VIETNAM POLICY--STATEMENT OF EDWARD W. BROOKE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100008-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 22, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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August 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
19321
ding-for- the construction of a secret- NATIONAL DRUM CORPS WEEK went was ordered to be printed in the
as to function and as to cost-Govern- Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in rec- RECORD, as follows:
ment building in Washington. The Gen- ognition of National Drum Corps Week, "CREATING A CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATION"-A
eral Services Administration=GSA-ad- VIETNAM POLICY STATEMENT
August 20-27, I am proud to salute our (By Edward W. Brooke, attorney general of
matted that negotiated contracts are a American youth for their participation the commonwealth of Massachusetts)
-very unusual" procedure which are per- in this pageantry of patriotism. Our Day by day, the stakes in Vietnam are
mitted "only under rare circumstances." Drum Corps are symphonic symbols-
building growing higher and the risks more grave. It
Reliable sources say that this symbols that stimulate all of us to have is therefore essential that we re-assess the
houses employees of the CIA, but, when a deeper understanding and a greater total situation and evaluate the alternatives
the main CIA building was contracted, appreciation of our history and our her- before us.
the Eisenhower administration made full itage. Not only this spirit in sound Our foreign policy appears to be drifting
details on construction public. McClos- stands for our history, our Government, into a difficult and intractable position. Our
key bid on that project but was not our institutions, and our homes but also goals in Vietnam are still unclear. Our de-
awarded any share of it. it represents our courage, our hopes and cisions suggest the absence of a compre-
It is my understanding that in the our visions. hensive, long-range policy objective. We
construction industry it is common By our support of the ideals for which appear to be taking piecemeal, spasmodic
actions on a day-to-day basis, under the ap-
knowledge that McCloskey & Co. will al- they march, we as Americans put mean- parent assumption that military require-
most automatically receive the contract ing into their sounds. Not with words ments leave us no alternative but steady
awards. Consequently, many big com- as the sound of a tinkling cymbal, but escalation.
panies are not even bothering to bid be- with hearts swelled with gratitude for Recent reports of a projected American
cause they know of the cheap, foul, po- our inheritance of liberty, and with a troop commitment of 750,000 men in Viet-
litical action that will take place by Gov steadfast determination to pass on to nam over a period of five years'have been
ernment officials to see to it that the our children a glorious Government un- widely discussed in the press. These reports
former Democrat national treasurer's dimmed by selfish act or narrow think- disclaimed by the President and Secretary of
Defense, nonetheless raise serious questions
company will get the contract. Today we frig. regarding the "credibility" of the repeated as-
have' seen a patent and overt example I encourage everyone to participate in surances by the Administration that the war
of a corrupt government. There can be the observance of National Drum Corps is going well and that we are achieving our
no excuse for the General Services Ad- Week, and to lend support to local Drufn objectives. The Administration appears to
ministration's handling of the bids for and Bugle Corps activities. be less than candid in dispelling reports of
the Philadelphia Mint. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, a quick end to hostilities.
I was surprised to learn that the Gen- this week is National Drum Corps Week THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR AMERICAN POLICY
eral Services Administration would and I am glad to join with my colleagues As a concerned American and as the Re-
award such a substantial contract to a in paying tribute to the many young publican candidate for the United States
company which has such a bad reputa- people who participate in drum and Senate from Massachusetts, I have spoken be-
tion. Presently, according to the De- fore, at some length, on our policy and
bugle corps activities as well as to their strategy in Vietnam. I have urged a policy
partment of Justice, McCloskey & Co., advisers and instructors who contribute that offers hope for a third alternative to
are being sued by the U.S. Government significantly to the excellent results these the courses of "withdrawal" or "escalation."
for approximately $5 million. The De- young people achieve. The simple answers of "withdrawal" or
partment of Justice contends that after My own State of Massachusetts is the "escalation" are unacceptable political
a thorough examination of the Boston home of more than 300 drum and bugle choices. Neither is actually a political pol-
VA hospital, it was determined that there corps and we are proud of their contri- icy at all, but only an avoidance of real
were so many unauthorized departures butions to parades and events throughout solutions.
from the contract plans and specifica- our State. We are proud, too, of the fine A policy of withdrawal would be a denial
tions by McCloskey and failures by the way in which they represent our State of the commitment that we have made, pub-
architect-engineer properly to inspect at national events. This year Lynn, licly and insistently, to the people of South
and supervise McCloskey's contract per- Vietnam. It would be an outright surrender
Mass., was selected as the site of the in the test of strength that we have already
formance that local repairs were not suf- world open championships. On Satur- joined to stop the spread of Communist re-
ficient; and that it was necessary to re- day the finest performing units in the gimes by force or terror. It would involve
move and replace the brick outer. wall country participated in this champion- not merely a loss of American "prestige," but,
and windows, and to construct a new ship competition in Lynn and all reports more fundamentally, it would call into ques-
frame to support the new outer wall. indicate the event was an outstanding tion before the world the seriousness of our
The cause of the failure described was success. purpose and the consistency of our policy.
the negligence of McCloskey & Co. in the As one who on many occasions has en- On the other hand, escalation by itself
performance of the construction con- joyed watching well-trained drum and can be a blind, limitless policy that feeds
tract. The Government has been dam- bugle corps in action, I am glad to have on itself. It can be a policy with no pur-
pose, a military operation in which we grad-
aged in the approximate sum of $5 mil- this opportunity to tell these groups to ually relinquish the ability to keep our ac-
lion. keep up the good work. Not only do they tions in line with our interests. The in-
On one hand, our Government is suing gain a great deal from the experience of evitable result of escalation is to broaden
this company for $5 million because of participating in the corps but their com- the issues involved and, consequently, to
its negligence and poor construction of a }riunit benefits also. make the prospect of settlement more and
Government building. On the other \ J more unlikely. Escalation is a poor substitute
in my opinion, en1 r of motion for direction, at a price that in-
harid, it is improperly, volves tremendous risks to ourselves and to Into new contracts for the conJJ ~ ETNAM POLICY-STATEMENT OF the whole world.
struction of a $12 million building in
EDWARD W. BROOKE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS
enter into a contract of this nature after Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
he had been damaged so severely and
the at-
Brooke
rd W
d Ed
k
,
.
wa
en
this wee
extensively because of his dealings with torney general of Massachusetts, released
McCloskey. a statement concerning our problems in
I am appalled by the evidence that has Vietnam which I think my colleagues will
been compiled in the McCloskey case and find of interest. It is a thoughtful ex-
would hope would that rise above n the our Gov- pression of his views and reflects a care-
pressures cto ful study of our policies in southeast Asia.
it that ats the a the White a White Housa e and see see to I ask unanimous consent to have
contracts. I law thank was the obeyed i Senator issuing from printed in the RECORD the statement of
Delaware for his diligence and his deter- Edward W. Brooke.
mination in this matter. There being no objection, the state-
No. 139-9
I believe that a third course is still pos-
sible-a course that has as its ultimate ob-
jective a negotiated political settlement in
Vietnam in accord with the interests of the
Vietnamese people and the United States.
I re-affirm my belief that it is not our
purpose nor is it in our interest to occupy
and run Vietnam. We must recognize the
limits upon our role and upon our respon-
sibility. Our policy must be designed to
support the South Vietnamese people in
their determination of their own future. We
have committed forces to protect that choice
and to see that the South Vietnamese are
guaranteed the means to make their deci-
sions effective.
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 19322
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 22, 1966
ncaurarngry t nave urged: (1) that we do
everything possible to encourage the devel-
opment of viable national institutions-po-
litical, economic, and social-in South Viet-
nam, and (2) that we adopt a military strat-
egy which is both militarily and politically
sound over the long period during which we
hope to see essential political change in
South Vietnam. These I still believe are
essential requirements for a successful reso-
lution of the war.
I have stressed the importance of elections
to establish a clearly legitimate government
in Saigon. For the most part, progress since
then toward such elections has been en-
couraging. Current arrangements call for a
national election in South Vietnam on Sep-
tember 11th. The electorate will choose
delegates to a constituent Assembly which,
in turn, will be responsible for drafting a
national constitution. While the election
will take place under conditions that are less
than fully democratic, we must recognize the
serious problems involved in holding any
election in a war-torn country whose people
have had no real experience with democracy.
While the September election may be less
than hoped for as an open test of popular
sentiment, it should be an important first
step toward the institution of a truly repre-
sentative and responsive regime.
BUILDING A CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Beyond our support for the current elec-
tions, and the American military commit-
ment to defend the South Vietnamese from
aggression, our ultimate goal should remain
a negotiated political settlement of the war.
The President has repeatedly affirmed that
negotiation is the highest priority of our
policy, and he has held out a sincere and un-
conditional offer to sit down at the con-
ference table at any time. But this has not
been enough.
The challenge to American policy now is to
create the political and military conditions
that will stabilize a climate for negotiations.
Our political actions must be designed to
limit the issues at stake in the conflict to
those which can be successfully handled at
the conference table. We must help to build
the capacity and self-confidence of Vietna-
mese political forces to deal with them.
Our military actions should be aimed at
maintaining our posture in South Vietnam
and our potential position of strength at the
bargaining table. We should avoid further
escalation that will raise the stakes on our
under the strained conditions of war. I the limitations of our air action against
urge that we make every effort to encourage North Vietnam and in the South and that
a political leadership based on broad popu- these limitations be strictly respected.
lar consent. I have already indicated that Specifically, we must ensure against the
we must support the integrity of the Con- bombing of the civilian populations of North
stituent Assembly elections In September. and South Vietnam. I am concerned about
Further efforts should be made to obtain the reported plans to expand the war into
international monitors at the polls---per- the MeKong delta area at the risk of indis-
haps from an expansion of the present In- criminate bombing of the civilian population.
ternational Control Commission or from Furthermore we must avoid an escalation
Vietnam's neighboring Asian states, acting of the air war that might trigger direct Chi-
under United Nations auspices. nese or Russian entry into the conflict.
Once the elections have been held, we Careful limitation of bombing along the
should give further strong support to the Chinese border with North Vietnam is essen..
Assembly in writing a workable constitution tial. Specifically, bombing should be limited
and in passing authority Into the hands of to strategic military targets.
a legislative assembly and a duly elected 7. Finally, while stressing political develop-
government. Future elections should, be ment in South Vietnam and the prudent and
open to all shades of political opinion in restrained use of our military power to sup..
South Vietnam. But we should avoid efforts port our political objectives, we should
to control the internal politics of South actively seek and encourage new forums for
Vietnam or to place American influence be- political discussion and negotiation.
hind any one candidate or the leader. Once we have stabilized the political and.
2. In line with this same goal of national military situation, by the patient, con-
stability we should extend and intensify our sistent application of the political-military
programs of social and economic reform in Policy I have urged, a framework for negotia-
South Vietnam. tions may begin to emerge. In the meantime
I wish to express my support for the pro- we should give full assistance to the search
gram of rural reconstruction and Pacifica- for a political settlement.
tion in Vietnamese villages, and I urge that The proposal for an Asian-sponsored peace
the program be expanded to cover as much conference on Vietnam, as suggested by For-
of the Vietnamese countryside as under con- eign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand,
trol of Saigon. I further urge an expansion deserves our strong support. As an alterna-
of our economic and technical aid to South tire to the reconvening of the 1964 Geneva
Vietnam, as well as the assistance of our Conference, an all-Asia conference would
political experts for the organization of underline the responsibility of the Asians
modern government services. themselves to guarantee their own peace. It
3. We should state clearly and firmly our would also help to limit the Issues involved
intention not to expand the war by the in a settlement to those that immediately
commitment of American ground forces to concern the security of Southeast Asia. The
North Vietnam. "old" issues of the Geneva Conference and
We should reject Premier Ky's apparent the global interests of the major powers
inclination to carry the ground war north- would not be as likely to impinge upon
ward-and our rejection should be both the settlement.
public and unambiguous. Secetary of State The corning challenges to our policy in
Rusk has made this situation serious by his Vietnam-whether they be on the battlefield,
refusal, at a recent press conference, to rule in the streets, at the ballot box, or around
out the possibility of future American the conference table-will require a princi-
ground involvement In the North. Such an pled purpose and wisdom seldom demanded
escalation of the war would be extremely of any great power. If we allow events to
costly in terms of American lives and re- overwhelm purposes, expediency to replace
sources. It would place the conflict in Viet- Policy, or emotion to eclipse reason, we shall
nam far beyond any hope of negotiated have failed the test of history. That test of
settlement. I urge, therefore, that the Ad- our leadership is still open-as men every-
ministration act swiftly to rule out any such where watch to see which course the Amer-
eventuality. ican government and the American
L4_ The International Control Commission will take. People
into the conflict. toot of one ??aemilitarized" zone, instituted
y by the Geneva conference to separate the
The Administration's "two-sided" polic
has held out escalation as the fastest road two Vietnams.
to negotiation. The evidence to date, how- tended Military activity the has recently been re-
ex-
ever, does not support this assumption. The sponse tended to into the the demilitarized
Illegal presence of zone in et-
offer of negotiations combined with decisions namese North Viet-
to raise the level of hostilities is not a realis- support the troops request and installations. I inis-
tic policy for Vietnam-whatever its success 'ration ration to members made the International A ationa
has been in winning domestic support in the Control Commission h the ngua nteed
United States. mmission that fully guaranteed
We can and we must do more to build a international controls be set up to preserve
climate for negotiations before the course o the neutrality of the demilitarized zone.
5. war is completely out of control. I feel not . to We should
war definitely to our inaion
extend ould the state
g eCg Cam-
that
that we are dangerously close to that point neighborin
now. We should respect the sovereignty and ter-
Specifically. I suggest a seven point pro- ritorial integrity of Cambodia by a careful
gram
a American initiative solution to Increase r the deployment and use of American forces along
prospects for political its common borders with Vietnam. Yester-
namese War. These proposals are neither day, In reversal of its previous position, the
exhaustive nor sufficient in themselves to United States conceded that its air 'units
achieve this objective. But taken together may have bombed a Cambodian village. If
they could give our policy an important this is true, the Administration should offer
new emphasis. reparations to the Cambodian and
an ur-
1. We should give priority attention to people
should take steps ai against any fur-
political development and reform in South 'her military action n against nst Cambodia.
Vietnam. There are some signs of an improvement of
The political institutions of South Viet- American relations with Cambodia. We
nam must be capable of handling a nego- should act to preserve Prince Sihanouk's irc-
tiated.settlement. Moreover, they must be fluence as a possible mediator in future ne-
capable of maintaining authority and legit- gotlations. His position and prestige can
iunacy in time of peace. The current polit- serve as a valuable stabilizing force in South-
ical leadership of South Vietnam represents east Asia.
a temporary military rule acceptable only , 6. I urge that the Administration specify
DO-IT-YOURSELF SECURITY
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
dent, last 'Wednesday, August 17, 1966,
in the Times-Democrat of Davenport,
Iowa, one of the leading daily newspapers
in Iowa, there appeared an editorial en-
titled, "Do-It-Yourself Security." The
editorial deals with the retirement of the
self-employed.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
vigorous editorial of the Times-Demo-
crat.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
DO-IT-YOURSELF SECURITY
Whale many bills pending in Congress
would curb or stifle private initiative, some
seek to encourage individual industry and
thrift.
One such bill Is H.R. 10, which passed the
House 291-0, and has to do with some changes
in the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Re-
tirement Act of 1962. It is pending in the
Senate where Treasury Department opposi-
tion has kept it bottled up in committee.
The Davenport Chamber of Commerce re-
cently passed resolutions favoring the bill
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 1926
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 22, 1966
1943, during a grave crisis in the Grand
Alliance, or a discussion of the Indications
that the "National Committee" of captured
German officers was at first intended as a
serious signal to the German High Com-
mand and only later downgraded to a mere
propaganda device. Russia's role in the post-
war partition of Germany cannot really be
treated without taking note of the Marshall
Plan and her refusal to join in.
Laqueur's statement that the Russian
leaders who considered terms for sacrificing
the East German regime after Stalin's death
were a minority from the start is contrary
to the best evidence now available. The
Rapacki plan of 1958 was not a plan for
"military disengagement and a neutral zone
free from nuclear weapons," but for a de-
nuclearized zone In Central Europe which
would continue to be occupied by the oppos-
ing Russian and U.S. forces. The account
of West German attitudes toward Eastern
Europe, stressing the absence of guilt feeI-
ings and indeed of any serious interest, is
also superficial and oddly out of date.
Yet these weaknesses are peripheral to the
main theme of the book. The real con-
tribution of the final chapters to that theme
lies in the account of how, with the German
attack, the doctrinaire prejudices of the rul-
ing parties were superseded by a clash in-
volving two entire nations in unprecedented
horror and violence. "What Russians and
Germans think about each other" has since
come to be determined primarily by this
experience-the Russian experience of Ger-
man invasion and crimes, the German ex-
perience first of Russian poverty, then of
the same crimes and the fear of retaliation,
and finally of the Russian counterinvasion
and all that followed. Today, the Russian
fear of a strong Germany rooted in these
events is one of the causes of the persistence
of German partition and of the presence
of Russian forces in the heart of Europe.
