PATIENCE, PERSEVERANCE, AND PERSPECTIVE CALLED FOR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400070003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 26, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

A
May 26, 1966
Approveg6f-~g?g 5/ &. A_R ?Q0446R000400070003-8 11117
bers of the New England delegation at
our meeting Wednesday and the willing-
ness of all these members to participate
in efforts to restore the original tariff
level. I think that the excellent pres-
entations of factual data on the eco-
nomic impact of increased foreign com-
petition made by representatives of labor
and industry were adequate to direct our
immediate attentioi~ to the restoration
of the original tariff base.
I consider it an honor to have been ap-
pointed as chairman of the committees
established by the meeting to expedite
favorable consideration of my bill, and
other bills on this subject, and to take
other steps discussed at the meeting.
The courses of action outlined at our
meeting offer a number of possibilities
with great potential and we should pur-
sue each of them without delay. The
committees established at this meeting
will arrange to meet with officials of the
Treasury Department to investigate the
reason for the tariff reduction and to
present data on the impact of foreign
competition on domestic employment,
and all other necessary and desirable
steps will be taken.
I am confident that these measures,
in conjunction with our continuing ef-
forts to obtain hearings on H.R. 12983
in the Ways and Means Committee, will
prove productive, and I am especially
pleased with the progress which was
made at Tuesday's meeting.
of Local No. 45 of the United Rubber
Workers Union, and Vice President Wil-
lard E. Bittle and Labor Relations Man-
ager Thomas J. Nelligan of Uniroyal,
Inc.
Representing the United Rubber
Workers of America were: George Bur-
don, international president; Peter Boxn-
marito, international vice president; Sal
Camelio, director, District No. 2; Keith
Prouty, research director; S. A. Bercaro,
Local No. 21914, Watertown, Mass.;
Oscar R. Carlson, Local No. 21914, Water-
town, Mass.; William DiSalvo, Local No.
220, Bristol, R.I.; Edward Benemels,
president, Local No. 220, Bristol, R.I.;
Leo Jolly, president, Local No. 224, Woon-
socket, R.I.; Rudy L. Perusse, Local No.
631, Middletown, Conn; and Al Demers,
president, Local No. 137, Andover, Mass.
Representing New England footwear
companies were: Charles A. Cameron,
B. F. Goodrich Co., Watertown, Mass.;
M. A. Sousa, Bristol Manufacturing
Corp., Bristol, R.I.; T. J. Meyers, Good-
year Rubber Co., Middletown, Conn.;
S. A. Stone, Converse Rubber Co., Mal-
den, Mass.; David A. Golden, tariff
counsel, Rubber Manufacturers Associa-
tion, New York; P. W. Koval, U.S. Rub-
ber Co., Woonsocket, R.I.; and Mitchell
Cooper, Esq., Rubber Manufacturers As-
sociation, Washington, D.C.
This meeting has served to emphasize
the true nature of the Customs Bureau's
new guidelines, and to point out their
lack of legal justification. Although the
Bureau would seek to minimize the effect
of the recent tariff cut by labeling it a
revised method of evaluation, I have been
informed by the Customs Bureau itself
that the implementation of its revised
valuation methods will result in an $8.8
million loss of revenue on the 60.8 mil-
lion pairs of footwear already involved.
Congress has prescribed the proper and
legal mechanism for such tariff conces-
sions in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
The provisions of this act require the
Tariff Commission to investigate the
probable economic impact and effect on
domestic employment before such tariff
reductions may be granted. Moreover,
the letter and spirit of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act direct that such concessions
be reciprocal. The Customs Bureau's
new guidelines actually reduce the tariff
on rubber-soled footwear by at least 35
percent without any investigations or
report on the economic impact on do-
mestic industry and employment, and
without obtaining any reciprocal con-
cessions from our trading partners.
The effect of this action is to present
our domestic rubber footwear industry
and its employees with the burden of
this gratuitous tariff cut as our U.S. ne-
gotiators prepare for negotiations in the
Kennedy round at Geneva which may
further reduce this already-eroded tariff.
In fact, the domestic industry has been
exposed to the added risk that the Amer-
ican selling price system of valuations
itself may be negotiated at Geneva.
Obviously we are up against serious
odds in this battle and the high stakes
involved make our concerted construc-
tive efforts all the more necessary. With
this in mind it was very encouraging
for me to note the large turnout of mem-
LET'S GIVE A SECOND CHANCE TO
REHABILITATED VETERANS
(Mr. McVICKER (at the request of
Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, I have
introduced a bill to alleviate a situation
that has too long gone unheeded. I re-
fer to the more than 500,000 Americans
holding a less than honorable military
discharge. This hangs over their heads,
irregardless of the fact that many of
them have sought to lead exemplary lives
since leaving the military service of the
United States.
