he declared the Viet- namese conflict to be a limited war ior limited objectives calling for the exercise of "prudent liminess under careful control." That is the end of this statement, and it is signed presently by 78 Members of the House of Representatives. A list of the signers is included below: WILLIAM ANDERSON. 'VI:COMAS ASHLEY. JONATHAN HINGHAM. JOHN BEATNIK. .10EIN BRADEMAS. JAMES BYRNE. itO BALD CAMERON. trVTANUEL GELLER, JEIRREY COHELAN. JAMES CORMAN. DOMINICK: DANIELS WILLIAM DAWSON. IJILARLES DIGGS. Jo] IN Dow. KENT DYAL. DON EDWARDS. GEORGE FALLON. LEONARD EARBSTEIN. DONALD ERASER. %in-VE(1FL FRIEDEL. IHGHARD FULTON. ET)WARD GARMATZ. ROBERT CITA LIVID. .IAC OB OILBERT. .To LIN GILL IGA MARTHA GRIFFITHS. RICHARD HANNA. J LI& BUTLER HANSEN. WH.LIAM HATHAWAY. ,GUSTUS HAWKINS. KEN HECIILER, HENRY HELSOICKI. FLOYD HICKS, Cu LET HOMPIELD. ASSES HOWARD. J. OLIVA HUM. CIIARLES JOELSON. HAROLD JOHNSON. JAMES KEE. CECIL KING. El, I a, KREBS, WILIERT LEGGETT. CLARENCE LONG. TORBERT MACDONALD. HARRIS MCDOWELL, JR. ROY MCVICKER. JAMES MACKAY. JOHN MACKIE. SPARK MATSUNAGA. LLOYD MEEns. PATSY MINK. WALTER MOELLER. WILLIAM MOORHEAD. JOHN MOSS. LUCIEN NEWEL ROBERT NIX. JAMES O'HARA. ARNOLD OLSEN. EDWARD PATTEN'. ME.LVIN PRICE. HOLLAND LEDLIN. 'FLrcav[As REEs. JOSEPH RESINICX. HENRY REITG'S. GEORGE Rooms. BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL, EDWARD ROY BAL. FERNAND ST GERMAIN. JAMES SG uEVIER. OAR.LTON F2:ICKLES. ROBERT SWEENEY. HERBERT TENZER. FRANK THOMPSON, JR. PAUL TODD, JR. MORRIS TJDALL. LIONEL VAN DEERLIEL. WESTON VIVIAN. TESTER WOLFF. Mr. SMITH of California, Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentle- man from Iowa Mir. GROSS] and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to speak ont of order. The SPEAKER Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. (Mr. GROSS asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. GROSS, Mr. Speaker, last week, when the foreign aid supplemental au- thorization bill was before the House, I questioned the need for an additional $100 million for the contingency fund for a period of 120 days when $50 million had been provided in the regular ap- propriation for the entire current fiscal year and 'not a dime tad been spent in Vietnam. I said then that money from the pre- sent contingency fund was being used by President Johnson, not in Vietnam but to help the British in the boycott of Rhodesia?in a joint and outrageous effort to destroy that friendly govern- ment which is seeking its independence from Britain. In addition to the use of contingency funds, I am going to try to ascertain before the day is over whether U.S. mili- tary planes are being used in this repre- hensible enterprise and, if so, on what conditions; and by what authority. The subject of "United States -British Persecution of Rhodesia on last Thurs- day brought the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. O'HartAll to the floor of the House where he referred to Inc and proceeded to unburden himself of a few remarks from which I quote briefly: Our position as regards Rhodesia -- He said.? Is based upon our nationsa morality and our sense of virtue * * *. Our virtues and moralities do not change with the scenery of different parts Of the world. What we stand for * * * is the right of self-deter- mination of peoples everywhere *. cannot make it too clear that the issue in. Rhodesia is essentially the same as the issue In Vietnam. Then he topped it off with this: But we are not beholden to Britain, nor Britain to the United States, becalt;e our two countries think alike and act with similar response when the virtues and moralities are in issue. I assume that when the gentleman from Illinois says our "virtues," "moral- ity," and support for "self-determina- tion" does not change with the scenery that these ingredients would apply with equal force and effect to the city of Chi- cago, among others. There, according to reports, Mayor Daley, the nominal head of the Democrat political machine, with whom I assume the gentleman from Illinois has at least a passing acquain- tance, is accused by some Negroes and whites of denial of the right to deter- mine "the kind of lives they will make for themselves and their children.'' A Negro leader has announced he will be a candidate to unseat the mayor and perhaps attention should be given, in the interest of "virtue," "morality," and "self-determination," to a boycott of Chi- cago by the 50 States?a boycott in which the virtuous British would be invited to participate. But let us take a quick trip abroad and see, as the gentleman from Illinois says, how well "our two countries?the United States and Britain?think alike and act with similar response when the virtues and moralities are the same," Let us begin with Cuba, less than 100 miles off our shores. Perhaps, the gen- tleman from Illinois [Mr. O'HARA I would like to describe to the House the stand- ard of "virtue," "morality," and 'self- determination" the U.S. Government ascribes to Fidel Castro. He might also explain the British version of "virtue" and "morality" which permits them to trade as usual with Dictator Castro while the latter supplies subversives and guer- rillas to undermine the governments of Latin America. and bleed this country of money and troops, as in the case of the Dominican Republic. Perhaps the gentleman from Illinois would also like to explain the "virtue" and "morality" of British trade and profits as usual with Communist North Vietnam whose guns have killed 2,000 Americans and wounded another 11,000. He might further explain by what stand- ard of "virtue" and "morality" the Brit- ish continued to trade with Red China during the Korean war when 35,Wal Americans were being killed and another 120,000 wounded. Without Red Chinese troops, equipment and supplies in North Korea there would have been little more than a skirmish. Turning now to Africa I can vemem- ber how the society of bleeding hearts in Washington hailed the establishment of a so-called independent, self-deter- mining government in Ghana. They called it the African "showcase of de- mocracy," and the dollars of American taxpayers rolled in. Not too long after- ward, the head of that government, Nkrumahs also known as the "Re- deemer," made a trip to Washington, re- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, /966APproved For 4301140RIMPIVAV 1416:305)6250444?C000400050008-5 ceived the red carpet treatment, and promptly went on a national television network to boast that he was a Marxist. Thereafter, he kept the path hot to Mos- cow, carrying high the torch for commu- nism, at the same time grabbing the money we so tenderly proferred him. That worked so well that Dictator Nkrumah either executed, or jailed and held incommunicado, all self-determin- ing opposition. Through the years since 1957, We heard of n9 strangling boycott by the virtuous British, in which the U.S. Government was joined to bring down the tyrannical Nkrumah government and provide freedom for the Negroes of that land. Can the reason be that the Rhodesians unlike the British and Ghanians never picked the pockets of American taxpay- ers? For the Rhodesians the moral of this story seems to be that if you want to escape a boycott and economic pun- ishment climb aboard the Johnson gravy train as have the British, Ghanians, and a host of others. The tried and tested formula these days seems to be to grab all the foreign aid possible, then stage an insurrection, throw out the bad guys, establish a military dictatorship, and start the process all over again. Incidentally, it would be interesting to know the extent of Dictator Nkrumah's masterminding, along with his Commu- nist pals, including the notorious Ro- berto Holden, of the massacres and atrocities that have taken thousands upon thousands of lives, black and white, Protestant and Catholic, on the African Continent in the last few years. Now Ghana has just acquired a mili- tary dictatorship and it will be interest- ing to hear from the apologists, both in and out a Congress, when it is expected "virtue" and "morality" will take over. Or is a military dictatorship now ac- cepted as "self-determination"? When it became apparent that the showcase government of Ghana was in reality a brutal tyranny, Nigeria was then tauted as the new showcase. Prime Minister Balewa was pro-Western and an able man. But early this year Negro troops of the Nigerian army cut him down with their machineguns, along with some of his Cabinet officials, and established a military dictatorship. If there has been a British-United States boycott of Nige- ria for the purpose of establishing "vir- tue," "morality," and "self-determina- tion" for the Negroes of that African country we have not heard of it. Mr. Speaker, it was some 190 years ago that a little band of men assembled on this continent, announced they had ab- sorbed enough abuse from the British monarchy, and sued for their independ- ence. Promptly haughty Britain, then mis- tress of the seas, threw a blockade on this continent and attempted to strangle the colonists economically. That failed because, in part, the British could get no help. France, a world power, helped break the blockade. A few months ago British subjects in Rhodesia announced they, too, had paid enough tribute to and taken enough dic- tation from Britain. They announced their independence. Promptly the British Government es- tablished a boycott in an effort to stran- gle the Rhodesians economically and just as promptly the shameless opportunists In Washington announced they would join and help bring the Rhodesians to their knees. Why have the ultraliberal opportunists In Washington involved this Government in still another affair on the African Continent?a move that may well lead to warfare? Because, they say, Rhodesia, which has been self-governing for two decades, "is not yet ready for independence," and be- cause the color line has been drawn too tightly in Rhodesia. These Washington opportunists have apparently never read history or they would know that the rebel colonies of 1776 had at hand a large population of colored natives, Indians, and many thou- sands of Negroes, none of whom were recognized as a part of the community for political or governmental purposes. But laying aside for the moment the history of our forefathers' successful struggle to win freedom and independ- ence from the leeching British in Lon- don, it is unbelievably reprehensible that the United States would now join Britain in clamping a boycott on any friendly country. Rhodesia is a friendly country. It is not and never has been an enemy. It is strongly anti-Communist and has offered to send combat troops to Viet- nam even though they may be needed at home if the British carry out their threat to use military force. Whether the British, in that case would use Englishmen to kill Englishmen or hire mercenaries as they did in 1776, is not known at this juncture. But by what authority did Lyndon Johnson impose a boycott on trade with Rhodesia? Article 1, section 8, para- graph 3 of the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress has sole power to regulate commerce with for- eign nations. No power is vested in the executive to block foreign trade except under laws which control trading with the enemy and Rhodesia has not been designated an enemy. Additionally Congress, less than a year ago, in legislation which bears the John- son signature, amended the Export Con- trol Act of 1949 to provide that: The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States (A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fos- tered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States and (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse to take any action * * * which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or im- posed by any foreign country against an- other country friendly to the United States. Mr. Speaker, I charge that President Johnson, in his usurpation of authority to regulate foreign commerce with Rho- desia deliberately violated the Constitu- tion of the United States, and I charge that in the second instance, with refer- ence to the Export Control Act, as amended, he deliberately violated the will and intent of Congress, if not the law. 4255 Yes, let us have virtue and morality but let it begin here at home. On the walls of this Chamber hang two portraits and only two. One is that of the man often referred to as "the Father of his Country," George Wash- ington, the first President of this Re- public. It is not difficult to imagine what Washington would say to those in this country today who so blithely use the power of the Government he welded to join in destroying the Government of a valiant little country seeking its inde- pendence from British dominion. The other gentleman we honor each day is the Frenchman, Lafayette, with- out whose help in breaking the British boycott of 1776, it is doubtful that either portrait would hang in this Chamber. Instead, there would probably be one portrait?that of King George III. To those who now pander to the Brit- ish, in view of their dealings with Com- munist China, Communist North Viet- nam, and Communist Cuba, I ask again whether this Government is operated on a standard of double, triple, or quadruple morality? Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. FLYNT]. Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I support the rule called up by the gentleman from California [Mr. Simi and I support the bill, H.R. 12889. If the resolution referred to a few moments ago during the debate on the rule by the Speaker of the House of Rep- resentatives were at issue today, I would vote to reaffirm that resolution. (Mr. FLYNT asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT]. (Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, this de- bate on Vietnam which has been going on in the other body for some weeks, and which we join in the House today, will serve a national purpose if?instead of producing recriminations?it makes us face up to our present alternatives, which are relatively few. In conducting this debate, we need to bear in mind that it could be hurtful to the national purpose if it should result in giving Hanoi and the Vietcong a false impression of indecision and irresolution, increasing their will to persist and thus prolonging the war. I do not mean to imply that we should refrain from engaging in debate. The right to debate this and any other issue freely, both in this forum and through- out the land, is the very thing for which American men are dying in Vietnam today. But surely this particular bill, provid- ing the military wherewithal necessary to the successful conduct of the effort to which the Nation is committed, must pass. And it must pass overwhelmingly. This bill is hardly a proper vehicle for the expression of disaffection from our national objectives. Let us express ver- bally whatever reservations we may sincerely feel, but a vote against this bill would be almost unthinkable. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4256 Approved For MsmrtigA5N/Ay :RMIR5'57.14984s6F00040005000805trch I, I 9 6 6 It would be like coming upon a man in the ocean, whose boat had capsized and left him swimming, and?instead of throwing him a lifeline?engaging in a long, abstract debate about whether he should have been in the ocean in the first place. The time for discussion would be atter the lifeline had been thrown. 'today American men are engaging a ruthless and relentless enemy in the jungles of Vietnam. For the most part, it did not ask to go. We sent them. Certainly, by all that is right and holy, we owe them the obligation to back them up with the weapons, the tools, the ma- teriel, and the united support that they need. leo]. any Member of this House to vote against this bill today would not hasten the end of the war. If any considerable number of our Members were to do so, it could result in unnecessarily extending the war by planting false hopes in the minds of our enemies. It has been their central hope that, if they hold on long enough, eventually we will weary of the long, twilight struggle as did the French, and ultimately withdraw. If we would hasten their lying down arms and corn- inc to the conference table, then let us demonstrate clearly and forcefully to- day that theirs is a vain and forelorn hope. The best opportunity for such a demonstration on our part would be by a unanimous vote for the adoption of this bill. If we really will peace, then the peace offensive and the military offensive must go hand in hand. They must be con- ducted with equal vigor, for one depends upon the other. We might as well pontificate on the free coinage of silver or the admission of slave States to the Union as to argue about whether American troops should be in Vietnam. The fact is that we are there. The question is: Where do we go from here? Hardly anybody actually wants to tuck tail and run, inviting an armed Commu- Fast takeover. Few indeed are blood- thirsty for a bigger war. Practically no- body is really satisfied with the present situation, and almost everybody yearns for an honorable solution. In the search I7or this elusive grail, we have been re- peatedly frustrated. Perhaps the clue to such a solution may be found in a comment by President johnson, 00011 receiving the Freedom Award on February 23, wherein he said: Wu ask who ins a right to rule in South VeLunn. Our answer there is what it has been here for 200 years: The people must have this right?the South Vietnamese peo- hle?and no one else.. We stand for self- determination?for free elections?and we will honor thou-result. Part of the vulnerability of the South Vietnamese to Vietcong propaganda stems from the dismal fact that for the ; 2 years of its independent existence South Vietnam has not elected its na- tional leaders. They have had 10 Premiers in the past 2 years alone, and not one of them chosen by the people. Little wonder that so many in that land snow limited enthusiasm for defending Lien- freedom. Think for a moment what a dramatic thing it would be if the President should publicly and formally propose to the United Nations a clear-cut peace plan based upon one simple keystone?the will of the people. To begin, the President could recom- mend that a free election be held in all of South Vietnam?not next year but this year?in which it would be proven, by ballots rather than bullets, just ex- actly what government the people of South Vietnam want to represent them. He could propose that these elections be supervised by the U.N. to avMd their being falsely rigged by either side?and be preceded by a U.N.-supervised 6- weeks truce to provide a proper atmos- phere for toeir conduct. It would be necessary, of course, for both combatant forces to agree in ad- vance to respect and abide by the. results of the elections. But on what defensi- ble basis could Hanoi or the Vietcong refuse? A turndown on their part would expose as total fraud their pretenses at representing the popular will, betray their lack of faith in the people of South Vietnam, and help turn the tide of Asian opinion to our side. Surely we would have nothing to fear from such free elections. There has been no truly free election anywhere in the world during the past 15 years which has given any real comfort to the Com- munists. The South Vietnamese people have demonstrated their desire to par- ticipate. On last May 30, elections were held throughout South Vietnam for pro- vincial and municipal advisory councils. In spite of Vietcong threats and intimi- dation aimed at keeping peop[c away from the polls, fully 70 percent of those registered voted in the election even though the officers elected were to have very little real. authority. As a second stage, we might want to consider building into the plan a con- crete proposal for similar free elections, either 2 or 3 years hence, in ii hich all the people of North and South Vietnam could vote on unification as decreed in the Geneva accords of 1954. Both north and south profess to want reunification of the country?but each on its own terms. The Geneva agree- ment specified that such nationwide elec- tions would be conducted in July of 1956. South Vietnamese leaders we never satisfied that really free balloting would result in the northern zone, and the solemn agreement was never kept, Much of the present bitterness stems f Tom this failure. A somewhat disturbing report in the morning newspaper today quotes South Vietnamese Premier Ky as saying that his country has the "noble and supreme task" of "liberating the North and re- unifying the fatherland." Let us devoutly hope that he does not mean a reunification merely on his own terms brought a bous solely by the force of arms and unratified by popular vote, for this would be as wrong in principle as the evil against which we fight. The evil of communism lies not in its name alone, but in its policies and its methods. We shall not defeat' it by mimicking those methods. We shall defeat it ultimately by demonstrating to the world that there is a far better alternative by the way of democracy, the way of the freely and constitutionally expressed popular will. We have repeatedly said that we stand behind the Geneva accords, even though we were not a signatory. This proposal would be wholly consistent with our joint declaration with Great Britain, made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as re- ported in the Department of State Bul- letin, volume XXXI, which read: In case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they arc con- ducted fairly. So actually we have said these things before, at different times and places. But most of the world, unfortunately, does not know that we have said them. Maybe we have not quite put them into one simple package sufficiently dramatic to constitute a clarion call to peace and freedom in Asia. At worst, it would put Hanoi on the psychological defensive. If the overture failed, then all the world would know that we really had tried, and everybody would have a clearer idea as to just what we're fighting for?the right of every people to have a government of their own choice, and not one forced upon them by anybody else. No longer, if Hanoi re- jected the proposal, could the Vietcong masquerade as liberation forces or accuse us of trying to force our will upon their country. Surely this is one weakness in Senator ROBERT KENNEDY'S proposal that the Vietcong be admitted to a coalition gov- ernment, for the impression arises that we are bartering away the freedom of South Vietnam. The point is that we are not there to impose on the South Vietnamese a gov- ernment of our choice but to defend their rights to a government of their choice. Let us make this crystal clear---so clear that nobody can mistake or misconstrue it. Such an assertion of our faith in the democratic processes would show the strength of our deepest national convic- tions. It would be consistent with every major civilizing development since the Magna Carta. We would be challenging the aggres- sors to let the people decide?in the forum of reason rather than the battle- field of war. If they should refuse, it would further condemn them even in the eyes of Asians, perhaps gain us more al- lies and certainly leave us in a better psy- chological position if we are to stay and fight. And if they should accept, it might pave the way to the conference table and the honorable settlement for which all men of good will so fervently yearn. But if we would encourage the enemy to join us on this or any other avenue to peace, then we must demonstrate beyond doubt that we have both the will and tile means to triumph in the military phase of this struggle against aggression, and the patience to persist even in the face of adversity. Unanimous passage of this bill today would be one such clear dem- onstration. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4257 March 1, 1964Approved For 66:11413112991321M13 1111021E1F67-Bil01451R000400050008-5 Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLT- FIELD] 5 minutes. (Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am supp6rting this rule and I am supporting the legislation. I think if a study of the map of southeast Asia is made, you could readily determine that we are not fighting in South Vietnam just for 16 million people. We are fighting to keep 1 billion people from sliding into the con- trol of Red China. That is what we are fighting for. In that 1 billion people, there are 85 million people, highly industrialized and scientifically trained people in the nation of Japan with a capability of making any kind of plane or electronic gear or any other kind of equipment that can be used in war. This is the one thing that Red China needs?the industrial capa- bility of Japan. We are fighting against the four-prong formula of Communist conquest?infil- tration, subversion, terrorism, and guer- rilla takeover. If this formula of Communist conquest is allowed to go unchallenged, it will be used in every country in southeast Asia and in every country of the underdeveloped world. Let no one believe that our surrender and withdrawal from Vietnam would bring peace in southeast Asia or in the world. It would bring further use of the formula of Communist conquest in every country in southeast Asia and in the underdeveloped world. Peace cannot be established by the sur- render to a dictator's forces of tyranny and aggression. We cannot bring peace to the world in that way. None of us want war. None of us want our boys to be killed in foreign jungles. We all want peace and we all want to negotiate, but we do not want to reveal every term of possible negotiation before we get to the negotiation table. That is not the way that negotiation is successfully accom- plished. Peace can be established in my opinion by the support of just prin- ciples by our country and hopefully by other countries throughout the world. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution. The resolution was agreed to. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve Itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of air- craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construc- tion for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. The motion was agreed to. No. 36-15 IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee crf the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consid- eration of the bill H.R. 12889, with Mr. CAREY in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first read- ing of the bill was dispensed with. The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RivERs] will be recognized for 11/2 hours, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES] will be recognized for 11/2 hours. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS]. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, in that a little later, time may be of the essence, I yield 10 minutes now to the distinguished gentleman from New York Mr. RYAN] . (Mr. RYAN asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services for having yielded to me to start what I hope will be a reasoned debate on the policy consid- erations which should guide us in con- sidering this very important bill today. The bill before us authorizes a supple- mental appropriation of $4.8 billion prin- cipally for the procurement of aircraft and missiles and the construction of bases. The funds are needed, we are told, for the war in Vietnam. This is certainly not a routine authorization for a routine appropriation. It is rather a request for another brick in the arch of congressional support which the admin- istration is constructing for its policy. Although the war is being fought without a declaration of war, the President never hesitates to remind the Nation that it is being fought with the sanction and ap- proval of Congress. The President made It clear in his news conference on Febru- ary 27 that he regards support of this authorization for military appropriations as an endorsement of the administra- tion's Vietnam policy. If the President considers this a matter of policy, so do I. The basic issue is U.S. policy in Viet- nam. The question is not whether courageous American soldiers, sailors, and airmen are to be adequately equipped, supplied, and protected in carrying out and ex- ecuting their assigned missions. Of course, as long as they are committed to battle, they must be provided for prop- erly. No one argues that. If this were simply a bill to give supplies to the dedi- cated men in the field, it would have my full support. The real question is what our goals and objectives in southeast Asia should be and what strategy should be adopted in an attempt to realize them. It is not a matter of support for men in combat, but whether they should be in combat at all, or if they are, what their missions should be in the context of what strategy and what policy. This is a bill to finance escalation, not to finance an existing policy or decisions already made. It is now before us, and our responsibility is a heavy one. We should understand, if not accept, the fact that modern warfare is con- ducted without a formal declaration of war by Congress. We delude ourselves, and we delude the American people, if we pretend that Congress should ignore policy when it authorizes the appropria- tion of funds. Let us admit it. Since the House grip on the budget is the only hold it has on foreign policy, an authorization request is the only time when the House can re- view foreign policy. Yet the American people rely on Con- gress to oversee foreign policy. I am re- ceiving hundreds of letters about the Vietnam crisis. I am sure we all are. Unless we are prepared to tell our con- stituents that they have come to the wrong place?that they should write to the President instead?we must at some point take a stand. This bill is likely to be our only chance. We are entrusted by our constituents to act in this, as in every matter, in their interest and in the national interest. Today is the third time in 2 years the House has been called upon to express Itself on our policy in Vietnam. It may be the last time. THE IMPORTANT DEBATE Mr. Chairman, there is a crucial de- bate raging within the councils of gov- ernment, and this authorization touches the fundamental issues. The important debate is not about "withdrawal" or "mindless escalation." Nor is it about appeasement or bombing China. There are no Chamberlains or Hitlers in seats of power in this country. Mr. Chairman, the U.S. objective in Vietnam has not been clear. Most Gov- ernment officials now agree on one of two general objectives, and many of them vacillate between the two. One's view of what military and diplomatic strategy to pursue really depends on which of these objectives he believes that the United States should seek. The general objective sought by one view is a limited one: to prevent the Viet- cong from taking over South Vietnam by force, and to end hostilities in such a way that ultimately the United States can honorably leave the country. Those who favor this objective generally argue that the United States can and should only play a limited role in Asia. They believe that a future Vietnamese Govern- ment would be independent of China, at worst a Tito-type situation. Therefore, they are not overly troubled by the pros- pect of a coalition government in Viet- nam, reflecting the political realities. This general view was expressed be- fore the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee by the distinguished diplomat, George Kennan. Those who take this line believe the Vietcong must be a party to negotiations and are prepared to accept an interim coalition government. This was the es- sence of Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S statement on February 20. Furthermore, those who take this line have a military strategy which they be- lieve will lead to a solution. That strat- egy is based on the theory that we must show Hanoi and the Vietcong that they Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4258 Approved For EtimaikpggftwAp laimigNzEnotigf000Ll0005000mh 1, 1966 cannot win the war. This military strat- egy has been most clearly outlined by Generals Gavin and Ridgeway. Pro- ponents of this view oppose escalation of (Ale war. The second general objective has been gaining popularity within the adminis- tration during the past month. It is a much wider objective. It holds that the United States should help the Saigon government to gain control of South Vietnam and to carry out an extensive pacification plan which will deny the Vietcong the allegiance of a significant part of the population. Those who urge this objective believe that, if South Viet- nam goes Communist, the whole area of southeast Asia will be jeopardized. Conversely, they believe that, if the Viet- cong are decisively defeated, Chinese communism will be effectively contained. Those who take this view are horrified by the thought of an interim coalition government?or by the prospect of elec- tions which the Vietcong might win. This is the line of reasoning which, ac- cording to Senator FULBRIGHT, calls for "total victory." It is the doctrine espoused by the Secretary of State. Offi- cials who follow this approach neces- sarily react very sharply to Senator Roe- ERT F. KENNEDY'S proposal. !Those who take this line have a mili- tary strategy of their own. They want the United States to conduct search-and- destroy missions?to drive the Vietcong out of areas which they now control. They then want our troops to "hold" these areas, while pacification plans proceed. This is the strategy proposed by Vice President HUMPHREY and Gen. Maxwell Taylor. According to General Wheel- er's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (hearings on H.R. 12334 and 12335, pp. 4932, 4933, 4949 ) , this is the strategy of General Westmoreland. It calls, of course, for a continually increasing U.S. troop com- mitment. It believes that the U.S. role in southeast Asia must be long term, and that we will need many bases and supply lines. In short, this is a policy of ex- tended escalation. Mr. Chairman, this crucial policy de- bate may well determine the course of 0.S. domestic and foreign policy for the next decade. It is a debate which Con- press should not avoid. Otherwise, we abdicate our responsibility and con- tribute to the process by which the Ex- ecutive determines when and where and how to put this Nation to war. Mr. Chairman. I am convinced that the authorization which we consider this afternoon deals directly with the sub- stanee of this debate. As I will demon- strate, it is an escalation authorization. a my view, it deals directly with policy. Iwor it in effect says to the President: r-1.1.