This in turn, by maintaining both political
conflict between Germany and Russia and a
military imbalance in Europe requiring the
presence of American forces, is one of the
main factors of political rigidity and military
tension in the present world. One final irony
is that Stalin, by taking the road of German
partition, brought about the very alliance
of the main part of Germany with the West
which he had striven a quarter of a century
to prevent. The story of human folly in
Russo-Getman relations, which Walter La-
queur has told so well, Is not yet at an end.
VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
one of the most knowledgeable writers
about Vietnam is Jean Lacouture. To
those who wish to have some under-
standing of our war in Vietnam, I com-
mend Lacouture's article from the Re-
view of Books entitled "Vietnam: The
Lessons of War."
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
article by Jean Lacouture entitled
"Vietnam: The Lessons of War."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR
(By Jean Lacouture)
"On the long thin coast of Vietnam,"
wrote John K. Fairbank in the last issue
of this paper, "we are sleeping in the same
bed the French slept in even though we
dream different dreams."
The dreams of course are very different
but so are the beds and the dreamers them-
selves. Let us compare them and see when
the end of the night may come.
Nothing could be more valuable for
American leaders at the moment than a close
examination of the disastrous errors made
by the French in Indo-China from 1945 to
1956. To know the faults of a friend may
not cure one's own, but from France's expe-
rience America might well learn something
of what has gone so dreadfully wrong in
Vietnam today.
The French had three great dreams for
Indo-China and each led them into a dif-
ferent and more ugly phase of the war. At
first, in 1946, they clung briefly to the dream
of re-establishing their prewar empire in
Indo-China. Indeed, for one hopeful mo-
ment they seemed to be on the verge of a
promising new colonial policy: General Le-
clerc, sent out to "reconquer" the territory,
decided instead to negotiate with the Viet-
nam revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh.
Leclerc recognized Ho's Vietnam as a "free
state," connected with France, but con-
trolling its own diplomacy, army, and fi-
nances. This was the first agreement made
between a European colonial power and the
Asian revolution-and one of the shortest-
lived and sa4ldest in retrospect. For within
weeks the intrigues of colonialists in Saigon
and Paris and extremists among the Viet-
minh and its nationalist allies succeeded In
scrapping it, The way was now open for
France to plunge into full-scale colonial war.
But it soon became clear to everybody that
this would have been a hopeless venture,
doomed from the start by the half-ruined
state of France, the lack of an air force and
navy, and the disapproval of the Russians
and Americans.
At this point the French conceived their
second Indo-Chinese dream which led them
into a second war, lasting from 1948 to 1951.
Now they would transform their colonial
struggle into a Civil War. Against Ho's Viet-
minh they would set in opposition the "in-
dependent" Emperor Bao Dal, encouraging
him to cultivate his own anti-Communist
but nationalist leadership-a policy described
by the distinguished scholar Paul Mus as
"nationalist counter fire."
"
Perhaps it might have succeeded if the
nationalists had been given a chance to make
It work. But their power and prestige and
autonomy were always limited. While Viet-
namese and French troops died courageously,
Bao Dal preoccupied himself with tiger hunt-
ing, his ministers with profiteering. The
Vietminh methodically liquidated Bao Dai's
officials, dominated the countryside, and
organized its soldiers into divisions soon after
the Chinese Communists arrived on the
Northern Frontier in 1950.
After this decisive event and the outbreak
of the Korean War, France dreamed once
again of transforming the nature of the. war
in Vietnam, this time Into an international
conflict with Communism. In September
1951 General de Lattre arrived in Washing-
ton to argue that France, faced with Viet-
minh subversion supported by Communist
China, now needed and deserved to have its
risks shared. He was given both credits and
weapons. But later, in 1954, on the eve of
Dien Bien Phu, the French government de-
manded far more: It requested that several
hundred American bombers be ordered to
attack the enemy from Manila. To these
requests Washington finally responded that
"Indochina does not fall without the perim-
eter of the area vital to the defense of the
United States."
We can now admire the wisdom which led
President Eisenhower to reject both the
agitated appeals of the French and the ad-
vice of Admiral Radford and Vice President
Nixon, both of whom recommended inter-
vention. But we may well ask why a country
not considered of "vital importance" to
American interests in 1954 became so in
1965. The Communist camp, after all, Is no
longer a monolithic force able to exert uni-
fled global pressures as had been the case In
1954. In Korea, moreover, Chinese had re-
cently been fighting American soldiers, some-
thing they have since refrained from doing;'
and missile stratgey has meanwhile dimin-
ished the importance of local airforce bases.
One can only conclude that the diplomatic
views of American leaders have hardened
during these years. In the light of Mr.
Rusk's performance the diplomacy of John
Foster Dulles must be reconsidered and
credited with an admirable flexibility.
Thus France launched three wars in Indo-
China and lost them all. Its allies having
refused to provoke a brutal extension of the
war in order to avoid a local defeat, France's
dream of an International anti-Communist
"crusade" collapsed at Dien Bien Phu in the
spring of 1954. General Giap destroyed
France's main combat force; the Vietminh
controlled two-thirds of Vietnam; and nei-
ther Hanoi nor Saigon were protected from
attack.
Ho Chi Minh had offered negotiations six
months before this debacle and had been
ignored. Now Moscow and Peking were
agreeable to an international detente and
Washington seemed prepared to accept the
consequences of its failure to intervene,
Thus at the Geneva conference table in 1954
the Western powers benefited from a certain
complicity on the part of Molotov and Chou
En-lal: The West succeeded in wresting from
the victors half the territory and the larger
part of the material wealth of Vietnam. Ho
agreed to fall back to the north in exchange
for a promise that elections preparing the
way for unification would be held in 1956-
elections that he had no doubt of winning.
A great deal of confusion surrounds this
Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized
that the only texts signed at Geneva were
the armistice agreements between the French
and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the
"final declaration" of the conference---both
the United States and South Vietnam had
reservations about it-and it carried only the
force of suggestion. But apart from the
North Vietnamese, the French were the only
nation that formally guaranteed to carry out
the Geneva accords that provided both for
partition at the 17th parallel and for election.
And now France committed a new error
(its last?), dreaming this time that it might
finally leave Vietnam and forget it altogether.
Diem, now installed as dictator in the South,
wanted the French to quit his country as
soon as possible. This was not only because
certain French interests were intrigu-
ing against him-something that helped
strengthen his position as a nationalist
leader-but also because the French Army
was the only force that could compel him to
hold elections in 1956. In the event, the
French quickly yielded and the last of their
army departed in April 1956.
The consequences of this final French
error were, and remain, enormous. Diem was
now free to declare himself free of all the
Geneva obligations and soon did so with
American encouragement. The South could
now be reorganized as an anti-Communist
bastion, from which a reconquest of the
North could evenutally be launched. The
Diem government in fact soon created a Com-
mittee for the Liberation of North Vietnam,
which, beginning in 1958, parachuted agents
into the North, notably into areas such as
Vinh, where Ho's agrarian reform had pro-
voked violent peasant uprisings. But mean-
while the North, considering itself cheated
by Saigon and Washington (with France's
cooperation), began preparation to exploit
the political and social discontent in the
South to establish a base for subversive op-
erations. And Hanoi was to show itself far
more adept at this political game than
Saigon.
Could the French have resolved this Viet-
nam problem? In fact, they were confronted
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
persistently distrusted, after helping to bring vinced that the campaign was all but over
untold devastation and suffering to his coun- that he ordered a drastic cut in important
try-first by underestimating Russia's most branches of German arms production. But
dangerous enemy, and then by mistaking this view was not in the mainstream of Ger-
him for a realistic and calculable (and in that man nationalist thought about Russia; as
sense reliable) partner in the diplomatic Mr. La.queur reminds us, on his return from
game. Landsberg fortress in 1925 Hitler had to fight
The attack of 1941, and its consequences a strong "National Bolshevik" faction in his
that are still with us, thus cannot be under- own party, which saw the cooperation be-
stood without looking for the roots of the tween the German and Russian armies as
mistaken and indeed absurd ideas that Nazis reflecting a natural kinship between the
and Bolsheviks and more arti 1 I
and Stalin, entertained about e chrother lin
the teeth of all evidence. It is around this
central theme that Walter Laqueur, Director
of the London Institute for Advanced Studies
in Contemporary History (into which he has
transformed the Wiener Library) has written
a fascinating and highly useful, if somewhat
uneven, book, According to the Preface, the
book had been intended to deal with the even
wider subject of "what Russians and Ger-
mans have thought about each other in this
century," and the opening chapters do in-
deed offer many fiuminating glimpses into
the earlier history of mutual admiration and
contempt, mutual influence, misunder-
standing, and hostility between these two
nations. But the upshot of these earlier
developments is necessarily inconclusive.
For even if the element of hostility may be
said to have gradually increased before the
First World War, owing chiefly to the growth
of a modern upper class in Russia and the
corresponding loss of influence by the Ger-
man Baits and other "Russian Germans,"
nevertheless in the Twenties the open and
secret cooperation between the Soviet govern-
ment and the Weimar Republic was widely
approved in Germany and followed with great
hopes in Russia.
cialism." That he defeated this faction
quickly and decisively, and later easily tri-
umphed over all rival groups holding similar
i
deas, can only partly be explained by the
impact of his personality. The outcome sug-
gests that those officers and intellectuals who
reacted to the upheaval of the times by
adopting a "national-revolutionary" outlook
were less important for the victory of a to-
talitarian mass movement of the Right than
the far more numerous uprooted middle-
class elements still seeking to cling for their
self-esteem to conservative values. The myth
of the revolutionary conspiracy appealed
most effectively to them: It was their out-
look that Hitler expressed, their self-destruc-
tion that he ultimately accomplished.
The early Soviet hopes for a swift advance
of Communist revolution in industrial Eu-
rope and largely centered on Germany; they
changed even during Lenin's lifetime into a
more realistic determination to exploit the
conflict between defeated Germany and the
Western powers in order to prevent an ef-
fective capitalist encirclement of Russia.
Henceforth, the policy makers of Weimar
Germany were judged in Moscow not ac-
cording to their position on the "left" or on
the " lit I
i
'
gon 1 ut ing to the value they
It is, then, not Russian and German ideas placed
secretamilitary Cooperation with
about each other in general, but Nazi and Russia or to their inclination to sacrifice it
Bolshevik ideas that are relevant to the turn- to an understanding with France, then seen
ing point of 1941. It is in this field that Mr. as the most actively anti-Soviet power in
Laqueur's painstaking and imaginative study Europe. By that token, the Reichswehr
of often recondite sources-from the publica- appeared as the most reliable, the Social
tions of the Russian extreme Right both un- Democrats as the most dangerous force in
der the Tsar and later in exile to the early Germany.
writings of Hitler's Baltic "mentors," and Stalin, with his characteristic mixture of
from Soviet doctrinaire discussions about the doctrinaire rigidity and practical cynicism,
nature of "Fascism" to captured German formed his attitude toward the rising Nazi
police reports about the German Commu- movement in this context. Doctrine con?-
nists' attitude to the rising Nazi movement- vinced him that "Fascism" and "Bourgeois
has produced some striking discoveries. Mr. Democracy" were "only" different political.
Laqueur shows in detail that the "Protocols forms of the "dictatorship of the bourgeoi-?
of the Elders of Zion," first forged and propa- sie," that Nazis and Social Democrats were
gated in Tsarist Russia, gained a wide Euro- "twins," related as the right and left arms
pean audience only when used after 1917 to of the same ruling class, and that If the
"explain" the Russian revolution as the result Nazis ever came to power, they could not
of a Jewish conspiracy, and that Rosenberg possibly carry out a policy independent of
and other Baltic friends of Hitler literally the wishes of their "masters." Preoccupation
-
Bo
lshevism
as
e
i
l
e
t
p
h in
rventi
nism" the
rium
ph
of
the
Jews and
other
low
danger
rofca Franco Geroman rapprocaement ?us actual and potential opponents in June, 1934,
races over Russia's Germanic elite from the explains why Soviet leaders and the Comin- in a c sigrn under on the n conspiracy that against they had joined
Russian extremist emigres. But in passing tern saw the Social Democrats as the chief more significant, him . Even a
through the minds of the German Baits, enemy in Germany right up to Hitler's vic- road to Communist power, oignificant, the possibility of s legal
this "theory" acquired the new conclusion tory, and why they imposed on the German th, as first tested in
that a state deprived of its natural elite must Communists a view which prevented any Thirties the ' and popular again strategy early the midr
necessarily be weak and that the Russian concerned working-class action against the h occ in the early post-woe
Slavs, lacking a native master race, would Nazi threat while there was time. Mr. La- years, may have Hler's red "l "l Stalin under the
have to submit to German conquerors once queur, having impression Instructive the endless
their Jewish Bolshevik oppressors had been of this policy as well patiently its traced the docctrinaire stages Again, v is abouttt a to recall the political
Hitler's view of Russia, Mr. tifications, presents evidence that refutes Nazi ravings about the role of the political commissa In
Laqueur suggests, was formed from these conclusively the Communists' later claim of with the cs creat ion of f a Army similar in titution fin
sources at an early stage and was never sub- having been the most consistent fighters th the year of the a Nazi regime, after the
st;antially revised; even the evidence of Rus- against the Nazi danger from the stat; but the last year of the Nazi after the
sia's growing industrial and military strength, he finds no evidence for the opposite `ur ace, s plots hod keen foiled. Below ave a though freely used by Hitler in the Thirties according to which Stalin or thCmintern crxace Comintern of kinship seems to have
in order to present himself to German and is alleged to have deliberately favored Hit- coexisted in both regimes with their mutual
foreign conservatives as their protector ler's rise to power-whether from fear of a hatred.
against the "Red Peril," did not shake his German revolution or in the hope that it After the crucial date of h1941, Mr. igh to kLa rdehe
own conviction of the "fundamental" weak- would prove the prelude to it. Everything has not quite
msustain ain the highs work. he
ness of the hated regime. points to the conclusion that Stalin con- has set i s the main part y of his r th. The
Recognition that Hitler's view of Russia tributed to Hitler's victory not knowingly, single chapter entitled "Days s Wrath 19 the
and Bolshevism was so closely Integrated but precisely by his failure to understand whole is a the ag force; understanding displays on the
with the core of his world view does indeed that a Nazi regime was a serious ssibilit whole the imaginative n becmto
a clue to the method underlying the and that it would differ substantially from which the reader tdtr there has are a strange then become acs
madness of 1941; one recalls that in October all that had gone before. and occasional , but nt . One
of that year, even though stopped at the out- It was only in 1934 that Hitler's pact with misse, rexample, unfounded
any judgments.
ment one of One
skirts of Moscow, the Fuehrer was so con- Poland, his purge of the stormtroopers, and peace feelers Stalin addressed to Hitler in
19325
his murder of General Schleicher convinced
Stalin both of the strength of the new regime
and of the seriousness of its anti-Bolshevism.
From playing Germany against the West,
Soviet policy now turned to playing the West
against Germany; but Mr. Laqueur reminds
us that Soviet feelers for improved relations
with the Third Reich were repeatedly under-
taken long before Hitler took them up in
1939, and that the tactical turn toward a
united front with the democracies against
"Fascism" was accomplished without serious
reexamination of the esoteric doctrine about
their "fundamental" equivalence. As a his-
torian, he thus sees no grounds for surprise
at the Stalin-Hitler pact, and even presents
a fair case in favor of Stalin's decision to
divert the war from his threshold at the last
moment. What strikes him as odd is that
while Hitler's basic hostility remained quite
unshaken by this act of expediency, Stalin
still failed to perceive it and hoped to the
end he could avoid the fatal clash.
Mr. Laqueur unfolds this record of hubris
and folly without once raising his voice; his
astringent understatements are calculated
to let the ironies of history speak for them-
selves. Not the least of his merits is the
demonstration that the Soviet interpretation
of Nazism has not been corrected even now:
Stalin's successors, who delight in smearing
their various opponents as "new Hitlers" on
every occasion, have not published a single
serious study of the Nazi regime. Their gen-
eral textbooks of contemporary politics con-
tinue even to ignore the Nazi extermination
of the Jews. Instead, they repeat the old
dogmatic twaddle--including long disproved
forgeries about the alleged financing of Hitler
by American Jewish capitalists.
This continued Soviet failure to reexamine
the nature of Nazism is due in part, as Mr.
Laqueur suggests, to the difficulty of doing
so within the frame work of dogmatic Marx-
ism, but in part also to the embarrassingly
close parallels between the power structures
of the Bolshevik and Nazi regimes. One of
the questions he has left unexplored is in-
deed to what extent the two movements
learned from as well as misunderstood each
other.
Did not Hitler's description of Bolshevik
tyranny in some ways foreshadow the blue-
print of his own dictatorship? There seems
to be no clear evidence that the Fuehrer
made an early study of the techniques of
Communist one-party rule; but Mussolini
certainly did so, and Hitler consciously copied
his example after his return from the fortress.