One young man has two honorable dis-
charges in addition to an undesirable.
He is ineligible for reenlistment or change
of discharge in order to obtain decent
employment.
Another young man has an unsuitabil-
ity discharge which has been changed to
honorable, but under a service regulation
which still renders him "unsuitable."
As a result he can only do menial work,
although he is quite young and seems to
have exceptional intelligence.
Yet another is married with three
children. He comes from a deprived
background, and cannot get work be-
cause of his dishonorable discharge.
My bill would allow, under proper evi-
dence, awarding of a rehabilitation cer-
tificate to certain of these citizens who
qualify under its terms. By amending
title 10 of the United States Code, it
would aid those veterans who could ade-
quately prove rehabilitated conduct for
at least a 3-year period.
Certificates would be issued by the Do-
partment of Labor, with the Secretary of
Labor authorized to establish boards to
receive and act upon applications for
them. Evidence submitted to the boards
would include statements signed by law
enforcement officials, persons acquainted
with the applicant, and his employer, if
any. Boards could then conduct inde-
dependent investigations.
Those individuals receiving the certifi-
cate would then be eligible for job
counseling and employment placement,
as these benefits are denied to them
under existing law, thereby working se-
vere hardships upon many of them.
Mr. Speaker, I feel many of these vet-
erans deserve this opportunity to ease
their lotT and that my bill, once passed,
em a better springboard to
o
Dowes. )VYj'l.r
PATI CE, PERSEVERANCE, AND
PE PECTIVE CALLED FOR IN
VI NAM
( r STRATTON (at the request of
Mr. ATSUNAGA) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, when
this country undertook to declare its
independence in 1776 we had problems.
There were ups and there were downs
before we were fully free and operating
as a fully democratic society. We even
had to fight a long and bloody civil war
before the principle was finally accepted
that one region of our country could not
just go off and set itself up on its own
and thumb its nose at the established
authority of the country just because
they did not happen to like it.
But with patience and perseverance
we prevailed, Mr. Speaker. Neither
Rome nor the United States of America
was built in a single day. We need just
a little perspective when we see the
things that are happening today in Viet-
nam. Let us not panic. Let us take
the long view. The birth of a nation,
like the birth of an individual, can take
time and is often painful. But our
forces are doing well in Vietnam. Let us
not throw away the achievements and
the sacrifices they have made just be-
cause the news from Da Nang and Hue
and Saigon may be disturbing at the
moment.
In that connection I commend to the
attention of my colleagues an admirable
editorial that appeared in the Washing-
ton Post for May 25:
LESSONS Or ADVERSITY
The crisis in South Vietnam is producing
a great deal of reflection in this country, not
only about the United States role there, but
about the American role elsewhere in the
world where like situations may arise. Pain-
ful as this reflection may be, it is necessary,
useful and constructive as a means of devel-
oping policy in a democratically governed
society. Instruction based on theoretical
example is never as well remembered as that
derived from actual experience. The experi-
ence we are living through now is a teacher
we cannot despise.
The critics of American presence in South
Vietnam make some accusations that are not
easily answered. They say South Vietnam
is a very small country, and this cannot be
denied. They say it is a very weak country,
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t90110), IONA.I. RECORD - HOUSE May 26, 1966
and. this can hardly be disputed. They say
it is it very divided country, and no one can
ga.nsa;y it while Buddhists are attacking the
troop:, of their own government and those of
fl t allies, while Catholics and Buddhists stage
demonstration, and counterdemonstrations.
'riaey arty that it never has had and does not
now have familiarity with democratic insti-
tuions and that is true. They say that
::~o itla Vietnam lies in an area of Chinese
Communist influence and in close proximity
to Communist power and this cannot be
contradicted.
Ti is: only at grave risk that a great power
assists a small, weak and divided country
to resist aggression. The lesson seems plain.
tf.sreaiter let United States assistance be re-
served for victims of foreign aggression only
when hey are large, powerful, united, dem-
ocratic and far away from any Communist
power. Such assistance will not involve us
of the great risks that are involved in help-
ing the small, the weak, the divided and the
vulnerable. The great and powerful nations
we assist will make good use of our aid.
'i'hey will not fritter it away. They will not
waste their strength and ours in internal
bickering and quarreling. Their efficient,
Ircaccfui and capable utilization of oar aid
will be a source of continual satisfaction and
cxpnndoig power. Thus we shall make our
large irieuds invulnerable, ourselves secure
and r,krtain peace in our time. Once the
world has grasped our policy, Communist
bast ion:; will attack only small countries.