-e is the money with which to escalate. If you do so, it is all right with us. Mr. Chairman, it is not all right with me. In my view of domestic and inter- national policy, a wider war is not the answer. WIPLICAT[ONS OF MINDFUL ESCALATION ''-i CSC I want to make clear what I understand the mindful escalation policy to propose. It would impose a military solution upon an essentially political problem. My understanding of that policy comes from reading the transcript of the hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, reading dispatches from Vietnam in the New York Times and Washington Post, and listening to the recent speeches and comments of President Johnson aid Vice President Hu M PHREY The object of the policy is to w pc out the Vietcong, and to hold huge areas of the Vietnam countryside while the Saigon government carries on a program of pacification. Its pi oponente hope that the countryside can be cleared in 2 or 3 years?through intensive search and destroy missions?but they believe that the pacification of the countryside may take a great many more years of realize. Advocates of this escalated policy have no illusions about its cost. They know that it will take a great many men to conduct the search and destroy missions; more important, they know that it will require a great many more men to hold on the countryside once it has been ini- tially cleared. While it would be nice to believe that these tasks can be left to the South Vietnamese themselves, advo- cates of this policy are convinced that the countryside cannot be held without the presence of American troops in each village and hamlet. Most of those who urge mindful escala- tion admit that the cost will he con- siderable. They are calling for a mini- mum of 400,000 American troops. Ac- cording to Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times magazine on Sun- day, February 27, all of the President's military advisers agree that more than double the present strength is essential. Senator STENNIS has said 600,000 men may be required. Seymour Topping re- ported from Saigon in the New York Times on .Pebruary 26 that military au- thorities there expect that during peak combat periods there would be at least 2,000 American casualties per month. Mr. Chairman, I am not persuaded by these military "experts." I might re- mind my colleagues that the military have been wrong before. It. wae Secre- tary of Defense MacNamara, who upon returning from Vietnam on Oci,ober 2, 1963, said the major part of American forces would be home by Christmas, 1965. I do not doubt that America has the ability to defeat the Vtetcong and to se- cure victory for the Saigon government. But I am, neither convinced that the allies could secure victory according to their timetable, nor persuaded that the total annihilation of the Vietcong is worth the cost to America. I have always taken General Mac- Arthur's crisp comments on a land war in Asia most seriously. Senator Cain asked General MacArthur whether he had told Secretary of State Dull is that: Anybody who commits the land power of United Stales on the continent of Asia ought to have his head. examined. MacArthur replied: I don't know whether I made the state- ment, but I confirm absolutely the seltiments involved. Military situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Re- lations, U.S. Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, page 156. I have also been impressed by the study which Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had made on the conditions for a land war in Indochina while he was the Army's Chief of Staff. After reading the full reports of the study, General Ridgway con- cluded: We could have fought in Indochina. We could have won, i' we had been willing to pay the tremendous coat in men and money that such intervention would have required-- a cost that in my opinion would have even- tually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. (See "Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway," Harper & Row, 1056) . Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear that the cost of the policy of mindful escala- tion may be just as great as the cost, of the Korean war. In that war there were 157,000 casualties, including 54,000 deaths. We have all perhaps read the report published last month by Senator MANS- FIELD upon his return from Vietnam. Its conclusions are sobering. We would do well to recall them this afternoon. The report concluded: Despite the great increase in Amuse in mil- itary commitment, it is doubtful in view of the acceleration of Vietcong efforts that the constricted position now held in Vietnam by the Saigon government can continue to be held for the indefinite future, let alone ex- tended without a further augments ,ion of American forces on the ground. Indeed, it present trends continue, there is no assur- an.ce as to what ultimate increase in Ameri- can military commitment will be required before the conflict is terminated. For the fact is that under present terms of reference an.d as the war has evolved, the question is not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation, but rather of pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open ended. The Mansfield report, it seems to me, makes it indelibly clear that the :A sir can be won only by literally multiplying the numbers of American troops. It points out that, when we began to increase our troops after the authorization last May, the Vietcong began to supplement their forces correspondingly. The report also point out that the Vietcong at the pres- ent time "have the capability of a sub- stantial increase in their numbers within a short period of time." Although an estimated 35,000 Vietcong were killed last year, their ranks swelled from 103.000 to 230,000 during that time. At a minimal guerrilla ratio of 5 to 1, it would have been necessary to recruit 600,000 new troops just to keep pace. To put the matter more vividly, Secre- tary of Defense McNamara estimates that 4,500 North Vietnamese are infil- trating South Vietnam each month. To keep the current 4-to-1 superiority, it will take 20,000 additional troops a month to Vietnam. A more depressing way of looking at these statistics is offered by Prof. Ber- nard Fall. He points out that the traditionally accepted guerrilla ratio? based on the experience of Malaya and the Philippines?is 10 to 1. According to U.S. News & World Report for March 7, the Vietcong now have 235,700 men. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For&ft gg Itsh pauithip_gfieftw000Ll00050008-5 March 1, 1966 4259 Thus, an army of more than 2 million men would be required to defeat the Vietcong. At present the Saigon gov- ernment has an army of about 570,000 men, but the manpower pool appears to be pretty well depleated. Professor Fall doubts that the Saigon government could ever field an army of more than 1 million men. Therefore, to defeat the Vietcong, he reasons, the United States would be required to send at least a mil- lion men to fight in Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by the escalation of this war for yet another reason?the threat of Communist China. The threat of Chinese interven- tion must always remain a consideration in any review of our role in Vietnam. This is the area where our aspiration to secure freedom may collide with China's ambition to secure protective satellites. We must look beyond the conflict in Vietnam to the potential collision be- tween the United States and China . Prof. Roger Hilsman, Jr., former As- sistant Secretary of State for Far East- ern Affairs, testified before the Sub- committee on Far Eastern Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 1: Today Communist China and the United States are on a collision course. The out- come can only be war. The cost of war with China, Mr. Chairman, would be inestimable. Then there is the possibility that in the face of mounting casualties the ad- ministration will have difficulty in resist- ing increasing pressure to end the land war by using ultimate weapons on Hanoi, Haiphong, or China. Mr. Chairman, these are my concerns about a policy of mindful escalation. Yet I believe that an analysis of the proposed authorization makes it clear that continued escalation is precisely what is intended. AUTHORIZATION FOR ESCALATION My study of the bill, hearings, and Secretary McNamara's testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees shows that virtually all of the authorization is for procurement of aircraft or missiles, and for bases and other military construction. The rest is for research. No new authorization is asked for ammunition or supplies. The bill before us is not simply de- signed to keep the war at the present level, but to permit the escalation of the war in the discretion of the Executive. The largest item in the authorization bill is $3.4 billion for procurement of air- craft and missiles. Almost all of this is for the procurement of aircraft and air- craft parts. This is not simply to re- place aircraft which have been lost in battle. In 1965, 275 fixed-wing aircraft and 76 helicopters were lost. According to Secretary McNamara, aircraft cost less than _$2 million per plane. Thus, less than $600 million are needed to re- plenish the air force. Yet the bill au- thorizes almost $3 billion for aircraft. It is also worth noting that most of the lost aircraft were lost in missions over North Vietnam. Secretary McNa- mara estimated that 169 of the 275 planes were lost over North Vietnam. It seems fair to conclude that, if the De- fense Department expects to lose more planes this year than in did last year, the losses will result primarily from a stepped-up program of bombing in the north. We should be especially reluctant to underwrite such a project. Bombing of North Vietnam has neither brought the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table nor stopped the inflow of men and munitions. Indeed, Secretary McNa- mara estimates that infiltration from the north has more than tripled since we began the bombing. Senate hearings, page 338. It should also be noted that the intervention of regiments of the North Vietnamese Regular Army came about as a result of the bombing which was started on February 7, 1965. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary McNamara explained at page 132-133 that the authorization is not just for replacement of planes: It does include added inventory. He explained: We are providing for procurement of air- craft to be added to the force or modernize the force, rather than to replace potential losses. As for helicopters, Secretary Mc- Namara stated: The number of helicopters that we are buying far exceeds any number that we are likely to lose, and far exceeds any number that would be required to modernize units in the forces as of July of last year. (Senate hearings, p. 191.) Besides the procurement of aircraft and missiles, the other major request in the authorization bill is for military con- struction; $1.2 billion are requested for this purpose. Certainly there is a need for increased port facilities and access routes to transport supplies to the men who are already in Vietnam. Also, hos- pitals, housing, and community facilities are needed. But the bill goes beyond this by providing for the construction of airfields and ports which will allow continued escalation of the war without further action by Congress. Thus, in explaining the administra- tion's request for funds, Secretary of De- fense McNamara said: We will be prepared to house and support additional units if their deployment should be required in the future. (Senate hearings, p. 12.) Following this theme, the House Com- mittee on Armed Services Report at page 16 states that the money is needed "to achieve and maintain objectives in southeast Asia under present force de- ployments and to provide a base for aug- mentation thereof." Furthermore, other policy decisions appear to be hidden in this authorization bill. Only about one-half of the $1.2 billion request for military construction will be spent in South Vietnam; $346 million will be spent on "other" parts of the Asian mainland?presumably in Thailand. The decision to build new military air- fields, ports, and facilities in Thailand may seem desirable militarily, but it also appears to represent a decision to broad- en the base of the war. Similarly, many of the new airfields and ports will be built?under this authorization?with cement, rather than with temporary construction materials such as alumi- num matting. This would seem to sug- ges:; a decision to build military ports and airfields which will last for a long time to come. Mr. Chairman, my conclusion that this authorization will be considered as con- gressional approval of mindful escalation is drawn largely from the testimony of the Secretary of Defense before the House and Senate Armed Services Com- mittees. At one point in the Senate hearings, page 105, for example, the following exchange took place between Secretary McNamara and Senator SMITH: Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, are there any plans to escalate and step up the offen- sive in Vietnam? Secretary MCNAIVIARA. Well, there are prep- arations being made, and they are reflected in the fiscal 1966 supplement, for substan- tially increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units there. Whether or not we will carry out such higher rates of activities and actually deploy all of those additional forces is a decision that only the President can make, and no such decision has yet been made. Mr. Chairman, I believe that Congress should have some voice in the decision about whether to escalate this war rather than stabilize it. Yet as Secretary Mc- Namara's statement makes clear, this authorization would put that decision squarely and solely in the hands of the President. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to point out that the House Armed Serv- ices Committee report expresses the com- mittee's view that there was inconclusive evidence that the authorization is neces- sary for this fiscal year. It states this doubt at page 3: If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items in- volved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supple- mental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient defini- tive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts Involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization. I would suggest that the administra- tion has asked for this authorization for yet another reason, not connected with military necessities or bookkeeping. It wants a congressional authorization which it can cite as evidence of approval of the strategy of escalation. Mr. Chairman, this is not a simple authorization to continue the war at its present level. We should not pretend to ourselves or to the American people that it requires no policy judgment on our part. This authorization represents the administration's decision to make it easy to escalate the war in the future. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4260 Approved For Rowergymm czytiR197j_mismtwooLl0005000sitare',? /9?, THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT There are those who believe that Viet- nam marks the single great battleground of freedom. They argue that we should be prepared to send every soldier, every plane, and every bomb that we have to gain control of that country.. If the government of Saigon does not triumph, they argue, no country can be assured of freedom. Mr. Chairman, let us examine the na- ture of our commitment to Vietnam. Until this month, the administration argued that it was based on the state- ments and policies of three American Presidents. The most. important building block in this argument was President Eisenhow- er's letter to President Diem on October 23, 1954. The letter said: We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Govern- ment a Vietnam. I am, accordingly, in- structing the American Ambassador to Viet- nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government, can serve to assist Viet- nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of perform- ance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggres- sion through military means. The Govern- ment of the United States expects that this dC will be met by performance on the part o( the Government of Vietnam in undertak- ing needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an inde- pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong Government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in Purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage anyone who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. For a while the administration main- timed that our military commitment stemmed from this letter. But that argu- ment has since been discredited. It was Oral, deflated in a 1965 essay by Arthur Larson, who was Director of the U.S. In- telligence Agency under President Eisen- hower. Larson goes through the lette:r sentence by sentence and concludes: The nearest thing to a commitment at this atage was an indicated willingness, subject to some stiff (and as yet unsatisfied) condi- tions and understandings, to provide eco- nomic and technical assistance, including military advisers, material, and training" (Larson, "Vietnam and Beyond.") Then, on August 17, 1965, President Eisenhower settled the question sur- rounding his letter once and for all. We said we would help that country? lie said-- We were not talking about military programs, but about aid. (See Max Frankel's article -Military Pledge Is Denied by Eisenhower," New York Times, Aug. 18, 1965.) After President Eisenhower refused to accept responsibility for our military in- volvement, the administration turned to a treaty and congressional declarations to explain the root of our commitment. It pointed to the SEATO Treaty and two principal actions of the Congress?the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964 and the $700 million supplemental ap- propriation for military activities in southeast Asia which passed the House on May 5, 1965. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rusk said on February 18 that our com- mitment to Vietnam grew out of SEATO. "It is this fundamental SEATO obliga- tion that has from the outset guided our actions in South Vie'inam," he said. However, our obligation under SEATO is clearly limited under the treaty. In the first place, the testimony, Senate re- port, and Senate debate which sur- rounded the passage in 1954 of the Southeast Asia Treaty make it clear that instances of Communist subversion, in- spired from without, were to be treated under article IV paragraph 2 of the treaty which says: Tf, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the integrity cf the ter- ritory or the sovereignty or political inde- pendence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situa- tion which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult imme- diately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common de- fense. Instead, Secretary :Rusk relies upon article en. paragraph 1.? which says: Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unani- mous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common clanger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken, under this paragraph shall be immedi- ately reported to the Security Cott mil of the United Nations. Even if paragraph 1 of article IV were applicable, the nature of our obligation to Vietnam would be limited. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the Senate Foreign Mations Committee at page 14 of the Senate hear- ings on the treaty: We made clear at Manila that :1: was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force including, for example, U.S.. ground troops for that area, but that we rely noon deterrent power of our mobile striking force. It was apparent to the signers of the treaty, ta the Eisenhower administra- tion, and to the U.S. Senate that the treaty did not involve any promise to commit American ground troops to Asia. Senator Alexander Smith, one of the two U.S. Senators to accompany Mr. Dulles to the treaty conference in Manila, em- phasized this point in the debate on the Senate floor. Senator Smith said: The great contribution which this country is capable of making to the defense of south- east Asia in the event of an act of open aggression would be, as Secretary Dulles has said, to strike at the source of aggression rather than to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war. We have no purpose of following any such policy as that of having our forces involved in a ground war. (CO.NGRESSIONAL RECI /1E, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 103.) Article IV paragraph 1 is only opera- tive in the event of an open armed at- tack. If such an attack should occur, each state agrees to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This provi- sion helped to assuage the doubts of a Congress which was troubled that the Korean war had been fought without, a declaration of war. It make it clear that the treaty signatories are not bound to take any action without going through the appropriate constitutional channels. Thus, the President of the United States is obligated to consult Congress before meeting the obligations of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty requires that "Measures taken under this paragraph shall 'be immediately reported to the Se- curity Council of the United Nations." Yet, if we accept Secretary Rusk's con- tention that we have been acting in Vietnam under this treaty since 1954, we should recognize that for the first decade we were violating the treaty by not re- porting the measures taken to the Security Council. The framers of the SEATO treaty did not contemplate our involvement in an Asian land war, and we have not acted in accord with the provisions of the treaty. SEATO should not be consid- ered the source of our increasing com- mitment in Vietnam. President Johnson has also often said that our commitment to Vietnam was sealed by the Gulf of Tonkin. resolu- tion. However, the Gulf of Tonkin resolu- tion in August of 1964 did not contem- plate extending the war to North Viet- nam, nor the landing of large American armies in Vietnam. That resolution is cited as the legal basis although before it was ad ipted in the House and Senate the Senate debate made it clear that the resolution was an affirmation of the then existine policy. Senator FULERIGHT, in making the leg- islative history of that resolution, had the following exchange with Senator MCGOVERN: Senator McGOVERN. Does the Sena tor think there is any danger in this resolution that we may be surrendering to General Khanh's position as to where the war should be fought? (General Khanh had ad vocateci attacking North Vietnam.) Senator FULBRICHT. I do not thi Ilk there Is any danger of that. * * * I do not think the policy that the war be confined to South Vietnam has changed. I think it is still the policy .I think it is the correct one. Later in the debate, Senator BREW- STER asked: So my question is whether 'there is any- thing in the resolution which would au- thorize or recommend or approve the land- ing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China. Senator FULBRIGHT replied: There is nothing in the resoluta:in, as I read it, that contemplates it. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FT151919103NAMITI1RECIDUROPEOBOM6R000400050008-5 4261 Senator FtiLBRIGHT during the debate also said: I personally feel it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian Continent. Mr. Chairman, in my view the policy pursued in Vietnam was not contem- plated by the resolution of August 1964. Last May 5 the administration asked House approval of a supplemental ap- propriation of $700 million for military activities in southeast Asia not because the appropriation was necessary but be- cause the administration candidly sought congressional approval for a new departure in policy. No longer was the United States aid- ing the South Vietnamese to fight their own war. The United States was fight- ing the war. I voted against that bill because I was not willing to vote ap- proval of the decision to convert the conflict into an American war. The administration had not defined its ob- jectives, and there had been no congres- sional debate. On May 5 there were 34,000 American Armed Forces personnel in South Viet- nam. Today there are 210,000 and 6 divisions. The war has indeed escalated, and the administration cites the $700 million supplemental appropriation vote of May 5 as another legal basis for our commitment as well as one of the bricks in the arch of congressional support. Let there be no mistake about it. Today's vote will be similarly construed. Mr. Chairman, there is yet a third ex- planation for our commitment to Viet- nam?one which invokes American his- tory and evokes America's idealism. In his speech at Freedom House on Febru- ary 23, President Johnson appealed to the traditional American devotion to lib- erty. We are in Vietnam, he said, to "keep the faith for freedom." In his speech last week, President Johnson recalled President Roosevelt's four freedoms. Freedom of speech, free- dom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. I agree that we are dedicated to these freedoms at home and abroad. But our commitment is no less great in Paraguay, Spain, or Southern Rhodesia than it is in South Vietnam. Do we not have as strong a moral respon- sibility to "keep the faith for freedom" for the people of Cuba and Hungary as for the people of Indochina? In these cases the United States has recognized that it cannot join the bat- tles of every nation in the world. We should send economic aid; we should ex- ert diplomatic and economic pressure; we should set a personal example; we should strengthen the United Nations; but we cannot commit ourselves to fight an unlimited military war in every case of injustice. Our friends around the world recog- nize that no matter how great our love for freedom, our resources are not omni- potent. They know that we are pre- pared to use our full resources to stop armed aggression, as in Berlin, and to defend ourselves against a nuclear threat, as in Cuba. However, they do not expect us to devote all of our resources to the battle in Vietnam. Many of the world's leading diplomats no doubt share the view of George Kennan, the distinguished former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: Not only are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not re- ceiving as a consequence of our preoccupa- tion with Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy, and hopeful possibilities we should be developing, are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater of activity. Most of the world's leaders seem to be baffled and distressed?rather than heartened?by our increasing involve- ment in Vietnam. Whatever the nature of the commit- ment may be, we are clearly not obligated to pursue a policy of continued escalation which involves a full-scale land war on the Asian mainland. ALTERNATIVES TO ESCALATION Mr. Chairman, there are realistic al- ternatives to the extended escalation policy implicit in this bill, and they should be considered before we embark upon a wider war. I want to make it clear that I do not consider pulling out to be an acceptable course of action. The damaging effect of withdrawal upon our prestige and our relations with other countries of south- east Asia and our allies elsewhere would be severe. The consequences for Cam- bodia and Thailand must be recognized. We are past the point of unilateral with- drawal even if it would have been sensi- ble?which I do not suggest. The decision has been made without being formally made. We do have a pledge to the freedom of the people of South Vietnam and their right to freely choose their own government. However, within the framework of that pledge, there are reasonable and honorable al- ternatives. In past speeches before the House, I have made specific proposals for a diplo- matic resolution of the conflict. I be- lieved they were meritorious when I out- lined them on June 10, 1964, and again on February 24, 1965. Although conditions have changed and we have Americanized the war, I still be- lieve they should be pursued. They should be explored in a stabilized situation, not an intensified war. If we follow what might be called the Gavin- Kennan-Fulbright-Hilsman plan, we can hold Saigon, the provincial capitals, and our own bases, while we support the South Vietnamese as long as they are willing to carry forward counterguerrilla warfare and programs of economic and social reform. This would bring about a deescalation of our military involvement in South Vietnam which should be accompanied by a cessation of :the bombing in North Vietnam. While pursuing this military strategy, we should continue to press for negotiations. Mr. Chairman, I have consistently said that the conflict in Vietnam was not sus- ceptible to a wholly military solution? that it would be won not on the battle- field but in battle for men's minds, that the Government must win the confidence of the people, that we could help with support?but that our power must be ex- ercised in a supporting role for the bene- fit of the underdeveloped peoples. We must assist development, not insist on domination. This raises the whole question of our intervention policy, whether in ViOtnam or Santo Domingo or in any one of the 40-odd nations with which Dean Rusk reminded us we have treaty obligations. Of course, we cannot withdraw from the world. Neither neoisolationism nor the doctrine of military might should guide our actions. George Kennan said at hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10 that we should not be asked "to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country." The ad- ministration has sought to create a vital interest where there was a stake but not a life or death embrace. Mr. Chairman, our obligation to the freedom of the South Vietnamese did not require nor commend increasing escala- tion and a further influx of American combat troops. Rather it commended to us a search for political and diplo- matic alternatives. In the interest of aiding that search, eight of us sponsored on January 21 and 22, a conference of experts and scholars to examine and analyze the situation in Vietnam, pre- pare realistic proposals to facilitate a negotiated settlement and to project the framework of a creative Far Eastern for- eign policy. The report of the ad hoc Congres- sional Conference on Vietnam was issued on February 15, 1966. Our colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROSEN- THAL], deserves our commendation for his initiative in this project. While I do not necessarily subscribe to all of the conclusions and recommendations in that report, I believe they point to the general direction our policy should take. Therefore, I include the foreword and the conference recommendations at this point in the RECORD: AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM FOREWORD On January 21 and 22, 1966, a group of experts and scholars met in Washington at the invitation of eight Members of the House of Representatives to analyze the current situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic proposals to help end the war and facilitate a negotiated settlement. The sponsoring Congressmen have felt un- satisfied with the recent role of Congress in foreign affairs. They believe their office re- quires a more fundamental examination of foreign policy than that allowed by even the most careful consideration of specific legis- lation. The sponsors are convinced that the level of congressional analysis can be raised through greater intimacy between the legis- lative branch and the intellectual and uni- versity community. It was with this in mind that they invited to Washington a group of experts particularly qualified to discuss with them Vietnam and its implications for Amer- ican diplomacy. Some of the participants have spent con- siderable time in Vietnam, and have obtained intimate association with conditions there. Others offered the important perspectives of experience in negotiation, study of eco- nomics, diplomacy or international law, or Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Releaftan97043AiCIMMTBOIIME0 0400050008-5 4262 Approved For March 1, 1966 expert knowledge of relevidit geographical areas. ll'articipants were requested not to dwell on episodes. or errors of the past. Instead, they were asked to discuss present policies and possible alternatives to them; to analyze the problems involved in reaching and en- forcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to pro- ject the outlines of a creative American pol- icy toward Asia. Certain conclusions and recommendations emerged in the discussions and these are :aided explicitly at the beginning of the re- port. The subsequent summary of the dis- sex E Si011 S also includes some individual points which contributed to the analysis, although they were not unanimously endorsed. The sponsors regard the proposals made by the conference as important contributions to their own thinking about Vietnam and the formulation of American foreign policy. They feel the report deserves the attention of their congressional colleagues, members of I,he executive branch, and the American people. Finally, they view the conference as having set an important precedent for fixture congressional initiatives in foreign affairs. N NICE RECOMMENDATIONS The Conference reached the recommenda- tions and conclusions set out below. A sum- mary of the discussions from which they were developed follows. Vrcsent strategies 1. There are diplomatic alternatives, not yet fully explored, to continued military eocalation of the war in Vietnam. 7. Continued bombing of North Vietnam is not in the American interest either in shortening the war or in improving prospects for a negotiated settlement. 3. There should be no further escalation of American troop commitment. There are serious risks of inviting greater North Viet- namese and Chinese activity. 4_ Unilateral withdrawal of all American troops prior to a cease fire or peace confer- ence is not in our national interest. how policy initiatives 5. The most productive course for the future h; a deescalation of military activity and commitment. 6. The National Liberation Front must be recognized as a principal belligerent in the war, and as a necessary party to any peace conference and settlement. 7. To improve the likelihood of negotia- tions, the Saigon government should be broadened to include representatives less :hostile to negotiations. 6. The United States must help promote greater contact between all South Vietna- mese factions--representatives of the Na- tiinril Liberation Front, the Saigon govern- ment, and influential private citizens. Negotiations and the convening of a conference .). The difference between the several ne- gotiating positions is not insurmountable. The United States might agree to Hanoi's four points, treating them as one interpreta- tion of the 1954 agreement and thus an ap- propriate basis for negotiations. The con- troversial point three of the Hanoi program would then he a subject for subsequent dis- eixesion rather than prior approval. ia. The 1954 Geneva Conference should be reconvened with all parties to the hostilities represented. 1 le A procedure for reconvening the Ge- neve Conference would be to have the three nations on the international Control Com- mission (Canada, India, Poland) request a conference to receive new instructions on enforcement of the 1954 agreements. 17. The inability of the United Nations thus far to use Its good offices to help end the Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of including China as a full member of that institution. Despite the difficulties of in- volving the U.N. in a se Alement of the war, all parties should seek opportunities to utilize the United Nations in appropriate ways. Terms of a settlement' 13. A cease-fire must be secured. Given the dispersed. nature of the conflist, a cease- fire might be more easily reached at a con- ference, though the possibility of a prior cessation of hostilities should be explored carefully. 