Stalin, in turn, may have been inspired to
his purges, as Krivitski has suggested, by
the exa
l
' . . '
m
e of Hite
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1Fs`t 22,'1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19327
by two immensely volatile forces whose de- would seem to be sufficient elements of Saigon-courageous and outdated men-are
mands would have shaken any Western gov- calculated self-interest here to make realistic followed in office by juntas composed of
ernment, as they are shaking the United bargaining possible-on the basis of spheres young generals-of-fortune who add a new
States today. First, the demands of a people of influence, for example. star to their shoulders after each defeat in
thirsting to overthrow colonialism and to A second difference concerns the size and battle.
recover their national identity, their freedom power of the forces involved. General West- As for the moral climate in Saigon, one can
of maneuver, and their unity. But also the moreland not only commands a good many only say that the corruption which domi-
demands of a revolutionary group, supported more troops than General Navarre (750,000 nated the life of the city's elite in 1953 has
by one of the great power blocs, which claims as compared with 600,000) but he is also now been democratized. Shady dealings
the right to impose its authority on the relatively free from the financial, logistical, having to do with aid and military programs
entire nation in the name of a Communist and transport problems that plagued the are no longer conrined to people in high
doctrine highly suspect to the majority: a French. A far greater advantage, however, places, but seem to involve every kind of
group, nonetheless, whose heroism, discipline, lies in America's enormous fire power as well business. Testifying before the Senate on
and ruthlessly effective methods seem to as its air force and complete mastery of the February 4, Mr. David Bell, the Director of
arsure its success. sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the Foreign Aid, said that he knew of no black
It is the deep and constant intermingling United States and South Vietnamese forces market in Saigon-which only shows that a
of these. two forces which have made the are now twenty times more powerful than brilliant and hard-working official has had
Vietnam problem seem so hopeless and de- the army of General Navarre (which had no no time to stroll along the streets of a town
feating to the West. How can a Western more than eighty combat planes at its dis- where someone begs you to break the law at
government successfully sponsor an inde- posal during the battle of Dien Bien Phu). every step.
pendent "nationalist counterfire" when the The small size of the present theater of op- It would be wrong to predict a priori that
strongest feelings of many Vietnamese have erations in South Vietnam thus becomes a President Johnson's new "counterinsur-
been invested for many years in the local favorable factor of great importance: The gency" and "pacification" programs, based
civil war; and when one finds among those French forces were charged with the defense on plans for economic and social develop-
who have rallied to the Vietminh, and then of all Indo-China, a territory four times the ment in the Southern villages, will fail as
the Lao Doug and the NLF, a great many present size of South Vietnam. totally as did the quite similar plans spon-
patriots, drawn to the organization because But given these advantages can it be said sored by the French and later by the Diem
they believe it to be the hope of Vietnamese that the United States is now succeeding regime. Can they produce a qualitative
nationalism, capable of defeating colonial- where France was forced to retreat? Of change In Vietnamese attitudes toward the
Ism and Western domination. course, one answer must be yes, in the lim- present government and the United States?
Perhaps it might have been possible for ited sense that it is impossible to imagine What can be said is that any efforts by politi-
the French to disassociate the nationalist in- that the United States suffering a major de- cal and army leaders in the South, however
spiration in Vietnam from the Communist feat in the present circumstances. During doubtful their results, will surely be more
organization. But to do this would have the past year President Johnson has been effective than the current bombing of the
been very difficult. For to gain the con- able to dispatch enough American troops to North. I will not take up the moral aspects
fidence of the nationalists I believe that Vietnam to avoid another Dien Bien Phu, but of these attacks. It should be sufficient to
French aid to Vietnam would have had to beyond this the situation is less than hope- examine their diplomatic and military re-
meet three extremely demanding conditions: ful. The arrival of over 100,000 troops has sults thus far. According to predictions
that the donor of the aid would have no right done no more than stabilize a deteriorating made in January 1965, several weeks of daily
to intervene directly in the government; that military situation; it did not result in a sharp raids would bring the North to its knees and
the. aid would be given to the most worthy swing of.military advantage to the Western thence to the negotiating table. In fact,
leaders; and that it would not lead to the side, as certain observers had expected. The Messrs. Ho and Dang have since toughened
creation of oligarchies of profiteers and a military map published on January 30 in the their demands, passing from the relatively
climate of corruption. New York Times showing four-fifths of the flexible "four points" of March 8th to the
By all these standards the French failed. South "under Vietcong influence" must be recent letter of January 31, which refers to
If they ever had a chance to survive the regarded as accurate, notwithstanding con- the NLF as the "only representative of South
Asian revolution, they lost it, basically, be- trary claims by officials. (Incidentally, this Vietnam"; until then, Ho had mentioned
cause they were unwilling to alter their pa- map recalls the military charts the French only the NLF "program."
tronizing colonialist attitudes and deal with press did not dare to publish 12 years ago. As for military results, we must realize that
Asians with some sense of mutual respect or The American public has recently been get- the bombing of the North has no overwhelm-
cooperation. For the most part they pre- ting far more information on the Vietnam ing impact on a people who only recently
ferred instead to appoint and then control question from the press, television, Senate emerged from a resistance movement and are
the manageable, the incompetent, and the hearings, etc., than was ever available in now being trained to return to one; for the
operators, many of whom made fortunes out France.) most part their lives are not greatly affected
of the corrupt French aid program. The fact is that American policy in Viet- by the destruction of a bridge or a truck
Opposed in Vietnam, then, were a co- nam, although originally inspired by very depot. On the other hand, in January 1965
herent, principled, and implacable revolu- different intentions, now resembles all too there were two Northern regiments In the
tionary movement of militants organized in closely the disastrous policy of the French. South, while now in February 1966 there are
the villages-the country's fundamental so- The United States has also failed to solve eight. Furthermore, the combat reserve
cial and economic unit-inspired by an evi- the problem of providing support to genuine forces in the North are numerous enough to
dent nationalism and posing as defenders of local leaders without excessive intervention permit the dispatch of more Northern troops
stern justice and equality; on the other in the country itself. Indeed, it can be said to General Giap in the South every time the
hand, a regime obviously supported and con- that the French-perhaps hypocritically- United States escalates the bombing. The
trolled by ,foreign powers, partly composed did nevertheless succeed in transferring some American public has been told that the North
of former colonial officials, disdainful of responsibilities to the Vietnamese: These is being bombed to save American lives. But,
peasant claims, tolerant of a social order were quite feeble ones in military matters, on the contrary, it seems clear that the bomb-
where the influential and successful were rather more important in politics, and nearly ing in the North only increases the pressure
frantically engaged in profiteering-prepar- total in such administrative work as tax col- on General Westmoreland's troops. The
lug for the arrival of the inevitable catas- letting. By contrast, we are now seeing the American foot soldier must pay for the de-
trophe. The only possible result was a progressive Americanization of both the war struction caused by the American Air Force.
catastrophe on the scale of Dien Bien Phu. and the country itself : The influence of the And if Hanoi itself is bombed, we may be sure
How relevant is the French experience to local military headquarters grows weaker; that the Vietcong forces have well-laid plans
Vietnam today? Certainly the American, the efficiency of the government in Saigon to take atrocious vengeance on Saigon, a city
situation is different in important respects, continues to decay; American experts have they have both infiltrated and surrounded.
but really how different? For example, the taken over a great many local functions. Of The adversaries' have now sunk their claws
United States has'no colonial past in Viet- course one understands the concern for ef- into each other and so long as the ground
nam, no strictly imperialistic drive for eco- ficiency, but the psychological effects are fighting continues, we may expect that each
nomic gain. But its objectives are, curiously, hardly calculated to encourage the emer- blow will be followed by damaging reprisals.
both more altruistic and more imperious gence of authentic nationalist leaders at the Thus a political solution becomes all the
than those of its predecessor. After all, a present time, as Roger Hilsman forcefully more urgent although unlike the settlement
country seeking colonial profits is quite pointed out in his recent testimony before of 1954, it will not be preceded by a military
capable of making a compromise to preserve the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. disaster. But here American diplomacy is
at least some of its endangered wealth. But Certainly the Americans have done no bet- the victim of its own myths. Because the
what of a country that supposes itself to be ter than the French in finding worthy non- United States government has decreed from
defending a selfless principle? In fact, the Communst leadership. There is no need to the first that the war in the South was origi-
United States does seem to have several reexamine now the tragic liquidation of nally provoked by invasion from the North,
fairly concrete motives: e.g., to prove to cer- Diemism, an event made inevitable by the it has insisted that a solution must be nego-
tain nations that it is faithful to its alli- sectarian religious isolation and the oil- tiated with Hanoi, and only with Hanoi.
ances; to show the underdeveloped peoples garohic obstinacy of the Ngo family. But A false historical analysis has led to a polit-
of the Southern Hemisphere how costly it since then, what decadence! Sad man- ical impasse. For a careful study of the his-
can be to choose "Marxism-Leninism." There darins from certain conservative milieux In tory of South Vietnam over the last ten
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 22, 196
years will show that from 1956 onTarsi, strong
resistance. groups, the surviving members of
political-religious sects crushed by Diem,
were in active opposition to the regime in the
South; they were in fact already called "Viet-
cong" by the Diem regime at that time. Fur-
thermore, this essentially nationalist dis-
pldeI1t movement gained added support as a
resi It of the rural discontent which led Diem
to suppress the elected municipal councils in
1957; it spread further after the promulga-
tion of the terrible law of 1959 which pre-
scribed the death penalty for all "accomplices
of Communists"-and Communism comes
cheap in South Vietnam. At this time the
resistance was composed of nothing more
than Southern groups organized in self-de-
fense against Diem. Hanoi had made no con-
nection with them, The North Vietnamese
did not begin to exploit this situation and in-
filtrate agents until 1959; and it was only
after pressure from a Southern 'congress of
"former Vietminh. resistants" in March of
1969, that they prepared to intervene. At the
Northern Communist Party Congress in Sep-
tember, of thesame year the Hanoi govern-
anent gave direct encouragement to the revo-
lutionary activities in the South. Still, It
was-not until November 11, 1960, following
an attempted military Putsch against Diem,
that the Vietcong-feeling the pressure of
competition from military nationalists-gave
itself formal identity and established a polit-
ical headquarters by creating the National
Liberation Front.
Today it is clear that the NLF leaders are
closely linked to Hanoi, on which they depend
for much of their supplies and arms. But
anyone concerned with a peaceful settlement
in Vietnam should be aware of both the local
origins of the Front and its strong persisting
regionalism-its attachments to the milieux,
traditions, economy, and countryside of
the South. which give it a fundamental au-
tonomy.
And yet, notwithstanding the fact that
the Southern origins of the Vietcong insur-
rection have been carefully confirmed, no
element of the Vietnam problem has been so
neglected, especially in American official cir-
cles. We may be astonished, for example,
that the immense, spectacular, and prob-
ably sincere efforts of recent American diplo-
macy to persuade Hanoi to negotiate finally
produced, after thirty days of pause in bomb-
ing, a single defiant letter. Yet, America is
dealing here with a small and poorly armed
country; its allies are reluctant to give it aid
too openly, fearing a crushing American re-
ponse. Certainly it is a Communist govern-
ment, but one presided over by a man who in
1946 and 1954 was able to prove to the French
his willingness to accept compromise. And
of the four points posed as conditions by
Hanoi last year, Washington now accepts
three. Why then doesn't Ho play Lyndon
Johnson's game? In a conference the North
Vietnamese would hold so many trumps that
their present position is hard to under-
stand.
But perhaps- they were not in a position
to negotiate at all. If we look back over
the history of the NLF we find support for
the view that Hanoi is not able to,speak for
the Front. First for psychological reasons:
The published program of the NLF expressly
mentions the possibility of an independent
South Vietnam; and it looks forward to form-
ing an alliance with Laos and Cambodia
only. Thus it seems most unlikely that the
em resistance; we must recognize that it is
in fact a federation of maquts of different
ages and differing inspiration, and that it is
not as yet completely unified.
There is not as much geographic and psy-
chological distance between the typical
Southern military chief and Ho Chi Minh as
there is between Ho Chi Minh and Mr.
Kosygin. But to be effective now in Vietnam
diplomacy must certainly take account of the
maquisard and his part in the war. It must
also attempt to understand the role of the
Central Committee of the NLF, where Maoist
influence is strong but where all tendencies
coexist; of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi, with
its pro-Chinese and pro-Russian factions;
and the Political Bureau in Peking, with its
cast of performers, both civilian and mili-
tary. And finally we must comprehend the
very complex position of the Soviet Union,
which is quite unwilling to sacrifice either its
policy of peaceful coexistence or its com-
manding position as leader of the Communist
world. If the diversity of governmental
levels, alliances, and forces Involved in the
war presents difficulties, it also offers many
more chances for an alert diplomacy than
were available during the monolithic conflict
of the Cold War.
It is true that American leaders now argue
that to recognize the Vietcong is to admit
defeat. A curious intellectual position in-
deed-to refuse to recognize your adversary
for what he is. Perhaps it is worth recalling
that in December 1953, after Ho Chi Minh
had first announced himself ready to negoti-
ate, the French Socialist, Alain Savary, sug-
gested to Georges Bidault (then Foreign Min-
ister, now living in Brazil) that he seek Ho
out for talks. "You only make them bigger
by talking to them," said Bidault-who did
finally talk with Ho's delegate at Geneva, but
after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.
"Recognizing" the Vietcong certainly will
not solve .the problem of peacemaking in
Vietnam at a stroke. It would nevertheless
be an extremely constructive idea to focus
diplomatic attention firmly on the South at
the present time-without meanwhile ceas-
ing efforts both to make contact with Hanoi
and to assess Communist Chinese intentions.
But to bring about peace it will not suffice
simply to recognize the existence of a power-
ful revolutionary organization supported by
the North and already in control of the
largest part of the national territory. More
important is the task of reestablishing the
constitutional legitimacy which Diem em-
bodied for a brief period-reactionary as he
was-and which has since vanished. The
NLF is an essential element of this legitimacy
because it is the heir to the revolt against
Diem's totalitarianism as well as the princi-
pal force of resistance to foreign intervention.
But there are others who make up the social
and political society as well-the Buddhists,
the Catholics, and also the Army, a bour-
geoisie in uniform.
was among the factors that led to the Civil
War.
French colonial policy was only too famil-
iar with these very diverse political factions
and brilliantly played them off, one against
the other. But to divide and rule became
a pathetic policy as France's control became
more feeble. An American policy which
seeks a peaceful settlement must take ac-
count of both the socio-political pluralism of
South Vietnam and its extraordinary capacity
for finding original-and local-solutions to
its problems. Surely it is time for American
leaders at last to confront the people with
whom they have become so inextricably
involved.
INVOLVEMENT IN THAILAND
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD an article by Clayton
Fritchey entitled "State of Affairs" for
July 15, 1966.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STATE OF AFFAIRS
(By Clayton Fritchey)
WASHINGTON.-NOW that we have practi-
cally won the war in Vietnam (or so we are
told), Americans may be interested to learn
that we are well on the road to becoming
involved in Thailand in much the same
gradual, undeclared, and often secret, way
that we did next door.
Not many are conscious of It yet, but
Thailand is already so crowded with Amer-
ican air power that it is beginning to look
more like an air base than a country.
The Pentagon has never officially acknowl-
edged the extent of U.S. military operations
in Thailand, nor does it openly admit that it
is attacking North Vietnam from a sup-
posedly non-belligerent country, but the
public tipoff came when an American pilot,
Capt. Murphy Neal Jones, 28, of Louisiana,
downed in the first raid on Hanoi oil depots,
said he had taken off from Takhli Airbase
in Thailand. Since then other captured U.S.
pilots have made similar statements.
The Chinese reaction has been predictable,
just as U.S. reaction would be predictable if
Canada or Mexico permitted a foreign power
to launch . bombing attacks on American
targets from bases in their countries.
Peking has already warned Bangkok
against plunging into the Vietnam war, but
to no avail, for the U.S. has for years sys-
tematically promoted militant anti-commu-
nism in Thailand, just as it has in South
Vietnam. All we can hope Is that the end
result will not be the same.
Also, as in Vietnam, the people of Thai-
land have never been consulted about this,
and for the same reason-the
ilit
m
ary clique
An effective policy to bring about a peace- that seized power years ago does not permit
ful settlement should begin by making it elections. And, of course, the U.S. has never
possible for each of these groups to return prodded either country to hold elections, for
to an active political role. While General Ky, a representative government might not be so
after having won his sole victory of the war Willing to play the American game.
at Honolulu, occupies the stage, we may be President Johnson has repeatedly said that
sure that the other groups are ready in the he would be only too happy to settle the con-
wings, waiting for the protection and en- flict in Vietnam on the basis of the 1954
couragement the U.S. could still supply. And Geneva peace agreement, which called for
from such a revived political life we could the neutralization of Indo-China, and, in
expect an authoritative leadership to emerge effect, Southeast Asia.
-
6 .~____.?~==v w represent uoutn in Laos, in Vietnam, and now Thailand.
there may be a purely practical reason. Com- Vietnam in future peace conferences. While Both openly and covertly, by the use of the
bat conditions in the South are such that it the NLF is the largest force in the South armed forces and the CIA, the U.S. has en-
is by no means certain that a decision or an it recognizes that it is obviously not the only couraged and supported dictatorial govern-
agreement even if approved by the NLF force, reservilig a large fraction of the seats ments in all three countries in an effort to
would be supported by all the fighters in the on its Central Committee for groups who do enlist them in the American crusade against
field. not belong to the NLF. The democratization China.