In;asmoch as we will defend only large ones,
there will be no more East-West conflict.
or course, there will cone a time when all
the small. weak and divided countries have
been reiloced by aggression. But any war
chart follows that development is hound to
be cozily close at hand. In order to fight it,
we will not have to run the risks of trans-
porting troops great distances. Our soldiers
will nut have to give battle in strange sur-
roundings or in a disagreeable climate. They
will not be exposed to the temptations of
alien brothels but can revel in the luxury of
home-grown sexual immorality.
aucti are the lessons of adversity to be
polled from the difficulties encountered in
South Vietnam.
JCPSEPTI ALSOP SAYS WE ARE WIN-
NING IN VIETNAM
Mr. STRATTON (at the request of
M1'. MATSUNAGA) was (granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, last
inontfl when the subcommittee which I
had the honor to head, returned from an
iimpection trip to Vietnam, we reported
to this House, as the RECORD for April 27,
that we found the military situation go-
in?r muc11 better in. Vietnam than most
people back here had been led to believe.
We said we believed our forces were win-
ding Ore military war in Vietnam.
I (horn- tunately, Mr. Speaker, not much
of the national press paid much atten-
tion to that story. Somehow the press
seems to favor those accounts which
reflect unfavorably on our commitment
lit Vietnam and play down those ac-
ce mounts that favor it.
'.i'he report of the gentleman from Cal-
ifm,nisi, [Mr. Moss], for example, which
was highly critical of our foreign aid
dealings in Vietnam got banner head-
lifies in Washington and around the
country.
Yet the statement of the Governor of
Pennsylvania, a former Member of this
body, in Vietnam. on a visit, saying he
felt our military operations there are
going well got almost no coverage here.
Tliat is unfortunate, Mi.. Speaker. It
gives the people of the country a mis-
leading and distorted view of the actual
situation in Vietnam.
I do hope that perhaps the unhappy
experience of scone 90 American and
foreign press representatives in Da Nang
the other day, which wa reported in
the Washington Star on Tuesday, by Mr.
Richard Critchfield, as an experience in
which "the scales had fallen from the
eyes of some 40 American and foreign
newsmen" as regards the real motives
of the antigovernment Buddhist demon-
strators in Vietnam, may perhaps mean
that we can look for more accurate and
less consistently biased reporting and
photography in the future
In any case, Mr. Speake:u, I was de-
lighted to see that the optimistic view
which our subcommittee reported to this
House a, month ago is now supported by
no less distinguished a reporter than Mr.
Joseph Alsop, who has just returned from
Vietnam and whose report appears in the
current? June 4, issue of the Saturday
Evening Post. I am sure Members will
End his analysis of considerable interest.
I am, therefore, including t at this point
in the RECORD:
WHY WE CAT: WIN IN /IETNAM
(By Joseph Also))
In Vie.triam, great; numbers of Americans
are now committed to a, war which very few
rnur'icans even begin to understand. Most
of us, of course, have a fair understanding of
the issues our troops are fighti rig for, but only
a tin_ minority understand the war itself.
This has struck Inc with increasing force
after every one of r:ay more recents visits to
Victn.aln---and I have been Isere 16 times
since 1953. People talk about, other matters
such as the chops and chang^ s of politics in
Saigon, where the Communists might mail-
tige eventual vici;ory -although I do not
t lints they will. No one ever mentions tile
f ;rl,? desperate combat, prol;loms that now
face the Viet Cone;. No one analyzes the
present strategy of our brill srnt field com-
ir;anrier in Vietnam, Gen. Wiliam C. West-
moreland. No one refers in coy way to what
is currently happening on rlae battlefield.
Yet the battlefield is where our own best hope
of victory lies.
`Lira whole pattern of the lighting, as it
happens, is still determined by an almost
successful gamble that the Communist made
to win the war last year. Ilence we must
backtrack a bit at the outset in order to see
the 1.. wing, the nature and fire risks of this
enormous Viet Cong gamble, to make what
happened reasonably compr,;hensible.
Many normally w,_ll-inforn.ed persons still
believe that a Communist guerrilla move-
lent like the Viet Con[; is something spon-
taneous--halfway, lot us say, between a mis-
guided patriotic society and a nationwide
game of cops-and-robbers. from their first
Obscure guerrilla origins, however, the Viet
Cong have been a second government of
South Vietnam, and they still are. Futher-
more---and here is the import rut point-this
clandestine Communist second government
has all the fiscal, economic, manpower and
other problems that plague any normal gov-
ernment. Since this is also a government at
war, the V.C. second government's biggest
probicm is naturally to recr.nt, equip and
in.aina;a.in its armed forces. 'his has always
been the biggest problem, an,[ its difficulties
caused the Viet Cosrrg gambl,- already men-
tioned, which was decided on in late 1963
after the coup d'etat against; South Viet-
namese President Ngo Dinh Diem.