14. Agrimmcnt must be reached on a pro- visional government in South Vietnam and procedures for the holding of elections to form a ccuistiment assembly. A la-ovisional government might be established on the ba- sis of geographical areas contrtiled, with contested areas to be administered tempo- rarily by ihe International Contrel Commis- sion. Alternatively, decisions regarding such. a government could be reached by prior ne- gotiations between all parties in the south. 15. All parties moist firmly adhere to the results of free elections. 16. Amnesty must be cranted I'm all par- ties in the conflict. 17. Guarani:33es of the cease-fire, the provi- sional government, free elections, troop with- drawals, amnesty, and neutralizatien must be enforced by an effective International Con- trol Commission. The International Control Commission must, therefore, be sienificantly strengthened. United Nations participation in this pr :mess might reduce adrxenistrative difficulties and set precedent far future United Nations participation in the solution of other civil conflicts threatening world peace. lb. A settlement should assure the neu- tralization of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Arms control aereements must be reached applying to other nations of the area, prescribing their nonparticipa- tion in military alliances, the freedom of their territory for foreign military hates, and their protection from outside arms, material, and armed personnel infiltration. Mr. Chairman, these 13 points by no means exhaust the possibilities for nego- tiations. Rather, they indicate the di- rection in which our policy should, in my view, be directed. Unfortunately, our policy does not now appear to be headed In this direction. During the oause in the bombing in December and January the administration appeared genuinely to seek negotiations. There war, no ap- parent response from Hanoi to the Pres- ident's peace offensive, and the adminis- tration appears to doubt the possibility of negotiations. But this Nation should never abandon the search for peace. We should never abandon ourselves to all-out war. We are not only the strongest nation on earth, we are the most ingenious. We have an unflinching belief in the law, and we have a great tradition of domestic Peace preserved by the law. It is in this tradition that II have a great belief in the possibility of world peace through world law. Or, more precisely, I believe that world law is our only hope for world peace. It was with this faith in international law that the United Nations was founded some 20 years ago. It was founded by men who had learned a lesson far more profound than the lesson of Munich or Manchuria or Ethiopia. They had learned the lesson of London, of Berlin, of Paris, of Hiroshima. They had learned that while wars can be won, they are never an answer. They provide no answer for the hundreds of thousands who are injured, made homeless, killed. The lesson of the Second World War was the need for a world order and interna- tional law. But we seem to have forgotten that lesson in the war we fight today. We should have taken this dispute to the United Nations the moment it arose. We should have taken it to the Security Council. If the Soviet Union blocked us there, we should have gone to the Gen- eral Assembly. There is a good case to be made against the Vietcong. That was the place to make it. Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that it is now too late to bring tile United Na- tions into this dispute. Finally, last month, we took the matter to the Se- curity Council. They decided not to act. Now we should be prepared to take it to the General Assembly. There are those, I know, who say that the United Nations is too weak to handle this war. If it should try to handle this war, and fail, says the argument, then the United Nations will be damaged, per- haps permanently. But, consider the damage which fol- lows from not taking this issue to the United Nations. In effect, we are saying to the world:- The United Nations can- not handle major disputes. Mr. Chair- man, need I remind this body that the United Nations was founded precisely to handle major disputes. If we embark on a major war on the Asian mainland, and bypass the United Nations, we throw away the lessons of the last war, and dis- card the hope of our fathers. It is often said that each new irenera- tion must learn its lessons anew. I pray that that maxim will not prove true cf the lessons of total war. At the outset of this speech, Mr. Chair- man, I said that a great debate is now raging about which of two objectives this Nation should pursue in Vietnam ? a negotiated settlement or "total vic- tory." In all candor I must confess that the debate appears to be being won by those who ask "why not total victory?" This objective will be sought through a policy of mindful escalation. Its pro- ponents will elevate the America:1i troop commitment slowly, gradually condition- ing the American people. They are mindful of the domestic consequences which might follow full mobilization. Its proponents will also be selective in their bombing of North Vietnam. They are mindful of the danger of an all-out war with North Vietnam, or beyond that, with China. Mr. Chairman, those of us who urge stabilization of the war are also mindful of the effects of escalation. We are mindful of the domestic effects and the international effects. We should accept the challenge of the generals and explain why not total victory. Mr. Chairman, I do not doubt that America can win this war if we are will- ing to pay the price. If we are willing to sacrifice American lives and Viet- namese lives, to sacrifice the poverty pro- gram at home, to sacrifice a treaty ban- ning nuclear proliferation. But is this in our national interest? Is it in the in- terest of world peace and the rule of law? Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FoE8sitaftsiqWfa14a-Cei5rapE.6TftqpytAR000400050008-5 4263 Do we not have an obligation to the U.N. Charter which requires that threats to the peace be dealt with by that interna- tional organization? We are not dis- cussing Munich. We are discusing Laos; we are discussing Algeria. Each of those conflicts ended with a compromise set- tlernent, a negotiated peace. That should be our goal in Vietnam. But instead, the administration's policy is now swayed by those who coun- cil us to abandon ourselves to the great game of war. We can win it they urge, so let us. Mr. Chairman, it is hard to resist this temptation, I am sure. But that is the role of statesmen and politi- cians. When generals council victory, We must council peace. Mr. Chairman, when I vote on this measure it will be with a heavy heart. I know that few in this body will vote with me, and I do not lightly disagree with my President and my party. This has not been an easy decision for me to make. In fact, it has caused me more soul searching than any vote I have cast in 6 years in this House. I yield to no one in my devotion to my country. I yield to no one in my respect and admira- tion for the qualities of courage, dedica- tion, and patriotism of the American soldier. He performs miraculously in battle regardless of the conditions under which he fights. I know something of what he is experiencing in Vietnam to- day, for 20 years ago I too fought a jungle war in the Pacific. I hoped then, as my father did before me in the Meuse-Ar- gonne almost 50 years ago, and as my brother did after me in Korea, that thereafter disputes among nations could be settled through international law. I fully recognize that war is still an instrument of national policy. It is used today in Vietnam where we are at war without a declaration of war. If war were declared by Congress, the situation might be different. But today on the basis of the record I am unwilling to ratify with my vote an authorization which will be interpreted as the sanction for greater escalation of our military commitment. It will be accepted as the third brick in 2 years in the arch of congressional support for a policy which may well lead to world war III. Imbedded in this authorization are far reaching questions about how the United States should relate to the developing world and the social, political, and mil- itary revolutions in that world, about our relations with the Soviet Union, about our approach to China which is the key to peace in Asia. Mr. Chairman, now is the time to re- assess our policy and find an honorable, diplomatic resolution of the Vietnam conflict and then build a viable policy in the Far East. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may require. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to say that I totally, unequivocally, inter- nally, and eternally, disagree with the position of the gentleman who has just preceded me. This bill, the title of which I have react in asking for the House to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, is for the pur- pose of providing the needed equipment and bases for our boys in southeast Asia. The bill, as I have said, is supplemental to fiscal 1966 for procurement authoriza- tion and is directed entirely to the sup- port of- these men in this part of the world. I would like to state at the outset that regardless of the debate that is raging in other places in the area known as Washington, D.C., one thing is crystal clear to MENDEL RIVERS, a Representa- tive from South Carolina; namely, our soldiers, our sailors, our marines, our airmen, our Coast Guardsmen, are in southeast Asia. Most of these men are in Vietnam and,' for your information, that number exceeds 250,000. They need your support, they need facilities, and weapons. The passage of this bill is your expression to your fighting men in this part of the world, mostly Vietnam, and to the American public and to the world that we intend to support our forces in every possible way. The bill we have for consideration today is H.R. 12889 which authorizes sup- plemental appropriations during fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, re- search and development and military construction for the Armed Forces. For my part, I do not need to know anything more than what I have just stated. Your flesh and blood are far away?today they need your support? they are dying for you and for me. Let me describe the bill briefly for you. The Department of Defense submitted two separate bills, one for procurement and research and development, and the other for military construction. We combined these two bills for the simple reason that they both constitute a part of the same program and it was felt that dealing with the whole matter at one time was proper for all concerned. This bill contains authorization for appropriation as follows: Procurement $3, 417, 700, 000 Research, development, test, and evaluation 151, 650, 000 Military construction 1, 288, 100,000 Total 4, 857, 450, 000 I will draw your attention to three tables on page 5 of the report which set out, very clearly, the authorizations and appropriations for fiscal year 1966 in the first two columns and in the third col- umn, the additions which will be made by this bill. The amounts for aircraft, missiles, and so forth, are set out in money amounts. I will not recite all of the details that appears on these three tables. It is all set out there in clear, factual fashion. In virtually every respect this bill is exactly like those which you have con- sidered in the past, and merely repre- sents more of the same. There are two differences, however, that I would like to point out. First there are no naval ves- sels in this bill as there always have been in the regular programs; and second, for the first time the bill contains authority for tracked combat vehicles. We amended the law last year to include the requirement that these items be specifi- cally authorized. But other than that there is nothing new. PROCUREMENT On page 6 of the report you will see that the Army will receive at total of $965,400,000 broken down into aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles. Each aircraft, missile, and tracked com- bat vehicle is named and described. For obvious reasons, numbers are not given but you may be sure that if any Member of the House wishes to have that kind of detail I will be very glad to furnish it with the understanding that it is classified material. On page 9 of the report you will see that the Navy and Marine Corps will receive $802,900,000. This again is broken down in the same fashion?and on page 11 it will be seen that the Air Force will receive $1,649,400,000, in this case broken down only into aircraft and missiles. In all these instances each of the items is named and described. A matter of particular note, I think, is that of the $3.4 billion representing procurement in this bill, a little over $3.1 billion is for aircraft and the reason for this is quite simple. Mr. McNamara tes- tified that: Although the aircraft loss rate continues low, the rapidly increasing number of sorties Is resulting in larger total losses. In 1961, we lost 38 fixed-wing aircraft and 24 heli- copters to hostile action. In 1965, with both the very large increase in activity and the attacks against North Vietnam, we lost 275 fixed-wing aircraft and 76 helicopters. We anticipate that 1966 losses will be somewhat higher. A total of about $1.8 billion for the re- placement of aircraft losses is included in the fiscal year 1966 supplemental. Another $168 million is included for the Army to equip new aviation units. The considerably higher rates of utiliza- tion of many types of aircraft in all the services will also increase the consumption of spares. For example, Air Force taCtical air- craft in Vietnam are now flying 60 percent more hours per month than they normally do in peacetime. And you may recall that I mentioned last August, we were increasing the utilization rate of Military Airlift Com- mand aircraft also by about 60 percent. Ac- cordingly, we have included in the fiscal year 1966 supplemental about $1.2 billion for air- craft spares and other aircraft equipment for all the services. I will now go to "Research and devel- opment." The amount in this bill for research and development is very small. Nor- mally, in the regular programs, research and development comes to almost half of the total bill. Here the sum of $151,- 650,000 represents only about 3 percent of the bill. The reason for this is evident in that the weapons that the men are fighting with and will fight with are the result of research and development car- ried on in the past. Actually the funds in this supplement will be used in every instance to accelerate development proj- ects of particular interest to our opera- tions in southeast Asia. On pages 13 through 15 of the com- mittee report there is set out consider- able detail as to the research and devel- ?Pent programs which are contained in this bill. Perhaps one of the most important items is a very much intensified program Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 A celnli Approved For RtmatMfggliCdalM67_130a46r,R00400050008-11arch 19(;e; to !grid a cure for a partieularly virulent strain of malaria. Another important item relates to field medical treatment facilities and equipment. Others are an aingraf t photo flasher system for night photography?and acceleration of the frozen blood program to provide backup for the blood bank system. ITAR Y CONSTRUCTION he 'Military construction" portion of the report begins on page 16. It will be seen there that the total program is $1,- 2138,100,000, On pages 17 and 18 are set out; in quite considerable detail the_ areas in which the construction will be carried on and the amounts involved. I; is in the military construction por- tion of the bill that there is the only monetary addition made by the com- mittee. The committee added $49.7 mil- lion. This addition covers two items-- the construction of a jet-capable field in Okinawa for the Marines, and ship re- pair facilities in the Philippines for the Navy. These were found to be very irn- portant projects which had not been in- cluded in the program but which after its submission were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While on the subject of "Military con- struction," I should point out another amendment made by the committee. This appears as subsection 401(b) on page 5 of the bill. It is also set out on page 2 of the report. Under this amendment, the Secretary of Defense is required to furnish to the Armed Services Committees a description of each military construction project, "together with full and complete justifi- cation therefor, including a. cost analysis thereof, prior to the execution of any contract for the establishment or devel- opment of a military installation or facility." The reason for this amendment is the fact that the committee was concerned over the lack of preciseness in the "Mili- tary construction" request. As the report states: While providing sufficient latitude to the Department to construct necessary facilities, the committee felt that it should receive Information prior to the contract execu- tion ?- Relating to these projects. The committee does not mean to infer by this amendment that it doubts the need for these construction projects. The committee is anxious, however, to avoid giving the Department of Defense anything like a "blank check." Obviously it is difficult to plan con- struction in an area some of which is in an actual combat condition. I would be leas than frank if I did not tell you that some of these facilities described on pages 17 and 18 of the report may never lie built, or, if built, not in the locations which appear in the secret backup ma- terial. The progress of the war and many other considerations will dictate the actual course to be followed. Me. Chairman, that is the bill. Let me repeat what I said at the out- set?that while I have very strong per- sonal feelings about the war in Vietnam and nave expressed myself frequently on this subject, I feel that these considera- tions have very little to do with this bill and its passage. Our men are in Vietnam. They need our support and our help. Passage of this bill is that support and that help. Let the debate as to whether we should be in Vietnam, or how we should conduct the war in Vietnam, be carried on at another time. I will join in such debate. This is not the time for that debate. This is the time for only one thing?and that is to vote our fighting men the weapons that they need. Me. FARBS1EIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield just for a moment? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman for just one moment. Mr. FARBSTEIN. This bill also in- cludes appropriations for housing, hos- pitals, doctors, food, and clothing for our Armed Forces; does it not? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. This bill and the rest of the supplemental together, yes. That is absolutely right. You cannot light a we r without taking care of such necessary things as that. Mr. FA RBS rEIN. I thank the gentle- man from South Carolina. Mr. RYAN.. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. RYAN.. Mr. Chairman, is. this not a supplemental authorization bill for the fiscal year 1966? Mr, nivERs of South Carolina.. That is right. Mr. RYAN. Did I understand the gentleman to say that he had been as- sured by Secretary of Defense McNamara that our boys had everything they need and that there were no shortages? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. "Pos- itively," I said. Mr. RYAN. Will the gentleman ex- plain where in this bill there is an au- thorization for money for clothing? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. For clothing? Mr. RYAN. For clothing. M:r. RIVERS of South Carolina. For the gentleman's information, we do not authorize clothing. We authorize weap- ons systems, implement; of war. Cloth- ing comes under housekeeping. It is a continuing appropriation, and ihe Ap- propriations Committee has exclusive jurisdiction on that. They prcvide an awful lot of clothing. I knew you will be delighted to hear we have all the clothing we need, and we are getting along like a million dollars. Mr. RYAN.. I thank the gentleman. May I ask another question? Where in this bill is there an authorization for money for food? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That is not in this bill. Mr. RYAN. Then I take it the gentle- man did not intend, In answering the question of the gentleman from New York Mr. FARBSTEIN], to leave the im- pression that this bill authorized money for clothing and food. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. We have an Appropriations Committee that takes care of all of that. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Cer- tainly. I yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. FARBSTEIN. But this includes hospitals, does it not? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That is right. Mr. FARBSTEIN. And this is made evident on page 19 of your report. With- out this appropriation we could have no hospitals or the necessary money to build whatever new hopsitals are needed in Vietnam; is that correct? Mr. RIVERS of South Carohna. In southeast Asia. Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. LAIRD. I would like to inquire of the chairman to make the record emi- nently clear that there are no appropri- ations included in this particular bill. This is an authorization bill for appro- priations, and the question of the cloth- ing will be considered in the supplemen- tal appropriation bill which will be before the House in a week or 10 days. There may be no clothing shortages as far as Vietnam is concerned., but I am sure that the distinguished chairman, from South Carolina, will admit that there are clothing shortages in the - United States and in other sections of the Army because of the drawdown in stocks. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Let me say this: This is an authorization bill. Our committee does not authorize cloth- ing. If the gentleman on the Appropria- tions Committee?and he is a distin- guished member?says there are clothing shortages, this comes under his commit- tee and I will accept that statement. Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the able chairman for the splendid statement he has made and for bringing this bill to the House, and to assure him that I am wholeheartedly for this bill. What I want to ask is this: Every time I see a picture in the paper of some American men going down a jungle trail in Vietnam, running the risk of being attacked by snipers and being ambushed and the like, I just wonder if there is not some way that the genius of our country can provide a method of fer- reting out, or a method of destroying, the enemy without those men having io walk and to expose themselves on those jungle trails. My question to the able gentleman is this: Is there any way that we can pos- sibly provide the firepower to our men over there which will save their lb es and limbs better than they are mm being saved from the enemy? Second, could we do this by increasing the amount of our research appropria- tion? I notice that the bill provides- for the Army $27 million-plus, for the Navy $52 Million-plus, and for the Air Force Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FCIORSeta62006A17/RECCIRIP2BPWWW46R000400050008-5 4265 $71 million-plus for research and devel- opment. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Right. Mr. PEPPER. I know there are many problems, but could we possibly provide any more money for research that would, at a greater financial expense, conserve the lives of our precious men over there? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. At the moment the Defense Department tells us this is all they need, but following this up, on the 7th of March we will begin hearings on the regular 1967 authoriza- tion, and in that bill there no doubt will be more research and development au- thorization. No doubt some of the ques- tions which perplex the gentleman will be answered in that bill as far as re- search and development is concerned. As far as the safety of the men is con- cerned, we have tried every way on earth to safeguard these men. I do not like the idea of photographers following them all over the place with TV cameras, show- ing all kinds of things. I do not like that, but they do it. There are many things I do not like about this war, but I have to back my President, and he does the very best he can. This is the most insidious thing we have ever gotten into. There has never been a war like this or one to compare with it. We are learning all kinds of new things. Just the other day a friend of mine invented a light which he puts in a C-123?and you open up the bays andi a very vast light comes out and lights up the whole area like a football field. They try all kinds of things that the minds of these great scientists can produce to save our men and ferret out the Vietcong. People have called me lots of things. Some have called me a hawk. No one has called me a dove. But what I am in- terested in is the American Eagle and keeping the American Eagle flying. Mr. PEPPER. I remember President Roosevelt telling me? during the early part of World War II, when he was As- sistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I we were losing a terrific amount of tonnage and lives to German subma- rines. The Navy decided to put a re- search program into effect and invited a great number of the inventors of the country to come to facilities that the Navy established for them in New Lon- don, Conn., and put each one in a little cubicle and let him go to work with his idea. He said that in 6 months' time those men had come up with the best methods that we had been able to con- trive to diminish our shipping losses due to submarine warfare. Now, all I want to say here is that I was wholeheartedly behind the able chairman and his committee and the President, but I hope, I will say, that we will tell the armed services of our coun- try and the Department of Defense, do not spare any money in research and do not spare any money in more weapons or more firepower. You will not have any trouble with Congress giving more money for research and for more and better weapons which will save the lives of the men making this gallant fight. No. 36- 16 Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I assure the gentleman from Florida that we have told the Secretary that 100 times. Every chance we have had. Every bill we have had before our committee has come out of our commit- tee unanimously. Now, as far as research and develop- ment is concerned, we have averaged be- tween $6 and $7 billion per year on that. We are exploring every area we know. I do not think we have been niggardly with- our funds at all. We have given them everything that they claim they need. Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman yield to me? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Of course I will yield to the distinguished member of the committee. Mr. STRATTON. Is it not true in re- sponse to the questions raised by the gentleman from Florida that the overall departmental appropriation request is also a request for very substantial amounts of ammunition to do just the job he is talking about, so that we can use our vast productive capacity and vastly superior firepower to save lives of American soldiers? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. So much so that we have opened up another ammunition plant which is now in full production. Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle- man. Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman yield to me? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do not have much time, but I will yield to you one more time. Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell the Committee what he expects in the way of an increase in our troop strength in South Vietnam? The chairman said earlier we have 250,000 men there. What does he expect in the next 6 months, and in the next year? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I did not say 250,000 on the mainland. I said over 250,000 in southeast Asia. Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell us what he anticipates in the next 6 months? Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Your guess could be as good as mine; but it will be sizable. It will be sizable; but Your guess is as good as mine. However, I will tell you one thing: I would rather have too many than too few, and that is what we ? are trying to do. I know the gentleman agrees with me that we do not want to have too few, because these Com- munists do not frighten very easily. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may desire. Mr. Chairman, I join with the distin- guished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in urging your support of H.R. 12889. Before proceeding with my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself briefly to some of the questions which have just been asked, especially in reference to inventories. Now, on yesterday,. when Gen. Lewis Walt appeared before the House Com- mittee on Appropriations, I asked to have a conference with him in respect to the military situation and the inventory sit- uation specifically under his command presently in Vietnam. He advised us that this is the third war in which he has participated and never has he found the inventory situation as good as it is presently in Vietnam. This does not mean that our inventory situation back here in the United States or in anticipa- tion of future developments is all that we want, because as we brought out in the hearings?and it is in the published hearings presently before you?we do have shortages, including shortages of Marine clothing. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me? Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to the chairman. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. The shortages about whiCh I was speaking were not in Vietnam. There are no shortages in Vietnam. I am sure the gentleman will agree with me on that. Mr. BATES. Yes, indeed. That is the point I tried to establish. Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me? Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman. Mr. LATTA. Before my question, let me say that since I have been a Member of Congress I have always supported these authorization requests and the ap- propriations for them. I intend to sup- port this one. But I know there are a lot of Members of Congress who have had many, many letters from parents who have received letters from boys in South Vietnam indicating certain shortages. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to the attention of the gentleman in the well, the gentleman from Massa- chusetts [Mr. BATES] , an article dated Monday, February 21, 1966, written by Mr. Hansen W. Baldwin, which goes into great detail with reference to some of the shortages which exist in Vietnam. I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts has seen this article, but I would like to have the comments of the gentleman upon the article. Mr. BATES. I have not only read the article, but I have also talked on the telephone personally with Mr. Baldwin. As a matter of fact, this morning at 8 o'clock. I met with the Secretary of Defense and asked him to complete the study which is now being made of Mr. Baldwin's article and to which reference has been made by the gentleman from Ohio. However, the Secretary of De- fense did indicate generally?and I want to say "generally"?and the report has not been submitted to me yet?that the accusations and the charges which are made by Mr. Baldwin in his article are not accurate. Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I want to thank him for following through on this matter. I know this article was very disturbing. We have had other reports which seem to verify some of the charges which have been made in this article. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4266 Approved For RelmisAik5ARVIRAlit-RBRB3.0014181M0400050008-5 March Mr. Chairman, I look forward to fur- ther discussion of this matter on the floor of the House as a result of the re- quest which you have made.. Mr. BATES. I will say to the gentle- man from Ohio that no one is more con- cerned than I am to make absolutely certain that our men have what they need in combat. Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will tile gentleman yield? Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. MINSHALL. As a member of the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, we have been holding intensive hearings for the past several days on exactly the subject about which my distinguished colleague [Mr. LATTA 1, and the gentleman from Massachusetts have been discussing, mainly with ref- erence to clothing shortages. We have discussed this question with General Johnson, Chief of the Army; we have re- cently discussed it with General Greene arid General Walt of the Marine COrps, and also the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral McDonald. As a result of our subcommittee hear- ings there is no doubt in my mind or in their mind that our troops in Vietnam are currently receiving all that they pres- ently need. I concur with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services when he says that they are getting all they need. However, what concerns Gen- eral Johnson and General Greene are forecast shortages and the shortages that are presently in existence today with ref- erence to our troops here on the homefront. There is a definite shortage of cloth- ing, specifically of cotton khaki pants that they are issuing to the Marine Corps. They are presently receiving only one issue of cotton khaki pants, whereas the normal issue calls for three pair. This shortage will not be relieved until late this year. So, we cannot say that there are no shortages of clothing. There is this par- ticular shortage, plus others, that we 'brought out in the hearings, and which will be made public when our hearings are published. The Army will have adequate fatigue jackets but not enough pants in the months ahead. The Marines forecast a shortage of cotton khaki pants. This will be a funny looking Military Estab- lishment. George Washington's army at Valley Forge may have had no shoes, but the Great Society's forces are running out of pants. Mr. BATES. As a matter of fact, I heard about them in our own hearings. Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the omit:dem:in yield further? Mr. BATES. I yield further to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. LATTA. There have also been other shortages that have been brought to the attention of the Armed Services Committee in addition to clothing. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to the attention of the gentleman the testi- mony which appears on page 5068 of the hearings which were held by the Com- mittee on Armed Services where General Greene was being questioned by Mr. Blandford. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Blantiford asked the question: How about 10:5 ammunition, proximity fuse ammunition, proximity fuses, and 8- inch howitzer ammunition? His there been any reduction in that for practice purposes? General Greene replied: We have had some snortages in 105-milli- meter illuminating ammunition ,i. I checked on that specifically when I was :art this last time in south Vietnam. Howerer, although we don't have the levels that w, would like, our operations at night using this ammuni- tion have not been restricted. We still had enough on hand. I would say that 105- millimeter illuminating would have to necessarily be used carefully in raining. Then Mr. Blandford asked the follow- ing question: Well, actually, am I correct that there has been a reduction in the availability of this type of ammunition for training purposes? General Greene replied: That would depend, of cours, upon the division commanders. T cannot give you the specific answer. Then he goes on to another question which appears at the top of page 5069 to which General Greene replied: We have had a problem there again in 4.2 illuminating projectors.. Then Mr. Blandford asked this ques- tion: Where are the other places whcre we have problems? General Greene replied: believe the committee in the; ,- visits and examination of this prolciem, as I recall, found six different types of amr kunition in which there were indications of shortages. The Manne Corps has not been hampered or crippled in actual operations in South Viet- nam in any of these areas. Mr. Chairman, this is testimony which was given by General Greene before the Committee on Armed Services_ believe we ought to admit these short- ages exist and do something about them. Mr. BATES. I want to thank the gen- tleman from Ohio for revealing to the House this matter which was uncovered by our Committee on Armed Services, and we certainly intend to pursue this at every opportunity. I would just like to say to the Members generally now, if anyone has any specific items that they have reason to believe is hi short supply either overseas or here, call it to our attention and we will cer- tainly look into it and ;3ee that the situa- tion is rectified. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina,. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BATES. I gladly yield to the gentleman. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Gen- eral Greene also said this?and we cer- tainly do not want to cover up any- thing?but this is what Gener. .11 Greene said: The Marine Corps has not been hampered or crippled in actual operations in South Vietnam in a,ny of these areas. If we find any shortages, believe you me, we certainly are going to follow through ,:an them. (16 If the gentleman will yield further? right today in Washington, Lieutenant General Walt who heads the marines In the Da Nang area, said that he has never had an army of marines with bet- ter morale or better equipped. That is what he said today and he also said he has fought in three wars. So wherever we find shortages, we will follow through on them. So I do not think we need to worry about that kind of thing in Vietnam today. Mr. BELCHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BATES. I yield to the s entleman. Mr. BELCHER. This does not neees- sarily involve the question of shorOges, but I had a complaint from the wife of a serviceman in Vietnam. She said his letter stated there were 10 of them in their outfit, I think it was in the enei- neers?and all their sidearms and weap- ons had been taken away from them. He said that four of them had been killed by snipers and they had no means of protecting themselves. I also noticed on television, as I im- agine a lot of other Members of the House did, where a lady complained that her husband had been attacked and the only thing he had to defend himself with was a knife. He had no side arm or rifle whatsoever to defend himself with. Has anything like that come to tile attention of the committee? Mr. BATES. I have heard a story such as the gentleman relates. Has the gentleman addressed any inquiry him- self to the Department of Defense? Mr. BELCHER. Yes, I have. Mr. BATES. What was their rep10 Mr. BELCHER. They have not had time to make a reply yet. Mr. BATES. If the gentleman will give me specific information, I will be very happy to cooperate with him. Be- cause certainly the interest which the gentleman displays is on something that we on the committee also take very, very seriously. If there are any problems--if there are any shortages, we want to cor- rect the situation. We do not want, to hide anything under a bushel. Mr. BELCHER. Of course, this did not involve the question of a shortage. The guns were there but they were taken away from the men and the guns were locked up. Mr. BATES. I am not referring only to shortages. I am referring to any other kind of situation that the gentleman will give me specific information on and I will be happy to cooperate with him. Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairrnan, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the gentleman. Mr. LATTA. This is a very important matter. I think when the committee was before the Committee on Rules they asked for 3 hours and you thosteht that 3 would be adequate. Mr. BATES. The gentleman is bouts very well. Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman for yielding because we did bring out something that was apparently over- looked in the Armed Services Commit- tee. I want to commend the gentleman in the well. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1.966 Approved EeNtelffsesemn7gRacittraDMM446R000400050008-5 4267 You gave assurances that you will look into these matters as they come to the attention of the Mem- bers. I, also want to commend the chairman of the committee because he has been most helpful in the past about these matters. I think in my own case when I hear from parents of servicemen in Vietnam instead of bucking these things over to the Pentagon and getting their stock reply?"We will look into it"?I will buck them over to your com- mittee. I will get more information that way. Mr. BATES. I shall be very, very grateful to the gentleman if he does so. As a matter of fact, yesterday afternoon someone made an inquiry of me with re- ference to a particular bomb. This morning I was at the Pentagon, as I indicated a few moments ago, and I asked the Secretary of Defense to get out his book. We looked specifically into that book to find out about the inven- tory situation that we have and as to the present usage rate on this particular bomb and what our production is going to be and what our inventory is going to be 12 months from now. So if the gentleman will give us the information to which he refers, he will be doing us a favor. We would be most happy to co- operate with him because this is our business and when we come before the House we want to indicate what the facts truly are. I must say that the gentleman has been most helpful here today. Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. BATES. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. HUNGATE. I understand the gentleman is fully familiar with the ar- ticle by Hanson Baldwin that appeared in the New York Times of February 21, and the committee has the problems therein mentioned under active consideration. Mr. BATES. Yes, we have had the full discussion on that and will get full dis- closure of information on those points. Mr. HUNGATE. I thank the gentle- man very much. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, just to complete our thinking on this particular point. If this bill was before the Con- gress 10 years ago, not a single item in it would be considered by the Committee on Armed Services. Now why do I say that? Because years ago our committee did not take under its jurisdiction and purview missiles or airplanes. This year we are adding tracked vehicles. The only thing this committee had at one time under its jurisdiction was the question of the con- struction and also naval vessels, but there are no naval vessels in this particular bill, So now when we come before you, we want to make certain that as fully as possible we give you all the information to which you are entitled. In fact, there was a time when naval vessels were provided by the Congress when we did not even have to give an authorization because there was enough authorization left over from World War II to last a thousand years. Mr. Chairman, I agree fully with the distinguished Speaker of the House when he said that if we had had firm leader- ship prior to World War II, perhaps we would never have had World War II. I believe, too, that if we had not de- clared that Korea was outside the de- fense perimeter of the United States, perhaps there would have been no Ko- rea. But that is history. Today we are dealing with facts and not with con- jecture. As the distinguished chairman of this committee has said, our boys are now in South Vietnam. Maybe some in your family are in South Vietnam. I know that my family is represented there. So this bill contains authorizations for appropriations for procurement, for research and development, test and eval- uation, and for military construction in the amount of $4.8 billion. We have done much in the field of re- search and development. This year alone we will spend $6.7 billion just in military research and development. The fantastic things that have been invented, if they could be revealed here, would give you considerable comfort. Some of these are already in the hands of our troops and more are forthcoming. I would like to say that we do have one reservation, and that is the question of the timing of this specific legislation. Was it necessary to come here today, or could it have waited in the orderly proc- ess of things and been considered with the fiscal year 1967 bill, which we will consider on the 8th of March? That is a question. We asked for the specific facts. I must be frank and candid and say to you that the information which came to us was inconclusive. We did feel that much that is in this bill per- haps could have been deferred until the 1st of July, but we do not want to gam- ble. We do not want to take a chance. Oh, I know and you know that when the President comes up here with a budget for 1967 and he can eliminate from it $12 billion, like we have in this general appropriation supplemental bill, then, of course, it looks much better as the American people review it. But from a military point of view it achieves no purpose if bookkeeping is the only purpose. Nevertheless, we do not want to gam- ble. If this bill can be expedited, we want it expedited, because we want to make certain that our young men have what they need when they need it and not have too little too late. The rapid buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam in the calendar year 1967 did not provide time for the advanced development of detailed plans. Many of these will be submitted as soon as the Secretary of Defense receives this in- formation. I would not say that clair- voyance was used by the Department of Defense as to the development of pro- grams either last year or this year. Many of the members of our own com- mittee believed a year ago that we should have increased our production of heli- copters, ammunition, and production in other fields. But it was not done at the time we recommended because it was never believed, so we were told, that this war would escalate to the degree which it has. But as I have indicated, we are dealing with facts and not with fantasies, and we have young men there today and we must support them. In the military construction area this bill provides for troop housing, ports, depots, hospitals, signal communica- tions, airfields, and community facilities, not only in Vietnam, but nearby in the Philippines, in Guam, in Okinawa, Wake Island, Midway, and even in Thailand. Some will even be built in the United States. The list appears on page 26 of the report. As proposed originally by the Depart- ment of Defense, the language in section 401(a) of this bill was susceptible of an Interpretation that it constituted an un- limited transfer of authority to the ex- tent that the Department of Defense appropriations for personnel functions could have been used for procurement, or that procurement appropriations were authorized to be transferred to operations and maintenance-type ex- penditures in behalf of South Vietnam. But our committee wisely?I believe wisely?added the words, "for their stated purposes," so that whatever we have in this bill must be used for the general purposes intended and not ac- cording to what someone might want to do regardless of the intent of Congress. I will invite your attention to the fact that any aircraft, missile, or tracked combat vehicle for which funds are au- thorized in this bill can be made avail- able to the Vietnamese or to the Koreans or to the Filipinos or to the Australians or whoever else might be engaged in combat on our side in Vietnam. Why did we do this? The practical aspect of this is obvious. When these men are engaged in combat, that is no time to be keeping detailed accounting records. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. Government and the people of this coun- try must pick up the tab anyway. So let the men spend the time on defending themselves and executing the war, rather than keeping these detailed reports. Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall close. I have already taken more time than I had anticipated, but the basic purpose of this bill is to support our fighting men, as well as our friendly allies, who are in Vietnam now fighting for the objectives of free- dom. There might be all kinds of debate that could extend day after day, as it has in the other body, as to whether we are bombing enough, or just right, or too little, or whether we should get out of South Vietnam altogether. But while we are discussing this, time is moving on, and it takes a long time for many of these implements of war to be manufactured. Our forces require essential supplies, equipment, and facilities, to enable them to accomplish the job which they have been sent over there by us to do. I ad- vocate that all members of this com- mittee, regardless of what disposition they might have in respect to foreign policy, to support this bill and to support our men that we have sent 10,000 miles away to fight in the cause of freedom. Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4.268 Approved For RelcomiziogimAilicpe8?3539_94118M400050008-5 March 1, -.1!:c'; Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the dis- tinguished majority leader [Mr. At:aural. (Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, I con- gratulate the distinguished chairman of this committee and the distinguished ranking member, both of whom have adequately explained the details of this bill. I join them in urging the prompt adoption of this measure. The hill which is now before this House, its background and its implica- tions, have been considered with all the wisdom and experience we can bring to bear. It has been referred from commit- tee with a strong endorsement which has taken into account every pertinent cir- cumstance and consideration. It has been examined and debated, and exten- sive public discussion has taken place. I believe that the time for debate is over and the time to pass this bill is at hand. What is needed now is prompt and over- whelming approval of the present bill to demonstrate to those who oppose us that there is no division in the Congress or among the American people regarding support for our troops in Vietnam. I think recent discussions have made our goals in Vietnam crystal clear. As the President stated on February 23: Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not, empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is to prevent the forceful conquest of South. Vietnam by North Vietnam. The Secretary of State wisely pointed out on February 18: We are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live. Now, I do not intend to try the pa- tience of my colleagues by repeating on this occasion all the reasoning which has led to the conclusion that we must stand by the people of South Vietnam. Of course the task which faces us is not an easy one. Of course it is not without risks, grave risks. Of course, we cannot foretell how long it will be before an obdurate aggressor will be brought to his senses. But the difficulty of the task is not the criterion. This country was born under a resolution which called for lib- erty or death. Our men are in Vietnam now, they have undertaken the brave struggle with courage and determination. They are not going to be abandoned by this House at this hour. We are standing and they are fighting for what we believe is the right war in the right place and at the right time. Surely we are under no illusions about the nature of the war we are fighting or the goals of those who have provoked it. This is no struggle for liberation.. This is a part of an international con- spiracy aimed at all southeast Asia. This is not a civil war. It is an invasion, organized, sponsored and led from flanoi. The hardened international conspirators behind this invasion have already made it clear that Thailand is the next target in southeast. Asia while the free lands of Latin America and Africa should not be neglected. The horrors which have been visited upon the people of South Vietnam as a result of these decisions are well known to us. Our hearts go out to them in their suffering, but. also our admiration for the determination with which they have resisted the onslaught. I am proud that this country has, in consonance with our cherished traditions? lived up to its promises made to come to the assistance of the South Vietnamese* I hope that any doubts abeut whether we have a legitimate commitment to South Vietnam have been laid to rest. Our vital interests are involved in the struggle of the people of South Vietnam to build a new society according to their own desires, free from Communist ag- gression. Our commitment to Vietnam has been expressed since 1954 in congres- sional resolutions and acts, Presidential declarations, bilateral assistance agree- ments, and the SEATO treaty, as well as in the joint resolution of August 7, 1964. The. Congress has supported this commitment at every stage of the way. The vote we ask on the bill before us today will be a further expression of sup- port for that commitinent. The word of the United States is at stake here, and if the word of the United States is not good everywhere, it will not be good anywhere. If we fail ,in our commitments at one time how can friend or foe ever depend on our commitments at anytime. That the Communist north might at- tempt to take over South Vietnam by subversion or aggression was clear from the moment the Geneva agreements were signed in 1954. Indeed, :t is a fact accepted even by the few scholars expert on Vietnam who criticize aspects of our policy, that the Communists violated the Geneva agreements before the ink was dry on them. They did this primarily by leaving -their agents and caches of arms behind in the south, thus failing to regroup to the north as agreed, with a view to the battle they foresaw even then. The United States declared formally at Geneva that we "would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the afore- said agreements with grave coacern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." In October 1954, President E,senhower undertook a program of direct assistance to help South Vietnam become "capable of resisting attempted subversion or ag- gression through military meal is." And the United States joined with its allies in the SEATO Treaty, which was made applicable to South Vietnam by a spe- cial protocol. On May 11, 1917, Presi- dents Eisenhower and Diem, issued a joint statement which included the following language: Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article r'ir of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisen- hower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endanger- ing peace and stability. On August 2, 1961, President Keit d y declared: The United States is determined that tl,e. Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost 10 the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render. And on December 14 that year, redly- to President Diem's appeal for addi- tional support to meet the growing effort of the north, President Kennedy reaf- firmed that the United States was "pre- pared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence." President Johnson has reaffirmed these commitments many times, and on Au- gust 7, 1964, the joint resolution of the Congress, adopted by a vote of 504 to 2. stated inter aim, as follows: The United States regards as vital to tis national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and se- curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and in accordance with its obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all neces- sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member of protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, requesting assistance in defense of its free- dom. This resolution is still on the books. This resolution is the law of the land. The legality of the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam is not subject to ques- tion. As my colleagues surely know the American Bar Association's House of Delegates has voted unanimously on this question, to uphold the only reasonable view possible; namely, that our action concords with the Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and the SEATO Treaty. Specifically, the charter recog- nizes the right of individual and collec- tive self-defense, a right inherent under international law. And the applicability of the SEATO Treaty under which the pertinent obligations are individual and collective, was definitively spelled out by the Secretary of State in his :fil.tement of February 18. At this late stage can there be any doubt who started the war in South Vietnam or who provoked its escalation? It is crystal clear that the actions of the United States have constituted a meas- ured response to escalation by North Vietnam. Having laid the groundwork for aggression as early as 1954, the Com- munists hoped to achieve their conquest through rigged unification elections in 1956. However, the South refused to be taken in this way, insisting that the vot- ers' freedom to vote would have to be supervised and guaranteed by an ade- quate and impartial system of supervi- sion. The north thereafter began gre d- ually to infiltrate native South Viet- namese trained in guerrilla warfare, with the result that from 1957 to 1959 over , 1 000 civilians were assassinated or kid- , napped by the Vietcong. From 1959 through 1961 Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks were intensified. In 1961, in response to President Diem's request. the small American military mission was increased in order to add advisory tune- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1,1966 Approved FIKRZIRESSIINSME7RBCCECRDFlegtfa46R000400050008-5 4269 tions to its former logistical and support functions. North Vietnam between 1962 and 1964 greatly increased its in- filtration of military personnel, political cadres and equipment, and the number of American military advisers had to grow. By early 1965, Vietcong attacks reached intensive levels, and as a result we responded with air attacks against the north and the introduction of corn.. bat personnel. Regular units of the North Vietnamese military forces were introduced from December 1964, and this infiltration has continued to grow. Does any one doubt that the so-called National Liberation Front of South Vietnam is an artificial creation of Hanoi. This apparatus was created in late 1960 in Hanoi, indeed the names of the alleged leaders were not even dis- closed until spring of 1962. When these names finally were released, these pur- ported leaders were unknown to the peo- ple of South Vietnam, in fact Vietcong prisoners to this day reveal a singular unawareness of the names of these so- called leaders. An attempt has been in- tensified to create the impression that the Vietcong front is composed of inde- pendent South Vietnamese groups as well as Communists, and that it repre- sents the people of South Vietnam. However, the flow of refugees away from Communist areas, the Vietcong's ever increasing reliance on terror, the morale of the South Vietnamese fighting forces, and the lack Of support by legitimate South Vietnamese organizations give the lie to these claims. The Vietcong have never been able to gain any kind of a foothold in South Vietnamese political parties, labor unions, refugee groups, regional organizations or churches, and South Vietnamese politicians who have opposed particular governments in Sai- gon have never defected to the Vietcong. The Vietcong's attempts to call gen- eral strikes have failed, and their best efforts to prevent the people from voting in last year's provincial and municipal council elections also failed. People outside Vietnam are in many cases re- grettably ready to believe the fiction that the Vietcong represent an indigenous political movement, perhaps because this would make our own withdrawal easier to bring about, but the people of South Vietnam are not duped by these preten- sions. The Vietcong are an arm of Hanoi, and the South Vietnamese know this. In certain quarters we still hear the call for negotiation, for peaceful settle- ment. Does any one at this stage doubt the sincerity and perseverance of the United States in seeking a peaceful so- lution in South Vietnam? Again and again, using every channel available, the United States has invited Hanoi to meet for discussions without the imposition of any conditions whatsoever. Every sug- gestion made has been considered and, where possible, acted upon by the United States. At considerable military cost, the air attacks against the former sanc- tuary of North Vietnam were shut off for over a month. Hanoi, however, has remained obsti- nate and vitriolic about these negotiation efforts, rejecting them out of hand in- sisting upon prior acceptance of its own conditions. As the Members of this House know, the chief stumbling block remains Hanoi's insistence upon recog- nition of the so-called National Libera- tion Front as the sole, genuine represent- ative of the South Vietnamese people, Hanoi has likewise insisted upon accept- ance of this front's program, that is, upon handing over South Vietnam to Hanoi. I do not say that we should give up our attempts to negotiate a peaceful set- tlement in South Vietnam. Indeed, we must continue ?to persevere in these ef- forts. But I do believe that we must not, we cannot betray our commitments to the South Vietnamese people. This Na- tion has the resources and the will to win in South Vietnam, and win we shall. Our objectives are limited and reason- able. They boil down to making North Vietnam back off from its aggression in South Vietnam. I for one ain not going to be frightened from this course by those who raise the specter of a possible war with Communist China. We seek no such confrontation with Red China, and our limited objectives should be clear to Peiping's leaders. At the same time, we possess the awesome power necessary to such a confrontation, should the Chinese Communists indulge in suicidal rash- ness. The central point is that we must persist in the struggle to thwart the am- bitions of Hanoi backed by Peiping, so that, pacification achieved, the noble, revolutionary programs which were the subject matter of the Honolulu Confer- ence can proceed with greater vigor? and the people of South Vietnam can live in peace. The issues are clear, Mr. Speaker. Our commitments and our obligations are clear. Our duty is clear. Our troops and the civilian representatives who are help- ing the South Vietnamese are doing their duty. The people of this country will not shirk their duty. And just as surely, this House will not shirk its duty. Our military have carefully considered what they need to carry on the fight, and the bill which is before us is a request for the funds necessary to provide for these needs. Let us, then, without further pro- longing discussion, without feeding the hopes of the enemy that he can win in Washington what he cannot win on the batlefield, proceed to enact this bill. Our fighting men deserve this vote of con- fidence, immediately, overwhelmingly, and without further ado. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentle- man from Indiana [Mr. BRAY] . (Mr. BRAY asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me? Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding to me at this time. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill, but I do so with several qualms. My first qualm is that the President seems to want to keep this war on an un- admitted. "no win, no lose" middle track. We are not pulling back to enclaves and we are not pushing ahead to military success. This kind of policy is costly? much too costly. I will not vote to fund a war that throws men into a meat- grinder and money into a pool of quick- sand. I want to see us switch to mili- tary and diplomatic tactics aimed at put- ting us in a position to negotiate a suc- cessful conclusion to this war before we have spent tens of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars. To move into this particular legisla- tion, I would like to say I am not sur- prised that the Armed Services Commit- tee had to make provision for additional funds for Navy construction in the Far East. Secretary McNamara has been ex- tremely careless during the last few years in assessing American maritime and na- val needs. He has grossly underesti- mated our civilian and military seapower needs in the Far East. Our merchant marine has been left to stagnate. Our Navy has also been neglected?as witness the fact that it was up to the Armed Services Committee to provide for Navy construction needs in the Far East. I think the Secretary's lack of awareness of seapower and water transport has been costly to our war effort. From Vietnam to Brooklyn Navy Yard, Secretary Mc- Namara has done too little, too late. I would like to say, frankly, that I am worried about American maritime power. Secretary McNamara decided some time ago that Vietnam could be supplied by airlift, and he neglected the merchant marine. Now the Russians are building a merchant marine that is planned to make our merchant marine look like a tugboat fleet. The British have said that our merchant marine is so old and shoddy it can for the most part be in- sured only at a premium?and this could force many of our ships off the sea. I would have thought that the British would be content with bringing supplies to North Vietnam. Evidently they want to get the profits out of supplying both sides in this war. In short, the administration has not shown any foresight in planning the needs of our Navy or merchant marine. I hope that this carelessness is over and done with. There is only one area in which this administration has antioi- pated seapower needs before they de- veloped. I have read recently that our Potomac fleet is being reactivated. Evidently the President has determined that our budget is so well balanced that the Presidential yacht can be brought out of mothballs?but we cannot afford Brooklyn Navy Yard. I am also disturbed that much of the supplemental appropriation before us here today really belongs in the 1967 budget, but has been moved up to get it out of the fiscal 1967 budget to make room for wasteful spending programs in next year's budget. I do not think a supplemental appropriation should serve this purpose. I support this bill as a military spend- ing bill necessary to support troops in the field, but in many ways it disturbs me. Its disturbs me if it has any con- notation as being a mandate for escala- tion. It disturbs me that votes for this Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4270 Approved For ReirffIRgilg?M914APIMWIA93-9-9MSFin"00050008-5 march 1, 1966 authorization may be construed as sup- port of administration policy?my vote is not a vote in support of administration policy, my vote is rather a vote in sup- port of American troops. I would also like to say that my vote here today is not a vote for the budget gimmick aspect of this bill. I am starting to feel that everything that ciomes before us these days has a budget gimmick in it. I am getting tired of the President's little devices for getting expenditures out of the fiscal 1967 budget and getting receipts into it. I am getting tired of ha; foreign and Vietnamese policies. We are pursuing policies at home and abroad that would not convince a child, no less Ho Chi Minh, that we have any long-range fortitude. We are pursuing wasteful programs at home and absurd programs abroad. We are giving our allies aid while they give Ho Chi Minh trade. We are stationing troops in Eu- rope to protect Europeans who thumb their noses at our war effort because they think that any nation pursuing such shapeless and soggy policies must be in water over its head. I am worried about the President's policies. There is too much blood and too little belt-tightening. I favor a tough policy, but toughness is not op- timistic, extravagant, and malcoorcii- tinted sacrifice for insufficiently defined objectives. Toughness is a stern, calcu- lated unwavering pursuit of reasonable and well-defined goals. This is not a definition of administration policy. The policies of this administration are dangerous because they are not coming to grips with diplomatic reality as re- gards our allies and military reality with respect to Vietnam. The administra- tion's glittering generalities and opti- mism have built the American people up for a letdown if we cannot win a reasonable settlement at a reasonable cost. The potential backfire of this se- crecy, optimism and misrepresentation would cheer Hanoi more than all the dissent in these United States. It is con- structive dissent that can head off the backfire. My vote is for our soldiers, and for their splendid endurance in the face of this nerve-shattering war. I do not sup- port the way in which the administra- tion is conducting our overall cold war oolicy. I would also like to point out a way in which we can cut military expendi- tures to make up for the money we are voting today. We can begin to with- draw some of the 318,000 troops we have in Europe to protect the allies who do not support us. Three weeks ago, I in- troduced a resolution, House Resolution 728, to call on the President to begin withdrawing troops. Today's expendi- ture authorization makes my budget- cutting resolution more important. I urge this House to consider House Reso- lution 728, and I am putting its text and other information in the Appendix today. Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, we have heard from many that we should not be Ia. Vietnam, I do not care to discuss that matter at this time, because it is a moot question. It is a condition, not a theory that confronts us. We are in Vietnam. Several hundred thousand troops, sailors, a:nd airmen are there en- gaged in as vicious war as anyone has participated in during the history of this country. We are suffering heavy losses. The situation is very precarious. So, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this bill today is to provide the proper weap- ons and supplies for serviceman who are in Vietnam. The weapons a ad supplies called for i.n this legislation are neces- sary. After all, Mr. Chairman, we only have two alternatives before us in southeast Asia. We are in Vietnam in treat force, and the enemy has refused ti even talk about peace. So one alternatiae is to sur- render. That would make the United States the paper tiger of our time, and it would also result in turning over all of southeast Asia to the Communists. The ultimate results of such action on our part is horrible to even contemplate. Mr. Chairman, we have a mother al- ternative?an alternative which the ap- peasers ignore. That alternative is to win, and that is what this leaislation is designed to help us accomplish. Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that the United States has been bemoaned and cursed and attacked at home and abroad--and I especially refer to those attacks at home with reference to the demonstrations which are designed to do everything they can to defeat he United States?despite this fact the United States ts still the "Real McCoy." Despite all of the anvil choruses denouncing the United States and demandina that we surrender, the fact of the matter is that we are still there, arid do not plan to surrender until peace is secured. Also, despite the fact that we have made many, many errors?no question abtiut that? in our military planning, and timing, I have never yet seen and I do not be- lieve anyone has ever seen American troops any braver, more dedicated, and more patriotic than those which are par- ticipating in the conflict in South Viet- nam. Mr. Chairman, I have been over there several times, and I have talked to many of our American troops. I want to say that at no time have I found one man who was not proud that he was an Amer- ican and proud of the job he as doing. They did ask the question as to why we did not try to win. They asked the ques- tion as to why Americans were demon- strating against their county. They could not understand with all that Amer- ica means to the world, all of t he great- ness of America; they could not under- stand why our own people would bitterly attack America for its effort unselfishly being made in Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, I heard that question raised many times. I went to the hos- pitals and talked with dozens of young men and boys there. I talked to men who had an arm off or a leg off. At no time did I hear one man comr lain. He was proud he was an American. Mr. Chairman, the only questions they were asking were what are we doing to win on the home:front, and in by these anti-American demonstrations are tak- ing place in America. Now, Mr. Chairman, the GI in Vietnam has only one thing in his mind; that is, that the United States may win, and I deeply hope that in some way these wounded American patriots can transfer that patriotism; that same will to win to the homefront. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FARBSTEIN]. (Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, in the past, I have expressed reservation about some of the administration's ac- tions in Vietnam. Recently, I joined a number of other Representatives in urg- ing the President, among other things, to deescalate our military efforts in Viet- nam as a further effort to bring the war from the battlefield to the conference table. I still feel no good can come from further escalation and do not wish this vote to be considered otherwise. I desire to create a climate leading to the confer- ence table. Today we are faced with the task of voting on an appropriation for $4.8 bil- lion for Vietnam. Each Member must do some soul searching before casting his vote. I, for one, have carefully reviewed my predilections and balanced them with the Nation's well-being. American boys are committing their lives and honor to this fight in the Far East. These young men must not be de- prived of equipment, necessary hospitals, medical treatment, essential supplies, and helicopters needed to help them sur- vive in this jungle war. The Congress, regardless of any reservations and unan- swered questions on administration pol- icy, must not fail to grant the funds to supply these brave men. I do not desire to be in the position of turning my back on our young men who are presently sac- rificing their lives in Vietnam. On the scale, I find I must vote in favor of the appropriation. Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Chairman, the hearings that pre- ceded the approval of H.R. 12889 by the Armed Services Committee represented a very earnest effort by our members to determine the urgent needs of our mili- tary and to support them by this bill. We are aware of the scope of our in- volvement in southeast Asia and wish to provide what is required to achieve victory at the earliest possible time. It is apparent that as yet our full military capabilities have not been em- ployed in Vietnam nor have we followed the strategy that full military consider- ations would dictate. We trust that our actions are understood to reflect, our de- sire to resolve the differences by Peace- ful means. However, there ia a real danger that our enemies will exoloit our restraint through propaganda designed to create the impression we are losing the war, know we cannot win, and are plagued by disunity on the hoinefront. Certain events and actions might tend to give credence to such claims but our debate here today is not one of them. We are here attesting that we are de- termined to win and will meet the needs of our forces in their effort to do so. We Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 Approved FrgiDIRWRONS2IMSG7/RICOggRBOWMI446R000400050008-5 4271 on the committee have asked our service chiefs and department heads to tell us what they required and by this legisla- tion we are seeking to meet their needs in full. I have been disturbed that certain items have been transferred from the fiscal 1967 program without any real as- surance that procurement will be so ac- celerated that inclusion in this bill is necessary. To the extent such technique is employed, it does not have my ap- proval. However, I have found it diffi- cult to remove this criticism without in some way interfering with sound objec- tives. Therefore, I rely upon the good faith which must be implicit in the un- derlying request. Another important element in this legislation is the provision for ,military construction totaling over $11/4 billion. Our involvement in southeast Asia necessitates prompt action to provide needed facilities in support of supply, housing and hospital operations. Al- though many of the items have been specified, the bill makes available to the Secretary of Defense an additional $200 million for expeditious accomplishment of emergency contruction needed to meet any crisis which might develop. It is proposed that this authority will be fully funded. This bill will appeal to all as a timely, and we hope adequate, response to needs paramount in our thinking. We trust none shall misread our intent. Our de- termination to achieve our valid objec- tives in Vietnam is clear and in this spirit we support H.R. 12889. The action we take today will have an impact on our fighting men. Too fre- quently the headlines suggest confusion or division on the home front. This is detrimental to their morale and makes their task more difficult. We can be sure that our support of this measure will furnish unmistakable evidence that this House will respond to their needs promptly and completely. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It is my im- pression and the impression, I believe, of others that the French lost the war over there not an the battlefield but in Paris. Would the gentleman agree with that? Mr. PIRNIE. There is reason to be- lieve that is true. But we certainly have something more working in our favor as compared with the French. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I certainly hope that is true. But the French soldiers over there were left with nothing to fight with because of decisions re. suiting from agitation and dissent in their capital city of Paris. Is that not true and is it not so that that resulted in their defeat? Mr. PIRNIE. I hope that history will not repeat itself insofar as our effort and our operations are concerned. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. We must give our fighting men every support on the battlefield and I commend the gentle- man on his statement and certainly agree with him. Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman. (Mr. PIRNIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Vir- ginia I Mr. Many] . Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in my mind that this bill is es- sential to the support of all of our forces in Vietnam. I have visited Vietnam in the recent past and have seen the construction at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay and at a number of other locations. I was very pleased by the construction ac- tivities that I saw, In fact, I made par- ticular note of my feelings in this regard when Defense Department construction witnesses were before the committee. This is not to say that I am completely happy about the form of this present bill. The bill authorizes construction in a number of different areas as will be seen from pages 17 and 18 of the report. There is construction in the Philippines, Guam, at Midway and Wake Islands and about $63 million worth of construction right here in the United States. And, in- cidentally, that U.S. construction is set out by State and installation on page 26 of the report. The majority of the construction in this bill, over $736 million worth, is in Vietnam itself. The construction pro- gram involves almost every type from training facilities to ammunition stor- age. Some of it is for the Navy, some of it is for the Air Force and the largest part, some $407 million, is for the Army. We have a lot of people in Vietnam and maybe we will have more in the not too distant future. These people have to have, in great part, much the same kind of facilities that they would have to have here in the United States. They have to have barracks, hospitals, airfields, fuel and ammunition storage, and every other kind of facility which is a normal part of a military operation. I guess food and weapons come first in priority, but phys- ical facilities such as I have named run a very close second. And we have got to provide them. Of course, there are special problems involved in construction in a place like Vietnam. Vietnam is an undeveloped country, and any kind of logistic support is difficult. Right now, there is only one major port, Saigon. Transportation within the country is practically nonexistent. Sim- ply stated, there was nothing in Vietnam for us to start with as there would be in a developed country. We have to provide everything ourselves. We have to pro- vide port and warehouse facilities. We have to construct roads, and all of this has to be done under the most difficult circumstances and, obviously, at costs that are much greater than they would be here in the United States. Notwithstanding a full appreciation of these difficulties, I think I should say, as I mentioned a moment ago, that I was not at all pleased with the way the De- partment presented the construction pro- gram for this bill. I am against any kind of blank check to the Department of De- fense. And I am not alone in this. Many members of the committee feel the same way. But that is the kind of pro- gram that was handed to us in commit- tee. I tried as hard as I could to keep some congressional control, realizing the difficulty in predetermining exactly what was going to be built where, and haw much it was going to cost. I know that General Westmoreland needs to have a good bit of flexibility. I know he cannot predict the exact course of this war and for this very reason he cannot predict exactly where he is going to need a par- ticular facility or the exact cost of it. Notwithstanding these understandable difficulties, the Congress, in my mind, has a responsibility to see to it that it keeps itself informed as to just how our funds are being spent. It was with this in mind that I offered an amendment in committee which now appears as section 401(b) of the bill. The department has contended that this lan- guage is too rigid?that it will cause de- lays. I do not think the problem is as great as they contend. But anyway we have agreed on substitute language which I think will serve the purposes I had in mind about as well as the original lan- guage. The new language which is in the form of a committee amendment and will be offered by your chairman reads as follows: The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a de- scription of all construction projects, in- cluding cost estimates and periodic reports, made available to the Secretary of Defense simultaneously with the receipt of such in- formation from the persons responsible for the construction of such projects in sup- port of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam. Whenever such construc- tion projects, involving $1,000,000 or more, are performed by private contractors, the Secretary of Defense or his representative in Vietnam shall report to -the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the name or names of such private contractors. The amounts in- volved in each contract a copy of the report in support of each progress payment, and a complete report prior to final payment. The new language still does not pro- vide an ideal situation but it will enable us to keep our finger on the construction program. I want to stress that I have no doubt as to actual need for this construction, but I want to know and I think that you and I have a right to know just what is being done and how it is being done. Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the pending bill, H.H. 12889, authorizing appropriations for equip- ment, materiel, construction, and other purposes in support, primarily, of our effort in Vietnam. Our fighting men are engaged in one of the bloodiest, dirtiest, most brutal conflicts ever witnessed. It is the re- sponsibility of this Congress to provide full support promptly for all equipment, materiel, and facilities which will aid in saving the lives of our fighting men and hasten a successful conclusion of our ef- fort in Vietnam. I strongly endorse this legislation for weapons procurement and other pur- poses in full support of our commitment Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4:272 Approved For Relcop,TggpL5NRIAAElik.fal.B3L)ciffemo4o0050008-5 March 1, 1966 in Vietnam, Just as I voted for the re- cently adopted supplemental authoriza- tion for economic aid and assistance. As have previously stated, the military effort and the economic effort in Viet- nam are inseparable policy of the United States in dealing with the problem of Vietnam and southeast Asia. I also support this resolution as a logi- cal supplement of the policy decision made by the Congress in 1964 in the adoption of House Joint Resolution 1145, which authorized the President to take all necessary steps including the use of armed forces, since we regard as vital to our national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Vietnam and in south- east Asia. A vote for this legislation today is a vote to support our fighting forces, a vote to support previously adopted congres- sional policy, and support for the Presi- dent of the United States and the poli- cies of this country in the critical con- flict in Vietnam. Some might have doubts; others might have reservations; we may debate our respective positions; but support of this legislation is sup- port for the policy of President Johnson. We ought to overwhelmingly support this legislation because it is the right Wing to do and the only thing to do. I. congratulate the distinguished chair- man from South Carolina IMr. MyEris], and the members of the Armed Services Committee who have brought this legis- lation to the floor. They have given it the most thorough consideration, and yet have acted expeditiously on a matter of We most urgent need. The whole ques- tion of Vietnam has been discussed, re- viewed. and debated very thoroughly in the halls of this Congress. On the For- eign Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, we have been meeting and hold- ing hearings on this subject almost daily since we reconvened this year. Both in subcommittee and full committee, we will, as other legislation comes before us, particularly the foreign aid authoriza- tion bill, debate Vietnam and other world issues for many weeks and months dur- ing the balance of this session. There have been discussions and debate on pre- vious days on this floor just as there is today. Everyone has had ample oppor- tunity to project his viewpoint, to criti- cize, to support, or to say what he has to say on behalf of himself and his con- stituents. Notwithstanding voices of dissent, and I do not discourage proper dissent, it is clear that by vote after vote in this body, the overwhelming number of repre- sentatives of the people of this country, in carrying out the desires of their con- stituents, have time and again supported the President of the United States and the policies of this country as they apply to Vietnam. also suport this resolution because I am opposed to unilateral withdrawal by the United States from Vietnam. Such a course of action is unthinkable surren- der, and would accomplish nothing, while its results would be disastrous. There are those who maintain that we have no business in Vietnam at all. I disagree with this viewpoint because we Amen- cans have learned the bitter lessons of two world wars when aggression is al- lowed to succeed. Aggression under any name, technique, or strategy must not succeed. Nevertheless in determining our policy course and in support of this legislation whether the United States should be in Vietnam is almost moot. We must face the facts of life is they are. The fact is that the United States is committed in Vietnam in principle, in manpower, and in materiel.. We are committed by treaty, the pledges of three Presidents of the United States, a joint resolution of the Congress, and other declarations. We have approximately 250,000 men in southeast Asia, and the prospects seem apparent that we may have 400,000 or more, if necessary. By way of comparison I note that at the peak of the conflict in Korea. we had 327,000 men. there. Our expenditures for Vietnam are at the rate of $21/2 billion a year and climbing steadily. With these facts, I find very little comfort; or logic in the argument which alleges that the United States should not be in Vietnam for political reasons, military reasons, moral and humanitarian reasons, or that the United States is there illegally; or that the United States should not be there because this is a Vietnamese prob- lem; an Asian problem; a problem for the United Nations: or a problem of someone else. Another blunt fact is that there is no doubt in my mind that South Vietnam is and has been fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, sup- plied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Vietcong', National Liberation Front, or any other group of alleged or real indigenous dissent to the contrary, the fact remains that there is a determined aggressive and violent cam- paign to take over the government and the people. et South Vietnam. General Giap, leader of the North Vietnamese Army recently said: If the special warfare that the 'U.S. im- perialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome then it can be defeated everywhere in the world. In other words, if the United States wins in Vietnam, we will have effectively destroyed the new technique of aggres- sion, the so-called wars of national lib- eration. Vietnam therefore is a big test of the Communist strategy of a; gression. The United States has in vain sought to substitute words for bullets. We have talked to every nation in the world; we have gone to the United Nations; we have temporarily ceased bombings; we have made it clear that we di not in- tend to use more force than is necessary; and yet?we have had no favorable re- sponse from the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong, the North Vietnam- ese, the Red Chinese, or anybody else. The reasan it seems to me that we have had no response is that the enemy thinks that the United States and its allies will tire of this fight and that they, the en- emy, therefore can win it. It seems to me that we cannot fail or unilaterally pull out of South Vietnam without dire consequences. The people of South Vietnam are fight- ing for self-determination, a principle we strongly believe in. Therefore, the South Vietnamese ought to have that right without any infringement or inter- ference by the North Vietnamese, the Red Chinese, or anybody else. By our action here today we will make it clear to the world that the majority of Americans support our strong military help to the people of South Vietnam to resist subversion and foreign military intervention plotted, directed, and sup- plied from the north; and snake sure that the Communist doctrines of guer- rilla warfare and wars of national lib- eration will not succeed against the de- termined people with firm allies. We seek an end of the war by nego- tiation or other honorable means not in conflict with our obligations. I support our efforts to do so. I also support the purpose of moving on as rapidly as pos- sible with the more constructive task of laying foundations for a better future for all the people of southeast Asia. But our fighting men know why they are fighting in South Vietnam and they need our support. U.S. Army Capt. James Spruill, who was killed in Vietnam just last April, recorded his own convic- tion on Vietnam in simple and eloquent words in one of his letters. I quote a passage: Above all, this is a war of mind and spirit. And it is a war which can be won no matter what present circumstances are. For us to despair would be a great victory for the en- emy. We mast stand strong and unafraid and give heart to an embattled and confused people. This cannot be done il America loses heart. At the moment my heart is big enough to sustain those around me. Please don't let them back where you are sell me down the river with talk of despair and de- feat. Talk instead of steadfastness, loyalty, and victory?for we must and we can win here. There is no backing out of Vietnam, for it will follow us everywhere we go. We have drawn the line here and the America we all know and love best is not or to back away. Mr. Chairman, I urge unanimous ap- proval of this vital Presidential request, because the United States must perse- vere. Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be announced as for the $4.8 billion supplemental ap- propriation for Vietnam, although I have opposed and will continue to oppose the policies that have made this appropria- tion necessary. I support the appropria- tion because our men in Vietnam are the victims of that policy and they must have the support they need. I believe that the President eincerely wants peace, but I also believe that peace is unattainable unless the assumptions upon which our current Far Eastern policy is based are drastically changed. Specifically, if we continue to treat every Chinese move as a major threat to world peace, our panic policies will serve to translate that potential into action which will endanger not only Asia, but the en- tire world. There is evidence that China, despite her bellicose statements and her harsh and cruel internal life, is cautious in deed if not in word. It is clear that she has a paranoid fear of being attacked and Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved Fie6?eayABFA01/ikaryDPk7(98q46R000400050008-5 March .1, 1966 4273 this fear can only be intensified by U.S. efforts to encircle China. The Chinese have developed a nuclear capability that may soon be operational. Therefore, China must begin to share?along with the other great powers?the responsibil- ity of keeping the peace and protecting the integrity of other nations. Our success in containing Russian ex- pansion since World War Ills insufficient argument for applying exactly the same policy in Asia. We have forgotten that that policy of containment was estab- lished among nations sharing our tradi- tions and values, who had sufficient wealth and wisdom to maintain their own independence, and who had a demo- cratic foundation to sustain the ideals that we were defending. But we cannot defend freedom and democracy in south- east Asia the same way we did in Europe precisely because Asia is not Europe. Much of southeast Asia is anti-Chinese; but, because of its immediate colonialist background, it is also anti-Western? perhaps more so. Unfortunately, the people of south- east Asia do not yet have the institutions, the training or the leadership to make Western democracy work?no matter how much we insist and no matter how much we help. But, they do not want to be pawns in a forever shifting cold war. They want more than anything else to be left alone?left alone by the Chinese and, more importantly, by us. They want no entangling alliance, no binding treaties, and, no depreciation of their already meager resources through war. It would appear that a sound Asia poli- cy would be to foster the neutrality of southeast Asia and do all we can to help bring China into the community of na- tions so that her fears of the West, and of the United States particularly, could be brought to the level of rational dis- cussion. This cannot be done so long as we are forcing her hand through attempting to- beat North Vietnam into diplomatic sub- mission. This can only be done through the relaxation of tensions in southeast Asia, through a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and through the peaceful and faithful implementation of such a settlement. We must, I believe, be ready to sit with the Vietcong at the conference table and to allow them participation in the future political life of South Vietnam. And we must stop the bombing of North Vietnam lest we draw in China and destroy hope for peace in that region of the world. I anounce myself as for this measure because I don't want to see our boys die In the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place for lack of domestic support. But I would hope that our ef- forts for peace in southeast Asia would be intensified to end not only that war but also the threat of world war III. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT]. Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I should like now to discuss the Army's fiscal year 1966 supplemental program for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and No. 36-17 tracked combat vehicles, for which au- thorization is requested under the pro- visions of section 412b, Public Law 86- 149, as amended. This program has as its principal ob- jective the availability of military hard- ware to equip the Army. Because of the expansion of the Army's operations in Vietnam during the past year, equipment shortfalls will occur unless procurement actions are continued in several com- modity areas. The supplemental request reflects Army plans to make heavy current-year investments, especially in long leadtime Items, to sustain our buildup in south- east Asia, to permit orderly expansion of the Army to authorized force levels, and to replenish inventories reduced by draw- downs resulting from increased combat consumption or new unit activations. Authorization is requested, under the fiscal year 1966 PEMA, supplemental budget submission, for $825.6 million for aircraft and aircraft spares and repair parts; $64.0 million for missiles and mis- sile spares and repair parts, and $75.8 million for tracked combat vehicles. This is the first time that tracked combat vehicles have been included as a separate budget activity, and the first time for which special congressional authoriza- tion has been required. AIRCRAFT The budget figure of $825.6 million for aircraft and aircraft spares and repair parts represents approximately 34 per- cent?slightly more than one-third?of the total PEMA request of $2,465 million. The aircraft category is second only to the ammunition category in projected dollar outlay, and reflects the continued emphasis on the role of Army aircraft in support of both combat and logistical operations in Vietnam. Funds budgeted under the fiscal year 1966 supplemental estimate will permit inventory add-ons to aircraft which are urgently needed to enhance combat ca- pabilities in Vietnam, assist in meeting deployment schedules, and pay back, with preferred items, drawdowns from reserve assets. Additional buys of the CH-47A cargo transport helicopter?Chinook?and UH-1B/D tactical utility helicopter? Iroquois?are projected. These are the workhorses of Army air operations In Vietnam. The Army also plans to fi- nance the initial PEMA procurement of the CH-54A heavy lift helicopter?Fly- ing Crane?and to expedite procure- ment of the OH-6A observation helicop- ter?Pawnee?to replace several mar- ginally adequate aircraft types cur- rently in use in Vietnam. Additional procurements of helicopter trainers and fixed-wing surveillance aircraft are also evisioned. Other costs relate to the modification or retrofit of in-service aircraft, $16.6 million; ground and support equipment, $16 million; component improvement, $2.1 million; production base support, $2.2 million, and first destination trans- portation, $0.2 million. Included is $220.9 million for accelerated require- ments of aircraft spares and repair parts. MISSILES The $64 million estimate for missiles and missile spares and repair parts rep- resents 2.6 percent of the total PEMA submission. The projected funding is to cover costs of replacing Hawk air de- fense equipment connected with south- east Asia deployments and for providing similar equipment to support new unit activations. No new missiles are in- cluded. The estimate for missile spares and repair parts is $28.5 million. TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES For tracked combat vehicles the sup- plemental request comprises approxi- mately 3 percent of the overall PEMA total. Estimated costs, in almost all cases, are related to the replacement of combat losses or the equipping of new units. Approximately $22.8 million is projected for add-ons of self-propelled artillery and mortar carriers, to include the 155 millimeter medium howitzer, M109; the 8-inch heavy howitzer; M110; the 175 millimeter field artillery gun, M107, and the 81 and 107 millimeter mortar carriers, M125A1 and M106A1. Some $9 million is included for additional buys of the full-tracked cargo carrier, M548; the command post carrier, M577A1, and the light armored recov- ery vehicle, M578. A total of $44 million is also budgeted for repair parts and support materiel. Mr. Chairman, I support the unani- mous recommendation of the House, Armed Services Committee that the Army's fiscal year 66 supplemental re- quest for missiles, aircraft, and tracked combat vehicles be approved and I rec- ommend its favorable consideration by this body. (Mr. HEBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] such time as he may consume. Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise In strong support of this legislation and its implications of backing the Presi- dent in his efforts to bring about world peace in our time and security and free- dom throughout the world. Mr. Chairman, this bill is a carefully drafted piece of legislation and should have the support of every Member of Congress. It will provide the tools now necessary to pursue our objectives in South Vietnam. I am happy to support the President and the troops 100 percent in this noble effort to preserve freedom and stop aggression. Our President has said: To know war is to know that there is still madness in this world. The truth of this is borne out in South Vietnam. There we are vigorously re- sponding to the requests of the local government to assist in preserving the independence of that tiny nation. In so doing we are upholding the non- aggression and freedom-seeking objec- tives of the southeast Asia collective defense treaty, approved by the over- whelming vote of our Senate, 82 to 1. We are also following the overwhelmingly ap- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4274 Approved For Retease.2.00FQ7/13.:LChIn617)6_001444&1_%:),20400050008-5 ULN LIKE, IS ION A March 1, 1966 proved resolution of the entire Congress in support of our national efforts there, allowing the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam upon its request for "assistance in defense of its free- dom." Yet the whole matter could come to an end and bloodshed could cease and the avowed objectives of most of mankind could be achieved if?as President John- son suggested in his latest state of the Union speech?everyone would "stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962." We are willing to do so. These agreements are certainly reason- able, providing as they do for free elec- tions and local self-determination. If in fact North Vietnam and the comma- 1st world have confidence in the popu- larity of their cause, their aggressions in South Vietnam should come to an immediate halt; and we could proceed together to bolster up the local govern- ment of South Vietnam with free elec- tions and assured independence. Our own Government has sent, throughout the world, topflight repre- sentatives seeking to find some channel to bring peace while preserving the in- dependence of South Vietnam in fulfill- ment of the accords of Geneva. It is appalling that thousands of per- sons are losing their lives and billions of dollars are being expended in the machinations of war, when these lives and these treasures?both of life and of materials?could be much better spent in the forward progress of mankind. These thoughts all underline the statement of the President: know war is to know that there is still madness in this world. Nevertheless the responsibilities are on our shoulders at this time and we must fulfill them to the best of our ability, as disagreeable and as tragic as they may appear from time to time. When I spoke in Jacksonville on May 30, 1964, Memorial Day of that year, 1 said something about the Vietnam War which I think is appropriate to repeat at this time. I said: Under these circumstances we, the Amer- ican people, should be careful that partisan political considerations have nothing to do with the decisions that must be made, and we should be in constant prayer that what- ever decisions are made are in the best in- terests of the country and of mankind gen- erally. As I conclude my remarks I would like to give you an analogy which seems fit- ting: in the world of business, no busi- nessman would put great responsibilities on the shoulders of his office boy. He would not send that inexperienced lad to conclude some important contract transactions or any other deed of large proportions. In the troubled times of 1956, it is true that our country has these grave responsibilities of which we all are soberly thinking today. But if we believe, as I am sure we all do, that there is a God in heaven, he earely would not be giving us, in these Limes, these responsibilities unless he Lhought that we were indeed capable of fulfilling, them. So, although our tasks may be hard and the sacrifices great, I share with you the hope that we will each here today take courage and rededicate ourselves not only to our beloved Nation, but to the highest of human principles: sharing as we must these great responsibilities called forth by the challenging times in which we live. (Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York {Mr. STRATTON 1. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to mc? Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support this bill and commend the com- mittee for bringing it to the floor of the House, with full provision for all recog- nized needs of our Armed Forces in south- east Asia. The fight being waged in South Viet- nam is a fight for freedom. In the long run, it is also a fight for peace, for no real peace will be possible for men any- where unless; the forces of aggression are stopped in southeast Asia. I cannot conceive of any action by the Congress that would do more to encour- age aggression, in all parts of he world, than the defeat of this measure. The evidence that Congress was not prepared to back its Armed. Forces with the sup- plies and equipment needed to carry out our policies?which defeat of this bill would mean to the world?would under- mine the faith of every friend and ally we have It would also encourage the enemies of freedom to embark on new conquests and invasions all over the world. On the other hand, overwhelming ap- proval of this bill will demonstrate our determination to do all that is necessary to back our men and to provide them with what they need to do their difficult and dangerous duty in Vietnam. I hope and trust the bill will be over- whelmingly approved. (Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks. :i Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. It is a simple bill. It simply represents a recognition of the requests of our fighting services for what they need to do the job to which our servicemen are presently committed in Vietnam. And I think we have no alternative in this body except to support this legislation. I have been a little concerned by those Members of this House and of the other body who have suggested that one can support this bill today without support- ing the policy of our Government. That, to me, is nonsense, self -delusion. What is Congress supposed to do in a fighting situation anyway? We do not make decisions on strategy. We do not consult with the commanders in the field at every point. Rather we pass authorization bills, like this one. We pass appropriation bills. That is what we have done before with regard to Vietnam, and that is what we are doing again today. Obviously we are supporting the policy of our Government in this legislation, a policy of resisting the spread of communism in southeast Asia and thereby proving to the Com- munist aggressors that aggression does not pay. I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it just is not possible to have it both ways: either you support that policy of our Government or else you are against it. And you vote today registers your posi- tion on that vital question. Mr. Chairman, what we are facing today in South Vietnam represents in my judgment a very serious test, indeed an acid test, in our history as a government. As the majority leader indicated a moment ago, it is a showdown test of our ability as a democracy to survive the continuing challenge of communism. People in Communist countries have said that we are paper tigers?not be- cause they do not recognize that we have bigger bombs or greater carriers or more planes than do the enemy countries, but because they are convinced that when the chips are down, we in America just do not have the courage to see things through. It is about time that we recognize that, whether we like it or not, we are in a fighting war in Vietnam and that we must give to our fighting forces and to the administration, which has been pur- suing a policy backed by the overwhelm- ing votes of this Congress and the people, the support that they deserve and should have. Debate is a good thing in a democracy. But even in a democracy there must come a time when debate ends and when we get behind the decision that has been taken and back up our men on the fight- ing fronts. That is what this bill does, Mr. Chairman, and that is what the com- panion appropriation bill will do when it, too, comes to this floor. The time has come now for us to put an end to further harassment of our Viet- nam policy, to these attacks on our policy, these proposals which seem to come forward every day or so, of sonic new concessions that somebody thinks we ought to make to the Communists to somehow lure them to the negotiating table. This is. a time now for national unity. Let us not forget that it was President Kennedy who describe the Communist method of negotiation by saying, "What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable." That's what the Communists are trying to do in Vietnam. That is what our forces out there are trying to prevent. Let us support them, not add to their burdens and problems. I say, Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to have a little confidence in our Armed Forces, to have a little unity in support of our policy. As President Johnson indicated in the White House briefing the other day, no politician ever gets elected by constantly predicting his own defeat. The question in Vietnam is Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For_fielem318N01/1.3 ?,C14.-BDPERRW6R000400050008-5 4275 March 1, 1966 CU NI (3 AL KEWK whether we can prove to the Communists and to the world our determination, our patience, and our fortitude under pres- sure. Let us put an end to these doubts and fears that undermine our will and our resolution, and let this House join now in an overwhelming expression of confidence in our policy and confidence in our Armed Forces. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished gentle- man from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN]. (Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889 and say to my colleagues that this bill should not only pass, but it should pass with an overwhelming vote. This would serve notice on the world that when it comes to supporting our servicemen, who are defending freedom wherever challenged, that the American people are ready, will- ing, and able to provide whatever they may need to carry out their missions. This legislation was approved by the Armed Services Committee, as the ac- companying report states, "solely in or- der to achieve more rapid procurement of replacements of articles consumed, and to provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time." But, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to the reservations expressed by the committee on page 3 of the report regarding the necessity for this legislation. I cannot but have the feeling?which you will note from the report is shared by most mem- bers of our committee?that many of the Items involved in this legislation may simply have been removed from the regu- lar 1967 authorization to this supple- mental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. I am not satisfied that the actual need for this legislation has been sufficiently estab- lished and that the procurement of essential items will, in fact, be appre- ciably accelerated by the enactment of this bill today. Again, Mr. Chairman, I would refer my colleagues to the language of the report on page 3 wherein it is stated that: Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been pro- vided with sufficient definitive data to pin- point the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization. So, as you read this report, which I remind you again was a unanimous re- port, it is certainly not unfair to conclude that the Department of Defense has failed to sustain the burden of proof with respect to the necessity for this supplemental authorization and that, being realistic, we are participating in a substantial bookkeeping exercise that obviously offers little military advantage. In saying this, however, I do not mean to infer that what has been asked for in support of our troops will not be needed within the time frame of the budget for fiscal year 1967 which will be before the House for approval within the next few months. It is for this reason that I have no hesitation in my support for this bill. But as I said at the outset of my remarks, I nonetheless feel that by our actions today we should let our voices be heard loud and clear so all may know that we are going to provide our troops in the field with whatever they may need in supporting the interests of our Govern- ment and our determination to resist communistic aggression at this crucial hour. Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to use the balance of my time to make two other points. While they may not be directly related to the legislation before us, they certainly have a vital bearing on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. My second point is simply this: Our concern today in seeking to provide all the supplies necessary to our troops should not be permitted to pass without drawing attention to the similar prob- lems confronting our enemy. Ho Chi Minh is dedicated to a policy of total victory. Anything that the Hanoi re- gime needs and is denied cannot help but put roadblocks in their path to the south. The traffic of free world ships into North Vietnamese ports, regardless as to whether their cargoes are Com- munist or free world, strategic or non- strategic, simply must be stopped. Our governmental policy has clearly been too tolerant of this free world assistance to our enemy. The administration's in- difference has created a leadership vac- uum which the maritme unions have re- cently sought to fill through independent action because of this apparent tacit abdication of this aspect of foreign pol- icy to private effort. Bills exist in Con- gress which would do what the maritme unions seek to acocmplish, but the ad- ministration has shown only a negative interest. Regardless of official efforts to depreciate the importance of this trade, I simply cannot comprehend how the tol- erance of even one free world ship in the harbor of Haiphong can be justified. Now, in January of this year there was, in fact, a decided increase in this traffic over the previous month. The Depart- ment of Defense publicly admits that there were three British, one Cypriot, and three Greek vessels in North Viet- nam. While again the classified report indicates that the true figure is well over double that?well over double it, I tell you?and that is what we are not being told?actually the secret reports given to me by the Department of De- fense show that free world arrivals in North Vietnam in January are actually more than in any month since last July. I will say that again. Free world ar- rivals in January in North Vietnam were more than during any month since last July. Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit that we cannot say that we have provided our fighting men with the supplies they need without looking at the other side of the coin, without having done everything that we can to interdict the enemies' lines of supply. We should close every possible valve in their lines of supply and the higher up in the pipeline the better it will serve our interests. That is why I say that we should make sure that nothing destined for North Vietnam is ever loaded aboard a free world ship. Now, Mr. Chairman, my third point focuses not upon military hardware needs but, rather, upon that which this hardware seeks to accomplish. Mr. Chairman, the struggle in South Vietnam is essentially no different from that encountered in many other places in the world, where we are confronted with communistic aggression and sub- version. It is simply nothing but a struggle for the minds of men. Mr. Chairman, the U.S. presence in South Vietnam, to be successful in less- ening the spread of communism, must win the support of the South Vietnamese people by convincing them that we share a common cause, and that the United States is determined to help them achieve security and to establish a better way of life. Mr. Chairman, this effort can only be successful if the South Vietnamese are fully and accurately informed about the problems which we are facing jointly, and what is being done to solve these problems. Mr. Chairman, early last summer General Westmoreland made it clear to our special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that was sent to South Vietnam by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Rivzits], that in his judgment television offered a tremendous opportunity to help unify a country where communication is extremely difficult, if not totally non- existent. With proper encouragement, this project was finally approved. I have followed its progress closely. While I am apprised of some initial technical diffi- culties, I am informed that it is now op- erational and performing well since its inauguration in early February, and that there are airborne transmitters beaming daily television signals to the Saigon area. Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to see these flying TV stations as they were being assembled right here in the Wash- ington area, at the Andrews Air Force Base. I talked to the officers and men that were actually installing the equip- ment. I saw what went into these planes. It was the biggest scavenger hunt I have ever heard of?spare parts and obsolete equipment were sought wherever they could be found, and if they could not be found, makeship parts were fabricated on the spot. I was even told that some essential components were found on the local shelves of the Sears & Roebuck stores. Mr. Chairman, I have never witnessed a greater dedication than that of the crews who worked 24 hours a day, really around the clock, in order to get these planes operational and send them on their mission. Mr. Chairman, just this past week I had an opportunity to talk with the Vice President, following our White House briefing?that was last Thursday morning?and I asked him how this television project was getting along and whether or not he had heard anything Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4276 CONGRESSIONAL R ECOR1) ? HOUSE March 1. 1966 about it while he was in Saigon. I am pleased to report to my colleagues of the House that he was most, enthusiastic about the great potential of this pro- gram. He concurred in the need for its expansion just as fast as possible. So, Mr. Chairman, I say to the mem- bers of the Committee of the Whole house on the State of the Union today that if this program is a good program and if it can perform a vital function in helping to convince the people of South Vietnam of our determination to help them resist a ruthless advance of com- munism in their homeland, it is time we got to work here procuring the proper equipment with which to do this job, rather than sending them wornout, dis- carded, obsolete equipment held togeth- er with coathangers, baling wire, paper clips and Scotch tape. Mr. Chairman, I have heard rumors to toe effect that there are requests now pending for new and better equipment, including more suitable aircraft for this job, and as soon as I can learn more of the details as to what will be required, am going to do what I can to get it and get it quick, and get it to South Viet- nam. I urge your help in providing whatever may be needed in order to real- ize fully this dramatic potential of tele-. vision in South Vietnam. Mr. Chairman, the bill now pending before us calls for the authorization of $4.8 billion. The total of the President's recent supplemental request was $12.3 billion. These are only supplemental funds. No one knows how much we have spent in the past, and certainly all of us are certain that much more is going to be required in the future. I have been. told that the original program, this tele- vision program, in South Vietnam called for the expenditure of $1.4 million. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired. )4r. BATES. Mr, Chairman, I yield the gentleman 3 additional minutes. Mr, CHAMBERLAIN. I thank my rolleague for yielding to me this addi- tional time. The original program to provide this television network in South Vietnam called for only $1.4 million, to provide a network throughout the country that would reach from 80 percent to 90 per- cent of its inhabitants, and that this could be accomplished within, a year. When we are talking about a $12 billion supplemental appropriation, I say $1.4 million is a modest sum. The Govern- ment could afford it as much as the Gov- ernment could afford my taking a sip of water from this glass. So, Mr. Chairman, as we provide the hardware and equipment that will be needed for our troops in South Vietnam let us be bold to also think in terms of ming one of our greatest assets, one we have not used heretofore to the fullest. You know, Mr. Chairman, we hear so much about bold and imaginative pro- grams. But when we come up with something truly bold and imaginative we put it together with obsolete equipment. (c1; us do all we can to convince the South Vietnamese of our good intentions especially when we have a program that can serve our purpose and be expanded without bloodshed. Now boar that in mind. We are not going to try to kill people with television. Why do we have to appropriate all this money and send our boys by the hundreds of thousands crawling through the jungle and wreak- ing destruction on the countryside just to convince the South Vietnamese peo- ple that we mean business when no na- tion in the world can claim the abilities we have achieved with television? By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to add. that the or rasion of this bill is a time for unity aid not a time for dissension. The debate in recent weeks over our policy in Vietnam has had its purpose and its day in court. It has properly served to get a lot of thinking out in the open. How ever, the criticism that has been prompted, I believe, has reached the point of diminishing return.. After all that has been said, we are still confron ted with the stubborn fact that there is no real alternative to the basic premise of our present policy. We do not iotend to abandon the South 'Vietnamese peoPle and our own long-range interests to the aggressive demands of commuidsm. It is timely for us to put Ho Chi Minh on notice of our firm, united determination to support such a policy. There should be no other interpretation as to the meaning of what we do here today. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California I Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN ] . (Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend his remarks.) Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chair- man, I rise in support of this le;:islation. The Speaker of the House, Mr. Mc- CORMACK. the distinguished majority leader, Mr. ALBERT. the chairman and ranking members of the Armed Services Committee have all presented a strong position of support. The cemmittee members have passed the bill unani- mously. I do not believe this is the time to project an image of disunity to our free world friends or our enemies. I do not believe any real service would be ren- dered by not providing our men serving in Vietnam with the best in equipment to carry out their military mission. The debate here today suggests that many Members of Congress are becom- ing increasingly disenchanted with the inconsistent and sometimes ambiguous reports coming out of Vietnam. The American people have expressed an in- creasing amount of doubt about our policies. I believe this attitude arises because the people do not feel they have been told the entire story. I further believe the American people will back a firm policy that is designed to win, if they are told the complete facts. I have felt for some time that we should find out who our friends really are in southeast Asia and this includes our allies in both NATO and SEATO. As the gentleman from Michigan sug- gests, the shipping in and out of Haiphong has increased appreciably this year?this is, of course, understandable during times of military conflict. But the deplorable fact that our allies?our friends, if you will, are among those who are carrying supplies and materiel for the support of our enemies. Why can not we be equally firm with these so- called friends who choose to make a profit from both sides of this war? To me, this borders on the brink of inter- national treason. Not only does this problem exist in Vietnam but they con- tinue their normal trade relations with Cuba and other puppet countries of the Soviet Union and Red China. &miner or later we are going to have to get tough with our friends and ask them to ap- propriately decide which side of the fence they are really on. I sincerely believe President Johnson's place in history will be determined by his ability to strengthen the SEATO al- liance to bolster their ability to provide for their own security in that section of the world?thereby minimizing the num- ber of American boys required to up- hold our commitment in that faraway section of the world. The same thing can be said of our relationship with the NATO countries. Heaven forbid the day when our traditional alliances (Tumble. The only way we can expect to retain the respect of mankind is through a policy of firmness and fairness?be it military, economic, or political. Therefore, I support this bill today, but in closing I would like to admonish my colleagues to continue to seek other means to win this war. We can and must escalate the peace offensive throughout the world through the application of an economic, political, psychological, tech- nological, and humanitarian offensive? employing techniques that are creative, bold, and imaginative. This will require a broader commitment from all Amer- icans and our free world friends as we jointly uphold our firm resolve to sustain freedom for all mankind. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HALL I such time as he may require. Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as has been well stated, this bill represents authorization for our troops of all the services in South Vietnam. I rise in support of it because I think the way it has been reviewed, albeit hastily but by line item, whether in areas of research and development or in procurement of military equipment, tanks and missiles, or whether in the area of construction? indicates the proper approach to all authorizations by a legislative com- mittee. Many of us are extremely proud of the logistical support that is being rendered to our troops there. A vote for this bill is a vote for con- tinued support of these people and I would like to assure one of the e;entle- men who queried our distinguished chairman that medicine is again making a record in South Vietnam that has never been made before, based on the modern state of the art, to the point where we are having less than 1 percent of deaths from all battle casualties that reach any kind of aid. However, Mr. Chairman, all the supplies will not help if we are handicapped too much by a lack of will to win and by dissension in the ranks back home. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/Q7/13 ? C1A-JRDP67Bft46R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECUEu riu We have perhaps in the past overex- tended ourselves and not defended our- selves to the maximum. It is poor mili- tary policy if we do not use a maximum offense as the best defense. Perhaps there are items here in this supplemental or deficiency bill that have been moved from the fiscal year 1967 in- to the supplemental or deficiency author- ization in many areas. But there is cer- tainly much here that is needed imme- diately in follow-on and long leadtime items, and your committee is convinced this is the most appropriate way to get the materiel into the hands of our troops. Perhaps there is much here that was lopped off a year or so ago by a penny wise and pound foolish Secretary of Defense or Bureau of the Budget. But now the equipment is needed and to my mind it is proper and not further debat- able, in view of the committee hearings, report, and unanimous action. Perhaps there has been too long a delay in the proper interdiction of logis- tical supply lines of the North Vietnam- ese but now it is time to get on with the job. Yes, Mr. Chairman, a vote today is not In support of any of the Secretary of Defense's multiple mistakes or lack of State Department foreign policy. This is a vote for all our men in all the serv- ices in southeast Asia on a basis where we have undoubted superiority, in the air and sea, and should be about the job with adequate supplies. I strongly recommend a unanimous vote in favor of this supplemental au- thorization bill for the men in south- east Asia. (Mr. HALL asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Washington [Mr. Mem] whatever time he might require. (Mr. HICKS asked and was given per- mission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support this bill. My office is now tabulating the returns from a questionnaire I sent out last month-13,000 have been returned, and they are still arriving in large numbers. The questionnaire has a good deal of blank space, which the respondents have used liberally for comments. Mr. Chair- man, these comments, as well as answers to the questions I asked, show that the people of my district overwhelmingly support the President's policy in Viet- nam. Therefore, they would support this bill as I do. But, Mr. Chairman, along with their concern about Vietnam they are tremen- dously concerned about inflation. I con- fess that I too am worried about infla- tion, and have been for some time. The bill before us is a supplemental authori- zation bill. Why must it be supple- mental? Because we did not properly evaluate the situation last year. Now military expenditures are rising relent- lessly, while unemployment continues its downward trend, and unemployed skilled labor virtually no longer exists. All of these things show inflationary pressures, and those pressures are tremendous now. We must not ignore the inflationary danger. We must not allow ourselves to take half measures and pretend that we are facing the problem squarely with all its implications. We must not let our- selves underestimate the danger by al- ways dealing with parts but never with the whole. If we do, we will continue to have supplemental instead of compre- hensive legislation. What is the answer? Because infla- tion is caused by rising demand, meas- ures must be taken to curb demand. Many approaches are offered, and several of them together seem to me to offer the best approach. The Federal Reserve Board has already raised the price of money. This alone will not solve the problem. However, combined with other measures it can help to restrain invest- ment and reduce demand in that way. We must also look to decreased Govern- ment spending and increased taxes. Nonmilitary spending must be cur- tailed where it is possitle to do so with- out jeopardizing what is best in our Great Society programs. And that does not mean cutting down impacted areas school aid, or school milk, and hot lunches. It does mean that we must re- double our critical scrutiny o_ every measure for the expenditure of funds to be sure that it will achieve the purpose as economically and efficiently as pos- sible. As for taxes, last week I voted against the tax bill the purpose of which was to raise revenue to pay for increAsed spend- ing of the Vietnam war. I voted against it not because I think we do not need a new tax measure but because it seemed to me a palliative ar.d not a cure. I do not oppose the withholding changes, and I think it is sensible to graduate the with- holding rates to coincide more closely with tax rates. And since it is true that the Government needs funds now, a speed-up in collection will obviously help in the short run. The excise tax reim- position does bother me because excise taxes are not the most equitable kind of tax. But above all, I consider the meas- ures in that bill too little and too late. The tax which was not even discussed last week but which will be paid regard- less of the tax bill approved by this body, the tax which is the most discriminatory of all, is inflation. We cannot avoid taxation of some kind. The question then is whether we should tax through inflation, ignoring the problem and letting it take its course, or face the problem squarely and make the decision to tax in an orderly and evenhanded way. I think the choice is clear. Although it is never popular to raise taxes, we will have to do so. But we must do so in a meaningful way, not by halfhearted measures which lull us into thinking we have met the need. The sooner we recognize this fact and move to act the better. If we do not take well-planned meas- ures soon, then we will surely give rein to inflation. By so doing we may im- pose the cruelest tax of all on those least able to bear the burden, on the elderly 4277 and disabled living on fixed incomes, on the poor, the unemployed. A minute ago I mentioned the ques- tionnaires I am receiving from my con- stituents. A comment on one of them seems to me to reflect the responsible thinking of the people of my district on the need to be realistic about paying for our programs, both foreign and domestic. The writer said: We all want the benefits of the Great Society but nobody seems to want to foot the bill?if we are going to spend let us raise taxes (I might point out that I make over $10,000 a year with two dependents so I will feel it) but it has to be done. I was pleased to find in last Sunday's Washington Post that my views coincide with those of a most eminent economist, Dr. Paul A. Samuelson. He points to the latest estimates of our gross national product in this coming year, now ex- pected to rise about $5 billion above what has been forecast. His most telling point, in my view, is that our economic expansion is becoming rapid and frantic instead of orderly and durable, that it cannot benefit the country, and that it will harm those at the bottom of the economic ladder. It should be restrained so that orderly growth can be continued. I fully agree with Dr. Samuelson's con- clusion that a new tax plan is needed, and that work on such a plan should go forward at once. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate my support for this bill and to express the hope that all my colleagues will support it too. At the same time I urge them to face without flinching the need to keep our economy in hand and the responsibility to do so. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from New York. (Mr. ROSENTHAL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I vote for this supplemental authoriza- tion with reluctance and apprehension. The policy which such a vote would seem to endorse is one with which I have often disagreed. It is one with which, in many respects, I disagree now. Bombing of North Vietnam has been af negligible military effect and has in- volved serious diplomatic drawbacks. I have also felt that any settlement, any negotiations, any provisional govern- ment, and any elections which excluded the participation of the National Libera- tion Front would be highly impractical. Indeed, I think one of the principal ob- stacles to peace, in addition to the pres- ent hostility of North Vietnam, is our apparent refusal to acknowledge the existence of the National Liberation Front which is composed largely of South Vietnamese, and is clearly in control of much of South Vietnam. We do not in- tend to exterminate that force. We therefore must deal with it. And we must make clear to all that we shall deal with it. That concession I believe to be a prerequisite for settlement. I believe, therefore, that there are diplomatic alternatives to further escala- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4278 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECOP, I) ? HOUSE March 1, 1966 tion of this war. Not being sure if these alternatives have been adequately ex- plored, indeed having some feeling that they have been too quickly passed by, I am unable to accept any contention that we must escalate in Vietnam. Yet, I fear that this authorization permits such an escalation_ f am, moreover, puzzled by many of the provisions in this authorization it- self. I share the reservations expressed in the committee report: "If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items in- volved, in all three categories of procure- ment, research, and development, and con- struction, rlia.y simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this sup- Tilemental 1906 authorization without any ,:ofit program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legisla- tion which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authoriza- tion." With these misgivings, however, I still feel constrained to vote for the measure before us today. I can find no adequate reason to refuse American forces the support necessary for their survival. I question the policies which brought over 200,000 men to Vietnam. That being said. I still cannot find acceptable grounds for refusing those forces the means to defend themselves and to sur- vive in war. Here is a deeper problem, a more fundamental issue. The President's pri- macy in foreign affairs is nothing to be treated lightly. Its ultimate source of legitimacy is the Constitution. I do not believe that the congressional role in for- eign affairs is such that we should feel completely free to deny the President the means to pursue a policy, particularly in war, once that policy has been reached with ample consultation. Clearly, Con- gress must reserve the right to act in such a manner, 'rhe proper constitutional vehicle for such action, however, is a declaration of war. In any case, I be- lieve that the right to deny the President in war should be exercised only in cir- cumstances of the greatest clarity, or in issues about which there is little ambigu- ity. Vietnam is not such an issue, despite the misgivings many have about policy. I. am not happy with the minimal role. to which Congress is thus consigned. Nor am I convinced that the Congress has been adequately consulted or respect- fully attended in the formulation of poli- cies in Vietnam. But I do not accept the proposition that this vote today consti- tutes a considered and broad sense of Congress. do not believe my own vote, simply as a vote, properly represents my view- point on this matter, any more than the total vote of Congress adequately repre- sents the total sentiment of Congress. Complicated positions on matters of war and peace are not to be abbreviated by such simple symbolism. So I deny the legitimacy of this vote as a deep expres- sion of Mdividual or collective viewpoint on the full range of policy in Vietnam. I am voting for support and supplies for the American troops already committed to Vietnam. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. BO,;GS I, whatever time he might re- quire, (Mr. BOGGS asked and was given per- mission to revise arid extend his re- marks.) Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to commend the chairman of the distinguished Armed Services Committee and the members of that committee, in- cluding my colleague, the lientleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT], arid many others. This committee rep,:,rted this legislation unanimously. It is a com- mittee that debates issues thoroughly and completely. In my judgment, lhis com- mittee ROHM not have reported this bill unanimcusly had it not felt that it was absolutely essential for the s(,,eurity of our Nation and for the freedom of our Nation. should also like to come end and congratulate the Members of this body, the House of Representatives, for the unity which they have shown in the face of this challenge to our country. In my judgment, the only way we can be defeated is not by the Communists from the North Vietnam or by the sup- port which they receive from the Chinese Communists, who have declared time and time aga n their announced intention of conquering all free world, but we can be defeated if we divide among ourselves. We can be defeated if the word goes out to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not stand united in Vietnam, and that we will talk when we should be defending the bastions of freedom there and help- ing the men who are fighting in the name of freedom. I hope that this bill will be am opted by an overwhelming vote?I hope by a unanimous vote. For 25 years this country, known as the hallmark of freedom, has faced first one, then. another threat to freedom? to our own and to that of our friends. One after another these threats have been confronted and eventually con- tained. But still the threats persist. It has been a trying quarter ,if a cen- tury for the forces of freedom. At times we become exasperated with the continuing need to defend freedom. It is at those times that we need to remind ourselves that freedom is not entirely free; it must constantly be defended to be assured. If there has been any time in the hlstory of the changing world that we could not afford to tjre, it is now. I believe that we must reexamine the quarter-century that has just pissed us to see where we have gone, what we now have, and what we should be striving for. Let me take a minute or two to try to gain that perspective. In the Second World War the chal- lenge to liberty quickly became obvious and direct, and the call for our response became apparent. After 1945 the new challenge of communism in the form of the Red army moving across Europe be- came clear-cut; our measured response to that advance was clearly called for. It was successful; the adversary was stopped, but not before he had engulfed much of Eastern Europe. The Communist threats in southern Europe and the Middle East in the late 1940's were not as direct and open, but they soon became clear. The bold re- sponses of the American Government and of the threatened peoples themselves brought about a subsidence of tile threat, and again Communist expansionism was stifled. In Asia, meanwhile, the calamities of the World War and its aftermath were permitting Communist rule to establish itself on the Chinese mainland and on the northern part of the Korean Penin- sula. The free world was at a loss to stop it. But, by 1950 when the Commu- nists were sufficiently organized in power to openly attack South Korea. the free world no longer stood by passively, and as in Europe, the Communist thrust was eventually stalled. Shortly thereafter, the southeast Asian independence movements, which were soon to drive European colonial power from that area, were usurped by the Communists. A Communist regime, in the guise of anticolonialist liberators, was installed in North Vietnam under terms of the 1954 Geneva agroements. Not satisfied with the territory they al- ready had, the Communists that same year began stockpiling arms in the south and infiltrating some 10,000 Communist guerrillas into the South Vietnamese peasantry. The groundwork for an ex- tensive insurgency was laid in the south. By 1956-5'7 the insurgents began to act, when it became evident the t South Vietnam would not fall peaceably under Hanoi's control. By 1959 terrorist at- tacks, assassinations, and kidnapings had claimed an estimated 1,000 South Vietnamese civilian victims. Another Communist thrust was underway against a free world country. An earlier campaign against the French in Indochina had not been stopped until the Communists were able to establish another Communist-ruled nation. By 1960 that new Communist country was pressing in a now push into Laos and actively into South Vietnam, and it was making progress. If the new thrust of communism was to be stopped, it had to be done in Viet- nam and Laos. It was clear that Com- munist forces were gaining new terri- tory. The free world had been relatively successful in stalling Communist ag- gression elsewhere in the world. Was it to falter in southeast Asia? That ques- tion was posed in the 1960-62 period. It is still posed for us in 1966 with regard to Vietnam. Asia then has become the locale for the Communist offensive. But they are different Communists than the free world faced in Europe, and they are using different techniques. There is no longer direct, open aggression. Instead the Chinese and their North Vietnamese agents are perfecting the art of national Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved FoeMtnesffaNE1itafelpaygq94t6R000400050008-5 4279 March 1, 1966 liberation wars--of subtle, covert, and ambiguous external assistance to inter- nally based guerrilla units. What we face in Vietnam today is this kind of ambiguous, elusive military con- frontation. But the world is not preoc- cupied with other major wars at this moment, or with other major respon- sibilities that are of overriding concern. Nor is there a decolonization battle wag- ing in Vietnam. There are no excuses for us not to see this conflict in Vietnam as aggression by one state against an- other. A properly measured and positive response to this aggression must be found and pursued. To those who would ask proof of ag- gression against the South Vietnamese, I would ask the purpose of the 80,000 Communists, taken from the south to Hanoi in 1954, who were infiltrated back into the south beginning in 1961. I would also ask why nine or more regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces have been brought into South Vietnam in the past year. And I would ask the mean- ing of open boasts by the Hanoi leader- ship of its support for the so-called lib- eration movement in the south as a step toward reunification on Communist terms. That there has been aggression from North Vietnam, there is no question. This aggression against the south is di- rected and supported politically and militarily from Hanoi. The weapons, equipment, and other supplies for it are supplied largely by Hanoi, which in turn is supported by Communist China. . That the South Vietnamese deserve and must have help from us and other allies, I believe, is without question. How can we, or anyone, expect the South Vietnamese to meet successfully the growing power of all Asian communism? It is not by our choice that we are there. It is by the decision of the North Viet- namese, supported by the Red Chinese, that we are forced to respond to their aggression. The initiative has been on their part. Our actions have only been in response to their determined and growing aggression. Our actions have been in accord with our commitments under the Southeast Asia Treaty and with our bilateral com- mitments to the South Vietnamese made and confirmed by three Presidents. Our commitment to South Vietnam is firm. Under the SEATO terms we have agreed that "each party recognizes that aggres- sion by means of armed attack would en- danger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." That obligation has been called. It seems to me that our obligation is even more than this. It is to come to the defense of freedom. "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the sur- vival and the success of liberty." Those words of the late John F. Kennedy are still our guidelines. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I should like to insert into the RECORD a recent speech on the war in Vietnam which I de- livered in Chicago to the annual con- vention of the National Sand & Gravel and the National Ready Mixed Concrete Associations. The address was given on February 10, 1966, and the text of this speech follows: ADDRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS, DEMOCRAT, OF LOUISIANA, BEFORE THE NA- TIONAL SAND & GRAVEL AND THE NATIONAL READY MIXED CONCRETE ASSOCIATIONS, CHI- CAGO, ILL., FEBRUARY 10, 1966 Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to come here today. You stand In the tradition that has made this country great: That of individual enterprise and ef- fort. Your work contributes to the well- being and security of all Americans. And, because this is America, you too reap the benefits. I could speak with you about some of the legislative proposals now pending in the Congress, or at some length of the relation- ship of Government to business and labor. Today, however, because of the limitation of time, I would like to speak on a subject that now transcends all other. It is an issue that, despite the best efforts of President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and many others, requires broad discussion and understanding. I shall talk to you of Vietnam. I shall try to tell you why we are there, what we are trying to do, and the means we are employ- ing. I shall consider some of the alternatives which have been proposed by critics. You are intelligent businessmen. Your profession impels you to be realistic. You look at the hard facts. Thus, I shall not demean your intelligence with platitudes. Your time is limited. The subject is com- plex. Our cause is still misunderstood. So let us begin. First, let us speak of old realities and new myths. The old reality is that the Commu- nist world is still predatory. Now it is China more than the Soviet Union which casts covetous eyes on her neighbors. Communist China believes that it can conquer the world. It believes that it can do this through so- called wars of national liberation, In South Vietnam, such a bloody war of so-called liberation is raging. The Communist Viet- cong are trying to take over South Vietnam. They are being abetted, with men and arms, from North Vietnam. The root instigator is Communist China. We are in South Vietnam to help the South Vietnamese people retain their inde- pendence and freedom. This is our immedi- ate goal. Our whole history impels us to protect our weak friends from aggression. Our resistence to militant communism in South Vietnam is part of a long series of events in which we have defended freedom. It started with the Truman doctrine in 1947. Congress and the country agreed with Presi- dent Truman, and American aid was sent to Greece. The policy was a brilliant success and Greece and the Mediterranean were saved for the West. So South Vietnam Is in the tradition of our help to Greece and Turkey in 1917, For- mosa and Korea in 1950, and Berlin since 1948. All these stands in defense of freedom were successful. All these areas remain in the free world. But we have an even more important task. Vietnam is a crucial test between our coun- try and Communist China. If we leave without a just and honorable peace, the word will quickly spread around the world, like a prairie fire, that the West has quit and communism is the victor. The impact of this is obvious. First, it would demonstrate that the Chi- nese brand of communism which repeatedly and explicitly says it wants no peace will become dominant. The Sino-Soviet split will be resolved in favor of the militant and ag- gressive Chinese. As Secretary of State Rusk recently point- ed out: "A central issue in the dispute be- tween the two leading Communist powers today is to vhat extent it is effective and prudent to use force to promote the spread of communism. If the bellicose doctrines of the Asian Communists should reap a sub- stantial reward, the outlook for peace in this world would be grim indeed." Now the leadership of the Communist Chinese?the average age of the 17 men who make up the top leadership is 68?face many problems of their own. One is what Communists call revisionism. This is the tendency to forsake militant revolution for internal development, using some of the same incentives employed by free enterprise soci- eties outside the Communist orbit. This is what the Russians are experiencing, and by resisting aggression in South Vietnam, we are encouraging such revisionism in China. The effect of such a withdrawal on Japan would be serious. There a laborious effort has been quite successful in creating a peace- ful and democratic society. Its economy and industry are now harnessed to the ways of peace. I was in Japan recently and I am convinced that it could not continue as a free society if we, in effect, surrender in Viet- nam and withdraw from southeast Asia. Similarly, what do you think would have happened in Indonesia had we not been in Vietnam? Do you think the recent over-, throw and demise of one of the largest and most powerful Communist parties in the world would have been successful had not the Indonesians known that we were in southeast Asia and would remain until an honorable peace is attained. Equally important, we stand in Vietnam because we know that if we retreat there, then Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, would all fall very quickly. The probable result would be world war III. President Johnson has stated our reasons for being in Vietnam. If the Communists win, he said: "They would know they can accomplish through so-called wars of na- tional liberation what they could not accom- plish through naked aggression in Korea?or insurgency in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya?or the threat of aggression in Tur- key?or in a free election booth anywhere in the world." Our military effort in Vietnam, then, is vital to the ultimate success of the South Vietnamese people in achieving a stable, viable, government with a free society. But the fact is that military success in defeating the Vietcong is only the initial step in a long, tough, task of rebuilding the South Viet- namese society to meet the challenges and responsibilities of self-government as a mod- ern state. The military difficulties are compounded by the state of the South Vietnam economy and political organization. The Communists have wreaked havoc. In the dense jungles and broad deltas they have employed every conceivable method of terror and coercion. Imagine, if you will, the United States with half of the cities and towns under Communist control. Imagine no road or railroad or canal or river safe for communication and transportation. Imagine the farmer unable to produce his crop because of terror, mur- der, and assassination. And picture a ter- rain of jungles and swamps largely inacces- sible, Then you will have some notion- of the problems in Vietnam. Add to this the fact that most of the leadership?mayors, coun- cilmen, educators, editors, physicians, law- yers, and engineers have been assassinated. It is under these conditions that we seek to join with the forces of the South Vietna- mese Government to pacify their country. This is why our military leaders do not claim victory. The economic and social challenge is very great. But you do not hear enough of our efforts in these areas. That was the princi- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966 re' son fer the P:esident's visit to Hawaii this week. Today more than 1,000 employees of the .A]oncy for International Development? many of Ii]lem striving in the countryside and the small hamlets and villages?are en- iriered in helping the South Vietnamese peo- ple in every conceivable eras. Our Government is now providing more 1,11f1.11 $300 million a year for our technical sonnet to work with the South Viet- witnese. '1 his economic assistance is a four- ye,nt effort in four major areas: Geant eisl, to finance imports to help miiintain the South Vietnam economy on a daystosday niierating basis, and to prevent serious infliition, and (nal) the balance-of- pennons 0 ]i t. Cspital. projects assistance, to broaden the economiir Mine and improve urban facil- ities with water supply systems, electrifica- tion, improved harbors, roads, and transport :o' ilities a. Technical assistance, to improve human ekeils throi 1.7,11 education in agricultural Illethoris, public, health, public safety, public adininistration, logistics and ether areas, and Counterinsurgency, to maintain basic services for the pemile by providing food- Etatte, farm tools, reefing, and cement, and other materiels. Included In this part of the program is strengthother of the national police force. Now I have discussed with you why we are in South Vietnam and wiilPt we are laying to do there. I have a further duty. This is In frankly dissuss with you what the critics of our policy, both in and out of Congress, are saying. A President can be right and the entice country diregrce with him.. Or he may be wrong and still enjoy mass appro- bation. We have an obligetion I. answer these arguments. Co one ride Fnala advocate at worst, complete surrender- libot we get out right away. At best, they poise this defeat- 'him in an enciave theory which would effec- tively give the bulk of the country over to the Communists and leave us isolated. Others advocate mass boinblinr:. They want, us to take the wits to the Chine ,e main- land. Their intention is honorable. The result would be devastation. Mit not victory. And their proposals might unleash a world war. D.sparate as these critics are in the solu- tions they propose, they are similar in their eagerness to be relieved of the burdens of world leadership. They both want us to get the whole thing over with. Both views smack of the sentiments of Prime Minister Chamberlain, Mr. Chamberlain once spoke to the British, Nation and I emote: "Of a quarrel in a feraway country between peo- ple of whom we know nothing?why should. we get involved." This was appeasement. The result was 6 years of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind.. That appeasement would work was a myth then?it remains a myth now. These critics despair too soon. We have lsen in South Vietnam in force for a scant 0 months. Only now is our presence being lett. Six months ago, village after village was being surrounded and overcome, and the government forces had retreated to the town squares and to the city of Saigon itself. Today, many of the villages have been re- taken and pacified. More than that, the people know that we are there, They know that we intend to stay as long as necessary. The impact is one of enormous significance. Met over a month ago I was in Vietnam. I went there to see for myself. I saw the condition of the country. I saw the mag- nitude of the job. I saw that we were do- ing that job. I. was impressed by the will of the Viet- namese people. But I must pause to tell you about our magnificent men. Our forces are extremely able, alert, and intelligent. Most of bite men in our Aimed Forces today are high school graduates. Most of our offi- cers are college graduates. Most of them are trained in government, in economics and political systems. And most of them, thank God, understand the philosophica. and polit- ical thee it of communism so that they know what the war is all about. The morale of our men is tremendous. Inspiring is the only word for it. They know ieiby we are there, They know what we must "do. And they have the ability and will to do it. What linin are the pie ipects for immediate victory? Viciory in this instance is not like that of s, conventional war, in Het it must mean the containment of comxrc reism, and this will undoubtedly take time end effort and siierifice, But the etakes arc enormous, recall is vividly as any experience of my life, the days of the Cuban crisis; You may remember that Congress had just adjourned and President Kennedy riummoncii all of the coogressienal leaders back to Veshington. There i,s the Cabinet :Room of the White House he outlined in derail the Reesian mis- sile threat to the United State a For one terrible week the Nation looked down the nuclear barrel. On. the Monday after the Sunday morning that Khrushcher wrote his letter to the President ihdica dog withdrawal of the missiles, Preside] t Kinney said, at his final briefing: "The military threat of Russia is receding,. Now the three will come from Communist China as it develops the hydrogen bomb." Two years later, almeet to the lay, gath- ered in the same room, with 'Limo' the same people, with the exception of President Ken- nedy, President Johnson briefed is on the explosion of the first nuclear device in China. There were many questions directiid at Sec- retary Ru be mad Secretary McNamera. One prevailed above all the others. What threat does this pose to the free world? The answer came back, candid and lneef?very :ittie as of now, but a major and dangerous o' c' 10 years from a now, barring no change in Ulf! aggres- sive government now dominant in lihina. And as I talked with our leaders i.. Vietnam and Saigon, these meetings kept recurring in my mind. Si) this is the ultimate challenge of Viet- nam. Whether we turn back the threat now or whether we repeat the events of other days and ultimately face a China infinitely stronger than it is today and determined to conquer the rest of mankind. This is the challenge, but what it the fu- ture? Our objectives are clear. We intend to contain communism in Vietnam. We do not believe that the Communists will stop unless we stand firm. Thus we are erecting a wall, not a wall of brick and itone and barbed wire., but a wall of will and resolution. Yet at the same time, T want to mi sure you that President Johnson It: doing meerything possible to get the Vietnam conflict to the conference table where we can achieve a just and honorable settlement. Our emissaries range the world for peace Now we take our search for peace into a new forum at the United Nations. We will rtey :in Vietnam no longer than is necessary. We seek no territory or bases. We support free elections in South Vietnam if they can be conducted in ;ieeace and without Communist intimidation. The problem is, as the most ret tint pro- nouncements from Hanoi so graphecally re- veal, that the Communists do not yet want peace. They still think that they can win. Our enemies hope that we are a callow nation. They confuse our reluctance to ac- cept our destiny of world leadership with lack of resolve and thus call us a paper tiger. They hope that we will be unwilline to bear the weight of world leadership when the mantle grows heavy. They dream that the mightiest nation in the world, with a gross national product of nearly three quarters of a trillion dollars, will fall for the ,thurious alternative of gains or butter. They hope that the Democratic Party, fearful of being char- acterized as a war party, will hesitate to con- duct our Vietnam policy with vigor. They cling to the vain expectation tied our nii- tional determination will crumble. They are wrong and their hopes futile. We are strong, and we are resolvid. Presi- dent Johnson has the vast major ay of our people behind him. And even Al Inc faced substantial public opposition to our policy, he would still do what is right in Vietnam. His duty is to the national interest of the United States, not partisan political con- cerns. So we will persuade the Communists that the price of aggression is too high. And in the process, we will prevent world war III. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the dis- tinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LEGGETT]. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairrna is, I yield to my colleague from California I Mr. BURTON]. Mr. BURTON of Califon).a. Mr. Chairman, once again, as with the spe- cial appropriation of $700 million for the war in Vietnam which was voted last May 5, I am required, by conscience, to vote in apposition to the overwhelming majority of the Members of this House and to question, by that vote, the course and conduct of our policy in Vietnam. I do this with sadness, for I do not like to be in opposition to the President who, no less than myself or any other Member of this House, is acting out of conscience and a profound desire to serve the best interests of this Nation. I am not ignorant of, nor lacking in appreciation for, the terrible sacrifice:; made each day by our fighting men on the battlefields of Vietnam. Indeed, it is what these men are going through that has moved me to studied and deep reflection on this war. I oppose this bill as a futile attempt to achieve, by additional force of arms, so- lutions to problems which are not pri- marily military but essentially political, economic, and social. I am concerned lest the money that is voted today be interpreted as a support of this most futile course. I am con- cerned for the lives, American and Viet- namese, that this act of expansion of the war will cost. Last week, I supported and voted for an authorization of funds to pursue a program of peace to relieve the hunger, misery, and suffering of the Vietnamese people. Today, I cannot now vote funds to permit us to expand the war. Time does not permit us, under the limited debate rule, to discuss the wis- dom of our initial involvement in Viet- nam. Suffice it to say, we did, in fact, go astray, and now we find ourselves sinking deeper and deeper into a, land war in Asia for goals which become in- creasingly obscure and at costs which we dare not fully assess. Somehow, we find ourselves in the role of a nation attempting to preserve the era when Western nations determined the fate of Asia. That era is gone for- ever. The course we follow runs counter to the sweep of history and puts this Naticai Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/J3. ? CIA,RDP.67B0pg46R000400050008-5 4281 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOU in opposition to the forces of national- ism which history has demonstrated ca i not be contained by military action. We have been repeatedly warned of the dangers of committing ourselves to a course which involves us in a land war. in Asia. Yet, the funds we are asked to vote today finance such a commitment and reinforces the notion that with more men, more weapons, and the inevitable higher casualty lists, we can achieve stability of the political situation in Vietnam, foster support by its people of the government, develop its economic potential, and alleviate the suffering of its people. This course is counterproductive in my estimation. If we continue along this course and wander ever more deeply into the jungle mists of Asia, I fear that many more innocent Vietnamese will die, many more brave American soldiers will per- ish, many mothers and fathers will weep, and the honor of this great Nation will be cast over with a shadow that only time will dispel. It diminishes, in the eyes of the world, our very real desire for peace. The era has long since passed when we must arm to negotiate?for negotiate we must. We must negotiate with all par- ties to this conflict. The Vietnamese people must be represented in these ne- gotiations by all parties, including the Saigon government and the NLF. We must pursue peace through the United Nations and work toward the achievement of the Geneva accord. Peace in Vietnam, in all of southeast Asia?indeed in the entire world, dic- tates this course as it dictates my nay vote on this supplemental authorization of funds. (Mr. BURTON of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the Chairman of the Committee if he would give me 4 minutes. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do not have 4 minutes to give to the gentle- man, but I will give him 2 minutes; I have already given him 2 minutes. (Mr. LEGGErri' asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, it is unfortunate that the only record that will really be made in the House of Representatives this 1st day of March 1966, is that virtually unanimously, with few exceptions, the Congress of the United States votes $4.8 billion additional authorization to defend freedom in South Vietnam. I support the President and this appro- priation?the loyalty to the United States of those who do not certainly is no issue here. There are perhaps some outside this hall who would question the patriotism of anyone who expresses trepidation with respect to our commit- ment in southeast Asia. I would say that anyone who is not concerned with discussing choices of procedure to ac- complish peace and the freedom and progress of southeast Asians in the face of the obvious threats to the existence of mankind is a superpatriotic fool. No. 36-18 All Americans, I believe, are impressed with our own ability in this country to aecumulate one-half of the production of the world by private enterprise, demo- cratic, reasonably bloodless, hard work. There are none of us who would not want our system to work for the world as it does here. American policy since post-World War II is to spread the benefits of our system worldwide through Marshall plan aid, Agency for International Development, Alliance for Progress, food for peace, and kindred international organizations. We supplement our program through the most extensive military oversight sys- tem ever designed on this globe, Peace Corps, tourism, and sundry other State, private, and Federal technical assistance programs. We have spent more money and given more people assistance under this program than other nation or group of nations in history. By and large we have been extremely successful with sophisticated people. The threat of communism which I under- stand to be as a forsaking of liberty and justice and individual freedom in favor of a precisely managed socialistic dicta- torship has been met and has been suc- cessfully challenged. The trend for the left in Britain, Italy, France and Japan after World War II is now only a whisper because through our aid and their own creativeness these countries are economically successful. Were this not a fact, all of our guns and rockets could not have changed the tide. In the underdeveloped countries, how- ever, of Africa, Asia and South America where poverty is rampant and popula- tions are exploding, our "do good" policy has been questionably successful. A suc- cess record for Japan, Taiwan and West- ern Europe should be closely evaluated in relation to other restless countries un- able to fathom the precedents we give to them. The problem is that we become mes- merized with the term "communism." We know of the doctrine of Stalin, Khru- shehey and Mao Tse-tung that they peacefully or forcefully plan to capture the imagination of peasants and rural people first in south Asia, then Africa, then South America, and we are set in panic. We remember Hitler said what he would do and in 10 years he almost did it. We see the Communists restless in their containment and we fear they will do the same. Communism should be contained? there are many other ways where liberty Is not irrevocably lost by which people might develop and progress. History will no doubt record our age, I hope, as the great era when mankind conquered space and poverty through the programs de- veloped in the competition between de- mocracy and communism. I hope that the programs which ebb to the top as suc- cessful are democratic. We Should not become paranoid, how- ever, when the competition is discussed. I and many Americans would like to see the United States develop the leadership and the programs that will bring peace and prosperity to the underdeveloped world. When war breaks out, usually all hope of real progress is jeopardized. The problem is that if the United States is going to assume the stature of policeman of the world we should develop a realistic policy of helping people de- clare effective wars on poverty and stag- nation worldwide. We are the only na- tion that literally has a military ring around the world?the only nation that can provide that needed cloak of protec- tion. When we use that cloak to stamp out dictatorships of the right or left, we are working for the good of mankind. When we use that cloak and the CIA to stultify programs of people and per- petuate military coups and dictatorships, we many times militate against the prog- ress of peoples. When people's movements are ground- ed in communism we are in a dilemma. The people's program to change poverty we should support?communism we fight, and rightfully. Not to recognize that Communist programs with their ham- and-egg offerings appeal to many people, however, is to misread human nature. To handle such a movement of change when war does not break out is relatively easy. We step up our military assistance program to maintain the status quo and simultaneously step up AID efforts to promote economic devel- opment. A military coup many times is superimposed and our purposes are con- founded in local public opinion. The point is that we want to help people develop because that gives us security in the United States. However, we do not act with vigor until we are hit on the head with communism. When local war breaks out we are totally confounded as in southeast Asia today. We want to help people but things are so confused we do not know who to help or who to hurt. We are en- gaged in a war which it is to our own and the world's interest not to formally declare. We want to fight communism wherever it might be, but we are obvi- ously confused because we are forced to support six successive dictatorships, none of which were popularly elected, one of which only this morning very demo- cratically announced the summary exe- cution of a number of too enthusiastic merchants for the American dollar. I am pleased to see the United States now announce the $1 billion effort to solve the economic problems of South Vietnam, this sum apparently to consti- tute the balm to salve the pangs of any would-be Communist supporters for a better economy. We certainly were not prepared to offer this kind of "dough" while the French had control and it is only now that we are psychologically prepared to support this kind of one small country commitment. If we want to be the policeman of the world, which role I frankly support, I think we should have better reflexes than this. We are now in this position where to prove our point we are dropping' bombs at a greater daily rate than during World War II. Our commitment as re- ported in the newspapers is better than 50,000 tons of TNT per month, or 500,- 000 250-pound bombs per month. It is obvious that if we only wound one Viet- cong with every 10 bombs we would cas- cade the enemy to the conference table Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4282 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966 in 30 days. We now have in excess of 200,000 men committed, joining 500,000 South Vietnamese, plus 40,000 allied soldiers. Civilian casualties, I under- stand, are fantastic, though American military deaths are light to date. We have a program to liberate territory and are making modest gains. However, the Vietcong today is twice as strong as they were last year this time, control more territory, and their main units are yet to be engaged. We are raising our level of support by a substantial percentage and I believe the fiscal year 1967 military budget, when it is properly supplemented next year, will again extend substantially our com- mitment. We are expending ammunition at the greatest rate in history, perhaps expend- ing on this undeclared war one-fourth of our national income?approximately $24 billion. We are thus drawn in. bat- tle to defeat a so-called Vietcong and North. Vietnam who have a less budget for a year than we have in a month, who need but a few truckloads of materials a day to sustain them, who have no air force, no navy and certainly not a mod- ern army. They do have tunnel and jungle sanctuaries that are difficult to penetrate. think then my judgment under these circumstances would be to gage care- fully not only what we do but how we do it. We are really not so much ourselves trying to beat the Vietcong but trying to supplement the force of the free South Vietnamese so that the people them- selves will want to rid themselves of the Vietcong. Barbarous executions by South Vietnamese and massive land scarring by B-52's and our artillery will not get the support of the people if nearly a million injured, refugees are forced into Saigon as was reported to- day. it is possible that we can try too hard and lose the people. In a jury trial you can have a perfect plaintiff's case, but spend too much money on diagrams and witnesses and lose the jury. So in an election you can have an electable candidate, spend too much money and he is defeated by the elec- torate because the money shows. The point is that money along will not win the war of ideas in South Vietnam. I do not think we can say realistically for long that the peasant just wants to be left alone, he has no philosophy, yet by night many of them make the best soldiers in the world. The people of South Vietnam are erupting in part by northern stimulation and in part by conditions. The stimu- lation we can control, but we must de- velop and sell long-term economic pro- grains to change conditions, to control corruptions, to expand education, to democratize leadership, to abort class and caste systems and foreign economic domination. We must outline workable programs. it is not enough that we carry on a for- eign aid program at the $3 billion-plus authorized level and $1 billion-plus ap- propriated level and carry on a program largely with surplus grains and through the many times corrupt private sector and channel that aid to scores of coun- tries. 