If we are to undertake a serious and cred- of power in South Vietnam is not a fantasy. Under the cloak of fighting internal Com-
ible search for peace in Vietnam, we must The destruction of the small democratic munism, the tyrant Diem set out in 1956 to
take account of this diversity of the South- movements struggling to survive under Diem smash all political opposition in South Viet-
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,August 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19353
two to three weeks earlier than those in Department of Commerce; (2) approval of regional, or national headquarters in case
another. In hopes that such differences can employer and completion of a "statement of an emergency threatens.
be'combined in new, improved forms of understanding"; (3) satisfactory security By definition, then, our Civilian Executive
Douglas fir, approximately 4,000 trees from clearance; and (4) approval by the Secretary Reserve is comparable to our military re-
the Douglas fir's growth range are now being of Commerce. serve and provides a base upon which Indus-
grown near Corvallis. The Oregon State WESTERN FIELD OFFICES DEPARTMENT OF trial readiness can be erected much more
University's Forest Research Laboratory is COMMERCE rapidly than in the past.
undertaking the 60-year study under the A current candidate for admission into
direction of Dr. Helge Irgens-Moller. Arizona: New Federal Building, 230 N. First the program is Donald Jacobson, a sales con-
avenue, Phoenix, 85025 trot manager for Boise Cascade Corporation
The plantation study is also tied in with California: Western Pacific Bldg., 1031 S. in Portland, Oregon. As to why he applied
experiments now underway using a special Broadway, L. Angeles, 90015; Federal Bldg., for admittance into the program, Jacobson
which growth chambere 450 Golden Gate ave., San Francisco, 94102 sums t up by saying
which trees may grown under controlled d Colorado: Federal Building, 20th and Stout "You have to believe
temperature and with artificial lighting to in maintaining a certain preparedness.
street, Denver, 80202 There is satisfaction in knowing that you
stimulate varying day lengths.
Laboratory experiments already have Nevada: Federal Building, 300 Booth street, could contribute in the event of an emer-
shown that coastal Douglas fir is less influ- Reno, 89502 gency, and there is a real need for lumber
New Mexico: U.S. Courthouse, Albuquer- and wood products representatives within the
lied changing day lengths associated que, 87101 Reservist program."
with seasonal changes than are inland trees. Oregon: Pioneer Post office, 520 S.W. Mor- He points out that enemy action might
rlson street, Portland, 97204 well include a severe and crippling initial
IN CASE EMERERNCY-LUMBER EXECUTIVES Utah: Federal Building, 125 South State
NEEDED--COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SEEKS onslaught which would make impossible our
RESERVISTS street, Salt Lake City, 84111 normal centralized control and manage-
MORE WESTERN Washington: Federal Office Building, 909 ment of productive economy. For this rea-
It was D-day plus 60 and already American First avenue, Seattle, 98104 son, current Reservist planning envisages the
Industry was well on its way toward regain- Wyoming: Federal Building, 2120 Capitol deployment of production agency personnel
ing its former world supremacy. All major avenue, Cheyenne, 82002 to a number of relocation sites. Each site
ports and commerce centers were totally WESTERN ROSTER OF WOOD PRODUCT CLASS would be capable of making separate con-
, in the nuclear died I in attack RESERVISTS tributions to the National program without
and roughly 30,000 people had died
pananic rou while fleeing eing clogged panic former metro- G. E. Karlen, Managing Partner, Karlen- direct control or guidance in case communi-
politan areas. Davis Company, 701 Tacoma Building, Ta- cations were interrupted.
Hostilities had ceased after a few days, not .coma, Washington (Sawmilling). "In simple terms, things can happen
because of any truce but because both sides Leslie G. Everitt, Chairman of the Board, very quickly in our advanced world, and we
had exhausted their primary retaliatory Everitt Lumber Company, Inc., P.O. Box 822, mu t Ib e'spre aced om f contributing where
stockpiles. After the initial shock, which Ft. Collins, Colorado. lly. left Asia a wasteland, the U.S. and Russia Peter C. Gaffney, Executive Vice President one can in good faith, for those objectives
Gov-
charged the time directing
crippled, and Europe hardly touched, it sud- S.W. Forest Industries, Inc., 411 N. Central which nt are a cialsd best
denly became more important to repair Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona (Logging, Saw- ernme with
s."
domestic damage and forget about ideoligi- milling). emergHrealso nc ency em p activities."
that bus lumber in-
cal "differences. Frank E. Heard, General Manager Motrone- P y
Whether the war was to be continued or Heard Lumber Company, 1038 Beamer Street, dustry executives should easily be able to
Woodland, California. afford the time to attend a maximum of six
not was a moot qs, andf In any case, meetings per year. There are four uarterl y
production, eeted to and facilities were so- Fred C. Talbot, Street, albot Lumber Cam- sessions among local headquarters, and one
desperately needed to reestablish modern so- pang, 58 Sutter SreeSan Francisco, Cali- annual visit to national headquarters in
ciety. Successes toward that end during the fornia (Logging, Sawmilling). Washington, D.C. In addition, there may
previous 60 days could largely be attributed Richard S. McLelland, President, McLel- year at one
Western meeting gional once a header aters one
to a dedicated group of industry and busi- land Lumber Company, 804 N. 5th Street, b bee a three regional
ness leaders called Business and Defense Pocatello, Idaho (Sawmilling). Everett, Washington, ton, Santa Rosa, qua tr -
Services Administration Executive Reservists. Joseph H. Sampson, General Manager, g
The Reservists were (and are) selected and Bites-Coleman Lumber Company, Omak, or Denver, Colorado.
Washing-ton (Sawmilling). "As a peacetime sidelight," according to
organized by the U.S. Commerce Department G. Corydon Wagner, Jr., President, Cari- Jacobson, "individuals and companies have
because they have talent, training, and ex- a definite advantage in becoming familiar
perience to operate an established Defense boo-Pacific Corporation, P.O. Box 3419, with the workings of government, especially
Materials System during threatening or ac- Tacoma, Washington (Logging, Sawmilling).
the Department of Commerce. It offers a
tual warfare situations. They are charged, RESERVISTS READY FOR H-HouR-3,500 tremendous range of services, including an
in summary, with serving the government is, THROUGHOUT NATION PROVIDE INDUSTRIAL excellent library, and very complete produc-
inventorying available supplies and facilities, READINESS tipn and marketing information"
assessing critical areas of need for priorities, During peacetime, the Department fosters,
and planning reestablishment of manufac- (Three times within a generation our Gov- promotes, and develops both foreign and
ture and supply to get essential products for ernment has been forced to expand its civil- domestic commerce. As Jacobson states,
military and civilian use as rapidly as pos- fan staff to meet war emergencies. Each contact with the Department is beneficial to
sible. time it has had to look to nongovernmental a ecutive reservists, as are a sense of duty
More of these Reservists are needed, espe- sources for additional executive talent. d exputive patriotism.
n on our side -A
b
h
ee
ave
dally from the wood and forest products in- Time and geography
As in these prior emergencies, so improvisa.
roducing region
WWPA
.
-p
dustry in the
the chart to the right illustrates, only eight tions have not been too costly. But they ?/S OF SOUTH VIETNAM TERRI-
men from the 12 Western states now repel- march of history and technology makes it TORY BY VIETCONG
_
i i_
_
h
t
will again be
l
a
we
t to
give each man administration and coordina- so lucky. Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
tion duties for lumber products in 11/2 states Boise Cascade 34, Sales ation's Yakima, Elgln,
in the event of war. - the RECORD at the close of these remarks
The Department of Commerce is currently and Payette plywood mills, is currently a can-
welcoming applicants to the program. They didate for admission into the Executive Re- a story from Saigon, written by Jack
should be between 35 and 55 years old, be serve. He was a Lieutenant in the U.S. Steele of the Scripps-Howard service,
U.S. citizens, and have no military or civil Army between 1956 and 1959, holds a Bach- and published in the Washington Daily
defense commitment which would conflict elor's Degree in Management from Whitman News of August 15.
with Reserve membership. Applicants College, and a Master's Degree in Business The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
should also have a strong background in in- from Stanford University. He lives in Lake objection, it is so ordered.
dustrial production and management or Oswego, Oregon.) (See exhibit so
have comparable skills which would be of The National Defense Executive Reserve is
value to an emergency production agency. a corps of business executives and industry Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr.
Lumbermen interested In learning more - specialists who have volunteered to serve In Steele explains that despite the con-
about the Executive Reserve Program are in- time of national emergency. Authorized by tinued official claims that the war is go-
vited to contact the nearest Department of Congress in the Defense Production Act ing well for the United States, the Viet-
Commerce Field Office (see list above). When Amendments of 1955 and established by Ex- cong continue to gain control of the
an office, request a Background ecutive Order in 1958, it now provides some countryside. CBS news reports bore out
Statement Form CD-174. 3500 Reservists within twelve government
It must be emphasized that designation as departments. Each man is trained and ca- this fact recently in another way by
a Reservist is subject to (1) the needs of the pable of filling key civilian positions a local, showing the airlifting of Vietnamese
No. 139-13
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19354 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
civilians out of areas in the countryside
which American and South Vietnamese
are losing to the Vietcong.
Far from gaining control in South
Vietnam, we apparently are losing con-
trol of territory, and are simply moving
the people to refugee centers to make
certain they do not become dominated
by the Vietcong.
A second document which I ask be
printed at the close of these remarks is
the testimony to the subcommittee on
refugees by William Pepper.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2,)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr. Pep-
per is from New Rochelle, N.Y. He re-
.cently spent 5 weeks in Vietnam study-
ing refugee problems. As Mr. Pepper's
statement makes clear, by far the ma-
jority of present refugees in South Viet-
nam have been rendered homeless by
American military action, and by far the
majority of hospital patients, especially
Children, are there due to injuries suf-
fered from American military activities.
The plight of these children, and the
huge burden they impose upon physical
facilities, has been almost totally ignored
by the American people.
Yet Mr. Pepper's statistics make it evi-
dent that the population of South Viet-
nam is nearly half under age 16, and that
the breakdown of family life which the
war has caused will bring adverse reper-
cussions for decades to come.
When our administration talks of the
noble works we are instituting in South
Vietnam, let it not fail to point out also
the destruction we are bringing to it. If
We are building hospitals, we are creat-
ing far more patients than they can
handle; if we are building schools, we
are depriving far more children of edu-
cational opportunities than we are giving
such opportunities.
I also point to Mr. Pepper's conclusion
under the heading: General Security and
Welfare. He states:
In a way more subtle than physical scar-
ring, the conflict is affecting for a long time
to come the structures of the Vietnamese
people. It is doing this precisely because the
family is being gradually eliminated as the
basic unit.
He indicates that fatherless families
are uniting in a tribal system, and that
the thousands of abandoned and or-
phaned children are living in packs in
the cities. Orphanages are a third "de-
familyized" unit that is rapidly growing
in South Vietnam.
'As Mr. Steele's story suggests, this pic-
ture in Vietnam is getting worse, not bet-
ter, for as we lose area control, we are
beginning to move people out and further
destroy their means of livelihood, self-
support, and family independence and
organization.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
Aug. 15, 1966]
EXHIBIT 1
VIETCONG SPREADS FEAR-POOR VIET POLLS
TURNOUT FEARED
(By Jack Steele)
SAIGON, August 15-Both American and
South Vietnamese officials voiced concern to-
day that the turnout in the Sept. 11 constitu-
ent assembly election may not exceed 50 per-
cent of the registered voters.
Approved
This would be a bitter disappointment, es-
pecially since 70 per cent of South Viet Nam's
eligible voters cast ballots in less important
provincial council elections in April, 1965.
A 50 per cent turnout would mean a vote of
about 2.5 million, of slightly more than 5
million registered voters. Last year about
.3.5 million votes were cast.
Thie forecast may be too pessimistic. The
Vietnamese people In recent years have shown
a strong desire to vote, even in relatively
meaningless elections.
But it is the first current estimate of re-
sponsible officials here who have been keep-
ing tabs on election preparations.
DRAWBACKS
These officials say a 50 per cent turnout
would be "relatively good" under existing
war conditions and in view of the skepticism
of many Vietnamese.
They give three major reasons for their
rather gloomy predictions:
The Viet Cong are mounting a campaign
to terrorize and intimidate both voters and
candidates.
Security has declined in many areas of
South Viet Nam since the provincial council
elections 16 months ago. This may keep
more eligible voters from the polls.
Many Vietnamese seem unaware the elec-
tion is only four weeks off. Others apparent-
ly couldn't care less about electing a con-
stituent assembly which will have power only
to draft a new constitution.
The Viet Cong, in trying to crank up a
terrorist campaign to disrupt the election,
are operating differently from last year when
they denounced and "boycotted" the elec-
tions but did little to stop the Vietnamese
from voting.
THREATS
Some candidates, particularly in the Me-
kong Delta, already have received assassina-
tion threats from the Viet Cong and several
have pulled out of the campaign.
The Viet Cong also have launched a dia-
bolical propaganda campaign. They pass out
leaflets in and around Saigon warning men
of draft age they will be hauled off to Viet-
namese army training camps if they show up
at the polls.
The contention that security has declined
in the past year despite the buildup of nearly
300,000 American troops is contrary to the
official U.S. position.
American and Korean troops have pacified
small areas around their enclaves in the
northern coastal cities and base camps. But
their "search and destroy" sweeps actually
have enabled the Viet Cong to tighten their
control over many contested villages and
hamlets.
EXHIBIT 2
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. PEPPER TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
U.S. SENATE SESSION, SUMMER AND
AUTUMN, 1966, HON. EDWARD M. KEN-
NEDY, CHAIRMAN
(William F. Pepper, Executive Director of
of the New Rochelle Commission on Human
Rights, Instructor in Political Science at
Mercy College In Dobbs Ferry, New York, and
Director of that, college's Children's Insti-
tute For Advanced Study and Research spent
between five and six weeks this spring (1966)
in Viet-Nam as a Free Lance Correspondent
accredited by the Military Assistance Com-
mand in' that country, and the Government
of et-Nam.
(During that period in addition to travel-
ling, he lived in Sancta Maria Ohphanage in
Gia Dinh Province and in the main "shelter
A? Q'ust ,2.2, .1966
phanages--among them, AnLac; Go-Vap;
Don Bosco; Hot Dve Anl; Bac Ai-hospitals:
Cho-Ray; Holy Family; Phu My; Saigon-
Cholon (central hosp.) and shelters in Sai-
gon, Cholon, Qui-Nhon and outer Binh-Dinh.
(He interviewed, frequently, more than
once, the following Cabinet Ministers of
South Viet-Nam: Dr. Nguyen Ba Kha, Min-
ister of Health; Dr. Tran Ngoc Ninh--Min-
ister of Education; Mr. Tran Ngoc Lieng-
Minister of Social Welfare; Dr. Nguyen Thuc
Que-High Commission for Refugees.
(In addition, he conferred with the leaders
of the Voluntary Agency Community, and the
USAID Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Mr.
Edward Marks, as well as the USAID child
welfare specialist, Mr. Gardner Monroe.
(Sessions were also held with Mademoiselle
E. La Mer of UNICEF and Mr. Pierre Baesjous
of UNESCO.
(At the present time he has a book in prep-
aration and has authored a number of
newspaper articles since returning.)
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the Sub-
committee for this opportunity to appear
and present some personal observations on
the conditions facing one segment of so
called refugee population of South Viet-Nam.
I only hope that these reflections will add
something of value to the Subcommittee's
consideration of an extremely complicated
situation.
The cumulative figure of "tactical refu-
gees", or persons displaced from their normal
habitations by the conflict, and unable to
return, some while ago, passed the one mil-
lion mark. Only a small percentage of them
have been classified as "permanently re-
settled."
My observations indicate that a great
number of these "tactical refugees" are chil-
dren and that there are others who have
not been counted-also mostly children-
who, in institutions, makeshift shel-
ters, hospitals, with friends and relations or
on their own, in the cities, and provincial
towns.
It may be helpful to set the framework for
the present condition of childhood in South
Viet-Nam, from this viewpoint, by comment-
ing upon the quality of services, and living
conditions which we have come to regard
as being essential human rights of every
young being.
WHO ARE THEY?
According to WNESCO study in 1964, 53%
of the population of South Viet-Nam is un-
der 21 years of age, 43.4% is under 15 years
of age and 47.5% of the population are
under 16. Pierre Baesjou, the chief of
WNESCI officer in Viet-Nam, emphasized
during the course of our lengthy conference
that these per-centages were higher today.
Naturally with an annual Birthrate of 50
per 1,000 and a yearly population increase of
2.5%, there would be an increase.
It should be quite obvious, then, that
we are speaking of the majority of the
people of Viet-Nam when we refer to her
children. It should also be emphasized in
the context/of planning that 69% of the
Vietnamese people will be under 21 by 1980.
EDUCATION
While the Ministry of Education of the
Government of South Viet-Nam maintains
that 70% of the children are receiving some
schooling, this figure is not advanced by
officials of UNICEF and UNESCO present in
Viet-Nam. It is also disputed by others of
the private assistance community who are
concerned with school construction and edu-
cational programs. As a consensus it prob-
ably would be more accurate to say that at
best 45-50% of the children of South Viet-
Nam are receiving at most two hours of
schooling
six da
s a we
k
i
,
y
e
, n
ne or ten
area" in Qui-Nhon, for a shorter period of months a year. In the rural areas, the per-
time. His main interests were the effects of centage of children getting even this mini-
the War on women and children, the role of mal educational expocure is greatly reduced.
the American Voluntary Agencies there and City and town schools often function with
the work of the military in civil action. four or five shifts to meet this standard.