South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 was
a country in which every province had its
own civil war, with the Saigon government
controlling the provincial capitals and a good
many villages, with the V.C. second govern-
suent controlling a good many other villages,
and with troops of both side :s in the field
everywhere. By that time, there was i Viet
Cong provincial battalion of a..bout 504) men
operating in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces.
There was a Viet Cong distri,'t company of
about 150 men operating in each of cat least
2,50 of the administrative distrcts into which
the provinces are subdivided. And in each
of several thousand V.C.-controlled vtllagcs
and hamlets, there was a Viet Cong guerrilla
band of 20 or 30 men to maintain loc; l dis-
cipline and to harass friends of the estab-
lished government in neigirhoring villages
and hamlets. All these V.C- soldiers---about
50,000 in the local forces and 110,000 in the
guerrilla hands, or approximately 16(1,1)0) men
in all-had to be paid and armed and. kept
supplied with ammunition soil much other
materiel, and all but the minority of strictly
part-time guerrillas had to be provided with
rations as well. Salaries and rations stho had
to be found for tens of thousands of Viet
Cong in essentially civilian occupations.
ranging upward from humbl( couriers and
tax collectors, through secret )olicemea and
the personnel of the medical services. t,o the
awe-inspiring members of it c Communist
Party's central committee for I north Vietnam
in their remote jungle lair near the Cam-
bodian border.
In addition, this second government; was
deeply engaged in a big and costly program
of military public works. The rule books for
guerrilla war, written by Mao Tse-tung and
his remarkable Vietnamese Communist pupil,
Gen. Vo Nguyen Clap, lay dov ii an ah;;olute
requirement for guerrilla main bases in areas
immune to penetration by licstile troops.
The mountainous, jungle-covered and
swampy tracts of South Vietnam provide
splendid terrain for many sucti main-base
areas. But barracks, hospitals; and Cuarerous
other facilities had to be score slv built with-
in these fastnesses. Wherever the gs'ound
was suitable, the main bases ;rlso had to be
fortified by an almost inconceivably aitlike
program of digging and tunneling; and al-
though corvee labor from V.C.-controlled vil-
lages was used for this purpose. the hundreds.
even thousands of men in the t orvee.s it least
had to be riven rations white away from
home. Finally, all the main Is ryes had to be
prestocked with medical supplies, ammuni-
tion and food. This was an emrrnotrs utrder-
L;aking in itself. A single undergrouncl cache
found last year, for instance, cantain'sd no
lass than 2,000 tons of rice. S oce the cache
was in a huge hole approachable only by a
narrow tunnel, all this rice had evidently
been carried in on men's back:;, bagful by
bagful.
Early in 1963, moreover, the first main
forces-their nature will be explained in a
moment--had begun to be mchilized in the
main-base areas. Therefore, long before
Diem was assassinated in November, 1963,
the Viet Cong leaders had to meet a pretty
imposing total budget. Their clandestine
second government then contr rIled no more
than about four million of the total :;oath
Vietnamese population of 17 million- Few
legally etsablished government:, of countries
having only four million peel's manage to
keep more than 160,000 men under arms at
all times, even if their soldiers are paid the
merest pittance, as are the soldiers of the
Viet Cong.
Such was the position when the Diem re-
gime was brought down by a:r army coup,
and almost the entire structure of govern-
ment control abruptly came to pieces, for a
while, in almost every provin 'e. The Viet
Cong were thus enabled to surge forward
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 May 26, 1966 Approved MPI RMSgIMG=6 RDR 446R000400070003-8 11119
everywhere, and this led to the decision to 1954. From Le Duan's arrival onward all the rule of Mao Tse-tung: Popular support of
begin organizing main forces on a really big higher direction of the V.C. had come from the guerrilla movement must never be en-
scale. Hanoi. The northern Communist govern- dangered until the final victory. But the
Like everything else the Viet Cong had ment had also provided large quantities of Hanoi leaders and the V.C. high command
done up to that time, the move to organize military equipment and had secretly sent clearly believed that the gamble could never
the main forces was strictly in accordance further tens of thousands of cadres to the go sour, simply because they were so certain
with the rule books of Chairman Mao and South to aid and guide the struggle there, of an early victory-after which, of course,
Gen. Glap. Main forces (the classification But all this was hidden well enough that any grumbling in the villages could be dealt
is Mao Tse-tung's) bear little resemblance those who wished could go on claiming that with by secret police,
to the simple guerrilla bands that almost this was "Just a civil war." To insure the expected victory, they
everyone envisions when the Viet Cong are The other mask, worn to deceive the rim- brought off a feat probably without parallel.