'We appropriate at the $2 billion level to change poverty in our domestic program in 3,000 counties-0E0. Are we suc- cessful? How can we do the job world- wide at this level where per capita in- come is not $2,000 as in the United States but $100 as in nearby Mexico or less. The point is that we cannot ship sur- plus materials with hands clasped across the boxes even at the greatest rate in history worldwide and then under our assumed worldwide police power declare that nations in our favor can qualify for this aid to more or less do as we do but that if this program is obviated by creep- ing poverty, local corruption, dynastic domination or population explosion, we will blow your head off if you try to revolt if you are Communist tinged. Rightfully and in a good moral con- science if the United States would stim- ulate people rebellious against dictator- ship oppression and poverty, where our aid programs are ineffective, maybe more rebellious people would be oriented to- ward the U.S. middle ground rather than the extreme right or extreme left. In our efforts to maintain and per- petuate our own security we should not be satisfied with a good try to defeat poverty worldwide. We should make our programs work. Where poverty and domination swell behind dormant dic- tatorships, then should American foreign policy be to effect change by democrati- cally oriented revolution if need be. Declare to the world, then, that the impoverished and the dominated will re- ceive our support, not just a halfhearted effort and not just when communism is the competitor. This policy declared and followed then will mean a successful U.S. foreign Trolley?people will rally around us worldwide?this is the best and only effective containment policy?tins policy also will have a natural fallout of giving us security at home. It will mean a worldwide effort for perhaps our lifetimes by the United States and other successful democracies at a dollar level commitment not at cur- rent foreign aid rates, but at. current mil- itary South Vietnam rates. By my words of trepidation to the President concurrent with 77 of my col- leagues this is what I mean. Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairmaa, I yield myself 10 minutes. (Mr. CLANCY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I whole- heartedly support HR. 12889 and the $4.8 billion of supplemental military au- thorizations, primarily for southeast Asia. This supplemental authorization is needed in support of the American effort to help block Communist efforts to sub- jugate all ,of Vietnam. Today, the one most compelling prob- lem demanding our attention is the situation in Vietnam, and it is up to us to see that our military needs there are adequately funded. Our Nation's pri- mary obligation is to fully support our men who have been sent to combat in South Vietnam. Wherever American boys are sent to battle they should be sup- plied with the best possible weapons and with the best logistical support that we can give them. The passage of the bill we are now con- sidering is indispensable to our military posture and preparedness. It is designed to insure that there will be no shortages in Vietnam so that our fighting men in the field can perform their mission with maximum efficiency. Overwhelming passage of this legislation will give needed assurance to our men in Vietnam that we are standing behind them 100 percent. We now have more than 200,000 men actually deployed in South Vietnam. Added to this figure are the many thou- sands who directly support them in southeast Asia. And our commitment in South Vietnam is growing daily in terms of men, material and money. We must not be content to fight just to keep from losing; rather, we must marshal our resuorces and concentrate our energies on winning this conflict in the shortest possible time. We must strive to avoid a long and bloody stale- mate dragging on for years. It appears the Communists are testing our will and determination at this time and in this place to see how long they can drain our resources?particularly our manpower. They are counting heavily on a collapse of the American will to resist their ag- gressive designs. Yes, our will and staying power are being tested by the Communists in this hard and bitter contest. It is obvious that the principal Communist objective is to get the United States involved to a maximum extent in a ground war of at- trition in Asia in which our superiority in weaponry remains unused. It is mandatory that we undertake effective action to bring this struggle to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible. Certainly we would all prefer not to have to be there. However, aggressions left unchecked will continue to grow. It is in our best interests to repel this ag- gression, but I urge that we do so with all deliberate speed. The legislation before us provides in the main authorization for appropria- tions for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles, and for the construction of military installa- tions. The authorization totals $4,857,- 450,000, which exceeds by $50 million the sum requested by the administra- tion. It will provide the required author- ity for the necessary appropriations to support military operations in southeast Asia. Section 401 of the bill provides that funds for the support of the South Viet- namese armed forces and the other free world forces fighting in South Vietnam shall be derived from the regular appro- priations for the support of our own military forces rather than from funds carried in the military assistance pro- gram. We are advised that a transfer of this authority will result in improving procedures for supplying military items to the United States, Vietnamese, and other free world forces in Vietnam. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE 4283 It is unfortunate that the appropria- tions requested last year were insufficient. I would be the first to concede that de- velopments in a situation such as we find ourselves in Vietnam cannot be predicted precisely, and we must allow for flexi- bility in our planning and judgments. My colleagues and I on the Armed Services Committee must rely to a great extent on the information and facts fur- nished us in briefings by the Secretary when he appears before us. Yet, even a cursory review of the record indicates that he, too, is sometimes wrong in his assessments of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. role in that war, and in his short-term predictions of the outcome. It is my earnest hope that Secretary McNamara will give greater heed to the combined judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he will follow more closely recommendations made by them on military matters. The military ad- vice he receives represents many years of experience. Experienced professional military judgments are most essential in aiding the Secretary to arrive at the crucial decisions he must make. Before closing my remarks I would like to urge once again that we lose no time in passing the bill under consideration. To win the struggle in Vietnam, we must unite as a nation to let the entire world know that we are going to make the nec- essary sacrifices and bear the necessary costs to defeat the Communist aggres- sion there. It is well to remember that the war in Vietnam is not primarily a war about Vietnam. It is a war which concerns the future of Asia, a war which could very well determine the future of the entire free world. I hope we will continue to honor our commitment to freedom in Vietnam, and we should take every step possible to insure that the struggle is brought to a successful conclusion in the shortest possible time. Mr. Chairman, I now yield to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. GEORGE W. ANDREWS]. Mr. GEORGE W. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I am supporting this bill 100 percent. I think the sooner it becomes law the better off our fighting men in South Vietnam will be. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that in my opinion the vast majority of the peo- ple in Alabama are supporting our Pres- ident in this vicious war against com- munism. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that there has not been a draft card burned in Alabama; there has not been a beatnik-led demonstration against our foreign policy in Alabama. We have had some beatnik-led demonstrations down there that did not concern our foreign policy. I will predict to you if such a demonstration as that occurs in Ala- bama, somebody is going to get hurt. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think the sooner we fight this war to win the better off the whole world will be. I think the greatest, most courageous decision made in the history of this Nation was made by former President Harry Truman when he ordered the use of an atomic weapon on Hiroshima. He served notice on the Japanese Government that if they did not surrender, they could expect further bombings within 3 days. Hearing nothing from the Japanese, the second bomb fell on Nagasaki. You know the story. That courageous action fore- stalled the bloodiest invasion that had ever been planned in the history of this world and saved hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. If I were run- ning this war, Mr. Chairman, I would pick up the telephone and call Hanoi and say, "We will give you 30 days to get out of South Vietnam lock, stock, and barrel. If you are not out at the end of that time, then you can expect ,us to drop whatever type bombs we desire, wherever we choose to drop those bombs," and let us get this thing over with and bring those boys back. I know the argument against that is that you might endanger the lives of the people in this country. Now, this is war that we are in, Mr. Chairman. We should all share the jeopardy. I am thinking of that kid in that rice paddy and in that snake-infested, ma- laria-infested, sniper-infested jungle whose life is in danger and in jeopardy 24 hours a day. Let us bring this war to an early conclusion. I tell you in my opinion there is nothing that the Com- munists respect more than power. We have it today; let us use it and get through with this war. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gen- tleman from New York [Mr. BiNGHAml. (Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his re- marks.) Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, ear- lier today the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. COHELANI submit- ted a brief joint statement on behalf of 78 members of this House. I was priv- ileged to be among the sponsors of this statement. I shall vote for HR. 12889 for the pur- pose stated in the committee report. But, in so voting. I do have reservations, and these reservations go somewhat be- yond the terms of this joint statement. My vote does not mean that I am wholly satisfied with the administration's poli- cies with respect to Vietnam. While I agree with President Johnson that we cannot withdraw from Vietnam and let the Communists take over, and while I salute him for resisting the pressures of those who would expand and escalate the war, I do not believe that we have yet been sufficiently resourceful or flexi- ble in our efforts to get negotiations started. In fact, recent developments create the impression that the adminis- tration is no longer giving much thought to the question of how to achieve a negotiated settlement. Why, then, am I voting for this sup- plemental authorization bill? First, for the simple and obvious reason, mentioned in the joint statement, that we must give our forces in Vietnam all the support they need, so long as they are there. The second reason is more complicated: I fear that a substantial vote against the au- thorization might actually impede our objective of getting talks started by en- couraging Hanoi to continue its appar- ently total intransigeance. This leads to a question which I sub- mit we should all pander. It is certainly one of the key questions before us at this time. The question is: Why, in spite of all the President's efforts since last April to get discussions started with Hanoi, has Iianoi steadfastly refused to budge? Rather than discuss this question to- day, in the atmosphere of a debate on this defense authorization bill, I intend to examine it at some length tomorrow under special orders, and I would be glad to have any Members join in a discussion of the question at that time. Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KUPFER1VIAN]. (Mr. KUPFERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I sin voting for this appropriation because I cannot leave our American troops in the lurch without proper protection on a foreign shore. But it must be pointed out that it was a great mistake to have put them and us in this position. The biography of General Ridgeway, in discussing the filling of the vacuum in Indochina when the French pulled out in 1954, shows that we could only be in- volved in a stalemate at great loss to the United States in lives and money. We should not have been put in our present position. We should not have been involved in an escalation. We should not have waited so long to bring the question to the United Nations. When the administration states that it seeks no blind escalation, we must question whether it has not already done so and left us in the lurch. An article by Murray Kempton in the New York World-Telegram and Sun on Friday, February 25, 1966 entitled, "Clear Sighted Escalation" well describes the situation into which we have been led. I should like to insert Mr. Kempton's article in the RECORD at this point. The only course left to us to pursue, as my predecessor, now Mayor Lindsay, has said, is hard diplomacy to seek peace. CLEAR-SIGHTED ESCALATION (By Murray Kempton) "The tide of battle in Vietnam has turned In our favor."?Vice President Humsrmsy on his return. It will be 5 years in June since another Vice President came back from Saigon. "There has been a substantial improve- ment in the situation in Vietnam," Lyndon Johnson said then. There were 685 American military advisers In South Vietnam at the time. The Vice President brought a promise to raise the total to 1,600 or so. But the real danger, he said, Is not from communism but "from hunger, ignorance, poverty, and disease." Privately, the Vice President told President Kennedy that "American combat involve- ment at this time was * * * undesirable because it would revive anticolonial emo- tions throughout Asia." For this is a war that has always been going well. Even so, by October of 1961, Gen. Maxwell Taylor went to Saigon and came back to re- port that, while only the Vietnamese could beat the Vietcong, more American troops were needed to show them how to do the job. President Kennedy was skeptical. Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4284 pp v A ro ed For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE March "The troops will march in," he said, "and in 4 days everyone will have forgotten. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off and you have to take another." Still, in December 1962, he ordered larger commitments to Saigon. Everyone was en- couraged. That spring, Secretary of Defense McNamara went, to South Vietnam for the that time. "Every quantitative measure- ment we have," he reported. "shows that we are winning the war." Taylor came back in October of 1962. and Found "a, great national movement" assem- bling to destroy the Vietcong. "The spear point of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam," the President said in his 1963 state of the Union message. Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was hay- MT, his troubles by then and none of our official tourists echoed Vice President John- son's assessment of Diem as the Churchill of Asia. Still, in October, Secretary Mc- Namara, said that a thousand of the 16,000 American troops in Vietnam could be brought home by the end of the year and that the major part of the military job would be finished by 1965. So, by Christmas of 1965, we had more than 200,000 Americans under arms in South Vietnam, and the Vietcong had risen from their 12,000 at the time of Lyndon Johnson's confident introduction to the problem in 1961, to more than 230,000. There was never a time when the thing was not said to be going well, and here we are at a moment when it is impossible to deny that, until now, it has all along been going very badly indeed. There is no way to imagine the delight of our enemies in our situation except to think what would be our own pleasure if there were 200,000 Chinese struggling through Indonesia or 200,000 Russians wal- lowing in Albania without one of our soldiers to the smallest degree inconvenienced. Ilaad poor President Johnson, since all these disasters come from the careful plans of Democrats, is reduced to a dreadful mangling of history in order to argue that a series of decisions, which time has proved to have been based on mistaken estimates, where part of a sober, coherent plan now turning toward fulfillment. We can believe lam when he says that we have no cause to fear a mindless escalation. It is quite enough to remember the history of the last 5 years and recognize that everything that was done was so carefully thought out. Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York I Mr. Rm.!. (Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to revise and ex- tend his remarks.) Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chalr- man, I rise in support of HR. 12889, a supplemental authorization of $4.8 bil- lion for necessary procurement, research and development, and military construc- tion. Mr. Chairman, I have been in Vietnam. I have been with our troops, and I can report to this House that their morale is absolutely magnificent and is deserv- ing of the fullest support. Further, Mr. Chairman, there should be no doubt whatsoever in Hanoi or Peiping that the United States of Amer- ica will totally and completely back its men in the field while at all times utiliz- ing every resource of diplomacy--includ- ing the U.N.?to reach the conference table and an honorable and viable peace. :However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this debate today is important. It is on a serious subject. It deals with many implications for the future of American policy, the chances for peace, and the opportunity?free from terror and ag- gression?for South Vietnam to do the job that must be done in rural recon- struction and pacification backed by major reforms?including education and land reforms?by the government in Saigon. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that the debate here in this House, compared with the other body, is very limited; that we are only devoting 3 hours to one of the most important subjects ever to come before these United States Frankly, we have not conducted a serious national debate here today, and I regrei it. How- ever, I strongly support this authoriza- tion. Mr. RIVERS of South Cart dia. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LONG]. (Mr. LONG of Louisiana ask t A and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Chair- man, I rise to give my full support to H.R. 12889 and urge its immediate pas- sage. The duty we owe to our fighting men is clear. Those men and women who to- day are performing so nobly to guarantee a continuing place for freedom in our world must be as fully supplied with the equipment necessary for them to do their jobs as it is possible for us to give them. Their sacrifices are incalculable. We must not fail in our duty to them, Few individuals outside our own mili- tary forces are acquainted with the tre- mendous effort being made by our forces in Vietnam. Focus your attent, on on the wide role played by any one of our serv- ices. Our Navy, for example, is involved in almost every facet of the conflict. Its flexibility, mobility, and ability to extend our national power through every medi- um has been well demonstrated. In the air, fighters and boothers are flying combat sorties well into North Vietnam. Three carriers from the 7th Fleet are on station off Vietnam at all times. Two of these giant warships, each with their 100-plane airwings, strike at North Vietnamese infiltration routes 24 hours a day. The third car- rier, operating further south off the Viet- namese coast, provides air support for United States and Allied ground forces in South Vietnam. Destroyers, the workhorses of the fleet, cruise the waters of the South China Sea. These ships have fired an average of 12,000 rounds a month?more :,,han 160 tons of o.rdnance?against the Vietcong targets. In addition to bombardment, our destroyers are carrying out missions in antisubmarine warfare, search and rescue, and protection of the fast carrier striking forces. Other craft are on con- stant alert for possible shipment, of sup- plies into South Vietnam. Thousands of junks are detected: and searched each week. Still other ships carry thousands of marines ashore and thousands more are ferried in behind the enemy in heli- copters from amphibious assault ships. 1, 1966 Logistics is an area of naval activity which cannot be overlooked. Over 94 percent of the logistic support for all U.S. Forces operating in Vietnam is brought in by sea. Ashore, more than 10,000 Navy personnel are providing sup- port. Seabee units are at work con- structing bases in the jungles of Viet- nam, Navy hospital corpsmen are car- rying out their duties with units, arid of- ficers are performing advisory roles with the Vietnamese Navy and river assault groups. Gentlemen, these operations depend on our authorization of the appropriations for the procurement of the aircraft, mis- siles, and equipment needed for the job. This bill enables us to continue acquisi- tion of these things during the remainder of fiscal 1966. The committee under the leadership of its illustrious chairman has studied carefully the needs reflected by this bill and is convinced of the sound- ness of the bill. Their vote on the bill was unanimous. I heartily endorse that . RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. vote. Mr. I yield 1 minute to the gentle- man from Missouri [Mr. Iceman]. Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Ha. 12889 authorizing the appropriation of $4,857,450,000 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, re- search, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the support of our troops in South Vietnam. This authorization, Mr. Chairman, represent- ing a supplemental authorization for the fiscal year of 1966 is vitally needed to support our troops. It has been asked for by the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces as neces- sary to accomplish our objectives, in South Vietnam. It has been supported by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been unanimously recommended by the House Committee on Armed Services. This measure must be passed to meet the commitment this body itself made when it passed the Tonkin resolution of August 10, 1964 by a vote of 416 to 0. The time for debate is past. The time for action is now. This is not only to carry out a commitment of the Executive. This is a commitment of the Congress itself and we should show the Communist aggressors not only in southeast Asia but all over the world that we are united in our determination to stop Communist aggression. Mr. Chairman, Winston Churchill said: It is the duty of every citizen in time of trouble to do or say or even think of nothing that can weaken or discourage the energies of the state. This statement, in my opinion, can well serve as a standard of conduct for all Americans in regard to South Vietnam. The questioning of our policy now which we committed ourself to on August 10, 1964 can only serve to weaken the state and give encouragement to our enemies. This is our time to say something which will strengthen and encourage our men in South Vietnam. We should speak out Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 4285 with an overwhelming vote in favor of this measure. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gen- tleman from Ohio [Mr. Lays]. Mr. LOVE. Mr. Chairman, I sup- ported this bill and in so doing support the administration and its policy in Viet- nam. I naturally feel that this bill is necessary to support our forces in south- east Asia but I especially like the psy- chological impact it can make at this time in the world of ideas and the need for unity in our own country. My re- marks are in extension of research, de- velopment, test and evaluation supple- ment for the Air Force as set forth in pages 5 of the committee's report. The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia sup- port supplemental for the research, de- velopment, test and evaluation, Air Force appropriation amounts to $71,- 085,000. These funds are required for immediate initiation of developments in- volving two aircraft weapons systems, de- velopment and test of an item under the chemical/biological operational support program, development and test of a num- ber of items in the conventional muni- tions program, and a classified project. The aircraft and related equipment program amounts to $36,300,000 which provides for two engineering develop- ment programs under the close support fighter program. These developments, which will increase our capabilities for close air support of ground forces in southeast Asia, consist of $10 million for development and test of modifications to the F-4 (TSF) aircraft to improve its performance capabilities, and $26,300,- 000 for development and test of modifica- tions to the A-7A aircraft to adapt this Navy aircraft to meet Air Force re- quirements. The other equipment program amounts to $34,785,000 which provides for an ad- vanced development program require- ment, a number of items in the engineer- ing development program, and a general support program development requirement. In the advanced develop- ment program, $1,600,000 is included for development and test of a conven- tional munitions component. In the en- gineering development program, $250,000 is provided for development and test of a munition under the chemical/biological Operational support program, and $7,- 735,000 is provided for a number of munitions and other projects under the other operational support program. The general support program includes $25,- 200,000 for development of a specialized collection activities program system. The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia support supplemental for this appropria- tion includes only the most urgent devel- opments which can be made available to combat forces before June 30, 1967. Therefore, the items selected are those whose lead times are so long that they cannot be deferred until the fiscal year 1967 appropriation becomes available. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from rilinois [Mr. ANDERSON] such time as he may require. (Mr. ANDERSON of rilinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889, the supplemental defense authorization bill. At an hour when more than 200,000 American men are locked in mortal com- bat with the enemy in southeast Asia, it is inconceivable to me that as Rep- resentatives of the people in the Congress we would do less than support this bill. It is a bill designed purely and simply to authorize the necessary supplemental funds required to fund military procure- ment of needed items. There have been some suggestions both in the debate here on the floor today and elsewhere that something more should be read into this vote than an approval or authorization of necessary funding for the American Armed Forces. Indeed, there have been times today when it seemed as if certain Members of this body wished that there could be two separate and distinct votes on this measure. One vote would permit those who are simply in favor of doing something for the boys to vote "aye." The other vote would be for those who not only wished to authorize funds for the Department of Defense but simul- taneously to give a ringing and rousing approval to everything past, present, and future that has been or will be done by the Johnson administration. Certainly, there is nothing in the word- ing of the legislation now before us which explicitly commits anyone to an approval of the various policies that have been pursued by the administration with re- spect to the matter of Vietnam. It could be argued that implicit in the ap- proval of this authorization bill is the approval of current policy. However, I think that we would be establishing an unwise precedent indeed if we were to attempt to read too much into the passage of a military authorization bill. By the same token, I think that the 76 Members of this body who have signed a manifesto or declaration that their vote for this measure does not carry with it approval for th escalation of the war or our deeper involvement in southeast Asia will also "carry coals to Newcastle." Mr. Chairman, I have no qualms at all concerning the legality of our present position in South Vietnam as expressed In a recent resolution of the American Bar Association. I think our presence there is legal under international law, under the SEATO treaty to which we are a signatory, and under the Charter of the United Nations. However, I think that the future actions of the present administration with respect to the con- duct of the war in South Vietnam must be based on a clear declaration of what our ultimate purpose there is to be. I am not convinced that the administration has been absolutely clear in this regard. In particular, I am concerned at the obvious attempts that have taken place recently to gloss over the differences that apparently were opened up between the administration and the junior Senator from New York when the latter spoke in favor of admitting the Vietcong to a share of power and responsibility in South Vietnam. Rather than attempt to paper over internal differences of such fundamental nature, I think that the administration should make it crystal clear that our boys are not dying in South Vietnam merely so that we can ultimately repair to the bargaining table perhaps to hand over a portion of the government of that country to the Vietcong. There- fore, Mr. Chairman, I take this time to set down these words so that my position may be irrevocably clear. I support this measure and with it the heroic sacrifices being made by our men in South Viet- nam. At the same time I do not want history to record that by this vote I gave this administration my blank check with respect to its future conduct of policy in South Vietnam. Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and yield back the balance of my time. Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentle- man from Missouri [Mr. RANDALL]. Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, our fighting men are committed in Vietnam and we have passed the time for much more debate. It seems to me we should be more concerned about getting the im- plements and tools of war to them so that they can do the job. I think we might pause for a monment to reflect that this is the first time in all of our American history that we have ever stopped in the middle of a fighting war to debate how we got into the war and why and whether it was a wise thing to do. That is ex- actly what we have been doing for far too long. Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentle- man. Mr. RYAN. Has war been declared by the Congress? Mr. RANDALL. It has been brought out crystal clear that the joint resolution unanimously agreed to by this House, 416 to 0 on August 7, 1964, is a sufficient declaration to authorize the President to conduct military operations in south- east Asia. The southeast Asian resolution stated "that the Congress approves and sup- ports the President as Commander in Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The resolution was very firm and included the recitation: The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of peace and security in south- east Asia. Mr. RYAN. Does the gentleman con- strue that resolution to be a declaration of war? ? Mr. RANDALL. Not a formal decla- ration, but for my part the resolution provides ample authority and I think also, for the overwhelming majority of fellow Members, as will be shown by the vote on this bill today. The situation as to Vietnam is that the President has ordered a gradual buildup of forces only after frequent con- sultations with the Congress. The Con- gress has repeatedly expressed its ap- proval not only through the August 1964 resolution but by monetary appropria- tions for the war. Exclusive of the measure before us today, the Congress has overwhelmingly approved two sup- Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67600446R000400050008-5 4286 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966 plemental appropriations including the $1.7 billion southeast Asia emergency fund passed on September 17, 1965, di- rectly after the President announced his intention to increase our military par- ticipation. in that area. There have been frequent consultations by the President with Congress, both by resolution arid by appropriation and by both means we have overwhelmingly approved the President's policy. The Congress' strongest weapon in foreign policy is through control of appropriations. Approval of these mone- tary sums should be recognized as con- stituting firm support of the President's authority to conduct war in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war by the Congress. There exist some valid reasons why there should not be a formal declaration of war. Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot .of humanitarian concern about injury or harm to a few Vietnamese civilians in the .jungles of Vietnam. If this has hap- pened, it has been accidental and un- avoidable and not by design or intentional. But I want to take the time to discuss sonic items in this authorization that were touched on briefly by the gentleman from Missouri I Mr_ HALL 1. refer to funds for more and better 'field hospitals and evacuation facilities. know you have heard about the new hospital ship and also those new portable operating rooms that can be brought in by helicopter and permit on operation to be performed very near the scene of com- bat. Let in; remember the present rate of fatalities among our American wounded is less than I percent. That represents a drop from the 2.5 percent level of 1.