(His visits took him to a number of: or- The classes range in size from 60 to 80 Du-
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August 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19355
pits. In some private schools they go up to Thousands and thousands of the "street appear from out of nowhere, by themselves.
100 students in each class. children" living on their own in cities and They range in age from the newborn on up.
To indicate the shortage of facilities, there towns, as well as countless others who huddle My observations indicated that the chil-
are (1) a combined total of 2,620-primary with families and friends, in the city and dren of the Viet Cong were mixed with
and secondary-schools that would allow a country, never see a classroom of any type. "loyal" Vietnamese and montegnard chil-
student to go from the first to the twelth The Ministry of Education for South Viet- dren and, for the most part received com-
grade. This in a country that has between Nam receives 5 % of the total national budget, parative treatment. I interviewed two "V.C."
7 and 8 million students in this age range. The inadequacy of this allocation speaks for children in Holy Family Hospital (Qui-Nhon)
The figure is rapidly increasing, and so is the itself. If it were not for American private both of whom had been terribly burned and
gap between available places and student and public assistance in this area the picture in one Of whom had juscontentt thskin eir greatraft-
demands. would be considerably worse than it is. g? They were
Previously, students who completed five HEALTH ment, to the extent that they did not want
years of primary schooling had to take a to return to their village which they last re-
national there were no war in Viet-Nam the membered as being an inferno.
national examination prior to secondary status of the health of its children would I talked with others-always through an
be r requ equir e. ed to Then take an entrance to whoexams- passed be-as it is throughout the underdeveloped interpreter-and received stories of night
school would ld entrance
wr world-a very serious problem. awakenings by the "War Gong" and mad,
nation provided by the secondary school Though it is difficult to obtain precise in- frenzied races for cover before the attack.
which they decided to enter, and usually, formation due to the fact that most deaths One 15 year old related how he awoke with
which was very similar the certifying g y occur outside of the hospitals,, specialists the "gong", called for his mother and, then,
exam-After the first cycle of study-8 estimate the rate of infant mortality to be
years-they had to take the exam for the remembered no more. that precise mo-
high school cycle of three years, they would around 50% for a national average. It is ment, apparently, a bullet entered one side
take the first of the Baccalaureate exam. conceded to be considerably higher In rural of this head, passed out through the other
part areas. The average child, barring any of side, severing an optical nerve on its way,
Then after the third year, the final exam is the misadventures of war, may look forward leaving the lad permanently blinded.
taken for the Baccalaureate, second part. to a life span of between 30 and 35 years. Without question, however, the greatest
They were, then, eligible for university. The regular incidence of diseases, such as physical damage to children, indeed to the
The Minister of Education has abolished tuberculosis, polio, cholera and leprosy among rural civilians, generally, who reside in the
the national certifying examination, but others, is alarming, and the conflict has made 2600 odd villages, is caused by the bombing.
students must still take the individual more acute the shortage of doctors and med- This is the permanent physical effect that
secondary school entrance examinations. ical personnel. . There are for example, over will live for the lifetimes of the scarred
The Minister has also eliminated the first 600 doctors in the armed services, according bodies, and then some.
cycle-4 years-examination. to Dr. Bak ha, the Minister of Health. He It cannot be denied, Mr. Chairman, it is
The difficulties of the educational system has only about 200 doctors working for him happening, daily, there, and for every child
of Viet-Nam may best be seen in the com- and there are an additional 230 who are pri- that is visible in a hospital bed, there must
parison of the number of primary and vate practioners for a total of around 1,030 be scores that never make it that far. It is
secondary school students with the number physicians in South Vietnam. The propor- a direct result of this conflict and I submit
of schools available at each level. tion of nurses-practical or otherwise-is that we as a nation have as real a?responsi-
There are 5,700 primary schools and about about 9 for every 100,000 inhabitants and the bility for its alleviation, as we do for its
5,000,000 students. The number of schools proportion of midwives is 5 for every 100,000. perpetration.
needs to be about doubled, to meet present The general situation is, of course, ren- It is true, the most extensive medical
needs. dered far more serious because of the war. assistance presently being provided is offered
592 schools Thme are 2,00
0,000 secondary (minimum fig and t - In an economic vein, the Government of by the United States. All forms of medical
dents foor tretyhose schools. those echools, The number . The nufire) of s see Viet-Nam allocates only 2% to the Ministry are being provided in the forms of person-
dents f of Health while the U.S. AID contribution in nel, medicines, supplies and equipment.
ondary schools needs to be increased four services and medicines is somewhat larger. Some very fine work is being done, for exam-
times to meet present needs. The prevailing impression-and one that ple, in the areas of plastic surgery and ortho-
capacity for 50 student, based on schools with a was contained in a recent UNICEF confer- pedics by Americans.
feasible for ence report, prepared by the Government of Mr. Chairman, it is not nearly enough.
0 Viet-Nam. for 5 is not t economically is high
It schools here, at this time e South Viet-Nam-is that the health of the The number and type of facilities, are clearly
due to ct larger apital here, a children suffers from: 1) an absence of by- inadequate. The interiors of the existing
due to 1) the capital expense and d 2) that genie knowledge; 2) nutritional deficien- hospitals are characterized by the omnipres-
inadequate transportation facilities teaties (most infant deaths are the result of euce of flies, inadequate ventilation, and air
cant. Cenenc shows require, efficient tea d safe under nourishment, infantile beri-beri, and circulation, and sanitation facilities. In im-
netwoork o of f transportation shows, an and safe protein malnutrition); 3) The physical, so- mediate consideration and planning a high
net transportation for r students who cial and pyschological effects of the war, and priority should be given to the relief of the
live some distance. the inability of the existing facilities to deal injured children of Viet-Nam.
NUIVIBER OF SCHOOLS AND GRADES COVERED with the existing conditions. A Swiss organization, "Terre Des Hommes,"
Primary: 5,700 (total) ; 3,800 (public), 2,000 Mr. Chairman, there are two profoundly, that is dedicated to providing " ' * "
through grade 3, 1,800 through grade 5; 1,900 heartrending effects of this war upon the vigorous, immediate and direct help to
(private), 1,300 through grade 3, 600 through children of Viet-Nam. The first, the physi- the most unfortunate children," under-
grade 5. cal damage, I shall discuss in this section took its own investigation of these condi-
Secondary: 592 (total);' 150 (public), 64 and the second, the social and pyschological tions sending two representatives to Viet-
through both cycles, 12th grade, 86 through destruction, I shall consider in the subse- Nam on October 17, 1965. I have appended
one cycle, grade 8; 359 (private), 138 through quent part. their report to this statement, (A) for
both cycles, 12th grade, 221 through one My introduction to the extent of actual the committee's consideration. They were
cycle, grade 8; 83 (semi-private) (w/Govt. war injury was provided by Mr. Le Tuan-Anh shocked by the conditions encountered and
subsidy), 18 through both cycles, grade 12, the chief nurse at Cho-Ray Hospital in abhorred by the inadequacy of facilities.
65 through one cycle, grade 8. Saigon. The Cho-Ray children's ward con- They concluded that "? " " efficient medical
In a lengthy conference with Dr. Tran Ngoc sists of 40 beds and usually, not less than and serious surgical procedures in local areas
Ninh-since replaced by a new Secretary of 70 to 85 children. In many instances one are impossible in the present circumstance."
State for Education-he stated that teacher can encounter beds with two or even three I might add, Mr. Chairman, that in addi-
training schools turn out about 1,000 primary children in them. The injuries vary. Some tion to waiting, each day, they are dying.
school teachers a year and the need is for are the victims of grenade explosions, some Terre Des Hommes reportedly has located
6,000. At the secondary level, 800 teachers are contacted by mortar fire and shrapnel some 400 hospital beds in Europe and else-
are graduated annually and 2,500 are needed. and others by bomb explosions. A large where to receive and treat immediately a
In both instances these requirements are set number are the victims of Napalm and the beginning group that cannot be adequately requested
of. the
to help up with only the present needs of the ploslons. horrible pho ous is more ter- United States ethscene. e provision of tt an poration
population.
There conditions have rendered illiterate rifying because it does not extinguish as facilities for, the removal of the children.
roughly 40% of the male population of 60% readily as Napalm. So long as the surface From my several conversations with the
of the female
lfare, 15 and 19 years of age, we find that B70%e of receives Thechildrenicomert )the hospitals of Cho- LiMiniser engt I dornott feel` that he would oppose
Viet-Nam's males and 85% of her young Ray, Holy Family in Qui-Nhon, Phu My, just the removal of the children. The United
women are illiterate, at this time. outside of Saigon, and the others, in any States State Department has remained ada-
Children housed in the refugee shelters number of ways and from all parts. Some- mant in its refusal to cooperate with Terre
usually receive no education at all. If 20% times their families bring them-and leave Des Hommes. I have further appended cor-
of those living in this condition are exposed them, so that the hospital is forced to begin respondence on this matter, (B) and a re-
to any schooling it is extraordinary. Some of orphanage care under very difficult condi-? lated editorial from the (York) Penn. Ga-
(C) I would to respectfully
none programs
usher them a in, and frequentlyn they situation. Daily
at all. friends such
epoOrphanages or. quality, h others have educational
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 1935E
urge the Sub-Committee's consideration of
.the merits, of the Terre Des Hommes pro-
posal, and inquiry into the refusal of our
government to assist. The evacuation for
treatment program would in my judgment,
Immediately benefit only a small number of
children involved to date, but it would con-
stitute a beginning.
It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to say
tritely that "war Is hell" and this is one of
Its realities. Hell is worse in some parts than.
others. In Viet-Nam an unusually large por-,
tion of the population are children, as was
pointed out earlier. Their natural habita-
tional places of straw and bamboo and vege-
. tative construction tend quickly to become
furnaces, and ovens. This is not and has not
always been the case, where men have fought.
THE GENERAL SECURITY AND WELFARE
In a way more subtle than physical scar-
ring, the conflict is affecting, for a long time
to collie the structures of the Vietnamese
people. It is doing this precisely because the
family is beinggradually eliminated as the
basic unit.
Millions of Vietnamese under 21 have never
known what it is to live in peace, and have
been, and are, being raised without the pres-
ence of the father. The fathers of these
Countless ones are, of course, dead or fighting
the war. This places an enormous nation-
wide responsibility on the mothers, for, not
only must they raise the average family of
five children, but, they have also to provide
for them. (The 7 piasters per refugee each
week paid by the Ministry of Social Welfare,
which itself receives only 1/2 of 1 %a on the
total budget, even with anticipated increase
is not sufficient in these inflationary times,
and any way, does not reach many unclassi-
fled families.)
The result of this situation is varied, some-
times, interestingly enough, the families and
friends in shelters, such as those I visited in
Qui-Nhon, Binh Dinh, and Cholon, often
band together and form a type of tribe or
larger independent unit.
In other Instances, children are separated,
abandoned or left alone and they drift Into
the provincial towns, where they exist in
packs and on their own. Every provincial
town has these urchins and Saigon appears
to have thousands of them. They often syn-
dicate their business activities-shoe shining,
begging, car watching, etc.-and many are as
young as seven or eight. Here, the peer
group, existing and sleeping In the streets,
has taken the family's place.
A third effect is reflected in the number
of orphanages in South Viet-Nam. There
were 77 when I left and the indications are
that the number will continually increase.
They house between 10,000 and 10,500 chil-
dren and ranged in size from 25 or 30 to
several hundreds, and the children in age
from the new-born to 17 or 18 year olds, I
lived in one, and visited a great number of
others. The care and facilities range from
poor, to good. Mademoiselle La Mer, the
UNICEF representative to the Ministry of
Social Welfare is alarmed, along with a num-
ber of others, that the authorities will sieze
upon the construction of more orphanages
aS a solution to the problem of Viet-Nam's
unattended children. This could easily hap-
pen-as I understand it did In the Korean
instance--for foster parent treatment is not
a part of the pattern of the Vietnamese peo-
ple.
orphanages at present, have one or both par-
ents-according to UNICEF statistics which
I have appended (B); two thirds, have no
parents. Physically, it is not an unattrac-
tive thought for a parent to place her child
in such a setting,and keep him there until
he is able to work, always refusing to al-
low him to be placed for adoption.
Actually, these settings breed dependence
and low morale and rarely provide a mini-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 22, ,7966
orally adequate educational program. Per-, doned, etc.), That it be implemented by
sonal attention and care is characteristically the American Voluntary Agencies and
absent. Food and shelter are provided, ade- groups such as Terre Des Honunes, in a co-
quately, as a rule, but, in the makeshift ordinated fashion through its Council,
"orphanages" which one often finds attached (ACVA) with the financial support and gen-
to the refugee shelters, these basic neces- eral assistance of the U.S. Government and
sities are frequently absent, and the tiny the cooperation of the Government of Viet-
beings more nearly resemble animals than Nam.
humans.
There are bound to be long range effects
upon a future adult population resulting
from this de-familization, and de-personal-
ization of the lives of their children. Im-
mediately, one is quite conscious of the
increasing problem of juvenile delinquency
which is plaguing Minister Lieng to no end.
It persists and grows in every city and pro-
vincial town.
The increasing suicide rate (not political
suicide) in South Viet-Nam is also quite
alarming-this is a fairly recent phenom-
Second, that, as a part of the first sugges-
tion, and a natural follow up, thereto, a
foster home and adoptive placement pro-
gram be undertaken by some Voluntary
Agencies who are specialists in this field, in
the United States and elsewhere. In the
meantime, available hospital and institu-
tional places should be secured, also in the
United States and elsewhere, for the chil-
dren.
Third, that planning and construction of
needed medical treatment facilities in Viet-
Nam be greatly accelerated, and the number
enom which was raised by Mr. Baesjou-the of medical personnel in service in that coun-
UNESCO Representative, and also by Lawson- try be tremendously increased,
Mooney the Director of Catholic Relief Serv-
ices. While no accurate statistics are avail-
able, as yet, the incidence of self-destruction
is growing, and of particular note and horror
is the fact that mass or group suicides are
becoming more common, and that the par-
ticipants are frequently teenagers.
With the destruction of the family, family
life, veneration for age and physical removal
from the ancestral burial place--the major-
ity of Vietnamese indulge in confucianistic
ancestral worship and do not attend any
formal temple or church-a void in appar-
ently created and a social reaction sets in.
These, then, are the more subtle effects of
the physical conflict. The hundreds of chil-
dren whom I met in various parts of the
country, some briefly, some for periods of
extended conversation and acquaintence-
ship, could best be described as solemn. How
often, Lawson Mooney and I both com-
mented on the fact that the majority of
them did not know how to participate in any
form of group play. Fun, was clearly not a
part of their usual day; listlessness, definitely
was. I taught English three evenings a week,
for awhile to an interested group at Sancta
Maria, and then, again, more briefly in Binh
Dinh to some injured "V.C." children and
found all of them to be quite responsive,
after an initial period of timidity.
Mr. Chairman, the committee should
briefly be aware of the very special problems
facing the Eurasian children of South Viet-
Nam. Simply put, they are by and large
rejected by the society at this time, and
frequently abandoned. This is a particularly
relevant concern for the Sub-committee due
to the increasing number of "Ameriasian" or
half American babies presently being pro-
duced in that country. If no plan of evacua-
tion and foster or adoptive placement, in this
country or elsewhere, is devised for these who
are cast aside, then, they surely will have a
difficult future road to tread.
CONCLUSIONS
The effects of the conflict, Mr. Chairman,
have _ greatly set back the capacity of the
existing government to provide essential
services such as education and health care,
so that even at present the needs- of the
population are not nearly being met. In
addition, the great numbers of children live
daily in a situation where they could be
physically brutalized at any instant. Per-
haps, even more ominous is the breakdown
of the family and what this portends for the
future, as well as what it means right now.
By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to submit some proposals for the
consideration of the subcommittee.
First, that a program of mass evacuation
of children from South Viet-Nam be estab-
lished. That it operate on the basis of es-
tablished priority conditions for evacuation
(i.e. the wounded, and injured; the aban-
move, immediately, the children from the
areas of intense fighting-particularly in the
Central Highlands, and the Northern five
Provinces-and wherever possible, to reset-
tle them in family units in more secure
areas.
Fifth, that to more efficiently carry out
the whole relief assistance program in. Viet-
Nam, consideration be given to the U.S. Gov-
ernment through AID contracting on a wider,
basis with the Vol-Agency community on
a specialized basis for the purpose of dividing
up the tasks and avoiding present duplica-
tion.
Mr. Chairman, the American Voluntary
Agencies are doing yeoman work in Viet
Nam. Without their presence, it is safe to
say that the conditions previously described
would be far worse. Catholic Relief Services
alone, for example, transported and dis-
tributed 50,000,000 pounds of food, cloth-
ing, equipment and supplies last year. Sim-
ilar efforts in varied fields were turned in by
CARE, I.V.S., Church World Service, Foster
Parents Plan and others. But, all of this is
clearly, not enough. A new and full com-
mitment is needed, Mr. Chairman, to rescue
the children of Viet-Nam from a situation
that is no way of their making. If ever a
group of innocents had a claim on history
it is these little ones. There must begin an
immediate, effective and coordinated attack
on these conditions, involving both in coun-
try and outside of the country programs and
solutions. And all the while internal fa-
ciilties are being developed to treat the
maimed and scarred of tomorrow, let us re-
member that today's children are waiting.