mentioned. They also differ sharply from the Pie people of South Vietnam, was vastly more Although they were still no more than the
local forces-the provincial battalions and important and valuable to the V.C. This was second government of South Vietnam, the
district companies, which are already well the mask of amiable agrarian reformers- Viet Cong between January, 1964, and the
above the guerrilla level-for the main forces the same mask that the Chinese Communists early spring of 1965 wrung from the unhappy
have no permanent regional attachments, had worn with such success until they got villages enough men and resources to in-
and their units are much larger and more control of China. Until the critical period crease the V.C. main forces to 24 regiments,
heavily aimed. In fact, they almost exactly we are now examining, the Viet Cong also complete with porter battalions, or the
resemble regular troops in a regular army. wore this mask with great success, thereby equivalent of eight army divisions. Even
According to the Mao-Giap rules, these main gaining rather solid popular support in their so, this was not enough to meet the war
forces have two functions: to help the local "liberated areas" and seriously softening up plan's requirements. Hence the second gov-
forces and guerrillas increase the pressure every contested area. The success ulti- ernment undertook the considerable further
everywhere, until the established government matcly depended, however, on something responsibility of maintaining and providing
is visibly hanging on the ropes; and then to much more important than Communist prop- porter battalions for two complete divisions
strike the knockout blows in big set-piece aganda or V.C. land reform. It depended on of the North Vietnamese regular army, the
battles like that which finished off the French a convincing pretense of government by con- 325th and the 304th, which covertly invaded
at Dienbienphu. sent, which was impossible without a con- South Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965.
With more than 160,000 men already under siderable degree of real consent. To gain By the spring of 1965, therefore, besides
arms, and with the additional organization this degree of consent, the Viet Cong prom- 160,000 troops in the V.C. local forces and
of something like a brand-new regular army ised the peasants, again and again and with guerrilla bands, the second government
now decided upon, the V.C. second govern- utmost emphasis, that there would be no could boast a main-force army of the
ment obviously had its work cut out. At the V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription. strength of 10 light-infantry divisions. And
outset, all went easily enough. In the secret These promises were approximately kept this new army, with its porter battalions and
main-base areas, with their palm-thatched until the year 1964. Devious, even cruel, longer range supply detachments, numbered
barracks, their deep-dug, jungle-hidden for- tricks were often resorted to, of course. A close to 800,000 men. The achievement was
tifications and their painfully accumulated potential recruit's government identity card astonishing, but the price was heavy. One
supply caches, large numbers of Viet Cong would be stolen, for example, and he would can imagine the Viet Cong finance minis-
cadres and recruits were now assembled for then be frightened into volunteering by ter-they have one, even if his name is not
regimental training. The new main-force warnings that the government police would publicly known-groaning when he learned
regiments had a strength of around 1,500 shoot him as a Communist if they ever picked the true scope of the main-force program.
men each. In design they were roughly com- him up. Or an obstinate noncontributor And one can all but hear his colleagues airily
parable to regular light-infantry regiments to the Viet Cong war chest would be "strug- telling him not to worry, because victory
of 30 or 40 years ago, and they had the capa- gled with" by V.C. cadres before all the peo- was just around the corner.
bility of being joined together in light-infan- ple of his village, and if this public brain- It is almost unknown in America, but the
try divisions for the knockout blows that washing did not get results, he might then truth is that a Viet Cong victory really was
were expected later. Each regiment was be shot in the back of the neck as a "spy just around the corner in the late spring of
given an attached porter battalion of about for the reactionaries and imperialists." But last year, months after the situation had
500 men to handle its local supply and trans- in the main, the V.C. military outfits really been supposedly saved by President John-
port. To get all these men, recruiting was were manned by volunteers, which made the son's decision to bomb North Vietnam.
stepped up in all the V.C. areas of South average outfit both tough and highly moti- Throughout the spring of 1965 almost the
Vietnam. A major expansion of the supply vated. And in the main, besides road tolls, whole South Vietnamese army was firmly
movement from North Vietnam, down the Ho market tolls and the like, the V.C. tax col- pinned down in the provinces by the urgent
Chi Minh trail and along the sea-smugglers' lectors only asked the people of the villages requirements of local defense. In those
routes, was also undertaken to provide the for "voluntary contributions," which meant spring months almost the whole of the
new regiments with their 57 mm. recoilless that the burden on the peasantry was light army's slender mobile reserve, 13 South
rifles, heavy mortars, antiaircraft guns and and easily bearable.