APPENDIX
VIETNAMESE CHILDREN IN FIRE AND BLOOD
INTRODUCTION
A letter from the International Red Cross
Committee (IRCC) to Terre des Holnmes
(9-2-1965) mentioned the Vietnamese pro-
vincial hospitals "crowded with wounded,
particularly people suffering from extremely
severe burns. There are among these many
civilians and therefore many children."
Burns and wounds resulted from bombs, bul-
lets, grenades, napalm, phosphorous, flares.
2) Terre des Hommes simultaneously and
In identical terms established contact with
the government of the Vietnamese Republic
(South), with the representative of the NLF
(Vietcong) in Algiers and with the govern-
ment of the Democratice Republic of Viet-
nam (North). It offered to each its immedi-
ate and direct help to Vietnamese children
who were burnt or wounded and cannot be
cared for properly in their present location.
3) The government of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (North) did not answer
this offer. The representative of the NLF's
response (received after three months' delay)
expressed only the desire that Terre des
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Hommes should make a protest with a po-
litical character. Only the government of
South Vietnam gave enthusiastic support to
our proposal.
4) A representative of Terre des Hommes
met twice with Mr. Maunoir and Mr. Durand,
delegates of the IRCC, who expressed ap-
proval of the projects of Terre des Hommes
(treatment in Europe or elsewhere of chil-
dren seriously hurt but not treated, or not
treatable locally.) At the same time they
asked their colleagues in Saigon to open the
doors of the public health and social action
ministries as well as of the Vietnamese Red
Cross to Terre des Hammes.
5) Terre des Hommes then contacted (10-
15-66) a representative of the State Depart-
ment (Washington) at the United States
Mission in Geneva, who was relatively open
to our plans and asked to see us again upon
our return from Vietnam. He recommended
strongly that we contact Dr. J. who is an
American General there.
6) Terre des Hommes reserved hospital
beds in different countries (Switzerland, Aus-
tria, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Hol-
land, Denmark) and the delegates, upon their
departure to Vietnam already had "in their
pocket" about 400 beds. The expense of
hospitalization was assumed by Terre des
Hommes.
DISEASE AND REMEDY
10-17-1965 Two representatives of Terre
des Hommes, one of them a surgeon, left for
Vietnam.
(a) Stop at Bangkok (Thailand)
This stop gave us the assurance that we
would be able to hospitalize and treat in
Thailand a sizeable number of burned and
wounded children from Vietnam, thanks to
the important medical facilities and hospital
possibilities in Thailand. At the end of the
mission we planned to visit Bangkok again.
However, it is obvious that the European
public is not likely to finance an organization
that provides care several thousand miles
away if it is not directly shocked by the con-
tact with Vietnamese children treated under
its eyes in Switzerland or other European
countries. This contact with Vietnamese
children would make it possible for the
European public to "live" the suffering of
these children and to associate itself with it
by an act of will.
(b) Visit in Vietnam
1) In the course of numerous encounters
and official interviews (minister of public
health, highly placed health officials, Vietna-
mese heads of medical departments and hos-
pitals, American military doctors) our proj-
ects were unamimously well received. The
reason for this unanimity is the obvious im-
possibility In a large number of cases of
practicing locally any type of really efficient
medicine or serious surgery (especially ortho-
pedic surgery) because of lack of facilities
and personnel.
2) Besides orphanages and baby centers,
which take in innumerable children, who are
starving, very seriously ill or abandoned, we
visited four provincial hospitals. Only one
of these (Rach-Gia) which benefits from the
presence of an American medical team, seems
to operate normally. The three other hos-
pitals (Hue, Cantho, Mytho-but particu-
larly Hue) show the frightening spectacle of
an Immense distress: To the extent that one
finds children burned from head to foot who
are treated only with vaseline, because of
lack of a) ointment for burns, b) cotton,
c) gauze, d) personnel. In places, with the
atmosphere of slaughter houses for people,
where flies circulate freely on children who
have been skinned alive, there are no facili-
ties for hygiene, no fans, and no air condi-
tioning. We know, from reliable sources,
the head doctor of a large hospital told us:
"I have received many representatives from
diverse institutions, but, before you, none
even asked to see a single child.
3) It is important to be very conscious of
the fact that most of the children who are
wounded, burned or sick are not in hospitals
(treated in hospitals). This is because they
are never found, because there is no means
of transportation, or because of non-existent
medical or para-medical personnel and the
lack of specialized equipment or sanitary
facilities. These children suffer and die
without care, "at home", in villages, in straw
huts, etc.
4) Out of a total of 500 (800 or 1000) Viet-
namese doctors only 200 minister to the
needs of the civilian population (14 million)
which amounts to only a little more than one
doctor per 100,000 people (end of October,
1965). The other doctors are used for mili-
tary needs.
5) About the same time, a little bit later,
and independently of Terre des Hommes, two
Dutch doctors visited Vietnam. One of them
was a specialist in plastic surgery and the
other an internist. Here are extracts from
texts that were published upon their return
in the Dutch press: "It is indescribable.
Thousands of people suffering from untended
burns arrive from the interior of the country.
Nobody takes care of these unfortunate peo-
ple because no one seems to know what could
be done. In Vietnam one encounters all the
forms of infectious diseases and their compli-
cations. Every tenth South Vietnamese suf-
fers from tuberculosis. Numerous types of
sickness are not treated. There is an un-
imaginable number of people suffering from
war wounds. The few existing hospitals are
overflowing with patients. It Is not rare that
three people share the same bed. There are
practically no nurses. Most people are tended
by members of their own family, who usually
sleep in the hospital Itself, under the bed or
next to it, anywhere where they can find
room. No efficient treatment of burns is
used."
6) Some figures (end of October 1965)
provided by authorized official sources.
Burned and wounded children: thousands
(no precise census on a national scale is
possible). Even if there were only hundreds
our anguish and our action would already be
justified;
Completely abandoned children: thou-
sands, including 11,000 orphans;
Children suffering from tuberculosis: see
above the national percentage;
Hungry children and children suffering
from undernourishment: thousands (exact
census is not possible) ;
Children suffering from infantile paralysis
or serious multiple illness: number not
known but obviously enormous.
Civilian refugees (adult and children)
600,000 to 800,000. Refugees without refuge
and extremely miserable.
7) Like the American doctor S. (a Colonel)
in Thailand, the American doctor J. (a Gen-
eral) and his assistant, doctor M. (a Colonel)
with whom we have had lengthy meetings,
were quite favorable to the projects of Terre
des Hommes. Their approval, however, de-
i
19357
a) Efficient medical and serious surgi-
cal procedures in local areas are impossible
in the present circumstances, depending
upon cases and location;
b) Not only in the hospitals, but every-
where, it is urgent to detect sick, wounded
or burnt children who are unattended or
insufficiently cared for;
c) Relevance of the Terre des Hommes
projects: transportation to Europe, Thai-
land and other countries of children who
have been found to need care. The existing
national and international help will remain
for a long time Incapable of coping with all
cases;
d) It is illusory to imagine that external
initiatives, even powerful ones, could create
from nothing, a sufficient number of hos-
pitals perfectly provided with rigging (beds,
nursing and medical personnel, supplies and
equipment). The present Terres des Hom-
mes project is not new for this organization.
Several years of experience have proven
that it is just, humane and efficient to treat
elsewhere those who because they are not
attended to, where they are, suffer, wither
or die. It is another illusion to wait hope-
fully but helplessly until "others" (govern-
ments, institutions) should "do something."
Even if this "something" is presently begin-
ning to show signs of life, although for the
time being the immense and intense need
cannot be met.
e) For financial reasons, it is necessary to
have at our disposal free airplanes or free
places in airplanes with unoccupied seats.
f) One or several competent and perma-
nent representatives of Terre des Hommes
should be sent to Vietnam.
PRESENT CONDITIONS
1) Upon our return, in spite of his own
wishes, those of General J. and our own, re-
peated attempts at meeting the previously
encountered representative from the State
Deparment remained fruitless.
2) Several people held a meeting at Bern
(11, 26, 1965) at the Political Department of
the Federal Government. A representa-
tive of the Political Department, the direc-
tor and two staff members of the Federal
Police for Aliens, Mr. J. P. Maunoir as dele-
gate of the IRCC, the general secretary of the
Swiss Red Cross and three representatives of
Terre des Hommes, as well as others did at-
tend this meeting. The delegate of the
IRCC (an organization which has been do-
ing what it can in Vietnam) made a final
declaration: "At the IRCC we think that we
are bound to help those who are victims of
war or of its consequences. Therefore, we ap-
prove any action that is taken either locally
or abroad. If we have the means we shall
help. Our rule of action is to attend to the
most pressing needs; when a child is burned
or wounded, it is at that very moment that
he must be helped and prevented from
dying. But if, besides our own efforts, there
exists an organization such as Terre des
Hommes which attempts long range action
we give it our approval. Our delegates, if
they are able to, will help the representative
that you (Terres des Hommes) shall send to
Vietnam to select the children."
pended upon the agreement of the Amer
can 3) On behalf of Terre des Hommes a certi-
government (personified as far as we were
concerned, by the representative of the State fled d nurse, Her Miss V. B.mission, (with left for the Vietnam a (12,
12
Department in Geneva whom we had seen she would receive the help of IRCC
before leaving and who was to be contacted ing that p
upon our return) to give us the help desired delegates in Saigon, according to the declara-
by our organization, namely the loan of tion of Mr. Maunoir in Bern) was as follows:
American military medical planes. Later the a) To detect seriously wounded, burned, or
Federal Office for Aeronautics (Swiss) should sick Vietnamese children who are insuffici-
consent to the landing of the planes on Swiss ently cared for, in the hospitals of the capi-
territory. Doctor J. who is a General, thought tal and provincial cities, as well as in vil-
that it is desirable to help unfortunate chil- lages and towns.
dren in the way chosen by Terre des Hommes b) To select transferable children and or-
because "if the U.S.A. intends to send people ganize their medical and social records. To
in many Vietnamese hospitals. This latter to train leaders, this will take much time." initiate necessary arrangements for their
information was given to us by competent Meanwhile the children are waiting. transportation and treatment in hospitals
specialists or official people. One of them, 8) Conclusion. In Switzerland, Europe (or elsewhere) where,
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19358 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 22, 1966
upon action from Terre des Hommes, beds
have already been reserved for them.
c) To organize and activate this trans-
portation of children.
4) Active search for free means of trans-
portation: American military medical planes
(see below), airplanes or seats aboard civilian
airplanes: Swissair, Air France, Alitalia, Air-
India, etc. Contacts which would probably
prove fruitful in the future with the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA,
Montreal). Terres des Hommes, which needs
very large amounts of money necessary for
the hospitalization and care of the children,
cannot spend huge sums in travel, when
every day hundreds of empty seats, which
do not benefit anybody, are carried across the
skies of the world at great cost. Several
civilian airlines, sensitive to these considera-
tions, are enthusiastically campaigning for
this new style of human, cooperation. Simul-
taneosuly the search for European and
extra-European facilities available at the
best price is continued. Terre des Hommes
Is expanding into other prosperous countries
in order to Increase appreciably the chances
for the survival of children.
5) Because it was impossible to contact
the delegate of the State Department who,
according to General J., is the only "com-
petent" official, Terre des Hommes wrote to
President Johnson in order to obtain his per-
sonal intervention; transmission of this re-
quest was confirmed by the chief of the U.S.
Mission in Geneva, following which, the
much-desired encounter between the rep-
resentative of Terres des Hommes and the
representative of the State Department fi-
nally took place. But he is opposed to any
cooperation with Terres. des Hommes under
the desired conditions. American help could
eventually be obtained if the Terres des
Hommes organization limited its efforts to
local work. Therefore, in spite of the com-
petent support of General J. for the Terre
des Hommes project we shall not have the
assistance of military medical planes to aid
the wounded, burned or sick Vietnamese
children whom we. wish to help.
6) 1.7.1966-In Saigon during a cabinet
meeting the definitive and official agreement
to the Terre des Hommes projects by the
general-prime minister of the Vietnamese
Republic was announced and a permanent
inter-departmental Committee is created.
7) 1.13.1966-Terre des Hommes organized
in Geneva an international press conference
about these subjects. The two Dutch spe-
cialists participated in this activity.
8) 1.17.1966-Letter from the White House
(Washington) to Terre des Hommes: Subtle
but negative answer, to the request of Terre
des Hommes.
9) 1.20.1966-Pressing message from the
Red Cross: "A cruel war ravages Vietnam.
Civilian hospitals are overcrowded with the
sick and the wounded and it is hardly pos-
sible to attempt to give the necessary treat-
ments. Hundreds of thousands of refugees
are piled up in the vicinity of large cities
and survive in the greatest misery. Incalcul-
able number of families are torn apart.
Abandoned children and orphans can no
longer be counted.
10) 1.31.1968-Answer from Terre des
Hommes to the White House. The text is so
explicit and detailed that there was reason
to conclude with "the conviction that the
people and the government of the United
State would assist Terry des Hommes to
rescue a large number of wounded and
burned. Vietnamese children."
NOTES
1) The hospitalization in Europe of several
hundred children shall expose them to the
population of prosperous countries. As a
result of having seen, known, lived with and
loved these children, the people of these
countries shall accept with full understand-
ing and confidence the financing of the care
that we shall offer to hundreds or thousands
of other children in countries closer to their
own. The physical "transfer" and the tem-
porary "uprooting" of these children have
nothing in common with the "transfers" and
the "uprooting" which are caused by suffer-
ing and death.
2) We are all in agreement with respect to
the principle that local work is most desira-
ble but who has done it efficiently and suf l-
ciently since the beginning of the war? Was
there any action from those who could do
something, continue to be able to do some-
thing or preach action? To organize local
hospitals would be the logical and wise thing
to do. But who would make the plans, draw
the blueprints, supervise the construction?
When? Where? And how much time would
it take? Where are the funds, the supplies,
the equipment and the personnel? Where
can one find large numbers of available and
highly trained specialists? How many are
there? Where are the necessary' army of
male and female nurses? If it is so easy to
save locally by modern means thousands of
burned, wounded and sick people, children
as well as adults, why has this not already
been done? Now as in past centuries, when-
ever horrors beyond measure are encountered,
it Is affirmed that! "someone' is going to do
something about it, somewhere" Terre des
Hommes has chosen to save immediately, by
available means, those little ones that can
be saved. There exists an irremediable dif-
ference between the notion of working "on
the scene" and the need for saving people
right now.
For it is not enough to shout: "Let there
be a hospital!"
[Lausanne, Is ler fevrier 19661
JANUARY 17, 1966.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. K.: I refer to your letter of De-
cember 14, 1965, to the United States Mission,
Geneva, together with copy of letter of same
date addressed to President Johnson.
I understand that both you and your asso-
ciate, Dr. C., have been informed through
your meetings with our Mission in Geneva
that the United States Government welcomes
all efforts to aid the victims of Communist
aggression in South Vietnam, and we com-
mend your organization and all others which
have similar humanitarian objectives to ex-
tend medical assistance to victims, particu-
larly children.
I am sure that you were advised by the U.S.
Mission in Geneva, during your visit in Viet-
nam and by Mr. A. S., that some thirty coun-
tries are already engaged in extending medi-
cal assistance to victims of the conflict in
South Vietnam. You also have our view that
the most effective way of extending assistance
is on the scene in South Vietnam where chil-
dren and others can be treated near their
families and in familiar surroundings. How-
ever, any medical assistance given to needy
Vietnamese children outside of the country
Is, of course, also welcome.
As Mr. S. informed Mr. C. at a meeting in
Geneva on December 20, U.S. Military air-
craft cannot be provided for airlift to Eu-
rope of Vietnamese children who may need
medical treatment, and no United States
funds are available to support your activities
in Europe. On that occasion, Dr. C. informed
Mr. S. that in view of unavailability of U.S.
aircraft, your organization would be able to
obtain commercial aircraft on a gratis basis
to enable you to proceed with the airlift plan.
Accordingly, we were somewhat surprised
to learn that at a press conference! on Jan-
uary 12 In Geneva you were reported as hav-
ing. stated that the U.S. Government. response
to your request for U.S. military aircraft to
airlift needy Vietnamese children to Europe
is not to be considered finally "negative". In
order to avoid any misunderstanding, I repeat
to,you Mr. 8.'s. advice to Dr. C. that U.S. air
craft are definitely not available for this pur-
pose. Since neither U.S. aircraft nor U.S.
funds are available in support of the activ-
ities which you plan to undertake in Europe,
your plan is a matter to be decided upon by
your organization and the Government of
South Vietnam.
May I again take this occasion to commend
you and your organization for the humani-
tarian activities which you are seeking to
carry out. I regret that our commitments
and undertakings are such that we cannot
assist a project of this nature which is out-
side of South Vietnam, but I assure you that
we arc prepared to. consider extending assist-
ance to organizations which undertake hu-
manitarian projects for the benefit of needy
persons within South Vietnam.
Sincerely,
Mr. CHESTER L. CooPER,
The White house,
LAUSANNE,
Jan. 31, 1966.
Washington, D.C. (U.S.A.)
DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge
receipt of your letter of the 17th inst., the
text of which constitutes the reply of the
United States government to the requests we
have made on behalf of Vietnamese children
who have been cruelly stricken by the war.
This reply calls for the following comments:
(The United States Government letter
states:)
1. "We commend your organization and all
others which have similar humanitarian ob-
jectives to extend medical assistance to vic-
tims, particularly children."
In other words, you agree with us in rec-
ognizing the existence of these child victims,
whose number and the nature of whose suf-
ferings have been evident to us on the scene.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
2. ". . some thirty countries are already
engaged in extending medical assistance to
victims of the conflict in South Vietnam."
While we give due recognition, in passing,
to the commitment of these countries, we
are resolved on action with respect to our
own concern. Our position is especially clear
in the light of the "urgent" appeal now is-
sued by the Red Cross: "The innocent vic-
tims of the war in Viet Nam must be
saved . A cruel war is raging In Viet. Nam.
Civilian hospitals are overcrowded with sick
and wounded. It is scarcely possible to give
necessary care any longer."
Everything presently undertaken (or
planned) obviously deserves only praise, but
these measures cannot be considered[ suf-
ficient as long as numerous wounded or
burned children remain deprived of care or
effective treatment.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
3. "The most effective way of extending
assistance is on the scene in South Vietnam
where children and others can be treated
near their families and in familiar surround-
ings."
Our viewpoint differs from yours:
a) To help "on the scene" may appear
the most logical plan of action, but it is not
therefore the most "effective". For the "ef-
fective" way of extending assistance is ac-
tually to save victims through supplying
treatment truly suited to the nature of the
malady, under the safest technical condi-
tions, with the aid of a sufficient number of
highly specialized medical and paramedical
personnel (in plastic surgery, for example).
They must have modern equipment which
is indispensable, and sanitary conditions
that have nothing in common with the hor-
rors of the Vietnamese hospitals we have
visited (only one in four is an exception).
The "most effective" manner of saving
burned or wounded children who have been
insufficiently treated, not treated, or who
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are untreatable on the scene is obviously
then to save them elsewhere, with medical
and surgical procedures which are suitable
and which modern science makes available.
We would further note that, according to
information received from the most trust-
worthy authorized sources, a very great
number of these wounded and burned chil-
dren are not in hospitals, but are suffering
(or dying) "at private homes", either be-
cause they cannot be transported to hospi-
tals, or because overcrowded hospitals can-
not receive them, or because the hospitals
have no facilities for giving them proper
care; care that would be dangerous in any
event because of a total lack of sanitation
facilities. This lack of sanitation is often
accompanied by an absence of the most
elementary equipment: fans, air-condition-
ers, protection against flies etc.
b) The families of thees children are fre-
quently absent, far away, wounded them-
selves, dead or missing.
c) As for their "familiar surroundings",
these may be only a straw hut or a village
where one suffers or dies without assistance,
or else those hospitals whose indescribable
destitution makes them veritable charnel-
houses for the living.
Two Dutch doctors whom we did not know
made a trip to Vietnam shortly after we
did, made the same observations as we did,
and drew the same conclusions: there Is no
possibility, on the scene and in the immedi-
ate circumstances, of being able really to
cope with all the problems. This explains
the favorable response with which General J.
and his colleagues have received our move-
ment's program.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
4. "However, any medical assistance given
to needy Vietnamese children outside of
the country is, of course, also welcome."
This is precisely the type of assistance
which we are furnishing. And we are very
much aware that it is, as you term it, "wel-
come."
(The United States Government letter
states:)
5. "U.S. Military aircraft cannot be pro-
vided for the airlift to Europe of Vietnamese
children who may need medical treatment,
and no United States funds are available to
support your activities in Europe."
The members of our movement-and the
world will share our feelings-experience
some difficulty in picturing the United States
unable to furnish aircraft which might be
used to transport our children, or without
the financial means to support our activities
in Europe, that is, to finance the chartering
of an airplane. We have never asked for
funds from the United States, but simply
for the loan of one or several military hos-
pital planes, or the offer of unoccupied places
in American planes.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
6. "We were somewhat surprised to learn
that at a press conference on January 12 in
Geneva you were reported as having stated
that the U.S. Government response to your
request for U.S. military aircraft to airlift
needy Vietnamese children to Europe is not
to be considered finally negative."
At the time of that conference I declared:
"I cannot bring myself to consider as abso-
lutely negative the reply which a member of
the Department of State gave us, in the name
of the U.S. government.
Here are the reasons for that declaration,
whose optimism will be either justified or dis-
appointed by the future:
a) I was not able (and I am not able) to
keep myself from hoping, indeed from being
certain that the American people are prepared
to furnish aircraft or funds for the rescue
from Vietnam of burned or wounded children
who at this moment cannot be saved in their
own land.
b) I have good reason not to forget that
part of the world owes its liberation from
Hitlerlan executioners to the American peo-
ple. Thus, for reasons of discretion, and so
to speak, in the name of the American peo-
ple, I did not dare to admit publicly to the
press of the world that the U.S. government
has answered "NO" to the request of Terres
des Hammes.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
7. "U.S. aircraft are definitely not avail-
able for this purpose."
The American military air force includes
hospital planes. And even if we admit that
they are not available for the transportation
of burned and wounded children, it would be
in keeping with the humanitarian obligation
toward these children of the American gov-
ernment and people to make these planes
available.
(The United States Government letter
states:)
8. "Since neither U.S. aircraft nor U.S.
funds are available in support of the activi-
ties which you plan to undertake in Europe,
your plan is a matter to be decided upon by
your organization and the Government of
South Vietnam."
Even if American aircraft and American
funds cannot be used in the resci a work
which has been undertaken, and taking ac-
count of the reception given by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam to the pro-
gram of Terre des Hommes, we deem it use-
ful to emphasize that our plans are far from
being limited to the concerns of that gov-
ernment and our organization.
Indeed, without making any judgment at
all on the direction of this war, we feel
that the armed forces of the United States,
involved in acts which have mutilated our
little ones, can in no way shed that involve-
ment when it is an urgent question of sav-
ing the lives of those children. At the very
moment when it is both possible and neces-
sary to lend support, the U.S. armed forces
cannot content themselves with falling back
on an organization without aircraft and
without large financial support or on the
government of an unfortunate people.
In conclusion, in order that you may have
the opportunity to express publicly the sur-
prise occasioned by my declaration at our
press conference, I am releasing to the inter-
national press, copies of the correspondence
between the U.S. Government and Terre des
Hommes, together with a memorandum on
our activity. All items are reproduced in
full, without additions; deletions or commen-
tary; only the names of the American Gen-
eral and Officers favorable to our plans are
replaced by initials.
With the conviction that the people and
government of the United States will want
to assist Terre des Hommes to rescue a large
number of wounded and burned Vietnamese
children, may I assure you, Sir, of my most
respectful and cordial sentiments.
TERRE DES HOMMES,
(Signed) SPOKESMAN FOR TERRE DES
HOMMES.
[From the York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily]
THE MILK OF HUMAN KINDNESS FLOWS IN EU-
ROPE-TINY VICTIMS OF U.S. NAPALM RAIDS
(By Jane Armstrong)
LONDON.-Two little faceless children from
Vietnam, sent here for free plastic surgery at
the famous Mclndoe Burns Center, have
aroused all Britain to the horrors of a war
in which the Innocent and young seem to be
chief victims of napalm, grenades and satu-
ration bombing.
Since British papers showed pictures of the
youngsters being carried from the plane with
muslin bags over their heads, money, toys
and gifts have flooded the hospital at East
Grinstead in Sussex. Surgeons there who are
waiving the fees, already have started the
delicate work of giving back to these waifs of
war new, happy faces.
"We are taking special care to make them
look Vietnamese," said a hospital official.
The boy, Doan Minh Luan, aged eight, who
needs 12 operations, may be here for years.
His face was mutilated beyond recognition in
the fire in which his family were burned alive
last year. Because of the war, Luan had no
treatment, at all for more than four months.
The girl, Tran Thi Thong, nine, was com-
pletely scarred by a grenade and has no eye-
lids. Her parents are peasant farmers be-
yond Saigon and she will go back to them
eventually.
At the Burns Center where the late Sir
Archibald Mclndoe restored many wartime
Canadian flyers, the children are private pa-
tients. Their beds, costing $135 a week each,
are paid for by Lady Sainsburg, energetic
wife of grocery chain millionaire.
"Now I am trying to bring in some para-
plegic cases. I like doing things quickly,"
Lady Sainsbury told me.
She is starting a British branch of the
Swiss charity Terre des Hammes (World of
Mankind), which rescues child victims of
war.
"We made the same offer to both North
and South Vietnam," she said. "But the
North won't send their children out to us.
They replied with a statement of their be-
liefs."
Yet politics in South Vietnam almost pre-
vented the first group of injured children
leaving there too. When Swiss philanthro-
pist Edmund Keyser, founder of Terre des
Hommes, asked for help by U.S. military
transport, American generals in the area at
first backed the idea as good propaganda.
But the final decision, like others in the
Vietnam war, was made in the White House
by the president. The answer was "No."
Although the Americans airlift wounded
Vietnamese soldiers, their policy is that ci-
vilian casualties depend for treatment on
foreign medical teams sent in.
Keyser, who began saving children in the
Spanish civil war, then asked "world airlines
for the use of their empty seats from Saigon.
This was refused. Air fare alone costs nearly
$1,500, so Keyser and his volunteers raised
the money to charter the first flight that
brought 32 Vietnamese youngsters to Geneva
a month ago.
Beds were promised for them all over Eu-
rope. Italy took the sickest 16 without quar-
antine, despite the risk of cholera.
"The big difficulty is cost of transport,"
said Lady Sainsbury. Vietnam is In greatest
need. The children are so terribly maimed.
But our ability to help them depends on free
transport or raising money ourselves."
The two little Vietnamese at East Grin-
stead appear to have started a substantial
British effort to help others like them. Do-
nations are rolling in, sometimes as little as
sixpence from' an old age pensioner.
At the Vietnamese embassy, an anony-
mous Englishman who lived in Saigon, mans
the telephone to give progress bulletins to an
avid public. There is always news to report
because the seven members of the embassy
visit the hospital in turn to keep the young-
ters cheerful.
Luan and Thong share a sterile, sealed
room overlooking the hospital gardens, He
is intrigued by his new building set and she
by a talking doll. But they are most fasci-
nated by television, the first they have ever
seen, and by the English bathtub in which
they can splash.
The hospital staff have been astonished by
their happy dispositions. Within a week,
Thong was greeting the nurse, in English.
"Hello, one, two, three, four, five, hello."
She apparently memorized this from tele-
vision.
Within two weeks both children had a
first successful operation to restore their
upper eyelids. Luan had extra surgery to
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19360 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE August 22, 1,966
flee his chin which had "melted" into his closed. Luan learned in only three days
neck so that he could not close his mouth. and then taught the girl. She is more sensi-
Now he can. A Vietnamese girl student tive about her face. She was a pretty little
flew from Geneva for a few days so that the thing.
youngsters would not be frightened on There is, inevitably, some mystery as to
awakening to find their eyes blindfolded. who these children are and how they were
The student also set up a special menu for chosen from thousands of other needy cases.
them of boiled rice, vegetable soup and pork. There is only one children's hospital in
Then there was a second operation to give South Vietnam where patients lie two in a
them lower lids. Then skin grafting starts bed and the death rate is depressingly high.
little by little at fortnightly intervals until The Vietnam embassy, also in the dark,
September when both will be given a rest is sending reports on all the children to
from this harrowing procedure. Eventually Saigon where it is hoped the ministry of so-
Luan and Thong will move into the chil- cial welfare finds it possible to inform rela-
den's ward where lots of laughter and play tives. No one can say what will happen to
is encouraged so that new faces grow, look- Luan, the orphan. There.are at least 30,-
ing happy. 000 known children like him without any-
. Lady Sainsbury, who took them to hospi- one to care if they live or die. Lady Sains-
tal and telephone nearly every day, said bury hopes to bring over orphans for adop-
"they are clever children, the little boy es- tion here.
pecially. They had to relearn how to raise But the big obstacle to all these splendid
their new eyelids which otherwise stayed plans is a lack of transport.
ANNEXE No. 3.-Distribution des orphelins dans les orphelinats du sud Vietnam
1+ Le pourcentage cat calculi stir l'effectif total do chaque province, i'interpolation so fait avec la r@glo :l calcul, ce
qul fait clue nous impliquons les dicinlales]
Orphelins
Enfants
Enfants confles
Provinces
Ayant encore des
proches parents
Sans proches
parents
Abandonn6s
par lours parents
Total
Nombre
Pour-
Nombre
Pour-
Nombre
Pour-
Nombro
Pour-
centage
tentage
tentage
contago
Phu Yen ----------
39
16.2
125
52.0
21
8
52
22.0
237
Da Nang_ ----------
Qu:m Ngai-------
82
31.0
130
49.0
1
75
0.38
29
11.0
262
718
36.0
387
20.0
113
6
732
37.0
1950
Bien lloa----------
47
29.0
104
62.0
3
1.7
7
4.3
161
Vinh Binh ---------
52
8510
_
8
4
6.0
61
jut Nhon ---------
fah Long
(1)
24
(1)
24.0
(1)
4
(1)
4.0
2
(1)
12
(1)
60
(1)
60.0
(1)
100
Thua Tlilon-------
116
17.0
113
16.0
1.4
2.7
412
62.0
659
Longg An----------
MyThc------
__--_
34
18
28.0
10.0
3
21
2.5
12.0
t
89
0.8
53
81
40
68.0
234.0
119
168
Go Cong_____
_____
6
10.0
18
30.0
7
11
29
48.0
60
AnXuyyen
Quang Tr
57
19
35.0
68.0
2
4
3.0
14.0
1
3
1.6
10
-------- __
2
----------
7.0
28
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there further morning busi-
ness? If not, morning business is closed.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, informed the Senate that,
pursuant to the provisions of section 1,
Public Law 689, 84th Congress, the
Speaker had appointed Mr. HAYS, of
Ohio; Mr. RonnNO, of New Jersey; Mr.
DENTON, of Indiana; Mr. RIVERS, of
South Carolina; Mr. CLARK, of Pennsyl-
vania; Mr. ARENns, of Illinois; Mr. CHAM-
BERLAIN, of Michigan; Mr. BATES, Of
Massachusetts; and Mr. FINDLEY, of Illi-
nois as members of the U.S. group of the
North Atlantic Treaty Parliamentary
Conference, on the part of the House.
The message announced that the
House had disagreed to the amendments
of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14596)
making appropriations for the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and related agen-
cies for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1967, and for other purposes; agreed to
the conference asked by the Senate an
the disagreeing votes of the two Houses
thereon, and that Mr. WHITTEN, Mr.
NATCHER, Mr. HULL, Mr. MORRIS, Mr. MA-
HON, Mr. MICHEL, Mr. LANGEN, and Mr.
Bow were appointed managers on the
part of the House at the conference.
ENROLLED BILL SIGNED
The message also announced that the
Speaker had affixed his signature to the
enrolled bill (S. 2663) for the relief of
Dinesh Poddar and Girish Kumar Pod-
dar.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPER-
VISORY ACT OF 1956
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate proceed to the
consideration of S. 3158, the unfinished
business.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The bill will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE. CLERK. A bill (S.
3158) to strengthen the regulatory and
supervisory authority of Federal agen-
cies over insured banks and insured
savings and loan associations, and for
other purposes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The question is on agreeing to
the motion of the Senator from Wis-
consin.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Senate resumed the consideration of the
bill (S. 3158), which had been reported
from the Committee on Banking and
Currency, with an amendment, to strike
out all after the enacting clause and
insert:
That this Act may be cited as the "Flnai ial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966".
TITLE I-PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FEDt:RAL
HOME LOON DANK BOARD AND THE FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION
SEC. 101. Subsection (d) of section 5 of
the Hoene Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (12
U.S.C. 1464(d)) is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"(d) (1) The Board shall have power to en-
force this section and rules and regulations
made hereunder. In the enforcement of any
provision of this section or rules and regu-
lations made hereunder, or any other law or
regulation, or in any Other action, suit, or
proceeding to which it is a party or in which
it is interested, and in the administration of
conservatorships and receiverships, the
Board is authorized to act in its own name
and through its own attorneys. Except as
otherwise provided herein, the Board shall
be subject to suit (other than suits on claims
for money damages) by any Federal savings
and loan association or director or officer
thereof with respect to any matter under
this section or any other applicable law, or
rules or regulations thereunder, in the
United States district court for the judicial
district in which the home office of the asso-
ciation is located, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia,
and the Board may be served with process
in the manner prescribed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
"(2) (A) If, in the opinion Of the - Board,
an association is violating or has violated,
or the Board has reasonable cause to believe
that the association is about to violate, a
law, rule, regulation, or charter or other
condition imposed in writing by the Board
or written agreement entered into with the
Board, or is engaging or has engaged, or the
Board has reasonable cause to believe that
the association is about to engage, in an un-
safe or unsound practice, the Board may
issue and serve upon the association a notice
of charges in respect thereof. The notice
shall contain a statement of the facts con-
stituting the alleged violation or violations
or the unsafe or unsound practice or prac-
tices, and shall fix a time and place at which
a hearing will be held to determine whether
an order to cease and desist therefrom should
issue against the association. Such hearing
shall be fixed for a date not earlier than
thirty days nor later than sixty days after
service of such notice unless an earlier or a
later date is set by the Board at the request
of the association. Unless the association
shall appear at the hearing by a duly author-
ized representative, it shall be deemed to
have consented to the issuance of the cease-
and-desist order. In the event of such con-
sent, or if upon the record made at any such
hearing the ;Board shall find that any viola-
tion or unsafe or unsound practice specified
in the notice of charges has been established,
the Board may issue and serve upon the
association an order to cease and desist from
any such violation or practice. Such order
may, by provisions which may be mandatory
or otherwise, require the association and its
directors, officers, employees, and agents to
cease and desist from the same, and, further,
to take affirmative action to correct the con-
ditions resulting from any such violation or
practice.