other crew-served weapons. And many more The trouble was that this semi-voluntary was also being chewed up by new main fo ce
specially trained cadres were brought down system reached its limit with the creation regiments. By mid-June, after the bloody
from the Communist North to become officers of the first five or six main-force regiments, fight at Dong Xoai, about 60 miles from Sal-
and noncoms. as did the system of largely concealed aid gon, only three of the government's reserve
By New Year's Day of 1964, at least five and direction from the North. If the masks battalions` remained in good combat trim.
of the new main-force regiments already had were retained, enough men and resources to Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had an uncom-
been recruited, armed and trained. By this complete the war plan simply could not be mitted central reserve equivalent to at least
time, too, because of their post-Diem surge, secured, and both masks were therefore five divisions in their main-base areas. No
the Viet Cong controlled perhaps five million boldly and simultaneously dropped. Begin- reserves on one side, strong reserves on the
to six million people. Even so, however, the ping in 1964, all the main forces and many other, meant, of course, that the V.C. could
second government's base in the country- of the provincial battalions were completely win province after province by concentrating
side-the Viet Cong infrastructure, as our recquipped with the new 7.64 mm. family in heavily superior force wherever they chose
intelligence officers call it-was still too small of Chinese-made weapons, which required to do so. In this manner they could count
to support the ambitious military superstruc- a supply movement from North Vietnam too on rolling up South Vietnam like a carpet
ture that was planned. To complete the big to be hidden any longer. At the same before the summer ended. Then President
plan, the masks had to be dropped. This was time, preparations also began for the even- Johnson upset their calculations by ordering
the Viet Cong gamble. If Gen. Westmore- tual invasion of the South by complete units the commitment of U.S. troops on a big scale.
land's strategy attains the hoped-for results, of the North Vietnamese regular army. This order had all the elements of bril-
this dropping of the masks will be remem- Thus the pretense was abandoned that this liantly successful, if wholly unintentional
bered as the moment when the Viet Cong was "Just a civil war." At the Caine time, ambush, and like every good ambush, in the
began to lose the war. But it did not look and incomparably more important, the pre- first place, it was a complete surprise. There
that way at the time. tense of governing by consent was also quite had been an earlier surprise in February,
Until 1964 the Viet Cong had always worn ruthlessly abandoned. when the President gave the order to bomb
two masks-one to deceive people abroad, The repeated Viet Cong promises that there the North after the Viet Cong attack on the
the other for the South Vietnamese them- would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. con- Pleiku barracks. But this second surprise
selves. For foreign eyes, they had worn the scription became dead letters, Taxes were was quite as complete as the first, and it was
mask of an indigenous movement of social sternly imposed on the people of the villages. far more terrible.
discontent. However, as early as 1956, Le Quarter by quarter the Viet Cong increased Nor was this all. Effective ambushers
Duan, now first secretary of the Communist these levies until they became cruelly bur- must never attack the head of a column,
party of North Vietnam, had gone south to densome. Universal military service was nor hold their fire until the column has
make preparations for the beginning of guer- proclaimed for all males from 18 to 36. As passed-either way, some of the enemy
rilla war, with the aid of many thousands of the manhunt progressed, the Viet Cong press column may escape. But to open fire on the
cadres whom the Communist government in gangs began rounding up boys of 14 or 15. middle of the column insures that the am-
the North had ordered to go underground in All this was a gigantic gamble, for the V.C. bushees can neither advance nor retreat, but
the South when the French war ended in had now broken the first and most sacred must stand and fight and be annihilated. It
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11121
maximum effort that was normally required no fewer than eight uniformly successful scene shifted to the Ia. Drang Valley. Here the
each month. The balance of every month spoiling operations against long-planned men of the 1st Air Cavalry engaged an en-
was spent resting, training, absorbing re- V.C. attacks in a recent period of only a few tire North Vietnamese division, composed of
placements and doing meticulous sand-table weeks. Thus another crucial rule is being the 32nd regiment, the 33rd regiment, and
exercises to prepare the next sally against a broken pretty frequently, for both Mao and the 66th regiment, with two V.C. main-force
government post. And all these weeks be- Giap lay great emphasis on all guerrillas' regiments in occasional support. Even by
tween operations were passed in the absolute need to move absolutely unseen, while mid-October the number of American com-
security of a main base, with its simple but watching the smallest enemy movement, bat troops on the ground was not large, and
comfortable barracks, its reassuring fortifica- Inasmuch as such texts as Mao Tse-tung's Maj. Gen. Harry Kinnard, commander of the
tions, and its food caches. On the Protracted War and Vo Nguyen Giap's 1st Air Cavalry, Today, however, this quite bearable exist- People's War, People's' Army have always had mit his vital division n.ot
Hence heonever put
ence has suffered a savage transformation, the standing of scripture for both the Viet into the line more than two battalions-plus,
It began when Gen. Westmoreland called in Cong and the North Vietnamese, the Mao- the battalions in combat being rotated by
the B-52's of the Strategic Air Command, Giap prescriptions' rather monotonous failure helicopter as the fighting went on. On our
with their immense loads of heavy bombs that to work nowadays must be a very shaking side, therefore, we did not have as much as
can penetrate even fortification tunnels 30 thine in itself The Vie+ n
____ . . ..
ong
main-base areas, with such effect, as captured work a bit better. Nowadays a VietaCong w As must happen, alas, in battle, 275 men
documents have revealed, that the main- battalion commander getting his orders for of the Air Cavalry were killed in the weeks
force regiments are now under strict orders another surprise-attack-plus-ambush must the action lasted. But we have since cap-
to spend no more than one night, or at most have the same sinking feeling that the gov- tured the enemy's complete battle plans,
two nights, in the same place. Long gone, ernment's province chiefs always used to and we also have a post-battle critique by
therefore, are each month's restorative have when word came in of another pre- the North Vietnamese commander on the
stretches of orderly barracks life. dawn assault on an isolated post. For the scene, who has the pseudonym of Gen. Bai
Night after night, the main-force soldiers long pull, an unending diet of many big and Quan. This evidence reveals that in this
must bivouac in the jungle or on the moun- little defeats, with only the rarest success to single battle the enemy lost the staggering
tain slopes. Every day or every two days raise the spirits, can in itself prove fatal to total of 5,000 killed and severely wounded,
there is a toilsome march to the next bivouac, the Viet Cong. The strain of declining as well as almost all his heavy weapons. By
These movements cause supply problems, and morale is already grave, as prisoner interro- any test this victory against such odds was
the men sometimes go hungry. There's little gations reveal, and this strain is bound to a shining feat of U. S. arms, all the more
time for rest or training, or any of the other increase if Gen. Westmoreland is allowed to noteworthy because these were near-green
things that keep an outfit happy and in com- pursue his strategy.
bat trim. In addition, as the American forces These are the principal factors that con- American olasDrang valley no one could
in Vietnam have grown stronger, there have trol the present pattern of the fighting in any longer believe in an intended Viet Cong
been more infantry sweeps through the main- Vietnam. I would be less confident of their pull-back to low-level guerrilla activity. If
base areas-many of which had not been great significance if I had not closely watched the V.C. could not or would not pull back,
visited by hostile troops since the beginning the trend of the fighting. When I visited it was clear that they would have to try to
of the French war. Supply caches that took Vietnam in the spring of 1965, one could go forward. Furthermore, there was increas-
months, even years, to accumulate are found easily discern American air power's effects on ing evidence of a massive, continuing inva-
and destroyed by our men. Fortifications the Viet Cong. But it was equally easy to see Sion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese
representing hundreds of thousands, even that air power alone was not enough, and regulars coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
millions, of man-hours of hard work are dis- that the V.C. would win during the summer Reconnaissance also revealed that the North
covered and greatly damaged, if not always if the President did not commit U.S. ground Vietnamese were urgently improving the
totally destroyed. V.C. outfits that have troops.
sought the base areas' security must either When I visited Vietnam again last Septem- trail No ember, therefore, H noi''s apparent
flee or stand and fight against hard odds. in ber, the full impact of the initial U.S. troop intention to reinforce the Viet Cong tothe
these ways still another cardinal Mao-Giap commitment was really beginning to be felt. utmost led Gen. Westmoreland's staff to
rule has been broken-the rule that a suc- The fine Marine victory at Chulai had make carefully revised estimates of the en-
cessful guerrilla movement needs completely taught the Viet Cong that Americans were emy's maximum capabilities-the maximum
secure bases. Without this minimal securi- not "paper tigers" after all-at any rate, not military buildup the North Vietnamese gov-
ty, Mao says, any such movement must auto- on the field of battle. The first B-52 raids on ernment and the V.C. second government
matically "deteriorate" into a mere "peasant the main bases were beginning + ~, ... ,
pose" could "avoid defeat." the tide had turned, but it lw sabycno meathat
ns
From the foregoing follows the final pro- clear as yet how the Viet Cong and their
found change in the V.C. situation. In Viet- masters in Hanoi would deal with this alarm-
nam the intelligence gathered has always ing change.