"(B) A cease-and-desist order shall become
effective at the expiration of thirty days after
service of such order upon the association
concerned (except in the case of a cease-and-
desist order issued upon consent, which shall
become effective at the time specified there-
in), and shall remain effective and enforce-
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August 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE - 19403
failure of the administration to meet the riod ending with July 1966 were down
inflationary threat will do when they to 27.2 percent as compared with 36 per-
step into the secrecy of the voting booth. cent in July a year ago.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi- I ask unanimous consent to insert in
dent, will the Senator from Tennessee the RECORD the Metropolitan Police De-
yield? partment's July 1966 report on crime in
Mr. GORE. I yield. the District of Columbia.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senators There being no objection, the report
are discussing the question of inflation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
and its relation to interest rates. In as follows:
some respects higher costs do tend to dis- CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JULY
courage people from buying goods and
services. If they must borrow money
at high interest rates, then, to some ex-
at least, that might tend to reduce
tent
,
the pressures for buying goods. But, on
the other hand, in a great many cases
costs have been raised, as Senators know.
For instance, we have heard criticism
of the farmer-that his farm prices went
up by about 3 percent. Interest rates
that he paid were up about 30 percent.
Interest is 10 percent of the farm cost,
on the average; thus, if we multiply the
30 percent by the 10, we come up with
a 3-percent factor. That is enough to
amount to the 3-percent increase in farm
production cost, when the farmer has to
pay the 30-percent increase in the cost
of the money he had to borrow to carry
himself along until he can buy his equip-
ment and other material necessary to
operate the farm. it would be unfair to
be critical of a farmer who raised his
prices by 3 percent when his costs went
cialists In ambush, were becoming the am-
bushed. Their morale had been rubbed raw
by constant harassment. Their losses both
in casualties and defections had been so
severe that the Viet Cong had been forced to
conscript 15-year-olds from the villages. The
President looked up from his reading. "The
war," he told an aide, "should be over in
1967."
UNMIXED BLESSING?
All Americans pray, of course, that the
President's prediction comes true. But there
is unspoken apprehension that the end of
During July 1966, a total of 3,628 Part I If the United States were suddenly plunged
Offenses were reported in the District, an into peace, what would happen to our war-
Increase of 784 offenses or 27.6 percent from buoyed economy? A staggering $30 million a
July 1985. day now being poured into the Vietnam war
During this month Increases occurred in would go begging. Hundreds of companies
the classifications of Criminal Homicide, up geared to war production would be disrupted.
4 offenses or 40.0 percent; Robbery, up 74 of- Thousands of youths now employed by the
fenses or 23.2 percent; Aggravated Assault, armed forces would be turned loose on the
up 59 offenses or 22.2 percent; Housebreak- streets to hunt for civilian jobs.
ing, up 202 offffenses or 28.6 percent; Grand It is no secret that our whole economy has
Larceny, up 43 offenses or 30.9 percent; Petit been juiced up by the armaments industry.
Larceny, up 270 offenses or 30.8 percent; A cease-fire, according to the DMS, Inc., re-
Auto Theft, up 132 offenses or 25.7 percent. search firm, would affect 500 companies em-
The classification of Rape, with 14 offenses ploying one million people in 33 states.
being reported, showed no change. Hardest hit would be the 300 ammunition
The increase for this month brought the makers, next the, aircraft manufacturers.
trend of serious offenses (total offenses for Each plant compelled to shut down would
the past 12 months) to 36,006, an increase effect an entire community, including grocers,
of 2,997 offenses or 9.1 percent from the trend merchants and shoe salesmen.
of July 1965, and an increase of 127.9 percent Fully aware of the- problem, President
from the low point of June 1957. Johnson is preparing to shift from war to
Clearance of Part I Offenses for the twelve peacetime production with a minimum
month period ending with July 1966 were lurch. He believes the changeover can be
down to 27.2 percent as compared with 36.0 accomplished without ending America's 68
for July 4965. months of healthy growth. Congressional
inter-
alike
r
i
d
,
v
se
s
leaders and presidential a
viewed by PARADE, agreed that defense pro-
AFTER VIETNAM duction is not essential to prosperity.
"There are too damn many wonderful things
up by 3 percent.
Mr. GORE. I am not criticizing the
VVV
farmer.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. In contrast,
the man who ienas line muney iiua i ulocy parade, a Sunday newspaper supple-
his prices by 30 percent or more. That ment, carried an article by Jack Ander-
is a part of the real problem.
di its son, "After Vietnam-What?"
i
v y
s fin ng
Much of the money
In it, my distinguished cfrom
away from the farmers, away from the West Virginia, Senator JENNINGS colleague leag RAN-
and their families, away from wage earners DOLPH, chairman of the Senate Public
and then torn are into banks and moneinto y y Works Committee, expressed encourag-
large in tuplowing it ing views as to what the future can hold
is eee a ed a for our Nation through public works
plants laargersrge and plants and equipment. equipment, but there need
question in my mind as to whether we programs under a peacetime economy.
need them as rapidly as the present trend From his vantage point as chairman of
seems to indicate: The overall national this vital Senate committee, he is in a
effort is going strongly in the direction position to be well informed as to the
of automating and into new plants that value of such programs and to direct
are not necessarily needed for our war the course of public works planning. I
effort, into plants which, while highly am pleased to hear of these proposals,
desirable, could be postponed for a time. and, as a member of the Senate Appro-
There is a question whether, as a mat- priations Committee, I shall welcome the
ter of priorities, we ought to be asking opportunity, when it presents itself, to
people to do without homes while we go take constructive action on such
strongly providing incentives to invest programs.
in the other field. I ask unanimous consent that the
So far as costs are concerned, the farm Parade article be printed in the RECORD
is one place where, If the farmer's costs at this point.
go up, he must raise his prices or take a There being no objection, the article
loss. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. He as follows:
encourages me and gives me hope that [From, Parade, Aug. 21, 19661
there will be action and leadership in AFTER VIETNAM-WHAT?
trying to achieve this objective. (By Jack Anderson)
CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, during July 1966, a total of
3,628 part I offenses were reported in the
District of Columbia. This represented
an increase of 27.6 percent over July
1965. Clearances for the 12-month pe-
President, the August 21 edition of Those privy to the President's thinking
WASHINGTON, D.C.-President Lyndon B.
Johnson, studying a top-secret intelligence
summary prepared in news capsule form for
believe he will switch priority from fighting
Communism in Vietnam to fighting poverty
at home. At the first signs of economic
sluggishness, he probably will cut taxes, then
start diverting defense money into the Great
Society.
Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Presi-
dent's Council of Economic Advisers, said
recently, "If nothing were done to adjust
nondefense government spending, there
would be a big drop in demand. This would
create unemployment and loss of income,
which would lead to further drop in de-
mand."
However, Ackley went on to say, "Some-
thing would be done, and quickly. I expect
the first thing would be a tax reduction. .
I would guess you'd get a combination of
tax reduction and a stepping-up of some of
the programs that have been slowed down
in the past year."
Most White House advisers frankly are less
interested in tax savings than in making the
United States a better place to live.
"I am not quite sure what the advantage
is in having a few more dollars to spend,"
said economist John Kenneth Galbraith, an
unofficial presidential consultant, "if the air
is too dirty to breathe, the water is too
polluted to drink, commuters are losing out
in the struggle to get in and out of the cities,
the streets are filthy, the schools are so bad
that the young wisely stay away and hood-
lums roll citizens for the dollars they save
in taxes." The cost of solving all these prob-
lems should take up any Vietnam slack.
The planners acknowledge that a cease-
fire could cause some economic adjustment.
The stock market, sensitive to the slightest
tion. The digest reported that the Viet Cong change in the economy, almost certainly
had been hounded out of their hideouts by would go into a temporary skid. A few plants
American search-and-destroy missions and might not be able to find commercial con-
B-52 raids. Left behind in the overrun tracts to keep their production lines rolling.
sanctuaries had been literally tons of desper- Some displaced workers might have difficulty
ately needed food, arms and medical supplies. finding new jobs. Some youths who other-
The black-pajamaed guerrilla fighters, spe- wise would have been drafted might also
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
need to hustle to make a living. But this
"transitional friction," as one economist
foresees it, would be like shaking a glass of
water. The movement might cause some
ripples on the surface, but the water
eventually would settle to the same level.
Iii addition, there are other factors which
should soften the economic Impact of a
Vietnam peace:
The economy is less committed to the Viet-
nam war than it was, say, to the Korean
War. The latter drove defense spending
from 4 to 11 percent of the gross national
product, as the grand total of all goods and
services is called. The $10 to $15 billion ex-
tra Vietnam spending, however, should fall
below 2 percent of this year's anticipated
$727 billion G.N.P. Therefore, a cease-fire
should cause considerably less economic dis-
location than followed the Korean War.
A sudden truce would bring no massive
demobilization, For one thing, only one-
tenth of America's 3 million men under arms
are fighting in Vietnam, and these would be
moved out of that country only as fast as the
peace could be policed. No matter what
happens in Vietnam, most of them would be
needed elsewhere to defend our commit-
ments.
It would take six to nine months to shift
the production lines from defense to civilian
work. Military contracts would continue to
run if only to bring the war-depleted in-
ventories back to normal levels.
Some civilian demand has built up, which
would make up for some defense cutbacks.
For example, the. big aerospace companies,
which now receive $3.50 out of every $10 of
Vietnam spending, have a big backlog of
civilian orders. Boeing alone has $3 billion
in unfilled civilian orders.
The nation's chief emergency planner,
Farris Bryant, a former Florida governor,
constantly reviews war and peace needs. As
the President's unofficial "ambassador" to
the 50 state, governors, he also is in close
touch with the states, "There need be no
fear today that peace would affect pros-
perity," he told PARADE flatly. He is con-
fident that even the dozen states most de-
e
de
t
p
n
n
on defense contracts could maintain
prosperity through tax cuts, highway ex-
tensions and public works programs.
Nobody on the policymaking level thinks
the leaf-raking, make-work projects of the
Great Depression days would be needed to
stimulate the economy. There is enough
authorization already on the books to keep
the economy humming. Senator JENNINcs
RANDOLPH (Democrat, of West Virginia),
chairman of the Senate Public Works Com-
mittee, is ready to roll with $175 million
worth of approved public buildings, post
offices and water-control projects that have
been held back by war priorities.
He also has a $300 billion dream for better-
ing and beautifying America over the next
25 years, if only the money can be spared
from munitions. Here's how he would like
to bolster the economy and give the nation a
facelifting with the same appropriations:
RANDOLPHI believes more billions must be
authorized to combat water pollution. He
claims it would cost $20 billion to clean up
Lake Erie alone, could take $100 billion, to
lick the problem nationally. Par from con-
sidering this a makework proposal, one ex-
pert warns: "Water pollution is our number
one problem. The United States can't even
operate without clean water."
RANDOLPH would like to make our great
Southwestern desert blossom like a Garden
of Eden. This would take a $100 billion irri-
gation project that would harness 20 percent
of the runoff waters from Alaska and north-
ern Canada and pipe it to the Southwest.
Power stations would also be built from the
Columbia River on down.
THE OPTIMISTIC VIEW
He not ,only hopes to finish the Interstate
Approved
cost of about $20 billion, but he would like to
build an additional 156,000 miles of scenic
highways-at about $500,000 per mile-to
make our rural and mountain areas more
accessible to tourists.
He is eager to proceed with depressed area
construction projects, at the cost of between
$4 and $5 billion, to help eliminate pockets
of poverty.
RANDOLPH came to Washington in 1933 and
helped write the New Deal's public works
legislation. He believes public support is
building up for peacetime projects that will
make this country a better place to live. His
dream of a desert-watering program may take
a while to sell to the public he acknowledges,
but he believes a share of any money that
may be diverted from defense will go into his
programs. In any case, he is firmly con-
vinced that "the U.S. does not face the trag-
edy of the Depression of the 30's."
What would happen to your pocketbook if
peace should be declared in Vietnam? First,
your taxes likely would be cut. The latest
tax out stimulated growth and actually
brought In more revenue for the government
from the increased income. The cut pro-
vided people with more pocket money, which
increased their buying power. Accordingly,
manufacturers geared up production, creat-
ing more jobs and putting more money into
circulation.
Second, peace should bring easier credit.
To forestall unemployment and unused
capacity, the policymakers are expected to re-
duce lending rates, thus making money
cheaper, and likewise, driving more of It into
circulation.
Today's economists have proved that they
can speed up or slow down the economy by
tax and credit controls. Businessmen have
come to depend on planned federal spending
to promote prosperity. Whatever the polit-
ical arguments may be, this is how President
Johnson can be expected to try to head off a
recession.
"We'll have the capacity, creativeness, re-
solve and resourcefulness to meet the prob-
lem," predicts Senator RANDOLPH optimisti-
cally.
TITLE 19 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1965
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
in recent weeks a number of articles have
appeared drawing attention to title 19 of
the Social Security Amendments Act of
1965, pointing out that the program for
which it makes provision seems to be
developing far beyond what those who
drafted it had anticipated. I, for one,
have been amazed at its potential scope
and cost. I do not believe that a single
Member of Congress predicted what has
happened. I am glad that the House
Ways and Means Committee has been
looking into the matter and will soon give
us the benefit of its study and recom-
menclations. Recently I had occasion to
discuss the matter briefly with Chairman
WILBUR MILLS, and I know that he shares
the surprise and concern that many of
us feel about title 19.
The Social Security Amendments Act
of 1965 was referred to as the most
sweeping piece of social welfare legisla-
tion ever to be enacted in this country,
and sweeping it was. It is now clear that
no one realized just how sweeping if
omprehensive program in
tion of the measure attention was con- effect by July 1, 1975, which provides care
centrated primarily on two of its sec- and services to virtually all individuals
tions: First, the Provision for a long who meet the plan's eligibility stand-
overdue across-the-board 7-percent in- ards with
respect to income and re-
crease in social security benefits;; and sources, inclpCb c 1 services to en-
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August 22, 1966
second, the establishment of medicare to
help meet the health care requirements
of 19 million Americans 65 years of age
and older. There was little discussion
of title 19, which certainly has proved to
be the "sleeper" in the bill. I am certain
that no one dreamed that within the next
5 years, "medicaid," as the program es-
tablished by that title is called, could
come to dwarf medicare.
' Title 19 was designed to bring together
under one uniform medical assistance
program, with certain prescribed Fed-
eral standards, various Government pub-
lic assistance medical programs such as
Kerr-Mills, and the programs for the
blind, disabled, and families with de-
pendent children. Also to be covered
were individuals who, except for having
enough income to meet their daily needs
would fall within the public assistance
group, and all children under age 21
whose parents qualified under the State
income limitations for the medicaid pro-
gram even if they had not been receiving
cash payments under the aid to depend-
ent children program. In replacing
Kerr-Mills, title 19 thus extended the
basic Kerr-Mills principle beyond those
persons in the over-65 category to in-
clude other public assistance groups. Of
course, the Federal Government has been
paying the principal share of support
payments to the blind, disabled, and
children in families where the father Is
unemployed or absent. It has not, how-
ever, made a major contribution to their
medical costs.
An important consideration in estab-
lishing title 19 was the desire to provide
an adequate medical program for needy
persons which would bean improvement
over Kerr-Mills and the other program to
be included under medicaid. A major
objective which was incorporated in title
19 was the substitution of a flexible in-
come standard for the rigid means t
st
,
e
which in some States had caused great
concern. Other improvements included
specific provision for five basic medical
care services; reimbursement to hospitals
on a "reasonable cost" basis rather than
under the existing standards, where they
frequently lose money on public assist-
ance recipients; elimination of relative
responsibility and residency require-
ment; modification of lien provisions;
and State administrative flexibility.
These changes are helpful and desirable
and.contribute toward a more meaning-
ful program which can do the job that
needs to be done in a realistic way.
States implementing title 19 will have
to provide five basic medical services by
July 1, 1967: One, inpatient hospital
services; two outpatient hospital serv-
ices; three, other laboratory and X-ray
services; four, physicians' services; and
five, skilled nursing home care for per-
sons 21 years of age or older.
All States are required to have title 19
in effect by December 31, 1969, or lose
Federal assistance for their State medical
care programs. Also, they are required
to have a c