been substantial, but the South Vietnamese On the key point there was some divergence
formerly had no way to process intelligence between Gen. Westmoreland and the majority
as it came in, much less to respond to it of his staff. Westmoreland already suspected
promptly. Nowadays, in contrast, the intel- that the President had achieved an unin-
ligence gathered has multiplied many times tended ambush, and he therefore doubted
over, partly by freer reporting by the people whether the Viet Cong were free to follow
of the countryside, partly by mechanical Mao's rules of "advance and retreat." His
means such as airborne infrared devices that staff members were almost unanimous in
spot main-force campfires and the like, and expecting the Viet Cong to follow the rules.
partly by the enormously increased numbers This was a disturbing prospect, for a return
of deserters and prisoners of war. Further- to classical guerrilla fighting was bound to
more
set Gen. Westmorelands up something like ea Vietnamese- s tmean American hrough jungle and ooveremountains
now in fre-
American intelligence-processing factory, quently vain pursuit of mere companies of
capable of handling several tons of captured the enemy. Westmoreland's staff asked
documents and several hundreds of interroga- "whether the people at home would stand
tions in a single week. Thus it is no longer a for an endless penny-packet war." If there
case of blind men fighting men who see all was any way at all to exhaust American pa-
too well, as it was for so many years. tience and fortitude, endless penny-packet
new eyes of the intelligence can even war was surely the most likely way. packet
penetrate main-base areas well enough so These worries were shown to be ill-founded
that each B-52 strike has proved to have an in October, in the obstinate battle for the
even chance of finding its pinpoint target of Pleime Special Forces post, and in the sub-
barracks and fortifications within the huge sequent fighting in the la Drang valley, which
surrounding tract of swamp or jungle or continued into early November. For days on
mountain forest. Movements of Viet Cong end, with superb courage and endurance, a
u
good and the nits are also being swiftly tracked if luck is small band of men of the Special Forces, both
movements fairly Somet mes we have no luck, as with the hurled back and
a greatly superior number of
recent attack near Saigon. Yet good intelli- troops of the V.C. main forces. When the
gence enabled Gen. Westmoreland to mount Pleime outpost had been relieved at last, the
No. 87-18
projected a continuous growth of the enemy
main forces in South Vietnam at the rate
of two regiments per month until the end
of 196G. In other words, the main forces,
which had a strength equivalent to 10 divi-
sions when the President committed U.S.
troops, were projected to grow to a strength
equivalent to about 18 divisions before next
New Year's Day.
This projection by Gen. Westmoreland's
staff was presented to Secretary of Defense
McNamara when he visited Saigon at the end
of November. It of course implied a need
for a good many more American troops to
match the enemy's expected increase of
strength. For this reason the new estimates
caused a panic in Washington when Secre-
tary McNamara brought them home. Out
of the panic grewthe President's peace of-
fensive, the pause in the bombing of the
North, and other manifestations that pre-
sumably helped to renew the Hanoi leaders'
slumping faith in their basic theory of Amer-
ican weakness of will. The question remains
whether the panic was justified. I think it
was wholly unjustified.
I discovered My chief reason Is based on the situation
for my most recent visit in February. On
the one hand, all was far from perfection
on our side. The stability of the South
Vietnamese government could certainly not
be taken for granted. And the President's
hesitant and intricate methods of war-mak-
ing, combined with the manifestoes of the
war's senatorial and other critics, had de-
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00400070003-8 May tl, 1936
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privcd our men of the absolute confidence combat must be discounted fur accidental regimental ranks, and with close to double;
in their support at home that American duplication, a big addition must also be the number of men or women (for women
in
t;:?oops in combat always ought ideally to made for enemy dead'. dragged !'way con- are now being drafted for this onrprse) to
have. On the other hand, however, these tinning compliance with the old discipline. serve in the porter battalions and the longer
imperfections, though serious enough, were It is also conservative to assume that the range transport detachments. If the train tal
seve
e in the
was
ii~ly
the
s ofthet Viet counterbalanced by the situation Was douU e the total .:ifatl oserk tiled off nce whatathe awill berthe strain opri t he V C 1,)8
of the Viet Cong.
The refugee flow from the V.C. areas was the overal figure for enemy d~?ad and dis- and go~pnm~nlbhDkemb~halthc lprr,;;ent
increzsing; by the end of February the total abled in January and Februn?'y alone was The was nearing 800,000 men, women and child- probably above 30,000. To this must be enemy reinforcement has behind it a truly
yen, or close, to one sixth of the population added 1,100 P.O.W:s and battle field deserters de'pe in all cision-a rdecisio eserve indfa t+,